66 STORIES OF

BATTLE COMMAND

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

School for

Command Preparation

Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

presents

66 STORIES OF

BATTLE COMMAND

Adela Frame and James W. Lussier, Editors

Fort Leavenworth Research Unit

United States Army Research Institute

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

66 Stories of Battle Command / Adela Frame, James W. Lussier, Editors

xi, 255 p. maps; 23 cm. 

Includes index.

ISBN

1. Military Command, Modern - - 21st century. 2. Military

Decision Making, Modern - - 21st century. 3. United States - - Army 

Commanders - - Narratives. 4. Military Maneuvers - - California - -

Fort Irwin 5. Military Art and Science - - Narratives. I. Title. II. Frame, 

Adela. III. Lussier, James W.

2000

U260.

355.4/

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

FOREWORD

The U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI) Research Unit at Fort

Leavenworth and the School for Command Preparation (SCP) of the

Command and General Staff College have a long history of mutual

support which dates back to the inception of the Tactical Commanders

Development Course (TCDC) in 1988. Since then, ARI has

periodically conducted interviews and surveys of numerous SCP

graduates in a continuing effort to maintain the high quality of TCDC

and more recently to support the development of the Battle

Commanders Development Course (BCDC).

One finding that has consistently emerged from these studies is the

unsolicited praise for the exchange of stories and personal maxims

that occurs during TCDC and BCDC. As we have found in our

studies of other aspects of tacit knowledge, the military tradition of

instruction through experience and historical example has a sound

foundation in psychological theory. SCP seminars and exercises

regularly prompt battle commanders to relate personal accounts that

illustrate battlefield concepts. These practical anecdotes have a clear

motivational value and also provide a lasting source of easily recalled

tactical knowledge. 

The current project was initiated to collect stories from

experienced commanders. These stories will supplement the BCDC

curriculum by providing a common pool of anecdotes to successive

classes. They will also provide a basis for a broader discussion of

requirements for future battle command. 

The candor and commitment of the experienced commanders who

shared their stories is greatly appreciated; they have made a significant

contribution to the next generation. 

JOHN R. WOOD DR. EDGAR M. JOHNSON

Brigadier General, USA Director

Deputy Commandant Army Research Institute

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The editors wish to gratefully acknowledge the contributions of

the following persons:

Retired General Fred Franks, Jr. for his substantial work to

characterize and promote active consideration of Battle Command

within the U.S. Army.

Major General William S. Wallace and Major General Russel L.

Honore for essential narrative contributions in addition to gracious

introduction to commanders within the U.S. Army 4th Infantry

Division (Mechanized) and 1st Cavalry Division.

Colonel John D. Rosenburger and Major James L. Miller for

preliminary contribution and encouragement as well as insights for

continued refinement of the project method and purview. 

Lieutenant Colonel Michael Prevou who served as the

representative of the School for Command Preparation and developed

the methods of incorporating the book into the program of instruction

at the Tactical Commanders Development Course. 

Dr. Robert S. Ruskin and the continuing quality support of the

Consortium Research Fellows Program at the U.S. Army Research

Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

And most appreciatively, to Mr. Robert E. Solick for his careful

reading, perceptive suggestions, and judicious guidance.

CONTENTS

Forward iii

Acknowledgements iv

Contents v

Lesson Themes ix

Illustrations xi

Introduction 1

 by GENERAL FRED FRANKS, JR., US ARMY (RETIRED)

Battle Command Stories

 1. Company Team Knows Its Sector 7

 2. Misreading the Effects of Terrain 9

 3. Mentally Preparing for the Mission 11

 4. See Yourself 13

MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM S. WALLACE

COMMANDER, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION (MECHANIZED), 1999

 5. Orchestration and Synchronization 15

 6. Clear Objectives for Clear Intent 16

 7. Enriching Experience 18

BRIGADIER GENERAL RUSSEL L. HONORE

ASSISTANT DIVISION COMMANDER, 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION, 1998

 8. Carousel of Deception 25

BRIGADIER GENERAL [RETIRED] HUBA WASS DE CZEGE

SENIOR MENTOR, DIGITAL ADVANCED WARFIGHTING EXPERIMENT, 1999

 9. Follow Your Heart 29

10. Picture of the Obstacle 31

11. Simultaneous Attack 33

COLONEL GEORGE BOWERS

COMMANDER, 2ND BRIGADE, 1CD, 1998
vi

12. Leave OPFOR Tactics to the OPFOR 37

13. Shaping the Battlefield for a Flexible Defense 39

COLONEL JOSEPH FIL

COMMANDER, 1ST BRIGADE, 1CD, 1998

14. See the Terrain to Assess the Terrain 43

15. Critical Forward Check 45

COLONEL BENJAMIN FREAKLEY

COMMANDER, 3RD BRIGADE, 1CD, 1998

16. Leadership in a Composite BCT 49

17. Pressure to Decide 50

18. Seize the Initiative 54

19. Conditions for Attack Dissolve in Bad Weather 57

20. Huddle on the Battlefield 62

21. Two MICLICs Delay Breach 66

COLONEL TED KOSTICH

COMMANDER, 2ND BRIGADE, 4ID(M), 1999

22. Pick Up the Red Pen First 69

23. Everything Takes Longer Than You Think 72

24. Tactical Patience and Managing Battle Tempo 75

25. No News is Bad News 76

26. Survivability on the Move 79

COLONEL RICK LYNCH

COMMANDER, 1ST BRIGADE, 4ID(M), 1999

27. Air-Ground Planning 81

28. JSTARS Missing Link 84

29. Aviation BCT Challenges 86

30. Safety and Fratricide at Live Fire 88

31. Apaches in Every Valley 90

32. Rock Drills for a Common Picture 92

COLONEL CRAIG MADDEN

COMMANDER, 4TH BRIGADE, 4ID(M), 1999
Contents

vii

33. Sensing the Battle 95

34. Stop and Fuel or Go Without 97

35. Too Many Changes of Mission 104

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DOUGLAS BOONE

COMMANDER, 1ST BATTALION 5TH CAVALRY, 1CD, 1998

36. Engineers in the TOC 111

37. Unknown Avenues of Approach Along the South Wall 118

38. Accelerated Decision Making Process 121

39. Engineers at the Point of Attack 122

40. Integrated Countermobility Destroys Enemy 126

41. Hell Bent on Breaching 127

42. Up the Furlong 130

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID HANSEN

COMMANDER, 20TH ENGINEER BATTALION, 1CD, 1998

43. Launch Me Early 133

44. Aviation Company Lessons, Developing Engagement Area 137

45. Nothing in the North 140

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DYFIERD A. HARRIS

COMMANDER, 1ST BATTALION 4TH ATTACK AVIATION, 4ID(M), 1999

46. Quick Correction in the Bowl 145

47. Washboard Attack 150

48. Moving Cautiously to Contact 153

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ORLEY H. JOHNS

COMMANDER, 3RD BATTALION 8TH CAVALRY, 1CD, 1998

49. FASCAM Kills 159

50. Trusting Your “Eyes” 161

LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEPHEN MITCHELL

COMMANDER, 2ND BATTALION 82ND FIELD ARTILLERY, 1998

51. Fighting Digital, Fighting Analog 165

52. Hounds From Hell Racing Across Germany 170

53. Unknowns of Digital Doctrine 176

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOE MOORE

COMMANDER, 1ST SQUADRON 10TH CAVALRY, 4ID(M), 1998
viii

54. Seventy-Two Hour Guard Mission 183

55. Too Bold for Day One 190

56. From Parts to a Whole at NTC 193

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOE MOORE

COMMANDER, 1ST SQUADRON 10TH CAVALRY, 4ID(M), 1999

57. Scatterable Mines, Force of the Future 199

58. In the Dirt 201

59. Be at the Breach 204

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN PEABODY

COMMANDER, 299TH ENGINEER BATTALION, 4ID(M), 1999

60. Remnants of the FSE 207

61. Fighting Dirty 217

62. OPFOR Deceived in the Fog 225

LIEUTENANT COLONEL FREDERICK RUDESHEIM

COMMANDER, 1ST BATTALION 9TH CAVALRY, 1CD, 1998

63. Coalition Forces 229

LIEUTENANT COLONEL THOMAS R. RUHL

COMMANDER, 2ND BATTALION 8TH INFANTRY, 4ID(M), 1999

64. Brute Force and Ignorance 233

65. S3 on the Battlefield 238

66. Battle Command Team 243

LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHRISTOPHER TUCKER

COMMANDER, 2ND BATTALION 5TH CAVALRY, 1CD, 1998

Index 247
ix

LESSON THEMES

GENERAL THEME STORY NUMBERS

Command and Control, 

 Staff Planning Process 3, 27, 28, 36, 38, 66

Command Estimate 3, 22

Command Intent, 

 Communicating to

 Subordinates

6, 19, 20, 25, 27, 28, 

31, 63, 64

Command Position on the 

 Battlefield 29, 33, 45, 58, 59, 65

Command Thought Process,

 Use of Commander Time 3, 8, 10, 15, 32

Contingency Planning 35, 65

Creating Confusion, Ambiguity 5, 8

Decision Process Management 3, 17, 18, 33, 34, 35, 

51, 60

Enriching Experience 7, 11, 54, 57, 58

Flexible Planning, Flexibility, 

 Adaptive Execution

13, 16, 19, 48, 52, 59, 

61, 62, 64

Focus on Mission 41, 43, 52, 61

Intuition 9, 33, 49, 50

Know Unit Capabilities 7, 12, 14, 43, 56
x

GENERAL THEME STORY NUMBERS

Modeling a Thinking Enemy 5, 13, 17, 22, 26, 33,

49

Monitoring Enemy 5, 8, 23, 60, 64, 66

Personal Wargame 3, 14, 48

Situational Awareness 4, 8, 10, 20, 31, 39, 

46, 51

Staff and Subordinate Reporting 4,6, 10, 17, 25, 43, 50, 

55, 63

Supervision 15, 32, 46, 54, 66

Synchronization, 

 Considerations of Timing

5,7, 11, 21, 23, 24, 26, 

27, 34, 35, 40, 60

System Employment and 

 Capabilities, Use of Assets

1, 6, 11, 21, 25, 28,

29, 36, 40, 57

Technology 10, 14, 23, 24, 28, 43, 

44, 51, 52, 53, 57

Terrain Appreciation, 

 Reconnaissance, Using Terrain 1, 2, 8, 14, 37, 47
xi

ILLUSTRATIONS

Maps, National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California

Figure 1. Northern Corridor/Live Fire Area, NTC. 3

Figure 2. Central Corridor, NTC. 4

Figure 3. Southern Corridor, NTC. 5

Figure 4. Brigade Combat Team Defensive Plan. 51

Figure 5. Reconstituting the Reserve. 53

Figure 6. Day 1 Attack – Base Plan. 55

Figure 7. Day 2 Attack – Initial COA. 57

Figure 8. Day 2 Attack – FRAGO. 59

Figure 9. Brigade Combat Team Attack to Hill 720. 98

Figure 10. FRAGO to Refuel at Furlong Ridge. 100

Figure 11. Attack Over Siberian Ridge. 103

Figure 12. Meeting Engagement in the Central Corridor. 106

Figure 13. OPFOR Main Body Maneuvers North. 108

Figure 14. OPFOR Bypasses BCT Defense. 120

Figure 15. Attacking Furlong Ridge and the Whale. 131

Figure 16. 3-8 CAV Defense in the South. 147

Figure 17. 3-8 CAV Attacks Through the Washboard. 151

Figure 18. 3-8 Movement to Contact – Central Corridor. 154

Figure 19. 1-9 Movement to Contact – Central Corridor. 209

Figure 20. Advance Guard Main Body Maneuvers South. 213

Figure 21. Attack Through Brown and Debnam Passes. 218

Figure 22. 1-9 CAV Reorients North. 222

Figure 23. OPFOR FSE Attacks to Iron Triangle. 227

Figure 24. Attacking the MRB in the Washboard. 234

Figure 25. Attacking the MRC at Gary Owen. 239



INTRODUCTION

Soldiers have always been good storytellers. Along with the

doctrine and training and drills, along with the study of military

history, the personal recollections of fellow soldiers are an important

source of developing a feel for the art of battle command. Stories are

a primary means of transmitting the tribal wisdom of the profession of

arms.

Years ago, as a young officer, on the verge of entering my first

war, I knew an older soldier, a veteran of the Korean War. I listened

to many stories told by this soldier, and embedded in those stories

were lessons arising from the experience of combat. These were real

stories of decisions and the emotions surrounding them, set in actual

wartime situations, not mere precepts in a leadership manual. Later,

facing the challenges of combat, I recalled those lessons and the

stories that had made them memorable. These warstories had been an

important and unmistakable part of my preparation for combat.

In today’s Army, there exists an unspoken stricture against telling

warstories – an implied message that “no one wants to hear your

warstories.” Nothing could be more wrong. The commander who

shares his experiences, good and bad, encourages a climate of open

exchange and honest appraisal. These stories are valuable. They

stimulate, they enrich, they teach.

This book contains stories from field and general officers

commanding in training exercises, most from rotations at the National

Training Center. In their stories, they describe their thoughts, their

actions, their successes and especially their mistakes. In each story

the commander tells how he learned an important lesson in battle

command - and he identifies the lesson. And every story succeeds;

there is not one without a valuable lesson. The willingness to share is

striking from every contributor. Each has shown no reticence in

honestly describing his errors, the mark of a confident, experienced,

and learning student of the military art.
2

As you read the stories, note well. Few are about tactical

maneuvers and doctrinal principles. Instead, they are stories of

friction and confusion - friction generated in the challenging task of

orchestrating the actions of a large complex force. This, under the

pressure of a hostile environment and a wily, punishing OPFOR, who

know the habits of BLUFOR commanders as well as they know the

terrain. And they are stories of growth, as the commanders strengthen

their intuitive feel for battlefield dynamics, a process achieved only

through experience and practice. I commend the creative, forthright,

hardworking, reflective, and insightful commanders presented in

these stories. They are serious students of the art of battle command.

GENERAL FRED FRANKS, JR. U.S. ARMY (RETIRED)
3

876

IRON

TRIANGLE

BROWN

PASS

GRANITE

PASS

RACETRACK

EAST RANGE ROAD

910

DRINKWATER

LAKE

LEACH LAKE

PASSES

DRINKWATER

VALLEY

ECHO

VALLEY

ESCARPMENT

BRUNO ALPHA PASS

BRAVO

PASS

ARROWHEAD

Figure 1. Northern Corridor/Live Fire Area -- National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA.
4

876 COLORADO

IRON

TRIANGLE

BROWN

PASS

DEBNAM

PASS

780

760

GRANITE

PASS

CRASH HILL

MATTERHORN

CHINAMAN’S

HAT

WASHBOARD

RACETRACK

BRIGADE

HILL

H DI DEN VALLEY

BIKE

LAKE

EAST RANGE ROAD 910

CHOD

PEANUT

AB

SR

OT

R W

AO D

BASALT

GOAT 

TRAIL

BRUNO

Figure 2. Central Corridor -- National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA.
5

VALLEY OF DEATH

SIBERIA

SIBERIAN

RIDGE

TIEFORT

MOUNTAIN

760

781

BRIGADE

HILL

BIKE

LAKE

WHALE

FURLONG

RIDGE

H DI DEN VALLEY

OP 1

RED PASS

720

WHALE

GAP

OP 2

JOHN WAYNE

FOOTHILLS

JOHN WAYNE PASS

Figure 3. Southern Corridor -- National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA.

MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM S. WALLACE, 1999

1. Company Team Knows Its Sector

A number of years ago at NTC I saw a company team of five tanks,

two Bradleys, and about a platoon of dismounted infantry defeat the

entire OPFOR regiment. It was just surprising. Great fight and some

very good actions by a young company commander and his sergeants.

They were defending Red Pass, the economy of force effort for the

battalion. The battalion main defense was elsewhere, up on the Siberian

Ridge up by 781, because that is where they expected the OPFOR to

attack. They had a substantial amount of engineer effort put in a

complex obstacle in Red Pass. There was a wire mine obstacle and a

tank ditch in Red Pass that happened to be in about the right place. 

The OPFOR regiment, based on their reconnaissance, knew the tank

ditch and wire mine obstacle was there but they also knew it was lightly

defended. So, they opted to attack with the entire regiment, all 180

some vehicles, into Red Pass. The fight broke down like this. The

battalion is defending. The OPFOR comes rolling through the Whale

Gap, took a hard right heading toward Red Pass, using heavy smoke so

the battalion didn't recognize where the main effort was going until very

late in the fight. The OPFOR’s lead motorized rifle battalion arrived

within range of Red Pass. This company commander and his XO had

positioned their tanks up on a piece of high ground on the south side of

Red Pass and started taking the OPFOR under fire with their M1s at

very long range. They killed a few OPFOR vehicles early on which

caused the OPFOR to slow down a little bit. 

What they did following that, which was very smart on their part,

was after firing a number of rounds and killing a number of OPFOR

vehicles, they withdrew off of that high ground into their prepared

fighting positions which were on the reverse side of Red Pass. In the

process of doing that, the OPFOR recognized that there were some

vehicles located up on that high ground and elected not to try to assault

that high ground and tried to assault around the opposite side of Red

Pass. Of course, these vehicles have withdrawn in depth into their

fighting positions. And while the OPFOR was trying to assault around

the left side, they committed their breaching assets into the complex

obstacle. 
8

It just so happened there was one tank crew in a wadi on the north

side of Red Pass. One tank crew who had reconned to the nth degree

and knew every inch of that wadi. As the OPFOR's assault elements

and engineer assets approached the obstacle, that one tank crew started

taking them under fire and killing every one of them. They would fire

two rounds, duck down in the wadi, move along the wadi, come up to

another firing position,

fire a couple of rounds,

duck down, move to

another position, come

back up, fire a couple of

rounds and so on. So, as

far as the OPFOR was

concerned, they thought

they had a whole

platoon, maybe a company, off on their left flank, and it was one single

tank that was using the terrain very, very well, and had boresighted their

weapon system. 

Ultimately the OPFOR recognized that and they dismounted a bunch

of infantry to try to take out this tank. The infantry, dismounted, came

over another piece of high ground on the north side of Red Pass. As

they crested that high ground, a Bradley, which was located in depth

behind the tank, started taking them under fire. With his 25mm he

destroyed every one of the OPFOR dismounted infantrymen. By this

time, the OPFOR had lost about two battalions worth of combat power.

Because while the OPFOR is all gaggled up expecting to have a

relatively easy time of breaching, artillery starts falling on them and they

take some attrition from the artillery.

Eventually the OPFOR did breach the obstacle. They got about a

battalion's worth of vehicles through the obstacle on the other side of

Red Pass when they ran into the company commander, his XO, and

another tank who had pre-positioned earlier into their dug-in positions.

They essentially destroyed that final MRB from an area where the

OPFOR didn't expect to be shot from by a force they didn't expect to be

there. By that time, the task force had figured out what was going on

and moved some tanks around on the other side of Red Pass. The end

result of the fight was that this one young company commander, with

five tanks, two Bradleys, and some dismounted infantry, destroyed

about three motorized rifle battalions and most of the engineer

"The OPFOR ...thought

 they had a whole platoon, maybe a

company, off on their left flank, and

it was one single tank that was

using the terrain very, very well..."
Major General Wallace

9

breaching assets of the OPFOR. It was absolutely brilliant and

something you don't see very often. 

What the hell does that have to do with battle command? Well, you

had a commander, a young captain, who understood the piece of terrain

he was fighting on. He really understood it. He knew where his tanks

needed to be initially

to get long-range

shots. He knew where

he could position

behind the defile to

take advantage of

shorter range shots if

the enemy did come

through the breach.

He had a tank on the

north side of the obstacle that was using the terrain very wisely. He

knew precisely the ranges at which his tanks could kill with MILES. So,

he knew himself very well, he knew the terrain very well. I think he had

a pretty good idea how the enemy would have to fight him if they came

through that particular area because that was a fairly narrow choke

point. There really wasn't any opportunity for the OPFOR to mass there

without securing both flanks of the obstacle, which he'd denied them for

a long period of time. 

2. Misreading the Effects of Terrain

I don't think we do a good job in our Army these days of reading

terrain. We all understand the terrain is out there but I don’t think we

regularly do a good job identifying the advantages and disadvantages of

a particular piece of dirt. Let me give you an example from a fight at

the NTC. The brigade was attacking from east to west at NTC. There is

an area in the southern portion of the corridor called the Washboard, a

very rugged, undulating, series of wadis. The objective was on the far

side of Brown/Debnam Pass back by Crash Hill. The Brigade elects to

attack through the Washboard for all the right reasons except they didn't

pay attention to the terrain. They knew the enemy was weakest in that

area. They knew that the enemy probably would not expect them to

attack through that area. They knew that the strength of the enemy's

defense was up by Crash Hill, in the Brown/Debnam area, which was

"One young company commander,

with five tanks, two Bradleys, and

some dismounted infantry, destroyed

about three motorized rifle

battalions... It was absolutely

brilliant."
10

better maneuver terrain for the organization. They attacked through the

Washboard and they have an unsuccessful attack. 

The reason the attack was unsuccessful is not because they decided

to attack in the wrong place. Not that they attacked where the enemy

was weakest, but the terrain caused their offensive operation to be

slowed to the point where the OPFOR could tell where they were

coming, react to them, reposition, and in fact, when they made contact

with the OPFOR, the OPFOR was stronger in the Washboard than

elsewhere. The OPFOR had had an opportunity over a period of several

hours to recognize that the brigade’s main effort was in the Washboard

area just because the terrain slowed the brigade to the point where they

couldn't react any quicker. All the right things were done at the brigade

level to attack the weak point, an assailable flank, through an area where

the enemy didn't expect them, except they didn't recognize the fact that

the terrain made it a less feasible course of action than it appeared to be

if you looked at a flat map with no terrain influences. 

The contour interval on some 1:50,000 maps and especially the NTC

map do not fully represent the terrain. In areas, they miss radical

changes in elevation. Wadi systems you may travel across don't show

up on the map because the contouring is a twenty meter interval and will

not catch the true terrain character. A ten meter deep wadi doesn't

necessarily show up on the map. That can be very significant to a tank

crew. So, if you do nothing but look at the map and determine where

you are going to attack, then you don't necessarily recognize the severity

of some of the pieces of terrain over which you are trying to attack. It

just flat slows you down. The enemy has an opportunity to see what

you are doing and because he is in a piece of terrain that is not as severe

as the one over which you are attacking, he can react to you quicker than

you can close with him and attack. You have a major problem.

"All the right things were done ...

to attack the weak point, an assailable flank through an

area where the enemy didn't expect them, except they

didn't recognize the fact that the terrain made it a less

feasible course of action than it appeared to be..."
Major General Wallace

11

3. Mentally Preparing for the Mission

In terms of battle commanders, I guess there are two things I would

share. First, it has always been my belief that every once in a while a

commander has to take time to think. And frequently because of the

urgency of what is going on, in either a training simulation or a combat

situation, you get so involved in the urgency of the right now, that you

don’t take time to think. I have seen a very few commanders who have

taken the time the night before they were going to start an attack or

defense and take time for themselves, all by themselves, with a map and

their own brain and sit

down and say, “OK, here’s

where I think my folks are

positioned and here’s what I

think the enemy is going to

do tomorrow.” So, you are

wargaming in your own head without a bunch of staff officers there

giving you their opinions. Just wargaming in your own mind how you

think the fight is going to go down tomorrow. Some commanders can

do that in 15 to 20 minutes; some commanders take an hour to an hour

and a half to do it. But, in my judgment, it is an absolutely essential

piece of being a commander to have some idea of what you expect to

happen in the upcoming operation. In our doctrine, we call it

visualization of the battlefield. 

My notion is just sit down and think. I tell my folks that you must

do that. The night before the fight, go sit in your vehicle with the map.

Tell your driver to not let anyone bother you. Sit there with a cup of

coffee, and just kind of map out to yourself. Think about how you

expect the enemy will come, and importantly, what you are going to do

about it. If you do that appropriately, and there is no way it is going to

be completely right, but in my judgment you can get to about a 70%

solution just thinking your way through it. The 30% that you don't get

to is the stuff you have to jump on in the morning, but the 70% you do

get right is pretty valuable. Those are judgments and observations and

"You get so involved in the

urgency of the right now, that

you don’t take time to think."

"Sit there with a cup of coffee, and just kind of map out to

yourself. Think about how you expect the enemy will

come, and importantly, what you are going to do about it."
12

expectations that you’ve already thought out ahead which allow you to

react quicker when it does happen than had you not thought about it. 

Now, what that should generate, in my judgment, is probably three

or four things. First of all, you have some idea as a result of this

personal wargame of what decisions to expect to have to make

tomorrow. My experience is if you take the time to do that, you can

probably figure out 70-80% of those decisions. I'm not talking about

whether to have eggs or bagels for breakfast. I'm talking about when do

I have to commit my reserve? When do I have to transition from

offense to defense? When do I expect my offensive capability to have

culminated? When do I have to reposition my artillery? How long does

it take to do that? Big, big decisions. Major muscle movement

decisions. And it has always seemed to me there aren't many of those

big decisions that you have to make. But, every one of them is

absolutely critical to the outcome of the battle. In most battles, from my

experience at NTC, the brigade or battalion commander has about five

or six of those big decisions he has to make. Not a whole lot more than

that. If you can figure out what those decisions are, that’s good. 

The second thing that results from that, in my judgment, is that you

end up with some idea of where on the battlefield those decisions will

have to be made in terms of time and space which is also a good thing to

know. The third thing that generates from that is there’s some

expectation of where you personally, as the commander, need to be

positioned on the battlefield in order to see those things evolving with

your own eyes. So you are not depending on a bunch of radio calls and

a bunch of staff officer estimates and all the sort of things that take a

long time to get to you. And frequently the information that you would

get is absolutely correct but it is too late to make the decision. 

The final thing that should generate from all that is having now

understood the decisions you

have to make, where do you

expect them to happen, where do

you have to be to make that

decision? Then you ought to go

back and share with your staff,

the folks that are providing you

with the information

requirements that you need to

make those decisions. If you are a thoughtful guy who can sit down and

wargame in your head, you can come up with a whole bunch of

"Then you ought to go back

and share with your staff, the

folks that are providing you

with the information

requirements that you need

to make those decisions."
Major General Wallace

13

solutions to tactical problems before they are presented to you. And, if

you are really good and take it to heart, you can also kind of rehearse in

your own mind what the FRAGO sounds like that you’ll give to your

subordinates tomorrow. Then you don't have to fumble about and try to

figure out what you are going to tell them to do because you have

already figured out what the conditions are, what the condition of your

force is, where the enemy is located. And you have rehearsed it well in

advance with what instructions you have to give to your subordinates in

order to keep a tactical emergency from happening or how to react to a

tactical emergency.

I've got probably 70-80 rotations at the NTC. It is very seldom that I

have seen a battle at the NTC where there wasn't some opportunity for

the BLUEFOR to win the fight. There is some moment in the battle

where the OPFOR has made a mistake or there is a possibility to take

advantage of a window of opportunity. And frequently you don't

recognize it was there until after the fact, when you lay everything out

and say here's the bad guys and here's the good guys, and here's what

was going on and here's what you could have done. Which is part of

our training process. But, the important thing to me is that the

opportunity is frequently there, you just don't recognize it. 

4. See Yourself

The second observation I would give is we talk about seeing

ourselves and we see the terrain. We spend a tremendous amount of

time trying to figure out what the enemy is doing. We have an entire

organization within our intelligence community designed to provide us

with information about

the enemy. Generally, we

do a fairly decent job of

focusing on the enemy. It

may not be focused in the

right place at the right

time with the right

information, but generally we know that the enemy gets a vote in the

fight. It has always been interesting to me that sometimes we know

more about the enemy than we know about ourselves. We don't know

that Alpha Company only has nine tanks instead of fourteen. We don't

know that Alpha Company has 100% of their basic load of ammunition

but Bravo Company only has 50%. It is awfully difficult to impose your

"It has always been interesting

 to me that sometimes we know

more about the enemy than we

know about ourselves."
14

will on the enemy if you can't impose your will on your own

organization. It's an interesting observation when units at the NTC don't

understand the status of their own

organization, their own forces, in

terms of people, equipment, and

supplies. Which is really kind of

fascinating because you would think

you could get great information

from your own by just asking for it,

but there is so much friction

between the tank crew and the

brigade commander and the reporting chains that intercede. It’s just

very, very difficult to get the information. 

 Which also requires the commander to make sure that he specifies

exactly what he needs to know about his organization. And, it changes

from fight to fight. Clearly, you always want to know what your

combat power is. But if you are in an offensive operation and you are

trying to do a deliberate breach, it would be really nice to know how

many tank plows you have operational. Rather than be surprised by the

call from the company commander at the point where he is getting ready

to enter the breach and he says, “I am now dismounting my engineers to

do a manual breach of the obstacle.” Then the commander calls back

and asks, “Where are your plows?” Well, they are back in the assembly

area because they’re broken or the tank that was carrying the plow went

down at four o'clock this morning and we haven't been able to get it up.

Something like that should be an absolute red star cluster that says there

is a real problem here. But some really important things end up

happening and getting un-reported or handled as only routine if you

aren’t careful. 

That is a function of the commander not being specific in the things

he really needs to know before the fight starts. And, when I say before

the fight starts, I am not talking five minutes before LD. I am talking

about twelve hours before LD because you need the time to influence

and make corrections and adjustments. If you don't have the time to do

it, then you might as well not have the information.

"It is awfully difficult to

impose your will on the

enemy if you can't impose

your will on your own

organization."
BRIGADIER GENERAL RUSSEL L. HONORE, 1998

5. Orchestration and Synchronization

I continue to observe art of command limitations of commanders.

You look at the definition of battle command, within the first five words

is the word art. The art of leading, deciding, motivating, to accomplish

the mission using these available resources. Just a general paraphrase of

the definition of battle command. 

I repeatedly see people who don’t fully optimize the art of their

command in the execution of leadership and command. They rely on

the science side. I’ve come to the hypothesis from recent observations,

three NTC rotations this year and numerous other training events, that

we’ve taught synchronization for a long time in the Army and a lot of

our leaders are stuck on synchronization. Synchronization kind of deals

with science, because when you look at a definition of synchronization

it talks about the relationship of battlefield functions in terms of time

and space. Well, time and space are kind of science. 

The new doctrine calls for something bigger than synchronization. It

calls for orchestration. Orchestration’s definition leans more toward the

art of what we do. It’s the mixing and the matching at the right time.

The problem with focusing on synchronizing is it suggests working

sequentially vice simultaneously. In garrison we do a lot of

synchronized activities that in truth are in most cases sequential events

not simultaneous events. So if you spend most of your time in garrison

and you go to an event like the NTC you probably bring over what

works for you in garrison. You synchronize. Say Alpha Company’s

going to be here, Bravo Company’s going to do this, Charlie Company’s

going to do this, Delta

Company’s going to do this

and Headquarters Company’s

going to be spread over the

three of those. The staff

officer puts his hand up and

claims victory. He’s got it

synchronized. The problem

"So, we plan... sequentially.

Then we get out on the

battlefield and things start

happening simultaneously."
16

with synchronization is how do you get synchronization and

simultaneous operations inside of your formations? 

And so again it goes back to art and science. The science gives you

the basics to kind of get you in the ballpark of making the right

decisions. But the art of orchestrating and the science of synchronizing

need to accompany each other, need to complement each other rather

than strictly relying on synchronization to perform the task. The old

sequential execution is based on an old model we used to work from;

we’re gonna fight, we’re gonna fight the enemy division

reconnaissance, we’re gonna fight the enemy regimental

reconnaissance, we’re gonna fight the enemy’s CRPs, we’re gonna fight

the enemy’s FSE. And it was a sequential laydown of how we fight the

enemy. So, we go through and we plan all this stuff sequentially. 

Then we get out on the battlefield and things start happening

simultaneously. We’re not only fighting the enemy reconnaissance,

we’re fighting the enemy’s artillery, we’re fighting the enemy’s

reconnaissance forces that were left over in zone, we’re fighting the

weather. So again, I think one of the pieces we need to work on and

continue to tackle is the concept of simultaneous operations,

simultaneous execution, and orchestration vice synchronization.

Synchronization is the piece you start off with, the subpiece you gotta

have to get to orchestration. But there’s a leap from sequential to

simultaneous. When you look at the battlefield, if you’re fighting the

enemy and you’re fighting him sequentially, you won’t be optimizing

the opportunity to throw him off balance and wrestle the initiative from

him. Because you’re sequentially fighting as opposed to fighting

simultaneously through the depths of his formation. So you say, OK it

looks like we killed the first formation now let's go to the next

formation. The idea is to cause chaos and confusion by fighting these

formations simultaneously. Battle command focuses on that human

orchestration of warfare.

6. Clear Objectives for Clear Intent

Subordinate to the human dimension of warfare is the command and

control piece, those things that facilitate decisions. This is what people

normally focus on. Battle command includes the art of deciding. So,

the things that help us do that are command and control nodes. What

they give us is situational awareness. Situational awareness increases

the information we have to make decisions. It doesn’t mean we’re
Brigadier General Honore

17

gonna make the right decision just because we have the information.

And a lot of people have gotten confused about that. It’s because you

think you know you’re gonna make the right decision. I mean we see

examples of that imperfect reasoning every day. You see the news tell

people, “Hey its raining outside; there are puddles of water all over the

place; there’s a lot of traffic; traffic’s going slow.” You see people

driving down the road and here is this nice, educated man and his wife

with their kids being pulled out of the ditch. “Well what were y'all

doing? Didn’t you hear the news?” “Yeah we heard it. But we

thought we could get through.” So having information is usually a

given. It’s what we do with it is what makes the difference.

You can invest so much in getting information. Now, how do you

take that and orchestrate that with your mission in terms of what you’re

trying to do, what the enemy is doing, and the relationship to terrain and

weather? I’m more and more convinced, as I think about elements that

can be relative to others on the exercise of battle command, of the

importance of the leader and the people around him to pass available

information. How do we present available information to the

commander or the staff that’s helping him control the fight? You only

have one commander, and the people who are controlling it to present it

to him have a big dilemma. In the armor and the infantry units, the

commander is out on the battlefield in the fighting vehicle. Somewhere

in the rear he’s got a staff that’s helping him and he also has his fighters,

his company commanders, all of them on the battlefield with a steady

stream of information. 

The control and coordination functions that the staff work at must

have clear guidance. Let me give you an example in CAS, Close Air

Support. The commander is saying his intent: “I want to attack the

enemy early with CAS.” That’s normally what they say - early. Well,

early is like a goal. As opposed to the commander saying to his staff

something that sounds more like an objective: “I want to attack the

enemy with CAS when we cross Phase Line John.” An objective is tied

to time and it’s measurable. And he then says, “I want,” and he gives a

location where he wants to reduce the enemy's formation. And he may

say something to the objective: “the CAS is to destroy 10 enemy

vehicles, combat vehicles.” So now we’re going from a goal to an

objective. “I want to use CAS early, ” isn’t an objective. It ain’t tied to

time, it ain’t tied to a type of damage he wants. 

Commanders know they have to say something about CAS. But it’s

harder to state an objective. So he’ll say something that’s very general
18

and what he normally gets, when he states something that un-specific, is

exactly what he asks for. The CAS shows up, it closes his artillery

down, it’s not focused, and it leaves or it doesn’t get in the fight. The

commander has not been specific in how he wants to use that weapon

system to attack the enemy. 

And what you will

see is the folks who

are better rooted and

well-rounded in the art

and the science of the

business can formulate

an objective for that weapon system. And they can force their staff. So,

while he’s out there dodging bullets on the battlefield, he’s prompting

his staff on, “Where is the CAS? How many minutes out? Is the artillery

set? Do we have friendlies out of the way? Do we have the ingress and

egress routes clear?” 

The reason the commander is speaking in generalities and not

making sure of his staff, because he’s still ultimately responsible for

what that staff does and what they focus on, is because he himself is not

totally grounded in the application of that weapon system. So he speaks

in generalities. But he’s been taught in CPXs and stuff, he’s gotta say

something about CAS. And then, when the enemy has just totally

destroyed over half of his forces, he says, “Where is the CAS?” So in

the application of battle command, I see the inappropriate application of

the art and the science of command is a frequent failure along with a

failure to continually focus on seeing the enemy, seeing the terrain,

seeing yourself. 

7. Enriching Experience

My understanding of battle command became clearer to me after I

was out at the NTC, through repetitive performance. I think the NTC

provides first rate battle command opportunity through repetitive

experience. I also attribute my understanding to education and great

opportunities to teach tactics at Leavenworth, Knox, and NTC. I had a

lot up in my head that just ended up being education. It’s like the young

doctor who’s spent 10 years becoming a medical doctor. He’s good,

he’s sharp, what he lacks now is experience. I think the combination of

education and experience is what has given me a clear vision of what’s

going on. Also, I notice what I’m seeing, what I’m hearing, what I’m

"So he’ll say something that’s very

general and what he normally gets...

is exactly what he asks for."
Brigadier General Honore

19

not hearing. But I think that came together at NTC for me. It was a

combination of this experience from being an instructor and

participating in the review and process of writing of doctrine, and the

experience from NTC, that I think gave me a much better appreciation

for the concept of battle command. This is why you see all my

stationery from now on, as long as I’m in tactical units... you see that

emblem dealing with battle command. You see the enemy, yourself.

You see terrain, time, space and purpose, embedded intent, a running

estimate and visualization. 

I think our challenge is how we in garrison utilize a system, and how

we simultaneously articulate art. How do you make up for experiences

people haven’t had? We keep trying to approach that in the Army.

Well, I don’t know how to do it, but this is how we’ve attempted to do

it. We’re gonna build you some experience with simulations, repetitive

simulations. The experience

piece is very important. So

you try to use simulation,

repetitive simulation, to build

experience. But the problem

is warfare is a contact sport.

And a lot of the simulation

we have is constructive simulation. In other words, you put some

artificial intelligence in the computer, you sit there and you look at a

“So you try to use simulation,

repetitive simulation, to build

experience. But the problem is

warfare is a contact sport.”

Battle

Command

Battle Command Fundamentals

Leading,

Motivating,

Moral & Physical

Presence

See

Enemy

See

Yourself

See

Terrain

Deciding,

Concept of

Operations

Embedded Intent,

Visualization,

Current & End State

Purpose

Time Space
20

map, and the two forces come up. And in the constructive world if you

have five and he has two, you win. Generally, if you have five and he

has three, you might lose one, you still win. That’s just the way

constructive simulation is. BCTP is constructive. When you get into

virtual simulation you have to actually shoot the other person, but you

don’t have physical contact. You get into the virtual world, you get into

some of the more advanced technology. With the virtual world you’re

looking at the battlefield in the form of some visual media. You’re not

looking at a map. CCTT, Close Combat Tactical Trainer, is virtual.

You’re sitting there in your tank and you’re looking through the screen

and what you’re seeing is the Central Corridor at NTC, it’s virtual. So,

we keep trying to create experiences and simulation to help people get

experience.

The problem with repetitive simulation in the constructive world is

that you can get very good at constructive simulation. And you can get

very tired doing it, but it has yet to even come close to the dynamics and

the friction of actual live simulation or actual live warfare. All we get at

NTC is live simulation. And the best we can expect to get in our

training process, through simulation, is process. So, for example, you

know you want to shoot the artillery and you want to have the CAS.

What you learn from process is that you have to have separation of

either time or space for both of them to be used. Either you gotta tell the

aircraft, “You’re going to fly at this height and the artillery are going to

shoot at this height.” That way they’re both occupying the same space

at different places. Or it’s going to be separated by time. The artillery’s

going to continue to shoot until 1000 hours and at 1001 the CAS is

going to come in. So if you follow this postscript and go back to what I

was talking about simultaneous vice sequential, what we’re trying to do

is get simultaneous attack where the CAS and the artillery are hitting the

enemy simultaneously by utilizing space. 

The way amateurs do this is they shoot the artillery then they call the

CAS in. So if you were the enemy you’d say, “Oh the artillery’s

coming in, the artillery’s finished. Oh OK, here come the aircraft.”

Better if they have to fight both of them simultaneously. You get a

synergistic effect where the enemy’s trying to run from the artillery and

the CAS simultaneously. And when he’s running from the artillery, that

means he can’t shoot at the aircraft. So the aircraft come in and are

safer and more violent and thereby execute the task. Then, oh by the

way, you got ground forces simultaneously attacking him. 
Brigadier General Honore

21

"You get a synergistic effect

where the enemy’s trying to

run from the artillery and the

CAS simultaneously. And

when he’s running from the

artillery, that means he can’t

shoot at the aircraft."

That’s how we get the synergistic effect on the battlefield. And

that’s not a word we’ve used, “synergism,” in the Army in terms of the

application of our warfighting capability. We’ve always used the word

“mass” as a way to articulate where we’re talking about simultaneous

attack. How we mass combat

power? So how do you mass

combat power? You’ve got to

have simultaneous attack. The

way to do it is you attack this

formation with artillery and

you might be attacking with

CAS. And you might be also

attack with EW while attacking

by direct fire. All this is

happening simultaneously. 

As I continue to study battle command, and get back to and think

about some of the lessons learned, it still hinges on the ability of leaders

to tell folks and to lead them as to what they will do. And then actively

supervise the execution. I see a big, big, big problem in the Army now -

failing to supervise the execution.

The senior leader is still expected, once he gets synchronized and he

gets simultaneous things going, to supervise. He still has to supervise

the execution. That’s one of the lessons out at NTC. People can say

anything, doing it is very hard. Can you do what you advertise? And in

most cases, most of us can’t do everything we advertise, particularly

from a unit perspective. So our commander at the last NTC rotation, he

would come in with some great stuff and all that at the rehearsal, but

most folks around there weren’t trained well enough to execute that. 

Institutionally, I think the Army knows what we want to do. What

we lack is the amount of experience to do what we say we can do. And

the opportunity of cyberspace allows us to do a lot of that and to

reinforce that we can accomplish these things with precision. But, as I

and other OCs at NTC experience, what we saw over and over again, is

that even when people can do what they say they are going to do, the

challenge is that the enemy’s got a vote in this and the terrain’s got a

vote. 

This concept of supervising execution as you look at it, it evolved, it

just wasn’t invented. And you go back and you look at some of the

great battlefield commanders, Napoleon, George Patton. They all had

personal presence on the battlefield. They were out seeing what the hell
22

was going on. They were not sitting back in their office. Now I think

that presence is good for two things. It’s good for the soldiers to see.

But I think that’s secondary to actually getting a feel for the tempo and

the hell that’s being raised based on the decisions you’re making. And I

think that’s what

people expect of

us, to be out

supervising the

execution of the

task. 

But too many

commanders, too

many, they’re not using any of their senses to supervise. Their hearing,

for example, they don’t necessarily listen to their own radio net when

they’re not in the fight. I’ve seen some of them come in to the TOC and

sit down, and their staff is briefing them, and they tell them to turn the

radio down so they can hear. And what they’re missing is the scouts

from one of the subordinate battalions is calling in with the enemy

location, but he’s told them to cut the radio down so he can hear what

this captain is about to tell him.

You should use all the assets available to you. Now we even have a

system call the EPLRS, Enhanced Position Location Reporting System.

On the EPLRS screen you can see where all of your vehicles are in your

battalion. And each battalion’s got one of those screens in the battalion

CP. But I’ve seen battalion commanders with that who still don’t use it.

So, supervision in the Army and seeing the battlefield means more than

your subordinates telling you what’s going on.

I think any of the elements of battle command deserve attention and

you steadily run across stuff on battle command. But my further

observation would be the Army hasn’t

really totally embraced this concept. We

have people that say the word, but what

they mean when you hear them talk is

C2, command and control.

Army battle command doctrine, is

descriptive, it’s not prescriptive. The

reason why we’ve always maintained

that is because we want human

intervention. We want commanders to

make decisions. They say, “This is why

“...presence... It’s good for the soldiers

to see. But I think that’s secondary to

actually getting a feel for the tempo and

the hell that’s being raised based on the

decisions you’re making.”

"Army battle

command doctrine, is

descriptive, it’s not

prescriptive.

...because we want

human intervention.

We want commanders

to make decisions.”
Brigadier General Honore

23

I’m doing this based on the enemy and the terrain,” vice a checklist that

comes out of Leavenworth. We want them to be active in the decision.

But in actuality, when most people say battle command all they’re

thinking about is stuff, things. They're not thinking about the concept

and the art of executing the mission, and the requirements of supervised

execution.

BRIGADIER GENERAL (R) HUBA WASS DE CZEGE,

1999

8. Carousel of Deception

We talk a lot about the value of deception - how we, through

deception, can throw the enemy off balance and gain a great victory at

relatively low cost. I learned a valuable lesson about deception when I

was commanding a task force at the Yakima Firing Center in

Washington during a Brave Shield 16 exercise, back around, I think,

1977. 

We were sitting on a hill mass overlooking a desert valley with

another hill mass to our front. To the left we had a wide-open valley

and to the right we had a very deep canyon. The canyon had one trail

through it. You could drive single file down, wind your way down into

the canyon, and back up the other side. And by doing that you could get

around onto the enemy’s flank, if you wanted to attack.

We had the mission to attack. As I looked at my situation, there

were three ways I could do it. I could maneuver around to the left, into

this wide-open valley. It was good maneuver ground but it was wide

open. You could be seen from miles away. Or you could go straight

ahead. If you went straight ahead you went right into his defenses. Or

you could take this risk and go down into the canyon. If he spots you,

you’re trapped. But if he doesn’t spot you, you could hook into his

flank. So that was pretty attractive until I began looking at it.

I said, “Ok, I think what I’m going to do is - I’m going to make the

enemy think that I’m going down into the canyon.” I’m going to have a

feint to present the story that I’m going into the canyon. I will send a

small force into the canyon but make it appear that the entire task force

is going in. Then I’m going to have the small force attack from the

flank. And when he’s distracted from that, then I’m going to roll

straight ahead very quickly across the valley and straight into him.

And hopefully he’ll be focused on the other side.

So how do I do this? I

found that if I get the engineer

to make a little cut at the lip of

the canyon, then I could drive

some vehicles in full view to

“Go around the hill enough

times to give him the picture

that it’s the whole task force

going into the canyon.”
26

the lip of the canyon, then hook a right and go around the hill again. Go

around the hill enough times to give him the picture that it’s the whole

task force going into the canyon. I figured that after dark he’d have his

radars up and he’d be watching what I was doing. This area was very

easy to track with radar. It’s a direct line of view. There’s no way to

get into the canyon without him seeing you for about 3 or 4 thousand

meters so he could count a lot of vehicles going by. Also there was a

risk of artillery but you could smoke that partially. Anyway, you could

really demonstrate what you were doing.

So I decided to take all the TOW tracks, which wouldn’t help me in

the attack, and the VTRs. On radar they would sound like tanks. I was

a mixed armor/mech task force so I put together a composite force that

would look like three mech/armor teams going into the canyon. So we

put that force together and surely enough they rotated around the hill

three times, down the lip, through the canyon, up the other side, through

some rough ground on the other side and they attacked from the flank.

When I heard the sound of the attack, and the time was about right, I

said, “Forward, charge.” We called the companies and we dashed

across ground and into the other side. With great success. We didn’t

have any trouble coming up through the hill, met very little resistance

until we were fairly well into the hills, several kilometers on the other

side.

It was about that time it began to dawn on me what was happening

and what had happened. What had happened was that the enemy didn’t

give us any resistance because he was asleep! We hadn’t fooled

anybody. They were just asleep. And the radar operators were asleep.

They just didn’t expect the attack at all that night.

It dawned on me that you can go to all this trouble and all of the

expense to try to pull off a deception when all that’s really important is

to create ambiguity. You need to be sure, if you’re going to go to all

this trouble and expense that the enemy is really reading the message.

And if you have no way to check

whether he has picked up on it,

then you’re taking risk. So from

that time on, whenever anyone has

talked to me about “Well, let’s try

to deceive the enemy,” I thought

about that event. It clarifies your

thinking. Is doing this really worth the expenditure of resources we’re

putting into this ruse or feint or deception? I’ve come to the conclusion

“At the tactical level,

creating ambiguity is a lot

more important than trying

to create a deception.”
Brigadier General (R) Wass de Czege

27

that, at the lower tactical levels, it often isn’t worth the trouble. What’s

really important is: not to present him a pattern of operations that he can

read and predict; to try to be different; to try to be fast so he can’t read it

until it’s too late. What I’m really talking about is, at the tactical level,

creating ambiguity is a lot more important than trying to create a

deception. When you expect the enemy to actually do something, you

have to know when he’s done it. And you have to have an alternate plan

in case he hasn’t done it.

 

COLONEL GEORGE BOWERS, 1998

9. Follow Your Heart

The frame of reference is February 94, NTC. I was battalion

commander of the armor task force. We were balanced: two armor

and two mech. It was a brigade continuous ops mission in the Central

Corridor and we were attacking from east to west. It was planned over

a 36-hour period. I was in the southern part of the Central Corridor

and the other task force was in the Northern Corridor. We were

echeloned left. The mech force was the main effort; I was the

supporting effort. He was also a balanced task force: two and two. We

were conducting a movement to contact on a brigade level and we

moved through the Central Corridor until we got to about the northsouth grid line on the 876 complex. 

The mech task force commander reported on the brigade net that

he had made contact with the forward security element which would

indicate that their intentions were to stop him in the northern part of

the Central Corridor around the Iron Triangle. What we did not know

was that the forward security element had split. A portion of it had

tied him up and another portion had moved south to meet me. About

2 kilometers before the 876 complex my intuition, after having been

in the National Training Center for the better part of 11 days, told me

to go 90 and go behind the mech task force. I don't know why. I

don't know why I felt that way. But given the combat situation at the

time and the reports that I was listening to on the radio in my tank,

my Charlie company, the lead company, had got right out and made

contact with the FSE. So I had three companies that had not been

engaged at that time. 

I didn't do that. Within about 15 minutes, the 1-8 Task Force had

been attrited down. Not only had the forward security element done

what it was supposed to have done, the advance guard main body had

started to work its way around the Iron Triangle along the road

complex that hugs the high ground on the north side of the Central

Corridor. At the end of that fight, which was about another 45

minutes, we were attrited down to less than 50%. 

Had I taken that intuitive thought process and executed, we

probably would have tied them up at the Central Corridor. It would
30

have been a one on one and it would have been a stalemate against

the regiment. What ended up happening was the better part of two

MRBs bypassed us and kept on going deep. The lesson learned out of

that is, as a commander, sometimes there is not an empirical why or

justification or scientific rationale for making the decision, it’s just

gut level feeling. In my 23

years in the Army, and I’ve

done little above brigade level

in 23 years, all I've done is

command soldiers or been

around soldiers. I’ve been

lucky. I have always found

that 9 times out of 10, the

more experience you have with soldiers, the more time you've been in

the field, or in garrison for that matter, your intuition is more right

than wrong. There is calculated risk in choosing to go with or

ignoring your intuition. But because of the experience level that you

have in the field and the situational awareness you have at the time,

your mind and body may be telling you to do something at odds with

the expected action. You've got to be smart enough to trust and

execute on what your mind and body are telling you to do. 

It is kind of analogous to golf. You hit a drive down the fairway.

You’re about 150 yards from the green. The wind is in your face,

which adds a club length. Your mind tells you to hit a 7 iron. But

your eyes tell you, and the sense that you have with the wind in your

face tells you, to hit a 6 iron. If you listen to your intuition and it says

hit a 6 iron, 9 times out of 10 you will be correct. If you go with what

you think you can do, then 9 times out of 10, you're short. That’s the

same process that a commander feels on the battlefield. You can't

touch it, you can’t smell it, you can’t feel it. It’s just there and you

can’t explain it. It's the same thing with watching soldiers in the field

and you see an accident waiting to happen. Say, soldiers are moving

across the field, they may be riding too high in the turret, he may be

going too fast, and then all of a sudden you pan around and you see

another situation. You've got two choices, let it go or run down real

quick and stop it and correct it. You know that given human nature, 9

times out of 10, you may have an accident waiting to happen on your

hands. 

If you are in a situation like that, then you need to do what your

heart tells you to do because it is probably right as opposed to trying

“Sometimes there is not an

empirical why or justification

or scientific rationale for

making the decision, it’s just

gut level feeling.”
Colonel Bowers

31

to bear down and keep on track with the plan. I was getting feeds over

the radio from the mech commander telling me they had held up the

forward security element. I was getting feeds by listening to his

company commanders telling him what they were doing. I was not

getting anything. The option to that would have been to continue the

attack in flank but I didn't have anything out in front of me. My

intuition was to come and try to go around to his flank on the north.

We would have had to choke down, but we may have been able to

flank them on the north because they wouldn’t expect that. They

would expect you to make a wide turn. That's just something I’ve

thought about all these years. I wish I could have done it differently.

10. Picture of the Obstacle

We’re now in the bubble where Force XXI is starting to show us

what possibilities are out there with technology onboard. Helicopters

are able to take pictures day and night, having the FLIR, having the

optics to be able to see farther, satellites. When I was at the National

Training Center in May, I was commanding the brigade in a live fire

operation. The SP was around Arrowhead. 1-7 CAV was one of my

task forces, the Division Cavalry. We were going to conduct a

passage of lines around Drinkwater, just west of Drinkwater Lake.

The battle handover line was about 2 kilometers past Drinkwater

Lake. 

Right at where they normally conduct a defense at Drinkwater,

which was along the high ground, was where we had the TAC. I

moved up through and co-located with my S3, FSO, my ABE, and

others. We had the 1-7 in front. They had Kiowas flying. They had

eyes on the obstacle, deep in the Northern Corridor. They also had the

AMPS box which has the capability for the Kiowa to take a picture

and pass it back through Vtel and then it will come out hardcopy and

you can make an assessment of it. 

I did not get to see that picture. But somebody back in the 2-12

Task Force, which was following and was going to conduct a passage,

saw it. There was some discussion for about 10 minutes that there

was a 100-150 meters of nothing but wire on the northern part of the

obstacle. In the southern part of the obstacle were tank ditches, wire,

and the assumption is they would probably have mines. Again, my

intuition said go to the north because you have the least amount of

resistance and also, anytime you are conducting a movement to
32

contact or deliberate attack, momentum and mass are key. In my

mind, I let somebody talk me out of it, and we went south. And, 41⁄2

hours later we got through the obstacle and then we went on down

through. When they

showed us the picture

the next day in the

AAR, it was plain as

day. About 150 yards

of nothing but wire

that was open in the

north, and all you would have had to have done is run through it with

tanks. I hadn't seen the pictures. 

That vignette taught me that you need to change the paradigm, you

need to plan for technology. You need to get commanders to where

they know the capabilities and practice with it before you go to the

field. And you need to trust it so that when you have to base a

decision off of a picture, that it’s current, it’s valid, and that whoever

took the picture, how he’s positioned, knows what you're trying to

achieve. This is a bold assumption, but I would say that we would

have reduced our time going through that obstacle by 3 hours. There

was a company in the north, but we just did not trust that technology

because we had not trained with it very much. We knew the

capability. I pushed very hard for three months to get it in. My S2

knew about it. But we got so overwhelmed with moving the task force

through battle handover, getting them through to where you had the

forward passage of lines, that we didn't stop to assess. 

There needs to be an assessment period and commanders need to

understand that assessment period. Where are we? What are we

doing? Is it the right or wrong thing to do? Do you have the right

combat ratios? Do we have a little bit of time to make this

assessment? We have always taught that. But in actual execution,

commanders are pressured to keep the momentum going. Sometimes

when a subordinate commander wants to take just a minute to assess,

unless he is very strong, he’s bowled over and has to continue. In my

case, I heard about it, I sat

there and thought about it

for about 10 minutes, and

then I’m actioned to the

southern part of the

obstacle. There was a

“Sometimes when a subordinate

commander wants to take just a

minute to assess, unless he is

very strong, he’s bowled over.”

“...about 150 yards of nothing but

wire that was open in the north, and

all you would have had to have done

is run through it with tanks.”
Colonel Bowers

33

discussion with the battalion commander who had seen it, and he said

I think we still need to go to the southern part of the obstacle. If I had

seen the picture, and seen what I saw the next day, I would have said,

"Nope, we are going north." 

11. Simultaneous Attack

It was a live fire brigade defensive mission. 1-7 was in the

northern portion of the live fire corridor, the Drinkwater corridor, and

2-12 was in the Alpha-Bravo Corridor. We had Kiowas that were

covering the entire front of the brigade sector, and we were focusing

on the Leach Lake Passes that fed into the Northern Corridor. The

way the targetry is set up, up there, they will start to present

themselves on the other side of the high ground to represent a forward

security element or a combat reconnaissance patrol depending on

what you have done to them with deep fires. If you take out their CRP

initially, then they will change the targetry to represent that they had

to re-form CRPs and they’re coming in blind. If they come in and

they’re successful with their CRPs, and the night before the

reconnaissance elements that are out conducting counterreconnaissance are unsuccessful with taking out anywhere from 2-4

CRPs, then they come in so they have mass. 

In this particular mission, we had been successful in the north. We

had identified the forward security element. They had a Kiowa Warrior

on station, right at the mouth of the passes that came in and fed into the

Northern Corridor. Artillery was set. 1-7 was conducting a rearward

passage of one of their Cavalry troops. Up to that point, I had not

understood what was meant by simultaneous attack. 

I had indirect fire. I had Kiowas that had not only the capability to

lase from 8 km out, but I also had Hellfires and I also had the FAC,

which allowed me to control air sorties into a target. When you do

your course of action analysis, you identify named areas of interest

where you place eyes, either Kiowas or COLT or Scouts, to watch

those areas of interest. The intent there is to try and track enemy that

advance from a certain known point into your sector and then through

your sector. That gives you time, if you do the analysis correctly, to

determine their speed, what type of vehicles, and which direction they

are going to come in from so you can then react to deepen your sector

by moving units around into either hasty prepared positions or

prepared positions in a defense, to thicken the battlefield, if you will.
34

What happened here is we had the artillery set, we had the Kiowas

on station, and we had identified the targets. Then the Kiowa pulled

off station, so we didn't have a good accurate read on the forward

security element. We were late with the artillery. The air that we had

on station did not initially engage, so we did not have a very effective

engagement of deep fires on the initial elements that were on the

other side of the mountain complex. What I learned out of that

scenario is that when you are in your planning stages, you take your

named areas of interest, you look at the types of organizations you

may be defending against, what type of structure they will have based

on the ground, and then given that, when you watch them come into a

named area of interest, you can turn that into a target area, a TAI.

What the Kiowa gives you the capability to do, with their 8

kilometer stand-off lasing capability, they can lase the initial targets

and feed a 10-digit coordinate back to the artillery. The guns then

prepped and are prepared to fire. At the same time they are preparing

to fire, you've cut an ACA, and you can plan an ACA through that

TAI. That then allows the air force to come in on one part of that box

and drop their bombs or

shoot while the artillery is

coming in from the other

end. So, you've got

simultaneous attack on

both sides of the column.

“So, you've got simultaneous

 attack on both sides of the

column...[and]... three forms of

lethal fires going into a box.”
Colonel Bowers

35

And oh, by the way, if in a defensive role (because you never want to

use the Kiowas in an offensive role) he can fire Hellfire initially to

back out and give an initial stunning blow so that you have three

forms of lethal fires going into a box. That has to be planned, but it

can be executed if you think through the process.

And that is the lesson I took away, that will never leave me

because if you can talk it through... Are they going to come in a

column? Are they going to come two up? If they are coming in a

column, then the Kiowa lases the initial vehicle, he fires the

coordinates back to the guns. The guns are set, they begin firing. The

Kiowa fires the Hellfires, and in turn the FAC, or someone else, then

can also get the 10-digit coordinates for the Air FAC. He can then

bring his air into the trail end of that column. So, you have massed

fires on that column initially and then the Kiowa may come back in

on station, make a BDA and then feed it back. But that has to be

rehearsed all the way down at the rock drill, so everyone understands

the vision and the concept of the operation, so when we execute it, it

can be executed precisely.

We were able to execute it in the evening right before dusk. We got

close. The timing was off a little bit but we got close. That is another

vignette that talks technology and its capabilities, because the brigade

has the one fight. If you have a brigade commander who has two task

forces, he can't be a super battalion commander. He has to take the

assets he has available, air,

helicopters, artillery, and he has to set

the conditions for the deep fight. So

that when he passes the battle to the

battalion commanders, he has attrited

the enemy to some degree. He has

slowed their momentum, and he has caused them, in a defensive

scenario, to piecemeal into a defensive fight so that the weapon systems

he has that are vectored into an engagement area can kill precisely.

They don't waste ammunition and they’re not overwhelmed and

overmassed.

It’s tough. We often wonder why guys like Abrams, Patton,

Eisenhower and others were so successful. But what I think we forget

sometimes is that they went over the same ground again and again,

and knew and understood the ground. The ground doesn't change. It

hasn't changed since Napoleon. Then they were able to understand the

technical improvements of the time, the tank, the artillery, the air, and

“A brigade commander

... can't be a super

battalion commander.”
36

how you combine those and mass them. They were most effective

because they capitalized and leveraged the technology. But they also

understood the ground out there and the relationship between them.

Sometimes we want today’s commanders to be intuitive, to make

good decisions, but that only comes after repetitive training. I think

the more time you spend in the field, the better you get at your

fieldcraft and the better you get at your decision making process. You

simplify it. We get hung up in the MDMP with process instead of

what we want to get out of it. Until we get through it and hone it

down it’s not

effective. And

most times out

of a 14-day

rotation, you'll

find that what

we start with and what we end up with is like night and day. We cut

out the extra and go right to the heart of what we really need to allow

us to make decisions to kill the enemy. I think you get better and

better at that the more you stay in the field. 

My first rotation as battalion commander we spent six months and

we trained all the way through to brigade level out in the field. This

last rotation we did platoon lanes, company lanes, some form of link

lanes with company commanders. We did Janus with battalion. We

did not conduct battalion task force maneuver because we didn't have

the space and we did not do brigade maneuver. Simulation, CCTT,

helps to get at synchronization. It doesn't replace the field, but it does

prepare decision-makers to, in a repetitive process over either NTC

ground or European ground, to confront the decisions they will

constantly be challenged with, to prepare them. Then, when they go

to the field, they are in that mind-thought process. That way of

thinking that you end up progressing to in the field which allows you

to make those quick, intuitive decisions because you’ve gotten

accustomed to it. Finding ways to give commanders those effective

tactical command experiences is always going to be the challenge. 

“We want today’s commanders to be

intuitive, to make good decisions, but

that only comes after repetitive training.”
COLONEL JOSEPH FIL, 1998

12. Leave OPFOR Tactics to the OPFOR

You remember every battle out there very distinctly. I’ve got

absolutely lock tight memories on every one of them. So let’s look at

the first two. One was a very tough battle for us and the second was still

a tough one, but we were successful. Unsuccessful in the first,

successful in the second.

First mission was a movement to contact. It was Central Corridor,

we were coming from the west to the east. It’s a battle that we had

fought through intellectually many, many times and wargamed

extensively. And we knew how we wanted to play it. This is one that

you fight in your dreams, over and over again. We had developed a

course of action, a prototypical course of action, at home station, by

wargaming before we ever deployed, on generically how we wanted to

fight an enemy who is trying to find, fix, and destroy us. How would

we do that to him? And we knew what the combat power ratios were

going to be. So we thought how to apply something that we had

intellectually thought through. 

As the fight proceeded, we found that what we were unable to do

was to fix with a minimum piece of combat power in order to achieve

a flank, and to destroy with a second so that incrementally we could

go back to the next

echelon (because the

enemy fights it in

echelon with a bigger

and bigger piece). He

was able to do to us what

we tried to do to him.

That was to fix, with a very small element, our advance guard with

his FSE. And then he brought in his advance guard battalion to

destroy that and then quickly fix the next echelon, which was our

advance guard battalion. 

He is very fast on his feet. We tried to fight it the way he fights it.

He fights with an incrementally larger element of combat power. He

finds with the smallest he possibly can, fixing with the smallest that it

will take to get that element fixed, quickly bringing combat power to

“We were unable to ...fix with a

minimum piece of combat power

in order to achieve a flank to

destroy with a second.”
38

“Don’t just adopt the OPFOR

tactics because they work for him.

They may not work for you.”

destroy it, and then fixing the next one. So it’s a sequential fight, and

he’s faster at it than we are.

We raced and we were able to get very quickly through zone. But

we got fixated on speed, rather than the relationship of our forces to his

and to terrain. Because he knows the terrain better and fights this very

fight every rotation, he does a very skillful movement to contact. The

difference is that he goes west to east or east to west, but he goes the

same place automatically each time. So, there are some advantages he

has but we knew that going into it.

The lesson learned is, you can’t just fight the OPFOR the way

the OPFOR tries to fight you. And when we go back this next year,

our tactics and our course of action will be very different. We should

not worry about all those first incremental combat reconnaissance

patrols, forward security element, advance guard company, advance

guard main body. What we must do is go for the jugular

immediately, and try and go very deep and go after his main body.

The rest of the stuff we can fight it as we see it. Don’t just adopt the

OPFOR tactics because they work for him. They may not work for

you.

For this mission we

had a plan to bring in all

the combat multipliers.

And we wargamed

extensively since the

course of action was

already in our mind. That

was, we were going after the enemy not after terrain. We were going

where he was, as opposed to where the graphics said we should go, and

then we’d mass combat power. The air was going to go deep after the

main body. The artillery was going to go closer to the advance guard,

direct fire. In other words we were going to fight it in echelons and

separate all the pieces. The first time out of the box, the first battle, it is

hard to do all that. It didn’t work as well as we wanted it to. He brings,

we call them “forms of contact,” his combat multipliers: NBC,

electronic means, close air support, artillery delivered FASCAM. He

brings those on very, very quickly. They get you de-synched before you

know it. We planned for that. We knew that was coming, but it’s hard

to do on the first fight. Lesson learned is you don’t necessarily want to

do things just the way the enemy does it, number one. Number two, if
Colonel Fil

39

the main event is to destroy the main body, that’s probably the way you

want to go.

13. Shaping the Battlefield for a Flexible

Defense

The second fight was different. It was a defense in sector. Again

our orientation was to the east. We were defending in sector east to

west. That’s another one we thought through because the sectors

have gotten wider. Zones are narrower than they used to be, so

you’re attacking with less space than you used to have which gives

you fewer courses of action. Sectors are wider which gives the

enemy more courses of action. And this is good, these are healthy

changes to make it a difficult rotation, the way it should be.

We had thought that probably the best way to defend was to have

a covering force deep. This would not only attrit the enemy but also

give us a lot of battle space to shape. Then we could fight the main

fight farther in depth in our sector, farther back. But also, we might

be able to deny him some of the courses of action he had. You take a

sector that goes from the Drinkwater Valley down to Central

Corridor, or Drinkwater, Echo, Central Corridor and Hidden Valley.

Include all of those and part of the northern part of Siberia as it comes

into John Wayne Pass. There are a lot of things you can do there,

especially since the enemy doesn’t come the same way with

everything he’s got, Task Force Angel and Avenger and all the rest of

his guys. 

We knew that was a possibility. We developed a course of action

with 1-12 out front. What we wanted to do was show strength in some

places, show weakness in others, deny some avenues with dismounted

infantry, FASCAM, a big heavy obstacle effort. And without tilting our

hand, we wanted to accept the penetration through the Brown Pass. We

would accept it also through Debnam Pass, although not as good. We

preferred Brown. And, if all else failed, we’d fight them as they came

through the Colorado. We would have planned, rehearsed contingency

actions for all of those. We wanted to have a reverse slope defense on

the western side of Brown Pass. The end-state was, we wanted to be

able to mass the combat power of four company teams on his main

effort, and to have the inherent, rehearsed flexibility to accept the fight

wherever he penetrated. 
40

Late the afternoon before the defense, we recognized that the

boundary we had been given in the north had moved further north.

So now we had the additional challenge of not only Echo Valley, but

the full Drinkwater Valley and the Leach Lake passes coming into our

rear with Alpine Pass. Basically we had a plan that was very, very

flexible; every company team had at least two battle positions that

they were to establish, not always digging in, but they had to find

wadis and develop the engagement area for at least two battle

positions. That allowed them to mass the combat battle power of

these four or five companies in two or three different areas based on

how the actual fight progressed. 

It worked and we stopped them. 1-12 Cavalry shaped the

battlefield initially and caused them to come through Brown Pass, just

the way we wanted them to. 1-5 Cavalry had a very, very agile,

mobile defense in depth. He moved companies around to stop

penetrations, mass fires, took them down to nothing. It was a great

fight.

The lesson learned on that one; you don’t know where he’s going

to come. You can deny him a few courses of action but his plan is

based on retaining multiple flexible courses of action so that he can

make decisions as he fights it. While the terrain lets you know what

those decisions are likely to be, where he’s likely to make them, you just

have to accept that. You can deny him a few of them, and you can help

him to go where he wants to go by putting a heavy obstacle effort where

you don’t want him to go. If you’re not too obvious about it you can

shape the battlefield and accept the penetration where you want it. Then

move company teams around and think through all the triggers and

timelines used to get them moved around. Have a flexible fire plan that
Colonel Fil

41

you can move based on

predetermined decision

points, with friendly and

enemy criteria already

thought out. Through the

wargaming process, you can

figure we may have to fight it

here, or here, or right here. So, how do we mass direct and indirect fires

and all the combat multipliers? Also, it’s the second fight, so you are

starting to get better synchronized and C2 systems are working.

“You can help him go where he

wants.... If you’re not too

obvious about it you can shape

the battlefield...”

COLONEL BENJAMIN FREAKLEY, 1998

14. See the Terrain to Assess the Terrain

I learned a lesson as a Battalion Commander. It's paid often in

spades since. And the lesson or the learning was from failure, abject

failure. I was commander of 1-5 Cavalry, out of the Second Brigade

of the 1st CAV. It was towards training day 13, towards the end of

the rotation, and normally by that time units are coming along really

well with their training. We had a very good train-up. We were a

balanced task force, two tank companies, two Bradley companies.

Our mission on the first day was to attack and penetrate an enemy

forward defensive position with the idea of continued attack on the

next day to complete the destruction of the enemy's second defensive

position. This attack was coming from north to south. The piece of

ground at the National Training Center, the final objective, would be

what is referred to as the Whale. To get to the Whale we were going

to have to go over the top of a ground called Siberia, very broken,

very disrupted ground.

A contributing factor to the poor decision I made was fatigue. The

battalion was centrally located up along East Range Road at an

assembly area. Our battalion was to be the lead battalion of the

brigade to go over the top of the northern side of the ridge at Siberia,

attack down the south side of Siberia, penetrate the enemy, and if

successful, the second battalion would go through us and continue the

attack to destroy the enemy at Furlong Ridge. Then we would

continue the attack and take the Whale. That was planned for the

13th. It was an abject failure because we really failed to appreciate

the ground. That's what

the real lesson was as a

commander. When the

staff is briefing and you

are getting all this

information given to you,

to really take the time to

evaluate the terrain is difficult. And I knew. I have a great

background in operations, so when they say people don't pay enough

attention to the ground, I'm always saying, “I pay attention to terrain,

"...when they say people don't pay

enough attention to the ground,

I'm always saying, 'I pay attention

to terrain, I'm not one of those.'”
44

I'm not one of those.” But, I just kind of allowed the staff to brief me

on the terrain and as a commander I didn't really embrace and think

about and get really involved in the ground. 

So, believe it or not, we planned, even up to doing, a battalion

level breach. We knew the enemy would have a lot of obstacles

forward. And on broken ground like that, where it is all running

north-south and your whole

formation is going to be

broken up and you are going

to be forced down wadis,

single vehicle wadis, it's

preposterous to think you

would even attempt a

battalion breach, but that's what we worked on in rehearsals, and

that's what we said we were going to do. 

For the reconnaissance, we did not go forward because from

where I was in the assembly area, I could see the ridge we were going

off of and I had reconned that ground before. I just didn't make the

logical in-depth assessment. I took it for granted. I didn't make the

real logical assessment of... Wait a minute, this is a decentralized

attack, we need to get up and attack through the wadis and then have

a subsequent objective for orientation where we reorient and then

continue to attack. I took the ground for granted and lost the fight.

What happened to us is that we went up the side. The first

company got up there, really didn't have a good appreciation for the

"...it's preposterous to think

you would even attempt a

battalion breach, but that's

what we worked on..."
Colonel Freakley

45

enemy on that ground, couldn't see the enemy. First company died

pretty quick coming across the top of the ground. The rest of the

battalion kept going, got into the wadi systems, started to get

disorganized because the plan didn't really take into good

consideration the ground and literally we were defeated handily by

the enemy. We probably killed maybe a company but the whole

battalion was destroyed. The next battalion came up and tried to get

something going off of what we had done. They didn't have a good

appreciation of the ground and the brigade attack ground to a halt

before it really even matured. So, the point that I learned and that has

stuck with me is, regardless of the fatigue factor, if you are the

commander or the operations officer, you really have to get eyeballson, hands-on, get-on-to-the-ground, really look at the ground. 

It's something that will affect us in the future because our young

officers really rely on technology, in particular GPSs. And they don't

spend a lot of time really evaluating ground. They just watch the

GPS screen and go from Point A to Point B. Whereas a lot of folks

have walked the ground, driven over the ground, map in one hand,

eyes looking at the ground. Also too, with the advent of Force XXI

and all the feeds we are going to get from computers and UAVs and

other type of electronic means of transmitting data, they are not going

to take the time to appreciate the ground. So I find myself now, as a

result of that lesson back in 1992, putting the brakes on when I am

being briefed about ground to get up and to look and see how the

terrain really is going to effect the operation and what's going to be

done. 

15. Critical Forward Check

Now as a brigade commander, I'll tell a story about the importance

of checking your instructions. The brigade had made an attack and

our next mission was to defend. The defense was to be from Granite

Pass at the National Training Center down along the Iron Triangle

across the top of Hill 876 and 780, down to and including Hidden

Valley. The brigade staff had really done an excellent job of putting

all the actions into motion to get the brigade to transition from the

offense to the defense very rapidly. HET and HEMTT transports

were early, were forward. We grabbed guys from the offense,

brought them back. We had class IV moving up before we even gave

the operations order to put in barriers. I met all the battalion
46

commanders on top of the Iron Triangle so I could give the defensive

order overlooking the ground they were going to fight from. Bright

day, it was about 11-12 noon. It was a bright clear day to see the

ground. 

We had an airborne battalion with us. Up around the Granite Pass

was where I was going to put the airborne battalion. So, I was going

to put a Bradley company and a light company up there. Then, the

main effort of the brigade was going to be right around the Iron

Triangle. The supporting effort was going to be 3-8 down in the

south. We had put together the brigade barrier plan and had said

these are the belts where we are going to put the brigade obstacles and

this is where the brigade fight is going to be. I pointed out that

forward of this, along north-south Barstow Road, we would use our

close air support and our artillery fires to destroy the enemy out there.

Then the barriers that they first hit, they would be brigade barriers,

and beyond that were engagement areas that the brigade would use to

engage the enemy in. I had no intent at all for direct fire from the

battalions to be in those engagement areas. 

We typically do a backbrief in the brigade and I asked the

battalion commanders if they understood the task and purpose for

their units, and did they understand what they had to do. They said,

“Yes, sir.” In our backbrief we go over the task organization you

have been given. What is your task and purpose, and any special

assets that you have been given? So, for smoke, or chemical

reconnaissance, or if you have been given a COLT to work your area,

you tell me why. You understand from the order I have given you

why I have given you those assets. So, they were clear on all that.

They had what they were going to do. 

 I let them go, and they moved out rapidly. And, as I said,

concertina wire mines, class IV and V was already coming forward.

So I waited about two hours because I had told the battalion

commanders, even before giving their orders, I wanted them to get

out in the engagement areas where they wanted to kill the enemy, and

get their company commanders down there and start developing

engagement areas while we had daylight. This was

November/December rotation and it got dark about 1700 every day,

so we only had about three to four hours of daylight once we gave the

order out for them to operate in daylight. So they were all out there

working and I let them do their thing. I went back and checked some

things in the brigade and then I went out to check the progress. I
Colonel Freakley

47

went to the main effort first. He clearly understood what he had to

do. He had developed his battalion engagement area. He had placed

his companies, and was constructing obstacles. That was 1-9.

Then I went up to the 501st Geronimos and I talked to them and

they were pretty much squared up. I had to tweak their plan because

the battalion commander wanted to have the Bradleys counterattack

into the enemy's flank, but I wanted him to hold their defensive

position and force the enemy into the main engagement area of the

brigade. I didn't want them to be very mobile. I wanted him to make

the enemy come to where he wanted to kill him. 

Then I went down to 3-8, and now it’s dark. They were defending

the brigade obstacles. They were way forward. They were 3 to 4

kilometers in front of where we

really wanted to kill the enemy

in the north, and they were

really shooting the direct fire

into the brigade engagement

area. Had the enemy come in

to where we wanted them to

come into, 1-9, they would have had an immediately assailable flank

into 3-8 and ruptured the brigade defense because they were so far

forward of 1-9. The battalion commander had issued his order, given

his instructions. His guys had been working for hours. They had

started to build obstacles. And, I said, "Too bad. You're changing." 

 Our doctrine talks to us about supervising as part of troop leading

procedures. You issue the plan and then you supervise the plan. So,

here’s a case where because I followed the doctrine, and went out and

supervised, we were able to pull it back together. The next day when

the enemy attacked, the enemy initially came in where we wanted

them to come in, but because the defense was so strong there, his

advance guard battalion was destroyed. So he then decided to come

south into 3-8's sector of defense and 3-8 destroyed the enemy. It's

the first time in my ten years of going to NTC where the OPFOR

commander came in a van to me and said “I attacked you but you

destroyed my regiment.”

The other thing that was very good by 3-8 CAV, is that the

obstacles they were putting in reinforced the plan anyway. They just

fell back behind those obstacles and continued to kill. So, the

obstacles contributed to the plan and thickened the obstacle belt. But

by them coming back and getting set, they were able to defeat the

“They were way forward.

They were 3 to 4 kilometers

in front of where we really

wanted to kill the enemy...”
48

enemy. They did a great job. They had three tanks destroy 43

vehicles. 

I served for 20 months as a general's aide. The general had been a

platoon leader in Korea, a company commander in Korea in 1950 in

the height of the fighting. He had been a battalion commander in

Vietnam and a brigade commander in Vietnam. And I asked him as a

leader, he was an infantry officer, what did he spend the most of his

time doing in the Korean conflict and Vietnamese conflict. And, he

said “personal reconnaissance.” Either checking the ground or

checking the routes that the enemy could come into his units, or

checking his units to see how they were doing. That is where he

spent most of his time. That is what we all need to continue to do.

The importance of backbriefs and forward checks show up in

historical examples also. First, it’s doctrine that commanders should

supervise. Not all commanders do. Lots get trapped into command

posts. But, there is a story where Ulysses S. Grant was attacking

Robert E. Lee's army toward the last year of the Civil War, and he

was constantly trying to close with and destroy Lee's army. He spent

a full day prior to this attack, riding all day on his horse, just checking

the plan to conduct this attack. The next morning the attack was to

occur, and after riding all day and most of the night, Grant went to

camp, took the saddle off his horse, and went to sleep. So the attack

commenced in the first part of the day. Grant was sleeping, and an

aide rode up and said things aren't going very well on the left flank.

And Grant said, “don't worry, they will,” and turned back over and

went to sleep. It’s because he had personally checked the ground, and

personally checked what was to be done, and talked to the leaders that

he was confident that his work had been done, and now it was up to

them to do the fighting. And he was right. They carried the day and

destroyed the enemy. Examples like that have stuck with me about

how important it is to personally check and conduct reconnaissance

well forward to make sure that the plan is being carried out.
COLONEL TED KOSTICH, 1999

16. Leadership in a Composite BCT

This was a February rotation for the brigade combat team. Our

task organization was a tank battalion, a mechanized infantry

battalion, a light battalion that came out of Hawaii, an aviation

brigade minus that had an attack helicopter battalion, a lift battalion,

our direct support engineer battalion, forward support battalion, our

DS field artillery battalion. We also had an MLRS battery that came

to us out of Fort Sill, plus a brigade reconnaissance troop that we

formed internally under the division Force XXI structure. When it

was all said and done, it was about a 6300-soldier rotation.

I think I'll start on the battle command side during the train-up.

A lot of challenges with the train-up in that we had a number of

competing demands between train-up, redesign, and the Digital

Advanced Warfighting Experiment. There were a number of

opportunities to hone the staff efforts. The staff knew how I would

fight but the two battalion commanders that we went through the

Advanced Warfighting Experiment with were not the same two

battalion commanders I took to the NTC. Those commands at the

same time were focusing on their gunnery skills and their individual,

platoon, and company level training to raise the proficiency level. We

did have a number of opportunities to get together at company lanes,

task force lanes, Janus exercise, and some other things, to include

LTP. But the real collective energy did not come together as a total

entity until we got to the National Training Center. 

I would tell you when you take a composite of organizations that

you don't have a habitual relationship with, the challenge of battle

command is to get everyone to understand how you fight and what

you are looking for. What your task, conditions, and standards are,

and then communicating that you have the genuine welfare of them

and their organization at heart, as you would your own. I’ll give you

an example. One of the battalions that was attached to us did not have

a habitual training relationship with us. We went through an exercise

where we did some rather dynamic re-taskings. As a result, the size of

this battalion went from being a rather robust battalion to a rather

small battalion. The perception of that commander initially was, or at
50

least it was my belief his perception was, that I was questioning his

competence. That was not it at all. I was willing to accept risk at one

part of the battlefield. Given the capabilities of his force, I gave that

risk to his force. I also took substantial combat power away from him

because I believed in my heart of hearts that I needed to mass it

elsewhere. Once we had that discussion and we walked it through, we

later found we could make whatever task organization changes we

wanted across the entire brigade combat team without the issue of

ever questioning someone's integrity or competence. That was a new

dynamic for me because every time I deployed previously, we've had

folks with habitual association. You've had a day-to-day relationship

with them, and this was not the case there. It caused some growing

pains. Once we got through that, it went very well. 

Probably the greatest command challenge I faced was the large

size of the task organization and the fact that there were many

competing demands. Not all the demands were simply focused on

mission accomplishment. Consensus building is probably a poor

choice of words, but it called for a greater degree of cooperation

versus directive intent or directive guidance. As a function of that, I

think the task force as a whole matured much quicker. We were more

cooperative in terms of uniting to get everyone towards a common

cause. This was a success of the brigade combat team. Even though

in some instances a certain unit or force would pay a disproportionate

share of the bill in terms of either casualties or relinquishing resources

in order to better the organization as a whole. 

Now, having said all that, when we got there, the first day the

main body deployed, the wind was over 40 MPH and it was raining.

That is the type of environment those soldiers and leaders entered into

the NTC. It rained the whole time we were there. Every fight we had

it rained. So, to keep morale up, keep discipline up, and keep the

fighting spirit up required a large degree of involvement by leadership

at all levels. And, I will tell you that every place I went I saw leaders

sharing the hardship of their soldiers. No one was asking their

soldiers to do anything that they were unwilling to do themselves. I

think that paid us rather big dividends. 

17. Pressure to Decide

Defense. Our maneuver box went from the northern boundary in

the National Training Center all the way to the southern boundary.
Colonel Kostich

51

We had the whole width. And that gets back to the point I made

earlier about economy of force and deciding where to accept risk.

One of our operations was a defend mission and we had to defend

from the northern boundary to the Turtle Fence. I opted to accept risk

in the north. The plan called for a battalion minus (a light company

and a tank company) up in the Northern Corridor, an armor heavy

force in the Central Corridor, on both the North and South Wall, and

then I positioned my reserve back, in Siberia, just south of the Central

Corridor, off the main avenue of approach. I had positioned my

reserve so I could go either way. I felt I had enough flexibility in my

plan, given a reconnaissance. Since I had interior lines, I could

reposition the force where required to blunt any penetration. The

force in the north did its job absolutely magnificently. We were never

penetrated in the north. Had some challenges in the center, but were

never penetrated in the center. The decision criteria for the

commitment of the reserve was where the enemy was going to go. If

he went center, of course, there was a backstop. If he went south, then

the reserves requirement was to assume a blocking position in order

( - )

Reserve

Main Defense

Economy

of Force

Figure 4. Brigade Combat Team Defensive Plan.
52

to disrupt and delay the enemy force so I could reposition the main

body towards the southern sector. 

In terms of battle command, I missed the decision point because I

didn't have a good read on the enemy. At the decision point that I had

chosen, I didn't ensure that, through my R&S plan, I had sufficient

eyes to allow me to make that decision. That decision had to happen

when the enemy came out of the Brown/Debnam complex. Was he

going to go center or was he going to go south? At that decision point

I had the requisite eyes, but I couldn't talk to them. The mechanisms

were in place, but I didn't have the comms. 

To set the stage, the reserve company fell asleep. I had Sentinel

radar coverage. We had synched force protection measures to make

sure that the individual organization was protected from both air and

ground infiltration, and as circumstance would have it, everybody

went to sleep. It was a multiplicity of errors that contributed to the

fact that the enemy was able to land Task Force Angel about 600

meters from that tank company and they never knew it. One thing led

to another, and I was not aware of the situation. So when we had

stand-to in the morning, we were ready to go for the fight. I

positioned myself where I could see the battlefield both sides, north

and south. I had my S3 on the North Wall. He was my directed

telescope up north, so he could interface between the northern task

force and the task force at the

North Wall. The next thing I

know, I look to my left rear and

I see my brigade reserve just

dissolve before my eyes. The

enemy had closed in with

dismounted infantry and

infiltrated some AT-5s, and the

reserve was gone in a minute. 

Now having said that, I don't think he really understood the

success of what he had done. I immediately had to take forces from

the north and reconstitute a brigade reserve. I accepted further risk up

in the Alpha-Bravo Pass complex with the limited amount of light

infantry and some AT systems. It was at that very point that the

enemy had reached the decision to go south as opposed to center. I

never did position the combat power I wanted between the center and

the south. I had enough to delay and disrupt. It ended up that the

"The next thing I know, I

look to my left rear and I see

my brigade reserve just

dissolve before my eyes."
Colonel Kostich

53

division allowed me to commit attack helicopters to the operation and

that's what finally broke the attack in the south. 

From a battle command perspective I had the time line, but what I

did not do is get my TOC into the fight quick enough to help me with

some of those decisions. By that I mean, the TOC has the ability to

step back from all the fur flying. They can apply a very methodical

and deliberate process, the decision support matrix, answering PIRs

and other commander's critical information requirements, and then

share those with the commander and tell him what they think is

happening. I didn't get the most from that cell. Partly I would say it

was my fault because I was too engrossed in the fight and I didn't pull

what I needed from the TOC. At the same time, the TOC didn't push.

The battle captain in the TOC said "Sir, I think here's the read right

here and I think we missed the read. And I think oh, by the way, now

he is going south."

We made that decision based on the intel available, but we were

about 30 minutes too late. Had we made the move sooner, before the

enemy got into terrain where he could maneuver, we would have had

the ability, through a number of dynamic obstacles, air, Volcano, and

other systems, to shut the effort down in the restrictive terrain and

Main Defense

( - )

Reserve

Economy

of Force

Figure 5. Reconstituting the Reserve.
54

then use artillery. But I missed the read. I didn't make the call in time.

I recognized this later. At the time I refused to believe. I knew he had

reconnaissance in the south, but I refused to believe he was going to

come in the south because the terrain was more conducive for him to

mass combat power in the center. If he came in the south, I did know

he would have to fight uphill to get at me. 

We had talked through this, walked through this, but by the time

we saw he was actually in the south, the ground assets I had available

to reposition were not sufficient to stop him. At the same time, he

kept the pressure on in the center so you had to make the decision

whether that was the main effort or not. If I thinned out the center too

much, then what happens? I anguished a good 30 minutes before I

made the decision to reposition one of the maneuver battalions from

the center into Siberia where the Southern Corridor comes back up

into the Central Corridor. By that time, the number of combat systems

he had committed to the fight were simply such that if I didn't get

attack aviation in it wasn't going to be long. All in all we moved well. 

Part of battle command is being able to be decisive and make the

right decision with the information available. We had all the

information that I believe we needed to make the decision. We just

didn't know it. When we did know it, it was too late. Later, we

discussed why we made the decision? Why did we not know what we

knew later? Who else

knew? Well, the BRT

commander knew. Who

did he tell? A whole host

of things, and when you

peel it all back there are

ways to work through that. We just weren't creative enough at that

time to make it happen. That was the defensive fight. 

18. Seize the Initiative

Offensive operation. This was our last force on force fight. Day 9,

a night attack, where we went both center and north. We did a

spoiling attack in the center with the main effort in the north. The

enemy was defending forward of Granite Pass. They were defending

on the east side of Granite Pass and Barstow Road. They were set at

800, 876, Peanut, up in that area. We had set conditions to fix the

"We had all the information that I

believe we needed to make the

decision. We just didn't know it."
Colonel Kostich

55

enemy in the southern half of the Central Corridor while we

maneuvered through the north with the tank heavy task force. We had

an initial breakdown in critical friendly zones with the radar coverage.

We had an initial breakdown in movement as we lost a percentage,

more than I wanted to, to indirect fire in the north before we really got

moving. So the first decision I had to make was with the battalion

commander and his assessment of whether he could still carry out the

mission he was given, given the combat power. The key to his

success was not so much the direct fire systems, but retaining the

mobility assets, the engineers, because we knew someplace we were

going to have to breach and we believed that to be Granite Pass. 

The battalion commander said he had sufficient assets left. We

attacked at night. We had the scouts forward and we knew there was

a significant wire and mine obstacle in Granite Pass. We lost the

initiative a little bit and as a result received a non-persistent chem

strike. At that time, the commander wanted to wait the 60 minutes for

it to clear. I said negative, button up, MOPP4, and we took the breach

HIDDEN VALLEY

GRANITE

PASS

COLORADO 876

IRON

TRIANGLE

BROWN

PASS

DEBNAM

PASS

780

760

Fixing

Attack

Main Effort

DAY 1

OBJ

Day 1 Attack

Base Plan

BRIGADE

HILL

RACETRACK

Figure 6. Day 1 Attack -- Base Plan.
56

in full MOPP. The decision I struggled with there is do I wait and let

the enemy mass additional combat power, most notably fires, and

allow him to reposition? I knew in the south if we didn't keep the

pressure on, he would just start moving units from the south to the

north. In 50 minutes he could basically reposition the entire battalion

he had set in the south. I made the decision we would continue the

attack. We breached through the minefield and the next thing you

know, probably 50% of the task force was still intact and we are now

behind the enemy. 

We had a multi-phased attack. The first day we were supposed to

secure up to Brown/Debnam if we could, with the second day

continuing the attack to the west to Crash Hill. When it was all said

and done, we could have been to Crash Hill at the end of the first day,

but I didn't have the combat power to do that. I could have gotten

there and said yes, we are on the mountain, but I would have never

held it. So, I made the decision that once we got through the pass, we

would orient a company to the southeast to take the enemy in the rear

and then send the remainder of the task force up to the

Brown/Debnam Pass and secure that. We did that, but what we lacked

was the dismounted

strength to hold it. So

yes, we were kings of the

hill for the day, but we

lacked the combat power

to hold the ground. And I lacked the ability, at that point, to reposition

the assets I had in the center and the southern part of the Central

Corridor up to the north to reinforce them. Just didn’t have any left.

It was a very good fight. 

Most difficult decision was, after the artillery strike do we still go?

The breaching was a difficult decision. Do we wait for chem to

dissipate? Given the situation we were in, I decided we couldn't. The

key to our success in the north was speed and surprise. What he did

have up there, defending, was not dug in like it was in the center and

the south. Once you afforded him the opportunity to do that, we knew

we would lose that fight. So we took the breach and had the

subsequent challenge with decon and some of those other things we

had to go through afterwards. 

I felt these were good decisions and would make them again in a

flash. By the time you are under fire, both observed fire and

templated fires, you have basically lost the initiative. And the only

"I could have gotten there and

said yes, we are on the mountain,

but I would have never held it."
Colonel Kostich

57

way we were going to get that initiative back was to close with the

enemy and take his fires out of the fight. He subsequently, once we

got through, put FASCAM in. But because we took the initiative, he

FASCAMed behind us. So, the breach was there. We created a

breach. He had a plan to reseed but it was too late. We were through. 

19. Conditions for Attack Dissolve in Bad

Weather

The second portion of that battle had us moving from positions in

contact. We were attacking a motorized rifle battalion plus and he

had a CAR, combined arms reserve, of 10-15 tank killing systems.

That was the follow-on day. So I had the armor battalion relieved by

the mech infantry battalion, who took over security of

Brown/Debnam Pass. I pulled the armor battalion back and

reorganized those folks. And, we had a plan to use the light infantry

in an air movement operation, not necessarily an air assault, even

though it was cross-FLOT. The LZs were secure so it was more of an

air movement from the north side of the Granite Mountains. The light

battalion was to infiltrate along the valley that ran just north of Crash

DEBNAM

PASS

BROWN

PASS

COLORADO

MATTERHORN

( - )

Day 2 Attack

Initial COA

DAY 2

OBJ

876

GRANITE

PASS

WASHBOARD

Figure 7. Day 2 Attack -- Initial COA.
58

Hill. They were going to come down the north side of the mountains

and then come down on Crash Hill from the north. The mech

battalion was going to continue to secure Brown/Debnam Pass and

then move along the north wall of the bowl, clearing the wall and the

ridges where the mountains joined the desert floor. They were going

to clear that wall and then they were going to set up support by fire

positions. We were going to pass the tank battalion around and then

continue the attack on Crash Hill. We had fairly good reconnaissance

out although we had some challenges communicating with the recon. 

And then, all of a sudden, probably about 2100 that night, the

weather just went to zero. Couldn't see, couldn't fly, couldn't do

anything. We were in the process of conducting a FRAGO. We had

adequate WARNOs out to everyone, but what I didn't know was

when we passed the warning orders to subordinate maneuver

battalions, some of those folks hadn’t left "wake up" criteria. You

always have to leave your command post with what I call "wake-up"

criteria. They have to know when to go find the boss or wake the boss

up. So, they had no idea we were changing the base plan until about

0300 even though we had been working this since about 2100 that

night. 

I had established a number of criteria for how we were going to

work the base plan. We had a good read on where the enemy was and

obscuration was the key element to our success with the ground

maneuver through Brown/Debnam and the subsequent assault at

Crash Hill. The problem was the wind was blowing so strong you

couldn't get smoke, and if you could it was blowing the wrong way.

We really needed the smoke to blow from north to south or south to

north, but the wind was directly out of the west. Now our obscuration

plan was gone. 

Well, we couldn't fly the dismounts in because the weather was

zero-zero for the helicopters. So now what were we going to do? Now

we were going to truck them in. But then I had to redo the timeline

and that required us to assemble trucks, cross-load all the infantry.

We had previously had a plan where we would move the infantry to

an LZ with a timeline from

that LZ to their assault

position or support by fire

position which would be X

hours. But now it was Y

“So of all those conditions

that I said I needed in order to

be successful on this fight,

not a one of them held up!”
Colonel Kostich

59

hours because of the added time involved with trucking and

movement. 

Then we ran into the challenge of CASEVAC. Again, air traffic

was grounded. I could get them in but had no way of getting them

out. Then we ran into road conditions. A truck slipped off the road.

No one hurt, but now the whole column is jammed up behind them

with no place to go. Then another major element of combat power

was fixed wing aviation. Even they couldn't fly because the clouds

were so low. So of all those conditions that I said I needed in order to

be successful on this fight, not a one of them held up! So at 0300 I

made the decision we were going to frag, and we were going to go

WASHBOARD

DEBNAM

PASS

BROWN

PASS

COLORADO

MATTERHORN

Coalition

Force

( - ) Day 2 Attack

FRAGO

DAY 2

OBJ

Initial COA

876

GRANITE

PASS

Figure 8. Day 2 Attack – FRAGO.
60

through the Washboard. We were going to keep hold of

Brown/Debnam Pass but now take the maneuver tank battalion, that

previously we were going to maneuver behind the infantry battalion,

to the Washboard. We also moved the mech battalion down. They

left a small force in contact, but basically the brigade reoriented from

going center, now to going up to the Washboard and going to the

south. 

At the same time, we had picked up, the day prior, a company

from host nation. So now we also had a force on our side that had

T72s and BMPs. They were a coalition force that we were going to

deploy with us. Initially, when I made the decision to frag off the base

plan, we wanted them to lead us through the Washboard because they

knew the terrain much better than we did. As host nation they had

been there numerous times. With that as a general overview, I met

with the battalion commanders at 0500 at Four Corners and we went

through all this. Everybody acknowledged and understood the reason

for change and why we were doing what we were doing. The weather

is still very, very ugly. 

But parallel planning was not occurring at the battalions and

below. From the time the planning started until the time we made the

actual decision, parallel planning was not occurring. Even though

command posts were all acknowledging, "Roger, I got it, Roger,

Roger." The commanders knew we were going to change as early as

0300. Only one had taken steps to make that change and get

company commanders refocused and reoriented prior to our LD at

0700. So now I've got one battalion trying to refocus, reorient, on the

move and another battalion that had done some preparation and

probably had a fairly good picture of what needed to be done. He had

the graphics, et cetera. And then the third battalion is still on the base

plan because I needed to focus some of the combat power from the

enemy towards the north. The only way I could do that was the

dismounted or light battalion. By pulling some enemy attention to the

“Everybody acknowledged and understood the

reason for change and why we were doing

what we were doing. ... But parallel planning

was not occurring at the battalions and below.”
Colonel Kostich

61

north at Crash Hill and focusing him north, we could at least hold him

in position while the rest of the brigade maneuvered. 

So we LD at 0700. The coalition force is a company-size force

and I am traveling with them in my 113. The intent was I was going

to drop off behind the coalition force while they continued their

movement to contact through the Washboard followed by the armor

battalion, followed by the mech battalion. In the haste, and the fog

and friction of war, the mech battalion jumps prematurely. So they

start to maneuver through the Washboard. They are to my front and

to the west when they should have been to my flank and to the east

because I am with the coalition force. Remember, I wanted to lead

with coalition followed by the mech battalion, followed by the armor

battalion. Now what I have is the mech battalion, with me in the

middle, and the armor battalion behind. 

As the mech battalion enters into the Washboard, they come under

direct fire from an enemy combat recon patrol. But, due to the

weather, visibility, orientation, and a host of other things that come

with the fog and friction of war, they looked to their left, which is

now back to their east and southeast, and who do they see but me and

the coalition company. Thinking those are the tanks that fired, they

promptly take the coalition company under fire. Now I have a

fratricide. We limited it, but by that time the coalition forces had

already lost three systems. The coalition commander could not be

convinced to remain with the brigade combat team so he starts to

disengage and move east. Now remember, there was the mech

battalion, the coalition battalion in the middle, and the armor battalion

in the back. Now the armor battalion sees the coalition company

moving east, and interprets the bad guys are counterattacking. When

it was all said and done, we lost all but two vehicles from the

coalition company to fratricide for a whole host of reasons. 

We continued the attack through Washboard. When I did the battle

calculus, knowing all I knew about enemy systems, our systems, our

OR rates, we had no business attacking because I didn't have the

requisite combat power when you counted all the systems. Hasty

attack says I should have 3:1. And by the way, now the weather had

cleared, but I had lost my CAS window. I had lost my aviation. But

guess what? Now the enemy's helicopters were flying. His fixed

wing is flying. And when it was all said and done, he really had an

advantage in the battle calculus. I was attacking a force one and a half

times superior to mine. We made good use of the terrain. It was slow
62

and deliberate. We managed to get folks behind Crash Hill, on the

west side of the hill, but the enemy had already committed its

combined arms reserve through his forces in contact against a second

echelon of our division. 

Battle command challenges occurred at the decision point. Having

aids to assist you in making the decision is absolutely critical.

Specifying go, no-go criteria. I believe we had those, but what I

didn't do was share those decision criteria with my subordinate

commanders at the

right time. When I

published the

orders, I should

have said, here's

the decision

criteria I am going to use to make the decision when we go and do

this. We have a decision support matrix, but it doesn't always say all

the things you are going to consider simultaneously. It is more

sequential. At a certain point I’m going to make this decision. What

it doesn't do is allow you to set the conditions ahead of time that says

here's what is going to cause me to come off my base plan even

before we undertake this operation. Once it started, I had all the

decision points. That was all done. What I did not share with them

ahead of time was all those things that were going to cause me to

change from the order we already issued. That was one challenge. 

"What I did not share with them ... was

all those things that were going to

cause me to change from the order."
Colonel Kostich

63

The other challenge is clearly I should have been more direct in

saying put your “six” on the radio. We talk to competent battle

captains and TOCs but I made the flawed assumption that they would

make sure that their commander was awoken or the commander

knew. And questions were coming back which led me to believe that

the commanders were involved in the process, but these questions

were being generated by battalion S3s or other battle captains and

being fed back up, not necessarily from or through the commander.

So, here we are 3 to 4 hours out from execution and it's the first time

the battalion commander is being made aware of a rather radical

change from the base plan even though this had been working for at

least 6 to 8 hours prior. They didn’t have their wake-up criteria either

or if they did, it did not include for example, “Tell me when a

FRAGO comes in.”

20. Huddle on the Battlefield

Situational awareness in your command post is just as essential for

battle command as is situational awareness on the battlefield. The first

thing I look at whenever I come into a command post is the chart that

has the current division FRAGO and the current brigade FRAGO.

And, that’s the last thing I look at when I go out. So, if something has

come in I know to review it. Check FRAGOs when going in and out,

it jogs your memory. So, when I left we were on Division FRAGO

12, now we’re on 14, let me see the two that came in. And, before I

leave, I always have the battle captain write down my wake-up

criteria. I always have the battle captain or the ops sergeant walk with

me to where I am sleeping. There was an incident during our rotation

where they couldn't find a battalion commander. Not that he was

goofing around. He just went outside and crawled in his vehicle and

went to sleep. But when it's dark and raining, you wake up 100 guys

in a 100 different vehicles... That's the level of detail you have to

follow through. What I suspect is that not everybody had that. They

all knew how I was going to fight. There is no doubt in my mind that

folks knew that flexibility in a plan was essential. There was no doubt

in my mind that they knew if we couldn't do X, we would do Y. They

knew I had every confidence in them, but what they didn't know is

that we had changed the plan and they were already well behind the

power curve. 
64

Also, superiors owe it to subordinates to look them right in the eye

and ask if they have enough time to do this. When we did that that

morning, everybody was nodding in the same direction either out of

pride or a whole host of reasons. Clearly it was a complicated plan

given the fact that we had changed it so late in the game. When

commanders briefed me back, they clearly understood what I wanted.

The understanding has to go at least two levels down. I don't believe I

gave them, or they had, adequate time to get their subordinates to the

same level of understanding. 

One of the tools that worked well for me is whenever we had an

operations order or a FRAGO we would huddle on the battlefield

someplace. After we talked, I’d always have the commanders go to

the side of a track with a piece of chalk or butcher board and draw

what I just told them to do, and what they think this fight is going to

look like. Because, if they can't draw it, that means they can't

visualize it. And, if they can't visualize it, how are they going to fight

it within your intent? I use the same technique now. If you just have

them brief it back to you, they will memorize it and parrot it back to

you. But that does not guarantee they understand it. So I have them

draw it. I started that as a battalion commander and I do the same

thing here. It doesn’t have to be pretty but it should give you that

warm feeling in your gut that you know he knows what you want him

to do. Now, he'll work the details at his level, but clearly don't ever

let him walk off, especially from an orders brief, without

understanding that.

The other TTP that served us well in battle command, and this is

in the pre-execution phase, is having the order delivered and ready for

the battalion commanders, and/or whoever comes to your brigade

orders brief, prior to them actually receiving the brief. This way they

can study it. And I’m a fan of cartoons. You can’t get the level of

resolution or lethality off these drawings that you can off of a map.

But it is a picture that will stick with you. So, they get to visualize

the battlefield and visualize where you want them in relationship to

time and space, to the enemy and friendly forces. I give that to them

"If you just have them brief it back to you, they will

memorize it and parrot it back to you. But that does not

guarantee they understand it. So I have them draw it."
Colonel Kostich

65

before they ever get the orders brief so they have the opportunity to

sit down and look at it and figure out their role in this. So when they

hear the orders brief they are figuring out where they fit in the grand

scheme of things. Then before they leave, they show me what they

think I told them to do. 

Presence on the battlefield. I always traveled with my

FSCOORD, always in an armored vehicle, and I always sent my S3

to the opposite side of the battlefield. In some cases where there are

three ends, we accepted risk and I sent no one other than an LNO.

Also, I always had someone who could speak my language in a

dissimilar forces headquarters. For example, I always had a tanker in

a light battalion headquarters. Not because the light battalion were not

good fighters, but when I gave them a company of tanks, the assigned

tanker could articulate to that battalion commander the amount of

fuel, ammo, and other issues a tanker would automatically consider. 

I also had them provide me with similar LNOs. LNOs are

absolutely essential. We have gone away from that. We overlook that

and instead send your least experienced guy because you don't want

to give up a good guy to be an LNO. You ought to send the best guy

you have to be your LNO, because he is speaking for your

organization in your absence. He is watching out for your best

interests. 

Somewhat related, though not necessarily battle command, is

attachment and cross-attachment organizations. Policy was, always

send your very best. So if I were to send you a tank company, I would

send you the best tank company in my battalion. I, in exchange,

would get your best infantry company or mech company back. You

always kept your weakest. The reason you always sent your best was

he is best capable of executing the mission and representing your

battalion in your absence. Not everybody will adopt that mindset, but

I always send the very best in a cross-attach. 

Every single day I would go look commanders in the eye. And

you could just tell what they are going through. You can tell whether

you are wasting your time talking to them or if, in fact, their batteries

are charged enough to understand what you are saying. Be very

conscious when you wake your commanders up, and what you are

putting your staff through in preparation for the battle. What you don't

want to have happen is they get to the fight and say let's get this over

with. They are so mentally and

emotionally drained from everything "What you don't want

to have happen is they

get to the fight and say

let's get this over with."
66

they've done prior that they are not ready to fight. It's that delicate

balance that you have to see face to face and you can't do that by

talking to someone on the radio. You have to go look them in the

eyes. That’s probably a brilliant flash of the obvious, but you would

be surprised the number of junior leaders that folks did not get down

and see every day and look them in the eye, even though they have a

critical role in the fight. Some days you have to make a decision

based on what your guys look like physically and mentally.

Sometimes you have to make a call of risk avoidance or risk

minimization. If you don't look at them, you're wrong. 

I take some digital products, but once you get in a close fight,

they are of limited utility. They are great for the battle captain and

the TOC. They are great for those folks keeping you in the fight. And

sometimes the tendency is to get so involved in the close fight

because that is where our comfort level is, that is where we all grew

up. I didn't realize that right away. You have to take a step back and

remember that that young lieutenant colonel or captain knows how to

fight that close fight. What I've got to do is set the conditions for him

to be successful in that fight, not help him once he's in it. Once he's in

it, that's his fight. That's really a leap that many folks have to make. It

was difficult for me initially because most of us are hands-on type of

people. You’re hands-on as a company troop commander, you’re

hands-on as a battalion commander. But as brigade commander I've

got to step back and ask how I can structure him for success in his

fight. 

21. Two MICLICs Delay Breach

In live fire we had a problem in deconflicting aircraft and

artillery. Even though I believe we were experienced in it, there was a

great reluctance from the Air Force using max ord to simultaneously

attack targets while artillery was going through. That made SEAD

very, very difficult, because you had to shut the artillery off to bring

the air in, and the air would leave and you would start the artillery

back up. We could never convince them that we weren't going to hit

them because we knew where the gun's target line was and knew our

max elevation. We could just never make that work. And we tried it

hard. We gave them PAAs where we repositioned artillery. We

knew which artillery were hot and which were cold. We tracked

artillery positioning to a science in our live fire but could never
Colonel Kostich

67

convince the folks that were flying that we had the requisite level of

precision in our control.

 So we go to the breach. We have obscuration. The wind is

blowing the right way. All the conditions are set. We bring up the

MICLIC and we are doing very well. We're going to put two lanes in

and just blow through this thing. MICLIC number one goes in, bring

up MICLIC number two. Within a matter of 30 minutes from the line

of departure, we are at the breach site already. Good combat power.

Moving well. MICLIC one fires, lane opens. MICLIC two misfires.

It's on the ground, but it hasn't gone off. Because of the spacing

between the lanes, we couldn't put anybody through the first lane due

to safety reasons because the second one had not exploded. 

So, now we are

looking at our watches. I

know how much smoke we

have, and I knew that if I

did not have smoke for the

second objective, that I

"MICLIC one fires, lane opens.

MICLIC two misfires. It's on the

ground, but it hasn't gone off."
68

would get through the first one and no more. I had positioned myself

where I could see the breach. Based on what I could see, I made the

decision to accept risk, lift and shift from smoke targets to HE targets

and prep on the subsequent objective. Set the conditions for

obscuring the subsequent objective once we got through the breach

because that was about another 30 minutes. Given time-distance, I

anticipated it would take that long for the smoke to build up. We

never detonated the second MICLIC prior to the obscuration

dissipating. Now the second MICLIC goes, I've got all these nice

lanes through the minefield, but guess what? No obscuration. I'm

deep. I’m working on the next guy. The smoke platoon did not get

through the far side of the breach to continue the obscuration. 

Again, where do I accept risk? I knew I'd never get the final

objective if I did not lift and shift because I knew the amount of

smoke I had remaining. My FSCOORD was right there. We timed it

and decided if we don't stop it now, we will not have adequate

resources to get beyond there. In either case we would have

culminated at the breach. So I made the decision to accept risk based

on some input I had from the task force engineers and the FSCOORD,

but the timing was off. We got through the breach, but we didn't have

the combat power we needed to continue the attack to the north. 

We detonated the MICLIC by hand. We had to wait 15 minutes,

and then put a block of C4 on the end and blow it up. With all the

various safety constraints, we were not allowed to use the other lane.

The valuable lesson from that is I need to know going in what the

spacing is so if X blows and Y doesn't, I still have a lane I can use. I

didn't ask that question going in. Those are the kind of things you

pick up and put in your kit bag. In the future... one MICLIC. We will

get the forces on the far side and then I will worry about a second

lane. I synchronized the combat power and resources available at

brigade to structure for success. We had artillery, mortars, air. We did

all that right to a point. Until I made the decision to go with two

MICLICs, so we could get through twice as fast, when I should have

just said one MICLIC. What I allowed to happen, and I missed the

read on this, is I allowed the brigade combat team to close on a breach

anticipating, as timed, the lanes are going to both be open and as soon

as they go, we're through. When the second one didn't blow, now I

have the whole brigade jammed up.
COLONEL RICK LYNCH, 1999

22. Pick Up the Red Pen First

The hardest mission was our first mission at the National Training

Center, force on force. It was billed as a movement to contact

mission. I had 88 tanks and 44 Bradleys, 3 maneuver battalions, and I

was going against an OPFOR that I believe had a similar amount of

systems and a similar mission... that we were both doing movement

to contact. What happened was, rather than take the time to stop and

think to fight the enemy, and really analyze his capabilities and

vulnerabilities, I simply took at face value what the division order

said. You get a division order out there, the 52nd Division. And

there’s always an intel annex, and in the intel annex is always the

most likely enemy course of action. And, all I did, very naively, was

assume the 52nd Division does have eyes so they’re telling me what

the enemy is going to do. As a result, I based my plans on what I

thought the enemy was going to do as a function of what the division

told me they were going to do, which was all wrong. All wrong. 

You have to focus on the enemy. You have to think like the

enemy, and that’s really the most critical piece of battle planning.

But we pooh-pooh that all the time. Instead, we say the enemy is

going to this, the enemy is going to attack in this CRP, FSE, advance

guard formation. Then in the CRP you can expect to see three

vehicles, and the regimental recon comes forward and it’s going to

have some BMPs and BRDMs. But that’s all wrong because he never

does that. The OPFOR at the National Training Center is not

constrained by the smart books we write here at home station. He

does whatever he wants to do. So, what you have to do in battle

command is you have to ask what are the enemy's capabilities,

vulnerabilities, and what’s his mission? In my first mission at the

National Training Center I didn't do that. I took at face value what the

division told me. So, I thought I was doing a movement to contact

against an enemy also doing a movement to contact. He was coming

through Red Lake Pass, he was oriented on Irwin Military City, and

he was working his way through Whale Gap in the Southern Corridor.

I convinced myself that as long as I blocked the Valley of Death in

the Southern Corridor and continued to move, then we would have
70

the meeting engagement, and conditions were favorable to me, and I'd

win because we had all these great plans. 

The problem was the enemy didn't do that and he never intended

to do that. He had about a third of the combat power that I had. I

didn't know that. I didn't ask that simple question, “How many tanks

and BMPs does the enemy have?” Since he only had a third of the

combat power that I had, he was never going to do a movement to

contact or meeting engagement because he would have lost. So,

what's he going to do? Well, if you think about what he is going to do

given unfavorable conditions like that, he’s going to move to defend.

He’s going to find a key piece of terrain, and he is going to set up a

defensive position there, and then I'm going to attack into a defending

enemy. But I never thought about any of that stuff. What I thought

was we were going to meet in the middle, and I was going to win

because I had more than he did and we had trained for this.

What happened was the enemy continued to progress only to the

Siberian Ridge complex. Then he did a reverse slope defense on the

Siberian Ridge complex, which is almost impossible to attack against

because you are attacking uphill through constricted terrain. And

although I thought the CRPs would be about 3 BMPs, very small

things, he augmented the CRPs with T80s, AT weapon systems, and

NBC reconnaissance platforms, and all those things. So the CRP that

I thought was going to be about 3 platforms ended up being about 10

platforms. And he kicked those out real early and he controlled a key

piece of terrain. So, a 2A45, for example, which is an AT weapon

system, set up just behind the Whale Gap, took out an entire task

force as he went through, and we never did figure out where he was

until the AAR. And then I'm thinking, because I'm visualizing what is

going on in the battlefield, we lost the task force there, but I'm not

sure why we did. I'm still convinced the enemy is coming and we are

going to have this meeting engagement. I told everybody that there

were two pieces of key terrain I wanted to control, Hill 466 and the

John Wayne Foothills. We got to those pieces of key terrain and when

I got there I said now we win because that is the key terrain. Problem

is he didn't ever want that key terrain. He stayed on the east side of

the Siberian Ridge Complex and waited for us to attack. And we did.

We piecemealed ourselves in this defensive set, and he wiped out the

entire brigade combat team. 

So, the moral of this story is don't believe anything you hear from

anybody because nobody knows. Unless you have the opportunity to
Colonel Lynch

71

call the enemy personally and ask them what they are going to do,

nobody knows. Everybody is just thinking what they know. We use

the term "most likely enemy course of action" but we have no idea

what that means. All we’re doing is thinking. So, what the

commander has to do is say, "Okay, I got all that input. Very

interesting. But first tell me what is the enemy's capabilities. How

many tanks, BMPs, BRDMs, et cetera? What chemical capabilities

does he have? Persistent, non-persistent? What kind of FASCAM

capabilities does he have?" Ok, I have his capabilities. Number two,

what is his mission? What is he trying to do? In this particular

vignette, what I was told by the 52d Division was that his mission

was to secure Irwin Military City. As a result of that, I was convinced

that regardless of how many losses he took, he was going to continue

to attack to the east and take the Irwin Military City. That was never

his mission. His mission was to destroy as much of us as he could. He

wasn't caring about what he was taking. Third, and probably the most

important question to ask is, what are his vulnerabilities? If you do

that first, “you pick up the red pen first,” in the words of General

LaPorte, then you think you know what the enemy is going to do. As

a result of that, here is what I am going to do so I can accomplish my

mission having thought about the enemy, having truly focused on the

enemy. 

At home station training we did exactly the wrong thing. First off,

in every training event leading up to the National Training Center I

controlled both the BLUEFOR and REDFOR. It’s easy to win when

you control the bad guys. That was a mistake. Then we published this

NTC smart book that says when the enemy has this mission he is

going to do this, et cetera. It is all very doctrinally constrained. But

the OPFOR at the National Training Center, any OPFOR, is not going

to feel constrained by some book that somebody wrote back at Fort

Knox, Fort Leavenworth, Fort Benning, wherever that may be. So,

thinking like the enemy. That’s the critical piece.

“...in every training event leading up to the National

Training Center I controlled both the BLUEFOR and

REDFOR. It’s easy to win when you control the bad guys.”
72

23. Everything Takes Longer Than You Think

National Training Center again. The defense in sector mission. I’m

given the entire width and depth of the National Training Center as

my maneuver space. It is all part of Force XXI TTP. Normally you’re

constrained to the Central Corridor, Southern Corridor, whatever, but

they didn't want to do that. Given the digital capability that I had and

the idea that you could have expanded situational awareness based on

this digital capability, I should be able to move my forces to get them

at the right place at the right time, to mass the effects of combat

power, and kill the enemy even though I have a battle space that is

twice as big as anybody else's. The concept of Force XXI operations

is you take a task force that normally had 3 to 5 kilometers as its

battle space and now you give him 15 kilometers. You take a brigade

combat team which normally had 15 kilometers as a battle space and

you give him 45 kilometers in terms of width of sector. The reason

you can do that is because based on information technology, now you

have a better view of where you are, where the enemy is, where the

friendly forces are. That is the concept, so you have more battle

space. I liked it. The problem with the digital capability is not if the

technology goes out but when the technology goes out. And

sometimes, even though you think you are going to have the

technology, you don't have it at all. 

For example, I was supposed to have as a brigade combat team

access to JSTARS, so I would have moving target indicators. In the

Warfighter and all the simulations prior to NTC, I had JSTARS, and the

JSTARS indicators is what caused me to cue my UAV and send my

UAV over there. From the UAV I could watch the enemy and make

decisions about what I’m going to do about them. I thought I was going

to have that same capability at National Training Center, but I didn't

have it. When I got to NTC, JSTARS was vectored to a real world

mission. But that was okay. Now I had lost that piece of technology, but

you still have assets... a UAV and ground reconnaissance capability.

So, I had the entire National Training Center. I was sitting at the east

side of the reservation with my back up to the east gate. I was

conducting a defense in sector mission with an enemy coming from the

west to the east. I had this entire battle space I had to defend. What I

could have done was taken a doctrinal approach to the problem and said

I'm going to put a task force in the south, a task force in the center, and a
Colonel Lynch

73

task force in the north and have a very linear defense and hope he

doesn't penetrate. Because if he penetrates me, then I have the normal

OPFOR drive by. He's penetrated and he continues to move to the east

gate. Waves to you as he goes by. This is what the existing doctrine

would have told me to do. 

Well, you can't do that given the fact that you have three maneuver

battalions each with only three companies, a light infantry battalion, and

45 kilometers worth of battle space. I mean, you can do that but if you

do that you’re stretched very, very thin. So, this is the other piece I was

talking about. You have to think outside the box. We talked about the

enemy’s vulnerabilities and capabilities. Then, what are my capabilities

and vulnerabilities, and what is my mission. What I decided to do is a

defense in depth focused purely in the Central Corridor and accept risk

in both the south and the north. I put a task force forward, Task Force

1-66. Behind them I put both Task Force 1-22 and Task Force 3-66 as

mobile reserves. So, when the enemy came in, if he decided not to go

center but to go south or north, I could flex those two mobile reserves. I

could then cause him to never penetrate me, assuming I could position

my force at the right place at the right time, but rather have to fight

multiple fights in sequence. I knew he wasn't going to come across the

entire width of the battle space. He was trying to penetrate and then take

the east gate. 

With no JSTARS I wasn’t able to see the width of my sector and

make the decision. The problem people have to remember is, even on

the Force XXI battlefield, you still have to move from point A to

point B. Moving form point A to point B takes a lot of time.

Everything is timing. I told the guys, as we prepared for the National

Training Center, all these

lessons I've learned the hard

way. One is, everything is

timing. And two is, everything

takes longer than you think it is

going to take. So, if you think

about those two things, if I've

got Task Force 1-22 as a mobile

reserve, I've got to have some

trigger line when I've got to launch him from point A to point B so he

can get there and get set in time. 

Given no JSTARS and given one UAV, how do I see deep? Well,

the answer is ground reconnaissance. One of the greatest things that

“...they’re lessons I carry

today... One is, everything is

timing. And two is,

everything takes longer than

you think it is going to take.”
74

we did in this division redesign is create these brigade reconnaissance

troops, two scout platoons and a striker platoon, then have those guys

report directly to the brigade commander. So, I used the

reconnaissance troop as my deep eyes, and then used the task force

scouts as our closer-in eyes. One of the things that people are getting

confused with now is that you have all these scouts, what do you do?

What you don't want to do is use your brigade reconnaissance troop to

do nothing but augment the capability of the task force scouts. You

don't want all these eyes looking at the same thing, essentially. 

The basic paradigm in the Force XXI operations is see them deep,

kill them deep, and only get in direct firefights with their supply

trucks. That’s what you want to do. So, you put the recon troop out

deep, and that is what I did in this defense in sector mission. I was

able to put them out deep enough, having published a reconnaissance

order separate and distinct from the tactical order. Important point.

See, what we do a lot of times is we say I am going through this

mission analysis process and it’s going to take me X amount of hours

to do it at the brigade level and now I'll publish this order. If you

publish the order that tells your recon assets to do something at the

same time you tell the tactical/maneuver units to do something, what

you've probably done is waste about 24 hours because the recon troop

could have already been out there. So, we published two separate

orders. One as a recon order, and one as the maneuver or actual

tactical order. I never brought the recon troop commander back for

that second order. He just stayed out there and input to me. 

It’s all terrain management. Even in the desert, the expanses of the

Mojave Desert, there are only certain places the enemy can go. So, if

you can get eyes on those certain places, focus on those NAIs with

ground assets and electronic assets if you can, then when he gets to

that NAI, then he has to make a decision. See, that's the other thing

about thinking like the enemy. He's got to make decisions like you

have to make decisions. So, if you can watch him make his decision,

then you are better prepared to move your forces at the right place at

the right time to be able to take advantage of the situation. The recon

troop was absolutely critical. 

So, the enemy came in on this defense in sector mission, saw Task

Force 1-66 in the middle and thought that was where the defensive

area was going to be. But that was only the first of three. He had

three repetitive fights that he had to fight so by the time he had gotten
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75

to the east gate, he had nothing left. Unfortunately, we had nothing

left either. 

24. Tactical Patience and Managing Battle

Tempo

The third vignette happened in the Division AWE. Remember, the

division was very successful in Division AWE. Four combined arms

armies killed by the 4ID. That's the way the story plays out. And it

worked. In simulation, which makes it a lot easier, but it worked.

Force XXI battlefield enhancements in lethality and enhancements in

survivability based on situational awareness and I say, “Amen.”

That's a true statement. If you know where you are, and where the

enemy is, and where all your friendly forces are, then there is much,

much less probability that you are going to have a fratricide because

you know who is where. And there is much greater capability to get

you to the right place at the right time so you can kill him. So you are

now much more lethal. And, by the way, you have all these fancy

systems. You have Crusader, you have Comanche, all these futuristic

systems.

We were able to kill four combined arms armies with one division.

The problem is the third leg of that stool which is the OPTEMPO leg.

Remember, we say improvements in lethality, survivability, and the

ability to manage the tempo of the battlefield. That doesn't mean things

happen quickly. All it means now is that we’re managing the pace of the

battle so that we contact the enemy at situations to our advantage. That's

the critical piece. I wasn't paying attention to that during the first fight. It

was either the Division AWE itself, or it might have been one of the

ramp-ups. We were going to the Neckar River. The Neckar River is a

real pain in the butt river that we had to get across so we could

accomplish our objective. What I thought I'd do is race to the Neckar

River and get there as quickly as I possibly could. But, even when things

started going wrong, I continued to push to the Neckar River and we just

got our butts kicked at the Neckar River. 

I got to thinking why that happened. That happened because I got

in a hurry. You don’t have to be in a hurry given today’s technology

and tomorrow’s technology. Rather, you can manage the tempo of the

battlefield because you know where you are and you know at what

rate you are moving and what's going on in your area of the world.

And, you know what the enemy is doing and at what rate he is
76

moving, and what’ going on in his area of the world. Then you can

make decisions to do what you have to do, to get where you want to

be, by managing the tempo of the battlefield. People are starting to

get fixated on this idea that things happen quicker on tomorrow's

battlefield given all this digital capability and that is exactly wrong.

What is exactly right is, it is going to happen at the pace that you

want it to happen because you are now in charge of the tempo. You

don't have to do everything quickly. 

25. No News is Bad News

Our third mission at the National Training Center was a deliberate

attack mission. When you are out of communication, you’re camping

out. Remember, it’s command and control. If you are in command,

and are in control, that means you can talk to all your forces. If you

go to the National Training Center and you don't set yourself up for

success in communication, then you’re just camping out. In the third

mission we had that problem. I had to attack across the width of the

National Training Center and the enemy was set on the western side

of Brown/Debnam Pass. We thought we knew how he was set up, but

it proved that we were wrong. Again, it goes back to thinking like the

enemy. Is he going to set up reverse slope Brown/Debnam? Is he

going to come forward? Is he going to come to the east of

Brown/Debnam Pass? Is he going to set deeper back by Chinaman’s

Hat? Thinking like the enemy is still the critical piece. I had to do a

deliberate attack given the situation. What I chose to do is a double

envelopment. 

You can take some

risk on the Force XXI

battlefield. And one of

the great things we have

in the 4ID is the ability to

“If you go to the National Training

Center and you don't set yourself

up for success in communication,

then you’re just camping out.”

“People are ... fixated on this idea that things happen

 quicker on tomorrow's battlefield given all this digital

capability and that is exactly wrong. ... it is going to

happen at the pace that you want it to happen because

you are now in charge of the tempo. "
Colonel Lynch

77

take risk and not lose your job. The CG wants you to try some things

that may be different than most people do, and that's what we're

supposed to do; push the margins to see what we can do given the

capabilities that we have. So, I said, OK, here is my great idea... I'm

going to do a double envelopment. I'm going to come down the middle

with Task Force 1-66 and work my way through the Brown/Debnam

Passes. But at the same time I'm going take Task Force 3-66 and run

them through the Southern Corridor and have them attack up through

the Colorado Wadi. And I'm going to take Task Force 1-22 and bring

them down the Northern Corridor and have them attack over the Bruno

Escarpment area. Then, before you know it, the enemy is going to be hit

in three directions simultaneously. And he is going to lose. That was

my plan. It was a great plan, just didn't work worth a darn. 

The reason it didn't work worth a darn was the communications

piece. If you want to be truly a commander on tomorrow's battlefield,

before you allow your staff to do any kind of course of action analysis

or recommendations of course of action, they have to prove to you

that, no kidding, you’re going to be able to communicate over the

battle space that you’re operating in. That means knowing what

retrans stations are going out? What relay stations are going out?

What am I using UAV for? Is it going to be a retrans vehicle? Am I

going to take a UH60 out of my inventory and make him a retrans?

Then, is there redundancy? For example, you say you want to retrans

the brigade command net. If that retrans station goes out, what is

backing that up, because if you can't communicate, then you are just

camping out.

What I found in this double envelopment plan that I had, because I

was using all 45 kilometers of width, is the only way I could

communicate with every element in the fight was if I flew in the

UH60 over on top of each task force. Then I could talk to that task

force commander. Then I was having a great conversation. The

problem was me and that task force commander were communicating

and no one else was hearing us communicate. See, that’s the problem.

You have to be able to eavesdrop on all command nets. Some guys

say you can get out of voice command and get into digital command

and that is all wrong. All wrong. First off, remember only 70% of

communications are at the hands of the listener. Always know that.

So, you, the brigade commander, are communicating with, say, Task

Force 1-66 commander, and you guys are having this great

communication. Now you have situational awareness of what his
78

fight is in his sector. That is only about one-third useful. What’s then

very useful is that your TOC heard that same conversation. So your

XO sitting back in the TOC knows what is going on in Task Force

1-66's sector and the commander of Task Force 1-22 and the

commander of Task Force 3-66 and the commander of Task Force

1-14, 45 kilometers away, heard that same conversation. That way

we’re all given the same relevant common picture. You have to know

what is going on across the battle space. 

So, I'm flying around and it is a long fight. It takes us about 6-7

hours to work our way through it. I'm flying around talking to each of

the task force commanders but no one else is hearing that. And as the

result of that, Task Force 1-22 in the north, which is supposed to be

pacing itself against Task Force 3-66 in the south so to hit him at the

same time, could not do that because he did not know how fast Task

Force 3-66 was moving. Task Force 3-66, on the other hand, did not

know how fast Task Force 1-66 was moving. So what happened is we

got piecemealed. We ended up attacking first with Task Force 3-66.

Now, the enemy, he has a lot of options. The enemy has X amount of

attack aviation, that Sokol capability that he’s got. So, what he did is

he could take all those assets and pile on Task Force 3-66 because he

only had one fight going on. Remember, my plan was for him to have

three fights going on at the same time. But he had one fight. He

killed Task Force 3-66. And nobody knew Task Force 3-66 was killed

because they were out of communication. Then he turned on Task

Force 1-22 who was working their way through the Bruno

Escarpment and he is getting killed. Then all that was left was the last

task force, 1-66, and he killed them. That is the problem with the

communications. See, everything is timing and everything takes

longer than you think it is going to take. You need commo to

compensate for that.

The commander, right now, brings to the battlefield two critical

issues. One more important than the other. One is, clearly articulated

commander's intent. What I told all the task force commanders is I

wanted to hit the enemy all at the same time. The plan was not to

fight 1-66, then 3-66, but rather everyone at the same time. They all

understood that. The problem with that is they didn’t know what

everyone else was doing. No news wasn't good news. No news was,

we don’t know what’s going on in that sector. So, they continued to

progress and Task Force 3-66, in the absence of any kind of

information from anybody else, thought everybody else was doing
Colonel Lynch

79

what they were supposed to be doing as well and continued to

progress even though 1-22 had been slowed up. So, clearly articulate

commander’s intent. What does “right” look like when it’s all over?

What is the task and purpose and end state, so when we are all done,

here is what “right” looks like?

That’s important, but not as important as the second piece,

information requirements. In the digital battlefield people say it will

be real easy to be overwhelmed with information. Quite frankly, it

could be if you didn't refine what information you needed via

informational requirements, PIRs, priority information requirements,

what I need to know about the enemy, and CCIRs, critical

information requirements for your own forces. What do I need to

know about the friendlies? What are my high value assets? What are

my high payoff targets? Where are they positioned on the battlefield?

So, if the commander articulates all that, when somebody sees it, then

they can feed that information back and say here is the answer to that

question. But if you can't communicate, you can't do that. So, in

numerous occasions on that fight somebody saw something I needed

to know, but they couldn't tell me because I was out of

communication even though I was flying around in this UH60. 

You talk about the ground reconnaissance. It’s only useful if you

put them out and can still communicate with them. We tried using

TACSAT to give us long range communication and that didn't work

as well as we wanted it to. There has to be some backup capability.

When you put all your eggs in one basket, you have to make sure you

watch that basket and make sure it works. You have to be able to

communicate. You have to plan on redundancy. 

26. Survivability on the Move

When I talked about the four things in terms of command that I told

my units as we were preparing for the National Training Center, I said

everything is timing and everything takes longer than you think it is

going to take. The third one is if you stay in one place more than 8

minutes you die, and the fourth one is when they kill you, they are going

to kill you from the flanks and rear. All those things proved to be true in

1995 when I went out there as a task force commander as well as in

1999 when I went out as a brigade commander. There was on numerous

missions, for example when I talked about the movement to contact

mission, first mission, a single 2A45 weapons system properly
80

positioned can kill an entire task force. He's not going to kill you head

on. He's going wait till you go by and kill you from your flanks and your

rear. What you have to do in all your home station training is, you have

to insure that everyone realizes that the enemy is not always to your

front like he is on all our gunnery ranges. Rather, he is always to your

flanks and your rear and he is going to kill you from those positions.

That was a critical piece that we trained hard here at home station and

we still screwed up at the National Training Center. 

Then the other. If you stay in one place for more than eight

minutes, you die. Everything you do at the National Training Center

and everything you do, I'm sure, in combat is observed. If you believe

that you won the counter-reconnaissance fight, you're kidding

yourself. Because what the

enemy does at the National

Training Center, and I'm

sure in combat, is he puts

out a whole bunch of

ground eyes to watch your

movements. If those

ground eyes get taken out,

he's got a plan to refurbish those ground eyes. So you never really

win the counter-recon fight. One of the things we kid ourselves with

is we put up this chart in all of our TOCs with pictures of BMPs and

BRDMs and little stick figures, DRT teams, and then we get a report

in saying we killed a BMP, so we check it off. And if it ever got to

the point where we checked off all the BMPs, then we won counterreconnaissance. That's all wrong, because all he does is he refurbishes

them. First off, we never really knew how many he put out in the first

place because again, he doesn't read those smart books we put out at

home station. So, you have to know you lost the counterreconnaissance fight, which means if you stay in one place more than

8 minutes, you die because he is watching you. He’s watching your

assembly areas. He’s watching your LOGPAC areas. He’s watching

your FARP. He’s watching your LD. And then, at his choosing, he is

going to kill you if you stay in one place more than 8 minutes. The

reason you use 8 minutes is that is how long it takes him to process a

fire mission. From the time he first calls a fire mission to the time he

sees rounds on target is 8 minutes. So you just have to remember that. 

“...if you stay in one place more

than 8 minutes you die,

and ... when they kill you, they

are going to kill you from the

flanks and rear."
COLONEL CRAIG MADDEN, 1999

27. Air-Ground Planning

My headquarters is aviation oriented. We have 2-4 General

Support Aviation Battalion, which has 24 Blackhawks. We've got 1-4

Attack, which is 24 Apache attack helicopters, so you've got the

flavor of the attack helicopter business. We've got 1-10 CAV

Squadron, with Bradleys and two troops of Kiowa Warriors. So the

brigade is a mix and it’s considered the eyes and ears of the division.

So, a lot of the guys in the brigade are familiar with armor because of

the CAV squadron. But the brigade staff doesn't deal that much at the

task force level with what an armor battalion or even a CAV squadron

does until you get into an NTC environment. 1-67 Armor was

attached for this rotation. When we deployed to NTC as the brigade

headquarters, we went through many different types of mission that

these aviators in the brigade staff have never even seen before. Very

hard on the S3 shop in terms of OPTEMPO. 

When a maneuver brigade goes to NTC and an aviation element

goes with them, that aviation element brings some planners to help

plan the missions. When we went to NTC as an aviation brigade

headquarters, we planned all our aviation missions but were also

planning the ground maneuver part. Yet we didn't have a chunk that

came from one of the maneuver brigades to help us plan the ground

maneuver missions. Our aviators in the S3, along with each of the

battalion commanders that owned those guys, still had to plan the

mission. So, where you normally have an element that comes along,

like aviators, that helps you plan, we didn't have that additional

chunk. We are not going to significantly change that. I think it is just

a training requirement and we may have to add more LNOs or more

armor guys in the brigade staff. 

I’m thinking one of the missions that was probably the most

challenging was an attack. We flailed terribly, I thought. We try to do

one-third/two-third rule where at the brigade headquarters level we

spend one-third of the planning time and we give the units below us

two-thirds of the time before the mission. Probably the most

challenging and difficult mission was an attack where we had the

possibility of having to do two breaching operations. Nobody in our
82

brigade headquarters had ever done breaching operations. Even as an

armor guy, I had never been through a breaching operation. I got

with the two commanders who would have to breach, 1-10 CAV and

1-67 Armor.

It snowballed at the brigade headquarters. Usually at NTC when

you get a mission, you are already getting ready to start fighting

another mission. You are really planning a mission and fighting a

mission simultaneously. We spent way too much time at the brigade

level trying to figure this one out. We didn't even have the experience

level to wargame a breach, so we pulled in our engineer commander

and he kind of got us spun up. Even he had to spin up somewhat in

terms of how we were going to do this breaching operation at the task

force level, a pretty big operation. It took some time. Then we talked

it through at our brigade staff level. And then we had to include it in

our wargaming. We spent a lot of time getting ready and learning for

this mission. 

And, the OCs drove us a bit. I let myself get overcoached and I'll

never do that again. You have to make an assessment and go with your

gut feeling. Because I hadn't been to NTC since 1983, I initially let the

OC relationship influence my planning. I heard, “you guys really need

to plan for two breaches.” Well, two breaches are a big operation. Two

task forces trying to get through obstacles. One of them has to punch

through and eventually you get to the far side and you go on the attack.

So we spent way too much time planning at the brigade staff level. By

the time we got the brigade order down to the engineers and the

squadron and the battalion that had to breach, we were already behind

the power curve. They were doing their final rehearsal up into that night.

We had to execute the operation early the next morning. 

At the brigade level, I learned if you don't have a competent staff

on a particular mission and you're not well read on it, you probably

won't have enough time to plan it at the brigade. At least give the

missions down to the battalions

and tell them they will have to

plan for a breach. Have them

backbrief brigade on the

mission to explain how they are

going to do it. Don’t plan it at

the brigade level. We didn't know what “right” was. That was the

bottom line. We had so many guys at the staff level who hadn't done

this, and even at the battalion level, who were all going through a

“...give the missions down

to the battalions... Don’t

plan it at the brigade level.”
Colonel Madden

83

learning process while the clock was ticking. Eventually you have to

execute it. 

The actual mission plan was good. But we didn't allow the

battalions or squadron enough time to plan it and practice it all the

way down to troop level. Then they had to execute it without a lot of

rehearsal. Totally the fault of the brigade. And, you have to have a

timekeeper and this time we didn't have a timekeeper telling us we

were way behind. We needed someone telling us, “Get the mission

out,” and “It’s time to rehearse,” et cetera. As soon as you get the

mission, you set up a time sequence that allows you to monitor all

these things so you give these units two-thirds. The point is, even if

it’s an average plan, get the

average plan out to the units on

time. An average plan wellrehearsed will be much better than

this ideal plan with no time to

rehearse. You think you know that going in, but you let yourself get

overwhelmed with TOC movement and other missions. It becomes a

vicious cycle and suddenly time has gotten away from you and it’s

time to execute. 

I think all aviators walked away from that attack, at least in the

TOC, knowing that we need to understand and learn more about

combined arms operations. We think we are pretty knowledgeable

because we do have to support everybody, but if we haven't been

around breaching operations or other ground operations, we need to

get smart on it. We also need to learn how to work our own Kiowa

Warriors with our own Apaches. At the brigade we didn't do well on

Kiowa Warriors working with Apaches. It used to be we'd have

OH-58 scouts working with Cobras and there was real tight

communications and understanding between those aircraft. Now, I’ve

seen situations where, for example, Kiowa Warriors might see some

targets or might see a situation, and the Apaches, because they hadn't

worked with them a lot

couldn’t provide the

teamwork needed. Two totally

different type of aircraft. The

Kiowa Warriors primarily

work with the CAV

themselves and not with the

Apaches. They did a little before NTC but not enough. So when it

“...even if it’s an average

plan, get the average plan

out to the units on time.”

“When it came to actual

missions, there was not that

synergy between the scout

aircraft and attack aircraft.”
84

came to actual missions, there was not that synergy between the scout

aircraft and attack aircraft. That causes some challenges. 

28. JSTARS Missing Link

The enemy did have a really good obstacle belt set up, we did

have to conduct a breach. But I found out something very interesting

later during a meeting with the JSTARS folks. We went before the

National Press Club and briefed on JSTARS. As it turns out, they

showed me a picture of this particular battle with JSTARS and the

obstacle belt was clear. JSTARS could spot the barbed wire. We

were using JSTARS during the rotation, but I didn't know the full

capabilities of the JSTARS. The JSTARS feed was going into the Star

Wars building in a very clean, prim environment so everybody can

go, “Hey, that’s a great picture.” And in fact JSTARS was giving us a

damn good picture of what was going on. We didn't have trained

operators who could trigger us, to tell us that JSTARS was picking up

an obstacle belt. And we weren’t getting direct feeds that the staff

and I could analyze. 

It would have been immensely helpful. All night long one of the

roles of the CAV Squadron was to conduct a reconnaissance, find

weak points in the obstacle belt. Zero illumination, very, very dark.

Guys are maneuvering. They get engaged by the OPFOR and besides

killing OPFOR, they end up with fratricide. It’s a real confusing

situation out there at night. And to be honest, these ground guys

hadn’t done a whole bunch of night manuever training because of

training restrictions, and it was a concern when we went out to NTC.

Every plan we did I had to think, do I think these guys are at the

training level to execute this mission? I would rather not even execute

the mission than send them in a valley where they are going to flip

their tanks over. I knew the battalion commander, S3, XO, and I'd go

down and talk to the crews beforehand but you just don't have a

complete feel. The battalion commander has told you where he

stands, but how far can you push these guys before you push them

beyond their limits? This is a concern. 

I thought one of our weaknesses was we didn't have enough light

infantry, dismounts, during the rotation. What the OPFOR is good at is

they'll infiltrate guys all over the place on the battlefield and they'll

watch you all day and all night. When you get their reconnaissance map

back it has where your FARP was, et cetera.
Colonel Madden

85

What I realized after the fact was JSTARS, and of course UAV to

some extent, but JSTARS especially painted a nice little obstacle belt.

We could have used that a lot better than we did because the CAV

Squadron was out all night doing the reconnaissance, starting to probe,

looking for obstacles. The goal was never to do a breach. The goal was

to find a hole in their obstacle belt and

punch through. You try to do that as

you’re doing your night

reconnaissance. That wasn't real

successful because it took them a while to get out there and it was a

pretty decent obstacle belt. I never physically met the guys from

JSTARS to explain our mission... here is our focus, and how can you

help me? I told the JSTARS folks I think a missing link is how do they

find out what my commander's intent is, what is important to me? So

you can focus them.

With better JSTARS coordination they would have recognized the

connection between the picture and the mission and said, “OK, CAV

Squadron, here’s where they painted the obstacles, we think there’s a

weak point down here. Really focus your efforts there.” Then I think we

would have been successful, and may not have had to do a breach. The

CAV could have opened up a hole and punched through. As it turned

out, we went into battle and the CAV got up to the obstacles, and the

armor battalion got up to the obstacles, and they started taking fire but

doing pretty well. Then an anti-tank weapon took out almost half the

armor battalion at the point of the breach. The AT at NTC can very

effectively reduce the MILES exposure of their vehicles. So it’s

remarkably difficult to take out the AT. It was really frustrating for him;

frustrating for me to see. All these guys are out there exposed and the

AT is taking them down one by one. 

I think that was really the first time a BCT had used JSTARS

fairly consistently so we learned a lot about it. They had a great

picture during the breach but that was untransmitted or understood as

far as I know in my TOC. My S2 was very sharp and did a great job

on IPB. And, during the spoiling attack he did receive a pretty good

read on JSTARS and said we think they've committed and here's

where they are going. But it was such a busy, intense environment,

we didn't learn as much as we should have. One of the things I found

was if JSTARS spotted something, we used that as a trigger to send a

UAV to go out and confirm. UAV is like looking through a soda

straw. So if we find something we are interested in, then we send the

“JSTARS painted a nice

little obstacle belt.”
86

UAV. You have this little UAV over here, and it is so accurate you

can use it to shoot artillery if you get a good target. We were starting

to kill things. But that’s just individual targets.

The UAV can become the focus of the TOC. But, that is such a small

part of the fight and there is a danger there. You only have so many

people to go around, and if the battle captain or the TOC officer is

looking at the UAV, they are missing the point. They really have to be

doing analysis of what is

going on right now and

the big picture. Let a

captain or NCO work the

UAV. That should not be

the TOC’s sole function.

UAV did some good stuff but be careful about being too focused on it. 

29. Aviation BCT Challenges

Our strength should have been aviation planning but our TOC was

physically disconnected from what was normally the aviation brigade

assembly area. We were now located where a maneuver TOC

normally would be. It’s unusual for an aviation brigade headquarters

to be disconnected from the aviation assembly area but we were more

like a regular maneuver brigade headquarters where you are

physically separated from the aviation brigade assembly area who are

“The UAV can become the focus

of the TOC. But, that is such a

small part of the fight....”
Colonel Madden

87

in the rear for artillery protection. If you want to talk about attack

helicopter planning, you call up to the attack battalion commander

and come together and talk through it. So we didn't give them as

much of a planning focus as we normally do because we were now

not co-located as well as being split focus. We were trying to find out

how to plan armor, artillery, and aviation altogether. So, what I

thought should have been a strength was actually a weakness. We

have to figure out how to maintain the same level of aviation planning

we normally conduct and still be able to plan a ground maneuver

fight. 

Also, there is a further challenge. Where do you fight the battle as an

aviation brigade commander? That question comes up and I throw it

back out. Everybody flails with it. At NTC there are basically three

valleys that you fight in,

the Central Corridor, the

Northern and Southern

Corridors. Apaches were

generally flying in the

deep attack in the

Southern Corridor and the Northern Corridor. Most of the ground

fighting was taking place in the Central. I think the brigade commander

should be where he can most influence the fight and that often was on

the ground in the Central Corridor. If that is the case, then you have to

be forward in a vehicle. I had a 113 I borrowed from 2nd Brigade I was

riding in. So I would be working the ground fight talking to the armor

battalion commander and the CAV squadron. My deputy brigade

commander ran the TOC. Then the S3 and I ran the mission so he was

able to bust away during the mission and be out in a Blackhawk usually

while I was in the 113.

At the same time, the Apaches now are moving in these northern

and southern valleys. How do you talk to these guys when they are in

the air behind mountains? You can't. So what we did was we bumped

our S3 out in a Blackhawk and tried to perch them. That is typically

what I have done in an aviation brigade is perch to control the fight.

They had difficulty with radios. Radios didn’t work well. Apaches

are basically line of sight so if your Apaches are back behind the

mountain, you have lost contact with them. So then you have to figure

out how to do retrans. You put a retrans up on a mountain. You only

have so many retrans. If you are working all three valleys where do

you put your focus in terms of commo? That is something we got

“ Where do you fight the battle as

an aviation brigade commander?

... that often was on the ground in

the Central Corridor.”
88

better at, but we could never fully take TerraBase information and

really do a detailed analysis of the valleys. Where is the best place to

put retrans vehicles so you can talk to the Apaches when they go in

deep?

We tried UAVs, which can retrans but it’s not secure. We used

that for deep attack. As it turns out, when I talked to the JSTARS

guys last week, I found out that they also could have relayed. They

have a huge radio system so as JSTARS was airborne and our

Apaches went deep, I could have relayed or retrans and could have at

least talked to them and had them relay to the flight lead. 

30. Safety and Fratricide at Live Fire

My number one concern was safety. It was anywhere from 110 to

130 almost all the time in the box and it was zero illumination. It was

the worst illumination period you could have. When you have

commanders coming to you saying they haven't been able to train up at

battalion level with night vision goggles and night driving, we had to be

really careful with what we did. So when we did do missions, instead of

making them hit the LD at 0400, we would set it so that they might be

traveling a little ways in complete darkness, but at some point it is going

to start to get light enough so they can actually be in a safe condition in
Colonel Madden

89

the areas they are going into. I was not going to put anybody in a

dangerous situation just to maneuver guys. There were a couple times,

had they been better trained in terms of night vision or had more night

driving experience, I would have definitely sent them in some of the

areas at night earlier to position for attack. Safety played a role, as it

should for every commander, as to when you trigger the guys to go. We

walked away and we didn't kill anybody and no one got seriously

injured. With the amount of aviation present, the poor illumination, and

the high temperatures it was pretty successful to walk away without

serious injury. 

But as we were going through the battles, we had fratricide out

there. Because of the way we conducted our force on force missions,

ours was a pretty fluid battlefield. I

don’t know if they compare rotation

fratricide but I thought we had more

than we probably should. Some of it

was very eerie and it goes back to

Desert Storm, when an Apache pilot

picks up a target but is not sure if it’s OPFOR, shoots, and it turns out

to be one of our 113 smokers that has a big thing on the back that you

are not used to seeing until you go to NTC. You start to hear the radio

traffic. Friendly vehicle killed. 

NTC puts these guys in a situation to make them realize you have

to have good graphics on your map. One of the things they push at

NTC a lot is to have graphics down to the lowest level. That is a huge

challenge to get it to the lowest level, to the tank crew and Apache

pilots. If you are able to do that, then they have situational awareness.

It is a challenge in a non-digital environment. Going into the live fire,

it is a concern that if you have some fratricide in force on force, are

these guys really ready for live fire? The BCT steadily improves over

a period of time, you get to the point where your staff and

commanders are ready for live fire.

By live fire you’re working smart with the artillery. The Apaches

did a mission separate from the ground maneuver guys. We

incorporated the mortars. Engineers got to do some really good

obstacle placement. During live fire, we got to use the Bangalore

torpedoes. Live fire is like a graduation exercise at NTC. It's not a

range. It's very wide open, but very controlled in terms of safety.

Another unique thing is in the rehearsal and discussions of

maneuvering the elements in a live fire, now you have to really worry

“You start to hear the

radio traffic. Friendly

vehicle killed.”
90

about safety danger fans. Before in a non-live fire environment, if you

happen to have that tank next to that other tank, or that Apache that

may be a little close to MILES, no one is as concerned. When you get

to live fire, you are worried about the safety danger fan of a Hellfire

or of a mortar or MLRS when it shoots. You better have that grid

square clear and everyone accounted for.

When you go through some of your mission rehearsal, you have to

think when I move this COLT team up on this mountain, is he in a

safe zone so when the M1 is driving by is he in a safety danger fan of

that particular weapon system? You should be doing that before you

get to the live fire. They try to tell you to do that. It takes some time

and thought. You never get to that point until you get to live fire and

walk through those steps. Even when we did go live, when we

thought it was squared away, we still had a COLT team that was

questionable. I think we had to pull them out. It’s the right call if

there is any question in anyone's mind. You have to walk it through.

In combat you would have to think through that too. In force on force

they will brief you and say, “This TOW fired and there was a

fratricide because an engineer vehicle pulled up behind your TOW

vehicle.” These are some of the lessons you don’t fully learn until

you go to NTC. You see it more clearly with all the digital readouts.

It’s common sense but you can see how that kind of fratricide

happens in the fog of war when guys are moving around the

battlefield.

31. Apaches in Every Valley

We set up a defense in the Central Corridor. The intent was to take a

risk in the Southern Corridor and force the enemy to the northern valley.

We felt if their strength could bust through the Central Corridor, we

would probably get overwhelmed. We put the CAV squadron in defense

in the Central Corridor. I used the armor battalion as a reserve. The

intent was to send them north. We wanted them to go to the northern

valley. Here's where JSTARS did give us a good read. And sure as heck,

they clashed with the CAV squadron in the Central Corridor and got

into a huge fight. They decided during the fight to swing the main body

north, exactly what we wanted. 

The CAV squadron commander and I had a little

miscommunication. We had a Canadian unit, the Coyotes, great

reconnaissance vehicles; we sent them into the southern valley and they
Colonel Madden

91

actually got into the rear area of the OPFOR. But their intent was to

watch that Southern Corridor and inform us if they were swinging to the

south. I wanted the CAV commander to send Kiowa Warriors to the

northern valley and watch that corridor with air CAV. He thought I

meant the northern part of the Central Corridor. So when it all came out,

we basically left the north open. 

We had JSTARS. The S2 called them for a read, and then he told

me he thought they were swinging north. I said, “We have a big battle

here in the Central Corridor. The CAV is heavily committed. I don't see

that.” He said he thought from the read he had been given by JSTARS

that the main body was swinging to the Northern Corridor. I wanted to

see the situation develop a little more. Essentially, they had almost equal

amounts of forces going at us in the Central, and now they were

swinging north. The danger in this fight was I didn't want to commit the

1-67 Armor reserve in the wrong direction, because that was exactly

what I thought the OPFOR wanted us to do. If they could make us

swing in a direction that they were going to be weak in, then we would

commit an entire armor battalion in the wrong direction. So I held them. 

They got chemical attack while they were waiting, which made the

armor battalion button up. They were going through some real

challenges. Now the S2 was saying they were definitely going north. At

the same time, the CAV commander was saying he was starting to get

overwhelmed in the Central Corridor. So I told the armor battalion, to

chop one tank company to the CAV squadron in the central valley, and

move two tank companies north to block that passageway because the

enemy could work their way in the rear area. That is exactly what we

did and by the time we sent the one tank company to the CAV squadron,

they had lost almost everything in the CAV squadron. It was a brutal

fight. The CAV and they continued to fight with the chopped tank

company. Now the armor battalion was starting to swing up into the

northern valley.

The OPFOR moved so fast that it turned into a meeting engagement

almost in the rear area. They move extremely fast and know exactly

where they are going. It turned into quite a battle there. They also came

over the mountains from the northern valley into the Central Corridor

going through some paths they had figured out. They came into the rear

area of the CAV. Again, the armor engaged those guys. So it was a great

fight. At the same time we were sending Apaches up north, and they

were killing. And Apaches were in the Central Corridor. The Apaches

were also in a reserve role to do what we call over-the-shoulder fire. 
92

They stand off from our friendly armor and use the armor's ground guys

who are keeping the ground engaged; but the Apaches use their standoff

capability to kill from a great distance which works pretty well. It was

probably the best battle we had.

Had I had to do it over, I probably would have committed the

armor battalion earlier. But I was afraid to commit them in the wrong

direction and then we would have lost them totally. I didn't trust the read

I got from my brigade TOC compared

to what I was hearing from my CAV

commander. He was in a brutal battle

and he was getting attrited. If we lost

the Central Corridor, we lost the war.

What's the decision? Do I let them get

beat up in the Central Corridor and

block off the Northern? I decided to get

one tank company to support the CAV in the central and two to the

north. But I didn't commit those two to the north early enough to cut

them off before they got pretty far back into our rear area. 1-67 fought

and maneuvered great. The CAV had an exceptional battle. 

We were also always challenged by having the one artillery battalion

with two MLRS batteries and one Paladin battery. Who do we give

priority to? It's a constant challenge and I thought we had it pretty well

thought out. The challenges are if somebody starts to get overwhelmed,

suddenly you want to call artillery to support them. Now where do these

guys shift to? Now they've got to shift their entire focus to another unit

and they've been doing all this planning for another unit and we've got

to be smart about how we do that. 

32. Rock Drills for a Common Picture

After you get the mission, go through the rock drill rehearsals. As

much as possible, the brigade commander really should go to every

battalion-level rehearsal. So you might literally sit through six hours of

rock drill in 130 temps. That can cook your brain in kevlar, but you

have to do it. Make sure they understand the mission. You can then fix it

right there if there are misunderstandings. If two rock drills were going

simultaneously, then I would attend one and send the S3 to the other.

We'd split our forces, and then come back together and exchange info.

Most of the time these guys were so sharp that they were on track. They

knew the mission and came up with some good plans. And, you don’t

“I didn't trust the read I

got from my brigade

TOC compared to what I

was hearing from my

CAV commander.”
Colonel Madden

93

want to have to say, in the middle of a rock drill, “Guys, you have this

all screwed up.” If they don't understand it, then either the commander's

intent was not clear, or the order was screwed up. Fortunately, I think

the orders we put out were pretty decent as long as we got them out in

time. It helps you grasp the overall concept by going to some of these

rehearsals and seeing what these guys are doing at the company or troop

level. Because you are only thinking at the battalion level and you have

to be thinking at the troop level. How are they are going to maneuver

their forces?

And then there is the aviation piece. You need to see what the

Apaches are doing and generally they are going to go deep and go to the

rear area. That was the mission I was most comfortable with, so if I had

to miss a rehearsal, that was the one I missed. Our strength should have

been aviation planning but they make mistakes too. So they’re still

important to watch. You assume that because you knew what you were

doing, they knew what they were doing. As soon as we got the order,

even a warning order, anything that made sense enough that you could

bring the commanders together, I would go to their sites, but ideally we

would get them together at one time. 

I think the AAR process is also a challenge at NTC. Everybody has

AARs going on. That complicates the time. You have to schedule

around them. Probably one of the biggest mistakes was not immediately

corralling the commanders after every single mission change to talk it

over, get ideas, plus backbrief the staff to say, “Here's what we think is

the best concept. You guys start to plan for it now.” Instead of going

through this course of action drill, we go back and say here's the course

of action and generally what we’re thinking about. Now you guys flesh

it out, get the plan together and put it out. It’s basic stuff. Onethird/two-third rule, get the commanders together. The trainers keep

driving home to do simple planning. It sounds easy but it’s hard to do a

good simple plan. Simple is easy to execute. The tendency is to get too

complex with too many moving parts. You have to get airspace control

and management down too. You have Kiowa Warriors doing

reconnaissance with the

CAV, and you have

Apaches flying around

them. You have to get

these air routes.

Something you thought

was simple is starting to

“Probably one of the biggest

mistakes was not immediately

corralling the commanders after

every single mission change...”
94

turn complex. 

During train-up for that rotation we worked our way up. Starting

with platoon and company to battalion and up to brigade and then you

go to NTC. You work your way up. But, what kills at NTC is lethal

company and platoons, a small unit capability. So should it be reversed?

The CG will reverse the train-up for this next rotation. This train-up

we’ll do simulation training with the staff and work our way down so

just before we go to NTC, the platoons are ready and freshly trained up.

Train up a brigade staff and work your way down so by the time you are

going to NTC the lethal platoons and companies just finished their lanes

training. 
LIEUTENANT COLONEL DOUGLAS BOONE, 1998

33. Sensing the Battle

One of the best examples of where I was in the situation as a

decision-maker was in the NTC train-up at Fort Hood. We were

defending. It was actually the task force minus and the battalion minus.

We had two companies defending and we were being attacked by 2-8

CAV who was working as the OPFOR. They were attacking and trying

to find a point in which they were going to attempt to penetrate and

attack our lines. Well, anytime that you are defending, the staff tries to

gain information to tell me, the commander, where they assess the

enemy is going to attack, the point of penetration. What that then does

is key a trigger of events of positioning. If they are coming into a place

where we are weak, or perceived to be weak, and not attacking across

our front, then you reposition and get all your forces at the enemy's

point of penetration.

As the commander, you try to put yourself into the best place

where you can see and feel and sense the battle and you get a lot of

things through radio traffic. You can't see everything, but you try to

find that point where you're not in the thick of things because you don't

want to be at the point where you actually have to fight, but you need to

be in a place where you can sense and see. Well, you sense by seeing

and hearing and almost feeling at that point. In this battle, we were

defending. The enemy had attacked through the night, and now it was

the early morning and he was getting ready to try to make his

penetration and find our point. I am listening to the radio traffic and our

staff is taking in the spot reports. The enemy is being seen, and they’re

counting the number of vehicles and location. With the spot report, the

staff takes that in and tries to paint the picture to me. They tell me, OK

this is our assessment. As the typical commander, I’m asking the same

questions to my staff, OK, tell me where they are coming, what’s your

assessment, where is he going to try and make the penetration? Because

I need so much time to reposition my forces, to stop where the enemy is

going to make the point. Well, the staff doesn’t have the same

perspective. The staff is sitting back in the TOC and they are trying to

redevelop the approved radio traffic and other people’s spot reports.

They are not there. They’re off and away. They’re more sheltered. 
96

They have the map board out and they’re taking in everything and

plotting friendly and enemy. And, from that picture, they try to then

visualize and give me their assessment to help out. They help

synchronize many of our assets. 

In this case, I am waiting to get the staff to help me; looking for the

triggers, looking for the enemy situation. And I am getting ready to

move assets. And I say, “Where is the enemy going, where is the

enemy going to be?” The S2 reads the spot reports, reads his templates

and says... he is going to the west, that is where he is going to make the

penetration. The staff is getting all these inputs and they are convinced

the enemy is going to the west to make the penetration. Now, I am right

there, but seeing and feeling a different sense. I am starting to see what

he can't... smoke generators being built up and I start seeing some

indicators that he had some forces there but he wasn't going west. There

were indicators that he wasn't really pushing. You can't sense that

unless you are there. Now I am starting to see that he is, in fact, going

to make the push the other way. So, my staff is telling me to go one

way but because I am

there, I’m able to see

indicators and feel

indicators, and hear

indicators of sight and

sound to know the

enemy has just a feint on one side and he is, in fact, pushing to the other.

Instead of pulling the trigger and committing forces the way my staff is

telling me, I overrode my staff and said no, we’re going the other way. I

think he is going and pushing the opposite end and we are going to push

and leave our forces over here because that’s where he’s going to go.

And, in fact, he did. 

I didn't go with the staff's assessment; I went with my feeling

because I was there. That was the right outcome because he feinted one

way and then pushed the other. And we were certainly in a much better

situation to stop the enemy. And it goes back to what we are taught, that

the commander uses his information, uses his staff, but he has to be at a

point on the ground so that he can see and feel and get his own

assessments. And then he has to make the decision. Does he feel he is

in the right place and he understands the situation, or does he accept the

complete assessment of somebody else who is not there? 

“There were indicators that he

wasn't really pushing. You can't

sense that unless you are there.”
Lieutenant Colonel Boone

97

As much as we do this thing in the Janus exercise, in the CPX, you

have to really get there and have an OPFOR who is a thinking OPFOR

and are putting up indicators of sight and sound, smoke, artillery, to see

there is a difference between someone who is trying to make an attack

and someone who is trying to set and feint. I learned my lesson of

where to position myself and just how key it was. You go through the

plan and you can position your companies and you can position your

reserve. But equally important is where do I position myself. And then

when you fight with the task force, you can usually fight with your S3.

You have to plan on those things. I also learned to have the S3 in

another portion of the battlefield because his eyes are more experienced.

He’s a field grade who is generally experienced. And you learn the

company commanders are fighting. They’re in the throes of the battle,

and their assessment of their ability to assess is sometimes limited.

They are in there, moving

vehicles and returning fire,

and it’s pretty tough to then

give an accurate assessment

when you’re having to dodge,

lookout and move. We

learned to position myself

and the S3, and look at and

actually study and plan where we would be during the battle. We were

able to cross-talk and get a better assessment on one side of our area of

operation. We learned we were better able to talk and assess by being

there and being close and being able to feel and sense than the

commanders who were actually right there in the middle of the fight.

And this was one example of where as a decision maker I was given a

bunch of information. You have to take both assessments but then

finally you have to make a decision as a commander. 

34. Stop and Fuel or Go Without

At the NTC, I had as many poor outcomes as I had good outcomes.

One of my poor outcomes was directly related to a decision I made. It

came down on one of our first attacks at the NTC, a hasty attack. We

were attacking from west to east. Our zone or area of operation was the

Central Corridor from the North to South Wall including the Valley of

Death and Siberia. The enemy was defending to the east around Hill

720, mostly in the Central Corridor. Well, the initial plan the brigade

“...the company commanders

are fighting. They’re in the

throes of the battle, and their

assessment of their ability to

assess is sometimes limited.”
98

came up with was to attack straight on, with two battalions going

straight down the Central Corridor, which is what mostly happens. In

this case, they (the OCs) spread the area, the attack zone, much further

from north to south and gave us the option of going a different route, a

different axis. The brigade commander thought about it and said we

have the opportunity, perhaps, to do an end run with one force. I said,

“Sir, we have got to try this thing.” We were certainly concerned

because it’s much further along and much more difficult to synchronize

things. But every brigade gets an opportunity to attack straight down

the Central Corridor. Who gets an opportunity to do something like this,

something much more dynamic? 

But whenever you do something that calls for greater distance, a

longer move, it calls for much more deliberate planning... time factors,

certainly logistics of moving a mechanized force 40 to 50 kilometers. It

calls for more planning, more detailed planning. You usually have

about 48 hours from receipt of order to execution. When you’re not

prepared or not used to the turn around, you know some of your

planning will be more hasty than deliberate. The Colonel gave me the

1-5

1-12

Proposed

Refuel Site

SIBERIA

( - )

BIKE

LAKE

WHALE

COLORADO

RED PASS

VALLEY OF DEATH

FURLONG

720

760

780

876

TIEFORT

MOUNTAIN

BROWN

PASS IRON

TRIANGLE RACETRACK

Figure 9. Brigade Combat Team Attack to Hill 720.
Lieutenant Colonel Boone

99

mission. It was a supporting mission, supporting attack. It actually took

a company away from me and gave it to 1-12, which was the main

effort. I was going to be the supporting effort with a task and purpose of

coming in from the flank to the Valley of Death, coming up from south

to north, up through Siberia, trying to attack over the hill, and then either

draw the enemy away or keep them from reinforcing and moving as

reserves. That would then allow the main effort to breach, penetrate the

enemy's defense, and push on. I was going to attack onto a flank.

Certainly, the intent was, if I could get to a point and establish an attack

by fire position, to destroy the enemy on the other side and/or keep the

enemy from repositioning. Then he would be weaker at the point, so

1-12 would be successful in penetrating. 

Well, this was my first NTC rotation, and I’d heard about it, but until

you actually go through it, you just don't realize how difficult the terrain

and the environment makes anything. As simple as it sounds,

repositioning your forces is difficult. We were positioned in the

Colorado Wadi area and getting ready to attack. We get the mission.

We had the plan. We were trying to go through it. We were supposed to

cross LD the next morning when the sun comes up at five-thirty, six

o’clock. Part of my plan I knew needed to happen was to get my fuelers

up to a point on the LD to refuel all my vehicles that were doing the

screen and the counter-recon and securing the LD. They were out there

and they needed to be refueled before we took off on this 25-30

kilometer move the next morning. Because of the rugged terrain and

how difficult it is to find your way around at night, circumstances have

it, the fuelers were not at the LD and had not completed vehicle

refueling when it was time to go. 

Now I’m faced with a decision. I have some combat power, but I

have some vehicles that are not topped off. So, do I stop operations and

say to the brigade, I’m sorry but I’m not ready to go or do I go with

what I have and try to make it

to the objective. My plan to

have everybody refueled in the

morning is not happening

because the fuelers had not all

made it there; they had trouble

getting there the night before.

The support platoon leader

couldn’t find all his guys to get them to the point... So, here I am, what

do I do? Do I call the boss and say, sorry we can’t go, or do I go with

“...do I stop operations and

say to the brigade, I’m sorry

but I’m not ready to go or do I

go with what I have and try to

make it to the objective?”
100

what I’ve got? I said, “Fuelers follow me.” We’ll get to a point

somewhere close to the Whale Gap on the north side, before we go to

Siberia and start attacking from south to north. We’ll stop, do a tactical

pause and refuel at that point. We have got to cross LD and get

ourselves into position. There are different phases in an attack, but one

of the things you have to do is get your forces postured to a point and

then you do your last jump off. We had a long move to get from where

we were to a point where we could start influencing the fight. So, my

decision was to go with what we’ve got, we’ll get to a point, then refuel,

posture ourselves, and then continue the attack. 

Of course things never go as you plan. I was convinced that, with

the route we were taking, we would move in a covered and concealed

position and the enemy would not see us. Well, you don’t sneak up on

the OPFOR at the NTC. They have eyes all over the place. As soon as

I started making my move south, around the Bicycle Lake area and

through some narrow areas,

he had positioned eyes and

had caught me with artillery

Proposed

Refuel Site

876

SIBERIA

WHALE

RED PASS

VALLEY OF DEATH

FURLONG

720

760

780

TIEFORT

MOUNTAIN

1-5

( - )

1-12

IRON

TRIANGLE RACETRACK

Figure 10. FRAGO to Refuel at Furlong Ridge.

“Well, you don’t sneak up on

the OPFOR at the NTC.”
Lieutenant Colonel Boone

101

going through that area. I lost 5 or 6 Bradleys to artillery. So, I know he

has eyes on me. I’ve lost the element of surprise. He knows I’m there.

He’s not sure where I’m going, but he knows I'm going further to the

south. I needed to keep moving because every time I slow down he’s

able to put effective artillery on me. 

And now I get to my point, where I was going to go to a tactical

pause, bring up my fuelers, fuel and bring my force together to

concentrate and mass the force to continue on. I’m to the point. I’m

getting artillery on me. I know I have to refuel. My refuelers were

unable to keep up because of the rough terrain. They are back at least

45 minutes behind me. I get to my point and I have a viable fighting

force with some tanks, with some Bradleys. I’m down to ten or twelve.

Five or six tanks, five or six Bradleys. And my task and purpose is to

first, get up and occupy the attack by fire position. Certainly it will fix

the enemy and prevent him from influencing the main effort. I am still

the supporting effort. My task and purpose is tied to the synchronization

of when 1-12 is going and where I need to be when he starts making the

point of penetration. 

Well, the NTC, because of the mountain ranges, it is very difficult to

maintain communications across 8-12 kilometers. You have the main

mountain range right between where the brigade commander is and

where I am. So, now I lose communication with higher headquarters. I

am unable to determine exactly where 1-12 is in relation to me. I am

unable to communicate with my boss to get a refinement. I'm still going

off of a plan. I know what his intent is. I know where he wants me to

be, but he needs to know my situation. 

I’m at a point where I can go with partial force. Or, do I go to

ground, take the time to refuel, rearm, refit, bring together my force and

then go forward? There are advantages and disadvantages to either way.

Do we have the enemy leaning toward me? Is my fellow battalion

commander doing well? Does he need me to move up and go because if

he’s stopped, then the enemy is able to shift his artillery concentration?

So there are advantages of moving up but if you get up there and you

don’t have enough combat power, enough punch, then you’re unable to

accomplish your mission. I’m faced with all of these things, and I’m

faced with the break in communications. I can’t talk to him. That is

really the dilemma of this battle, and many battles, is that when you’re

out there on your own, you don’t have access to the higher

commander’s current intent. What does he want me to do with my

force?
102

I am the supporting effort. I need to be in a position so the enemy is

faced with fighting us from both directions. I am supposed to be in a

place that keeps him from putting all his assets and focused effort on

1-12. 1-12 is supposed to make the penetration and defeat the enemy in

total. I am supposed to fix the enemy and support. I do not have my

combat forces in a posture to really be successful. I am faced with

spread-out forces, my tanks are low on fuel, I’m not sure if they’ll be

able to make it or not. I’m also faced with needing to be at the place

according to the plan and the commander's intent. 

I call and I get an assessment from the tank commander. “Can you

make it?” “I don’t know, it’s close.” I am faced with enemy artillery

possibly destroying more of my vehicles. I've already lost 5 or 6. So,

without being able to communicate with the boss, I decide... We have

got to go. It’s 45 minutes for the fuelers to arrive. I can’t wait that long.

Forty-five minutes is an eternity to sit out here. We’re going with what

we’ve got. The plan remains basically the same. One force is going up

one side and at one point

almost coming up on

line. We are fighting a

very difficult fight.

We’re going from low

ground, up Siberia,

toward Hill 720. His main effort is on the other side of the hill, on the

central valley floor facing 1-12. If we can push ourselves up and get up

to the top, we are able to get into position where we can shoot down on

the enemy. 

We continue on. We get up and are doing very well. The enemy

starts repositioning because he sees us now coming, and he’s having

to pull his AT-5s, and he’s even having to pull some of his tanks and

reposition toward us. He has committed his reserve toward us. We

are making a good fight and even have a couple of Bradleys make it

over the top and come down into position. But my tanks are running

out of fuel and they don't make it to the top. So, I get to the right

position but I don't have enough

combat power to actually hold

my position, and the enemy is

then able to counterattack and

destroy me because I have

piecemealed myself. And in

fact I wasn't synchronized with

“It’s 45 minutes for the fuelers to

arrive. ... Forty-five minutes is an

eternity to sit out here.”

“...a couple of Bradleys

make it over the top... But

my tanks are running out of

fuel and they don't make it...”
Lieutenant Colonel Boone

103

the other guys because he was a little behind waiting for me to get

into position. So, the enemy was able to take care of me, and then

turn his effort toward 1-12 and reposition. 1-12 was able to make the

breach, get some combat force to the other side, and it ended up being

kind of a draw with 8-10 combat vehicles on each side. 

The fact that we made a breach was not what all elements get to do,

but we would have been much more successful (you never know) if I

had waited for the fuel and concentrated my combat power and then

moved on. Who's to say? Certainly, that was the training lesson of the

day from the OCs. Here you’ve planned it, you know you need the

logistic factors. The plan wasn’t executed. You didn’t have your fuel on

the LD. Then you come up with a plan to refuel on the move. You

didn’t do it and you had tanks that literally run out of gas as they are

reaching their objective. What did you learn today? 

That's what you are faced with when things don't go as planned.

What could have helped me in that situation? More information. If I

had been able to talk with my boss, give him an assessment and let him

make the decision. I'm fighting part of a brigade combat team. I am a

Proposed

Refuel Site

876

SIBERIA

WHALE

RED PASS

ALLEY OF DEATH

FURLONG

720

760

780

TIEFORT

MOUNTAIN

1-5

( - )

1-12

IRON

TRIANGLE RACETRACK

Figure 11. Attack Over Siberian Ridge.
104

supporting effort. Had he known my situation, he could have been able

to say, you go to ground, or the conditions are right, I need you to go

there. We weren’t able to communicate. He could have adjusted 1-12's

movement, either to slow down or stop. Had he known I was taking the

artillery, he could have adjusted his assets to give me some protection

with counterbattery fire or other means. I didn't know where he was. I

had also lost communications with even my TOC, who had

communications with him. I was out there by myself. I was back to

hasty. When you plan to do something as deliberate as we did then you

really have to have, not only your maneuver plan, but you have to have

your communications plan and your logistics plan to support your

maneuver. Communications in this case was key. I was unable to know

where the friendly forces were and certainly didn’t know where the

enemy was or what he was doing. 

35. Too Many Changes of Mission

I watched my brigade commander when we were on the movement

to contact in the Central Corridor. It was our first fight. I was the

follow-on force. 1-12 was the lead element to go through Brown and

Debnam Passes, attack from west to east. Their expected point of

contact was around Hill 876 and the Iron Triangle. The first thing the

enemy does to us is they get a good jump early in the morning and

actually get to the decisive ground, key terrain. They are already on 876

and the Iron Triangle with some combat power, while we were getting

ready to come through the passes. Then to make things even tougher for

us, they throw FASCAM minefields right out there in the middle of one

of the major routes in which 1-12 is using to come through the passes.

This does everything that it is planned to do. It desynchronizes our

timing in coming through and prevents 1-12 a viable combat force able

to meet the enemy on a movement to contact.

So, now the brigade commander is faced with a dilemma. He

knows the plan has 1-12 as the lead element and me with a follow-on

mission. But, he sees the timing is out of place and 1-12 is unable to get

his combat forces through the passes. He knows the enemy is

continuing to march and is going to get all his combat forces into the

876, Iron Triangle area. If the enemy gets there, we cannot generate

enough combat power to defeat him on that terrain. There is a marked

advantage of owning that terrain. You can get behind hills and the IV
Lieutenant Colonel Boone

105

lines. The enemy attacks from west to east through the passes. You just

can’t generate enough combat power to knock a force off that ground. 

The Colonel knows the combat reconnaissance patrols have already

moved in and set the 876 line. That means that his advance guard is

right behind him and moving close. And, if he doesn't get some combat

power in there, defeat the CRPs and then get to 876, if the advance

guard makes it there to that line, we don't have enough combat power in

the entire brigade to defeat that force much less the follow-on main

body. So he's got his lead element caught up in FASCAM. What does

he do? One option is to fight it through and the other option is he

commits me early, completely against the plan. He calls me up and

says, I’m going to need you. He commits the brigade reserve back to

me. A complete change in mission, I’m the lead element. I get on my

internal nets and I start “OK, change in mission, here’s the enemy

situation, here’s the friendly situation...” We’re getting ready to go. 

About that same time, 1-12 finds another route and starts pushing

forces through so the brigade staff gives him a different assessment.

Look boss, everything is synchronized to support 1-12 not 1-5. They

tell him 1-12 is getting through and it’s probably not the wisest thing to

change mission. We need to let 1-12 continue with the plan and we'll

commit 1-5. So as I'm saying, boss we're ready to LD in five minutes,

he says, no, we're going with the original plan. 1-12 is getting through.

1-5 will follow. By the way, Reserve, you’re back under the control of

1-12. Here is the reserve company commander jumping back and forth

on radio nets, and who he’s talking to, and who he’s following.

So the Colonel was faced on the first fight with the dilemma

where things are not going to plan. He knows the enemy is pushing,

and he needs to get to key terrain and not let the enemy beat him

there. So what does he do as he is trying to commit his forces? At the

level of the brigade or even the battalion when you start changing

missions, it's pretty easy for maneuver forces, we are pretty flexible.

We go left, we go right and all that.

But it’s the supporting cast that

goes with it; the artillery, the

logistics lines, even the medics and

where they are going to set up aid

stations. All are not quite as

flexible. Where you have your targets for the artillery and where you

have air support going in is all based on a plan that is somewhat

“But it’s the supporting

cast that goes with it... All

are not quite as flexible.”
106

flexible but also takes some time to synchronize back to a change in

mission. 

I think all of that came into play. Especially your first fight out

the door, you’re not quite as responsive. When he said “Are you

ready to go?” I said “Yeah I’m ready but...” Meanwhile, my guys

are sitting in place and waiting for the situation to develop. And then

I have to go in and change plans, and do it over a mapboard and say

“Ok, here’s what we’re going to do. You remember this, this and

this...” But it’s different than the plan that we rehearsed and talked

about. Even for a well-trained force, it takes a lot to be able to do a

change in mission and a change in order and then issue a frag order

across the radio net and then allow your subordinates to visualize

your intent and now a change. Not easily done. It is facilitated if you

have a plan with graphics, there is some built in flexibility. You still

have to communicate that down with the intent to your subordinates

and then give them time to pass it down the line. To have a battalionsize task force ready to change mission and go one way or another

takes more than a couple of minutes. So, it was probably ten to

fifteen minutes before I came back and said I’m ready to go. And in

that ten to fifteen minutes, 1-12 was able to get through the passes.

And we then changed back and said we’re in the same mission.

Well, just as he feared, our timing was off, our artillery was off, air

support was off and the enemy was able to get his advance guard, which

876

COLORADO

1-5

AG

Main

Body

IRON

TRIANGLE

BROWN

PASS

DEBNAM

PASS

780

760

1-12

GRANITE

PASS

RACETRACK

BRIGADE

HILL

910

Figure 12. Meeting Engagement in the Central Corridor.
Lieutenant Colonel Boone

107

is a battalion-size equivalent, right up to 876. He sits there defending

and waiting for 1-12 to come out of the passes. Certainly not a good

day for 1-12. Difficult to fight the OPFOR when they have the key

terrain like they did. So, this fight is certainly not going the way the

brigade had envisioned it. 

The advance guard main body continued to push down the

southern side of the corridor and we say, holy cow, is he going to

continue to push south. Well, I’m postured on the south. 1-12 is

attacking on the north side of me with the plan of him setting up in

support, and then me pushing down the south and going into position to

attack the main body around the Racetrack area. That’s where they

envisioned my task force meeting the enemy. Now, the indicators are

the enemy is with strength. Is he going to continue pushing down the

southern wall right south of 876, and just keep right on coming heading

toward the Colorado Wadi? That's where I'm sitting, but I'm not in a

good defensive position. I'm sitting back, postured ready to attack, and

not really ready to defend. So, now I get the change of mission to move

forward, establish a hasty defense, and stop any enemy that might come

from 876. I get set. 

But, now the brigade is getting more and more enemy spot reports

and a read on the enemy. The enemy force attacks with his combat

reconnaissance patrols and his advance guard main body and then he

has the main body itself. The advance guard main body is the one the

brigade saw and was afraid was going to continue to attack. They, in

fact, just went to ground and established their support position right

there. And the main body's plan was to continue to run the North Wall

right on through the Goat Trail and right up toward Crash Hill. The

enemy saw our condition and our posture, with me in the south still with

strength, and 1-12 in the north, which had piecemealed itself and had

been rendered combat ineffective. We had no fighting force in the

north, no way of stopping them. We were concerned he was going to

continue to attack in the south. I went forward, established a defense to

stop the enemy. He just went to ground. We weren't fighting. Just

looking at each other. But the main body is now pushing the North

Wall.

So, here the brigade is now getting more information. And I get

my next change in mission to pick up everything from the south and

move to the north and stop the enemy's main effort as he was trying to

run the North Wall. So, again I come up with my frag order off the

mapboard. Based on the directive of the brigade commander, my
108

assessment of the traffic, and what was happening to 1-12, I knew I

needed to get there with some urgency. The brigade thought and I

thought that I would be able to actually beat the enemy to a point,

establish a defense, and then he would come along the North Wall

around the Iron Triangle and continue toward the Goat Trail. 

Unbeknownst to me, and the brigade at that time, the enemy had

already penetrated. About the time that I'm getting an order to move

north, he already had his lead elements across the Goat Trail and

moving on. He established a firing line along the north protecting his

route as he was coming out of the Triangle and heading toward the Goat

Trail. So he’s already established a firing line, and here I am

committing my forces from south to north trying to stop him. I'm

running right into his established firing line. I piecemealed my unit,

where I was sending

companies at a time

up there and not

bringing my entire

task force up there

into a hasty attack,

because I didn't know the enemy's situation. My assessment was to get

as much up there as fast as I could. I gave a frag order but the

companies are spread out in different areas and, based on different

distances to move, your companies are going to get there at different

“I didn’t think I was going right into a

fight. I was going in first to establish

one position in a defense.”

876

COLORADO

1-5 AG

Main

Body

IRON

TRIANGLE

BROWN

PASS

DEBNAM

PASS

780

760

1-12 IRON

TRIANGLE

GRANITE

PASS

RACETRACK

BRIGADE

HILL

910

Figure 13. OPFOR Main Body Maneuvers North.
Lieutenant Colonel Boone

109

speeds unless you make a plan that calls for a link-up. I didn’t think I

was going right into a fight. I was going in first to establish one position

in a defense and then everyone else comes online and then we'd really

be able to fight a defense, not an attack, a hasty attack, against an

enemy's firing line. 

Based on my assessment and the brigade commander’s of the

enemy situation and my situation, I needed to get up there with a

company at a time and then I would consolidate my forces at that point.

What ended up happening was a company at a time going against a

company on line. He had the advantage. He had the terrain. He could

see me coming. With just a company, I piecemealed my force and was

defeated. That company went to ground, and half of it was left. I

brought in another company, and even a company and a half wasn't able

to completely defeat this enemy force and I'm bringing up a third

company. Still, because I was piecemealed, I was unable to defeat that

enemy in his firing line because I didn't have a viable force and was not

able to get into position. The enemy was able to continue to run the

North Wall, and I and the brigade had failed on this mission to stop the

enemy. 

It all goes back to battle command, the commander being able to

visualize the end-state that he wants. The enemy situation changes, the

friendly situation changes, and you get to a point that shows you just

how difficult it is. Even when the commander has a vision, it is very

difficult to make it all happen in a synchronized manner. It is much

easier in the cyber world of the computers and the CPX, where you’re

not going across rough terrain and the varying time-distance factors of

synchronizing forces. There, the timing’s correct and you have enough

combat power to accomplish the mission. In this case, I know the

brigade commander had a vision and he articulated it. He knew where

he wanted us to be. We just weren't able to get there in the right posture

and in the right time. I'm not convinced that any of us had an idea that

the enemy had already beat us to the punch. They already had forces

there and the numbers he had was already in the key terrain. It was our

first fight, toughest one. Movement to contact is tough. We learned a

lot of things that day and how important it is to concentrate your forces

at the right place at the right time. I think we got better throughout the

rotation and really tested the OPFOR in later battles. Every rotation is

successful because you learn something. 

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DAVID HANSEN, 1998

36. Engineers in the TOC

As an engineer, my job is to provide the brigade commander early

assessment and the running assessment. The ability to provide the

brigade combat team commander total terrain perspective with regards

to: what the enemy is using it for, how we can best use it, where we can

use it to our advantage, how to constrain it, how to expand it, and then

of course how to reinforce it, and how to maneuver on it. In addition to

the terrain, my job is to make sure the commander is fully aware of the

capabilities and assets that the engineers bring to the party. Everything

from the individual Sapper squads, in both the offense and the defense

but also the weapon systems, Volcano, MOPMS capability, the small

amount of direct fire we bring with M2s, and then hopefully, in the

future the ability to bring anti-tank fire with the Javelin. The engineers

will field the Javelin and give us a 2000-meter anti-tank capability down

at the squad level, which will greatly enhance the brigade combat team's

ability to fight in that mechanized environment. Then of course there is

the ability to provide survivability support to the combat team, that is,

digging assets. Finally, we bring bridging assets.

The engineer is a slice element to the brigade combat team. I own

very few assets when the battle begins. I attach my companies and then

I'm attached to the brigade combat team. The command support

relationship I have with my companies is, I generally give them

OPCON to the task force commander. I have fought with four different

task force commanders, two on each rotation. Each had an engineer

company OPCON to them. That enables them the ability to break them

out any way that the mission requires. 

The company commander goes to the task force with two line

platoons, an assault and obstacle platoon, and his company

headquarters. The individual company CP links in with the task force

CP, with a 577, and becomes an integral part of that task force

commander's TOC. He provides both the terrain analysis and assists in

the IPB and battle planning preparation. And that is really a mirror

image of what we do in the battalion for the brigade combat team. I do

not operate a separate TOC. When I took command, engineer TOCs

were separate. One of the initiatives that I wanted to bring to the 1st
112

CAV was to integrate the engineer TOC inside the brigade combat

team's TOC. 

A very interesting story. One that my first task force commander still

marvels at, because he didn’t think I could pull it off. I had been in

command about 3 weeks and we had our first Janus exercise about 60

days out from actually conducting our first rotation. As a new

commander, I wasn't sure how we did much of anything. So, we got

ready to move to the Janus site and I directed my then S3 and XO to

take our TOC and hook it up to the 1st Brigade's TOC. Everybody said,

"You've got to be kidding me. That's the brigade commander’s TOC.

You can't do that." I said, “Why can’t I do that?” “Because that’s his

TOC, you don’t just move in.” “Well,” I said, “here’s what we’re going

to do guys. We’re going to hook up there and he’s going to have to

come throw my big butt out of that TOC. We're moving in.” 

So E8s, they'll take care of pretty much any job you want them to do,

they hooked up and the Janus starts and in walks Ironhorse 6 and he

says, “What the hell are you guys doing in here.” I said, “We are here to

stay.” “Well, we’ll see about that.” And from the very beginning, the

brigade combat team was able to get a synergy of current ops direct to

the battle captains and the leadership of BCT. What we provide is an

ability to see the battlefield, the obstacles on the battlefield, and give

them instant terrain analysis on the battlefield--something that they did

not have because the poor ABE, Assistant Brigade Engineer, was a

captain sitting in there trying to do future plans as well as current ops--

incapable of doing that. So, what we were able to do was take my S3

and current ops cell and move it in there with my TOC and provide realtime information to the brigade combat team. At the same time the ABE

becomes a member of the planning cell and we take his infrastructure,

his 577, and integrate him in with the planning cell. 

Now I have complete engineer battlefield assessment as part of the

IPB process to the plans cell, without conflicting with the current ops

running of the battle, but with the engineer and terrain assessments

necessary to give the warfighter, the guy who’s out on the joystick, the

current real-time information to help him make decisions. This is, of

course, translated to the forward command group, the brigade combat

team commander, the field artillery commander, and the engineer

battalion commander. Those three folks are the forward command

group. They are shortly followed on the battlefield by the TAC, which is

the S3 of the brigade combat team. And, when we need to huddle up

and make some quick command decisions, to change our avenue of
Lieutenant Colonel Hansen

113

attack or to change our intent, then the TAC can come forward, the

command group can rally up, and then we can talk with the TOC and

make the decisions based on their assessment of how the situation is

going. So, the first and foremost decision that I made as an engineer was

to co-locate the engineer battalion TOC with the brigade TOC. As a

result of that, the other two engineer battalions and subsequently the two

other brigade combat teams from the 1st Cavalry Division adopted that

process and now that is the norm within the cavalry division. I will tell

you that is the norm throughout the corps of engineers now, two years

later, because of the efficiencies that we gained by doing that. 

The ERI battalion, engineer restructuring initiative battalion, is a

very slim headquarters. Our battalion staff is 1/3 the size of an armor or

mech infantry staff. We are that slim. Because we’re a slice element, I

don't maintain the assets on the battlefield. Those assets are given to the

task force command. There is occasion where the brigade commander

will retain control of certain engineer assets, digging assets, bridging

assets, Volcano, scatterable mine delivery assets, based on METT-T and

of course his organization for combat. But, for the most part, that

command and control is given down to the task force command. I will

tell you that it is very difficult for him to manage the assets that he has

in addition to these extra staff slice elements that come his way. It is at

that point that on the battlefield, generally, the battalion commander and

the engineers will go with the main effort, and the S3 will go in the TAC

vehicle in the supporting effort. We will monitor engineer activity and

be of assistance to the task force commander, as another set of eyes on

the battlefield, to assist him in the optimal employment of engineers in

whatever mission. So, in the deliberate attack, making sure we have the

conditions set with smoke, direct fire, suppression of the enemy,

positive identification of the obstacle. 

I have my own track as a part of the forward command group. My

XO is in the TOC. I’m out on the battlefield with my 113, moving,

observing the fight, getting to a point of advantage where I can see into

the enemy's defense, say if we’re on an attack. So, we can help guide

not only the engineers, but the task force to the optimal location.

Because, my God, here’s a lieutenant colonel, the task force

commander, who has no more experience than I have, commanding four

maneuver companies. He’s got artillery coming in, mortars, he’s got air

defenders, he’s got engineers, and he is still riding in a weapons system,

a Bradley or tank, and he is still trying to fight and move. How difficult

can you make one man's job? I’ll tell you, I have great admiration for
114

my fellow mechanized and armor brothers, because whew, they bite off

a chunk. And I'm not sure how many of them really grasp that command

business. It is almost overwhelming. When you’re down in the wire and

everything is falling apart. People are dying left and right, and the holes

aren’t opening up, and all of a sudden there is no smoke, no direct fire,

no indirect fire, and the enemy is just bringing fires on you. All of a

sudden you look around and the only people bringing whooppee on the

battlefield are the yellow blinking lights that you own standing right

there at the breach site. You just got to shake your head and wonder

how that task force commander doesn't pull all his hair out. 

The point is that as an engineer battalion commander, my assets are

out there. I can sit back in a Rasputin mode and come over the net and

say, “John, this is Lumberjack Six, you got a hole over here on the left

and the enemy doesn’t see it.” Or, “John, your company just got wiped

out, we need to bring more smoke over here...” I can provide battlefield

assessment. I have the ability to assist him. I cannot direct him but I

can sure help him. My other objective is to keep engineers alive on the

battlefield. We did pretty good. Most of our battles, the engineers, along

with just the battalion commander, were the only people alive at the end

of the battle because we maneuver, not to engage, but to not be killed, so

we can stay alive to get to the breach and then fight on past that to the

objective. 

In each mission, the engineer looks at the mission differently. Our

three missions in the CAV have always been movement to contact;

attack in some shape, fashion or form, hasty or deliberate; and defense

in sector. And that, of course, can be a transition to a hasty defense or a

deliberate defense. Generally it’s defense in sector. Some people now

call it an area defense, whatever the vogue term is. The engineer's part

with regards to both missions, the success of the engineers on the

battlefield, is in the preparatory phase. More so on the defense in sector,

certainly, than in the ability to attack. But I will not discount the fact

that home station terrain, and then the rehearsals on the prestaging

battlefield, are so critical to success. Without them, you won't find that

success. 

And in those battles that are hurry up and knock em out and get em

done, without the preparatory time, I can tell you we fared poorly in all

instances. And you only achieve success under extreme conditions of a

decent plan, ample time to rehearse with all players on hand, optimal

conditions at SP when we LD, superior execution in all facets of the

battle from maneuver, to fire support, to engineer breaching, to
Lieutenant Colonel Hansen

115

command and control, to signal, to even the MPs handling the TRPs and

getting people moving. All that, and then the enemy has to make a

mistake because it is his turf, his ground, you’re penetrating his

backyard. He done dug that hole or fought that battle twenty times

before and he has got to make a blunder or he’s got to misread your

intent. And when all those conditions happen, you have a chance of

winning a battle at the National Training Center. Because if you can

whip the 11th Armored CAV Regiment, you can beat any enemy in the

world. Those are the guys who are the best. So, you put all those

conditions you got and you say I have to strive for each one of those,

under all circumstances, and in every battle. 

All right, how does the engineer get to that point? The engineer starts

at home station. He has a very rigorous home station train-up. When I

took this battalion, my companies had only trained for the standardized

250-meter, three-row deep minefields. They could go out, put mines on

the ground and watch. That’s really great in a compartmentalized

battlefield like Europe or Korea. In the big open warfare at the National

Training Center, or Southwest Asia and Kuwait, et cetera, it’s not going

to cut the mustard. Two hundred and fifty meters is an anthill to you and

me out here on the plains of Texas. So, my first rotation, I was not here

for the home station train-up. I inherited the battalion following that and

went through the headquarters gen-up with Janus, and the military

decision making process with the brigade combat team. But, in the

reality of things, we had not done a sufficient job at training ourselves to

deal with the wide-open spaces and the magnitude of the avenues of

approach that we have at the National Training Center. So, that took

some adjustment on the battlefield. That adjustment occurs pretty

rapidly when you transition into a defense in sector. 

Defense in sector is the engineers’ meat and potatoes. If it fails, the

engineer will be blamed for a failed mission because it is our job to

provide the countermobility

effort on the battlefield, the

obstacle play. We have to put

in all those mines and all that

wire. We have to dig all those

tank ditches. We have to do all

“Defense in sector is the

engineers’ meat and potatoes.

If it fails, the engineer will be

blamed for a failed mission...”
116

that planning. We have to synchronize engagement area development

with the maneuver guys, and we have got to get that tanker off his tank. 

Making the tanker get on the ground two days in advance of the

battle is the hardest thing in the world. Because he doesn't think about

a battle two days in advance. But if I don't get him on the ground,

then I don't meet the seven-step basis by which you go in and develop

an engagement area. So, getting your fighting brethren on the ground

and saying, "hey look dude, tell me where you want to kill the enemy

from, because that's the engagement area out there, and that’s where

your task force commander and your brigade commander says that’s

where you’re going to kill them. Now, tell me where you want me to

dig you a hole." Well, two days in advance that tanker is not thinking

about whether or where he wants a hole. Now, one hour before the

enemy rams it down his throat he's going to be real concerned about

where that hole is. But he doesn't realize it takes me six hours to dig

that hole with an ACE, and don't come to me three hours into digging

this thing and say, “Oops, I made a mistake, I really want it over

here,” ‘cause it won’t happen.

Then, of course, all those tankers want to be on the high ground

where all the rock is and they want me to dig holes in rocks with ACEs

that break when they hit the rock. That's a dilemma in itself. It is up to

the engineer to convince the tanker that we want to dig him a top, firstline house here, a first-line survivability position, and he’s gonna sit

there and he’s going to kill the tar out of the enemy and he’s going to be

a hero. But listen, bud, you have to pick a place where I don't die in this

hole trying to fix it for you, or nobody gets anything. So, there’s a

dilemma too, and you have to dig early enough, because everybody
Lieutenant Colonel Hansen

117

wants a home. Everybody wants a survivability position so they can all

be heroes. So, we have to work early. It has to start early. And the

tankers have to be as proactive as we are getting on the ground. 

Now, I have some very strong points of view. It is currently counter

to Army. It is counter to my armor and my mech brethren. I believe the

engineers should pick where the armor and the mech infantry guy fights.

I believe that the ground, the terrain is a fixed item, it never changes. I

believe that the brigade commander, through his experience, can pick

the engagement areas. As soon as he puts his hand on the map, way

back in the planning cell, the field artillery and the engineer commander

knows what they need to do, to go out and set it. There’re optimal

distances for all the weapon systems, and I’m certainly aware of all

those. I know exactly how far these guys are going to shoot with these

weapons system. I can go to the ground and I can pick a spot that will

allow me to max distance and shoot throughout the length of the

engagement area. So why shouldn't I go pick the hole, dig the hole and

say, “if you occupy that you’ll be a stud.” But we still haven’t worked

through that yet. 

We now have a lot of ADP terrain systems, where I can sit in the

TOC and I can draw lines of sights from these 6 and 8 digit grid squares.

And I can reverse shoot out of the engagement area where we then draw

a square for the TRP. The field artillery commander can then go ahead

and begin his planning because the brigade commander said, “Kill him

here.” We can put that TRP on the ground right there in the TOC. We

can shoot lines of sight. I can put the distance on it, and I can put an 8-

digit grid location at the end of that radial. I can say, without a doubt, if

you dig this tank in right here, you will be able to shoot max distance to

this TRP, intermediate distance to this TRP, and short range distance to

this TRP. And you will slaughter the enemy. We haven't developed that

planning technique on the other side of the house. Heaven forbid, an

engineer should pick where a tank should go, or a mech infantry guy

should go, even though we understand the terrain. The old philosophy is

you have to stand on the ground. You have to get on your knees with a

set of binoculars, and you have to see TRPs sitting out in the middle of

the sand. And to do all that you lose six to eight hours minimum,

because you have to get everyone there, you have to issue

subinstructions, you have to travel to the location, et cetera. 

It is a reality. There are so many tools now. In our planning, we

provide those from the brigade down to the company. We’ve now

bought computers for each of the companies, and we’re going to shoot

“As soon as [the brigade commander]

puts his hand on the map, way back in

the planning cell, the field artillery and

the engineer commander know what

they need to do, to go out and set it.”
118

those lines of sight right inside their task force TOC. So, the company

commander, task force engineer, can hand it to the battalion commander

and say, “Here’s the radial. You want to kill here, here’s the radial. If

you go to each of the radials on this computer picture, and we dig a tank

in at the end of each one of these, you’ll just tear them up. It’ll be ugly

for them and you’ll be a hero.” We are bringing automation online to

help prepare the battle. 

The other aspects with regard to this is that once you establish the

battle position, where you’re going to fight from, you can't afford to

move that halfway, six hours, in advance. And if you do, you have to be

prepared to fight from the surface of the battlefield. You'll have no

survivability. You’ll have to fight from the wadis; you’ll have to fight

from the relief of the terrain. Because all the time has expired and the

energy should have been spent doing that right. Because once the battle

commences, I'm done digging. I have to get out of the way or I die.

Same with the countermobility effort. 

37. Unknown Avenues of Approach Along the

South Wall

We had our heads handed to us in a battle because we didn't do a full

and complete analysis of the terrain, specifically the Colorado. We were

defending through the passes and to the entrance down past Matterhorn

to the mouth of the Colorado. We had decided that we wanted to have

the enemy come into a kill zone in Brown Pass, but we wanted to force

them against the North Wall so that we could lay fires against them in

the wadi. We did that because history says that the OPFOR enjoys using

the wadi system on the North Wall. So we were going to give them what

we thought they'd want. We wanted to ensure they were not able to

penetrate the south part of the upper Central Corridor. We didn’t want

them to use Debnam. And we really didn't want them to get into the

Colorado because they enjoy that a lot, and are able to use that a lot, and

we would have a hard time routing them out of there with our assets.

We’d probably have to fight them at the exit in the west if that

happened. So, our two efforts were in Brown Pass, a turning obstacle

that would force them to go to the North Wall, and then a series of

minefields and wire obstacles in the entrance of the Colorado from

Debnam all the way down to Brigade Hill but back behind Basalt Hill.

A series of battle positions in there enhanced by obstacles. We shut off
Lieutenant Colonel Hansen

119

the wadi itself with a series of obstacles so they wouldn’t have a highspeed avenue. 

We thought we did a pretty good job but what we did not know,

which we picked up through aerial photography later, is that the enemy

had along the South Wall, south part of the Colorado, several avenues

that brought him into the Colorado on the south. These allowed him to

run right along the ridge line and emerge in the west. The enemy was

able to give us a pretty strong feint into Brown that fixed the task force

in battle positions

up in front of Crash

Hill and on the

reverse slope of

Brown. They were

able to send the

advance guard main body to fix the forces in the battle positions at the

mouth of the Colorado. Then they took their first echelon main forces

around that South Wall and were able to pretty much destroy everything

in their way. The only force that had a battle position in their way was

the company of engineers who had a battle position down on the South

Wall. They went through them like hot knives through butter. They

emerged and we determined what they were doing. We displaced

throughout the Colorado and attrited a lot of that task force in that fight.

We were able to reposition the majority of the forces in the actual

reverse slope Brown Pass defense between Chinaman's Hat and Nelson

Lake so that we could fire into their flanks coming in. But the enemy

had already gained the high ground. They were able to set AT-5s up on

the high ground and pretty much attrited us to the point where once they

were able to pass the no penetration line west of Nelson Lake, they

declared victory. Their combat power was certainly superior to ours. 

The lesson learned there was that we, as engineers, did not do a

sufficient job, a complete job, of terrain analysis. When you look at the

elements of Engineer Battle Analysis, EBA, it’s like OCOKA. Engineer

Battle Analysis as part of the IPB when we’re doing mission analysis.

Step four is understanding the key terrain and step five is the avenues of

approach. When we go back and look at that mission, I just didn't know

that that southern avenue existed and neither did many others out there

who had previously OCed at NTC. The OPFOR had developed the pass

since the time when some of the task force commanders had been there.

There was somewhat of a reliance on old memory rather than

completing a new, thorough assessment. I relied too heavily on those

“...what we did not know...is the enemy

had ... several avenues that brought

him into the Colorado on the south..”
120

warriors, as it was my first rotation, to give me information. But, the

onus of this analysis, the EBA, is purely on the engineers and our ability

to see the whole thing and we failed to do that. As a result, we got our

heads handed to us in that mission. We fought well, fire, maneuver,

movement to contact, it was good. There were a lot of things learned.

But, the enemy did not do what we wanted the enemy to do and that is

not good when you're fighting a defense in sector. 

I got to see the satellite imagery that showed the pass about 5 months

later. That tool was not available during that rotation. It was very much

available in my second rotation. That imagery has been improved, and

you can see the lines where the battle positions are dug in. You have

that capability. It makes you wonder what capabilities the new AWE

Division, Force XXI, have... that they have real-time information on

where the enemy, their FSE, advance guard, all the elements of the

enemy are. And of the myriad of ways in which tactical formations are

employed, if you could see them, there are only X number of decisions.

When you are executing missions on decision point graphics, then you

learn to fight the same way. 

BROWN

PASS

DEBNAM

PASS

CRASH

HILL

COLORADO

FEINT

MATTERHORN

BDE HILL

AG

Main

Body

GRANITE

PASS

876

Figure 14. OPFOR Bypasses BCT Defense.
Lieutenant Colonel Hansen

121

38. Accelerated Decision Making Process

In my first rotation, the brigade commander adhered to the strict

military decision making process. Complete. There were times he

would accelerate course of action development because of his

experience and understanding the terrain. He would have a focused

course of action and want us to refine that. So, the course of action

development stage was more a synchronization and refinement of an

established course of action. For the most part, he adhered to DDMP. 

During my second rotation, the brigade commander, using what we

call the accelerated decision making process, was able to assist the

brigade combat team in developing feasible, suitable, acceptable brigade

level OPORDERs in 6 to 8 hours. Unheard of. And the anguish of

developing this voluminous beast of a brigade OPORDER that is only

good when you roll it up, go find somebody, and poke them in the eye

with it, because that is all it's good for once you LD. All that pain kind

of goes away under this newer way of doing business. It keeps the

fundamentals of the old process but it streamlines it. There is opposition

within the Army from some extremely important and respected

warfighters that the accelerated way may not be the way to go. But I will

tell you from being a guy who has to execute it and do it and be a part of

his brigade combat team planning staff as well as an executor... it's the

only way to go. As a result, it's the only way in which you can meet the

1/3-2/3 rule and nobody meets the 1/3-2/3 rule. I think the leadership

that continues to promote the deliberate decision making process forgets

the fact that it precludes anybody from meeting that rule and allowing

the task force commander the time he needs to actually get on the

ground. I will tell you that if you are not conducting rehearsals, you're

not going to win the fight. You have to give the task force commander

the time to produce his OPORDER, get his plan and intent done, and

then get on the ground and do his rehearsal. We're not doing that and

that is why battles are lost. But if you follow this accelerated decision

making process, you have the ability to actually, possibly reach that 1/3-

2/3 and give the task force commander what he needs to execute. 

I also firmly believe that a brigade combat team commander should

have enough experience and expertise to not hokey around with "give

me three courses of action and let me decide..." That’s terrible. Looking

at the three brigade combat team commanders they have in the 1CD,

none of them do that. These guys are experienced, they know how to

fight, they can look at terrain. Mission analysis is such a critical point
122

under this system because that’s what gives that brigade combat team

commander a look at the enemy, his own friendly capabilities, his flank,

his adjacent friendly forces. It gives him a look at the ground that he

needs to have so he can know the enemy, know himself, and know the

terrain, so he can establish a course of action, and that the course of

action development should not be a course of action development. It

should be a refinement for synchronization of the fundamental course of

action that the brigade commander wants to fight. And let them

wargame it. Wargaming is great. We’re all over that wargame. It’s

critical. That is where we really get a timeline. We look at the attrition

rates and the feasibility - the feasability - of the course of action. 

When we get done, we have a synch matrix that’s pretty darn good

and we could actually issue it just based on that without any further

refinement. Boom. Give it to the task force and they could do with that

enough, in a very short period of time, to probably execute a successful

mission. This brigade commander is on to something here that has really

taken away a lot of pain in the staff officer’s life and it has been able to

successfully provide the task force commander the time he needs. That

is really one of the big developments I've seen: streamlining some of

that agonizing planning process that some of the senior leadership has

said, for some reason, everybody has to go through. I think there’s a lot

left to be done on this. 

39. Engineers at the Point of Attack

The enemy had a movement to contact. But then they transitioned

into hasty defense. I will tell you they had already pre-dug a

tremendous amount of fighting positions. They were almost on the

verge of a deliberate defense. We were moving from west to east. Our

LD was on the rear slope of Brown Pass, coming through the passes.

We were able to get through the passes reasonably well. They did

FASCAM one or two of them, but we had a pretty good rehearsal and

contingency plans for using the other passes. We probably did not

execute movement through the passes with the deliberateness that we

should have; knowing full well that the enemy uses that as a

“...a brigade combat team commander should have enough

experience and expertise to not hokey around with ‘give me

three courses of action and let me decide...’”
Lieutenant Colonel Hansen

123

fundamental separator of our forces so they can separate us and attrit our

forces through various means, CAS, artillery, chem. 

We had wanted to go up and attack that north flank, but we were

being attrited so bad we weren't making progress. During this attack, the

engineers actually lost situational awareness of where they were on the

battlefield and I was right there with them tracking that lead engineer

company. I lost situational awareness of where the company teams were

because the task force commander lost situational awareness of where

his company teams were. We don't have that FBCB2 terminal inside

the vehicle. We have EPLRS, but that only tells some FBCB2 terminal

box that’s sitting in the rear where somebody in the TOC can see us all.

Nobody was reading that, and we don’t have dedicated FBCB2 terminal

operators since the MTOE doesn’t support it. Nobody could tell me,

“Hey, engineers, you are the point of attack.” I realized I was lead once

I was sitting down there. I didn’t see anybody else. I didn’t know what

was happening. And I said, “Hey, we really are alone here.” And I was

the one who pushed them in there. We knew that we were too far

forward when we actually crossed the line between Hill 876, Division

Hill, and Hill 800. At that point we knew we were pretty much alone. At

that point your options are to turn around or to go for the only relief

element that I knew was on the ground. So, that’s what we did. 

So, all of sudden, when we were able to assess where the heck it is,

I'm talking to the brigade commander telling him I'm sitting up here in

the Racetrack, 300 meters off the front line. We're not taking fire.

We're counting antennas, calling in artillery fire on these individual

fighting positions, I’m asking where they are? The brigade commander

had to regroup and get an assessment of where the TOC thought

everybody was. And then, all of a sudden, they found out, heaven

forbid, the engineers were sitting up there without maneuver forces. I

had four tanks with us as part of the breach force, but that was it. They

were cautiously moving forward to the point of attack. I was moving

forward ahead of the brigade commander. He had pulled up somewhere

around Hill 800 and was sitting there. I normally move one to two

terrain features, IV lines, ahead of him. It’s standard, I try to be his eyes.

He'll pull me back a lot because I move kind of aggressively. Although

in the last couple of battles I stayed with him and we hunkered down. I

was able to sit there and had situational awareness as part of the TAC.

On movement to contact I don't like to sit too much. 
124

We were able to get the majority of forces through the passes. What

we found out though, in this movement to contact was that the safest

place in the Central Corridor was right down the middle. Everybody

hugs the sides. Well, guess what? If you hug the sides, you’re certainly

within the range fans of all their weapons systems. But what we found

out was, if you go right down the middle of the Central Corridor, the

enemy on both sides,

north and south walls,

does not have the range to

hit the center and the dead

space for the enemy is

down the center of the

box. 

In the middle of battle

we figure it out. We’re attacking down the middle. And all the friendly

maneuver forces are taking tremendous attrition on the flanks. But the

forces that went right down the middle, to include our engineers,

received no attrition. The enemy couldn't hit them. All of a sudden we,

the engineers, are hunkered down 300 meters off their front wire. And

we're looking at their dug-in tanks on the other side, counting their

antennas in the holes, and calling in coordinates for fire missions. The

engineers are already there, at the wire, and we’re waiting on maneuver

forces to catch up to us because they were fighting off the walls. The

CSOP were along the wall. Instead of fixing the CSOPs and bringing

artillery in to eliminate and bypass them, we elected to fight, and of

course, we’re taking attrition from each CSOP. 

Now the AT-5s that were in that front line, on that first echelon

defense up there, were in the far corners and they couldn’t range us

either. We were hunkered down low, and we were way down in. We

were able to actually dismount Sappers and move forward to cut the

wire. We dismounted right in their face. But their tanks could not come

up because we had a platoon of tanks assigned to us and we had M1s

sitting up there. The T72s were sitting down about a click and a quarter

away from us. They were looking at us and we're looking at them and

they are not going to get out of their hole to come get us because there’s

an M1 looking at them. They have artillery raining in on them. 

The bottom line is we were able to sneak up, cut the wire, and then

finally, the task force is able to cut free a maneuver company team who

comes running up the Central Corridor, right down the middle. And he

can't be engaged. Upon his arrival we launched an attack almost where

“...if you go right down the middle

of the Central Corridor, the enemy

on both sides, north and south

walls, does not have the range to

hit the center...”
Lieutenant Colonel Hansen

125

everybody says you shouldn’t go, that’s right into the center of their

defense. And frankly, their overlapping fires were not sufficient in the

center, as opposed to their flanks, because stereotyped BLUEFOR

always opts to attack a flank. As a result, we were able to penetrate the

obstacle and pass 14 combat systems through before they were able to

reseed with their FASCAM, which is standard. We held another

platoon of engineers in reserve. We laid in another point of breach and

passed follow-on forces through that. At the point that they called end of

mission, we had almost equal combat power and we were moving

forward which gave us the advantage. 

I guess we were lucky because we got there without being destroyed.

On the other hand, we had not done an analysis of where the enemy can

actually range you with their weapons systems from the wall. If there is

no enemy sitting on the floor of the Central Corridor, then he has a hard

time ranging that center. So there are some advantages. He typically

will put a majority of his weapons systems up there in the center to

cover down once you try to penetrate. But then you find out he really

doesn't do that. He really pushes his assets to the flanks because he

knows you'll penetrate there. He also believes he can maneuver into the

center easier than he can maneuver to either far flank. We still

maintained enough combat power in the task force to get a company

team to respond. We didn't ever have to set a support by fire position for

the supporting force. We never actually developed sufficient smoke to

provide the obscuration necessary, but we were able to suppress the

enemy through indirect fires enough that we were able to actually

penetrate. We did get smokers up there and they assisted somewhat. 

Another advantage we had that prevented the enemy from

repositioning, because they should have repositioned and they weren’t

able to reposition, was that the other task force went all the way down

past Brigade Hill, past Bicycle Lake, came through the Valley of

Death, all the way around and enveloped up through Siberia. Their

firing position was bringing fires down to the east of Hill 760. So, we

had main attack and supporting attack go all the way around. The

enemy did not know the size of that force and did not put anybody

down in the Valley of Death. They could have easily shored that up

had they been there but they didn't think we were bold enough to do

that. The brigade commander was able to send the mech infantry task

force around that way to fix the enemy and prevent him from

repositioning. We executed the breach within 8 minutes. So, that was

pretty quick. It was done with dismounted Sappers as opposed to
126

firing MICLICs. We were saving the MICLICs for the FASCAM we

knew would come in on us.

40. Integrated Countermobility Destroys

Enemy

We went to a defense in sector and we won that. We destroyed

the enemy and we pinned them up against the North Wall. At change

of mission we were calling CAS in on them and they were hemmed

up against the wall unable to move. We had 2,200 meters of Volcano.

We had 4,000 meters of linear minefields with the first row dug in.

We had MOPMS to close lanes. We had supplementary minefields

back behind 910 so the enemy could not come down the Central

Corridor and go around 910 and then get down into the Colorado

wadi. So, we knew about the southern avenue but we decided we

could fight them out front and by positioning company teams where

they had long shots. And the enemy saw all that engineer activity and

the dug-in mines, the first row dug in. They had no capability of

breaching that with any speed and as a result, they elected to go north. 

What they didn't know is when they elected to go north, we had

minefields laid in the central part of the reverse slope of Brown Pass.

We had ditches at Debnam so they had to go through Brown Pass. There

were two company teams coming off of Alpine Pass waiting to assist

once we knew what the enemy's plan would be. As a result, the enemy

did exactly what I watched them do the year before. They came through

the Goat Trail. They went to the North Wall. They consolidated forces,

and they started to prod the North Wall. 

What they didn't know is we had put a Volcano minefield off of the

North Wall, and we put a minefield in the middle so to them it looked

like it was about 3,000 meters of obstacle there. What we failed to do, as

engineers, is fully tie in that Volcano all the way up the slope so the

enemy was able to actually get on the North Wall and bypass it, but they

had to bypass it by single vehicles. What happened was they found that

little bypass because they saw we didn't tie it in. Which we didn't. We

didn't do it intentionally. We just didn't do a good job because we

couldn’t get the truck up there. We should have blown a MOPMS right

there and tied it in. That would have ended it. But the enemy finds a

single lane and they put everything they had into going around that

thing. And when they did that they stopped their forward movement,
Lieutenant Colonel Hansen

127

trying to get that bypass, and we were able to attrit them. Then they got

to the far side and started to mass but we had already repositioned and

were sitting there attriting them with the indirect and calling in CAS.

We had superior numbers and they were about to be destroyed but the

COG called change of mission at that point. I feel like we really

succeeded in destroying the enemy in that battle.

Lessons learned were that the brigade commander had a solid course

of action and early on was able to allow us to develop and synchronize

that course of action early. He gave us ample time. I had 18 S&P trailers

of class IV and V moving with us out of the movement to contact

because the FSB and MSB commanders were intent on pumping that

stuff forward. We put in, in that first defense in sector, about 5600 mines

and that was light. That was an underachievement of our goal. We

ultimately reached our goal in the last battle of the campaign. We got

three of the four Volcanoes on the ground. The enemy committed to a

course of action where we really wanted the enemy to go to, which is

almost 100% opposite of what happened during the previous year. 

The maneuver did a great job in destroying Task Force Angel. They

tried and totally destroyed them. So the enemy didn’t get those eyes in

to be disruptive. The counter-recon effort was outstanding and did a

great job destroying the enemy’s ability to have eyes. I’m sure you’ve

heard that a million times from a million maneuver guys. If you win

that counter-recon fight and you take away the OPFOR’s ability to see,

he’s just as blind as you are. That really helps to equalize the odds in

“I’m sure you’ve heard that a

million times from a million

maneuver guys. If you win that

counter-recon fight and you take

away the OPFOR’s ability to see,

he’s just as blind as you are.”
128

this environment. You get better effects. We had great effects. We

actually killed more combat systems by mine kills than we did with the

field artillery. We actually killed more weapon systems with mine kills

than we did with the TOWs. 

41. Hell Bent on Breaching

A movement to contact. The enemy goes into a hasty defense and

the movement to contact transitions into a hasty attack. That's where we

got up there in the Racetrack, penetrated, and were able to pass about 14

combat systems through that first breach and then through the second

breach we were able to pass the rest. The task force got up and our BSA

set up around Division Hill and the TOC was at Big Sandy. Enemy

defense of the Whale Gap, the Furlong. Let's just put this brigade team

through a 200 sieve. As a result, this figth is always ugly when you get

to play this one.

Two years ago we fought it in reverse, we came out through the

Southern Corridor from the west and we attacked from the south. Of

course the enemy fights this with their CSOPs real tough, and allows

you to get right in there and brings all hell on you, from NBC to every

weapon system known to man. He puts in his first defense and then he

puts in a back up defense that no one has ever lived long enough to see

beyond. 

In 1996 we attacked with the main effort going right through their

Southern Corridor west to east and had great difficulty with the CSOPs

and we got a recock on this mission. At the same time, a task force went

through the Valley of Death. Needless to say we didn't do real well in

there and got chewed up right in the gap. Actually got pretty well

attrited before much really got

through the Valley of Death. We

recocked. The enemy can't

change their scheme and we are

allowed to go back and rethink

our plan of attack. If we want to

change it we can for the training

value. So, we thought through it

this time and they wanted to do

the same thing only they wanted

“...the report was it was

triple stranded wire with

three rows of mines. The

reality was it was a single

strand of wire with one row

of mines...”
Lieutenant Colonel Hansen

129

us to be more deliberate, aggressive, the whole BCT. We were

somewhat too cautious. Maybe our tactical patience was too much. At

the same time they wanted us to have tactical patience once you

identified the enemy, to work yourself into a position to kill him. One

battalion commander was very successful coming through the Valley of

Death and was able to penetrate the enemy. The other was pretty

successful in eliminating CSOPs.

The problem was I had generated too much energy in my engineers

and they were hell bent on breaching. They didn't give a damn what it

was, they were going to breach. We emerged down at the Whale Gap,

and lo and behold there was a single strand of wire and one row of

mines sitting there. It ended about 70 meters to the left of where they

went in. We could of drove right around. About the time I get up on the

hill and see all this, we're already committed to breaching operations.

So, the report was it was triple stranded wire with three rows of mines.

The reality was it was a single strand of wire with one row of mines and

it ended 70 meters to the left. The moral of the story is, battalion

commander, get your butt up to the high ground and start picking that

point and looking at the ground so that you can assist the maneuver task

force commander with picking the optimal point of penetration. Get

your butt at the high ground and help him. Big lesson learned for me

and my company commander engineer is make sure the reports you're

getting are accurate reports. Get up there and look yourself, and

confirm that what’s being reported to you is true. Because you know the

difference between a triple strand and single strand of wire, three rows

versus one row. And then look left, look right, and find the bypass. We

were hell bent on breaching that day. And sure enough we launched

MICLICs, we cut wire, and we stagnated for about twenty minutes

doing all this hocus stuff when in two minutes we could have driven

right around it. 

Lesson learned is find a bypass. Always find the bypass, because the

enemy can't possibly, and they don't have the assets, to put the obstacle

across the whole thing. The other aspect was that once we get through

there, we have to have enough combat power to move forward, because

the enemy starts laying in FASCAM. And all of sudden you look

around and the only people standing there are the engineers and one or

two tanks you were able to penetrate. The reality is you have to have the

combat power available to assault, and they have to be moved up

aggressively to penetrate. Once that breach is in, they must assault

immediately to get beyond that very narrow killing point because it will
130

be reseeded, it will receive chemical, it will be closed up. That's why on

that movement to contact, the enemy's hasty defense, and our transition

to a hasty attack, we were so successful. In eight minutes we were

passing combat systems. By the time we got the lane in and proofed real

quick, we had four Bradleys just standing there frothing at the bit. I was

surprised we didn’t catch an artillery attack and get us all. That is so

good to see. 

I think it should be mandatory that the breach force commander be

the company engineer. The maneuver task force commander cannot

afford to take a maneuver company commander and make him a breach

force commander. All the failed missions that I've ever been on in a

breach, it was a maneuver company commander in charge of the breach

force. All the successful ones that we’ve had, there’s always been an

engineer company commander in charge augmented with a tank platoon

for local security. That tank platoon ends up being the big killer because

they seem to live. They maneuver to live, and then once the breach is

through, they are able to penetrate to the far shore and they start

cleaning up as the assault force passes through. It allows a fifth

command and control element to a task force commander so that his

four company commanders can maneuver and fight and kill, not be

concerned with the TTP of working through a breach. 

That's what an engineer commander does. He lives for it. There’s

no tank commander in the world that loves to breach. It’s just like,

“Nuts,” they hate it. All they want is the engineer to get it over with so

they can attack. They can adhere to that and they can practice it at home

station and they can have the assigned tanks that are going to be part of

the breach force. And, those tanks know they like being with the

engineers, we take great care of them because we're not used to having

them, and we baby them. And they also know they get the greatest

amount of kills because they seem to live and they seem to get into the

fight. It facilitates the commander’s execution of the mission. 

So, we got the recock. We breached that single strand. We went

through. Boom. We get destroyed on the far side because it took too

long and we weren’t using our brain. At the same time the mech task

force is emerging out. And when they called end of mission we were

progressing on but our combat power was very weak. 

42. Up the Furlong
Lieutenant Colonel Hansen

131

Here in 97, we were coming down through Siberia. What a great

opportunity we had there. We were able to actually put the engineer

TAC up forward and put eyes on, from the high ground at 781. With

high-powered binoculars we

were able to look and actually

watch the enemy engineers

putting in the obstacles. Even

before the COLTs were

supposed to get out, we

positioned the engineer TAC

forward to give real time information. And then at the recommendation

of the S3 of the engineer brigade and the TAC, we put COLT teams up

to reposition with the TAC and they were able to bring their high-power

binoculars forward. As a result, we were able to TRP each one of the

battle positions they put on the reverse side which assisted us greatly so

we were able to position where their CSOP was on the north side of the

Whale. We were unable and unsuccessful at seeing the CSOP that they

placed in the John Wayne Foothills but were able to destroy them in the

movement. We attacked with two task forces abreast. Task Force 1-12,

main effort, on the west side of the Siberia and Task Force 1-5 on the

east side. 1-5, the supporting effort, was to gain the Whale. 1-12 was to

penetrate the gap or if necessary go over the Furlong. 

The enemy reported later that they FASCAMed the gap, so we did

not fare well at the Whale with 1-5. We lost a lot of assets there. We

were able to recover those assets there and transfer them over to 1-12. 

SIBERIA

WHALE

RED PASS

VALLEY OF DEATH

FURLONG

TIEFORT

MOUNTAIN

1-5 1-12

JOHN WAYNE

FOOTHILLS

781

Figure 15. Attacking Furlong Ridge and the Whale.

“All the failed missions that I've

ever been on in a breach, it was a

maneuver company commander in

charge of the breach force. All the

successful ones that we’ve had,

there’s always been an engineer

company commander in charge...”
132

So, we fought the Furlong. The Furlong became an assault breach.

Dismounted infantry were on the reverse side. Mortars on top of the hill.

It was ugly. It was a dismounted draw fight. We actually penetrated

their defense and got two tanks to the back side of their first line of

defense. They committed the CAR. The CAR was able to destroy those

and they fought us back and killed our systems, pushed us back up on

top of the Furlong. We fought our way back down. They pushed us back

up. We pretty much had a stalemate but we had more combat power

than they did, still ready to project. 

We got a recock and fought it again. We shifted assets. It was

almost a repeat, almost identical. It became a cat fight, a pull fight, an

assault fight. Dismounted engineers, dismounted infantry, fighting,

hand-to-hand combat right up on the Furlong. The lesson to think about

here is, how do you maintain passage? We couldn’t decipher which

lanes were open. One lane would be open. We would mark it with

cones. Boom, it would die. Then all of a sudden we’d get a tank blown

up in the middle of it. We were able to penetrate on the far side. They

beat us back again and pretty much a stalemate there again. If I had to

do it over again, I’d pull my MICLICs up there and shoot those rabbit

killers right over the top of the Furlong and fry all that dismounted

infantry. That would have been a way to clear those guys out of there.

We were able to go around the tip of the Furlong and get some

penetration through there, but they had a tremendous amount of

firepower, just TRPs massed. We had extremely effective smoke during

the first fight. That’s why we actually did penetrate the MRB back by

their CAR. 

Communication and battlefield awareness was horrible. We’d get a

lane open. Boom. Not. Lane’s closed. If you’ve been on the Furlong,

you know there are a series of paths going up. You go up one, get a lane

up, and then they blow a tank. And at the base they’re trying to direct

which lane to go up. “Nope, don’t go up that one, go up that one. Not

up that one, go up this one.” And which one do you go up? And the

answer is, you really can’t get up there. I don’t know if there’s any way

to win that. Chaos reigns supreme when you’re in the open and there’s

no longer commo, and affix bayonets because we’re going after them. It

really changed the perspective with regard to how you fight. It had been

a long since anybody’d had the bayonet fight on the Furlong. Most

people forgot that there was such a fight.
LIEUTENANT COLONEL DYFIERD HARRIS, 1999

43. Launch Me Early

Defense mission. Once we did the China Lake mission, we were

pushed against a pretty tight schedule. We flew the China Lake mission

early morning, like three o’clock, recovered the aircraft, put them to

bed, then that afternoon we relocated out to the first field site, East Gate.

What I allowed to happen was - I guess it's that visualize yourself piece.

The jump completely derailed our mission for the next day. I never

caught that it was doing that. I heard concerns from subordinate

commanders. "Sir, you're asking us to do too much." But, when you’ve

done something already yourself, you know you have done it, so you

think they can. I had conducted jumps before. I told them to relax, it

was just a jump and then you’re going to go. I thought they could

handle it. When we made the jump, we actually ended up getting there

at night and the next morning the mission was at 0530. So, while we had

done a pretty good job of planning the mission and rehearsal, what we

failed to rehearse was the preparation. 

We got up the next morning. Blackhawks had no fuel. My FARP

platoon had apparently floundered in the night, and because it got dark,

did not get all the Apaches refueled which wasn't an issue because the

lead company had fuel. It was the other ones behind him who needed

fuel, so I had to try to turn. But it all started from the jump. It really

taught me that lesson that the preparation planning is just as critical. I

was so concerned about planning the mission that I didn’t plan the

preparation. When we made the jump, the fuelers closed in with all the

gullies and washes on the desert floor. They tried to cold refuel the

aircraft that night but they couldn’t get to the aircraft to cold refuel

them. So it completely derailed them. You would think it was routine,

something we did everyday. But the desert put an extra challenge in

there that no one was prepared to handle. In daylight it was no problem

because there are plenty of roads. Now you're talking about a guy out

there with goggles and a guy trying to do light discipline. Once it got

dark, it was painful. The HHC commander finally, about three o’clock

in the morning, apparently stopped them. I was down for the night. He

said "I'm not going to get anybody killed. The boss is just going to have

to chew me out in the morning." Which I applaud. I just wish they’d
134

woken me up to tell me that. That would have been nice. But that was

a derailment of preparation. 

Then when we actually got launched for the mission, I had a

challenge to prevent my people from becoming too focused on that

setback. The next morning we are ready to launch. The entire discussion

was, “We don’t have fuel, we don’t have fuel.” When in reality, the

only critical fuel bird out there was the Blackhawk that was supposed to

fly the brigade commander. But every commander I had could not get

over the fact that his aircraft had not been topped off. We had done

mission analysis and it was a 15-minute flight, probably 20 minutes in

the BP, and a 15 minute flight back. That's barely an hour and you've

got two hours worth of gas on board without even getting topped off.

You only flew 10 minutes yesterday. I had to get them to forget about

the fuel and go execute the mission. Go. 

That was leading up to the first fight. The mission was we were

going to destroy the forward security element of the advance guard.

The CAV was going to make contact and then we were going to come

in on the flanks and try to destroy him. There’s a saying in the attack

helicopter business, “Launch me early rather than launch me late.” I am

a flexible enough asset on the battlefield. I can flex to change even if

I’m going in the wrong direction. It’s better to be going in the wrong

direction early than the right

direction late.

 Some of this problem was

higher, some was my problem.

We became so engrossed with

JSTARS and UAV that we

forgot some fundamentals of

being an attack helicopter pilot.

First, the CAV had eyes on the

target already. I don’t need JSTARS to confirm what I already know

is out there. Also, there was a phase line at Nelson Lake and between

Nelson Lake and the next phase line they would not allow JSTARS or

UAV to feed you any information. Well, if you knew the attack was

coming and they hit that first phase line, in my mind, that is when I

launch. Because I don’t want to be in the ABF, waiting on him, when

they come into the engagement area. They’re going to kill someone. 

For some reason the battle captain at brigade was holding us and

he was trying to get a better read. It’s that perfect intel thing those

guys look for. It's funny how we learn these lessons over and over

“Launch me early rather than

launch me late... It’s better

to be going in the wrong

direction early than the right

direction late."
Lieutenant Colonel Harris

135

again. There’s no such thing as perfect intel. You don’t need to wait

for perfect intel. I got a read. I got this much dust moving. Launch

me. Launch me, let me do a movement to contact. Let me get into

position and I’ll develop the situation. Well, we launched when they

got a good read at the next phase line. But by that time the FSE is

already in contact with the CAV. The whole plan is shot. They’ve

already pushed east all the way over to Brigade Hill. So the whole

plan of bloodying his nose as far back as possible with Apache

helicopters is derailed because you’re waiting on the perfect intel. 

So, those events really stuck out in my mind. One is I allowed my

entire mission to be derailed because I didn’t think of the move and

the mission the next day. It was a routine jump in my mind. Well, it

may have been for me but it wasn’t for a lot of the guys out there.

Second, once you get all this worked through and it's time to go. I

had to get them over, “We don’t have fuel.” We were wasting time

because everybody was talking about fuel. So I finally get on the

radio and asked, “Well, how much fuel you got?” “Well, I got 2000

pounds.” “So, why am I having this discussion. That’s plenty of fuel

for the mission.” 

Yeah, you can’t park on a cloud. You run out of fuel it’s a bad

thing. So, when an aviator gets in the aircraft they’re always looking

to see if that gauge is full. But there is such a thing as mission

analysis. Even for routine flights, mission analysis dictates how

much fuel is needed to do this mission. Well, they had done it. They

knew how much fuel they needed. They only needed around 1400

pounds and they have 2000 pounds. They became fixated on this one

issue. That probably delayed us another 15 minutes. 

Then when I’m finally ready to go, and I’m already thinking I’m

behind the power curve, I get told, “Hold.” No, I don’t want to hold.

You’ve already told me he crossed the phase line. We all look for the

perfect solution on occasion. The battle captain - and he was an

aviator - had so much information. This is one of my long-term fears,

especially with Force XXI. So much information is available, I think

people are going to delay decisions based on trying to get a perfect

read, and I don't think it is ever going to happen regardless of the

technology. Your situational awareness will be improved but it won't

ever be perfect. At some point it has to go back to experience of the

commander’s gut that says, “I need to do this now. I have a 70%

solution, I need to do it now.” I think we were looking for the 80-90%

solution and it never happened. 
136

So, bam, the CAV gets hit. Now, my guys launch. We go to the

ABF and of course we start hitting the lead battalion, the security of

the main battalion. The flank security guys actually get around,

because once they go through the ABF, they go behind. Of course,

battle of the day went to the Krasnovians. 

They had to uncurl out there off of Bicycle Lake. Part of the concept

of fighting throughout the depth of his formation is what we were trying

to get to. The concept

was, which I fully

agreed with and still

agree with today and

want to try again, is, if

I get the Apaches out

in front of everybody

else, with the Kiowas

having eyes on the

target, as soon as he comes across the first phase line, smack, you

bloody his nose. It’s an old street fighting method, you get the first

blow in. Now his entire plan, his timing is off, he’s desynched because

he was expecting to gain ground before he makes contact. Bam. As soon

as you roll across you get Hellfire, you get artillery, you get MLRS all

falling on top of you. You’re completely slowed down. Then it’s a

footrace. 

The ground manuever plan was literally a footrace for the CAV. The

CAV was trying to beat them... The battle out there normally takes

place right in front of Tiefort, it’s Brigade Hill. We were trying to beat

his forces over the road, fight them on terrain they don’t normally fight

on, so we could push out and get at Brown/Debnam Pass. We wanted to

control it. The Apaches could delay them long enough for us to get to

there with the ground cavalry. That was our mission, a delay mission.

But if I’m going to delay, I’ve got to be ready. We were late. Some of

that was on me. I think we could have stemmed that if we had launched

sooner. I enjoyed it. There were a lot of lessons learned.

The other thing that becomes a challenge for us is now, with Army

aviation, once you get out there, we don't have the radios to do

battlefield reporting. I don't know if we'll ever spend the money or we’ll

ever get over-terrain radar for the distances we travel. NTC is just a

function of relief. When I was in Germany, we were going 100K deep.

Well, if you’re a brigade commander, you just sit back and wait because

there is no way I am going to talk to you. I don't have anything on

"If I get the Apaches out in front of

everybody else, with the Kiowas

having eyes on the target, as soon as

he comes across the first phase line,

smack, you bloody his nose."
Lieutenant Colonel Harris

137

board that’s going to allow me to talk that distance to you. We saw the

same thing at the NTC. My guys would be in the ABF engaging targets.

And you have the brigade S3, the brigade commander, my S3 and me.

We're all screaming for tactical information reports. 

I finally figured out that the best thing I could do, because it really

was a company fight, was try to bounce back and forth and find pieces

of terrain where I can relay that message back. It’s very important for

the brigade to have the situational awareness of what’s happening. But if

I have a captain who’s actually trying to kill targets, and all he's

worrying about is whether he can report back, at some point, he's not

killing targets anymore. Where is the trade-off? That's still a tough

question. There is a balance there that has to be achieved. 

What I normally told the company commanders was to look at the

CCIR and if you knew it was a CCIR and saw that piece of information,

then you were obligated to stop. At least you should pull back and give

that information back because there would not be a CCIR out there if it

wasn’t that important. Beyond that, fight. That’s what you’re out there

for, to kill tanks. And if you’re killing tanks, kill them. Then tell me

about it when you get a chance. That wasn't always a popular decision,

but I’m still convinced, if I have a company out there and he’s killing

tanks, he’s going to do us a

lot more good if he kills tanks

than if he’s reporting back to

me. That was the first day in

the box. Day one. First

mission. Oh yeah, it started

off great. 

44. Aviation Company Lessons, Developing

Engagement Area

Actually, once you got past the initial maintenance problems, it went

pretty well. There are all sorts of company lessons you learn throughout.

Guys staying in the ABF too long, just not moving, and allowing the

ADA piece to maneuver around behind you. You shoot once or twice

out of an ABF, it's probably time to move. You get up in Alpha-Bravo

Passes and you’re in the shadows, and you’re killing all this stuff. 

"...if I have a company out there

and he’s killing tanks, he’s

going to do us a lot more good

if he kills tanks than if he’s

reporting back to me."
138

Looks pretty good, you don’t want to move. While they're sitting there,

they don’t know there’s an ADA piece that’s closing on them. 

Another good lesson deals with frontal shots. With the Cobra it was

a real issue because that was the hardest part of the tank and the TOW

obviously threw basically a straight projectile. The Hellfire comes down

more on top of the vehicle, which isn't as big of an issue. However, what

my guys failed to realize is, and sometimes they continue to fail to

realize is, when you start engaging a guy nose to nose, the entire time he

is closing on you. So, if you have this formation and you take out some

front targets. Well, you create smoke and the other targets will start to

come closer and closer to you until you are forced out of your ABF and

can't get any other shots. Or, you’re killing targets and now all of a

sudden one guy happens to get you inside his main gun range. And that

sabot moves a little faster than that Hellfire. Then you lose. You can't

teach that sometimes unless they see it. It's proper selection of an ABF.

Staff gives them a plan. We select an ABF. And I tell all my

commanders that when you get out there, the ABF is a tactical firing

position, it doesn't lock you in to any type of terrain, it’s a direction that

orients you for the attack. But if it doesn't work, move, and tell

somebody where you moved to. Find a better spot to accomplish the

mission. They need to bring that initiative and flexibility to the

battlefield. 

Another big point that was discussed was engagement area

development at the company level. I saw this for the first time very

clearly at the live Hellfire shoot. It's funny because we talk it all the time

and I can tell you until we did that live fire exercise, I would have told

you engagement area development by the companies was pretty good.

This was in the central valley in front of Nelson Lake. The ABF was out

around Chinaman's Hat. They had paper targets out there, et cetera. 

It was very simple stuff. We had been training to the company level.

Now I’m trying to integrate a battalion in the air. The first mistake I

made is there should have been a battalion level engagement area rather

than the companies’. We thought we had done that and we basically

gave this company this EA and another company the other EA.

Something we didn't take into consideration was predominant winds.

When this one company starts killing one EA, then you had another

company at this EA. Wind is blowing across his targets and his targets

become obscured. 

We missed a lot of missile shots. Hellfire uses the laser. A couple of

guys use the laser tracking mechanisms. It’s a little box that comes
Lieutenant Colonel Harris

139

around and holds the laser spot there. That's fine as long as the aircraft

can pick up the heat and know that it’s there. So, the missile is in the air.

Everything is looking beautiful. About three seconds before it goes,

smoke comes across the target from the other engagement area, causes

the laser to go off. Laser goes away and the missile goes off target. I

really felt that was my fault. That was a staff failure where we gave

them two very close targets. Some of it was the limitation of NTC. The

engagement area development plan was done independently for two

companies, fire distribution, what they were going to do. One company

planned to work east/west and the other planned to work west/east. So,

they were both basically were starting in the center and working out.

Well, winds were going west/east. As soon as the guys in the west start

killing their targets, all the east targets become obscured. He's got lasers

breaking and he’s got missiles going. That was the last live fire exercise.

We needed to work on fire distribution. We also needed to work on

an alternate fire distribution plan. So, when you got in, the target you

thought you were going to see didn't present itself. The company

commanders quickly, among themselves, changed that. Now the

Apache has the laser spot tracker. You can shoot a laser out and hit a

button and it will go where this other guy is shooting his laser. Then

he’ll say that, from that spot on the ground, you take everything north of

this and I'll take everything south of this. The laser is spot checking.

That’s just a quick method of doing it. What happened though is when

he shot it out, one of the company commanders couldn’t pick up the

spot and it wasn't working correctly. So, now we’re flailing because

technology has let us down. Technology let them down. They’re

worrying how to break up the area without it. But if you looked exactly
140

behind where they said they were going to shoot that spot, there was a

ridge line. Right there. All you’d do is say you take everything from the

end of the ridge line. The ridge line was out of the engagement area but

you still could have used it as a reference. Hey, a piece of terrain. It used

to work in the old days. It works pretty well. I think the whiz kids that

we grow become so engrossed in the technology and they understand it

so well that when it goes away...

“Well, how do we break up the

engagement area now?” Break out

your map and do it the way we

used to. It works. 

45. Nothing in the North

This was a split attack. It was pretty successful except that there was

confusion as to who was responsible for the Northern Corridor. In this

fight we finally get 1-67 Armor into the battle. They come in that night.

Now we have an armor battalion. We have the CAV out front that has

been screening. You have me in the back. The next morning the CAV

is getting probed the whole time and now they’re going to have an

attack. My mission was the division CAR and regimental CAR,

combined arms reserve. We knew they would come either out of the

Colorado Wadi down there or they expected them possibly to come

through the North. 

The Canadians had the southern portion. They were pretty incredible

by the way. It's the only time I saw someone get that deep into the NTC

rear and not be detected. He had great intel but he couldn't talk. That's

the problem, the radios again. They were watching the Southern

Corridor. If anything came through there, that was my primary

responsibility. I was going to destroy that. 1-67 was basically back in the

East Gate area with the ability to swing north if something came north

or the ability to go through the Central Corridor. The CAV had a

strongpoint basically in this Central Corridor. He was set up in the

Central Corridor. But I thought he had also put in an economy of force,

a troop, up north to cover that or his Kiowas were going to cover that.

Well, I don't know how it got missed, but no one was up north.

Obviously, when the enemy came through, they started the attack. The

Krasnovians had great reconnaissance. They quickly figured out, strong

"...the whiz kids that we

grow become so engrossed

in the technology...”
Lieutenant Colonel Harris

141

in the center, economy of force in the south, and they’re not sure what

we have in the north, there's no real economy of anything. 

Nothing in the north. If we would have been committed to the north,

it would have been fine. Contact is made, pick up the division CAR,

they’re coming out of the Colorado Wadi like we thought. I take a

company up there and decimate him. Understand, I had a lot of MILES

maintenance problems. I may have six aircraft and half that can shoot,

maybe two. They were still stopping this guy. While they're stopping the

division CAR, the regimental CAR is running through the Northern

Corridor unchecked. Everyone came down the center except for the

division CAR. We basically stopped the division CAR. The CAV is

getting hit by almost everything. Looks like everything is coming to

center. We commit part of the armor battalion to the Central Corridor.

This is where the attack is coming. We rotate one company off and

bring the other company back up in. Because we also had these KVTs,

these 30 M1 tanks, that everybody is looking for out there. Heck, there

are a lot of extra forces out there because we have so many attack

helicopter assets. So, the pressure starts to come in the Central Corridor. 

The two lead battalions basically fix the CAV and the armor

battalion in the Central Corridor. Meanwhile, the entire regimental

CAR in front of the follow-on battalion come behind them and up

through Granite Pass. They come up through Granite Pass into the

Northern Corridor. Sweep. They come around on the northern flank.

Finally, we picked that up. My guys come up and we start. Here's the

problem with attack helicopters a lot of times. We are very flexible but

when you start to get into the "everything is falling apart, help me”

mode, then it is all reactionary and there is not a lot of time for planning.

This is something that I think my commanders have learned. That’s

going to happen and I think just by virtue of what we can bring it’s

going to happen. It happens to artillery, it's going to happen to attack

helicopters. 

What I tried to stop them from doing is if you get a report that a lead

vehicle is somewhere and you know it’s going to take you 20 minutes to

get there, well then you don't want to go there. You have to pick your

piece of terrain where you want

to fight. I would have guys run

into Alpha-Bravo Pass and lose

a whole company. Well the

enemy was already there. We

"You have to pick your piece

of terrain where you want to

fight. I would have guys run

into Alpha-Bravo Pass and

lose a whole company."
142

don’t want you to go into the pass. You should have waited. Pick your

terrain. You still look at a map. You still decide, they’re moving this

way. There’s only so many ways they’re going to come. They’re going

to come through those passes. So, pick an ABF that’s going to allow

you to kill them in the pass. Bottleneck them in the pass, bring artillery

to effect, bring CAS to effect, and then you can start doing it. All that

was coming on, but it wasn’t synchronized. 

What finally ended up happening is the enemy broke through the

passes and now they’re back in the rear area. My FARP had a fight to

the last man. Literally, one of the 50 cal gunners in my shop, his 50 cal

jammed. He was the last guy. They had bypassed him, and then they

finally saw the FARP. I guess part of them broke off to hit the FARP.

Well, the FARP had actually set up an L-shaped ambush, so when they

came in it was a fight to the death. The kid on the 50 was just waxing

people. His 50 jammed as the last guys were trying to do 3-second

rushes on him and he tried to go for another weapon and the last guy

came up and killed him. But there was one guy left. 

The piece that broke down on us on that day, the brigade rehearsal.

I'm still not sure why that got missed, why no one was up north. The

other thing was we allowed the armor battalion to get fixed. Part of that

lead MRB’s mission was to tell who was up front. Once they made

contact, they maintained contact, and then someone maneuvered behind.

The enemy tried to maneuver through that Southern Corridor with the

Division CAR. But my two companies did a pretty good job, so nothing

came through the Southern Corridor. But, then I tried to flex to the north

and we just didn't do it right. 

The hardest part for me was where to be and when to be there.

Command presence can be such a force multiplier, it’s incredible. This

day I decided I was going to go in a Blackhawk and in the south because

that’s our primary mission.

I'm going to put my S3 in

the TAC and he is going to

go on that ridge line

between the Northern and

Central Corridor. So, now he is in a position to talk and control if we

send someone to the mountain. Well, it would have worked until my S3

got killed by a chemical attack. As soon as I wrote my guys off from the

Southern Corridor, and they swung to the north and we started losing

people, the FARP started getting on the line. My Hawk runs out of gas

because my FARP has been overrun and I see my guys just flying all

"Command presence can be such

a force multiplier, it’s incredible."
Lieutenant Colonel Harris

143

over the valley and I'm trying to get somebody on the radio. I finally get

my captain and I say, “Tom, brief whatever assets are back here.”

Because, all they needed was someone to gather the four, five, six,

however many helicopters they have left, mass them and go kill

something. You got them all running around on their own. I'm sitting on

the ground out of gas, my S3 was killed, so he can’t talk to anybody.

The TOC was overrun. So they're running out.

But the first few battles I didn't feel I was in the right place at the

right time. I was struggling to figure out where I needed to be. Where

did I want my S3? We were figuring some of that out. We had him at

the brigade TOC one time, that didn’t work out. 

And, then not having a dedicated brigade headquarters took some

adjusting too. My brigade headquarters is normally there, and interfaces

and does a lot of coordination between the ground brigade and aviation

forces. Now all of a sudden, my brigade headquarters is the ground

brigade. So now when I'm up actually trying to get information, for the

first time in my life I'm competing with two other battalion

commanders. And, oh, by the way, the brigade is more comfortable

with my capabilities, comfortable with what aviation does, than what the

ground does. So, the ground guys are getting more focus, and I'm

missing a lot of pieces. It was the first time an aviation brigade had ever

been a BCT, which I think is a great thing. I think it should happen

again. I don't think we quite had it figured out what we were expected to

do. I think the OCs drove the aviation brigade to focus all their attention

on conducting a breach, which in reality was never the CG's intent. His

concept is that this is a strike force, an entry force. I think 4th Bde would

make an effective strike force.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ORLEY JOHNS, 1998

46. Quick Correction in the Bowl

This was our first NTC defense. Force on force. Task Force 1-9

was in the north and we were in the south. We were at the Hill 876

complex, Peanut, CHOD, just to the east of it, right on the tip.

Southeast of the Cul-de-sac. The enemy tries to run the North Wall

and come around. We’re setting a defense. First of all, my staff and I

had a little confusion understanding the commander's intent. Initially

we thought our engagement area was going to be to the west of 876

complex. The brigade commander wanted us to set my 3-8 Task

Force engagement area just to the west of the complex. So when we

got out on the ground, we were running around and making things

happen. Here's where we want to kill them, here’s where I want to set

forces. The engineer company commander says, "Sir, this doesn't

make sense. You have an engagement area out there, you are arraying

the forces here. We can't kill them out there the way these obstacles

are set.” I thought about it and I said, “You know you are exactly

right.” 

So I talked to the brigade commander. He had come down for a

back brief, and he said let's talk about what we want to do. He listens

and says, “No, no, that was not my intention.” And he says here's the

way I want this set up. “I want some obstacles forward but I want

your engagement area to be in the bowl just to the east of Hill 876.”

We had had a confirmation brief at brigade. But, when I was at the

map at the brigade brief, I didn't say specifically where my

engagement area is or point to where he wanted to kill them. So we

did not initially have full understanding. With that later face to face,

we got it. And we fixed it. Sometimes you have to catch yourself. The

indication was there. 

 We do confirmation and back briefs in the battalion as well as

the brigade. SOP. I will visit key units and try to get to more. We at

least go around and check on preparations. From the brigade we had

gotten into a battle rhythm, where we said at a certain time we are

going to issue operations orders. For example, change of mission

plus 1.5. So, one and a half hours after change of mission, whatever

the mission was, we were going to a location and we know we’re
146

getting an operations order from brigade. We go there and get the

operations orders while the battalion TOC will already have been

given a hard copy. They are already starting to do a mission analysis.

By the time the S3 and I get back, the battle captain already has it set

up to brief the mission analysis. They've got proposed, restated

mission and talk about courses of action. They lay it all out. We go

through the brief. I may or may not stay for the wargame. I come

back and they tell me what they came up with. So, we got to a point

where we have everything on a timeline. 

During the NTC train-up, the brigade’s intent was purposefully

make the battle rhythm a lot quicker. More fast-paced than at NTC.

We forced ourselves to get into a rhythm and to do simultaneous ops.

At the same time we were executing an operation, we would be

planning another one for the next day. We would do the rehearsals

and go on. Here it was like a self-imposed brigade timeline. By the

time we got to NTC, we had plenty of time to visit units, et cetera. It

wasn't relaxed but less stressful than expected.

But, again for this defense, the engineer company commander

recognized my error early on. He knew the position couldn’t be

correct. There must be something I’d missed in the intent. For a

while there I kind of told him he didn't understand. But he said, “Sir,

this does not make sense, its not doctrinally correct,” and on and on.

So, we finally got that worked out. But we ended up a little behind in

the engineer effort because he had started digging based on my

directions. We finally got the defense set. Of the initial effort, we had

several blocking obstacles and several turning obstacles. To make a

long story short, we were at about the 50% solution in terms of

prepared positions for vehicles, tanks and Bradleys; and we were at

about a 75-80% solution for obstacle effort, mines and wire. Not too

terribly bad, but not what we wanted. What it caused me to do was

more of a mobile defense based on how it was arrayed. 

So, we’re looking at a regiment coming in against the brigade. In

my portion of the sector, brigade wanted to convey there was strength

in the south, and they wanted to push them north into 1-9’s main

effort. I had a little narrower sector than he did, his was a little wider.

He had five company teams and I had three. I had two tank and one

Bradley. We set the defense. Pretty effective to start out with. They

started to breach our main obstacle belt in the south where I had my

Charlie company arrayed, who in fact was my main effort for the task

force. They started to come in and they had some slight penetration to
Lieutenant Colonel Johns

147

the north in 1-9’s sector. Then they breached the obstacle north that

tied in with 876, CHOD, Peanut. They started to breach. But I had

my forces arrayed in such a manner that they couldn't make it

through. The synch piece of the indirect and direct fires at that point,

along with the existing obstacles on the ground, stopped him. 

I had that one company team destroy upwards of 34 to 40 vehicles

right there in that one piece of ground, not more than about a 1,000

meter grid square. At that point we stopped the OPFOR cold. What

do I attribute that to? The battle command team went back and

actually face to faced with the brigade commander because there was

confusion on the intent. So, seeing ourselves, how we are arrayed.

The second part of that, I think we had a pretty good read on how the

enemy was going to come. That wasn’t a problem. Seeing the terrain

too, how we defend. Unsuccessful as far as the start and where we

were going to put the obstacles. Successful in that the engineer

company commander kind of keyed us that this doesn't make sense.

We corrected that and we were successful. 

What I would have done differently. I would have listened to the

engineer more and went back to the brigade commander earlier and

876

RACETRACK

IRON

TRIANGLE

BROWN

PASS

RES

DEBNAM

PASS

780 760

COLORADO

3-8

1-9

114

WADI GRANITE

PASS

BIKE

LAKE

BRIGADE

HILL

Figure 16. 3-8 CAV Defense in the South.
148

said there’s confusion on the engagement area setup and asked what

we are responsible for in terms of brigade directed obstacles. We

didn't do that soon enough and we lost a little time. Fortunately,

because of the way the enemy attacked, we wound up okay. They

continued to try to come south and run the South Wall. We thought

that at least a company plus had penetrated, but it turned out it was

less than a company. It was a very good mission. We conserved

combat power for the main effort in the north while at the same time

we maintained ops. And I don't recall what the end combat strength

was. But, we still had tanks in the fight. I know both of the OPFOR

battalion commanders and they said their commander was raging over

the radio, “I don’t care how the hell you get them, just kill them. Stop

them.” A classic. It was a good fight. 

There was also brigade flexibility during that defense. And my

running assessment keyed me to when to call for help from brigade. My

northernmost company in that defense was in the Racetrack. We were

just a little south of that. We were tied in with East Range Road. That

northern company started to get some effective fires on them. Our

running estimate told us we’re

having a problem here, we needed

to get somebody in and backstop.

The brigade commander moved a

tank company team from north in

1-9 sector down into our sector. He was my team but he’d been

attached as part of 1-9. This was unique because this company team had

undergone a chem attack. They’d been slimed, so they were in MOPP4.

So I’m listening to Brigade TOC tell Assassin Six to move to CP such

and such and come up on 3-8 Battalion Command. Time... now.

Couple of minutes later, ol’ Assassin Six is on my net to coordinate.

That quick. We moved him to checkpoint whatever, orientation is...

with task and purpose to block the penetration of company moving from

such and such. Time now. Report when set. And they’re moving.

That’s their move. These guys are in MOPP4 and they got it in position.

That was just one of those things where we, and obviously the brigade

commander, saw that we would have to do something at the brigade

level to backstop us in the south. We didn’t have enough force in the

south to be able to reposition to backstop ourselves. So, it became a

brigade fight rather than just a task force. And it turned out okay. 

And that was not the only move of Alpha 3-8. He wound up

moving again because the enemy started to push north. So, OK, I tell

“Our running assessment

told us we’re having a

problem here...”
Lieutenant Colonel Johns

149

Assassin Six I want him to reposition. So he moved back again. So

he did two moves in a matter of minutes. I mean, the guys were

moving. It was just being able to see and that running estimate let us

see that we're having problems here, or we're not strong enough here,

or I want you to reposition because we can get some flank shots in.

So, I’m not going to say all

fights were successful because

they weren’t. I’m not going to

tell you we were able to

visualize at all times what we

needed to do to be successful at

all times. Several times that

window just passed us by. The

joke was: you’re riding along in your track, maps flapping in the

breeze and all of a sudden something flys by. And you go, “What

was that?” Well, it was a decision point. You were supposed to make

a decision back there, OK.

But I think the key to the whole thing was, and we could deem it a

successful rotation, because with each operation we got a little better.

In every area, battle command, intel, manuever, we got better. We

understood how important it was to visualize where we saw

ourselves. When we first started out, for example, we were a little

optimistic in terms of combat power. You report number of systems

for the first battle. But you know as you go through fights you start to

lose vehicles; they throw a track, they get stuck in minefields,

whatever. So, you start another fight and you think maybe you have

enough combat power but you really don't. Instead of just doing the

comparison of forces and telling the boss you understand the task

organization he gave, you need to let him know you just don’t have

the combat power to do what he wants you to do. I never did that. I

think in a couple of cases I should have asked for a little bit more

combat power. You have to make the call of whether or not you can

do it with available assets. If you can’t get it, you work with what you

have but he should know your assessment. You have to understand

the commander's intent and then determine, based on the estimate,

whether or not you can reach the intent. And you have to constantly

assess, as the battle progresses, where you are and if you can if fact

meet that intent and what it takes to do that. At certain times, you

have to decide to move or reposition forces. At a certain time you

have to say, I need to move the mortars, then I need to detach a

“Something flys by. And you

go, 'What was that?’ Well, it

was a decision point. You

were supposed to make a

decision back there, OK.”
150

platoon. I need to get the Foxs forward to do a chem recon. I need to

move the artillery out of harms way because they’ve been sitting there

a while. 

We do a decent job of insuring intent is understood. We brief the

order as close as possible to where we are going to fight. Right after

that we do a confirmation brief. Each of the commanders gets up on

the map and states what the brigade commander wants us to do. We

discuss task organization, mission, and task/purpose. “You want me

to attack along this axis. You want me to reserve combat power. You

want me to get here. I want to have at least three company teams at

the conclusion of this fight so I can satisfy the follow on intent.”

Everybody briefs maneuver and support. What I think we did very

well was we had all our liaison officers station themselves at the

brigade TOC. So as information came out, they called or came back

to their TOCs with the advance copy of the next order. And then we’d

start the wargamming piece. So, when we got the actual order it was

just fine tuning. 

And the brigade commander was great about going around to each

one of the TOCs and telling our TOCs how he saw the coming fight.

We’d give him a back brief. He got out and made sure it’s clear in

everybody's mind what was expected. We didn’t have to send a lot of

messages back to brigade asking questions. There were some RFIs to

brigade but as we went along in the exercise the list got smaller

because we knew how the brigade commander fights. The last op

wasn’t perfect, but by the time we finished up, we all understood.

And the AAR process was a good one. Everybody got in there and

we all came clear. So we knew how we missed the mark on the

targeting. We got to the point where we were really together.

47. Washboard Attack

Deliberate attack, force on force was in the Washboard area. 1-9's

objective was around Crash Hill area. The Geronimos were going to

hit objective Matterhorn right in the middle and we were going to go

south. We actually did this mission twice. We started out in our

formation, moved out of tactical assembly area. We’re cross-talking

and it’s going pretty well. We get into the Washboard and it becomes

one of those things where I want to go west, but I'm having to go

north, and then south now because of the terrain, so it’s slowing me

down. As far as seeing ourselves we got too spaced out in our
Lieutenant Colonel Johns

151

movement. At a certain point on the ground, I should have said

change to a different movement rate because we were going into the

Washboard. How many folks manuever down in that area? We

found ourselves getting separated. 

We were hearing pretty good situation reports from what is

happening center and north. 501st and 1-9 are talking to each other.

“I've got elements forward on this grid, continue to push.” Or, “I have

contact, I can handle it with indirect/direct fire.” “I am maneuvering

my Alpha team.” And the brigade did pretty well. In our sector, in

the south, it turned into a platoon and section fight. So, the first

company got in. The remaining companies were spread out. They

were trying to not stay too closed up because of the terrain. They

didn't want to get bundled up. Well, the lead element got into the

wadi system and started to fight and I couldn't bring enough combat

power forward to bear on the enemy as the fight started. We did

pretty well in terms of attriting the enemy, but we just didn't bring the

combat power forward. We had platoons and sections fighting that

fight. It really wasn’t a company fight. 

We recock. This time we are going to go a little further south and

really hit that South Wall and maneuver with tanks. Just get the tanks

up high. Then also use the low ground, bring our infantry forward,

perhaps dismounted if needed, and then attack the enemy. Cross-talk

DEBNAM

PASS

BROWN

PASS

ALPINE PASS

CRASH

HILL

( - )

COLORADO

3-8

1-9 1-501

NELSON

LAKE

Figure 17. 3-8 CAV Attacks through the Washboard.
152

is important. Not only within the battalion, but across the brigade

because it was a coordinated effort. Hit them all at one time. 1-9 hits

north, the Geronimos hit center, and I hit south. 

The second time around in terms of maneuver, we did quite well.

They were not expecting me to maneuver the tanks as far up on the

South Wall as we did. I had tanks way up on the wall. They told us

later on they just weren't expecting us. Normally tankers want to ride

low ground. They may see the AT flashes but they continue to move.

This time I was actually hitting the flanks of the guys in the AT

positions because we were that high up on the wall. We were able to

effectively bring all the combat forces to bear. I had a company/team

that was south in my sector on the wall, I had one center, and I had

one in the north just tied in with the Geronimos, 1-501 Infantry

Battalion. We moved along and we were pretty successful in driving

the enemy force off the objective and pushing them, causing them to

reposition toward the Crash Hill area where they were taken under

fire by 1-9. 

Why successful? I think because we saw the terrain a little better

the second time as well as where we needed to maneuver and where

we needed to be positioned to effect fires on them. Seeing ourselves,

tightening up the formation. I changed the organization in terms of

putting some infantry forces in the center tied in with the Geronimos

rather than just in the south. Then in the terms of seeing the enemy,

we kind of knew what the set was going to be, where he didn't want

us to go. We had an idea he didn't expect us to come so far south, the

Washboard, and we were correct. So, we thought about how he would

array himself. As it turned out, he pushed more forces to the south

this time to take us on, because initially he had pushed north into 1-9's

zone. We were thinking he would not expect us to come so far south

and that his orientation would be northeast rather than semi-south so

we wanted to come in to the rear of him. We were pretty much able to

do that, higher terrain, so that worked for us.

Another thing, the relationship that we enjoy with the OCs was

good. We dialoged well. We want to learn as much as we can during

training. We stopped and did the mission over. He asked what are you

going to do differently. We got the S2, S3, fire support, and engineer

involved. Everybody got into the fight and it was more of a

coordinated effort. As a result of that coordination, I was able to

synchronize all the battlefield operating systems in order to bring the

fire power to bear at the critical time. It worked. 
Lieutenant Colonel Johns

153

48. Moving Cautiously to Contact

Movement to contact took me further east. I was moving from east

to west towards 876 but I had the same problems. 1-9 was supposed

to come forward and gain contact with the FSE, destroy them and the

advance guard, and then I was going to hit the main body. I played a

key role in the brigade fight as far as he starts the fight and I finish it.

The way they came at us is they split the seam between us and hit us

simultaneously. 

I started out in my formation and as I started to move, my lead

element got forward of my trail elements. I was moving in a modified

box formation. So I had two companies, the lead and the trail company,

and then tucked in the center I had the mortars, my engineers, and

command and control element. So, we started moving forward. My

advance guard company, Charlie Company, moved ten kilometers

forward of the next element. 

This is our first mission. So we are just trying to figure out where

we are, the terrain association, the movement technique and rates.

We had just gotten on the ground, feeling out the terrain. In the CCTT

we had fought in NTC terrain but for the actual maneuver train-up we

of course fought on Fort Hood lanes. You have to get reoriented with

the ground. And a lot of folks will be new to NTC. And at Fort Hood

of course the distance is limited; at NTC you see 5-7 kilometers

depending on where you are. That’s a hard piece because the terrain

association and distance are different. Recognizing a target, even

through a tank sight, and determining if they are at a distance they can

engage or call direct is difficult.

We started moving forward and we got separated. Charlie got

contact at the South Wall short of 780 to the east. Contact from AT

weapons systems started to atrit him. By the time he got up towards

876, he was pretty much gone as far as combat power. As the

command and control piece of that, yours truly tucked in behind the

advance guard company and pushed forward. I got a call on the radio.

“Mustang Six, are you the lead element in your task force?” It was

Zero-Six. “Well, negative.” Come to find out, I was one of the only

surviving tanks forward with the advance guard company. They had

moved so fast, so far forward, they got attrited. The only ones left

were myself, the XO, and I think two other tanks. A combination of

indirect fire and AT weapons systems just picked them off.
154

They just kept moving. They’d see the smoke signature and

flashes coming from the south but they just kept moving. Before you

know it, it’s a tank gone, a Bradley gone, another tank gone and he

gets there and is set at a check point but he has no combat power. I

had him set and approximately 15 kilometers behind him is the

remainder of the task force. And the enemy is closing in and they’re

trying to gain that ground so they have that bowl to fire the long range

and indirect fires. 

We started moving forward and what happened was I got two more

companies set, Racetrack area and south along the main avenue of the

approach coming through there. They were set. The enemy came in and

started to move to the north, to try to run the North Wall at the

Racetrack area. As it turned out, they penetrated with greater than a

company and we got attrited in the area. We were not able to maintain

momentum, move my advance guard companies forward to gain

contact, and then maneuver the remainder of the task force on the

enemy force. I didn't set the conditions to gain the key terrain that I

needed, while at the same time attriting the enemy that had flank

protection provided by the AT fires and indirect. 

Early on in the fight, I kept getting SITREPs from the elements

about where the enemy was and I saw that I was slowly starting to get

BRIGADE

HILL

IRON

TRIANGLE

BROWN

PASS

OBJ

TEXAS DEBNAM

PASS

876

780

COLORADO 1-9

3-8 C

GRANITE

PASS

RACETRACK

WASHBOARD

910

Figure 18. 3-8 Movement to Contact -- Central Corridor.
Lieutenant Colonel Johns

155

this gap in forces. Panic strikes and you say, “I want you to move as

quickly as possible to checkpoint 51, Delta on to checkpoint 41.” The

first fight, everybody is just very concerned with 360 degree security.

Everybody is moving to

watch they are making

checkpoints on time.

They’re not moving to

the sound of the guns,

just creeping along

watching for those checkpoints. And I need them up there now, and

with a sense of urgency. We just didn’t get to that. We tried to play

catch-up and the enemy was faster on the draw than we were, got to the

key terrain faster, and I couldn't recover. 

So the recovery was really the reaction to the majority of his force

coming forward and capturing that key terrain. We tried to get up

there and establish a hasty defense and stop it. At that point, it wasn't

movement to contact. It was a hasty defense and trying to defend

what we had. It wasn't a matter of the battle staff not providing the

information. It was me recognizing that to start out in the eastern

portion of the zone we needed to move a little bit more quickly to get

to a certain grid line, north-south. There, I could have moved quickly

because I know contact is unlikely. So the entire task force should

have moved out. And then I would have pushed forward my advance

guard and continued to creep forward with the remainder of my task

force. He gains contact, he sets the conditions, he fixes, and then I am

“They’re not moving to the sound

of the guns, just creeping along

watching for those checkpoints.”
156

able to maneuver to the south, north or both to destroy that enemy

force. I was never able to do that. What happened was instead of this

we got attrited and pulled forward to establish positions to stop the

enemy.

One of the things that limited us was communication. We used

retrans. The first fight we lost contact because I didn't push a retrans

forward knowing that at a certain point on the battlefield that the

scouts lose comms with us. We didn't foresee that. So, I didn't push

the retrans forward soon enough. It was like trying to get a SITREP.

“Where are they.” Before you know it, they are attrited but you find

that out as you move closer and gain contact. We understood what we

needed to do, but we lost control of it quickly because of the comms.

I knew I had to tuck everybody in. I understood I have to maintain

flank and rear security and I have the advance guard forward. I

realized after we regained contact that we had not satisfied those

conditions, so we need to fix it now. We were being reactive rather

than proactive.

In the TOC, as far as the command and control, reports going to

higher were pretty accurate. We got better as we went along. The XO

was serving as my TOCmeister even when he wasn't there. My S3

Air, battle captain, was able to assess the situation based on the

situation reports we got in from company team commanders and then

take that information and put it together and send it to brigade. I think

we did that pretty well. 

Where we had a failing was the cross-talk between battalions. So, I

have my fight going on but what are the recommendations I need to

make to the brigade commander in term of what I am seeing in the south

or in the north. And am I conveying that to my brother battalion

commanders so they understand what I see in the south and what effect

it may have on the operation. For example, in this operation, 1-9 was

supposed to hit first, then I was coming and providing the punch for the

main body. Well if he knew that my forces were separated and that my

lead element had been attrited, then that may have caused him to move a

little further south with some of his forces covering the flank until I

could move forward. 

We weren't cross-talking as much as we should have with the other

battalions and telling them the situation we had. It was kind of like I'm

fighting my own fight, tunnel vision. And too late I'm telling them what

he may want to do. That first fight we were fighting our own fight rather
Lieutenant Colonel Johns

157

than visualizing what our part of the fight means and how important it is

to the overall brigade plan. We got better at that as things went along. 

All of these were learning experiences, some quite humbling. And

they forced us to take a good hard look at ourselves and how we see the

fight developing. You have to be able to visualize on the map and in

your mind how you want to see the fight develop. Otherwise, it just

becomes a happening rather than something that is planned. At the

battalion level I have to

look at the worst case

scenario for me, and

how to guard against

that worst case scenario

given the assets I have.

I can ask for more but I

may not get it. So,

given the worst case scenario, here is how I want shape my portion of

the battlefield. If it’s a defense, here’s where I want to kill them. Here’s

were I want the stand-off in terms of weapons systems. Here’s were I

want to engage him. Here’s were I want the indirect and direct fires to

come to bear on him, because that’s where I want to kill him. On the

offense, the question is, what gives me the marked advantage over him

in terms of time and space. I look at parts of the battlefield and decide

how I want to fight at each of those points were the enemy may be.

How do I want to fight each piece of the battlefield. You have to be able

to see yourself and the terrain at all these different phases. And then we

have to be able to constantly make an assessment, a running estimate, of

where we are, where the enemy is, how we’re doing as far as planning

goes. Because sometimes you go off plan right away. Why would you

fight the plan when it’s not working? If he’s already behind you, why

are you fighting the plan?

“You have to be able to

visualize...how you want to see the

fight develop. Otherwise, it just

becomes a happening rather than

something that is planned.”

LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEPHEN MITCHELL, 1998

49. FASCAM Kills

The first situation was a force on force defensive mission in

Brown Pass. We had a couple of days to prepare for it. The weather

was really bad; it was extremely foggy and visibility was really low.

We had planned a FASCAM minefield that we were going to shoot

into Brown Pass. When we shot the FASCAM minefield in, it would

slow them down in the pass. I then had artillery targets planned

behind the FASCAM minefield with MLRS and cannons to hit the

OPFOR when they got caught in the FASCAM. We had a couple of

observers who we put into position so we could see the targets and

see the minefields so they could tell us when it happened. 

The weather went so bad that the FA observers couldn't see the

minefield. They couldn’t see the targets. So the brigade commander

and I started talking about whether we need to shoot this minefield in

or not because it wouldn’t do what we want it to do. And, I was

thinking I sure would like to be the attacker today, this is great

weather to attack in. But then I got to thinking too about how poor

the visibility was in that pass and I thought that if we shot this thing in

we might get lucky because the enemy is going to have as hard a time

seeing as my observer is. We were trying to see the battlefield from

the enemy's point of view. 

We shot the FASCAM minefield in. I kept asking the observer,

could he see anything, could he see anything. He couldn’t see

anything. He heard vehicles coming through the passes, he heard

them stop, he couldn't give me any kind of account of what was going

on. I shot the artillery targets in because I thought they might be in the

vicinity of them. The conditions weren’t set the way I wanted them to

be set, but we went ahead and did it anyway.

"...I got to thinking... about how poor the visibility was

in that pass and I thought that if we shot this thing in,

we might get lucky because the enemy is going to have

as hard a time seeing as my observer is."
160

During the AAR outbrief from the battle, the OPFOR

commander came up and he started showing us what happened. His

guys had sent their recon through that pass and of course there wasn't

anything there then. After recon went through, we had fired in the

FASCAM so the forward security element had no idea it was there. It

was super foggy and they ran into the minefield, didn't realize where

they got in it or where "out of it" was, and ended up losing their entire

forward security element in the FASCAM minefield. They then

pulled out and went down and changed their plan of attack and came

through the southern passes. This was what we wanted them to do in

the first place. Our defense was the strongest in the south. So, that

was a decision that turned out very well. And we ended up with a

decisive NTC victory.

It was fairly decisive there and also in the south. They rolled into

our strength where we had 3-8 Armor. When they came in there, we

had all our engagement areas set up. We took out the rest of the

OPFOR down there, so it was a great day for the 3rd Brigade. I chose

that one because visualizing the battlefield was key to that decision in

trying to see the enemy. We didn't have the conditions set that we

wanted. It wasn’t the way

we had actually visualized

the fight would go, because

the weather wasn’t what it

normally is at the NTC,

extremely clear and you can

see forever. But I tried to

visualize the battlefield

from the enemy’s

perspective and how he was going to roll through that pass and not be

able to see anything. Typically we don't fire the FASCAM in for the

FASCAM to do the killing, we fire it in to slow them down so we can

"Visualizing the battlefield was

key... from the enemy’s

perspective... he was going to

roll through that pass and not

be able to see anything."
Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell

161

do the killing with direct and indirect fire systems. In this case, under

those weather conditions, the FASCAM was actually the system that

did the killing. 

The other decision going on during this mission was, if you shoot

the FASCAM minefield you are going to tie your guns up for about

30 minutes. Firing it in at that time of day was a risk because we

couldn't see the enemy so we don’t know his timetable. If he was

coming in to us earlier, he might have been coming in and my guns

were tied up shooting the FASCAM minefield behind him, as

opposed to being ready to shoot the killing munitions on top of him.

So that was part of the way that decision was made. Do we want to tie

the guns up for 30 minutes for something that may or may not have

an effect? That was one of the reasons for possibly not shooting.

Also, the enemy has the capability of ARK-1 Radar at the National

Training Center. So, when you’re shooting the FASCAM minefield

in, the enemy has the ability to pick up our guns on radar, then they

can shoot counterbattery on top of them. So if you’re shooting for a

long period, you have your guns at some risk if the enemy has the

radar in his artillery and range. We were not sure, because of the fog,

exactly where they were positioned, even though we had guys we had

successfully put on the battlefield who would have been able to see if

it was clear weather. There were some unknowns in there. There

were lots of unknowns but we went ahead and did it because we

really felt it was early enough in the fight that even though we

thought the CRPs, combat reconnaissance patrols, had already come

through, we thought the FSE hadn't gotten through the pass yet. That

FSE is what we really wanted to stop and kill. As it turned out, that is

exactly what happened. 

50. Trusting Your “Eyes”

A later decision wasn’t a good decision. It was my decision, so I

figure if I want to talk about a decision, I’ll talk about mine. It was a

live fire defense. As some background, before I took command of the

battalion, I was an observer-controller at the NTC. I was training

guys coming through there for about 16 rotations. One of the

observations I made, that was somewhat of a trend, is that

FSCOORDs would not believe their eyes, their FA observers. Their

observers would report accurate information to them, would want to

shoot missions that would kill the enemy. And typically the
162

FSCOORD or brigade commander would think they understood the

battle better than their eyes did,

wouldn't believe them and would

do something else. So, I made a

vow to myself I would never do

that. 

And then, there we were... It

was the last training day, the last fight. We’d stood up the

engagement areas and we had our targets out and a target array was

coming up on us. The brigade commander and I were together in a

track and we had a pretty good view of the fight. Although not a

perfect view, we could see it. I was fairly experienced with the

terrain and had a high level of confidence in myself in terms of timing

and how to kill those guys. 

The OPFOR was coming in, first north, then the south, because we

had slowed them down north with some FASCAM and some wellplaced artillery triggers that worked exactly like we wanted them to in

the north. They came in through the south and we fired those targets.

And, I thought my observer in the south was not calling in his targets

soon enough. He had a chance to catch them out deep and he didn't do

it. They were coming in and I thought he could catch them again if

he’d catch them in close. What he did though, he didn't call a deep

target in, then he called

in the real close target. I

was off watching the

battlefield, and although

I couldn't see it as clearly

as he could from where

he was, I decided that he

was wrong and so I overrode him on the radio and instead called in a

target that was a little bit farther out. 

Well, when you play back the AAR tapes, and I hate these things

‘cause they always tell the truth, what it showed was that as the

enemy marched in there, they hit part of the target where he missed it,

that's true. Then I went ahead and called the middle one, but by the

time I got that called in, they were really coming past the middle one.

And if I had shot the target he told me he wanted to shoot, they had

hit an obstacle there and they were slowed down. That's where just

about the entire enemy array was. And it would have hammered. As it

was, because I overrode him and thought I knew better, the target we

"I decided that he was wrong and

so I overrode him on the radio

and instead called in a target that

was a little bit farther out."

"...I made a vow to myself I

would never do that. And

then, there we were..."
Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell

163

shot went in behind them. So, that’s why I’d said I would never do

that but now I had. So, from a battle command point of view, I’d say

it was a failure to see myself as well as I should have. Because I

really had a high degree of confidence in that young captain’s abilities

and he had the better view of the battlefield. Really, in my opinion it

was a great deal of arrogance on my part to override him and say I

know better. If I had to do that over again, I would have trusted my

subordinate, shot where he wanted to shoot, and we would have had a

much more successful fight on that particular defense. 

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOE MOORE, 1998

51. Fighting Digital, Fighting Analog

In the Warfighter exercise we were well forward, performing,

effectively, a guard mission for the division. Division is marching

east to west into zone near Bamberg and Nurnberg, Germany. So the

CAV’s all out by itself, for the most part. But my air arm was flying

well to my front, a lot more than it can in the current Kiowa air

frames we have today, literally fifty plus kilometers forward of my

ground assets. Plus, in my TOC I have access to the JSTARS

imagery coming in and I have access to the ASAS and all the enemy

intel that comes in off of it. But the key for me, sitting that far out, is

the JSTARS. 

We were in a defensive posture so the enemy had to come to me.

Which meant he created moving target indicators, which is what

JSTARS tracks. What JSTARS did, and what ASAS helped with,

was, it gave me an enormous view of the big picture. I could see from

Frankfurt to Stuttgart. I could see every single moving thing trying to

come at me. And I could see it at about 200 kilometers to my front

and then right into my face. And then with my helicopters I would fly

out and confirm what those things were. This one is tanks, this one’s

BMPs, this one’s artillery, this one’s just trucks. And I could

determine relative danger and threat and then start using the long

range weapons to take the most dangerous of those and start hurting

them early, attriting them early. 

What that allowed me to do is, I then took advantage of that kind

of information and scattered my three ground troops with absolutely

incredible dispersion. Dispersion that would be (it wouldn't be risk

taking) it would be a true gamble in the current technology without

that kind of awareness. So I had one guy way up in Wurzburg and

he’s the northern most and then way down south, literally forty

kilometers away, fifty kilometers away, is the next troop, actually the

next two troops. And they were protecting an artillery grouping that

was supporting us, an MLRS battalion, a cannon battalion and some

other stuff.

They were also protecting the FARPs, where we get gas and bullets

for our helicopters. So they’re set way over here and they’ve got mutual
166

support and all those things you want to have. But they are in a protectkey-resources posture. And I had this one avenue of approach, the

autobahn that goes through Wurzburg. Well to the north I needed to

cover, block, slow potential enemy, particularly enemy recon that was

coming through. And that was really their mission, to deal with

reconnaissance, individual vehicles. I was going to let arty and air,

helicopters, deal with the big guys. 

Well, as the battle unfolded, we were controlling the tempo of the

fight fairly well and I could see it. We had a very large formation

coming straight at us that we had eliminated a good chunk of. But right

behind it was another large formation. It looked like it was tracking

along the same line of march which was directly toward those two

troops in the south. And there was a large engagement area set up to

the front of these two troops where they were going to hold the enemy

in while we beat the daylights out of them with every other weapon in

the arsenal. Which is what we had done to the lead guy as he had come

through. 

Well, that was when JSTARS went down - literally zzzppp -

went off the net. We lost them because of a problem inside my TOC.

One of those electron things happened and we had a corrupt file and

the machine crashes - it locks up.

It crashes so hard, the guy had to

use his networking capability to go

in and get noncorrupt files off

someone else’s machine and reload

his entire hard drive. It took about

an hour to move that much data back into our files, reboot the

machine and come back on line. 

Well, in that hour, I also happened to lose two of my aircraft

because the sun had come up. We had gone from a night condition to

a day condition. And when you go to day, the aircrafts’ vulnerability

to ground fire goes up dramatically because the enemy can suddenly

see. And in that transition I immediately lost two aircraft. So, I

called all my aircraft back into the over-the-shoulder mode, where

they fly in friendly airspace and they avoid enemy ADA. 

We were trying to develop a picture of where the enemy ADA

was so I could get my air back out again. And in fact, about the time

JSTARS came back on line, we had developed a route to get them

back across our front line; back into enemy territory to do their

mission of keeping me informed, in that next twenty to fifty

"That was when JSTARS

went down - literally

zzzppp - went off the net."
Lieutenant Colonel Moore

167

kilometers, of who is coming at us. Well, in that hour I lose my

aircraft and I lose the JSTARS link. And while ASAS was up and

running, it wasn’t enough. And honestly, we weren’t trained to

exploit all the advantages. 

So, we suddenly were very analog, a normal CAV squadron with

a CAV troop stuck way out all by itself, unsupported. And in that

time, that enemy

trail guy didn’t

follow. He peeled

off. He said, “I’m

not going there,

those guys have

been destroyed.

I’m going to go this other route.” And that other route was right

through Wurzburg on the autobahn and right into my CAV troop.

And when we looked up my gut said, “This is dumb. We don’t have

mutual support. We’re blind to our front. We’re just like we would

be if we were a so-called normal CAV squadron in broad daylight.

We’ve got to start getting mutual support.” And right off the bat, I

started moving my southern troops to the north. But they had a lot of

ground to cover. The dumb move I made was I didn’t order the

troops in the north to disengage, fall back across the river that they

were using as a shield, and move to link up with us. Instead they held

in place while we moved to them because up to that point they had

not had any really significant combat. 

I had made the move for the guys in the south to start moving

north to try to link up with them almost immediately after we lost

JSTARS. Immediately I knew... this was bad and I needed to get

mutual support. Say, that was right at the same moment. It was at

least 45 minutes later before it clicked that I needed to get Alpha

troop out of there. I still had no indication that the enemy had

continued its route of march and by now I should have been in contact

with them down south. I wasn’t in contact with them down south.

The battles in the south had just kind of petered out and ground to a

halt. And the enemy had to be somewhere. And somewhere meant

probably moving toward A troop. 

So, 45 minutes later I ordered them to disengage and it was

literally minutes later that the melee began up there and they ended up

fighting with a single company size unit. They fought an entire

regiment of the OPFOR. And you just don’t do that unsupported by

"We don’t have mutual support. We’re

blind to our front. We’re just like we

would be if we were a so-called normal

CAV squadron in broad daylight."
168

artillery, unsupported by air, or any other resources. And in about ten

minutes they evaporated, just went away. I lost the entire troop. 

Later, this circumstance would be repeated with my Charlie

Troop with two big differences. My air was flying and available to

me and I had JSTARS, and I saw the situation coming. And because

of a critical resource that was vulnerable - I had a slow-moving

artillery unit that was directly in the line of march of this enemy tank

regiment - I purposely put my Charlie Troop in the way to block that

tank regiment so it would not get to the artillery unit. But this time I

had three MLRS battalions in support. I had alerted and scrambled all

my available Comanches, so I had six of them on station, all loaded

with Hellfires ready to do their thing. At the moment of contact, all

that came to bear on the enemy regiment. Because we could see the

regiment coming. We could set it up and launch one aircraft out to

strip away this guy’s ADA early. So we flew, effectively, immune to

his air defense the entire time. And we destroyed that tank regiment

and I lost one tank. 

To me it was the night and day difference between when you

have good eyes deep, forward, JSTARS, and all this other stuff.

When you add enemy situational awareness to friendly knowledge,

then it's not risk taking to put a single troop in harm’s way against a

regiment. Not if you know you can

bring all this other stuff to bear. But,

when I went analog, where now I

can’t see the enemy well enough to

target three MLRS battalions, even if

I had had them (MLRS) in support, I

couldn’t have given them sufficient

targets to shoot at to make them

truly useful. 

All I could see was the guy I was

fighting to my direct front in A Troop. And behind that, and to the

flanks of that are larger formations that are all closing. It was just

unbelievable to see that with one circumstance I lose an entire troop and

inflict minimal casualties on the enemy and with the other we absolutely

slaughter an entire tank regiment and I lose a single tank in the

exchange. And that artillery unit, that was such a slow mover, got away

just fine.

The same kind of fight. Same isolated, no mutual support, all

that other stuff. But difference was, the second time... one, we were

"When you add enemy

situational awareness to

friendly knowledge, then

it's not risk taking to put

a single troop in harm’s

way against a regiment."
Lieutenant Colonel Moore

169

ready and had the time to see it coming and we set out ready to handle

the situation, and two, we dealt with it vigorously. I could not do that

during the first incident. And what I came away with was - if I ever

go analog again, if I ever lose my deep eyes, I lose my ability to fly,

then I need to return to the analog tactics of good mutual support, get

the squadron together so it can defend itself, and my risk taking has to

be moderated - a lot. Because now it is a gamble. I’ve got a guy who

is 40K from his brothers and no way to help him out, and that’s too

far away for even some of the artillery systems to range. That’s a

gamble, not a risk, when you can’t see the enemy with pretty good

fidelity.

It’s something I had never experienced before, because I’ve gone

my whole army career with a so-called analog life, where you see the

enemy to your front and you might see the dust cloud of someone

closing. And there’s a lot of ambiguity in the situation, so things like

mass and mutual support and maintaining those at all times becomes a

watch word, particularly in the armored community. But we don’t

like to move unless the entire task force can bring to bear its direct

fire systems pretty rapidly. 

In the world of AWE, it’s not even risk taking. If you can see

the enemy, you can exploit the added advantages. You can see bad

situations develop if you are staying alert to it and watching for it.

And that gives you time to go back to the old way. And if you need

mass, then mass. But if you don’t need mass, you can exploit the

advantage sometimes though dispersion and you reduce your risk to

enemy artillery or air or whatever. 

I know we confused the enemy the entire exercise because we

didn’t operate normally, doctrinally, given the digital assets. The

CAV alone might be strung out over frontages normally a division

wouldn’t cover. So to me it was an interesting observation that as

you go digital, at the same time, we need to remember what it is like

to fight analog, and fight blind. So that when it occurs, and you are

suddenly blind, you immediately return to the principles that you

grew up with. In my case I grew up with that, but today our youth

might grow up in an environment where they are used to tremendous

awareness of themselves and of the enemy. If either one of those two

- either awareness of yourself or awareness of the enemy - suddenly

evaporates, then there has got to be a very firm set of procedures they

are supposed to do when that occurs so they can reestablish that

awareness of themselves and the enemy, whichever one was lost. 
170

And that was the piece I came away with. There is an SOP in my

TOC now. If we lose that kind of awareness then, say, do the

following three things. Bring all maneuver units closer together.

Launch additional aircraft to establish some security for whoever is

the guy left out. Get all of our systems, get all of our units under

control and in support of each other in case something bad should

happen during the time frame we are blind. More like a normal unit. 

52. Hounds From Hell Racing Across

Germany

I’ve been living with the AWE now right on three years. And I’ve

been convinced from the very beginning that that kind of awareness,

if boldly exercised, allows you to do things differently, grossly

differently. The principles are probably all being applied, but we are

now in an era where we

don’t have to mass until

we really need to and we

can see it and pick the

point we want to do that.

And if we want to avoid

contact, we can do that too. We can definitely fight a different kind

of battle. And I have spent every exercise I have been in with 4ID

trying to do that differently. I have strung CAV squadrons out that

would just plain be stupid anywhere else. It could not be done. 

I am not even certain it could be done in real life with the current

training of our leaders - not the soldiers - the leaders, because of the

isolation they would feel. That troop sitting in Wurzburg with the

nearest buddy 40 kilometers away would have to feel like he is really

in a hurt up there. Because in his tank, that troop commander can’t

see the things I can see and there would have to be a tremendous

amount of trust involved. Probably Rommel and his subordinates in

North Africa come closest to that kind of completely isolated view of

the battlefield. Where an entire column would take off into the desert

to go either get their supplies, or whatever, but with no earthly idea

where the Brits were or anything else. Just tremendous confidence in

themselves and the guy on their left, front, right, rear, and supplies.

Everybody knew what they were doing and it would work out OK.

That is kind of what is happening here except now at my level, a little

ol’ LTC. Theoretically if I had all these toys in a vehicle moving

"Awareness, if boldly exercised,

allows you to do things

differently, grossly differently"
Lieutenant Colonel Moore

171

across the desert, I can see stuff that has never been available to a

LTC in history much less to O-6’s and generals and everybody else. I

can actually employ my formation in a truly bold and audacious

manner, and not be gambling when I do it, actually knowing exactly

what I am going to do. 

Which kind of leads to my observation just from AWE, which

may or not be applicable. In the exercise, we would get the

opportunity to exploit an attack that had been successful and had

destroyed the lead echelon. We went charging into the rear, and I was

leading the way and was not aware the brigades were moving so

slowly to my rear, just because I was not focusing on it. I had the

blue situational awareness, I just wasn’t paying attention. And while

we were at it, we found out we had actually outrun the MLRS

coverage, our longest shooter. That longest shooter could not even

shoot my TOC or my combat trains, much less, my front line trace.

We had gotten that far out. 

So the ADC calls me up, “Come to a halt, back up, you’re too far

out, you’re over extended,” and on and on. And then I realized, yeah,

I was way the heck out. But first, I had my own artillery unit traveling

with me and then, I had my air arm up because it was night and we

had full rein on the battlefield, JSTARS was working fine. I realized

I had not painted a good enough picture of just how successful our

attack had been. That I, as a little squadron, had wandered through

this entire combined arms army with literally no contact other than

trucks, which we had slaughtered as we went by. And we were doing

it at almost road march speed which was why we had outrun

everybody. 

Then I explained the situation to him and immediately began

asking permission. Let me go, let me go all the way to Heilbronn,

which was another 70

or 80 kilometers from

where we were at the

time. I know I will

outrun all the fires but

they can catch up,

because right now is

the opportunity. I’ve

already sent helicopters out and Heilbronn has enemy. They aren’t

expecting us. They’re not postured for us. They only have ADA on

our side of the river, which we can knock out. And we can deliver

"...for a brief period there, you

could get a feel for what Patton

must have felt like, screaming

across France because everything

we ran into we just slaughtered. "
172

this MLRS unit that was with me close enough to really hurt these

guys while they are not ready. And the CG got involved and the

decision was made fairly quickly, inside of thirty minutes, to let me

go. Oh, by the way, 3rd Brigade was going a different direction, head

south and follow, and keep up as best you can. So, a hounds from

hell kind of race across Germany began, and for a brief period there,

you could get a feel for what Patton must have felt like, screaming

across France because everything we ran into we just slaughtered. I

had my air; this time I’m not depending on the Air Force. It's my air

flying flank security and running my route before I had to run it. So

if they wandered in and did make contact with the BMPs, whatever,

they just took them out for us - just like the 9th Air Force did for

Patton. This time though, it's an organic element. 

And we went charging down there and slammed into the

Heilbronn Bridge and in fact got the MLRS in range to fire in support

of an Apache attack over the river just twenty minutes of when the

Apaches were on station. It was that closely timed, that as we got

there, got within range, set the MLRS, and started shooting missions,

fifteen minutes later, here come the Apaches. Waves...two battalions

came flying in. And what we would find out later was the whole

division of the OPFOR would effectively die in the MLRS, Apache,

Comanche, and CAS strikes that we would control for the next two

hours. In the end, we killed so much stuff that we won the foot race

to the bridge. We in fact seized the autobahn bridge that goes across

the Neckar River. Well, we ended up dropping it into the water. That

was one of our last acts. 

But we didn’t cross it, and the CG didn’t want us to. He just

wanted us to get control of the thing so they couldn’t use it coming

back at us, because we were in fact strung out. The division was

actually moving forward in order to set a defense. And we ended up

just getting there first, winning the foot race, got control of the bridge,

dropped it in the water. And we did all that because we were able to

kill all the guys who were guarding the bridge previously, with all

these strikes. 

At the time we thought we had killed a regiment. In fact, in the

AAR, we found out we killed the OPFOR division and hurt another

division in the process. And I ended up losing absolutely nothing.

Interestingly, the enemy had occupied the area while JSTARS was

unable to watch it. The way that JSTARS was set up was that it was

still trying to support an overall battle that was occurring in Nürnberg. 
Lieutenant Colonel Moore

173

So, its range limitation petered out just short of Heilbronn. I could

see up to within 15K of Heilbronn, reliably, courtesy of JSTARS. I

could not see the Neckar River or Heilbronn itself. And I sure enough

couldn’t see the approach. And no one else could either. I ended up

flying my own helicopters out. 

So, I had a very localized picture, of what it was like in and around

the one massive bridge and all the small bridges that are in the town

there. And our vehicle count had it up to a reinforced regiment. I’m

not sure exactly why, it literally could be a blunder in my own TOC,

or it could be just a function of the way the pilots would identify

enemy in real life. And CBS did an OK job of replicating that. We

literally thought the pilots were looking at the same thing when they

reported because the bridges were so close together. When in fact,

they were probably seeing different formations in the urban

environment in Heilbronn and the wooded countryside on either side.

And we’d get a report of 16 tanks in grid 123456... and we’d get

another report of ten tanks in grid 123457 and we attributed it to

being the same group of tanks, a confirmation. In reality it was two

different sets of tanks and the concentrations were far larger. Since

we had nothing else, these were all stationary, very low hits, in the

way of JSTARS. And then you don’t get very good BDA, which is

probably a little unrealistic considering the Apaches and Comanches;

those pilots love to report their BDA. And they have a TV tape that

tells you exactly what they did or didn’t do, so getting BDA off of

helicopter is actually pretty easy, but it's not inside the simulation. So

we had a hard time estimating our successes until we showed up with

the rest of the squadron. 

I would end up taking no casualties getting there, lost two aircraft

in the battle surrounding the bridges themselves. Later, the enemy

would counterattack us and we would have to rearguard for the division

as it set up its defense. I would lose about a troop and change in ground

combat power just fighting to control the bridge long enough to put it

down in the water. We ended up dropping, I’d say, five or six bridges

total, and ended up taking down most of another regiment’s combat

power as we tried to disengage ourselves from the Heilbronn area.

The result was we were able to set a defense where the CG wanted to

set a defense; and we were able to do a great deal of damage to a guy

who had every intention of attacking us 24 hours later. But now he

can’t because two of his divisions have been mauled very badly. In my
174

view, the opportunity to do that was again a function of awareness that

does not exist in normal units and in the willingness to grab it and use it. 

The fact that we didn’t see the perfect picture, all the way out

technically to infinity, is the reality. We saw the local picture

extremely well and then there was just enough of an image that we

felt we had an opportunity. And I think it was a valid opportunity.

We knew the thing was defended. We knew it was defended in

strength. The fact it was defended in such great strength was

something of a surprise. But at least, on the near side, I knew in

detail what was across the Neckar River and I could handle all of that,

and did handle all of that. It was the other side of the river that was

an unknown. But the son-of-a-gun has to get across that river if he

wants to take me out. In my case there is a boldness, this kind of an

awareness, making me comfortable with it. And not everybody is.

There are a lot of people who are finding it hard to be that confident

in what they are seeing and to go act on it. 

They said in the AAR they were flabbergasted by the boldness. It

was kind of humorous. The OPFOR commander during the AAR

said he was in the middle of a shift change briefing when the word

came in that we were attacking instead of setting a defense. But he

had been convinced from the reads he was getting that we were

moving to a defense. And in fact, he was correct at the moment they

had had the read. We had all gone stationary. I was the only guy

who had any interest in moving other than the 3rd Brigade

commander. But we had both run out of gas and had to do a

refueling. And we had halted to refuel. So the OPFOR had

misunderstood that our halt and 3rd Brigade’s halt had to do with gas,

and the fact that we had to bring fuel forward and pump the tanks

before we could sprint. It took me about 45 minutes to fuel up. It

took them about an hour. Everyone else was in a defensive posture.

They were getting instructions to shift to the offense but they too

were getting all these supplies ready for this march across Germany. 

And so, that picture the OPFOR commander had was momentarily

accurate and thirty minutes to an hour later here comes 4th ID en

“...two of his divisions have been mauled very badly.

...that was again a function of awareness... and in the

willingness to grab it and use it."
Lieutenant Colonel Moore

175

masse, all three brigades on the march, the CAV Squadron leading the

way. And every one of them going absolutely as fast as their vehicles

could go. I wasn’t in combat order, I was in road march order, just

like 4th Armor Division was in most of France. Move as a road

march, let the aircraft find the enemy and just have an advance guard

out there to make initial contact. And just go. 3rd Brigade right

behind us was in the same condition. And he was using a UAV to

give him the kinds of information that I was using helicopters for. He

drove the same routes I drove down so I was his de facto advance

guard. I had already been down these roads and cleared them. And

the air had already been down the road before my ground showed up.

So, it just gives us the ability in this case to move 3rd Brigade much

more quickly than he would normally be able to do. We were all in

the haul butt category. 

There was no way we would have ever previously considered

doing that. Short of being a Patton type of guy, we couldn’t do that

without the knowledge feed that it is OK, there is nothing out there

that can hurt you. Because you are so vulnerable in that road march

column. In an analog world that would have been considered

foolhardy and the CG never would have authorized it. And a slower

move would have been

less successful. On our

MTI we could see a

large group coming out

of Mannheim, out of

the Rhine River area,

and I had to get there

first. There’s no way I

could have done that in

a tactically dispersed

wedge formation pattern. If we were going to win this footrace, we

had to move as a road march. Even then, we had to throw a lot of

CAS and a lot of extremely long-range weapons at that other column

that we were trying to beat to the Heilbronn River. Ends up it was an

enemy tank division on the march trying, once it realized we were

attacking, trying to get up there to reinforce the bridgehead. 

I’m not sure if the OPFOR had the visibility we did during the

exercise. I don’t know. They knew we were moving again across the

board. I’m not sure if they understood what all that meant. It was

impressive that they picked up our move that quickly. But since

"I had to get there first. There’s no

way I could have done that in a

tactically dispersed wedge

formation pattern. If we were

going to win this footrace, we had

to move as a road march."
176

every single unit in the division picked up and moved at almost the

same time, its not too surprising if every one of your scouts that are

out forward suddenly all report, wall to wall, offensive action

occurring. You would have to assume the worst, that you have a

general offensive. He acknowledged he had no idea of the purpose of

the offensive, just that it was occurring. And honestly, I’m not all

that certain that inside 4th ID we really knew why we were doing it,

other than we could. And it seemed to be a good thing and possible.

Lord knows that the ground is more defensible the farther you go

west, so we might as well see how far we can go. 

53. Unknowns of Digital Doctrine

That is where the experimental nature of the exercise really comes

out. Some things you just plain have to do so you can find out whether

it is good or bad. The guys at the chalk boards can sit and discuss it all

they want, but you have to fight a real enemy to find out does this really

work. What does it mean to dislocate the other commander’s mind from

the reality of the

situation? When he is

in confusion and trying

to wrestle with what

he ought to do, what

are we doing, tangibly,

what does that mean?

I think that it means a lot. And I think it is something that the EXFOR is

capable of doing, if we can exploit the advantage, that no force in a long

time has been able to do. 

To do the unanticipated, the unthinkable. To drive through the

sand dunes to get to the Euphrates River when only the Bedouins go

through those sand dunes if you live in Iraq. Even the Iraqis don’t go

through those sand dunes. That’s unthinkable to them. Why would

you ever worry about that flank? Only guys with camels who have

been doing it for generations go through there. And lo and behold,

here go entire divisions of armor through there. It is hard for us to

appreciate how unthinkable situations are like that, and its true impact

on the other side’s commanders. 

I think that move to Heilbronn gave us an opportunity to actually

knock the guy completely back on his heels; and make him less

confident for the rest of the exercise. He wasn’t sure just what we

"The guys at the chalk boards can

sit and discuss it all they want but

you have to fight a real enemy to

find out does this really work."
Lieutenant Colonel Moore

177

could or could not do at each given point. And it is going to continue

to cause him fits through the beginning of the next exercise I suspect.

He’ll have some answers if we continue to take advantage of the

information we have. It’s tough, it really is. If I can suddenly put

myself in OPFOR’s shoes, I guarantee, I could turn some of this the

other way. I now know

enough about it to know

ways to make our life

difficult. I’m not sure with

his resources I could

necessarily beat 4th ID,

however you want to

define that. But, I know you can deceive us and you can do things to

make it hard. I’m not sure you can actually beat us because it would

just mean you would have to give more ground up and it would take

longer to kill you. But it’s almost inevitable because of our ability to

see, unless politics say you can not give up this ground and you must

do a die in place mission, ala Warsaw Pact, Cold War, we will stand

right here at the fence and stare you down. Then I don’t see where

the goodness of the EXFOR truly comes into play. 

If you are going to make use of the information, sometimes it

means you have to step back, let all the artillery land on empty dirt

and say, "Hi, now watch what happens." Or, step back and take

advantage of the range advantage and our mobility which we have an

overmatch of with most other the armies of the world. When we are

forced to dig in we lose our mobility advantage. We let the guy get

inside our range advantage and now we are trading attrition warfare.

If attrition warfare... like say Korea, if the Korea theater required

attrition warfare, then the EXFOR might not be that much better than

traditional forces. It would be a little better because the information

resources would be better, but they can’t exploit all the advantages

because the politics of the moment won’t allow them to do anything

else except attrition warfare. So, something like a Desert Storm and

probably even a Bosnia, you can exploit your advantage in many

ways and you are not as hamstrung. You have plenty of room to

maneuver and plenty of tools that we would be allowed to use if we

had to. Any theater with that strength taken away from you, then you

might know the information but you can’t do squat with it. 

So, those are two that came out of AWE. I’m not sure it has that

entire capability in real life. It only works in simulation, currently. 

"It is hard for us to appreciate

how unthinkable situations are

like that, and its true impact on

the other side’s commanders."
178

I’ll probably be a retired old guy reading about it in AUSA or

something fifteen, twenty years from now to truly see a unit with field

capable systems where they are doing what we are seeing in a hard

wire environment. I’m confident, just thinking of the leaps in

technology we’ve experienced in the last twenty years, that given

another 15 or 20 years, its hard to fathom what would be available to

that generation. And right now the ATCCS terminal has a huge

screen in a big ass box. Who knows, it might fit in the cargo pocket

of a uniform by the time we get to that point. Whatever, it will be

different than what we have now. But there is no doubt, if you have

the information on the other guy, and you have the information on

yourself, and you are equipped with lethal systems, and you have

mobility, watch out. It’s every Armor officer's dream, that’s for sure.

Give me the mobility advantage, give me a good weapon and then tell

me where the other guy is. That’s perfect. It’ll be an interesting

environment when that happens, no doubt about it. 

I’ll tell you, all those years at NTC, over and over, you see

commanders can’t seize the opportunity presented. They either don’t

recognize it, they don’t realize they’ve just gotten the advantage on

the OPFOR. Almost without exception, except for the worst defeats,

almost every battle out there, there is a moment of opportunity,

sometimes three or four, where if the guy would just seize it and

boldly take advantage of it, they really have the chance to win the

day. And, ninety-eight percent of the time, they won’t recognize it or

if they recognize it, they won’t act vigorously. They’re timid when it

comes time to taking advantage of it. How many 0-5s have ever seen

their entire formation all in one field of view fighting another

formation just as big? Or 0-6s? They’ve seen little electrons, but you

look up and see 200 track vehicles fighting 200 track vehicles and the

swirling dust cloud of activity. You just don’t get to see that more

than a couple of times in your career. So, why should we be surprised

that they have a hard time recognizing it and seizing it when the time

comes. Whereas the OPFOR commanders see it every month of the

entire two years they are in command. They see it over and over and

"Almost without exception, ... almost every battle out

there, there is a moment of opportunity... where if the

guy would just seize it and boldly take advantage of it,

they really have the chance to win the day."
Lieutenant Colonel Moore

179

over and they learn to seize the opportunity and to have trust in their

sergeants to carry through. 

We just don’t get those opportunities. Without that situational

awareness to say, hey I know where you are, I know that you have an

exposed flank. And to get people confident that that reality is a

reality and that if you will act on it you can take advantage of it. With

the analog guy, he doesn’t know that flank is open. Only the OPFOR

knows that. He has to actually probe and go find out. Then he has to

trust his sergeant who says, oh, by the way, there is nobody over here,

follow me. Does an 0-6 trust an E-5 he’s never met with his entire

formation, and if he blows it,

they’re all in trouble? Or, does

he send a system over that tells

him something. It's kind of sad

that we’ll trust the electronic

eye before we’ll trust the

human eye and what he reports.

It's more indicative of our American culture than anything else. We

don’t trust our politicians, but we trust our newscasters and our

computers and what they put out on them. Politicians I can

understand but I don’t know if I’d trust the computers as much as

some people do. They read it on the web, somehow its truth

regardless of who put it there. 

It’s generational when some don’t fully trust the digital inputs. If

you go to my TOC, its commented that it’s the best analog TOC in

this experiment. That’s because I’m the lowest echelon in the

experiment and I’m not being supported the same way that the

division’s TAC One is. That doesn’t mean I don’t have more

equipment. The biggie is I don’t have Applique. I don’t have any

way of seeing my units like Applique made available to brigade. That

piece is not being played in CBS. So, I am forced to use little stickies

to track myself, not necessarily the enemy. I’m doing it the old

fashioned way. I have my staff beat into submission that if there is a

friendly entity that they can’t tell me where it’s at and what it’s doing,

combat strength, and everything else, I just beat them unmercifully.

And they have gotten extremely good at picturing 1-10 CAV, and all

those guys, and 1st Brigade and whoever is in my vicinity. There is

no ATCCS machine that is as accurate as my analog map. Every

observer has commented on it. I guarantee there isn't one because

that thing gets updated by the second not by the half hour. And it’s at

“Does an 0-6 trust an E-5

he’s never met with his entire

formation, and if he blows it,

they’re all in trouble?”
180

the icon level, we call it. When my guys in the sim center break out a

piece and send it over here, what we call, split an icon, say they take

two tanks and park them over here to be an observation post, I require

them to report that. And the locations and everything those guys are

doing, just like Applique would let me track those two tanks. I want

to know about it. If the combat trains breaks into two parts, part goes

here, all my fuel and ammo assets go over here, I want to know about

it. So we create a new blue sticky to represent it. 

So my entire organization and those friendly units in my vicinity

are all tracked at that level. If our artillery breaks down into batteries,

I make them plot each battery. But all that is, is a human workaround

for a missing digital link that isn’t yet provided in this experiment.

That’s really all it is. If I had Applique, I’d have better view of that

than my guys creating this enormous map. And I would be looking at

that to tell me the kinds of friendly information that right now my

guys are doing the hard way. Now the enemy, I don’t have any of

that help. I have to use JSTARS and I have to use ASAS because the

enemy’s not nice enough to call me up with his location every time he

moves. And it's working just fine. Now, we happen to post it on the

sticky board just so we can have the two views of the same map. If I

look to the right, I see the JSTARS view. I look to the center, I see

my analog version of Applique. I look to the left, I can look at a

blown up version of the ASAS screen or the MCS screen. You can

toggle and see a whole bunch of it. So, we have a mixed set. We’re

using ATCCS for what ATCCS will currently let me see and we use

analog to cover the gaps that Applique should be covering. Because
Lieutenant Colonel Moore

181

it's not a part of this experiment, it isn’t there. To me it's not analog.

It’s just an analog surrogate for the missing digital link. 

I’m not sure I’d be comfortable with these systems had I not

worked with the systems at Fort Irwin. That time at NTC taught me to

just plain trust the workstation. That gave me a view of the battlefield

that when you tied it to other sources of information gave you a pretty

complete picture. That’s how I’m handling the ATCCS. I have

multiple forums of information. But, put altogether, I have a fairly

complete picture. Each one, in and of itself, is only a part of the

puzzle. And, what I’m trying to train my subordinates on is, use all of

the suite to complete the picture, not just little fractions. Stop being

BOS oriented, if I’m the S2, I track the enemy. No. Well, you have

to track the enemy in relation to us. So you have to understand where

we are and what we are doing so you can understand the impact of

what the enemy is doing. 

For the artillery, you have to understand where the maneuver guys

are. They’re your protection. They’re the guys you’re firing in support

of. For the maneuver guys, you have to understand where the artillery is

or you don’t have help when you need help. And we’re getting through

to them. They are seeing now that each has a piece of the puzzle. Some

have big pieces. I’d say JSTARS is the single most valuable resource I

have. It gives me a view of the enemy that nothing else can quite match.

If I could only keep one machine, JSTARS would be the one I’d keep.

But JSTARS with

ASAS together gives an

even better picture.

MCS with AFATDS

complete a picture that,

right now, MCS can’t.

But MCS and Applique,

or Applique’s follow-on, FBCB2, that completes your picture. One at a

low level of detail and one at a high level of detail. MCS is kind of

gross, with big muscle movement stuff – I can tell you where a battalion

is. So, a flank unit up to my north – it’s a great way to track them. I can

track all the battalions in 2nd Brigade. Say 2nd Brigade is 30 kilometers

to my north – that’s good enough. But I need to see 1-67, because

they’re doing a passage of lines through me, at an inordinate amount of

detail. And I need to have a system that gives me that view because

they are in amongst us, we’re intermixed, and I have to be able to tell

them apart so we don’t do something stupid. Applique, or FBCB2, has

"JSTARS is the single most

valuable resource I have. It gives

me a view of the enemy that

nothing else can quite match."
182

the potential to do that. Its interesting to watch all these pieces come

together. Some people are getting confused. Some of my own guys get

confused. But then they didn’t get to stare at the Sun Workstation at

Fort Irwin for a lot of years either. 

The unfamiliarity is with young guys too. And at the same time

their experience with the analog piece is low too. When we realized

we had trouble with Alpha Troop, they couldn’t solve it. So, when

the same problem presented itself to Charlie Troop, they still couldn’t

solve it. It was unique having a situation where a tank regiment was

fighting a CAV troop, guarding an MLRS battalion. It was unique.

So, it’s hard to teach that. We are going to do things that are

potentially not normal according to what we now call normal. 

And, our lethality may not be all housed within our tanks. Our

tanks may be a force to hold the enemy in place long enough to take

them off the map with other weapons, not just the tank. Whereas

today, the tank is the

ultimate weapon. You do

a lot of things with arty,

atrit and shape, you delay

and disrupt, but when the

tanks show up, they do the

killing. Well, its kind of

odd, when you start thinking about tanks holding in place long

enough so arty can kill the enemy. Its completely backwards from

anything we've ever done before, where normally arty disrupts the

guy to allow the tanks to get in close enough to take them out. That’s

what I mean when I say this is completely different. It is different.

And for everyone who says it's the same, just better. No, it's different

- completely different. Our tactics, techniques, and procedures are

different. I think, ultimately, we will see that we will shift in

doctrine. Say, the principle of mass – it's probably true. But what’s

mass – tanks, or effects? Effects of weapons, effects of information.

What’s something like maintain contact? It is a truism that once you

gain contact with the enemy,

you always maintain

contact. 

 

"Our tanks may be a force to

hold the enemy in place long

enough to take them off the map

sheet with other weapons."

"And for everyone who says

it's the same, just better. No,

it's completely different."
LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOE MOORE, 1999

54. Seventy-Two Hour Guard

We spent almost seventy-two hours trying to guard the

preparations of the brigade. It culminated in a regimental attack

against the brigade which we had to actually defend. Part of that,

they had been probing us most of three nights running. I was facing

west strung out over about a 35 kilometer frontage which works from

the top of Drinkwater all they way down to the Valley of Death. So, I

had to find ways to communicate across Tiefort, find ways to

communicate with my troop way up north in the Drinkwater Valley.

So, the Drinkwater Valley avenues, the Echo Valley avenues, the

Central Corridor, and then the Valley of Death. Barstow Road kind

of defined our forward line of troops. It was just unbelievable how

wide this sector was and the commo challenges that presented, how to

use my air to fill in the gaps and some other things. It really made my

brain hurt trying to deal with it. For most of three nights. The first

night was relatively weak but we did have some activity, recon only.

But the next two nights, it was beyond recon. They were sending in

dismounts, up to a hundred at a time. And they were sending in

company sized detachments of ten to twelve vehicles, trying to knock

a hole in our guard line so the recon could go through it and find out

what was behind us. And that just was a zoo. The stress on the troop

commanders, the platoon leaders, and my squadron and staff and me

was never ending. 

Meanwhile, we knew this regiment was coming and we needed to

do some things to get ready for the big fight which was inevitable.

The casualties we took during the guard had an impact and caused me

to reassess my techniques for the defense. It really complicated our

life trying to get obstacles emplaced and trying to prevent fratricide as

we’re building obstacles yet conducting an ongoing, relatively lethal,

fight in the guard. The night before the big attack, two hundred

infantry, dismounted, and twenty combat systems tried to push their

way through the guard line. Meanwhile we have some obstacles on

the ground and we have some holes in the ground. In fact, one of my

lieutenants was being evacuated with a broken nose because he drove

his Bradley off into one of the tank holes. It was a tank position that
184

he was unaware of. It wasn’t his platoon, he hadn’t dug it. He

missed the chem sticks. The way the chem sticks were illuminating

the position, they were facing the other direction. The assumption

was anyone driving up on the hole would do so from the rear. Well

he did it from the front, being a scout he was out forward. Gun tube

was over the rear and he’s scanning for targets, and taking near

misses in this little melee, and he drives right off into the hole. Broke

his nose. He was with us again a couple of days later but I ended up

losing him for the fight. That was how complex this battlefield had

become. 

I had to take a lot of risk. I ended up pulling most of the

operational tanks away from my guys that were on the flanks. And I

did it over time. So it started out looking about near three ground

troops abreast. And then over the course of the 72 hours, platoons

were being removed and put in position on the North Wall of the

Central Corridor. After many years at Fort Irwin, I have a pretty good

idea of how this guy wants to fight. So, I stacked the deck for the

fight I expected. And in fact, he would oblige me and run the North

Wall. But I only had two operational tanks left in the south wall of

the Valley of Death area. I had three operational tanks in Echo

Valley and Drinkwater and that was it. Every other working tank was

sitting in the Iron Triangle area by the time the sun came up the day

of the regimental. In fact, largest MRB I’ve ever seen in my life and

I’ve got a few battles under my belt. The single largest one I’ve ever

seen tried to come through the Iron Triangle with a mission to fix me

so they could run Echo Valley which was where the brigade

commander wanted them to go. 

My mission was block any enemy that came into the Central

Corridor and put up a stiff enough defense that they would say, “The

hell with this,” and they’d go north in Echo Valley. It was OK if they

went south into the Valley of Death but the preference was they not

do that. So, those two tanks I had in the south, I had blocking the

Valley of Death, for the most part, to persuade them not to do that.

What he did was, he ran that new reserve component tank battalion

abreast of his advance guard. And the tank battalion ran on the South

"I have a pretty good idea of how this guy wants to fight.

So, I stacked the deck for the fight I expected. And in

fact, he would oblige me and run the North Wall."
Lieutenant Colonel Moore

185

Wall, 876, Hidden Valley area. And then this AGMB that had

something like 17 tanks and 40 some odd BMPs, plus all two hundred

infantry, it was just enormous, tried to push through to the Iron

Triangle. We would end up grinding all that to a halt right around the

Racetrack and Hill 780. 

They would get about five tanks on 780 from the reserve

component guys, and they would end up getting about an MRC, bits

and pieces, three tanks, six to eight BMPs, in the area of the

Racetrack and the North Wall. But they were all from various units.

They never did get command and control back. I didn’t know at the

time but I found out later. I still had a couple of tanks and a couple of

Bradleys that I backed up to 760 to make sure they didn’t come across

the line. And they never did. And we in fact did block them, and

they did in fact go to Echo Valley. The other tank battalion and the

Apaches would get their chance to deal with them up there. 

But the technique I used was to bring tank platoons down over the

course of the day, then two or three days, slowly increase the combat

power in the area I expected trouble. It worked. What didn’t work

was we didn’t get the obstacles in we’d have liked. Lots of reasons,

including training. We had not had any engineers with us in our train

up. And with the restructure we are very very light on engineers.

There weren’t enough engineers to service the training and

operational requirements at brigade, much less pick up a unit the size

of 10th CAV. So, we trained with the engineers for the most part at

the dust bowl at Fort Irwin. 

The other comment I’d make about the mission we did is by

running it for 72 hours, with day and night activities going on the

entire time, culminating in the big battle, it put a stress on the

squadron that I rarely saw when I was out at Irwin either as an OC or

on my previous rotations. Back then, we’d have these discreet

battles, almost like lanes. You’d start around sun-up or shortly before

sun-up, and it’d end by around noon. Then you’d go into the AAR

sequence and the prep day and all that. We didn’t get that. So for

about a three day period, it was just incredible. You watch what

"...running [the mission] for 72 hours with day and night

activities going on the entire time, culminating in the big

battle, it put a stress on the squadron that I rarely saw when

I was out at Irwin...”
186

you’re doing. You never knew when you’re going to encounter an

enemy BMP or BRDM or something like that. One of my LNOs

went out and left the TOC to go coordinate with brigade. And it

wasn’t a mile from the TOC and he collided with a BRDM in his

Hummer and the BRDM would end up destroying his Hummer and

killing my LNO. And we would have to go through all the gyrations

of that. And that was in broad daylight, two o’clock in the afternoon,

in depth, in sector. So, you never could completely ignore the fact

that we might have been penetrated the previous night. We were

constantly running sweeps, confirm or deny that the enemy was in the

areas in the rear. Many times our real small, chase down the enemy

battles, would go till three or four in the afternoon, after a night’s

worth of combat, to knock out the two or three guys who in fact got

through. Just about sunset, the whole game would start all over again,

and on and on. 

That just was tremendous. It taught all of us a lot about ongoing

operations while still conducting planning and still conducting

coordination; revising tonight’s plan given last night’s experiences

and losses. What did the enemy do well and not do well? What routes

and avenues did he end up using? And that was happening all the

way down to the youngest guy. The second night’s positions were

different from the first night’s because they learned from it. It’s the

Duffer’s Drift learning technique, because that’s what it felt like. You

had three nights like that. Each night progressively more difficult.

You really felt like you were in the middle of a Duffer’s Drift

situation. And yet each night was unique. There were new twists to

every night we were out there. So, that one mission was far and away

the one I learned the most on, and I suspect in the squadron, if you

ask most the leaders, they’d agree, it was the one they’ll remember. 

The live fire battle, where we went fifty kilometers and stuff, that

was the most fun thing we did at Fort Irwin. But the one where I

learned the most, got the most out of it, walked away from it having

learned something myself was the 72 hour guard mission. And I

couldn’t recommend more highly more of those types of missions to

any unit: infantry, armor, whatever. Something that will stress them

over a longer period of time. Because it’s closer to a real combat

situation. Nothing’s free. Even going out and doing a leaders recon,

we had to take combat systems with us because we didn’t know what

was safe and what wasn’t. The security in our FARPs and stuff went

way up because we just didn’t know, until we could do the sweeps, if
Lieutenant Colonel Moore

187

we had gotten them all. No matter how close we were trying to

count, it wasn’t that predictable. So, it was a good mission. Really

was.

Everyone else was effectively behind us, at East Gate, down

towards Red Pass. 1-67, which had been training under division

control down south, was joining the brigade. So, their movement

north to link up and get integrated into the brigade, and then the

operations of the attack battalion, and their FARP and assembly area

and all that; that’s what we were protecting, along with a notional

build up of combat power the division was doing off the reservation

to our east. But the big deal was, we were supposed to stop any eyes

from getting to a line kind of described by 760, north and south. If we

could keep them west of that, then they couldn't get eyes on the air

assembly area, they couldn’t see what 1-67 was doing, et cetera. We had

relative success with mounted systems. A few got through but we

chased them down and killed them the next day, normally in the

morning. We could find them and kill them, particularly with the air that

I had available. But, the dismounted guys were a real problem. Chasing

individual DRT teams proved very difficult. We got a couple but almost

without exception they got some through that we never did find.

So, they actually had eyes on a number of things in the rear, courtesy

of the dismounted recon. The nature of the squadron was, I just went out

there without any dismounts because my 19D strength was so low. I

just didn't have the wherewithal to work the ridges except with

helicopters. And in the few cases that we found things on the ridges with

helicopters, then we would form an ad hoc squad to go up there and

knock them out. We couldn't patrol the ridges. We couldn't put our own

OPs out. If I did, we lost equipment in the process. Bradleys would be

unmanned in the effort.

One of the concerns I have with our new division structure is the loss

of our dismounts. We just don't own the infantry and the dismounted

scouts that we really need in most theaters. The infantry is not too bad

because of what they are trying to do with upping the number of people

in the back of their Bradleys. But I only own two scouts in the back of

each of my Brads and that's assuming I had 100% which I did not. I

ended up averaging 3 guys per vehicle and that left us very little

dismount capability. It gave us a challenge, there’s no doubt about it. It

worked OK for everything except the dismounted guys. That was hard.

Good mission, good event for us.
188

I know the OCs were frustrated by it and one criticism that I had of

the OPS Group was they like to focus on that big regimental attack.

Well, from our perspective, that was almost anti-climactic. It was fun, it

was a tough fight, and the one true commander that controlled most of

that fight got a lot out of it at the troop level. But since the brigade and

all of its resources got focused on the regimental main body which went

north, I had almost no artillery fire in support of me, no CAS, no

nothing. It was a troop commander's fight. I had already resourced them

with some extra tanks to try to deal with it, but nothing was available to

me, as a squadron, to help them. The bigger challenge for me was that

72 hours that led up to that fight and the OCs didn't want to spend much

time talking about that because that wasn't as interesting as their

traditional melee fight. So, we spent no time in the big AARs talking

about the guard. It’s too bad, because as a CAV Squadron, we don’t

have defend on our METL, we have guard. Yet the AAR was a defend

AAR. But it was OK as a training event. We learned from it. And at

the troop level, they did spend a lot of time talking about the challenges

of the guard mission. 

A challenge, particularly during that mission, was I found it very

difficult to get to places. I never visited my troop up north. I tried twice.

It was so far away that to do it by ground it would have been an all-day

affair, particularly since I had to drive way back to the east gate to get

north. So I tried by air twice, and both times, with the weather and wind

limitations, I lost use of the aircraft. So, for two and a half days I never

visited the troop commander up there and had only off and on

intermittent commo with him. And, I screwed up. I really needed to get

up there at least once partly to see his fight, his problems, with my own

eyes. Later I would pay for that, and he would too, when I made a

decision because of my view of his fight which was not accurate. It was

not the reality. He was trying to tell me. He thought I understood his

situation. And I thought I understood his situation, and I didn't. So, I

ordered him to do something he should never have done. It happened to

be my troop commander who had only been in command a month, so he

didn't know me as well as some others. So when I told him to do

something that sounded a little odd to him, he gave me a, "Roger, out,"

and executed. My other two troop commanders who had been with me a

year would have said, “Wait a minute, that doesn’t sound right boss,

reconsider.” 

So I really learned. Here I had my troop commander, that I knew the

least, the farthest away. I didn't get a lot more personally involved up
Lieutenant Colonel Moore

189

there for what appeared to be sound reasons at the time. I didn't get as

personally involved in some of the things relating to the transition to the

defense and the

obstacle effort. I

found that time got

away from me as I

was taken back to

brigade for meetings or sitting with my own staff working on issues.

Because of the free-flow nature of the fight, things occurred like the loss

of my LNO. When we lost him, he had with him all the orders. It was

kind of an adventure to figure out how to replace all that plus go out and

deal with him. I let myself get too personally involved in some of that.

So, I didn't give any of my ground troop commanders or air troop

commanders the kind of personal attention that I feel we need to do in a

combat situation. I ended up spending a lot of time talking to them on

the radios. And we were so strung out we didn’t have meetings. 

The only commander I really spent some time with was that guy I

thought was going end up with the main fight. And he would. I

personally located my Bradley with his troop. And I was physically

there during the fight and that helped immensely, but how to use my

own personal time and having hard and fast philosophy and rules for

things I wanted to get done with my time personally, and sticking to

them, was a big lesson I got out of it. The tactics, nah, tactics were about

right. Use of air was about right. I was a little frustrated with artillery

but I’m almost always frustrated with artillery and its responsiveness or

lack of. But that was about normal. The issue was more at a personal

level...what could I do to make the captain understand his mission a

little better? What could I do to help him with his fight? 

I did find that in the night fights, the guard mission fights, I ended up

operating from the TOC or the TAC instead of forward. The frustration

I had is if I had been allowed to fly in the helicopter, that's where I

would have been. With the thermals sitting in that helicopter and the

comms in that helicopter, I could have seen lots of the different battles

in each of the corridors very easily. At least in peacetime, I am not

authorized to sit in that helicopter when it’s flying around in the dark

because I am not a rated aviator. That was a limitation because the

helicopter at night was the one system that could see the whole picture.

Instead, I had to look at a map in the TOC to track multiple fights across

my entire front separated by many dozens of kilometers. The only place

I could keep my finger on all of that was in the TOC and that was

"Here I had my troop commander that I

knew the least, the farthest away.”
190

frustrating but I knew that limitation going in. Later in live fire, during

a day mission, I would go airborne and fight it from the air and it

worked great, I wouldn’t change a thing. But at night there are safety

limitations which keep me from doing that. 

55. Too Bold for Day One

If I had a mission to do over again, it would be the first mission, the

movement to contact. It was very frustrating. We had an idea of what

we wanted to do but were completely unable to execute it because of

maintenance problems caused by the draw, inability to get boresighted,

bad comms, et cetera. The Apaches were having all the same problems

and a key part of the battle was contingent on an Apache success early

on that never materialized. They too were going through the same

problems with trying to get themselves unscrewed after an abortion of a

trip to the desert. We really

ended up needing another day

in the desert to unload all the

backs of our trucks, get our

comms straight and get

ourselves re-oriented. We

didn't get it, and I screwed up.

When I didn't get that day, in retrospect, I should have changed my

tactics. I had a very bold plan, that required a high level of execution,

something we might have been able to do on training day 7. But on

training day 1, we weren’t ready for it. I should have had a more

cautious, more simple solution to the problem that we were closer to

being able to execute. We ended up getting really strung out, and

disjointed, and we lost all of our mutual support. The OPFOR took

advantage of it. 

We lost a battle we didn't have to lose, at least not that ugly. They

really gave it to us. There was no doubt at the end of that battle, we

were dead, they weren’t. No other battle during the rotation did that

occur. Every other battle, we might be dead, but so were they. Or we’re

still alive and they’ve got a few guys alive. Lots of dead vehicles on the

desert floor and let someone else figure out if there is a winner here or

not. Good fights with lots of learning and units could feel good that

they’d accomplished something. They got pretty close to meeting their

requirements. But not the first one. The first one we all walked away

from it kicking rocks. I would love to do that again if I ever had the

" I had a very bold plan, that

required a high level of

execution... But on training

day 1, we weren’t ready for it."
Lieutenant Colonel Moore

191

opportunity. And I would definitely, in retrospect, change the way I did

it. A lot slower. 

The Apaches were having their own MILES problems. And their

MILES are a lot more difficult to maintain than ours. They were

having maintenance problems and couldn't get near the number of

aircraft in the air that they wanted to. My awareness of that wasn't

very high. I screwed that up. So did everybody else. Other than that,

the rest of the battles were good fights. 

We found we had a challenge getting information up. I described

my TOC as being constipated on information. I don't think we train as

well in our schools and in our units to know what product you give to

higher headquarters if you are in a recon or guard mission. Is it an

overlay? Is it a long SITREP? Some series of grids and date-time

groups? What exactly is it and how do we format that so the

customer, who was back there asleep and now he’s getting ready to

do his operation, has a quick, probably graphic, product to describe

what’s been going on? I think the digits are going to drive us to

figure this one out. When you’re trying to move acetate, move

overlays, you get so overwhelmed with the challenge, with the

mechanical piece of moving that overlay to a TOC that’s 20

kilometers away in the dark, that you give up on it. 

But, I’ve worked with my guys to look at what they are tracking

coming out of these troops, air and ground. And then how do we get it

to somebody so they can use it? We never got good at it. We got

better at it but we never got good at it, even to the end. Reporting up

from the squadron to brigade was never what it should have been, and

I carried too much of that load on the command net with the brigade

commander. I often would tell the brigade commander something that

his S2 and S3 didn't know, because my S2 and S3 guys had not

passed it up through normal channels. I think that’s normal. I've seen

it often enough at Fort Irwin and at BCTP, where a subordinate

knows key information but for various reasons doesn’t pass it up. 

It’s included in our training methodology. When you do lane

training, the platoon or the company goes out to do training and has no

higher headquarters over him. Then all he is doing is talking down.

He’s the last commo net that’s established. Everybody else are just OCs

or whatever. So, he never gets used to talking to someone above him;

he’s just talking down. All of us are really guilty of that. All

commanders focus down and spend 99% of their time and energy on

subordinate FM commo, sending and receiving instructions. It is very
192

difficult to train people to go to the boss and render SITREPs in a

fashion that will help him track the battle, make key decisions, and

influence the action. The only units I’ve ever seen that are good are the

ones who go and do big exercises. They do REFORGERs, do NTC, go

to Intrinsic Action where they actually operate for two, three months as

a battalion, as a task force. They get better at it, until finally it’s second

nature. I’ve not seen a simulation or a STX lane that did it well. 

We improved as much as we could during the NTC. Did it by brute

force. I used to beat the living daylights out of the guys in the TOC

every time I caught them not reporting. You have to give the guys the

confidence to make some of those calls. It is not just higher to down, but

down to up. “From what we’re seeing in spot reports, my guess is the

enemy is trying to do this.” OK, say that, instead of just rendering a

bunch of data points. Again, we had lost our digits. Our primary means

to send a lot of this, the means that we had trained, was not there. When

we went to the good old fashion way, we were slow and cumbersome.

It got better, but it never got good. My S3 shop was stuck the same way.

They were used to putting together a SITREP graphically and beaming

it up. Now they were having to do it the old long-hand way. And they

did it but we lost some of the information. The data made it, but the

information of our real situation and what was going on got lost. 

Again, I found that I carried a bigger load on the command net than I

thought I would. This rotation I was working for an aviation brigade

and some of what I was saying didn't always get understood. They

thought we could move from one side of the valley to the other quite

quickly because if you look on a map, the North Wall to South Wall is
Lieutenant Colonel Moore

193

seven kilometers at Hill 780. But you can't drive that straight line; you'll

get killed if you do. You really have to back up, find a terrain you can

hide behind, drop south and come forward very carefully, or one of the

long shooters will take you out. Now, that is hours worth of work. But

it’s only seven kilometers as the crow flies, what’s the deal, what’s

taking so damned long? Frustrating occasionally, but it was educational

for us all. The

good thing about

the OPFOR is if

you try to do that

straight line drive,

they'll normally punish you for it. So, you learn very quickly at the

lowest level, don’t do that. And they don't after the first day. 

56. From Parts to a Whole at NTC

I do not subscribe that the Army is worse today by lots over the

Army of our last 15 years. It is worse today over 1992, as our Army

returned home after Desert Storm. That is a true statement. There is no

doubt about it. That was also the best Army we had had for 20 years or

more. We were as good as we ever were upon completion of Desert

Storm. The fact that we dropped from there is a given. We have not

dropped below the standards of ’89; we’re about on par with that. What

amazes me personally is that we are doing as well as we are doing. I

think of all the training I got to do in ‘84 and ‘86 and ‘89 as I was

getting ready for rotations. As a junior officer, the amount of time I

spent in the field... only to go to Fort Irwin, and for the most part get

pushed around in the desert and have a couple of good days, but most of

the rotation the OPFOR had the upper hand. Then I go out as a

Squadron Commander and as a Brigade S3...there were very limited

field opportunities, very poor train-up by standards I was used to. Yet,

we hung in there. By the end of the rotation, we had some successes. I

suspect that the reason is we have good people. We've got good

equipment. And once we get an opportunity to do intense training, in an

event like Fort Irwin, at the end of 14 days you have a pretty good unit

out of it. So, it’s damn worthwhile one way or another.

Irwin is one of those training events that gets a lot of criticism

because there is a lot of money spent. But in reality it is the only thing

like it we have. People want to scale Irwin back to company training. I

really disagree with that. We can do some company, and obviously

"The good thing about the OPFOR is if

you try to do that straight line drive,

they’ll normally punish you for it."
194

platoon training, at home station. But, the only way a captain ever sees

what it looks like to have the squadron, the brigade try to do something

is at Fort Irwin. Otherwise, all he sees is an icon in simulation or a

cartoon at CCTT. And we don't have enough simulators to show the

whole squadron, much less the whole brigade. But at the National

Training Center he can look up and see his whole brigade, and he has to

understand for the first time why his part of this battle is nested in the

brigade’s overall view of how to fight the battle. The commander's

intent now starts taking on meaning. 

When I had my conversations with my captains after the event, lots

of it was on commander's intent. Some battles they understood better

than other battles. And you could tell the difference. When they

understood it, things went better. Conversations on the net were cleaner

and understanding went up. If I ever confused them, because they are in

this bigger fight and they aren't all by themselves on a lane, then that got

ugly. That’s when we had these disjointed affairs. Even though we

could see each other, our minds were looking at the battle with filters in

place because we didn't understand precisely what it was that was

expected of us. That was great training for all the commanders to try to

deal with that and get better at it as we went on. 

You just can't do that in lane training. Try as you might to make it a

decent scenario wrapped around a lane, it's never that good.

Particularly, a fight like the guard mission where day one is different

from day two, which is different from day three. Did I articulate the

differences well? Did I make modifications that would work? Did the

troop commanders modify their scheme to reflect what they were

learning? It's good stuff. You just can’t do that anywhere else. But it’s

expensive. 

There are also a lot of criticisms of live fire that I generally don't

agree with them. There are things in live fire that you learn that you

don't learn in force on force. One of which is the lethality of friendly

fire and an absolute concern for it. In force on force, in laser tag, you are

unconcerned with it. But boy, we had an MLRS shot land short, it

landed 300 meters in front of one of my troops, and I mean it got their

attention. Having that round land right in the middle of the defending

battalion's tanks made a very clear point. This is dangerous stuff. Small

boo-boos can get lots of people hurt, direct or indirect fire. It’s just that

important in live fire to see what our Howitzer's do, to see lots of tank

cannons and Bradley guns firing in a relatively concentrated array. You

kind of understand suppression when you see all that as opposed to laser
Lieutenant Colonel Moore

195

tag where you don't see any of that, just eventually the lights start

blinking. If you want to teach a lieutenant about suppression, during a

live fire at Irwin he can see a close enough approximation that he can

visualize it. He now knows what real smoking rounds look like instead

of the hokey ones. In live fire you see all that. 

Live fire was important. We got our procedures for passing our

aircraft through our ground lines, so we wouldn't accidentally shoot

them or call for artillery that would harm them, down to an art form.

I’ve never seen it like that. We had never done it that well. Everyone

was paying attention to it; no one wanted to be the guy who accidentally

shot a helicopter. They would call saying they were flying back to go

get fuel, and they’re on air corridor so and so. We would announce that.

And A Troop knew that air corridor was straight over the top of their

heads so he would take his guys to a safe condition, put the alert out to

all the guys in the troop that we have a friendly aircraft inbound.

Everybody then depressed their gun tubes and ensured they did not

engage. The pilots could actually see it. They could see guys out

scanning and all of a sudden the sequenced visual of the guns coming

down and the TCs coming up and waving them. They could see it and

knew no one was going to hurt them. Same thing with the outbound

leg. 

It took the pressures of live fire to generate the seriousness and the

energy that that required from the TOC, the flight ops, and the troop

commanders and everybody else, all to get involved. We tried the same

technique with force on force but someone would always screw it up.

Not in live fire; they wouldn't run that risk. I think we got a lot out of it.

We now all know what “right” looks like. We know it. We’ve seen it.

We now know its importance. And in my next exercise, when I say I

want to run air space coordinations the same way we did in live fire,

everyone in the room knows what I'm talking about because they've

seen it and know what “right” looks like. But up to that point we had not

done it right. And, I was in one of those helicopters. It made me feel

better and I had the aviator's perspective of flying through my own lines. 

JSTARS was really the brigade's part for the rotation. I have no

feed, which is a frustration for me. I have been a proponent, since this

game started, that DIV CAV squadrons have to get a JSTARs feed

directly into the CAV. Otherwise, I can't use my resources as well and I

can't answer a lot of the mail from division. Everyone keeps saying the

Division G2 shop, or whatever, owns it and that's a bunch of malarkey. 
196

The Division G2 answers the CG's PIR and almost nothing else. So,

here I am, a LTC out there in front of everybody, trying to track inbound

systems. With just a little bit of early warning, I could have postured air

or ground systems to be in ambush waiting on them. Instead I got very

little of it. As it worked its way through the division staff, through the

brigade staff, to finally be a radio call to us, it was a historical event. The

guys were already on us. Yet, in the simulations where I had my own

feed, with my own interest in mind, it was much more responsive. I

don't care if it's a slave feed, where it's someone else's and I'm just

getting an image of it, because I'm looking at it in a different perspective

and I've got different tools available to me to deal with what I'm seeing.

That's okay. Having my own Common Ground Station or something

like it that allows me to manipulate the image is even better, but I can

deal with it either way. But I had nothing; I didn’t have any of the feeds.

I just had the radio call that said, “Oh by the way.” And, hopefully,

whoever was on shift at brigade or division, had my interest at heart and

called at the appropriate times. And we asked lots. 

Same with UAV. We didn't have the ability to influence where it

went very well and we couldn't see any of the images coming off of it.

We found out later that a number of times they were actually looking at

us and reporting it as enemy. The next thing I know I'm trying to turn

off an artillery mission on one of my own platoons because that UAV’s

right over my head taking an image of us and he is unable to tell the

good guys from the bad guys. We were so intermixed that that’s not that

surprising. At that point in the fight, the UAV's utility was pretty

marginal, unless you had guys good enough to tell the difference

between a Sheridan and a Bradley. Most of them weren't good enough

to do that, particularly at the altitude they were flying the UAVs. But out

deeper, where you can try to track the guys coming in, that would have

been handy. But again, someone would really have to be paying

attention and trying to answer my questions to make it useful as opposed

to having my own monitor. I did deploy with a monitor that was

supposed to have done that, but it didn't work. The system went down

and never did work at any point during the exercise. 

But, the entire brigade had tremendous commo problems which

dated back to the hasty train download. I didn't get all my data comms

in until live fire. I went through the entire force on force period and

didn't have any of them. I couldn't communicate with any of the digits,

couldn't make any of that work. Couldn’t even make ASAS work or

feeds coming in work until I got to live fire and then most of the feeds
Lieutenant Colonel Moore

197

weren't usable. There’s no JSTARS feed for plywood popping up. The

trick to me is if you are going to have a DIV CAV, a recon-based

organization, it has to be able to access these feeds from above on a very

direct level. 

That is just part of the training opportunity and it's a relatively small

audience. It would have been nice to try to figure out how to use the

information for something other than a historical event. We would

render a spot report that we are in contact with three unknown things,

hot spots. We think two of them are BMPs. And then brigade would

come back and say, “You’re exactly right. It's two BMPs, and a BRDM.

The UAV is looking right at it.” So why didn't they report it to me first?

Why did they wait for my spot report which energized the system and

got people focused? Now that you are confirming this, whatever

happened to picking them up before I was shooting at them.

That’s what makes the NTC a great event. Building a training event

that allows you to work that at Fort Hood or Fort Riley is really hard. So

you go to a place like NTC and we all get educated on how hard this

really is and how we have to depend on our young soldiers to

understand their job well enough. That when that E4 is standing there

looking at that monitor and sees something like that...bells and whistles

go off and it's time to call somebody

because that's a bad thing, that

wasn’t predictable, that needs to be

reported. That’s the kind of

problems we had. How to

communicate to the most junior

guys, who are actually running these

systems, the importance of certain

types of information. It's kind of

nice to say, well, you have to train them on PIR, and you have to have it

posted and all that, but it's more than that. Nobody’s PIR said report two

BMPs and a BRDM, it never makes it into the PIR. Yet, for me and my

troops that are out there well forward, those Bradley OPs, that’s exactly

the type of information they need. They need to know anything that’s

moving to their front so they can be prepared when they show up. It

takes training.

That's why I like the Duffer’s Drift technique because you use a

UAV one way the first night, modify it the second night, modify it

again the third night. JSTARs didn't come online until we were

facing the regimental attack so that wasn't one of our options. But the

"...we all get educated on

how hard this really is

and how we have to

depend on our young

soldiers to understand

their job well..."
198

UAV we got to work three different ways trying to improve it over

time. And it did improve. It allowed me to vector aircraft. If I knew

the UAVs were watching certain things, I wouldn't waste aircraft on

those things. I let the UAV handle those NAIs and we'd go over here

with the aircraft and do something else until the UAV picks

something up. Then we frag aircraft down based on that spot report

to respond. That’s handy. That really allowed me to be efficient with

the use of my resources, when I had something like a UAV or

JSTARs to give me an early warning, when I had confidence in the

operators. 

I didn't have to do the classic screen line. Particularly, the classic

air screen line where you move your aircraft in a double arm interval

and they just sit there and hold a hover looking out to the west. I let

the UAV and others do that and I used my aircraft to go and check

certain very difficult areas and trails going through the mountains,

whatever. And, I was able to do some risk management. I didn't have

to send my aircraft out into enemy territory where they may get shot

down. I let the UAV, the unmanned system, do that and kept the

aircraft behind our friendly ADA until they knew they had something

to go out and check on. Then they could go out very specifically and

check that

target. That,

in simulation,

worked very

well but did

not work as well at Fort Irwin because of all the human elements, and

the training challenges of all those people in the loop. We all knew

what we wanted, but had a hard time getting there. That was realistic.

That kept my TOC staff going. 

"We all knew what we wanted but had a

hard time getting there. That was realistic.

That kept my TOC staff going."
LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN PEABODY, 1999

57. Scatterable Mines, Force of the Future

I was the engineer battalion commander serving under the 1st

Brigade combat team commander during the Digital Advanced

Warfighting Experiment in the 4th ID. I think it was the second-to-last

mission. I had gotten a heads-up from the engineer brigade

commander that division was going to go on the defensive. We were

conducting an offensive operation. This is somewhat frankly artificial

because of the artificiality of Warfighter exercises. In my mind I think

we can get some bad lessons learned out of Warfighters because we

think we can do all these things and the electrons respond perfectly to

what you tell them to do. The fog of war is dramatically diminished.

So, we had to go on the defensive. We had an extremely large area

of operations to cover for the brigade. It was something like 70 or 80

kilometers wide and 100 kilometers deep in German territory. I got

the indicator, the heads-up, from the engineer brigade commander

while the 1st brigade commander was focused on the current fight. I

started putting together a way to fight this. I was very concerned

because we had something on the order of 18 hours to prepare to

conduct the defense. That’s just no time at all. So, what I did was I

got one of the brigade planners. I also got my S3 and the ABE, and

we went to the plans tent and we sketched out a way to do this

defense. In my own mind, what the 1st Brigade commander had

pushed us toward, up to that point, was to avoid what we call the “red

zone fight,” which is direct fire fight. We wanted to kill the enemy

deep, using all of the Force XXI technologies we had available to us,

including UAV, JSTARS, Raptor (ICO), et cetera. 

The Raptor is similar to the Hornet. The Hornet is an intelligent

minefield. It’s a munition you place on the ground that you can either

arm or disarm. In the armed mode it will shoot this munition up in the

air. It will detect, within whatever distance away, a movement. If it is

programmed to go against the light/heavy wheeled vehicle or heavy

armor vehicle, whatever, it will go up into the air and shoot the

munition top-down against the target and kill it. So, it’s not a mine in

the traditional sense of the word, but it is in terms of its effect. Raptor

is just taking this munition a couple steps further in that it can in
200

addition to just detecting it locally, it can give you a feed back to a

command post and tell you what it is seeing out there. So, it’s another

set of eyes on the ground. It uses seismic and noise detection devices

to do this. So you get a digital display that shows you've got

movement in whichever particular area you put the systems on the

ground. This is technology 12 to 13 years in the future. We were

fighting with technology we think we will have fielded in the Army at

that point. The whole point of the exercise was to help the Army learn

what it could or could not potentially do with this technology

assuming it comes to pass and it all works like it is supposed to.

So, we are on the offensive. We are transitioning to defense. I

came up with the plan to leave some of these Raptors out at critical

junctures that the enemy would have to pass through to help get us the

read. And then we could use that to not only arm the Hornets, that are

part of the Raptor system, to kill any vehicles coming through, but

also use it to do fires - artillery, CAS, some kind of deep fire. We

focused our defense around a few areas where we could put Volcano

minefields down. Its a ground-based system where you can put down

1100 meters worth of minefields in about 10 to 20 minutes,

depending on the terrain. We picked about four, if you will, lines of

defense on the ground in which we could put these obstacles down

and around which the 1st brigade commander could then maneuver his

forces. We intentionally left certain areas open either covered by

Raptor, which we would arm once we were through that area; or took

risk, in some cases, by not putting them down. I developed this plan

in about an hour, it was very quick, with my guys. I took it in to the

commander and told him we had a proposal how to construct the

defense. I threw it up on the mapboard and briefed him on it. He

approved it and told us to execute it. So we did. 

As a result of that we were able to defeat an extremely large force.

Again, it’s Warfighter, it’s all electrons. I am not sure if this would

have worked in reality or not. But we really stopped a major effort by

the enemy, who was advancing against us. I was not the primary

decision-maker, the brigade commander was, but I came up with the

recommendation that he approved and subsequently played out. 

We had something like 24-30 separate Volcano systems

underneath our authority at that point. My organic battalion only has

six. If you know anything about Volcano, it’s relatively high

technology and very sensitive, and you have to have soldiers who are

extremely well-trained on how to use the system. The platforms that
Lieutenant Colonel Peabody

201

we put them on break down all the time, as a matter of routine. My

most recent NTC experience tells me you have to have three to get

one. At any point in time, you are likely to have about a 33% OR rate.

If you get 50%, you are doing good. 

First of all, scatterable mines are the force of the future. I think

that’s the number one lesson. We just don't have the manpower in the

future reduced-force to put out conventional minefields. If you put

together a good plan, it can be extremely effective. But on the other

hand, we lost a number of these

systems trying to put them in.

We did have some maintenance

difficulties in the Warfighter,

although they are not nearly

what I have experienced in real

life. So, it was very effective in

blunting the enemy attack. Then, after these scatterable mine systems

were out for 24-48 hours, they pop after 48 hours, which was just

about the time we were going to attack back through this area and we

did not have to worry about any of those mines. 

58. In the Dirt

I don't think it’s currently possible for an active duty unit, with all

of the other things that we have to do, Red cycle, Special Duties,

personnel shortages, and everything else, to be as ready as you want

to be for an NTC rotation. But if you ever were ready, you probably

wouldn’t need to go out there anyway.

The first mission for the aviation brigade rotation, the aviation

brigade commander conducted command and control from his UH60.

He took me, the FA battalion commander/FSCOORD, up in the

helicopter with him. We were going to command and control from

the air. Sounds great. It did not work for me at all. Maybe it worked

for the brigade commander but I don’t think so because he never used

that technique again. And I don’t think the FSCOORD ever went up

in the helicopter again to command and control during a current fight,

the actual battle, from the helicopter. 

There were a number of reasons. First, they had helicopter

problems. That was out of our control. The thing took off 45 minutes

late and there were fuel problems. Second, they didn’t have all the

FM radios that I needed to command and control from there. So I

“We just don't have the

manpower in the future

reduced-force to put out

conventional minefields.”
202

was using a manpack radio with a long whip antenna and jumping out

of the helicopter every time we landed on top of some hill. Trying to

command and control using that technique was difficult.

The biggest reason I will never do that again is twofold. Number

one, an engineer is, by definition, supposed to be the primary terrain

expert in the brigade combat team. You can't be a terrain expert and

understand how the terrain is affecting the current fight unless you are

with the soldiers, on the terrain, in the current fight. You just can’t.

You have to be on the ground. As my mentor out there told me, “you

are a man of dirt, you have to be in the dirt to be a man of dirt.” And

second, I have no control over that stinking helicopter. I am tied to the

brigade commander. Wherever he wants to go or do, I have to go with

him. That won't work for me. Just because he needs to be at a

particular place in the battlefield, does not mean that’s the place for

me as his brigade engineer and engineer battalion commander. I

learned that lesson the first time.

I made that mistake again though. This is the unbelievable part.

The part where you look back and you say, “You could have saved

yourself some grief by not making the same mistake twice.” I didn’t

go up in the helicopter, but I

tied myself to the brigade

commander again on a

subsequent fight. The advice

I would give to any engineer

is you have to figure out

where the decisive point on

“I made that mistake again... I didn’t

go up in the helicopter, but I tied

myself to the brigade commander

again on a subsequent fight.”
Lieutenant Colonel Peabody

203

the battlefield for engineer operations is, ahead of time. Wherever

that point is, that’s where you have to be. If you are not there, you

cannot provide value-added to the brigade commander during the

current fight. You are then just a force provider. If you’re just a force

provider then who needs you anyway. That’s what I would advise

other engineers. Get out in the dirt. Get in your command vehicle,

and be where the critical schwerpunkt is for engineer operations. In

mobility operations, that’s probably where the main effort is going to

be doing a breach. You may be the breach force commander. Most

maneuver commanders don’t want to give their engineers that

responsibility, unfortunately. If you’re not the breach force

commander, regardless, you need to get out to the breach. 

I did apply that lesson in a couple of ways during the live fire

portion of the exercise. First, we were doing a brigade deliberate

attack. I think it was supposed to be a deliberate attack. It wasn’t

much of one because we didn’t have good obstacle intelligence,

which is fairly typical at the National Training Center. If you’re

going to have a deliberate attack, you have to know what the enemy

has got, where he’s at, what he has in terms of obstacles. We just

never get the intelligence, or if we get it, it’s inadequate. This was not

an exception.

We had an attack aviation helicopter squadron, the division

cavalry squadron, and one armor battalion under the brigade’s

control. The concept of the operation was that the squadron would

initially attack, develop the situation, and penetrate the initial enemy

obstacles. Once they got through, they would then pass the armor

battalion through. The armor battalion would continue the attack. We

would pass through in the vicinity of Alpha-Bravo Pass, go through

the Alpha-Bravo Pass complex and then continue through Echo

Valley and up into Drinkwater Lake and attack through the west end

of Drinkwater Lake. That’s what happened. 

We had one engineer company, Charlie, with 1-10 CAV

Squadron, the initial force. We had another engineer company with

the armor battalion. And retained, for this portion of the fight, was

our third engineer company. I put one of the platoons from this third

engineer company with the first force, the squadron and our Charlie

company. I left Alpha/588 Engineers pure with the Armor battalion. I

took the third company commander and his company minus under my

control and constituted a mobility reserve, which turned out to be

extremely effective. I never had to use it but I had no doubt that I
204

could have. We attacked to the obstacle. We developed the situation.

We found bypasses, openings, in the obstacle. We marked and

passed the force through the openings. Once I got on the far side of

the obstacle, 1-10 CAV had been attrited in their combat power and

could not continue the attack. They passed 1-67 Armor through.

Then I picked up the engineers from the 1-10 CAV Squadron. So,

now I had a company plus for mobility reserve. 1-67 Armor

continued forward with their organic engineers, Alpha 588, and we

were successful in the attack.

Regardless of why we were successful, in terms of not taking a

large amount of attrition, that mission allowed me to do two things.

First, I was forward with the engineers who were breaching at the

time of the breach. I could see what was going on and was able to

advise both the task force commander, who was breaching, and the

brigade commander on what the situation was from the engineer

perspective. That was effective. Number two, I had command and

control of some capability on the battlefield. Even though it wasn’t

used, again, it could easily have been employed. I could have

committed them into the breach, put myself in direct support to the

task force commander at any time, and continued to conduct the

breach. But the most important thing is I was able to see the battle

and provide value-added should the need arise. 

59. Be at the Breach

Now, this was a lesson I learned by screwing up a previous attack.

I had tied myself to the consolidated Volcano platoon. We constituted

it differently than the MTOE, which spreads the Volcanoes

throughout the engineer companies. I understand many other

engineer battalions also constitute Volcano platoons. This has been

the best way to go for us. I had determined in the second offensive

operation we had, I think it was a hasty attack in the Central Corridor,

that we needed to protect the flanks and I needed to be with the

Volcano platoon in order to protect the flanks. Unfortunately, several

things happened to prevent us from doing that. Number one, we never

adequately synchronized maneuver coverage of potential obstacles we

put down to protect the flanks. Second, we had significant NBC

attacks in this particular mission. I was significantly slowed down by

one and could not adequately place the Volcanoes in a timely manner.

Most importantly, when the brigade had its forward force breaching
Lieutenant Colonel Peabody

205

the weak point in the enemy obstacle, I was not there to see what was

going on. So, I could not assist in committing more engineers to open

the breach or advise the commander that he had the breach in and he

should attack that point. 

That was a very short window in time, about 30 minutes, where

had we aggressively attacked through there, the brigade probably

could have met success by penetrating the enemy obstacle system and

taking the fight to the enemy. At the time of the breach, I was about

10 to 12 kilometers behind the actual breach operation, near 876,

CHOD-Peanut Gap. I

was way behind them.

When I figured out I

needed to be up there, I

skedaddled up there. But

it was too late. By the

time I get up there we have enemy pouring through against us where

we had just breached. The maneuver forces in the south are down to

zero and zero combat power. The engineers are there but they can’t

fight the OPFOR with 50 cals and MK-19s. 

We didn’t commit the maneuver force to a breach that was almost

successful. This was at the brigade commander’s order, and I just

followed the order because I wasn’t smart enough to understand there

was another option. I wasn’t there to see it as it developed. Instead

of taking the other maneuver force and committing it down to where

the engineers were making a breach, we gathered up these engineers

and moved them backwards to where the other maneuver force was.

We then committed them a second time in a second location. We

piecemealed ourselves, and the result was predictable. We

culminated shortly thereafter and went right into an AAR. And that’s

the same lesson I talked about earlier, the engineer provides valueadded. Decide ahead of time where the decisive point is for engineer

operation, and make sure you are there when it is happening. 

“By the time I get up there we have

enemy pouring through against us

where we had just breached.”

LIEUTENANT COLONEL FREDERICK RUDESHEIM,

1998

60. Remnants of the FSE

My first battle at NTC was a movement to contact and I was the

lead battalion. I gave my commander's intent for the task. Destroy

two particular elements of the enemy, the forward security and the

advance guard main body. The forward security element is like a

company plus sized unit, and the advance guard main body is about a

battalion minus sized unit. My purpose was to allow 3-8 to follow on

and defeat the main body of the regiment, 173rd MRR. I had to

complete my task up front in order to allow 3-8 to be successful. I

gave some critical tasks under the emerging doctrine of commander's

intent. I told my commanders we had to maintain momentum and

move fast because I knew the enemy would be moving fast. 

In the movement to contact at the NTC there are some knowns that

would not be known in a battlefield somewhere else throughout the

world. We’ve been fighting at the National Training Center for so

long we know some things about our enemy. We know they are very

good for one. We also know they will move very fast. Typically, they

move much faster than we do and so they beat us to the punch. They

get to the decisive terrain before us and then are able to maneuver and

destroy us in detail. That is one of the things I wanted to do, maintain

momentum, to achieve the decisive terrain. I had given objectives for

orientation on the decisive terrain. 

This movement to contact was in the Central Corridor. We were

starting close to Hill 720 near the far eastern boundary of the

reservation, moving west through the Central Corridor. When we

wargamed it, we felt that our contact with the FSE, the lead combat

element of the enemy, would be in the vicinity of Objective Texas.

Objective Texas was located in the vicinity of the Iron Triangle, the

area just south of Granite Pass. The terrain there, in the Central

Corridor, it slopes down to the south. So, if you get up there, you

have positional advantage over anybody coming through the passes

from the west. The two prominent passes are Brown Pass in the north

and Debnam Pass in the south. Anyone coming from west to east will

either use those two passes or come through one more southern
208

option, called the Colorado, which is really broken. So, typically they

come through one or both of those passes. So, we said if we can get

to the vicinity of Objective Texas, then we will have positional

advantage and be able to destroy the enemy as he comes out of these

passes. That's the plan.

I had a very aggressive lead company team commander. It was a

tank company team. He was my advance guard. His task was to

destroy the forward security element. This one company was going to

take care of that first element by himself. The FSE was going to be

handled by my lead tank company, A Company, 3-8, tasked to me.

These guys had been working with me for months. We were on the

same sheet of music. There was about a 3 to 5 kilometer gap between

this lead company team and the task force. The remaining task force

consisted of three company teams; one more tank and two mech

company teams. If we were going to have the FSE destroyed, it was

also most likely going to severely attrit my lead company team. That

was something I would have to accept in order to have my task force

take on the advance guard main body, get to a place where I could

have positional advantage on him, and then destroy him. 3-8 could

then assume the main effort to destroy the red team.

When we crossed the line of departure, things were looking very

good. We were moving very fast. We had worked on this for a long

time and I had drummed home something that I had come to believe

in over time after listening to a lot of smart people. That is, whenever

you make the decision, there are three options when it comes to actual

timing of the decision; you can make the decision early, you can

make the decision on time, or you can make the decision late.

Typically, what happens is we make a decision late. Rarely do we

ever make it on time, and infrequently do we make it early. I think

that’s about wrong. If I am going to do anything, I am going to make

decisions early. Because if I try to make them early, I just might be

on time. But I can prevent myself from being late.

So, we are en route now. The entire task force is moving. I’ve

got that dispersion about right between the lead company team and

the main body of the task force. The lead company team is moving

out with purpose. He does not have contact and we keep expecting

contact to occur somewhere in the vicinity of Objective Texas in the

south where there is a very important hill mass called 876, Division

Hill. We expected that it would be somewhere in that vicinity that the

enemy would be making it out of the passes and would be trying to
Lieutenant Colonel Rudesheim

209

rush to this terrain and we would be getting there and there would be

this fight between two like-size units at about that location. It didn't

materialize. We were on the move and he's reporting to me “No

contact.” One of my first critical decisions is, do I slow him down and

wait for the enemy to emerge from the passes and then take the fight

to the enemy or fight him wherever that happens to be? Or, do I

continue to push him through the pass? My advance guard was

headed for Brown Pass, the northernmost pass. Again, my intent was

to maintain momentum; I didn't want to slow them down. I am also,

at this point, getting some sketchy information about the enemy. With

a movement to contact that is expected. You are not going to get a

very clear picture.

I have very good reason to believe that the forward security

element of the enemy is coming through Brown Pass. I have got some

scouts positioned in the passes and they are telling me now in the

north that the FSE appears to be headed toward Brown Pass. Now,

I'm envisioning that we are going to have a meeting engagement

between two forces in Brown Pass. I instructed my lead company

team to go, to continue on. I had an objective that was just on the east

side of Brown Pass, the emerging side for the enemy. This was our

most successful course of action. The lead company was moving

with such speed that he was able to get to this terrain. Rather than

IRON

TRIANGLE

BROWN

PASS OBJ

TEXAS

FSE

Main

Body

AGMB

Advance

Guard

DEBNAM

PASS

876

780

COLORADO

BDE HILL

GRANITE

PASS

Figure 19. 1-9 CAV Movement to Contact -- Central Corridor.
210

have him try to move through the passes, where I thought he would

have a weaker position, I wanted him to establish position on the east

side of the pass so that he could then engage an enemy emerging from

the pass. That's about what happened I am told. In fact, I lost contact

with him.

The commo is very sketchy when you get into the passes

because of the hill masses. When you get beyond the pass, you have

to have radio retransmission in order to be able to contact somebody

on the far side. I lost him earlier than expected. My last contact was

he had made contact with the FSE. No more contact; all I know is

there is nothing coming out of the pass. So by extension I am

figuring something is going on here. There’s a fight going on but I

don't know exactly what is happening.

I did have one more subsequent contact with him and he reported

doing really well and had destroyed the enemy's tanks, which is

critical because the tanks are the enemy’s rapid fire killing systems.

It looked like he was having some significant success. I would add, to

fast forward a bit, that the outcome was not quite as successful,

ultimately, because the enemy threw an air strike in on him. A rotary

wing air strike. I’m surprised they did that. It was interesting they

would commit it to such a small force. But they did that in order to

dislodge him. They attrited him. What ended up happening was a

canceling of both the FSE and my advance guard company with one

critical exception. The FSE had with them some AT-5 long-range

anti-tank systems. Three of them, I believe. Two of them survived.

And those two systems managed to get to the east side of the passes

and just went to ground. They didn't continue the attack. They didn't

have any combat power with them. They are not an offensive system;

they sit on terrain where they can see a good distance. They can

engage at max ranges, about 5 kilometers, and they destroy you at a

distance. It is very difficult to pick them out because with the

distances in the desert you can’t even see the flash. So, those two

systems were still alive, unbeknownst to me.

Now, my main body is also moving very fast. We have moved

out into formation. We have used a system I have nothing but praise

for now. That is we had colored panels on the rear of the bustle racks

of our vehicles. What that does is give each company its own color

code. I can, at a glance, as a task force commander, see the formation.

Rather than see a bunch of vehicles that may from an aerial view look

like a formation, but from the ground looks like a bunch of vehicles
Lieutenant Colonel Rudesheim

211

moving in the same general direction, with the color panels I can spot

the companies. I can see their relative positioning and I can see that

we are in a task force wedge, lead company, two flank companies.

Everybody is about where they need to be, they are keying off of each

other, and the movement is rapid. Again, momentum being key. 

Now comes the critical decision. I don't know the outcome of the

FSE fight with my advance guard, and I do not know where the

advance guard main body is. Now I said there were two formations I

had to have contact with and

destroy in order to be successful

in my mission, the FSE and the

advance guard. But, frankly I

had no clue where the advance

guard main body was. I only

knew where it wasn't. It wasn't

on the east side of the passes at the time. And it wasn't, to my way of

thinking, up where my advance guard company was having to fight.

But I wasn't even sure of that. 

We were advancing quickly and I was approaching the point

where I had to decide whether to go north or south. I said in my intent

I already had a predisposition to go north because the terrain was

most favorable in the north. I also had planned an option to go south

should the enemy be coming primarily from the south, Debnam Pass.

If the enemy was coming from the north pass, Brown Pass, then I

would likely choose the northernmost objective, Texas. Then I could

engage him from the north into his formation. But if he is coming

from the south, then I would swing south and establish the second

objective. That's where I was going to engage him.

But, since I didn't know where the enemy was, I felt at the time,

like I was on the horns of a dilemma. I had this massive formation of

combat power moving with great momentum and I had to do

something with it. I did have a conversation with the brigade

commander and I said we were approaching the decision point to go

north or south. He asked me where the objective was. My answer, if

he had the commo

cut would be “I

haven’t a clue.”

Our intel was way

too sketchy. We

had good coverage

"Frankly, I had no clue

 where the advance guard

main body was. I only

knew where it wasn't. "

"I was on the horns of a dilemma. I had

this massive formation of combat

power moving with great momentum

and I had to do something with it. "
212

in the north and that's why I kind of knew that's where the FSE was,

but for the southern pass, we didn't have coverage and brigade didn’t

have coverage. So it was a void, an intelligence void.

To add to the battlefield conditions, I had a company commander

of the lead team who has to go north or south calling me and quite

appropriately asking me, “Boss, which way do you want me to go?”

We’re taught to be decisive. And as I

said, my predisposition was to make

the decision early rather than try to be

on time or late. I said “Go to Texas.

Go north.” And there was comfort in

that. I know where I’m going now.

I’m not uncertain. I’m sure I’m going north. The company

commander was happy with that. He knew where he was going. 

Unfortunately, it was the wrong decision. It was the wrong

decision because that AGMB that we were all looking for so hard was

coming south. It was coming through the southernmost pass, through

Debnam Pass. I didn't know that at the time of the decision. 

My lead company commander, the one who had asked which way

to go, got to Texas. Understand, we still had not seen the AGMB yet

and my guy has gotten to Texas. If I were on the other side of the

passes with good eyes, I would have seen the enemy approaching the

southern pass. My company commander gets there and says he's set at

Texas. He says, “I’ve got great fields of fire, I can see for days, and

I’m in a great tactical position.” Oops. I ask, “What enemy can you

see? What are you

engaging.” He says, “I see

no enemy. I’m not engaging

anything.” Well, that's

another thing I've learned

along the way. It doesn't

matter how great a position

you're in, if your mission is

to destroy an enemy and you can't see him or you have no clue where

he is, this is a bad thing. 

So, I have nowhere to tell him to go yet, but I just know this is not

particularly good. This company commander in the north who is now

where he wants to be and all happy in Objective Texas, starts

receiving some long-range AT fires from that AT-5 section who were

survivors of that FSE, advance guard fight. But they’re not

“I said ‘Go to Texas.

Go north.’ And there

was comfort in that.”

"It doesn't matter how great a

position you're in, if your

mission is to destroy an enemy

and... you have no clue where

he is, this is a bad thing."
Lieutenant Colonel Rudesheim

213

particularly effective to where he is. He’s just telling me he’s

receiving fires. He is maneuvering and trying to fire on them but it is

a very long-range fight. Minimal contact. But of course it’s the only

contact he has and he thinks it’s pretty significant. 

Now, again, he was only the lead. I have two companies in trail.

One company generally to the north and another generally to the

south, thus forming a wedge with the lead company being the one

who went north. But, the southern portion of that wedge went to the

south and stopped. Sat at vicinity Hill 876. This is a critical piece of

terrain, almost center of the Central Corridor. All roads lead past Hill

876. He is now reporting some dust clouds coming out of the southern

pass, Debnam Pass. Hmmm. He can't characterize it. He can’t call it

the AGMB. As it turns out, that is the only significant contact I'm

hearing. But, just to clutter things a bit, we have that AT-5 firing at

the northernmost company team and he’s worried about that. Now, I

have a third mech company whose commander is off the net. His

vehicle went down so his XO is in charge. That third company team

is still moving slowly, centered more or less between the two other

company teams, west. I haven't told him to go north. I haven’t told

him to go south yet. But I still feel I have a decision with him

because he is further back.

Advance

Guard

OBJ

TEXAS

BROWN

PASS

DEBNAM

PASS

AGMB

IRON

TRIANGLE

876

780

COLORADO

FSE

Figure 20. Advance Guard Main Body Maneuvers South.
214

In the next few minutes, it doesn’t happen over a long period of

time, it appears to me that I've got the AGMB in the south. I have a

dialogue with my S2 over the net. “Where do you think the AGMB

is?” “I don’t know.” They could be following the FSE. They could

be going south around the FSE. I don't know the outcome of the fight.

If the FSE was successful in Brown Pass, then it would not be

infeasible to have the AGMB follow him because he has cleared the

way. My advance guard had been destroyed and their AGMB could

follow. Typically, that wouldn’t be the case. The OPFOR typically

like to send the FSE in one direction and the AGMB in another. It

could happen either way and it can’t be said they always do one or the

other. In this case, he chose to go south. He chose to go south

because his lead company, his FSE, was ground to a halt right there in

the northern pass. He definitely wasn't going to send his AGMB right

into the same melee. He was going to go south and he chose to go

south. 

That emerged in the next 10-15 minutes. My clue was I had T80

tanks coming out of Debnam Pass. They were being effectively

engaged initially by my southern

team, Bravo 3-8. So, I have two tank

teams now engaging. I have my

advance guard who, unbeknownst to

me, is really combat ineffective

because he took out the FSE, and I

have my southernmost tank team who is now engaging the lead

elements of what appears to be the AGMB. And, I have my two

mech teams, one in the north, and one coming slowly west in trail.

Now I make my second decision. Not a bad one at this point, even

in hindsight. I said, “By golly, they’re coming south.” I directed the

southern tank team, “Hold what you have. You must destroy the lead

elements of the AGMB and allow us to maneuver Bravo and Charlie

company south so that we can mass direct fire systems on the

AGMB.” The rest really was out of my hands as far as tactical

decisions went because the company team in the north came south but

his route south was the most direct. He went almost straight south. I

did have a conversation with the commander, a great commander.

The commander did not want to move. He thought he was in a great

position. I told him to get down there now.

So, he then began moving south. But, that same AT-5 section that

was bearing on him when he was in a defensive position with terrain

"My clue was, I had T80

tanks coming out of

Debnam Pass."
Lieutenant Colonel Rudesheim

215

masking him... Well, when he pulled out, he didn't pull east and then

back around south and west, he went straight south. In doing so, he

flanked himself to the AT-5 firing system. He didn't know what he

was up against. AT-5s, if you can’t take them out and they are left

alone, they will sit there and plink away at you until they destroy you

in detail. His combat power was severely attrited before he ever

made it to link up with the team in the south to then stop the AGMB.

He got down there with a platoon plus out of three. 

Then the trail company team arrived. The XO of the company was

having a problem. A movement to contact is relatively simple to plan

but difficult to execute because it is all about drills. Once you are on

the move, being able to move to react rapidly is key. Unfortunately,

the XO was unable to control the movement of the company and it

continued west. That company was also attrited by remnants of that

same FSE that were just sitting there. I hesitate to use the word

remnants because it sounds like an unimportant formation, don’t

worry about it. But we have lost battles to remnants and that is

exactly what happened here. We had an AT-5 section that took out

the better part of the company team coming south and also ground to

a halt this mech company team. They were hit by AT-5 fires and once

they stopped they also lost some to indirect. So, the command and

control of that trail company team was somewhat discombobbled. It

was generally ineffective.

The southernmost company tank team did a superb job, but the

combat power wasn't there to stop the AGMB and they eventually

were bypassed. In summary, we failed our mission. We did not stop
216

the AGMB. We were partially successful, but that doesn't count. We

took care of the FSE and destroyed some of the AGMB, but not near

enough. So, the OPFOR was still able to engage Task Force 3-8 and

they were attrited by the AGMB and didn't have the combat power to

take on the remainder of the regiment that was following. The battle,

in that respect, didn't go well.

The critical decisions that I felt I had to make were two. First,

whether or not to have my advance guard company team continue in

its attack or to come to a hasty defense and await the FSE. My call

was to have them continue on and that one was about right in

hindsight. My second decision and the one that I want to focus on is:

whether I go north or south? I’m trying to convey a sense of

momentum. Momentum is a double-edged sword. You have an entire

task force worth of combat power moving inexorably in one direction

and you are trying to make a decision as quickly as possible as to

what to do with it. It's not like you can turn it on a dime. So, you are

trying to decide what to do. I reached the decision point where I had

to decide whether really to stop or to slow a whole lot and await

further resolution of the enemy situation which, in hindsight, was the

right thing to do. 

In hindsight, I believe I should have, as I did not know where the

AGMB was, slowed the task force down and remained more flexible.

I removed some of my own flexibility by committing to the north.

Once I did that, now I had to repair my decision by bringing company

teams south that I had already sent to the north. This is a large area, a

five kilometer spread. Movement from the north to south is anywhere

from 3 to 5 kilometers. It’s not something you do very quickly. So,

that cost me dearly. As my first battle of the NTC rotation there was

plenty to be happy about, if only because the formations looked and

moved well. I was told later on, and of course choose to believe the

OPFOR regimental commander when he said he was very surprised at

how quickly we moved. We caught them by surprise by being in the

pass when we were. BLUEFOR units, being blue and ponderous,

don’t usually make it to the pass. So, the OPFOR has the ability to

choose what terrain they want to use. They were getting good reports

also about our position. Of course, this is in hindsight. They knew we

were moving very quickly towards the west and they were waiting to

see whether we were going to go north or south. He had better intel

than I did and he knew that I had committed more. Again, I’m told

there was an animated discussion by the OPFOR about whether or not
Lieutenant Colonel Rudesheim

217

they needed to move or even go to ground, to stop and go to a hasty

defense on the west side of the passes.

For further thought, I had another option that I didn't exercise

because it seemed like it was too dangerous at the time. That was to

continue to press the fight through the passes and to take the fight to

the enemy on the west side of the passes. A totally unheard of thing

to do but I really felt that with the time and distance I would find

myself caught in the passes rather than getting to a positional

advantage. So, I completely discounted that. I still think that would

have probably been a very long shot. 

But, again, the enemy was somewhat concerned, I’m told, that the

formation was moving fast and he felt like he needed to hurry up more

so than normal. He had to get through and get set so he could be in

position before things started to happen. Truth of the matter is, had I

made the decision correctly, I wouldn’t have committed north and then

retained the ability to bring my two company teams south... slowed

things down and let the situation develop, get more intel. If I had just

taken the lead from the company team in the south, that now we’ve got

significant dust clouds and oh, by the way, I see T80s in the south...

Boom, now I know it's south and I take my other two company teams

and I pile them all on

in the south. Then

we have a good

chance of destroying

the enemy in the

south. I pretty much

gunked that up when I went north. Not that it was an irretrievable error.

I think we still might have pulled it off, and were attempting to, but it

was hard business trying to get from the north to the south. They’re not

chess pieces.

61. Fighting Dirty

The fight was deliberate attack. It was at the brigade combat team

level. It was a rather complicated plan. Not impossible to execute; we

had done it in simulation. Certainly no validation of what works on

the ground, but it was planned well. What we wanted to do was

present the enemy with an attack that was not coming from the same

direction you typically see. So, we wanted to present him with a

dilemma where we were coming at him in numerous directions. In

"...it was hard business trying to get

from the north to the south. They’re

not chess pieces.”
218

this attack, I was the main effort. Now I was attacking through those

same passes, Brown and Debnam Pass, to the west, to an MRB minus

defending vicinity Crash Hill. The brigade plan was to have a light

force plus a mech company team come from Alpine Pass and come in

from the northern flank of the enemy.

We had Task Force 3-8 coming through the Colorado in the south

and then coming around to the north. So, you had a force from the

north and a force from the south. I was coming directly into the

defenses of the enemy. The timing was right and the most difficult

thing was timing. You have three formations, three different battalion

task forces, that are coming from three different directions; and the

key was to be a near simultaneous attack so that the enemy couldn't

deal with each one of us exclusively and then refocus to the others.

Our intent was to provide him with simultaneous attack from three

directions. The enemy's strength was his interior lines; his ability to

read position very, very quickly with no enemy force between his

repositioning effort. That’s the definition of interior lines. So, if you

take that away by freezing forces in the north and the south, then he

has very little flexibility and his defense is greatly weakened.

DEBNAM

PASS

ALPINE PASS

CRASH

HILL

( - )

BROWN

PASS

COLORADO

3-8

1-9

1-501

NELSON

LAKE

Figure 21. Attack Through Brown and Debnam Passes.
Lieutenant Colonel Rudesheim

219

My commander's intent was mass combat power at the passes.

One of the things we have a problem with is coming through the

passes. The passes naturally disarticulate formations. If you’re not

careful, you push out and you may never get your stuff together

before you move on. We wanted to make sure we massed our combat

power. Then we wanted to be able to identify where it was that we

were going to breach because we had an enemy’s defense that we

must breach. I had engineers with me and we were going to have to

do a task force breach, which is a pretty complicated operation. I was

to then take the objective.

We did this mission twice. Its very unusual to redo a mission.

The Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver made a great call.

Before we even kicked off the first attack he said, “this is a really

complicated mission.” There’s an eight step training model we use

and the last step of the model is retrain. He said to the OPFOR,

“Rather than do another mission, I want them to have the opportunity

to do this mission again, regardless of the outcome of the first

mission.”

As it turned out, the first time we did it we came through the

passes. We had secured the passes with infantry, which worked out

well because the passes tend to be the first real challenge; getting

through the passes without getting gunked up. Certainly, we expected

the enemy to attempt to cause confusion in our formations with

several means. One was to have enemy in the passes sniping at us

and causing us to react to contact. That really pulls the formation

apart as they’re trying to move. The other thing is they use artillery to

deliver mines. It causes you to no longer be able to use a pass without

having to breach and also you lose vehicles. As you try to move out

of the pass, artillery delivers mines and they fall all over you. As you

try to get out of them, it destroys more vehicles. It is a real dilemma.

The enemy in fact did that. He used artillery delivered mines on

Debnam Pass, the southernmost of the two. 

We were doing something which made folks nervous, but I was

confident. We were using both passes. Command and control is a

little tougher, but I wanted to have my options open. I didn't want him

to close me down and then I'm all stacked up on one pass. I wanted to

have combat power coming out of both passes simultaneously and

twofold, I wanted to get out rapidly. I can move through two passes

quicker than I can move everyone through one. Second, he has no

idea where my effort is going to be. He sees me coming out of both
220

passes. He doesn't know whether I'm going north or south. I’m not

tipping my hand early. I’ll tip it but I’m not going to tip it now. 

He used FASCAM in the passes but because of our use of

infantry, and I have high praise for the infantry, they did a superb job

and that’s what we’re all about, we had already secured the passes

with infantry and had alternate routes marked. So, when he dropped

FASCAM on us, we had marking systems and people who were there

to point a new direction. I say you can’t turn a formation on a dime,

but it was pretty close. We did lose a vehicle or two to the FASCAM

but everyone else turned and went in a new direction and used an

alternate pass. We talk about Brown and Debnam but there are a lot

of ancillary passes. We used the alternate pass and got through there

with no problem.

We got to the far side and collected ourselves. In the desert

coming out of the passes, the passes are high ground and then it

slopes down and then it actually gradually rises again to this enemy’s

position. You can see a long way. About the time we came out of the

passes we called for smoke. It was very difficult to adjust the smoke

and it didn't go as well as we had liked. But that was not the toughest

part. 

Our intent all along was to go south of Crash Hill, which was the

dividing point in the Central Corridor west. You go North Wall and

Crash Hill or you go South Wall and Crash Hill. That was it. The

enemy wants us to go north because it’s more condensed. The hill

masses are actually a little north so the enemy is able to mass more

direct fire systems in the north and he can get you from more angles if

you take the north route. What he attempts to do is look very strong

in the south, puts in a tank ditch, et cetera, to push you north, so you

want to go north. We didn’t want to go north. We were now on an

azimuth to go south. As we were doing this, I had a lead company

team that was going to set up a support by fire as part of the

preconditions for sending my breach force forward to initiate the

breach.

But enroute the enemy threw some conditions at us that really

caused me to make a decision. It was critical. I had to make this

decision along with the brigade commander. As we were moving,

coming out of the two passes, we sort of merged together, but there

are still two major formations. The enemy is still not sure which way

we were going to come. As we come along, he does something, which

really makes life tough. He uses persistent chemical tied in to
Lieutenant Colonel Rudesheim

221

FASCAM. And, if you have a persistent chemical agent and you

don’t know where the center of mass of the radius is, then you have

no idea where the contaminated area is. You must use Fox vehicles in

two different locations and triangulate to figure out where the point of

impact is. Then you have a very limited radius, about one kilometer

around the center of the impact, you just stay out of it and you’re fine.

If you don't know that, you're hurting. Because then you must

template a much larger area, since you don't know the exact point of

impact, and stay out of these grids. So, thank you very much, I have

nowhere to go. What he also did, very wily enemy, was to shoot

FASCAM and tie it in. So, even if you know exactly where the chem

is, you have to go around it and now you've got a FASCAM. And by

the way, its not open, there’s the southern wall. So, it’s the southern

wall, can’t crawl up that thing, then the FASCAM, then you’ve got

your persistent agent. Very nice. He did all that to prevent us from

going south. 

So, as we were coming in, we got the persistent agent and we lost

some vehicles. We were unable to determine the precise point of impact.

So, they gave us some

grids to stay out of. It was

tantamount to saying you

can't come south unless

you want to fight dirty,

contaminated. Now, I had

a conversation with the brigade commander. I said we'll go to MOPP4

and fight dirty. He had his reasons, he said no, he didn’t want us to do

that. We would have been severely restricted. You have your protective

mask on, everything becomes more ponderous and harder to do. You

talk through voice emitters; it’s not good. He said to go north. I said,

“Roger.” We had had a commander to commander discussion about

what we were going to do, and I was to go north. Now my plan had

been to go south, so a lot of flexibility was needed. 

In the interim, I had a company team that I had sent north to keep

the enemy guessing. I was going to send this team to the south,

eventually, once the breach was complete and through the obstacle. I

didn't want to send him out to get killed. I wanted him to position

himself in the north so the enemy was still somewhat confused about

whether we were going north or south. He was already up there so he

became my lead element. The company team down south was

contaminated. I told him to stay where he was and continue to engage

"It was tantamount to saying you

can't come south unless you

want to fight dirty, contaminated."
222

the enemy. His task and purpose had now changed. His task had been

to destroy enemy, vicinity of the breach, in order to allow the

successful completion of a breach down here. He was the support by

fire position. His task now changed to fix enemy south of Crash Hill

to prevent the enemy from repositioning to the north and influencing

our point of penetration that had now shifted to the north. He didn't

have a lot of combat power but what combat power he had I told him

to keep south.

Now I’m having to do some things on the fly. This company team

that was going to be my assault force, to come through the breach

first, now took the lead because I wanted to have tanks in the lead. He

starts working the North Wall. He gets all the way to the wire and

he’s still alive. And there’s hope. Then I bring up my engineers, a

great company, Alpha Company from 8th Engineers. They come up.

But there’s one critical piece missing here which I alluded to earlier,

smoke. Obscuration is a critical piece to putting a breach in because a

breach operation takes time. If you don't have obscuration, then the

breach force is clearly exposed. If there is an obstacle, unless the

enemy is stupid, he is going to have it covered by fire. So, whoever is

sitting there playing around in the wire or trying to remove mines is

going to be under direct fire. So, the only way to protect them is to

DEBNAM

PASS

ALPINE PASS

CRASH

HILL

( - )

BROWN

PASS

COLORADO

3-8

1-9

1-501

NELSON

LAKE

Figure 22. 1-9 CAV Reorients North.
Lieutenant Colonel Rudesheim

223

destroy the enemy shooting at them or obscure with smoke so they

can’t see. 

We didn’t have smoke; smoke is not that flexible. I still said,

being the eternal optimist, we can do this. The engineers were being

protected somewhat by that lead company team. Unfortunately, the

lead company team is slowly but surely being attrited. There’s enemy

with long-range fires. He’s in the defense, so he’s stationary. Again,

long-range anti-tank fires from a flank at a distance...if you’re

looking carefully you can see the flash, but it’s not like you can see or

pick out a vehicle to orient your own fires on. So, he’s being attrited.

He’s also being attrited by formations that are on the south side of

Crash Hill. They just peek over the top and are now able to engage

him. There are also enemy dismounts tied into the North Wall. 

So, he is having some problems. But he is holding his own in as

much as he is still a vital combat force. But then, the engineers get up.

Now the engineers, like I said, they were great engineers, but they are

about as vulnerable as can be once they start doing their job. You have

these very slow vehicles that come up. You have MICLICs that lay a

mine charge that are on these M60 tank chassis. Very slow. Very slow

moving. Like on Monty-Python, someone yells, “Bring forth the holy

MICLIC...” And, everybody looks back and here comes the MICLIC,

slowly plodding its way to the front. 

In theory, it gets up there and shoots this line charge of C4

explosive. Blows it. Massive explosion. You have a lane. Success.

Touchdown. Everybody goes through. That only works, again, if you

have smoke. Smoke’s not there. He gets up there and just before the

last piece of wire is cut and he’s almost through, he dies. He has no

more combat power, no

more engineers, we

can't get through. We

have one engineer, one

tank, and these guys

have tried to reposition

here so they can add suppressive fires. I've already tied up one

company here. That's it. I don't have any more. We almost make it

through but we can't.

We go back and find out we were going to have a chance to do the

mission again. As it turned out, it was a good thing because the

second time around we didn't change our plan dramatically. It was a

good plan. We were still going to go south. We hadn’t had an AAR

"He gets up there and just before

the last piece of wire is cut and

he’s almost through, he dies."
224

or exchange of information, so the OPFOR wouldn’t have been sure

if we were going north or south. He had only seen us breaching north.

The plan, in essence, stayed the same. We still had an attack at the

BCT level from three directions, but the light force that had been in

the north was now taking some key terrain down in the south to

facilitate this breach. The enemy had some infantry that was tied in

and we wanted to put our infantry on his, destroy it so I no longer had

an exposed flank as I put in my breach. That was the key difference to

this plan. Other than that, it was about the same. I was still coming

through both passes, et cetera.

We had templated where the enemy's persistent agent was. I said

put it on your maps. My guys didn’t think he was going to put it in

the same place. I didn’t care, I had them put it on their maps. Sure

enough, he put it and the FASCAM in the same place. This time, I

had already gotten the company team through and I said, “MOPP4,

now.” We fought dirty. And actually only one company team got

caught. The others were able to make it around it because we didn't

have this big block of terrain to get around. We were very precise as

to where the enemy's persistent agent was and we were able to divert

to go around. I did have some contamination but not to any great

extent. 

The fight went about right in as far as we got into support by fire.

We got smoke although it was sub-optimal. The place for it to go is

not right at the breach. You’d think you’d want it right at the breach,

so there is a cloud of smoke while I'm cutting wire and blowing stuff

up. No, where you want it is behind, between the enemy and the

breach, obscuring the enemy's ability to shoot at you. Got the

engineers in there and got the breach and got my assault force

through. My tank assault force got through. I was right behind him

and they pour through on the far side of the breach and now we are on

the objective. What we should have done and it didn't happen, was

that we should have set a section of tanks right there. We were on the

move, but that’s no match for an enemy who is stationary and can

calmly pick you out. You want to set two tanks who are scanning to

protect the forces coming through. But if everyone is on the move, no

one can scan effectively. The lead company team did not set some

tanks to scan, so as he was pouring through, the enemy withdrew

from the objective off to his max ranges and shoots back in on the

objective. My guy is not watching. He is going for the far side of the

objective and is not scanning for the enemy. Anyway, he made it on
Lieutenant Colonel Rudesheim

225

the objective. He slowly but surely lost all his combat power on the

objective from an enemy who had withdrawn. The enemy was upset

that we were able to get through their obstacle but I was displeased

because we didn't have the combat power we should have on the far

side.

All in all a much better fight. I learned from the first iteration

that there is something to be said for doing the same mission a second

time. The parameters and variables were slightly different. This time I

decided I would not be pulled off my point of penetration. He is going

to throw persistent and FASCAM on me but I am staying the course

because it is harder for me to get through up north than to fight

through what he is putting on me in the south. 

62. OPFOR Deceived in the Fog

We had a defensive fight, which was a clear win for us. The

tactical decisions in that case for me were few. In a defense you really

have to decide about the repositioning of a reserve and about

repositioning of the actual defense itself. Those were the important

decisions I executed.

Our defense was fabulous. We had two days to prepare and we

had chosen the point where the enemy would attempt to penetrate.

This defense was Central Corridor. We were defending. There were two

task forces forward abreast in this defense. I was in the north, 3-8 was in

the south. The enemy chose to come north. We believed that he would

attempt to penetrate at the Iron Triangle and vicinity 114 Wadi, which is

along the North Wall. It's because it is very difficult to get all your fires

into that location. If he gets into this wadi, this draw, then you can't

shoot him. Once they

own that, they just run

that thing until it

comes out and then

they are behind you.

It's almost unfair. 

So, he attempts to

throw a whole bunch of infantry; he might use Task Force Angel, an air

assault formation, or he might use Destroyer. But he will use the

infantry to initially seize that key terrain right there and then he will

bring forward his forward detachment or his FSE depending on which

formation he chooses, and then he will bust through north. And then,

"If he gets into this wadi... then you

can't shoot him. Once they own that,

they just run that thing until it comes

out and then they are behind you."
226

very unimaginative of him, he will take his whole regiment and run

them right through that same location. But hey, why should they fool

with success? That’s what they'll do and have done. 

We had time to prepare. I had a light company that was attached to

me plus my four companies. I put that light company right there, and

said this is where he is coming. These guys were great Americans.

They rolled some boulders and stuff to block this thing up and then we

put a bunch of mines and there was wire. The engineers had put in all

kinds of wire and did a fabulous job. And then the weather intervened. 

The day before there was a tremendous fog that came in from the

Central Corridor. Incredible, you could see it rolling in. It was like a

wall of white; it just covered us. I remember thinking that I hoped it

didn't happen the day of the fight because we can't see anything.

Remember, I said obscuration is the key

to success when you are attacking a

defending enemy? So he wouldn’t even

have to worry about smoke. That fog was

better than any smokescreen he could

have delivered. 

The day of the fight... The same

weather. The fog is as dense as I've ever

seen it. Could not see the hand in front of

your face. I’m thinking we really have a

problem. But the enemy had a problem too. I was figuring this is his

backyard. The enemy knew the terrain but good. It’s his sandbox so I

figured he wouldn't have a problem navigating. But he did. He had

some problems getting around that day. Couldn't see squat. So, he came

through the passes and he went north. His plan was to breach the Iron

Triangle and run 114 Wadi with the whole regiment. I’m not

clairvoyant, that was just a smart thing for him to do and, by golly, that's

what he chose to do. He also detected weakness up there because I didn't

dig in my company up there. I had a mech company that stayed up there

but because of the terrain up there, I didn't even want to dig him in. I

wanted to keep them flexible. I dug in some other companies, but not

that one. 

So, he went for it. He went up there. My light company came out of

the hills, shot and killed the first BMPs that were trying to do a breach.

The enemy piled on and started to try to breach when all of a sudden

they ran into more mines and more obstacles. Then the company team

that was up there, they had rehearsed coming forward, popping up. 

"It was like a wall

of white. It just

covered us... That fog

was better than any

smokescreen he could

have delivered."
Lieutenant Colonel Rudesheim

227

They just started destroying the enemy. It was a matter of five minutes

and the enemy's forward security element was destroyed. 

Now the enemy commander had a dilemma. Does he continue to

press the attack to the north and stay on plan or completely change the

plan? Hmmm, shoe’s on the other foot now. His reports are “Don’t

come north.” His guys on the ground are saying, "They're all over the

place! Don't come north." He changes his whole tactical plan and went

south. He did that. It was a bad move. He ran right into 3-8 who had a

great engagement area down there and they took him out. 

My tactical decisions at this point... where to commit. I had a

reserve that was uncommitted in the rear. The brigade commander

asked if I had stopped the enemy in the north and could he take my

reserve? Hard question to answer because you don't know what you

don't know. You know that the enemy was up in the north. You know

you had this fierce fight and then all of a sudden - nothing. Is this the

calm before the storm? Is there going to be another major attack? You

don’t know. Because of the fog, our intel is so poor that we can't

really tell whether the enemy is repositioned yet to the south. I

thought we could hold it with what we had; I wouldn’t be committing

my reserve. So, he took that tank company and ran it to the south and

that company was able to contribute to the destruction of the enemy

who had now decided to go south. So that was a good thing.

It makes it sound clean. There was some back and forth with that

same tank company in the ensuing hours of the fight, but the bottom line

RACETRACK

IRON

TRIANGLE

BROWN

PASS

RES

AGMB

DEBNAM

PASS

876

760

COLORADO

3-8

1-9

114

WAD

FSE I

BDE HILL

GRANTIE

PASS

Figure 23. OPFOR FSE Attacks to Iron Triangle.
228

is he was committed south to conduct the fight to the south. The further

decisions made were relatively easy ones. I quickly figured out that

nothing was coming north and I took everybody I had and sent them to

the south. So we had an interesting thing. OC said it normally doesn't

happen. The enemy was being engaged from at least three directions

and that is typically not what happens. I had a company team in the

south. We were able to further drive the enemy to the south after

convincing him to go

north. He thought a

company team of mine

actually belonged to 3-8

in the south by the way

it was positioned. We deceived him into thinking that company team

was part of the southern defense. The way he does things is he counts

company teams to decide where to commit. That was part of his

decision process that drove him to initially go north versus south. 

Again, that was a relatively easy fight regarding my command

decisions to make. I just had a conversation with the brigade

commander as far as whether to allow my reserve... allow nothing, he

was going to take it. But the question was whether or not I really

needed to still use it or did I have a viable defense that I could still hold.

Because it would be a bad thing to say, “Yeah, no problem, boss. Take

'em,” and then have to say, "Oh noooo! They're coming," and then have

to pull them back up north.

"The enemy was being engaged

from at least three directions."
LIEUTENANT COLONEL THOMAS R. RUHL, 1999

63. Coalition Forces

This was a hasty attack. We were attacking from the Central

Corridor west up through Brown/Debnam up towards Crash Hill. We

were scheduled for a 0700 LD, but in February at NTC that is dark,

causing us to start movement at about 0430 in the morning. Pitch

dark, zero percent illum, raining, couldn't see your hand in front of

your face. At the time, we were two mech companies, two tank

companies. Just as we were getting into the Brown/Debnam Pass

complex, the brigade commander gave us a FRAGO. We were not

going to attack north through the Brown/Debnam Pass. We were

going to switch and attack south through the Colorado Wadi: a very

difficult, challenging, up-and-down place first, to navigate in; second,

to fight in. 

The plan was shifted because he had gotten some additional

information. Our plan heavily relied upon air assets to conduct the

attack in the north. We knew it would be a very tough mission. But

the weather came in, the clouds were down low. It looked almost like

a smokescreen the clouds were so low. The clouds were low and it

was raining. We got a call just before the FRAGO came out that we

were not going to have air assets to support the attack. It would have

been impossible to make the attack work as planned in the north. So,

we did a real quick shift hoping to shift quicker than the OPFOR

could. But the way the terrain is laid out, as we shifted and tried to go

through this rolling terrain, all the OPFOR has to do is move from

here to here. They can move twice as quick as we can, based on the

terrain they had and what we had.

Also, the brigade commander said he was giving me a coalition

force company. My recommendation was I didn't want the coalition

force and didn't have time to coordinate with them, because they have

identical vehicles to the OPFOR. The only thing different is a panel

on the back of their turrets. I said it was too late, we were going to

have fratricides. He told me I had to have them and they were

coming. I said I would send them forward, well ahead of my task

force, and let them try to do some of the breaches and initial work. He

said he wanted me tucked up right behind them. I said, okay. 
230

I gave a very quick FRAGO to my commanders along with my S3

and we shifted from the north. It was about 10-12 kilometers to pull

out from where we were and swing back into the Colorado Wadis,

causing us to also request a 30-minute delay in LD. We just couldn't

physically move fast enough with the visibility conditions. 

The coalition forces came up on my net as we’re starting to do this

movement. They said, “We are here,” and gave a position which was

well in front of us. I said good, continue to move. My lead company

starts to turn and they start catching fire from an OPFOR tank. So,

they are receiving direct fire from their front. They look off to their

left and there are OPFOR vehicles coming at them. So they engage

the OPFOR vehicles and destroyed them all in a matter of about a

minute. It was the

coalition forces company.

They were not where they

had said they were. We

could not see their panel

on the back of their

vehicles, because they were coming at us and the panels were on the

back of their vehicles. It led to a very large fratricide. We continued

the mission.

The lesson learned is it’s hard enough to do operations, especially

in limited visibility, but then the additional coordination required for

any kind of coalition force mission has got to be very well planned,

very well rehearsed. Everybody has to understand it. I had gotten the

FRAGO out to the company commanders; they had gotten it to their

platoon leaders on their company nets. There had not been time to

get it down to the squads and the individual tanks. They were the ones

who actually engaged and destroyed the coalition company. It all

happened in a matter of about five minutes. We were using radios for

the FRAGOs. We got the FRAGO, I gave it to the company

commanders. They’d given it to platoon leaders. The platoon leaders

were just starting to pick up their handsets to talk to their soldiers, in

their tanks and their Bradleys, when the coalition forces came up. So,

it all happened very quickly. But the complexities of dealing with

coalition type forces is not something you can do on the fly. It leads

to fratricides. 

In addition, with NTC play,

the country of Mojavia then

sends envoys from their

"So they engage the OPFOR

vehicles and destroyed them all

in a matter of about a minute."

"The complexities of

dealing with coalition type

forces is not something

you can do on the fly."
Lieutenant Colonel Ruhl

231

government to my TOC with letters of complaint to me. Newscasters

are there. It was an added distracter on top of the rotation. 

As I said, it was pitch dark. We were moving two or three hundred

combat vehicles at night in that kind of terrain. It was very slow.

Fortunately my S3 was travelling right behind me. So when the

brigade commander said a FRAGO was coming, the S3 just hopped

in the back of my Bradley with me. As soon as we heard we were

getting the Mojavian company, we looked at each other and knew

there was a risk for fratricide. The brigade commander was doing the

right thing, because he was also given a very short time to make those

decisions. It didn’t work out as well as it could have. 

If you look at it from the perspective of the young company

commander who was my lead company, he was receiving direct fire

from the front. Positive OPFOR. He had lost a couple of vehicles to it

because the OPFOR had pressed well forward of where our probable

line of contact was. So we thought we had another 4 or 5 kilometers

to move freely, but the OPFOR had in fact pushed elements forward.

And we didn't have scout eyes down there to identify that because we

had planned on attacking north. So we attacked without scouts in the

front. And my lead company makes contact. He’s fighting. His guys

are fighting. They’re scanning. Everybody was scanning left and

right. They see OPFOR vehicles. They engage.

I lost a coalition company and most of the lead company because

the OPFOR was much farther forward than we had anticipated. We

really attacked with three companies instead of five and we still came

very close to accomplishing the mission. It was a long fight, six

hours. The Colorado Wadi system has real dips up and down but if

you tuck in near the base of the mountain, actually in the wadi itself,

it’s about 50 meters wide, real deep and it runs the whole length. But
232

it’s obstacled all the way and they have enemy vehicles sitting behind

each little obstacle to slow you down. As the mission progressed, it

became a dismounted fight. Our dismounted infantry just got up and

cleared the whole wadi system. We took some losses as we went but

it worked out pretty well, at least for us. We were the lead battalion

coming through the Colorado Wadi. The other battalion that was part

of the brigade swung out left around us. They got right even with us

There was a lot of enemy out there. You can't see from down in the

wadi system where I was. They died very quickly. In a matter of

about ten minutes, that whole battalion was gone. Part of the stress

added to that decision was, normally at NTC you do a mission and

then you have 24 hours to plan and prep the next mission. Then the

third day you will fight one. We were doing continuous ops; a

mission every day. This was about our third straight day of missions.

Everybody was exhausted by that point. 

A lesson learned for me was the extra planning time for the

coalition forces. Had I to do it again, and he gave me the same

guidance, I would take an extra five minutes before I started shifting

and pushing the battalion south to do two things. One, I would have

the coalition forces double check exactly where they were, a couple

of times, to make sure I had positive and they were positive as to

where they were. Second, just take the five minutes to make sure

every vehicle in my task force knew that coalition forces were

coming, where they were at, and what their mission was. I got it to

company commanders, they got it to platoon leaders, and that was the

last I tracked it. I was trying to race my vehicle and navigate and still

talk to my boss. I think that extra five minutes would have saved the

whole thing. 
LIEUTENANT COLONEL CHRISTOPHER TUCKER, 1998

64. Brute Force and Ignorance

The situation is a brigade attack where my task force was a mech

infantry task force. I was the initial brigade main effort to conduct a

penetration of an enemy defense and to pass the armor task force

through. The attack is from east to west in what is commonly referred to

as the Washboard of the National Training Center. The line of

departure was Barstow Road and my objective was to penetrate the

enemy defenses which ran from Hill 1195 south to the South Wall. The

brigade's objective was further to the west towards Hill 1064, out toward

the MARS Site. I would penetrate the enemy's defenses and the armor

task force would continue on to the objective.

I had a mechanized infantry task force, three mechanized infantry

companies and two tank companies. I had been reinforced by the

brigade commander. The enemy was in a horseshoe defense in the

Washboard from Hill 1160, actually started out at Hill 910 west to Hill

1195, and then south on a straight line down to the South Wall. Our plan

was to attack to achieve a penetration near a terrain feature known as

Benchmark 999, which is a piece of high ground where I can focus my

combat power at where I believe the enemy was defending. My plan

was to penetrate there using a mechanized infantry company in the

south to focus the enemy's combat power towards the south and make

them think I was going to flank them in the south, but actually use the

rest of my combat power to penetrate him at that location.

Factors that cause commanders to make decisions are based on

knowledge of the enemy, knowledge of friendly, and knowledge of

the terrain. And coincidentally they are the basic elements of battle

command; see yourself, see the enemy, see the terrain, and see the

inter-relationship of the three. I believed that the enemy was in a

horseshoe-shaped defense but there was a weakness, it seemed,

between two MRCs in the vicinity of Benchmark 999 and that's why I

built my plan that way. So, I had what I believed were the enemy

locations. The key point here in making my initial decision for the

attack was that I was basing it on the enemy template, and therefore,

would have to get it confirmed by my reconnaissance either through

brigade COLTs or task force scouts. This was our first mission out of
234

the box. I had all my combat power. All my systems were working.

There were no issues with friendly forces. The terrain did not support

long-range fires, did not support massing of combat power at point of

penetration. 

So one of my decisions was to basically have two company teams

lead in the north, a company team in the south as a fixing force, and

then two company teams to follow these two lead company teams to

destroy the combat power at the point of penetration. I would then

use the following two company teams to basically widen the

shoulders of the penetration to assist the forward passage of the

follow-on task force. 

I had a pretty good idea of the terrain, but not perfect. Although I

had many rotations and had been on that ground before, I still didn't

know where all the turns were and where exactly we would be able to

position forces. My first decision was to develop this plan; my intent

was for this to be a deliberate attack. 

My second decision, not a doctrinal decision point for actual

execution, was whether to adjust the plan at about 0500 based on

intelligence. We had what we believed were the flanks of the two

motorized rifle companies in the vicinity of Benchmark 999 based on

reports of my scouts, the Brigade COLTs, and reports we had received

through brigade that division intelligence had identified these positions.

And so I felt I knew roughly where those two motorized rifle companies

were. I did not know about anything in the south, and I was not sure of

WASHBOARD

DEBNAM

PASS

BROWN

PASS

COLORADO

BRIGADE

HILL

876

CHINAMAN’S

HAT

Figure 24. Attacking the MRB in the Washboard.
Lieutenant Colonel Tucker

235

the enemy defenses between Hill 1066 and Hill 1195, which is the high

ground that runs from Brown/Debnam Pass back to Chinaman's Hat. I

didn't know that portion. I felt since I knew where these two motorized

rifle companies were, I could still execute my plan the way I had laid it

out. My second decision was “no change.” This is where I started to run

into problems. This eventually led to our problem because I did not have

knowledge of the enemy and we knew there were some, by template

should be some, between 1066 and 1195. I decided "Hey, I'm going to

fight my plan because I think I have a good idea where the enemy is." I

totally discounted the enemy in the north. I didn't know where they

were. I didn't adjust my scouts. I said "Hey, I know where the two

MRCs are, so we are going to attack just the way we planned it out."

Higher had little new information beyond some identified dismounted

infantry. 

 This was the first decision that led to a bad outcome. I elected to

stay with the plan. This being a deliberate attack, I really did not have an

80% solution on the enemy. I would have been better served, in

hindsight, either to go to my higher and request a change of mission or

change my plan and conduct this as a movement to contact, leading with

an advance guard who could develop the situation. What I could have

done at 0500, not having all the information, I could have gone to the

brigade commander and said I don't think there is enough information

here for me to do a deliberate attack. Recommend that I move to

contact, identify the enemy's

defenses, and then bring up

the rest of my combat power

to try to achieve a

penetration. Without detailed

information on the enemy in

the north, I did not have a

confirmed fire support plan

for the north. I didn’t have all

the enemy information I needed to conduct a deliberate attack, yet I

elected to conduct the deliberate attack anyway. I didn’t go to higher

and ask for confirmation.

So, at 0630 we attacked, per the plan. Made light contact with enemy

security forces. And I thought everything was fine. As we approached

Benchmark 999 and started taking direct fires, we identified the enemy

positions where we intended to be the point of penetration. However,

because of the terrain and because we had not done a good rehearsal

"I didn’t have all the enemy

information I needed to conduct

a deliberate attack, yet I elected

to conduct the deliberate attack

anyway."
236

taking terrain into account, the north/south wadi complexes pushed my

combat power to the north. As a result, I lost two companies of combat

power to the enemy that was between Hill 1066 and Hill 1195. 

There was a motorized rifle company reinforced with AT-5s, which

have 3 plus kilometers, 3500 meter range. Those anti-tank weapons up

in the hills destroyed two of my companies. My other company was

destroyed attempting to make the penetration by himself. So I had no

mass and no mutual support and I elected to try to continue the attack

anyway. As opposed to trying to hold some ground to pass the armor

battalion and maybe he could assume my mission, I elected to continue

the attack believing I could still achieve a penetration. But when it came

right down to it, I only had one company left. That was the third bad

decision. After I'd lost two companies of combat power to an enemy

force that I had not properly identified, I continued the attack anyway

telling my brigade commander that I still think I can get up here and

take the ground around Benchmark 999 so he could pass the armor

battalion through. By making that decision, I destroyed my entire task

force. It lasted about three hours. 

The armor battalion was about three kilometers back and the brigade

commander attempted to pass them north of me once we'd identified this

force, pound it with artillery and smoke and continue the attack. I did

not have good information on the enemy on the northern flank. I had no

suppressive artillery fires accurately planned on these positions. I had no

accurate smoke planned. So, I was reacting to contact with the enemy

between Hill 1066 and 1195 at the same time that I'm in contact to my

front. As a result, the enemy forced me to fight in two directions and he

was fighting in one direction (south). I was trying to fix this decision

now by adjusting artillery and smoke on the move against an enemy

force that I don't have an accurate picture of and at the same time trying

to continue the attack. At this point, what I should have done is

recommend to my brigade commander that I go to a hasty defense and

focus what combat power I have left to identify the force in the north, so

he could then focus his artillery fires and smoke to support the attack of

the armor task force. 

The third bad

decision was to continue

the attack with “brute

force and ignorance,”

like the Scorpion Team

motto, thinking we will

“I was ... adjusting artillery and

smoke on the move against an

enemy force that I don't have an

accurate picture of and at the same

time trying to continue the attack.”
Lieutenant Colonel Tucker

237

eventually bull our way through. We never did. We lost the entire task

force. The battalion behind me achieved a penetration of about one

kilometer before they were rendered combat ineffective. Without

detailed intelligence from us, the brigade never had a good read on this

force. We could never get them pinned down in such a way to allow the

armor battalion to pass through. 

The brigade intelligence officer believed the enemy would be

defending in a horseshoe defense, but we felt the predominance of this

combat power would be down in the valley floor. I discounted the

enemy's effective use of the AT-5 anti-tank guided missile launcher,

which is common knowledge at the NTC. They are very effective with

the AT-5. 

The decisions that led to the outcome: my intelligence update

decision at 0500 to go with what we had and continue with the attack;

and the second decision was this business of continuing to try to achieve

this penetration, when in fact I still did not have a good idea of the

enemy's positions along the 1066 and 1195 ridge. Rather than stop, get

my scouts into position, and get my infantry into position to take this

guy out, I elected to continue the attack. That decision ultimately caused

the brigade commander to do the same thing, pass the armor task force

in behind me. Basically, the brigade got defeated in detail. 

An underlying action that contributed to the bad decision and poor

outcome is a poor focus by me to my scout platoon leader. During the

planning and preparation phase, I did not properly focus the guidance to

my scout platoon leader. “Go out there and find the enemy,” is not good

enough guidance for a scout platoon leader. We did not focus him on

specific

named

areas of

interest

where

he could confirm or deny the enemy's defenses. I did not take into

account, nor did I give him guidance to put very many scouts along, the

1066/1195 ridge. As a result, I didn't have a lot of eyes up there. We

attacked at 0630 in September and it was fairly light. We could have,

with reconnaissance in better positions, identified them as we made our

approach march. But we didn't.

The lessons here I learned as a battalion commander in decision

making at the NTC is first, I must know the enemy as well as an

intelligence officer does. That probably will never happen but I have to

“‘Go out there and find the enemy,’ is not good

enough guidance for a scout platoon leader."
238

have an intimate knowledge of the enemy, so I can give the best

guidance possible to my maneuver commanders. Second, the

knowledge of the enemy will allow me to focus my scout platoon;

which I never, in my entire rotation as battalion commander, never got

in the right place at the right time. Third, with a good knowledge of the

enemy and good use of reconnaissance, I can adjust. At an intelligence

update early in the morning, prior to battle, take the time to make a

decision to change the plan or take the time to change portions of the

plan. 

I had a battle later where I did have a good read on the enemy

when the battle began, and then the enemy repositioned. As a result of

my not continuing to follow the enemy during the battle, when it came

time to employ artillery and smoke, I could never get it in the right

place. Knowledge of the enemy and use of the reconnaissance assets

before and during the fight allows the task force commander to bring

additional combat multipliers that will support his ultimate decision of

what he does with maneuver. I never did do that very well. 

65. S3 on the Battlefield

This situation is brigade live fire attack, training day 13, the last

training day of the rotation. Brigade concept of the operation is the

armor task force with three infantry companies and two tank companies

attacking in the north in what is commonly referred to as Drinkwater

Valley. That is the area from about the 424325 grid square across the

Drinkwater Valley out towards Leach Lake Passes. It is the northern live

fire corridor of the NTC. The armor task force was to attack there to

achieve a penetration. 

My task force was organized with one mechanized company, one

tank company, and one engineer company. I was attacking in the

south from Brown Pass to Hill 1203. My objective was Objective

Bengal. My mission was to conduct a supporting attack in the south

against a motorized rifle company defending Gary Owen Impact Area

in the northwest corner of the military reservation. The brigade

commander's intent was to conduct a penetration in the north through

those two passes to cause the enemy to orient its combat power there.

Then I would conduct a supporting attack to take the southern

objective so then the brigade would own enough ground. The

brigade’s overall mission was to pass another force through. 
Lieutenant Colonel Tucker

239

The first decision I made was to develop a plan for the use of a

mech company team, a tank company team and an engineer company.

The brigade commander held out one tank company in reserve. Given

my limited combat power, our plan was to initially fix the enemy, get

him to fire on us to support the brigade commander's intent, and then

mass the battalion's combat power against one motorized rifle platoon in

order to take the objective. The enemy was defending kind of in a two

up, one back formation. The terrain is such that there is really only one

way to get onto the objective, through a narrow pass just north of Hill

1203. 

Terrain features along the way are C130 Hill or Crash Hill. The

major terrain feature that divided the armor battalion from the mech

battalion is the Granite Mountains. My initial plan was to move forward

two company teams abreast to get the enemy commander to fire on me

and allow the brigade commander to attack with the main effort in the

north, the armor task force. Then, once he shifted the effort to the south,

the original plan was to attack the enemy from south to north, and to

destroy the southern motorized rifle platoon and the center motorized

rifle platoon, and then the northern motorized rifle platoon. 

Figure 25. Attacking the MRC at Gary Owen.

1203

DEBNAM

PASS

ALPINE VALLEY

CRASH

HILL

BROWN

PASS

NELSON

LAKE

GARY

OWEN

McLEAN

LAKE
240

The brigade commander thought that was also the best place to

achieve a penetration and destroy that company. The other reason was to

take enemy into account based on how he was defending. We took

terrain into account and I felt I could secure Hill 1203, then use that to

protect my left flank and attack from south to north to destroy the enemy

force. Friendly factors affecting my initial decision were that I only had

one mech, tank, and engineer company, not a lot of combat power. The

brigade reserve was going to be kept way back in the fight. As a result

of making this decision, I built my reconnaissance and surveillance plan

with NAIs on the enemy platoons and I built my artillery and smoke

plan based on attacking from south to north. 

My second decision. At about 0500 I walked into the TOC. I did

have scouts in good positions. They had a pretty good idea where the

enemy was and it was only a motorized rifle company, three platoons. I

have a good idea where they are. I've got an artillery and smoke plan

that is pretty close to where I want the enemy and believe the enemy is.

I have confirmed that, and have scouts in the right position. I know

where the enemy is. The terrain is good high ground in the south, high

ground in the north. I felt like I could get in there and make the attack.

My intelligence

update confirmed

my decision to

continue the

attack south to

north. The one

thing I failed to do at my second decision was to specifically adjust my

artillery and smoke plan on the grids my scout platoon leader had given

my intelligence officer. I stayed with my maneuver plan, but in

hindsight my artillery and smoke plan was just a little bit off. At 0500 I

said it was close enough. It really wasn't close enough. 

The decision was to stick with the plan. This time I’ve learned my

lesson from two weeks before. I have reconnaissance in. I have a good

idea where the enemy is. The terrain supports me attacking from south

to north. And the terrain out in front of the enemy position is all open.

So, that’ll work.

At 0600 we attacked. Got into position. The enemy fired some

artillery at us, got him focused on us. Brigade attacked. Went up in the

north. The brigade commander's big decision was that he had committed

the reserve armor company to the north. So as a result, we ended up

with three tank companies and three mechanized companies in the

"My artillery and smoke plan was just a

little bit off. At 0500 I said it was close

enough. It really wasn't close enough."
Lieutenant Colonel Tucker

241

north. The brigade commander told me I had to continue my mission

with the combat power I had been allocated; one mech company, one

tank company, and one engineer company. The brigade attack was

successful, although the armor task force was destroyed in the north.

The brigade commander told me we still have to take the southern

objective. I have to do it with what I have. 

So, we continued the attack. We had an artillery prep and close air

support go in on the southern motorized rifle platoon, which was fairly

successful based on the reports of my scouts. As I said earlier, I had not

adjusted my smoke plan. So, when I called for smoke it was off target.

My artillery was not quite on target. What destroyed the southern

motorized rifle platoon was a combination of artillery and close air

support. The smoke was not right where I wanted it and we tried to

adjust the smoke. The artillery wasn't landing exactly where I wanted it

to, but the reports from close air were that we were getting some

battlefield effects. We see secondary explosions and we think we have

either destroyed or rendered the southern motorized rifle platoon combat

ineffective. 

We continued the attack. We had a pretty good knowledge of the

enemy and terrain. Friendly forces... I only had a limited amount of

combat power for this fight. I am going to stay down in the south. We

began to move toward the south and the two enemy northern platoons

shifted. The true positions were a little further forward than we thought

they were. As I began to maneuver my mech and tank company

forward, with the engineer company in back, I started taking flanking

fires from these two platoons. My S3 got into a position where he could

see the whole area. It’s a bowl, Gary Owen Impact Area, behind these

two terrain features. He moved north of McLean Lake, and reported to

me that if we would adjust our scheme of maneuver, the center platoon

would be out of range and we could maneuver around the dry lakebed

using the northern ridgeline for protection. 

We could fight one platoon at a time because he could see the

targets and they were oriented to the south and to the east. He called me

"My S3 got into a position where he could see this whole

area...and reported to me that if we would adjust our

scheme of maneuver the center platoon would be out of

range and we could maneuver around the dry lake bed."
242

and said if we maneuver to the north, we'll only have to fight one

platoon in the north, then the platoon in the center. The platoon in the

center couldn’t shoot around this corner but he could shoot out into the

area we were moving toward. Based on my S3's report of the enemy,

his knowledge of the terrain, and the limited amount of friendly forces -

I couldn't afford to take very many losses - I made the decision to take a

tank company, followed by the engineer company, north around this dry

lakebed. I used the mechanized infantry company to establish a support

by fire on the south side of the dry lake bed to fix the northern

motorized rifle platoon and thereby enable the tank company to get into

a support by fire position. I then bring the engineers forward to breach

the obstacle, which was a complex wire mine tank ditch. 

The other thing that helped me make this decision was my own

personal knowledge of the terrain. Eight and a half years before, I had

seen another unit make this similar move. As we began to move, it

came back to me that because of the shape of the terrain, the tank

company and the engineers would be protected as long as we could keep

the platoon to the north fixed. The decision here was supported by my

battalion operations officer based on his vision of the terrain and the

enemy and his relaying that back to me. We changed the plan. So

instead of attacking in the south, which the brigade wanted me to do, we

attacked in the north. We made that decision on the move based on the

enemy's initial effects and his direct fire weapons, and our read of the

terrain and his position. When we changed the plan to attack to the

north, most of my fire support plan went out the window. As a result,

we had to call grid missions for smoke and artillery to attempt to

suppress these two platoons. 

The lesson learned from a late decision is that when you have the

possibility of either attacking in the south or in the north, you have to

have your fire support officer at least think through what happens if we

can't go in the south,

should we have to go

on a branch plan to

attack in the north. We

had never talked about

that. I had not talked

about contingencies

during my planning process. As a result, it took a very long time for the

artillery and smoke to get shifted. Ultimately they never did. I could

never get smoke exactly where I wanted it. We went to a field expedient

"I had not talked about contingencies

during my planning process. As a

result, it took a very long time for the

artillery and smoke to get shifted."
Lieutenant Colonel Tucker

243

means of calling in airburst smoke and HE on the ground. The

combination of dust in the desert and the smoke provided enough

obscuration so I could bring the engineers in, fire the MICLIC, open the

minefield, bring ACEs forward, plow the tank ditch, and we were

ultimately able to get on the objective. We destroyed the entire

motorized rifle company and I still had basically half of the mech, tank,

and engineer company left at the end. 

The decision here was on my S3. He was on the other avenue of

approach and he reported to me. Based on his vision of the terrain and

the enemy, and based on the advantages of the terrain in the north and

the enemy's inability to put direct fire effects along the route that went

around the dry lake bed, I made the decision to go north. Although we

did not have a contingency plan as part of our task force operation, he

and I had talked about other options, and that’s why I had him move

along the northern avenue of approach. 

The key things that led to success on this decision were: one, using

the battalion task force operations officer, my S3 to move on another

avenue of approach; two, we ensured he had the commander’s

visualization of the battlefield. He knew what I wanted to achieve.

Whether it was in the north or south, it doesn't make any difference. He

knew what I wanted to have happen. So, when he got into a position

where he could see the enemy and the terrain and the positioning of the

friendly forces, he was the one who said the enemy is not in a position

to orient their fires this way. The terrain will protect our right flank all

the way around the dry lake bed. If you continue in the south, he will

shoot you up. And so we made the decision to go north.

66. Battle Command Team

One of the things that causes commanders to make wrong

decisions is our gap in information about the enemy. The more we

know about the enemy, the better decisions we can make. That’s a

yeah, no kidding. What that means in training is that commanders must

pay their main effort in their planning process to the development of

intelligence and information about the enemy. The lesson has been

learned for years at the National Training Center – Battalion

Commander, you can't leave the planning of task and purpose of your

scout platoon's mission to the battalion S2. I’ve seen that time and time

again. It’s the S3, the S2, and the Scout Platoon Leader. I believe that

as soon as you get that warning order from brigade and you do some
244

initial mission analysis: the S2, with an initial template, and the

commander, because he is the most experienced guy there. The

commander, doing his commander’s estimate, then says very, very

early, here are my PIR and here's what the scout platoon must find out. I

believe the commander has to be personally involved in planning the

scouts. It can’t be, “Hey, I’m going to eat an MRE, you two guys plan

it all out.” It has to be more than just saying, what I typically saw and

what I did, "Scouts, I want to know where the enemy is here and here.

OK?" The scout platoon leader in an infantry or armor battalion is a

great 1st lieutenant. He’s one of your hoooah, hard charging guys, wants

to impress the boss, be a hero. “Roger sir,” he’s out there. I call it blind

aggression. We’re running out there searching for the glory and often

the scouts find themselves dead and don’t have impact on the outcome

of the battle. 

The other factors that I think affect decision making that we don't

use enough of are the battalion S3 and the battalion TOC. I think that the

Battalion Tactical Operations Center is often left in the dust and most

units have the battalion XO at that location; the guy who is probably the

next most senior guy on the battlefield, by experience. So, if you are

attacking and you have the S3 on an avenue of approach and the

commander on an avenue of approach, all of that information, coming

back in and being filtered, is back in the TOC. And the TOC is not

necessarily under attack. They’re not running at a hundred miles an hour

with guys shooting at them. They can be listening first and then

thinking. The battalion XO can then come up on the net, “Hey sir,

haven’t heard anything from Scout Six in some time, I recommend you

slow down, don’t cross phase line X until we’re sure I’ve got artillery in

position, smoke’s ready to be fired,” et cetera. 

The XO is that guy who can be that little voice in the back of the

battalion commander’s head saying, “I think you ought to do this, have

you considered that,” and so on. Because for an infantry or armor

battalion commander, you’re fighting from the turret of your combat

vehicle. You have what I call the rocking syndrome. You're bouncing

around in the desert, you're trying to hold on to your map board, you're

"The scout platoon leader in an infantry or armor

battalion is... one of your hoooah, hard charging guys,

wants to impress the boss, be a hero. ‘Roger sir,’ he’s

out there. I call it blind aggression."
Lieutenant Colonel Tucker

245

trying to hold on to your hand sets. You're being shot at. It’s hard as

heck to listen to everything and make the right decision. 

We talk in our doctrine about the S3 being with the supporting

effort. I feel the S3 needs to be your eyes on another location on the

battlefield. Supporting effort or main effort is immaterial but his eyes

need to be somewhere on the battlefield to give you that different look.

That different look in live fire led to our success. There are a lot of units

where the S3 and the commander move near each other so they can be

each other’s wingman but that leads to the two senior field commanders

on the battlefield now having the same picture of the battlefield. May

not necessarily be a good idea.

And the other guy is the executive officer. He has to be big brother.

The XO in the TOC, tracking the map, has to be like the analyst at the

NTC Star Wars building. He has to be watching the whole battle to get

the mental picture based on what the S2 is telling him about the enemy

and about what he hears about the friendly. He has to listen. He has to

do some analysis. The most important thing he can do for the

commander to help with the decision making process is provide

"The TOC is not necessarily under attack, they’re not

running at a hundred miles an hour with guys shooting at

them. They can be listening first and then thinking."
246

recommendations. There are a lot of XOs out there that carry all that

information in and "Hooah, Sir! You're doing great. Keep it up." But

it’s a more active role for the XO. The guy who truly synchronizes

combat power at the task force is the battalion XO. He is in a place that

is fairly dry and fairly not under stress and has a battle staff with him

who can help him. The battalion commander has a Bradley or a tank or

a HMMWV and generally he doesn't have all those guys around him. I

do not advocate putting the battalion S2 or the FSO in the back of the

commander's Bradley. They won’t see anything from there. They’re in

the back of that armored vehicle, bouncing around, trying to look at a

map. 
Index

114 Wadi, 225, 226

AAR (after action review), 32,

70, 93, 150, 160, 162, 172,

174, 185, 188, 205, 223

ABE (assistant brigade engineer),

31, 112, 199

ABF (attack by fire), 99, 101,

134, 136, 137, 138, 142

Abrams, Gen. Creighton W., 35

ACA (airspace coordination

area), 34

ACE (armored combat

earthmover), 116, 243

ADA, 137, 166, 168, 171, 198

advance guard (BLUEFOR), 37,

38, 153, 175, 208, 209, 210,

211, 212, 214, 216, 235

AFATDS (advanced field

artillery tactical data system),

181

AGMB (advance guard main

body), 29, 37, 38, 47, 69, 105,

106, 107, 119, 120, 134, 153,

185, 207, 208, 211, 212, 213,

214, 215, 216

Alpha-Bravo Passes, 4, 33, 52,

137, 141, 203

ambiguity, 26, 27, 169

AMPS (aviation movement

planning system), 31

analog, 165, 167, 168, 169, 175,

179, 180, 181, 182

analysis, 33, 69, 74, 77, 84, 86,

88, 111, 112, 118, 119, 120,

122, 125, 134, 135, 146, 244,

245

Apache, 81, 83, 87, 88, 89, 90,

91, 92, 93, 133, 135, 136, 139,

172, 173, 185, 190, 191

Applique, 179, 180, 181, See also

FBCB2.

Arrowhead, 3, 31

art, 1, 2, 15, 16, 18, 19, 23, 195

artillery, 8, 12, 16, 18, 20, 21, 26,

33, 34, 35, 38, 46, 49, 54, 56,

66, 67, 86, 87, 89, 92, 97, 100,

101, 104, 105, 106, 112, 113,

117, 123, 124, 127, 129, 136,

141, 142, 150, 159, 161, 162,

165, 168, 169, 171, 177, 180,

181, 188, 189, 195, 196, 200,

219, 236, 238, 240, 241, 242,

244

ASAS (all source analysis

system), 165, 167, 180, 181,

196

assessment, 31, 32, 44, 55, 82,

95, 96, 97, 102, 103, 105, 108,

109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 119,

123, 148, 149, 157

AT-5 - 52, 70, 85, 102, 119, 123,

152, 153, 154, 210, 212, 213,

214, 215, 236, 237

ATCCS (army tactical command

and control system), 178, 179,

180, 181

backbrief, 46, 48, 82, 93

Barstow Road, 4, 46, 54, 183,

233

Basalt Hill, 4, 118

battle command, 1, 2, 11, 13, 16,

17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 49, 52,

53, 54, 61, 62, 64, 69, 109,

147, 149, 163, 233, 243

BCT (brigade combat team), 49,

50, 51, 61, 67, 70, 72, 85, 89,

98, 103, 121, 112, 113, 115,

120, 122, 128, 143, 199, 202,

217, 224
248

BCTP (battle command training

program), 20, 191

BDA (battle damage assessment),

35, 173

Benchmark 999 - 233, 234, 235,

236

Bicycle Lake (Bike Lake), 4, 5,

100, 125, 136

Blackhawk, 81, 87, 133, 134,

142, See also UH60.

BMP, 60, 69, 70, 71, 80, 165,

172, 185, 186, 197, 226

boresight, 8, 190

BOS (battlefield operating

system), 152, 181

BP (battle position), 40, 118, 119,

120, 131, 134

BRDM, 69, 71, 80, 186, 197

breach, 7, 8, 9, 14, 44, 55, 56, 57,

66, 67, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 99,

103, 114, 123, 125, 126, 127,

128, 129, 130, 131, 143, 146,

203, 204, 205, 219, 220, 221,

222, 224, 226, 229, 242

Brigade Hill, 4, 5, 118, 125, 135,

136

brigade engineer, 202

Brown Pass, 3, 4, 9, 39, 40, 52,

56, 57, 58, 59, 76, 77, 104,

118, 119, 122, 126, 136, 159,

207, 209, 211, 214, 218, 220,

229, 235, 238

BRT (brigade reconnaissance

troop), 54

Bruno Escarpment, 3, 4, 77, 78

C2 (command and control), 16,

22, 41, 76, 113, 115, 130, 153,

156, 185, 201, 202, 204, 215,

219

CAR (combined arms reserve), 57,

61, 131, 132, 140, 141, 142

CAS (close air support), 17, 18,

20, 21, 38, 46, 61, 123, 126,

127, 142, 172, 175, 188, 200,

241

CBS (corps battle simulation),

173, 179

CCIR (commander's critical

information requirements), 53,

79, 137

CCTT (close combat tactical

trainer), 20, 36, 153, 194

Central Corridor, 4, 20, 29, 37,

39, 54, 56, 72, 73, 87, 90, 91,

92, 97, 98, 104, 118, 124, 125,

126, 140, 141, 142, 183, 184,

204, 207, 213, 220, 225, 226,

229

chemical, 46, 55, 56, 71, 91, 123,

129, 142, 148, 150, 184, 204,

220, 221

China Lake, 133

CHOD (Chief of Defense) Hill, 4,

145, 147, 205

coalition force, 60, 61, 229, 230,

231, 232

Cobra, 83, 137

Colorado Wadi, 4, 39, 77, 99,

107, 118, 119, 126, 140, 141,

208, 218, 229, 230, 231

COLT (combat observation and

lasing team), 33, 46, 90, 130,

233, 234

Comanche, 75, 168, 172, 173

combat multipliers, 38, 41, 238

Common Ground Station, 196

communication, 76, 77, 83, 90,

132

communications, 76, 77, 78, 79,

88, 101, 104, 156, 183, 188,

191, 196, 210

company commander, 7, 8, 14, 17,

31, 36, 46, 48, 60, 97, 105,

111, 118, 129, 130, 131, 136,

137, 139, 145, 146, 147, 203,

212, 230, 231, 232

constructive simulation, 19, 20

contingency, 39, 122, 243
Index

249

counterattack, 47, 61, 102, 173

counterbattery, 104, 161

countermobility, 115, 118, 126

counter-reconnaissance, 33, 80,

99, 127

course of action, 10, 33, 37, 38,

39, 40, 57, 69, 71, 77, 93, 121,

122, 127, 146, 209

course of action analysis, 33, 77

CP (command post), 22, 48, 58,

60, 62, 111, 148, 200

CPX (command post exercise), 18,

97, 109

Crash Hill (C130 Hill), 4, 9, 56,

57, 58, 60, 61, 107, 119, 150,

152, 218, 220, 222, 223, 229,

239

cross-attachment, 65

cross-talk, 97, 150, 151, 156

CRP (combat reconnassaince

patrol), 16, 33, 61, 69, 70, 105,

107, 161

Crusader, 75

CSOP (combat security outpost),

124, 127, 128, 131

DAWE (digital advanced

warfighting experiment), 120,

169, 170, 171

DDMP (deliberate decision

making process), 121

Debnam Pass, 4, 9, 39, 56, 57, 58, 

59, 76, 77, 103, 118, 126, 136, 

206, 211, 212, 213, 214, 218, 

219, 220, 229, 235

deception, 25, 26, 27, 228

decision-making, 1, 12, 15, 16,

17, 22, 23, 30, 32, 36, 40, 41,

43, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 59,

60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 67, 72, 73,

74, 76, 92, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100,

103, 112, 113, 115, 120, 121,

135, 137, 149, 160, 161, 172,

188, 192, 200, 208, 209, 211,

212, 213, 214, 216, 217, 220,

225, 227, 228, 231, 232, 233,

234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239,

240, 242, 243, 244, 245

defense in sector, 7, 39, 72, 74,

114, 115, 120, 126, 127

Defense of Duffer’s Drift, 186,

197

deliberate attack, 32, 76, 113,

114, 150, 203, 217, 234, 235

Desert Storm, 89, 177, 193

digital, 49, 65, 72, 75, 76, 77, 79,

89, 90, 165, 169, 176, 179,

180, 181, 200

direct fire, 21, 38, 46, 47, 55, 61,

74, 121, 113, 114, 147, 151,

157, 161, 169, 194, 199, 214,

220, 222, 230, 231, 235, 242,

243

dismounted infantry, 7, 8, 9, 39,

 52, 56, 58, 60, 84, 131, 132, 

 151, 183, 187, 223, 232, 235

Division AWE (Division

Advanced Warfighter Exercise

in support of Digital Advanced 

Warfighting Experiment

[DAWE]), 49, 75, 120, 169,

170, 171, 177 See also

Warfighter. 

Division Hill, 123, 128, 208 See

also Hill 876.

doctrine, 1, 11, 15, 19, 22, 47, 48,

73, 182, 207, 245

Drinkwater Lake, 3, 31, 203

Drinkwater Valley, 3, 33, 39, 40,

183, 238

DRT (dismounted reconassaince

team), 80, 187

EA (engagement area), 35, 40, 46,

47, 115, 116, 117, 134, 138,

139, 140, 145, 148, 160, 162,

166, 227

East Gate, 133, 140, 187

East Range Road, 3, 4, 43, 148
250

EBA (engineer battle analysis),

119, 120

Echo Valley, 3, 40, 183, 184,

185, 203

economy of force, 7, 51, 140

Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D., 35

engineer, 7, 8, 14, 25, 49, 55, 67,

82, 90, 111, 112, 113, 114,

115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 123,

124, 125, 126, 128, 129, 130,

132, 145, 146, 147, 152, 153,

185, 199, 202, 203, 204, 205,

219, 222, 223, 224, 226, 238,

239, 240, 241, 242, 243

EPLRS (enhanced position

location reporting system), 22,

123

ERI (engineer restructuring

initiative battalion), 113

Euphrates River, 176

EW (electronic warfare), 21

EXFOR (Experimental Force),

176, 177

experience, 1, 2, 12, 18, 19, 20,

21, 30, 36, 62, 64, 66, 82, 89,

97, 113, 117, 121, 135, 157,

162, 182, 186, 201, 244

"eyes," 31, 33, 52, 69, 74, 80,

100, 101, 127, 130, 134, 136,

161, 162, 168, 169, 187, 200,

212, 231, 237, See also

observer.

FAC (forward air controller), 33,

35

FARP (forward arming and refuel

point), 80, 84, 133, 142, 165,

186, 187

FASCAM (family of scatterable

mines), 38, 39, 57, 71, 103,

105, 122, 125, 126, 129, 131,

159, 160, 161, 162, 220, 221,

224, 225, See also scatterable

mines. 

FBCB2 (Force XXI battle

command brigade & below),

123, 181

feint, 25, 26, 96, 97, 119

fire support, 114, 235, 242

fix, 37, 38, 54, 92, 101, 102, 119,

124, 125, 141, 142, 155, 184,

222, 234, 239, 242

flank, 8, 9, 10, 25, 26, 31, 37, 47,

48, 60, 79, 80, 99, 119, 122,

123, 125, 134, 136, 141, 149,

152, 154, 156, 168, 172, 176,

179, 181, 184, 204, 211, 215,

218, 223, 224, 233, 234, 236,

240, 241, 243

FLIR (forward looking infrared

radar), 31

FLOT (forward line of own

troops), 57

fog of war, 90, 199

Force XXI, 31, 45, 49, 72, 73, 74,

75, 76, 120, 135, 199

force on force, 54, 69, 89, 90,

145, 150, 159, 194, 195, 196

Fox, 150, 221

FRAGO (fragmentary order), 13,

58, 59, 62, 63, 100, 229, 230,

231

fratricide, 61, 75, 84, 88, 89, 90,

183, 229, 230, 231

friction, 2, 14, 20, 60, 61

FSCOORD (fire support

coordinator), 64, 67, 87, 161,

162, 201

FSE (forward security element),

16, 29, 37, 69, 120, 153, 161,

207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212,

214, 215, 216, 225

FSO (fire support officer), 31,

152, 242

Furlong Ridge, 5, 43, 100, 128,

130, 131, 132

Gary Owen Impact Area, 238,

239, 241
Index

251

Goat Trail, 4, 107, 108, 126

GPS (global positioning system),

45

Granite Mountains, 57, 239

Granite Pass, 3, 4, 45, 46, 54, 55,

141, 207

Grant, Gen. Ulysses S., 48

graphics, 38, 60, 89, 106, 120

HE (high explosive), 66, 243

Heilbronn, 171, 172, 173, 175,

176

Hellfire, 33, 35, 90, 136, 138, 168

HEMTT (heavy expanded

mobility tactical truck), 45

HET (heavy equipment

transporter), 45

Hidden Valley, 4, 5, 39, 45, 185

Hill 466 - 70

Hill 720 - 5, 97, 98, 102, 207

Hill 760 - 4, 5, 125, 185, 187

Hill 780 - 4, 45, 153, 185, 193

Hill 781 - 5, 7, 130

Hill 876 - 3, 4, 29, 45, 54, 104,

105, 107, 123, 145, 153, 185,

208, 213 See also Division Hill

Hill 910 - 3, 4, 126, 233

Hill 1064 - 233

Hill 1066 - 235, 236, 237

Hill 1195 - 233, 235, 236, 237

Hill 1203 - 238, 239, 240

home station, 37, 69, 71, 79, 80,

114, 115, 130, 194

Hornet, 199, 200

ICO (intelligent combat outpost),

199, See also Raptor.

illumination, 84, 88, 89, 229

information, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17,

43, 53, 54, 72, 78, 79, 92, 95,

96, 97, 103, 107, 112, 120,

130, 134, 135, 137, 143, 150,

155, 156, 161, 165, 175, 177,

178, 180, 181, 182, 191, 192,

197, 209, 224, 229, 235, 236,

243, 244, 246

information requirements, 12, 53,

79

intelligence, 13, 19, 53, 69, 134,

135, 140, 149, 165, 203, 211,

212, 216, 217, 227, 234, 237,

238, 240, 242

intent, 17, 19, 33, 46, 50, 60, 63,

78, 85, 90, 91, 93, 99, 101,

102, 106, 113, 115, 121, 127,

143, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150,

194, 207, 209, 211, 218, 219,

220, 234, 238, 239

intuition, 29, 30, 31

IPB (intelligence preparation of

the battlefield), 85, 111, 112,

119

Iraq, 176

Iron Triangle, 3, 4, 29, 45, 46,

104, 108, 184, 185, 207, 225,

226, 227

IV lines (inter-visibility lines),

105, 123

Janus simulation, 36, 49, 97, 112,

115

Javelin, 111

John Wayne Foothills, 5, 70, 131

John Wayne Pass, 5, 39

JSTARS (joint surveillance target

attack radar system), 72, 73,

84, 85, 88, 90, 91, 134, 165,

166, 167, 168, 171, 172, 173,

180, 181, 195, 196, 199

Kiowa, 31, 33, 34, 35, 81, 83, 91,

93, 136, 140, 165

KVT (Krasnovian Variant Tank),

141

LD (line of departure), 14, 60, 80,

88, 99, 100, 103, 105, 114,

121, 122, 229, 230

Leach Lake, 3, 33, 41, 238

linear, 73, 126
252

live fire, 3, 31, 33, 66, 89, 90,

138, 139, 161, 186, 190, 194,

195, 196, 203, 238, 245

LNO (liaison officer), 64, 81,

186, 189

LTP (leader training program), 49

LZ, 57, 58

Mannheim, 175

map, 9, 11, 20, 45, 64, 84, 89, 96,

117, 140, 142, 145, 150, 157,

179, 180, 182, 189, 192, 244,

245

mass, 9, 21, 25, 32, 33, 36, 38,

39, 40, 41, 50, 54, 55, 72, 101,

127, 143, 169, 170, 182, 208,

214, 219, 220, 221, 236, 239

Matterhorn, 4, 118, 150

McLean Lake, 241

MCS (manuever control system),

180, 181

MDMP (military decision making

process), 36

METL (mission essential task

list), 188

METT-T (mission, enemy,

terrain, troops, and time

available), 113

MICLIC (mine-clearing line

charge), 66, 67, 126, 129, 132,

223, 243

MILES (multiple integrated laser

engagement system), 9, 85, 90,

141, 191

mission analysis, 69, 74, 86, 119,

120, 122, 134, 135, 146, 244, 245

MLRS (multiple launch rocket

system), 49, 90, 91, 136, 159,

165, 168, 171, 172, 182, 194

momentum, 32, 35, 154, 207,

209, 211, 216

MOPMS (modular packed mine

system), 111, 126

MOPP (mission oriented

protective posture), 55, 148,

221, 224

motorized rifle platoon, 239, 241,

242

movement to contact, 29, 32, 37,

38, 60, 69, 70, 79, 104, 109,

114, 120, 122, 123, 124, 127,

129, 135, 155, 190, 207, 209,

215, 235

MRB (motorized rifle battalion),

7, 8, 9, 30, 57, 132, 184, 218

MRC (motorized rifle company),

185, 234, 235, 236, 238, 240,

243

MTI (moving target indicator),

175

mutual support, 166, 167, 168,

169, 190, 236

NAI (named area of interest), 34,

74, 198, 237, 240

Napoleon, 21, 35

Neckar River, 75, 172, 173, 174

Nelson Lake, 119, 134, 138

Northern Corridor, 3, 29, 31, 33,

51, 77, 87, 140, 141

North Wall, 52, 58, 107, 108,

109, 118, 126, 145, 154, 184,

185, 192, 220, 222, 223, 225

Objective Texas, 207, 208, 211,

212

obscuration, 58, 66, 67, 125, 222,

226, 243

observers, 159, 161, 162, See also

"eyes."

obstacle, 7, 8, 9, 14, 31, 32, 39,

40, 47, 55, 84, 85, 89, 111,

113, 115, 118, 125, 126, 129,

146, 162, 189, 203, 204, 205,

221, 222, 225, 232, 242

OC (observer-controller), 21, 82,

98, 103, 143, 152, 161, 185,

188, 191, 228
Index

253

offensive, 10 12, 14, 35, 54, 176,

199, 200, 204, 210

OH-58 - 83

OP (observation post), 187

OPORDER (operation order), 45,

63, 121, 145, 146

opportunity, 9, 10, 13, 16, 18, 21,

56, 64, 70, 98, 130, 171, 174,

176, 178, 191, 193, 197, 219

OPTEMPO (operating tempo),

75, 81

orchestration, 15, 16

over-the-shoulder, 91, 166

PAA (position area for artillery),

66

Paladin, 92

passage of lines, 31, 32, 33, 132,

181, 234

Patton, Gen. George S., Jr., 21,

35, 172, 175

Peanut, 4, 54, 145, 147, 205

picture, 26, 31, 32, 33, 60, 64, 78,

84, 85, 86, 95, 118, 165, 166,

171, 173, 174, 181, 189, 209,

236, 245

PIR (priority intelligence

requirements), 53, 79, 195,

197, 244

planning, 34, 60, 69, 81, 82, 86,

92, 93, 98, 111, 112, 115, 117,

121, 122, 133, 141, 146, 157,

186, 232, 237, 242, 243

position on the battlefield, 12, 52,

66, 79, 97, 214, 

purpose, 19, 46, 79, 99, 101, 148,

150, 176, 207, 208, 222, 243

R&S plan (reconnaissance and

surveillance plan), 52, 240

Racetrack, 3, 4, 107, 123, 127,

148, 154, 185

radar, 26, 52, 55, 136, 161

radio traffic, 22, 89, 95

Raptor, 199, 200, See also ICO.

recock, 128, 130, 132, 151, 219

reconnaissance, 7, 8, 16, 33, 38,

44, 46, 48, 49, 51, 53, 58, 61,

69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 79, 80, 84,

85, 91, 93, 99, 105, 107, 127,

140, 150, 160, 161, 166, 183,

186, 187, 171, 197, 233, 237,

238, 240

Red Pass, 5, 7, 8, 187

red zone fight, 199

rehearsal, 21, 35, 44, 82, 83, 89,

90, 92, 93, 114, 121, 122, 133,

142, 146, 235

repetitive, 18, 19, 20, 36, 74

reserve, 12, 51, 52, 53, 57, 61, 73,

90, 91, 92, 97, 99, 102, 105,

125, 140, 150, 204, 225, 227,

228, 239, 240

retransmission, 77, 87, 88, 156,

210

reverse slope, 7, 39, 70, 76, 119,

126

RFI (request for information),

150

Rhine River, 175

risk, 25, 26, 30, 50, 51, 52, 64,

65, 66, 67, 73, 76, 90, 161,

165, 168, 169, 184, 195, 198,

200, 231

rock drill, 35, 92, 93

Rommel, Field Marshal Erwin,

170

running estimate, 19, 148, 149,

157

S2 - 31, 85, 91, 96, 152, 181, 191,

214, 243, 245

S3 - 31, 52, 64, 81, 84, 87, 92, 97,

112, 113, 130, 137, 142, 143,

146, 152, 156, 191, 192, 193,

199, 230, 231, 238, 241, 242,

243, 244, 245

sabot, 138

safety, 66, 67, 88, 89, 90, 190

Sapper, 111, 124, 125
254

scatterable mines, 113, 201

schwerpunkt, 203

scouts, 22, 55, 74, 83, 156, 176,

187, 209, 231, 233, 234, 237,

240, 241, 244

SEAD (suppression of enemy air

defense), 66

sector, 7, 33, 39, 72, 73, 78, 146

see the enemy, 18, 19, 45, 152,

160, 161, 168, 169, 233, 243

see the terrain, 13, 43, 233

see yourself, 13, 18, 150, 157,

233

sequential, 15, 16, 20, 38, 62, 73

shape, 39, 40, 114, 157, 182, 242

Siberia, 5, 39, 43, 51, 54, 97, 99,

100, 102, 125, 130

Siberian Ridge, 5, 7, 70

simulation, 11, 19, 20, 72, 75, 93,

173, 177, 192, 194, 196, 198,

217

simultaneous, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21,

33, 34, 62, 66, 77, 82, 92, 146,

153, 218, 219

SITREP (situation report), 154,

156, 191, 192

situational awareness, 16, 30, 62,

72, 75, 77, 89, 123, 132, 135,

165, 168, 169, 170, 171, 174,

179, 191

smoke, 7, 26, 46, 58, 66, 67, 96,

97, 113, 125, 132, 138, 139,

154, 220, 222, 223, 224, 226,

236, 238, 240, 241, 242, 244

Sokol, 78

Southern Corridor, 5, 54, 69, 72,

77, 87, 90, 91, 128, 140, 142

South Wall, 51, 97, 118, 119,

124, 148, 151, 152, 153, 184,

185, 192, 220, 233

SP (start point), 31, 114

space, 15, 19, 20, 36, 39, 72, 73,

77, 78, 124, 195

specificity, 14, 18, 145, 237

staff, 11, 12, 15, 17, 18, 22, 43,

45, 49, 65, 77, 81, 82, 84, 89,

93, 94, 95, 96, 105, 113, 121,

122, 139, 145, 155, 179, 183,

189, 196, 198, 246

striker platoon, 74

supervision, 21, 22, 23, 47, 48

supporting effort, 29, 46, 99, 101,

102, 104, 113, 131, 245

survivability position, 116

synchronization, 15, 16, 21, 36,

41, 67, 96, 98, 101, 102, 105,

106, 109, 115, 121, 122, 127,

142, 152, 204

synergistic, 20, 21

TAC (tactical CP), 31, 112, 113,

123, 130, 131, 142, 179, 189

TACSAT (tactical satellite), 79

TAI (target area of interest), 34

task and purpose, 46, 101

Task Force Angel, 39, 52, 127,

225

task organization, 46, 49, 50, 149,

150

technology, 20, 31, 32, 35, 36,

45, 72, 75, 135, 139, 165, 178,

200

tempo, 22, 75, 76, 166

terrain, 2, 8, 9, 10, 13, 17, 18, 19,

21, 23, 38, 40, 43, 45, 53, 60,

61, 70, 74, 99, 101, 104, 105,

107, 109, 111, 112, 114, 117,

118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 136,

137, 138, 140, 141, 147, 150,

151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 157,

162, 193, 200, 202, 207, 209,

210, 211, 213, 214, 216, 224,

225, 226, 229, 231, 233, 234,

235, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243

terrain analysis, 88, 111, 112,

118, 119, 120, 125

Tiefort Mountain, 5, 136, 183

time and space, 12, 15, 63, 157
Index

255

TOC (tactical operations center),

22, 53, 62, 65, 77, 80, 83, 85,

86, 87, 92, 95, 104, 111, 112,

113, 117, 118, 123, 128, 143,

146, 148, 150, 156, 165, 166,

170, 171, 173, 179, 186, 189,

191, 192, 195, 198, 231, 240,

244, 245

TOW (tube-launched, opticallytracked, wire-guided), 26, 90,

127, 137

TRP (target reference point), 115,

117, 131, 132

TTP (tactics, techniques, and

procedures), 64, 72, 130, 182

UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle),

45, 72, 73, 77, 85, 86, 88, 134,

175, 196, 197, 198, 199

UH60, 77, 79, 201, See also

Blackhawk.

Valley of Death, 5, 69, 97, 99,

125, 128, 183, 184

virtual, 20

vision, 18, 35, 88, 109, 156, 242,

243

visualization, 11, 19, 63, 64, 96,

106, 109, 133, 149, 157, 160,

195, 243

Volcano, 53, 111, 113, 126, 127,

200, 204

Vtel (commercial videoteleconferencing hardware), 31

VTR (vehicle, tracked, recovery),

26

wadi, 8, 10, 45, 118, 126, 151,

225, 231, 236

Warfighter (Division-level

Advanced Warfighting

Exercise, [DAWE or DIV

AWE] supporting Digital

Advance Warfighting

Experiment [DAWE]), 49, 72,

165, 199, 200, 201, See also

Division AWE. 

wargame, 12, 37, 38, 41, 82, 122,

146, 207

WARNO (warning order), 58, 93,

243

Washboard, 4, 9, 10, 59, 60, 61,

150, 151, 152, 233, 234

weather, 16, 17, 58, 60, 61, 159,

160, 161, 188, 226, 229

Whale, 5, 43, 131

Whale Gap, 5, 7, 69, 70, 100, 128

Wurzburg, 165, 166, 167, 170

XO (executive officer), 7, 8, 77,

84, 112, 113, 153, 156, 213,

215, 244, 245

zone, 39, 97, 165
256