THE ROLLBACK OF SOUTH AFRICAíS

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

PROGRAM

by

Dr. Stephen F. Burgess

and

Dr. Helen E. Purkitt

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air War College

Air University

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
The Rollback of South Africaís

Chemical and Biological Warfare Program

Dr. Stephen F. Burgess

and

Dr. Helen E. Purkitt

April 2001

USAF Counterproliferation Center

Air War College

Air University

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427

The internet address for the USAF Counterproliferation Center is:

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm

.
Contents

Page

Disclaimer.....................................................................................................i

The Authors ............................................................................................... iii

Acknowledgments .......................................................................................v

Chronology ................................................................................................vii

I. Introduction .............................................................................................1

II. The Origins of the Chemical and Biological Warfare Program.............3

III. Project Coast, 1981-1993....................................................................17

IV. Rollback of Project Coast, 1988-1994................................................39

V. Transition to ANC Rule, Proliferation Concerns and Efforts to 

 Conceal Project Coast Details: 1994-1996.........................................57

VI. Bassonís Arrest and Trial and TRC Hearings, 1997-2000.................65

VII. Conclusion.........................................................................................81

Appendix A................................................................................................83

Appendix B................................................................................................85

Appendix C................................................................................................97

Notes..........................................................................................................99
i

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S.

Government, Department of Defense, or the USAF Counterproliferation

Center.
iii

The Authors

Stephen F. Burgess is Assistant Professor of International Security

Studies and an Associate of the U.S. Air Force Counterproliferation

Center, U.S. Air War College. He completed his Ph.D. at Michigan State

University, was chosen as a Fulbright-Hays Dissertation Research Abroad

fellow, and was a Research Associate at the University of Zimbabwe. Dr.

Burgess was a Lecturer at the University of Zambia, an Instructor at

Vanderbilt University, and an Assistant Professor at Hofstra University,

New York where he taught courses on democratization, international

political economy, and international organizations and law. Dr. Burgess

has been an active scholar for more than a decade, presenting papers at

conferences of the African Studies Association, American Political

Science Association, and International Studies Association. In 1997, his

book, Smallholders and Political Voice in Zimbabwe, was published by

the University Press of America, and he is under contract with Scarecrow

Press to write The United Nations under Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992-97.

Dr. Burgess has published several book chapters and journal articles,

including ìAfrican Security in the 21st Century: The Challenges of

Indigenization and Multilateralism,î African Studies Review (September

1998). His research interests include international organizations,

peacekeeping, and African politics and security.

Helen E. Purkitt obtained her Ph.D. in International Relations from the

University of Southern California. She is Professor of Political Science at

the U.S. Naval Academy. Her research and teaching interests include

African politics, environmental politics, international relations theory, and

political decision-making. Past INSS/NARC sponsored research includes

developing a system to monitor environmental threats in African regions

(1997) and ìThe Politics of Denuclearization: The Case of South Africa"

(1995). She is currently completing an on-line introductory Political

Psychology textbook and a book-length manuscript on South Africaís

past, present, and future defense policies. Recent publications include, ìA

Problem Centered Approach for Understanding Foreign Policy: Some

Examples from U.S. Foreign Policy toward Southern Africaî in S. Nagel

(Ed.) Handbook of Global International Policy (New York: Marcel
iv

Dekker, 2000), Editor, Annual Editions: World Politics 00/01

(Dushkin/McGraw Hill, 2000); ìBridging Gaps: The Experiences of Two

Members of the First Generation of Civilian Women Professors at

USNA,î in F. DíAmico and L. Weinstein (Eds.) INSIDE/OUTSIDE:

Women & the U.S. Military (New York University Press, 1998); and,

ìProblem Representations and Political Expertise: Evidence from ëThink

Aloud Protocols of South African Elites,î in D. Sylvan and J.F. Voss

(Eds.), Problem Representation in International Relations (Cambridge

University Press, 1998).
v

Acknowledgments

This research was supported by the U.S. Air Force Institute for

National Security Studies (INSS), U.S. Air Force Academy, and the U.S.

Air Force Counterproliferation Center (CPC), Maxwell Air Force Base,

and the Naval Academy Research Council (NARC) at the U.S. Naval

Academy.
vii

Chronology

1939-1945 South Africa produces mustard gas during World War II.

1946 South Africa dumps mustard gas out to sea.

21 March 1960 The Sharpeville Massacre incident brings international

condemnation of South Africa.

1962-1967 Egypt uses chemical warfare in North Yemen.

1963 South Africa accedes to the 1925 Protocol to the Geneva

Convention, banning chemical and biological warfare

(CBW). UN approves a voluntary arms embargo against

South Africa.

1964 South Africa begins to assist Portugal and Rhodesia in

counter-insurgency campaigns against guerrilla forces.

1967 South African Police (SAP) intervene in Rhodesia

against guerrillas.

1972 South Africa signs the Convention on the Prohibition of

the Development, Production and Stockpiling of

Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on Their

Destruction (the BWC).

1974-1975 ìDÈtenteî between South Africa and Zambia leads to

cease-fire and SAP withdrawal from Rhodesia.

1975 South Africa ratifies BWC.

25 June 1975 Mozambique becomes independent under a revolutionary

communist regime.

11 November 1975 Angola becomes independent under a revolutionary

communist regime. Cuban troops stop South African

offensive.

December 1975 Clark Amendment stops U.S. aid to UNITA and leads to

isolation of South Africa in Angola.
viii

February 1976 Defense Minister P.W. Botha delivers a speech to the

South African Parliament, warning of a Soviet-led ìtotal

onslaughtî campaign, which could involve NBC

weapons.

16 June 1976 Soweto Uprisings begin and last until 1977, leading to a

call for more effective crowd control CBW agents.

1976-1979 War in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) intensifies and leads to

accusations of South African involvement in CBW

attacks. Preparations proceed for a sophisticated CBW

program.

1978 P.W. Botha becomes Prime Minister.

May 1978 Cassinga Raid on guerrilla camp in Angola leads to

accusations of South African CW.

1980 Gen. Magnus Malan becomes Defense Minister.

April-May 1981 Project Coast is launched, with Dr. Wouter Basson as

Director.

August 1981 Operation Protea is launched by SADF in Angola.

1982 Delta G Scientific Company begins work on CW agents.

December 1982 Dr. Basson allegedly arranges killing of 200 SWAPO

prisoners.

1983 Roodepoort Research Laboratories (RRL) begins work

on BW agents. P.W. Botha becomes State President

under new constitution.

1984 A new wave of uprisings begins and lasts until 1986.

CDC, Atlanta, sends samples of Ebola, Marburg and Rift

Valley viruses to South Africa.

June 1985 State of Emergency is declared in South Africa.

1985 Plans for a chemical and biological weapons program are

devised.

1986 Covert negotiations begin between the regime and the

ANC.
ix

1985-1989 Both sides in the Angolan war raise claims of rival use of

CW.

October 1987 Both sides claim CW used by other in battle of Cuito

Cuanavale in Angola.

1988 Surgeon General Nieuwoudt dies and is replaced by Dr.

Knobel. Negotiated settlement concluded for the

withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and South

African forces from Namibia.

January 1989 P.W. Botha suffers a stroke and is replaced by F.W. de

Klerk on an interim basis.

April 1989 The Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) attempts to

assassinate Rev. Frank Chikane with poison.

30 July 1989 President de Klerk announces the formation of the Kahn

Committee to investigate covert activities by security

forces. Project Coast is not investigated.

September 1989 F.W. de Klerk is elected and assumes office as President.

November 1989 President de Klerk orders rollback of nuclear weapons

program.

January 1990 U.S. issues warning to South Africa, calling for nuclear

disarmament, or else the U.S. would consider South

Africa to be ìhostileî to the U.S.

February 1990 Ban on ANC is lifted, and Nelson Mandela is released.

26 March 1990 Dr. Knobel briefs President de Klerk on Project Coast as

a ìdefensiveî CBW program. De Klerk orders

destruction of lethal agents.

April 1990 Defense Minister Malan orders privatization of Delta G,

RRL and Protechnik.

1990-1991 The Harms Commission investigates ìthird forceî

activities in South Africa.

July 1991 Privatization of Delta G, RRL and Protechnik proceeds,

leading to massive payments to Basson and his

associates.
x

September 1991 U.S. becomes aware of Project Coast.

19 November 1991 Kahn Committee issues final report, but Project Coast is

not included.

December 1991 Basson sent to Croatia and buys 500 kgs. of

methaqualone to import into South Africa.

16 January 1992 Suspected CW attack by South Africa is launched against

Mozambique.

18 November 1992 Lt. Gen. Pierre Steyn is appointed to investigate SADF

secret projects, including Project Coast.

January 1993 President de Klerk receives the Steyn Report, retires 27

generals and Col. Basson, and orders rollback of Project

Coast. Documents are placed on CD-ROM and CBW

agents are dumped out to sea.

31 March 1993 Basson is retired from active duty and removed as head

of Project Coast.

August 1993 Office of Serious Economic Offenses (OSEO) informs

the CIA and MI-6 of the misdeeds of Basson and Project

Coast.

October 1993 Basson makes the first of five trips to Libya.

November 1993 U.S. and UK object to the South African Confidence

Building Measure (CBM) for the BWC.

January 1994 Negotiated settlement reached for elections and an

interim government.

11 April 1994 U.S. and UK ambassadors deliver demarche to President

de Klerk regarding Project Coast secrets and CBW

proliferation.

21 April 1994 President de Klerk responds to demarche and asserts that

Project Coast CD-ROMs are a ìnational assetî and will

not be destroyed.

27 April 1994 Nelson Mandela and ANC win elections and head

interim government of national unity.

19 August 1994 Dr. Knobel briefs President Mandela on Project Coast.
xi

November 1994 OSEO completes Project Coast report. It is labeled ìtop

secret.î

15 April 1995 South Africa submits revised BWC CBM, with U.S. and

UK approval.

May 1995 Basson is rehired as a regular SANDF surgeon.

October 1995 Basson makes the last of five visits to Libya.

December 1995 Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is

established.

February 1996 After 16 months, the Mandela cabinet acts on the OSEO

report on Project Coast.

January 1997 Basson is arrested in Pretoria while selling 1,000 Ecstasy

tablets and is found in possession of secret Project Coast

documents.

June 1998 Project Coast scientists testify before TRC.

July 1998 Basson testifies before TRC.

August 1998 Basson is charged on 17 counts, including murder,

conspiracy to commit murder and fraud.

4 October 1999 Basson trial begins in Pretoria.

27 February 2001 State rests its case in the Basson trial.
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 1

The Rollback of South Africaís

Chemical and Biological Warfare Program

by Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt

I. Introduction

From the 1960s until the 1990s, apartheid South Africa was an isolated

state that felt threatened by growing domestic unrest, as well as by a more

powerful state actor, the Soviet Union, which was helping hostile regimes

and liberation movements in southern Africa. 

One response of the apartheid regime to changing threat perceptions

outside and inside of South Africa was to develop a new and more

sophisticated chemical and biological warfare (CBW) program, code-named

ìProject Coast,î and to accelerate a nuclear weapons program. The CBW

decision-making process was secretive and controlled by the military and

enabled a very sophisticated program to be developed with little outside

scrutiny. Military and police units used chemical and biological agents for

counter-insurgency warfare, assassination, and execution of war prisoners.

As the regime felt increasingly threatened by opposition at home, top

political leaders approved plans for research and development of exotic

means to neutralize opponents, large-scale offensive uses of the program, and

weaponization. However, the plans were not operationalized. The end of the

external threat led to a decision to unilaterally dismantle the program, prior

to a shift to majority rule. Lack of civilian control over military programs

made the rollback difficult, rife with corruption, and left proliferation

concerns in place.

Ultimately, the United States, Great Britain, and other countries

pressured the South African government to ensure that the CBW program

was dismantled and the former project manager, Dr. Wouter Basson,

constrained. However, Basson secretly retained copies of Project Coast

documents, which helped to perpetuate proliferation concerns.

Today, a divide exists between those who believe that South Africa

developed the ìsecond most sophisticatedî program, after the Soviet Unionís,

and are concerned about proliferation, and those who believe that it was
2 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

ìpedestrian.î The former are focused on the proliferation danger, while the

latter are focused on the criminality and corruption of the program. 

This monograph analyzes the origins and development of the South

African CBW program, as well as its rollback. It concludes with a profile of

South Africa as a state that produced weapons of mass destruction and with

a list of outstanding questions. More than 20 policy lessons, based on the

South African case, are presented, which should be considered in future

CBW non-proliferation studies (see Appendix B).
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 3

II. The Origins of the Chemical and Biological Warfare 

 Program

In 1981 or earlier, the South African government initiated Project Coast,

a sophisticated chemical and biological warfare (CBW) program. The focus

here is on the biological aspect of the program, which was especially

sophisticated, and how it developed. 

Project Coast was not the first CBW program that the South African

government had developed. From 1914-1918 and 1939-1945, South African

troops fought in the two World Wars and faced the threat of CBW. Although

the 1925 Geneva Convention banned the use of chemical and biological

weapons in warfare, Japan and possibly the Soviet Union employed such

weapons in WWII. As early as the 1930s, widespread evidence emerged of

the efficacy of biological warfare (BW) based on scientific work conducted

in the US, United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.1

 The South African

scientific and military communities kept pace with the various developments

in CBW. 

In the 1940s, South Africa produced mustard gas for possible use in

WWII. According to Dr. Renfrew Christie,2 the mining industry had

developed, since the 1930s, explosives that were linked with chemical agents.

 The Anglo-American Corporation, Anglo-Vaal, and other companies were

involved. The Director-General of War, H.J. van der Bijl, oversaw the

production of chemical weapons and defensive measures that would protect

South African troops against chemical and biological attack during the

Second World War.

During WWII, South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts was a member

of the British War Cabinet and party to CBW planning. For example, the

War Cabinet, in 1943, planned to retaliate against the threat of Nazi

biological warfare (BW) on British livestock. The plan was to use anthrax

spores, released by 500-pound cluster bombs, each containing over 100 fourpound spore devices. Trials at Porton Down in the UK indicated that the

cluster bombs produced effective aerosol concentration of spores that covered

nearly 100 acres from impact. 

The War Cabinet viewed this biological weapon as a ìquick-fixî

solution weapon requiring no special munitions or hardware. The British

would simply charge ordinary cattle cakes with anthrax spores. This was a
4 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

neat and simple example of wholly effective, precision deliverance, literally

down the throat and into the stomach of targeted cattle. By the end of WWII,

the British had stockpiled five million cakes.3 During the Second World

War, South Africa learned from the British the lesson that BW was simple

technology that anyone could use and that it could be effective, under certain

conditions, in Africa.4

In the 1940s and 1950s, South Africaís wartime connections with Britain

and the United States continued. South African officers trained in Britain and

the United States in chemical and biological warfare strategy and tactics.5

Also, in the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration initiated the United States

ìAtoms for Peaceî program, which proved to be a significant factor

contributing to South Africaís later ability to produce nuclear weapons.6

After the Second World War, in 1946, South Africa dumped large

quantities of mustard gas out to sea. However, South Africa did not roll back

its CBW program entirely. According to Dr. Vernon Joynt of Mechem (an

explosives warfare company) and the Council for Scientific and Industrial

Research (CSIR),7 the literature on the World War II program was

maintained. Also, the South African Defense Force (SADF) maintained a

small military program related to CBW research and development. The

government also maintained funding for a modest number of basic research

projects located in the Afrikaans universities and other government supported

institutions. Much of this research was conducted under the umbrella of

CSIR. 

In 1960, Dr. Joynt helped start a new phase of the chemical warfare

(CW) program, when he corrected a problem with tear gas that was then used

to control riots and to deal with militants hiding in the bush. In the 1960

Pondoland uprising in Transkei, tear gas was extensively used. That same

year, Dr. Joynt was sent to a nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) warfare

course in the United Kingdom. In the 1960s, CSIR continued to work on tear

gas and on CX powder for tracking. Dr. Joynt fitted Cessna Aircraft, which

were used by SADF in spreading CX powder. In the mid-1960s, CSIR

worked on mustard gas and on gas masks to replace the World War II-vintage

masks of the SADF. 

The Egyptians had used chemical weapons in Yemen in the mid-1960s

and may have passed their expertise on to the African National Congress

(ANC). So, South African leaders realized the importance of updating their
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 5

own CBW program. The EMAC (electrical, mechanical, agricultural, and

chemical) Department worked on and innovated weapons, including those

using chemical and biological agents, during the 1960s and 1970s.8

In 1963, South Africa belatedly became a party to the 1925 Geneva

Convention, banning the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare.

 From 1925 to 1963, South Africa was not willing to forswear CBW in

combat situations. South African accession to the Geneva Convention and

ratification of the 1975 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,

Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on

their Destruction (BWC) did not deter apartheid leaders from continuing to

develop a new and more sophisticated CBW program in the 1980s.

According to Dr. Joynt, in the early 1970s, SADF generals asked the

CSIR for ìaggressiveî CBW agents and wanted a CBW industry started. Dr.

Joyntís superior, J. Wynand de Villiers commented that Africa was not the

kind of continent for CBW and that a CBW program was too ìcomplexî and

too expensive to develop. In 1974, de Villiers wrote a 10-page report, in

which he gave a R500 million (more than $500 million in 1974 U.S. dollars)

estimate to build a CBW program. Finally, de Villiers concluded that the

USSR was too well armed with CBW and would retaliate against any CBW

attack.9 The SADF postponed its plans to develop an offensive CBW

program and supported a minimal CBW research and development program,

which was never well developed. By 1980, it consisted of only one

individual who worked on CBW at the Special Forces complex in Pretoria.10

After the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960 and the imposition of a United

Nations arms embargo, the rulers of South Africa developed a heightened

sense of isolation, withdrawing from the British Commonwealth in 1961 and

distancing South Africa from the West. Especially under Prime Minister

Verwoerd in the 1960s, the ruling Afrikaner nationalist elite developed a

ìlaagerî (or ìcircle the wagonsî) complex. Afrikaner nationalists saw

themselves as an ethnic and religious minority and as ìGodís chosen people,î

surrounded by ìblack heathensî and ìgodless communistsî and betrayed by

the West. The iconoclastic character of the Afrikaner nationalists had been

developed over 300 years of settler history and a series of wars, with African

kingdoms and with the British Empire. As the laager complex deepened, a

similar process of isolation was developing in Israel, known as the ìMasada

complex.î Like their South African counterparts, Israeli leaders saw
6 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

themselves as a ìchosen peopleî surrounded by enemies who were attempting

to annihilate them. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the isolation of South

Africa and Israel by African and Arab states led both countries to cooperate

with each other on armaments development, including the nuclear weapons

and missile programs. It is suspected that they also cooperated on chemical

and biological warfare research and development.

Counter-insurgency and Chemical and Biological Warfare in

Southern Africa

South Africaís threat perceptions changed as guerrilla activities in the

southern African region increased in the 1960s and 1970s. South African

involvement in counter-insurgency campaigns in the region influenced the

direction that South Africaís CBW development took in the 1980s, and also

provided useful training opportunities, strategies, and tactics that influenced

the way South African defense and police special covert units used CBW

against political opponents. Moreover, many of the Selous Scouts,

Rhodesiaís elite counter-insurgency force, who were experienced in using

CBW for counter-insurgency, joined South Africaís Special Forces and police

after the political transition in Zimbabwe in 1980. The Rhodesian CBW

program has been chronicled by a former top Rhodesian agent, Henrik Ellert

and by Tom Mangold in Plague Wars.

11 Some former Selous Scouts played

key roles in incidents where South African Special Forces and police used

CBW agents against opponents during the 1980s and 1990s.12

In the early 1960s, South Africaís response to developing guerrilla

movements and a changing regional security environment was to increase

security force cooperation with Portuguese forces fighting guerrilla

insurgencies in the former colonies of Angola and Mozambique and with

Rhodesian police and defense forces. Increased involvement in security

operations in southern African states was part of a national security strategy

designed to counter communist-inspired guerrilla campaigns in those states.

 Also, the regime sought to be in a position to launch attacks on African

National Congress (ANC) and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) military

training camps in Zambia and Tanzania.13 The South African military was

anxious to obtain first-hand experience with counter-insurgency techniques

and interested in exploring the potential usefulness of unconventional
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 7

chemical and biological weapons.14

The Portuguese military were the first to use CBW for counterinsurgency warfare in Africa. Portuguese troops poisoned wells and threw

drugged prisoners out of aircraft. South African military officers were

dispatched to Portuguese Army units in Angola to gain experience in counterinsurgency warfare. In general, South African military personnel were not

impressed with the overall effectiveness of Portuguese counter-insurgency

programs. However, officers who worked in Angola did learn first-hand how

the Portuguese military used defoliants and napalm, mined trails, and

poisoned water holes as tactics to counter their guerrilla enemies without

having to engage in direct combat.15

In the 1960s, South African police and military personnel started helping

the former Rhodesian government deal with an increased ìterroristî threat.

 In 1967, the South African Police (SAP) sent a contingent to help with

border patrols, as ANC and Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU)

guerrillas infiltrated into the country from Zambia. The SAP trained

Rhodesian intelligence personnel and, later, the Selous Scouts in mine laying

and other counter-insurgency techniques. The SAP acquired some of their

techniques from the French in Algeria.16

In the mid-to-late 1960s, South African Defense Force (SADF) military

advisers in Zimbabwe assisted with the interrogation of captured ANC

guerrillas. The South African military was interested in gaining experience

in bush warfare and establishing enhanced intelligence monitoring

capabilities of ANC and PAC political and guerrilla activities in neighboring

states. A detachment of Corps of Signals of the SADF Monitoring Division

known as ìV Troopî started intercepting and de-ciphering coded radio

transmissions of Zambian police in 1968. After the high-profile withdrawal

of SAP forces in early 1975, SADF personnel remained behind, maintaining

a low profile. Their presence was increasingly important to Rhodesian

security, and SADF personnel participated in several counter-insurgency

operations conducted by the Selous Scouts, from 1973 to 1979, in Rhodesia,

Mozambique, and Zambia.17

The former commander of the Selous Scouts emphasized the importance

of counter-insurgency tactics developed by the British in Malaysia and

Kenya, but noted that they had to modify these tactics in the process of
8 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

developing their distinctive approach towards counter-insurgency warfare.18

This approach included a willingness to experiment with new types of

weapons, including chemical and biological ones.19 The Selous Scouts

experimented with the use of poisons, for example, to impregnate toxins into

blue jeans slated for guerrillas of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation

Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA)

guerrillas. The Scouts also experimented with poisoned pens to assassinate

guerrilla leaders, and with bacteriological cultures that they introduced into

the Ruya River near the Mozambique border in 1976. Former top Rhodesian

intelligence operative, Henrik Ellert, claims that a Selous Scout operation

poisoned the water supply of a town in Tete province, Mozambique in an

attempt to kill ZANLA guerrillas who were reported to be operating in the

area. Other accounts allege that Rhodesian military forces experimented with

cholera to contaminate rivers and with the seeding of anthrax spores in

farming areas used by ZANU and ZAPU in an effort to poison guerrilla food

supplies.20 Finally, Rhodesian forces poisoned wells and were suspected of

using chemical and biological agents, especially in Rhodesiaís Eastern

Highlands and across the border in Mozambique.21

As the 1970s developed, the Rhodesian government became increasingly

dependent on South Africa for financial support and military hardware. By

the end of the 1970s, SADF military intelligence was a principal source of

funding for the Rhodesian counter-insurgency program, including the Selous

Scouts. The Rhodesian defense budget was very small, and the regime had

one rudimentary chemical and biological warfare plant that received outside

aid from South Africa. In assisting Rhodesia, South African researchers

continued to work on CBW and land mine projects.22

After 1980 and the independence of Zimbabwe, South African

involvement in the Rhodesian guerrilla war provided useful training

opportunities and personnel connections. Many Selous Scouts left Rhodesia

and were quickly integrated into special units of the SADF and SAP. SADF

Special Forces and SAP officers stationed in Rhodesia had studied the

organizational structures and tactics used by the Selous Scouts, including the

use of chemical and biological agents. 

Similar tactics were used in Namibia and Angola by personnel assigned

to the 5th Reconnaissance Commandos, by the SAP security branch
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 9

ìcrowbarî (koevoet) unit, and by the SADF Special Forces D40 unit. They

were also employed in covert support operations for the Union for the Total

Independence of Angola (UNITA) and in Operation Barnacle in the 1970s

and 1980s.23

The Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) in South Africa employed many

of these same tactics against political dissidents in the late 1980s and early

1990s. Toward the end of the apartheid era, the use of poisons against

dissidents became routine CCB practice. By the time Eugene De Kock took

charge of the CCB in 1988, he had a working relationship and regular

contacts with Wouter Basson, the director of the CBW program, known as

Project Coast. Whenever the CCB wanted ìspecial toolsî for interrogations

or to eliminate political dissidents, Basson was available to supply

customized orders.24

Variable Effectiveness of CBW in Counter-Insurgency and

Difficulties Verifying Use of Biological Agents

Evidence of the use of biological and toxic agents during the Rhodesian

war indicates variability and, in some instances, unintended consequences.

 For example, the program developed by the Selous Scouts to poison new

blue jeans that were then to be worn by ZANLA guerrillas was aborted, after

several farmers died when they purchased and wore the jeans. Selous Scouts

intermediaries, who were paid for each pair of jeans delivered to guerrillas,

had started to sell the pants to stores that serviced rural populations. 

After the Selous Scouts received reports that ZANLA rebels were using

a village in Tete province, Mozambique, the Selous Scouts introduced

poisonous biological agents into the Ruya River to kill the guerrillas and their

supporters. Despite intensive intelligence gathering efforts, no effects on the

guerrillas were detected. However, over 200 villagers died suddenly after

drinking the water in the reservoir that the Selous Scouts had poisoned.25

Debates continue today about the veracity of the claim that former

Rhodesian forces, with South African involvement, planted anthrax spores

in grain fed to cattle in guerrilla-held areas and caused an anthrax epidemic

that struck 10,000 cattle in Zimbabwe in the early 1980s. This long-standing

claim was published in 1999 in Plague Wars,26 a book issued in tandem with

a BBC Panorama documentary on biological warfare (BW). Officials of the
10 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

Zimbabwean veterinary service repeated the claim in 1999. They noted that

the strain of bacteria responsible for the outbreak was not native to Zimbabwe

and immediately alleged that these incidents could be linked to South

Africaís past CBW program. The Zimbabwean government has continued

to emphasize that recurring anthrax outbreaks can be traced to past South

African involvement in the Rhodesian civil war.27 At this writing, these

allegations by the increasingly unpopular Zimbabwean government have not

been substantiated.28

The continuing debate about past use of anthrax as a biological weapon

highlight the fact that many biological agents have long-term effects that are

difficult to verify whether they were caused by deliberate action or were

natural in origin. The continuing controversy, more than two decades after

the event, about whether anthrax was used suggests that BW allegations can

be used as both a psychological weapon to intimidate civilians and rebels in

a conflict zone and as a political dis-information and diversionary tool by

unpopular governments.29

In 1993, there was an outbreak of cholera in Zimbabwe. Dr. Timothy

Stamps, the Zimbabwean Minister of Health, told Tom Mangold of BBC

Panorama that he believed this outbreak was the result of another BW attack

since it seemed to be a controlled outbreak lasting three months and was

eliminated in seven months.30

The SADF experienced similar problems and variable results in their

efforts to counter CBW agents in military operations in Angola, Namibia, and

Mozambique, as well as inside South Africa. Several CBW incidents

underscored the variable effectiveness and unintended consequences of

CBW, as well as the difficulties involved in documenting a CBW attack and

those who initiated it.

From the late 1970s onward, South Africa stepped up its military

activities, by supporting UNITA in Angola and the Mozambican Resistance

Movement (RENAMO) in Mozambique. Operation Barnacle was launched,

aimed at the ANC and its armed wing, Umkhonto we sizwe (MK),

throughout southern Africa. In May 1978, SADF launched the Cassinga raid

against a South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) camp, killing

more than 800 people. In the wake of the raid, SADF soldiers and

paratroopers were accused of using chemical warfare.31 Combined with the

reports coming out of Rhodesia and Mozambique of CBW usage, the Cubans,
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 11

Angolans, and Mozambicans, as well as the ANC, PAC, and SWAPO came

to suspect that South Africa possessed an offensive CBW program.

In Angola in the 1980s, South African troops faced increased costs and

maneuverability problems once they were confronted with the prospect of

wearing defensive CBW masks and uniforms that had to be changed daily.

 SADF troops routinely avoided local water supplies in Angola and parts of

Namibia because they had little intelligence about whether water supplies had

been poisoned by SADF Special Forces secret operations or by guerrillas of

SWAPO, ANC, or UNITA.32

The SADF experienced repeated difficulties in verifying alleged use of

CBW gas by Cuban-backed Angolan government forces. Further, they were

unable to irrefutably rebut allegations that SADF forces used chemical agents

against SWAPO and refugee camps in Angola and Namibia. In addition,

reports persisted that, in early 1989 in Angola, SADF was testing

organophosphates, new generations of teargas, and battlefield missile

warheads. Supposedly, the warheads were being designed to deliver

chemical, biological agents, and possibly even a miniaturized nuclear device.

 Also, in early 1989, UNITA forces in Angola reportedly experienced ìhuge

losses.î33 Some sources alleged that the deaths were due to SADF testing of

chemical gases. Other sources close to SADF claimed that the deaths were

due to an ìunexpected shift in the windî that blew chemical gases onto the

UNITA troops.

The question of who used what type of agents in Rhodesia, Namibia,

Angola, and Mozambique raises important issues. If South African forces

were involved in offensive CBW in southern Africa in the 1970s, it would

have violated international commitments. These included the 1925 Geneva

Protocol, to which South Africa acceded in 1963, and the Convention on the

Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of

Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC), which

South Africa signed in 1972 and ratified in 1975. Also, it means that the

regime might have previously developed chemical and biological weapons

and used them. Claims that Project Coast was developed in the 1980s as a

ìdefensiveî program, in reaction to the ìSoviet and Cuban threatî in Angola

and Mozambique would lose credibility. The South Africa of the 1970s

would be viewed even more as an ìoutlaw state,î willing to break

conventions and subject black victims to chemical and biological attacks. If
12 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

true, it would also appear that the regime was prepared to continually violate

commitments to international law, if threats to its survival continued to grow.

Perceptions of a Soviet and Cuban ìThreatî and

Moves towards a Sophisticated CBW Program

The collapse of Portuguese colonialism led, from 1974 to 1976, to the

takeover of Angola and Mozambique by revolutionary communist regimes,

backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba. Suddenly, South African leaders

found themselves surrounded by communist forces, which were viewed as

implacable and unscrupulous enemies. South African defense experts knew

that the Soviet Union possessed nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)

weapons. In regard to the Soviet BW program, indications of its scale and

sophistication had been gained during and after negotiations surrounding the

1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

According to former South African leaders and generals, NBC programs

were developed with the intention of ìcountering the communist onslaught.î

General (retired) Georg Meiring, former SADF Chief of Staff, commented

that SADF sought protection against BW in the 1970s, as biological weapons

became known as the ìpoor manís atomic bombî and as the possibility of

BW operations by Soviet-trained SWAPO and ANC/MK guerrillas

increased.34

According to Magnus Malan (SADF Chief of Staff, 1975-80 and

Defense Minister, 1980-91), the U.S. encouraged the SADF to enter Angola

in October 1975, and then abandoned South Africa to face Cuban forces

alone.35 In addition, South Africa faced the Soviet and Cuban NBC threat

alone. 

In response, P.W. Botha and Malan proceeded to approve a new and

more sophisticated CBW program and acceleration of the nuclear weapons

program. Brig. Gen. (ret) Bill Sass, former State Security Council member

and SADF Chief of Operations,36 commented that the nuclear weapons

program was developed to defend South Africa against a major communist

onslaught. First, South Africa would announce that it was testing a nuclear

weapon in the hope of drawing in the U.S and the West to resolve the crisis.

 Second, South Africa would announce that it was targeting a major African
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 13

city, like Luanda, which might induce a Soviet nuclear threat and U.S.

intervention.

Similarly, Malan, Meiring and others claimed that the CBW program

was intended to counter the Soviets and Cubans and ANC and SWAPO

guerrilla groups, who might have used chemical and biological weapons of

their own in the 1970s and 1980s.37 However, such contentions remain open

to question and are unproven, until documents from the 1970s prove these

perceptions and actions actually existed.

ìTotal Onslaughtî and Project Coast: Protests and Violence

in South Africa Fuel Support for Expanded CBW Program

In 1976, the Soweto uprisings began, bringing a wave of unrest to South

Africa, after more than a decade of relative calm. The 1976 wave of rebellion

continued into 1977. Unrest would persist until 1984, when an even greater

uprising commenced and lasted for more than two years and reverberated

until 1990. The 1976 uprisings led the apartheid regime to search for ways,

including the use of chemical agents, to control or incapacitate large groups

of people.

After the Soweto uprisings commenced, a high-level political scandal

erupted, ìMuldergate,î which was named after Connie Mulder, the heir

apparent to Prime Minister B.J. Vorster. The scandal demonstrated that

corruption was eating away at the formerly unquestioned strength of the

apartheid regime. Informal norms had become entrenched by the mid-1970s

that permitted an extensive level of corruption within the Afrikanerdominated bureaucracies. The corruption was an important pre-condition that

allowed Wouter Basson and other top officials to use the CBW program in

the late 1980s and early 1990s as a cover for their personal gain.

In the wake of these regime-shaking events, the Defense Minister, P.W.

 Botha, replaced B.J. Vorster as Prime Minister in 1978 and initiated his

vision of the ìtotal strategy.î Botha differed from his predecessor in that he

was oriented towards the military (and special forces), especially because of

his years of service as defense minister. He initiated a range of reforms,

combined with the widespread use of coercive power, to ensure the survival

of the regime. Power was increasingly consolidated in the hands of the

military and taken away from civilians. 
14 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

In particular, Botha favored the development of advanced weapons

projects and covert operations that would give South Africa additional

advantages against its adversaries. South Africa initiated a series of internal

and external military and paramilitary operations. These included

assassinations, torture, and smuggling, as well as forgery, propaganda, and

subversion. All were defined as ìlegitimateî weapons against the ìtotal

onslaughtî of ìredî and ìblackî forces. These practices were established at

the top and legitimized deviant behavior throughout the military, police, and

intelligence services.38

Within the ìany means necessary to surviveî framework, preparations

began to develop a chemical and biological warfare (CBW) program, called

Project Coast, which would counteract and even rival the Soviet program. 

P.W. Botha and SADF Chief, Magnus Malan directed the Surgeon General,

Major General Nieuwoudt, to launch the program.39 Nieuwoudt enlisted a

young military doctor, Wouter Basson, to be his lieutenant and program

director. In the late 1970s, they approached South African university

scientists and specialists in weapons development to determine if they would

be willing to participate in and even lead the different components of a CBW

program.40 They also began to make contacts in the international scientific

community.

The Organizational Context of Project Coast:

The 7th Battalion of SADFís South African Medical Service (SAMS)

The decision to locate the new chemical and biological warfare program,

Project Coast, within SADFís South African Medical Service (SAMS) would

have important consequences for both the way the program was managed and

the direction of research and development over time. At the time Project

Coast was launched, SAMS existed as a separate medical branch of the South

African military that had joint ties with Special Forces. The close connection

with covert Special Forces operations provided a highly secret and loosely

managed organizational context for the new chemical and biological warfare

program. Weak managerial oversight and accountability quickly led to

personal abuse of authority and corruption by Project Coast manager, Wouter

Basson. 

South Africaís involvement in Angola in the 1970s and 1980s resulted
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 15

in important organizational changes within the military that ensured that the

new CBW program was controlled by the military. Between 50 and 80

percent of all SADF military related deaths in Angola were due to difficulties

encountered in getting immediate treatment for combat injuries, accidents, or

treatment for diseases. There was already a long-standing appreciation

among military leaders for the importance of immediate field treatment for

SADF soldiers. This appreciation can be traced back to the large number of

casualties incurred in the Anglo-Boer War.41

In Angola, the importance of immediate battlefield medical attention was

the primary rationale used to justify elevating and re-organizing the SAMS,

as a new and separate fourth branch of the military. The new medical corps

branch was placed on an equal footing in terms of operational command and

administrative matters with the three existing branches of the service (army,

navy, and air force). SAMS received a mandate to develop defensive

capabilities and to train to protect the South African Defense Force (SADF)

from all types of attacks, including biological and chemical warfare. This

mandate was the principal reason why managerial oversight and

responsibility for the new CBW program was given to the 7th Battalion of the

South African Medical Service. 

SAMSís mission changed and became more ambiguous, as SADF forces

shifted from battlefield operations to policing functions at home. The fact

that 7th Battalion was accorded a large degree of autonomy from its inception

and operated on a strict ìneed-to-knowî basis meant that relatively few

SADF officers, including the majority of senior SADF generals, had detailed

knowledge of the activities of 7th Battalion throughout its existence.42

The 7th Battalion was a special support organization that was established

to support special services operations. SAMS medical personal (e.g., doctors

and orderlies) were also Special Forces officers who underwent special

service training. During the period of South African involvement in Angola,

many of these medical personnel served as members of small (i.e., four-man)

Special Forces covert action teams. While the military Surgeon General was

responsible for the operations of seven medical battalions, the secret nature

of the 7th Battalion operations during incursions into Angola meant that this

unit had a high degree of operational autonomy. This autonomy and latitude

for independent action continued throughout the 1980s, even though new

types of Special Forces operations at home increasingly replaced the combat-
16 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

related functions of the unit. As the SADF increasingly undertook policing

and internal suppression of political dissidents at home, SAMS conducted

new basic research projects and the development of new chemical and

biological weapons that might assist.

Maj. Gen. Nieuwoudt, the Surgeon General and head of SAMS,

recruited Major (Dr.) Wouter Basson, the respected young cardiologist and

personal physician of P.W. Botha, to head Project Coast.43 Although Project

Coast was run by the military, Basson proved to be a highly successful

entrepreneur who played a key role in defining the research and development

agenda. He capitalized on the secret nature of this unit to establish a number

of new projects and as a rationale for acting alone.

From the start, Basson was a highly charismatic and effective recruiter

who was apt at identifying and enlisting some of the most promising and

highly skilled medical researchers from the military and from the larger

civilian scientific community. Basson also proved to be a master manager of

people. He was able to inspire loyalty and respect from employees. Many of

these researchers and scientists joined the program because they were

intrigued by the intellectual challenges and opportunities to participate in

path-breaking research in one of several related disciplines, e.g., chemistry,

anatomy, and virology. Almost all were Afrikaner South Africans who

shared a sense of patriotic duty, a nationalistic zeal for the importance of the

work, and a sense that their research was critical for maintaining national

security.44
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 17

III. Project Coast, 1981-1993

From 1979 through 1981, the State Security Council, led by Prime

Minister Botha and Malan, and the SADF discussed the principles that might

apply to the CBW program. It became clear that a program to defend against

a Soviet CBW attack could only be built if the Soviet offensive program was

emulated and then tested.45 As it became evident that an offensive CBW

program was to be developed, discussions began concerning the possible uses

for such a program. Malan proposed that signs of a chemical warfare attack

in Angola would force the Cuban and Angolan forces to don suits, which

would cut combat effectiveness in half. In 1981, General Constand Viljoen,

SADF Chief of Staff, requested that the CBW program provide SADF with

agents for crowd control in South Africa. Other possible uses considered

included counter-insurgency, assassinations, and black population control.

 It is noteworthy that, during the process of launching the CBW program, no

delegation from South Africa appeared at the 1980 review conference for the

1975 Biological Weapons Convention.

In April 1981, a top-level SADF committee meeting finalized the

principles for Project Coast.46 One principle was that chemical and biological

warfare (CBW) should be treated as a top-secret matter, because it was

susceptible to deception by adversaries. Another was that, since the West had

supposedly fallen behind the Soviet Union, South Africa had to fend for itself

in the CBW arena. The SADF committee decided that secrecy was essential

and that South Africa would use front companies to research and produce

chemical and biological weapons in top-secret installations. The desire for

secrecy meant secret funding for the project, the creation of front companies,

and the exclusion of the state arms producer (ARMSCOR) from the initial

phases of the project. ARMSCOR would only be brought in during the

weaponization phase of the program.

As Malan suggested, South Africa would experiment with a strategy of

forcing the enemy in Angola to don protective suits. The CBW program

would also investigate means of dealing with massive demonstrations,

insurrection, and insurgency, as well as black population growth. Another

principle was that biological warfare (BW) had to be used with caution. BW

could be devastatingly effective and, therefore, attractive. However, the

regime was concerned that BW was difficult to control and it could cause

tremendous, plague-like damage.
18 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

In May 1981, the Surgeon General and head of SAMS, Maj. Gen.

Nieuwoudt, established Project Coast, and the Minister of Defense, Magnus

Malan, and the Minister of Finance, Barend du Plessis, approved the

Program.47 Nieuwoudt made Dr. Wouter Basson the Project Coast director,

as well as specialist adviser to the Surgeon General. Basson also became a

lieutenant colonel, joined the 7th SAMS Battalion, and began making trips

to Angola with the SADF. In addition, he continued making trips abroad to

make contacts with scientists and to procure supplies for Project Coast.

In August 1981, the SADF launched Operation Protea in Angola. 

During the operation, evidence was discovered that the Cubans might be

preparing for chemical warfare.48 Although the evidence was sketchy, top

SADF generals chose to take action to counter CBW anyway. Defense

Minister Malan took SADF generals to Angola to examine CBW protective

suits and demonstrate problems that they created during combat. Afterwards,

Malan reiterated his proposal that the SADF take measures that would force

the Cubans rather than the South Africans to don suits. Accordingly, the

SADF developed a strategy of deception, by firing ìsmokeî that would

achieve such a result. In addition, Malan proposed that the CBW program be

developed to counteract the ANC and its military wing, Umkhonto we sizwe

(MK), which was in the process of escalating a revolutionary war with more

than 3,000 guerrilla forces. The SADF had evidence that some of the

ANC/MK troops had been trained in the Soviet Union in CBW techniques.49

Basson was ìtaskedî to develop Project Coast by a ìkitchen cabinet,î

composed of Minister of Defense Malan, SADC Chief (Gen. C. Viljoen), the

Commanding Officer of Strategic Intelligence and Special Forces (Gen. K.

Liebenberg), SAP Commissioner van der Merwe, and the Director General

of the National Intelligence Service (NIS). Basson was placed in charge of

managing all aspects of Project Coast, including defensive and offensive

measures.50 The annual budget for Project Coast was estimated to be $10

million, with a staff of 200 involved.51 Members of the Project Working

Group included Surgeon General Nieuwoudt and his deputy and successor,

Dr. Niels Knobel. They were supposed to supervise Project Coast, but

Knobel has claimed that they would rarely visit the front companies for fear

of compromising their cover. Basson decided with the scientific researchers on

requirements and costs. Much of Bassonís efforts went into circumventing

sanctions against the sale of military-related items to South Africa and into black

market, sanctions-busting activities. All procurement was undertaken by Basson
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 19

and signed for by Nieuwoudt and his successor, Knobel, who has claimed that he

and Nieuwoudt were only told after the fact about Bassonís activities.

The problem of procurement by SADF was the lack of civilian

leadership and supervision. The SADF was still supplied with uniforms

using 1930s regulations. A Special Defense Account was established by the

SADF that precluded access by the Auditor-General.52 Thus, while Wouter

Basson was required to provide records of financial expenditures for Project

Coast activities, there was no effort throughout this period to match these

records with those of covert special operations.53 The rationale of the need

for secrecy for covert programs and Bassonís unsupervised activities would

lead Project Coast into a morass of corruption.

The chain of command demonstrates that major decisions about Project

Coast were in the hands of Defense Minister Malan and top SADF generals.

 Below is the chain of command for Project Coast, along with the four

companies that were established to develop the CBW program:

Chain of Command for Project Coast

Chief of Military Command (SADF)

(C. Viljoen 1980-85, J. Geldenhuys 1985-90, K. Liebenberg 1990-93)

Security Working Group

SADF Strat. Inteligence/Special Forces Chief (Liebenberg, 1980-90)

Surgeon General (Niewoudt, 1980-88, Knobel, 1988-93)

SAP Commissioner (van der Merwe)

Project Officer (Basson)

Project Officer (Basson)

Roodeplaat RL

D. Goosen (1983-86)

W.Swanepoel (1986-93)

Infladel

Admin/Finance

D.J. Truter

Delta G. Scientific

Phillip Mijburgh

Protechnik

Jan Lournes

Minister of Defense (Magnus Malan)
20 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

In 1982, the Delta G Scientific Company began work on chemical

warfare agents for Project Coast. The chemicals that Delta G developed for

testing were divided into lethal, incapacitating, and irritating agents. 

Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (RRL) then tested the biological effects of

the agents from Delta G. RRL was the company that was primarily

responsible for biological warfare. Protechnik Company was to develop the

protective CBW equipment.

In 1983, RRL opened and started research on biological agents and on

the biological effects of chemical agents. Daan Goosen became the first head

of RRL and served until 1986. According to Gen. (ret.) Georg Meiring,

South Africa developed a sophisticated and dispersed project. Project Coast

was not just one individual and was not just RRL.54 There were a number of

different research and testing centers at universities and companies, and

scientists in various parts of South Africa assisted Project Coast.

Anthrax, cholera, botulinum, and a variety of pathogens were collected

and/or developed at RRL and elsewhere for testing. Apparently, a principal

objective was to collect and test a range of biological agents in order to

develop protection from a Soviet BW attack. In 1984, Dr. Schalk van

Rensburg joined RRL and started the cholera research program. By the end

of 1984, Project Coast and RRL had tested a range of BW toxins and had

developed countermeasures to ricin and botulinum. Reportedly, they had

acquired anthrax, Plague, cholera, E. coli, staph, necrotizing fasciitis, ricin,

botulinum, gas gangrene, anti-matter bacteria, and the Ebola, Marburg, and

Rift Valley viruses.55 However, one must question if RRL had the facilities

to keep Marburg, Rift Valley, and Ebola viruses.

Eventually, according to a number of sources in the U.S. and South

Africa, Project Coast developed pathogens that had never before been seen.

 Project Coast managed to obtain the Soviet-developed flesh-eating bacteria,

necrotizing fasciitis, as well as the antidote. In 1994, the South Africans

surprised the Americans by revealing that they had the bacteria and then gave

it to the U.S.56 However, claims by Basson and former Surgeon General

Knobel that South African espionage agents penetrated Soviet Russian

programs during 1980s remain to be proven.

According to Tom Mangold in Plague Wars,

57 baboons, trapped upcountry in Kruger National Park, were shipped by the crate load to RRL for

biological tests. There is evidence that some of these tests were done in the
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 21

park itself. Tourists reportedly witnessed researchers using poison darts that

took several hours to incapacitate or kill primates. The tourists registered

their complaints and demanded that the practice be terminated. According

to the Chief Warden of Kruger Park, the SADF used Kruger and other parks

for military tests. However, Kruger Park officials were not told what was

being tested, only what areas would be restricted and for how long. His

impression is that more sensitive tests occurred on private reserves or Cape

testing areas.58

It appears that, from the start, Project Coast was not just a ìdefensive

program.î59 In the early 1980s, fears of a ìblack tidal waveî drove white

scientists to try to develop a variety of means that could ensure the survival

of white South Africa. Plans were devised to build a large-scale anthrax

production facility at RRL. The anthrax could have been used either outside

or inside South Africa, particularly where guerrillas were present. According

to former RRL scientist, Mike Odendaal, who testified in the Basson trial,

those plans were nearly operationalized in 1985.

Also, reportedly part of Project Coast was genetic engineering research,

which was being conducted to produce a ìblack bomb,î bacteria or other

biological agents that would kill or weaken blacks and not whites. The black

bomb could be used to wipe out or incapacitate an entire area where an

insurrection was taking place.60 Project Coast scientists asked Basson to

obtain a peptide synthesizer outside of South Africa that would assist in

genetic engineering efforts. 

Many aspects of Project Coast research projects, including the countryís

links with other states, have not and may never be uncovered. Research on

birth control methods to reduce the black birth rate was one such area. Daan

Goosen, the managing director of Roodeplaat Research Laboratories between

1983 and 1986, told Tom Mangold of the BBC that Project Coast supported

a project to develop a contraceptive that would have been applied

clandestinely to blacks.61 Goosen claimed that Dr. Knobel knew all about

this project and those scientists had been told that this was the most important

research on which they could work. Goosen reported that the project had

developed a vaccine for males and females and that the researchers were still

searching for a means by which it could be delivered to make blacks sterile

without making them aware.62 Testimony given at the Truth and
22 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

Reconciliation Commission (TRC) suggested that Project Coast researchers

were also looking into putting birth control substances in water supplies.63

Project Coast claimed its first victims at the end of 1982, when

ìOperation Duelî was launched, which aimed to eliminate hundreds of

SWAPO prisoners and SADF informants.64 Col. Johan Theron,

Counterintelligence Officer in the Special Forces, testified at the Basson trial

that he received muscle relaxant pills from Basson in December 1982 and

killed approximately 200 SWAPO prisoners, then dumped their bodies from

airplanes out to sea. Also in Namibia, the Soviet Union accused South Africa

of using herbicides. Napalm and phosphorous were allegedly used by the

SADF in Angola during the 1980s, actions that were against the 1925 Geneva

Protocol.

In November 1983, Basson was allegedly involved in the use of CBW

against regime opponents in Dukuduku in KwaZulu-Natal. There he

instructed South African agents to tie their intended victims to trees and

smear a jell-like ointment on their bodies. When that failed to kill them, they

were allegedly injected with an anaesthetic drug and then a muscle relaxant.

 After they had died, their bodies were thrown into the sea. 

In 1985, four SWAPO detainees held at Reconnaissance Regiment

headquarters were allegedly given a sleeping drug in soft drinks, taken to

Lanseria airport outside Johannesburg and injected with three toxic

substances supplied by Basson. Their bodies were thrown into the Atlantic

Ocean. 

In 1986, Basson is also alleged to have supplied poisoned tea and orange

that killed Special Forces member Lance Corporal Victor de Fonseca in a

military hospital in Pretoria. Fonseca is said to have started ìtalkingî about

clandestine operations after developing brain cancer. These acts were part of

the 16 murder charges introduced on 26 March 1999, prior to the October

1999 opening of Bassonís trial in South Africa.

In 1984, uprisings in South Africa started in the Vaal Triangle, south of

Johannesburg, and spread throughout the country. The mass actions were far

more widespread, violent and deadly than in 1960 or after 1976. The

nationwide scope of these protests intensified concerns over crowd control

and fueled ongoing efforts to develop weapons, including chemical and

biological agents, to deal with the unrest. SADF Chief of Staff, General

Constand Viljoen, as well as Generals Liebenberg and Meiring, were seeking
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 23

an offensive CBW substance that would weaken and incapacitate rioters and

was less irritating than tear gas. They consulted Basson and Project Coast.

 Also, the SADF sought a chemical that would color the skin for about two

weeks and allow the identification of frontrunners in the violence.65

In response to General Viljoen, Delta G Scientific developed a ìNew

Generation Tear (NGT) Gas,î also known as CR gas. The NGT gas was

designed to be more powerful than conventional CS tear gas and to

incapacitate without lethality or excessive irritation.66 NGT (CR) gas was

intended to counteract rolling mass actions led by the ANC or its surrogates.

 According to Gen. (ret.) Meiring, NGT (CR) gas was used rarely and only

on the Chief of the Armyís say-so. When NGT (CR) gas was used, it was

usually mixed with CS gas and solved in water to be used by water cannon.

Suspected Chemical Warfare in Angola, 1985-1989

In 1985, UNITA leaders made the first of several claims (between 1985

and 1989) that their troops had been attacked by chemical weapons (in this

case, organophosphates) and asked SADF for assistance. In the 1985

incident, UNITA guerrillas reported that they had surrounded a town, and the

Angolan government garrison had responded by using chemical agents.67 In

1985, Col. Wouter Basson took command of the 7th SAMS Battalion and

assumed overall responsibility for protecting SADF and UNITA forces from

CBW attack. Therefore, Basson came to inspect the alleged CW attack. Lt.

Col. Johann Smith, a SADF liaison with UNITA, assisted Basson and claims

that convincing evidence of chemical weapons use was found.68

In a second incident, in 1986, UNITA forces spotted a brown vapor,

which they thought was mustard gas, and asked SADF for safeguards against

CW. According to Gen. (ret.) Chris Thirion, who served in Angola off and

on for 20 years, on a number of occasions between 1985 and 1988, the local

population in southeastern Angola exhibited the type of disorientation

indicative of CW.69

UNITA claims and intelligence data heightened SADF fears of CBW

attack in Angola, Namibia, and inside South Africa. According to Brig. Gen.

(ret.) Bill Sass, former State Security Council member and SADF Chief of

Operations, SADF had evidence that the Cubans actually brought their

chemical warfare program to the battlefield as early as 1985.70 According to
24 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

Gen. (ret.) Jannie Geldenhuys, SADF Chief of Staff, 1985-1990, the Cubans

in Angola had the delivery capability and intention to use CBW, as indicated

by radio intercepts.71 Cuban and Angolan army helicopters were shot down

and were discovered to have had the capability to carry chemical agents. 

Captured Soviet advisers gave evidence about CW use. In addition, fears

rose that ANC/MK guerrillas might put BW agents in South African

reservoirs.72

The need for protective equipment, clothing and antidotes and for CBW

strategy and tactics intensified. Gen. Geldenhuys ordered counter-measures

and the purchase of anti-CBW suits. P.W. Botha visited Angola and actually

put on a suit. The cost for gear was expensive, especially gas masks, which

were not reusable. Subsequently, Special Forces Gen. Liebenberg and

Wouter Basson were investigated by the Office of Serious Economic

Offenses (OSEO) in regard to 20 million rand in chemical warfare gear that

was supposed to be, but never was, delivered to UNITA.

In Angola, the conflict reached a peak in October 1987, with the battle

of Cuito Cuanavale. While Cuba and the Angolan government claimed a

great victory, over 5,000 government troops were killed and advanced

SAMs (SA-8s) were captured by the SADF who, subsequently, gave them to

the U.S. According to David Steward, President de Klerkís chief of staff,

1989-1994,73 Cuban and Angolan government forces used CW at Cuito

Cuanavale and at Lomba River. A UNITA commander on the ground, Gen.

Deon Ferreira, claimed that he saw a ìflash in the sky,î which was indicative

of a CW attack. Later, UNITA troops were evacuated to Pretoria with their

hair falling out. 

Basson led the investigation and brought with him Dr. Heyndrickx from

Ghent, Belgium. According to Gen. (ret.) Meiring,74 other European

scientists accompanied them. Heyndrickxís research project was done in

loose collaboration with a clinic in Mavinga in southern Angola that was

staffed by SADF personnel. Subsequently, Heyndrickx, as well as the South

African government, accused the Angolan government of using CW. 

However, Heyndrickx refused to allow findings to be reviewed by his peers

that MPLA used poison gas on UNITA in the Angolan war.75

In the aftermath of Cuito Cuanavale, SADF planned to assist UNITA in

retaliating for the 1987 CW attacks by firing NGT (CR) gas from 120mm

mortars and 155mm howitzers. Tests were conducted at the SADF training
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 25

center.76 In addition, according to Cuban officers who were interrogated, CW

agents had been brought into Angola. An indication occurred at the

beginning of 1988, when the 50th Havana City Brigade arrived from Cuba

with anti-CW protective gear. As mentioned earlier, reports of CW use by

SADF and by Cuban and Angolan government forces continued into early

1989, even after peace agreements were signed for the withdrawal of Cuban

forces from Angola and SADF withdrawal from a soon-to-be-independent

Namibia.

Plans for a Chemical and Biological Weapons Program

By 1985, several Project Coast program directors were planning for a

massive escalation of the chemical and biological agents production program

and working on plans that would have resulted in a weapons program. 

According to RRL scientist Mike Odendaal, he had received instructions to

start a factory where biological agents would be produced in mass form, and

200,000 rand ($100,000 in 1985 U.S. dollars) had already been spent on the

plans.77 A new wing had been added to Roodeplaat Research laboratories for

a production-scale laboratory, with fermenters that could produce 300 liters

or more of anthrax and other biological agents and a P-4 level laboratory. For

the first few years, Project Coast used P-2 to P-3 facilities, and RRL only

used two 10-gallon fermenters for growth medium. In 1985, when the new

wing for RRL was built, a P-4 facility was added. Basson and his superiors

in the SADF (Generals Liebenberg, Nieuwoudt, and Viljoen, as well as

Magnus Malan) approved the up-grade.

According to RRL scientist Schalk van Rensburg, when Basson wanted

the safety level raised to level 4, two British scientists, on an unauthorized

visit from Porton Down, UK (which had been privatized) helped and

advised.78 According to Tom Mangold, MI-6 opened a file on Basson after

he attended the Second World Conference of Toxicologists in Ghent,

Belgium, where he reportedly met with scientists, including some from

Porton Down.79 Consequently, both American and British intelligence

agencies knew of Bassonís activities during this time but did little against

him. However, there is no evidence, besides Bassonís claims, that Basson

ever visited Porton Down.80
26 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

In the end, the directors of Project Coast decided not to fund the larger

fermenters. According to Odendaal, SADF decided that biological agents

would be used in low intensity regional skirmishes and assassinations, but not

on a more massive scale.81 Therefore, in comparison to the USSR, which had

scores of big fermenters, the South African program was quite small in size

and scale. However, according to many American and South African experts,

in terms of the range of biological agents possessed and the science involved,

the CBW program was the ìsecond most sophisticated program,î next to the

Soviet program, and more sophisticated than the Iraqi program that was

uncovered in 1995. In our interviews, no comparisons were made with the

U.S. program that existed until 1969.

A senior former army officer confirmed that ìany thinking person in the

SADFî knew that South Africa had developed chemical weapons, at least by

the mid-1980s.î He confirmed that South Africa was manufacturing

chemical weapons from the mid-1980s until the ìwhole scenario changedî

in the early 1990s.82 Earlier, the army had spent most of its time testing

decontamination gasses. Also, at this time, several public statements about

developing methods to counter chemical attacks appeared.

Weaponization began in cooperation with ARMSCOR, the state-owned

arms producer, which developed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and

missiles that would have the capability to carry chemical and biological

agents. All of this was top secret, and the Americans and British only

discovered weaponization in 1994. They did not insist that weaponization be

included in the chemical and biological memorandum because they had no

hard evidence upon which to make such a demand.83 The South African

Ministry of Defense still denies that weaponization took place.

While reports that the former South African government tested battlefield

weapons capable of carrying biological agents and chemicals cannot be

confirmed, there is evidence that such weapons were developed. Basson, much

like his counterparts in other countries (e.g., Iraq), had difficulties developing

effective delivery systems for using biological agents in mass casualty weapons.

 While Project Coast researchers undertook conceptual studies in the

aerosolization of biological agents, the evidence available to date indicates that

sophisticated aerosolization delivery systems were not developed. However,

conceptual studies of such systems were well underway at the time Project Coast

was shut down. Much more progress appears to have been achieved developing
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 27

sophisticated artillery warheads and tactical missiles that were capable of

delivering NBC warheads. What types of missiles and warheads were built,

possibly tested and sold abroad remain among the most important questions

related to South Africaís NBC programs still to be answered.

Project Coast and the Nuclear Weapons Program Compared

From the start, Project Coast had a secretive military culture that was

impervious to scrutiny by civilian authorities. Project Coast was more

compartmentalized, secretive, and loosely managed than the nuclear weapons

program, which was controlled by ARMSCOR. A professor who worked on

the nuclear weapons program claims that the highly technical nature of the

nuclear weapons program required that it should be well controlled.84

The nuclear weapons program was militarized in the late 1970s but

remained under the control of ARMSCOR. Many of the nuclear scientists

who worked on the nuclear program did not know about the CBW program

and were surprised to learn that South Africa had one at all.85 As the money

required to support P.W. Bothaís covert projects was considerable, especially

for the nuclear and missile programs, the budget of the regular SADF forces

was increasingly squeezed. By the end of the 1980s, this money crunch was

creating tensions between the top professional military and the ìsecurocrats.î

Concerns of senior professional military leaders about the adverse effects on

the air force, navy, and army, if ìP.W. was allowed to continue developing

his toys,î was a major factor fueling support to unilaterally close down the

nuclear program.86 The conventional military leadership were less concerned

about the costs associated with the CBW program. As Brig. Gen. (ret.) Bill

Sass, a member of the former State Security Council recently observed,

ìdetails of Project Coast were not widely known among members of the

SADF leadership.î87

Internal Unrest and Project Coast

In June 1985, a state of emergency was declared in South Africa, as the

indigenous uprisings intensified. The governmentís perceived need for

crowd control agents intensified. General Viljoen asked his fellow generals

how the SADF should respond to ìfighting in the streets.î One proposal was
28 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

for a ìthird forceî to be created to take on this task. This force would

supposedly combine the military functions of the SADF and the police role

of the SAP in suppressing unrest.88

Another proposal was to use non-lethal chemical weapons, particularly

in the form of the new tear gas [NGT (CR)], which Project Coast had

developed. General Liebenberg revealed that chemical agents were being

developed to make people passive and to render equipment unusable. Gen.

Lothar Neethling, South African Police forensics commander, ordered the

development of tear gas, gas grenades, and tranquilizing drugs for use in

pacifying rioters. Neethling was also an expert in use of CBW for

assassination and worked closely with Basson, who supplied poisons to get

rid of individual opponents of the regime.89 By 1986, the state of emergency

led to massive waves of arrests and detentions in South Africa. In response,

the ANC/MK vowed to ìmake the streets ungovernable.î The SADF

proceeded with efforts to develop and apply CBW agents to counteract the

ìblack onslaught.î

The 1984-86 township unrest produced antipathy between military and

civilian departments. In essence, the State Security Council, the SADF, and

SAP took over the state. Civilian departments were subordinated to the State

Security Council. Even the Education departments began to take orders from

the SSC. At this time, the security forces perpetuated the doctrine of

ìplausible denial.î Security forces carried on activities in secret, which

allowed civilians to deny knowledge.90

In 1986, the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) was created, drawing on

the ìdirty tricksî experiences of the Selous Scouts and D-40. The CCB

became one of the cornerstones of an alleged ìthird forceî that was dedicated

to preventing the ANC/MK from taking power. There was a consensus in the

Botha government that unconventional methods were needed, according to

Malanís testimony before the TRC, and that Malan personally approved

establishment of CCB but never gave it instructions to have anyone killed.

 Malan denied the existence of a third force and refused to apply for amnesty

from the TRC. However, he said he would apply for collective responsibility

with the ANC leadership for acts committed during the violence that started

in 1960. Similarly, former Air Force General Tienie Groenwald said he

would apply for amnesty for ìclandestine operationsî of the Afrikaner Volks
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 29

Front. He acknowledged this body had connections with pre-1994 election

bombings, but that his involvement was limited to military operations.

By 1987, the uprisings by black youths in South Africa had largely come

to an end. As mass actions subsided, ANC/MK guerrillas stepped up their

armed campaign, which came to include the bombing of civilian targets. 

While the Botha government sought ways of eliminating the guerrilla threat,

negotiations between the apartheid regime and Mandela continued. In

response to the ANC/MK and other perceived threats, the CCB started

operations in 1988. According to the Steyn Report and a number of

interviews, Basson worked with the CCB, had offices in the same building,

and supplied them with CBW poisons for assassination purposes. The Steyn

Report also found that Basson and the CCB were receiving instructions from

Malan and other superiors. However, Basson and the CCB interpreted the

instructions as they saw fit.

International Links Established During Project Coast

From 1981 onwards, Basson and Project Coast scientists intensified their

international contacts, particularly at conferences on CBW. South African

delegations made visits to the U.S., Britain, Taiwan, Israel, and Germany. 

Basson attended a conference on biological warfare (BW) in San Antonio in

1981. From 1981 to 1986, the Reagan administration followed a policy of

ìconstructive engagement.î Reagan administration officials sent signals to

the Botha regime that the U.S. was willing to turn a blind eye to American

industries and scientists as the South Africans built up their defense

industries. Under-Secretary of State William Clark went one step further and

welcomed South African defense officials and experts to Washington and

facilitated their interaction with U.S. counterparts. The attitude of Clark and

others enabled South Africa to gain access to U.S. scientists. At the same

time, Bassonís trip to San Antonio reportedly attracted the attention of

American intelligence, and he was barred entry to the U.S. for scientific

purposes.91

In 1984, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) sent eight

shipments of the Ebola, Marburg, and Rift Valley viruses to South Africa.

 The CDC was concerned with outbreaks of Ebola and other viruses and

sought South Africaís assistance in preventing their spread. While CDC
30 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

motives were benign, suddenly, South Africa possessed viruses that could be

used with devastating effect in surrounding countries.

Details of the extent and importance of South African cooperation with

Israel in CBW research have not been disclosed. The two countries started

working together on covert research related to nuclear weapons after World

War II. These links developed into a mature working relationship by the

1970s. Bilateral cooperation between the two states proved especially fruitful

in developing nuclear weapons and testing a number of increasingly

sophisticated missiles. Israel and South Africa also cooperated closely in the

production of the G-5 artillery gun to fight a conventional war.92 This line of

research that cost millions of rand also explored the feasibility of using NBC

warheads for the G-5, and later the G-6 gun. The Israelis also helped South

Africa with armored cars and tanks and the Cheetah (a Mirage offshoot). 

Given the breadth and depth of cooperation, it is quite possible that Israel and

South Africa cooperated on CBW efforts. It is significant that Basson went

to Israel several times during the 1980s.93

Transnational Links: The Ford Case and Basson

New questions surfaced about the apartheid governmentís international

connections and interest in biological warfare and birth control methods in

early 2000, after Pat Riley, one of the owners of a southern California biotech

firm, BioFem, was shot and after his partner, Dr. Larry Ford, committed

suicide. The Irvine, California police had questioned Dr. Ford about his

partnerís shooting and, after Fordís suicide, found documents in his house

that led them to dig up his backyard. Although not all of the contents found

have been disclosed, published accounts indicate that the police removed

automatic rifles from a concrete bunker and tubes of cholera and typhoid

fever germs from a freezer in the Ford house.

At the time of his death, Ford was working on a ìmicrobicideî form of

birth control that he had patented in 1997. Ford claimed that his product,

ìInner Confidence,î could prevent millions of people from dying of AIDS,

especially in Africa, and in the process make investors extremely wealthy.

 His microbicide contraceptive was a vaginal suppository that contained

chemicals that kill germs transmitted through sex, as well as sperm. The

potential advantage of this type of contraceptive would be to protect the user
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 31

from HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases. To date, no microbicide

product has been approved for marketing. There was little interest in this

birth control approach until the late 1990s, as several technical problems

remained unsolved. The results of several small-scale trials, and one large

scale publicized study of another microbicide found that the chemicals in the

microbicide damaged the lining of the vagina, making the user more, rather

than less susceptible to HIV infection.94

Local authorities and the FBI, who launched a weapons of mass

destruction investigation into this case, began investigating claims Ford made

to his associates and friends that he served as a consultant to the SADF and

had close ties with the CIA. Former South African Surgeon General, Dr.

Niels Knobel, initially confirmed that he met Ford at a conference in San

Diego, California in the late 1980s and that they had remained friends ever

since. Knobel also confirmed that they shared an interest in AIDS, because

they both knew that the epidemic was going to have a devastating impact in

Africa. However, Knobel recently acknowledged that he met with Ford and

his associates, during one of their many visits to the South African trade

representativeís official residence in Los Angeles.95 In a recent phone

interview, Knobel stated, ìOur whole policy of protecting members of the

defense force against HIV (educating them to use condoms) came from my

relationship with Larry. We both worked toward a cure for AIDS that would

be available to the vast population of Africa, (and) there was no political

agenda.î96

Others reported that Ford visited South Africa several years earlier than

Dr. Knobel acknowledged. According to Dr. Scharf, the former head of

Military Hospital One in Pretoria, Ford visited in the mid-1980s as a guest of

the South African Surgeon General. Dr. Scharf remembered a visit by Ford

to his hospital as the guest of Knobel in 1984 or 1985. Knobel insisted that

Ford be given VIP treatment (at the hospitalís expense). Scharf was offended

by Fordís request for human placenta that he wanted to use in his research on

viruses. Scharf refused to cooperate and claimed that he threw Ford out of

his office, after warning him that such activities would be very controversial,

if they became public, due to the fact that all Africans viewed babies as

sacred.97

Recently, Knobel confirmed to American reporters that he helped Ford

establish protocols to test his product in South Africa but said he did not
32 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

know if those trials were every carried out. According to microbiologist

Mike Odendaal, researcher at RRL, Ford also visited South Africa again in

1987 to instruct scientists working with a SADF front company on how to

turn teabags, doilies, and pornographic magazines into ìweaponsî that could

be used against the ANC by using a species of clostridium bacteria. 

Odendaal reported that the scientists found much of Fordís advice confusing

and some went so far as to call him a fraud.98

Police investigating this case have been unable to corroborate many of

Fordís claims made before his death. For example, Ford claimed that he

parachuted into southern Africa during the apartheid era to take blood

samples from dead guerrilla fighters in order to help the U.S. government

determine the biological warfare agents against which the Soviets were

vaccinating their allies.99 Another long-time Ford associate, Jerry D. Nilsson,

also came under investigation. Nilsson claimed that he and Ford traveled to

Africa together. In 1988, Nilsson organized a group of doctors, including

Ford, to buy a defunct Los Angeles hospital. The plan was to turn it into a

state-of-the-art infectious disease research center, the Lake View Terrace

Institute. Nilsson told the Los Angles Times that the facility was to be ìone

cog in a complex, far-reaching projectî with related facilities in Africa,

Germany, Italy, and Britain. The scheme flopped when research groups

denied they were backing the venture. 

The nature of Nilssonís relationship with Ford has remained unclear. 

Police seized considerable material when they raided Nilssonís house and

storage lockers but did not release details of the searches. Nilssonís friends

claimed that he and Ford stashed chemicals and germs at several locations in

southern California. Police acknowledged that the evidence strongly

suggested that Dr. Ford was deeply involved in a conspiracy and that he

would be in custody today were he alive. Another long-time associate of

Ford claimed that only about one per cent of the story of Fordís activities in

Africa has been disclosed.100

In July 2000, an Orange County, California grand jury heard evidence to

determine the facts in the Ford case. Evidence pointed to Fordís links to the

former South African regime as part of a larger network with officials of the

former government and perhaps with rogue elements. The FBI opened an

international investigation to determine whether any crimes under U.S. law

had occurred in South Africa. Ford claimed to have served as a consultant
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 33

to the South African government, lecturing scientists on biological topics

relevant for making BW. If true, his actions would have constituted a

violation of U.S. laws, which prevented such contacts during the apartheid

era.101

The results of a closed grand jury investigation of the Ford case have not

been made public, but the discovery of biological agents and toxins in Fordís

possession renewed questions about whether Basson called upon former

associates to conceal biological agents, poisons, and drugs overseas. 

Testimony at the Bassonís trial to date has failed to explain where tons of

drugs and smaller quantities of deadly toxins whose production Basson

oversaw before his retirement from the military in 1993 went and why so

many drugs were produced in the first place. One of the prosecutors in the

Basson case has acknowledged that the prosecution still does not have a very

clear idea about either the purpose of the drugs or their final destination.102

At the time of Bassonís arrest, investigators found several trunks in his

possession that contained documents and items related to Project Coast.103

The investigators also found a great deal of personal correspondence between

Basson and individuals in Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and other

countries in the trunks and among Bassonís personal effects. One letter was

from an individual in the UK, who lived near Heathrow Airport. This letter

described what Basson should do if he needed to leave South Africa quickly.

 The letter said he should contact ìthemî when he arrived at Heathrow and

that ìwe will collect you.î Other letters, from individuals in other countries,

described similar emergency exit plans.

The identity of this letter writer and others was not known by the

investigators representing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC),

the South African Presidentís office, or the National Intelligence Agency

(NIA), who were all present at the time after the trunks were found. The

contents of the trunks were itemized, and the National Intelligence Agency

(NIA) took control of them for security reasons. The chief investigator for

the TRC at the time, Dr. Villa-Vicencio, never learned whether these letters

were from private individuals or representatives of governments.104

The documents are interesting, given statements made by Juergen

Jacomet, a former Swiss military intelligence agent, who worked with Basson

on money-laundering for Project Coast in Europe. He spoke of a right-wing
34 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

conspiracy and alluded to the existence of an information organization of

individuals, including Americans.105 The death of Dr. Ford and revelations

of his South African involvement, and his failed effort to establish the Lake

View Terrace Institute raised again the possibility of a right-wing

international network, united by a vision of a South Africa once again ruled

by whites. 

No evidence to date has been found to substantiate concerns expressed

by some about possible linkages between Project Coast programs and the

intentional use of HIV or microbicide contraceptives.106 However, the recent

revelations since Fordís death have been consistent with reports that the

former South African government was already concerned about the future

impact of the AIDS epidemic by the mid-1980s. In the 1980s, as the South

African government became more aware of the magnitude of the impending

AIDS epidemic, the SADF started testing thousands of SADF soldiers for

HIV. The secret right-wing Afrikaner organization, the Broederbond, also

recently acknowledged that they had completed population projections during

the mid-1980s. They suggested that whites would be in majority in the future

due to the devastating effects that AIDS was projected to have on the black

population of South Africa.107

Throughout the 1980s, Basson continued his foreign visits and

interaction with experts from the U.S., the UK and other countries. Most

contacts appear to have been legal ones between Project Coast scientists and

other scientists and consultants in Europe. Most of the substances and

knowledge relevant to biological weapons were not controlled in the 1970s

and 1980s as there was not the same level of concern with the possible use

of biological agents and chemical substances that emerged during the

1990s.108 However, Basson and Knobel subsequently claimed that Basson

visited Iraq and Iran, the Philippines, North Korea, Croatia, and met with

members of Colombian drug cartels, making contacts and collecting

information. What was obtained or exchanged during these visits has not yet

emerged. 

Corruption and the Deterioration of Project Coast

Basson took advantage of the loose financial oversight and

accountability requirements to ensure that he would acquire large sums of
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 35

money from the project several years before the actual decisions were made

to privatize these state-owned corporations. Starting in the mid-1980s, if not

before, Basson was reported to have offered his friends and trusted employees

the opportunity to invest in a number of these official front corporations. 

Basson and other early investors made overnight fortunes, when these

corporations were privatized in the late 1980s.109 The magnitude of these

profits, perhaps more than any other action, caught the attention of a nonmilitary agency, the Office of Serious Economic Offenses, who started

investigating the financial flows associated with Project Coast soon after

these corporations shares were sold on the open market.

Basson was the central figure in coordinating the funds and the whole

program. He was the central point of contact between the scientists, the

army, and the government sponsoring Project Coast. As the project expanded

into sophisticated research, genetic engineering, and the manufacturing of

large amounts of Mandrax and Ecstasy (which may have been sold on the

black market), millions of dollars were siphoned off into a series of elaborate

holding companies. While Basson continues to maintain that the large

amounts of Mandrax and Ecstasy that were produced by state-owned

companies were authorized products intended for use in crowd control, few

observers, including the prosecution in his ongoing trial, believe this story.110

 Instead, a mystery remains about why so many drugs were produced and

where they went. 

As Basson and his closest associates skimmed millions of dollars from

Project Coast activities, he and his American accountant, David Webster,

developed an elaborate web of foreign shell companies to launder the money.

 Several offshore holding companies, such as WPW Investments that was

incorporated in the Cayman Islands in 1986, sold initial share offers at low

prices (e.g., $4.00 U.S. per share) to Basson. In this company, as in

numerous others, Bassonís accountant, David Webster, was the Director

while Basson maintain indirect control as a member of the Board. Towards

the end of Project Coast, new companies were being incorporated and large

amounts of assets were being transferred from existing companies to the new

ones over a 24 or 48 hour period.111 The investigation of the South African

forensic auditor, Hendrik Bruwer, took nearly seven years to complete. After

traveling to the U.S., UK, Belgium, Switzerland, Croatia, and Luxembourg,
36 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

Bruwer produced an 800-page report that highlighted serious illegalities in

the SADF and former government. 

Obtaining permission from foreign governments delayed the

investigation, as these on-going investigations by other national and

provincial bodies (e.g., the Transvaal Auditor Generalís office). Bassonís

American accountant, David Webster, who had acted as a nominee for

Basson, at first refused to hand over papers in his possession to South African

investigators. He was eventually forced to do so by an American court. The

international and transnational character of this case was highlighted by the

fact that the Basson trial took the unusual step of holding sessions of the trial

in Jacksonville, Florida in September 2000 in order to establish the exact

nature and extent of David Websterís involvement in the case. The

complexity of these dealings are such that the prosecution believes that it will

take most of the two years that the Basson trial is expected to last to present

evidence to support fraud charges against Basson.112

Project Coast ground to a halt in 1988, due to corruption by Basson and

others. According to interviews with Project Coast scientists, between 1982

and 1987, Project Coast was advancing as a sophisticated program.113 Project

Coast had acquired anthrax, cholera, botulinum, and other biological agents,

was planning to add a wing to RRL to produce massive amounts of anthrax,

and was proceeding with genetic engineering research to produce germs that

would harm blacks and not whites. However, as the communist threat

receded in 1987-88 and as it seemed possible that the apartheid regimeís

days were numbered, Basson and others took large amounts of money that

was intended for Project Coast programs and diverted it to their own

accounts. Elsewhere in government, top officials were taking funds on a

large scale. As the biological warfare program stopped, Basson and others

began to plan how to roll Project Coast back in such a way that would be

advantageous to them. By 1988, President P.W. Botha, Magnus Malan and

Wim de Villiers of ARMSCOR had initiated the privatization and

liberalization of the defense industry. They envisaged a transfer of power to

Mandela and the ANC and saw the need to keep the defense industry out of

their hands. The privatization process opened the door to the type of

corruption exhibited by Basson and his colleagues.

In 1988, Basson was supposed to have bought a sophisticated peptide

synthesizer for $2.2 million from clandestine sources. Project Coast
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 37

researchers were attempting to make significant advances in the field of

peptides to alter brain function, which was a key to creating a biological

weapon that would affect blacks and not whites. However, at the trial of

Basson, Dr. Lucia Steenkamp, a Project Coast scientist, refuted claims that

Basson had bought the peptide synthesizer, and the prosecution alleged that

Basson defrauded SADF by pretending he needed the synthesizer but actually

used the money for overseas business deals.114

In August 1988, Delta G scientists arranged for 1,000 kilograms of

methaqualone to be produced. The production manager at Delta G

approached Dr. Philip Mijburgh, managing director of Medchem

Consolidated Investments, and asked him to produce the methaqualone. 

What happened to the methaqualone and whether or not it was encapsulated

remains unknown.115 The explanation given by witnesses at the Truth and

Reconciliation Commission (TRC) hearings in 1998 was that the

methaqualone was to be mixed into NGT (CR) gas and used for crowd

control purposes. General Lothar Neethling testified that, on three occasions,

he had been requested to provide Dr. Basson with Mandrax tablets

confiscated by the South African Narcotics Bureau (SANAB). He claimed

that he had given Dr. Basson approximately 200,000 tablets in total as well

as quantities of LSD and dagga (marijuana), on the understanding that they

would be investigated to determine whether they would be appropriate crowd

control weapons. None of the witnesses could provide the TRC with any

information about tests that had been conducted in this regard, and at least

one witness stated that these drugs would not be suitable for such a purpose.

 Medchemís role is noteworthy given the fact that Defense Minister Malanís

nephew, Dr. Mijburgh, was on the board. Mijburgh benefited from

privatization of both Medchem and Delta G Scientific in the early 1990s.

In 1988, Dr. Knobel became Surgeon General, after Dr. Nieuwoudt died.

 Basson briefed Knobel, claiming that he had penetrated facilities in the

USSR, Libya, the U.S., and UK (Porton Down). He also claimed to have

entered facilities and contacted scientists in Belgium, France, Switzerland,

Germany, and Israel. Knobel still believes Bassonís claims. However, in

retrospect, Knobel found that Bassonís activities were not sufficiently

monitored and that the working group committee approach to supervision

was a mistake.116 According to Gen. (ret.) Geldenhuys, as the 1980s

proceeded, Project Coast continued to be managed by committee, which left
38 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

it susceptible to mismanagement and corruption.117 Geldenhuys attended the

steering committee for Project Coast on one or two occasions from 1985-

1990. Usually, Geldenhuys was replaced by Surgeon General Nieuwoudt

and, from 1988-1990, by Dr. Knobel. He also attended meetings of the

satellite program on missiles. The problem was that a committee could not

control Basson. 

According to Geldenhuys, General Liebenberg was convinced that the

Project Coast steering committee (of which he was a member) was

supplanted by the ìSmall Command Council,î especially in review of

finances and in working with Basson. The Small Command Council was

controlled by Malan and was for secret projects on a ìneed to knowî basis.

 In contrast to his TRC statements about Project Coast, Gen. (ret.)

Geldenhuys now claims that, as SADF Chief of Staff, he monitored finances

and that his chief of finance was good. He claimed that there was not

disproportional spending on Project Coast and that secret funds were audited.

 Geldenhuys pointed out that, in the 1980s, South Africa was the ìskunkî of

the world. This led to an ìunconventional arms tradeî and to the use of

middlemen and secret funds. However the Office of Serious Economic

Offenses (OSEO) objected to secret funds, as well as ìsafe houses,î

clandestine front companies and clandestine flights.118
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 39

IV. Rollback of Project Coast, 1988-1994

In 1988, conditions for the rollback of the CBW program, Project Coast,

improved dramatically, as the pace of change accelerated in South Africa and

southern Africa. President P.W. Botha and the South African Defense Force

(SADF) realized that the Soviet Union was crumbling and knew they were

going to win against the Cubans in Angola. 

Suddenly, P.W. Botha changed his position and accepted a change in

strategy. The goal became minimal destruction, using cross border raids, and

not defeat of the regimeís adversaries. As Botha realized there was a greatly

reduced external threat, he agreed to enter into negotiations, which had

started at a lower level in 1986, to reach a compromise with Nelson Mandela

and the ANC. In 1988, the U.S., Cuba, Angola, and South Africa negotiated

the withdrawal of Cuban troops in exchange for the independence of

Namibia, and by the end of the year, a deal was reached. The Soviet and

Cuban threat that had helped give rise to Project Coast rapidly began to

recede. However, the ANC/MK continued their guerrilla campaign,

including the bombing of civilian targets.119

At the beginning of 1989 President Botha suffered a stroke and was

replaced on an interim basis by F.W. de Klerk, an ìoutsiderî to the state

security system (including Project Coast). In April 1989, South African

troops were confined to barracks in Namibia and were withdrawn by the end

of the year. In September 1989, de Klerk was elected and inaugurated as

State President and shunted Botha aside. De Klerk began his own five-year

plan of ending apartheid. Part of his task included trying to establish civilian

control over the security apparatus and reining in the ìsecurocratsî and secret

projects (like Project Coast). Talks with Mandela reached their climax, and

top ANC prisoners, such as Walter Sisulu, were released. Finally, in

February 1990, de Klerk lifted the ban on the ANC, PAC, and South African

Communist Party, and released Nelson Mandela. 

De Klerkís decision to release Nelson Mandela and lift the ban on the

ANC initiated a four-year period of negotiation and contention. In 1991, the

Conference for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) process of

negotiations began, involving the government, the ANC and other parties.
40 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

In 1992, the negotiation process slowed and concerns mounted as the

campaign of rolling violence spread throughout South Africa. Violent

clashes continued, especially in Kwazulu-Natal. At the same time, mistrust

of de Klerk and the National Party government grew among ANC leaders.

 There was a real concern by all parties that the situation in South Africa

would ì spin out of controlî before a negotiated settlement was reached.120

 The fear of collapse ultimately provided an important incentive that

eventually brought most parties back to the negotiating table. In 1993,

negotiations stalled, and violence continued. Chris Hani, leader of Umkhonto

we sizwe (MK) and the South African Communist Party, as well as a possible

successor to Nelson Mandela, was killed in a right wing hit operation. The

fear of a ìthird forceî and a right-wing coup continued. 

During this period of negotiations, instability and violence, many in the

regime believed that they needed insurance against the ANC/MK and the

ìblack onslaught.î With this in mind, the CBW program was kept intact by

Basson and his associates as insurance and was used in assassination

attempts. Also, experiments with chemical warfare apparently continued,

with an alleged attack on Mozambican troops as late as January 1992. At the

same time, Basson, Philip Mijburgh and others were in the process of milking

Project Coast for all the financial gain possible. 

Basson began to establish contacts with foreign governments, such as

Libya, which might be interested in purchasing CBW secrets. Soon, Basson

became the target of investigation from the National Intelligence Service

(NIS), SADF counterintelligence, and the Office of Serious Economic

Offenses, as well as the CIA and MI-6. The investigations culminated in the

Steyn Report of December 1992.

De Klerkís Efforts to Roll Back Secret SADF Projects 

When de Klerk became President in 1989, he sought to find out about

the secret projects of the SADF, including the nuclear weapons and CBW

programs. On 30 July 1989, President de Klerk announced formation of the

Kahn Committee. It issued three interim reports, and a final report on 19

November 1991. Its mandate was limited: the committee considered only

projects brought to its attention by the various state departments that were

still operative, with a view to recommending the cancellation of covert
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 41

activities wherever possible. Where the committee was of the opinion that

projects should be allowed to continue, recommendations were to be made

for the possible scaling down and, where necessary, adaptation of such

projects. The committee was requested to ensure that projects did not benefit

any particular political party or organization. Projects that were not

terminated were to serve what was defined as ìthe national interest.î Such

activities were said to include the elimination of violence, intimidation,

sanctions and international isolation.

However, the Kahn committee, because of assurances given to De Klerk

from Knobel and Basson that the CBW program was defensive, did not

investigate Project Coast. According to Dr. Ian Phillips, ANC defense

expert, the explanation for de Klerkís lack of knowledge about the CBW

program was institutional. The Minister of Defense, Magnus Malan, was not

served by a civilian Department of Defense that administered the SADF. 

Military personnel held all the top positions that should have been filled by

civilians. Consequently, the flow of information was curtailed by secrecy.

 De Klerk claimed that Malan had kept information about the CBW program

secret. P.W. Botha and Malan ran the State Security Council with no

distinction between strategic and tactical levels. They approved projects and

let the operatives proceed to carry them out as they saw fit. In sum, the

apartheid regime had no conception of civil-military relations.121

After de Klerk lifted the ban on the ANC and freed Mandela, he

addressed the SADF and SAP. De Klerk stressed that the ANC was now a

party and not the enemy. Needless to say, many in the security forces did not

like the message. On 26 March 1990, President F.W. de Klerk was briefed

by Surgeon General Knobel about the defensive side of the CBW program,

such as gas masks and protective suits. Knobel informed de Klerk about

work with lethal chemical agents, and in response, de Klerk ordered Knobel

to stop work on the lethal agents. However, de Klerk was not provided with

all of the details about Project Coast, especially about the offensive aspects

of the CBW program and its use in assassination activities. The same was

true with other SADF projects and ìthird forceî activities.122 Only with the

Steyn Report at the beginning of 1993, did de Klerk become aware of the

skill, sophistication, and offensive nature of Project Coast. 

According to General (ret.) Meiring, the CBW program was still needed

after 1990, due to problems of crowd control and the possibility that the
42 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

ANC/MK had CBW.123 At the same time, once de Klerk decided to roll back

Project Coast, the process was time-consuming due to the sophistication of

the program. Scientists and researchers had to be laid off over a period of

time. Also, South Africa did not want to attract attention. 

According to Pierre Steyn, former Secretary of Defense, another major

impediment to dismantlement was the bloated military that had developed

throughout the 1980s. This meant that the government faced a ìsituation of

insubordination in the military by 1992.î124 In response to de Klerkís order,

intelligence procedures were restructured and personnel changes were made

but police investigations were never able to flush out all the details of what

was happening. Throughout the military, there was stonewalling.

Proliferation and Counterproliferation

At the beginning of 1990, the US, backed by Britain and Israel, issued

a strongly worded ìhostile nation warningî on rolling back the South African

nuclear weapons program.125 With the prospect of the ANC taking power,

the U.S., the UK and Israel did not want to see the programís assets or secrets

being sold to adversaries in the Middle East or elsewhere. De Klerk was

persuaded by the ultimatum, especially as he saw no future need for nuclear

weapons. In addition, South African officials were being forced by the U.S.

to take a stand on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in time for the June

1990 NPT review conference. According to Prof. Andre Buys, in early 1990,

de Klerk decided to end the nuclear program.126 It took three years (1990-93)

to dismantle. Documentation, diskettes, and hard drives were destroyed. De

Klerk appointed Prof. Mouton as the auditor to supervise the disarmament

process. From 1990-93, ìOperation Masadaî was carried out by the

government and involved shredding of documents and destroying of hard

drives relating to the nuclear weapons program and Project Coast.127

In contrast to the nuclear weapons program, no pressure was exerted in

1989 or 1990 over the CBW program, even though the CIA released a report

in 1989, which placed South Africa on a list of countries that had developed

and stockpiled chemical weapons. However, the main focus of concern for

the United States and her allies was nuclear proliferation. For a brief time,

between 1987 and August 1990, when South Africa sold the G-6 155mm gun

and chemical warfare agents, including NGT (CR) gas, to Iraq, the United
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 43

States became concerned about the proliferation of a conventional weapon

that had the capability to throw ìexoticî shells.128 However, there was little

or no interest among U.S. policy and intelligence communities about possible

proliferation threats associated with South Africaís biological warfare

program. 

The information that the CIA and MI-6 possessed was widely circulated

or available within the Bush administration or the Thatcher/Major

governments. This lack of interest changed in 1993, as the U.S. learned more

about South Africaís CBW and missile programs. Wouter Bassonís trips,

particularly to Libya, and access to an informant, who provided the U.S. and

allies with key details of Project Coast, increased the interest and concern of

the United States, Great Britain, and other allies. The new information led

the U.S. and Britain to issue a demarche in April 1994. Israeli officials

probably knew more about the program but did not want the U.S. and Britain

to know that they were involved with it.

According to Gen. (ret.) Chris Thirion, as the head of SADF intelligence,

he was asked for access to Project Coast secrets by good friends overseas. 129

 These included professional contacts in Germany, the U.S., Switzerland, and

Austria. Also, top South African authorities, Generals Liebenberg and

Meiring asked him if he could put Basson in touch with the right people. He

refused to ask his U.S. counterparts, because he customarily met with them

collectively and thought it would be awkward to ask. 

In the 1980s, Thirion built a good relationship with his U.S. counterparts

and cooperated with them in investigating the Soviet-built SA8 surface-to-air

missile, after the SADF had captured it. He provided information about the

G-5 gun to American counterparts, even though ARMSCOR was on bad

terms with the U.S. government. Thirion did not want to jeopardize his

relationship with the U.S. by mentioning Basson. However, he did ask a

Swiss agent one-on-one if he would be interested in meeting Basson. The

agent replied that the Swiss government was indeed interested. Thirion was

interested in defensive measures and encouraged the Swiss to put together a

team of doctors and send them to Angola. 

In 1991, U.S. embassy officials, including the defense attachÈ,

discovered at an arms show that South Africa was running a CBW program,

including gas masks and protective suits.130 The Americans asked the South

Africans about the CBW but elicited little response. Later, an American
44 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

delegation was invited to visit Protechnik to view facilities producing CBW

protective gear. By September 1991, the U.S. government (and not just the

CIA) became aware of Basson and Project Coast and began to look for signs

of proliferation, especially to ANC allies, such as Libya. 

Continued ìThird Forceî Activities and CBW Use 

In 1989 and the early 1990s, violence escalated inside South Africa, in

spite of the unbanning of the ANC and the release of Mandela. The

ANC/MK reserved the right to resume their urban guerrilla warfare

campaign, and violence between ANC and Inkatha supporters escalated in

Kwazulu-Natal. In this atmosphere of violence, the CCB and other ìthird

forceî agents intensified their murderous activities. 

In April 1989, the CCB attempted to assassinate the Reverend Frank

Chikane with poison during a trip to Namibia.131 Another attempt was made

during a trip to the U.S, where one doctor finally diagnosed his malady as

organophosphate poisoning. According to the testimony of RRL scientist,

Schalk Van Rensburg, to the TRC, the men who tried to kill Chikane with

Parathion had poor intelligence. He stated, ìThey were counting on little

(sic) forensic capability in Namibia. And too little was smeared over his

underwear to kill him when he went to the U.S.î132 Chikaneís attempted

assassination and several other CCB incidents illustrate the difficulties

involved in using biological agents as methods of assassination.133

CCB operative Petrus Jacobus Botes (who claimed to have also directed

operations by the CCB in Mozambique and Swaziland) asserted that he was

ordered, in May 1989, to contaminate the water supply at Dobra, a refugee

camp located in Namibia, with cholera and yellow fever organisms. A South

African army doctor provided them to him. In late August 1989, he led an

attempt to contaminate the water supply. However, the attempt failed to have

any effect because of the high chlorine content in the treated water at the

camp.134

In May 1990, a South African newspaper, Vrye Weekblad, reported that

a South African government covert operations unit, known as the Civilian

Cooperation Bureau (CCB), employed biological agents against South West

African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) members. According to this article,

the CCB had nearly 300 people working for it, and reportedly consumed
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 45

about 0.28 per cent of the entire South African defense budget. Reportedly,

the group had authority to operate inside South Africa and in neighboring

countries and was disbanded at the end of 1990.135

In 1990, violence in KwaZulu-Natal and other parts of South Africa

escalated, with assistance provided to Inkatha militants from the CCB and

other ìthird forceî agents. In response to rising evidence of third force

activities, the Harms Commission was established in 1990 and was charged

by President de Klerk with investigating third force agencies, including the

CCB and Vlakplaas. As the CCB was being terminated in 1990, CCB

operatives absconded with more than R12 million ($4 million in 1991 U.S.

dollars) that was due to Mechem (the explosives warfare company) for

teaching advanced demolition techniques.136

According to David Steward, F.W. de Klerkís chief of staff, these third

force activities came as a surprise to de Klerk. In spite of the evidence, the

1991 Harms Commission lacked teeth and was unable to uncover many of the

secret projects and third force activities that were going on in South Africa.

 In early 1992, Project Coast was still operating against the regimeís

ìenemies.î According to TRC testimony, Jan Lourens of RRL and Trevor

Floyd of the CCB allegedly took poisoned screwdrivers to London with plan

to kill ANC leader, Pallo Jordan and SACP/ANC military leader, Ronnie

Kasrils. Basson allegedly developed ìpoison beerî to be used against South

African blacks. 

Privatization, Corruption, and Drugs

In April 1990, Minister of Defense Malan decided to privatize

Roodeplaat Research Laboratories and Delta G, and Protechnik. Since de

Klerk had made the decision to start rolling back Project Coast, the Ministry

of Defense and SADF could no longer afford to sustain the three companies

and their employees. However, the privatization proceeded with insufficient

government oversight. In three years, Project Coast operatives pocketed state

assets totaling more than R50 million ($17 million in 1990 U.S. dollars), all

for an investment of as little as R350 000 ($120,000 in 1990 U.S. dollars),

and attracted the attention of the Office for Serious Economic Offences

(OEO). Among the chief beneficiaries was former Special Forces soldier

Philip Mijburgh, nephew of Magnus Malan.137
46 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

In July 1991, commercialization and privatization were put in motion.

 Malan ordered all research stopped by the end of August. Contracts with

SADF were cancelled. The ownership of RRL and Delta G Scientific were

transferred from Ministry of Defense to managers and scientists. OSEO

investigator Fouche testified to the TRC in 1996 that a five-year research

contract between the SADF and RRL was canceled by the SADF on the same

day RRL was privatized and transferred to Mijburgh and other colleagues in

August 1991. The termination of the contract meant the SANDF had to pay

these new owners R32.6 million ($11 million) in cancellation fees. In 1992,

Denel was created as the privatized production facility of ARMSCOR. 

However, ARMSCOR continued to control acquisitions and to maintain

secrecy.

In 1991, Basson began to build Merton House, a multi-million-rand

building in Pretoriaís plush Arcadia suburb. Bassonís plan was allegedly to

use the building as a high-class brothel. At the time the project was under

construction, Basson claimed he was merely the middleman for a group of

American doctors who were developing the property. This new building

reportedly outraged local residents. Actual construction started in 1992, and

even before the house was completed in 1993, it was up for sale for

R8.5million ($3 million). Waterson Properties built the mansion with

directors Christopher Marlow, Tjaart Viljoen, and Sam Bosch. Many

important documents were allegedly seized from Boschís house shortly after

Basson was arrested. Sam Bosch agreed to be a state witness in Bassonís

1999 criminal trial.138

In December 1991, the Project Coast Coordinating Management

Committee, including Knobel and Liebenberg, sent Basson to Croatia. There

he purchased 500 kgs. of methaqualone from ìrenegade Croatiansî (including

high-ranking government officials) and brought it back to South Africa.139

 The following year, benzilate and quinazolinone compounds, which were

most difficult to develop, were acquired in Croatia. During his Croatian

transactions, Basson ìlostî $1.6 million. (TRC found that the Croatia deal

was in itself extremely questionable, leading to a loss of millions of rand.)

 Dr. Basson intercepted Vatican bearer bonds to the value of $40 million that

had been intended for the purchase of weapons by the Croatian government,

leading to his arrest in Switzerland. Why the military was importing such

large quantities of methaqualone at such high cost at this late stage of
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 47

negotiations is not clear and was not adequately answered by Dr. Knobel or

Dr. Basson. The TRC questioned whether the methaqualone was actually

destroyed.

In the early 1990s, Delta-G made a cash purchase for mercury from

another former state-owned company, Thor Chemicals, a SADF frontcompany that was involved in the network of corporations working to provide

materials for the covert CBW program. What this mercury was used for

remains unknown. The prosecutor in the Basson trial investigated this

purchase since mercury can also be used for the production of sassafras to

produce Ecstasy. Others speculate that this purchase was related to the

production of Mandrax. However, mercury produced by Thor Chemicals has

also been linked to the mysterious nuclear substance, ìRed Mercury.î140

In the mid-1990s, the South African Broadcasting show Agenda reported

allegations of a large 1992 clandestine shipment of a mercuric substance to

Delta G during research for a program on murders connected to deals in Red

Mercury. The broadcast pointed out that Delta G was reported to have

carried out research to create nerve gases that could immobilize enemy forces

for a number of hours but not kill them, making it possible to overrun

strategic installations without exposing friendly forces to dangerous

compounds. Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Landman, who headed a special

police team set up to probe a string of murders apparently connected to Red

Mercury at the time, confirmed he also had evidence that Delta G had bought

more than two tons of yellow mercuric oxide from controversial Natal-based

mercury recyclers, Thor Chemicals, in September 1991. Agenda producer

Jacques Pauw said there was evidence that yellow mercuric oxide was one of

the ìbuilding blocksî of red mercury, the substance said to make nuclear

devices smaller and more effective. Thor Chemicals executive Alan Kidger

was murdered two months after the Delta G deal. Kidger was found

completely dismembered and smeared with a black oily substance. His death

has been linked to the trade in Red Mercury by police investigations. There

is some evidence that the murders of Durban armaments dealers Don Juan

Lange in June and Dirk Stoffberg in July 1994 and perhaps others were

connected to the trade in Red Mercury. To date, none of the ìRed Mercury

murdersî has been solved. The prevailing theory of prosecutors and

journalists is that all of these individuals were involved in clandestine arms

procurement deals. In 1992, Medchem and Delta G Scientific produced
48 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

1,000 kilograms of Ecstasy. The Ecstasy manufactured was, in all likelihood,

encapsulated by Medchem Pharmaceuticals. This was a subsidiary of the

holding company Medchem Consolidated Investments, under which Delta G

Scientific also fell (according to TRC testimony). 

During the 1992 time period, a South African Air Force jet, which

frequently flew abroad on top-secret missions, was allegedly carrying

designer drugs, such as Mandrax. On this occasion, the Mandrax was for the

use of a group of rugby enthusiasts who went to the first game between the

Springboks and England when sporting ties were re-established. Dr. Johan

Koekemoer, former research manager at Delta-G told this information to the

Gauteng Attorney Generalís office researchers, after turning stateís evidence

in preparations for Bassonís trial.

A Chemical Weapons Attack on Mozambique?

On 16 January 1992, a chemical warfare attack was reportedly launched

on Mozambican troops. According to the December 20, 1992 report of Lt.

General Pierre Steyn, the SADF, as an experimental training exercise,

launched an attack from Komatipoort (near the border) into Mozambique. A

gas similar to teargas, causing pain and irritation, was allegedly sprayed from

reconnaissance airplanes.141

Investigators were unable to determine the accuracy of this information,

as the use of the Komatipoort airstrip was not regulated. After the incident,

scientific teams from South Africa, Mozambique, Switzerland, Sweden, and

the United Kingdom conducted a series of investigations. Military personnel

from several countries also attempted to determine the cause of deaths of

civilians in Mozambique who were suspected victims of CBW attacks. The

reports were inconclusive. The only report that expressed a belief that the

troops had been exposed to a chemical agent was that of the British scientist. 

These outside investigators had a great deal of difficulty disentangling

the proximate cause of deaths since many of the victims were suffering from

malnutrition and other diseases at the time of their death. A UN investigation

was launched and was also unable to come to any firm conclusions.142 The

reported incident also raised American and British concerns, which helped

lead to the demarche of 1994.
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 49

According to Dr. Joynt, when the Steyn Report was leaked in 1993, it

linked him to the reported attack on Mozambique.143 Joynt was using

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to locate mines for clearing in the

Komatipoort area. One of his planes was accused of dropping chemical

agents on Mozambican soldiers in January 1992. After the alleged incident,

approximately 40 soldiers were found to be acting strangely.

Dr. Ian Phillips, ANC Defense Expert, asserts that battlefield use of

CBW was evident with the Mozambique incident.144 He alleges that a highflying airplane launched a chemical attack against Mozambican soldiers on

the border near Nkomati. The bomb exploded well above the ground. The

use of CBW against Mozambican troops preceded the whites only

referendum in 1992 and was used to demonstrate the resolve of the de Klerk

government. Afterwards, three teams of inspectors, including one from the

UK Ministry of Defense, were sent to examine the site.

Dr. Torie Pretorius believes that the SADF was carrying out an

experiment on a chemical agent in Mozambique.145 The drone aircraft with

yellow smoke was tested after De Klerkís speech against secret projects in

1990. 

In an interview, Gen. (ret.) Meiring stated that, in January 1992, he and

the Mozambican General Dias went to the hospital to inspect troops that had

reportedly been subjected to a gas attack by SADF.146 The SADF 6th Medical

Battalion found no evidence of a gas attack. The SADF concluded that the

troops who were reportedly attacked had deserted in the face of a

Mozambique National Resistance Movement (RENAMO) attack.147

The Steyn Report

The Steyn Report was the most ambitious attempt to uncover the secret

projects of the SADF, including Project Coast, with the aim of helping to

restore civilian control over the military. The year 1992 was a very sensitive

period, and rapprochement between the regime and the ANC was proceeding

slowly. The behavior of the security forces was a big problem given the weak

civilian control. All attempts at reform met with resistance. In 1990, Lt.

Gen. Steyn was SADF Chief of Personnel and was working with Jakkie

Cilliers (now director of the Institute of Security Studies, Pretoria) on civilian

control of military. Together, they produced a code of conduct for SADF that
50 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

was then rejected by SADF leaders. Later, Lt. Gen. Steyn proposed

completely opening the SADF to blacks, but the proposal was also rejected.

 The problem in the SADF was that traditional leaders (Malan, Liebenberg,

and others) had acquired an exalted status and were being driven by political

convictions. Their underlings were following them blindly. In such a

situation, imposing a neutral and binding code of conduct was difficult to

accomplish.

In mid-1992, Lt. Gen. Steyn was transferred and promoted to Chief of

SADF staff, where he chaired staff functions and not line functions. 

However, he was in the position to control SADF programs. He worked with

Roelf Meyer, the Acting Defense Secretary, 1991-92. In the second half of

1992, the Goldstone Commission began to investigate violence in South

Africa. SADF generals became increasingly concerned that their actions

would be discovered and that they would lose control.

During the investigations, Justice Goldstone stumbled upon damning

evidence and reported directly to the President and not to the Cabinet or to

the SADF. De Klerk was compelled to investigate and called Steyn to report

to the Cabinet. The SADF Army Chief, General Meiring, and SAP General

van der Merwe asked Steyn to investigate, and he agreed. On 18 November

1992, de Klerk appointed Lt. Gen. Steyn to investigate SADF secret projects,

including Basson and Project Coast and ìthird forceî activities around the

country. As a result, de Klerk learned of the activities of Basson, Project

Coast, CCB and other covert units.148

SADF military procedures could not be used in the investigations,

because the subjects of investigation were not all military personnel and

because military procedures presupposed full cooperation from all involved.

 Because of the possibility of a military cover-up, counterintelligence

agencies were used to check on the validity of information. The information

was reviewed independently by two separate organizations to confirm

allegations. The two agencies were the National Intelligence Service (NIS)

(later the National Intelligence Agency), headed by Dr. Barnard and Dr.

Scholz and SADF Counterintelligence, led by Joffel van der Westhuizen.149

The CIA and MI6 were concerned and were in touch with the NIS/NIA.

 While the different organizations often had to rely upon information

obtained from the same source, it was probable that the information that they
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 51

received was valid. The NIS/NIA had been conducting its own intelligence

operation since 1989, investigating the SADF and SAP secret projects. 

Targets for investigation included Project Coast and Basson, as well as Jan

Lourens and Brian John Davie of Protechnik, who were involved in the CBW

experiments.

According to a Weekly Mail & Guardian account of the Steyn Report the

three front companies (Delta G, Roodeplaat Research Laboratories and

Protechnik) were found to be involved in developing chemical and biological

weapons.150 In 1991, SADF Counterintelligence began investigating Basson

after there were security leaks to the media. Evidence was found that

Bassonís team had armed RENAMO with chemical weapons. 

The Steyn team quickly investigated projects that needed to be stopped.

 However, financial misdealings were not examined. Investigations went

smoothly, until the first report was completed and issued on 20 December

1992 and landed on de Klerkís desk at the beginning of January 1993. De

Klerk was asked to take action, even though there was no legal basis for

action, no charges and no solid evidence. However, pre-emptive steps were

deemed necessary, before a cover-up could be launched. De Klerk was

presented with the counterintelligence evidence, which demonstrated that

SADF secret programs ran against de Klerkís stated policy of civilian control

over the military. However, de Klerk failed to ask SADF Chief of Staff,

Liebenberg, and SAP head, van der Merwe, if they knew about the illegal

activities. Instead, de Klerk called in Liebenberg, Meiring, and the SADF

Chief of Intelligence and informed them of the evidence. Liebenberg said he

was ìshocked,î and that he would report back in 10 days.

President de Klerk decided that firm and decisive action was needed,

even though there was no conclusive evidence. In mid-January 1993, de

Klerk called Liebenberg in again and announced that he had changed his

mind and that he wanted to act assertively. He would fire the generals

responsible for the CCB and other secret projects. De Klerk asked

Liebenberg to ensure that the SADF policed itself. Subsequently, de Klerk

launched another, more random investigation. Instead of acting against

Liebenberg and van der Merwe, de Klerk let Liebenberg off the hook, and

Liebenberg was not obliged to report back. De Klerk did not even confront

the SAPís van der Merwe about the activities of the CCB unit of the SAP and

its notorious leader, Eugene de Kock. As a result of the second investigation,
52 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

27 generals retired early. Col. Dr. Basson was required to leave the SADF

at the end of March 1993 and was given a ìsoft retirementî and reserve

status.151

By the first quarter of 1993, the sources of investigation were drying up.

 Steyn was ostracized, and there was no prosecution of SADF generals. In

fact, some generals, such as Chris Thirion, sued the government and won. 

The Steyn Report found that Project Coast and Basson, RRL, Delta-G,

Medchem, and SADF were all operating completely outside the purview of

the civilian government, and the TRC confirmed these findings. According

to David Steward, de Klerkís chief of staff, P.W. Botha was the only civilian

who knew anything.152 Subsequently, the National Prosecutorís office

(Anton Ackermann and Dr. Torie Pretorius) took up the investigation, as

evidence was laboriously dug up and as cases were developed against de

Kock and Basson. After the Steyn and Goldstone Commissionsí

investigations and findings, the SADF ìput the shutters down.î153

According to General (ret.) Meiring, who was Army Chief of Staff, the

ìnight of the generalsî was based on hearsay evidence and the media.154

There was bad blood between the SADF and the NIS/NIA. Steyn was Acting

Chief of SADF. He relied on unconfirmed evidence given to him by military

intelligence and the NIS/NIA. Often, Steyn and de Klerk obtained

information from only one source. 

The Steyn Report and the Rollback of Project Coast

The Steyn Report found that Project Coast was offensive in nature. The

SADF had to create an offensive CBW program in order to test defensive

measures, and the lack of civilian control meant that the program was used

as only a few top SADF leaders saw fit. According to this report, starting in

1985, the ANC and MK escalated their campaign of violence to include

civilian targets, and the SADF and SAP retaliated by using methods, such as

CBW. These persisted, despite later efforts made to assert civilian control.

 Gen. Liebenberg and Gen. Meiring, in particular, knew about SADF secret

programs, including Project Coast, and took an assertive hand in running

them. Gen. (ret.) Liebenberg signed for Project Coast activities and so did

Surgeon General Knobel. 

De Klerk become aware of the scale, sophistication, and offensive uses

of Project Coast at the start of 1993. Upon receiving Steynís report, de Klerk
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 53

finally ordered the destruction of all lethal and incapacitating CBW agents,

as well as an end to such research and operations. He also forced the

retirement of Basson at the end of March 1993. In January 1993, the Minister

of Defense, Kobie Coetzee, acting on de Klerkís order, authorized all CBW

research and development stopped. Project Coast documents containing

formulas and experiments were to be transferred to CD-ROMs. 

According to Dr. Kobus (Jack) Bothma, in testimony at the Basson trial,

an office secretary scanned in the documents from Project Coast onto CDROMs. Philip Mijburgh transferred the CD-ROMs to the Ministry of

Defense, where they were placed in the vaults, and President de Klerk was

given a key to the contents, so that only the State President could open it,

along with the Surgeon General, and Head of the NIA, Niel Barnard. 

Although it seemed that Project Coast had been rolled back, Mijburgh

issued destruction documents that were inconclusive. While the South

African government believed that it had rolled back Project Coast, four years

later, in January 1997, police investigators found that Basson had taken

copies of Project Coast documents home and hidden them in trunks. 

Whether all CBW agents were destroyed at the beginning or end of 1993

remains a matter of opinion. Also, large quantities of drugs were

unaccounted for and were either in possession of Basson or were secreted

elsewhere. According to General (ret.) Meiring, all CBW agents were

dumped out to sea at the end of 1993. The Forensic Branch of the SAP,

headed by SAP General Lothar Neethling, placed all agents destroyed on a

schedule. The agents were dumped 200 nautical miles south of Cape

Argulhas. While lethal CBW agents were destroyed, the irritants, including

NGT (CR) gas were kept.155

According to Dr. Knobelís testimony to the TRC, SADF

Counterintelligence destroyed all CBW agents in January 1993. The

methaqualone purchased in Croatia was allegedly destroyed then, after the

order was received that work on all incapacitants should cease. 

On 7 January 1993, Dr. Knobel advised his superiors that South Africa

ìshould concealî NGT (CR) gas from the inspectors of the Chemical

Weapons Convention (CWC). On 14 January 1993, South Africa formally

acceded to the CWC. However, work on the dispersion of NGT (CR) gas

continued.156 By March 1993, de Klerk publicly announced that South Africa
54 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

had dismantled its six nuclear weapons in 1991. By the end of 1993, the

South African missile program was rolled back. 

The order to terminate Project Coast led to the immediate transfer of

ownership of RRL and Delta G to Project Coast managers, including Basson

and Mijburgh. The way had been opened to massive financial improprieties.

 The 10 shareholders in the Roodeplaat Research Laboratories became

millionaires overnight when the SADF closed down Project Coast at the

beginning of 1993. Later, the SADF paid the debtors, who were the

shareholders, a total of R18 million ($6 million). However, the details of this

multi-million-rand scam only emerged in 1996 in Parliament. This was

almost a year after the South African National Defense Force (SANDF),

which had replaced the old SADF, had written off Project Coastís debts of

almost R22 million ($7.5 million in 1996 U.S. dollars).157

According to Gen. (ret.) Meiring, the process of rolling back the CBW

Program took almost three years of commercializing the front companies and

phasing out the scientists.158 In 1993, a forensic audit was conducted to

determine the whereabouts of all moneys and the availability of CW and BW

agents. The only problem detected by this audit was the Croatian swindle,

and a South African agent arrested by the Swiss government. Also in 1993,

a parallel investigation took place. The Office of Serious Economic Offenses

(OSEO) was investigating reports of financial misdealings, and General

Meiring and Surgeon General Knobel appeared and gave testimony. They

also briefed President de Klerk.

In early 1993, the ANC and MK became aware of the Steyn Report and

the CBW program.159 Another indication of the CBW program for the ANC

was the ìRed Mercuryî campaign, which involved a number of high-level

assassinations, including killings in Cape Town and the use of chemical

compounds.160

On 31 March 1993, Basson was retired by President de Klerk from the

SADF Medical Service (SAMS) and became a reservist. Basson had also

been ordered to destroy Project Coast documentation. However, Basson did

not follow, to the letter, the orders of his superiors and kept Project Coast

research documentation alive. Transnet, the state-owned transportation and

infrastructure corporation that built and maintained railroads, tunnels,

airports, and hospitals, immediately employed him. Basson then went to
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 55

Libya on contract to give advice on military counter-measures to CBW

attacks. 

Gen. (ret.) Meiring states that he does not know if Basson gave away

secrets. According to Meiring, the U.S., especially, as well as the UK and

other NATO countries, knew about Project Coast and were worried that

information would fall into the wrong hands. However, U.S. and UK

officials apparently never knew exactly what South Africa possessed at this

time.
56 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 57

V. Transition to ANC Rule, Proliferation Concerns and 

 Efforts to Conceal Project Coast Details: 1994-1996

In the second half of 1993, peace negotiations between the de Klerk

government and Nelson Mandela and the ANC gained momentum. In

August 1993, the Office of Serious Economic Offenses (OSEO) informed

MI-6 and the CIA of the misdeeds of Basson and Project Coast. 

The Americans and British became even more concerned when, in

October 1993, Basson made his first trip to Libya on behalf of Transnet, the

state-owned transportation and infrastructure corporation. This was the first

of Bassonís five visits to Libya, with his last visit in October 1995, and it is

possible that he sold Project Coast secrets. 

In addition, South Africa submitted a Confidence Building Measure

(CBM) for 1993, as stipulated by the BWC, which provided details on the

rollback of the biological side of Project Coast. In November 1993, the

Americans and British objected to the South African CBM and began the

process of interacting with the South African officials in an effort to see that

Project Coast would be rolled back to their satisfaction. According to U.S.

 Ambassador Princeton Lyman, the South African CBM was not forthcoming

on many aspects of the CBW program, including offensive uses,

weaponization, and proliferation.161

According to Peter Goosen, proliferation expert in the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, the South Africans lacked the technical expertise to submit

an acceptable CBM and sought British and American assistance. In the

meantime, de Klerk and his colleagues attempted to reassure the U.S. and the

UK that the CBW program had been rolled back.162

In January 1994, negotiations between the de Klerk government and

Nelson Mandela and the ANC finally reached settlement, and elections were

scheduled for April 27. As the momentous hand-over of power approached,

the U.S. and UK became increasingly concerned about Basson and others

proliferating chemical and biological warfare secrets to other states and/or

groups of concern. 

On 11 April 1994, Ambassador Lyman and the British High

Commissioner, Anthony Reeve, delivered a demarche to President de

Klerk.163 The U.S. and Britain demanded that their experts be briefed, all
58 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

CBW systems and records, including the CD-ROMs be destroyed, abuses of

the program be investigated and reported, and Mandela be informed. 

According to David Steward, de Klerkís chief of staff, the American and

British ambassadors regarded Basson as a ìdangerous agent.î164

Within the American team, there were differences. Ambassador Lyman

was primarily concerned with reducing the proliferation threat, and State

Department and CIA officials joined him in this approach. However,

officials from the National Security Council (NSC) were outraged by

evidence of the use of CBW and wanted to see that those responsible were

punished. Department of Defense officials were late in joining the U.S. team

and felt marginalized. Consequently, they sided with the NSC. Ultimately,

Ambassador Lyman was able to prevail and focus on proliferation concerns,

even though seeking convictions for past CBW use was part of the

demarche.

165

According to Dr. Knobel, then South African Surgeon General,

President de Klerk and the South Africans cooperated with the Americans

and British.166 However, Knobel and other South African officials believed

that the Americans and British were acting on the basis of questionable and

uncorroborated evidence, some of which came from press reports. On 21

April 1994, South Africa responded to the demarche and asserted that Project

Coast records were a ìnational assetî and that the CD-ROMs would not be

destroyed. According to Knobel, he and Basson were given responsibility for

briefing the U.S. and British experts and Mandela. 

After the demarche and the inauguration of President Mandela in May

1994, American and British delegations arrived for the first of several visits

to South Africa. Knobel, Basson and others extensively briefed the

delegations over a three-day period and took them on a tour of Roodeplaat

Research Laboratories, which had been converted to commercial production.

 The SADF compiled a large file on Project Coast and gave it to the

Americans and British. 

South Africa reassured the British and Americans that the three keys to

gain access to Project Coast secrets on CD-ROM were in the hands of the

President, Surgeon General, and National Intelligence Agency head. The

South Africans transferred information, which they had obtained from the

Russian and Iraqi programs (including flesh-eating bacteria). Knobel claimed

that Basson was offered a job and money by the U.S. and Britain but
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 59

declined. Three teams (from the UN, U.S. and UK) investigated the January

1992 alleged CBW incident in Mozambique. In 1994 and 1995, American

and British teams made more visits to South Africa to facilitate the rollback

of the South African CBW program.

Basson and his trips to Libya were the main source of contention

between the US, Britain and South Africa. In spite of the demarche, Basson

continued to visit Libya in 1994 and 1995, until he had completed five trips.

 The U.S. and UK kept up the pressure on South Africa to control Basson and

suggested that the SANDF, which had replaced the SADF, rehire him. 

Opinion on the damage done by Basson varies. 

According to Mangold and Adams, there is no doubt that Basson was

originally invited to Libya to help them with chemical warfare facilities at

Rabta. 167 General (ret.) Meiring believed that Basson did not pass secret

information on the CBW program to the Libyans or to other foreign

governments. However, Meiring suggested that he gave them other

information and defensive CBW techniques. There was still secrecy about

how the knowledge was passed. Meiring stressed that Basson was always

under instructions, and claimed there was nothing that went unnoticed by the

SADF. 

According to Gen. (ret.) Meiring, much of the information for Project

Coast was obtained from the nationals of the U.S., UK, and Germany. Highly

technical advanced knowledge passed from U.S., UK, and German scientists

to the South Africans. The South African government did not want to cause

the American and British governments embarrassment by revealing that fact.

 Ambassador Donald Mahley, U.S. State Department proliferation expert, and

his British counterpart had led teams that examined Project Coast documents

in 1994. 

The range of pathogens that were developed led to the American claim

that South Africa had the ìsecond most sophisticated program next to the

Soviets.î While there was no evidence that South African scientists

themselves had genetically modified pathogens to create new ones, there was

evidence that Project Coast had obtained the pathogens from elsewhere. In

addition, from 1989-93, the South African military still had the capability to

launch or deliver a nuclear or CBW payload. 

On 18 August 1994, Knobel briefed President Mandela, Defense

Minister Modise and his deputy, Ronnie Kasrils. The SANDF also provided
60 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

a large file on Project Coast. Before April 1994 and the elections, Mandela

was only getting sketchy details from de Klerk about what was developed,

according to senior ANC officials.

Within the ANC, there was a debate, from 1990-94, about whether to

keep the nuclear program. However, the conclusion to roll back the CBW

program was unanimous. According to Dr. Ian Phillips, ANC defense expert,

the ANC wanted to know where the information about the CBW program had

disappeared. The ANC believes that white South African scientists and

former operatives who are now living in the Middle East as well as the U.S.

and Britain sold many of Project Coastís secrets to foreign sources.

Despite these internal differences and uncertainties, the policies of the

new South African government included a strong commitment to promoting

non-proliferation norms and treaties. Prior to signing the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Minister of Foreign Affairs,

Roelof ìPikî Botha, sought and got repeated assurances from Surgeon

General Knobel and the Department of Defense that South Africa no longer

had a CBW program. Botha repeatedly asked for clarification on this point,

as he had to give assurances that South Africa had destroyed its CBW

program before signing the NPT.168

Lt. Gen. Steyn briefed Mandela, after his inauguration, on the findings

of the Steyn Report. Mandela agreed not to release the Steyn Report due to

concerns it might jeopardize the transition process. All parties, including

Mandelaís office, F.W. de Klerk (who had stayed on as Deputy President in

the interim government), and two attorney generals, who had access to the

information in the report, kept the report under wraps for more than two

years.

In 1997, The Weekly Mail and Guardian reported that President Mandela

had been in possession of the Steyn Report since 1994. However,

presidential liaison Parks Mankahlana denied that Mandela had a copy but

confirmed that Steyn had briefed the president. The difficulties that de Klerk

had in ensuring that his order to dismantle the CBW program was carried out

and a widespread tendency to stonewall the politicians made a deep

impression on the military leadership appointed by Mandela.

These experiences figured prominently in the mind of the new Secretary

of Defense, Pierre Steyn, and others who were the first leaders of the new

Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD). They believed that a combined
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 61

headquarters, led by civilians, was critical for developing a professional and

fully integrated new South African National Defense Force (SANDF). An

important mission of the newly created OSD from the start was to put in

place oversight and accounting procedures that would make it impossible for

SANDF personnel to engage in the type of fraud and out-of-control abuses

associated with Project Coast.169

In 1995, according to Dr. Ian Phillips, ANC defense expert, the

establishment of a Defense Department with the assistance of the U.S. and

UK cleared up the problem of military dominance and the ìsecurity state.î

 The 1994 Defense Act created better structural differentiation and civilian

control. The Mandela government had to find a way to implement the

Defense Act in a piecemeal fashion, after it had been found to be

unconstitutional, due to certain clauses.

In November 1994, the Office for Serious Economic Offenses (OSEO),

a special unit attached to the Attorney Generalís department, completed an

official report on the activities and financial irregularities of a network of

companies that supplied the SADF with pharmaceuticals and anti-chemical

warfare equipment (i.e., Project Coast). The report was sent to Justice

Minster Dullah Omar, was marked ìtop secret,î and the minister was

reported to be studying it.170 One researcher in the Attorney Generalís office

reported studying Project Coast in early 1993. 

Jan Swanepoel, the head of the OSEO, confirmed to The Weekly Mail

and Guardian that the company network was under investigation in

connection with ìflow of funds connected with an army project.î 

Another report in The Sunday Tribune in December 1994 described the

network of companies working with SADF on CBW. They named the key

directors of this network under investigation as Dr. Wouter Basson, Dr.

Wynand Swanepoel, and Dr. Phillip Mijburgh (a nephew of Magnus Malan),

and noted that all three had served in SADFís medical service (SAMS).

The Weekly Mail and Guardian reported, from correspondence between

Basson and Mijburgh, that they were researching the legal aspects of CBW.

 The same newspaper also reported that SADF military officials used the

Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) facilities to obtain and

develop different strains of germs, some of which were highly toxic to

humans.171
62 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

One week before, in an article in The Weekly Mail and Guardian, it was

reported that ARMSCOR acknowledged at the end of 1994 that it owned

Protechnik, a chemical warfare research plant. Protechnik described itself as

the biggest nuclear, biological, and chemical laboratory in Africa. It was

officially designed to develop only defensive equipment against chemical

weapons. However, its operations stirred protests (and continue to do so) in

the Pretoria metropolitan area, especially due to fears of accidents. 

By the end of 1994, more information about the CBW program was

emerging from several other sources. They included an investigation by a

team from the Attorney Generalís office and reports in The Sunday Tribune,

and The Weekly Mail and Guardian, based on their independent

investigations. Reports emerged of experiments at SADF research firms,

including some bizarre experiments involving dogs.172 

In 1995, Bassonís trips to Libya continued. In February 1995, an article

appeared in The Times of London on possible South African CBW links to

Libya. Evidently, someone in MI-6 tipped off the Times. In March 1995, the

CIA and DIA informed President Clinton of Bassonís activities, who

authorized the sending of a delegation to South Africa, which met with

Mandela. It is not certain if the delegation met with Basson or if was he in

Libya. 

Once again, the Americans urged the Mandela government to bring

Basson under control by rehiring him. On 15 April 1995, South Africa

submitted a much-revised Confidence Building Measure (CBM). This was

nearly two years after the U.S. and UK challenged the 1993 CBM (no CBM

was submitted to the UN in 1994). This time U.S. and UK objections were

addressed satisfactorily. Even so, the Americans and British continued to

share concerns about the potential spread of the secrets on the CD-ROMs by

Basson and others to states and/or groups of concern.

In May 1995, Defense Minister Modise and Secretary of Defense Pierre

Steyn rehired Basson as a regular SANDF surgeon (he had been on reserve

status). In early 1995, Generals Meiring and Knobel sat down and discussed

Basson, after receiving information from NIA, CIA, and MI-6. Basson had

been asked by government and SANDF officials to curb his behavior, but

there was no way to do so, except to rehire him. Meiring and Knobel went

to Deputy Minister of Defense Ronnie Kasrils and urged that Basson be

rehired.173 Kasrils went to Modise and Steyn and recommended the same. 
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 63

Later, Kasrils defended the governmentís action in rehiring Basson, by

saying it was to stop him from giving valuable and potentially dangerous

secrets about the chemical and biological warfare programs to other

countries.174 Dr. Ian Phillips, ANC defense expert, said that Basson was

rehired in order to bring him under parliamentary scrutiny at a time when no

legislation was in place that could stop his activities.175

Evidently, great concern existed within the South African government,

the SANDF, and among foreign governments about the possibility that

Basson was selling Project Coast secrets. However, even after being rehired

by the SANDF, Basson still made another and final trip to Libya in October

1995.176

A U.S. government lawsuit in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania against

ARMSCOR created tense relations between the U.S. and South African

governments This hampered U.S. investigators in exploring possible

ARMSCOR involvement in chemical and biological weaponization. 

However, overall U.S. relations with the Mandela government remained

reasonably sound, and the investigations into Project Coast concluded

satisfactorily. Finally, in October 1996 Deputy President Mbeki and Vice

President Gore worked out an agreement so that ARMSCOR could plea

bargain at a meeting of the U.S.-South African Bi-national Commission. The

Defense Committee and Defense Minister Modise signed the agreement in

July 1997.

In February 1996, the Mandela cabinet finally acted on the OSEO report,

after 16 months of keeping it secret. This ruling gave OSEO investigators

permission to follow the flow of funds overseas but did not agree to the

request made by the Justice Ministry that the secrecy on the project, regulated

by the Protection of Information Act, be lifted. However, no one was charged

immediately, and Project Coastís debts of R22 million had already been

written off by the SANDF. 

In May 1996, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Accounts

began its own investigations. However, this committee and a special

parliamentary committee on Project Coast encountered resistance from

SANDF chief, General Georg Meiring, who refused to release information

about the CBW program.177 Even though parliamentary committee sessions

were held in camera, members were unable to learn many details about

Project Coast. In August 1996, the special committee finally questioned
64 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

Bassonís involvement with the privatization of RRL. Since this was almost

a year after Project Coastís debts had been written off, it indicated how weak

parliamentary oversight was in practice. 

The difficulties encountered by parliamentary committees to hear details

of the military involvement in Project Coast reflects a transitional agreement

reached by cabinet members of the Government of National Unity (GNU).

 The agreement, endorsed by President Mandela and his deputy presidents,

Thabo Mbeki and F.W. de Klerk, supported General Meiringís position that

details of Project Coast should remain secret and that an earlier cabinet

decision to lift the secrecy from the project did not apply. This decision in

part reflected a concern that full disclosure might compromise ongoing

criminal investigations. 

Mandelaís spokesman, Parks Mankahlana explained in confirming

Mandelaís support for Meiringís position that, ìan overall lifting can be

considered once the OSEO investigation is over ... There is no intention to

impose permanent secrecy on the matter.î178 The decision to withhold was

taken due to concerns of the GNU, the new SANDF leadership, and former

SADF generals, as well as the U.S., Great Britain, and other countries, that

full public disclosure, either in parliament or in the TRC hearings, could pose

a serious threat to domestic security.

Foreign governments were also concerned that highly sensitive

information might be leaked. Concerns about the fragile political situation

that prevailed in South Africa and the possible reactions by the public or

paramilitary groups to complete disclosure of Project Coast was a genuine

source of concern for many South African politicians in the government and

several interested foreign governments, including those of the U.S., UK,

Israel, and Germany, during this period.179 They were concerned that past

relations between their scientists and weapons experts and those with South

Africa during the 1980s would be revealed.
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 65

VI. Bassonís Arrest and Trial and TRC Hearings, 

 1997-2000

Revelations and Roadblocks during the

Truth & Reconciliation hearing

on Project Coast after Bassonís arrest in 1997

The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was

established at the end of 1995 when Nelson Mandela officially appointed the

Chairperson, Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Dr. Alex Boraine, ViceChairperson, and 17 TRC Commissioners. The mandate of the Truth and

Reconciliation Commission required full disclosure and transparency about

the past actions of current and former government officials. In December

1996, Mandelaís office, for the first time, provided the TRC with a copy of

the Steyn Report, so it could be investigated more fully. At the time, the

TRC officials said that the information could not be released, because much

of it was in the form of ìuntested allegations.î180

The TRC was ìa political compromise born out of the negotiated

settlement between a minority government and the liberation movements. It

was ìa compromise between those who wanted an apartheid war crimes trial

and those who demanded blanket amnesty for those who had killed, tortured

and committed political crimes during the apartheid era.î181 The

Commission tackled four tasks: 1) to reveal the truth about the period

between 1960 and 1994 in order to understand how the apartheid system

developed and endured; 2) to provide a forum for thousands of victims; 3) to

consider what compensation victims deserved; and 4) to consider amnesty

applications. After an investigative stage and a series of hearings, the TRC

issued a final report in 1998.182

From the outset there were limits imposed on the scope of the TRCís

investigations by its legal mandate, subsequent rulings of the executive

branch, and political considerations, as well as ties to the fragile status quo

that prevailed in the first years after the transition and time constraints. 

The TRC process has been criticized from several different quarters. 

Some have charged that the process was hopelessly naive from the beginning.

 Others have cited the lack of personnel with experience working in the

military or intelligence community as a fatal flaw that limited the
66 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

Commissionís ability to uncover the truth about past atrocities.183

However, the temper of the times and its legal mandate called for the

body to primarily focus on uncovering past atrocities and promoting

reconciliation. This mandate shaped the questions, procedures, and personnel

who worked as investigators and lawyers for the Commission. Moreover,

TRC lawyers were required by law to protect the civil liberties of South

African citizens who were accused of past wrongdoing, while ensuring that

no one was above the law. These requirements meant that the TRC process

was extremely slow and time-consuming.

From the start the TRC investigation into Project Coast was limited by

Ministry of Defense restrictions, designed to ensure that the investigation did

not became a ìfishing expedition.î TRC investigators worked closely with

military intelligence and representatives of other agencies, as TRC

investigators were sensitive to the needs of several ongoing criminal

investigations and national security concerns. ìNational securityî proved to

be the major constraint on the scope of the hearings. Time was also a

limiting factor, as Bassonís lawyers engaged in a series of stall tactics that

delayed his appearance until the closing days of the TRC hearings. Thus, a

number of questions about this project remained unanswered at the time the

TRC investigation phase ended.

Initially, TRC investigators had little information about Project Coast.

 A top-secret briefing to a few Commission members in 1996 revealed only

that South Africa had a CBW capacity in the past, but only a ìdefensiveî one,

and that it was dismantled prior to the 1994 elections. The TRC continued

with low-level investigations, but had so little information at their disposal

that it seemed unlikely that anything new would emerge.184

This expectation changed suddenly in January 1997 when Basson was

arrested during a sting operation on charges of fraud and the possession of

illegal substances based on his alleged effort to sell 1,000 Ecstasy tablets.185

 A subsequent search of Bassonís friend and business associate, Sam Boschís

home, uncovered 5 or 6 trunks and a couple of suitcases that contained secret

documents related to Project Coast that were thought to have been destroyed

when the CBW program was dismantled.

The senior TRC researcher, Dr. Villa-Vicencio, rushed to Pretoria, after

Basson was arrested, in order to represent the TRC. He was joined by Mike

Kennedy, the representative of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), and
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 67

representatives from the Office of Serious Economic Offenses (OSEO), and

the Gauteng Attorney Generalís Special Investigation Team. Together they

went through the contents of these trunks. After some initial squabbling, an

agreement was reached that the NIA would take control and responsibility for

keeping these documents secure. Before the documents were turned over to the

NIA, the contents of the trunks were inventoried.186 These documents contained

the core of information, which formed the basis of the TRCís investigative work

over the next 18 months. The TRC called in Professor Peter Folb, University of

Cape Town, to serve as their scientific and technical adviser.

In March 1998, Chandre Gould, another TRC investigator who had

access to the documents, and the TRCís Commissioner, Wendy Orr, looked

at some of the technical documents that had been found in Bassonís trunks.

 Gould wanted an explanation of some of the pharmaceutical and medical

terminology. Orr was horrified by what she did understand, even though

there was much that she did not understand in the contents. One of the first

documents Dr. Orr examined was the infamous verkope lys (shopping or sales

list) (See Appendix C).187

The senior TRC investigator, Villa-Vicencio, concluded that the trunks

contained a ìmixed bagî that included memorabilia, as well as sensitive technical

information, which might prove embarrassing to foreign governments, as well as

information readily available in open source literature (e.g., formulas for

methaqualone and how to build a bomb). He felt that collectively, these

documents confirmed the idea that South Africaís biological weapons program

had developed some very sophisticated processes and procedures.188

The beginning months of 1997 were the start of a period of unprecedented

public disclosures by South African newspapers. A wide range of the governmentís most sensitive information about past activities continued to leak and be

reported by the press throughout the TRC deliberations. Thus, despite the fact

that many Project Coast hearings were held behind closed doors, the public

heard much of this testimony in an almost daily stream of revelations. Many

of these articles revealed details about the scope of Project Coast activities

and efforts by past officials to use CBW against political enemies.

During this period, TRC investigators were discovering ìpockets of

secret documentsî that were supposed to be destroyed by former SAP, SADF

intelligence and prison authorities, but had not been shredded. As TRC

investigators conducted spot checks of police stations in six different areas,
68 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

they found a wealth of information contained in residual documents that were

never destroyed.189

The Project Coast hearings were scheduled to take place from 8 to 12

June 1998. However, several weeks before these hearings started the

Gauteng Attorney General expressed concerns that the appearance of key

witnesses at these hearings might jeopardize their impending criminal

prosecutions. Defense, NIA and representatives of President Mandelaís

Office all supported the position that much of information must remain

classified, including information about South African collaboration with

foreign countries, as it would pose a proliferation threat. Several members

of the SANDF lobbied to not hold the hearings at all.

At a hastily called meeting of representatives of various agencies at the

end of May 1998, two main objections were raised. One objection to the

TRC hearings was that information disclosed during these hearings could

lead to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that would cause

South Africa to violate its international obligations. A second concern was

that revelations of the involvement of various foreign governments in the

CBW program could jeopardize international relations. South African

government officials told the participants that Britain and the U.S. had voiced

the strongest objections to the hearings.190 Dr. Peter Folb, the TRCís

scientific adviser, disagreed with the official assessment during this meeting,

ìbecause much of the science involved in Project Coast was pedestrian.î191

The compromise that was reached was to have a small group of

representatives from the meeting go through every document in the TRCís

possession and decide together which could be placed in the public domain

at the hearing. Commissioner Orr, Dr. Folb, and TRC investigators Gould

and Jerome Chaskalson represented the TRC. Knobel, his lawyers, NIA

officials, and other SANDF members, represented the government. 

Documents were placed into one of three categories: (1) no restrictions (i.e.,

ones to be referred to in the hearing and released to the media); (2) ones to be

referred to but not released; and, (3) those that would not be mentioned at all.

The Presidentís office did not accept the TRCís decision to hold the

public hearings and issued an application to have section 33 (c) invoked,

which would require that the hearing be held behind closed doors. Thabo

Mbekiís legal adviser and Abdul Minty, Chairperson of the Council for

the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, formally
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 69

presented the request for a closed hearing.192 After extensive discussions,

the TRC went ahead with open hearings with the understanding that a

government representative would monitor the proceedings to ensure that

no proliferation or diplomatically embarrassing information was released.

 This agreement meant that the hearings were bogged down with legal

motions and delays from the first day.

On the first day of the hearing Dr. Knobel, accompanied by his lawyer,

passed out several documents marked ìtop secretî to the media. These

documents were subsequently recalled on the ground that they had not yet

been cleared through the proper declassification channels. Months later, an

unlucky Swiss journalist was detained at the South African airport and

thrown in jail overnight when he was found leaving the country with

classified documents from the first days of the TRC hearings. Dr. Folb, TRC

senior expert technical adviser, was no longer allowed access to these

materials, including his own memos, written for the TRC.193

Legal wrangling delayed Bassonís appearance before the TRC until the

last day of the hearings. However, scientists in charge of Project Coast

projects did appear. Basson only testified after he was declared in contempt

of a TRC citation and his lawyers had exhausted a lengthy appeals process.

 His Supreme Court application that he not be forced to testify before the

TRC, due to his constitutional right not to incriminate himself, was turned

down on 27 July 1998. The TRCís final closing date for non-amnesty

hearings was 31 July, and legal wrangling meant that Basson did not take the

stand until the last day. He did not reveal any new information and

sidestepped most questions. The hearings ended with many questions

unanswered.

Although Basson used legal delaying tactics, the threat of criminal

penalties did finally force him to testify before the Truth and Reconciliation

Commission (TRC). Even though his TRC testimony was of little value,

several individuals who had worked for Basson started to reveal many more

details about the covert programs in their testimony in an effort to obtain

TRC amnesty and immunity in future legal proceedings. 

The scientists began to talk to authorities about what CBW weapons and

knowledge were developed, how the knowledge and weapons were used, and

even some details about what was sold after the 1994 elections.194 Other

individuals, such as Dr. Johan Koekemoer, former research manager of Delta-
70 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

G, was arrested for being in possession of the designer drug Ecstasy and

agreed to testify against Basson. The public also heard about the extensive

misappropriation of public funds.

Disclosures from the TRC had international ramifications. In response

to testimony at the TRC hearings in June 1998, the British Military

Intelligence (MI5) and police reopened files on six people who had died in

Britain during the 1980s and 1990s of apparent strokes or heart attacks. The

re-opened investigations were initiated to explore which of these deaths

might have been murders related to South Africaís secret germ warfare

program. These investigations required unprecedented amounts of

cooperation between South African and British intelligence services. The

dead individuals had all worked in Britain against the apartheid regime, or

had knowledge of Pretoriaís secret operation in the 1980s to acquire and

develop chemical and biological weapons, at the time of their death in Great

Britain.195

Despite the limited knowledge obtained from Basson at the TRC, these

hearings played a critical role in opening up secret government activities. 

The TRC hearings on Project Coast opened ìa window on the house of

horrorsî to public scrutiny and let public know much more about what went

on during apartheid era. These disclosures, in turn, helped to stimulate a

national dialogue that was designed to allow the nation to start to heal.196

These disclosures also established an important precedent and ensured that

South Africaís most important post-1994 trial involving national security

issues would be open rather than closed to the public. 

Wouter Bassonís Bail Hearing: The Role of Non-Governmental

Organizations (NGOs) and the Press in Ensuring Public Disclosure

In August 1998, Basson was charged on 17 counts including murder,

conspiracy to commit murder, fraud, and the possession of and dealing in,

illegal substances. Why Basson had stolen the Project Coast documents and

kept them in his garage, just waiting to be discovered, is not clear. Dr. Daan

Goosen, former managing director at RLL (until he complained that the

program was out of control and was forced to resign), claimed that Basson

kept the documents in order to have something of value (he was unable to

replicate the knowledge on his own) and because he was possibly
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 71

blackmailing people for protection.197 Others expressed concern that he kept

the documentation in order to be able to sell it to foreign governments (e.g.,

Libya) to maintain his lavish life style after stepping down as head of Project

Coast.

Efforts to understand Bassonís motives were complicated by the secrecy

required by an ongoing criminal investigation and due to the governmentís

desire to keep further details of Project Coast from being disclosed. 

Immediately after Bassonís arrest at the beginning of 1997, his defense

attorney claimed that the NIA had kidnapped him. NIAís response was that

they were holding him in protective custody due to numerous death threats.

 Bassonís attorneyís submitted a 60- page bail application. Basson was

eventually released. He went back to work at One Military Hospital in

Pretoria. He still works there when his court case is not in session. The

South African government has been paying his legal costs. As of August

2000, Bassonís legal fees since his arrest in 1997 had cost the State 4 million

rand (over $500,000 in 2000 U.S. dollars).198

Bassonís bail hearing and related legal proceedings were closed to the

public. The State was operating on the assumption that the legal proceedings

would remain closed to the public throughout much or all of the criminal

trial, which began in October 1999 and was expected to last until October

2001. This situation triggered a two-year legal effort by a non-governmental

organization (NGO), the Freedom of Expression Institute (FIX), to make

Bassonís bail application open to the public. FIX filed a legal petition in

1997, after receiving a request from two newspapers, The Sunday Times and

Mail & Guardian, to do something about the closed legal proceedings. FIX

filed an application with the Magistrate Court as the sole plaintiff, because

legal glitches precluded the two newspapers from filing as plaintiffs.199

The Stateís position was that the bail application contained information

negative for South Africaís foreign relations in three categories: 1) names of

individuals who had not been charged; 2) names of countries mentioned in

the bail application; and 3) the names of local people involved in Bassonís

business dealings. The Ministry of Justice insisted that the last category be

kept secret, because to do otherwise would compromise ongoing criminal

investigations. A second argument used by the State was similar to those

heard during earlier efforts to keep the TRCís Project Coast hearings closed,

to wit that information in the bail application would be in violation of the
72 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

BWC and CWC that South Africa had ratified and promised to uphold. NIA

argued that classified information should not be released until it had gone

through the normal declassification process.

FIX countered that much of this information was no longer secret, since

it had already been made public by the TRC. They also noted that several

reporters already had full transcripts from the hearings and had used this

information in published press reports. On the day that the Regional

Magistrate of Pretoria heard the bail request, several reporters were in the

court until the Court went into camera session. FIX, now joined by several

news organizations and an independent journalist, appealed to the Supreme

Court. To support their position that much of the information in the bail

hearing was already in the public domain, FIX prepared and presented a

summary of the TRC hearings which included all information that had

already been disclosed to the public.200

The Supreme Court ruled that most sessions of Bassonís upcoming trial

would be held in public. An agreement was reached among the parties to the

legal action that the bail application, with only a few deletions related to

potential defendants in future legal cases, would be made public.

When Bassonís trial opened on 4 October 1999, the room was filled with

South African and foreign reporters. The result was a flurry of press reports

during the opening days of the trial. However, as the drama of the opening

sessions waned, few reporters bothered to show up to cover the trial on a

daily basis. The verbatim transcripts of the trial are recorded in Afrikaans

and few individuals outside of court officials can afford the high cost of these

transcripts.201

Most of the major South African newspapers are not giving this case a

high priority because they feel it is no longer newsworthy among a public

suffering from ìTRC fatigue.î This means that only a few local papers are

sending reporters, while the larger ones only send reporters when there is a

high profile witness. Only one independent reporter who works for a South

African NGO, the Center for Conflict Resolution (CCR) has been taking

notes of daily proceedings.

The CCR has posted weekly and monthly summaries of the Basson trial

on their web site, several weeks after the proceedings have been held. The

summaries have become the primary continuous record of the case. South

African and international observers must now rely on a single source for most
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 73

of their information on perhaps the most important case under the new

constitution. It has become evident that the CCR is developing a sense of

ownership of what is obviously public information. The presence of

additional NGOs would produce a broader and freer flow of information.

The limited news coverage of the Basson case continued, even when the

trial took the unprecedented step of shifting its venue to Jacksonville, Florida

in September 2000. This unusual move was taken in order to hear evidence

from American witnesses, including Bassonís accountant, David Webster.

 However, no English-speaking national newspaper or international wire

service covered the story.202

Several other aspects of the legal wrangling over the Basson bail

application and subsequent court case may have relevance for those interested

in promoting non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and

democracy worldwide. It is notable that the move to open the Basson legal

process to the public was taken by an NGO, with a small staff of 4-6

individuals. The past and current senior administrators of FIX are highly

experienced civil libertarian activists, who worked for years against the

apartheid regime in well-known NGOs.203

NGOs continue to play a useful watchdog role of criticizing

governmental actions that may be placing unnecessary limitations on the

rights of individuals in the new South Africa.204 Even the prosecutor in the

Basson hearing, while downplaying the importance of this legal action in

light of what has come out in public court, acknowledged that it was an

important test of individual guarantees included in the new constitution.205

From the Stateís perspective, the legal action over bail took up too much

of their time during two critical months when they were also trying to finish

their criminal investigations of Basson. The prosecution had opposed

publicizing the bail account because they wanted to continue investigating

murder charges without publicity. They supported the NIA position that all

documents should go through standard declassification procedures. In

camera sessions of Bassonís bail hearing, the State argued that holding court

proceedings in public would endanger national security and individual lives.

 The prosecution noted that the publicity surrounding the bail hearing had

made the job of convicting Basson much more difficult. The trial judge had

excluded a large number of documents during the opening sessions of the
74 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

trial that had been introduced during in camera sessions of the bail hearing

on similar national security grounds that the prosecution had used.206

The Basson Trial: 1999-present207

The Basson trial promises to be one of the longest and most complicated

trials in South African legal history. Basson was initially charged with

multiple counts of fraud, murder, conspiracy to murder and possession of

drugs (Ecstasy, Mandrax, and cocaine). However, the trial was quickly halted

by objections presented by his lawyers. In hindsight, the most important

objection raised by the defense related to conspiracy to murder charges

against Basson for the poisoning of 200 SWAPO prisoners of war in a

Namibian detention camp and his alleged involvement in the murder of five

other SWAPO members in Namibia. 

The defense argued that there was no precedent under South African law

to charge citizens for actions in other countries and a general amnesty issued

on the eve of Namibian independence in 1989 protected all South African

police and military members from criminal prosecution prior to that date.208

By the second week of the trial, it had become clear the prosecution

would experience serious difficulties in their efforts to win a conviction

against Basson on murder charges. When the trial resumed, the presiding

judge, Willie Harzenberg, ruled that six of the eight murder/conspiracy to

murder charges against Basson had to be withdrawn on the grounds that the

Criminal Procedure Act did not allow prosecution in a South African court

for crimes committed in another country. He also ruled that Basson was

indemnified from prosecution by the Namibian amnesty. The judgeís

decision to throw out these murder charges was a serious blow to the

prosecutionís case, since the five murder charges were the only ones that

placed Basson at the scene of the crime.209 These rulings meant the

prosecution would not be able to present accounts of the CCBís policies or

methods of operations, which might have helped in proving Bassonís motives

in the remaining 14 murder/attempted murder charges. 

The prosecutors were surprised by this ruling and have acknowledged

that these rulings hurt the Stateís case. The ruling was surprising, because the

same prosecutors had used a similar approach in presenting evidence in an
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 75

earlier case against Eugene de Kock, the former head of the CCB. In the de

Kock case, the defense had not challenged the prosecutorsí evidence. 

However, the Basson case is very different from that of de Kock where the

prosecution was able to obtain the cooperation of most of de Kockís 25

subordinates who testified against their former commanding officer. Dr.

Torie Pretorius felt that another important difference was the fact that he

(Pretorius) had a close working relationship with local authorities and

criminal investigators working for the Goldstone Commission in obtaining

four witnesses for 100 of the 176 murder counts against de Kock. 

What Pretorius learned from this experience was that the State would not

win with only one cooperative co-conspirator, because the South African

legal system was not set up to take on the old military establishment. In

Bassonís case, there are no multiple witnesses who can implicate Basson in

specific murders. As Dr. Pretorius explained, ìBasson was the only common

denominatorî in most of these conspiracy/murders. The lack of evidence

explains why the State did not charge any of Bassonís superiors. According

to Dr. Pretorius, the lesson to be learned for prosecutors attempting to win

conspiracy/murder cases involving CBW use is that the prosecutor must be

at the murder scene as soon as possible and have a close working relationship

with investigators on the ground.210

The prosecution did not appeal the judgeís rulings regarding amnesty or

murders that occurred outside South Africa. Instead, Prosecutor Anton

Ackerman, emphasized, after Basson had pleaded guilty to 61 charges, that

most of these charges could not be considered apartheid crimes since they

related to Bassonís self enrichment schemes. Other witnesses have testified

how Basson was the central figure in an international sales and procurement

network that included arms deals involving the Libyan and Pakistani

governments and drug deals. Several additional witnesses testified to

Bassonís involvement in manufacturing drugs and to his luxurious lifestyle. 

Bassonís financial dealings were extremely complex throughout the 10

years of Project Coast. The prosecutionís charge sheet covering illegal

money transactions runs several hundreds pages. The entire indictment spans

two volumes. However, despite the complexity of these financial

arrangements and the technical nature of many of the charges involving

biological agents and chemical substances, the judge in this case did not
76 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

exercise his option under South African law of calling upon his own expert

assessors.211

During the sixth week of the trial, the judge ruled that the State would

not be allowed to use the record of Bassonís bail proceeding in the interest

of national security. The judge also issued several additional rulings that

criticized the procedures used by OSEO investigators in their dealings with

Basson. During the 10th week of the trial, Prosecutor Ackerman submitted

a request for adjournment to permit the Director of Public Prosecutions time

to study the trial transcript and decide whether or not to request that Judge

Harzenberg recuse himself from the case. This motion caused a great deal of

controversy and delayed the trial for several weeks.

When the trial resumed, Ackerman argued that South African law

required a judge to be impartial, and that Judge Hartzenberg had shown bias

on several counts. These included his rulings excluding evidence, his timing

on ruling the inadmissibility of the record of Bassonís bail application, and

by denying the prosecution sufficient time to research jurisdiction issues. 

Hartzenberg, who under South African law rules on the recusal request,

dismissed it on the grounds that it was ìfrivolous, mind-boggling, absurd and

ëunfounded in its totality.íî212

This was the first of several events, including Ackermanís absence from

the trial for several weeks in subsequent weeks. Periodic bomb threats,

which started in the sixth week of the trial, caused additional delays. These

delays may be indicative of the types of judicial problems that can be

expected when the judicial system of a new political order attempts to

implement criminal charges against individuals who managed covert CBW

programs. 

The prosecutors have requested but have not yet seen the information on

the CD-ROMs related to the BW program currently held by the President. 

The prosecutors are still waiting for a reply to their request to see this

information from the Ministry of Justice. The prosecutionís position is that

all information should be declassified, even if it may endanger national

security, if the information can be used to prove murder. While the

prosecution remains convinced that they have enough evidence of fraud and

abuse to convict Basson on multiple charges, others are beginning to wonder

if the odds makers who are now betting that ìDr. Deathî will not be

convicted of any criminal penalties or financial fines might be right.
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 77

Implications of the Basson trial (as of March 2001)

The Basson trial to date illustrates some of the difficulties involved in

criminal proceedings against individuals who were involved in covert CBW

programs with extensive international linkages in national courts. Based on

the recovered stolen documents, the prosecution is convinced that Basson

established his own procurement network that included a large number of

diverse individuals worldwide (e.g., Heyndrickx, Webster, Ford). 

However, the prosecution has faced a number of obstacles in marshalling

the evidence needed to prove that these actions constituted criminal acts. 

First, the prosecution had to obtain permission and funding from their

government to undertake international investigations. Next, the prosecution

had to win permission from federal and state authorities in the United States

before they were able to examine relevant documents related to Bassonís

transactions held by his American auditor, David Webster. They then had to

attempt to penetrate a web of complex dealings, since Webster, not Basson,

was the Chief Executive of many of Bassonís international holding

corporations. In September 2000, the trial had to travel to Jacksonville,

Florida in order to obtain the sworn statements of Americans they believe

helped Basson to defraud the government because these foreign nationals had

refused to return to South Africa voluntarily to testify. 

The prosecution also had to send process servers to Canada to subpoena

two former doctors who had worked on Project Coast in order to force them

to appear in court. They, like many other doctors, scientists and former

Special Forces officers with knowledge about Project Coast, had already

emigrated from South Africa. In other cases, potential witnesses were never

located. Even in cases where key South African witnesses were still living

in the country, the prosecution frequently had to promise legal immunity in

order to gain full cooperation as stateís witnesses.

The area that gave the prosecution the most difficulty was uncovering

evidence related to the large number of illegal drugs produced under the

auspices of Project Coast and subsequently sold on the black market. During

the third week of the Basson trial, South Africa Narcotics Bureau officers

involved in the sting operation that led to Bassonís arrest in January 1997

testified that before the deals involving Basson they had never encountered

Ecstasy capsules in South Africa. 
78 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

A pharmacist recruited to work at Delta G after his military service,

Steven Buekes, told the Court that Basson had asked him to set up a facility

to make Mandrax, including a laboratory where the base compound could be

granulated. Buekes testified that he made 100,000 tablets, marked MX on

one side and RL (for Roussel Laboratories, legal manufacturers of Mandrax)

using ingredients supplied by Basson. Another witness, Jerry Brandt, was

managing director of the front company, Organochem, that was responsible

for procurement for Delta G. Mr. Brandt told the Court how he was tasked

by Basson to procure the formula for manufacturing Ecstasy. 

These and other witnesses allowed the prosecution to show that Basson

had authorized the manufacture of large amounts of Mandrax and Ecstasy

under the auspices of Project Coast. However, the State still does not know

why these drugs were manufactured, where they went, or where the profits

from the sale of these drugs went. 

The prosecution does not believe the defenseís claims that these drugs

were only manufactured and used by Special Forces to incriminate suspected

ANC ìterroristsî and sympathizers, and later as a means of crowd control.

 However, the prosecution is still missing many parts of the true story. What

has come out in court to date is that Basson started producing hallucinogenic

drugs during the mid-1980s. At some point the emphasis shifted to

producing drugs for profit. However, the motives remain unknown, as do the

targets (or customers), and the planned or actual methods of distributing these

drugs. 

There is little evidence that Mandrax and Ecstasy were produced for

illegal sales in South Africa. Instead, the prosecutors are still exploring the

possibility that the bulk of these drugs were destined for illicit sale in Europe,

India, and possibly the United States.

South African officials investigating the flow of illegal drugs have been

hampered by the lack of forensic capability to do chemical fingerprint tests.

 Earlier investigations and the prosecutors in the Basson case failed in their

first efforts to obtain the help of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)

in running these tests.

There was no real interest among American officials, until a drug arrest

in Chicago that involved the illegal possession of Ecstasy traced back to

South Africa. Apparently one of the innovative processes developed by

Project Coast researchers was an extremely pure type of the drug that had a
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 79

unique root (e.g., no impurities). U.S. authorities were able to trace this

particular sample back to Delta-G Laboratories. This incident led to greater

international cooperation between U.S. and South African authorities

involved in efforts to stem the flow of drugs internationally.213

A similar pattern of heightened U.S. interest emerged after Dr. Fordís

suicide in Newport, California in 2000. Revelations of links between Ford

and his associates and Basson, Knobel, and Project Coast led the FBI to

initiate a ìweapons of mass destruction investigationî to determine whether

a U.S. crime had been committed in South Africa.

Each of these experiences suggests that effective measures designed to

limit the proliferation of CBW or illegal drugs in the future will require much

greater inter-agency cooperation within nation-states and new forms of

international cooperation among agencies in several countries. The South

African case suggests the need for greater coordination between defense and

counterproliferation agencies and agencies whose primary mission are crime

solving and prevention. 

The Basson trial is also useful for illustrating the complex ways that

CBW project managers may be able to exploit transnational financial flows

and international corporate instruments to quickly move, launder, and house

large sums of money for either political or personal motives.

The Basson trial may also serve as a useful reminder of what may

become a more general trend: the initiation or continuation of covert CBW

programs primarily as a means to cover illegal personal gains from the sale

of weapons (including CBW) and drugs.
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 81

VII. Conclusion

This monograph provides the profile of South Africa as a state that

developed a CBW program. South Africa was an isolated state that felt

threatened by a more powerful state actor, the Soviet Union, which was

helping hostile regimes and movements in neighboring states. One response

of the apartheid regime to changing threat perceptions in the region was to

develop a CBW program and to accelerate a nuclear weapons program.

The decision-making process, which was secretive and controlled by the

military, enabled a nuclear weapons program and a very sophisticated CBW

program to be developed with little outside scrutiny. Military and police

units used chemical and biological agents for counter-insurgency warfare,

assassination, and execution of war prisoners. 

As the regime felt increasingly threatened by opposition at home, top

political leaders approved plans for research and development of exotic

means to neutralize opponents, large-scale offensive uses of the program, and

weaponization. However, the plans were not operationalized. The end of the

external threat led to a decision to unilaterally dismantle the CBW program

prior to a shift to majority rule. 

Lack of civilian control over military programs made the rollback

difficult, rife with corruption and may have permitted the transfer of findings

and materials to other states.

Ultimately, the United States, Great Britain, and other countries pressured

the South African government to ensure that the CBW program was dismantled

and the former project manager, Dr. Wouter Basson, constrained. Since Basson

secretly retained copies of Project Coast documents, concerns remain about

whether he assisted other states by transferring and selling such information.

The information that has emerged to date about Project Coast suggests

a country that possesses chemical and biological weapons is likely to use

them against adversaries at home and abroad. The unpredictable, hot and windy

environment of southern Africa did not discourage conventional military or

counter-insurgency units from experimenting with these weapons. 

However, in both the Angolan and Rhodesian conflicts, conventional

arms remained the primary instruments by combatants. The South African

case illustrates that the threat perceptions of top political leaders is the
82 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

determining factor in whether they decide to undertake costly, covert CBW

research, development, and production programs. The South African case also

supports the proposition that once a political regime has CBW capabilities, they

may use these capabilities against political enemies both at home and abroad.

The South African case also dramatically shows how thin the line is

between defensive and offensive weapons. First the Iraqi, and now the South

African, cases suggest that it is prudent to assume that if a country is

suspected of developing covert nuclear capabilities, it is probably supporting

research into the offensive uses of chemical and biological weapons as well.

 If efforts are being made in the more challenging and expensive nuclear

arena, why would a regime not develop the more accessible and less costly

chemical and biological weapons?

South African CBW programs also underscore the importance of control

by civilians, of transparency, and of accountability. Some aspects of the

apartheid regimeís management of their CBW programs may be unique. 

However, this case vividly illustrates what will happen when there is loose

accountability of covert NBC research and development by senior military

and political leaders. This is especially likely when the government is

besieged both at home and on its borders.

The efforts to dismantle the South African CBW program illustrate how

difficult effective NBC non-proliferation agreements will be to enforce. For

many, the discovery that Wouter Basson secretly kept some of the classified

documents is deeply disturbing to those who believe that South Africa developed

highly sophisticated CBW capabilities during the Project Coast years. 

For others, the science involved in the 10 years of research conducted by

Project Coast was considered so pedestrian that they are not worried about

the possibility of proliferation. These differing views of the program deserve

further research and evaluation by CBW experts.

The likelihood that the South African government still possesses highly

sophisticated CBW secrets, which it considers a ìnational asset,î will remain

a source of concern for the foreseeable future. As controls on arms sales

erode and as high-level corruption increases, the chances that top officials

might sell these secrets to states and/or groups of concern increases. The

issue for counterproliferation experts is how to prevent such a transfer of

deadly information from occurring.
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 83

Appendix A: Key Questions for Further Research on the South

African CBW Program

1. What highly sophisticated biological agents/pathogens (including new ones) and

unique processes and procedures did the South Africans develop under the auspices

of Project Coast? Which ones did they acquire from abroad? From where?

2. Which unique processes and procedures developed under the auspices of Project

Coast were surprising to the American investigators? (e.g., biological weapons,

chemical weapons, drugs, germicides, and genetic engineering) 

3. How important were each of the following to Project Coast developments: opensource literature, scientific contacts, and Bassonís network of covert procurement

agents?

4. Did the South Africans purchase poisons or chemicals abroad for use in their

CBW program? Can a foreign government legally purchase similar chemicals and

poisons today in the U.S., Canada, Europe, or elsewhere in the world?

5. What specific coordination/cooperation was there between the former SADF

military CBW programs during the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s with foreign

governments including U.S., UK, France, Germany, and Israel?

6. Where will the key scientists involved in Project Coast be in the future? 

7. What type of delivery systems did South Africa develop to weaponize their CBW

agents? How far did Project Coast go in developing aerosol means of delivering

CBW?

8. Did the South African government field-test any biological agents or chemicals?

 If yes, which ones, where? When? Why?

9. What specifically and when did the U.S. and the UK learn about South Africaís

biological weapons program? How?

10. How important was U.S. pressure in South Africaís decision to close down its

bio-chem. capabilities? What type of pressure was most effective, i.e., bilateral or

multilateral efforts? 

11. Was Basson working with or without the knowledge of senior government

officials when he visited Libya as a Transnet consultant? When he visited Iraq as a

SADF colonel before 1990? To other countries? 

12. Why was Basson arrested? 

13. Why has the South African government not responded to the Basson

prosecutorís request to gain access to the CD-ROM information related to Project

Coast?
84 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

14. Why was so much Ecstasy and Mandrax produced? What was the methaqualone

produced for Project Coast used for? 

15. What happened to the drugs? Where were they distributed? Who got the money

from drug sales or distribution?

16. Is there any evidence that Wouter Basson worked with foreign (i.e., Russian) or

domestic organized crime syndicates?

17. In its genetic engineering experiments, how close was South Africa to a ìblack

bombî? Are other countries developing similar biological weapons? 

18. Is there any evidence that the former South African government supported

research, testing, or distribution of germicides designed to increase usersí

susceptibility to AIDS or other diseases? 

19. Is there any truth to rumors that young, former Afrikaner right-wingers and

former SADF and current SANDF personnel in South Africa are working with local

syndicates and representatives of the Russian Mafia to market drugs and arms or

hardware capable of using CBW?

20. How great a concern is South African NBC proliferation today? What are the

concerns?

21. What is the danger that secrets are likely to leak out of South African National

Defense Force or be sold in the future?

22. How effective is civilian control over the military (including control over former

SADF officers who might be right-wing ìmolesî and ANC political appointees who

might be hostile to the U.S. or anxious to increase their personal wealth)?

23. What is the basis for the contention by some in South Africa that, rather being

a sophisticated CBW program, the South African CBW effort was ìpedestrian and

ìfraudulent?î

24. Has any effort been made by anyone to investigate if Basson, et. al., could be

tried in an international tribunal for crimes against humanity or war crimes?
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 85

Appendix B: General Policy Lessons Drawn from the South African

CBW Case Study

Policy Lesson #1: CBW proliferation is more difficult to prevent than

nuclear proliferation.

South Africa was able to build Project Coast, the ìsecond most

sophisticatedî CBW program with little fanfare, whereas the nuclear weapons

program was known and monitored by the international community from the

late 1970s onwards. The most important factors influencing South Africaís

decision to develop CBW R&D, to approve Project Coast and upgrade it over

time, and to plan weaponization were the changing threat perceptions of

senior political and military leaders of the apartheid regime. The importance

accorded CBW increased, as the country shifted from being a valued partner

in the western alliance against communism, to one fighting insurgencies in

neighboring countries, to an isolated, pariah state, under attack by guerrillas

and opponents at home. While South Africa pursued CBW R&D before

Project Coast, there were two main triggers for dramatically increasing the

tempo: 1) the belief of South African political and military leaders that the

Soviet Union or Cuban-backed forces in Angola and elsewhere might use

chemical and biological weapons; and, 2) the increasingly violent and

ubiquitous nature of political opposition in South Africa. This trend suggests

two more general policy lessons:

Policy Lesson #2: A countryís public statements, related to changing threat

perceptions, are important indicators that a regime may be pursuing covert

CBW programs.

Policy Lesson#3: If a government believes their enemy ìmayî posses CBW,

it is likely to develop both defensive and offensive CBW capabilities. Since

distinctions between offensive and defensive CBW capabilities are difficult

to maintain, any country developing defensive CBW capability, is likely to be

developing covert offensive CBW capabilities.

South Africaís acquisition of CBW capabilities and learning how CBW

agents might be employed for counter-insurgency and assassinations were

influenced by involvement in warfare in neighboring countries. As the tempo

of guerrilla activities in Portuguese territories and in Rhodesia increased,

South African financial support and involvement in counter-insurgency

operations in neighboring countries also increased. There is considerable

evidence that South African military and police personnel learned first-hand
86 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

from their involvement in Rhodesiaís counter-insurgency operations in the

1970s how they might use poisons and biological viruses for assassinations

and to contaminate water supplies used by guerrillas. South African

involvement in the Rhodesian anti-guerrilla war provided training

opportunities, strategies and tactics, and personnel connections for

subsequent defense and police special covert units. This learning process

influenced how the South African government dealt with domestic enemies,

and suggests the following lesson:

Policy Lesson #4: Once a country gains experience using CBW as a

counter-insurgency warfare tactic abroad, it is more likely to develop and

use these capabilities against political enemies at home and abroad.

Although the extent of South African involvement in developing and

using CBW in Rhodesia remains unclear, its alleged use in the 1970s is

instructive for highlighting several aspects of CBW warfare. In the

Rhodesian war, the effectiveness of biological and toxic agents as counterinsurgency weapons was highly variable. The Rhodesian case suggests that

difficulties in identifying the perpetrators of biological attacks distinguish

biological from nuclear or chemical warfare. Several biological agents, such

as anthrax, are found in nature. Others (e.g., cholera) can be caused by

factors other than a biological attack. Long-standing charges by Zimbabwean

officials that South African and former Rhodesian forces planted anthrax

spores in grain fed to cattle in guerrilla-held areas could not be substantiated.

 Continuing uncertainties underscore the difficulties that should be expected

in future efforts to verify allegations of biological agent use. Recent

statements by Zimbabwean officials that South Africa planted anthrax found

today in rural areas underscore the fact that allegations of biological agent use

may be a political disinformation technique for unpopular regimes. 

Policy Lesson #5: The effectiveness of biological agents as counterinsurgency or assassination weapons is highly variable. Several biological

agents can continue to have serious long-term adverse effects for humans and

the environment.

Policy Lesson #6: Allegations of the use of certain biological pathogens are

difficult to verify, especially in developing countries where victims are likely

to already be weakened by malnutrition, poor health, and other diseases.
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 87

Policy Lesson #7: Allegations of CBW might be used as part of ìPSYOPSî

campaigns in guerrilla conflicts or as a useful political disinformation

technique for unpopular regimes decades after a conflict has ended.

SADF experienced similar problems defending its forces against

possible CBW attacks and in denying allegations that SADF was using CBW.

 In Angola, Namibia, and Mozambique, SADF experienced varying degrees

of effectiveness, unintended consequences, and difficulties in documenting

whether and who had initiated specific CBW incidents. In Angola, SADF

troops faced increased costs and maneuverability problems, if they were to

be forced to wear defensive CBW masks and uniforms that had to be changed

daily. SADF troops avoided local water supplies in Angola and Namibia,

because they lacked intelligence about whether water supplies had been

poisoned. SADF experienced difficulties verifying alleged use of gas by

Cuban-backed forces and rebutting allegations that SADF forces used CBW

against SWAPO forces and refugee in camps in Angola and Namibia. 

Unconfirmed rumors persist that South Africa tested organophosphates, new

generations of teargas, and a battlefield missile whose warheads were capable

of being fitted with chemical or biological agents in Angola. Even though

CBW effectiveness is doubtful in the harsh and unpredictable climate of

southern Africa, SADFís experience suggests that CBW might be used

anyway. 

Policy Lesson #8: The effectiveness of CBW is unpredictable and variable.

 Unintended consequences should be expected when used in harsh terrain

and unpredictable climate zones.

Policy Lesson #9: While allegations of chemical agent use can be verified

more readily than the use of many biological agents, verification difficulties

should be anticipated, especially in areas where victims are already suffering

from malnutrition, diseases, or general poor health.

The threat of CBW use by enemies was an important trigger and justification

for launching a major covert CBW program in South Africa. The primary

rationale for the establishment of a new, covert CBW program wasthe victory of

pro-Communist forces in Angola and Mozambique in the mid-1970s and the

belief that the Soviet Union would bring its massive program to bear against the

apartheid regime. This belief and the perception that the West had fallen behind

the Soviets led the South African President, P.W. Botha and his military advisers

to decide to race to build the most sophisticated and secret CBW program

possible. These events suggest a general, albeit rather obvious lesson:
88 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

Policy Lesson #10: If a country believes their enemy may have CBW

capabilities, the country is more likely to engaged in intensive covert CBW

programs.

The existence of a separate medical branch, the SADF Medical Service

(SAMS), that worked with Special Forces in Angola created the

organizational basis for developing a highly secretive and loosely managed

CBW program. South Africaís involvement in Angola provided the rationale

for the reorganization within the military that ensured these new CBW

programs were controlled by the military. From an administrative

perspective, the reorganized SAMS had an equal status with the three existing

branches of the military. A fear of CBW attacks in Angola led the

government to issue a mandate to SAMS to develop defensive capabilities

and to train SADF forces to protect themselves from all types of attacks,

including biological and chemical. This mandate was the principal reason

why managerial oversight and responsibility for a new CBW program was

given to the 7th Battalion of SAMS. This case suggest that:

Policy Lesson #11: The organizational context matters. The location of South

Africaís CBW program within a separate medical corps, equal in status with

other branches of the armed forces, appears to be a unique feature of this case.

 The organizational context should be carefully explored in other case studies.

After South African troops left Angola, the SAMS mission changed and

became more ambiguous. As SADF forces shifted from battlefield

operations to policing functions at home, Project Coast R&D activities

expanded and focused more on offensive uses of CBW against political

opponents and guerrillas. Project Coastís manager, Dr. Wouter Basson, had a

charismatic personality and professional reputation that helped him to be an

effective recruiter of some of the most promising medical personnel and

researchers from both the military and private sector. Most of these SADF-linked

researchers and civilian scientists were Afrikaners who shared the same

nationalist zeal and sense that their research was critical for maintaining national

security. This feature of Project Coast suggests another policy lesson:

Policy Lesson #12: CBW monitoring efforts should try to determine whether

there are important shared characteristics of key personnel suspected of

managing and working in covert CBW programs.

Basson used state-owned and private corporations, international holding

companies, and foreign bank accounts to operate projects under the auspices

of Project Coast in a compartmentalized fashion. As he established
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 89

numerous officially sanctioned South African front companies and offshore

holding companies, he set up his own independent network of procurement

agents and contacts in foreign countries. These practices ensured that only

Basson and a handful of his most trusted associates had complete knowledge

of the full scope of Project Coast R&D activities and access to all financial

accounts. Basson took advantage of the loose financial oversight and

accountability requirements to purchase shares in the front companies and to

earn huge profits when they were privatized. The magnitude of these profits,

perhaps more than any other action, caught the attention of the Office of

Serious Economic Offenses, which started investigating the financial flows

associated with Project Coast soon after these corporationsí shares were sold

on the open market.

The major programmatic features of Project Coast were authorized by

Bassonís superiors in order to ensure that its varied R&D programs remained

secret. While Basson had to account for financial expenditures tied to

specific projects, there was no overall mechanism for reconciling the

expenditures and outputs of various R&D programs. The use of public and

private business entities and international financial accounts created

opportunities for personal gain. Virtually from the inception of Project

Coast, Basson and his associates moved to take advantage of secrecy for their

personal gain. Secret organizations and weak independent accounting

procedures provided Basson with incentives, resources, and rationales for a

host of illegal activities. International contacts, procurement of equipment

and supplies abroad, and the offshore financial shell corporations provided

additional layers of complexity. This case suggests a more general lesson:

Policy Lesson #13: Covert CBW programs may evidence similar complex

corporate structures and financial practices, because transnational entities

offer added protection for secret projects (as well as opportunities for

personal gain).

Project Coastís official mandate was to develop defensive measures and

agents to protect the military. However, from the programís inception,

Basson established several basic research programs designed to test and

develop chemical and biological agents for offensive purposes. A top-level

state committee approved Project Coast projects, the establishment of new

front organizations, and the compartmentalization of each program. Senior

political and military leaders left the details of management and day-to-day

operations to Basson. He maintained exclusive but indirect control by
90 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

serving as a member the Board of Directors for each of these parastatal

companies. Only a handful of senior research scientists, senior military

officers, and politicians had a thorough view of the scope and activities

conducted under Project Coast. Senior officials did not know the details and

apparently did not want to know the details of Bassonís organizations or

activities. Even fewer individuals understood the financial details across

holding companies and money laundering channels. Allegedly, Basson and

his most trusted associates (e.g., his accountant) had a detailed and complete

picture of the amount of money being spent, what the money was spent on,

and who actually received secret public funds. This meant that there was no

general reconciliation or independent accounting between the amount of

money spent on individual programs and other types of expenditures. The

management of Project Coast suggests a more general lesson:

Policy Lesson #14: Covert programs that lack adequate accounting

procedures or independent oversight encourage corruption and support for

new, increasingly expensive projects.

Despite evidence that Basson and his closest associates took advantage

of Project Coast for personal gain, Bassonís activities in creating new front

companies, money-laundering channels, and his own network of sanctionbusting procurement agents and money-launderers were approved by his

superiors. Current evidence suggests that only a few senior military and

political officials cooperated with Basson for personal gain. Most of the

inner circle of securocrats who participated in authorizing additional R&D

activities did so for political reasons. Basson is often characterized as the

ìmad doctorî undertaking rogue actions. However, Bassonís activities were

only one component of a comprehensive covert effort undertaken by the

former apartheid regime to develop biological, chemical, and nuclear

weapons and sophisticated delivery systems. In addition to his own network,

Basson had used the existing government-run sanctions-busting networks that

had been developed to supply South Africaís nuclear program. Project Coast

also used ARMSCOR R&D facilities in operationalizing plans to weaponize

CBW agents. 

Much like the Iraqi case, the South African experience suggests that

national efforts to build nuclear weapons capabilities go hand-in-hand with

efforts to develop biological and chemical weapons.
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 91

Policy Lesson #15: A country that is developing a nuclear weapons

capability is likely to be pursuing chemical and biological weapons.

Although Basson drew from the same pool of covert procurement

specialists as were used by ARMSCOR, cooperation between Project Coast

and ARMSCOR was very informal. Unlike the tightly managed nuclear

program, Project Coast lacked adequate supervision or accountability

requirements. There is some evidence that Basson worked closely with

ARMSCOR and CSIR scientists to develop chemical agents that could be

delivered in sophisticated missile systems. The picture now emerging is one

of close and concerted efforts by several different parts of the South African

defense establishment to develop weapons of mass destruction and the capability

to deliver each type of weapon in missiles with varying range. These efforts were

highly compartmentalized. Only a small number of individuals in the

government and military had full knowledge of these efforts. Most senior

military generals were only briefed on the scope of the countryís CBW initiatives

starting at the end of the 1980s. The ìneed-to-knowî rationale of NBC

programs in the South African case suggest another general lesson:

Policy Lesson #16: The full scope of a comprehensive, covert NBC effort is

likely to be known by only a small group of politicians, military leaders, and

senior research scientists. 

While rumors could not be substantiated that the former South African

government tested battlefield weapons capable of carrying biological agents

and chemicals, we did find evidence that such weapons were planned and

developed. Basson, much like his counterparts in other countries (e.g., Iraq),

had difficulties developing effective delivery systems for using biological

agents as weapons of mass destruction. While Project Coast researchers

undertook conceptual studies in the aerosolization of biological agents, the

evidence available to date indicates that sophisticated aerosolization delivery

systems were not developed. Much more progress appears to have been

achieved in developing sophisticated artillery warheads and tactical missiles

that were capable of delivering NBC warheads. What types of missiles and

warheads were built, possibly tested and sold abroad, remains among the

most important unanswered questions related to South Africaís NBC

programs. The facts about this case that have emerged so far suggests

another general lesson:
92 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

Policy Lesson #17: A country that is developing weapons of mass

destruction will be likely to pursue the development of sophisticated means

of delivery, including missiles of varying ranges that may be capable of

carrying NBC warheads and aerosolization methods of delivering chemical

and biological agents.

As the threat from internal political enemies increased, top political

leaders approved increasingly expensive and exotic CBW programs based on

promises that they could be used to cope with domestic unrest. The senior

political and military officials who authorized these programs did not want

to know details about efforts designed to eliminate political opponents using

CBW or more conventional means. Instead, the inner circle of ìsecurocrats,î

who authorized research on genetic engineering, birth control methods, and

the use of chemicals to neutralize domestic opponents, operated on the basis

of a largely informal system of norms and procedures. In some cases,

approval was given using non-verbal communications, such as gestures or

nods. There is also evidence that no explicit orders were necessary to prompt

many military, police, and political officials to start destroying documents

when the end of apartheid was in sight. Managers of several secret projects

run under the auspices of Project Coast started destroying documents several

years before these projects were ordered closed down. Thus, we may never

know the full scope of activities conducted under Project Coast. This case

provides an important illustration of the types of challenges that are likely to

be faced by those working to limit chemical and biological weapons

proliferation:

Policy Lesson #18: Verification of past CBW programs will be difficult due

to the intentional use of verbal, rather than written instructions, and by the

destruction of documents long before national or international weapons

inspectors arrive on the scene.

The end of the ìcommunist threatî in the late 1980s and the election of

F.W. de Klerk were the major factors influencing South Africaís decision to

rollback its CBW program. De Klerk was committed to negotiating a

managed political transition that would ensure that the Nationalist Party

remained a significant actor within the next government. After entering

office in 1989, de Klerk gradually obtained evidence about South Africaís

governmental involvement in ìthird forceî activities that could not be

ignored. Rumors of coups and a right-wing conspiracy to take control of the

government and a growing fear during the early 1990s that the country might
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 93

descend into civil war created uncertainties and difficulties in terminating

CBW programs. The Steyn report presented de Klerk with evidence of

extensive abuse of power by the police and military, including operations run

by Wouter Basson. De Klerkís reaction was to fire dozens of senior military

officials. This move prompted a defensive reaction on the part of many

military leaders and fueled additional efforts to cover up past misdeeds. As

a top former general told us, ìthe shutters went down inside the South

African military.î Thus, de Klerk experienced difficulties regaining full

civilian control of the military and in ensuring that all CBW agents were

destroyed and secrets secured. This sequence of events suggests another

policy lesson.

Policy Lesson #19: Political leaders who attempt to close down NBC

programs in political systems that lacked democratic oversight and a strong

tradition of civilian control of the military are likely to have a protracted

internal struggle in efforts to unilaterally terminate those programs.

A number of outside actors, including the United States, United

Kingdom and Israel shared the De Klerk governmentís concerns about what

an ANC-dominated government might do with weapons of mass destruction.

 These concerns led to a series of outside pressures and moves that were

designed to ensure that the South African government completely dismantled

their nuclear, chemical, and biological programs. As the ANC was poised to

take power in 1994, the U.S. and UK were not satisfied that the program had

been rolled back and feared that secrets would fall into the hands of

adversaries. The U.S. and Great Britain took the unusual step of issuing a

demarche and demanding investigation of Project Coast. A great deal of

diplomatic effort was also directed at ensuring the completion of two South

African confidence-building measures. However, the U.S. is still not

confident that the CBW secrets will not be transferred. This sequence of

events suggests the following policy lesson:

Policy Lesson #20: Rollbacks of weapons of mass destruction are likely to

require extensive outside pressures and take several years to complete.

In South Africa, the rollback took several years to complete. The

process of privatizing the major state-owned companies involved in these

weapons systems started in 1989. At the start of 1993, Basson was put in

charge of transferring Project Coast information to CD-ROMs. However,

after Basson was dismissed from SADF, he made several trips to Libya,

which raised proliferation concerns. As part of extensive pressure by the U.S.,
94 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

UK and other countries to completely rollback Project Coast, the Mandela

government ìrehiredî Basson in 1995 in an effort to ensure that CBW

knowledge did not fall into the hands of anti-western governments. Although

the South African government assured the U.S. that CBW knowledge was

under lock-and-key, the January 1997 discovery that Basson had in his

possession large amounts of Project Coast-related documents, previously

thought to have been destroyed, renewed fears of proliferation by Basson and

his associates. Thus, the extent of official or unofficial proliferation from

South Africaís CBW program remains unknown. This case highlights two

important policy lessons for future non-proliferation efforts:

Policy Lesson #21: The complete dismantlement of CBW capabilities is

extremely difficult to guarantee or verify, even in cases where governments

have common interests in dismantlement and when the current government

maintains a commitment to global nonproliferation.

Policy Lesson #22: The procedures a regime follows in dismantling its CBW

program matter. Unilateral disarmament will not allay proliferation fears.

TRC revelations, Bassonís arrest on drug charges, and testimony at the

Basson trial suggest that there was extensive fraud and use of CBW facilities

to produce illegal drugs. Still unknown are the intended uses of the drugs,

where they went, and who authorized and benefited from their production and

to what extent. This case suggests that CBW programs may be used as

covers for a wide range of covert activities, including the illegal production

and sale of drugs. Bassonís links with individuals in the U.S. and Europe

suggest an important, but poorly understood transnational set of connections.

 Revelations during the Basson trial have led European countries and the U.S.

to initiate new investigations. Allegations in the Basson trial of fraud and use

of CBW facilitates to produce illegal drugs and evidence that crimes were

committed in several countries suggest that future nonproliferation

investigations are likely to involve multiple agencies, such as Scotland Yard,

the CIA, and foreign ministries, in a number of countries. 

In addition, CBW programs may be maintained because they serve as a

useful cover for lucrative illegal operations for project managers and some

senior military and political leaders, in addition to serving more traditional

national interests. The South African case highlights the possibility that

criminalization of future CBW programs may add a new complication to

future nonproliferation and rollback efforts. Thus, new methods and

approaches may need to be developed to monitor and control future CBW
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 95

programs that may operate as covers for illegal operations. 

Policy Lesson #23: Future nonproliferation efforts are likely to require

greater cooperation among agencies in several countries in order to contain

the spread of chemical and biological weapons knowledge. 

Policy Lesson #24: New methods and approaches will be needed to

monitor and control future CBW programs that may operate as covers for

criminal networks.
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 97

Appendix C

The ìverkope lysî (sales list) referred to at Truth and Reconciliation

Commission hearings. Provides the date of delivery of certain

potential murder tools manufactured at the Roodeplaat Research

Laboratory near Pretoria in 1989. 

Date Substance/Compounds Volume/Quantity Co-worker/

Co-ordinator

19-03-89 Phencyclidine (PCP)

Thallium acetate

1 x 500mg

50g

Johny Koortzen

23-03-89 Phencyclidine (PCP) 5 x 100mg Johny Koortzen

04-04-89 Aldicarb in Lemon Juice 6 x 200mg Chris & others

04-04-89 Azide laced in Whiskey 3 x 1,5g Chris & others

07-04-89 Vitamins D 2g Chris & others

15-05-89 Vitamins D 2g Chris & others

15-05-89 Cathardine 70mg Chris & others

19-05-89 Thallium acetate 1mg Chris & others

30-05-89 Phosphide tablets 30 tablets Wouter Basson

09-06-89 Spores (splenic fever

bacteria) on a letter

1 letter with

spores

Wouter Basson

20-06-89 Capsules NaCN 50 capsules Koos

22-06-89 Salmonella mixed with

sugar

200g Koos

27-06-89 Whiskey laced with

Paraquat

1 x 75ml Chris & others

20-07-89 HG-cyanide 4g Koos

10-08-89 Azide 4g Capsule cyanide

7

Koos

11-08-89 Cigarettes contaminated

with B Anthracis (splenic

fever bacteria)

5 cigarettes Chris & others

11-08-89 Coffee chocolates laced

with B Anthracis (splenic

fever bacteria)

5 chocolates Chris & others

11-08-89 Coffee chocolates laced

with Botulinum (bovine

para botulism bacteria)

5 chocolates Chris & others
98 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

11-08-89 Peppermint chocolates

laced with Aldicarb toxin

3 chocolates Chris & others

11-08-89 Peppermint chocolates

laced with Brodifacoum

toxin

2 chocolates Chris & others

11-08-89 Peppermint chocolates

laced with Cathardine

toxin

3 chocolates Chris & others

11-08-89 Peppermint chocolates

laced with Cyanide

3 chocolates Chris & others

16-08-89 Capsule Propane NaCN 7 capsules Koos

18-08-89 Formalin & Pyridine 30 phials of 50ml Koos

05-09-89 Cathardine powder in a

bag

10mg Koos

08-09-89 Methanol 3 phials of 30 ml Koos

08-09-89 Mamba toxin 2mg Koos

18-09-89 Whiskey laced with 50 ml

colchicine

75mg Chris & others

06-10-89 B. melitensis c

Brucellosis bacteria -

Malta fever bacteria

1 x 50 Koos

06-10-89 S. typhimurium laced in

deodorant

1 can Wouter Basson

21-10-89 B melitensis c Brucellosis

bacteria - Malta fever

bacteria

Quantity unknown Koos

21-10-89 Salmonella typhimurium

laced in deodorant

1 tin Wouter Basson

During 1990, Dr Immelman, at the request of the accused (Wouter

Basson), provided the accused with a drug bacteria that could be

mixed in Coke.
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 99

Notes

1. Edward Regis, The Biology of Doom: The History of America's Secret Germ

Warfare Project (New York: Henry Holt, 1999). Albert J. Mauroni, America's Struggle with

Chemical-Biological Warfare (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2000). Erhard Geissler, et. al.,

eds., Biological and Toxin Weapons: Research, Development and Use from the Middle Ages

to 1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Ken Alibek, with Stephen Handelman

(Contributor) Biohazard. (New York: Random House, 1999). Tom Mangold and Jeff

Goldberg, Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare (New York: St. Martinís Press,

1999). John Prados, ìAll Weapons Great and Small,î Washington Post, Book World, 16

January 2000, 7. 

2. Interview with Dr. Renfrew Christie, Cape Town, South Africa, 26 June 2000. 

3. Mangold, Plague Wars, 219.

4. Interview with Dr. Christie, 26 June 2000.

5. Interview with General (retired) Jannie Geldenhuys, Pretoria, South Africa, 13 June

2000.

6. H.E. Purkitt, ìThe Politics of Denuclearization: The Case of South Africa". 

Presentation at the Defense Nuclear Agency's Fourth Annual International Conference on

Controlling Arms, Philadelphia, Penn., 21 June 1995. (Earlier draft presented at Institute for

National Studies (INSS), U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado, 9 November 1994.

7. Interview with Dr. Vernon Joynt of Mechem (explosives warfare program) and the

Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), Pretoria, South Africa, 14 June 2000.

8. Interview with Dr. Torie Pretorius, prosecutor in the Basson trial, Pretoria, South

Africa 21 June 2000.

9. Interview with Helmut Heitmann of Janeís Defense Weekly, Cape Town, South

Africa, 26 June 2000. Heitmann and other analysts subsequently echoed De Villiersí

skepticism about the usefulness of chemical and biological weapons in Africa. In the 1980s,

Heitmann commented that chemical weapons were ineffective in Africa, given the heat, and

the possibility that shifting winds could blow the agents onto oneís own troops. Biological

weapons could be delivered through food and water, but the weapons could spread into oneís

own population.

10. Interviews with former South African military and civilian officials, July 2000,

including Gen. (ret.) Geldenhuys and Dr. Joynt.

11. Henrik Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War: Counter-Insurgency and Guerrilla war

in Rhodesia 1962-1980 (Gweru: Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1989). See Mangold, Plague

Wars, pp. 218-23.

12. For a further discussion of the role of former Selous Scouts and other foreigners

in South Africa during the 1980s see Mangold, Plague Wars, pp. 218-23. See also Ellert,

The Rhodesian Front War.
100 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

13. Analysis of the TRC Report by the SADF Contact bureau, 28 May, 1998, Pretoria,

South Africa and The Military in a political arena: The South African Defence Force (SADF)

and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Pretoria, June 2000. 

14. There was a general awareness during the 1960s of the potency of anthrax and

other biological agents as counter-insurgency weapons. In the 1960s, comic books featured

ìCaptain Devilî who poured anthrax into the Orange River and killed communist guerrillas,

according to Dr. Ian Phillips, ANC defense expert, interviewed, 13 June 2000 in Pretoria,

South Africa.

15. South African military and political planners during the late 1960s and early 1970s

studied carefully the effectiveness of Portuguese ìprotected villagesî in preventing guerrillas

from gaining control of large sections of Angola. However, South African planners viewed

a guerrilla threat at home to be highly unlikely at the time (Interview with Rocklyn Williams,

5 July 2000). In planning for the long-term possibility of guerrilla activity, the government

moved to expand the Bantu homeland policy to Lebowa and Venda and instituted policies

to depopulate northern areas of South Africa. This approach was viewed as a more effective

way of handling future problems and deflecting external critics with a promise of eventual

independence for the ten designated homelands. 

In Angola, South African military planners, however, were impressed by the ability of

the Portuguese to regain the offensive in the late 1960s by using helicopters, poison,

landmines, and other techniques to counter guerrilla gains. See John Marcum, The Angolan

Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, 1962-1976 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,

1978, pp. 116-118).

16. Interview with Dr. Ian Phillips, ANC defense expert, 13 June 2000.

17. The South African Police (SAP) started helping the Rhodesians to counter growing

insurgency problem in the mid-1960s. Until 1974, the number of SAP (and SADF) personnel

grew, until there were about 1,200 SAPs stationed in Rhodesia. While South African help

was welcomed initially, tensions quickly developed with reports that SAP personnel were

illegally shooting rhinoceroses for the horns in Chiwore game reserve and that they were illdisciplined, bored, and poorly trained. The first SAP contingents were relieved after three

months. South Africa attempted to solve the problem by sending better-trained and more

English speakers to Rhodesia. Tensions developed again as Rhodesians increasingly had to

rely on South African manpower and military hardware in the early 1970s. Many Rhodesian

troops resented South African efforts to tell them how to conduct their counter-insurgency

campaigns. These tensions were one reason why the South African police presence was

reduced during the 1970s [Interview, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) officials,

Washington, D.C., 13 September 2000]. See also Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War and Ron

Reid-Daly, with Peter Stiff, Selous Scouts: Top Secret War (Alberton, South Africa: Galago,

1983) for detailed accounts of these tensions.

18. Reid-Daly, Selous Scouts.
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 101

19. Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War. He claims that the Selous Scouts experimented

with throwing cholera viruses in rivers but could not detect any adverse effects associated

with this experiment. He reports that in 1976, a group of Scouts moved into the Ruya

wildlife area near Mozambique and introduced measured quantities of bacteriological

cultures into the water at several points along the Ruya river. Although the Scouts never

knew if any fatalities resulted from these experiments, Ellert notes that these experiments

corresponded in time with reports of deaths among people living on the banks of the Ruya

River in Mozambique. These deaths were officially attributed to cholera (p. 12). 

20. Mangold, Plague Wars, 214-218.

21. Interview with Jakkie Cilliers, Director of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS),

Pretoria, 12 June 2000. The South African State in the Basson trial is planning to use

information gathered by journalists to support charges against Basson related to the use of

CBW in Rhodesia. However, the prosecution was unable to discuss this evidence while the

trial is ongoing. Interview, Pretoria, July 2000).

22. Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War, 90-3; Interview with Peter Stiff, 12 July 2000.

23. From 1978 until independence the South African intelligence service stepped up

their efforts to recruit experienced Rhodesian Special Forces, Ellert, 90. 

24. Jacques Pauw, Into the Heart of Darkness (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1997).

 South Africa. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Truth and Reconciliation Commission

of South Africa Report. (Cape Town: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 1998).

25. Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War, 111-113. 

26. Mangold, Plague Wars, 214-23. See also Meryl Nass, ìAnthrax Epizootic in

Zimbabwe, 1978-1980: Due to Deliberate Spread? The PSR Quarterly vol. 2 no. 4

December 1992.

27. ìBasson anthrax link to Zimbabwe,î http://www.saep.org/forDB/ WAR anthrax,

ZANNOW990331.htm.

28. Many biological warfare experts discount the claims made in Plague Wars that

Rhodesian and/or South African forces planted anthrax spores in black farming areas in

Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. In black farming areas under rebel control, there was no wildlife

control or regular cattle dipping. During this period, there was a noticeable rise of rinderpest

and other cattle diseases. According to Richard Cornwall, a senior defense analyst and

expert on Zimbabwean politics at ISS-South Africa, ìeverything just broke downî (Interview,

4 July 2000). Under these conditions, it would have been extremely difficult to limit the

effects of anthrax to only certain areas.

Mangold cites a DIA report to support allegations that anthrax was planted in cattle

feed in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. However, Dr. Bill Thom, Director of the African division of

DIA, conducted a search of DIA files at the request of the authors and found that the DIA

document number cited in Plague Wars was a citation for a regulation manual that had
102 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

nothing to do with Africa or biological weapons (Interview, Bill Thom, 13 September 2000).

 Apparently, Mangold erred when citing a DIA report, or the document never existed.

However, Mangold is confident that such experiments occurred, and it is possible that

this strategy was one of the many BW experiments carried out by units of Selous Scouts in

their quest to find new counter-insurgency tools. Regardless of the veracity of the

allegations, the case is useful for illustrating how difficult it is to prove or disprove

allegations of anthrax attacks. For a further discussion of the available evidence in this and

other recent incidents of alleged use of anthrax as a weapon see Seth W. Carus, Working

Paper on Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological agents in the 20th

Century. 3rd Revision. (Washington, DC: Center for Counter-proliferation Research,

National Defense University, 1998). 

29. The Mugabe government has become most unpopular in Zimbabwe. In the June

2000 parliamentary elections, Mugabeís party, ZANU (PF), lost control of all urban seats and

all parliamentary seats in Matabeland.

30. Mangold, Plague Wars, 220.

31. The Cassinga raid highlights the difficulties involved in verifying CBW incidents.

 The TRC concluded that this alleged use was developed under auspices of Project B. A

report on the Cassinga attack was prepared by a joint UNHCR/WHO mission on 30 May

1978 and reproduced as Annexure V in UN document 13473 of 27 July 1979. However,

observers who arrived 30 minutes after the attack say they found no evidence of chemical

weapons use. (Interviews with former SADF special forces officers and defense analysts,

July 2000).

32. Interviews with former SADF Special Forces officers, July 2000

33. Interview with Dr. G. Scharf, former Director of Medical Hospital One (Pretoria),

6 July 2000.

34. Interview with Gen. (ret.) Georg Meiring, Pretoria, 3 July 2000.

35. Interview with former Defense Minister Magnus Malan, Pretoria, 23 June 2000.

36. Interview with Brig. Gen. (ret.) Bill Sass, Pretoria, 12 June 2000. This rationale

for developing nuclear weapons is the one most frequently mentioned by former SADF

generals and some former politicians. For a further discussion of other rationales that have

been provided by South African officials during and after the apartheid era, see Badenhorst

(unpublished manuscript), Hounam and McQuillen (1995), Reiss (1995), and Stumpf

(1995/96).

37. According to Brig. Gen. (ret.) Phillip Schalwyk, South African forces in Angola

received an urgent cable from UNITA commanders during Operation Savannah asking

for help because they had been attacked by Cuban troops who wore ìpig face masks.î

Interview, 12 July 2000. 
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 103

38. Annette Seegers, The Military in the Making of Modern South Africa. (New York:

St. Martinís Press, 1996).

39. Interview with Magnus Malan, 23 June 2000.

40. Interview with Dr. Vernon Joynt, Pretoria, 14 June 2000. Dr. Joynt claims that

Surgeon General Nieuwoudt sent Major Wouter Basson to him in 1978 and offered him the

directorship of a chemical weapons program. While Joynt refused, many scientists and

specialists accepted research projects by Nieuwoudt and Basson, and many did not tell their

superiors.

41. Seegers, The Military. See also S.A. Watt, ìThe Anglo-Boer War: The Medical

Arrangements and implications thereof during the British occupation of Bloemfontein:

March-August, 1900,î Military History Journal Vol. 9 No. 2 (August). South African

Military History Society / military.history@rapidttp.com. (Accessed 15 June 2000). 

42. Interview with Dr. G. Scharf, former Director of Military Medical Hospital One

(Pretoria), 5 July 2000. Although the 7th Medical Battalion Group is still in existence and

tasked with the mission of supporting the 44th Parachute Brigade and Special Forces

Brigade, the military medical service has undergone a dramatic reorganization since 1994.

 Authorization for a re-organized service, renamed the SADF Medical Service (SAMS) was

approved by the Minister of Defense in March 1999. SAMS has a much broader mandate

today that includes providing assistance to the health services of South Africa, in addition to

providing comprehensive military health service to the National Defence Force and South

African Police Service.

43. In an interview in Pretoria on 13 June 2000, Gen. (ret.) Chris Thirion stated that

he first met Basson when the latter was earmarked in the late 1970s to become the doctor for

SADF Special Forces. Thirion claims that Basson was arrogant, that he was Defense

Minister Magnus Malanís ìblue-eyed boy,î and that he had the ear of General Kat

Liebenberg of Special Forces. Thirion complained when Basson was given access to military

intelligence and when Basson short-circuited the command structure. Thirion continued by

commenting that, in the 1980s, Malan became a member of parliament and started the custom

of showing people in his constituency that the SADF was winning the war in Namibia and

Angola. He would bring generals from each branch of the service. However, Basson

represented the Medical Health Service and not the Surgeon General.

44. According to ANC defense expert Dr. Ian Phillips, interviewed 13 June 2000, Dr.

Basson was a ìDr. Strangeloveî who was part of a group of young scientists, specialists,

intellectuals and soldiers who emerged in the 1970s and enthusiastically supported the

apartheid regime. Their ìpatriotismî provided them with the motivation to commit ìperfect

crimesî on behalf of the regime. Later, some members this group would claim that they were

ìonly following orders.î

Others, such as Dr. Daan Goosen, who was the managing director at RRL, remain

unrepentant noting that ìSouth Africa was in a war situationÖthe terrorists and political
104 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

figures were the targets on the ANC side.î Dr. Goosen went on in this interview to explain

that Basson spelled out to him, at the time they were negotiating Goosenís employment, ìthat

it would be a biological chemical weapons program [and that] it would be offensive. We

initially spent a lot of time on the ethical use of these things, and I was convinced that the

products would be used in a war sense, very ethically. There isnít much of a difference if you

use a gun to kill someone or if you use a more refined product to do that.î Frontline

transcripts from Plague Wars: A report on biological weapons threats and how the Soviet

Union secretly amassed an arsenal of bio-weapons. Transcript from television show

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ frontline/shows/plague/sa/.

Many individuals, who worked on Project Coast or had contact with Basson within the

military, including most former SADF generals and officers, continue to respect him as a

brilliant heart surgeon. Many of these individuals assert that Basson did nothing wrong since

all of his actions, including the alleged fraudulent ones, were approved by superiors. Others

stress that they did not know specifics about most Project Coast programs or Bassonís

financial activities until press revelations started to appear in the 1990s. 

45. Interview with Magnus Malan, 23 June 2000.

46. See Lt. Gen. (Dr.) D.P. (Niels) Knobelís testimony to the Truth and

Reconciliation Commission (TRC), July 1998.

47. Chris Oppermann, ìHow the taxpayer footed the bill for Project Coast,î Weekly

Mail and Guardian archive, 27 June 1997.

48. According to Helmut Heitmann, Janeís Defense Weekly and defense expert, in a

26 June 2000 interview, the evidence was not conclusive.

Heitmann was among the first journalists to raise questions about South African

allegations that the Cubans had used chemical weapons in Angola and highlighted the

difficulty of verifying the source of alleged CBW attacks (Heitmann, 1985, 1990; see also

Steenkamp, 1989).

49. Interview with Magnus Malan, 23 June 2000. Despite concerns by senior military

leaders about the possibility that Cubans might use CBW in Angola, little time was spent on

defensive CBW training during the 1970s. From the mid-1970s through the late 1970s only

a few hours during one day of training was devoted to CBW of SADF infantry personnel.

 Most of these sessions focused on the use of CS gas. Many more hours of training were

devoted to how to counter urban violence. Interview with Mark Malan, former SADF officer

and senior researcher at the Institute for Strategic Studies-South Africa, 23 June 2000. 

50. According to Chandre Gould, formerly of the TRC, interviewed 29 June 2000 in

Johannesburg, South Africa.

51. Mangold, Plague Wars, 236. They estimate four to five million pounds.

52. Interview with Dr. Ian Phillips, 13 June 2000. 

53. Interview with Rocky Williams, ISS-South Africa, 5 July 2000.
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 105

54. Interview with Gen. (ret.) Meiring, 3 July 2000.

55. Mangold, Plague Wars, 243.

56. Mangold, Plague Wars, 241.

57. Mangold, Plague Wars, 243.

58. Interview conducted in 1997 by Helen Purkitt. 

59. Magnus Malan indicated as much in a 23 June 2000 interview.

60. According to Dr. Rocklyn Williams of ISS, Pretoria, interviewed 15 July 2000, he

debriefed a SADF sergeant in 1983 who talked about the development of a ìblack bomb.î

61. Mangold, Plague Wars, 244.

62. Mangold, Plague Wars, 244. In an interview for the television

documentary, Dr. Daan Goosen again acknowledged that the target of Project Coastís

work on drugs that would induce infertility was the black population. One line of

research was to develop a vaccine, one for males and one for females that could be

given surreptitiously or under another pretext. This research was based on open

source contraceptive research. Another line of research was work on a [unnamed]

product that could have been given without the knowledge of the person receiving it

either orally or in some sort of injection. He went on to state, ìthe most serious

problem as told to us [was] the birth rate of the black population, and that it would

outgrow the resources of the country and it was very important that this be brought

under control. There was no doubt about that. This was given to us by Basson, by

the surgeon generalÖit was very clear that this was the most important project we

had to work on.î Frontline transcripts from Plague Wars: A report on biological

weapons threats and how the Soviet Union secretly amassed an arsenal of bioweapons. Transcript from television show http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/

shows/plague/sa/. (Accessed 15 June 2000)

63. Interviews with a South African journalist, 20 July 2000.

64. According to Chandre Gould, formerly of the TRC, in a presentation, 29 June

2000.

65. Interviews with retired generals Thirion and Geldenhuys, Pretoria, 13 June 2000.

66. Interview with Gen. (ret.) Meiring, 3 July 2000. As a subscriber to the 1925

Geneva Protocol, South Africa could not legally develop lethal CW agents. 

67. Interview with Gen. (ret.) Meiring, 3 July 2000.

68. Interview with Col. (ret.) Johann Smith, Pretoria, 30 June 2000. He was certain

that the MPLA and Cubans used CW in Angola.

69. Interview with Gen. (ret.) Thirion, 13 June 2000.
106 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

70. Interview with Gen. (ret.) Sass, 12 June 2000.

71. Interview with Gen. (ret.) Geldenhuys, 13 June 2000.

72. Interview with Gen. (ret.) Meiring, 3 July 2000.

73. Interview with David Steward, June 26, 2000.

74. Gen. (ret.) Meiring, interviewed 3 July 2000. Meiring was not certain if the

Cubans and the MPLA used CW at Cuito Cuanavale in 1987. 

75. Soon after his investigation, reports emerged that Dr. Heyndrickx manufactured

allegations that the Angolans were using CW and that he was on the payroll of the South

African government or the CIA. In 1997, Weekly Mail and Guardian reported that Dr.

Heyndrickx had been arrested for misusing funds at the University of Ghent and that the

Belgian police are still looking for 12 British-made chemical agent monitors which

Heyndrickx bought with university funds. He said he destroyed the machines because they

were defective. 

76. Gen. (ret.) Meiring, interviewed 3 July 2000.

77. Testimony by Dr. Mike Odendaal in the Basson Trial, 24 May 2000. See ìHIV

Blood Sample Frozen for Chemical Warfare, Basson Trial Hears,î South African Press

Association (SAPA), 24 May 2000.

78. Mangold, Plague Wars, 243.

79. Mangold, Plague Wars, 242.

80. Dr. Basson told Mangold (Plague Wars, 442, note 443) in 1998 that the reason

why a detailed investigation by Britain's MI-6, the Security Service, failed to substantiate the

allegations that he visited Porton Down is because he used false names and passports for his

frequent visits. Another possibility is that Basson met with former Porton Down employees.

 Several former employees of Porton Down report that they were asked to pose as employees

after reporting contacts with Wouter Basson to British authorities. See Michael Evans,

ìSouth Africa may have ordered British deaths,î The Times (London), (14 July 1998), 7 for

further details.

81. Testimony by Dr. Odendaal, 24 May 2000. See ìHIV..,î SAPA, 24 May 2000.

82. Interview with former South African military officer, who will remain

anonymous, July 2000.

83. Ambassador Princeton Lyman, e-mail to Stephen Burgess, 18 September 2000.

 Ambassador Princeton Lyman backtracked somewhat from earlier statements made in a 31

August 2000 interview about claims that weaponization took place. Donald Mahley of the

U.S. State Department, who was part of the delegation to South Africa after the demarche

of 11 April 1994, also downplayed evidence of weaponization in a 30 August 2000

interview.
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 107

84. Professor Andre Buys, Director of Institute for Technical Innovation, University

of Pretoria, in a 14 June 2000 interview.

85. Professor Buys, in a 14 June 2000 interview.

While the project manager for the nuclear bomb project was aware of ongoing research

into chemical weapons (in an interview with Helen Purkitt, July 1994), even he did not have

full access to the details of specific CBW projects.

86. H.E. Purkitt, ìThe Politics of Denuclearization: The Case of South Africa". 

Presentation at the Defense Nuclear Agency's Fourth Annual International Conference on

Controlling Arms, Philadelphia, Penn., 21 June 1995. Earlier draft presented at Institute for

National Studies (INSS), U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado, 9 November 1994.

87. Interview with Brig. Gen. (ret.) Bill Sass, 3 July 2000. 

88. Interview with Gen. (ret.) Thirion, 13 June 2000. Thirion claimed that he had

proposed a gendarmerie or carabinieri to serve as the ìthird force.î Instead, P.W. Botha,

Magnus Malan, and Adriaan Vlok devised the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) and other

agencies that were more covert and far more lethal.

89. Interviews with Generals Thirion and Geldenhuys, 13 June 2000.

90. Interview with David Steward, Executive Director, De Klerk Foundation and

President de Klerkís chief of staff (1989-94), Cape Town, 26 June 2000.

91. Mangold, Plague Wars, 242. Skepticism still surrounds Basson and Knobelís

claims about Bassonís international activities. According to several interviewees, it is

doubtful if Basson ever penetrated Porton Down or U.S. and Soviet facilities. 

92. According to Gen. (ret.) Sass, interviewed 12 June 2000 in Pretoria.

93. According to Gen. (ret.) Sass, interviewed 12 June 2000 in Pretoria.

94. Arthur Allen, ìMad Scientist,î Salon.com (http://salonmag.com/health/

feature/2000/06/26/biofem), 26 June 2000 (accessed 9 August 2000). It has only been in the

last few years that researchers have renewed their focus on finding an effective microbicide

(a chemical that can kill off the virus). Three dozen microbicides are now in the pre-clinical

testing stage, and 20 others are ready for safety trials in humans. Researchers were hoping

that nonoxynol-9 was the answer. However, in July of 2000, microbicide researchers from

UNAIDS discovered to their horror that the spermicide nonoxynol-9, a chemical found in

many contraceptives, lubricants, and gels worldwide, is not only ineffective against HIV, it

actually appears to increase the chance of infection in high-risk women. Of 999 prostitutes

in Africa and Thailand, 59 women using a nonoxynol-9 contraceptive gel called Advantage-S

became infected with HIV, compared with 41 women using a placebo. Claudia Kalb, in ìWe

Have to Save Our People,î Newsweek, 24 July 2000 posed on afro-nets@usa.nealthnet.org,

July 17, 2000.

95. Jeff Collins, ìSuspects all visited the home of a South African trade official, police

say,î Orange Country Register, (July 18, 2000). Dr. Ford, Dino DíSaachs and Dr. Jerry
108 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

Nilsson, who are all suspected of conspiring to kill Biofem Inc. chief executive James

Patrick Riley, visited the South Africa trade attachÈ, Gideon Bouwer in the 1980s. 

96. Arthur Allen, ìVaginal Detergent,î Salon.com (http://salonmag.com/ health/

feature/2000/06/26/biofem), 26 June 2000 (accessed August 9, 2000). 

(http://salonmag.com/health/feature/2000/06/26/biofem), 26 June 2000 (accessed August 9,

2000). Jeff Collins, ìSuspects all visited the home of a South African trade official, police

say,î Orange Country Register, (18 July 2000).

97. Interview with Dr. G. Scharf, former Director of Medical Hospital One (Pretoria),

6 July 2000.

98. Jeff Collins ìSuspects all visited the home of a South African trade official, police

sayî The Orange County Register. (July 18, 2000). This article cites a Sunday Times interview with Knobel, in which he confirmed that he relied on Fordís expertise whenever he had

questions about chemical or biological weapons and said that he helped Ford and Riley gain

approval for the use of products produced by BioFem. Knobel also confirmed that he

introduced Ford to Wouter Basson, who arranged a briefing with Project Coast scientists and

Dr. Ford at Fort Klapperkop outside Pretoria in June or July 1987 where he demonstrated

how to lace teabags, doilies and even a Playboy magazine with deadly bacteria. A new

project, codenamed Project Larry, was started around the time of Fordís visit but was closed

within a few months. While Dr. Knobel reports no knowledge of a Project Larry, Adriaan

Botha, a Project Coast scientist who attended this briefing, reported that Ford sent them five

bags of biological material they hoped to cultivate into organisms that could be used to kill

the enemies of apartheid. Jeff Collins ìFord advised South Africa on warfare devices,"

Orange County Register (15 March 2000).

99. Arthur Allen, ìMad Scientist,î Salon.com (http://salonmag.com/ health/

feature/2000/06/26/biofem), 26 June 2000 (accessed August 9, 2000)

100. See Andrew Bluth and Tony Saavedra ìThe materials are collected at the home

of Jerry Nilsson, who was questioned and released,î The Orange County Register, April 2,

2000 and Tony Saavedra ìSurgeon says he doesn't know why he was subjected to a search,î

The Orange County Register, April 5, 2000

101. There were also allegations that Ford may have tested his birth control product

on prostitutes in South Africa. Julian Rademeyer ìIllegal tests on SA prostitutes?î Pretoria

News, 22 July 2000 (http://home.global.co.za/~jrad/ ptabio.htm) and Arthur Allen, ìMad

Scientist,î Salon.com (http:// salonmag.com/ health/feature/2000/06/26/biofem), 26 June

2000 (accessed August 9, 2000). See also articles in Los Angeles Times and other

newspapers in Mad Scientist archive on Project Coast on the Mad Scientist web page

(http://www.madsci.org). 

102. Interview with South African prosecutor in the Basson case, July 2000.
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 109

103. Interview with a former TRC investigator, 20 July, 2000. In addition to scientific

literature, papers from scientific conferences, and government documents marked top secret,

investigators found financial records, canceled checks, bags of foreign coins, memorabilia

(e.g., a cartoon of Basson carrying a violin case), and several small bottles of scotch and beer

cans, which they did not taste. The contents in these trunks were really a ìmixed bagî of

personal effects and top-secret documents.

104. Interview with a former TRC investigator, 20 July, 2000. 

105. Mangold, Plague Wars, 277-8.

106. Dr. Daan Goosen, former managing direct of RRL, claimed that Project Coast

never conducted research on HIV as a weapon. However, he acknowledged that Project

Coast scientists were planning to do some work that he termed ìlegitimate workî for a

European pharmaceutical company. Interview Transcript from television show

http://www.pbs.org/ wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plague/sa/ (accessed 15 June 2000)

107. Interview with South African reporters who covered the TRC hearings, July 2000.

 Despite the lack of evidence linking Project Coast research with the intentional use of AIDS,

allegations that the policies of the former South African government were motivated by AIDS

considerations are likely to be raised in the future, as the HIV epidemic peaks in South

Africa. For example, one researcher at the International AIDS conference held in Durban

in July 2000 suggested in a paper that projections of huge losses in the black population

through AIDS was the real reason why de Klerk had started transition process.

108. As Daan Goosen noted, ìbiological weapons was a new field, and it was done all

over by all countries, even England at Porton Down and the Americans at Fort Detrick. We

know they were doing it, and we had contacts with all that work and the weapons that were

developed.î Frontline transcripts from Plague Wars: A report on biological weapons threats

and how the Soviet Union secretly amassed an arsenal of bio-weapons. 

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plague/sa/. (Accessed 15 June 2000). 

109. Interview with Dr. G. Scharf, former Director of Medical Hospital One

(Pretoria), 6 July 2000.

110. Interview with prosecutor in the Basson trial, Dr. T. Pretorius, July 2000.

111. Affidavits and memorandums on file at the Freedom of Expression Institute,

Johannesburg, South Africa. Prosecutors have already introduced into the trial documents

found in Websterís possession that indicate that the WPW group was started in the early

1980s by a group of South African doctors. According to these documents, they were tasked

by southern African health authorities to set up clinics in various African countries. The

State alleges that Basson set up the companies to create a cover for himself as a successful

businessman. ìAudit reveals Basson fraud,î Business Day, (14 June 2000).

112. Unlike the allegations of murder that rest on proving an indirect link to Basson,

many of the fraud charges already introduced at the Basson trial established his direct

involvement. Documents in Websterís possession showed Basson was the sole shareholder
110 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

and beneficiary owner of the various companies in his groups. Bruwer, the forensic auditor,

introduced documents that proved that Bassonís overseas companies, known as the WPW

Group, and a local one, Wisdom Group had changed names and were restructured regularly.

 These restructurings complicated the investigation and made it more difficult to trace the

flow of funds. Nonetheless, Bruwer was able to establish in detail the assets of these

companies, which included two aircraft and properties in South Africa and overseas, as well

as shares in other companies, all allegedly funded by state money. The state is trying to

prove that Basson set up the companies to create a cover for himself as a ìsuccessful

businessman.î Business Day, 14 June 2000.

113. Interview with Jacques Pauw, Johannesburg, 29 June 2000. Pauw had

interviewed the Project Coast scientists, including Andre Immelman, Schalk van Rensburg,

Mike Odendaal, Daan Goosens, and Peter Lourens.

114. Interview with Col. (ret.) Johann Smith, 30 June 2000. Negotiations with

Mandela and the end of the Angolan war led Basson and others to take advantage of a

window of opportunity to get rich. He was able to deceive top generals and salted away

millions. Smith was certain that Basson turned to dealing Ecstasy and other drugs, because

his money was in Swiss banks, and he still needed to raise cash in South Africa. 

115. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 514.

116. Interview with Dr. Niels Knobel, Pretoria, 15 June 2000.

117. Interview with Gen. (ret.) Geldenhuys, 13 June 2000.

118. Interview with Gen. (ret.) Geldenhuys, 13 June 2000.

119. Interview with Brig. Gen (ret.) Bill Sass, July 1994. See Purkitt, ìThe politics

of denuclearization,î for further details of changes made at the end of P.W. Bothaís rule.

120. See H. Purkitt, ì"The cognitive basis of foreign policy expertise: Evidence from

intuitive analyses of political novices and 'experts' in South Africa," pp. in D. Sylvan and

J. Voss (Eds.) Problem Representation and Political Decision Making. (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1998) for evidence of how widespread this fear was in 1992,

after negotiations had broken down.

121. Interview with Dr. Ian Phillips, 13 June 2000.

122. Interview with David Steward, 26 June 2000.

123. According to Gen. (ret.) Meiring, interviewed 3 July 2000.

124. Interview with senior official of Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 1997.

125. According to Dr Renfrew Christie, interviewed 26 June 2000, the U.S., backed

by Israel and the UK, issued a ìhostile nation warningî to South Africa in January 1990 to
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 111

destroy the nuclear weapons program in order to keep it out of ANC hands. Christie claimed

that, in the 1980s, the Israel had been involved in South African NBC programs, and the U.S.

 and Britain did not object to South Africa developing those programs.

126. Interview with Prof. Buys, 14 June 2000.

127. Interview with De Wet Potgieter, a journalist in Pretoria who has reported for

several South African newspapers, 13 June 2000.

128. According to Col. Mike Ferguson, former Defense AttachÈ to South Africa,

interviewed 23 May 2000 in Washington, D.C.

129. Interview with Gen. (ret.) Thirion, 13 June 2000.

130. According to Col. Mike Ferguson, interviewed 23 May 2000.

131. Interview with Col. (ret.) Joep Joubert, Pretoria, 23 June 2000, who worked with

the CCB and Special Forces and retired from the SADF, before the Harms Commission

findings. He believed that Chikane had to be eliminated as an ìenemy.î Joubert thought that

the operation was well planned, and authority was given from the top, probably by P.W. 

Botha, Pik Botha, Adrian Vlok, and Magnus Malan. Joubert had testified before the Harms

Commission that he had full responsibility for CCB and Special Forces missions and the

budgeting of secret funds. He believed that a CBW program was essential and that in order

to have a good defensive program, a good offensive program was needed.

132. Testimony of RRL scientist, Schalk Van Rensburg, to the TRC on 9 June 1998.

133. Bumbled assassination attempts using BW devices seem to have been pretty

common. This fits with what BW terrorist experts have found in other cases. See Carus,

Working Paper on Bioterrorism, 88. 

Carus classifies this incident as probable or possible use but with no authoritative

confirmation. In some cases, a biological agent was used, but there was no information to

indicate whether the perpetrator knowingly caused the infection. The probability of

intentional contamination for these cases is difficult to determine. See Carus, 90.

134. Jacques Pauw, Into the Heart of Darkness: Confessions of Apartheidís Assassins

(Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1997).

135. Pauw, Into the Heart of Darkness, 226.

136. According to Dr. Joynt, interviewed 14 June 2000.

137. According to De Wet Potgieter, a journalist in Pretoria who has reported for

several South African newspapers, interviewed 13 June 2000, Uwe Paschke, who married

P.W. Bothaís daughter, and Philip Mijburgh, Magnus Malanís nephew, both had

connections to the CBW program and Basson. Mijburgh especially profited from the

privatization of the front companies for Project Coast.

138. In June 2000, the State in the Basson case called a number of witnesses in an

attempt to prove that Basson lived a life of luxury, while defrauding the apartheid
112 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

government of millions of rand. The court presented evidence that Libya had shown an

interest in Bassonís luxury Pretoria home, Merton House, to use as an embassy. Basson had

allegedly built the house to suit his luxurious lifestyle. However, the house became an

embarrassment after extensive media coverage. It was eventually sold to the Zimbabwean

government at a loss. Other witnesses testified that Basson took his business associates and

employees on luxury overseas holiday trips and entertained lavishly, while earning a public

servantís salary. The Angolan rebel leader, Jonas Savimbi, hired a private aircraft belonging

to a group of companies owned by Basson. According to Defense Advocate, Jaap Cilliers,

the aircraft often landed at U.S. military bases and was familiar to customs officials. He said

the aircraft was seldom searched, which made it easier for Basson to transport equipment

earmarked for Project Coast and SADF throughout the 1980s. Business Day, (14 June 2000).

139. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 515.

140. Stefaans Brummer, Weekly Mail and Guardian (20 December 1995). See also

Peter Hounam and Steve McQuillen, The Mini-Nuke Conspiracy: Mandela's Nuclear

Nightmare (London: Faber & Faber, 1995). (Interviews, South Africa, 1994-2000).

141. The TRC reports Lt. Gen. Pierre Steynís report to President F.W. de Klerk, 20

December 1992, as source of this incident.

142. TRC researchers could not arrange a meeting with the British investigator. 

Investigators met with Dr. Staub, a member of both the Swiss and the United Nations

investigating team. He told them that he believed that the troops had suffered dehydration

and had not been the victims of a chemical attack. This explanation struck the Commission's

investigation unit as unlikely but is consistent with the assessment of foreign military

personnel who investigated this and other alleged incidents of CBW use in Mozambique

during the early 1990s. As one foreign official who had investigated these incidents

explained, ìitís very difficult to isolate cause of death when people are so malnourished and

dehydrated when they dieî Interview with foreign investigator, Johannesburg, South Africa,

July 1992. See Purkitt, 1995 for additional details.

143. According to Vernon Joynt, interviewed 14 June 2000.

144. According to Dr. Ian Phillips, interviewed 13 June 2000.

145. According to Prosecutor Dr. Torie Pretorius, interviewed 20 June 2000.

146. According to General (ret.) Meiring, interviewed 3 July 2000.

147. During the interview, Meiring asserted that ANC/MK troops had been trained

in CBW and that SADF intelligence concluded that there could have been chemical and

biological agents in Mozambique. There is no corroborating evidence for this assertion.

148. Interview with David Steward, 26 June 2000.

149. Interview with Gen. (ret.) Meiring, 3 July 2000.

150. According to a Weekly Mail & Guardian account, 14 November 1997.
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 113

151. According to General (ret.) Meiring, interviewed 3 July 2000. Bassonís soft

retirement meant that he was no longer an active member of the SADF but continued to draw

a paycheck as a reserve SADF officer and doctor at a military hospital.

152. This account of the Steyn Report relies on an interview with David Steward on

26 June 2000. 

153. Interview with David Steward on 26 June 2000.

154. According to General (ret.) Meiring, interviewed 3 July 2000.

155. According to General (ret.) Meiring, interviewed 3 July 2000.

156. See Knobelís testimony to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, July 1998.

157. Oppermann, ìHow the taxpayer footed theÖî Weekly Mail, 27 June 1997.

158. According to Gen. (ret.) Meiring, interviewed 3 July 2000.

159. According to Rocky Williams, ISS, Pretoria and former MK colonel, interviewed

15 June 2000.

160. According to Ian Phillips, interviewed 13 June 2000.

161. Interviews with Ambassador Princeton Lyman, Washington, D.C., 25 May and

31 August 2000.

162. Interview with Peter Goosen, proliferation expert, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Pretoria, 15 June 2000

163. According to Dr. Ian Phillips, ANC defense expert, interviewed 13 June 2000,

Anglo-American cooperation on South Africaís NBC program was not as smooth as it may

have seemed. During the 1989-94 period, the British were upset with the Americans at the

latterís efforts to promote their own ìsolution for South Africa.î

164. Interview with David Steward, 26 June 2000.

165. Interview with Ambassador Lyman, 31 August 2000.

166. Interview with Dr. Knobel, 15 June 2000.

167. Mangold, Plague Wars, 243.

168. Telephone interview with Roelof ìPikî Botha, 13 July 2000. He stressed in this

interview that he never had detailed knowledge of South Africaís CBW program, except

when he had to obtain assurances that the program was closed down before South Africa

signed the NPT.

169. Interview by Helen Purkitt with senior South African OSD officials,

Johannesburg, July 1997.

170. Weekly Mail and Guardian, 15 December 1994.
114 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

171. Koch and Fleming, Weekly Mail and Guardian, 15 December 1994.

172. Koch and Fleming, Weekly Mail and Guardian, 15 December 1994.

173. General (ret.) Meiring, interviewed 3 July 2000.

174. Oppermann, ìHow the taxpayerÖ,î Weekly Mail, 27 June 1997.

175. Dr. Ian Phillips, interviewed June 13, 2000. Phillips also commented that, at the

time, General Meiring, Chief of SANDF, held the ANC-dominated government and

parliament in ìcomplete contempt.î

176. Although Bassonís trips to Libya did decline after he was ìrehired,î the South

African government at one point placed Basson under an undeclared ìhouse arrest.î

177. Oppermann, ìHow the taxpayerÖî Weekly Mail, 27 June 1997.

178. Stefaans Brummer, The Mail and Guardian, 23 August 1996.

179. This view was expressed in confidential interviews with both South African and

U.S. officials.

180. Soggot and Koch, Weekly Mail and Guardian archives, 27 June 1997.

181. Max du Preez, ìForwardî in Wendy Orr, From Biko to Basson. (Saxonwold,

South Africa, Contra Press, 2000).

182. A rump TRC staff remained to consider thousands of outstanding amnesty

applications. 

183. According to the current staff of the TRC, the political climate of the day

prevented the TRC from employing former military and intelligence personnel as researchers.

 Bishop Tutu and other senior members of the TRC reportedly accepted the criticisms that

they were naÔve about the willingness of senior politicians and some foot soldiers in the

apartheid regime to engage in full disclosure and reconciliation in hindsight. According to

these staff members, Bishop Tutu has stated recently that he would not have agreed to grant

blanket amnesty, based on his experiences working with certain recalcitrant and unrepentant

witnesses. The current TRC staff is planning to publish codicils to the original report

covering former President de Klerkís behavior as President, since a legal injunction by de

Klerk forced the TRC to leave that section blank in the 1998 report. The Commission is also

continuing to investigate the causes of the Heldenberg commercial airliner crash that was

believed to be secretly carrying explosive materials for the nuclear program. An 800-page

report about this incident was recently posted on the TRC web site and the Commission plans

to issue a final report before it goes out of existence. (Interview with Mr. Patti Prior,

Advocate, and associates in the Legal Department of the TRC, Cape Town, 20 July 2000).

The former top military leadership was so incensed by their treatment before the TRC

and the procedures employed that they formed an informal Contact Bureau and issued an

alternative report and response to the TRC final report. The purpose of this report was to
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 115

address the flaws and perceived biased and unfair treatment of the SADF by the TRC and to

provide the public with a ìtrue picture of the Cold War and armed conflict ñ the spirit and

dynamics, the psychoses and syndromes.î See Analysis of the TRC Report by the SADF

Contact Bureau, 28 May 1999, compiled by Maj. Gen. (ret.) Dirk Marais, Convener of the

SADF Contact Bureau, Pretoria, South Africa. Despite this animosity, many of the retired

generals associated with this network are now serving on advisory commissions for the

SANDF. This group also maintains an office at SA Defense Headquarters. (Interview with

Gen. (ret.) Dirk Marais, Convener of SADF Contact Bureau and telephone interview with

Gen. (ret.) Jannie Geldenhuys, 13 July 2000). 

184. Orr, From Biko to Basson, 326.

185. No coherent explanation has emerged to date to fully explain why Wouter Basson

was caught peddling drugs or the timing of his drug arrest. Several of our interviewees

emphasized the fact that there were tensions between the various agencies involved in

monitoring Bassonís movements prior to his arrest. A couple of these interviewees reported

that they were told that Bassonís arrest was the result of the NIA losing out in a bureaucratic

battle, after ìothers blew the whistleî on Bassonís drug activities. At the time of Bassonís

arrest, several South African press reports attributed the timing of the arrest to CIA reports

to the South African government that Basson was getting ready to flee the country, possibly

to work in the Middle East, a few weeks before his arrest. The reports described how Basson

had been under the protection of the NIA due to concerns that he would be the target of a

foreign assassin. Chris Bateman, ìThe man who knows too much about killing,î Cape

Times, (12 June 1998), 17. Another news report, which claimed to be based on OSEO

sources, reported that Basson had sent 4 cases (three of them were worth R6m, R5,57m, and

R220,815) out of country to banks in Luxemburg and Belgium, shortly before his arrest. The

account went on to allege that British and Belgian secret agents were involved in these

transactions. See Chris Bateman, ìEvil Einstein,î Cape Times, (12 June 1998), 17.

186. At the time of Bassonís arrest, all of these investigators shared a sense of urgency

because there was some question as to whether the government would be able to keep these

records. These documents had been found towards the end of the week and the investigators

were concerned that Basson's lawyers would be able to successfully argue in court the

following week that the contents of the trunks were personal property. (Interview with a

former TRC investigator, 20 July 2000).

187. The ìverkope lysî was a list of items, allegedly ordered by Dr. Basson and given

to CCB operatives. This list includes anthrax-infected cigarettes; shampoo poisoned with an

insecticide, and poisoned chocolates. Wendy Orr, From Biko to Basson (Saxonwold, South

Africa: Contra Press, 2000): 328-9. See Appendix C for the complete list.

188. Interview with a former senior investigator for the TRC, 21 July 2000.

189. Interview with Dr. Villa-Vicencia, former TRC investigator for the TRC, 21 July

2000.
116 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

190. For additional details of this meeting that included representatives of the old and

new military and political guard, see Orr, 331-2. Dr. Orr notes that she arrived at this hastily

called meeting and found that she was the only TRC (and the only woman) representative

among the 40 participants.

191. Orr, From Biko to Basson, 332. She notes that Dr. Folb made himself forever

unpopular with many participants at this meeting by making this observation. 

192. Chandre Gould confirmed the agreement regarding the status of documents in a

telephone interview in July 2000.

193. Telephone interview with Dr. Peter Folb, Cape Town, 20 July 2000.

194. For example, Dr. Jan Lourens, a bio engineer who worked at Delta G and later

headed Protechnek, was one of the scientists who applied for amnesty to the TRC after

Bassonís arrest. He called the claims ìnonsenseî that Project Coast was a defensive

program. He proved to be a particularly effective witness as, during his testimony, he was

able to produce some of the ìJames Bond typeî weapons developed to deliver fatal doses of

poison applicators (including umbrellas, screw drivers, and a signet ring with spring-loaded

dose-powder) that had been made to order for Wouter Basson. Lourens was also crucial as

a witness because he testified that SADF chief Gen Kat Liebenberg told him to ìforget about

the whole thingÖî and then told Lourens that ìthose are my toysÖI want them back.î

Instead, he had buried these ìtoysî at his Northern Transvaal farm and resigned from the

military. After Bassonís arrest he told his story to Transvaal Attorney General J. díOliveira

and testified before the TRC.

A former senior procurement official for Delta-G who worked for the company for

eight years agreed to cooperate with prosecutors. This official proved to be very helpful

since he kept a diary that contained details about all products and raw materials that entered

the facility. The diary also described several business dealings that he had with Thor

Chemicals executive, Alan Kidger, who was subsequently brutally murdered. This unnamed

senior procurement official described Delta-G as "state-of-the-artî research laboratories

consisting of five different facilities and described the cell structures that ensured that nobody

really knew what the other was doing.

195. Michael Evans, ìSouth Africa may have ordered British deaths,î The Times (14

July 1998), 7.

196. Paraphrase of comments made by a former TRC investigator for TRC during an

interview in July 2000.

197. Frontline transcript of interview from Plague Wars: A report on biological

weapons threats and how the Soviet Union secretly amassed an arsenal of bio-weapons.

 1998 PBS Online and WBGH/FRONTLINE television show, http://www. 

pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plague/sa/.

198. This figure does not include the prosecution cost, those of the seven-year Office

for Serious Economic Offenses investigation, or the cost of forensic auditor Hennie Bruwerís
The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical . . . 117

investigation.

199. Information in this section is based on an interview with Laura Polleciett,

Director, Freedom of Expression (FIX) and several South African reporters during July 2000,

and on information contained in FIX administrative files.

200. Report on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (ìTRCî) Transcript on

South Africaís Chemical and Biological Warfare. Freedom of Expression Institute,

WWBI:\CS\GB\MM\TRCHearings_CBW.doc., 4/1/99.

201. By the seventh week of the trial even the prosecution lacked the funds to pay for

court transcripts. The Court adjourned at the end of November 1999, reserving the right to

re-examine former Surgeon General Knobel once they had examined the transcripts for the

evidence. This delay was necessitated by the fact that the prosecution team lacked the funds

to purchase the daily transcripts from the transcription services!

202. A comprehensive search of all newspapers indexed in Nexis/Lexis during one

week that the Basson trial was scheduled to be in session in Jacksonville, Florida did not

locate a singe published account of these proceedings. This fact underscores how dependent

observers are on a single source for their information about the trial.

203. One worked for Black Sash, an NGO founded by white women liberals, whose

initial mission was to help non-whites who had run afoul of apartheid pass laws.

204. During the late 1980s after the former South African government had banned

nearly all labor and civic organizations that supported majority rule, a loose coalition of

groups forms under the umbrella of the United Democratic Front (UDF). The UDF served

as the principal source of legal political opposition to the apartheid regime. Continuing

crackdowns led to many new, small non-governmental organizations (NGOs) being formed.

 Funding by the U.S. and other Western countries to promote democracy was critical to the

operation of many of these groups throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. Currently,

organizations such as FIX are struggling to stay in business due to the lack of financial

support from domestic or international donors.

205. Interview with Torie Pretorius, Prosecutor in the Basson trial, 12 July 2000.

206. Interview with Torie Pretorius, Prosecutor in the Basson trial, 12July 2000.

207. Much of the descriptive narrative in this section relies on the trial summaries

posted on the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) web site and South African press

accounts of actions taken during the trial to date. To access these summaries, see

http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/cbw/cbw_index.html

208. The prosecution also objected to conspiracy charges, arguing that it was

unprecedented for a person to be charged with conspiracy to murder when the murder took

place in another country. The reporter covering the trial for CCR, Marlene Burger, noted in

her summary that there was a precedent in South Africa for this, since the case against former

policeman, Eugene De Kock, included charges for crimes committed in another country (see
118 . . . The Rollback of South Africaís Chemical

Trial Week One, CCR Web Page. Both prosecutors in this case, Dr. Tore Pretorius and

Anton Ackerman (SC), are well aware of this precedent as they represented the State in its

successful prosecution of De Kock in his capacity as head of the CCB unit of the South

African police.

209. The judge also threw out two murder charges that occurred in Swaziland and a

plot by an SADF hit squad to contaminate the water of a SWAPO transit camp with cholera

shortly before the Namibian elections. The judge upheld the Stateís right to prosecute

Basson for the death of a SWAPO member who was fed poisoned ìjungle juiceî in

Owamboland because this victim was flown to a military hospital in South Africa for

treatment and thus, died within the courtís jurisdiction (Week Two, CCR Trial summary).

210. Interview with Dr. Torie Pretorius, Prosecutor, 12 July 2000.

211. Marlene Burger, the investigative reporter who is taking notes during the trial for

the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), observed in a phone interview that this was a

highly unusual. In most complex cases involving intricate corporate maneuvers judges bring

in expert assessors to help them interpret the evidence. (Interview, July 2000). 

212. Quotes taken from the CCR Trial Summary for week 12.

213. Interviews with South African authorities, including the prosecutor, Dr. T. 

Pretorius, July 2000.