Note: Decisions of a three-justice panel are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal. 

ENTRY ORDER

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2016-362

FEBRUARY TERM, 2017

In re A.L., D. L. and D.L., Juveniles } APPEALED FROM:

}

} Superior Court, Orleans Unit,

 } Family Division

}

} DOCKET NO. 34/35/36-9-14 Osjv

Trial Judge: Robert R. Bent

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

Mother appeals termination of her parental rights to A.L., D.L., and D.L., born in October 

2010, January 2009, and February 2012, respectively. On appeal, mother argues that the court 

failed to consider the relevance of the actions of the Department for Children and Families (DCF) 

in its determination of whether there was a substantial change in material circumstances due to 

stagnation. We affirm.

The three children came into DCF custody in September 2014 after mother left them 

unattended to spend time with her then boyfriend. Following a hearing, the court found that they 

were children in need of care and supervision (CHINS) for lack of proper parental care. At 

disposition, custody was transferred to DCF. The case plan included goals for mother related to

domestic violence, alcohol and drug dependence, and mental-health. 

DCF moved to terminate mother’s parental rights in November 2015. A hearing was held 

in July 2016. In a written order, the court found the following. After the children came into 

custody in September 2014, mother did not have meaningful contact with them until May 2015

after she moved back to Orleans County after having been assaulted by her boyfriend. She had 

only three supervised visits with the children between December 2014 and May 2015. After 

mother began more regular visits in May 2015, she started family-time coaching. The coach 

observed that mother was generally able to take care of the children. In August 2015, mother 

appeared to be impaired at a visit—she was speaking very quickly, was agitated, and wanted to 

discuss adult issues in front of the children. The DCF caseworker informed mother that visits 

would cease until mother was able to meet with her and discuss what had happened at the visit. 

No meeting occurred and the family-time coach closed the case three weeks later. During the 

summer of 2015 mother had intermittent visits. The children were upset with mother’s absence 

and had difficulty with transitions, and mother “had trouble understanding her role in their 

suffering around the transitions.” 

DCF did not move visits beyond supervised contact because mother had not completed the 

other case-plan goals. Mother had alcohol and drug dependence and was required to provide 
2

urinalysis results. These were not provided. Mother had an adversarial relationship with her initial 

DCF caseworker. The caseworker was unable to obtain urinalysis results from mother and in 

general had trouble obtaining functional releases, which hampered DCF’s efforts. 

The case plan required mother to obtain a domestic violence screening and follow up with 

the DCF domestic violence resource person. The domestic-violence requirement stemmed from 

the facts that mother’s boyfriend was charged with assaulting her and the children reported 

witnessing domestic violence. Mother had one preliminary meeting with a domestic violence 

specialist and then did not follow through on this requirement. 

Mother also did not complete a mental-health assessment. She did engage a mental-health 

counselor, but did so late in the process and only to a limited degree. In a year, she saw the 

counselor six times. She also did not report her counseling to DCF. 

In October 2015, DCF filed a petition to terminate parental rights. 

After mother’s DCF caseworker retired, a new caseworker was assigned in November 2015 

and he reinstated family-time contact. The court credited the coach’s testimony that while mother 

was appropriate with the children most of the time, mother lacked the skills to manage all three 

children at once. 

Based on these findings, the court concluded that there was a change in circumstances and 

that termination was in the children’s best interests. The court found that mother’s inadequate 

progress amounted to stagnation. The court further concluded that mother’s parenting skills had 

not sufficiently improved for her to safely resume parenting within a reasonable period of time. 

The court explained that mother failed to understand how her own conduct had affected the 

children, particularly the domestic violence and substance abuse, and she remained unable to 

parent all children together. Mother did not play a constructive role in the children’s lives—she 

had little contact with them when they were first taken into DCF custody and had failed to reengage to a level necessary to provide them with the stability and security they needed. They had 

special needs as a result of the traumatic experiences they had while in mother’s care, and mother 

has not demonstrated that she understood this or how to care for them. Mother appeals.1

To grant termination of parental rights when there is an existing disposition order, the court 

must first find there was a substantial change in material circumstances and second that termination 

is in the children’s best interests. In re S.W., 2003 VT 90, ¶ 4, 176 Vt. 517 (mem.). A change in 

circumstances can be shown by stagnation—the passage of time without improvement in the 

parent’s ability to care for the children. Id. On appeal, this Court affirms the family court’s 

findings unless they are clearly erroneous and the court’s conclusions if supported by the findings. 

Id.

Mother argues that the court failed to consider the relevance of DCF’s actions to its 

determination of whether there was stagnation. See In re S.R., 157 Vt. 417, 421-22 (1991) (noting 

 

1

 Father has not had contact with the children since the DCF case began. Father did not 

appeal the order terminating parental rights. 
3

that “stagnation caused by factors beyond the parents’ control could not support termination of 

parental rights”). Mother claims that DCF’s actions caused her progress to stagnate because DCF 

did not allow her to move to unsupervised visitation. Mother contends that after DCF filed for 

termination DCF stopped assisting mother and this led to lack of progress.2 Mother points to the 

court’s finding that “the effort to reunify substantially ceased after the [termination petition] was 

filed.” Mother also relies on the court’s statement that by the time the termination petition was 

filed mother’s progress towards reunification was inadequate and that the situation did not improve 

by the time of the final hearing. 

The evidence does not support mother’s claim that it was DCF’s actions, and not her own, 

which resulted in both the decision not to move to unsupervised contact and mother’s lack of 

progress in general. DCF’s decision not to allow unsupervised contact with mother rested on the 

fact that several parts of the case plan remained unaddressed, including those requirements related 

to substance abuse, mental health, stable housing, and domestic violence. The only area in which

the court found some responsibility on DCF’s part was related to substance abuse, where the court 

found that the lack of releases was not solely mother’s fault. Nonetheless, the court did not find 

that the lack of improvement in this area was the critical fact, emphasizing that the problems that 

mother faced were “substantively very deep.” Further, the court acknowledged that mother had a 

discordant relationship with her caseworker, but did not blame DCF, finding that this was due to 

mother’s antagonism toward her caseworker and DCF in general. 

The court found that the case plan goals were clear and that mother did not comply with 

several of them. Further, the court’s findings reflect that mother’s lack of progress on these issues 

was a result of mother’s own behavior. The case-plan goals regarding domestic violence, mentalhealth counseling, and parenting stemmed from the domestic violence involved in mother’s 

relationship with her boyfriend and mother’s action of leaving the children unattended while with 

her boyfriend. This behavior resulted in trauma to the children. Older D.S. would wake up 

screaming in the night or crying from nightmares and he drew pictures of mother being kicked by 

her boyfriend while the children watched scared. He was sad, sullen, angry, and depressed. A.S. 

was clingy and demanded constant attention. She recounted watching the boyfriend beat up her 

mother and that her older brother had to look after her and her younger brother. A.S. had extended 

screaming and crying tantrums. Younger D.S. and A.S. needed to be able to see each other at all 

times, including nap time at daycare. Mother denied that domestic violence was a factor in her 

relationship, did not engage in domestic-violence assessment, and continued to lack an 

understanding of how her own actions had caused damage to her children. Mother did not have a 

mental-health assessment. While evidence was provided at the termination hearing that mother 

had a counselor, mother did not communicate this relationship to DCF and her efforts to obtain 

counseling were “late and limited.” Despite family-time coaching, provided by DCF even after 

the termination petition was filed, mother was unable to parent all three children at the same time. 

 

2

 In a supplemental filing, mother cites to this Court’s recent decision in In re D.S., 2016 

VT 130, to support her argument that DCF prematurely withdrew services. The evidence in this 

case does not support such a finding. The initial case plan, filed in December 2014, had a goal of 

March 2015. DCF continued to provide services to mother throughout that time. Even after the 

termination petition was filed, DCF provided mother with a family-time contact and a coach. 
4

Finally, mother did not have a stable living situation. The lack of progress in all of these areas 

resulted from mother’s own action or inaction.

In sum, the court’s order demonstrates that the court fully considered whether mother’s 

stagnation was caused by circumstances beyond her control and its finding that stagnation was a 

result of mother’s own actions is supported by the evidence. 

Affirmed.

BY THE COURT:

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Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

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Beth Robinson, Associate Justice

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Harold E. Eaton, Jr., Associate Justice