a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST

Wednesday, March 16, 2005

MILITARY PERSONNEL

Preliminary Observations 

on Recruiting and 

Retention Issues within the 

U.S. Armed Forces

Statement of Derek B. Stewart,

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management

GAO-05-419T
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-419T.

To view the full product, click on the link 

above. For more information, contact Derek 

Stewart at (202) 512-5559 or 

stewartd@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-419T, a testimony to 

the Chairman, Subcommittee on Military 

Personnel, Committee on Armed Services, 

House of Representatives 

March 16, 2005

MILITARY PERSONNEL

Preliminary Observations on Recruiting 

and Retention Issues within the U.S. 

Armed Forces 

DOD’s 10 military components generally met their overall recruitment and 

retention goals for each of the past 5 fiscal years (FY), but some of the 

components experienced difficulties in meeting their overall goals in early 

FY 2005. However, it should be noted that several components introduced a 

“stop loss” policy shortly after September 11, 2001. The “stop loss” policy 

requires some servicemembers to remain in the military beyond their 

contract separation date, which may reduce the number of personnel the 

components must recruit. During FY 2000-2004, each of the active 

components met or exceeded their overall recruiting goals. However, for 

January 2005, the Marine Corps missed its overall active duty recruiting goal 

by 84 recruits and narrowly missed its goal again for February 2005. The 

Army also missed its overall recruiting goal for February 2005 by almost 

2,000 recruits. This is significant, given that the Army has also already called 

up members from the Individual Ready Reserve and moved new recruits 

from its delayed entry program into basic training earlier than scheduled. 

Four of the six reserve components mostly met their overall recruiting goals 

for FYs 2000 through 2004, but many experienced difficulties in early FY 

2005. DOD has noted that the Army Reserve components will be particularly 

challenged, since fewer active Army soldiers leaving active duty are joining 

the reserves. In terms of retention, the active components generally met 

their overall retention goals for the past 5 FYs. The Army, for example, met 

or exceeded overall retention goals from FY 2000 through FY 2004. The 

Army and the Air Force, however, missed retention goals in the first quarter 

of FY 2005. 

Overall recruitment and retention data do not provide a complete 

representation of military occupations that are either over- or under-staffed. 

For example, GAO’s analysis of early FY 2005 data shows that 63 percent of 

the Army’s active component specialties are overfilled and 32 percent are 

underfilled. Also, several hundred hard-to-fill occupations exist within the 

10 DOD components. GAO identified 73 occupations that have been 

consistently designated as hard-to-fill occupations. GAO’s analysis also 

shows that 7 of the Army’s current occupations (e.g., infantry and cavalry 

scout) and 6 of the Air Force’s current occupations (e.g., combat control and 

linguist) are on both their “hard-to-recruit” and “hard-to-retain” lists. 

DOD’s components have been taking a number of steps to enhance their 

recruiting and retention efforts. For example, DOD has expanded eligibility 

for selective reenlistment bonuses and has also begun offering reenlistment 

bonuses of as much as $150,000 to special operation forces personnel with 

19 or more years of experience who reenlist for an additional 6 years. The 

Army increased the amount of cash bonuses it offers to new recruits in hardto-fill military occupations to as much as $20,000. The Army also increased 

its maximum college scholarship from $50,000 to $70,000. In addition, the 

Army plans to add 965 recruiters in FY 2005, and the Marine Corps plans to 

add 425 recruiters by FY 2007. 

To meet its human capital needs, 

the Department of Defense (DOD) 

must convince several hundred 

thousand people to join the military 

each year while, at the same time, 

retain thousands of personnel to 

sustain its active duty, reserve, and 

National Guard forces. Since 

September 11, 2001, DOD has 

launched three major military 

operations requiring significant 

military personnel—Operation 

Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring 

Freedom, and Operation Iraqi 

Freedom. The high pace of military 

operations combined with the level 

of casualties in Iraq and other 

factors, such as lengthy overseas 

deployments, have raised concerns 

about DOD’s ability to recruit and 

retain sufficient numbers of 

personnel who possess the skills 

and experience needed. 

This testimony presents GAO’s 

preliminary findings on (1) the 

extent to which the active duty, 

reserve, and Guard components 

have met their overall recruiting 

and retention goals, (2) the degree 

to which the components have met 

their recruiting and retention goals 

for selected hard-to-fill critical 

occupations, and (3) steps the 

components have taken to enhance 

their recruiting and retention 

efforts. This testimony focuses on 

enlisted personnel. In continuing 

its work, GAO will assess the 

reliability of DOD-provided data 

and plans to issue a report on these 

issues this fall. 
Page 1 GAO-05-419T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss our preliminary 

observations on recruitment and retention issues within the active and 

reserve components.1

 To meet its human capital needs, the Department of 

Defense (DOD) must convince several hundred thousand people to join the 

military each year, the majority of whom are recent high school graduates. 

Last fiscal year alone, DOD had goals to recruit more than 180,000 

personnel into its active duty forces and more than 120,000 personnel into 

its reserve components. Moreover, DOD must retain tens of thousands of 

personnel each year to sustain its active duty, reserve, and Guard forces. As 

you know, this Subcommittee and others have raised concerns about 

DOD’s ability to recruit and retain sufficient numbers of personnel who 

possess required skills and experience.

My statement, which focuses only on enlisted personnel, will address our 

preliminary findings with respect to (1) the extent to which the active duty, 

reserve, and National Guard components have met their overall recruiting 

and retention goals; (2) the degree to which the components have met their 

recruiting and retention goals for selected, hard-to-fill critical occupations; 

and (3) steps the components have taken to enhance their recruitment and 

retention efforts. Mr. Chairman, we expect to complete our evaluation of 

the services’ recruitment and retention efforts by August and issue our 

report this fall. Findings presented here are preliminary, and we will assess 

the reliability of data provided to us by DOD as we complete our 

evaluation. The work done in preparation for this hearing was conducted 

from February to March 2005 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. 

Summary Our preliminary examination of DOD data indicate that DOD’s active and 

reserve components generally met their overall recruitment goals from 

fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2004; but, some of the components 

experienced difficulties in meeting their recruiting goals in early 2005. 

1

DOD’s reserve components include the collective forces of the Army National Guard and 

the Air National Guard, as well as the forces from the Army Reserve, the Naval Reserve, the 

Marine Corps Reserve, and the Air Force Reserve. The Coast Guard Reserve also assists 

DOD in meeting its commitments. However, we do not cover the Coast Guard Reserve here 

because it accounts for about 1 percent of the total reserve force and falls under the 

Department of Homeland Security rather than DOD.
Page 2 GAO-05-419T 

However, it should be noted that the “stop loss” policy implemented by 

several components shortly after September 11, 2001 might have facilitated 

some components in meeting their overall recruiting goals for fiscal year 

2002 and beyond. The “stop loss” policy requires some servicemembers to 

remain in the military beyond the expiration of their contracts or 

retirement dates, which may reduce the number of new people the 

components must recruit to meet their endstrength goals. In fiscal year 

2004, the Army, Navy, and Air Force each exceeded their enlisted aggregate 

recruiting goals for active duty personnel by 1 percent, while the Marine 

Corps met its goal. However, the Marine Corps missed its enlisted 

aggregate active duty recruiting goal of 3,270 new recruits by 84 people, or 

2.6 percent, for January 2005 and narrowly missed its goal again for 

February 2005. The Army also missed its February recruiting goal of 7,050 

new active duty recruits by 1,936 people, or 27.5 percent. This is significant, 

given that the Army has also called members of the Individual Ready 

Reserve into active duty and moved thousands of recruits from its delayed 

entry program into basic training ahead of schedule. Regarding the reserve 

components, four of the six components generally met their enlisted 

aggregate recruiting goals for fiscal years 2000 through 2004, but like the 

active Army and Marine Corps, most of these components also experienced 

difficulties in meeting their early fiscal year 2005 recruiting goals. DOD has 

noted that the Army Reserve components will be particularly challenged, 

given that more active Army soldiers are staying in the active force, and of 

those leaving, fewer are joining the reserve components. Moreover, all of 

the active components generally met their aggregate retention goals for the 

past 5 fiscal years. The Army and the Air Force, however, missed some 

aggregate retention goals in the first quarter of 2005. For example, the 

Army missed its reenlistment goal for servicemembers completing their 

first term by 6 percent. The Air Force achieved a reenlistment rate of 50 

percent compared with its goal of 75 percent for servicemembers 

completing their second term. 

Recruitment and retention rates, when shown in the aggregate, do not 

provide a complete representation of military occupations that are either 

over- or under-staffed. Our analysis of early fiscal year 2005 data show, for 

example, that 63 percent of the Army’s active component occupations (i.e., 

specialties) are overfilled, and 32 percent are underfilled. Also, 20 percent 

of the Marine Corps’ active component occupations are overfilled and 15 

percent are underfilled. In the Navy, 32 of its active component occupations 

are over-filled and 55 occupations are under-filled. Based on the data we 

have received to date, hundreds of hard-to-fill occupations exist within the 

10 DOD components. Moreover, on the basis of our analysis to date, we 
Page 3 GAO-05-419T 

have identified 73 occupations, in 7 of the 10 components, that have been 

consistently designated as hard-to-fill occupations. Our analysis also shows 

that 7 of the Army’s occupations (e.g., infantry and cavalry scout) and 6 of 

the Air Force’s occupations (e.g., combat control and linguist) are on their 

“hard-to-recruit” and “hard-to-retain” lists. 

DOD’s components have been taking a number of steps to enhance their 

recruiting and retention efforts. DOD, for example, can now offer selective 

reenlistment bonuses to personnel who reenlist while serving in 

Afghanistan, Iraq, or Kuwait, whether or not they serve in a critical 

occupation. In addition, DOD recently began to offer reenlistment bonuses 

of as much as $150,000 to special operation forces personnel with 19 or 

more years of experience who reenlist for an additional 6 years. Individual 

components have also implemented changes. The Army, for example, 

increased the amount of cash bonuses it offers to new recruits in hard-tofill military occupations to as much as $20,000. In addition, the Army 

increased its maximum college scholarship from $50,000 to $70,000, and 

the Army National Guard doubled the amount it will provide to repay a 

recruit’s student loan to $20,000. Regarding the services’ nonfinancial 

efforts, the Army and Marine Corps are increasing their recruiting forces. 

The Army plans to add 965 recruiters to its current recruiter force of 5,065 

recruiters in fiscal year 2005, and the Marine Corps plans to add 425 

recruiters to its current recruiter force of 2,600 recruiters by fiscal year 

2007. Our fall 2005 report will contain more discussion of these and other 

DOD efforts to enhance recruitment and retention.

Background Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, DOD 

has launched three major military operations requiring significant military 

personnel: Operation Noble Eagle, which covers military operations related 

to homeland security; Operation Enduring Freedom, which includes 

ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and certain other countries; and 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, which includes ongoing military operations in 

Iraq. These military operations have greatly increased the services’ 

operations and personnel tempo of the military services, and especially 

those of the Army and Marine Corps, which have provided the bulk of the 

military personnel burden associated with operations in Iraq. Additionally, 

a significant number of military personnel have been killed or wounded in 

Iraq. Many congressional and military observers have expressed concern 

that the current operations tempo, combined with the level of casualties in 

Iraq, might lead to lower recruiting and retention rates, thereby raising 

questions about DOD’s ability to sustain long-term force requirements. In 
Page 4 GAO-05-419T 

addition, there are growing concerns that a number of stress factors, such 

as back-to-back and/or lengthy overseas deployments and heavier reliance 

on the reserve components in the Army and Marine Corps, may 

significantly hinder DOD’s overall ability to effectively recruit and retain 

forces.

According to DOD officals, recruiting is the military services’ ability to 

bring new members into the military to carry out mission essential tasks in 

the near term and to begin creating a sufficient pool of entry-level 

personnel to develop into future mid-level and upper-level military leaders. 

To accomplish this task, active, reserve, and Guard components set goals 

for accessions, or new recruits, who will enter basic training each year. To 

assist in recruiting, the military services advertise on television, on radio, 

and in print and participate in promotional activities, such as sports car 

racing events. In response to some of the services missing their overall 

recruiting goals in the late 1990s, DOD increased its advertising, number of 

recruiters, and financial incentives. Our September 2003 report2

 assessed 

DOD’s recruiting advertising programs, and concluded that DOD did not 

have clear program objectives and adequate outcome measures to evaluate 

the effectiveness of its advertising. We recommended, and DOD agreed, 

that measurable advertising objectives should be established and outcome 

measures should be developed to evaluate advertising programs’ 

performance.

The term retention used by DOD refers to the military services’ ability to 

keep personnel with the necessary skills and experience. Servicemembers 

have the opportunity to either leave the military or reenlist when their 

contracts expire. A common retention concern is that too few people with 

the needed skills and experience will stay in the military, thereby creating a 

shortage of experienced personnel, decreased military efficiency, and 

lower job satisfaction. Although the services have each created their own 

unique means of tracking retention, they all measure retention in a career 

path at key points that are delineated by various combinations of years of 

service and number of enlistments. The Army and Marine Corps set 

numerical retention goals; the Air Force and Navy state their retention 

goals in terms of percentages of those able to reenlist.

2

See GAO, Military Recruiting: DOD Needs to Establish Objectives and Measures to Better 

Evaluate Advertising’s Effectiveness, GAO-03-1005 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2003).
Page 5 GAO-05-419T 

Military Components 

Generally Met Overall 

Recruiting and 

Retention Goals for the 

Past 5 Fiscal Years 

(2000-2004), but Some 

Components Have 

Missed Early 2005 

Goals

The military components generally met their overall recruiting and 

retention goals over the past 5 fiscal years. However, some are beginning to 

experience difficulties in meeting their overall recruiting and retention 

goals for fiscal year 2005.

Most Overall Recruitment 

Goals Were Met for Past 5 

Years, but Army and Marine 

Corps Experienced 

Recruiting Shortages Early 

This Year

According to DOD data, the active and reserve components generally met 

their enlisted aggregate recruiting goals for fiscal years 2000 to 2004. 

However, it should be noted that the “stop loss” policy implemented by 

several components shortly after September 11, 2001, might have 

facilitated these components in meeting their overall recruiting goals for 

fiscal year 2002 and beyond. A “stop loss” policy requires some 

servicemembers to remain in the military beyond their contract separation 

or retirement date. Keeping servicemembers on active duty longer can 

reduce the number of new people the services need to recruit to maintain 

endstrength. For example, the Army, which has implemented some form of 

“stop loss” since December 4, 2001, has required several thousand 

servicemembers to remain on active duty beyond their contractual 

separation or retirement date. The recruiting data presented in table 1 

show that in fiscal year 2004, the Army, Navy, and Air Force actually 

exceeded their goals with a 101 percent rate. 
Page 6 GAO-05-419T 

Table 1: Total Active Duty Enlisted Aggregate Recruiting Goals and Achievements for Fiscal Years 2000-2004

Source: DOD.

More recently, however, the Marine Corps and Army failed to meet 

February 2005 overall recruiting goals. The Marine Corps missed its 

January goal of 3,270 new recruits by 84 people, or 2.6 percent, and 

narrowly missed its goal again in February. This is the first time that the 

Marine Corps has missed a monthly annual recruiting goal since 1995. The 

Army is also beginning to experience difficulties and, in February 2005, 

missed its goal of 7,050 new recruits by 27.5 percent, or 1,936 recruits. This 

is significant, given that the Army has also called members of the Individual 

Ready Reserve3

 into active duty and moved thousands of recruits from its 

delayed entry program into basic training ahead of schedule.4 Air Force and 

Navy overall recruiting goals, on the other hand, do not appear to be in 

jeopardy at this time, as both services intend to reduce their endstrengths. 

Over the next year the Air Force plans to downsize by about 20,000 

personnel, and the Navy is looking to trim more than 7,300 sailors. 

Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force 

Fiscal 

year Goal Actual

Percent 

of goal 

met Goal

Actual Percent of 

goal met Goal Actual

Percent 

of goal 

met Goal Actual

Percent 

of goal 

met

2000 80,000 80,113 100 55,000 55,147 100 32,417 32,440 100 34,600 35,217 102 

2001 75,800 75,855 100 53,520 53,690 100 31,404 31,429 100 34,600 35,381 102 

2002 79,500 79,585 100 46,150 46,155 100 32,593 32,767 101 37,283 37,967 102 

2003 73,800 74,132 100 41,065 41,076 100 32,501 32,530 100 37,000 37,141 100 

2004 77,000 77,586 101 39,620 39,871 101 30,608 30,618 100 34,080 34,361 101 

3

The Individual Ready Reserve is comprised principally of individuals who (1) have had 

training, (2) have served previously in an active or reserve component, and (3) have some 

period of their military service obligation remaining. 

4

The delayed entry program consists of individuals who have signed a contract to join the 

military at a future date.
Page 7 GAO-05-419T 

Table 2 shows that four of the six DOD reserve components generally met 

their enlisted aggregate recruiting goals for fiscal years 2000 through 2004 

but that the Army National Guard achieved only 82 percent of its recruiting 

objectives in fiscal years 2003 and 87 percent 2004, and that the Air 

National Guard achieved 94 percent of its recruiting objective in fiscal year 

2004.

Table 2: Total Reserve Component Enlisted Aggregate Recruiting Goals and Achievements for Fiscal Years 2000-2004

Source: DOD.

First quarter 2005 reserve and Guard recruiting data suggest that the 

reserve components may experience difficulties in meeting their early 2005 

overall recruiting goals. The Marine Corps Reserve, which achieved 106 

percent of its overall first quarter 2005 recruiting goals, is the only reserve 

component that has met or surpassed its goal so far this year. The Army 

Reserve and Army National Guard achieved 87 and 80 percent of their 

overall recruiting goals, respectively. The Air Force Reserve achieved 91 

percent of its overall recruiting goal; the Air National Guard, 71 percent; 

Army National Guard Army Reserve Navy Reserve

Fiscal year Goal Actual

Percent of 

goal met Goal Actual 

Percent of 

goal met Goal Actual

Percent

 of goal

 met

2000 54,034 61,260 113 48,461 48,596 100 18,410 14,911 81

2001 60,252 61,956 103 34,910 35,522 102 15,250 15,344 101

2002 60,504 63,251 105 38,251 41,385 108 15,000 15,355 102

2003 66,000 54,202 82 40,900 41,851 102 12,000 12,772 106

2004 56,002 48,793 87 32,275 32,710 101 10,101 11,246 111

Marine Corps Reserve Air National Guard Air Force Reserve

Fiscal year Goal Actual 

Percent of 

goal met Goal Actual 

Percent of 

goal met Goal Actual

Percent

 of goal

 met

2000 9,341 9,465 101 10,080 10,730 106 9,624 7,740 80

2001 8,945 9,117 102 11,808 10,258 87 8,051 8,826 110

2002 9,835 10,090 103 9,570 10,122 106 6,080 6,926 114

 2003 8,173 8,222 101 5,712 8,471 148 7,512 7,557 101

2004 8,087 8,248 102 8,842 8,276 94 7,997 8,904 111
Page 8 GAO-05-419T 

and the Navy Reserve, 77 percent. DOD has noted that the Army Reserve 

components will be particularly challenged, since more active Army 

soldiers are staying in the active force, and of those leaving, fewer are 

joining the reserve components.

Most Overall Retention 

Goals Met for Past 5 Years

According to DOD data, the four active components generally met their 

enlisted aggregate retention goals from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 

2004. However, as I stated in the discussion on recruiting, it should also be 

noted here that the services’ “stop loss” policies implemented shortly after 

September 11, 2001, might have facilitated the services in meeting their 

aggregate retention goals since fiscal year 2002. In addition, the Army 

generally reduced its overall retention goals from fiscal year 2000 through 

fiscal year 2003. 

Table 3 shows that the Army is the only active component that met all of its 

retention goals for fiscal years 2000 through 2004. Table 3 also shows that, 

in fiscal year 2004, the Navy missed its retention goal for initial 

reenlistments by just less than 2 percentage points and the Air Force 

missed its goal for midcareer term reenlistments by 5 percentage points. In 

fact, the Air Force missed this goal in 4 of the past 5 fiscal years and missed 

its goal for career third term or subsequent reenlistments in 2000 and 2001. 

The Navy missed its goal for reenlistments among enlisted personnel who 

have served from 10 to 14 years in 2 of the past 5 fiscal years, and the 

Marine Corps missed its goal for second and subsequent reenlistments in 

fiscal year 2003 only.
Page 9 GAO-05-419T 

Table 3: Total Active Duty Enlisted Aggregate Retention Goals and Achievements for Fiscal Years 2000-2004

Source: DOD.

Notes: Various Navy and Marine Corps retention goals for fiscal years 2000 and 2001 were not 

available or complete (i.e., “N/A”).

The Army tracks retention rates by initial term (first enlistment, regardless of length), mid-career 

(second or subsequent enlistment with less than 10 years of service), and career (second or 

subsequent enlistment with 10 or more years of service).

The Navy’s most important retention categories are Zone A (up to 6 years of service), Zone B (6 years 

of service to under 10 years of service), and Zone C (10 years of service to under 14 years of service).

The Marine Corps tracks retention by first enlistment and second or subsequent enlistment.

The Air Force tracks retention by first term (first enlistment, regardless of length), second term (second 

enlistment), and career (third or subsequent enlistment). 

For the first quarter of fiscal year 2005, data show that the Army missed its 

initial reenlistment goal for active duty enlisted personel by 6 percent and 

its midcareer reenlistment goal by 4 percent. The Air Force also missed two 

Service FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004

Goal Actual

Percent 

of goal 

met Goal Actual

Percent 

of goal 

met Goal Actual

Percent 

of goal 

met Goal Actual

Percent 

of goal 

met Goal Actual

Percent 

of Goal 

met

Army

 Initial

20,000 21,402 107 19,750 20,000 101 19,100 19,433 102 19,821 21,838 110 23,000 24,903 108

 Midcareer

23,700 24,118 102 23,350 23,727 102 22,700 23,074 102 18,422 19,509 106 20,292 21,120 104

 Career

24,300 25,791 106 20,900 21,255 102 15,000 15,700 105 12,757 12,804 100 12,808 13,987 109

Navy

Zone A N/A 29.6% N/A 57% 56.9% Short 56% 58.7% Exceed 56% 61.8% Exceed 56% 54.1% Short

Zone B N/A 46.5% N/A 69% 68.2% Short 73% 74.5% Exceed 73% 76.7% Exceed 70% 70.2% Exceed

Zone C N/A 56.6% N/A 89% 85.0% Short 90% 87.4% Short 86% 87.9% Exceed 85% 86.9% Exceed

Marine Corps

First term 5,791 5,846 101 6,144 6,144 100 5,900 6,050 103 6,025 6,001 100 5,974 6,011 101

Subsequent N/A 63.4% N/A N/A 5,900 N/A 5,784 7,258 125 6,172 5,815 94 5,628 7,729 137

Air Force

First term 55% 53.1% Short 55% 56.1% Exceed 55% 72.1% Exceed 55% 60.5% Exceed 55% 63% Exceed

Second term 75% 69.7% Short 75% 68.9% Short 75% 78.3% Exceed 79% 72.9% Short 75% 70% Short

Career 95% 90.8% Short 95% 90.2% Short 95% 94.6% Short 95% 95.2% Exceed 95% 97% Exceed
Page 10 GAO-05-419T 

of its reenlistment goals for active duty enlisted personnel in the first 

quarter of fiscal year 2005. The Air Force achieved a reenlistment rate of 50 

percent for second-term reenlistments, compared with its goal of 75 

percent, and a reenlistment rate of 92 percent for career reenlistments, 

compared with its goal of 95 percent. The Air Force also established a goal 

for 55 percent of all personnel eligible for a first-term reenlistment to 

reenlist and missed this goal by just 1 percent.

We are continuing to collect, analyze, and assess the reliability of retention 

data for both the active and reserve components, which we will 

incorporate into our final report. 

Aggregate Recruitment 

and Retention Data Do 

Not Identify Over- or 

Under-staffing within 

Certain Military 

Occupations 

Recruitment and retention rates, when shown in the aggregate, do not 

provide a complete representation of occupations that are either over- or 

under-filled. For example, our analysis of fiscal year 2005 Army data, on its 

185 active component enlisted occupations, shows that 116 occupations, or 

63 percent, are currently overfilled and that 60 occupations, or 32 percent, 

are underfilled. Also, the Marine Corps told us that, of its 255 active 

component enlisted occupations, 52 occupations, or 20 percent, are 

overfilled and that 37 occupations, or 15 percent, are underfilled. Data 

provided by the Navy show that 32 enlisted occupations are overfilled and 

55 occupations are under filled. 

According to the Congressional Budget Office, about 30 percent of the 

occupations for enlisted personnel experienced shortages and about 40 

percent experienced overages, on average, from fiscal year 1999 through 

fiscal year 2004.5

 We requested the active, reserve, and Guard components 

provide us with their list of hard-to-fill occupations. On the basis of data for 

7 of 10 components, we identified several hundred occupations that have 

been consistently designated as hard-to-fill because the components had 

not been able to successfully recruit and retain sufficient numbers of 

personnel in these areas to meet current or projected needs. Of these, we 

identified 73 occupations as being consistently hard to fill. Table 4 shows 

these 73 hard-to-fill occupations, by components.

5

Congressional Budget Office, Budget Options (February 2005).
Page 11 GAO-05-419T 

Table 4: Hard-to-Fill Occupations

Component Enlisted occupation or specialty identified as being consistently hard to recruit or retain 

Active Duty Army Infantry

Cannon Crewmember

Multi Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Crewmember

Field Artillery Computer System Specialist

Cavalry Scout

M1 Armor Crewmember

Abrams Tank Maintainer

Bradley Maintainer

Petroleum Supply Specialist

Food Services Specialist

Cryptic Linguist

Army Reserve Heavy Construction Equipment Operator

Concrete and Asphalt Equipment Operator

Carpentry and Masonry Specialist

Cable Systems Installer-Maintainer

Military Police

Psychological Operations Specialist

Civil Affairs, General 

Light Wheel Vehicle Maintainer

Chemical Operations Specialist

Motor Transport Operator

Ammunitions Specialist

Hospital Food Specialist 

Automated Logistical Specialist

Petroleum Supply Specialist

Shower/Laundry and Clothing Repair Specialist

Water Treatment Specialist 

Active Duty Air Force Aircraft Loadmaster

Airborne Mission Specialist

Air Traffic Control

Combat Control

Tactical Air Command and Control

Aerospace Control and Warning Systems

Intelligence

Imagery Analysis
Page 12 GAO-05-419T 

Crypto Linguist 

Signals Intelligence Analysis

Electronic Signals Intelligence Exploitation

Survival/Evasion/Resistance/Escape Operations

Pararescue

Interpreter/Translater

Electronic Computer Switching Systems 

Air Force Reserve Aircrew Operations

Intelligence

Aircrew Protection

Weather

Manned Aerospace Maintenance 

Logistics

Maintenance Management Systems

Transportation

Munitions and Weapons

Security Forces

Active Duty Marine Corps Counter Intelligence Specialist

Marine Corps Reserve Intelligence

Imagery Analysis

Reconnaissance 

Civil Affairs Non Commissioned Officer

Ground Communications Repairer

Military Police

Air Traffic Controller

Airborne Radio Operator

Scout Sniper

KC-130 Crewmembers

(Continued From Previous Page)

Component Enlisted occupation or specialty identified as being consistently hard to recruit or retain 
Page 13 GAO-05-419T 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data

Notes: The remaining components (Air National Guard, Army National Guard and Navy Reserve) did 

not provide us with data.

Active duty Army data from 2001-2005, Army Reserve data from 2000-2009, active duty Air Force data 

from 2000-2005, Air Force Reserve data is current proposed information, Marine Corps data is 2000-

2005, Navy data is from GAO report 05-299.6

More specifically, we asked DOD to provide us with the current hard-to-fill 

occupations for active duty components, and we received data for the 

Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Marine Corps currently does not report 

hard-to-fill occupation information to DOD. Table 5 shows the extent to 

which these occupations were over- or under-filled as of November 2004.

Active Navy Aviation Structural Mechanic (Equipment)

Aviation Structural Mechanic (Structural)

Cryptologic Technician

Data Processing Technician

Electrician’s Mate

Fire Control Technician

Machinist’s Mate

Mineman

Missile Technician

Operations Specialist

(Continued From Previous Page)

Component Enlisted occupation or specialty identified as being consistently hard to recruit or retain 

6

See GAO, Financial Costs and Loss of Critical Skills Due to DOD’s Homosexual Conduct 

Policy Cannot Be Completely Estimated, GAO-05-299 (Washington, D.C.: February 2005).
Page 14 GAO-05-419T 

Table 5: Over- and Under-filled Hard-to-Fill Occupations As of November 2004

Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component 

Personnel 

authorized

Personnel 

assigned Difference

Navy

Special Warfare Diver 3288 2187 -1101

Surface Force Corpsman 614 188 -426

Nuclear Missile Technician 10536 10364 -172

P-3 Flight Engineer 354 257 -97

Sonar Technician (Submarine) 1985 1901 -84

In Flight Aviation Technician 214 145 -69

Sonar Technician (Surface) 175 111 -64

Linguist 932 872 -60

Special Operations Corpsman 101 54 -47

Aviation Warfare Operator 225 215 -10

Air Force

Crypto Linguist 1459 1916 +457

Explosive Ordinance Disposal 1006 1074 +68

Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE) 404 408 +4

Airborne Crypto Linguist 944 499 -445

Operation Intel 2519 2293 -226

Network Intelligence Analysis 1511 1365 -146

Pararescue 362 243 -119

Imagery Analysis 1150 1071 -79

Combat Control 432 360 -72

Electrical Signals Intelligence Exploitation 734 673 -61

Army

Infantryman 39690 41287 +1597

Cavalry Scout 7656 7889 +233

Motor Transport Operator 11830 10459 -1371

Health Care Specialist 16962 16472 -490

Fire Support Specialist 4283 3914 -369

Chemical Operation Specialist 6694 6342 -352

Special Operations Medical Sergeant 769 630 -139

Petroleum Supply Specialist 8306 8206 -100

Explosive Ordinance Disposal 984 886 -98

Food Service Specialist 9659 9588 -71
Page 15 GAO-05-419T 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data

Note: N/A denotes not available.

Further analysis of the data shows that 7 of the Army’s occupations 

(infantry, fire support specialist, cavalry scout, chemical operations 

specialist, motor transport operator, petroleum supply specialist, and food 

service specialist) and 6 of the Air Force’s occupations (airborne linguist; 

combat control; imagery analysis; linguist; SERE [survival, evasion, 

resistance, escape operations]; pararescue, and explosive ordnance 

disposal) are on both the services’ “hard to recruit” and “hard to retain” 

lists. 

DOD’s Components 

Are Taking Steps to 

Address Recruiting and 

Retention Challenges

DOD has made enhancements to existing programs and introduced new 

programs in recent years to improve its ability to recruit and retain 

servicemembers. These programs include increasing the eligibility for and 

size of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses and educational benefits, and 

the number of recruiters.

DOD, for example, expanded the pool of servicemembers who are eligible 

to receive a selective reenlistment bonus. Selective reenlistment bonuses 

are designed to provide an incentive for an adequate number of qualified 

midcareer enlisted members to reenlist in designated critical occupations 

where retention levels are insufficient to sustain current or projected levels 

necessary for a service to accomplish its mission. The statutory authority 

for this bonus was amended in the Fiscal Year 2004 Defense Authorization 

Act to allow the Secretary of Defense to waive the “critical skill” 

requirement for members who reenlist or extend an enlistment while 

serving in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Kuwait in support of Operations Enduring 

Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.7

In addition, in February 2005, DOD announced a new retention bonus for 

Special Operations Forces personnel (Army Special Forces; Navy SEALs; 

and Air Force pararescue, plus a few other specialties) who decide to 

Marine Corps

No data available N/A N/A N/A

(Continued From Previous Page)

Hard-to-fill critical occupations by active component 

Personnel 

authorized

Personnel 

assigned Difference

7

Pub. L. No. 108-136, sec. 626
Page 16 GAO-05-419T 

remain in the military beyond 19 years of service. The largest bonus, 

$150,000, will go to senior sergeants, petty officers, and warrant officers 

who sign up for an additional 6 years of service. Personnel who sign up for 

shorter extensions will receive a smaller bonus; personnel who extend for 

1 additional year, for example, will receive $8,000. 

Individual components have also implemented changes. The Army, for 

instance, increased the amount of cash bonuses it offers to new recruits in 

hard-to-fill military occupations up to $20,000. In December 2004, the 

National Guard announced that it is increasing its initial enlistment 

bonuses from $8,000 to $10,000 for individuals without prior service who 

sign up for one of the National Guard’s top-priority military occupations 

such as infantry, military police, and transportation. DOD officials also said 

the Army and the National Guard are increasing the amount of their college 

scholarship funds for new enlistees. The Army increased the maximum 

college scholarship from $50,000 to $70,000, while the Army National 

Guard doubled the amount it will provide to repay a recruit’s student loan 

to $20,000. 

Finally, the Army and Marine Corps components are increasing their 

recruiting forces to meet their additional recruiting challenges. The Army 

plans to add 965 recruiters to its recruiter force in fiscal year 2005, for a 

total force of 6,030 recruiters, and the Marine Corps plans to add 425 

recruiters to its recruiter force by fiscal year 2007, bringing its total 

recruiter force to 3,025 recruiters. 

Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to 

respond to any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee 

may have at this time.

Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments

For questions about this statement, please contact Derek B. Stewart at 

(202) 512-5559 (e-mail address: Stewartd@gao.gov) or David E. Moser at 

(202) 512-7611 (e-mail address: Moserd@gao.gov). Individuals making key 

contributions to this testimony included Alissa H. Czyz, Joseph J. Faley, 

Brian D. Pegram, and John S. Townes.

(350662)
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