Mr. Darrell G. Lochte

CountyAttorney Kerrvllle, Texas OpinionNo. WW-1449
Re: Qualificationsof Agreed

Dear
with fied Supervisorsunder Article 3.06,Vernon's Texas ElecMr. Lochte: tion Code.
You ask whether agreed supervisors selected in accordance Article 3.06 of Vernon's Texas Election Codemust be qualivoters of the election precinct in which theymay serve as well as qualified voters of the county.

Our answer Is that such agreed supervisorsmust be qualified voters of the countybut they are not required to be qualified voters of the election precinct inwhich they may serve.

Article 3.06 of the Election Code, in Its pertinent portion, reads as follows:

"Any five (5) or one-fifth (l/5) of the candidates,whichever is less, whose names appear on the official ballot of any general, special, or primary election, on the day preceding the electionor prior theretomay agree inwriting signedby them upon two (2) supervisorswho, when selected, shall be sworn as election offlcers. Said supervisors shallbe.qualified voters of the county in which they may serve as such supervisors,

. . ."

The requirements of this Article 3.06 are clear and would be without question, except for the general requirement of Article 3.03 of this Code. The pertinentportion of this latterArticle Is:

"All supervisors, judges and clerks of any general or primary election shall be qualified voters of the election precinct in which they are named to serve. 11

. . . The followingprinciple of law is well established,and is applicable and determinative in this situation.Mr. Darrell G. Lochte, Page 2 OpinionNo. WW-1449

.Thegeneral rule is that when the iawmakes a generalprovision,wparently for all cases, and a special provision for a particular class, the generalmust yield to the special in so far as theparticular class is concerned. Perez v. Perez, 59 Tex. 322. This rule is based upon theprinciple that all acts and parts thereofmust stand, ifpossible, each occupying itsproper place, and that the intentionof the Legislature ismore clearly reflectedby a particular statute than by a general one. Accordingly a specificact isproperly regarded as an exception to, or qualificationof, a general law on the same subjectpreviously enacted. In such a case both statutes are permitted to stand, the general one being applicable to all cases except the particular one embraced in the specific act. Townsend v. 16 S.w.2d 1063.” Terrell, 118 Tex. 463, Sam Bassett Lumber Co. v. City of Houston, 145 Tex. 492, 198 S.W.2d 879 (1947). See also City of Austin v. Cahill, 99 Tex. 172, 88 S.W. 542 (1905); Gabbert v. City of Brownwood, 176 S.W.2d 344 (Civ.App. 1943, error ref.); 39 Tex.Jur. 212-213, Statutes, Sec. 114.

SUMMARY Agreed supervisors selectedunder authority of Article 3.06, Vernon'sTexas Election Code, are required to be qualifiedvoters of the county in which theymay serve but are not required to be qualifiedvoters of the election precinct in which theymay serve. Yours very truly,
WILL WILSON Attorney General of Texas

By: LA h&J W. E. Allen AssistantAttorney General WEA:pw:jp APPROVED:Mr. Darrell G. Lochte, Page 3

OPINION COMMITTEE: W. V. Geppert, Chairman
Pat Bailey Iola Wilcox Gordon Zuber
REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL By: Leonard Passmore OpinionNo. WW-1449