Number 129, October 1997

**NATO Enlargement:**

***Putting the Cost inPerspective***

**by David C. Gompert**

**Conclusion**

Fundamentally, Europe is now more secure than it has been in a century—one of themost secure regions on Earth. Our strategy should be to: (1) keep it that way; and, (2)get more contribution from Europeans to strengthen security in Europe and elsewhere. Theinvestments needed to implement NATO enlargement directly support this strategy:- The U.S. share of $150-200 million per year will update the security infrastructure of    Europe, thus helping to ensure that recent progress is made permanent. 
- The new members’ share of about $1 billion per year—which they willingly,    democratically, are choosing to accept—will transform their ex-communist militaries    into lean and competent organizations fully answerable to civilian leadership.
- The old members’ share of about $1 billion per year will give the United States    added security and reduced strain by augmenting U.S. power projection capabilities, for    use not only in Europe but beyond, where more acute dangers lie. 

The security of Europe, after a century of unprecedented violence, is so vital that weneed not expect a specific future threat to justify this investment. Moreover, if some newthreat arose, we would surely feel compelled to defend European democracy, as we did inthe past—whether or not NATO has been enlarged. Rather than "costs ofenlargement," these payments should be considered an investment in the future ofdemocracy in Europe and in the ability of our allies to bear more of the burden of commondefense in Europe and elsewhere.** **

**Introduction**

Congress faces two questions about the cost of admitting Poland, Hungary and the CzechRepublic to NATO: (1) How much will it cost? (2) Is the cost worth it? In *StrategicForum #128,* Richard Kugler explains that, based on reasonable and consistentassumptions, the Clinton Administration’s figures—$2.1-2.7 billion per year forNATO as a whole, with $150-200 million per year the U.S. share—are sound. The debateshould now shift to whether this would be a good investment.

Although the U.S. cost is small, it is important for Congress to understand thejustification. The Pentagon’s budget is already tight: planned reductions in U.S.military infrastructure will barely pay for needed modernization of forces in the years tocome. With so little slack, every new obligation must make sense. Moreover, the youngdemocracies about to join NATO are still going through a difficult economic transition andcannot afford any unnecessary military outlays. Finally, most of NATO’s currentEuropean members are struggling to live within more austere national budgets in order toqualify for the European Monetary Union; they, too, are pinching their francs, lire anddeutchmarks.

As Richard Kugler explains, the "costs of enlargement" are minor compared tototal current U.S. and European defense budgets. There is no need to beef up forces todefend Europe from some new threat. But there is a need for NATO members, new and old, toinvest in *peacetime preparedness*. This paper identifies three strategic dividendsfrom that investment: - Insurance that Europe will be fundamentally secure in the twenty-first    century—quite a change for the continent that produced two world wars and one cold    war in the twentieth century. 
- The creation within the new members of military establishments that are streamlined,    competent, accountable, and integrated into NATO—a crucial step on the road to    permanent democracy.
- Improvement in the capability of our current West European allies to bear more    responsibility and burden for security in Europe and, just as significant, the defense of    common interests beyond Europe, e.g., the Persian Gulf. 

**Insuring the Security of Europe**

Because there is no specific threat to Europe on the horizon, this is the leastconcrete strategic gain from the proposed investment. Yet in a sense, it is the mostbasic. In this new era of uncertainty and flux, those charged with responsibility fortheir citizens’ security, be they American, German or Polish, cannot neglect defensecapabilities in hopes that new threats will not arise. Indeed, a consensus exists in theUnited States—among Democrats and Republicans, the President and Congress, thegovernment and voters—that prudence demands a capable military even when the countryis unthreatened. The same reasoning should apply to the security of Europe, scene of theworst violence in world history. To be sure, European security has improved dramaticallyover the last decade. Our strategic goal is to lock in that progress.

Historically, central Europe has been the fuse of European conflict. Two world warswere ignited there; a third might have been, but for NATO. Reasonable American voices nowask: Would we risk the lives of our sons and daughters to defend Poland, Hungary or theCzech Republic? But surely a threat of aggression against the new democracies of centralEurope would have to be regarded as a threat to Europe itself. To presuppose a futureattack on Poland that we would not consider a threat to Europe flies in the face of bothexperience and geography. So the fairer question is: Would we defend Europe? Three timesin 80 years, Americans answered yes.

If our answer remains yes, we would defend Europe (and thus Poland), it follows that wewould be wise to make that intent clear by admitting these countries into NATO, thusreducing the likelihood of actually having to do so. It follows, as well, that we shouldinvest in the peacetime preparedness of Europe, including the new democracies. Failing todo so would suggest that the security of half but not all of Europe is important to us. Inthe remote event that the threat of aggression reappeared, we would rue our failure tomake our position clear and to make at least minimal preparations. Conversely, the returnon this investment, in that admittedly unlikely event, would be incalculable. 

The expectation of a future Russian threat is not necessary for this commitment andthis investment to make sense. We should take a longer view of the safety of Europe, thesecurity of this part of Europe and the value of NATO. The Cold War and the former Sovietthreat were but one episode in a continuing history of a continent at once blessed withpromise and cursed with conflict, whose future, like its past, will affect the UnitedStates and the rest of the world. Being purely defensive, this investment in peacetimepreparedness will help insure a far safer century for Europe, and thus for us, than theone now ending.

In a practical sense, $150-200 million per year should also be seen as the cost ofupholding the principle that NATO must have military integrity—a principle championedby the United States. If we decline to make this contribution to NATO’sinfrastructure, and our current allies followed our "lead," as they surelywould, we would be signaling an indifference to NATO’s military underpinnings,contradicting and weakening our insistence that this is not a hollow alliance, withcommitments it cannot fulfill. At best, this would suggest that we stand behind thesecurity of the alliance’s old members but not its new ones. At worst, it would leadto the erosion of NATO’s entire military foundation. This investment will reinforcethe discipline that enabled NATO to prevail in the Cold War, to become the world’smost credible alliance, and to respond to the security challenges of the new era. 

**Transforming the Militaries of the New Democracies** 

A military establishment that is integrated into NATO will never be the same. NATO"denationalized" the militaries of the original West European members, which hadpreviously warred with each other on a regular basis. It helped reform the armed forces ofseveral current members that were once undemocratic: Spain, Portugal, Turkey and Greece.And now it can help Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic develop militaries that lendstrength and add confidence to democracy’s future. 

Their inclusion in NATO’s military organs, their streamlining and modernization,and their use of NATO’s physical infrastructure will rivet the armed forces of thenew members to a model that has worked extraordinarily well for the rest of the alliance.This, too, should be considered a strategic return on the proposed investment, since thesuccess of democracy depends on military reform, and the United States has a huge equityin democracy’s success. For the country that stood, for many decades, for the rightof Poles, Hungarians and Czechs to become democratic, the cost of transforming theirmilitaries to strengthen democracy should not seem too large.

No one is more mindful of the need to reform and integrate the military establishmentsof Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic than the countries themselves. When communismended, the old militaries—overfed, unresponsive to democratic direction,environmental polluters, mismanagers of public resources—were unacceptable. In theyears that followed, military reform was disappointingly slow compared to the rest oftheir political and economic metamorphosis. Creating new militaries—trim,professional, accountable, efficient, respected—is a high priority. 

There are already signs of progress in anticipation of NATO membership. Civil-militaryrelations have begun to improve; plans to streamline forces and ready them for NATO arebeing drawn up; the vestiges of the old Warsaw Pact militaries are vanishing. Withratification and subsequent integration, the transformation will be accelerated andfinished.

One hears from American skeptics of NATO enlargement, or of bearing the costs, that thenew democracies have better things to do with their money than to remold their armedforces. This point of view underestimates the importance of having a professional,apolitical military establishment in making democracy succeed. Perhaps because U.S.democracy is so secure and the U.S. military is so able, we take a responsive military forgranted. In any case, who is in a better position to understand whether the cost ofjoining NATO is worth it than the countries that are joining? Suggesting that thesecountries cannot make the right decisions on matters as weighty as their own security andthe path of their own transformation is not helpful. We must show confidence in them andtheir democracy.

Moreover, it is by no means clear that the cost of restructuring their armed forceswithin NATO will be greater than the amounts they would spend overtime—inefficiently, no doubt—on national defense if they were excluded fromNATO. Becoming members of the world’s strongest alliance, led by the world’sstrongest country, is bound to improve their security, perceived and real. So Poland,Hungary and the Czech Republic, if excluded, would either end up spending more on securityor else feeling less secure. In any event, without the military and management disciplineprovided by NATO, they could waste their resources and squander their chance for permanentsecurity. If we are genuinely concerned about the wise and economical allocation ofresources on defense by the new democracies, NATO membership is not the problem but thesolution. 

**Improving West European Contributions to the Defense of Common Interests**

The third strategic dividend from the proposed NATO investment is potentially thebiggest for the security of U.S. interests. Unlike the United States, which is highlycapable of projecting military power, the bulk of West European forces are suitable mainlyfor border defense—a holdover from the Cold War. If another Gulf War occurred today,the NATO allies would be no more able to contribute major forces to a U.S.-led coalitionthan they were in 1990, when they provided less than 10 percent of the force (by the mostcharitable measure). If we could increase this to, say, 20 percent, the benefit for theUnited States would be great. The allies could share more in the cost and risk—and,in the worst case, the casualties—while giving the coalition more overall muscle. Inpeacetime, the allies could take some of the strain off the U.S. force structure, which isnow laboring hard to meet the need for peacekeeping while also remaining ready for majorconflict.

What has NATO enlargement to do with the defense of the Persian Gulf and other commoninterests? A great deal. The military strategy to provide for the security of the newmembers does not call for permanent forward defense, Cold-War-style. There is no need tobase U.S. and West European forces on the soil of the new members. Provided the necessaryNATO infrastructure improvements are made—which depends on the United States and theother allies making the investment—we can refrain from deploying forces eastwardunless and until a need arises. This strategy will not require any improvement in U.S.forces, which are already highly mobile. (This explains why the U.S. share of the cost ofenlargement is less than Western Europe’s.) But major improvement is needed in theability of German, French, British and other West European forces to deploy and operate ata distance. Enlargement gives our current allies not only a motivation but an obligationto enhance their forces in this direction.

As they do, they will be able to help more in defense of shared interests not only inEurope but in more dangerous adjacent regions, including the unstable but critical swathof lands from North Africa through the Middle East to the Persian Gulf. This would lessenthe burden and risk of the United States and make the current $250 billion defense budgetgo much further. In this sense, the nearly $1 billion per year the West Europeans shouldspend on improving their forces—roughly 40 percent of the total investment—canbe seen from the U.S. perspective not as a cost at all but as a direct benefit.

But can the current NATO allies afford this? Absolutely. Collectively, the Europeanmembers of NATO spend about $160 billion per year on defense, second only to the UnitedStates. By reprogramming $1 billion, they can improve significantly their ability toproject forces. We should be concerned less about whether the allies increase their totaldefense spending than about how they intend to spend it. The key is for them to investmore of their money on forces that can conduct distant operations. Some allies understandthe need for this: the British and French, and to a lesser degree the Germans, have begunto point their defense programs away from stationary defense and toward the ability toprotect far-away interests. But their progress has been slow, and enlargement shouldprovide the needed impetus.

Congress should focus not on whether the current European allies are going to increasedefense spending but on whether they are going to modernize their forces in thisstrategically beneficial way. And the Clinton Administration should direct its energies toensuring that allied plans are adequate. If they are, congressional concerns about fairburden-sharing should be satisfied. It would be reasonable for Congress to ask NATO’sSupreme Allied Commander to confirm that the defense programs of our current allies aresufficient to increase their share of the burden of defending NATO’s new members andother common interests.

Let’s not underestimate the potential of the new members to contribute in thefuture to the security of common interests other than their own territory—especiallyas they develop more modern armed forces that work with ours through NATO. They helped asbest they could during Desert Storm, and they are helping in Bosnia. As their confidencein their own security and future gains strength, we should count on them to join the restof the European allies in shouldering more of the responsibility and burden of protectingcommon interests. 

David C. Gompert is a Distinguished Research Professor at INSS, on leave from RAND,where he is vice president. He was Senior Director for Europe and Eurasia on the NSC staffof the Bush Administration. He can be reached at (202) 685-2355.

The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by members and guests of the Institutefor National Strategic Studies and the National Defense University faculty. These includereports of original research, synopses of seminars and conferences,the results ofunclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguished speakers.

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