GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

A

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST 

Wednesday, March 9, 2005

UNMANNED AERIAL 

VEHICLES

Improved Strategic and 

Acquisition Planning Can 

Help Address Emerging 

Challenges 

Statement of Sharon Pickup

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

Michael J. Sullivan

Acting Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management

GAO-05-395T
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-395T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Sharon Pickup 

at (202) 512-9619 or pickups@gao.gov, or 

Michael J. Sullivan at (937) 258-7915 or 

sullivanm@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-395T, a testimony

before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air 

and Land Forces, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives 

March 9, 2005

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

Improved Strategic and Acquisition 

Planning Can Help Address Emerging 

Challenges 

Current UAV operations have achieved mission successes, but some 

challenges are emerging. Among the successes, the Predator UAV has 

performed traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

missions and less traditional close air support and armed strike missions. In 

addition, certain small UAVs have enabled troops to accomplish their 

missions at greater distances from enemy positions. Nonetheless, UAV 

operations have been hampered by certain emerging challenges. For 

example, some UAVs are not fully interoperable with others, with manned 

aircraft systems, or even with conventional forces. Certain UAVs are unable 

to operate in sandstorms or other poor weather conditions, thus forfeiting 

some of the advantages otherwise available from the sensor payloads. And 

UAVs increasingly compete for limited bandwidth. 

DOD still lacks a viable strategic plan and oversight body to guide UAV 

development efforts and related investment decisions. DOD has set up a 

Joint UAV Planning Task Force to guide UAV development and fielding, but 

the task force has only limited authority and cannot enforce program 

direction. DOD’s UAV Roadmap contains some elements of a strategic plan, 

but it does not describe the interrelationship of service roadmaps to the 

DOD Roadmap or clearly identify funding priorities. Thus, DOD may not be 

well positioned to make sound program decisions or establish funding 

priorities, nor will Congress have all the information it needs to evaluate 

funding requests. Such a plan would also help DOD minimize the types of 

challenges that are emerging. 

DOD has not consistently implemented best practices in developing and 

fielding UAVs. GAO has found that programs have succeeded when DOD 

has used innovative development processes, relied on evolutionary 

technology development, ensured high-level management attention, and 

constrained resources and relied on achievable technologies. Development 

has been hampered when DOD has insisted on requirements that outstripped 

technology, rushed into production before completing testing, used overly 

ambitious schedules, or engaged in concurrent testing and production. 

Global Hawk UAV 

Source: U.S. Air Force. 

The current generation of 

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) 

has been under development for 

defense applications since the 

1980s, and as the Department of 

Defense (DOD) transforms its 

military operations, UAVs are 

becoming increasingly vital. 

Today’s testimony identifies 

(1) GAO’s preliminary observations 

on operational successes and 

emerging challenges from ongoing 

GAO work reviewing UAV current 

operations, (2) the extent to which 

DOD has developed a strategic plan 

and oversight body to manage its 

investment in UAVs, and 

(3) lessons from GAO’s prior work 

that can be used to promote the 

efficient development, fielding, and 

operational use of UAVs. 
Page 1 GAO-05-395T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for this opportunity to discuss our work on the Department of 

Defense’s (DOD) unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). As you know, we 

appeared before you last year to discuss management issues that we 

identified in our work on research, development, and fielding of the latest 

generation of UAVs. At that time, we emphasized the need for DOD to 

develop a strategic plan to guide UAV development and fielding and an 

oversight body to implement such a plan. We also pointed out some of the 

factors that led to success in UAV acquisition programs and those that 

hampered acquisition efforts, emphasizing that strong leadership is needed 

to ensure that the most cost-effective solutions are adopted. 

As you know, the current generation of UAVs has been under development 

for defense applications since the 1980s, and as DOD transforms the way in 

which it conducts military operations, UAVs are becoming increasingly 

vital. Since we appeared before you last year, we have seen continued 

growth in the funding for UAVs and an acceleration of the trend of 

employing UAVs in military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Furthermore, the types and quantities of UAV systems currently in 

operation, under development, or planned for future development are 

steadily growing. 

Today, you asked us to discuss our preliminary observations on the work 

we are currently conducting for this Subcommittee on the performance of 

UAVs in current operations, and DOD’s progress in improving strategic and 

acquisition planning. Specifically, we will highlight (1) operational 

successes and emerging challenges that U.S. forces are experiencing with 

UAVs in the field, (2) lack of progress in establishing a viable strategic plan 

and oversight body to guide joint and service-specific UAV development 

efforts and related investment decisions, and (3) lessons learned from our 

prior reviews that can be instructive for the efficient development and 

fielding of UAVs. 

The information we will discuss on emerging challenges is based on our 

preliminary work for the Subcommittee. We will be continuing our work 

after this hearing, including meeting with officials from U.S. Central 

Command and previously deployed units to discuss their actual operational 

experiences with UAVs and lessons learned. We plan to issue a report 

based on this work to you later this year. 
Page 2 GAO-05-395T 

To address our objectives, we conducted preliminary interviews with or 

reviewed documents from the Joint UAV Planning Task Force, Joint Forces 

Command, the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Marine Corps, and other 

organizations; updated our previously issued report on UAV force structure 

planning, development, and fielding; and updated our prior body of work 

on UAV development and acquisition. 

We conducted our work from July 2004 to February 2005 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Summary Current UAV operations have achieved certain mission successes but 

challenges are emerging. UAVs have been used to support tactical, 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, as well as strike 

missions, in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, Global Hawk was used to 

identify 55 percent of the time-sensitive targets1

 to defeat enemy air 

defenses in the Iraqi theater in March and April 2003. In addition, the 

Predator UAV has been used in Iraq and Afghanistan to conduct 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as highly successful 

lethal strike missions using Hellfire missiles. According to the Commander 

of U.S. Central Command, demand for UAVs is insatiable.2

 Nonetheless, 

based on our preliminary discussions with DOD and the services, it is 

becoming apparent that DOD faces some emerging challenges affecting its 

ability to maximize the use of UAVs to enhance operations and effectively 

promote force transformation. Specifically, interoperability remains a 

challenge. For example, some UAVs are not fully interoperable with one 

another and, in some instances, ground forces have not been linked to or 

able to use data generated by other services’ UAVs. Also, the ability of 

UAVs to operate in poor weather conditions is limited and the availability 

of bandwidth3

 needed to support UAV operations is constrained.

While DOD continues to request funds for UAVs and the services continue 

to plan, develop, and field UAV systems, it still has not developed a 

1

 Time-sensitive targets are targets that are expected to be vulnerable to attack for only a 

short time.

2

 Testimony of General John P. Abizaid, Commander, United States Central Command, 

before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 1, 2005. 

3

 Bandwith refers to the available frequencies to support the flight of UAVs, to transmit the 

output of on-board sensors, and to interface with air traffic control centers.
Page 3 GAO-05-395T 

strategic plan to guide investment decisions or established an office with 

sufficient authority to implement such a plan. Last year, we reported that 

DOD had established a Joint UAV Planning Task Force (Task Force) within 

the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics), and that the Task Force had issued the UAV Roadmap 2002–

2027 in December 2002 covering UAV development from 2002 through 

2027. 4

 However, we noted that DOD did not have a viable strategic plan to 

guide the development and fielding of UAVs. Although the Roadmap 

included some elements of a strategic plan, including long-term goals, 

approaches to attaining long-term goals, performance goals, and some 

performance indicators, it omitted some critical elements. For example, 

the Roadmap did not include a mission statement, description of how 

program evaluations were used to establish or revise goals, discussion of 

the interrelationship between service plans and programs to develop and 

field UAVs, or provide adequate information on current and projected 

funding needs. Moreover, even if a strategic plan existed, we reported that 

neither the Task Force nor any other office has sufficient authority to 

implement such a plan. We recommended that DOD establish a strategic 

plan and designate the Task Force or another body to oversee 

implementation of the plan. Since that time, we understand that the Task 

Force is updating the UAV Roadmap and continues to act as the focal point 

to coordinate with the services on UAV development. We are hopeful that 

the new Roadmap will include all of the elements of a strategic plan. 

Without a strategic plan to guide investment decisions, we continue to 

believe that DOD will not be in the best position to validate requirements, 

make sound programmatic decisions, or establish funding priorities. We 

also believe that the Congress will not have all the information it needs to 

evaluate DOD’s funding requests. Furthermore, such a plan could help DOD 

anticipate and take steps to minimize the types of challenges that are 

occurring today.

Our past work in UAV development and acquisition has identified 

important lessons that can be applied to the development and fielding of 

UAV systems to overcome some of the emerging challenges that we have 

identified. Our reviews have found that success was achieved when DOD 

has used innovative development processes, relied on evolutionary 

approaches to technology development, ensured high-level management 

attention, and constrained resources and relied on achievable technologies. 

4

 GAO, Force Structure: Improved Strategic Planning Can Enhance DOD’s Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicles Efforts, GAO-04-342 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2004). 
Page 4 GAO-05-395T 

On the other hand, development was hampered when DOD insisted on 

requirements that outstripped technological capability, rushed into 

production before testing was completed, implemented overly ambitious 

schedules, or engaged in concurrent testing and production.

Background DOD defines a UAV as a powered aerial vehicle that does not carry a human 

operator; can be land-, air-, or ship-launched; uses aerodynamic forces to 

provide lift; can be autonomously or remotely piloted;5

 can be expendable 

or recoverable; and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. Generally, 

UAVs consist of the aerial vehicle; a flight control station; information and 

retrieval or processing stations; and, sometimes, wheeled land vehicles that 

carry launch and recovery platforms. In addition, UAV systems require 

adequate intra- or inter-theater communications capabilities to permit 

operators to maintain control of some vehicles, and to permit the UAVs’ 

communications equipment to transmit the information obtained by the 

onboard sensors to ground commanders or other users.

UAVs provide battlefield commanders with real-time intelligence through 

their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission. The United 

States is also considering using UAVs to assist with border security for 

homeland security or homeland defense. Important advantages of UAVs 

include their ability to operate for a far longer period than a pilot could 

safely operate an aircraft, and the fact that DOD avoids putting 

servicemembers’ lives at risk during operations.

Initially, UAVs were seen as complementary systems that augmented the 

capabilities the warfighter already had. However, UAVs are evolving into 

more significant roles, for which they can provide primary capability. For 

example, the Global Hawk UAV may eventually replace the U-2 

reconnaissance aircraft, and the Unmanned Combat Aerial System may 

eventually perform electronic warfare missions performed by the EA-6 

Prowler aircraft today. Moreover, UAVs are figuring prominently in plans 

to transform the military into a more strategically responsive force. UAVs 

are expected to be an integral part of this information-based force. For 

example, they may serve as relay nodes in the Army’s Future Combat 

System’s command and control network. 

5

 An autonomously piloted UAV is one that is pre-programmed for its mission before it takes 

off. It then flies its mission without a ground-based pilot. A remotely piloted UAV is 

controlled by a pilot in a control station on the ground during the flight.
Page 5 GAO-05-395T 

Since we testified before the Subcommittee last year, DOD has increased 

its planned expenditure for UAVs and associated systems, and the systems 

have continued to be heavily used in Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact, about 12 

different types of UAV systems have been used in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 

addition, the budget request for UAVs grew significantly between fiscal 

year 2001 and fiscal year 2005, from about $363 million to about $2.3 billion, 

respectively. DOD projects that funding needs will grow to about 

$2.9 billion in fiscal year 2009. These figures do not include supplemental 

appropriations. DOD has requested about another $234 million for UAVs in 

the fiscal year 2005 supplemental request. 

DOD Has Achieved 

Certain Operational 

Successes, but Some 

Challenges Are 

Emerging

As we have seen in recent operations, UAVs are being used in greater 

numbers and on increasingly challenging missions, and they are likely to be 

called on to operate more extensively with other UAVs, manned systems, 

and conventional ground and air forces. As our preliminary discussions 

with DOD officials and our review of various documents suggests, DOD has 

performed successful missions using a variety of UAVs, including the 

Predator, Global Hawk, Pointer, and Raven. However, some challenges are 

emerging, such as issues concerning interoperability, the ability to operate 

in poor weather conditions, and communications and bandwidth 

limitations. 

Recent UAV Successes in 

Combat Operations

The Air Force has used Predator in a variety of intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance roles in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Predator is also 

being used for other missions, including close air support and armed strike. 

For example, a Predator UAV armed with Hellfire missiles was used to 

attack a target carrying suspected terrorists in Yemen in 2002. The Air 

Force believes that using Predator has enabled it to achieve time-critical 

targeting that might otherwise have been impossible. 

In addition, Global Hawk has also significantly improved DOD’s ability to 

gather intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. Global Hawk captures detailed images of targets and wide 

swaths of terrain and then transmits those images on a nearly real-time 

basis to battlefield commanders and intelligence centers. In fact, while 

flying just 3 percent of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

missions in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Global Hawk generated 55 percent of 

the time-critical targets against enemy air defenses. 
Page 6 GAO-05-395T 

Lastly, small UAVs such as the Pointer and Raven have been instrumental in 

enabling troops to find, locate, and destroy numerous targets. For example, 

during a single mission, a team used a small UAV system to locate a target, 

cover the team’s movements, target the adversary, and then conduct a 

bomb damage assessment to determine whether additional strike missions 

were needed. Moreover, the use of small UAVs has enabled ground forces 

to accomplish their missions at greater distances from enemy positions, in 

effect expanding the standoff distance and thereby reducing the risk to U.S. 

servicemembers on the ground. 

Certain Challenges Are 

Emerging

Notwithstanding these operational successes, it is becoming apparent from 

our preliminary discussions with DOD officials and our review of various 

documents that DOD faces some emerging challenges affecting its ability to 

maximize the use of UAVs to enhance operations and effectively promote 

force transformation. Such challenges relate to interoperability, the ability 

of UAVs to operate in poor weather, and the availability of communications 

and bandwidth. 

First, while numerous UAVs have been used to conduct various missions in 

recent operations, interoperability is a challenge. The services have 

generally been reluctant to adopt common mission management systems or 

other interoperability approaches within similar types or classes of UAVs. 

As a result, it appears that some UAVs may not be fully interoperable with 

other UAVs, with manned aircraft systems, or even with conventional 

forces. For example, in certain instances ground forces have not been 

linked to or able to utilize data generated by other services’ UAVs. Each 

service has tended to initiate its own separate development program, 

specifically tailored to its own requirements, rather than adopting an 

existing capability from another service. DOD is aware of this problem and 

has taken some steps to address it. For example, DOD is evaluating several 

areas, including vehicle development, training, and data sharing, to 

determine if improvements in these areas will increase UAV 

interoperability. However, we have not evaluated the effectiveness of 

DOD’s efforts at this time.

Second, weather and environmental constraints are a key limiting factor 

for UAV operations. UAVs are generally not able to operate in certain 

inclement weather conditions, including sandstorms and icing conditions. 

For example, dust storms have kept Marine Corps UAVs from performing 

some of their missions. At the same time, certain UAV sensors are capable 

of “seeing” through clouds, sandstorms, and other inclement weather 
Page 7 GAO-05-395T 

conditions by day or night. Nonetheless, this capability may not be 

available because the vehicles themselves are not always able to carry the 

onboard sensors during these poor weather conditions, consequently 

undermining the capability made available by UAV operations.

Third, communications represent a major challenge for UAVs. There is 

widespread concern that UAVs are consuming increasingly large amounts 

of communication bandwidth as DOD fields additional UAVs requiring 

communications capability. Bandwidth is needed to support systems that 

control the flight of UAVs, to transmit the data collected by payload 

sensors, and to interface with air traffic control centers. As UAVs and other 

weapons systems requiring bandwidth are increasingly employed, limits on 

bandwidth availability will hamper DOD’s ability to obtain the benefits 

from these new weapons systems if bandwidth availability is not expanded. 

DOD is aware of this challenge and is exploring possible solutions.

A Strategic Plan and 

Effective DOD 

Oversight Can Be 

Helpful in Addressing 

the Challenges

DOD has set up a Joint UAV Planning Task Force to guide UAV 

development and fielding. The Task Force is the primary focal point, but 

has limited authority to enforce program direction. The Task Force has 

issued its UAV Roadmap 2002--2027 to communicate its vision and 

promote interoperability. Although the Roadmap includes some elements 

of a strategic plan, DOD still lacks a comprehensive plan, as well as an 

office with sufficient authority to implement it. Without a strategic plan to 

guide investment decisions, DOD will not be in a position to validate 

requirements, make sound programmatic decisions, or establish funding 

priorities nor will the Congress have all the information it needs to evaluate 

DOD’s funding requests. Furthermore, such a plan would help DOD 

anticipate and potentially minimize the types of challenges that are 

emerging today.

Joint UAV Planning Task 

Force Established

In October 2001, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics) created the Joint UAV Planning Task Force as the joint 

advocate for developing and fielding UAVs. The Task Force is the focal 

point to coordinate UAV efforts throughout DOD, helping to create a 

common vision for future UAV-related activities and establish 

interoperability standards. However, while the Task Force’s authority 

focuses on program review and advice, it is insufficient to enforce program 

direction. The Task Force Director testified in March 2003 that the Task 

Force does not have program directive authority, but instead provides the 
Page 8 GAO-05-395T 

Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) with 

advice and recommendations6

—that is, the Task Force tries to influence 

service programs by proposing changes for consideration by the Under 

Secretary. Last year, the Director of Defense Systems, in the Office of the 

Undersecretary, testified that the Task Force tries to guide service 

acquisition, planning, prioritization, and execution of unmanned air 

systems.7

 Nonetheless, the Task Force cannot compel the services to adopt 

its suggestions and does not have approval authority. For example, 

according to DOD officials, additional progress is needed to achieve better 

interoperability among the services in UAV platform and sensor 

coordination. 

The Roadmap Has Some 

Elements of a Strategic Plan

The UAV Roadmap exhibits some elements of a strategic plan, but is not a 

comprehensive plan to guide the development and fielding of UAVs that 

complement each other, perform the range of missions needed, and avoid 

duplication. Key elements of a strategic plan would include: 

• a mission statement;

• an explanation of long-term goals and objectives;

• strategies to attain long-term goals;

• an explanation of the relationship between long-term goals and 

objectives and annual performance goals;

• identification of external factors that could affect accomplishment of 

the goals;

• a description of how program evaluations were used to establish or 

revise the goals; 

• a description of the relationship between similar programs; and

6

 Statement of the Director, Joint UAV Planning Task Force, before the Subcommittee on 

Tactical Air and Land Forces, House Committee on Armed Services, March 26, 2003.

7

 Statement of the Director, Defense Systems, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense 

(Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, 

House Committee on Armed Services, March 17, 2004.
Page 9 GAO-05-395T 

• information concerning funding needs and expenditures.

The Roadmap represents a good start on a strategic plan because it 

incorporates some of the key elements. For example, the Roadmap

identifies approaches to attaining long- term goals, and it assesses, in part, 

annual performance goals and performance indicators that identify 

progress toward these goals. However, the Roadmap only minimally 

addresses the other key elements. In particular, it does not explain the 

interrelationship between service-specific efforts, identify opportunities 

for joint endeavors, or address funding issues.

DOD officials acknowledged that the Office of the Secretary of Defense has 

not issued any guidance that establishes an overall strategy for UAVs. While 

several high-level DOD strategic-planning documents—including the 

National Military Strategy and the Strategic Planning Guidance—provide 

some general encouragement to pursue transformational technologies, 

these documents do not provide specific guidance on UAV development or 

related force structure integration. In 2004, we recommended that DOD 

develop a strategic plan or set of plans. We understand that DOD plans to 

issue an updated Roadmap later this year. We hope that the new Roadmap

will include all of the elements of a strategic plan. As we testified last year, 

it is important that DOD’s plan clearly identify goals, requirements, 

programs, funding needs, performance measures, and the interrelationship 

of service-specific programs to each other; how service-specific UAV 

programs promote joint operations; and funding requirements. With such a 

plan, we continue to believe that DOD will be better positioned to validate 

requirements, integrate service efforts, and establish program and funding 

priorities. We also believe that such a plan will assist the Congress in 

evaluating DOD’s funding requests for UAVs. 

Our Prior Work 

Identifies Important 

Lessons for the 

Efficient Development, 

Fielding, and 

Operational Use of 

UAVs 

Within the past year, we have reviewed four UAV programs and observed 

factors that lead to successful outcomes and others that tend to increase 

risk of poor outcomes. The UAV programs included in our reviews were 

the Global Hawk, Predator, Shadow, and Joint Unmanned Combat Air 

Systems. Table 1 displays the common factors that we identified that lead 

to successful acquisition programs and those that increase risk and limit 

success.
Page 10 GAO-05-395T 

Table 1: Factors That Lead to or Limit Success

Source: GAO.

Global Hawk Top management attention set the stage for the early success of Global 

Hawk. The Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics) became personally involved in establishing the original plan for 

development. Leadership insisted on fielding an initial capability that 

could be developed within a fixed budget while providing for an 

evolutionary process to add enhancements to succeeding versions. The 

result was a successful advanced concept technology demonstration which 

produced seven demonstrators, logged several thousand-flight hours, 

passed its military usefulness assessment, and effectively supported 

combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

In March 2001, the Air Force began a systems acquisition program that 

continued the evolutionary approach with a plan to first acquire basic 

systems very similar to the demonstrators (designated the RQ-4A) and then 

slowly and incrementally develop and acquire systems with more advanced 

sensor capabilities while using the same air vehicle. However, DOD 

restructured the program twice in 2002 to more quickly develop and field a 

larger air vehicle (RQ-4B) with more advanced but immature technologies. 

The restructurings tripled development costs and compressed the 

procurement schedule. Program funding, which previously had been 

stretched relatively evenly across 20 years, was compressed into roughly 

half the time, tripling Global Hawk’s budgetary requirements in some years. 

The development period was expanded by 5 years and production period 

compressed by 9 years, creating significant concurrency between fiscal 

years 2004 to 2010. By adding the new larger air vehicle with its associated 

new technologies and design elements, while speeding up the acquisition 

schedule, the Air Force accepted higher risks compared to the original plan 

which followed a more evolutionary approach. 

Lead to success Limit success

Innovative process Requirements that outstrip resources, 

including technology

Evolutionary approach Rush to production

Management attention Ambitious schedules

Simple requirements and fixed resources Concurrent testing and production
Page 11 GAO-05-395T 

Because of this concurrency, the Air Force plans to invest in almost half of 

the total fleet of the new larger Global Hawks before a production model is 

flight-tested and operational evaluations are completed to show that the air 

vehicle design works as required. Likewise, full-rate production will begin 

before the airborne signals intelligence and multiplatform radar (the two 

required capabilities justifying the new, larger model) complete 

development and are flight-tested to prove the integrated system will work 

as intended. The primary reason for building the RQ-4B model was to 

integrate and carry the advanced sensors to provide added capability to the 

warfighter. In our November 2004 report, we raised concerns about the 

substantial concurrency and accelerated pace for acquiring the new 

system. We recommended rethinking the revised plans and limiting initial 

procurement of the new model until a new business case is completed that 

reduces risk and justifies further investments based on a knowledge-based 

acquisition strategy. The Air Force did not agree with us, but we note that 

since our report was issued, DOD officials have criticized the Global Hawk 

program for cost increases and have decreased buys in fiscal years 2006 

and 2007.

Shadow The Army’s Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle program, called Shadow, had 

unusual interventions by top-level individuals that early on established 

resource constraints, encouraged evolutionary acquisition strategies, and 

set an early fielding date. Agreements were reached to ensure that the 

program followed a “no bells and whistles” approach to development that 

focused on key achievable technologies and limited the program to “must 

have” capabilities and restrained costs. Despite cost increases and 

operational shortfalls caused largely because the program did not allow 

time to develop and test the system before production began, the Army was 

still able to quickly deliver a needed capability to the warfighter that has 

been used during recent combat operations.

Predator The Air Force’s Predator A (MQ-1) also had success by following an 

innovative advanced concept technology demonstration approach. 

Development was focused and brisk and within 18-months of start-up 

prototypes were deployed in Bosnia, demonstrating its worth before 

completing development and starting production. Predator As are being 

used with substantial success in Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom. 

However, the Air Force then started a highly-concurrent development and 

production program in 2002 to quickly acquire substantial numbers of a 
Page 12 GAO-05-395T 

new, larger, and multirole variant, the Predator B (MQ-9). Subsequently, Air 

Force headquarters revised the strategy to include fielding an interim 

combat capability by fiscal year 2006 and developing Predator B in three 

separate increments, thereby extending the completion of development by 

4 years. Recognizing increased risks, the program office lowered annual 

buy quantities and extended production 5 years. 

Joint Unmanned Combat Air 

Systems

This joint effort combined previously separate efforts of the Air Force and 

Navy to develop advanced unmanned systems that can attack ground 

targets. The Air Force had plans to abandon its initial low-risk approach to 

development that increased its requirements and accelerated its program 

schedule shortly before shifting to product development. Concerned about 

the accelerated schedule and a lack of synergy in the separate Air Force 

and Navy efforts, Office of the Secretary of Defense officials intervened to 

reconcile requirements and funding challenges and to improve oversight. 

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency was designated to lead 

the joint demonstration program with Air Force and Navy participation. 

Plans and strategy established a $4 billion demonstration program that 

would develop larger versions of the Air Force and Navy prototypes, 

leading to an operational assessment in 2007. A common operating system 

was to be developed and both versions were expected to also share 

common subsystems and weapons. The intent was to then offer 

alternatives to the services leading to possible start-up of systems 

development in 2010. 

Although not clear at this time, program direction and content appears to 

be again changing. Congress reduced fiscal year 2005 funding, stating that 

the program had not properly coordinated with the services and that the 

focus should be on meeting Air Force and Navy requirements. Recently, 

DOD decided to transfer leadership and funding from the Defense 

Advanced Research Project Agency to the Air Force as joint office lead 

with Navy participation. Transitioning will occur this year with Air Force 

taking over in 2006.

There are trends that run consistently through these four programs. That 

is, when DOD provides strong leadership at an appropriate organizational 

level, it enables innovative, evolutionary, and disciplined processes to 

work. Once leadership is removed or diminished, all these programs have 

tended to lose control of requirements and add technical and funding risk. 

We have also found that after successful demonstrations to quickly field 

systems with existing technologies, problems were encountered after the 
Page 13 GAO-05-395T 

programs transitioned into the system development phase of the 

acquisition process. The services pushed programs into production without 

maturing processes and also began to add new requirements that stretched 

beyond technology and design resources. DOD officials tend to agree with 

the factors that lead to success and those that lead to problems and have 

made some limited progress in the last year, but we have not yet seen a 

consistent and across the board application of these successful practices.

Concluding Remarks We believe that a greater emphasis on strategic planning and application of 

the lessons learned for development and fielding of UAVs could be helpful 

in addressing the emerging challenges that we are identifying on our 

current work for the Subcommittee. We will more fully examine these 

emerging challenges and monitor DOD’s efforts to address the challenges, 

and we will report to you on this work later this year. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our prepared statement. We would be happy 

to answer any questions that you or members of the Subcommittee may 

have.

Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

For future questions about this statement, please contact Sharon Pickup at 

(202) 512-9619, Michael J. Sullivan at (937) 258-7915, or Brian J. Lepore at 

(202) 512-4523. Other individuals making key contributions to this 

statement include Harry E. Taylor, Jr., Patricia F. Albritton, Jeanett H. Reid, 

Elisha T. Matvay, Robert B. Brown, Cheryl A. Weissman, Ron La Due Lake, 

Kenneth E. Patton, Lily J. Chin, Bruce D. Fairbairn, Steven M. Hunter, 

Matthew B. Lea, Charlie Shivers, and Adam Vodraska.
Page 14 GAO-05-395T 

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Short-Range System. GAO/NSIAD-92-311. Washington, D.C.: September 4, 

1992.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Medium Range System Components Do Not 

Fit. GAO/NSIAD-91-2. Washington, D.C.: March 25, 1991.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Realistic Testing Needed Before Production of 

Short-Range System. GAO/NSIAD-90-234. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 

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