Page 1 of 25

1

Approximately one year earlier, on February 20, 2001, while he was represented by his

first attorney, Defendant, acting pro se, filed a “Waiver of Jury Trial,” voluntarily consenting “to

be tried by a judge only.” Doc. 12.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. CASE NO. 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK

RICHARD JAMES ADAMSON, JR.,

Defendant.

___________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Doc. 258, Second Amended Motion to Vacate under

28 U.S.C. § 2255, by Richard James Adamson, Jr. The Government has filed its response, Doc.

281, and Defendant has filed his reply. Doc. 282. This cause is therefore in a posture for

decision. Having carefully considered the matter, the Court recommends that the second

amended motion to vacate be denied.

BACKGROUND

In 2001, the defendant, Richard James Adamson, Jr., was charged in a second

superseding indictment with ten counts of mailing threatening communications, of threatening a

federal judge, and of soliciting the murder of an FBI agent. Doc. 44. On January 3, 2002,

Defendant pled guilty to Count Ten, mailing threatening communications to United States

Magistrate Judge William C. Sherrill, Jr., and waived jury trial on the remaining nine counts.1

Docs. 72-73. George W. Blow, III, Defendant’s third attorney in this case, represented

Case 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK Document 287 Filed 06/11/07 Page 1 of 25
Page 2 of 25

2

Defendant’s first attorney was allowed to withdraw after Defendant threatened to “knock

[him] out.” Docs. 14, 16, & 17. Defendant’s second attorney was likewise allowed to withdraw

after Defendant threatened him with legal action and a bar complaint. Docs. 39, 41, & 42. In

granting the final substitution, the Court cautioned Defendant that any “abusive or hostile

behavior” towards Mr. Blow would be “deemed a forfeiture of his right to counsel.” Doc. 42 at

2. The Court also advised Defendant of his right to self-representation and his right to retain

counsel of his own choosing. Id. at 2-3. 

3

In fact, there was no real question about Defendant’s competency. See Doc. 18. 

Case No: 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK

Defendant in both of these proceedings.2 At the plea hearing, Defendant stated that he was “in

full agreement with Mr. Blow,” to whom he referred as “‘father,’” regarding the waiver, Doc.

154 at 8, and Mr. Blow elaborated:

At the time he filed his original pro se waiver, there might have been some

questions about his competency and so forth...certainly was about his happiness

with his counsel at that time....3

However, subsequent to that time, he and I have had numerous discussions about

this. He still wishes to do it. I agree with it. I think there’s a valid reason for

doing it, and a good strategic reason for doing it. So I’m confident that he is

doing it for competent reasons and it’s not influenced by anything that may have

been influencing him in the past.

Id. at 8-9. Later, Defendant stated:

I would like to say that Mr. Blow has gone out of his way, above and beyond the

call of duty to inform me of everything surrounding this case. He’s gone out and

purchased law books for me so I can read it for myself. He’s delivered case law

to me. There should be an adoption petition up there somewhere from him. But

he really has gone out of his way, and I have no complaints whatsoever.

* * *

He’s working too hard. He actually showed up and visited me on New Year’s.

Id. at 16.

The change of plea proceedings concluded with the following from the Court:

In a jury trial, before a defendant is convicted, all 12 jurors have to agree that the

Case 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK Document 287 Filed 06/11/07 Page 2 of 25
Page 3 of 25

Case No: 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK

defendant is guilty. In a judge trial there’s just one person. So if I decide you’re

guilty, you would be held guilty in a nonjury trial. In a jury trial there are 12

people, and if any one doesn’t agree that you’re guilty, then you won’t be

convicted.

* * *

Also, the jury selection process takes place right here in open court in your

presence.

* * *

You have a chance to talk to Mr. Blow, to consult with him, to consult with him

about each decision he makes about picking a jury.

* * *

In a case like this, where the charge is sending a threatening communication to a

judge, we would spend all the time that we had to to make sure that we had jurors

who were willing to be completely fair, that didn’t come in with any preconceived

notion, that weren’t going to hold you–find you guilty just because of what the

charge was, but who would really listen to the evidence and hold the government

to their burden of proving you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

* * *

And you might think that’s difficult, and the nature of this charge is a difficult

charge against you. But I’ve had cases with charges that one would think difficult

for a defendant, and we spend extra time in the jury selection process, even

questioning jurors individually out of the hearing of the other jurors to make sure

we get fair jurors.

* * * 

Mr. Adamson, if I were charged with threatening a ballplayer, I’m not sure I’d

want a ballplayer to be the one that made the decision. If I was charged with

threatening a judge, I’m not sure I would want a judge to be the one that made the

decision. But I’m not charged with any of that and you are, and it’s you decision. 

I just want to make sure you understand that you’re putting one judge in the

position of making the decision instead of 12 jurors who have to connection to the

legal process at all.

Id. at 21-23.

Case 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK Document 287 Filed 06/11/07 Page 3 of 25
Page 4 of 25

Case No: 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK

Defendant acknowledged his understanding of the Court’s cautionary words, stating:

[A]s Mr. Blow said earlier, there’s special strategic reasons behind [the waiver of

jury trial]. And the court may be aware that I do have a degree as a paralegal. 

I’ve had extensive experience with the criminal justice system, unfortunately. 

But it’s a decision that didn’t take a whole lot of discussion at all, and I would be

honored to have you hear my case.

* * *

I think the difficulty would be more on your part than mine, because they are your

constituents and co-workers and such. But I have no concern about your...ability

to be impartial. I knew about you long before I came here. You have a good

reputation in the state for being impartial, and I don’t expect a volte-face on the

philosophy of the court regarding convicts, but I don’t think you’ll have too much

trouble with this one.

Id. at 22-23.

Shortly thereafter, Defendant proceeded to bench trial and was found guilty on all counts. 

Doc. 78. More specifically, the Court held:

My finding is that Mr. Adamson has been proved guilty of all nine counts, Counts

1 through 9, beyond a reasonable doubt. With respect to the first eight counts, I

find that he was not acting under duress.

First, I do not credit substantial parts of Mr. Adamson’s testimony. I do not find

that he was under an imminent threat of bodily harm within the Department of

Corrections. I find that he had reasonable alternatives for dealing with any

perceived threat, if there was any perceived threat. And I find Mr. Adamson was

well familiar with the alternatives. He’s filed a number of lawsuits, he’d been in

touch with the Department of Justice. I reject the assertion that those actions had

led to an imminent threat against him, that he could deal with only by seeking to

get into federal custody.

I don’t need to reach the question, therefore, of the causal relationship between

the crime and the avoidance of any harm, but I note that I have substantial

questions about whether that element of a justification defense is met here.

* * *

In sum, though, the justification defense fails because I do not credit the assertion

Case 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK Document 287 Filed 06/11/07 Page 4 of 25
Page 5 of 25

Case No: 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK

that Mr. Adamson was in imminent danger of physical harm, nor the assertion

that he had no reasonable alternative to the action he took.

The more difficult question in the case is Count 9. It is with substantial

reluctance in any case that a conviction gets based, in substantial part, on the

testimony of a cooperating witness who obviously has an incentive to lie in an

effort to get a 5K1 or a Rule 35 motion....

The factual dispute here is unusual, to say the least. Having considered all the

evidence, my finding beyond a reasonable doubt is that Mr. Adamson did solicit

Mr. Householder in an effort to have Mr. Householder use any contacts he had in

order to arrange to have Mr. Leon killed.

That’s my resolution of the factual dispute between Mr. Adamson’s testimony

and Mr. Householder’s testimony. My conclusion that Mr. Adamson intended to

do that is supported further by the evidence of his behavior on other occasions.

I have not overlooked the defense assertion that it would be irrational to solicit

someone else to do this when Mr. Adamson didn’t know Mr. Householder any

better or any longer than he did, and when the information was provided that Mr.

Householder was cooperating. At least on Mr. Householder’s description, the

solicitation came early, at the beginning of the conversation, and thus before Mr.

Adamson knew Mr. Householder was cooperating.

Also, it’s clear from the facts in the case that Mr. Adamson was not concerned

about authorities learning of his threats. He mailed the threats directly to Judge

Novotny. He wrote down threats to Judge Novotny and to Mr. Leon. It’s clear

that a substantial part of what Mr. Adamson was doing was intending to cause

harm by communicating the threat. In that respect, a solicitation itself, even if

communicated back to Mr. Leon and to others, is just one more way to

communicate the threat.

Communicating the threat in that manner would not be sufficient by itself to

constitute a violation of section 373. It is required under that statute that there be

intent that another person engage in the conduct constituting the felony.

My finding is that Mr. Adamson did so intend. I mentioned the value to him of

having the threat communicated or the solicitation communicated only to show

that the defense suggestion that it makes no sense because he might be found out

doesn’t change things in this case, because I think being found out was not

something that Mr. Adamson was concerned about.

Doc. 155 at 177-80.

Case 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK Document 287 Filed 06/11/07 Page 5 of 25
Page 6 of 25

Case No: 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK

The Court scheduled sentencing, Doc. 79, and Defendant then moved to represent

himself pro se. Doc. 80. The Court granted the motion, finding that Defendant understood the

hazards of self-representation , that he had “sufficient training, knowledge and ability” to

represent himself, and that he had knowingly waived his right to counsel. Doc. 82.

Before sentencing, Defendant filed a plethora of motions, including motions for

appointment of counsel for sentencing, for new trial, and to withdraw his guilty plea. Docs. 85,

100, & 116. As grounds for a new trial, Defendant made six claims: (1) the Government

engaged in prosecutorial misconduct; (2) the Government violated Brady; (3) Mr. Blow rendered

ineffective assistance when he interviewed hostile witnesses alone; (4) Mr. Blow was ineffective

by failing to subpoena or call any witnesses besides Defendant; (5) Mr. Blow was ineffective

when he failed to move to suppress statements taken in violation of Miranda; and (6) the

cumulative errors of the Government and Mr. Blow deprived Defendant of due process. Doc. 85

at 1, 21, 26, 29, 34, & 40.

On April 12, 2000, the Court sentenced Defendant to 188 months imprisonment, to run

consecutively to “any other sentence currently being served.” Docs. 123 & 131. Before the

imposition of sentence, the Court conducted an extensive hearing on all outstanding motions. It

began with the request for appointment of counsel, which Defendant narrowed to a request for

“an attorney for sentencing purposes.” Doc. 167 at 2. The Court denied Defendant’s motion,

finding that Defendant had “willfully brought about the disqualification of three successive

competent, able, well-experienced [court-appointed] lawyers,” and that by “bringing about that

situation, Mr. Adamson has forfeited his right to appointed counsel.” Id. at 4-5. The Court

examined Defendant’s pattern of requesting counsel and then invoking his right to selfCase 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK Document 287 Filed 06/11/07 Page 6 of 25
Page 7 of 25

Case No: 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK

representation and concluded that Defendant was attempting “to create whatever issue he can for

appeal and to game the system at every opportunity.” Id. at 5.

The Court then turned to Defendant’s allegations that Mr. Blow rendered ineffective

assistance of counsel. At that time, Defendant thoroughly questioned Mr. Blow regarding his

representation. Id. at 18-74.

In denying the motion for new trial, the Court found:

First, with respect to the ineffective assistance, Mr. Adamson has pointed to

absolutely nothing that Mr. Blow did that would constitute ineffective assistance

of counsel. Mr. Blow explained what he did on the matters about which he’s been

asked about here today. The explanation has all made perfect sense.

The Strickland standard, of course, would be applicable. Mr. Adamson fails at

every level of the analysis. He has not shown anything that Mr. Blow did that

was below the standard of an effective lawyer. He has not shown anything that

could have been done that would have affected the outcome of the trial.

Mr. Adamson was convicted because he was guilty, and the government proved

he was guilty. Mr. Adamson has suggested not a thing that Mr. Blow could have

done to have prevented that.

Mr. Adamson alleges prosecutorial misconduct, but has provided no claim that

the government is guilty of misconduct in any respect.

Mr. Adamson has made a Brady allegation, but has not shown any favorable

evidence that existed, let alone that any favorable or exculpatory evidence was

withheld.

Based on the testimony regarding Mr. Adamson’s statements to the officer, I

believe Officer Jimenez, there was not a custodial interrogation. Volunteered

remarks by a defendant give no rise to a Miranda right and would not have

supported suppressing that evidence.

In short, there is no reason to believe that this was anything other than a full and

fair trial in which Mr. Adamson was represented by a competent and effective

counsel.

The facts are that Mr. Adamson wrote four letters to Judge Novotny that

contained true threats, exactly as charged. The writing and sending of the letters

Case 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK Document 287 Filed 06/11/07 Page 7 of 25
Page 8 of 25

Case No: 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK

was stipulated, but it would not have made any difference, because the

government could readily prove it.

The attempted defense that these were written out of necessity or under duress,

the need to get out of state custody, is unfounded factually, and that was my

finding after the trial, even on the assumption that that’s a legal basis for

the...defense.

There’s a good bit of irony in Mr. Adamson’s position here. The position is,

essentially, that he willfully committed a federal crime–that is, threatening a

federal judge–that he did it knowing and intending that it be a federal crime, and

that he, therefore, get out of state custody. But now he says, because he

knowingly and intentionally committed a federal crime, and he did it for the

purpose of committing a federal crime, it’s really not a federal crime. He’s got it

upside down.

It’s sometimes asserted that a defendant who does not know the defendant’s acts

constitute a crime ought not be convicted, and under certain statutes that may be

true. Mr. Adamson’s claim is he knew it was a federal crime to threaten a judge. 

He threatened the judge so that it would be a federal crime so he would get

transferred into federal custody; and then he says, because he knew it was a

federal crime and did it for that reason, it’s really not a federal crime. That

doesn’t make any sense.

In any event, my finding at the time was that Mr. Adamson didn’t do this because

of a need to get out of state custody. He intentionally threatened Judge Novotny

and committed the other offenses with which he was charged.

Id. at 79-82.

The Court also denied the motion to withdraw plea, finding:

There’s not a basis for withdrawing the plea. The guilty plea to the count dealing

with Judge Sherrill was knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally made for reasons

expressed on the record at the plea colloquy. I made it very clear to Mr. Adamson

that, if he didn’t like the sentence that might be entered on that count, it would not

be a basis for withdrawing a plea.

In any event, it seems clear that the conviction on that count impacts the

sentencing guidelines not at all. So, Mr. Adamson’s assertion that he entered the

plea in reliance on getting a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility,

and since he didn’t get it, he now wants to withdraw his plea, makes no sense. 

That is, even if he got the three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility on

that count, it would make no difference. And, in fact, the conviction on Count

Case 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK Document 287 Filed 06/11/07 Page 8 of 25
Page 9 of 25

4

The Order was subsequently amended to correct the Court’s statement that Defendant

was convicted of soliciting the murder of a federal judge when, in fact, he was convicted of

soliciting the murder of an FBI agent. Doc. 159. 

5

Magistrate Judge Sherrill did recuse himself after Defendant filed his first § 2255

motion. Doc. 176. 

Case No: 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK

Ten makes no difference on the guidelines.

Id. at 83-84. The Court also orally denied Defendant counsel on appeal.

In separate notices of appeal, Defendant appealed the judgment and sentence and the

denials to appoint sentencing counsel, for new trial, and to withdraw the guilty plea. Docs. 124-

127. The Court granted Defendant leave to appeal in forma pauperis but denied him

appointment of appellate counsel without prejudice to seeking appointment of counsel with the

Eleventh Circuit. Doc. 149.4 Subsequently, Defendant sought rehearing on the appointment of

counsel motion and the recusal of the presiding district judge, Honorable Robert Hinkle. Doc.

153. The Court summarily denied rehearing, Doc. 160, and in a lengthy and detailed separate

order, denied Defendant’s request for recusal. Doc. 161.

Thereafter, Defendant filed another motion for rehearing directed to Judge Hinkle’s

refusal to recuse himself. Doc. 174. The Court summarily denied the motion. Doc. 175.5

Defendant did not appeal Judge Hinkle’s recusal orders.

On appeal, Defendant was represented by counsel appointed by the Eleventh Circuit, Ms.

Elaine Joan Mittleman. Adamson v. United States, No. 02-12251 (11th Cir.) (Dec. 13, 2002,

order appointing counsel). In her appellate brief, Ms. Mittleman raised two issues: (1) whether

Judge Hinkle abused his discretion in denying recusal “when the magistrates whom appellant

was convicted of threatening worked in the same court,” and (2) whether Judge Hinkle abused

his discretion in finding that the recusal motion was not timely. Id. (June 3, 2003 Appellant’s ECase 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK Document 287 Filed 06/11/07 Page 9 of 25
Page 10 of 25

Case No: 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK

Brief at 6). 

In dismissing Defendant’s appeals, the Eleventh Circuit based its decision on

Defendant’s failure to file a notice of appeal directed to the recusal orders, finding it was without

jurisdiction to consider arguments related to the denials of the motions for rehearing regarding

the recusal orders and refusing to address the merits of those claims. Doc. 190 at 3-4. Because

Defendant failed to brief any issues related to his convictions, sentence, or any orders preceding

his convictions and sentence, the issues were deemed abandoned. Id. at 5. 

Thereafter, Defendant filed a second motion for new trial based on newly discovered

evidence. Doc. 193. The Court, finding this to be yet another attempt to raise issues related to

Judge Hinkle’s refusal to recuse himself, denied the motion. Doc. 201. Defendant appealed the

order. Doc. 202.

While the appeal was pending, Defendant filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct

sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 with supporting memorandum. Doc. 210 & 214. 

Defendant simultaneously filed a motion for the recusal of Judge Hinkle from the § 2255 motion

and a motion for change of venue. Docs. 215 & 216. Shortly thereafter, the Eleventh Circuit

granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss his appeal with prejudice, Doc. 220, and Judge Hinkle

denied Defendant’s request for his recusal. Doc. 221. Defendant then filed an amended motion

to vacate. Doc. 223.

At some point, Defendant sought a writ of mandamus from the Eleventh Circuit

regarding Judge Hinkle’s refusal to recuse himself. In finding that the mandamus petition was

frivolous, the appellate court stated:

In this case, Adamson has not demonstrated bias stemming from an extra-judicial

source nor has he made a showing of pervasive bias that would necessitate

Case 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK Document 287 Filed 06/11/07 Page 10 of 25
Page 11 of 25

Case No: 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK

recusal. The allegedly biased actions cited by Adamson related to (1) Judge

Hinkle’s previous ruling on his motion for new trial, and (2) Judge Hinkle’s

working relationship with the magistrate judges who were the victims in this case. 

First, the mere fact that Judge Hinkle previously has ruled adversely to Adamson

does not, in itself, establish pervasive bias. Additionally, the district judge’s

working relationship with the two magistrates demonstrates neither an extrajudicial source of bias nor judicial conduct “display[ing] a deep-seated favoritism

or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.”

Doc. 229 at 3 (citations omitted). Defendant’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was

likewise denied, the Eleventh Circuit noting:

District judges presiding over § 2255 motions frequently are faced with

complaints about their actions in the underlying criminal [matter]. There is no

reason to doubt that the judges remain well-equipped to fairly adjudicate all such

claims. Because this Court did not overlook or misapprehend any of the factual

or legal issues that Adamson raises, his motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

Doc. 232 at 2 (emphasis in original).

This cause was then stayed while Defendant pursued certiorari with the United States

Supreme Court, which was denied. Docs. 231 & 239. In the interim, Defendant filed a motion

to amend with a proposed second amended motion to vacate. Doc. 233. Defendant then sought

mandamus for this Court’s failure either to review his § 2255 motion or to rule on it. Docs. 252

& 253. Subsequently, the Court granted the motion to amend and allowed the filing of the

second amended motion to vacate and ordered the Government to respond. Docs. 257, 258, 261,

& 277.

On this occasion, Defendant raises five grounds for relief:

1. Defendant was denied effective assistance of trial counsel when counsel

failed to call a particular witness, properly to cross-examine a Government

witness, to inform Defendant that Judge Hinkle “was friends and coworkers with two of the victims when counsel encouraged [him] to waive

his right to jury trial,” and to introduce into evidence copies of habeas

petitions previously filed by Defendant;

Case 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK Document 287 Filed 06/11/07 Page 11 of 25
Page 12 of 25

Case No: 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK

2. Defendant did not knowingly or intelligently waive his right to trial by

jury since he did not know about the relationship between Judge Hinkle

and the victims;

3. Defendant was denied due process when Judge Hinkle failed to reveal his

relationship with the magistrate judge victims before accepting the jury

trial waiver and was denied his right to counsel when Judge Hinkle

refused to appoint counsel to represent Defendant at the hearing on the

motion for new trial, at sentencing, and on appeal;

4. Defendant was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel when

counsel failed to brief issues related to his conviction and sentence, raising

instead only issues that were not “preserved by the filing of a notice of

appeal”; and

5. The Government misled the Court and concealed exculpatory evidence

regarding whether the inmates solicited to kill two of the victims believed

the solicitations were a scam.

Doc. 258 at 3a-3c. Each will be considered in turn.

DISCUSSION

I. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

As noted, Defendant alleges four bases for his claim that Mr. Blow rendered ineffective

assistance. A review of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), is thus appropriate. 

To prevail on a constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must

demonstrate (1) that his counsel’s performance was below an objective and reasonable

professional norm, and (2) that he was prejudiced by this inadequacy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

686. The court may dispose of the claim if a defendant fails to carry his burden of proof on either

the performance or the prejudice prong. Id. at 697. The court need not address the adequacy of

counsel’s performance when a defendant fails to make a sufficient showing of prejudice. Id.; see

also Tafero v. Wainright, 796 F.2d 1314, 1319 (11th Cir. 1986).

With regard to the performance prong of Strickland, a defendant must provide factual

Case 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK Document 287 Filed 06/11/07 Page 12 of 25
Page 13 of 25

Case No: 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK

support for his contentions that counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient. Smith v.

White, 815 F.2d 1401, 1406-07 (11th Cir. 1987). The court must consider counsel’s performance

in light of all of the circumstances at that time and indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s

conduct fell within the wide range of reasonably professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

689-90. To show counsel’s performance was unreasonable, a defendant must establish that “no

competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take.” Grayson v. Thompson,

257 F.3d 1194, 1216 (11th Cir. 2001) (emphasis omitted). “An ambiguous or silent record is not

sufficient to disprove the strong and continuing presumption...that [counsel] did what he should

have done and that he exercised reasonable professional judgment.” Chandler v. United States,

218 F.3d 1305, 1314 n.15 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1204 (2001). “The

relevant question is not whether counsel’s choices were strategic, but whether they were

reasonable.” Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481 (2000). There are no “absolute rules” for

determining whether counsel’s actions were indeed reasonable, as “[a]bsolute rules would

interfere with counsel’s independence–which is also constitutionally protected–and would

restrict the wide latitude counsel have in making tactical decisions.” Putnam v. Head, 268 F.3d

1223, 1244 (11th Cir. 2001). “To uphold a lawyer’s strategy, [the Court] need not attempt to

divine the layer’s mental processes underlying the strategy.” Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1315 n.16. 

“No lawyer can be expected to have considered all of the ways [to provide effective assistance].” 

Id. Quite importantly,

If a defense lawyer pursued course A, it is immaterial that some other reasonable

courses of defense (that the lawyer did not think of at all) existed and that the

lawyer’s pursuit of course A was not a deliberate choice between course A,

course B, and so on. The lawyer’s strategy was course A. And [the Court’s]

inquiry is limited to whether this strategy, that is, course A, might have been a

reasonable one.

Case 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK Document 287 Filed 06/11/07 Page 13 of 25
Page 14 of 25

6

According to testimony at trial, Alexander was housed at Taylor Correctional Institute

with Defendant. Doc. 155 at 42. Alexander had originally sent Magistrate Judge Novotny a

letter “relaying that Mr. Adamson had solicited him to assist in finding somebody to kill [her].” 

Id. Later, Alexander informed the FBI that “the entire letter writing and entire thing had been a

scam perpetrated by he and Mr. Adamson” because “they were tired of doing their time in the

state system and wanted to do their time in the federal system.” Id. at 43. 

Case No: 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK

Id.

To show prejudice, a defendant must show more than simply that counsel’s unreasonable

conduct might have had “some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Strickland,

466 U.S. at 693. Instead, a defendant must show a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A

“reasonable probability is defined as a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Id. Additionally, prejudice is established only with a showing that the result of the

proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable. Lockhart v. Hill, 506 U.S. 364, 370 (1993). 

Finally, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that given the principles and presumptions

set forth above, “the cases in which habeas petitioners can properly prevail...are few and far

between.” Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1313 (11th Cir. 2000). This is because the test is not what the

best lawyers would have done or even what most good lawyers would have done, but rather

whether a reasonable lawyer could have acted in the circumstances as defense counsel acted. 

Williamson v. Moore, 221 F.3d 1177, 1180 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 903 (2001).

A. Failure to call Donnie Alexander as a witness.6 

Defendant raised this claim in his motion for new trial. Doc. 85 at 26-27 of 64. The

Court resolved this claim adversely to Defendant at the hearing conducted on April 12, 2002,

finding that Defendant had “pointed to absolutely nothing that Mr. Blow did that would

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Indeed, the testimony at the hearing plainly

Case 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK Document 287 Filed 06/11/07 Page 14 of 25
Page 15 of 25

Case No: 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK

supports that conclusion. Defendant questioned Mr. Blow precisely as to why he did not present

Alexander as a witness or the substance of his interviews with Alexander at trial, and Mr. Blow

explained:

Mr. Alexander was basically ratting you out that there was a plot to do harm to

Judge Novotny; and that at first he thought it was a scam; that you were just all

talk. And later he became convinced that it was real, and that he was going to

cooperate with the FBI and was willing to wear a wire and take a polygraph, and

all this sort of stuff. I mean, he told them that you, I believe, had knew of a

[cache] of weapons that had been stolen from a military base and was buried

somewhere in North Carolina, and stuff like this.

He was obviously trying to ingratiate himself to the government in hopes of

getting some return. He offered to wear a wire, and he did wear a wire. 

Apparently, at the time of the wire, he signalled you that, in fact, he was wearing

a wire. He was trying to play both sides of the street, and I think it backfired on

him.

* * *

Mr. Adamson, I was trying very hard to convince this court that, when you wrote

eight letters to the United States District Magistrate threatening her, you did so

out of a sincere belief that your life was in danger; that you needed some

attention, shall we say, to get out of the State Department of Corrections; and that

that constituted the necessity....

In my view, there’s no point in undermining that defense by showing that you

have propensity for doing this as a scam. A scam is not a defense to that crime, at

least as I understand the law....But if you write a letter to the judge that is

perceived to be threatening, and you mail it, and it is done willfully, there’s no

specific intent required. Therefore, the fact that you have done it as a scam

doesn’t make it right, doesn’t keep it from being illegal. And in my view, trying

to paint a particular picture to the trier of fact...we were better off staying as far

away from that as we could, and that’s why I didn’t present it and I tried not to

get into it.

At some point, during the judge’s inquiry, while he was deliberating, when you

wanted to say something, and I basically told you to keep quiet, that you were

going to open up a can of worms, that’s why I told you that, and I remain

convinced of that.

Doc. 167 at 35-37. 

Case 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK Document 287 Filed 06/11/07 Page 15 of 25
Page 16 of 25

Case No: 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK

Mr. Blow’s decision to focus on a justification defense and to avoid any testimony that

might undermine the presentation of that defense is plainly the type of strategic choice protected

from challenge as it was a reasonable strategy to use, and Defendant cannot show that no “no

competent counsel would have taken similar action. Counsel therefore did not act deficiently,

and further inquiry is not necessary.

B. Failure properly to cross-examine Special Agent Mark Leon.

In Count Nine, Defendant was charged with soliciting Arthur Householder, a fellow

inmate, to use his contacts on the outside to arrange the murder of Special Agent Leon. Doc. 44.

In this claim, Defendant maintains that Mr. Blow should have questioned Leon regarding

Alexander’s admission that his letter to Magistrate Judge Novotny was part of a scam that he and

Defendant concocted in order to be removed from state custody, see supra at n.6, as it “would

have bolstered Defendant’s defense that his alleged solicitation of Householder was a scam.” 

Doc. 258, Mem. at 4.

Unlike what might occur in a jury trial where it is sometimes necessary for an attorney to

cross-examine a witness on an alleged favorable point to make sure the jury “gets it,” in a bench

trial, the Court, sitting as the finder of fact, does not need matters repeated to it ad infinitum. 

Special Agent Leon stated on direct examination that Alexander had told him the letter he wrote

Magistrate Judge Novotny was part of a scam with Defendant to secure federal detention, and

the Court can discern nothing that counsel could have asked him further on cross-examination to

bring that point home any clearer. Be that as it may, as Mr. Blow stated, he did not want the

Court to focus on Alexander’s statement, as it undermined his defense that everything Defendant

did was because he was in imminent fear for his life at the hands of state actors. This was clearly

Case 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK Document 287 Filed 06/11/07 Page 16 of 25
Page 17 of 25

Case No: 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK

a matter of reasoned decision-making on counsel’s part and did not rise to the level of deficient

performance.

C. Failure to inform Defendant of Judge Hinkle’s relationship to the magistrate judge 

 victims.

In this claim, Defendant maintains that he would not have agreed to a bench trial before

Judge Hinkle if counsel had informed him that Magistrate Judges Sherrill and Novotny

“routinely worked on cases assigned to Judge Hinkle....” Doc. 258, Mem. at 5. Defendant

acknowledges that he knew these magistrate judges were employed in the Northern District of

Florida and “were thus co-workers with Judge Hinkle,” but he did not know that they

“personally worked” on Judge Hinkle’s cases.

Long before Mr. Blow was appointed to represent Defendant and the issue of jury

waiver was explored in open court, Defendant had filed a pro se waiver of jury trial. Doc. 12. 

He was competent to make that filing, see Doc. 18, and indeed, at the hearing into the matter, it

was clear that Defendant had made that decision himself after extensive consultation with Mr.

Blow. At that time, Defendant touted his “extensive experience with the criminal justice

system” and agreed with counsel’s explanation that the decision to waive jury trial was a

strategic one. The Court took that opportunity fully to explain to Defendant the ramifications of

his decision and the rights attendant to having a jury sit as the trier of fact, even going so far as

to advise Defendant that he should really consider his decision in light of the fact that he was

agreeing to allow a federal judge to decide whether he had committed various offenses against

other federal judges, judges which Defendant knew worked in the Northern District of Florida. 

Defendant was adamant that he wanted Judge Hinkle to make the decision regarding his guilt or

innocence.

Case 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK Document 287 Filed 06/11/07 Page 17 of 25
Page 18 of 25

Case No: 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK

“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s

conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be

relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. The Court has no

hesitation in finding that counsel’s alleged failure specifically to advise Defendant that the

magistrate judge victims routinely worked on cases with the presiding district judge (a failure

which the Court assumes arguendo) did not undermine the proper functioning of the adversarial

process or affect this Court’s confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. Even if Defendant

had proceeded to trial before a jury of his peers, he would have been convicted, as the evidence

against him was overwhelming.

D. Failure to introduce into evidence copies of habeas petitions previously filed by

Defendant.

This issue was likewise covered in the hearing on Defendant’s motion for new trial and

was decided adversely to him. See Doc. 167 at 79. Defendant thoroughly questioned Mr. Blow

regarding his failure to introduce copies of documents Defendant had previously filed which

referenced his physical abuse at the hands of penitentiary employees. The following exchange

between Defendant and Mr. Blow occurred and explains counsel’s decision to forgo their

introduction:

Q. Do you believe that in fairness that the court should have considered that

evidence, those over 200 grievances and allegations of beatings and abuse

that the DOC officials have responded to [which were part of the official

file in Adamson v. Moore, Cause No. 4:00cv309-WS (N.D. Fla.)], and that

the defense regarding Judge Novotny’s letters were of necessity?

A. No, sir. Now, let me explain why I don’t think so.

First of all, the fact that you write a grievance and say, “I’ve been

assaulted,” or whatever, does not necessarily make it admissible

evidence....You can testify that, but for the fact that you have written it

Case 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK Document 287 Filed 06/11/07 Page 18 of 25
Page 19 of 25

7

Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(a), three things must occur for a defendant to waive his right

to jury trial: the defendant must make the waiver in writing, the Government must consent to the

Case No: 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK

sometime in the past doesn’t necessarily make it true. I don’t recall any

time that they responded to it and found that, in fact, you had been

physically abused and...something resulted. I think if there had been some

action that they had taken and found that your complaints were

substantiated, that might be a different story. The simple fact that you

write a grievance and say, “I’ve been abused,” doesn’t prove that.

* * *

[U]nfortunately, if you look at some of those [grievances] and their

responses[,] [s]ome of those responses were not very favorable to you,

including some explanations about your close management status, and

they considered you to be a violent inmate.

Now, I’m not sure I would agree with them at all on that, but they weren’t

asking me. I don’t think that helps your case, Mr. Adamson.

I mean, we were trying–I was trying real hard, and I certainly believed

you

to be in agreement with my defense, to correct the impression that this

court had perhaps already formed–all right?–because of the instances with

Mr. Clark and Mr. Harper, and what the judge said in the order that

appointed me, where he said he though that you were gaming the system. 

I was trying very hard to change that impression and to present to the

court an image of an individual who is confined, who is being mistreated,

who wants nothing more than to be treated as a human being; and that

your actions in writing these letters to Judge Novotny as a matter of selfdefense, if you will, was reasonable.

For this reason, going into things that may have painted a picture of you as

having violent propensities, or having management problems within the

prison, or having engaged in a series of scams before involving

threatening judges, and so forth, was not helpful in my view to the defense

that we were trying to present and the image of you that I was trying to

present.

Doc. 167 at 54-56. Counsel’s explanation reflects a studied strategy which Defendant cannot

show was beyond what any competent counsel would have followed.

II. Waiver of jury trial.7

Case 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK Document 287 Filed 06/11/07 Page 19 of 25
Page 20 of 25

waiver, and the Court must approve it. Indisputably, the rule was followed in this case.

Case No: 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK

In this claim, Defendant maintains that he did not knowingly or intelligently waive his

right to trial by jury since he did not know about the relationship between Judge Hinkle and the

magistrate judge victims. The record plainly belies this assertion.

A defendant is

sufficiently informed to make an intelligent waiver if he was aware that a jury is

composed of 12 members of the community, he may participate in the selection of

the jurors, the verdict of the jury must be unanimous, and that a judge alone will

decide guilt or innocence should he waive his jury trial right. 

United States v. Martin, 704 F.2d 267, 273 (6th Cir. 1983). The Court covered these matters and

stressed to Defendant that he consider the import of having a judge sit solely in judgment of a

defendant accused of acts against other judges. At that time, Defendant candidly advised the

Court that he knew about Judge Hinkle’s working relationship with the magistrate judge

victims--“I think the difficulty would be more on your part than mine, because they are your

constituents and co-workers and such”--and that he was not concerned that the judge’s

impartiality would be affected by that relationship. 

“Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” Blackledge v.

Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977). Defendant, a trained and litigious paralegal, knew that the

judges were “co-workers,” and the fact that Magistrate Judges Sherrill and Novotny “routinely

work[ed] on cases assigned to [Judge Hinkle]” does not elevate the relationship of the three

judges to something more than “co-workers.” Thus, Defendant had sufficient knowledge of the

judges’ relationships to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to jury trial, and his

continued suggestion that Judge Hinkle was “operating under an apparent conflict of interest,” a

suggestion which has been repeatedly rejected by Judge Hinkle and the Eleventh Circuit, does

Case 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK Document 287 Filed 06/11/07 Page 20 of 25
Page 21 of 25

8

In Ground III of the motion itself, Defendant includes an allegation that the Court

violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it refused to appoint him an attorney to

represent him at sentencing. He did not, however, argue the issue in his attached Memorandum. 

To the extent that Defendant nonetheless intended this to be a viable issue, it is without merit. 

See United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 324-26 (11th Cir. 1995). 

Case No: 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK

not alter that conclusion. 

The Court closes this section with the following words from the United States Supreme

Court . Although uttered in a different context than presently at hand, they are instructive: 

[A] determination of guilt by a court after waiver of jury trial [can] not be set

aside and a new trial ordered except upon a plain showing that such waiver was

not freely and intelligently made. If the result of the adjudicatory process is not to

be set at naught, it is not asking too much that the burden of showing essential

unfairness be sustained by him who claims such injustice and seeks to have the

result set aside, and that it be sustained not as a matter of speculation but as a

demonstrable reality. Simply because a result that was insistently invited,

namely, a verdict by a court without a jury, disappointed the hopes of the accused,

ought not to be sufficient for rejecting it.

Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 281 (1942).

III. Denial of due process.8

In this claim, Defendant claims that Judge Hinkle was statutorily required to recuse

himself, and his failure to do so resulted in a denial of Defendant’s right to due process, thereby

entitling him to a new trial. This claim has been considered by this Court and the court of

appeals in one form or another on several different occasions and found to be without merit. The

Court does not believe further discussion is warranted.

Case 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK Document 287 Filed 06/11/07 Page 21 of 25
Page 22 of 25

Case No: 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK

IV. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

In this claim for relief, Defendant complains that the attorney appointed by the Eleventh

Circuit to represent him on appeal was ineffective when she failed (1) to challenge the denial of

Defendant’s motions for new trial and for appointment of counsel at sentencing and (2) to

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, the overruling of Defendant’s objections to the

PSR, and the sentence imposed.

Assuming arguendo that counsel acted deficiently in her prosecution of the appeal,

Defendant was not prejudiced thereby, as there is not a reasonable probability that the outcome

of the appeal would have been different. In other words, there is not a reasonable probability

that Defendant would have been successful on appeal if counsel had pursued the matters just

noted. The evidence at trial overwhelmingly supported Defendant’s convictions on all counts,

and Defendant’s sentence was within the Sentencing Guidelines. Furthermore, the objections

were properly disposed of, and thus, an appeal of Defendant’s conviction and sentence would not

have been successful. See United States v. Adams, 174 F.3d 571, 578 (5th Cir. 1999) (to reverse

conviction after bench trial, appellate court must conclude that, viewing evidence in light most

favorable to Government, no rational trier of fact could find substantial evidence indicating

defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt).

As to the post-trial motions, they likewise had no reasonable chance of success on appeal. 

The Court conducted a hearing on the motions, painstakingly examining the bases for

Defendant’s request for a new trial and his request for appointment of counsel. The Court fully

supported its decision on both motions, and as more fully explained supra, the Court’s rulings

were proper and not reasonably open to reversal.

Case 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK Document 287 Filed 06/11/07 Page 22 of 25
Page 23 of 25

9

According to Defendant, he acquired Ms. Rhew’s “concealed home address” through

trickery upon the Florida Department of Motor Vehicles. Doc. 258, Mem. at 17. 

Case No: 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK

V. Deliberate misconduct by Government.

Finally, Defendant argues that the prosecutor, Karen Rhew, purposely withheld Brady

material from the defense after Defendant wrote Ms. Rhew a “series of cards and letters” in

which he “commented on Ms. Rhew’s lack of breasts and insinuated she was a lesbian.”9 Doc.

258, Mem. at 17. More specifically, Defendant claims that he attempted another solicitation

“scam,” which ultimately involved two other inmates, Kenneth West and Christopher Michelson. 

According to Defendant, Ms. Rhew withheld evidence that Michelson threatened to kill West

after West informed him that Defendant’s solicitation of the murders of Judge Novotny and

Agent Leon was a scam. In Defendant’s view, this would have bolstered his argument that the

solicitation of Householder was also a scam.

To establish a Brady violation, Defendant must first show that the Government possessed

evidence favorable to Defendant. Even if the Court assumes this information was favorable to

Defendant, he cannot establish that the Government “possessed” this information in the first

place. Defendant candidly acknowledges that his entire argument is premised on “information

and belief” that the Government knew, either through West or a prison official, the basis for

Michelson’s threat against West. Otherwise, why would Ms. Rhew not have called either inmate

as a witness at trial? Defendant’s belief , however, that the Government knew West and

Michelson would claim that the solicitation was a scam, no matter how sincere it may be, is

insufficient as a matter of law to establish the Government’s knowledge of allegedly favorable

evidence.

Furthermore, there is not a reasonable probability that even if the Government had

Case 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK Document 287 Filed 06/11/07 Page 23 of 25
Page 24 of 25

Case No: 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK

disclosed this evidence (which, of course, requires the Court further to assume that the

Government knew about this evidence), the outcome of the proceedings would have been

different, the fourth Brady element. It cannot be disputed that Mr. Blow interviewed both West

and Michelson and had access to their FBI interviews, Doc. 167 at 25 & 61-63, and thus, he

potentially had access to the evidence that Defendant now charges the Government withheld. 

Assuming Mr. Blow had known of West’s statement that Defendant’s solicitation was a scam, it

is still highly unlikely that counsel would have chosen to use the information. As Mr. Blow

explained with regard to his decision not to call Donnie Alexander as a witness, he wanted the

Court to focus its attention on Defendant’s contention that everything he did was because he

sincerely believed he was in imminent danger. Bringing forth evidence that Defendant had

solicited even more persons to carry out his plans for the murders of Judge Novotny and Agent

Leon would have clearly undermined that defense.

CONCLUSION

Having carefully considered the matter, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to show

that either trial or appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in representing him. The

Court further finds that Defendant has failed to establish any constitutional violation regarding

his waiver of jury trial, Judge Hinkle’s refusal to recuse himself, or the withholding of Brady

material.

Case 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK Document 287 Filed 06/11/07 Page 24 of 25
Page 25 of 25

Case No: 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK

In light of the foregoing, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s second

amended motion to vacate, Doc. 258, be DENIED. 

IN CHAMBERS at Gainesville, Florida, this 11th day of June, 2007.

s/ A. KORNBLUM 

ALLAN KORNBLUM

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

A party may file specific, written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations

within 15 days after being served with a copy of this report and recommendation. A party may

respond to another party’s objections within 10 days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure

to file specific objections limits the scope of review of proposed factual findings and recommendations.

 

Case 4:00-cr-00052-RH-AK Document 287 Filed 06/11/07 Page 25 of 25