.-/ 

The X Corps in Korea, 

December 1950 
- 

“Carps are the Army’s largest tactical units, the i~~tr~rn~~ with which 

higher ecbelans of command conduct maneuver at the. operational level” 

GP 100-5, Operations, May 19%). The corps staff is the principal planning 

and eoardinating agency upon which the corps commander relies for the detailed 

preparation and oversight of hia operatians. It is the collective brain af the 

corps. It is useful to examine the performance of a corps staff required by fortune 

to respond to rapidly shifting ci~c~rn~t~~ces af combat. During the Korean War 

in 1950, the Army’s X Corps was faced with such circumstances, including the 

necessity to retreat and conduct a farced evacuation by sea, surely care of war% 

most difficult situations. 

Led by Major General Edward MI. Almond, X Corps cansiated of the 1st 

Marine Division and twa Army diviSiQEs. After the Inchon landing and the 

capture af Seoul, X Carps landed ‘s northeast coast and moved inland, 

where it was forced to retreat by Chinese troops. X Ccqas, nanethelesa, 

fought its way back to t,he coa a5 evacuated by ship at the port of 

Wungnam. 

This Combat Studies Institute Special Study focuses on the withdrawal af 

X Corps and im evacuation, emphasizing bow the corps’ staff operated under 

adversity. IJ$ng original corps reports and documents, Dr. Richard W. Stewart 

provides a penetrating and critical analysis of the X Corps’ st&’ as it faced 

the demands af retreat. Nis study reveals significant insights into the complex 

nature of cocks operations with obvious relevance ta taday’s Army. 

April 1991 

CSI publications cover a variety of military hisky terpics. The views expressed 

in this CSI publication are those of the author and not necessarily those af the 

Department af the Army or the Department of Defense. 
Staff 

Operations: 

The X Corps in Korea, 

December 1950 

Staff 

Operations: 

The X Corps in Korea, 

December 1950 

bY 

Richard W. Stewart 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Stewart, Richard W. (Richard Winship), 1951- 

Staff operations : the X Corps in Korea, December 1950 / 

by Richard W. Stewart. 

p. cm. 

Includes bibliographical references. 

1. Korean War, MO-B%-Campaigne-Kom (North)-Changjin 

Reservoir. 2. Korean War, 195@1953-Regimental historiesUnited States. 3. United States. Army. Corps, lOth-History 

I. Title. 

DS912.2.S74 1991 90-27286 

951.904’2--d&J CIP 
CONTENTS 

I. The X Corps: Inchon to the Yalu *.I..~.‘..‘~*..~.~.~.... 1 

ZI. The X Corps at Hungnam: The Staff I, . . . . . . . . . . . *. . . . . 11 

III. Managing the Withdrawal . . . . I.e.....*....l......I..... 21 

IV. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -. . . . . -. . . . . . . . . e. -. .49 

Appendix 1. The X Corps’ Major Subordinate Units ..‘..L.. 53 

Appendix 2. Demolition Table, Hamhung-Hungnam 

Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...55 

Appendix 3. The X Corps’ Operating Instructions J 

No. 27 . . . . . e . . s . . . . . . u . I. . , . . . . . . v , . . , . . . , e . s. .57 

Appendix 4. The X Corps’ Operations Order No. 10 . . . . . . . . .61 

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..~.~...........~.......~.‘..69 

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..~.......75 

V 
ILLUSTRATIONS 

Figures 

1. The X Corps’ Hungnam Evacuation Control Group . . . . . . .I9 

Maps 

1. The Eighth Army and X Corps’ invasion 

of North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...3 

2. The retreat of X Corps .I‘~...............,.....‘......... 15 

3. Phase I: Hungnam evacuation . &. . . . . , *. . . . . . . . . . . *. . . . . . .22 

4. Phase II: Hungnam evacuation . . . . . , . , . . , . , . . . . ~. , . , . , . . ‘31 

5. Phase III: Hungnam evacuation . . . . . . II,.S..e ,.....,.. . ...33 

6. End of Phase II (modified): Hungnam evacuation . , . . . . . .35 

vii 
I 

THEXCORPS:INCHONTOTHEYALU 

The staff becomes an all-controlling bureaucracy, a paper octopus 

squirting ink and wriggling its tentacles into every corner. Unless 

pruned with an axe it will grow like a fakir’s mango tree, and the 

more it grows the more it overshadows the generaI. It creates work, 

it creates officers, and, above all, it creates the rear-spirit.l 

- J. F. C. Fuller 

A mind that adheres rigidly and unalterably ta original plans will 

never succeed in war, for success .goes only to the flexible mind 

which can conform at the proper mament to a changing situation.2 

- Hugo von Freytag-Loringhaven 

The X Corps in Korea was an unusual, one of a kind, 

organization. All corps are uniquely configured for their missions 

and thus tend to break many organizational rules, but the X 

Corps was unusual even by usual corps standards. The corps 

was activated on 26 August, barely in time for the Inchon 

landings it was supposedly responsible for planning. Its commanding general, Major General Edward M. (“Ned”) Almond, 

retained his position as General Douglas MacArthur”s chief of 

staff of the Far Eastern Command (FEC). This was to lead to 

some ill will between the X Corps” and Eighth Army’s logistics 

personnel. According to some sources, the X Corps used the 

dual-hatted position of their boss to ensure priority for supplies 

and personnel for the X Corps at the expense of Eighth Army.3 

This exacerbated Almond’s already tense relationship with Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, Eighth Army commander.4 

In addition, upon assumption of his new command, Almond 

almost instantly quarreled with Major General Oliver Smith, the 

commander of the 1st Marine Division which, along with the 

anemic 7th Infantry Division, comprised his corps. According 

to one contemporary observer, X Corps was a “hasty throwing 

together of a provisional Corps headquarters” and was “at best 

only a half-baked affair.“” The 1st Marine Division did most of 

the planning for and execution of the Inchon landings since X 

Corps was neither fully formed nor experienced enough in amphibious operations to operate as a functional headquarters.6 

The confusion and coordination problems within X Corps 

lasted beyond the Inchon landings on 15 September. The capture 

of Seoul proceeded slowly, and Almond did not endear himself 

to his units with his excessive prodding for them to move faster 

1 
2 

and his meddling that occurred down to regimental and battalion 

level. Only the overwhelming power of UN forces prevented 

serious consequences from these problems in coordination and 

personality at the corps level.7 

After its capture of Seoul and its linkup with Eighth Army, 

X Corps was withdrawn through the Inchon beachhead and 

landed on the eastern coast of Korea at Wonsan and Iwon. 

Thus, instead of being sent north with Eighth Army, the withdrawing X Corps caused massive confusion and supply bottlenecks. It did not help when advancing Republic of Korea (ROK) 

forces took Wonsan before the Marine spearheads of the X Corps 

could make it ashore through the minefields that filled the 

harbor.9 The X Corps landings from 25 through 29 October established the U.S. and ROK forces in northeast Korea, but at 

the same time, the X Corps was virtually isolated from the 

remainder of the UN forces .I0 Consequently, General Almond 

drew supplies directly from Japan, bypassing Eighth Army, to 

rapidly build up his forces. The X Corps, which included the 

newly arrived 3d Infantry Division, was set for a “race to the 

Yalu” against crumbling North Korean opposition. It seemed 

as if the war was winding to a successful close (see map 1). 

The heady optimism of October and November 1950 (the 

“home for Christmas” offensive) soon disappeared as the Siberian 

winds intruded and a massive Chinese force threw back and 

crippled X Corps units. The units near the Yalu hurriedly retreated, but the major Marine Corps and Army formations near 

the Chosin Reservoir were cut off. General Almond and his staff 

had blindly followed the guidance of the supremely optimistic 

Far Eastern Command, which seemed to ignore or discount sign 

after sign of a possible massive Chinese intervention. Almond 

directed his units to race to the Yalu without regard to their 

flanks or to the location of any enemy forces. Afterwards, some 

officers blamed Almond for this apparently reckless behavior. 

An equal number of officers understood that Almond was only 

following orders from MacArthur. Nonetheless, Almond almost 

certainly followed MacArthur blindly and tended to ignore or 

downplay the warning signs. As a commander of an independent 

corps, Almond should have been more vigilant and cautiousll 

Almond pushed his units hard, especially the more conservative 1st Marine Division. General Smith, the Marine commander, was leery of an operation in such mountainous terrain 

so far from the sea and was cautious-at the cost of numerous 

prodding visits from Almond. Other division staffs that attempted 
SCALE KOREA I 

0 50 100 miles 

1 I I 

&-$yy3zf.YJ.p 

R. 

CHINA *lr 1.c 

KOREA 

Tl.4” 1 

JAPAN 

Map 1. The Eighth Army and X Corps’ invasion of North Korea 
4 

to plan careful, conservative troop advances sometimes lost their 

subordinate units to the X Corps in Almond’s headlong rush to 

be the first to reach the Yalu, As the G3 of the ill-fated 7th 

Infantry Division stated: 

We planned an orderly concentration and movement to Choain, by 

first concentrating the regiments and moving them one by 

one. . f [but] thia plan was never carried out. Before we knew it, 

Almond ordered our closest battalions and smaller units to Chosin, 

individually, and as fast as they could get there.12 

As a result, as one modern author on the Korean War has stated: 

“The underestimation of CCF strength and the rush to launch 

the X Corps offensive per schedule on November 27 had led to 

an ill-advised thinning out of American forces on the east side 

of the Chosin Reservoir.“13 

So sure were Almond and his staff of the enemy’s weakness 

that they thinned forces across the entire front. The prejudicial 

intelligence of MacArthur’s Far Eastern Command-in particular 

the intelligence estimates of the FEC”s G2, General Willoughbyasserted that a Chinese intervention was highIy unlikely but 

that if it occurred the Chinese would suffer massive casualties 

to UN air power. This optimism colored the plans and ideas of 

all subordinate commands. Almond himself, shortly after the 

start of the Chinese offensive, visited an isolated regimental 

combat team (Task Force [TF] MacLean) that only a few days 

later was to be overwhelmed and destroyed while it attempted 

to break out of an encirclement by a Chinese division. He told 

the officers of the task force: “The enemy who is delaying you 

for the moment is nothing more than remnants of Chinese divisions fleeing north . . . We’re still attacking and we’re going 

all the way to the Yalu. Don’t let a bunch of Chinese laundrymen stop ~ou.“~~ 

When asked about his perceptions and decisions twenty years 

later, General Almond stated quite clearly that he had received 

his marching orders from General MacArthur to determine enemy 

strength in the area from Hungnam to the Yalu. He was determined to perform that mission until given other orders by 

MacArthur. Almond stated: “I was concerned with the immediate 

operations and operated under the orders that were at hand,“ls 

Nevertheless, this explanation overlooks a commander’s responsibility to remain independent in attitude and to rely on his 

own perceptions of the situation and the ground under his direct 

observation. Obviously, this was not the creed of Ned A.lmond.l@ 
Nlaj. Gen. Edward M. Almond, commanding general af U.S. X Corps, studying a 

map in northeast Korea 

At the start of the massive Chinese intervention, the X Corps 

staff at first tried to ignore it or downplay its effect on the 

corps” offensive plans. Almond himself, seeking guidance from 

MacArthur, flew to Tokyo and conferred with MacArthur on 28 

November. Even while X Corps units were being attacked and 

cut off by thousands of Chinese, Almond waited until MacArthur 

made a decision to ‘&readjust his front by withdrawing from the 

contact with the enemy until it was clearer to all concerned the 

extent of the invasion.“‘7 

Almond returned to Korea on the morning of 29 November 

and only then proceeded to direct the G3 and other staff officers 

to begin planning for “the discontinuance of the X Corps attack 

to the northwest and the withdrawal of the Corps forces as a 

whole to allow for our redeployment in action against the enemy 

to be decided later by General MacArthur.” Whether that redeployment was to be south to Pusan or west to link up with 
6 

Eighth Army was not yet clear, Early on the morning of the 

30th, Almond assembled his entire staff and the commanders 

of his divisions, explained to them the new concentration of 

the corps, and ordered Generals Smith and Barr to Submit a 

plan for the withdrawal of the 31st and the 32d Regiments from 

the positions east of the lake into Hagaru-ri and the evacuation 

of the wounded.‘“18 (Here Almond was referring to Task Force 

Faith, previously called Task Force MacLean until Clolonel 

MacLean became missing in action,) However, the plans were 

not prepared in time, and the task force was virtually destroyed 

during its retreat to the Marine positions at Hagaru-ri.1” 

The crisis that now faced the X Corps immediately affected 

the staff. In response to the new guidance and in an attempt 

to react to the rapidly changing situation for which they had 

no contingency plans, the X Corps staff prepared a succession 

of orders, each outlining vastly different types of operations. It 

then proceeded to publish these orders in rapid order, changing 

its plans each time before the subordinate divisions could do 

more than begin to react to the preceding order. As at Inchon, 

the corps specified missions for regiments and even battalions 

without coordinating the changes with their respective divisions. 

The 65th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) of the newly arrived 

3d Infantry Division reeled from the confusion emanating from 

X Corps headquarters. The divisional history of the 3d Division 

during this period adequately sums up the situation: “During 

the 1st of December to the 3d of December 1950 three different 

plans of operations were either initiated or considered and later 

abolished following changes in orders and missions from higher 

headquarters . . S [due to the] rapidly changing requirements of 

Corps.“2a The result was chaos. As another critic of the X Corps 

staff noted: 

For several days the harassed and overburdened X Corps staff, in 

response to Almond’s directives, had been issuing a Niagara of orders 

to his far-flung units. These orders came down to the divisions, and 

then to the regiments, in a steady stream. The recipients remembered 

them as a series of conflicting “march and countermarch” orders 

that were consistently overtaken by events and that seemed to make 

little sense and gave the impression that X Corps had lost all control 

of the situationzl 

The X Corps staff was doing what corps do worst-reacting 

to rapidly changing tactical environments. Planning, coordination, and shaping the battlefield are not possible if a corps 
7 

staff does not anticipate and foresee battlefield developments 

forty-eight to seventy-two hours in advance. A corps that is 

trying to catch up with a bold and unexpected enemy is often 

a hindrance to its subordinate units. It sends out orders that 

are old or wrong and do not reflect the current tactical situation. 

The X Corps staff in Korea in late November and early December 

1950 was groping in the dark for solutions to the Chinese attacks 

and was always too late with its prescriptions.22 

Lt. Gen. Ned Almond of X Corps and his chief of staff, Brig. Gen. John S. Guthrie 

MacArthur and his staffs incorrect understanding of the 

situation was only redeemed, in part, by the heroism and sacrifice of the men of the 1st Marine Division and 7th Infantry 

Division. Their story-the narrative of the destruction of Task 

Force Faith and the Marine retreat from Chosin Reservoir-has 

been told before.23 What has not been described, or has at best 

been evaluated superficially, is the way in which the staff of 

the X Corps recovered from the disasters of the last days of 

November and early December 1950. In the face of possible 

destruction, the corps planners managed to arrange, supervise, 

and execute a series of complex operations beginning in early 

December. These operations included the successful withdrawal 

of the 1st Marine Division from the Chosin Reservoir (a “breakout to the coast”), the consolidation of the corps in the Hungnam 

port area, and then the execution of the deliberate, progressive 

withdrawal of men and supplies out of Hungnam by 23 December. While not a flawless operation, the withdrawal of 105,000 

men, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies in 3 weeks 
8 

under enemy pressure was an outstanding operation. In an exemplary operation, the X Corps planned and executed those plans, 

foreseeing developments, preparing contingency plans, and monitoring the daily tactical situation without undue interference. 

The staff specified missions and boundaries and coordinated only 

what it needed to as a corps. In other words, it acted as the 

staff of a corps headquarters and not as a tactical headquarters 

or a “super division.” 

Marines assembling for their withdrawal from the Chosin Reservoir area 

This paper will focus on the withdrawal of X Corps from 

northeastern Korea and its evacuation through the port of Hung 

nam. In the process, it will examine how the corps’ staff functioned in this critical withdrawal and reconstruct the organization 

and implementation of the withdrawal and port destruction plans, 

How the corps’ staff actually functioned during this complex 

operation will be delineated. While much has been written about 

how great commanders and their troops respond to war, comparatively little work has been done on how a modern staff 

plans, coordinates, and conducts operations.24 By examining the 

command reports, staff journals, and reports of X Corps and 

its subordinate divisions, this work will reconstruct the flow of 

information, commands, and guidance from lower to higher headquarters and back again that occurred during this operation. In 

corps and higher staff operations, this information flow, far from 
9 

being a mere bureaucratic exercise, is an essential element in 

successful staff performance. Critical information must move 

quickly and accurately along channels if staff decisions are to 

be correct and timely. Timely information allows the commanders 

to monitor the tactical situation and to predict with some accuracy operational developments two to three days in the future. 

Armed with the proper information, a corps can demonstrate 

initiative rather than merely react. The evacuation of the UN 

forces from the port of Hungnam was a severe test of the staff 

and men of X Corps. An examination of the evacuation may 

reveal how a staff can be trained today to cope with such a 

complex and fast-moving battlefield. 

r 
II 

THE X CORPS AT HUNGNAM: THE STAFF 

Command groups and staffs are not just faceless automatons, mindlessly and heartlessly concocting grandiose schemes 

to inflict on the poor combat soldier at the front. They often 

consist of former commanders who are attempting as best they 

can to make order out of the chaos of information reaching 

them. Commanders and their staffs also have distinct styles and 

personalities that affect their decisions and how they are transmitted to the implementing forces. We have already seen how 

the X Corps staff coordination at Inchon and Seoul was not 

what it should have been. The new staff needed time to become 

a team and resolve the inevitable personality conflicts between 

staff members and commanders at all echelons. Unfortunately, 

events moved too swiftly to afford the opportunity for adequate 

coordination, either in the attack or the withdrawal. 

The commander of the X Corps, Major General Edward 

(‘“Ned”) Almond, has been called “the most controversial senior 

commander in Korea.“25 General Almond was aggressive, uncompromising, argumentative, unforgiving, and personally brave 

to the point of recklessness. Even though he had served in the 

Italian theater in World War II rather than in the Pacific, he 

was one of MacArthur’s most loyal disciples. Once given orders 

by MacArthur, as we have seen, he would drive his staff, his 

men, and himself to the utmost to accomplish them, This 

mission-oriented ferocity made him a terror to his staff and, 

during his regular flying trips to frontline units, a driver of his 

men. In one incident late in the Korean War, Almond, unsatisfied with the pace of an advancing reconnaissance column, 

literally descended upon the unit in his L-5 reconnaissance plane 

and aggressively chewed it out for sloth. Later, when that same 

column received a report of 4,000 Chinese just ahead, the commander of the point reportedly declared, “We’re going to attack 

the Chinks. If we turn back, we’ll run into General Almond!“26 

Almond was just as hard on his staff. His G3 after the 

Hungnam evacuation, Colonel Frank Mildren, admitted that his 

job was “‘the first job I’d had in the Army that I thought I 

couldn’t handle.” Late hours, high tension, and Almond’s perfectionism were almost too much for Mildren and for others of the 

11 
12 

staff. In one instance, Mildren recounted Almond’s sometimes 

maddening attention to detail: 

Almond loved to draw arrows on maps. One time I brought him a 

map depicting a RGK operation, but I only had two arrows: one for 

the main effort; one for a secondary effort, Almond got up and 

drew in a lot more arrows-aeven or eight, I thought he was wrong; 

it was too great a dispersion of the available forces. So I went back 

to my office and took off most of the arrows. Later Almond de 

manded to know, *‘where are my arrows?” Instead of telling him 

forthrightly that he was overdispersing the forces, I said, “If you’d 

presented that solution at Leavenworth [at the Command and 

General Staff School], they’d have given you a fuzzy U [unwatisfactory].” God, the air turned blue . . . I said, “General Almond, you 

don’t need a G-three.” He said, “You’re right, I don’t.” So I left and 

the next morning I let my assistant give the briefing. Almond 

demanded, “Where’s the G-three? The G-three is supposed to give 

the briefing.” So I got up and gave the briefing, and he never said 

a word about it.27 

Almond’s leadership style was aggressive to a fault. He liked 

bold and flashy maneuvers with scant regard for caution or 

flanks. He liked to create special task forces and had a tendency 

to tell regiments and even battalions how to fight their battles. 

He often showed up in person near the point of an attack to 

spur the “lagging” unit commanders to greater speed, often 

regardless of the situation. This style spoke well of Almond’s 

personal bravery, but bypassing normal command channels 

while conducting fast and fragmented attacks set dangerous 

precedents-precedents that helped cause the heavy loss of life 

in the “Race to the Yalu” campaign. It also kept Almond’s staff 

in a permanent state of crisis management. 

Almond’s X Corps staff consisted of a number of highly 

talented individuals, most of whom went on to higher rank. His 

chief of staff was Major General Clark L. (“Nick”) Ruffner, later 

to rise to four stars. One of his aides (who flew with Almond 

to the Chosin perimeter of the doomed Task Force Faith) was 

Lieutenant Alexander M. Haig, Jr., also to reach four stars, who 

served as chief of staff in Nixon’s White House and secretary 

of state under President Reagan. Almond’s G2 (intelligence) during the evacuation was Lieutenant Colonel William W. (“Bill”) 

Quinn, later to command the 17th Infantry of the 7th Infantry 

Division and who rose to three stars.28 One of Almond’s assistant chiefs of staff and closest confidants was Lieutenant 

Colonel William J. MacCaffrey, who retired as a lieutenant 

general.29 The corps’ 63 (operations and plans) was Lieutenant 

Colonel Jack Chiles, who felt the constant pressure of Almond’s 
Lieutenant General Almond’s G3, Lt. Cal. John H. (‘“Jack”) Chiles 

Ieadership style. 30 The Gl (personnel) was Colonel Richard H. 

Harrison and the G4 (logistics} was Lieutenant Colonel Aubrey 

Smith.31 Rounding out this picture of talent was Lieutenant 

Golone Edward L. Rowny, the corps engineer, who became a 

three-star general before retiring and then went on to become 

President Reagan’s chief strategic arms negotiator. Rowny, like 

MeCaffrey, had served in Italy with the 92d Division as 

Almond’s G3. His role in planning the evacuation from 

Hungnam and the destruction of the port was to be critical to 

its success. 
14 

Another key player in the evacuation was a Marine Corps 

officer who, while not on the corps staff per se, was attached 

by the Marines at Inchon and at Hungnam and supervised 

much of the amphibious operations. This was Colonel E. H. 

Forney, who was given the position of deputy chief of staff for 

ship movements and who supervised much of the actual loading 

of troops and equipment at Hungnam.32 He worked closely with 

Colonel Twitty, commander of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade. 

Colonel Twitty was the base and port commander who, with 

Colonel Forney, arranged the details of the evacuation from 

Hungnam. Handling the daunting problem of controlling the 

flow of refugees was the corps’ provost marshal, Lieutenant 

Colonel William Campbell. The flood of refugees that followed 

the withdrawing X Corps threatened at times to clog up the 

vital movement of soldiers and materiel to the south.33 All of 

these staff officers had their role to play in X Corps’ operations, 

and none could do it in isolation; to ensure the corps’ successful 

withdrawal under Chinese pressure, staff synchronization and 

coordination were vital.34 

The staff actions that resulted in the evacuation of X Corps 

from northeast Korea began with the 8 December planning conference at X Corps headquarters in Hamhung, just north of 

Hungnam (see map 2). However, the corps’ staff had obviously 

been thinking about evacuation problems before this time, since 

they outlined an initial plan for the sealift of the corps out of 

the port at this meeting. This was an example of diligence and 

foresight on the staff’s part, since the delicate withdrawal of 

the Marine and Army units from the Chosin Reservoir area was 

also still under way and needed constant supervision. At this 

point, at least two major subdivisions in the corps staff existed. 

One section of the staff was busily planning for the evacuation 

from the port. The other section was coping with the hourly 

strains of coordinating the actual withdrawal of forces in the 

face of the enemy. On 8 December, Marine breakout and linkup 

forces were still positioned 2,000 yards apart along the narrow 

road between Koto-ri and Hungnam. (The 1st Battalion of the 

1st Marines, backed up by Task Force Dog of the 3d Infantry 

Division, was pushing north, while the 7th Marines was pushing 

south.) Only the X Corps staff could orchestrate the fire support, 

communications, personnel, and materiel necessary to manage 

that complex operation. The corps staff, however, was already 

turning at least part of its efforts to the next challenge. 

Obviously, the corps had already learned one of the most important lessons of staff work: to anticipate developments and begin 
’ MAR 

‘F MacL 

i 

“4 FROM PUNGSAN 

!7 xx tt2 

HUE WJ 

,\ MAJON-DON 

,j HUNGNAM L’ 

i3 SEA 

OF 

JAPAN 

Map 2. l~he retreat ot X Lorps 
16 

simultaneous contingency planning to meet those developments. 

As time went on, the corps staff further subdivided as it sent 

an advance element to Pusan to coordinate the arrival of the 

evacuated forces, their resupply, and their redeployment as a 

part of the Eighth Army.35 

The X Corps staff meeting with Major General Almond at 

1030 on 8 December was the first official attempt to deal with 

the problem of orchestrating and synchronizing the withdrawal 

Even so, General AImond was not pleased. IIe berated his staff 

for having prepared a plan that used only sealift and ordered 

them to try again with a plan that utilized all possible means 

of evacuation, including airlift capacity.36 The staff, in its haste, 

had violated one of the first rules of staff operations: any plan, 

even an outline, must address, even if briefly, all angles of a 

problem. In its extreme form, this rule can become almost a 

“Murphy’s Law” of staff work: whatever small aspect of a 

problem has been overlooked or considered unimportant wilI be 

seized on by the commander and used as proof that the staff 

has not done its work. The X Corps staff immediately began 

creating a new plan. 

Right from the start, the corps staff faced the problems of 

balancing evacuation means (sea, air, land} and evacuation 

times (which units, of what type, and when} to ensure that just 

enough combat power was on hand with enough supplies to 

defend an ever-shrinking perimeter surrounded by enemy forces. 

This involved a certain amount of intelligence forecasting, care 

in framing assumptions, and just plain wild guessing. The staff 

erred on the side of caution more often than not, in part as a 

response to the shock of the massive Chinese attacks that drove 

the corps south along its main supply routes (MSRs). 

While planning continued on a more comprehensive withdrawal operation, the land evacuation option rapidly disappeared as Chinese units quickly cut off all roads to the south. 

An overland convoy would have involved running continual 

risks of ambush and destruction while necessarily abandoning 

large quantities of supplies at the Hungnam base. All the available trucks couId not have carried more than a small portion 

of the huge supply dumps at IIungnam. With news just coming 

in of the frightful destruction of Eighth Army units during the 

retreat from the Chongchon River (especially the 2d Infantry 

Division”s running of the “‘gauntlet” at Kunu-ri), the land retreat 

option grew less and less feasible and was finally completely 

abandoned.37 As for air evacuation, that was only possible as 
17 

long as the Yonp’o airfield south of Hungnam was retained. In 

addition, the corps planners realized that airlift was incapable 

of meeting more than a small fraction of the corps’ needs. Yet 

even though planes were not able to lift tremendous amounts 

of supplies, air evacuation was especially useful in moving the 

wounded south to Pusan. Air evacuation was exploited so well 

that from 10 to 15 December, 3,600 men, 1,300 tans of cargo, 

196 vehicles, and even a few refugees were airlifted successfully 

out of Hungnam.“& 

The corps planners quickly recognized that the most important means for evacuating the X Corps and its equipment was 

by sealift. There were over 100,000 troops converging on the 

Hungnam area and around 350,000 tons of military supplies, 

incInding 3,635 tons of ammunition, 29,400 fifty-five-gallon 

drums of fuel and 1,850 tons of food. The number of personnel 

to be evacuated was increased as well by Almond’s courageous 

decision to evacuate all civil government officials and their 

families “‘together with as many other loyal and non-communist 

citizens as shipping space would allow.” When asked later about 

his decision, Almond explained that while his initial impulse 

was humanitarian, “I had decided that this humanitarian attitude towards the evacuation of the refugees would in no way 

interfere with the operations plans of X Corps troop movements.‘“3g Nevertheless, to accommodate such tremendous 

numbers of military personnel and civilian refugees-with the 

addition of the huge volume of equipment and supplies-could 

only be effected by sea evacuation. 

Almond specifically ruled out talk of a Dunkirk-type evacuation, since he wanted to remove all usable supplies and vehicles. 

At Dunkirk, most of the heavy equipment and supplies were 

abandoned in order to save the men. That was never an option 

for General Almond. Despite the gathering of unknown numbers 

of Chinese divisions to his north, General Almond declared his 

intent to withdraw deliberately in order to provide the time 

necessary to allow all equipment and supplies to be withdrawn. 

Operating Instructions No. 27 (see appendix 3), published on 9 

December, explicitly stated that all supplies would be moved or, 

if necessary, destroyed: “Personnel, equipment and supplies 

ashore not needed in defense of HUNGNAM will be outloaded 

and shipped to PUSAN-POHANG-DONG area. Supply stocks, 

while in last priority for outloading, will be out-loaded to the 

maximum degree possible. Those which cannot will be finally 

destroyed.‘“4Q Operating Instructions No. 27 also ordered X Corps 
Part of the 15,000 U.S. troops that retreated from Chosin Reservoir as they rest 

momentarily on the narrow, frigid raad leading to Hungnam 

to evacuate by phases to Pusan-Pohang-Dong on the southern 

tip of Korea. There, the men and equipment would be matched 

up again, and the corps would move into line as part of Eighth 

Army. The desperate situation of Eighth Army was recognized 

by Almond and MacArthur, and this situation required that 

X Corps preserve as much combat power as possible so that 

the corps could reconstitute as quickly as possible and join 

Eighth Army on line. 

The importance of logistics in this evacuation was further 

highlighted by the fact that the logistics annex dealing with 

the flow of men and supplies was issued as a complete annex 

A to the operations instruction. The detailed operations order 

for the defense and withdrawal operation was not issued until 

f 1 December (see appendix 4). Those in charge of the cumbersome logistics system needed even more advance warning of a 

major shift in operations than did the tacticians. 

The operating instructions also established a special “Corps 

Control Group” under the command of Colonel E. H. Forney 

(see figure 1). This control group established cells to coordinate 

the movement of supplies and troop units. During this complicated “amphibious landing in reverse,” it was apparent that an 

experienced Marine Corps officer could best coordinate between 

the land forces and the Navy. The control group maintained 
19 

Figure 1. The X Corps’ Hungnam Evacuation Controt Group 

Source: X Corps Speed Report Hungnam Evacuation 

constant communications with the Navy, the loading units, the 

corps headquarters, and the commander of the 2d Engineer 

Special Brigade, who was responsible for the final staging area. 

Another ad hoc control group was established under the 

command of Lieutenant Colonel Arthur M. Murray. This group 

went to Pusan to receive the troops and equipment as efficiently 

as possible in order to send the ships back for another load.41 

This group coordinated the unloading of supplies and expedited 

the entire process. The unloading of the ships was reduced from 

the normal three days to one day. This was due in no small 

measure to the efforts of this control group. 
III 

MANAGING THE WITHDRAWAL 

The Evacuation 

The actual evacuation of the port of Hungnam and northeast Korea began as elements of the 1st Marine Division withdrew along the Koto-ri-Hamhung-Hungnam axis (see map 2). 

Upon reaching the port, the division was immediately loaded 

on the ships. The Marines had been through an extended ordeal 

and were loaded as quickly as possible without having them 

take up a position in the newly established perimeter defenses. 

However, the attached army elements of the 7th Infantry Division (ID), many of which had been in fighting as severe as 

that of the Marines, rejoined their parent division without a 

break and assumed a role in the defense of the X Corps perimeter. It was just as well that the Chinese did not immediately 

attack the defensive perimeter in force. 

The withdrawal of X Corps’ units was in the following 

order: 1st Marine Division, ROK I Corps (3d Division and 

Capitol Division), U.S. 7th Infantry Division, and U.S. 3d 

Infantry Division. The Marines were loaded from 9 to 14 December, the ROK I Corps from 15 to 17 December, the U.S. 7th 

Infantry Division from 18 to 21 December, and U.S. 3d Infantry 

Division from 21 to 24 December (see map 3). For political and 

publicity reasons, the Marines, who had just finished a highly 

publicized and almost disastrous withdrawal from the Chosin 

Reservoir, were loaded onto ships first. The ROK troops-whose 

condition was quite poor even though most of their withdrawal 

was unopposed-came next. Since the 3d Infantry Division was 

the freshest unit of all-only a few of its battalions had seen 

combat up to this point-it was the logical choice to stay behind 

as the rear guard until the last. It covered the withdrawal of 

the mangled 7th Infantry Division. The 7th, after the destruction 

of Task Force Faith at Chosin, was virtually a two-regiment 

division.42 

During the final stages of the withdrawal, conventional 

artillery, naval gunfire, and close air support effectively prevented any major enemy forces from endangering the beachhead. The Hungnam perimeter contracted gradually according 

to the plan outlined in Operations Order No. 10 (see appendix 

4). But the Chinese and North Korean forces were kept offbalance and thus were not able to exploit the opportunity. What 

21 
Line 

To and HAGARU-RI 

15 miles 

J 

LEGEND 

xx 

m 3 EVACUATlON 21-24 DEC 

xx 

m 

&OK 

EVACUATiON 18-21 DEC 

xxx 

EVACUATION 15-l 7 DEC 

xx 

m 1 MAR EVACUATION S-15 DEC 

SEA 

OF 

JAPAN 

(, URBAN AREAS 

\ 

n BRIDGES 

I 

I 1 AIRFIELD 

@ COORDINATING POINT I 

Map 3, PhSSS I: HLIngWitn WaWStlOn 
23 

few attacks there were occurred on 16, 18, and 19 December, 

but nowhere did the enemy units penetrate the main line of 

resistance (MLR). These probing attacks did generate intelligence 

for the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), but before that intelligence could be exploited, U.S. forces conducted a series of 

deliberate withdrawals to new defensive positions. The CCF 

would thus have to locate and attack new positions all over 

again in the face of withering air and naval gunfire. 

Finally, on 24 December, the last three battalions (one from 

each regiment) of the 3d ID, which had been covering the 

removal of its regiments from the perimeter, abandoned their 

final strongpoints and loaded onto landing craft. Planned demolitions of bridges and rail lines were carried out as these units 

retreated under close air and naval gunfire support. Finally, the 

few military supplies left (mostly unserviceable or, in the case 

of some frozen dynamite, too dangerous to move) were detonated 

as the convoy sailed for Pusan. 43 Some of the dynamite that 

was usable was apparently set as booby traps for the Chinese 

to discover. Lieutenant Colonel Mildren, acting G3, said he had 

the engineers from the 3d Division “mine all of the toilets. They 

had pull type chains. We put I forget how many tons of dynamite underneath so that the first person who pulled the chain 

on a toilet was going to get the shock of his life.““* The results 

of these booby traps are not known. The evacuation from 

Hungnam was no Dunkirk, but it was still a retreat and a demoralizing defeat after the high hopes of November. 

Simultaneous Planning 

The complexities of the massive withdrawal operation from 

Hungnam must have seemed overwhelming to the staff of X 

Corps. Virtually no doctrine guided them, and precious few 

examples existed of successful withdrawals of such huge quantities of men and equipment in the face of an enemy. When asked 

later about his lack of guidance, Almond replied: “To be 

perfectly frank, this operation, practically in its entirety, was 

entirely new to me and to my staff. I would say that the success 

of it was due 98% to common sense and judgment and that 

this common sense and judgment [was] being practiced by all 

concerned.“45 Without any blueprint, the corps staff had to piece 

together a plan to synchronize the movement of units, supplies, 

and equipment into a single port; coordinate for the defensive 

battle, while slowly loading a mixture of tactical and support 

units and equipment; juggle the arrival and departure times of 

ships and planes with the Navy and Air Force; and ensure that 
24 

An infantryman guarding a pass twelve miles north of Hamhung during the 

evacuation 
25 

the off-loaded units and equipment were battle ready as quickly 

as possible after their arrival at Pusan. 

The first staff action during the withdrawal of X Corps was 

to ensure the successful retreat of the 1st Marine Division and 

their attached Army elements from their positions around 

Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri to Hungnam. The Marines had managed 

to concentrate two of their three regiments at Hagaru-ri, while 

a third was isolated to their south at Moto-ri. Even though the 

fighting had to be handled by the forces in contact, most of 

the planning fell on the shoulders of the X Corps. 

General Almond was personally involved in the planned 

withdrawal and reconcentration of forces right from the start. 

He ordered his staff to begin initial planning on 29 November 

for the concentration of the corps at Hungnam. He then flew to 

Hagaru-ri and met with General Smith (1st Marine Division commander), Major General Barr (7th Infantry Division commander), 

and Brigadier General Hank Hodes (deputy commander, 7th 

Infantry Division). At this meeting, still surrounded in controversy because of the destruction the following day of Task Force 

Faith, Almond explained his concept of the withdrawal of the 

corps. He also ordered Smith and Barr to “submit a plan for 

the withdrawal of the 31st and 32d Regiments from the positions 

east of the lake [Chosin Reservoir] into Hagaru-ri and the 

evacuation of the wounded.“46 He fully expected Smith and Barr 

to save the cutoff Army forces, but their lack of action doomed 

Task Force Faith to destruction. After the meeting, Almond 

returned to his headquarters at Hamhung and ordered his staff 

to work on the larger plan. Shortly after the Marine units and 

their attached Army forces gathered at Hagaru-ri on 1 and 

2 December, Almond and his staff began orchestrating their 

breakout attempt.47 Many of the troops were wounded and 

exhausted after fighting their way back from Yudam-ni and 

from the east side of the reservoir. This made the planning for 

the breakout attempt critical to its ultimate success or failure. 

Task Force Dog: Holding Open the Door 

For the breakout to be successful, it was essential that the 

MSR from Hagaru-ri to Hungnam be kept open for the retreating Army and Marine units. The use of Task Force Dog of the 

3d Infantry Division was an essential element of the plan to 

accomplish that mission. Given the state of the 7th Infantry 

Division, Almond naturally turned to his freshest combat force, 

the 3d Infantry Division, to provide security to the Hungnam 

base and the MSR. 
Commanders in Korea (left to right): 7th Division artillery commander, Homer W. 

Kiefer; 7th Infantry Division deputy commander, Brig. Gen. Hank Hodes; X Corps 

commander, Lieut. Gen. Ned Almond; 7th Infantry Division commander, Mej. Gen. 

Dave Barr; and Robert B. Powell, commander of the 17th Infantry Division’s 17th 

Infantry. This picture was taken along the banks of the Yalu at Hyesanjin. 

The 3d Division was fresh, partly because it had never had 

a chance to implement most of the orders that reached it from 

30 November to 3 December. It had received a series of orders, 

each of which sent the division in different directions and each 

of which was superseded before it could be implemented. On 

3 December alone, X Corps published Operating Instructions 

Nos. 23 and 24, each of which caused major reorganizations, 

reorientations, and boundary changes for the 3d Division.“8 The 

final order, Operating Instructions No. 24, called upon the division to concentrate in the Hamhung area. This time, the order 

remained in force. The 3d Infantry Division closed on the 

Hamhung-Hungnam area from 4 through 7 December, withdrawing from the Wonsan area by road and by sea. 

General Almond discussed the need for a special force to 

hold open the MSR with the 3d Infantry Division commander, 

Major General Robert Soule, on 5 December.49 Orders were 

issued later that day, and TF Dog was formed at 0930 on 

6 December at Hamhung. It was placed under the command of 

an assistant 3d Infantry Division commander, Brigadier General 

Armistead D. Mead.50 It consisted of the 3d Battalion, 

7th Infantry; the 82d Armored Field Artillery Battalion (Self- 
27 

propelled [SP] 155mm howitzers); the 3d Platoon, 3d Reconnaissance Company; Detachment Headquarters (HQ), 3d Infantry Division (and a detachment from the tactical command 

post); HQ Detachment, 3d Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA), Automatic Weapons (AW) Battalion (SP); Company A, 73d Engineers 

(Combat); a detachment of the Ordnance Bomb Disposal Unit; 

a detachment of the 3d Signal Company; and the 52d Truck 

Transportation Battalion.sl TF Dog was further assisted by the 

65th RCT and the 999th Field Artillery Battalion, the latter of 

which was given the mission of general support reinforcing 

(GSR) of the artillery units assigned to TF Dog. 

No time was wasted in getting TF Dog on the road. Established at 0930 on 6 December, it was ordered at 1130 to go to 

an assembly area at Oro-ri as soon as possible. By 1200, all 

the newly assembled staff sections had been alerted, and the 

first unit was on the road north by 1500.52 By 1530, the entire 

task force was in convoy, and the advanced command post 

reached Oro-ri by 1645. It moved quickly up the MSR towards 

Koto-ri, reaching Majon-dong at 1430 on 7 December. It then 

pushed on through Sudong to Chinhung-ni (see map 2). This 

movement enabled the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, at Chinhungni to push north to Funchilin Pass to assist in the critical bridging operations. The X Corps coordinated the dropping of bridging material at Funchilin Pass (the only bridge over a wide 

The commander of the 3d Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Robert H. “Shorty” Soule 

(left), with the commander of the 65th Puerto Rican Regiment, William H. Harris, 

Soule reinforced X Corps in northeast Korea. 
28 

chasm had been destroyed), and by late afternoon of 9 December, the way to the south was clear.53 

With Navy and Marine air flying close air support and TF 

Dog providing fire support-aided by the 999th and 58th Field 

Artillery Battalions and F Battery of the 1st Marine Regimentthe road was kept open. TF Dog coordinated carefully both with 

air and artillery support and set up blocking positions to ensure 

control of the MSR. They also filled in holes in the road and 

controlled the high ground.54 

The actual meeting of the retreating Marine elements and 

the northernmost troops of TF Dog occurred near Chinhung-ni 

at 0240 on 10 December. Marine and Army troops doubtless 

breathed a sigh of relief as they passed through TF Dog and 

the rest of the 3d Infantry Division, knowing that the end of 

their ordeal was in sight.55 Despite some scattered attacks by 

small elements of Chinese, the stream of men and vehicles 

poured south. By 0500, over ninety-four vehicles had passed 

through TF Dog and double that number by 1000.56 The Chinese 

did manage to cut the road at one point near Sudong late on 

10 December in the 65th RCT area, A composite Marine force 

led by two Army officers (one of whom, Lieutenant Colonel John 

U. D. Page, was killed in action and received the Medal of 

Honor posthumously) beat back the attack, and the withdrawal 

continued. By late evening of the llth, the commander of the 

65th RCT was able to report that TF Dog was itself able to 

retreat and that his G Company arrived at Majon-dong at 1955. 

“The Gate,” he reported, “is closed, the door locked.“5~ 

The initial phase of the withdrawal of X Corps from northeastern Korea was completed. Staff coordination of all available 

assets had paid off. However, the hurried nature of the withdrawal, essential under the circumstances, had severely pressed 

the subordinate staffs. The staff of TF Dog, for example, afterwards complained about the shortness of time allowed them for 

planning. The new staff needed time to make complete plans 

and issue detailed orders to units unfamiliar to them. The situation was only overcome by the concerted efforts of the task force 

commander and his staff, through their “being constantly available for consultation and actively supervising all planning and 

troop movements.” The other complaint, common to any “pickup” or ad hoc task force, was that “the Task Force Commander 

did not intimately know the capabilities and personality of subordinate commanders.” The TF staff had never worked together 
An aeriaF view of the road through the Funchilin Pass south of Ksto-ri, December 

1950 

as a team. The result was that each staff member encountered 

new command systems and methods that initially caused “a 

lack of harmony, certain disunity of effort and duplication of 

work.” This disorientation included an unsettling lack of certainty over who would furnish enlisted personnel and even office 

supplies for the command post (CP)! The TF staff had to operate 

on a shoestring, and this inhibited the efficient operation and 

movement of the CP. The unit that provided most of the enlisted 

personnel and the equipment for the CP apparently was not 

“‘habitually required to make rapid and frequent CP displacement. Therefore, there was considerable confusion and delay in 

breaking down one CP and establishing another.” All of these 

problems were overcome by conscientious staff officers, but such 

difficulties should be remembered by any commanders when 

they get the urge to task organize without restraint.58 

Port Operations 

Once the corps was concentrated in the Hungnam area, the 

actual withdrawal from the port could begin. The corps had been 

working on that plan even while managing the withdrawal of 

the Marine and Army column from Hagaru-ri to the coast. The 

first and most critical need during the evacuation from 

Hungnam was a carefully orchestrated defensive plan. This plan 

was outlined in X Corps Operations Order No. 10. In this plan, 

the initial defense of the Hamhung-Hungnam area was divided 
30 

up among the remaining divisions of X Corps and the retreating 

elements of ROK I Corps, which was under temporary X Corps 

control. The 3d Infantry Division was generally responsible for 

blocking the enemy threats on the western side of the perimeter. The 7th Infantry Division was placed in the northeast 

sector, and the ROK I Corps-retreating from the far nortbeast-took up positions along the eastern side of the perimeter 

(see map 3). 

Despite the presence of elements of five Chinese divisions, 

enemy activity throughout the period of the withdrawal and 

establishment of the defensive area was minimal. In fact, after 

it was all over, one infantry regimental commander was puzzled 

that the CCF “hadn’t really hit US.“~~ After the hammer blows 

of the last few days of November, it seemed as if the Chinese 

forces were content with merely forcing X Corps to withdraw. 

Most enemy actions were restricted to small ambushes, probing 

attacks, and attempts to infiltrate into the port of Hungnam 

hidden in the crowds of refugees. This lull was probably the 

result of the Chinese’ lack of mobility and their rudimentary 

logistics infrastructure. It also was due to the fact that their 

attacks on the Marine division and Army regimental combat 

team were very costly to them. 

The initial plan for the phased withdrawal of forces from 

Hungnam was as follows: 

Phase I 

9-15 December. A perimeter was to be established including 

Yonp’o airfield, and the 1st Marine Division was to be withdrawn (see map 3). 

Phase II 

15-18 December. The corps was to be withdrawn to line 

Nan, The 3d Infantry Division would then begin to retreat 

through the 7th Infantry Division’s positions to establish another 

perimeter along line Fox, close to Hungnam. ROK I Corps was 

to begin to withdraw to lines Nan and Dog while out-loading 

one regiment of Marines then attached to the 3d Infantry Division (see map 4). 

18-19 December. The 3d Infantry Division was then to 

establish a perimeter along line Fox, while the 7th Infantry 

Division was to withdraw completely behind the Tongsongchon 

River defenses along line Dog. 
Map 4. Phase 11: Hungnam 

_ ._. .~“._ _... _ . .,. .I_ _ 

SEA OF JAPAN 

evacuation 
32 

Phase III 

IS-24 December. The 7th Infantry Division and the 

remainder of ROK I Corps were to out-load completely, whiIe 

the 3d Infantry Division assumed control of the entire shrunken 

perimeter along line Fox (see map 5). The 3d Infantry Division 

was then to load its trains while the last of the bulk supplies 

were taken aboard ships. Gradually the 3d Division was to withdraw its battalions leaving only strongpoints behind until the 

last minute. Then, the last battalions, one per regiment, were 

to withdraw completely and move into waiting landing craft 

for what was in essence a reverse amphibious landing. The 

demolitions that had been prepared beforehand by the engineers 

were then to be set off. 

Even the best of plans must often be changed, however, 

and the withdrawal from Hungnam was no exception. The plan 

had to be modified at the last minute. Phase I went as scheduled, but a meeting of the G3s of the divisions at corps headquarters on the 15th saw a problem developing. The 3d Infantry 

Division’s G3 was warried that if his division withdrew rapidly 

to line Fox as Phase II planned, it would both overstretch the 

frontage of the 7th Infantry Division and would prematurely 

restrict the 3d Infantry Division’s maneuvering space. The 

danger was also that as the 7th Infantry Division pulled back 

during Phase III, the Chinese could move rapidly on the beachhead. This could expose the final stages of the withdrawal to 

enemy artillery barrages. 

A modified plan was subsequently proposed and accepted 

that had the 3d Division retain battalion-strength outposts along 

line Nan in conjunction with the 7th Infantry Division while a 

portion of the 3d Division was establishing the final defensive 

perimeter along a modified line Fox. The remainder of the division was to establish strongpoints along the main line of 

resistance on line Dog, The 3d Infantry Division’s 15th Infantry 

was also given to the 7th Infantry Division, initially to cover 

the far right of the line after the withdrawal of ROK I Corps. 

At the end of this modified Phase II, the 7th Infantry Division 

would withdraw directly to the loading docks, while the outposts 

on line Nan (now manned by all three regiments of the 3d 

Infantry Division) held up any enemy attacks (see map 6). 

This modified plan was approved, and overlays were distributed in lieu of an operations order. By 1500 on 16 December, 

the 7th, 6&h, and 15th Infantries of the 3d Infantry Division 
SEA OF JAPAN 

Map 5. Phase III: Hungnam evacuation 
34 

had established themselves along line Dog in force, and the 

7th Infantry Division created outposts on line Nan. Then, in a 

further modification, General Almond directed on 17 December 

that the 7th Infantry Division retain its positions along line 

Nan until the last minute. Enemy pressure was unexpectedly 

light, and Almond eagerly sought to buy as much time as possible to load supplies. The 3d Division was temporarily given 

the 17th Infantry of the 7th Division and then took over 

complete control, first of line Nan on the 20th and then line 

Dog on the 21st. The 3d ‘Division retained line Dog until the 

23d, when it withdrew again to line Fox. Gradually reducing 

their frontline strength, selected 3d Division units out-loaded all 

day on the 23d. Finally, on 24 December, the last battahons of 

the 3d Infantry Division pulled back to their landing crafts, 

and the port of Hungnam went up in smoke as the last supplies 

and buildings were destroyed.G@ 

Working together with each other and wit-h the other 

services and allies, the division and corps staffs were able to 

improvise successfully to pull off this increasingly complicated 

withdrawal. Careful planning, the ability to ‘make last-minute 

changes, and .generally successful staff communications were 

among the keys to the success of this operation. All of these 

elements had been lacking in earlier X Corps operations. Either 

the corps staff had gained a certain measure of confidence 

from months of experience, or else, as seems more likely, their 

realization that defeat was a real possibility generated a 

greater attention on their part to detail than they previously 

had exhibited. 

Staff Coordination 

Obviously one of the keys to managing the phased withdrawal of UN forces from Hungnam was the establishment of 

the Evacuation Control Group. This organization ensured that 

there was a point of contact for staff communications and coordination. The control group managed and controlled both the 

supply-loading problems and the tasks of supplying the remaining troops with food and ammunition. It also served as the 

controlling headquarters that would orchestrate the movement 

of units from the front lines to their designated holding areas 

and then load them swiftly onto ships. All of these activities 

had to be carefully coordinated with the tactical staffs so as 

not to weaken the forces on the observation post line of resistance (OPLR) and the main lines of resistance. 
_, . 

SEA OF JAPAN 

: 

Map 6. End of Phase II (modified): Hungnam evacuation 
36 

The use of a control group was an ad hoc method of ensuring that all concerned staff elements had a single point of 

contact to coordinate all tactical and logistical moves. The 

control group did not replace the traditional corps staff but 

rather provided them with a communications node that ensured 

that each member of the staff knew what the other staff 

elements were doing. This information flow was then 

coordinated with the naval personnel and the port facilities 

operators. The G3 and G4 of the corps remained in primary 

control of tactical and logistical matters, respectively. However, 

as soon as the G3 and G4 had agreed on the timing for pulling 

a unit out of the line, they notified the control group, who then 

worked out the fine tuning and details of the moving and 

loading process. 

Within the control group, the operating agency was the 2d 

Engineer Special Brigade. This was the unit that actually supervised the military and civilian personnel (5,000 in number at one 

point} in the port area and coordinated the loading of the ships. 

The brigade further supervised a quartermaster battalion, a tank 

company (security), and an ordnance ammunition company.61 

The process worked as follows. The tactical unit that was 

notified through its chain of command of its pullback was 

required immediately to send back a liaison officer to the control 

group headquarters. Upon the arrival of this liaison officer, all 

future operations of that unit were controlled by the control group. 

The control group managed the road and rail network, the holding 

areas, and the warehouses and ensured that shipping was available at precisely the moment of the unit’s arrival The designated 

unit moved back to an assembly area with its equipment (including basic loads of ammunition in case of an unexpected enemy 

attack). The unit’s vehicles were loaded first, followed by the 

men. The heavier equipment (tanks and artillery pieces} had 

been loaded before the unit’s arrival. The control group directly 

supervised the loading process and eventually developed its collective skills so that it knew just how long it would take for 

loading each type of unit. The group then prepared the holding 

area facilities to accommodate the next arrivals, who were on 

their way even before the last soldier of the latest increment 

was loaded. 

The establishment and successful operation of the Hungnam 

Evacuation Control Group was essential to the orderly withdrawal of X Corps. In any corps or higher headquarters, there 

is no greater problem than communication and coordination. 
37 

As the evacuation of Hungnam nears completion, explosives are placed on a pier 
The docks at Hungnam, as tney are blown up on 24 December 1950. Retiring 

landing craft are shown in the foreground. 

Staff elements are always unsure of exactly who has a need to 

know certain elements of their plans. The control group cut this 

Gordian knot of confusion by establishing one special working 

group for this unusual problem 6th one mission to accomplish: 

to coordinate an evacuation. All staff elements-especially the 

63 and G4-knew exactly what to provide to this central control 

point and when to provide it. The Evacuation Control Group 

helped turn a confused, bumbling, half-defeated corps into a 

successful corps. It turned the corps staff into a model of successful coordination. 

The Evacuation Control Group was the critical element that 

helped ensure that the G2, G3, and G4 staff elements coordinated their actions. As a result, cooperation between all staff 

elements during the evacuation was apparently superb. However, if the journal entries of the G2 and G3 are any indication 

of the general flow of communications within the corps, this 

was not the usual state of affairs in X Corps outside of the 

control group. 
39 

The two critical staff eIements for the tactical phases of 

this operation, as indeed in any military operation, were the 

G2 and G3. Since the lines of ~ornrn~nica~io~ and responsi 

between these two staff elements were nat as clear in the 1950s 

as they are today, it is irn~~~ta~t that we clarify the 62 

G3 functional areas of concern at the time and describe bri 

how they conducted their daily activities. 

The X Corps’ 2 prepared and distributed the daily 

PERINTREPS (peri ie i~tell~~e~~e reports) that discussed the 

enemy situation, possible enemy intentions, recent enemy 

contacts, summaries sf patrol findings, and the status of how 

the counterintelligence co X) was handling their ion 

of the rear battle. This la o&fern was a particular em% 

in this operation because o e number and location of refugees 

and infiltrators. The 62 key staff role in eontrolli 

(though not necessarily the rear battle. In terms 

t’he close battle, the G-2 e more than note instances of 

enemy activity and en try to match the attacks up wit 

known enemy units. is more critical role was in providin 

intelligence for use by the few deep battle assets available to 

the corps commander: mainly Marine, Navy, and Air Force 

bombing support. 

As the USS Beger, a high-speed transport, rests at ancnor IIT preparation for loading 

the last UN landing craft, a huge explasian destroys the harbor installations at 

Hungnam 
As enemy forces strike the X Corps, the evacuation proceeds 

The larger role for fighting the deep battle fell within the 

purview of the corps’ G3. The G3 coordinated the air support 

missions, the deep artillery strikes, and the naval gunfire. The 

corps’ G3 also was responsible for submitting the daily situation 

report. This was the PEROPREP (periodic operations report). 

This report covered the friendly situation, fire support coordination problems, air support, engineering activities, bombline 

reports (the line beyond which friendly bombers ran no risk of 

hitting friendly troops), patrolling-route overlays, and the status 

of demolition plans. The G3 thus controlled much of the deep 

battle intelligence collection capabilities and was responsible for 

acting on many of the results of that collection. Thus, the Gd 

probably had more knowledge of what was happening deep in 

the battle zone than did the 62. This was not all bad, since 

the 63 had the responsibility to fight the deep battle, but there 

were numerous instances of confusion and duplication of reports 

that resulted from this partial overlap of duties with the G2. 

Much of this confusedness can be appreciated by reading the X 

Corps’ staff journals. 

While staff journals for any organization are seldom flawless, those of the X Corps during the evacuation show several 

instances of critical events being reported only to the G2 and 

not to the G3-and also the other way around. Even a cursory 

examination of the journals, preserved in the command reports 
41 

for the corps, show numerous discrepancies between the journals 

of the two staff elements. Since the PERINTREPS and 

PEROPREPS were based on these journals, errors can be 

tracked as they worked their way into the official summaries 

for higher and lower distribution. Mistakes resulting from the 

lack of congruity between these journals, and reports emanating 

from them, had an impact on corps operations. 

An example of how one event was handled highlights this 

problem. At 0130 on 14 December, Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 65th Infantry (l-65), 3d Division, was attacked by 

between 200 and 300 Chinese in the Ore-ri area. (This occurred 

before the company’s withdrawal closer to Hungnam.) The 

company was forced to withdraw across the river west of the 

town. Qnly by daybreak, supported by two other companies and 

a tank platoon, were they able to restore their positions. 

The first report sent to X Corps about this breach in the 

defensive perimeter was sent to the 62, not the G3, at 0300, 

one and a half hours after the attack began. An hour and a 

half time lag cannot be considered unusual, especially since the 

corps’ 62 was probably interested in the event for no other 

reason than to maintain his order of battle and as an aid to 

analyzing enemy intentions. However, the G2 journal went on 

to note at 0400 that the attack ended as of 0350. The G2 

summary of the event was a quick statement: ‘“Events of the 

U.S. and South Korean infantrymen loading aboard an LCVP at Hungnam 
Riflemen from the Us..% 65th Infantry, Jd Infantry Division, as they m,ove toward the 

Hungnam defense perimeter to relieve U.S. fQrCaS 
43 

past few days emphasize the steady closing in of enemy f~rees 

around the X Corps beachhead.“‘62 

The G3 journal, however, tells a slightly different story of 

the same event, and it is evident that the two staff elements 

received their information through different channels at different 

times and did not share that information. The first report of 

the attack was sent to the G3, X Corps, by the 63, 3d Infantry 

Division, at 0320, twenty minutes after the X Corps’ 62 had 

been notified. The initial report stated that the enemy had 

attacked but that the 3d Infantry Division forces had counterattacked and the situation was ‘“well in hand.“” This confident 

report was contradicted at 0445, when it was reported that an 

estimated 300-400 enemy were still attacking and that artillery 

was firing on the B/l-65’s former positions. Then, at 0840, t 

division reported that a large counterattack force had been 

formed and was moving out at 0830 to retake the lost positions. 

The situation was not as “well in hand” as had been reported 

earlier. Finally, at 0945, the G3 of the 3d Infantry Division 

reported that his men were back in Ore-ri and were ‘“mopping 

up.” However, a later report at 1350 indicated that the positions 

were not actually retaken from the enemy until 1130, so the 

earlier report of the “mopping up” at 0945 was optimistic to 

say the least. (The G2 journal does not even list any report 

after 0400 despite the obvious interest in the details shown by 

the G3.) This action cost Company B almost one-third of its 

strength killed, wounded, or missing in aetion.63 

This small skirmish (small for the corps, a major attack for 

B Company} highlights several issues of interest to students of 

staff coordination, First, it takes time, in this case between one 

and a half to two hours, for reports-even of major events-to 

reach a corps headquarters. This, if nothing else, must point 

out the corps’ earlier folly (at the Inchon landings and the race 

to the Yalu) of trying to control individual battalions or regiments from the corps level. Second, in the example above, the 

corps’ G2 received a battle report twenty minutes before the 

corps’ G3. This points out either a lack of any standard operating procedures (SOP) for reporting combat events (surely the 

G3 needs to know about the loss of a major frontline position 

before the 62) or poor reaction on the part of the 3d Infantry 

Division’s G3 personnel. While the battalion and regiment may 

have been too busy fighting off an attack to report back in 

great detail, this excuse does not hold for the division. In the 

press of battle, reports are not the highest priority for the 
44 

fighters. However, a division fulfills its role best when, physically removed from the chaos of battle, it reports occurrences 

clearly and accurately to its higher headquarters. Then it can 

better arrange for support from air and artillery assets best 

accessed through corps. This incident also points out what is 

apparent to anyone reading such staff journals: the G2 and G3 

staff elements evidently did not talk to each other as much as 

they should have, nor did they exchange information regularly. 

There is no indication that the G2 passed on any of his information to the G3 or that the G3 reciprocated when he began reeeiving more detailed and regular reports of the action after 0400. 

Roth staff elements had a vested interest in keeping each other 

informed of the many enemy moves and friendly countermoves. 

Yet both were guilty of failing to keep the other informed. 

Possibly some communications occurred between staff members that were not registered in the staff journals. The staff 

journals of military organizations, even of a corps headquarters 

that has the time for more thorough and complete reeordkeeping procedures than most headquarters, often provide only 

a listing of receipts of messages from higher and lower headquarters rather than a comprehensive record of information 

flow and decisions. Thus, staff journals are less than ideal 

historical sources for determining why specific military decisions 

are made. Nevertheless, they are often the only reliable sources 

we have. 

Despite these coordination problems between the G2 and G3 

at Hungnam, the evacuation went smoothly. The Chinese 

pressure was not too strong and, with few exceptions, the naval 

gunfire and air support were excellent. Such fire support was 

critical to the long-term survival of the evacuation perimeter. 

In the area of naval gunfire, it was not always easy to eoordinate the required support. On at least one occasion, Army and 

Navy personnel quarreled because of their inability to understand each other’s capabilities and planning constraints. On 15 

December, the 7th Infantry Division arranged with the Navy 

for a series of “harassing fire” missions against possible enemy 

concentrations to its north. The 7th Infantry Division’s naval 

contact at the fire support coordination qenter (FSCC), a 

Lieutenant Sheltron, informed the 7th at 2045 that the fire 

mission was all set and that the Air Force, the ROKs, and the 

3d Infantry Division all had been notified. However, at 2140, a 

Lieutenant Colonel Tabor, also at the FSCC, reported that the 

fires had been suspended until a friendly patrol cleared the 
45 

designated fire area. Only twenty minutes later, Colonel Franson 

aboard the command ship Mt. ikfcKinZey, called the 3d Infantry 

Division’s G3 and stated that “Naval personnel went to quite a 

bit of trouble to clear the fire mission and notify AF [Air Force] 

opns.” He was upset that just prior to the mission going off, it 

was canceled and the Navy put on standby alert until the patrol 

could be located. The G3 hastened to inform the colonel that 

the 7th Infantry Division had been called and “corrective 

action” was being taken. G4 Just what that corrective action was 

was not made clear. 

It is apparent that 7th Infantry Division personnel did not 

fully understand, even at this late date, the complex procedure 

for clearing naval gunfire and how difficult it was to modify a 

fire plan at the last minute. On the other hand, the Navy apparently did not understand the inexact nature of land warfarewhere anything can (and does) happen to delay patrols or cause 

them to lose communications with smalI units. All Army units 

make due allowance for “friction” in the course of every operation, but such inexactness apparently was not understood by 

the Navy in this instance. Even so, there were hundreds of other 

successful naval fire missions during the course of the evacuation, including the delivery of 3,000 eight-inch shells; 18,600 

five-inch shells; and 162 sixteen-inch shells from the battleship 

Missouri.65 When this naval artillery support is added to the 

hundreds of air sorties per day (including “Night Stalker” B-26 

flights) and the thousands of rounds of conventional artillery 

shells fired during the course of the evacuation, it is apparent 

that the X Corps perimeter was well supported by fire. 

The Refugees 

Providing security to the Hungnam perimeter area during 

X Corps’ withdrawal was only one U.S. concern; the refugee 

problem added an additional concern. As the special report on 

the Hungnam evacuation states: “The extent of the mass exodus 

of civilians from their homes as a result of the United Nations” 

withdrawals in the X Corps zone had not been anticipated.“66 

The mass movement of refugees really began when thousands 

of Koreans followed the columns of Marines as they retreated 

from Koto-ri. The X Corps’ fear of a large-scale infiltration of 

the Hungnam perimeter prompted it initially to turn away all 

refugees from the port. As the withdrawal began, the numbers 

of refugees increased. A rumor apparently began to spread that 

the UN forces would furnish ships to all who wanted to leave. 
46 

The result was a flood of humanity that converged on the port. 

Over 50,000 refugees from Hamhung tried to board the last 

refugee train from that city to Hungnam as the UN forces 

pulled out. The refugees clogged the MSRs, railways, and roads. 

At Hungnam and Hamhung, even the city officials quit their 

posts and Joined the flood of refugees. Consequently, all civil 

government and police control broke down. 

The X Corps staff attempted to cope with the refugee 

problem as best it could. The provost marshal, assisted by 

numerous military police and Counterintelligence Corps (CIC) 

agents, collected all the refugees and moved them to the nearby 

village of Soho-jin. The X Corps’ civil affairs section chief, 

Lieutenant Colonel Moore, coordinated with the provost marshal 

and nearby tactical units to ensure that the refugees were safe, 

fed, and controlled.67 He also tried to coordinate with the U.S. 

advisers of the KMAG (Korean military advisory group) 

attached to ROK I Corps. However, the ROK commanders 

seemed mostly concerned with evacuating their own troops. 

The refugees, once controlled, were quickly screened by the 

CIC and military police. Enemy agents were-as far as possible, 

given the numbers involved-identified and removed for intensive interrogation. Some intelligence information was also 

gleaned from the remaining refugees. 

Following General Almond’s policy of evacuating as many 

refugees as possible, the U.S. and Korean Navies cooperated in 

making as many cargo ships available as possible. Initially, 

the loading process was under the control of Lieutenant Colonel 

Raemon and Lieutenant Dodge of the Hungnam civil affairs 

team. However, on 19 December, these men were evacuated, and 

from 20 to 23 December, the 3d Infantry Division had to cope 

with the problem with only a little assistance from X Corps’ 

provost marshal section. Working in less than ideal circumstances, the division coped as best it could. Tactical commanders at all levels from platoon to division were involved in 

the refugee problem-either in guarding them, feeding them, 

moving them, or planning for their evacuation. Authorities 

loaded a total of 98,100 refugees and evacuated them to the 

south. Unfortunately, they had to leave almost an equal number 

behind to attempt to evacuate on foot or else stay to face the 

consequences. 

HOW the X Corps dealt with the refugee problem at 

Hungnam points out several interesting lessons. First, since no 
Refugees being evacuated on an LST during the evacuation of Hungnam 

one had expected such a large number of refugees, no plans or 

coordination had, been prepared ahead of time. Apparently, it 

was assumed that the Koreans would handle the problem. When 

this assumption proved false, the X Corps’ staff had to react 

and throw together a team and plan at the same time a delicate 

withdrawal operation was under way. Tbe initially uncontrolled 

flow of refugees compromised the security of the corps and 

inhibited the smooth functioning of the logistical flow along the 

MSRs. The collapse of all civil government-for which the civil 

affairs team was an inadequate substitute-compounded the 

refugee problem. Tactical commanders and military policemen 

found themselves performing unfamiliar duties. While the 

X Corps staff reacted well to the problem, clever improvisation 

was no substitute for carefully thought-out plans. Doubtless, the 

corps staff did not expect the refugee problem any more than 

they expected the massive intervention of the Chinese. However, 

a corps staff-even more than a division staff-must be judged 

on its ability to prepare for all possible contingencies and to 

plan accordingly. 

Another lesson which can be learned from the Hungnam 

refugee problem is that even though the problem was handled 

for the most part by corps resources, the tactical units were not 

unaffected by the problem. The tactical units had to deal with 

the refugees in their areas and contend with the threat to their 
48 

own movement and security. Tactical commanders, such as the 

3d Infantry Division commander who was left virtually on his 

own with the refugees at the very end, cannot afford to assume 

that refugees will not be a problem. Refugees posed a problem 

for all units in the area as they attempted to move, screen, 

feed, and evacuate them, A staff problem in this instance had 

a way of becoming a tactical problem as well. 
IV 

CONCLUSIONS 

A number of conclusions and lessons can be drawn from X 

Corps’ experience in its evacuation from Hungnam: 

Communications 

The establishment of a centralized control group was a critical element in ensuring the timely flow of information on coordination measures in the evacuation from Hungnam. Through 

the use of a centralized control group, X Corps continued its 

normal staff operations of coordinating tactical moves, fire support, close air support, reconnaissance, and movement plans 

while managing the evacuation. From X Corps’ experience, we 

can assume that extensive coordination is needed to perform 

even the simplest of manipulations of a corps. 

Vision 

X Corps should have anticipated the nature of its developing 

battlefield further in advance and with greater clarity. A corps, 

with all of its logistical and support activities, is cumbersome 

to move and needs all the warning that farsighted staff officers 

can provide. In regard to tactical operations, a corps” ability to 

understand the full range of battlefield possibilities (encompassing the deep, close, and rear battles) is of vital importance to 

its subordinate divisions. Corps can warn their subordinate units 

of impending attacks, prepare contingency plans, wargame 

courses of action, and do in-depth analysis of possible courses 

of action. Few of these activities are possible in anywhere near 

the same degree of detail at a division headquarters (as opposed 

to a corps headquarters). 

Joint and Combined Operations 

Any corps can expect to be involved in joint or combined 

operations. Naval gunfie, Marine or Air Force air support, allied 

forces, refugees, host government programs, and a multitude of 

other coordination opportunities could present themselves to a 

corps. Although most corps may not be separate corps, these 

eventualities cannot be ruled out. Corps must learn to function 

at an operational level in political and military affairs and not 

focus on what is perhaps most familiar to most officers-tactics 

at the brigade or battalion level. Major political concerns, civil 

problems, joint and combined military operations, and even strategic plans must become the stock-in-trade of the corps’ staff 

49 
50 

officers. Current military training barely touches the surface on 

most of these issues. 

Focus 

In general, a corps headquarters, such as that of the X Corps 

in Korea in November and December 1950, is successful and 

useful if it focuses on what it does best: long-term planning, 

coordinating movements of subordinate units, and coping with 

the logistical situation while fighting the deep and rear battles. 

It is least successful when it tries to micromanage the battlefield 

and move battalions around in a vain attempt to react quickly 

enough to outperform a rapidly developing threat. This is as 

true in the defense as it is in the offense. As the doctrine of 

the time stated: “The Corps issues the necessary instructions to 

assure coordination between adjacent divisions. As a rule, the 

detailed execution of defensive measures will be left to the division,“68 Corps must analyze and control the full range of operations (especially deep and rear operations) while allowing divisions to fight their own portion of the battle. 

Doctrine 

The doctrine for large units in 1950 consisted of general 

statements in Field Manual 100-15, Field Service Regulations 

for Larger Units.69 The need for a corps to focus on the deep 

battle comes through unmistakably in this manual as does the 

concern that corps obtain accurate and timely intelligence about 

enemy long-range intentions: 

The Corps plan must be projected well into the future; they must 

envisage action days in advance. . . Adequate and timely information 

of the enemy must be assured if the commander is to make the 

maximum use of his own forces and employ them decisively. . . ~ 

Plans for the employment of the corps cannot be improvised. From 

the initiation of operations until their conclusion the corps commander and his staff must be planning far in advance of the current 

situation. . . . Failure of large units to prepare suitable plans for 

future action may so delay the execution of suitable measures as to 

jeopardize the operations of the corps and higher units.70 

All of these points reinforce what corps must understand as a 

matter of course: they cannot be taken for granted. 

The race to the Yalu and the Chosin Reservoir campaign 

were painful defeats because, to a great extent, X Corps did not 

follow its own doctrine of foreseeing events and planning for 

all contingencies. The corps jeopardized its own operations and 

almost presented the Eighth Army and the U.S. government 
51 

with a catastrophic defeat due to its lack of vision. The Far 

Eastern Command and General MacArthur must share in this 

blame, but the X Corps was the controlling headquarters and 

could have done more to analyze and plan for different eontingencies. The recovery of the situation after the disastrous defeats 

of late November and early December were partly a result of X 

Corps’ remembering how a corps should act. The evacuation of 

Hungnam was a considerable triumph because X Corps recalled 

its proper role and coordinated as a corps should. 
Ii 

III 

0 

92 9s 

xxx 

Ixl 

OPCDN During 

---- 

Evacuation 

I! 

pq55 $q77, 

Source: Shelby Stanton, AmericaS Tenth Legion, 331-32. 
APPENDIX 2 

Demolition Table, Hamhung-Hungnam Operation 

FACILITY OR 

NO INSTALLATION 

1 Bay Bridge 

2 Bay Bridge 

3 Bay Bridge 

4 Defile 

5 Defile 

6 Bay Bridge 

7 Low-Level 

Wooden Bridge 

8 Bay Bridge 

9 RR Rolling Stock 

RR Turntable 

10 RR Bridge 

11 Bay Bridge 

12 Bay Bridge 

13 RR Bridge 

14 RR Overpass 

15 Bay Bridge 

RR Bridge 

16 Bay Bridge 

17 Low-Level 

Wooden Bridge 

18 Bay Bridge 

19 Pier #1 and 

cranes 

20 RR Tunnel 

21 RR Tunnel 

22 RR Tunnel 

23 RR Tunnel 

24 RR Tunnel 

25 RR Tunnel 

COORDINATES DESTROYED BY DATE REMARKS 

cv 5171 

CV 5660 

CV 5654 

CV 4723 

CV 4726 

cv 6831 

cv 7221 

CV 7820 

cv 7719 

cv 7718 

CV 7418 

cv 7318 

cv 7417 

cv 7517 

cv 7716 

cv 6612 

CV 7712 

cv 7810 

CV 8209 

cv 8508 

cv 8913 

CV 9213 

cv 9615 

CV 9616 

cv 9817 

1st Mar Div 

1st Mar Div 

1st Mar Div 

3d Inf Div 

3d Inf Div 

3d Inf Div 

3d Inf Div 

7th Inf Div 

X Corps Engr 

7th Inf Div 

3d Inf Div 

3d Inf Div 

X Corps Engr 

3d Inf Div 

7th Inf Div 

3d Inf Div 

3d Inf Div 

3d Inf Div 

Navy UDT 

Cap Div IROK) 

Cap Div (ROK) 

Cap Div @OK) 

Cap Div (ROK) 

Cap Div EROK) 

Cap Div /ROK) 

55 

10 Dee 50 

14 Dee 50 

15 Dee 50 

Approx 

7 Dee 50 

Approx 

7 Dee 5P 

16 Dee 50 

18 Dee 50 

18 Dee 50 

18 Dee 50 

18 Dee 50 

18 Dee 50 

18 Dee 50 

17-18 Dee 

5Q 

18 Dee 50 

18 Dee 50 

16 Dee 50 

21 Dee 50 

21 Dee 50 

24 Dee 5Q 

Approx 

18 Dee 50 

Approx 

18 Dee 50 

Approx 

18 Dee 50 

APP15 Dee 50 

Appmx 

15 Dee 50 

Approx 

15 Dee 50 

Blown 

Blown under fire 

Steel treadway 

blown under fire 

Road crater 

Road crater 

Blown 

Blown and burned 

Blown 

Blawn and burned 

Blown 

Bhvn 

Blown 

300 Pr cars engines 

blown and burned 

Blown 

Blown 

Blown 

Blown and burned 

Blown 

Blown plus NGT 

Blown 

Blown 

Blown 

Blown 

Blown 
FACILITY OR 

NO INSTALLATION COORDlNATES DESTROYED BY DATE REMARKS 

26 Defile 

27 Bay Bridge 

28 Defile 

23 Defile 

cv 6904 

CV 7203 

cv 95a4 

cv 9704 

3d Inf Div Approx Road crater 

10 Dee 50 

3d Inf Div Apprax Blown 

10 Dee 50 

Cap Div (ROK) Approx Road crater 

15 Dee 50 

Cap Div (ROK) Approx Road crater 

15 Dee 50 
APPENDIX 3 

The X Corps’ Operating Instructions No. 27 

X Corps 

APT 909 

9 Dee 50 

01 27 

Task Organ: N/C 

1. X Corps initiates withdrawal by water and air without delay 

from HUNGNAM area to PUSAN - POHANG-DONG area. 

2. Opns 0 to be issued separately. 

3. Logistical Instructions for Embarkation, Annex A. 

ALBIOND 

Maj Gen 

Annex “A”: Logistical Instructions for Embarkation 

Distr: C, Plus 

I ROK Corps 

Corn 7th Flt 

CTF 77 

OFFICIAL: 

Chiles 

G-3 

57 
X Corps 

APO 909 

9 Dee 50 

Annex A to 01 27 

Logistical Inrrtructions far Embarkation 

1. Personnel, equipment and supplies ashore not needed in 

defense of HUNGNAM will be outloaded and shipped to 

PUSAN - POHANG-DONG area. Supply stocks while in last 

priority for outloading, will be outloaded to the maximum degree 

possible. Those which cannot will be finally destroyed. 

2. Equipment and supplies afloat, except that urgently needed 

ashore, will be diverted to target area. 

3. X Corps Control Group, Co1 E. H. Forney, in charge, is 

responsible for maintaining a continuous flow of personnel and 

equipment out of HUNGNAM area. Designated representatives 

of major units will report to the X Corps Control Officer with 

descriptive list of personnel and equipment to be outloaded. The 

Commanding General, 1st Mar Div will furnish TQM assistance 

as requested by Co1 Forney. 

4. The CO 2d ESB, with 1st Shore Party Bn FMF and 53th 

MP Co attached, will be responsible for loading, for operation 

of port facilities, and for stocking ships, when needed, with B 

rations for consumption during voyage. Troop assistance will 

be made available by dembarking units as required. 

5. The 2d ESB, with 79th Engr C Bn attached, will be responsible for operation of final staging areas. Units reporting to 

this area will be fed and sheltered by 2d Engr Spec Brigade. 

Troop assistance will be made available by embarking units as 

required. 

6. Units are responsible for initial assembly of personnel and 

equipment. 

7. Movement from initial areas will be directed by the X 

Corps Control Officer. 

8. Personnel will report to final staging areas with hand 

carried baggage and equipment only. Remainder of personal 

equipment and clothing will be carried on organic vehicles. 

59 
60 

Vehicles will be stowed no higher than cab height and with 

nothing protruding beyond the sides and rear of the truck. 

9. Units moved to the final staging area will remain there 

until called to the loading point. 

10. When called to the final loading point, each vehicle will be 

manned by one driver who accompanies the vehicle until 

debarked at destination. 

11. Operational rations are in short supply and must be eonserved for units in contact. 

12. Units will carry basic load of ammunition on transport, 

13. Units of Bn or larger sizes will send advance detachments 

to PUSAN. Arrangement for such parties will be made through 

G-4, x corps. 

ALMOND 

Maj Gen 

OFFICIAL: 

Smith 

G-4 
APPENDIX 4 

The X Corps’ Operations Order No. 10 

x corps 

APO 909 

11 Dee 50 

apn 0 10 

Map: KOREA, 1:50,000 

Task Qrgn, Annex A. 

1. a. Annex B, Intel. 

b. FEAF and NAVFE Spt X Corps Crpns. Eighth Army 

delays on successive Psns to the South. 

2. X Corps withdraws to the HUNGNAM base, thence by sea 

and air lift to the PUSAN - POHANG-DONG area. Annexes C, 

D and E: (Phases 1, 2 and 3 respectively, Opn Overlays). 

3. a. I ROK Corps (-): Defend Asgd sector (Phases 1 and 2), 

embark on X Corps 0 (Phase 3). 

b. 1st Mar Div: Embark as directed. 

e. 3d US Inf Div: 1st KMC Regt Atchd; withdraw deliberately from present psns, effect maximum delay of En, defend 

assigned sector, (Phase I), cover withdrawal and embarkation 

of X Corps Elms (Phases 2 and 3), embark on X Corps 0. One 

Regt (Annex C) Corps Res. 

d. 7th US Inf Div: Withdraw deliberately from present PSRS, 

effect maximum delay of En, defend assigned sector (Phases I 

and 2), embark on Corps 0. 

e. Sp Act Gp: X Corps Res, HUNGNAM. 

f. X Corps Arty: Annex F, Arty. 

g. Engrs: Annex G, Engrs. 

h. X Corps Res One Regt, 3d US Inf Div, Vie HUNGNAM; 

SP Act Gp, Vie HUNGNAM. 

x. (1) All units carry one basic load Ammo upon embarkation . 

(2) Expedite Mvmt all tactically non-essential Pers, Veh, 

Equip and Sup to embarkatian points. 

61 
62 

(3) Exert maximum effort to prevent abandonment or 

destruction Equip or Sup. 

(4) Exert maximum effort to locate En Trip Cone prior 

to En atks and to bring Air Strikes and Arty Cone thereon 

promptly. 

(5) Employ demolitions, obstacles and mines to the 

maximum to block En Adv. 

(6) No mvmt of civilians into or out of X Corps Def 

areas. Permit no refugees to enter outpost area. 

(7) Unit Def areas to be abandoned only on authority 

next higher cmd. 

(8) Organize Psns with maximum depth and all-round 

Scty. 

(9) Stock adequate Ammo on Psns. Avoid overstocking 

in Fwd areas. 

(10) Bn and larger units, maintain approximately onethird combat Str as Res. Prep for C/Atk to restore original Psns. 

(11) Improve Defensive Psns continually. 

(12) Organize Alt and supplementary Psns within sectors as appropriate, 

(13) Prep C/Atk plans concurrent with organization of 

Psns. 

(14) Hold MLR at all costs. 

(15) Destroy all bridges, Afld, port facilities and other 

installations of Mil value; destroy Sup on X Corps 0 only. 

4. a. Adm 0: N/C 

b. Embarkation instructions - See Annex A, 01 27. 

5. a. Current SO1 in Eff. 

b. CP’s: X Corps HUNGNAM; others Rept Lots: 

ALMOND 

Maj Gen 

Annexes: A - Task Orgn 

B - Intel (issued separately) 

C - Opn Overlay, Phase 1 

D - Opn Overlay, Phase 2 

E - Opn Overlay, Phase 3 
63 

F - Artillery 

G - Engineer 

H - NGF Spt (issues separately) 

DISTR: C, Plus: I ROK Corps, COM 7th FLT, CTF 77 

OFFICIAL: 

/s/ CHILES 

G-3 
X Corps 

APO 909 

11 Dee 50 

Annex A, Task Orgn, to Opn 0 10 

Command Group Maj Gen E M Almond 

Hq & Hq Co, X Corps 

8222nd Defense Plat 

521st Mil Intel Svc Det (w/2 Interpreters) 

522nd MiI Intel Svc Det 

210th CIC Det 

Two (2) Civil Asst Teams 

X Corps MP Co (Prov) 

772nd MP Bn 

88th MP Co 

One (1) MP Co, ROK 

3d Hcptr Det 

106th Fin Disb Sect 

1st BPQ 

4th Sig Bn (-) 

Attached Units: 

GHQ RTT & Photo Teams 

272nd Sig Const Co 

58lst Sig Relay Co (-) 

226th Sig Svc Co (-) 

2nd Sig Intel Unit 

X Corps, Sig Depot (Prov) 

S & I Sect, 226th Sig Svc Co 

S & I Sect, 65th Sig Depot Co 

Sig Repair Sect, 4th Sig Bn 

205th Sig Repair Det 

19th CID 

Honor Guard Co 

ROK Honor Guard Co 

52nd Rep1 Co 

369th Rep1 Co 

1st KMC Bn 

3d KMC Bn 

a. I ROK Corps Maj Gen KIM, Pat II 

One (1) TACP, 5th USAF 

3d ROK Div Brig Gen RHEE, Chong Chan 

Two (2) TACP’s, 5th USAF 

ROK Capital Div Brig Gen SONG, Yo Chan 

65 
66 

b. 

C. 

1st Marine Division, FMF, (Reins) 

1st Marine Division, FMF 

1st Amph Trac Bn, FMF 

Co B, 1st Armd Amph Bn, FMF 

Btry C, 1st 4.5 Rkt Bn, FMF 

VMO 6 FMF 

Radio Relay Plat, 1st Sig Qpns Co, FMF 

One (1) Civil Asst Team, USA 

163d MiE Intel Svc Det, USA 

181st CIC! Det, USA 

41st Royal Marine Commandos, BC 

3rd Inf Div (-one (1) Regt) Maj Gen R. H. Soule 

1st KMC Regt (-1st and 3d Bns) 

One (1) TACP, 5th USAF 

Five (5) SFCP Dets, ANGLICO, 1st Sig. Bn, 1st Mar Div 

Five (5) TACP’s, 5th USAF 

59th MP Co 

d. 7th Inf Div 

7th CIC Team 

One (1) Civil Asst Team 

One (1) ANGLICO Det, FMF/LANT 

Eight (8) TACP’s, 5th USAF 

Three (3) TACP’s, 1st Mar Div 

e. Corps Reserve 

One (1) Regt, 3d US Inf Div 

Hq & Hq Svc Co, 8227th Special Activities GP 

Prov Raider Co 

ROK SpeciaI Attack Bn 

f. 

g. 

Artillery With the Corps 

Hq & Hq Btry, 5th FA Gp 

8221st FA Topo and Met Det 

96th FA Bn 

92nd AFA Bn 

56th AAA AW Bn 

2nd Engr Spec Brig (-) 

Co A., 56th Amph Tk and Trac Bn (-) 

1st Shore Party Bn, FMF 

58th MP Co 

SFCP Det, ANGLICO, 1st Sig Bn, 1st Mar Div 

Two (2) TACP’s, 5th USAF 

One (1) TACP, 1st Mar Div 

Maj Gen D. B. Barr 

Col W. P. Ennis 

Co1 J. K. Wilson 

Co1 J. J. Twitty 

79th Engr Const Bn (-) 
67 

h. 1st Combat Service Group, FMF Co1 Cook 

7th MT Bn (-two (2) Co’s) FMF 

1st Air Del Plat, FMF 

Co A, 1st Amph Trk Bn, FMF 

i. Corps Chemical Units Lt Co1 W. T. Dozier 

Hq & Hq Det, 4th Cm1 Smk Gen Bn 

69th Cm1 Smk Gen Co 

j. Corps Engr Units Lt Co1 L. C. Fairbank 

8224th Hq & Hq Co, Engr Const Gp 

Attached Units: 

44th Engr Const Bn 

Det, 79th Engr Const Bn 

73d Engr (C) Bn 

185th Engr (C) Bn 

512th Engr Dump Trk Co 

91st Engr Water Sup Co, Plat 

Engr Maint Co 

636th Engr Lt Equip Co 

58th Engr Trdwy Br Co 

1st Engr Depot Plat (Prov) (Opn Control, X Corps) 

8223d Engr Map Distr Det (Opn Control, X Corps) 

8128th Engr Repro Det (Opn Control, X Corps) 

543d Engr Base Depot Co 

k. Corps Ord Units Maj R. E. Harper 

Hq & Hq Det, 328th Ord Bn 

Attached Units: 

1st Ord Maint Co 

14th Ex Ord Disp Squad 

17th Ex Ord Disp Squad 

330th Ord Depot Co 

58th Ord Ammo Co 

69th Ord Ammo Co 

508th Ord Tech Intel Team 

504th Cm1 Svc Co, Det 

Attached Units: 

21st Cm1 Decon Co (Cadre) 

2nd Ord Med Maim Co 

Det, 47th Ord Lt Acft Maint Co 

1. Corps Quartermaster Units Lt Co1 B. B. Baber 

Hq & Hq Det, 142d QM Bn 

Attached Units: 

58th QM Salv Co 
68 

1st Plat, 565th QM GR Co (-) 

821st QM Bath Co 

1st Plat, 20th QM Subs Sup Co 

1st Plat, 529th QM Petrl Distr Co 

580th QM Svc Co 

m. Corps Medical Units Cal A. G. Gorby 

121st Evac Hospital 

Attached Units: 

8216th Med Lab (Mbl) 

1st Surg Hosp (Mb1 

Hq & Hq Det 163d Med Bn 

Attached Units: 

Two (2) Plats, 421st Med Co11 Co 

618th Med Clr Co (Sep) 

559th Med Amb Co (-) (Sep) 

566th Med Amb Co (Sep) 

Avd Plat, 6th Med Sup Depot 

n. Corps Transportation Units Co1 L. L. Ayers 

Hq & Hq Co 52nd Trans Trk Bn 

Attached Units: 

377th Trans Trk Go 

513th Trans Trk Co 

515th Trans Trk Co 

Hq & Hq Co, 21st Trans Med Port Bn 

301st Railroad Opn Bn, ROK 

ALMOND 

Maj Gen 

OFFICIAL: 

/s/CHILES 

G-3 
1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

NOTES 

d. F. C. Fuller, Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure (Harrisburg, PA: 

Military Service Publishing Co., 1936). 

Freiherr Hugo Friedrich Philipp Johann von Freytag-Loringhoven, T?ze 

Power of Personality in War (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing 

co., 1955). 

United States Army, 8th Army Korea, “Special Problems in the Korean 

Conflict” (Seoul, 1952), 43-47, 51. 

Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-53 (New York: 

Time Books, 1987), 36, 229, 295, 416-17. 

Robert Heinl, Victory at High Tide (Annapolis, MD: Nautical and Aviation 

Publishing Co., 1979), 53-54. Comments of Major General Hickey, Deputy 

Chief of Staff of the Far Eastern Command (FEC). General Wright, 63 of 

FEC, also agreed that the Marines should have handled the planning for 

Inchon. 

However, X Corps apparently did an outstanding job coordinating the 

complex movement of forces from all over Japan to their ports of embarkation and their subsequent loading. The invasion was launched a mere 

thirty days after the creation of the corps planning cell (X Force) even 

though the Navy insisted that sixty days was the absolute minimum time 

necessary to plan and conduct the operation. See Shelby Stanton, America’s 

Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1989), 

39-93. 

For a detailed account of the 1st Marine Division and 7th Infantry Division 

coordination problems with X Corps during the capture of Seoul, see Roy 

Appleman, South to the NGktong, North to the Yatu. (June-November 

1950), United States Army in the Korean War (Washington, DC: Office of 

the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1961), 515-41. 

8th Army Korea, “Special Probiems,” 38. 

Blair, The Forgotten War, 345-46, 354, 365-66. 

There were attempts to link up with Eighth Army, but they were feeble at 

best. On 12 November, the 65th Regimental Combat Team of the 3d Infantry Division made contact with a friendly unit of Eighth Army to the east 

by “message drop.” Then, on the 14th, “One patrol from Co. C. made contact with the 19th ROK Regiment [of Eighth Army] on our west boundary.” 

United States Army, 65th Regimental Combat Team, Command Report, 

November 1950, Box 2886, Record Group 407, National Archives Federal 

Records Center, Suitland, MD. The Records Center is hereafter cited as 

NAFRC. 

Oddly enough, although men at the front tended to blame Almond and his 

headquarters, Almond’s staff saw the intelligence failure and the staff 

inflexibility originating at MacArthur’s Far Eastern Command. Years after 

the event, one of Almond’s key staffers, Deputy Chief of Staff William 

McCaffrey, stated clearly in his interview that “It really wasn’t Almond, it 

was MacArthur. Almond was doing the best he could with the missions X 

69 
12. 

13. 

14. 

15. 

16. 

17. 

18. 

19. 

20. 

21. 

22. 

23. 

24. 

25. 

26. 

Corps had.” Lieutenant General William McCaffrey, U.S. Army (ret.), interview, Box 52, Clay Blair Papers, United States Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, hereafter cited as McCaffrey interview. The 

institute is hereafter cited as USAMMI. 

Blair, The li”orgo0ten War, 420. 

Ibid., 457. 

Ibid., 462. 

Lieutenant General Edward Almond, U.S. Army (ret.), interview with 

Captain Thomas G. Fergusson, 1975, sect. V, p. 9, in the Almond Papers, 

USAMHI, hereafter cited as the Almond interview. 

As one of his own staff officers later stated in his own interview, Almond 

was “highly intelligent, opinionated, and completely devoted to General 

MacArthur. General MacArthur didn’t have anybody that was more of a 

disciple than Ned Almond.” Major General John H. Chiles, U.S. Army (ret.), 

“Oral Reminiscences of Major General John H. Chiles” [interview with D. 

Clayton James], July 1977, Box 50, Blair Papers, USAMHI. 

Almond interview, sect. V, pp. 12-13. 

Ibid. 

For the most complete reconstruction of the critical events of 28-30 

November, see Roy Appleman’s harrowing study of the destruction of Task 

Force Faith in his East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 

1950 (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1987). Almond, 

surprisingly, at the 28th of November meeting in Tokyo wanted to continue 

the attack to the northwest and the west. He still did not appreciate the 

size of the danger. See also Appleman’s newest study of this operation 

from the X Corps’ perspective. Roy E. Appleman, Escaping the Trap: The 

US Army X Corps in Northeast Korea, I950 (College Station: Texas A & 

M University Press, 1990). 

Max Dolcater, ed., 3d Infantry Division in Korea (Tokyo: Toppan Printing 

Co., 1953), 88-89. 

Blair, The Forgotten War, 509. 

McCaffrey interview. 

Especially by Roy Appleman, East of Chosin; and United States Marine 

Corps, US. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-53, vol. 3, The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, written by Lynn Montrass and Nicholas A. Canzona (1957; 

reprint, St. Clair Shores, MI: Scholarly Press, 1976). 

On this “gap” in military historiography, see Roger Beaumont, “Command 

Method: A Gap in Military Historiography,” Naual War College Revdew 31 

(Winter 1979):63-72. 

Blair, The Forgotten War, caption under photograph of Almond, photograph 

no. 6 between pp. 144-45. 

Russell A. Gugeler, “Task Force Gerhardt,‘” in Combat Actions in Korea, 

rev. ed., Army Historical Series (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of 

Military History, United States Army, 1987, 1970), 190. 
71 

27. Quoted in Blair, The Forgotten War, 722-23. 

28. Apparently, few blamed Lieutenant Colonel Quinn for the intelligence failures of December. See ibid., 616. In Quinn’s oral history, he recounts the 

story of how he and Almond berated General Willoughby (MacArthur’s 

thoroughly disliked intelligence chief) about the Chinese prisoners they captured. Apparently Almond told Willoughby, “You said they weren’t coming. 

They are here!” When Willoughby didn’t believe him, Almond invited him 

over to see for himself. He refused, contending that it was only a “‘token 

force.” Lieutenant General William Quinn, U.S. Army (ret.), Oral history 

interview, 1981, pp. 72-74, Quinn Papers, USAMHI. 

29. McCaffrey, while admitting that Almond had his faults, still referred to 

him as “a great soldier.” He had served as Almond’s chief of staff in the 

92d Division in Italy in World War II. “‘I got hired on because we’d been 

through the mill together. We had some bad times in Italy.” McCaffrey 

interview. 

30. Chiles summed up Almond in his interview as follows: “Very proud, very 

intolerant, but very fundamental along with it.” Chiles, “Oral Reminiscences.” Almond considered Chiles, along with Ruffner, to be among his 

best staff officers. Almond interview, sect. VI, pp. 17-18. 

31. Blair, The Forgotten War, 289. Aubrey Smith was later murdered by his 

wife in Japan while she was apparently under the influence of drugs. See 

ibid., 408-9 and 409n. 

32. Colonel Forney was decorated with the “Medal of Merit for his efficient 

action which involved Inchon first and Hungnam second.” Almond even 

referred to him at one point in his interview as “General Forney, who 

organized the activities in fine form. I mean Colonel Forney, he should 

have been a General!” Almond interview, sect. V, pp. 22-23, 26-27. 

33. Campbell had also been provost marshal of the 92d Division under Almond 

in Italy. Ibid., pp. 23-24. 

34. For a complete listing of all X Corps staff officers and the principal officers 

of the subordinate units, see Shelby Stanton, America’s Tenth Legion, 

323-28. 

35. For a comparative study of the withdrawal of large forces in the face of 

the enemy in modern warfare and the problems of planning such operations, 

see Major Michael Burke’s “Extracting the Beaten Expeditionary Force: The 

Margin Between Defeat and Catastrophe,‘” School of Advanced Military 

Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 1989. 

36. United States Army, X Corps, Command Report, 18 December 1950, Box 

1985, Record Group 407, NAFRC. 

37. United States Army, X Corps, ‘“X Corps Special Report, Hungnam Evacuation,” p. 3, Box 1983, Record Group 407, NAFRC, hereafter cited as “Special 

Report Hungnam.” For the story of the 2d Infantry Division’s ordeal running the “gauntlet,” see S. L’. A. Marshall’s The River and the Gauntlet: 

November 1950, the Defeat of Eighth Army (Nashville, TN: Battery Press, 

1987). 

38. “‘Special Report Hungnam,” 3. 
72 

39. Almond interview, sect. V, pp* 23-24. Almond stated that ““As Commanding 

General, my policy was to evacuate all civil government officials and their 

families together with as many other loyal and non-Communist citizens as 

shipping space would allow. This was extremely successful because as we 

loaded our ships with equipment and materials, particularly the LSTs in 

loading tanks out, there was a lot of vacant space between tanks and on 

deck.” Almond was highly praised for his decision both by Korean officials 

and by public opinion in general. 

40. “Special Report Hungnam,‘” 3. 

41. Annex A (Logistics) to Operating Instructions 27. Although initially the 

Navy indicated that turn-around shipping would not be required, the size 

of the evacuation mandated that ships off-load in Pusan quickly and return 

for two and sometimes three additional loads. 

42. “Special Report Hungnam,” 5. 

43. According to Lieutenant Colonel Frank Mildren, acting G3 at the close of 

the operation, “The only thing we left there was all of this frozen fruit 

juice. We blew up what ammunition we couldn’t take out but left all these 

big cases of frozen juice that we couldn”t use. You know, they sent us all 

this fancy orange juice, pineapple juice, and all kinds of other juices. Well 

in 40 degrees below zero temperature you can’t drink it. It’s all frozen.” 

Colonel Frank Mildren, U.S. Army (ret.), Oral history interview with Lieutenant Colonel James T. Scott, 1980, USAMHI, pp. 131-32. 

44. Ibid. 

45. Almond interview, sect. V, pp. 26-27. 

46. Ibid., pp. 12-13. At least one of Almonds staff officers, Lieutenant Colonel 

McCaffrey, felt that Brigadier General Hodes was deficient in his duty in 

that he was tasked, presumably at this meeting, to rescue TF Faith but 

failed to do so. He stated in his oral history interview: “There was this 

Ass’t Division Commander [Hodes] who was supposed to break in with 

another battalion. The 3d [2d] Bn of the 31st and the Tank Co. of the 7th 

Div. was supposed to break in. They got to, a road block and lost 8 tanks 

out of 24 and, the ADC turned them around and said they couldn’t break 

through. He came back and told Dave Barr they couldn’t break through. 

The Maj. Gen. [Barr] was in Hungnam, the ADC was in Hungnam 

[Hagaru-ri] and there were 2,600 men dying up there, and I haven’t forgotten that one either. Those two G. D. General officers could have been 

up there. That’s where the Marines were.” McCaffrey interview. However, 

at the time that Hodes did try to break through, he had only the RCT HQ 

and a tank company; the 2-31st Infantry was stuck at Koto-ri. See Apple 

man, Escaping the Trap, 85. 

47. The Marine forces at Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri were joined by the survivors of 

TF Faith at Chosin but only made it to Koto-ri before the Chinese cut the 

roads. 

48. Dolcater, 3d Infantry Division, 88-89. 

49, Appleman, Escaping the Trap, 282. 

50. Brigadier General Mead had just wound up a similar mission as commanding general of Task Force C protecting the withdrawal from Wonsan by 
73 

51. 

52. 

53. 

54. 

55. 

56. 

57‘ 

58. 

59. 

60. 

61. 

62. 

63. 

64. 

elements of the 3d ID. His new staff of TF Dog (and their normal units/ 

sections) were Major Burdell, S3, HQ 3d ID; Captain Motta, 52, HQ 3d ID; 

Lieutenant Colonel Newbury, X0, 3d AAA Bn; Major Hay, 54, 3d AAA 

Bn; Major Steward, Asst. X0, 3d AAA Bn; Captain Patterson, Asst S3, 3d 

AAA Bn; Captain Javins, Comma, HQ 3d ID; and Captain Roth, Asst S4, 

HQ 3d ID. United States Army, 3d Infantry Division, Command Report, 

December 1950, Box 2881, Record Group 407, NAFRC, hereafter cited as 3d 

ID, CR, December 1950. 

Doicater, 3d Infantry Division, 92; and Blair, The Forgotten War, 538-39. 

Clay Blair mistakenly adds in the entire 65th RCT and a battalion of the 

15th Infantry (3/15) to TF Dog and states “Task Force Dog. , . consisted 

of five of the division’s nine infantry battalions, powerfully supported by 

tanks and 3rd Division and X Corps artillery.‘” Those other units were in 

the area and played a key role in the rescue of the Marine division, but 

they remained under their own chain of command and were not part of 

Task Force Dog. 

The first unit on the road was the HQ section of 3d AAA AW EN (SP). 

Blair, The Forgotten %zr, 538-41. Almond later objected when Ridgway 

in his memoirs implied that the Marines had organized the bridge drop. 

Ridgway claimed, according to Almond, that Smith had “foreseen this 

danger and had a Treadway bridge air-dropped in sections in time to get 

his forces across.” In reality, Almond stated that the operation was 

“planned by the X Corps Commander who beforehand had arranged for a 

rehearsal at YONPO airfield for the air-drop of the bridge sections. I saw 

the test-drop made before the bridge was ever dropped at the proper place 

south of Koto-ri.” Almond, Personal Notes and War Diary, Almond Papers. 

3d ID, CR, December 1950, incl. 8, TF Dog Data. 

There were, after all, 2,300 Army personnel in the retreating column, 

although to read the news reports, one would think it composed solely of 

Marines. 

Message from TF Dog S3 to CG 3d ID in 3d ID, CR, December 1950, incl. 

8, TF Dog Data. 

United States Army, 65th Regimental Combat Team, S3 Journal, Command 

Report, December 1950, Box 2888, Record Group 4Q7, NAFRC. 

3d ID, CR, December 1950, incl. 8, TF Dog Data. Comments by Major 

Eurdell, TF S3. 

Blair, The Forgotten War, 544. 

Dolcater, 3d Infantry Division, 102-4. 

“‘Special Report Hungnam,” 5. 

United States Army, X Corps, G2 Journal, Command Report, 14-15 December 1950, Box 1986, Record Group 407, NAFRC. 

United States Army, X Corps, 63 Journal, Command Report, 14-15 De 

cember 1950, Box 1986, Record Group 407, NAFRC. 

Ibid. 
65. 

66. 

67. 

68. 

69. 

70. 

Blair, The Forgotten War, 544. 

“Special Report Hungnam,” 23. 

United States Army, X Corps, Civil Affairs Journal, Command Report, 12 

December 1950, Box 1835, Record Group 407, NAFRC. 

United States War Department, FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations: Larger 

Units (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, dune 

19421, 70. 

United States Department of the Army, FM 100-15, Larger Units (Washington, DC, June 1950). The updated version of this regulation probably did 

not reach the field for many months after its publication. Corps staff officers probably drew largely upon their experiences in World War II, however, 

and what they knew about doctrine (impossible to assess) probably was 

drawn from the 1942 rather than the 1950 version of the FM. The sections 

dealing with the corps in the offense or defense were, moreover, almost 

word for word in the two versions. 

Ibid., 62-63, 67. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

PRIMARY SOURCES 

National Archiues Federal Records Center, S&land, MD 

United States Army. 65th Regimental Combat Team. Command Report. November 1950. Box 2886, Record Group 407. 

-. S3 Journal, Command Report. December 1950. Box 2888, Record Group 

407. 

United States Army. X Corps. Civil Affairs Journal, Command Report, 12 

December 1950. Box 1885, Record Group 407. 

-. Command Report. 18 December 1950. Box 1985, Record Group 407. 

-. G2 Journal and G3 Journal, Command Report. 14-15 December 1950. 

Box 1986, Record Group 407. 

-. “X Corps Special Report, Hungnam Evacuation.” N.d. Box 1983, Record 

Group 407. 

United States Army. 3d Infantry Division. Command Report. December 1950. 

Box 2881, Record Group 407. 

United States Army Military History Institute, Carlisle 

Barracks, PA 

Almond, Edward, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army (ret.). Interview with Captain 

Thomas G. Fergusson, 1975. Almond Papers. 

Chiles, John H., Major General, U.S. Army (ret.). “Oral Reminiscences of Major 

General John H. Chiles” [interview with D. Clayton James], July 19’77. 

Box 50, Clay Blair Papers. 

McCaffrey, William, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army (ret.). Interview. Box 52, 

Clay Blair Papers. 

Mildren, Frank, Lieutenant Colonel, US. Army (ret.). Oral history interview with 

Lieutenant Colonel James T. Scott, 1980. 

Quinn, William, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army (ret.). Oral history interview, 

1981. Quinn Papers. 

OTHER WORKS 

Appleman, Roy. East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950. 

College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1987. 

-. Escaping the Trap: The US Army X Corps in Northeast Korea, 1950. 

College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1990. 

-. South to the Naktong, North to the YaEu (June-November 19501. 

United States Army in the Korean War. Washington, DC: Office of the 

Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1961. 

Beaumont, Roger. “Command Method: A Gap in Military Historiography.” A&vu1 

War College Review 31 (Winter 1979):61-74. 

75 
76 

Blair, Clay. The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-53. New York: Time 

Books, 1987. 

Burke, Michael, Major. “Extracting the Beaten Expeditionary Force: The Margin 

Between Defeat and Catastrophe.” School of Advanced Military Studies, 

United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, 1989. 

Dolcater, Max, ed. 3d Infantry Diuision in Korea. Tokyo: Toppan Printing Co., 

1953. 

Freytag-Loringhoven, Hugo Friedrich Philipp Johann, Freihers von. The Power 

of Personality in War. Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Co., 1955. 

Fuller, J. F. C. Generalship: Zrs Diseases and Their Cure. Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Co., 1936. 

Gugeler, Russell A. “Task Force Gerhardt.‘” In Combat Actiorcs in Korea, rev. 

ed., 183-92. Army Historical Series. Washington, DC: Off’ice of the Chief 

of Military History, United States Army, 1987, 1970. 

Heinl, Robert. Victory at High Tide. Annapolis, MD: Nautical and Aviation 

Publishing Co., 1979. 

Marshall, S. L. A. The River and the Gauntlet: November 1950, the Defeat of 

Eighth Army. Nashville, TN: Battery Press, 1987. 

Stanton, Shelby. America’s Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950. Novato, CA: 

Presidio Press, 1989. 

United States Army. 8th Army Korea. “Special Problems in the Korean Conflict.” Seoul, 1950. 

United States Department of the Army. FM 100-X Larger Units. Washington, 

DC, June 1950. 

United States Marine Corps. U.S. Marine Operations in Korea. Vol. 3. TZze 

Chosin Reservoir Campaign. Written by Lynn Montross and Nicholas A. 

Canzana. 1957. Reprint. St. Clair Shores, MI: Scholarly Press, 1976. 

United States War Department. FM 106-15. Field Service Regulations: Larger 

Units. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Off&e, June 1942. 

& U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 199I--554-OOl--40095 
Richard W. Stewart, Ph.D. 

Dr. Richard W. Stewart is the command 

historian at t,he U.S. Army SpeciaI Operations 

Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. While 

researching and writing this study, he was the 

research historian at the Center for Army Lessons Learnedl, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. A 

graduate of Stetson University in Florida, he 

received his master”s degree in history from the 

University of Florida and his doctorate in history from Yafe University. While completing his 

doctorali dissertation, Dr. Stewart was a Fulbright feIlow at University College, London, and 

a lecturer in Yate College, Yale University. He 

is also a U.S. Army Reserve major in Military 

Intelligence and a graduate of the U.S. Army 

Command and General Staff GolIege, Fort 

Leavenworth. 

CQIMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE 

The Combat Studies Institute was established on 18 June 1!279 as a department-levet activity within the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. CSI has the folIowing missions: 

1, Prepare and present instruction in military history at USAGGSC and assist 

other USACGSG departments in integrating military history into their 

instruction. 

2, Serve as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s executive agent 

for the development and caordination of an integrated, progressive program 

of military history instruction in the TRADOC service school system. 

3. Conduct research on historical topics pertinent to the doctrinal concerns of 

the Army and publish the results in a variety of formats for the Active 

Army and Reserve Components. 
U.S. Army Cammand and General Staff Colkge 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas