Desert Warfare: 

German Experiences in 

World War II 

bY 

Major General Alfred Toppe 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900 
FOREWORD 

Analysts continue to assess the data from Operations Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm as a means of improving the military’s ability to function efficiently in desert terrain. The information gleaned from this effort will enhance 

the already considerable body of knowledge on the subject derived from the 

historical record. That record, of course, is incomplete, in that much valuable 

information was never recorded, and much that was has been East or forgotten. 

Whelm contributions in the latter category are located or rediscovered, they &auk! 

be given the dissemination they merit. This is one goal of the publication pragram of the Combat Studies Institute. 

Such is the purpose of publishing Desert ?Varfare: German Experiences in 

World War 11, an abridgment of a two-volume work that fist appeared in 1952. 

Organized by Major General Alfred Toppe and written with the assistance of 

nine German commanders who served in North Africa, the manuscript (translated by Mr. II. Hitman) represents a collabarative attempt to determine “as 

many factors as possible which exerted a determining influence on desert warfare.” Is,sues addressed include planning, intelligence, logistics, and operations. 

Described and analyzed are the German order of battle, the major military 

engagements in North Africa, and tke particular problems of terrain and climate 

in desert operations. Not unlike many of the U.S. units engaged in the war 

with Iraq, the Germans in North Africa learned about combat operations in 

the desert only after they arrived on the scene and confronted the desert on its 

own terms. For this reason alone, as weIf as for the insights it offers, Desert 

Wa&rre requires the serious consideration of those responsible for preparing 

the U.S. military for any future conflict in desert terrain. 

ROGER S. SPILLER, PH.D. 

Director, Combat SXtudies Institute 

I CSI Special Studies cover a variety of military history topics. The views exprassed in this CSI publication are those of the author and not necessarily 

those of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense. 
Editor’s note: This Special Study is an excerpt from German Experiences in Desert 

Warfare Owing World War I/, by Generalmajor Alfred Toppe and 3 others [et al.], 2 

vols., 1952. These 2 vofs. include 380 pages, 36 sketches, 15 maps, and 85 photographs The original study was MS. no. P-129 In the Foreign Studies Series of the 

Historical Division, United States Army, Europe (now found in the Nationaf Archives). 

Mr. H. Heitman edited and translated the origin manuscript, which has been reformatted and edited, in part, by Combat Studies Institute editors. 
CONTENTS 

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii 

Introduction ............................................. .* ix 

Chapter I. Prior Planning ............................... . . 1 

1. Intelligence Planning ................................... 1 

a. Desert Terrain and Climate ....................... 1 

b. Scope of the Evaluation .......................... 3 

c. Influence of Intelligence on Planning ................. 3 

d. Availability and Evaluation of Terrain Intelligence ... 3 

e. Use of Historical Data for Planning Purposes ........ 4 

2. Operational Planning ................................... 4 

a. General ............................................ 4 

b. Changes in Troop Organization and Equipment , . . . 7 

c. Special Training . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 

d. Acclimatization of the Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 

e. Development of Special Equipment ................ 13 

3. Logistical Planning ................................. 13 

a. February-May 1941 ............................. 14 

b. June-December 1941 ............................... 15 

c. January-June 1942 . , . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . 

d. July 1942-May 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

Chapter II. Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

4. General Description of the Zone of Operations . . . . . . . 

a. Mountain Ranges . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . , . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . 

b. Steep Terraces . , . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

5. Order of Battle of Army and Luftwaffe Units . . . . . . . . 

6. Reasons for Changes in Organization and Equipment 

7. Descriptions of the More Important Battles , , . . . , . . . , 

a. 31 March-19 April: The First Counterattack to 

Reconquer the Cyrenaica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

b. May-June 1941: Battle for the Positions on the 

Border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

. . 15 

. . 15 

., 17 

. . 17 

. . 18 

. . 20 

. . 24 

. 28 

. 29 

. 29 

. 32 

. . . 

111 
c. July-Mid-November: The Siege of Tobruk and 

Preparations for the Attack ....................... 34 

d. Mid-November 1941--Mid-January 1942: Repelling 

The British Autumn Offensive and the Retreat 

to the Gulf of Sirte ............................... 37 

e. Mid-January-End of May 1942: The 

Counteroffensive to Retake the Cyrenaica and 

the Preparations for the Attack on Tobruk ......... 41 

f. Late May-July 1942: The Battle of Tobruk and 

the Pursuits to El Alamein ....................... 44 

g. August-Early November 1942: The Battles 

Around Alamein ................................. 47 

h. November 1942-January 1943: The German Retreat 

to the Border Between Libya and Tunisia .......... 50 

i. November 1942-March 1943: The Occupation of Tunisia 

and the Battles Fought in Tunisia ................. 52 

j. April-May 1943: The Final Battle in Tunisia ......... 56 

Chapter III. Special Factors ................................... 59 

8. Dust ................................................ ..5 9 

a. Effect on Troops, Weapons, and Equipment ........... 59 

b. Effect on Combat Operations ........................ 60 

c. Effect on Tactical Measures ......................... 61 

d. Effect on Aircraft and Their Crews ................... 63 

9. Terrain .............................................. ..6 4 

a. Influence on Tactical Measures ...................... 64 

b. Influence on the Construction of Field 

Fortifications and the Use of Weapons ............. 68 

c. The Tactical Importance of the Recognition 

of Vehicle Tracks by Air Observation .............. 71 

d. The Use of Vehicle Tracks for Deception 

ofthe Enemy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..~........... 

e. The Use of Wheeled and Track Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . 

f. Influence of Desert Terrain on the Development 

of New Tactical Principles for the Use of 

Motorized Units . . . . . . . . . . ‘ . . . . . s . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

g. Influence of Rainfall on Mobility in Desert Terrain 

. . . 71 

..* 71 

. . . 72 

. , . 74 

iv 
10. Water ................................................ 

a. General ........................................... 

b. Requirements for Troops and Vehicles, 

Economy Measures, etc. ......................... 

c. Water and Motor-Fuel Requirements ................. 

d. Tactical Importance of the Presence of Water Sources . 

e. Assignment of Engineer Troops for Water-Supply 

Services ........................................ 

f. Well-Drilling Equipment ............................ 

g. Method of Distribution ............................. 

h. Pipelines .......................................... 

11. Heat ................................................. 

a. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...81 

b. Effect on Unaccustomed Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . , . . , 81 

C. Effect on Tank Crews . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . *. . , 8.2 

d. Measures Taken to Avoid the Noonday Heat . . . . . . . . . , 82 

e. Special Equipment for Protection Against 

f. 

g. 

h. 

1. 

j. 

Temperature Variations . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . , . . . . 82 

Types of Shelter . . . . . . . . . , . . . . , . , . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . 82 

Comparison Between the Efficiency of Troops 

in the Tropics and in Temperate Climates . . . , . . . . . . 82 

Effect on Materiel and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 

Effect on Visibility . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . 83 

Effect on Airplanes in Taking Off and Landing I. . . . , . 83 

75 

75 

75 

76 

76 

79 

79 

80 

81 

81 

Chapter IV. Miscellaneous ......................... 

12. Cartographic Service ........................ 

a. General ................................. 

b. Reliability and Methods of Use ........... 

13. Camouflage ................................ 

14. Evaluation of the Enemy Situation Through 

Aerial Photographs ...................... 

15. Visibility at Night .......................... 

16. Choice of Camp Sites ....................... 

V 

........ 85 

........ 85 

........ 85 

........ 85 

........ 86 

.*..... 

. . . . . . . 
17. 

18. 

19. 

20. 

21. 

22. 

23. 

24. 

25. 

26. 

27. 

28. 

29. 

30. 

31. 

Selection of Battle Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 

Time of Day Selected for Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 

Influence of the Desert Climate on Daily Service Routine . 88 

Special Problems of the Technical Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 

Influence of Light, Shade, and Sandstorms on Combat . . . 89 

Influence of Darkness on Radio Communications . . . . . . , . 90 

Wind . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..I.............I........ 90 

Special Equipment and Procedures for Aircraft Crews . . . . 90 

Dry Docks and Port Installations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 

Reinforcement of Sand Surfaces for Landings 

by Amphibious Craft . . . . . . . I . . . v . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 

Changes in Ship Loading and Unloading Procedures . . . . . 93 

Materiel Losses and Replacement Estimates 

for Desert Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . 93 

Modifications in Supply-Dump ProceduresEspecially for POL . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 

Diseases and Insects in the Desert . , . I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 

Desert Weather Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . , . . . . . s . . . . . . 95 

Chapter V. General Remarks and Experiences ................. 97 

32. Special Equipment for Desert Warfare .................. 97 

33. Research and Development Possibilities for Special 

Desert Equipment .................................. 99 

34. Unusual Supply Problems ............................. 99 

35. Nutrition ............................................. 100 

36. Clothing ........................................... ..lO 1 

37. Comparison with Desert Warfare in Southern Russia ..... 101 

38. Troop Welfare in the Desert ............................ 102 

vi 
PREFACE 

In spite of the time limit imposed on him, Major General 

Alfred Toppe, the topic leader, with the collaboration of the leading German experts on the African campaign, has succeeded in 

this work in answering the assigned questions. The esprit de 

corps and the justified pride of the African veterans were a 

decided factor that helped to make the contributions so good 

and comprehensive that they could, to a large extent, be fitted 

into the attached study. This in no way detracts from the 

services of the topic leader. It was his initiative and organizational ability that resulted in this excellent study, despite the 

time restriction. 

The German experiences in African desert warfare are made 

unique by the fact that the command and the troops were faced 

with a mission in no way either planned or prepared, and they 

entered into it completely without prior prejudices. The experience gained, therefore, is free from outside theories and opinions 

and was only achieved by their struggling with an entirely new 

military situation; it thus has the value of originality. The value 

is diminished, however, by the fact that the experiences are in 

part negative and could not be developed further in a positive 

direction due to the lack of time and the limited means at hand. 

The particular conditions in Africa under which they were 

gained will have to be kept in mind in any evaluation. The 

impossibility of securing a supply line across a body of water 

dominated by the enemy, the numerical and material inadequacies held by the Germans- and even more their allies-and the 

increasing lack of Luftwaffe fighting and transport units-these 

are all negative aspects of the campaign. On the positive side 

belongs the tempo and performance of field forces under the 

leadership of Rommel, forces which were without a doubt far 

above the average in initiative, spontaneity, and soldierly zeal. 

Generaloberst Franz Halder 

KoenigsteWTaunus 

18 June 1952 

vii 
INTRODUCTION 

Two and a half months was the total time allotted for the 

preparation of this study. Prerequisite was that such German 

officers be induced to contribute who had had as broad as possible a view in the conduct of overall operations, who possessed 

practical combat experience, and, furthermore, who had exact 

knowledge of as many factors as possible that exerted a 

determining influence on desert warfare. In addition to the 

contributors listed below, a number of former members of the 

German Africa Corps also made contributions. 

The organization of this study was based on the individual 

questions assigned; German manuals were not used. The presentation, therefore, can be evaluated on the basis of actual 

experiences. 

A number of questions could not be answered exhaustively. 

The reason for this lies in the fact that no experience bad been 

gathered in such areas, or else operations took place in areas 

in which the typical attributes of a real desert were not present. 

The request (attached to the major question) that accounts by 

“individuals or groups” be added concerning “‘Special Equipment 

and Procedures for Aircraft Crews” could not be fulfilled because 

no authorities on this subject could be contacted in the short 

time available. A broad survey of important battles has been 

included in chapter II, section 7. The official documents contained in Field Marshal Rommel’s notes also have been utilized 

as a valuable source of information. 

Those who have contributed information and analysis to this 

study include: 

Major General (Generalleutnant) Fritz Bayelein, chief of 

staff, German Africa Corps, 1941-42. 

General of the Air Force (General der Flieger) Paul Deichman, chief of staff of the German Second Air Force. 

Major Helmut Hudel, commander, 1st Battalion, 7th 

Armored Regiment, Tunisia. 

General of the Army (Generalfeldmarschall) Albert Kesselring, Commander in Chief, South, 1942-43. 

Regierungsbaurat (official title in the construction engineering profession) Dr. Sigismund Kienow, military geologist, German Africa Corps, 1941-43. 

ix 
Brigadier General (Generalmajor) Gerhard Mueller, commander, 5th Panzer Regiment, 1942. 

Lieutenant General (General der Kavallerie) Siegfried 

Westphal, who functioned in North Africa in 1941-43 

as operation officer of Panzer Group (later Panzer Army 

Africa); chief of staff, German-Italian Panzer Army in 

Africa; commander, 164th Light Africa Division; chief, 

Operations Branch, German commander in Chief, South, 

attached to the Commando Supremo; chief of staff, 

Commander in Chief, South. 

Dr. Wilhelm Wagner, medical officer, 21st Panzer Division, 

1941-42, 

Major Hubert Ziessler, commander of an artillery regiment, 

1941-43. 

X 
I. PRIOR PLANNING 

1. Intelligence Planning 

a. Desert Terrain and Climate 

When the first German units were shipped to Africa in February 1941, the officers responsible for the operational planning 

had no data of any kind on the nature of the terrain and circumstances in the desert. The intelligence data furnished by the 

Italians was extremely meager, and the Italian maps were so 

inaccurate and so incomplete that they were used only for lack 

of something better. For this reason, the German command had 

to obtain all necessary information itself through reconnaissance. 

In the papers found in his estate, Field Marshal Rommel wrote: 

It has probably never happened before in modern warfare 

that an operation of this type was undertaken with so little 

preparation. On 11 February, I reported to General Garibaldi, 

the commander in chief of the Italian forces and informed 

him of my mission. Initially, he showed no enthusiasm for 

my plan to organize defense positions in the region of the 

Bay of Sirte as a first measure. Using the poor and inaccurate Italian map material, I then proceeded to explain to 

General Garibaldi my ideas as to approximately how the 

war in Tripolitania should be conducted. Garibaldi, who was 

unable to give me any precise information about the terrain 

that would be involved, advised me to reconnoiter the terrain 

between Tripoli and the Bay of Sirte personally, and said 

that I could not possibly have any idea of the enormous 

difficulties this theater of war presented. Around midday I 

took off aboard a Type He 111 plane to reconnoiter the 

combat area. We saw the field-type fortifications and the deep 

attack antitank ditch east of Tripoli and then flew over a 

wide belt of dunes which presented a good natural barrier 

before the fortifications of Tripoli and would prove difficult 

to cross with wheeled or track vehicles. Then we flew across 

the mountainous country between Taruna and Horns, which 

appeared hardly suitable for operations by armored units in 

contrast to the patches of level terrain between Horns and 

Misurate. 

Like a black band the Via Balbia road could be seen 

extending through the desolate country, in which no tree or 

shrub was visible as far as the eye could reach. We passed 

over Buerat, a small desert fort on the coast with barracks 

and a landing stage, and finally circled above the white 

houses of Sirte. Southeast and south of this locality we saw 

Italian troops in their positions. With the exception of the 

1 
2 

salty swamps between Buerat and Sirte, which extended only 

a few kilometers southward, we found no features in any 

sector that would favor a defense, such as, for instance, a 

deep valley. This reconnaissance flight supported me in my 

pEan to fortify Sirte and the terrain on either side of the 

coastal road and to concentrate the mobile units for mobile 

operations within the area of the defense sector in order to 

counterattack as soon as the enemy started an enveloping 

attack. 

From the above, it will be seen that Rommel himself had to 

gather the information on the terrain and on the peculiarities 

of the desert that he required for the conduct of operations. It 

was only during a later stage that the so-called militarygeographical description was made available to the Germans, 

which gave a general survey of the terrain but was baaed 

mainly on information gleaned from literary works and contained none of the detailed infarmation required by the troops. 

This data was of only small military value. 

The military geological unit attached to the German Africa 

Corps commenced a systematic assembling of data and methodical reconnoitering immediately after arrival. The English maps 

captured by the German troops proved an excellent help. The 

results of the methodical reconnaissance were consohdated in 

what might be called a traversability map and in reports, and 

these were made available to the command. These maps contained the following details: 

0 Terrain that could be traversed by any type of vehicle 

in all parts and in all directions. 

* Terrain outside the Pistes* that was moderately or poorly 

suited for vehicular traffic. 

* Terrain with many steep cliffs. 

* Salty swamps and depressions that were impassable after 

rain. 

e Sand dunes that were difficult for vehicular traffic. 

* Information on plant growth. 

e Broken terrain. 

e Impassable cliffs. 

l Cliffs that were leas steep and that could be traversed 

in numerous places. 

l Passes over the cliffs, with information as to whether 

they could be used by wheeled or only tracklaying vehicles. 

*Tracks. 
3 

e Trails, with information as to their usability for wheeled 

or tracklaying vehicles.* 

The mihtary geological unit compiling these maps consisted 

of two geologists and ten auxiliaries. However, they were inade 

quately equipped so that it was only possible to reconnoiter the 

areas that happened to be tactically important at any given 

time. Occasional inaccuracies and deviations in the lines 

marking the limits of the traversable terrain on the maps were 

unavoidable. 

Here, a word might be said about the work of the British 

Long Range Desert Group that, apart from its intelligence and 

sabotage missions, carried out reconnaissance far behind the 

Italo-German fronts in Libya. The results obtained in this 

reconnaissance work formed the basis for the British maps on 

the Italian colony of Libya, which were incomparably better, so 

far as quality, accuracy, and detail were concerned, than the 

Italian maps. The British maps were considered a particularly 

valuable prize when captured. 

b. Scope of the Evaluation 

The above serves to show that in deserts, the command must 

employ adequate personnel with adequate equipment organized 

in specialized units if it wishes to obtain usable maps within a 

brief space of time. After the winter of 1941, the traversability 

maps served as permanent data for the German command. The 

preparations for attacks and for defense positions were based 

on them. 

c. Influence of Intelligence on Planning 

The available intelligence information was so inadequate in 

the spring of 1941 that it influenced in no way the employment 

of the German forces. As previously stated, Field Marshal Romme1 had to gather the necessary information on the terrain and 

on the characteristics of the desert. On the basis of this information, he performed his mission of halting the British advance 

and preventing the loss of the whole of Libya. 

d. Availability and Evaluation of Terrain Intelligence 

The pamphlets Military Geographical Descriptions for Libya, 

Northeast Africa, and Egypt were published by the MilitaryGeographical Branch of the German Army High Command. 

Since they contained only information on cities, roads, oases, 

*Some of these maps are found in Toppe’s original, complete manuscript. 

See page ii. 
4 

and a general survey of the entire region, they could serve the 

command only as a source of general orientation, for which 

purpose they proved valuable. They contained very few important 

tactical details. They were put out in such large numbers that 

they could be made available down to regimental staff level. At 

these lower levels, their value was naturally restricted. 

e. Use of Historical Data for Planning Pwposes 

With the exception of the experience gained by General 

Graziani’s army during its advance on Egypt in the winter of 

1940, no information taken from military history was used in 

planning the campaign. One lesson that this experience pointed 

out is that troops that are not motorized are valueless in desert 

warfare and can do nothing whatever against a motorized 

enemy. General Graziani’s army consisted almost exclusively of 

infantry units, and it was tied down, enveloped, and destroyed 

by the well-motorized British forces because it was unable to 

conduct mobile operations. 

The African campaign took on such entirely new forms owing 

to the almost exclusive use of mobile troops by both sides in 

the desert. It was not possible in planning to make use of any 

examples taken from military history. Indeed, the methods of 

modern desert warfare were created by Field Marshal Rommel. 

2. Operational Planning 

a. General 

Prior to World War II, not a soul in the German armed forces 

imagined the possibility of it becoming necessary in any future 

war to conduct land warfare outside of Europe. This is why no 

particular attention was paid in the army to the military experiences of this type gained during World War I, particularly in 

the former German colony, German East Africa. It was only in 

1935 that a subsection for colonial affairs was created in the 

Foreign Affairs Branch of the Reich Ministry of War. This subsection was staffed with only one officer who had fought in 

German Southwest Africa. 

Prior to the outbreak of war in 1939, no preparations of any 

sort had been made in the German Army for any desert warfare 

that might possibly become necessary in the future. All preparatory work in the operational, organizational7 and training fields 

had been restricted exclusively to preparations for the conduct 

of war on the continent of Europe. This was why a suggestion 

submitted by the Mapping and Survey Branch of the German 

Army General Staff in 1938 that the maps to be issued in the 

eventuality of mobilization should include maps of Denmark, 
5 

Norway, and North Africa was disapproved as entirely unnecessary by the appropriate representative of the Operational Branch 

under instructions from the chief of that branch. 

It is an actual fact that early in 1941, the German troops 

reached the African theater of operations almost entirely unprepared for their new missions. 

Up to the summer of 1940, the information available to the 

German Army General Staff on North Africa was restricted to 

the reports furnished by the German military attachi in Rome 

and reports from agents of the German counterintelligence service. From the autumn of 1940 on, Special Detachment Dora, a 

detachment of the German counterintelligence branch, was in 

Libya. Its main mission was to keep the French territories in 

Africa under observation. Most of the data on which the German 

military attache in Rome based his reports came from his liaison 

officer attached to the governor general, who was simultaneously 

commander in chief of all forces in Italian North Africa, and 

on personal impressions gained while traveling. All positive information of a military nature on North Africa was taken from 

the manuals of the Foreign Armies Intelligence Branch (West) 

on the British, French, and Italian armed forces. 

Originally, Hitler had decided to leave Italian dictator Benito 

Mussolini an entirely free hand in conducting operations in the 

Mediterranean theater, which was another reason for the small 

interest of the German General Staff in this subject. A change 

in this fundamental view of Hitler only took place in the summer of 1940, when it became evident, on the one hand, that 

Italy was apparently avoiding any decisive action in the 

Mediterranean theater, while the British, on the other hand, 

were continually reinforcing their troops in Egypt without their 

transportation being appreciably affected by the Italian Navy. 

At the meeting between Hitler and Mussolini in October 1940, 

the dispatch of a German panzer corps to Libya was discussed, 

but no decision was reached. Following the discussion, a general 

of the armored force who was attached to the German Army 

High Command was sent to Italian North Africa for an on-thespot study of the possibilities of employing a German expeditionary corps there. Shortly after this, Italy rejected the support 

offered by Germany; quite obviously, Mussolini did not want 

any German military support in North Africa. The 3d Panzer 

Division, which in peacetime was garrisoned in the Berlin area, 

had been reorganized in all haste for employment in the tropics 

as a precautionary measure; it was now available for other 

employment. Later, when the British offensive, which gained 
6 

huge initial successes, threatened to develop into a catastrophe 

for the Italian forces, Italy requested the dispatch of German 

farces to Libya. 

The first unit to be transferred was the X Air Corps, which 

was sent to Sicily. So far as ground forces were concerned, the 

original plan was to send only a defense unit of brigade strength 

that was to be specially organized for the purpose, but it soon 

became evident that such a weak unit would not be able to 

give Germany’s ally any really effective support. In January 

1941, Hitler therefore decided to make a special corps of two 

divisions available-the German Africa Corps. 

Meanwhile, a special staff for tropical warfare (Sonderstab 

Tropen) had been formed at the headquarters of the commander 

of the Replacement Training Army in Berlin. It was composed 

of officers who had fought in the German colonies in World 

War I and was to assemble as speedily as possible all experience 

that could be helpful in the training, organization, equipment, 

and employment of troops in desert warfare. However, the march 

of events was too fast so that the first units of the German 

Africa Corps landed in Africa when the staff had just commenced its work in Libya. 

What has been said above goes to show that the German 

Army High Command was taken almost completely by surprise 

when the necessity arose to dispatch troops for warfare in the 

desert. In any event, the command had no time to make thorough preparations for this type of combat employment. For this 

reason, all preparatory work that was possible in the short space 

of time available had to be restricted mainly to the following 

measures: 

(1) Medical examinations of all troops to determine their 

fitness for service in the tropics, with the application of very 

severe standards. 

(2) Equipment of all soldiers with tropical clothing. 

(3) Adaptation of a training program for combat in open 

terrain. 

(4) Camouflage of all vehicles with a coat of desert-colored 

paint. 

(5) Organization of special units to handle water-supply 

problems. 

(6) Familiarization of the troops with the hygienic measures necessary in tropical climates. 
7 

(7) Orientation of the troops on the military-geographical 

conditions of the new theater of war and on the peculiarities of 

Germany’s allies and enemies. In this respect, it must be mentioned that initially only one military-geographical bulletin was 

available. It had been prepared in a hurry and was not accurate 

in all points. A manual of instructions for the tropics was being 

drafted in the summer of 1942. 

It was not possible within Germany to accustom the troops 

to the intense heat to which they would be exposed, particularly 

at that time of the year, the winter of 1940. To a certain extent, 

the troops that had to wait any length of time in Italy for 

transportation to North Africa adapted themselves automatically 

to the heat. 

b. Changes in Troop Organization and Equipment 

The composition of the units employed in Africa was the 

same as those in Europe. The pressure of time alone made any 

reorganization impossible in 1941, and later experience showed 

that no specialized organization is necessary for divisions and 

other units that are to be employed in desert warfare. However, 

it is necessary to have a far higher ratio of tanks and antitank 

weapons, since these are the two decisive weapons in the desert. 

It goes without saying that all units employed in desert warfare 

must be motorized. 

The following special units were newly activated for employment in the desert: 

(1) Water-supply companies, under the command of engineer officers. They were assigned to the corps and operated 

under the Water-Supply Branch of the corps supply and administration officer. These companies had pumps and equipment for 

the drilling of deep wells, while some of them had installations 

for the distillation of water. 

(2) Water-supply transportation columns that were organized in the same way as ordinary supply-transportation columns 

but were employed solely in the transportation of water to the 

troops. They had no tank trucks or tank trailers as was customary with the British units but had to transport water in twentyliter cans. This method of transportation proved extremely tiresome, quite apart from the considerable loading space required, 

which imposed an extra strain on the gas-supply services. 

(3) Astronomical observation teams, directed by professional astronomers who were awarded regular or assimilated 

officer rank. These teams worked under the special staff officer 
8 

for surveying attached to the operations officer of the army, 

and their function was to establish geographical points by 

astronomical means. They were rarely employed, sinee no serious 

orientation difficulties arose because most of the fighting took 

place in the eaastal region and not in the desert proper. 

The following changes proved necessary so far as equipment 

was concerned: long-range artillery, long-range antitank guns, 

and tank guns decisively influence the course of battle in desert 

warfare, and it was therefore necessary to employ mare longrange weapons. No alterations of the weapons t’hemselves were 

necessary. 

In their 87.6-mm guns, the British had a light artillery piece 

with a longer range than the Germans’ guns, but the German 

farces in Africa soon received lQO-mm and 170-mm guns that 

had a longer range than any of the British guns. In 1941, the 

guns of the German Type III tanks had a longer range than 

the guns of the British tanks, and this was the reason for the 

success of the German tanks in that year, but from May 1942 

an, the British employed American tanks of the Grant, Lee, and 

Sherman types that mounted guns with a considerably superior 

range of fire. In the Battle of Gazala, these guns came as a 

disconcerting surprise for the German tank units, and in the 

first phase of the battle, the British were able to gain considerable successes. 

Clothing and uniforms were entirely different from the elothing and uniforms worn in Europe. The German army uniform 

was made from a watertight linen, cut in a style approximating 

the traditional uniforms of the former German colonial defense 

forces. These uniforms proved unsuitable both in style and 

material. The material was too stiff and did not’ give adequate 

protection against heat or cold. In the early mornings, the 

material absorbed moisture from the dew so that it became intolerable to wear the uniforms. The British tropical uniforms, 

in contrast, were made of pure wool and were excellent. Large 

quantities of the British uniforms were captured and worn by 

the troops of the German Africa Corps (with the addition of 

German insignias). The Germans especially liked the British 

trousers. The tropical uniforms of the German Air Force, however, were goad. Their color, a yellowish-brown, was more appropriate than other German uniforms, and they were made from 

a material that was of a lighter and better quality which was 

cut in a more appropriate style. Uniforms of olive-drab color 

proved unfavorable. In view of tht normal camouflage difficulties 

in the desert, a yellowish-brown, which would have been a pro- 
9 

tective color, would have been best. High boats were unsuitable 

in every respect, since in hat climates, everything must be done 

to prevent soldiers wearing any apparel on the legs that restricts 

the circulation of the blood. In this matter, the troops helped 

themselves by wearing only slacks, most of which came from 

captured British depots and which the troops wore over their 

boats. The German shoe with laces and a cloth tongue proved 

suitable. The shorts issued to the troops could not be worn 

during combat, since they left bare legs exposed to injury by 

thorns and stones, and these injuries healed very slowly. The 

alive-drab caps with wide visors were excellent; the visor, in 

particular, was indispensable for the infantryman and for the 

gunner as protection against the intense glare of the sun. The 

tropical helmets that were issued could be used only in the rear 

areas and were entirely useless in combat. The German troops 

wore no steel helmets, in contrast to the British troops, whose 

steel helmets were more appropriate both in shape and weight, 

being lighter than the German helmets. The tropical coats 

issued, which were made from a thick woolen material, were 

good, but the English ones, which were fur-lined and reached 

only to the knees, were better. Owing to the stiff material from 

which it was made, the German tropical shirts were inferior to 

the British ones, which were made of so-called “Tropic” material. 

To protect the abdominal area of the body against the cold, the 

wearing of bellybands was obligatory, which proved a wise 

measure. Tropical helmets and mosquito nets proved an 

unnecessary expenditure. The majority of the troops got rid of 

them immediately after debarking from the ships, since they 

were not able to take them along owing to insufficient transportation space. The troops were also furnished wall tents, which 

had a special sun apron. With the exception of footwear, no 

leather was used in any article of apparel; it was replaced 

everywhere by thick linen. 

The types of vehicles used were the same as those used in 

Europe. Vehicles with diesel engines were not used to avoid the 

necessity of transporting two different types of fuel. However, 

experience showed that it would have been advisable to accept 

this disadvantage in order to facilitate transportation, since fuel 

oil could have been transported in bulk containers, such as tank 

trailers. The excellent coastal road would have allowed the use 

of such transportation. 

Volkswagens were used in great numbers and proved excellent. Far use under desert conditions, the following alterations 

were made to adapt the standard model: air intakes were placed 
10 

inside the vehicles to reduce the amount of dust taken in by 

the motor; in place of the standard tires, aircraft over-sized tires 

were used, which proved exceptionally good on rocky terrain 

and in sandy stretches. Because of their low air pressure, such 

tires reduced the shocks on rocky ground; while on sandy tracks, 

the wide treads of the tires prevented the vehicles from sinking 

into the sand and getting stuck. On the whole, however, the 

British motor vehicles, as a result of the extensive experience 

of the British in desert conditions, were superior to those of the 

Germans, being better adapted to the special conditions in respect to tires, power, higher ground clearance, and lower bodies. 

Double tires proved unsuitable, particularly in areas where the 

surface was covered with stones, as the stones became compressed in large quantities in the spaces between the tires. In 

the desert, motor vehicles must always carry something or other, 

such as rope ladders or grids, for the men to place underneath 

the wheels if they get stuck in the sand. 

To reduce the effects of sand and heat, additional air filters 

for all types of vehicles were developed and used. They proved 

very valuable, although it was not possible to ehminate the 

effects of sand on the motors altogether. 

Troops employed under desert conditions should be furnished 

a certain number of aircraft compasses, which should be 

mounted on the windshield next to the driver’s seat. By means 

of a small magnet, deviations were excluded so that the driver 

was able to drive in the direction ordered. The sun compasses, 

which were developed for the same purpose, did not meet requirements, since they were too complicated and failed to function 

properly around midday, between 1000 and 1400. Pocket compasses were indispensable and had to be issued to each man 

individually, since the individual soldier plays a greater role in 

the desert than in any other theater of operations. The compasses used by the British, in which the dials floated on oil, 

were better than the German ones-and were preferred by the 

German troops when they managed to capture any. 

The Germans failed to develop anything special as a protection against flies and other insects, which became particularly 

pestiferous in summer. Insecticides similar to FLIT were an 

urgent requirement for the combat units. 

6. Special Training 

It was not possible to give the troops, which were rushed to 

Africa suddenly and at short notice, any specialized training. 
All that was done was to have them attend a number of lectures 

by specialists in tropical medicine and by officers who had a 

vague knowledge of conditions from previous travels. However, 

these lectures gave the troops wrong impressions of what they 

were to expect from the effects of heat, sand, insects, and 

diseases-instead of orienting them properly. The instructions 

on hygiene in the tropics, on the other hand, were good. Even 

units that were transferred to Africa during the further course 

of the campaign there received no real specialized training because the orders for their transfer usually came so unexpectedly 

that there was no time for this purpose. However, in a suggestion submitted to the German Army High Command by the army 

in Africa, the following training subjects were considered 

important: 

(1) Exercises of all types in marching and combat in 

open, sandy terrain. 

(2) Cover and camouflage in open terrain. 

(3) Aiming and firing of all weapons in open terrain and 

at extremely long ranges. 

(4) Recognition and designation of targets without instruments. The aiming and firing exercises were to be carried out 

by daylight, at night, in the glaring sun, during twilight, facing 

the sun, with the back to the sun, with the sun shining from 

one side, by moonlight, and with artifieial lighting. 

(5) 

(61 

dations. 

(7) 

(8) 

terrain. 

(9) 

(10) 

(II) 

G9 

(13) 

(141 

Exercises during extreme heat. 

Exercises of long duration with no billeting accommoThe construction of shelters in sandy terrain. 

Practice in night driving and in driving over sandy 

Night marching in level terrain. 

Orientation by compass, by the stars, and so forth. 

Driving by march compass. 

Recovery of tanks and other vehicles in sandy terrain. 

Laying and removing of mines in sandy terrain. 

Exercises in mobile warfare. 

If it had been possible to train the troops in these subjects and 

to prepare them thoroughly, considerable losses could probably 

have been averted. 
12 

d. Acclimatization of the Troops 

So far as the first divisions transferred to Africa were concerned, no measures were taken to accustom the troops to excessive heat. Some of the repIacements sent forward later had the 

opportunity of spending a certain period in southern Italy or in 

the Balkans for acclimatization. The climate in these two regions 

is very similar to the climate in the coastal areas of North 

Africa. In the light of experience, however, a familiarization 

periad is not considered absolutely essential, since the troops 

employed without a prior period of acclimatization proved no 

less efficient in combat than those who had lived for a time in 

southern Italy or in the Balkans. It was not the climate alone 

that caused the heavy losses that were suffered but the poor 

food, the hardships during combat, combined with the effects 

of the climate; the troops had in no way been prepared for these 

circumstances. 

It proved very unwise to transfer units or replacements to 

the desert in summer, during the hottest part of the year and 

the time when the flies proved most troublesome. A parachute 

brigade provides a typical example. The brigade was transferred 

from Europe in July 1942, the hottest time of the year, and 

employed in defense in the rocky wilderness around El Alamein. 

The unit consisted of handpicked men, and within a very short 

while, more than 50 percent of them were sick from the eombined effects of the heat, with its accompanying discomforts, 

and the inadequate diet. Shortly after the unit was committed, 

numerous cases of metabolic disorders set in, such as dysentery, 

jaundice, and festering sores that healed only very slowly. The 

causes were the brackish drinking water, which contained as 

much as one gram of salt per liter, and the inadequate diet, 

which consisted almost exclusively of canned foods. Blond and 

redheaded men with blue eyes and fair skins were particularly 

susceptible, while the brown and dark-haired types soon recovered from the disorders that were almost inevitable in the 

beginning. These points were not taken into account in earlier 

medical examinations-the main emphasis being placed on sound 

teeth and a strong heart. The result was that the elite units, 

such as the paratroopers, suffered particularly heavy losses. Even 

prior acclimatization would not have protected them. 

The following experience was gained in respect to the acclimatization of persons to hot climates: men who had lived before 

in temperate zones stood the intense heat very well in the first 

year, during which they were far more efficient than the indigenous population and Europeans who had been living in the 
13 

country for a long time. This proved to be the case when German 

troops were employed in Sicily, for instance, where summer 

temperatures are the same as those in the deserts of Africa. In 

the average case, however, the powers of resistance of the new 

arrivals declined after the first year, and their efficiency sank 

below the level of that of persons who had spent a longer time 

in the country. The newcomers’ efficiency only started to improve 

gradually after a few years but never reached the same standard 

as that they experienced the first year. The following inferences 

can be drawn from this experience: 

(1) No prior, lengthy acclimatization should take place 

for troops, since this would waste part of their first year of 

maximum efficiency. 

(2) Only a brief transitional period should be allowed in 

a hot climate, during which the troops can be instructed in the 

manner of living under tropical and desert conditions and the 

best protective measures they should take without the added 

difficulty of enemy action. 

(3) After approximately one year on active service in a 

hot climate, the troops should be rotated to some other theater 

of operations. The disadvantage that the experience gained by 

the men can only be exploited for a relatively short time must 

be accepted. 

e. Development of Special Equipment 

The following special types of equipment were developed: 

(1) Special tropical clothing and uniforms, as dealt with 

in detail in section 2, b. 

(2) Special air filters for motor vehicles, including tanks. 

This subject has also been discussed in section 2, b. 

(3) Special medical equipment for use in tropical climates. 

3. Logistical Planning 

Logistical planning is an integral part of operational planning. In this operation, plans for the supply services also had 

to be prepared at top speed. The main concern in these plans 

was to provide transportation of supplies for the German troops 

by rail to Italian ports and by German or Italian ships to ports 

in North Africa. The selection of transportation media and 

supervision of the loading was the responsibility of a special 

branch, the Branch for Transportation to Africa. It operated 

under the command of the German military attach6 in Rome. 

Unloading in African ports and further transportation of supplies to the troops was the responsibility of the supply and 
14 

administration officer of the Africa Corps, later of the chief 

supply and administration officer of the Panzergruppe Afrika,* 

which later again was redesignated the Panzer Army of Africa 

and finally the German-Italian Panzer Army. Initially, all bulk 

commodities, as well as all troops, were transported by sea, but 

when shipping losses mounted, personnel were transported by 

plane. 

In November 1941, Field Marshal Kesselring arrived in Italy 

as commander of the Second Air Force. In coordinated action 

with the Italian Navy and Air Force, his mission was to protect 

Germans and to prevent British transportation in the Mediterranean. It is said that shortly after his arrival, he sighed: “Now 

it is clear to me that in conducting a war across the sea, the 

proper delivery of the means of combat at their proper place is 

of far more importance than any worries as to whether the 

enemy should be attacked on the right or left flank.” 

It was not possible with the means available to the supply 

command or with any improvised measures to secure adequate 

supply services for the armored forces in Africa. To keep open 

the supply lanes or to open these lanes was the responsibility 

of the operational command, which rested with the Italian 

Supreme Command. The Wehrmacht High Command had supported the Italian Supreme Command but had also occasionally 

interfered in the conduct of operations. It was imperative that 

this problem be solved if an adequate supply service was to be 

secured for the troops in Africa. As no solution was found, the 

supply service collapsed as a natural consequence after all 

improvised means had failed. The following dates and information concerning the functioning of the supply services has been 

furnished by the German general attached tothe Italian Supreme 

Command during the period from February 1941 to May 1943. 

a. February-May 1941 

The transportation of troops and supplies across the Mediterranean functioned without interruption. The convoys reached 

Tripoli regularly and almost without losses. Immediately after 

its capture, Benghasi was used as a port of debarkation. At the 

request of the German command, Italian submarines were used 

as early as April 1941 to transport fuel for the most advanced 

elements of the Africa Corps. They discharged their cargo at 

Derna. Coastal shipping along the African coast was organized 

with small ships and sailing boats with auxiliary motors. 

*An armored army with no rear-zone administrative responsibilities. 
15 

b. June-December 1941 

British surface and submarine craft interfered with the 

transportation of German troops and supplies. The losses in 

shipping space and in materiel were considerable. To relieve the 

situation, air transportation groups were employed to move 

troops and materiel, while naval barges transported tanks and 

important spare parts. The use of Bardia as a port of debarkation close to the front was prevented by the British Air Force. 

In December, Italian battleships had to be used to protect the 

convoys. 

c. January-June 1942 

During this period, transportation was favored by German 

superiority in the air, which was gained by the German Second 

Air Force under Kesselring and also by the fact that Malta was 

suppressed. The transportation of troops and supplies functioned 

smoothly and with few losses. Enough supplies were moved forward to enable the German-Italian Army to launch an offensive 

with limited objectives that advanced as far as the borders of 

Egypt in May-June. In addition, adequate supplies were stockpiled for a period of six to eight weeks against the eventuality 

of the air forces and naval vessels being employed in an operation to capture Malta. 

d. July 1942-May 1943 

As a result of Rommel’s advance into Egyptian territory after 

the capture of Tobruk (this advance was contrary to the plans 

of the Italian Supreme Command), the supplies deposited in the 

Benghasi and Tripoli areas for the front were practically useless, 

since the distances were too great for transportation of supplies 

on land and coastal shipping was prevented by the British. The 

German Second Air Force was compelled to transfer some of 

its units stationed in Sicily and southern Italy to Africa and 

Greece to support the Panzer Army of Africa, which was fighting 

desperately at El Alamein. As a result, the Luftwaffe was so 

heavily engaged that it was unable even to screen Malta. The 

British forces on Malta regained their strength and employed 

new types of bombers that were equipped with radar and had 

a wider radius of action. The British succeeded in bringing 

German convoy traffic to an almost complete standstill. The 

Italian battleships were in port at Tarent and La Spezia, unable 

to operate because of lack of fuel. Losses in materiel and fuel 

were so heavy that it was barely possible to obtain adequate 

supplies from Germany. The sea routes to Tripoli and Benghasi 

were completely severed. Air transportation from Crete now 
16 

played the major role, but quite naturally, the volume was far 

too small to meet even the most urgent demands of the front. 

In addition, the Wehrmacht High Command moved an infantry 

division from Crete to Egypt. This division had no motorized 

vehicles whatever so that it became an added strain on the 

transportation and supply services in Africa. 

After the occupation of Tunis, the distances across the sea 

were admittedly shorter. Nevertheless, in spite of the use of the 

military transport ships, which had been constructed meanwhile, 

and numerous ships of the smallest types, it was not possible 

to relieve the strained supply situation. Anglo-American power 

in the air was growing steadily, and transportation capacities 

were sinking from day to day. Even a temporary increase of 

the quantities transported by air to 1,000 tons failed to bring 

any relief. Once the German-Italian forces in Tunis were enveloped, the Anglo-American fighter planes had such complete 

mastery in the air, even over the Straits of Sicily, that it was 

hardly possible for even the smallest ships to reach Africa safely. 

Around 20 April, the German-Italian air transportation units 

were subjected to a crippling attack. 

Thus, the point must be brought out that as a result of the 

gradually developing Anglo-American supremacy at sea and in 

the air in the Mediterranean, North Africa was cut off from 

Europe. The German-Italian forces operating in Africa,‘therefore, 

could not be adequately reinforced or supplied. This lack of any 

possibility of maintaining supply traffic was not due to any 

failure an the part of the German or Italian headquarters responsible for the movement of supplies but solely to the fact 

that the German-Italian operational command did not succeed 

in keeping the supply routes to Africa open. Any examination 

of the question why these routes were not kept open or could 

not be kept open is beyond the scope of this study. 

Plans for supplying the troops in the desert had provided 

for adequate supply transportation space and also an additional 

water-supply service. Each division had the same transportation 

space; the same motor vehicle and weapons-maintenance units; 

and the administrative, medical, and military police units as a 

division in Europe-plus a water distilling company. The corps 

supply services included an additional, special water-supply 

company and filter and distilling units and geological teams. 
II, OPERATIONS 

4. General Description of the Zone of Operations 

The zone of operations in the North African campaign in 

Libya and Egypt consisted of a strip of land, sometimes as 

much as sixty kilometers wide, bounded on one side by the coast 

and on the other by the desert interior. 

The ground surface was either firm gravel, sand-covered 

gravel, or mixed sand and gravel. Within this entire zone, large 

parts of which were level plain, the desert could be traversed 

by all types of vehicles. The only exceptions were patches of 

deep sand and steep wadis-which could not always be ascertained from the map-and salty swamps, such as those at 

Marada, roughly forty kilometers south of Marsa el Brega. 

Natural sinuous defiles were formed at Derna and the Halfaya 

Pass at the border between Libya and Egypt. It was also possible to create defiles by the use of mines. 

Undulating, steppe-like terrain predominated, which consisted 

of low mounds and long ridges, whose average height above 

the surrounding terrain was from four to twenty meters. At 

times, these ridges had gentle slopes, and at other times, they 

rose steeply from broad, level valleys in which there were no 

watercourses. The summits were naked rock covered with loose 

rocks of varying size, which made motor traffic difficult but 

not impossible. In the valleys, the rocky bottom was covered by 

a layer of dust or clay of varying thickness. In dry weather, 

this ground could be traversed without difficulty by vehicles with 

four-wheel drive that were capable of cross-country travel-but 

not without raising dense clouds of dust. The steppe-like terrain 

had patches of camel’s thorn shrubs, around which the dust 

had blown to form small dunes. Traffic foElowed the broad paths, 

called Trighs or Pistes, which connected the few settlements and 

water holes. This terrain extended from the coast to a line 

roughly thirty or forty kilometers inland. The coast itself was 

fringed by a belt of dunes behind which was a zone of salt 

swamps, called Sebchen, which were usually dry. This coastal 

zone was frequently used as a bivouac area for troops, since it 

offered good opportunities for digging in tents and vehicles and 

had good water-supply facilities. The only parts of the coast 

where there were no dunes were the cliff sections at Tobruk, 

Bardia, and Sollum. There, the coastal sector was often intersected by deep wadis and was difficult to penetrate. 

17 
18 

Toward the interior, the steppe-like zone gradually merged 

with the desert proper, which is practically devoid of any type 

of vegetation. On the whole, motoring was easier in the desert 

proper than in the steppe-like zone, although movement was 

rendered difficult in rugged areas. In the desert, instead of rocky 

surfaces, patches with a deep covering of sand were encountered 

that made rapid travel possible. Here, the valley floors were 

clay pans, as flat as tabletops, which were submerged in water 

during the rainy periods. Only ‘at the foot of steep cliffs was a 

rocky bottom found or a soft, sandy bottom, where vehicles 

might easily sink. This soft sand also covered the beds of the 

numerous wadis, by which the steep faces of the ridges are 

broken so that it was often extremely difficult to surmount the 

obstacles presented, even by comparatively low, steep ridges. 

Farther south, these patches of soft sand increased in size 

and seriously impeded operations by armored units. The dividing 

line between those parts of the desert in which mobility was 

good and those in which it was bad is in eastern Libya and 

western Egypt, between the 29th and 30th degrees latitude. South 

of the 29th degree latitude, the vast dune-covered expanses 

began, and to cross them was considered quite a sporting feat. 

We can thus see that the area suitable for military operations 

was confined to the relatively narrow strip along the coast and 

the southern desert zone, which was more favorable for rapid 

movement on the whole than the northern, steppe-like zone (if 

the tarred coastal road is left out of consideration}. 

Within the zone described, the following types of terrain obstacles were to be found: 

a. Mountain Ranges 

Three mountain ranges played an important part in the war 

in Africa, namely: 

(1) The Cyrenaica Mounta&lzs. At points, these mountains 

reach a height of 875 meters above sea level and intercept the 

moisture carried inland by the north wind. The heavier rainfall 

here is the reason why the chalky ground carries a growth of 

macchia in contrast to the desert or steppe-like areas. The 

mountains rise in two, high, steep terraces that can be traversed 

at only a few points and are intersected by numerous deep 

valleys, which make it impossible to conduct sizable operations 

except along roads, South of the topmost ridges, the mountains 

slope down gradually to the desert terrain, which is good for 

vehicular traffic. For this reason, the Cyrenaica region was 
19 

vulnerable to attack from the south-a fact that Rommel recognized at once during his attack in the spring of 1941. For this 

reason, he delivered his main attack against Meehili, a desert 

fort designed to protect the southern approaches to the 

Cyrenaica. The fact that it was so easy to bypass is the reason 

why the Cyrenaica was never held with any degree of determination by either side during the entire campaign, although it 

could be called a natural fortress. During every retreat, every 

effort was made to pass through this region as rapidly as possible to avoid being intercepted. 

(2) The Gebel Nefusa Mountains. These mountains protruded like a barrier between the coastal plains of Tripoli and 

those of Misurata. South of Tripoli, they rose to a height of 700 

meters above sea level, the first 300 meters of which were a 

gigantic cliff. In the southeast, they descended in a gradual 

slope. At Horns, in the northeast toward the sea, their height 

was less than 200 meters above sea level. In the central part, 

this mountain range was extremely rugged, and motorized troops 

could onIy pass along the roads. The southeast slope was covered 

with a deep layer of wind-blown sandy loess that made vehicular 

traffic difficult. From the north, this mountain range formed 

an impregnable fortress. From the southeast, however, it was 

vulnerable to attack in spite of the mountainous and intersected 

nature of its approaches, since the attacking forces could find 

favorable assembly areas in the foothills and could approach 

under cover to the proximity of defense positions. Possibilities 

for bypassing the area existed and were taken advantage of by 

the British in the attack in January 1943. 

(3) The Matmata Mountains. These mountains, a range 

in south Tunisia, had a steep drop of 100 to 200 meters in the 

east. In the west, they sloped down gradually to a high plateau, 

which was sandy in parts, while in other areas, the ground 

was good for motor traffic so that it could be crossed by motorized columns in spite of occasional difficulties. The steep, clifflike waI1 in the east and north was interrupted by numerous 

wadis, through some of which an ascent to the high plateau 

was possible. 

The Matmata Mountains narrowed down the size of the 

coastal plains of southern Tunisia considerably so that it was 

possible to organize a defense line at the narrowest point, at 

Mareth. However, the steep mountainside was only a weak protection against flanking attacks, since it could be bypassed with 

little difficulty. Only if the German-Italian forces had been 

numerous enough to hold all passes and if they had had a 

- - 
mobile reserve available to repulse any enemy attempts at detouring the mountains would this range have constituted an 

important factor in the defense. 

b. Steep Terraces 

Most of the steep terraces in the steppe-like terrain were not 

high and followed a course parallel with the coast. Thus, they 

hardly interfered with troop movements. In the numerous caves, 

overhanging cliffs, and gorges, good opportunities could be found 

for troop shelters, for which purpose they were frequently used, 

since they were the most effective protection against air attacks 

that was to be found. Some of the steep terraces and other similar terrain features, however, became of outstanding importance, 

namely: 

(1) The Northern Rim of the Qattara Depression, on 

Which the Southern Flank of the El Alamein Line Was Based. 

This rim towered about 300 meters above the floor of the depression, which was 80 meters below sea level. Within the sectors 

held by the German-Italian forces, there were only three points 

at which motor traffic was possible, and even there, difficulties 

were encountered because of the deep sand. Throughout the 

entire campaign, no better protection for a flank was ever found 

than in the El Alamein line. 

(2) The Steep Terrace at SolEurn Between the BardiaCapuzzo High Plateau and the Sollum Coastal Plain. There were 

two roads with numerous serpentine curves across the terrace, 

one from the Via Balbia-the tarred coastal road-the other from 

the Halfaya Pass road. During the period of positional warfare 

in the summer of 1941, the terrace was within the combat area. 

(3) Large-Size Wadis. These were found in the Cyrenaica 

region and in the eastern approaches to the Tripolitanian 

Mountain and extended as far as the Bay of Sirte. Usually the 

bed of a wadi consisted of a layer of soft sand; less frequently, 

the beds were salty swamps with a growth of camel’s thorn. 

The banks were usually steep but not continuous, since they 

were cut by numerous intersecting wadis. On the whole, wadis 

could be considered as terrain obstacles-but as obstacles that 

could be overcome without difficulty unless obstinately defended. 

During the German-Italian retreat from El Alamein to Tunis, 

only one defense position was based on a wadi, namely the 

Buerat line, which extended along the Zem-Zem wadi south of 

the Via Balbia. After careful deliberation, however, the line was 

developed east of the wadi to prevent an approach by the enemy 
21 

under cover and not on the low-lying west bank, since the west 

bank was dominated by the higher opposite bank. 

The Buerat line could be bypassed easily. It was therefore 

evacuated by the infantry before the attack began and held only 

for a short while in a delaying action by mobile units. 

(4) Dune Terrain. Large sandy areas were found close to 

the coast, near larger wadis, and in the desert proper, where 

the ergs* present barriers that were impenetrable for traffic. 

Big dunes along the coast that interfered with traffic were 

found around Agedabia, on the shores of the Bay of Sirte south 

of Misurata, and in the neighborhood of Tripoli, thus mostly in 

western Libya. These dunes seriously impeded traffic off the 

roads, and even the roads were affected, since the dunes shifted 

constantly. After severe storms, the roads became so deeply 

covered with sand that they had to be cleared. For this reason, 

a constant road-maintenance service was necessary where the 

roads crossed dune areas. 

A large area of dunes was also found north of the El Fareh 

wadi, between El Agheila and Marada along the shores of the 

Bay of Sirte. These dunes protected the German Marsa el Brega 

position against flanking attacks and forced the British to make 

a wide detour through the region south of the El Fareh wadi, 

where vehicular traffic was possible. 

The big dunes of the desert proper were all south of the zone 

of operations, and only a section of them along the border 

between Libya and Egypt played a role of some tactical importance, since they afforded protection for the south flank of the 

German Alamein positions. The dunes in the desert proper were 

not crescent shaped like the dunes along the coast but formed 

continuous ridges between four and fifty meters high that usually 

extended from north to south. A number of these ridges, driven 

by the wind, formed a labyrinthian confusion of dune ridges 

with completely encircled hollows in which the firm ground could 

be seen, This enormous ocean of dunes formed what might be 

called a collection of honeycomb dunes. To cross them, it was 

necessary to have the best cross-country vehicles available and 

to drive at top speed at the first dune, breaking through its 

crest, and on driving down the opposite slope, to gather speed 

for the next dune. While driving in this way, vehicles were 

enveloped in a dense cloud of dust that reduced visibility to 

practically nil. In this way, one to two kilometers might be 

*Large areas of shifting sand dunes (translator). 
22 

covered per day. Seriaus losses in personnel and materiel were 

unavoidable. 

The Great Eastern Erg, a similar large dune area, extended 

from south Tunisia to south Algeria, close to the western border 

of Libya. If adequate German manpower had been available to 

extend the Mareth position across the Matmata Mountains and 

Fort Le Boeuf to this dune area, the German flank would have 

been as well protected as was the case in the Alamein line. 

(5) SC& Sulamps. These swamps developed at those points 

where the water in the subsoil of the desert rose to the surface. 

Owing to the constant evaporation that takes place in the desert, 

the salts carried by the water were deposited, and the resultant 

brine formed either a lake or, when mixed with sand and clay, 

a patch of thick, tough mud on which salt-marsh vegetation 

could take root. Once a person was caught in a salt swamp, it 

was impossible for him -to escape without help. Vehicles sunk 

in salt marshes could be recovered but only on terrain that was 

not too swampy. In really soft, swampy ground, the vehicle had 

to be pulled out by another vehicle, which was often extremely 

difficult and could only be done if the latter was on firm ground 

and had a strong engine. Most of the salt marshes were crossed 

by fords that were known to the natives. Many of the fords 

could carry vehicular traffic so that any salt marshes within a 

defensive position should always be kept under observation, and 

all fords crossing it must be carefully reconnoitered with the 

aid of native guides. Frequently, the salt marshes dried out 

completely and then presented no obstacle at all. 

The biggest salt marsh in the Libyan and Egyptian deserts 

was the Qattara Depression, the surface of which was eighty 

meters below sea level. This depression and its northern rim 

protected the flank of the El Alamein line. The swamp itself 

was skirted by a zone of soft sand varying between one and 

two kilometers in width, on which a few vehicles could travel 

with some difficulty. All other ground outside of the actual 

swamp, but within the Qattara Depression, was also soft and 

difficult to cross with vehicles. The salt marsh that was within 

the German zone of aperations in the Marsa el Brega line was 

considerably smaller. Nevertheless, in conjunction with the sandy 

patches and dune areas, it provided good protection against a 

frontal attack, in spite of the fact that it had numerous fords. 

The salt marshes of southern Tunisia, called Schotts, were of 

more importance. The Schott el Djerid was the terrain feature 

that led to the decision to construct the Gabes line, which served 

as a rear line for the Mareth line. In most parts, the Schott el 
23 

Djerid was considered an impassable obstacle, but its eastern 

part, the so-called El Fedjad Schott, had numerous good fords 

that could be crossed without difficulty by vehicles. 

Both Benghasi and Tripoli had good ports with ample capacities for shipping and landing, for which reason the former was 

used as the main supply base. The capacities in the ports of 

Derna and Bardia, as well as the naval port of Tobruk, were 

much smaller. 

There was no continuous railroad in Libya. The two railroads, 

each about thirty kilometers in length, in Tripolitania and in 

the Cyrenaica were of no military importance. 

The only permanent signal communications system consisted 

of an open-wire telephone line, on poles, from Tripoli to Bardia. 

The distances spanned were extremely great, and the line made 

only limited communication traffic possible. Furthermore, it was 

frequently interrupted by the frequent air attacks against the 

Via Balbia. 

The water-supply facilities along the Via Balbia were adequate. The water holes in the desert, usually with a small supply 

of brackish water, were generally known only to the natives 

and were not indicated on maps. 

During the main part of the year, the air was very hot but 

dry, the hottest months being June, July, and August. The 

highest temperatures registered around midday were about 140 

degrees Fahrenheit. At night, even in summer, temperatures 

dropped to about 5 degrees. In winter, from November to January, the nights were quite cold, temperatures dropping to around 

5 degrees and rising again during the daytime to about 85 

degrees. Rain fell only in winter but was then sometimes very 

heavy, starting suddenly and swamping extensive areas, sometimes stopping all traffic, even on roads, for protracted periods. 

The only other moisture was the heavy dew at daybreak and 

in the evenings. 

The outstanding weather feature was the sandstorms, which 

are called ghiblis. These sandstorms recurred pretty regularly 

every four weeks in all seasons of the year. They usually Iasted 

three days, and since they reduced visibility to nothing, they 

brought all operations by ground and air forces to a standstill. 

During these sandstorms, the range of vision was often reduced 

to less than three meters so that orientation was impossible. 

Owing to the wind from the sea, the climate in the coastal 

regions was almost always healthy. In spite of the enormous 

number of flies, there were few cases of malaria. On the other 
24 

hand, the troops proved extremeIy susceptible to jaundice and 

dysentery. 

5. Order of Battle of Army and Luftwaffe Units 

Army. The first units to be transferred to Africa between 

February and May 1941 were the corps beadquarters of the 

Africa Corps and headquarters units (the corps signal battalion 

and several supply units), together with the 5th Light Division, 

which was later reorganized to form the 21st and 15th Panzer 

Divisions. 

During the summer months, a number of so-caIled oasis 

companies, a few battalions, and some coastal batteries were 

moved in, with an Africa Division Headquarters to control them. 

In the autumn of 1941, these units were consolidated to form a 

division, later designated the 90th Light Africa Division 

Thus, the German combat troops in Africa at the end of 1941 

consisted of two armored and one light division. The two 

armored divisions remained under the command of the German 

Africa Corps. In the summer of 1941, this corps and the other 

army units in Africa were placed under the command af the 

newly created Panzergruppe Aft&a. On 21 January 1942, this 

headquarters was redesignated Headquarters, Panzer Army of 

Africa, which designation was changed again in the autumn of 

1942 to Headquarters, German-Italian Panzer Army. 

In the summer of 1942, the 164th Light Africa Division and 

the Parachute Instruction Brigade were transferred to Africa. 

As they were transported by plane and since the sea transportation capacities were steadily sinking, these units never received 

their vehicles. Thus, they remained nonmobile to a great 

extent-a fact that was to have very adverse effects on the 

withdrawal from El Alamein. 

In 1942, about eighteen batteries-that were not included in 

any of the divisions and consisted of Army Headquarters batteries, coastal batteries, and new batteries of captured gunswere consolidated as Army Headquarters Artillery. This artillery 

was organized in two regiments and was placed under the 

command of the commander of artillery in Africa. In addition, 

the reconnaissance battalions of the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions and the 580th Reconnaissance Battalion (a general headquarters [GHQ] unit} were consolidated to form a reconnaissance 

brigade under the immediate control of the Army Headquarters. 
25 

The army also bad the 900th Engineer Battalion, formerly a 

GHQ unit, available as a headquarters unit. 

At the end of 1942, therefore, the ground forces employed in 

combat consisted of the following: 

2 armored divisions 

2 light divisions 

1 parachute brigade 

1 reconnaissance brigade 

2 regiments of headquarters artillery 

1 engineer battalion 

The 288th Special Unit, a reinforced battalion originally 

organized as an elite battle group for employment in 

the Middle East 

This list does not include the numerous units available to the 

army for logistical support. 

The above divisions were organized as follows: 

a. Armored DiuisionsDivisional headquarters 

2 armored infantry regiments, each of 2 battalions 

1 tank regiment of 2 battalions, with a table of organlzation of 100 tanks each 

1 artillery regiment of 2 light battalions and 1 heavy 

battalion (9 batteries, with 24 light field howitzers, 8 

heavy field howitzers, and four lOQ-mm guns) 

1 antitank battalion of 3 companies, each with 3 guns 

with prime movers 

1 engineer battalion of 2 companies 

1 signal battalion, with 1 telephone and 1 radio company 

Supply and transportation units 

Total strength of each panzer division, 12,000 

b. Light DivisionDivisional headquarters 

3 infantry regiments of 2 battalions each 

1 artillery regiment of 2 light and 1 heavy battalion (24 

light and 12 heavy field howitzers) 

1 antitank battalion of 3 companies (armament as for 

panzer division) 

1 engineer battalion of 2 companies 

1 signal battalion (as for a panzer division) 

Supply and transportation units 

Total strength of the light division, 12,000 
26 

e. Parachute Instruction BrigadeBrigade headquarters 

4 battalions 

1 engineer company 

1 light artillery battalion 

1 mixed signal company 

Total strength of the Parachute Instruction Brigade, 

5,000 

In addition to the above, the following units were landed in 

Tunis and employed in combat from November 1942 to the end 

of the campaign: 

Considerable parts of the 10th Panzer Division 

1 battle group of regimental strength of the Hermann 

Goring Parachute Panzer Division 

Considerable parts of three infantry divisions, a number 

of GHQ armored battalions and the German Arab 

Legion, the latter of which was a unit of regimental 

strength 

Thus, the ground forces employed in combat in the African 

theater of operations were equivalent to the following: 

3 armored divisions at full strength 

2 light divisions at full strength 

2 infantry divisions at full strength 

1 parachute brigade 

Air Forces. The fact must be stressed at the outset that the 

air force units stationed in Africa were kept at a low level of 

strength to avoid further complicating the already difficult 

supply situation. Additional air support was given by air force 

units stationed at Italian or Greek air bases, which were transferred occasionally, for temporary periods, to Africa. 

Three phases must be differentiated in respect to the organization and composition of air force units stationed in Africa, 

namely: 

Phase A, February-November 1941 

Phase B, December 1941-December 1942 

Phase C, January--May 1943 

Phase A 

Command: German Air Force commander in Africa. The 

commander was subordinate to the X Air Corps (stationed in 

Athens and later on Crete) and was in tactical support of the 
27 

Africa Corps (later the Panzer Army of Africa). 

Flying forces in Africa: 

I long-range reconnaissance squadron (F-121-type planes) 

2 squadrons of the 14th Close Range Reconnaissance Group 

1 fighter group, later replaced by the 77th Fighter Wing 

of 3 groups 

2 groups of the 3d Dive-Bomber Wing 

1 destroyer plane group 

1 desert-rescue squadron 

Antiaircraft artillery: 

1 regiment of 4 battalions, tactically assigned to the Africa 

Corps (later Panzergruppe Afrika) 

Air Signal troops: 

1 air signal battalion 

Logistical support troops: 

1 team detailed by the Luftwaffe General in Italy 

Phase B 

Command: German Air Force commander in Africa. The 

commander was subordinate to the Second Air Force and was 

assigned tactical support of the Panzergruppe Afrika (later 

Panzer Army of Africa). 

Flying units in Africa, as in section a above. 

Antiaircraft artillery: 

Organized in the summer of 1942 to form the 19th Flak 

Division and tactically assigned to the Panzer Army 

Air Signal troops: as in section a above 

Logistical support troops: 

From 1942 on, Air Force Administrative Command, 

Africa, was controlled by the Luftwaffe General in Italy 

Phase C 

Command: Air Corps Africa, with Air Commanders 1 and 2. 

The Air Corps Africa was subordinate to the 2d Air Force and 

was required to cooperate as follows: 

Air Corps Africa with Army Group Africa 

Air Commander 1 with the Fifth Panzer Army 

Air Commander 2 with the German-Italian Panzer Army 

(later redesignated the Italian First Army) 

- 
28 

Flying units in Africa: 

2 fighter wings (53d and 77th) 

1 dive-bomber wing of 2 groups 

1 destroyer plane group 

2 antitank plane squadrons 

Reconnaissance, units as in section a above. 

Antiaircraft artillery: 

19th Flak Division, tactically assigned to the GermanItalian Panzer Army (later redesignated the Italian First 

Army). 

20th Flak Division, tactically assigned to the Fifth Panzer 

Army 

Air Signal troops: 

1 reinforced air signal battalion 

Logistical support troops: 

Air Force Administration Headquarters Tunis, with three 

air base areas 

The organization and the main items of armament as of 

January 1942 were the same as in Europe, with the exception 

of the additional supply units assigned for service in the desert, 

namely, the water supply units, the meteorological survey teams, 

and so forth. It must be emphasized in respect to the tables sf 

organization that the units at no time had the stated authorized 

strengths. The actual strengths were constantly subject to fluctuations according to the losses suffered and the replacements 

received. Thus, the combat efficiency, which also depended on 

the shipment of replacements in personnel and materiel, also 

fluctuated. 

6, Reasons for Changes in Organization and Equipment 

Initially, the German units were transferred to Africa with 

their normal tabIes of organization and equipment. Changes that 

were effected immediately in respect to equipment were as 

follows: 

a. All vehicles were immediately fitted with new special dust 

filters. 

b. Special units, namely, water supply companies, water 

transportation columns, and geological teams, were organized 

immediately to take care of water supply and transportation 

problems. However, owing to the steadily increasing transportation difficulties, large portions of these units remained in Italy 

until the campaign was over. 
29 

c. All vehicles were camouflaged by a coat of desert-colored 

paint. 

d. In reference to uniforms and other clothing, the troops 

were issued tropical shirts; khaki-colored linen jackets, breeches, 

and shorts; lace boots and shoes, both cotton-lined; linen caps 

with visors; tropical helmets; bellybands; and woolen overcoats. 

In 1941, the following additional changes became necessary: 

a. The antitank battalions arrived in Africa with 37-mm 

antitank guns. In the summer of 1941, these were exchanged 

for 50-mm guns, which were exchanged again in early 1942 for 

captured Russian 76.2mm antitank guns. This was necessary 

because of the increased effectiveness of weapons used on both 

sides. 

b. From early 1942 on, all infantry units were also assigned 

antitank guns, since tank warfare is the deciding factor in desert 

warfare, where the antitank gun becomes of even greater importance to the infantry than the machine gun. The aim of furnishing each battalion with eighteen 76.2-mm antitank guns was 

never achieved. 

c. Types I and II tanks, some of which were armed with 

machine guns and some with ZO-mm guns, were withdrawn after 

the summer of 1941 and replaced by Type III tanks, which had 

50-mm guns. These, again, were replaced after the winter of 

1941-42 by Type IV tanks, which had 75-mm guns. 

d. All motorcycles were replaced by Volkswagens. Even the 

half-track motorcycles that were used for a while proved 

unsatisfactory. 

7. Descriptions of the More Important Battles 

a. 31 March-19 April 1941: The First Counterattack to 

Reconquer the Cyrenaica 

Contrary to the views of General Garibaldi, commander in 

chief of the Italian forces in Africa, Rommel, who had arrived 

in the theater of operations on 11 February 1941 as commander 

of the German Africa Corps, was of the opinion that waiting 

would worsen the situation. The British forces were still in a 

long drawn-out column and were momentarily in a precarious 

condition, which had to be exploited immediately. Rommel was 

able to substantiate his opinions by reconnaissance and, therefore, his views prevailed. Immediately after the 5th Light Division commenced landing at Tripoli on 11 February 1941 and 
30 

moving up to the front, Rommel commenced a series of reconnaissance thrusts west of Agheila on 24 March, which he followed up on 31 March by an attack with limited objectives in 

the direction of Agedabia. The sole objective of this attack was 

to drive back the British troops in the advanced positions of 

Agedabia. Since these British troops retreated immediately, 

Agedabia itself was attacked and taken on 1 April, the enemy 

withdrawing toward Benghasi. The attack toward Benghasi that 

then followed was also successful, and on 4 April, that city and 

the port were taken by German forces. 

In view of the obvious weakness of the British, who had 

been taken by surprise by the German attack, it seemed advisable to continue the advance. Rommel decided not to continue 

the pursuit through the Cyrenaica but rather to launch an 

enveloping attack through the desert in order, if possible, to 

prevent the retreat of considerable enemy forces. For this reason, 

he pushed forward the bulk of the 5th Light Division south of 

Benghasi straight through the desert towards Mechili and Derna, 

with weaker forces moving by way of Msus in a flanking drive. 

This move also succeeded, and on 6 April, more than 2,000 

prisoners were taken at Mechili, Derna being captured on the 

same day. 

On 9 April, the pursuing columns reached the LibyanEgyptian border at Bardia so that all territory lost in Libya 

had been recovered. Only the Tobruk fortress remained in British 

hands. It was enveloped with weak forces by 11 April. Two 

attempts to take it in raids on 13 and 14 April and a third 

attempt, in a properly prepared attack on 30 April, failed. The 

forces available were inadequate for the task. 

Rommel now had to decide whether to break off the siege of 

Tobruk and to withdraw to the elevated terrain of Ain el Gazala 

or to maintain the siege-with the disadvantage that he would 

have to establish a second front in a line level with Sidi-OmarSollum-Bardia. He decided on the second solution. Chiefly Italian 

troops-namely, the X and XXI Corps, with a total of four 

infantry divisions (which were to be increased to five at a later 

stage)-were to maintain the siege of Tobruk. The Sidi-OmarSollum front was held only in strongpoints in order to release 

the bulk of the German forces for mobile employment in the 

open field. To summarize: 

(1) The units that took part in the actual offensive operations were as follows: 
31 

The 5th Light Division at that time consisted of three 

battalions; one tank regiment; and one each of reconnaissance, 

light artillery, antitank, engineer, and signal battalions, 

(2) The important factors that brought about this speedy 

and thorough success were the following: 

(a) The momentary weakness of the British forces, 

whose supply transportation had not yet been able to catch up 

fully with the rapid advance. 

(b) German supremacy in the air. 

(c) The direct attack through the desert, which the 

enemy had not expected. 

(3) A special feature of these operations was the advance 

through the desert from south of Benghasi toward Mechili and 

Derna, which was ordered by Rommel in spite of the serious 

misgivings of most of the commanders serving under him. The 

actions brought out the necessity of having the commanders of 

mobile units far ahead in the unit column in desert warfare 

and of employing all means, including liaison planes, to maintain contact within the pursuing force. There is no other possible 

way of remaining close on the heels of the retreating enemy. 

(4) Logistical requirements were not given the proper 

consideration. This is the reason why some of the units failed 

in the desert. But, on the other hand, Rommel could not afford 

to wait for the arrival of further fuel transports, as he would 

then have lost contact with the enemy. 

(5) Here, for the first time, the units had to cross a long 

stretch of desert, some units for 300 kilometers and more, and 

while doing so, they had to gather the experience they lacked. 

This experience included recognition of the necessity to carry 

along ample supplies of fuel and water and the difficulties of 

orientation. In the desert, it is almost impossible to establish 

one’s position by the sun, since the sun is usually almost directly 

overhead. The available maps, which were reprints of Italian 

maps, were inadequate. Practically no reference points existed 

so that all orientation had to be done by compass. Furthermore, 

the eyes of the troops had to become accustomed to the glare 

of the sun, which made contours unclear. Thus, it was extremely 

difficult to recognize objects-for instance, to differentiate 

between tanks and trucks. 

(6) Together with the fact that any movement caused 

immense clouds of dust, the above factor was originally exploited 

by Rommel, who had his supply and baggage trains move in 

tank formation in order to mislead the enemy. Later, this came 
32 

to the notice of the enemy, and later attempts to employ this 

ruse were unsuccessful. 

(7) At that stage, the German forces suffered little from 

enemy air attacks. 

(8) Here, for the first time, the &&mm antiaircraft guns 

proved effective antitank weapons. Later, they became indispensable for this purpose. 

b. May--June 1941: Battles for the Positions on the Bmder 

The British left Rommel no peace and in these months seized 

the initiative several times in attempts to take from the 

Germans the border positions that commanded the outpost area. 

The British, particularly, attempted to take the Halfaya Pass. 

In the mountain range extending from the coast to the interior 

of the desert (a distance of more than thirty kilometers), the 

Halfaya Pass was the only point at which tanks could cross. 

On 15 May, the British succeeded in recapturing Sollum, 

Capuzzo, and the Halfaya Pass. Two days later in an immediate 

counterattack, Rommel succeeded in retaking Sollum and 

Capuzzo, while the Halfaya Pass remained in British hands. 

On 27 May, however, the pass was finally retaken in an attack 

in which the 15th Panzer Division, which had meanwhile 

reached the front, also took part. 

On 15 June, after careful preparations, the British launched 

a major offensive that aimed at retaking the border positions 

and advancing on Tobruk. The British bypassed the German 

border positions and pushed forward almost as far as Bardia. 

The situation was critical. However, on 17 June, Rommel, again 

employing the 15th Panzer Division, succeeded in defeating the 

enemy by concentrating his forces in an attack on the west 

flank of the enemy, who had advanced northwards. The enemy 

forces were compelled to withdraw southward to avoid the eneirclement of some of their units. 

The more important features of these operations are as 

follows: 

(1) The pursuit phase was now over, and the actions described were those of attack and defense. 

(2) Stronger forces were employed on both sides than had 

hitherto been engaged. On the German side, both divisions, the 

5th Light and the 15th Panzer-minus certain elements tied 

down on the Tobruk front-were fully employed, as well as one 

Italian division. Without the 15th Panzer Division, the German 
33 

forces would not have been able to hold their own, particularly 

in the battle from the 15th to 17th of June. 

(3) Whereas the fighting during the pursuit in March and 

April took place on either side of the Via Balbia, all the actions 

just described took part in the desert. 

(4) The German side no longer had absolute mastery of 

the air; British bombing units were taking part in the fighting 

in concentrated attacks for the first time. 

In these skirmishes and battles, the 15th Panzer Division 

gained its first experience in desert warfare. The fields in which 

experience was gained were the same as those described for the 

5th Light Division in section 7, a. 

New features in this operation were as follows: 

(1) For the first time, all German units were exposed to 

lively enemy activity in the air, a feature they were to experience daily from now on. At first, several instances occurred 

where severe losses were suffered owing to the bunching up of 

vehicles and troops. It was weeks before the troops learned to 

counter this new combat factor by a wide dispersal of units in 

breadth and depth-a particularly important requirement in the 

desert, where no cover whatever is to be found. (The minimum 

distance between vehicles should be 50 and if possible 100 

meters.) It also proved necessary to dig in immediately all 

vehicles that were halted for any considerable time. They were 

to be dug into the ground to at least a depth that protected the 

axles in order to lessen the effects of bomb fragments. In the 

same measure, it was also necessary to camouflage the vehicles. 

This was only possible with the use of camouflage nets so that 

it was extremely difficult. Furthermore, it was now necessary 

for each and every man to dig a foxhole as protection during 

air raids. 

(2) The danger of radio stations being intercepted and 

located made it imperative to have all radio instruments, and 

particularly central radio stations, removed at least one kilometer from headquarters sites in order for them not to interfere 

with the functioning of staff headquarters. The resultant delay 

in the transmission of orders and reports had to be accepted as 

an unavoidable disadvantage. This delay had to be reduced as 

far as possible by the use of messengers with motor vehicles. 

During the time discussed above, consolidated measures were 

also taken in the envelopment of Tobruk. The intention to withdraw all German troops from the besieging force could not be 
34 

carried out, particularly at Ras el Nedauuar, on the southern 

front, where two German battalions remained in position until 

the autumn of 1941. 

(3) The danger of enemy tanks breaking through the 

front made it necessary to develop all-around defense positions 

protected by antitank mines. Rommel issued a bulletin describing the development of such positions, each held by a reinforced 

company in a system of strongpoints. Above all, this system 

was adopted along the border, where the Italian Sauona Division was employed in addition to five German oasis companies. 

c. July-Mid-November: The Siege of Tobruk and Preparations for the Attack 

It was clear to Rommel that Tobruk had to be taken as soon 

as possible, and it was obvious that the enemy would do everything possible to prevent this happening. Speed was therefore 

necessary. The following factors made it difficult for Rommel 

to take the steps that he recognized as essential: 

(1) The necessity of awaiting the arrival of further troops, 

infantry and particularly heavy artillery, and large supplies of 

ammunition from Europe, since the available forces were inadequate. 

(2) The steadily decreasing capacities for German seaborne transportation as the result of the mounting losses of 

ships. 

As early as July, it became evident that it would definitely 

not be possible for the Germans to commence any systematic 

attack before mid-September. At an early stage, it was realized 

that this deadline would have to be extended to October, then 

to November, and finally to December. Gradually, German 

doubts grew that the attack could be launched before the 

expected British offensive commenced. 

The summer months were spent in executing the following 

measures: 

(1) Reinforcement of the enveloping forces by artillery 

and through development of the terrain 

(2) Improvement of training. 

(3) The movement of large quantities of ammunition and 

fuel to Benghasi and farther east. 

(4) Improvement of the medical services, which had hitherto 

necessarily been neglected. 
35 

(5) Overhauling and maintenance of arms, equipment, 

and vehicles. 

The following is pertinent to the activity during these 

months: 

(1) All attempts to reduce frontage and thereby strengthen the enveloping line failed, since the Italian troops, by whom 

the greater part of the line was held, were not able to withstand 

counterattacks by the British. 

(2) The reinforcement of the artillery forces was pressed 

forward vigorously; for this purpose, a special artillery commander was assigned. Flash and sound ranging proved indispensable in the location of the enemy batteries. 

(3) Again and again, the order had to be stressed that 

all units employed were to dig themselves in as deep as possible 

in order to reduce losses. 

(4) Demonstration exercises took place to improve the 

standard of training, with particular emphasis on combined 

infantry-artillery-tank, artillery-tank-air force actions and the 

practical application of the all-around-defense strongpoint system. 

(5) It was only from Tripoli and Benghasi that ammunition and fuel supplies could be moved forward to the front. The 

lack of any rail connections proved a serious disadvantage. 

Investigations showed that to construct a railroad to meet even 

the most modest demands, at least 60,000 tons of shipping space 

for locomotives, cars, rails, understructures, and so forth, would 

be required, and a period of about twelve months for the TripoliBenghasi section and an additional three months for the extension to Derna would be needed. 

Ammunition and fuel had to be stored in the open, both in 

the vicinity of the ports and near the front, since tank installations and shelters were nonexistent. This made wide dispersal 

and the burying and camouflage of all supplies at the storage 

depots all the more important. These precautions were frequently 

disregarded so that unnecessary losses occurred. 

(6) Warm clothing after sundown was particularly 

important in the desert, and especially so for new arrivals, as 

a precaution against dysentery and skin diseases, since the difference between the daytime temperatures and those at night 

was extreme. After sunset, it was absolutely essential for every 

man to wear trousers and bellybands. Experience showed, in 

fact, that it was advisable to wear the latter day and night. 
36 

An appropriate diet was essential to prevent jaundice, which 

occurred frequently. A large proportion of the cases of jaundice 

that occurred in 1941 resulted because the rations issued 

included large quantities of pulses (i.e., leguminous plants) and 

conserved meat with a high fat content. Above all, food with a 

high Vitamin B and C content proved necessary, and on the 

whole, the food had to be light. Vitamin C tablets could not 

take the place of fresh vegetables. Owing to inadequate transportation space aboard aircraft, it was usually only possible to 

fly in fresh vegetables and fruit for air force personnel in Africa. 

(7) In weapons maintenance, protection of the inside 

parts of the weapons against sand proved a particularly important point. For this reason, a11 bolts and moving parts of the 

weapons were wrapped in sailcloth-besides the use of the 

standard muzzle covers. All weapons had to be cleaned very 

carefully, but after cleaning, they were oiled only thinly; otherwise, the dust would eat its way into the surface. No special 

means to protect the weapons against dust were available. What 

has been said about the care of weapans applies in equal 

measure to the care of other equipment and motor vehicles. 

(8) A high standard of training in the use and care of 

weapons, equipment, and vehicles was particularly important in 

desert warfare, and the work of the higher-echelon ordnance 

technicians in handling weapons, equipment, and vehicles was 

of great signifmance in maintaining the combat efficiency of 

the troops. 

Zn an overseas theater of operations, extensive maintenance 

services with well-equipped workshops for the repair and maintenance of weapons, tanks, and other motor vehicles were just as 

indispensable as stocks of all types of spare parts, particularly 

for tanks. 

It was also during the summer that Italian forces constructed 

the road ta bypass Tobruk; it was roughly sixty kilometers long. 

This road was graveled and tarred, and its construction, which 

took three and a half months in the heat of summer, must be 

regarded as an outstanding performance. On the whole, the 

German troops, who were unaccustomed to the heat, also came 

through the summer with few losses. 

On 14 and 15 September, Rommel launched a reconnaissance 

in force from the border positions in the direction of Bir el 

Habata (in the Egyptian desert}. The operation was directed by 

the headquarters of the German Africa Corps and was carried 

out by the 2lst Panzer Division, which had been organized from 
37 

the 5th Light Division. This operation, which was designated 

Sommern Achtstraum, must be considered a failure, since it 

failed in its purpose of discovering how far the British were 

along in their preparations for their offensive. No opponent was 

contacted, as the British reconnaissance forces had recognized 

the German intentions and had withdrawn in good time. On 

the other hand, the 21st Panzer Division suffered considerable 

losses in a number of air attacks, owing to the fact that it lost 

three and a half hours on Egyptian terrain in refueling, as the 

fuel trucks first had to be moved forward. These losses could 

have been avoided if sufficient fuel had been carried along in 

cans and if the fuel column had accompanied the combat units. 

Further losses were sustained while moving back through 

German minefields, the locality of which was not known precisely to the various units. 

d. Mid-November 1941--Mid-January 1942: Repelling the 

British Autumn Offensive and the Retreat to the Gulf of Sirte 

The British offensive opened on 18 November 1941. At the 

strategic level, it had been expected, but nevertheless it came 

as a tactical surprise. This was because, from the end of October 

on, the German air reconnaissance hardly ever succeeded in 

penetrating into Egypt, and the enemy had concealed all general 

preparations and signal traffic with extreme skill. 

Excluding the Tobruk garrison (one and one-half divisions 

and one armored brigade}, the ground forces of the enemy, 

which had meanwhile been consolidated to form the British 

Eighth Army, consisted of XIII and XXX Corps headquarters, 3 

motorized divisions, 1 armored division, and 1 armored brigadewith a total of about 700 tanks. 

Apart from the Italian 5th Division, one German division, 

and the GHQ artillery besieging Tobruk, Rommel had available 

for operational employment: 2 German armored divisions, with 

roughly 360 serviceable tanks; l. Italian armored division, with 

roughly 150 inferior tanks; and 1 Italian motorized division, the 

efficiency of which was also limited. 

The XXX British Corps, with the bulk of the available 

armor, advanced through Maddalena to relieve Tobruk, while 

the British XIII Corps enveloped the border positions from the 

south. 

The 21st Panzer Division, which was echeloned forward in 

the direction of Bir el Gubi, had the mission of halting the 

British advance but met with no success in its efforts. For a 

long while, the situation remained unclear to Rommel, because 
38 

the division reported too infrequently and its reports were confusing. On 23 November, it seemed that the situation would 

improve when Rommel succeeded at Sidi Rezegh in battering 

the British XXX Corps so badly that the commander of the 

British Eighth Army seriously considered breaking off the offensive. Overestimating the scope of his success, Rommel then 

decided on an enveloping pursuit on the next day. On 24 November, he advanced with the Africa Corps in the direction of 

Maddalena, then wheeled north, and arrived back at the Tobruk 

front on 28 November. Here, the situation had developed 

unfavorably in the meantime, since the enveloping forces had 

not been able, in the long run, to beat off the repeated attempts 

of the enveloped British forces to fight their way out. The 

enveloping ring had been breached already on 22 November at 

El Duda, although the breach was locally restricted. The Africa 

Corps now only had roughly 100 serviceable tanks available and 

was no longer strong enough to restore the situation. Thus, it 

became necessary to raise the siege on 7 December. The difficult 

maneuver of swinging the Italian Division, the Africa Division, 

and the artillery forces westward was performed successfully, 

and a new front was established in the Ain el Gazala line. This 

position had to be abandoned on 16 December because it was 

in danger of being enveloped from the south. 

For tactical reasons, Rommel thought it impossible to hold 

the Cyrenaica, which protruded northward and provided ideal 

opportunities for the enemy to bypass it, although the Italian 

command, for political reasons, demanded that he do so. He 

therefore decided to withdraw toward Benghasi-Agedabia. 

This movement was carried out in the following manner: 

(1) The Africa Division was dispatched through the 

Cyrenaiea in order to take possession of the important town of 

Agedabia before the arrival there of an enemy column reported 

to be advancing westward through the desert. 

(2) The Italian Division was also moved through the 

Cyrenaica to the rear on vehicles of the supply transportation 

columns. 

(3) The Africa Corps and the motorized Italian division 

at Mechili were to advance straight through the desert to 

Benghasi. The motorized units carried out the movement sueeessfully, but the available transportation space was unfortunately inadequate to move all Italian infantry forces to the rear. 

On Christmas, the Panzer Group was ahead of Agedabia. 

On the last day of the year, the Africa Corps, which was 
39 

echeloned to the right, was once again clearly successful in a 

defensive action against the pursuing enemy forces and destroyed a large number of enemy tanks. 

Two additional factors alleviated the situation for the 

armored group. One factor was the considerable reinforcement 

of the German air forces through the transfer of the Second 

Air Force Command-with the II Air Corps from the Eastern 

Front-to Italy and Sicily, a transfer that had commenced 

toward the end of November. As a result of this closer disposition of German air forces, the hitherto overwhelming superiority 

of the British in the air was somewhat reduced. The second 

factor favoring the Germans was that the extremely tense 

supply situation was relieved by the arrival of two big convoys 

at Tripoli with supplies of all sorts, replacement tanks, and two 

tank companies and artillery, which became organic to the units 

in Africa. This was the first supply shipment to arrive between 

16 September and 15 December 1941, during which period not a 

single ship had reached African ports, 

In spite of the relieved situation, Rommel decided not to 

await the enemy attack in the Agedabia area, and in early 

January retired to the Marada-Marsa el Brega line, where he 

hoped that his right flank would be better protected by the salt 

marshes. 

The more important lessons learned in the battle (that has 

been described above in broad outline) are as follows: 

(1) The old maxim that reports should be sent in as frequently as possible was frequently not observed, although orders 

had been given that a brief radio report was to be sent in every 

two hours-with the provision that the single word “unchanged” 

or a statement of position would be sufficient. 

(2) Similarly, not all of the units reacted automatically 

to any development by carrying out new reconnaissance. 

(3) The use of the “directional line,” with the aid of a 

few natural reference points in reporting and in issuing orders, 

proved an excellent system, particularly under desert conditions. 

This system is as follows: 

A directional line is drawn between two points on the map, 

from point A to point B. Starting at point A, this line is marked 

and numbered consecutively at intervals of one centimeter. Positions can now be reported by this line; for instance, three right 

of thirty-seven would indicate a point on the map three centimeters east of thirty-seven on the map. The starting number 

for the consecutive numbering of the centimeter markings can 
40 

be fixed as desired. Brief orders can be signaled in clear text 

with the aid of the directional line. It goes without saying that 

the line must be changed frequently. 

(4) Not all unit commanders or their genera1 staff officers 

were at all times precisely informed on the supply situation of 

their units, which had adverse effects on operations. At all 

times, all unit commanders and their assistants must know 

exactly how much of the more important types of fuel and 

ammunition their units have available, what quantities of 

supplies are to be expected within the next twenty-four hours, 

and what percentage of the most important weapons are ready 

for action, This knowledge is indispensable as a basis for all 

command decisions. 

(5) Under desert conditions, the frequent penetrations by 

armored forces and the open terrain expose the higher-level 

staffs to danger to a far greater extent than is the case in any 

other theater of operations. Thus, all staffs must be protected 

by close-defense antitank weapons. For this reason, the Panzer- i 

gruppe and the Afriea Corps had organized so-called combat i 

detachments consisting af tanks and antitank and antiaircraft j 

guns in battalion and eompany strength. These units also ; 

praved useful as a tactical reserve. 

(6) One feature peculiar to the desert operations in 

1941-42 was the constant threat to the southern flank of the 

side that happened to be on the defensive-the northern flank ~ 

generally being well protected since it extended to the coast. 

The danger to their right flank made it necessary for the 

Germans to have strong mobile forces, with ample supplies of 

fuel, echeloned far to the right to avoid their being forced to 

abandon a position bypassed by the enemy. 

(7) In desert warfare, retrograde movements will usually 

be restricted to roads and will be difficult owing to the lack of 

natural obstacles favoring new defensive lines. Only if a firm 

eontrol of units is maintained during retrograde movements over 

great distances will it be possible to prevent a retreat continuing 

beyond the intended point and endangering unit cohesion. For 

this reason, it is necessary to compel the rear echelons, such as 

transportation columns and so forth, to halt at intervals. 

(8) Owing to the dust that is caused by any movement 

on the ground, it is difficult to differentiate between friend and 

foe from the air, For this reason, bombing %toplines” must be 

established and clearly defined with due allowance for safety 

factors. 
41 

e. Mid-January--End of May j942: The Counteroffensive to 

Retake the Cyrenaica and Preparations for the Attack on Tobruk 

On 10 January 1942, the Panzer Group reached the MaradaMarsa el Brega line, where new defense positions were to be 

established. However, the remaining units, particularly the Italian 

troops, had been so far reduced in numbers during the previous 

fighting that they would hardly be able to hold the sixty 

kilometers of frontage against any major attack by the enemy 

for longer than twenty-four hours. A careful examination of the 

situation revealed that the enemy forces were still echeloned far 

to the rear so that they were in a critical situation similar to 

that which they had been in during the previous year. The 

coastal road remained closed to them until 17 January, when 

Rommel approved the surrender of the troops holding the 

Halfaya Pass since their supplies of ammunition and foods were 

exhausted. A careful examination of the strength ratios at the 

moment showed that the German and Italian forces were superior 

to the hostile forces at the front. Now was the moment to take 

preventive action, interrupt the assembly of the enemy forces 

through a counterattack, and delay his preparations for the 

continuation of the offensive. Rommel, therefore, decided to 

launch an attack with limited objectives while deciding on further 

action as the situation developed. 

The attack was scheduled for the morning of 21 January. 

Various deceptive measures were taken to conceal the German 

intentions, including strict secrecy concerning the intended 

attack. Thus, regimental commanders were informed only one 

day before the attack was to start. Also, all vehicular traffic in 

the direction of the front was to cease during daylight from the 

fourth day preceding the attack. From then on, vehicular traffic 

toward the front was firmly restricted to the nights. These 

measures proved fully successful. 

As part of the attack, the 90th Light Division, hitherto the 

Africa Division, was to break through the enemy lines on either 

side of the coastal road and to advance toward Agedabia. The 

motorized Italian corps was to follow immediately and was then 

to advance south of the Via Balbia, while the Africa Corps was 

to start out from an assembly area thirty kilometers south of 

the Via Balbia, in an enveloping pursuit designed to prevent 

the retreat of as many as possible of the enemy forces. The 

breakthrough by the 90th Light Division succeeded as planned, 

but Army Headquarters, to which the command had been 

upgraded on 21 January 1942, received no reports from the Africa 

Corps for a long time. The corps had run into a patch of deep 
42 

sand and could only move forward with difficulty. The intended 

envelopment thus failed. 

On 22 January, Agedabia was taken. In the following days, 

two attempts to pocket sizable enemy forces in the AntelatSaunnu area failed as the German forces were too weak, and 

their intention had been recognized at an early stage. However, 

large quantities of materiel were captured in a surprise raid on 

Msus. 

The Italian Supreme Command approved an advance as far 

as Agedabia-but not beyond that point. It feared reverses that 

might again endanger the Italian infantry divisions because of 

their lack of mobility. The employment of these divisions forward 

of the Marada-Marsa el Brega line was therefore not permitted. 

Rommel, nevertheless, persisted in his intention to take 

advantage of the opportunity of the moment. He advanced 

through the desert at the head of a specially organized battle 

group, and on the evening of 29 January, he captured the Benina 

quarter of the city of Benghasi. There, he received Mussolini’s 

belated approval of his advance. On 30 January, Benghasi was 

captured and a brigade taken prisoner. In the following days, 

the pursuit was continued straight through the Cyrenaica. Derna 

was taken on 4 February. 

The condition of the troops and the lack of fuel prohibited 

any attempt to attack Tobruk, so from 7 February on, the units 

were compelled to organize themselves in defense positions, with 

the north flank based on the Bay of Bomba in front of the 

British positions at Ain el Gazala. 

Since it was now to be expected that the exhaustion of the 

troops on both sides would lead to a period of comparative quiet, 

Rommel flew to Rome and Germany to learn the intentions of 

the Italian Supreme Command and Wehrmacht High Command 

with regard to the conduct of the war in the Mediterranean in 

1943. He found that practically no plans existed and that the 

Italians were even very averse to any offensive operations before 

autumn. 

In April, Rommel therefore again took the initiative on his 

own responsibility. His opinion was that it was necessary to 

take preemptive action against a new offensive by the enemy, 

which he expected in June, with probably even stronger enemy 

forces than before. It was vitally important to the Germans to 

capture both Tobruk and Malta, the latter of which, as a naval 

and air base, interfered to an intolerable extent with German 

seaborne supply traffic. Since the German Air Force could sup- 
43 

port only one of these operations at a time, however, it would 

be necessary for them to take place in succession. Rommel considered it desirable to attack Malta first and then Tobruk. 

However, if the preparations for the capture of Malta required 

too much time, he thought it best to attack Tobruk first so that 

after that town had been taken and the border line from Sidi 

Omar-Bardia reached, all air force strength could be concentrated against Malta.* Rommel’s suggestion was that the attack 

on Tobruk should open in the second half of May. 

After some argumentation, this suggestion was approved, and 

it was decided that Tobruk was to be attacked first, because it 

would take longer to prepare for the attack on Malta. The 

supply situation was exceptionally favorable in May so that 

adequate quantities of fuel were available in Africa by the 

intended date of the attack, 26 May. To a considerable extent, 

the ammunition situation was also relieved. 

Important lessons were learned in this phase of the campaign: 

(1) In pursuit actions, success depends not so much on 

the strength of the pursuing force as on speedy action and, 

thus, to a considerable degree, on the personality of the commander involved. Relatively small units under young and 

energetic commanders (colonels) proved most effective. 

(2) It is highly important to assign air liaison staffs to 

the pursuit forces. These staffs must be equipped with radios, 

so they can direct the close-support air units to worthwhile 

targets and, above all, so they can constantly report the lines 

reached to units in the air and thus prevent the air forces from 

bombing their own forces on the ground. 

(3) Enveloping enemy forces is more difficult in the 

desert than elsewhere, since natural obstacles, such as rivers 

and so forth, where enemy manpower can be concealed, do not 

exist. 

(4) It is not to be expected that any attempt to take the 

enemy by surprise through the use of deceptive measures that 

have once proved successful, such as air attacks on an enemy’s 

headquarters, will meet with subsequent success. 

(5) Terrain reconnaissance cannot be carried out too carefully. 

“An advance into the interior of Egypt was thus not discussed. 
44 

f. Late May--July 1942: The Battle of Tobruk and the 

Pursuits to El Alamein 

The operational plan underlying Rommel”s new offensive was 

as follows: 

(1) Frontal attacks by the Italian X and XXI Infantry 

Corps, which had been consolidated temporarily to form Armee 

Abteilung Cruewell, * to commence on the afternoon of 26 May 

in order to tie down the enemy forces in the Gazala position. 

(2) Advance of the five mabile units under the personal 

command of Rommel in a move around the right flank of the 

enemy at Bir el Hacheim in order to wheel in on the rear of 

the enemy on the 27th and complete the envelopment by 28 

May. Counting from the right, the five units were disposed as 

follows: 90th Light Division; German Africa Corps, with the 

15th and 21st Panzer Divisions; the Italian motorized corps with 

the Ariete Armored and the Trieste Motorized Divisions. 

(3) An attack on Tobruk, after the elimination of the bulk 

of the British Eighth Army’s forces in the field. 

These plans miscarried for a number of reasons. First, the 

two Italian infantry corps were too weak to tie down the strong 

enemy forces effectively. Initially, the enemy was admittedly 

taken by surprise by the forces that bypassed his southern flank. 

Then, however, the attacking column spread out fanwise as the 

result of the 90th Light Division turning northeast and the 

German Africa Corps turning north. At the same time, the 

Italian motorized corps, pivoting on the inner flank, was forced 

to move toward Bir el Hacheim and alsa reduce the speed of 

its advance. This fanlike disposition of the attacking forces 

greatly facilitated the defense. 

On the evening of 27 May, the attacking mobile force, which 

had split into three groups, was in a critical situation and in 

serious danger of being encircled. Furthermore, up to 29 May, 

Rommel to a great extent was unable to exercise his command, 

having become separated from most of his radio stations. Supplies had to be routed around Hacheim and, as convoy forces 

were lacking, large amounts of materiel and numerous vehicles 

were lost. 

Nevertheless, in spite of this unfavorable development, 

Rammel steadily persisted in his intention to take Tobruk. He 

*A temporary organization commanded by a corps commander with a corpstype staff. 
45 

concentrated his forces once again, established a defensive front 

facing east, and from l-6 June succeeded, one after the other, 

in eliminating a number of enemy strongpoints south and west 

of the main enemy position. In this way, and in coordinated 

action with Armee Abteilung Cruewell, he succeeded by 31 June 

in opening up a direct supply route. The route, however, was 

under fire during the daytime in most parts. 

Having thus eased the situation behind the center of the 

enemy front, Rommel proceeded to eliminate Bir el Hacheim, a 

bastion in his rear. This point was well fortified with field-type 

positions and tenaciously defended; it was not taken until 

12 June. Now the German Africa Corps advanced northward 

on Acroma, where it destroyed considerable armored forces by 

14 June and threatened to cut off the two divisions in position 

in the northern sector. One of these divisions fought its way 

out eastward, while the other cut its way through the Italian 

forces by way of Bir el Hacheim toward the south. Now, at 

last, the road was open to Tobruk, which the British were determined to defend. A new deceptive ruse of Rommel’s now proved 

successful. In the afternoon of 19 June, he moved his German 

Africa Corps eastward past Tobruk on the south, moved it back 

during the dark, and on the morning of 20 June, attacked the 

fortress from the southeast. On the following day, the fortress, 

with its garrison of 25,000 men and enormous stocks of supplies, 

was compelled to capitulate. On 23 June, Rommel crossed the 

border with the bulk of his forces, the 90th Light Division 

already having advanced to Sidi Barani. 

Thus, the operational objective bad been gained, and the time 

had arrived to release the bulk of the air forces for operations 

against Malta. The Italian Supreme Command and Field 

Marshal Kesselring, commander of the German Second Air 

Force, still intended to direct their attention to Malta, but 

Rommel believed that he now had an opportunity that would 

never recur of pushing ahead to the Nile. He was supported in 

his “opinion by the German High Command and succeeded in 

getting his way. The attack on Malta was postponed, and the 

main mission of the air forces was to continue supporting the 

pursuit in the direction of the Nile. 

On 28 June, Mersa Matruh was captured, and on 30 June, 

Rommel arrived with his thoroughly exhausted troops and only 

fifty serviceable tanks before the Alamein position, which was 

better fortified than any position he had hitherto encountered. 

Two attempts to break through this newly established British 

front failed on 1 and 10 July, whereas serious crises resulted 
46 

from numerous counterattacks by the British between 15 July 

and the end of the month, the British directing their attacks 

chiefly against sectors of the front that were held by Italian 

troops. 

Supply traffic again diminished considerably so that for this 

reason alone, if for no other, any new offensive was out of the 

question. It was found that Tobruk, as a naval base, had far 

smaller off-loading capacities than had been expected. 

To hold the front of about seventy kilometers, new German 

units had to be transferred to Africa, and the 164th Light Africa 

Division, the Parachute Instruction Brigade, and the Italian 

Folgore Parachute Division were brought across by air and sent 

into action. Transport of the Italian infantry divisions from 

Libya took a great deal of time. 

The more important lessons to be learned from this phase of 

the campaign were the following: 

(1) Once again, several tactical surprise actions had been 

successful because methods were changed each time. On the 

other hand, the ‘“dust deception” ruse was no longer effective. 

Rommel had had airplane propellers installed in a number of 

vehicles for the purpose of creating clouds of dust. These 

vehicles had been organized into a dust-producing platoon from 

which he expected good deceptive results. These, however, did 

not materialize. 

(2) It is dangerous for a force to leave a major strongpoint in its rear unguarded, even temporarily. If the forces available are inadequate to envelop the strongpoint, strong reconnaissance forces capable of combat should at least be left to 

keep it under observatian and, if possible, to contain it. 

(3) The British minefields, the extent and distribution of 

which were unknown to the German command, and the mined 

zones in the Ain el Gazala position frequently compelled the 

command to make tactically disadvantageous changes in its 

plans. Minefields also proved a good substitute for terrain 

obstacles, of which there is a lack in deserts. 

(4) Attack columns must be held together tightly, and 

units should only be detached for some separate purpose in 

cases of extreme urgency. 

(5) Commanders at higher levels should not change their 

positions too frequently, even if the attack is progressing favorably. The commander definitely must designate some specific 

spot as his command post and must maintain that post as a 

fixed point, even if the situation is unclear. 
47 

(6) In the case of air attacks on enveloped strongpoints 

or bases, it is necessary to designate the targets to be bombed 

with minute precision in order not to endanger the attacking 

ground forces. This is particularly difficult under desert conditions. 

(7) Supply columns are defenseless and require protection 

in convoys when the situation is unclear or confused; otherwise, 

they are apt to fall prey to enemy reconnaissance. 

(8) In defense positions, tanks also should be dug in at 

once. This should be done in such a manner that they can drive 

out of the positions immediately if necessary. The space between 

the tanks and the surrounding ground in the trenches provides 

good protection for personnel against enemy fire and bombs. 

g. August-Early November 1942: The Battles Around 

Alamein 

At the beginning of August, the strengths on both sides were 

about equal. Neither the British Eighth Army nor the German 

forces had any appreciable measure of superiority. Nonetheless, 

it was clear to Rommel that time was working against him and 

that as soon as the enemy had brought forward sufficient reinforcements, he would launch a powerful counteroffensive. 

Rommel, therefore, did everything possible to improve the 

German positions, with particular stress on the use of mines, 

including air bombs that were buried and prepared for electrical 

detonation. He even had what he called “mine gardens” laid in 

the outpost area and had all battalion command posts surrounded by minefields. In distributing the forces in the northern 

half of the defense line, which he considered the most endangered and which were in the zone of the Italian XXI Corps, 

he placed Italian battalions and battalions of the 164th Light 

African Division alternately. 

As soon as the supply situation permitted, Rommel intended 

to make another effort from the other end of the line to break 

through to Alexandria. However, for the moment, this was not 

possible, especially because of the fuel situation. Toward the end 

of the month, sufficient supplies of fuel would at last be available, if a large tanker that had left Europe managed to reach 

Tobruk. It was on this hope that Rommel-on the night of 

30-31 August, supported by the Italian Supreme Command and 

by Kesselring-based his plan to break through the southern 

part of the front (which was held by weaker forces than the 

rest of the British line) and advance by way of Alam el Halfa 

to Alexandria. 
48 

The breakthrough-which was to take place at night, at two 

points, as part of two waves-was delayed until after daybreak, 

with the German Africa Corps on the right and the 90th Light 

African Division on the left, followed by the Italian motorized 

corps as the second wave. After the commencement of the attack, 

the commander of the 21st Panzer Division was killed, and the 

commanders of the German Africa Corps and 90th Division were 

both wounded. When this blow was followed in the morning by 

the news that the German tanker, on its arrival in Tobruk, had 

been torpedoed and sunk, Rommel intended to break off the 

operation. However, the chief of staff of the German Africa Corps 

induced him to continue the attack, which was making good 

headway. Field Marshal Kesselring also emphatically favored 

continuation of the attack. The attack soon began to move 

forward, but already by the evening of 31 August, the shortage 

of gas began to make itself seriously felt. Furthermore, a sandstorm, which had been blowing continuously, stopped after several hours, and enemy air attacks commenced with an intensity 

that had not been experienced before. At this stage, the five 

German and Italian divisions were behind the enemy front, 

where they were unable to move for several days. Meanwhile, 

they were attacked by the enemy air forces daily between 

0700-1700 and 2200-0500 and suffered very heavy losses in 

personnel and materiel. Kesselring had promised to deliver 400 

tons of fuel per day by air if necessary, but only a fraction of 

this quantity reached the troops. The reason for this was that 

most of the fuel was consumed by the transporting planes 

themselves on the long trip. It was only on 3 September that 

sufficient fuel was available for the Germans to commence 

moving back to the jump-off positions, which were reached on 

6 September. 

The following weeks were utilized mainly to further improve 

the defense positions. The three German and three Italian mobile 

divisions (the Italian Litto& Armored Division had arrived 

meanwhile] were organized in three tactica reserve groups, one 

German and one Italian division to each group, and held ready 

for action. Toward the end of September, heavy air attacks were 

launched by the enemy against German airfields and ground 

installations of the German Air Force, signaling an impending 

British offensive. 

The offensive commenced at 2300 during the night of 23 

October, which was a dark, moonless night. 
49 

In this offensive, the British Eighth Army employed the 

following: 

3 armored divisions 

7 motorized infantry divisions 

7 tank regiments, which operated independently 

For the defense, Rommel had available: 

German forces- 2 panzer divisions 

2 light divisions 

1 parachute division 

Italian forces- 2 tank divisions 

1 motorized division 

1 parachute brigade 

4 infantry divisions 

The British had 1,200 tanks, among which were some of the 

latest Grant models. Rommel had 200 German and 250 Italian 

tanks, the latter of little value in combat. In the air, the Allied 

superiority was more pronounced than ever before, reaching a 

ratio of 1O:l at times in heavier-type bombing aircraft. In artillery and ammunition supplies, the enemy likewise was overwhelmingly superior. 

The British attack opened on the northern part of the front, 

with the point of main effort shifting southward later, and by 

29 October, the defenders had been forced to throw their last 

tactical reserves into the battle. The first attack was on the 

Italian strongpoints, and after taking these, the British enveloped 

the points still held by German forces. 

The “mine gardens” referred to previously did not have the 

desired effect because many of the mines had been detonated 

by the artillery fire or during bombing attacks. 

Although every inch of ground was hotly contested, a few 

kilometers being lost each day at the utmost, it was impossible 

for the Germans to hold the field permanently. Rommel, therefore, found himself forced to withdraw, if he did not want to 

risk complete destruction at Alamein. Consequently, he commenced withdrawing at the last possible moment on 3 November, 

contrary to Hitler’s express orders. By that time, the enemy had 

broken through the German lines on a front of twenty kilometers. 

The 90th Light Africa Division had been moved to the rear 

previously to take up support positions at Fuka, where no defense 

line had been prepared owing to the lack of forces. The bulk of 

the Italian forces were captured, because no vehicles were available to render them mobile, as had been done with the Parachute 
50 

Instruction Division and the 164th Division. A great part of 

the German divisions succeeded in escaping capture. 

From this phase of the campaign, the following important 

lessons were learned: 

(I) The decision to attack on 30 and 31 August with a 

very insecure supply situation and the hope that the 5,000 tons 

of fuel would arrive was risky, but to persist in this decision, 

after it was learned that the fuel tanker was sunk, resulted in 

dire consequences. 

(2) Once again, it was proved that only fully motorized 

units can be used in the desert. 

(3) The defense would have been more successful if some 

of the mines laid within the main battle zone had been used in 

the rear to compel the enemy to change the direction of his 

drive frequently. In this way, the effectiveness of the main defensive weapon would not have been spent so soon. 

(4) In transporting fuel by air, due allowances must be 

made for the fuel that the transporting planes themselves will 

consume. 

h. November 1942~January 1943: The German Retreat to 

the Border Between Libya and Tunisia 

The retreating troops, consisting almost exclusively now of 

German forces (particularly, the German Africa Corps and the 

90th Light African Division), did not succeed in establishing a 

new line of resistance at Fuka, and even Mersa Matruh had to 

be abandoned on 8 November because of the danger of its being 

bypassed. Whereas the German forces had been under constant 

attack from the air by day and by night, these attacks gradually 

decreased temporarily because of the effects of heavy rains on 

the British airfields in the Nile Delta. A halt of one day was 

called at Sidi Barani, where considerable elements of the Parachute Instruction Brigade rejoined the army. They had set out 

to march through the desert on foot but had captured vehicles 

in a successful raid on British supply columns so that they were 

again mobile. 

Thanks to the precautionary measures that had been taken 

to build up an effective antiaircraft defense there, the Halfaya 

Bass, which would have presented difficulties owing to the enemy 

superiority in the air, was crossed without serious losses. 

The idea of defending Tobruk was weighed but rejected almost 

immediately, as it would have amounted to voluntarily accepting 

a siege. The retrograde movement continued, the Cyrenaiea being 
51 

abandoned up to the Marada-Marsa el Brega line, which was 

reached by the first combat units on 18 November. Here, at 

last, there was an opportunity to reorganize the units. Rommel 

expected a long stay at this point, since the enemy required 

time to close up his units from the rear and to move his supply 

bases forward. 

On 28 November, Rommel flew to Hitler’s headquarters, where 

he unsuccessfully suggested that the African theater of operations be abandoned. After his return from this trip, he decided 

to construct a rear position at Buerat. On 8 December, work on 

this position commenced. German units that required a period 

of rehabilitation, namely, the 164th Light African Division and 

the Parachute Instruction Brigade, were employed for this purpose as well as rear elements of the German Africa Corps and 

native labor, all under the direction of the commander of the 

164th Light African Division. One of the main features planned 

by Rommel in this line was an antitank ditch in front of his 

positions, but owing to the lack of time and the inadequate labor 

forces available, he completed only parts of this ditch. 

On 10 December, Rommel found himself compelled to abandon 

the Marada-Marsa el Brega line, since he feared that it would 

be bypassed. For the same reason, he abandoned the Buerat 

positions on 18 January 1943. At no point did he have sufficient 

armored reserves with an adequate supply of fuel to counter 

any attempts the enemy might make to outflank him. 

Altogether, fuel supplies had become the major problem of 

this retreat. As no ships at all arrived in African ports, with 

the exception of a few military transports with a gross tonnage 

of 400 tons, the army was entirely dependent on air transportation for fuel supplies. On one single day, 200 tons were delivered in this way, but on all other days, the performances 

were far lower, rarely being more than 80 tons, and on one 

day, only 2 tons arrived. At any rate, the promised performance 

of 300 to 400 tons daily to be delivered by air was never achieved 

because of weather conditions and enemy activity. The fuel 

shortage was so serious that it was not even possible to take 

advantage of the favorable opportunities that frequently presented themselves to damage the pursuing enemy forces, since 

every drop of fuel had to be hoarded. Things got so bad that, 

in order to conserve fuel supplies, one motor vehicle was used 

to tow several others. This could usually be done along the 

coastal road, which was fairly level in most parts. 

On 23 January, Tripoli was abandoned, and the retreat continued towards the Tunisian border, which was reached by the 
52 

end of the month. Important experience gained in this phase of 

the African campaign include the following points: 

(1) Before the battle began, German Army Beadquarters 

should have combed out the transportation columns of the 

German Africa Corps and the 90th Division rigorously. Admittedly, these services were extremely limited, but a number of 

vehicles could have been obtained in this way to form a transportation reserve separate from the supply transportation 

services, and this reserve would have been available for the 

transportation of the infantry. 

(2) In the face of enemy superiority in the air, it is 

impossible to maintain supplies for large units by air. 

(3) During a retreat, all dispensable elements must be 

moved to the rear ahead of time, under a central command, 

and be directed firmly from point to point. This general rule 

equally applies in desert warfare. 

(41 It proved even more difficult than in the previous year 

to intercept stragglers, since there were no natural features in 

the terrain that facilitated the establishment of straggler-intercept 

lines. 

(S} Even during the retreat, the lack of engineer forces 

was seriously felt. 

(6) The mining of airfields by the indiscriminate seattering of mines proved to be effective for a shorter time than had 

been expected. 

(7) The Allied air forces made the mistake of attacking 

at regular times of the day, commencing their sorties at about 

0800 each day, ceasing them about 1200, and then continuing 

them from 1400 to 1700. The German troops were able to take 

advantage of the intervals to increase the speed of their march. 

i. November 1942-&fur& 1943: The Occupation of Tunisia 

and tlrze Battles Fought in Tunisia 

Extraordinarily heavy convoy traffic in the direction of the 

Straits of Gibraltar was observed on 6 November 1942. The 

Italian Supreme Command in Rome-as well as Field Marshal 

Kesselring, Commander in Chief, South,* and commander of the 

German Second Air Force-immediately feared that the Allies 

*Kesselring was given this title as the representative and coordinating head 

of German forces employed in the Mediterranean theater of war. Up to this 

point, he had command authority only over the air forces and, in a restricted 

degree, over the small naval combat units employed in the Mediterranean. 

_----...- _-~~-- 
53 

were going to land in force in French North Africa, a view 

which the Wehrmacht High Command, however, did not share. 

In fact, Goring, as commander in chief of the Luftwaffe, forbade 

the employment of strong air forces against the ship movements, 

which Kesselring had intended. 

When the Allied forces landed in Morocco and Algeria on 8 

November, they were met by French troops aIone. The German 

and Italian control organs of the Armistice Commission were 

only a few hundred strong and were valueless for combat 

purposes. 

It was only on 10 November that the Wehrmacht High 

Command ordered the Commander in Chief, South (who now, 

for the first time, was to take a part in ground operations) to 

occupy Tunisia. The only forces in Italy at that time were individual units of Rommel’s army that were awaiting transportation 

to Africa. No integrated body of troops was available. For this 

reason, the occupation of Tunisia bore the imprint of an improvisational measure from the outset. The first unit to be moved 

there was a guard battalion of the Luftwaffe, which was transported by air. This unit was followed by a fighter group and 

Italian elements. 

On 15 November, Lieutenant General Nehring,” as commander of Tunisia, assumed command over all units employed 

in Tunisia. He succeeded in gradually extending the occupation, 

which at first had been confined to the immediate surroundings 

of Tunis. By the end of November, Sfax and Gabes, in the south, 

were also occupied. 

After the transfer of additional German units, the advance 

units of the British First Army, operating in the north, were 

pushed back to Tabarka and Medjez el Bab. The port of Bizerta 

was surrendered by the French without any resistance. 

On 8 December 1942, General von Arnim, as commander of 

the newly created Fifth Panzer Army, assumed command over 

all army forces in Tunisia. Owing to the beginning of the rainy 

period, the Allied forces in Morocco and Algeria were unable to 

move their units eastward so that it was possible to consolidate 

the position in Tunisia by the end of the year and to establish 

an admittedly thin line of resistance against the British in the 

north, French forces in the center, and a U.S. corps in the 

*Commander of the German Africa Corps from February to September 1942, 

initially as deputy and then as successor to General Cruewell. 
54 

south-in a general line east of Tabarka-Medjez el Bab-FondukFaid-Maknassy. In the battles that took place on this front in 

early 1943, particularly in the central sector, a number of local 

German successes were gained. 

Early in February, RommeI arrived with his army along the 

Mareth Line. This was a line of French fortifications at the 

former border that had been stripped at the demand of Italy 

after the defeat of France in 1940. The Mareth Line offered 

several advantages: it was only thirty-five kilometers long, it 

was protected by a continuous line of antitank obstacles, and 

its south flank was securely anchored on the almost impassable 

Matmata hills. Thus, it would only be possible to dislodge the 

German-Italian Panzer Army by an enveloping movement 

entailing a wide detour. On the other hand, there was the disadvantage that the supply route to Tunis, which was more than 

400 kilometers long, could easily be cut by advancing U.S. forces, 

since the lOO-kilometer section between Maknassy and Schott el 

Djerid was not protected owing to lack of forces. 

To remove this threat to his rear, Rommel attacked at Faid 

on 14 February 1943, employing the bulk of his forces in the 

attack, some of them advancing by way of Gafsa, while the 

Allied forces were contained by elements at Fonduk. In this 

attack, he had available units of the Africa Corps-including 

the 2lst Panzer Division and the 10th Panzer Division, which 

had been made available to him temporarily by the Fifth Panzer 

Army. Rommel succeeded in breaking through at the Kasserine 

Pass at Faid and in advancing to Tebessa, which he held for 

ten days. The American troops, which were still unaccustomed 

to combat, suffered considerable losses, and for the time being, 

the threat to the rear communications was removed. However, 

Rommel no longer had sufficient forces for the drive on El Kef 

that Hitler and Goring desired. 

Since the German-Italian Armored Army under Rommel and 

the Fifth Panzer Army under von Arnim had now come into 

immediate tactical contact, a reorganization of the chain of 

command became urgently necessary. On 1 March 1943, the 

Army Group Africa was created and Rommel appointed as its 

commander. This army group was assigned the Fifth Panzer 

Army and the Italian First Army, the latter under the command 

of General Messer. Hitherto, the Italian First Army had been a 

part of Rommel’s army. The African Air Corps, which also had 

just been created, was to cooperate with the army group. 

On 6 March, the Africa Corps launched what was to be its 

last attack in Africa. The plan of this attack was to strike the 
55 

British Eighth Army on the flank while it was preparing for 

its new offensive. The armored units carrying out the attack 

were to operate from the Mareth Line. However, the general 

commanding the forces in this attack had no experience in this 

theater of operations, and the attack was halted by the heavy 

antitank defense of the enemy and, as a result, of the clear 

superiority of the enemy in the air. Heavy losses were suffered. 

Rommel had seriously doubted the chances of success from the 

beginning but was unable to escape the necessity of gaining 

time. 

At the express order of Hitler, Rommel left the African theater 

of operations on 9 March 1943, General von Arnim succeeding 

him as commander of the army group, while General von Vaerst 

assumed command over the Fifth Panzer Army. 

On 16 March, the British Eighth Army commenced its preparatory attacks against the Mareth Line, following up with the 

main attack on the night of 19 March. After crossing the antitank ditch, which was accomplished with difficuhy, the British, 

with strong air support, succeeded in expanding the penetration. 

Nevertheless, a German counterattack on 22 March succeeded 

in recovering the greater part of the ground that had been lost. 

Then, however, on 26 March, Montgomery, employing two divisions, succeeded in breaking through the flank position so that 

the Italian First Army had no choice but to withdraw to the 

Akarit wadi, where the line was thirty kilometers long and well 

protected on both flanks. 

The following are the main points of the experience gained 

in this phase of the campaign: 

(1) It took some time before the command and troops of 

newly arriving units in Africa accepted and adapted themselves 

to the conclusions that had to be drawn from the overwhelming 

Allied air superiority. One of these conclusions is that in ,the 

face of enemy air superiority, the employment of massed armored 

units is doomed to failure. 

(2) Once again, the value of speedy action was proved 

by the seizure of Tunisia, which took place solely with 

improvised means. 

(3) The hopes centered on the maintenance of the short 

supply route from Sicily to Tunis did not materialize. The chance 

no longer existed of forcing the enemy to dissipate his air 

reconnaissance and air combat forces by using a number of sea 

routes. The enemy was now able to concentrate his air attacks 

against the one existing sea and land route of supply. For this 
56 

reason, the supply situation, which was eased temporarily in 

early 1943, worsened steadily. From the end of March 1943 on, 

transportation by large ships, which was the only way in which 

requirements could have been met, ceased almost completely. 

j. April-May 1943: The Final Battles in Tunisia 

The attack by the British Eighth Army against the GermanItalian positions at the Akarit wadi began at daybreak on 6 

April. Although the defenders were taken by surprise, the attack 

failed to penetrate. However, the increasing number of Itahans 

who deserted showed how their morale was declining. In the 

German units, the shortage of ammunition for the artillery and 

special weapons was becoming more and more serious. 

An attack by the U.S. corps in the direction of Gafsa-Fonduk 

resulted in a breakthrough at Gafsa and, in view of the threat 

to the rear that now developed, made the evacuation of the 

Akarif wadi position unavoidable. 

In the rear of the Akarit wadi position was an extensive 

section of hilly country that offered poor protection for the west 

flank so that it was now necessary to retire to the Pont du 

Fahs-Enfidaville line, about 180 kilometers to the rear, and to 

abandon the intervening terrain to the enemy-almost without 

a fight. On 13 April, the Italian First Army moved into this 

line, which was about fifty kilometers long, and in doing so, 

for the first time made contact with the Fifth Panzer Army, 

which was holding the 120 kilometers of front extending from 

the coast in the north to Pont du Fahs. 

In May, event followed event in rapid sequence. On 3 May, 

the British First Army penetrated as far as Mateur, which 

necessitated withdrawal of the northern flank of the GermanItalian front to the area immediately’west of Bizerta. 

In the decisive and final attack, the enemy moved in two 

divisions of the British Eighth Army and directed his paint of 

main effort at the center of the sector held by the Fifth Panzer 

Army, which he penetrated with strong air support at 1530 on 

5 May. Tunis was captured by the Allied forces on the same 

day, Bizerta on 7 May. The southern flank, which was held by 

the Italian First Army, was not under such heavy pressure and 

was still intact when the western sector collapsed. 

On 12 May, all resistance by isolated groups ceased. Crowded 

together on the Cap Bon peninsula, more than 250,000 men, 

more than half of whom were German, were taken prisoner. 
57 

The Commander in Chief, South, had intended consolidating 

all staffs and withdrawing all specialists-such as gunners, radio 

specialists, tank crews, armorer artificers, and so forth-in order 

to fly them to Europe and thus prevent the capture of at least 

the more important personnel. He was supported in this intention 

by the Italian Supreme Command but was prevented from 

putting his plan into effect by the deputy chief of the Wehrmacht 

operations staff, who intervened in April. 

The following points concerning this final phase of the 

campaign in Africa deserve mention: 

(1) The smaller the area becomes that is available to the 

defending forces, the more concentrated will be the effects of 

the force attacking it with superior power, particularly in the 

present age of long-range weapons. A superior air force can 

almost completely paralyze all movements on the ground. 

(2) The brief descriptions of the individual phases of the 

campaign given in sections a to k show that the time chosen 

for attack varied; Rommel, for instance, preferred moonlit nights, 

while Montgomery chose a dark night at Alamein but, on the 

whole, usually commenced his offensives at various times of the 

morning. For the side that lacks air superiority, moonlit nights 

are particularly advantageous for attack, provided the troops 

have been adequately trained. 

(3) The side that is weaker in air strength must restrict 

all movements of troops and supplies to the night, as otherwise, 

raids by enemy fighter-bombers along the roads would cause 

heavy losses and might even bring all movements to a complete 

standstill for a considerable period of time. Movement at night 

requires careful planning and organization. Even for vehicles 

traveling alone, it is advisable during the daytime to avoid main 

roads. 

So far as the German side is concerned, the reasons for the 

defeat in Africa are to be found in the poor balance between 

ground forces, air forces, and naval forces. This poor balance 

resulted in the temporarily inadequate support rendered to the 

ground forces in November-December 1941 and the permanently 

inadequate support from the autumn of 1942 on, which was 

insufficient in spite of the self-sacrificing efforts that were made. 

The lack of balance also resulted in the constant lack of adequate air and naval protection for supply transportation from 

Europe to Africa, the volume of which was adequate only once, 

in April-May 1942. This inadequacy again resulted in the 

ground forces always being short of supplies and later in their 
58 

being handicapped by an acute lack of supplies of all kinds, 

particularly fuel and ammunition, 

In operations in an overseas theater of war, in particular, a 

well-considered balance between the three branches of the armed 

forces is of decisive importance. Attempts should never be made 

to offset deficiencies of strength in one branch by an increased 

use and augmentation of another-which, in the present case, 

was the army. 
III. SPECIAL FACTORS 

8. Dust 

a. Effect on Troops, Weapons, and Equipment 

Men in the desert are constantly exposed to the effects of 

dust. This bothers the fighting man all the more because he 

has to endure it in conjunction with heat and the lack of water. 

There is no universal remedy against dust in the desert. Dust 

is a betrayer that enables observers, both from the ground and 

the air, to perceive every movement for great distances, even 

by individual vehicles. 

Every footstep on the surface of the desert throws up dust 

and sand. Moreover, the almost perpetual winds carry along 

dust with them, generally in the form of dust columns as high 

as a house, which form themselves into whirlwinds and dust 

devils. In the beginning, the German troops in the desert suffered considerably from dust and had to fight against mental 

depression. However, they quickly became accustomed to it, so 

their fighting power was not affected to any appreciable extent. 

The dust in Africa does not cause any injury to health, since it 

does not contain any angular or sharp-edged particles that 

might lead to lung diseases. The eye inflammations caused by 

dust did not have any serious consequences. Wearing dust 

goggles proved helpful to the men, especially when traveling in 

the large clouds of dust produced by moving columns of motor 

vehicles. Therefore, all soldiers in the desert were equipped with 

a pair of dust goggles. 

The effects of dust on weapons and equipment, including 

motor vehicles, was considerable in the desert. Dust had the 

greatest effect on motor vehicles, because the dusty air that was 

sucked into the cylinders attacked the cylinders and pistons and 

caused these parts to wear out quickly. Special air filters 

reduced the wear but could not prevent it altogether. In generalpurpose cars (Volkswagens), the air intake openings were installed in the interior of the cars to give the engines purer air. 

In tanks, the air was sucked out of the battle compartment. In 

spite of this, the average lifetime of a Volkswagen engine in 

the desert was only 12,000-14,000 kilometers in comparison 

with 60,000-70,000 kilometers in other theaters of war. In the 

desert, it was necessary to change tank engines after about 

3,500 kilometers, while they would last for 7,000--8,000 kilometers in Europe. To be sure, this was due not only to the 

59 
60 

effects of dust but also, to a considerable degree, to the necessity 

of driving long distances cross-country in low gears, The other 

parts of motor vehicles (such as brakes, chassis, and all parts 

that could be penetrated by dust) also suffered considerably 

more wear and tear than under normal conditions. It is not 

possible to give any figures on this point. What is certain is 

that motor vehicles in the desert need substantially more Iubrication than in other theaters of war. No special greases and 

lubricants were used. 

The barrels of guns, as well as all unprotected moving parts, 

were especially affected by dust. The wear on barrels, therefore, 

was considerably higher, than in the European theater of war, 

Machine guns, submachine guns, and other smaI1 arms were 

the weapons most endangered, because inasmuch as they were 

used an the surface of the ground, they were especially exposed 

to the effects of dust. It was necessary, therefore, to protect all 

the movable parts of guns and equipment-especially the breechblocks-by such expedients as wrapping them up when not in 

use, covering them with shelter hafves, or by other means, The 

barrels of artillery pieces and rifles had to be provided with 

muzzle protectors whenever they were not being fired. In view 

of the effects of dust, special importance was attached to the 

care of weapons and equipment, as well as to cleaning them 

frequently. Impravised dust-proofing devices have been discussed 

in detail in the former German field manual Combat in. Deserts 

and Steppes and, therefore, no further mention will be made of 

them. 

b. Effect an Combat Operations 

The generation of dust made it practically impossible to 

conceal marching columns. Dust clouds could be seen even at 

great distances and enabled ane to recognize the size of the 

columns and sometimes even the type of vehicles (wheeled or 

tracklaying). On the other hand, the effects of dust were aIso 

taken advantage of far purposes of camouflage and deception. 

Dust was often created artificially in the desert, chiefly for 

purposes of deception. Rommel was the first to recognize the 

possibilities of this method, and he empIayed it up to the 

summer of 1942. However, even he often fell a victim to enemy 

deception measures. 

Concerning the importance and effects of dust, Field Marshal 

RommeI said: 

On 13 March 1941 I transferred my headquarters to Sirte so 

that. I could be closer to the front. In order to save time I 

attempted to reach this area by airplane. In the area af 
61 

Tauroga a sandstorm came up. The pilot of the airplane 

turned around, although I tried to get him to fly on. The 

trip was then continued by car. We were now forced to admit 

that we had had really no idea of the tremendous force of 

such a sandstorm. Huge clouds of a reddish blue hue 

obscured our vision and the car crawled slowly along the 

coastal road. Often the wind was so strong that one could 

not drive at all. Sand dripped down the car windows like 

water. It was only with difficulty that we could breathe 

through a handkerchief held in front of the face and perspiration poured from our bodies in the unendurable heat. That 

was the ghibli. In the silence I made my apologies to the 

pilot of my airplane. One Luftwaffe officer actually crashed 

with his airplane in the sandstorm that day. On 4 April 

1941 I got underway with my combat staff at 0300 in order 

to bring the artillery battalions into their positions before 

daybreak. In the complete darkness we did not find the 

columns. On the next morning we repeated our attempt and 

were finally able to locate the artillery. Among other things, 

we ran into the rear of a British outpost area without knowing it. Although we only had three vehicles, of which only 

one was fitted with a machine gun, we drove up to the 

enemy at high speed while raising a great deal of dust. This 

apparently made the Englishmen nervous and they evacuated their position in great haste, leaving weapons and 

materiel behind. 

In the description of the most important battles in the desert 

(see chapter II, section 7), further references appear concerning 

the effects of dust on combat operations. 

c. Effect on Tactical Measures 

During the first attack on Tobruk, dust had the following 

effects, concerning which we quote the following passage from 

Field Marshal Rommel’s diary: 

The “Brescia”’ and “Trento” Divisions were supposed to 

attack Tobruk from the west and to raise a great deal of 

dust in the process in order to deceive and pin down the 

enemy. During this time the main attack group was supposed to swing around south of Tobruk in a wide arc 

through the desert and attack from the southeast. The dust 

which was thrown up deceived the enemy so thoroughly that 

he guessed that the attack would come from the west and 

paid no attention to the enveloping movement. When the 

enveloping group had reached its jump-off positions, their 

columns were struck by heavy British artillery fire. However, 

the air was soon full of heat vibrations and gusts of sand 

blew into the faces of the enemy. Good visibility soon 

vanished completely. 
62 

On 11 April the encirclement of the fortress of Tobruk 

was completed. The “Brescia” Division opened the attack. A 

great deal of sand was blowing and the British artillery 

could therefore not be expected to direct any aimed fire. 

At about 1300 several enemy tanks moved past Ras el 

Madauer toward our lines. Because of the tremendous 

amount of dust, which moreover was being blown toward 

our positions, it could not be seen whether they were 

followed by any additional tanks and whether it was really 

a major attack. Therefore, I immediately committed all the 

antitank guns which were available in this area. It actually 

was a major attack and we succeeded in knocking out 

several tanks and halting the enemy advance. 

Around 1800 on 30 April a new attack was opened 

against Ras el Madauer. Numerous Stukas cooperated with 

us. Soon the hill was hidden in thick eIouds of smoke and 

dust. The visibility of the enemy was reduced to zero. It was 

impossible for them to deliver any aimed fire. Our attack 

led to a complete victory. 

During the advance of the German Africa Corps from the 

Alamein position into the British rear area, the effects of sand 

varied. After the Africa Corps had replenished its supply of 

motor fuel and ammunition on the morning of 1 September, it 

began to move about 1300. At first, the attack made good 

progress in the violent sandstorm, which bIew into the faces of 

the enemy. Unfortunately, the Italian divisions were far off and 

were unable to take advantage of the camouflage provided by 

the dust clouds in their advance. The vehicles and tanks toiled 

laboriously through the deep sand drifts that covered the attack 

areas. A fitful sandstorm raged all day and prevented the 

British Air Force from attacking in strong formations. When 

the sandstorm abated during the evening, the spearheads of our 

attack were engaged in stubborn combat with a strongly fortified enemy defense position, and the attack came to a halt. 

(Incidentally, reference might also be made here to the statements given in chapter II, section 7.) 

The intervals that the advancing units were ordered to keep 

from each other to avoid dust varied according to whether the 

dust cloud was being blown in the direction of the advance or 

to the side. Moreover, since these desert expanses were, in 

general, easily traversed by all kinds of motor vehicles, it was 

possible to drive with gaps between the separate vehicles, thus 

reducing the effect of dust on the driver and his visibility. In 

general, we used intervals of fifty meters, both in depth and 

width, During the night, this interval had to be shortened for 

the sake of visibility to maintain contact with the man in front. 
63 

The generation of dust through the recoil of the powder gases 

in artillery firing was of no special importance for the detection 

of artillery positions, because the combat zone was always 

enveloped in dust clouds anyhow. The discharges of guns of 

especially flat trajectory with a low-barrel elevation-antitank 

guns-could be observed and recognized with particular ease by 

the enemy because of their characteristic dust clouds. Naturally, 

they aIso prevented the gun crews from observing the effects of 

their own fire. 

d. Effect on Aircraft and Their Crews 

Sand and dust had no appreciable, immediate effect on airplanes and their engines, since sand filters were attached to 

the intake valves. Dust had no effect on the efficiency of the 

engines, but nevertheless one had to expect more rapid wear 

and tear on the engines, since very fine dust particles were not 

entirely kept out by air filters. Even the special precautions 

taken during refueling did not always provide 100 percent 

security. 

Very heavy sandstorms made flights practically impossible 

because of the extremely poor visibility when taking off. However, such storms were comparatively rare. The ghibli brought 

sand out of the interior at heights of as much as 5,000 meters; 

dust was still easily visible 100 kilometers out to sea and indeed 

occasionally was even carried as far as the European continent. 

This greatly hampered horizontal visibility, especially facing the 

sun. Sometimes visibility was reduced to below ten meters. On 

the other hand, vertical visibility was only slightly impeded. 

Nonetheless, it was only in exceptional cases that direct observation and aerial photography furnished satisfactory results 

about target details. In all airfields that consisted merely of 

sand, it was difficult and sometimes dangerous for several airplanes to take off and land together. When there was no wind, 

the dust remained hanging over the ground for an endlessIy 

long time so that in spite of extensive improvisations, formation 

takeoffs failed in their purpose. Landings had even more 

unfavorable effects, since machines with empty fuel tanks 

simply had to land in case they could not reach an alternate 

airport. When the wind was blowing, airplanes took off with a 

slight crosswind, so the dust raised by the takeoffs would be 

blown to one side and not disturb the pilots behind. Difficulties 

also arose in dropping bombs on point targets, since the dust 

thrown up by the first bomb made it impossible to sight the 

target accurately. Although the breathing, sight, and other functions of men in machines were hardly disturbed by sand, radio 
64 

equipment was more sensitive. Many radio failures could be 

traced to damage from dust. The most widely different methods 

were adopted to reduce the ill effects of dust at the airfields: 

(1) By selecting surfaces that were somewhat grassy or 

crusty, even if they possessed other disadvantages. 

(2) By laying out abnormally large airfields or several airfields located close together. 

(3) By reinforcing the surface of airfields with asphalt 

or mats. Nevertheless, dust and sand also had certain advantages for observers and scouts. They made it easier for scouts 

to detect every movement (by visible tracks), even on trails and 

airfields. However, inexperienced crews often overestimated the 

strength of the enemy. The tracks visible in the desert sand 

also enabled one to recognize where enemy troops had passed, 

as well as the strength and objective of movements. 

Besides the sand filters attached to the intake valves, no 

protective devices were installed either in the engines or in the 

airplanes themselves. On the ground, it was possible to protect 

airplanes, engines, and machine parts against sand only to a 

limited extent by the use of awnings. Repairs were made in 

repair tents. 

The German Army and the Luftwaffe, in general, protected 

themselves successfully against dust in the desert by the most 

widely different means and by taking particular care of 

weapons, equipment, and machinery. In general, weapons failed 

because of dust sooner than engines These failures, however, 

were not of vital importance. 

9. Terrain 

a. Influence on Tactical Measures 

From the general description of terrain given in chapter II, 

section 4, it is apparent that, with the exception of places with 

deep sand and rugged valleys, the desert in the combat zone of 

the German troops was, in general, passable for both wheeled 

and tracklaying vehicles. 

The influence of terrain on tactical operations is just as decisive in the desert as in other theaters of war. It is more difficult, 

however, to take advantage of the peculiarities of the terrain 

for one’s intentions, sinee due to the lack of forests, cultivated 

areas, villages, etc., it is seldom possible for troops to approach 

and assemble under cover. Nonetheless, even in the desert, there 

are widely different opportunities to take advantage of the 

terrain. For example, troop assemblies can be concealed in 
65 

ravines and valleys from ground observation and-to a limited 

extent-even from air observation. 

In both attack and defense, the important thing was always 

to have reconnoitered the terrain carefully in advance. In attack, 

importance was attached to choosing ground that could be 

easily traversed by motor vehicles and, especially, which offered 

a covered approach, at least in part, through the utilization of 

terrain contours. The fact that the desert surface was easily 

traversed by motor vehicles made it easy to advance in light 

formations with few casualties, as well as to make all kinds of 

enveloping movements. In actual practice, few limitations 

existed on freedom of movement. Thus, it was also easily possible to shift the direction of an attack. During an attack, the 

tank battle always occupied the foreground. Attempts were made 

to compensate for the lack of good observation posts by sending 

out forward observers. Difficulties arose for attackers if they 

were compelled to use the southern portion of the desert proper, 

which in places was covered with soft soil. In its attack of 

30 August 1442 from the Alamein position, the Africa Corps 

had to contend with these difficulties, Above all, many motor 

vehicles became stuck in the passes that led from the ridge of 

hills to the depressions and thus offered welcome targets to the 

enemy air forces. The failure of this attack can be attributed, 

in part, to the unfavorable ground, together with the overwhelming air superiority of the enemy, the weakness of our own 

forces, and the lack of motor fuel. 

In defense, terrain was preferred that offered an opportunity 

to prepare reverse-slope positions echeloned in depth. Moreover, 

the efforts of the troops to “crown the heights,” which was 

dictated by the desire to see farther into the country lying 

ahead, had to be constantly combated. Units naturally desired 

to have terrain in front and on the flanks that was not easily 

traversed by motor vehicles, but this wish could seldom be fulfilled. The following positions offered the most favorable opportunities for defense in the North African desert: 

(1) At the El Alamein position, it was necessary to 

defend a strip of open desert and steppes sixty kilometers long 

by field fortifications. There were no possibilities for envelop 

ment movements by major formations, since the position was 

blocked off on both flanks. In the north, it was protected by 

the Mediterranean. In the south, the position had direct-flank 

protection in the form of the northern edge of the Qattara Depression (Senke), which has only three easily guarded passes, 

namely, the one directly west of the Alamein position at 
66 

Munquar Abu Dweis, then along the trail between Mersa 

Matruh and the Quara Oasis, and along the trail between the 

Quara Oasis and the Siwa Oasis. Of these passes, only the first 

was actually guarded by minefiefds and troops; the two others, 

however, were utilized by the small sabotage teams of the Long 

Range Desert Group to penetrate the German rear area. 

Furthermore, the sandy soi of the Qattara Depression itself, 

which was filled with salt marshes, hampered movements by 

major units. Farther to the south, the great sandy desert served 

as a barrier to the hinterland. The only passage between the 

steep edge of the Qattara Depression and the sandy desert led 

through the Siwa Oasis, which was fortified as a strongpoint. 

(2) Farther to the west, the Marsa el Brega position was 

the first to offer good opportunities for defense again. Here, the 

area of steppes and desert south of the coast contains many 

salt marshes and dunes so that only narrow zones have to be 

guarded by field fortifications. The open desert begins south of 

the El Faregh wadi and extends to the area north of the 

Marada Oasis. The attackers, therefore, are forced to make a 

wide detour. 

(3) The Tarhuna-Hams position east and south of Tripoli 

is flanked by the Djebel Nefusa in Tripolitania and takes 

advantage of the mountainous terrain, which is not easily 

covered by motor vehicles.* Since the mountains descend steeply 

to the west but gently to the east, it can be more easily defended 

from attacks from the west. 

(4) The two positions farthest west, which are the ones 

most favored by nature, lie in southern Tunisia in the area of 

Mareth and Gabes. The former takes advantage of the heights 

of the Matmata Mountains and is protected against extensive 

envelopment in the south by the Great Eastern Erg (region of 

sand dunes). There is open terrain there in the form of a 25- 

kilometer strip between the coast and the Djebel Matmata 

(eighty kilometers wide between the southern end of the 

Matmata Mountains and the great sandy desert}. The Mareth 

position could be enveloped along this strip eighty kilometers 

wide, as first became evident during the fighting around the 

Mareth position. 

The Akarit position situated north of Gabes is partially protected along its front and in its southwestern flank by salt 

*The word “djebel,” when used as part of a place name, indicates that the 

area mentioned is near a mountain (CSI editors). 
67 

marshes, which cannot be traversed by major units, and in the 

northeast by the sea. During the fighting here, the British broke 

into the position at the places that were not protected by salt 

marshes and forced the defenders to surrender. 

Between the five positions named above, there were also 

three more defense lines that were used by either the Germans 

or the British during the hostilities. These positions were without any protecting obstacles and were only estabhshed as the 

result of the combat situation at the time, when the area behind 

them had to be held by the defender for tactical reasons. These 

were the following: 

The Sollum position had no frontal obstacles. All: strongpoints 

had to be dug into the ground. The northern flank was protected 

by the sea; the southern flank was open and could be easily 

enveloped. This position was chosen out of necessity, since the 

Germans intended to hold Tobruk and since this position was 

the key to the coastal highway and the important Halfaya Pass. 

Mobile units were organized behind the defense front to repel 

any enemy attempts at envelopment by mobile operations. During the British offensive in the winter of 1941, the front of this 

position was pinned down and enveloped in the south by strong 

British forces. 

The Gazala position west of Tobruk was selected by the 

British as an outpost area for the fortress of Tobruk. It had no 

frontal obstacles, was protected in the north by the sea, and 

was open in the south. In May 1942, Rommel surrounded this 

position in a wide enveloping movement. 

The Buerat position east of Tripoli had one weak frontal 

obstacle (Wadi Zem-Zem). The northern flank was protected by 

the sea; in the southern flank were several wadis that could be 

easily overcome by an attacker. Occupation of this position was 

ordered by the Wehrmacht High Command for the purpose of 

defending the eastern outpost area of Tripoli. It was enveloped 

by Montgomery during the British offensive in January 1943. 

The three positions mentioned above were thus of slight 

value for the defense. The terrain situated between all these 

eight positions is unsuitable for a lasting defense, because everywhere it contains more or less extensive areas of open desert 

and steppes. A defense in these areas, therefore, can only be 

conducted along mobile lines. 

The fact that for a distance of 3,800 kilometers, there are 

only five natural defense positions of any use shows the great 

superiority of the attacker in desert warfare. 
68 

b. Influence on the Construetim of Field Fortifications and 

the Use of Weapons 

The German troops constructed only field-type fortifications 

in the desert. In building them, an effort was made to keep the 

upper slope at ground level to prevent the enemy from recognizing them too soon. Special difficulties arose in constructing pasitions for antitank guns and heavy antiaircraft guns (high 

superstructures). These positions had to be emplaced on the 

reverse slope. In places where this was not possible, the 

expedient was adopted of keeping these weapons in readiness 

in some place in the rear and not bringing them up to the position until they were urgently needed. 

No experience was gained in the construction of permanent 

fortifications. However, it should be pointed out that the Italians 

laid out the fortifications of Tobruk so cleverly that they met 

with Rommel’s unqualified appreciation. The Italian emplacements, which were level with the ground, were later introduced 

into the German Army as “‘Tobruk positions” and used both in 

Italy and on the Western Front, 

From a purely technical point of view, it is extremely difficult 

to prepare field fortifications in the North African steppes and 

desert. Wherever the ground in the steppes is stony, it is very 

hard, because there is a layer of so-called surface chalk on the 

surface. This layer is formed when the rain water absorbed during the winter rises to the surface again during the summer 

and evaporates. During this process, the dissolved matter, such 

as chalk, silicic acid, etc., is separated again and cements the 

top layers into a firm crust having a thickness of from fifty 

centimeters to two meters. Under this surface chalk layer, there 

is a so-called lixiviation stratum that is especially soft and therefore easier to work. In constructing field fortifications, it is first 

necessary to labariously blast away the surface chalk layer. 

Work of this kind can only be done if sufficient time is available. If a temporary defense system is being established, one 

has to be content with erecting positions built out of such stones 

as may be laying around or else use steep slopes or ravines 

and fissures to get at the lixiviation stratum quickly. 

The surface chalk layer is of maximum depth in the steppe 

area, which extends about thirty kilometers from the coast to 

the interior. In the desert proper, its thickness and firmness 

diminish, and it is finally replaced by a gravelly crust a few 

centimeters thick, which is of only slight importance for the 

construction of field fortifications. 
69 

Naturally, foxholes and shelters can be dug in the loose loam 

or clay of the depressions. However, because of the complete 

lack of timber, construction work presents difficulties, so it is 

necessary to limit one’s self to bare essentials, The use of sandbags and sand-filled gasoline containers is of great importance. 

Difficulties with underground water have to be expected in 

the salt marshes, in which there is saltwater to a depth of about 

one meter, even when the surface is dry. 

It is impossible to lay minefields in rocky soil; in ground 

consisting of loam, clay, and sand, it is necessary to bear in 

mind that the mines will be exposed within a few weeks because 

of the action of the wind or else be clearly visible. 

Experience has shown that the effects of artillery and 

machinegun fire are substantially more intense on rocky ground 

than on soft ground. Shells fired with percussion fuzes do not 

penetrate the ground and therefore can have an especially 

strong fragmentation effect. If solid projectiles are fired, the 

effect is increased by the frequent ricochets. 

If it is at all possible to construct fortifications-this requires 

time and a great deal of materiel-they provide especially good 

protection. As an example, it might be mentioned that on some 

occasions, the Africa Corps used dried-up cisterns (indicated on 

maps by the word Bir), dating from Roman times, as command 

posts, ammunition dumps, and shelters for the troops. These 

cisterns had a small influx hole in the upper chalk layer, 

beneath which were large square caves of about 100 square 

meters and larger in area that extended through the lixiviation 

stratum. The roofs consisted merely of a layer of surface chalk 

one or two meters thick and were not supported for a length of 

thirty-five meters. Nevertheless, they held out against heavy 

artillery bombardments and air raids. 

How difficult it is to capture well-constructed fortificationsif they are resolutely defended-became evident during the siege 

of Tobruk, from April to November 1941; in the engagements 

around the desert fortress of Bir el Hacheim, south of Tobruk, 

in June 1942; and on the El Alamein front, from July to October 

1942. 

The most important fortresses of the North African desert 

were Tobruk, Bardia, and Mersa Matruh-as well as the 

Alamein position, which was constructed like a fortress. The 

three former fortresses served to protect coastal harbors; the 

latter was a barrier erected at the gateway to Egypt. All desert 

fortresses were built in such a way that their works cannot be 
70 

seen from the ground; thgt is, they were built level with the 

ground, had low-wire obstacles, communication trenches that 

were mostly of concrete, and strong antitank ditches. At the 

fortress of Tobruk, the outer ring consisted of two lines of strong 

positions that were not built like bunkers with embrasures but 

were completely sunk in the ground. In some places, the works 

in the outer line were surrounded by an antitank ditch. This 

antitank ditch was partly covered with light boards and a thin 

layer of sand and stones so that its outline could not be 

perceived even at close distances. The average length of one 

work was eighty meters. The work itself consisted of several 

shelters, well protected with concrete, that together could aecommodate a crew of thirty to forty men. The different shelters were 

connected by a communication trench with combat positions for 

machine guns, antitank guns, and mortars at their points of 

intersection. Like the antitank ditch, the communication trench, 

which was about two and a half meters deep, was also covered 

over with boards and a thin layer of earth, which could be 

easily opened at any desired point. The works were surrounded 

with strong wire obstacles, and the individual positions were 

connected by barbed-wire obstacles. The second line, which was 

about 200-300 meters behind the first, was of similar design. 

The desert terrain had a great influence on the selection and 

use of the various weapons. It was found that one cannot have 

too many tanks in the desert, for because of the almost unlimited possibilities for using and deploying tanks, they bear 

the brunt of desert warfare. An abundant supply of antitank 

guns is necessary, since in view of the almost endless distances, 

reconnaissance naturally assumes special importance. 

All guns should have the longest possible range, since the 

enemy can be seen even at a great distance, and it is necessary 

to get him accurately within your sights before he has you 

covered. Since there is very little cover and only a few reverseslope positions in the desert, it is advisable, for the most part, 

to use only weapons and vehicles (including tanks) with a low 

superstructure. With tanks, it is especially important to have 

one that is fast, maneuverable, and equipped with a long-range 

gun. Then, the question of whether the armor plate is of greater 

or lesser thickness is of no vital importance. 

In the course of time, mines acquired tremendous importance 

in the desert. They were generally used for furnishing unobstructed terrain with artificial obstacles. All fortresses, strongpoints, and fortifications were protected by minefields. In the 

course of the fighting, the employment of mines in the desert 

developed into a real art on both sides. 
71 

c. The Tactical Importance of the Recognition of Vehicle 

Tracks by Air Observation 

The tracks of motor vehicles in the desert can be easily 

recognized in aerial photographs. Together with other observations, tracks were constantly evaluated for the following 

purposes: 

l To discover troop assemblies and concentrations. 

l To ascertain enemy supply routes. 

* To determine whether terrain in enemy territory was 

passable for motor vehicles. 

It was, therefore, often possible to detect enemy movements 

in the flanks and rear of friendly territory, especially the 

movements of the British long-range reconnaissance detachments that were operating in the area of the German-Italian 

front. 

d. The Use of Vehicle Tracks for Deception of the Enemy 

An attempt at this form of deception was made during the 

first few months of the African campaign, but it was later 

abandoned because the expenditure of motor fuel was disproportionate to the results achieved. 

e. The Use of Wheeled and Track Vehicles 

The only track vehicles used in the desert were tanks, guns 

mounted on tank chassis, and antitank guns. The armored personnel carriers and artillery prime movers were half-track 

vehicles. 

Wheeled vehicles, the same types as were also used in Europe, 

were employed for all other purposes, especially to transport 

troops, equipment, and supply goods, as well as to tow guns in 

an emergency. 

Whereas track and half-track vehicles were able to traverse 

all kinds of desert terrain, wheeled vehicles frequently had 

difficulties, especially in getting over sand dunes or steep 

slopes. It would be desirable to use only tracklaying or halftrack vehicles in desert operations. Then, there would be no 

difficulties whatsoever in moving troops, weapons, equipment, 

and supplies-except in getting over salt marshes. 

Instructions concerning driving in the desert are contained 

in the German field manual, Combat in Desert and Steppes. 

These instructions were written on the basis of the experience 

gained by German troops in the desert and can be described as 

very useful. 
72 

f. Influence of Desert Terrain on the Development of New 

Tactical Principles for the Use of Motorized Units 

Since desert warfare is determined by the terrain and has to 

be carried out on a mobile basis, mobile engagements will be 

decided almost exclusively by motorized units. Combat in this 

open, unobstructed terrain must be carried on after the manner 

of a naval battle. Above all, it is essential to recognize the 

enemy’s intentions quickly and react immediately to them. This 

is only possible if the chain of command is short. The commanders, therefore, must be stationed in the immediate vicinity 

of, or right among, the combat troops and should not be 

hampered in their decisions by orders from headquarters that 

are far from the front. In desert warfare, a unit commanded 

from a rear headquarters runs the risk of being encircled and 

annihilated. 

To a large extent, Rommel’s victories were based on the fact 

that he realized these tactical necessities of desert warfare and 

consistently acted accordingly, while the British adhered strictly 

to orders that they had received a Iong time previously and 

were no longer applicable to the existing situation. Rommel’s 

successes diminished as he became more and more bound by 

orders from higher headquarters in. Germany and Italy. 

Other points must also be considered: 

* Open country permits a rapid concentration of forces at 

the decisive point. 

0 Long-range weapons of all types are of decisive 

importance. 

l The troops engaged in operations should carry along 

supplies for as long a time as possible, sinee it is often impossible to send supplies after them because their lines of communication are threatened. Supplies must often be sent to the troops 

by the convoy system. 

Field Marshal Rommel expressed his own views concerning 

the influence of the desert terrain on the development of a new 

system of tactics for motorized units as follows: “‘The North 

African desert was probably the theater where war was waged 

in its most modern form. On both sides the brunt of the fighting 

was borne by completely motorized units, for use of which there 

were highly favorable opportunities in this level, unobstructed 

terrain.“’ 

Here, it was possible to really apply the basic principles for 

the conduct of tank warfare as they had been taught in theory 
73 

before the war-and especially to amplify them. Here, out-andout tank battles were fought between division-size armored units. 

Although the war slowed down into infantry and position warfare from time to time, its most important phases-the British 

winter offensive of 1941-42 and the German summer offensive 

of 1942-demonstrated the principles of full mobility. In desert 

warfare, against a motorized or armored opponent, nonmotorized 

troops can only hold their own in elaborately prepared positions. If such a position is breached or outflanked, a retreat 

means delivering up such troops to the enemy. The most troops 

can do is to resist in their positions to the last cartridge. During 

the withdrawal from Cyrenaica in the winter of 1941-42, practically all the Italian infantry and many German infantry units 

had to be moved out by shuttle traffic of a few truck columns 

or else march on foot. Only sacrifices by the motorized units 

made it possible to cover the retreat of the German and Italian 

infantry units. Moreover, Field Marshal Graziani’s failures in 

the winter of 1941-42 were largely due to t,he fact that a large 

part of the nonmotorized Italian Army was helplessly exposed 

in the open desert to attacks by inferior numbers of completely 

motorized British troops. The weak Italian motorized forces could 

not engage the British with any prospect of success. 

From the nature of warfare in the Libyan and Egyptian 

deserts, it is possible to derive principles that differ from those 

applicable in other theaters of war. 

For instance, enemy units encircled in a pocket can be 

destroyed under the following circumstances: 

(1) When they are nonmotorized enemy forces or forces 

that must give support to other troops that lack mobility. 

(2) When they are enemy forces that are clumsily 

employed or forces whose commander has decided to sacrifice 

them in order to rescue other forces. 

(3) When they are enemy forces whose strength is already 

broken so that signs of disorganization and panic are visible 

among them. 

The following points are also worthy of mention: 

(I) A commander should strive to concentrate his own 

forces with respect to time and space, while, at the same time, 

attempting to scatter his opponents and defeat them one at a 

time. The terrain offers unlimited possibilities for such action. 

(2) Supply routes in the open desert are unusually vulnerable. A commander should protect his own supply routes with 
74 

all available forces and try to destroy or cut off those of the 

enemy. Operations across the enemy’s lines of communications 

can often force him to break off an attack at another point, 

since the supply system is essential for combat and therefore 

must be protected above all else. 

(3) The armored troops are the backbone of the motorized 

army. Everything depends on the tank; the other units are there 

merely to support it. Therefore, the battle of attrition against 

the enemy armored units must be fought as much as possible 

by one’s own tank-destroyer units. One’s armored troops should 

deliver the final thrust. 

(4) Reconnaissance data should reach the command in 

the shortest possible time, and the command should make its 

decisions and convert them into action as quickly as possible. 

The commander who reacts the quickest wins the battle. 

(5) It is the speed of one’s own movements and the 

organizational unity of the troops that decides the battle and 

deserves special attention, since desert terrain places hardly any 

obstacles in the way of swift movements. 

(6) It is of great importance to conceal one’s intentions. 

Deception maneuvers should be encouraged by all means, in 

some cases to make the enemy commander uncertain and induce 

him to resort to caution and delay. 

(7) When the enemy has been thoroughly beaten, the 

attempt can be made to exploit one’s success by overtaking and 

destroying major elements of his defeated units. Here, too, speed 

in exploiting unobstructed desert terrain is everything. It is 

necessary to reorganize one’s forces for the pursuit as rapidly 

as possible, as well as to reorganize the supply system quickly 

for the offensive units. 

g. Influence of Rainfall on Mobility in Desert Terrain 

In the steppes, heavy rainfalls occur only a few days in the 

year and in the desert proper even more rarely. A few hours 

after the rain has commenced, the wadis begin to fill with 

water. The water rises quickly and converts the otherwise dry 

valleys into raging torrents. In the first winter of the African 

campaign, the troops lost equipment and even men as the result 

of this natural phenomenon. In spite of the fact that the troops 

had been warned and were required to evacuate the wadis, there 

were still numerous living quarters in the valleys during the 

first big rainfall. The water began to rise during the night and 

washed away tents and motor vehicles. 
75 

The strong effects of the rain could be attributed above all 

to the fact that the troops were stationed in the mountainous 

area between Tobruk and Bardia, which was full of numerous 

steep slopes and deep wadis. In the area of El Alamein (winter 

1942-43), the effects of the rains, which commenced at the 

beginning of October, were substantially slighter, because the 

terrain was more level and the troops had gained experience in 

the meantime. 

After a rainfall, the water collects in depressions and lowlands and renders them impassable. In the steppes near the 

coast, large connected areas became impassable for traffic for 

this reason. It was even impossible to drive over the trails, since 

most of them followed the depressions. After one or two days, 

the water evaporated and the difficulty was removed. 

In the desert proper, rain had less effect on the surface. The 

water collected quickly in clay pits and changed them into lakes 

that lasted for several days-in some places even for several 

weeks. However, the water only filled the deepest parts of the 

depressions, while the border areas, where the troops generally 

pitched camp, remained dry. On the whole, rain had only a 

slight effect on the passability of terrain in the desert proper. 

Rainfalls, however, had considerable influence on military 

operations during the retreat from the Alamein position in 1942. 

Near Fuka, one panzer unit became stuck fast so that the tanks 

had to be blown up. However, the rain bothered the British even 

more. They could not carry out their pursuits because of the 

mud, while the German troops continued their retreat along the 

coastal highway without interruption. 

10. Water 

a. General 

The water supply for the German troops in Africa was never 

a troublesome problem; therefore, it did not influence or hamper 

operational decisions. The chief reason for this was that there 

were always enough wells available. Moreover, in the Africa 

Corps, the entire water supply for the German troops was centralized and was under the supervision of the corps surgeon. 

b. Requirements for Troops and Vehicles, Economy Measures, etc. 

During active operations, four to five liters of water were 

provided as a minimum supply for one man per day. This 

quantity was only issued to the field kitchen, which used it for 

cooking and making tea and coffee. Pure water was never issued 
76 

as drinking water. During quiet periods, unlimited amounts of 

water were issued to the troops whenever possible. 

The amount of water required daily by a battalion with an 

actual strength of 600 men-not including water for motor vehicle radiators-was about 3,000 liters. The amount of water 

required by the medical units was fixed at twice as much per 

man per day, i.e., about eight or ten liters. The amount of water 

required for the radiators of motor vehicles varied according to 

the types of engines and fluctuated between three and ten liters 

per vehicle per day. The figures for the water rations were 

generally the same at all times of the year. 

There were no impartant effects caused by evaporation No 

appreciable losses occurred because of evaporation, since the 

water was poured directly into covered containers or tanks at 

the standpipes and remained in them until it was used. Two 

other points deserve mention: 

* The problem of keeping water cool remained unsolved. 

0 There is no data available concerning the relation between water requirements and evaporation at different times of 

the year and in different temperatures. 

In combat units serving in the desert, the water consumptian 

was generally so limited that the men even had to go without 

washing almost entirely. Each man usually received a canteen 

(three-fourths of a liter) in the morning filled with coffee or tea, 

which had to last the whole day. Normally no water was used 

to clean vehicles and equipment. 

e. Water and Motor-Fuel Requirements 

In all combat operations, our chief concern was about motor 

fuel and not about the water supply. Only the garrison of 

IIalfaya suffered severely from the lack of water after its well 

had been destroyed by gunfire. 

d. Tactical I”mportance of the Presence of Water Sources 

Even in the operations of advance detachments, the motor 

fuel supply was of more importance than the water supply. This 

is especially remarkable if one compares the required quantities. 

For example, a tank needs an average of 50 liters of motor fuel 

for 100 kilometers, whereas, the three crew members need only 

an average of 12 to 15 liters of water per day. Added to this is 

the radiator water, averaging about seven liters. In a daily run 

of 100 kilometers, therefore, each vehicle requires 50 liters of 

motor fuel and 22 liters of water. 
77 

No great lack of water developed because the fighting was 

always in the coastal area. In numerous places in the coastal 

dunes, there were sufficient supplies of fresh water to take care 

of the needs of the troops. Above a stratum of salty underground 

water, there was a more or less thick stratum of fresh water 

that was constantly increased during the winter by rainfall and 

which did not evaporate in summer as much as in areas farther 

from the coast. This water was collected by laying out an 

extensive network of drainage ditches and by careful pumping. 

If too much fresh water was removed, the salt water underlying 

it forced its way in and rendered the installation useless. 

There are water sources of this kind in the sand dunes along 

the entire western coast of Egypt from Sollum to El Alamein. 

In addition, there are a number of wells in the solid rock in 

the coastal plains that yield fresh water. 

East of Sollum and extending as far as Ain el Gazala, there 

is a strip of steep coastline that has no continuous ridges of 

sand dunes and therefore contains only a few water sources of 

this kind. Here, it was necessary to dig for water in the bottoms 

of the wadis that opened on the sea, but only small quantities 

could be found, and it was of poor quality. The water-supply 

situation of the German troops, therefore, was at its worst 

during the siege of Tobruk and during the defense of the Sollum 

front. During this time, the troops were given water that was 

barely palatable and that contained one gram of cooking salt 

per liter. Some times, it was only agreeable to the taste if used 

in hot coffee. The result was a great increase in the number of 

intestinal diseases. 

Farther to the east, the water supply becomes better as one 

approaches Gyrenaica. Here, there are several large and efficient 

water sources that assure an ample supply for fairly large 

numbers of troops. In Cyrenaica itself, there are many abundant 

springs in the chalky formations of the soil that can meet any 

requirements with respect to water. The coastal area from 

Benghasi contains numerous deep wells and surface wells and 

is therefore adequately supplied with water. 

West of Agedabia, the coast becomes flat again and is enclosed by broad ridges of sand dunes that contain an adequate 

number of water sources. Finally, in the surroundings of Tripoli, 

there is an extensive stratum of underground water, which is 

one reason why this region, relatively speaking, is so thickly 

settled. Here, water is pumped mostly by windmills. 
78 

All these water sources are limited to a narrow strip of the 

coast. Outside of this strip, there are no springs or wells whatsoever that could be of any use for supplying major troop units. 

There are merely cisterns, most of which no longer contain any 

water. Only a few modern cisterns produce water into the summer. From August to November, even these cisterns are generally 

empty. 

Occasionally, there are water sources (indicated on the maps) 

in rubble-filled wadis situated below steep slopes. Usually, wells 

have also been dug there, but they are always dry. If new wells 

are dug, only damp sand will be found. These wells are dug by 

the men in camel caravans, who obtain the necessary water for 

their animals by this artifice. Water sources of this type are 

worthless for supplying a military unit. 

Large amounts of water are found also in the chains of oases 

along the nineteenth parallel, which includes the Siwa, 

Giarabub, Gialo, and Marada Oases. The artesian wells found 

here have their source in an underground river that is fed from 

the rainwater falling in the Sudan and which flows northward 

underneath the desert. Since the above-mentioned oases are 

situated below sea level, it cannot be assumed that the underground river flows any farther to the north. It is also impossible, 

therefore, to abtain any fresh water by deep borings in the area 

north af the oases chain. 

The above account shows that the only reliable place for 

obtaining water was aIong the strip of coast where it was naturally available. If military operations had been carried out in 

the interior of the desert, water would undoubtedly have been 

the decisive factor that would have determined the strength of 

the troops and their radius of action. As it was, however, it 

was always possible to make use of the water sources, which 

were most favorably situated with respect to the front, although 

it was sometimes necessary to transport the water as far as 

100 kilometers. In view of the Germans’ bad situation with 

respect to motor fuel, traveling this distance was certainly a 

considerable burden. For drinking purposes on the Alamein 

front, the new expedient was adopted of making use of a temparary lake, which was formed of rainwater from the southern 

part of the front and filtered by equipment. 

Of the large oases, only Siwa and Giarabub acquired any 

major tactical importance. The Siwa Oasis enabled the Germans 

to close off the only passage between the steep side of the range 

and the sandy desert during the fighting on the Alamein front 

and thus pratect their flank. The Giarabub Oasis was used by 
79 

the British as a strongpoint and base for their attack against 

the encircling ring around the fortress of Tabruk in November 

1942. 

e. Assignment of Engineer Troops for Water-Supply Services 

Engineers were only used for obtaining water in the beginning; the work was then assigned to water companies. The 

water-supply company of the German Africa Corps had the following equipment: 

(1) Several centrifugal pumps, driven by mobile power 

generators, with a lifting height of at least ten meters. 

(2) Several mobile water-purification units. 

(3) A motor-driven water filter with a diaphragm for the 

purpose of obtaining sterile water (not to be confused with 

chemically pure water). All the above equipment was used in 

all the units of the German Army and therefore was not designed for Africa alone. 

(4) After late summer 1942, water distillation plants for 

the purpose of obtaining drinking water from seawater were also 

added. 

(5) A laboratory, the chemist of which had to pass on 

the wells and analyze the water in them.* 

Water was divided into the following categories according to 

quality: 

No. 1 Water, which could be used for all purposes. 

No. 2 Water, which could be used for cooking. 

No. 3 Water, which could be used for motor vehicles, 

washing, etc. 

f. Well-Drilling Equipment 

On the whole, no experience was gained concerning well 

drilling. The Abyssinian wells, with which the troops were 

equipped, did not prove suitable for this purpose.** 

Some of the water-supply companies were equipped with 

heavy, mobile, deep-boring equipment, Salzgitter-type (Meissel 

percussion drills). Their size and efficiency are not known. They 

were not actually put to use and probably would not have been 

*It should be borne in mind that too large a concentration of magnesium 

sulphate in the water may lead to intestinal irritations and thus intestinal 

diseases (author’s note). 

**These wells were perforated pipes, driven into the ground, that gathered 

ground water. 
80 

successful. If the fighting had shifted to the area south of the 

nineteenth parallel, the Germans would have been in the region 

of the static underground water stratum and probably could 

have used the heavy-boring equipment to advantage. It probably 

would have taken several weeks to make a boring of this kind. 

The Benoto drill-a drilling scoop attached to a heavy plummeting weight, on the underside of which were sharp, movable 

steel claws-proved useful for operations in the coastal region. 

In operation, the drop weight fell freely onto the ground, whereupon the claws dug into the earth and then closed automatically. 

When the drop weight was raised, the earth heId in the claws 

was brought up with it and then disposed of when the claws 

were opened. The drill was named after its French inventor and 

was manufactured in Germany on a royalty basis (both heavy 

and light models). With the heavy Benoto drill, it was possible 

to dig wells fifteen to twenty meters deep in one day in loamy 

or gravelly soil, for which it was especially well adapted. However, it was impossible to drill below the underground water 

level with it because the force of its fall was greatly broken by 

the water. The small Benoto drill was chiefly used for test 

borings. It drilled a hole about ten meters deep and seventy 

centimeters in diameter in one day. The principle according to 

which it was built was good, but unfortunately, the construction 

was imperfect so that there were often operating difficulties. In 

particular, the wire cables were too weak and were subjected to 

much wear and tear at the guide pulleys. Nor were the claws 

able to stand up under the heavy strain. If these faults were 

eliminated, this drill might prove a very useful tool in desert 

warfare. 

The water distilling company was equipped with six water 

distillers mounted on trucks. This unit was employed only in 

special cases, since its fuel consumption was disproportionately 

high (one liter of fuel was required to obtain ten liters of water). 

During the German advance toward Egypt, this unit performed 

very important service, since all the wells had been contaminated with neat’s-foot oil by the British during their retreat. 

g. Method of Distribution 

As a matter of principle, all water was issued in canisters 

from the mobile water-purification unit, which served as an 

intermediate container. At the end of the water purification unit 

was a hose fitted with twelve faucets, which made it possible 

to fill twelve canisters at the same time. As a matter of 

principle, all water-both drinking water and radiator waterwas carried in canisters. Bakery companies were not issued any 
81 

fresh water, since by baking with seawater, it was possible to 

save salt. 

The standpipes were manned by teams from the water-supply 

companies. The water was distributed according to a table prepared by the quartermaster according to the personnel strength 

and vehicles of the various units. The water was taken away 

by the supply vehicles of the units. 

h. Pipelines 

If a position is occupied for a fairly long time, it is advisable 

to lay water pipes, since this saves considerable transport space. 

Aluminum pipes are recommended, since they can be laid 

quickly and connected with each other by a bayonet catch. Of 

course, strict supervision of the pipeline and standpipes is 

urgently necessary. When moving into the Alamein position, we 

made use of a British pipeline. In spite of strict orders, it was 

impossible to prevent it from being illicitly tapped. The available water supply was therefore soon exhausted. 

11. Heat 

a. General 

Even the very high temperatures during the hot seasons of 

the year failed to impair the efficiency of the German troops to 

any noticeable extent. This is shown particularly well by 

Rommel’s summer offensive from May to July 1942. The achievements of the troops refuted the former opinion of the Italians 

that European troops could not stand up under high temperatures. Even the British showed no regard for the heat; they 

attacked at Sollum in June 1941 and were planning a new offensive for June 1942. The most important thing for standing up 

successfully under hardships of this kind is the toughness of 

the troops and the good examples set by their leaders of all 

ranks, who as a matter of course should share all deprivations 

with their subordinates. 

Experience has shown that men under thirty-five are best 

able to adapt themselves to a hot climate. Acclimatization is 

easier in the open country than in cities. 

b. Effect on Unaccustomed Troops 

Newly arrived units had low fighting power and many losses 

through sickness, The heat paralyzed the men’s willpower and 

thus also their powers of resistance. The diseases themselves 

were probably more a direct result of the soldiers’ diets (bad 

water, canned food) and hardships than of the heat. The sudden 
82 

temperature drop in the evenings, causing abdominal colds, was 

also an important element. 

c. Effect on Tank Crews 

In tanks, the effects of heat-measuring 45 degrees on the 

gyrostatic thermometer (113 degrees Fahrenheit)-was naturally 

much greater on the men than among other troops. The heat 

became unendurable for men in combat, when the hatches had 

to be closed because of artillery fire and when the engines and 

ventilating systems had to be shut off during pauses in the 

action because of the lack of fuel. Nevertheless, the German 

tank crews held out under even these temperatures. 

d. Measures Taken to Avoid the Noonday Heat 

In combat, it was generahy impossible to make any ahowantes for even the greatest heat. During quiet periods in position 

warfare, however, there was always a noonday rest period of at 

least three hours. Cold rations were issued to the troops at noon 

and hot rations at night. 

e. Special Equipment for Protection Against Temperature 

Variations 

Measures were taken against temperature variations by 

requiring warm clothing and bellybands to be worn after sundown. Each soldier had three blankets, one of which had to 

serve as a ground sheet for protection against the night dampness. For wounded men, four blankets were required (two for 

covering the men and two for placing underneath them). 

f. Types of Shelter 

In combat, the troops had no shelter whatsoever. They either 

spent the night in their position or else in or underneath their 

vehicles. 

Wall tents for four men, with a double top awning, were used 

chiefly as shelter. They proved thoroughly useful and met all 

the requirements of desert warfare. At the beginning of the 

campaign, low one-man tents, likewise provided with an awning, 

were issued, but later there was not a sufficient number of them 

available. There were also larger tents for ten or twelve men. 

However, these could be used for the most part only in rear 

areas, since it was practically impossible to camouflage them. 

The Italian field hospital tents also proved highly successful. 

g. Camparisan Betweelz the Efficiency of Troops in Che 

Tropics and in Temperate Climates 

After the men had become accustomed to desert warfare and 

after those who could not adapt themselves to it had been elimi- 
83 

nated, the efficiency of the troops in combat operations was not 

inferior to that of troops serving in temperate climates. Even 

the drivers achieved normal efficiency, since the wind stream 

while driving cooled them off and refreshed them. In all kinds 

of physical labor, on the other hand, the heat greatly reduced 

efficiency. In this respect, the Italian troops were superior to 

the Germans. For this reason, they did most of the road construction work and mine laying. The detour road around Tobruk, 

for example, was built by Italian labor units. It constituted an 

outstanding achievement that German troops could not have 

accomplished in the same time. 

h. Effect on Materiel and Equipment 

The heat had no effect on guns, because they became so 

heated during firing that this more or less neutralized the outside temperature. No damage to war materiel and items of 

equipment was reported or was to be expected. 

i. Effect on Visibility 

In the interior of the desert about ten kilometers from the 

coast, the vibration of the air makes accurate observation practically impossible for a distance of more than one kilometer. 

All objects at a distance of one kilometer and more appear to 

move, and it is scarcely possible to decide whether a dark spot 

on the horizon is an approaching motor vehicle or a destroyed 

vehicle. At still greater distances, all contours become so blurred 

that one always thinks that one is surrounded by a sheet of 

water, from which certain elevations stand out as “islands.” In 

the beginning of the war in the desert, during the first attack 

on Cyrenaica, several units fell victim to this deception. They 

tried to drive around what they thought was a “lake” and therefore did not reach their appointed objectives, On the other hand, 

the vibration of the air protected small detachments in the 

desert from being discovered by the enemy from the ground. 

Surveying work suffered to an extraordinary extent from the 

vibration. It was only in the morning hours (until around 1000) 

that satisfactory work could be done with aiming circles or 

theodolites. 

j. Effect on Airplanes in Taking Off and Landing 

For the Luftwaffe, great heat often had a considerable effect 

on takeoffs and landings. The density of the air was so reduced 

that the lengths of takeoffs and lengths of landing strips had 

to be increased by as much as 50 percent. Landing operations 

could be indirectly disturbed by strong air reflections in the 
84 

heated ground layer, thus causing errors in the estimation of 

altitude. 

If airplanes stand for a long time in strong sunlight, the 

polished metal parts in the cabin, especially the glassed-in cockpit, become so hot that they cannot be touched. Therefore, the 

cabins have to be covered with tarpaulins. For the same reason, 

strong sunlight entering the cabin during flight is also disagreeable for the pilots. Curtains relieved this difficulty but 

hampered visibility. 
IV. MISCELLANEOUS 

12. Cartographic Service 

a. General 

In Libya, the German Army was initially solely dependent 

on the hastily reprinted Italian maps (scale l:ZOO,OOO), since at 

first, good German maps were available only on the scales of 

1:1,000,000 and 1:500,000 (which were mainly destined for use 

by the Luftwaffe). 

The Italian maps were poor and often showed points of 

interest more than twenty kilometers from the coast as several 

kilometers off. In compensation, there were captured British maps 

that included Libya and Egypt. They were excellent and as a 

result much prized. Later, they were reprinted. The French maps, 

used for the first time in Tunisia, were serviceable but were 

later replaced by German maps. In 1941, the Luftwaffe received 

a special map on a scale of 1:400,000 and in conic projection, 

which fully met requirements. 

b. Reliability and Methods of Use 

Sufficient maps were available for the following regions: 

Tripolitania (area around Tripoli): Italian map, 1:50,000 

Cyrenaica: Italian map, 1:50,000 

Egypt (western desert): British map, l:lOO,OOO 

Southern Tunisia: French map, l:lOO,OOO and l:ZOO,OOO 

The lack of good maps made itself felt, especially in defensive 

operations. New photographs were accordingly taken of the area 

of the Marsa el Brega position and of the Buerat position in 

cooperation with the Luftwaffe, the cartographic detachment of 

the Africa observation battery, the cartographic section of the 

German Army High Command, and the Military Geologic Office. 

The following method was used. The survey battery drew up a 

net of artillery points (APs) by use of traverses that were emplaced at the triangulation points (TPs). The APs were clearly 

identified by means of ground panels. Then, the Luftwaffe took 

a series of aerial mosaics with 30 percent overlaps. The results 

were transferred from the aerial photographs to the AP diagrams 

by the Military Geologic Office. This work was more difficult 

than expected, especially since only a simple stereoscope was 

available for the purpose. Correct evaluation of the form of the 

terrain and of the condition of the ground on the basis of the 

aerial photographs required a great deal of experience. Errors 

85 
86 

occasioned by the angle at which the photograph was taken, 

the distortion at the edges of pictures, etc., had to be compensated for as well as possible. After rough drafts had been finished, clean copies were made by the cartographic section, and 

these were reproduced by the printing section. In this way, maps 

were produced in a short time that fully met the requirements 

of the forces. They gave an accurate picture of the tacticai 

conditions of the terrain, permitted orientation, and contained 

correctly surveyed artillery points. 

In respect to tactics, the road maps made by the Military 

Geologic Office constituted an important supplement. The Italian, 

British, and French maps were redrawn and reprinted by the 

Mapping and Surveying Service and then distributed to the forces 

by the cartographic centers in Africa. The maps were always 

available in adequate quantities, with the exception of temporary 

scarcities brought about by the difficulties of supply. 

The maps and documentary material of the Military Geographic Branch were used by all headquarters down to the regiment. They were used for the initial basic orientation in the 

conduct of operations and as such were indispensable. In addition they contained a great deal of important information, especially in their description of road conditions. However, since 

only such documentation as was available at the beginning of 

the war could be used, there were gaps that only reconnaissance 

could fill in. The colored hachures on maps, indicating the passability of terrain or at least the limitations on its passability, 

were important. 

13. Camouflage 

Camouflage is very difficult in the desert and, in many cases, 

impossible. During the day, it was impossible to camouflage the 

movements of troops and columns from air observation. In the 

neighborhood of the front, the troops could only with difficulty 

be camouflaged from ground observation. The unavoidable dust 

clouds they raised betrayed any movement. 

NevertheIess, troop concentrations can be camouflaged, if great 

care is used. Depressions in the terrain will have to be exploited 

for this purpose. All vehicles will have to be covered with camouflage nets and vegetation (camel’s thorn) attached to the nets. 

Another means of camouflage, although on a small scale, is to 

seek out shifting shadows, In the open desert, all vehicles will 

have to be dug in as deep as possible. It goes without saying 

that the vehicles will have to be placed at as great a distance 

from each other as possible. 
87 

Although in most cases it will not be possible to camouflage 

the presence of vehicles and weapons, skillful camouflage can 

conceal the type of these vehicles (the arm of the service). It 

would be altogether wrong to resign oneself to the viewpoint 

that camouflage in the desert is useless. What has been said 

above is also valid for the troops in position. 

14. Evaluation of the Enemy Situation Through Aerial 

Photographs 

The main emphasis in aerial photography-in addition to 

determining the traffic on the Suez Canal, in the ports, on the 

roads, important paths, in the villages, and on the airfieldswas to provide details on the troops and positions of the enemy. 

But to check on our own camouflage, from time to time, the 

German positions were photographed from the air. 

Little by little, it was possible to improve the methods of 

evaluating the results of the aerial photography. As the enemy’s 

air superiority increased, however, the possibility of taking aerial 

photographs diminished more and more. Nevertheless, aerial 

photographs are indispensable. The evaluation was done by the 

Luftwaffe Photographic Section in the usual manner. 

In taking aerial photographs, dark-yellow filters were necessary. Developing required the addition of hardening material, 

since otherwise, the coating of the film melted, and there was 

the danger that microbes would damage it. In addition, dustproof vehicles were used for the developing of the film. Relief 

maps were also produced, but the need for them was not great, 

since the differences in altitude in the Libyan and Egyptian 

deserts is inconsiderable. 

15. Visibility at Night 

In the North African desert, the nights are much darker than 

in more northern latitudes. Thus, it was often difficult to find a 

tent in one’s own camp at night because it was impossible to 

orient oneself. As a result, it was also impossible for the enemy 

to detect troop movements taking place at night, unless there 

was moonlight or parachute flares were dropped by the air forces. 

On nights when there was a moon, the visibility was approximately as good as that prevailing in Central Europe at the fall 

of dusk. During the daytime, on the other band, it was possible 

to see very far in the desert. 

16. Choice of Camp Sites 

In the main, camp sites were selected for their good protection 

from air attacks. Preference was given to depressions in the 
88 

steep sides of the djebels, the banks of wadis, and the dune 

districts. Only the latter, however, offered an opportunity for 

troops to dig in vehicles and tents and to camouflage them. 

(This subject is taken up in detail in chapter III, section 9, 

‘“Terrain.“) 

17. Selection of Battle Sites 

In the attack, the German Army preferred easily passable, 

open desert for a battle site, because it made it possible for the 

armored forces to exploit their mobility and combat tactics, which 

were superior to those of the British 

In defense, the positions selected depended to a large extent 

on the terrain. Positions had to be difficult of access and provide 

flank protection; otherwise, on the whole, they were useless for 

defense. Regarding selection of positions, see chapter III, section 

9, “‘Terrain.” 

18. Time of Day Selected for Combat 

Field Marshal Rommel preferred to start fighting on moonlit 

nights or at dawn. The fighting often lasted until dark, unIess 

it was broken off sooner for tactical reasons. There were no 

lulls in combat, even during the great heat prevailing around 

noon. 

In general, the Germans carried out no night attacks. On 

the other hand, at the end of October 1942, the British carried 

out their large-scale attacks on the German positions at Alamein 

exclusively at night. They used parachute flares to illuminate 

the battlefield and tracer ammunition to show their troops the 

direction of the attack and sector boundaries. The British. commander in chief, Montgomery, preferred night combat. The German and Italian troops used the night for marches into their 

assembly areas, for large-scale shifts of forces, and for surprise. 

These night regroupings could almost always be carried out 

unnoticed by the enemy and, especially during the winter battles 

of 1941-42, came as a big surprise to the British. 

19. Influence of the Desert Climate on Daily Service 

Routine 

The daily routine in the desert did not substantially differ 

from that in other theaters of war. When not in combat, the 

troops were, as far as possible, given a lengthy rest period during 

the great heat around noon. The maintenance troops (workshop 

companies) were also given a noon rest period. Supply traffic 

could not afford to take these rests. 
89 

20. Special Problems of the Technical Services 

Through the fighting in the desert, the German technical services were faced with the following special problems: 

a. They had to keep the motor vehicles in running order, 

which, because of the conditions in the desert and the long 

supply routes, were exposed to extraordinary wear and tear. For 

this purpose, an increased number of repair shops were available. 

It is probable, however, that the problem would not have been 

solved had the stock not been replenished by captured British 

materiel from time to time. 

b. The water supply had to be safeguarded. The troops specially assigned to this task (see chapter III, section 10) did their 

work well. 

e. A detour had to be built around the besieged fortress of 

Tobruk. This task was undertaken by Italian labor forces and 

carried out successfully. 

d. The Capuzzo-Mersa-Matruh-Alamein railroad had to be 

operated. 

The above statements may give the impression that the technical problems encountered in the desert are less difficult than 

those in other theaters of war. This is not the case, however. 

On the contrary, many of the tasks that were necessary were 

so difficult that they were abandoned in advance. Among others, 

these included the extension of the railroad beyond Capuzzo, 

and at least up to Tobruk, and the procurement of steam locomotives-as well as the construction of a fortified defense position 

with bunkers at the Alamein front. 

21. Influence of Light, Shade, and Sandstorms on Gombat 

The intensive sunlight had a dazzling effect that was particularly disturbing when the light was reflected by bright dunes. 

It was therefore absolutely necessary to wear sunglasses. In the 

afternoon, it was impossible to tell vehicles from tanks at a 

distance of one to two kilometers and up. Favorable times of 

day were the early morning and the afternoon hours from 1600 

to 2000. 

In the desert, range estimation cannot be depended upon. In 

most cases, the distances will be underestimated. It was therefore 

advisable to use a range finder. During sandstorms, visibility 

was nil; moreover, visibility was influenced by sand driven by 

the strong winds (from five meters per second in intensity). From 

the air, dust produced an effect like local ground fog. During a 
90 

sandstorm, fighting was impossible. In addition, there were isolated instances of mirages In spite of these problems, however, 

adaptation to the visibility conditions prevailing in the desert 

was made relatively soon 

22. Influence of Darkness on Radio Communications 

Frequently, radio communication with Europe was interrupted 

for hours at a time during the nights because of pronounced 

fading. 

23. Wind 

The wind, constantly blowing near the coast, was regarded 

as, very welcome by the ground troops; it made it much easier 

to tolerate the heat. 

For the Luftwaffe, the fact that the general direction of the 

wind was interrupted by periodic land and sea winds on the 

coast (during the day from sea to land, during the night from 

land to sea) was of importance. Because of the temperature differences between the water and the desert, the winds on the 

coast are stronger than on the European continent. Moreover, 

they increase with the altitude. During sandstorms, the wind 

blew up to 150 kilometers per hour above 3,000 meters (at the 

height of storms). 8n the ground, the gusts blew at the maximum 

rate of sixty to eighty kilometers per hour. Inland, the wind is 

weaker. Very often, the direction of the wind is constant, especially on the coast. 

No data can be given on the wind velocity at various altitudes 

for comparison with velocities elsewhere, because no statistics 

are available on this. 

24. SpeciaI Equipment and Procedures for Aircraft Crews 

It was always advisable to try for an emergency landing, 

because the emergency equipment for desert landings, the armament, the radio, and the equipment for protection from the sun 

and cold nights was ample. Moreover, aircraft that made emergency landings were easier to locate from the air than those 

that crashed. Furthermore, the terrain was favorable everywhere 

for emergency landings, even for aircraft with stationary landing 

gears. Even a belly landing was preferable to bailing out. There 

is no case of crews having been lost in the desert; the “desert 

emergency squadron” played an important part in this. However, 

German aircraft were seldom employed in the interior of the 

desert. 

The briefing of crews on the native population and its customs 

was kept ta a minimum and was generally limited to the crews 
91 

of single-motored aircraft (fighters, Stukas, close-reconnaissance 

planes}. The crews of long-distance reconnaissance planes and 

multiengined bombers and the parachutists to be dropped behind 

the Tunisian front were briefed on the basis of need. It was 

possible to keep the briefing short, because the Arabs throughout 

had a friendly and helpful attitude. The sympathetic attitude of 

the Germans, which was soon known in the desert, was calcu- 

- lated to encourage friendliness. Small gifts and visits to the 

sheiks helped. 

The crews were systematically briefed about the emergency 

measures to be taken to survive in the desert. Briefings were 

based on certain cases and experiences. On this occasion, the 

following questions were discussed: 

Where are their oases, who occupies them, and what is 

their capacity? 

Where are the other water holes? 

What is the attitude of the local sheik? 

Should one assume that he is in touch with the Allies? 

Where are the nearest enemy forces? 

It was difficult to live off the land, since the natives had 

only just enough for themselves. As a last resort, the hunting 

gun included in the special equipment was available. Because 

of the scarcity of game, success in hunting depended largely on 

the skill of the crew. Water was obtained by spreading tarpaulins 

during the night to catch the morning dew. Rewards in gold 

were given to the Arabs for the rescue of German soldiers. 

Distress signals consisted of signal ammunition and smoke 

signals, which had to be used at the right moment when the 

crew of a plane overhead was able to see them. Large aircraft 

carried an emergency radio transmitter. In addition, if necessary, 

fuel and oil were to be set afire. The crews had been told to 

remain near their planes, if possible. Only if they were close to 

an inhabited place were they to start marching immediately. 

The aircraft had special equipment for the desert. This consisted 

of the following items: 

2 liters of bottled water 

Emergency rations (hard sausage, hard biscuits, cola, Dextro-Energen,* Pervitin, cognac) 

Gasoline stove 

One-man tent, sleeping bag, rubber mattress, linen cloth 

to protect the head from the sun 

*Grapesugar tablets. 
92 

cY3torm’y matches, flashlight with a portable generator, sun 

reflector, first-aid kit 

Emergency cdmpass, signal pistol with ammunition, red 

cloth strips 

Three-barreled hunting gun with ammunition (in dust-proof 

packing), hunting knife 

Foreign currency 

Emergency radio transmitter 

Blood transfusion sets were not included 

The search far missing aircraft was undertaken by the desert 

emergency squadron. It consisted of nine to twelve Starch planes 

and a number of personnel carriers able to cross desert terrain. 

The planes patrolled the terrain in question constantly. 

British prisoners of war stated that their men had small 

compasses camouflaged as uniform buttons and handkerchiefs 

printed with the map of North Africa and southern Europe. This 

was undoubtedly a very good idea. 

25. Dry Docks and Port Installations 

The information contained in chapter I, section 1, should be 

consulted in regard to the practicability and usefulness of the 

available signal communications material. In the whole of Italian 

North Africa, there was not a single dry dock, except for small 

vessels. The port installations of Tripoli, Benghasi, and Tobruk 

were good, if one considers the conditions prevailing in the 

colonies. From a technical viewpoint, there were no difficulties 

in unloading supplies. Difficulties appeared only after the port 

and unloading installations had been bombed. Besides the abovementioned three large ports, there were also some smaller 

unloading points, but they played little or no role in large-scale 

supply traffic. In Egypt, onIy Marsa Matruk was used as an 

unloading port. However, the capacity available was not used 

in full because of the proximity of the enemy and the bombings 

from the air. 

26. Reinforcement of Sand Surfaces for Landings by 

Amphibious Craft 

The Germans had no experience in reinforcing the sand surfaces on the coast and in the desert for landings by amphibious 

craft and for landing fields. The Luftwaffe used Italian and 

British airfields, The maintenance and improvement of roads 

was in the hands of the Italians. The British used steel matting 

for their airfields. 

Except during the rainy season, the surface of the desert was 

so hard that reinforcement of roads and airfields was unneces- 
93 

sary. Even the asphalted Via Balbia and the Egyptian coast 

road had only a foundation of broken limestone without an 

intermediate layer. 

Except for the ports mentioned in section 25, no advanced 

supply bases were established or used on the open coast. These 

were unnecessary because not even the normal ports near the 

enemy lines could be used fully. As a result, no steps were taken 

to reinforce the beaches for landings by amphibious craft. The 

whole of the coast consisted of sandy beaches, where the special 

landing craft of the German Navy, later imitated by the Italian 

Navy, were able to land. Basically, the difficulties that arose 

were caused by the sea, which made a landing impossible when 

the wind blew from the shore. 

27. Changes in Ship Loading and Unloading Procedures 

The loading and unloading of ships was not influenced by 

the desert climate. Moreover, in the coastal ports, as has been 

mentioned, the desert climate did not prevail. In comparison with 

the interior, the coast was much milder. In the main, native 

Arabs were used to unload the ships. The limited unloading 

capacity in comparison with European standards was due to 

the performance of these people, which was basically lower, and 

the difficulty in getting them to go back to work after air attack 

alarms and bombing raids. During the hottest hours, loading 

and unloading was interrupted when the situation permitted. 

28. Materiel Losses and Replacement Estimates for Desert 

Warfare 

It has not been possible to check the accuracy of the German 

estimates on materiel losses and replacement because a large 

part of the needs of the forces was covered by captured equipment, the amount of which was not listed. 

29. Modifications in Supply-Dump Procedures-Especially 

for POL (petroleum, oils, and lubricants) 

There were no essential changes in the stocking and distribution of fuel. Such changes were unnecessary. Fuel was conserved in German Wehrmacht jerry cans, which proved effective 

even in desert warfare. 

30. Diseases and Insects in the Desert 

In 1941, there were a great number of jaundice and dysentery 

cases. The reason was bowel irritations provoked by the drinking 

of bad water. Quick treatment with sulfa drugs afforded relief. 

(The tales that the health of some people was gravely damaged 

by sand fleas and scorpions are pure fiction.) 
94 

The health of the troops requires constant control, which 

should go hand in hand with thorough instruction. The battalion 

and other medical officers do not suffice for this purpose. It is, 

accordingly, advisable to assign a sanitation officer to every 

company and battery to do this work in close cooperation with 

a competent medical officer, The sanitation officer should give 

special attention to a number of protective measures. He will 

have to see that the soldiers wear warm clothes after sundown 

and that they do not drink unboiled water. Excretory matter 

should be buried after each movement of the bowels (the “spade 

system” is preferable to the latrine system). Whenever the situation permits, the soldiers should observe a siesta. Control of 

flies should be organized (mosquito nets were used only in the 

latrines). Vitamin C should be taken regularly. In specified districts, atabrine tablets should be taken to prevent malaria. If 

necessary, the water supply shouId be controlled (but only in 

the case of detached units). There should be a hygienic consultant for every two divisions, and he should be provided with a 

mobile bacteriological laboratory. 

There should be a mobile medical company in each division. 

The company should have 250 beds available. The German hospitals had the so-called Olympian beds, which proved very useful. 

In addition, the equipment of a medical company should include 

one light X-ray instrument and three sets of blood transfusion 

instruments with plasma. Furthermore, the carps and/or army 

medical officer will have to have available two surgical hospitals 

(with NO-400 beds) and two medical companies for every two 

to three divisions. This is in addition to the medical companies 

of the divisions. 

In respect to insects, there are flies wherever there are people. 

At first, the troops had no effective means to combat them. It 

was only during the final phase of the African campaign that 

the newly developed means (for instance, a preparation called 

DDT) could be issued. There was no way of preventing infectious 

diseases, such as dysentery and contagious jaundice, from spreading. The only preventive measure that could be taken was the 

order far the men to bury all fecal matters immediately. Infringements were severely punished. In contrast to flies, which were 

everywhere, mosquitoes (anopheles) were present only in the oases 

and their immediate vicinity. Since these insects fly only at 

night, use of mosquito nets is an absolute necessity in these 

areas. Atabrine tablets were used to prevent the malaria transmitted by mosquitoes. Orders specified that one atabrine tablet 
a day was to be taken. Since the units did not often stay at 

the oases for long, malaria cases were few. 

See chapter III, section 10, for treatment of water. 

31. Desert Weather Service 

It was the mission of the desert weather service to conduct 

weather observations and to keep the Luftwaffe posted on the 

basis of the results of these observations. The information was 

transmitted by a special radio frequency to a collecting station 

and retransmitted from there. The mission was carried out by 

small mobile teams consisting of one or two meteorologists, three 

or four weather technicians, and several radio operators. A 

special vehicle contained the weather-service equipment and the 

radio apparatus (loo-watt transmitter and receiver). 

The synoptic system was used, with ground weather reports 

from the numerous ground-observation stations distributed over 

the coastal area and also from the Italian desert oases. Radio 

weather-observing stations in Derna sent up two balloons every 

day. At the front, several pilot-balloon spottings were made, 

especially early in the morning and in the afternoon (singlestation pilot-balloon spotting was done, although it would have 

been better to use double stations). According to the velocity of 

the wind at a height of 200-500 meters, it was easy to tellwhile the temperature was still low and the wind was weakwhether there would be sandstorms and at what time they would 

start. Often errors occurred in the wind tests through local causes 

or because of a rapid change in the atmospheric pressure so 

that the estimate of sandstorms by means of pilot balloons sent 

up early in the morning was unreliable. Severe sandstorms will 

have to be predicted by means of the weather map, with special 

attention being given to the variations in atmospheric pressure. 

Small variations in pressure effect considerable changes in the 

wind at these low latitudes. 

In addition, the Luftwaffe transmitted further information 

over a special radio network. It transmitted individual weather 

reports, but the main emphasis was on providing fully workedout weather analyses and surveys and predictions organized by 

districts. There was a special encoding table for weather reports. 
V. GENERAL REMARKS AND EXPERIENCES 

32. Special Equipment for Desert Warfare 

The proposals for the improvement and modification of equipment-made on the basis of experiences gathered in the desertwere carefully considered by the agencies in the zone of the 

interior and followed through to the extent that the limited time 

available permitted. The developments described below are of 

special importance in desert warfare: 

a. Decreasing the sensitivity to dust of vehicular and airplane 

fuel and of especially sensitive weapons. 

b. Experimentation in the production of a dehydrated fuel 

for vehicles that is also fully effective in saltwater solution. Such 

a dehydrated fuel greatly alleviates the supply problem and 

would remove, to a large extent, the danger of air attacks on 

fuel dumps. 

c. Production of radar equipment to identify enemy forces 

that could not be seen by ground observation. 

d. Production of equipment for cooling drinking water or 

keeping it cool. 

e. Procurement of effective smoke-producing equipment that 

would be capable of sucking up large quantities of desert sand 

and then releasing it. 

f. The mass production of a cross-country truck with a three 

to three and a half-ton capacity has high priority for supply 

purposes. The truck will have to possess low-range four-wheel 

drive and a lock off on the differential. It will need low-pressure 

balloon tires. The advisability of utilizing air-cooled motors is 

uncertain. The Steyr Works developed an air-cooled heavy command car, which, however, was not used until shortly before 

the conclusion of the African campaign so that it could not be 

adequately tested. Insofar as an evaluation was possible, it 

seemed to have been in good working order. 

Special attention must be accorded the springs. The spiral 

springs used in German command cars, Types 16 and 17, did 

not prove practical. The springs broke easily and caused a bottleneck in supply. Leaf springs were better, but they had to be 

strongly constructed. 

All desert vehicles have to be provided with spades, boards, 

or rope ladders so that they can be dug out when they get stuck 

and put in action again. 

97 
98 

Desert conditions require a sturdy motor vehicle that does 

not weigh too much, has not got a complicated motor, and has 

deeply indented tires. Well-equipped replacement dumps and field 

workshops are a prerequisite. Both must be mobile and capable 

of producing results quickly. 

Camouflage (paint) of all vehicles proved advantageous. 

g. It is advisable to provide all passenger cars and some of 

the trucks with compasses, which should be so built that they 

can be easily seen from the driver’s seat. The compasses must 

be compensated by magnets (suitable examples are manufactured 

by the Askania Works in Berlin-Friedenau). 

h. The field forces must be completely outfitted with tents 

(with double roofs and dust proofed, where possible). The roof 

can be flat. 

i. The development of a dry drill similar to the Benoto (see 

chapter III, section 10, f> that can reach water sources quickly 

would be very useful. Mobile deep drills should also be at hand, 

such as are produced in Germany by the Craelius factory. 

j. Since there is a lot more salt water in the desert than 

fresh water, the field forces can often be supplied, even when 

no fresh water is available, by having distilling equipment at 

their disposal. For that reason, it is important to have such 

equipment. Such equipment should be sparing of fuel and be 

mounted on cross-country vehicles so that it can be taken along 

by motorized troops. Its capacity should be great enough to provide each man with four to five liters of water daily. 

k. Ordinary theodolites are adequate for surveying purposes. 

Still, it is a good idea to provide this equipment with special 

protection against dust. A military unit should be deployed that 

can quickly produce reliable maps in cooperation with the air 

force and can carry out terrain reconnaissance. One can recommend for the last-mentioned mission an organization that is a 

combination of the English Long Range Desert Group and the 

German Military Geology Office. 

1. The motors of the Type IV tank (long), which were put 

into operation in autumn 1941, were very efficient. Depending 

on the condition of the terrain in which operations had taken 

place, a general overhauling was necessary after about 10,0-O@-- 

15,000 kilometers. The motors of the Tiger tank, later used in 

Tunisia, proved too weak and too sensitive. The periscopes of 

many tanks were often damaged. 
99 

The cross-country mobility of the prime movers could have 

been improved. They were not up to the demands imposed by a 

thick ground covering of sand. 

33. Research and Development Possibilities for Special 

Desert Equipment 

German industrial capacity was capable of satisfying all 

demands for equipment necessary for desert warfare. It was 

not prepared for these demands when they came, however. Since 

technical developments always require considerable time, it was 

not possible in the comparatively short period during which 

fighting went on in Africa to technically perfect new equipment. 

Distribution to the forces did not impose difficulties, as a smoothworking distribution organization was available. 

34. Unusual Supply Problems 

The basic difficulties in ensuring the smooth-functioning supply of German forces in Africa have already been described in 

chapter I, section 3. 

Overseas theaters of war require many usable unloading ports 

that are as near to the front as possible. At least partial domination of the sea and air lanes is necessary. Rail connections between unloading ports and the front are essential. In any event, 

there must be adequate parking space for the supply trains. This 

space can never be too large, when one considers that all supplies 

must be sent overland from the harbors to the front. Supply 

dumps near the front are also necessary and must be kept regularly well stocked. 

It is very important that the commander of the army and 

his chief of staff are daily oriented, in detail, on the supply 

situation. When waging war in another section of the world, 

the supply situation must be calculated very accurately, as it 

exerts an even greater influence on the decisions of the command 

than elsewhere. On the other hand, the commander should not 

become overly dependent on the supply situation; nonetheless, 

he must expect a great effort to be made to get supplies from 

unloading ports to the front. Only what has already been unloaded can be included in calculations; supplies still on their 

way cannot be counted. 

Tactical considerations will determine the portion of the available ships’ tonnage to be used for the transport of men and 

supplies. This must be directed by an overall authority and is 

just as true for air transport. The latter can only be of temporary 
100 

assistance and otherwise must be regarded as a secondary transportation means. The army in the desert, itself, must determine 

what is to be sent over. 

In unloading, care must be taken, because of the danger from 

air raids, that the ships be emptied as quickly as possible, after 

which the supplies, especially fuel and ammunition, should be 

immediately moved from the danger zone into the interior. Strong 

antiaircraft protection and fighter escorts are indispensable at 

the unloading ports, as well as barriers against torpedoes and 

submarines. 

Fuel and ammunition must be stored at widelv scattered 

points, where it should be buried and well camouflgged. Burial 

of materiel is absolutely necessary as protection against the heat. 

Careful surveillance of camouflage, especially in rear areas, is 

important. 

Rommel’s supply columns were not assigned a maximum daily 

speed or travel time. They were simply given the mission of 

traveling as rapidly and as long as possible, because a shortage 

of column space always existed. 

There was always a lack of fuel in Africa. After it was unloaded, it was transferred to drums and then issued at the fuel 

dumps near the front in jerry cans. Underground tank installations are of course desirable, but they did not exist in North 

Africa at the time. 

The average loss of weapons and equipment in the desert 

was about 25 percent higher than in the European theater of 

war. Accurate figures, however, are not available (see chapter 

IV, se&ion 28). 

35. Nutrition 

Assimilation of food and production of body heat are about 

10 to 15 percent lower in hot areas than in Europe. Therefore, 

under normal conditions, the total nutritional needs are less than 

in Europe. Heavy physical exertion requires about the same food 

intake as at home. Too much meat, especially canned meat, was 

rejected by the men. 

A fundamental alteration of nutritional standards soon makes 

itself felt. Vegetables and fruit are more popular than meat. Too 

great a meat consumption considerably increases the body’s need 

for water. The high caloric count of fat is in contradiction to 

the above-mentioned low production of body heat in hot regions. 

Increased intake of vegetable products, especially marmalade, 

are necessary to equalize the low fat requirements. 
101 

Fresh meat is preferable if refrigeration facilities are available. 

Smoked meat, especially hard sausage that is not too fatty, finds 

a ready audience. Eggs should never be eaten raw. Legumes 

should not be served too often. Moreover, because of the danger 

of infection with intestinal diseases, greens should be thoroughly 

washed with a solution of permanganate of potassium. All sorts 

of dried fruits proved very satisfactory. 

The consumption of concentrated alcoholic beverages should 

be carefully avoided; the best principle is “No alcohol before 

sunset.” The furnishing of lemon and other citric juices is the 

best means of avoiding Vitamin C deficiency. 

As wide a variety as possible should be attempted in the 

menu, as the troops came to dislike foods that were served 

constantly. 

Refrigeration of foods (meat and fresh vegetables) is achieved 

by means of so-called cooling units manipulated by aggregates, 

which can be set up in trucks. The Luftwaffe also had refrigeration planes. 

The Field Cookbook for Improvised Cooking and Baking in 

the Colonies was drawn up as a cooking aid. 

The crews of armored vehicles and of planes needed extra 

rations because of the increased pressure exerted upon them. 

36. Clothing 

Clothing of 100 percent wool is most practical. In general, 

long trousers that could be tightly closed at the bottom (slacks) 

were preferred to breeches worn with high-laced boots. The slacks, 

such as were worn by the Luftwaffe, should be broad and cut 

on a comfortable bias. This is also true as regards the jackets, 

the most practical model for which is the Italian Sahariana. A 

warm cloth coat is indispensable in the cool seasons and nights. 

Woolen scarves become necessary in winter. Shoes should be 

constructed of a light leather with a linen inlay and thick, firm 

soles. 

Tents should be painted a striped and speckled green and 

brown on one side and the color of ocher on the other. 

Camouflage nets with knotted strips of many-colored cloth 

attached to them are the best for sending to the front. Such 

camouflage nets are practical for all larger motor vehicles. 

37. Comparisons with Desert Warfare in Southern Russia 

The southern Russian steppes (Kirgiz and Kalmyk steppes) 

have much the same rainfall as the ring of steppes in North 
102 

Africa, 100-200 millimeters a year. However, since the temperature is lower, on the average, evaporation is less. In southern 

Russia, therefore, the surface of the ground is not covered with 

a firm crust of surface lime, the vegetation is denser, and watercourses (with water} exist the whole year round-although, with 

few exceptions, they do not reach the sea but instead filter down 

through the sand or end in salt lakes. From the military point 

of view, the differences have the following effect: 

a. The water supply is easier to obtain in the Russian 

steppes. Although it is not as easy to obtain as in cultivated 

regions, it nevertheless does not present serious difficulties as 

long as an organization for reaching it and distributing it exists. 

b, In dry weather, traversability is at least as good as that 

in the open North African desert. During rainy weather, however, 

it is worse, since districts with a rocky subsurface are lacking 

or are to be found only in mountainous areas. 

c. The building of field positions is easier, since the ground 

is composed of clay or loam almost everywhere. 

Like the North African desert, the southern Russian steppes 

are better suited for attack than for defense. The biggest difficulties are encountered during the severe winter, especially when 

the enemy troops are accustomed to a harsh climate. 

The conditions arising from the dust in Africa are, in general, 

the same as those prevailing in the pure steppe terrain in southern Russia. 

38. Troop Welfare in the Desert 

In the African desert, as in no other theater of war, life was 

hard for officers and men alike. Life in the rear areas, as it is 

known in Europe, was possible only in the few supply centers 

in the rear, and then it was only a weak imitation of that else 

where. 

Because of the close contact of the troops with each other, 

all officers had to give an example of soldierly bearing and 

good moral living. Any extravagance on the part of an officer 

is noticed by the men and scrutinized with a magnifying glass. 

On the other hand, life in the desert offers an excellent opportunity to create a high level of community spirit. This brings 

about a feeling of solidarity in all ranks and prompts them to 

do their utmost. 

Especially in the desert, where no diversions exist, superiors 

must be carefully concerned about the welfare of their personnel. 
103 

The fact that there are no outside attractions makes it easier 

for leaders to provide that attention. 

An oppressive feeling of immense loneliness overcomes everyone more or less frequently in the desert-a feeling that one is 

cut off from everything that one holds dear. Commanders must 

recognize such moods and depressions and offer sincere encouragement so that such pressures will disappear. 

Even more important than rations for the well-being of soldiers 

in the desert is the maintenance of regular communications with 

the zone of the interior. The word “mail” occupies a place of 

high priority in desert warfare. All officers and agencies must 

be concerned, therefore, with assuring a rapid distribution of 

mail to the front lines, 

A good newspaper that carries up-to-the-minute news and 

gives space to the problems that absorb the soldiers at the front 

is also indispensable. Movies and theatrical performances at the 

front can relieve the monotony of the soldiers’ lives, even in 

the desert. 

The normal service time in the desert for a German soldier 

was six months. Regular rotation could, however, often not be 

provided in Africa between 1941 and 1943, with the result that 

many soldiers had to serve in the desert for twelve and even 

eighteen months. If relief is not possible after six months, for 

one reason or another, the men must be granted three weeks’ 

leave; otherwise, lasting damage to their health can easily result. 

Proper leadership, training, and welfare of the troops can 

lead to extraordinary successes, especially in the seclusion of 

the desert theater. Field Marshal Rommel has proven this. 

b U.S. GOVERNMENT PRlNTlNG OFFICE: 1991 554-001/42005 
About t&e Author 

AK&l Tappe joined t,he German Army in 1923, entering the 14th 

Cavalry Regiment at Ludwigslust. After training in both the Infantry 

and Cavalry Officer Candidate Schoals from 1924-26, he received his 

commission as a second lieutenant, in December of the latter year and 

was assigned to the 1st CavaIry Regiment, being promoted to first 

lieutenant in 1929. In 1934, he was detached for a two-year term at 

the Berlin War Academy, where he was promoted to captain (Cavalry) 

in 1935. From 1936-39, Toppe served as quartermaster training officer 

of the XI Infantry Corps and then,, after participating in general staff 

training courses in 1940, was promoted to major and assigned to the 

Paris headquarters of the quartermaster general for France as first 

assistant to the chief supply officer. In 1942, he was promoted ta lieutenant colonel and assigned as chief, Army Supply Department, German 

Army High Command, where he was promoted to colonel in 1943. 

Following service as chief of staff, X Infantry Corps, in northern 

Russia from early 1944, Toppe was transferred back to the German 

Army High Command as army quartermaster general in June of the 

same yeas, where he remained until the war ended and where he was 

promoted to major general in October 1944. 

COUBAT STUDEES INSTRXJTE 

The Combat Studies Institute was established on 18 June 1979 as a 

department-level activity within the U.S. Army Command and General Staff 

Callege, Fart Leavenworth, Kansas. CSI has the following missions: 

1. Prepare and present ins.tnxtion in military history at USACGSe and assist 

other USACGS@ departments in integrating military history into their 

instruction. 

2. Serve as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s executive agent 

for the development and coordination of an irttegrated, progressive program 

af military history instruction in the TRADQC service school system. 

3. Conduct research on historical to,gicrr pertinent to the doctrinal cuncerns 

of the Army and publish the results in a variety of formats for the Active 

Army and Reserve Components.