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95–829PDF 2004

U.S.–EUROPEAN COOPERATION ON

COUNTERTERRORISM: ACHIEVEMENTS AND

CHALLENGES

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION 

AND HUMAN RIGHTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 14, 2004

Serial No. 108–143

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

VACANCY 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia, Chairwoman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

VACANCY 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

VINCE MORELLI, Subcommittee Staff Director 

JONATHAN KATZ, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

PATRICK PRISCO, Professional Staff Member 

BEVERLY HALLOCK, Staff Associate

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION

AND HUMAN RIGHTS

ELTON GALLEGLY, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

RICHARD MEREU, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DONALD MACDONALD, Democratic Professional Staff Member 

RENEE AUSTELL, Professional Staff Member 

TOD HULL, Special Assistant 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

William T. Pope, Principal Deputy Coordinator, Office of the Coordinator 

for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State ............................................... 11

Gijs de Vries, Counterterrorism Coordinator, European Union .......................... 17

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Joseph R. Pitts, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Prepared statement ............................................. 8

The Honorable Nick Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Michigan: Prepared statement ........................................................................ 9

William T. Pope: Prepared statement .................................................................... 14

Gijs de Vries: Prepared statement ......................................................................... 20

Report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Initial Findings, 

August 2004) entitled The Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism .................... 24

APPENDIX 

Bruce Swartz, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. 

Department of Justice: Prepared statement ...................................................... 47

The Honorable C. Stewart Verdery, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Policy and 

Planning, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Prepared statement ........ 49

Responses from Gijs de Vries to questions submitted for the record by: 

The Honorable Jo Ann Davis, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of Virginia, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Europe .......... 54

The Honorable Joseph R. Pitts ........................................................................... 56

Responses from William T. Pope to questions submitted for the record by 

the Honorable Jo Ann Davis ............................................................................... 56

(1)

U.S.–EUROPEAN COOPERATION ON 

COUNTERTERRORISM: ACHIEVEMENTS AND 

CHALLENGES 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 1:35 p.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jo Ann Davis [Chairwoman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Ms. DAVIS. The joint Subcommittees will come to order. I suspect 

that we will later be joined by a few more Members before we get 

into the actual testimony. Before we begin, I want to welcome a 

delegation of Members of Parliament from the United Kingdom. 

We welcome our colleagues and appreciate their interest in our 

hearing. Welcome, we are glad that you are here with us today. 

The Europe Subcommittee wishes to welcome our colleagues from 

the Terrorism and Nonproliferation Subcommittee and expresses 

its appreciation to Chairman Gallegly and Ranking Democrat Sherman, and their staff, for their participation and cooperation. 

In July, the Presidential Commission charged with investigating 

the events of September 11, 2001, released its report on the events 

surrounding that tragic and fateful day. In their report, the Commission stated that:

‘‘The first phase of our post-9/11 efforts rightly included military action to topple the Taliban and pursue al-Qaeda. . . . 

But long-term success [against global terrorism] demands the 

use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, 

covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, 

public diplomacy, and homeland defense. If we favor one tool 

while neglecting others, we leave ourselves vulnerable and 

weaken our national effort.’’

Terrorism is a global problem. The world-wide reach of terrorist 

networks implies that the effort against global terrorism cannot be 

fought effectively solely by military means; comprehensively only 

on one’s home soil; nor successfully by any one country alone. To 

be successful, the entire tool box of policy, as noted by the 9/11 

Commission, must be utilized. 

2

A few weeks ago the full International Relations Committee held 

a hearing featuring the Chair and Vice Chair of the Commission. 

In his statement, Governor Tom Kean stated that:

‘‘Our Commission came to the judgment pretty quickly that the 

United States cannot win this war against terrorism without 

friends and allies. In every area we talk about, we need strong 

international partnerships. If our activities are to be successful 

they must take place in the context of strong government-togovernment relationships and sustained international cooperation.’’

Governor Kean also stated that:

‘‘We must rely on information exchanges and liaison with 

friendly intelligence services; we need foreign intelligence and 

law enforcement partners to surveil and arrest terrorist suspects; we need cooperation of foreign financial institutions to 

track the flow of terrorist funding; we need common international passport and document standards for international 

travel, and we need common security standards for international aviation.’’

Unlike the hearings held by the Full Committee which carefully 

reviewed those recommendations of the Commission which could be 

addressed by our Committee, this hearing will review the very 

practical efforts which have been taking place since September 11, 

2001 to deal with the global terrorist threat by this Nation and the 

nations of Europe, and their Union. 

Nowhere is there a more natural and potentially successful effort 

to combat terrorism than through translantic cooperation. The recent Commission report reminded us that many of the 19 terrorists 

who were involved in the events of September 11 were part of the 

so-called ‘‘Hamburg’’ cell based in Germany where they probably 

received training, reaffirmed their plans and transited through Europe to carry out their attack. We now know that the al-Qaeda organization and their supporters, and other terrorist groups, have 

found refuge in parts of Europe and have had access to items such 

as European passports and financial institutions. 

The Commission report also expressed concern for the eastern 

borders of Europe where the lack of rigid border controls could 

make that region of Europe a transit area for terrorists and a potential safe haven for operatives on the run. 

Although not all States in Europe face the same threat level, Europe on the whole has had plenty of experience fighting terrorism 

and has deployed a diverse array of countermeasures in that effort 

over the years preceding September 11. Regrettably, the March 

tragedy in Madrid and the recent events in Russia remind us that 

all Europe remains vulnerable to terrorist violence. 

For our part, the United States has the power and the global 

reach to accomplish much of the job. But as we are experiencing, 

we cannot do it all alone. Militarily, our dealings with Europe 

through the NATO Alliance can be an effective and efficient conduit for that aspect of the struggle against terrorism. 

This has been proven in Afghanistan, where close to 7,000 

NATO-led European troops are engaged. Nevertheless, a major eleVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:54 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\EUROPE\091404\95829.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
3

ment in any successful fight against terror is the ability of nations 

to bring non-military assets to the fight. Here, both Europe and the 

United States possess major law enforcement, financial, intelligence, and other important assets which can be effectively utilized. And as we will likely hear today, they are being engaged. The 

success of any effort against global terrorism, however, must start 

with a commitment and a strategy under which all participants can 

operate. 

Both the United States and the European Union have produced 

separate, but similar, strategy papers to combat terrorism. But a 

strategy on paper and a strategy in practice are two different 

things. Our priorities must be to reach the highest level of strategic 

transatlantic coordination and cooperation which can exist in order 

to be successful. 

If by reading the 9/11 Commission Report one shudders at the 

difficulty of trying to coordinate the activities of a mere dozen intelligence agencies in this country, one must really stop and think of 

the enormous challenge it takes to coordinate the efforts of hundreds of agencies in over 35 countries within the transatlantic community. 

Fortunately, there is a good news story. Both the United States 

and the nations of Europe and their Union have been clear in their 

understanding of the perils of unchecked terrorism. Both sides 

have made a commitment to combating the problem recognizing 

that only close cooperation will ultimately defeat the threat. And 

finally, the transatlantic dialogue seems to be taking place on a 

regular basis and at a variety of levels within our respective Governments. For instance, I understand that both Attorney General 

Ashcroft and Secretary Ridge are again preparing to travel to Europe this month for major meetings on the cooperative efforts. 

Our hearing today will look at that transatlantic cooperation and 

coordination to determine what we have achieved and what challenges remain. We are pleased to have witnesses from the Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland Security. 

We are also very pleased that the European Union’s Coordinator 

for Terrorism is with us to provide a European perspective. I look 

forward to hearing all of the comments. But before I turn to our 

witnesses I want to recognize the distinguished Chairman of the 

International Terrorism Subcommittee, Mr. Gallegly, for any opening statement that he may have. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. I thank the gentlelady, and let me begin by 

thanking you again for holding this hearing today, and for inviting 

the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, 

and Human Rights, to participate. I appreciate your work in addressing the European-American cooperation in the war on terrorism. 

The events of September 11 and many of the more recent terrorist attacks have demonstrated a central role that European nations need to play in the war against international terrorism. They 

also show the importance of close cooperation between the United 

States and Europe in this effort. None of the 9/11 hijackers were 

European citizens. However, al-Qaeda’s Hamburg cell played an integral part in the 9/11 attacks. This cell consisted of at least eight 

4

extremists, including three of the 9/11 pilots. And Zacarias 

Moussaoui, the alleged 20th hijacker, was a French citizen. 

Further, we have learned in previous hearings that some European citizens, whether native-born or immigrants, are either joining radical Islamic groups or are sympathetic to the goals of those 

groups. Given our close ties to Europe, as well as the visa waiver 

program that allows travel to the United States from many European countries without a visa, this is a trend that poses a direct 

national security threat to the U.S. 

Europe, however, is not just a source for terrorists seeking to attack our country. The continent, as the attacks in Madrid, Istanbul, 

Russia and other places have shown, has become a prime target for 

terrorists. To these attacks, I would also add the plot by a group 

of North Africans living in England to produce ricin, one of the 

world’s deadliest poisons. The operation was foiled by the British 

police in January 2003. The target for the ricin was most likely a 

location within Britain. 

I agree with the views expressed in Mr. De Vries’ written statement that the March 11th bombings in Madrid have strengthened 

the EU’s resolve to combat terrorism. At the same time, nobody believes that either side is doing enough in terms of intelligence, immigration, or law enforcement cooperation. 

I would like each of our witnesses to provide some specific steps 

that can be taken to strengthen our cooperation and efforts. As a 

starting point, let me suggest that both sides immediately begin 

discussions on sharing information on terrorist travel patterns and 

on lost, stolen, or fraudulent passports. 

The 9/11 Commission Report stated that targeting terrorist travels is at least as important as targeting terrorist financing. I urge 

both the United States and European officials to focus on this issue 

and improve our law enforcement efforts against fraudulent documents and other ways terrorists evade border controls. I thank the 

gentlelady and yield back. 

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you Chairman Gallegly. I would like to now 

recognize the Ranking Member of our Europe Subcommittee, Mr. 

Wexler, for an opening statement. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you very much Madame Chairwoman and 

congratulations to you for your ascension to the Chairmanship. 

Today’s hearing comes at an appropriate time given America and 

Europe’s solemn recognition of the third anniversary of September 

11. The response of the United States and Europe to terrorism in 

the aftermath of September 11 can be broken down into two 

phases: Post-9/11 and the lead-up and aftermath of the war in Iraq. 

The first phase, following 9/11, found the United States and Europe 

standing shoulder-to-shoulder focused for a common purpose and 

enemy. At that time support and sympathy for the United States 

was at an all-time high as our NATO allies unanimously invoked 

article V, and unequivocally supported our efforts to remove alQaeda and the Taliban from Afghanistan. 

Post-9/11 also led both sides of the Atlantic to work jointly to address exposed internal weaknesses in combating terrorism and proliferation of WMD. Like the U.S., the EU and its Member States 

made significant strides to strengthen laws and police enforcement, 

address border patrol and asylum issues, and broke down existing 

5

terrorist cells, froze financial assets, and arrested dozens of extremists. 

Initially, the United States and Europe set the right tone for cooperation. However, historic cooperation and support quickly 

turned sour following the highly-charged debate over Iraq diminishing American credibility in Europe and in the Muslim world, 

crippling the transatlantic alliance and exacerbating efforts to combat terror. 

The war in Iraq did what Osama bin Laden only dreamed, by exposing a deep and fundamental division in Europe and America’s 

counterterrorism and Middle East policies. The war in Iraq drained 

critical American resources and attention away from the rebuilding 

of Afghanistan and the capture of al-Qaeda members, created a 

new bastion of terrorism in Iraq and left the transatlantic alliance 

impotent to deal with the world’s biggest threat, Iran’s nuclear program. 

While Iran promised the British, French and Germans that it 

would suspend uranium enrichment last year, evidence has 

emerged indicating that Iran has violated its agreement and could 

obtain a nuclear weapon in the very near future. Such a development poses an unprecedented challenge to the United States and 

Europe. The United States is prepared to take this issue to the 

U.N. Security Council and threaten sanctions against Tehran. Our 

European allies wish to continue with negotiations and revisit the 

issue in November. 

Unfortunately, Iran is again exploiting our differences to buy 

time. Sanctions and diplomacy are not mutually exclusive and discussion with Tehran should continue. But with each carrot, we 

must also issue a stick to deter its nuclear efforts. 

Madame Chairwoman, the 9/11 Commission Report clearly stated that the United States Government cannot meet its obligations 

to protect the American public from terrorism without a major effort to collaborate with other Governments. To that end, our European allies remain America’s most important partner in this ongoing struggle and vice versa. I look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses who will shed light on the current status of 

our cooperation and efforts to bridge the growing counterterrorism 

differences between the United States and Europe. Thank you. 

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Wexler. I now would like to turn to 

the Ranking Democrat on the Terrorism Subcommittee for an opening statement, Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you Madam Chairman. I thank you, along 

with Chairman Gallegly and Mr. Wexler for putting these hearings 

together. It is rare that we have representatives of foreign Governments, or institutions, to come before our Committee and I thank 

Mr. De Vries for being here. 

Let me take this opportunity, Madam Chairwoman, since you referred to our Subcommittee as the Terrorism Subcommittee to 

point out that it is the Terrorism and Nonproliferation Subcommittee, as well as the Human Rights Subcommittee. And let me 

use this opportunity to once again talk to my great friend from 

Ventura County and renew my plea that sometime before the end 

of the 108th Congress—hopefully in the next week or 2—we actually have hearings on the Iranian and North Korean nuclear proVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:54 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\EUROPE\091404\95829.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
6

liferation programs. For us to end the 108th Congress without paying due regard to proliferation is a clear denigration and failure to 

meet the responsibilities that the name of our Subcommittee implies. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. SHERMAN. I yield. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. I would like to thank the gentleman for clarifying 

his position on the issue. Thank you. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. And I would point out that there may 

be reluctance since our policy toward North Korea is to beg them 

not to develop any more nuclear weapons and then to announce as 

a great success the fact that they have agreed to discuss the matter 

further around a six-sided table. 

Our policy toward Iran is to beg the Europeans to beg the Iranians, and as I will get to later; that has not been terribly successful either. But for us to ignore the greatest threat, and what the 

Vice President of the United States has identified as the greatest 

threat to the United States, simply because our policies are unsuccessful, is to ignore our congressional responsibility. 

We are all in this together, the United States and Europe, and 

yet we have had differences, whether it be on the Iraq war, Kabul, 

the Middle East peace process, missile defense, or the International 

Criminal Court. 

So far as I know, this has not prevented us from cooperating at 

a law enforcement level, and hopefully we will do everything possible to cut through the bureaucracy and exchange information as 

necessary and cooperate. 

Congress has again had to extend the deadline for the visa waiver States to produce non-counterfeitable documents of travel, but I 

would point out that our own State Department is unable to meet 

the very deadline they were prescribing for others. 

I commend Mr. De Vries for noting in his testimony the threat 

of terrorists obtaining weapons of mass destruction. I would point 

out that weapons of mass destruction range from tear gas or mustard gas on one hand, and a thermal nuclear weapon on the other. 

And I would hope that we would focus our attention on nuclear 

weapons since the 9/11 Commission indicated that the greatest 

problem we faced was a failure of imagination, and we seem unable 

or unwilling to imagine what could be done with thermal nuclear 

weapons to the United States. 

In these hearings, I hope we will explore why it is that a significant portion of Muslim youths living on the continent of Europe 

seems to have adopted radical views of Islam. 

Whereas, apparently a smaller percentage of Muslim youth in 

the Muslim world have adopted those views, and we in the United 

States, with a significant Muslim population, seem to have far 

fewer people involved in terrorist attacks on a percentage basis 

than those of Europe. 

Returning to the nuclear proliferation program in Iran, first we 

should also add that Iran is the number one State-sponsor of terrorism, and Europe has not conditioned any of the carrots on Iran 

ceasing its status identified by our State Department as a sponsor 

of terrorism. 

7

And so we have a circumstance where Europe comes to us and 

says let us work together, and I am supposed to go home and sell 

that to the people of my district. And then I have to explain to 

them that half-a-billion dollars has been sent from the World Bank 

to the Islamic Republic’s Government for it to use to meets its domestic needs, and so it can use its oil revenue to finance terrorism 

and nuclear proliferation. 

And some of that money is ours, and it has been literally hijacked by the votes of European Governments to send money—25 

percent of it ours—to a regime that is working every day to kill as 

many Americans as possible, and is looking forward to the day 

when they can kill us by the hundreds-of-thousands. 

What we see from Europe with regard to Iran is business-asusual can be coated as a mirror of diplomatic flurry and announcement of great success when we announce that there is going to be 

yet another meeting. 

The fact is that when a Government is sponsoring terrorism and 

is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of Americans, and Europe 

continues to press us on the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act because they 

want to invest in oil wells there, and when they send our money, 

as well as theirs, to a Government, and when they conduct trade 

negotiations on an as-usual basis, the people of Iran will believe 

their leaders when they say we can continue this foreign policy, 

and it will not hurt the Iranian economy and its economic relationships with the world. 

Only European cooperation and a more aggressive policy from 

the United States can convince the Iranian people that they pay a 

price for the decision of their Government to develop nuclear weapons. And with that, I yield back. 

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you Mr. Sherman. And I would now like to 

yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Pitts. 

Mr. PITTS. Thank you Madame Chair and thank you Mr. Chairman for convening this important hearing this afternoon on United 

States and Europe Counterterrorism Coordination. 

From 9/11 to the March 11 bombings in Madrid, to the airplane 

bombings, to the school attack in Russia, one thing is crystal clear: 

Terrorism is a global enemy. No country, no town, no individual is 

safe. Terrorism affects us all. And if it is to be defeated we must 

work together in pursuit of justice and peace. Today, we are here 

to discuss counterterrorism cooperation with our European allies. 

Certainly we have not seen eye-to-eye on every aspect on the war 

on terror. But what is often lost is the degree to which we do agree. 

We have many common challenges because the United States and 

Europe are open societies that value democracy and freedom and 

we must work together on counterterrorism efforts. 

I support the counterterrorism strategy outlined at the June 

2004 U.S.–EU summit. We need to improve border security. We 

need to prevent access by terrorists to financial and economic resources. We need to bolster law enforcement capabilities and coordination. In working together we can learn from each other and 

adopt policies and practices that are successful in improving our security. 

I will revise and extend my remarks with the rest of the testimony and I look forward to hearing our distinguished witnesses 

8

today. Again, I thank the Chairs for holding this important hearing. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pitts follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH R. PITTS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

I thank the Chairman and Madam Chair for convening this important hearing 

this afternoon on United States-Europe Counter-terrorism Coordination. 

From 9/11, to the March 11th bombings in Madrid, to the airplane bombings and 

school terrorist attack in Russia, one thing is crystal clear: terrorism is a global 

enemy. 

No country, no town, no individual is safe. 

Terrorism affects us all and if it is to be defeated, we must work together in pursuit of justice and peace. 

Today, we are here to discuss counter-terrorism cooperation with our European 

allies. Certainly, we have not seen eye-to-eye on every aspect of the War on Terror, 

but what is often lost is the degree to which we do agree. 

We have many common challenges because the United States and Europe are 

open societies that value democracy and freedom. 

We must work together on counter-terrorism efforts. I support the counter-terrorism strategy outlined at the June 2004 U.S.–EU summit. 

We need to improve border security. We need to prevent access by terrorist to financial and economic resources. We need to bolster law enforcement capabilities and 

coordination. 

In working together, we can learn from each other and adopt policies and practices that are successful in improving security. 

For example, I was recently told a story about a European airport that instituted 

a neighborhood watch program. 

The security personnel at the airport identified points of vulnerability and went 

out into the neighborhoods to educate the surrounding community about what to 

look for. 

If a person sees anything suspicious they are to call a private number, not a general emergency number like 9–1–1, to register what they observed. 

On one occasion, an elderly lady who was part of the neighborhood watch called 

in to airport security about two men she saw getting out of a van and going into 

the woods with what looked a fishing pole. 

The problem? There’s no place to fish around there. 

Law enforcement was sent out, and sure enough, they arrested two men with an 

SA–7. 

This anecdote proves that the threat is real. We could institute a similar strategy 

here to protect our airports. 

We also must continue our resolve to export those values that make our nations 

great: democracy, freedom, self-determination, and basic human rights. 

Specifically regarding human rights and democratization, it is vital that we help 

stop the myriad human rights violations and help promote the development of democracy. 

Islamic extremists are attempting to disrupt and dominate politics throughout the 

world. While our response must be firm, it must also be just. We cannot afford to 

compromise human rights for the sake of security, or we play into the hands of the 

terrorist. 

For example, in Central Asia, governments must be careful to arrest only the extremists and those who have committed crimes. Unfortunately, there are many 

peaceful religious believers who have been arrested in the sweep to crack down on 

extremists. We must support courageous leaders who stand for freedom in the midst 

of fierce opposition from secret security forces and official government pressure. I 

urge the governments of Central Asia to continue the fight against terrorism without violating fundamental human freedoms. 

The U.S. and E.U. must work together to engage this region to improve respect 

for and protection of human rights while combating terrorism. If we don’t, this region will crumble. 

In closing, whether you are from the United States or from Europe; whether you 

agree with the War in Iraq or oppose it; whether you are conservative or liberal; 

you are the enemy of the terrorists and they seek your destruction. 

You cannot appease them; you cannot negotiate with them; you cannot sit them 

down over a cup of Starbucks and talk to them. 

9

Together, we must frustrate them, find them, and fight them. And, I firmly believe that together we will win. 

We have many common challenges and we need to work together to improve security. 

I look forward to hearing our distinguished witnesses and I yield back the balance 

of my time.

Ms. DAVIS. I thank the gentleman for being brief so we could get 

on with the witnesses. Mr. McCotter, do you have an opening statement? 

Mr. MCCOTTER. No, Madame Chairwoman. 

Ms. DAVIS. Mr. Smith? 

Mr. NICK SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Madame Chairwoman, I would 

ask that my full written statement be included at this point. I 

would just like to add to it. 

Ms. DAVIS. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NICK SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

I would like to thank Chairmen Gallegly and Davis for holding this hearing today 

on counterterrorism cooperation with our allies in Europe. I would also like to thank 

our witnesses for joining us today. 

Much has been written about the rift between the United States and Europe in 

the context of disagreements over Iraq. Some have raised concerns that Europe and 

the United States do not have a shared vision to fight terrorism. Many have also 

noted that when Europe and the United States work together, the world follows. 

President Bush has lead attempts to raise the urgency of fighting terrorism in the 

United States. However, cooperation with Europe is important for defeating terror 

the way that cooperation helped the previous generation defeat communism. 

Europe has worked with the U.S. in the Security Council to pass and implement 

new terrorist financing resolutions. These have allowed tracking and limiting terrorist resources. Several European countries including Britain, Italy, Poland, the 

Netherlands, Denmark, Bulgaria, and others are working with us in Iraq to establish a stable government that can be a model in the Middle East. And even more 

countries are working with us in Afghanistan, although few have lived up to their 

promises for either troops or money. This cooperation must be expanded. 

Much has also been written about the close economic ties between the United 

States and Europe. While China gets all the press about foreign direct investment, 

an overwhelming majority of American investment abroad is investment in Europe. 

This economic relationship is central to the world economy. In addition to cooperating to address terrorism in the world at large, terrorism has many implications 

for US–EU relations. 

One concern that has been particularly relevant is travel. The 9–11 Commission 

report said that restricting terrorist travel is as important or more important than 

restricting terrorist financing. However, we need to be careful that these restrictions 

do as little damage as possible to our business, cultural and educational exchanges 

with Europe and other countries. These exchanges are some of our most important 

public diplomacy and are extremely helpful for the economies of the United States 

and visitors’ countries. Maintaining the balance between security and the benefits 

of these exchanges will require new thinking and new technology as we reexamine 

our security, economic, and business priorities in today’s security context. The way 

forward cannot be backwards towards more restriction. It must be towards more secure exchange. 

Consider a recent example. Last year the United States and the European Union 

completed difficult negotiations involving passenger lists on transatlantic flights. 

American regulations were said to violate European privacy laws. Eventually regulations were decided upon but the European Parliament challenged these regulations in court. With the recent election of a new Parliament, it is not yet clear what 

the status of this suit is, but this situation is an excellent example of the challenges 

that we must face. This debate required that we cooperate on our fundamental values about privacy and relate them to the risks associated with terrorism. This kind 

of discussion will be repeated as transatlantic cooperation continues, as it must. 

10

I would like to again thank the Chairmen for holding this hearing today. We must 

continue and expand our cooperation with Europe against terrorism and other dangers to world stability.

Mr. NICK SMITH OF MICHIGAN. You know, Europe and the United 

States have been close allies throughout history. Certainly we have 

worked together in and out of the Security Council in terms of our 

fight against terrorism. Many countries in Europe—Britain, Italy, 

Poland, The Netherlands, Demark, Bulgaria and others—are working with us in Iraq. 

Terrorism came boldly to the forefront back in the 1970s in the 

Olympics. It continued hitting us through the 1980s and the 1990s, 

and pretty much nothing was done until after 9/11. Now the United 

States has taken some bold steps; with the Taliban, in deciding 

that we must stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, and dealing with those countries that are 

harboring terrorists. And I hope that we all agree now that it is 

important. It is my guess that historians 50 years from now, or 75 

years from now, are going to look back at this time and say that 

it was a turning point. A turning point in trying to make a difference and trying to put limitations on the spread of threats and 

other terrorist activities, whether we are successful or not. 

We are only going to be successful if we work together and even 

in Iraq, where there is a lot of European countries that disagree 

with the effort, it seems to me that if we fail in that effort of making that country an example of democracy and to make a difference 

in that part of the world then it is going to jeopardize our long-run 

success in countering terrorism. 

So just my final sentence, Madame Chairwoman, is that cooperation with the rest of the free world is very important, and this time 

in history is very important. 

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you Mr. Smith. We have with us today on our 

first panel Mr. William Pope, Principal Deputy Coordinator, Office 

of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State. 

Mr. Pope joined the U.S. Foreign Service in 1974 and has assumed his current duties in the Office of Counterterrorism in August 2002. Prior to this assignment, he served as the Deputy Chief 

of Mission in Rome, and as DCM at the U.S. Embassy in The 

Hague, The Netherlands. He has also served in Paris, Belgrade, 

Pretoria and Botswana. Within the department, he has served as 

the Director of the Interagency Task Force on Soviet Functions and 

has been an Legislative Management Officer in the Bureau of Legislative Affairs. 

Mr. Pope was born in Alexandria, Virginia, and served in the 

U.S. Army Security Agency in 1969 through 1970. He holds a B.A. 

from the University of Virginia, has done graduate work at Georgetown University, and attended the National War College. It is nice 

to have a fellow Virginian here, Mr. Pope. We are glad to have you. 

Also on our first panel is Mr. Gijs de Vries, Counterterrorism Coordinator of the European Union. Mr. De Vries currently serves as 

the Counterterrorism Coordinator for the European Union in Brussels, and prior to his appointment earlier this year, Mr. De Vries 

served on special assignment as Ambassador in The Hague. 

Mr. De Vries has served as Deputy Minister of the Interior and 

is a member of the European Parliament, including Leader of the 

11

Liberal and Democratic Group. He has also been an Electorate in 

International Relations, with a Faculty of Law in English. 

Mr. De Vries, it is a pleasure to have you here and I look forward 

to hearing both of your testimonies. Mr. Pope, you will be first and 

each of you will be recognized for 10 minutes. Your full statement 

will be in the record and you are free to tell us whatever you want 

to tell us in 10 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM T. POPE, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. POPE. Thank you very much, Madame Chairperson. And Mr. 

Chairman and Members of the Subcommittees, thank you for this 

opportunity to appear before you today to discuss European cooperation with the United States in the global war on terrorism. 

Cooperation with Europe is vital, as you have already heard, to 

our ability to effectively prosecute that war against enemies that 

threaten all of us on both sides of the Atlantic. 

I would like, before getting any further, to express my deepest 

condolences to the people of Russia, who have suffered horrific terrorist attacks, leading to the deaths of so many innocent people in 

recent weeks. Our thoughts and prayers are with them. The pitiless and indefensible attacks in Russia only strengthen our resolve 

to try to deter future atrocities and see the culprits caught and 

punished. 

Europe’s abhorrence of terrorism was strengthened by the horror 

of the train bombs in Madrid, the repeated suicide bombings in 

Uzbekistan, the attacks in Turkey, and most recently, the tragic 

events in Russia. Europeans well know the price that terrorism 

exacts, both internationally and domestically. 

The scope of the terrorist threat makes clear that no one country 

can hope to succeed in defeating it alone. As President Bush has 

stressed and as we have heard this morning in your opening statements, the global threat we face requires a global strategy and a 

global response, and this is exactly what we are seeking to do, both 

bilaterally with our partners, and by aggressively mobilizing the 

United Nations and other international organizations to fight terrorism in every corner of the globe. 

In that effort, Europeans have been among our closest and most 

reliable partners. Cooperation has been forthcoming and rapid response to immediate threats the norm. 

With your permission, I thought that I could begin with a brief 

overview of U.S. counterterrorism efforts. Following the September 

11 attacks, the U.S. Government developed a national strategy for 

combating terrorism. 

We have implemented this strategy to act simultaneously on four 

fronts; to defeat terrorist organizations of global reach by going 

after their sanctuaries, leadership, finances, and command, control, 

and communications. 

Second, deny further sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists by cooperating with other States, including European 

States, to take action against these international threats. 

12

Third, diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to 

exploit by enlisting the international community to focus its efforts 

and resources on the areas most at risk. 

And, fourth, defend the United States, its citizens, and interests 

at home and abroad. To achieve these ambitious aims, we have 

sought with great success, I believe, to create and sustain a broad 

international coalition. 

Our multilateral counterterrorism efforts start at the U.N. and 

are centered around U.N. Security Council resolution 1373. Other 

regional and functional organizations are also crucial to building a 

seamless, global counterterrorism web. 

For example, the International Civil Aviation Organization 

(ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization can set international counterterrorism standards and best practices. Regional 

groups around the world, including the European Union, can and 

do encourage their members to adopt these standards and other 

best practices and to help in their implementation. For example, 

the G–8 (Group of 8, which includes several of our European partners) developed a set of guidelines and best practices to improve 

the security of travel documents, including the use of biometrics. 

ICAO reviewed these guidelines and best practices and agreed to 

adopt them as international standards. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) agreed, in a ministerial decision last December, to a United States-initiated proposal for all 

55 OSCE Member States to adopt and implement the ICAO standards and best practices. 

The G–8 Counterterrorism Action Group, what we call CTAG, focused part of its last meeting on bringing donor attention to document security assistance needs in the OSCE region and beyond. 

As with G–8 document security standards, the next steps will be 

to export completed standards and practices to other organizations 

for broader adoption and then to help those lacking the means to 

implement them. 

Let me now turn to our cooperation with the European countries 

and institutions. The European Union has been a solid partner in 

sustaining the global coalition against terrorism. 

Following 9/11, the European Council adopted an action plan to 

identify areas such as police and judicial cooperation, humanitarian 

assistance, transportation security, and economic and finance policy, to help fight terrorism. 

The EU and the United States signed Extradition and Mutual 

Legal Assistance Agreements at our June 2003 summit that will 

expand law enforcement and judicial cooperation. The Madrid 

bombings provided additional impetus for action. Since then, EU 

members have agreed, among other things, to reinforce operational 

cooperation, improve the effectiveness of border information systems and bolster technical assistance to third-world countries. They 

have also named an EU counterterrorism coordinator whose job is 

to monitor and encourage implementation of the EU agreement on 

enhancing counterterrorism capabilities. 

And it is a great honor for me to be on the same panel with Minister De Vries. At the recent U.S.–EU summit this year, our European partners and we renewed our commitment to further develop 

our cooperation against terrorism and agreed to work together to 

13

deepen international consensus and enhance international efforts 

to combat terrorism; prevent access by terrorists to financial and 

other economic resources; develop measures to maximize our capacities to detect, investigate, and prosecute terrorists and prevent terrorist attacks; to protect the security of international transport, 

and ensure effective systems of border control; diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists can utilize to recruit and exploit to 

their advantage; and to target our external policy actions toward 

priority developing countries where counterterrorism capacity or a 

commitment to combating terrorism needs to be enhanced. 

Let me turn very quickly now to the broader question on how we 

see the war on terrorism in Europe. European nations are active 

participants in a variety of multilateral organizations that have 

made contributions in counterterrorist efforts, including G–8, the 

Financial Action Task Force, OSCE, the International Maritime 

Organization, as I mentioned, and ICAO. 

The capabilities of our Western European partners are excellent. 

The European intelligence and security forces are well aware of the 

threat posed by Islamic extremism and generally do an effective job 

of monitoring extremists. They have successfully forestalled numerous incipient mass-casualty attacks since 9/11, including some on 

United States facilities in Europe. 

Terrorist activity and the presence of terrorist support networks 

in Europe, however, remains a source of concern. As we all know, 

much of the planning for 9/11 took place in Europe. And terrorist 

support networks continue to exist on the continent despite the 

best efforts of security services and European Governments. 

Efforts to combat the threat in Europe are sometimes complicated by the fact that some countries have legal impediments to 

taking firm judicial action against suspected terrorists, often stemming from asylum laws that afford loopholes, or inadequate 

counterterrorist legislation or standards of evidence that lack flexibility in permitting law enforcement authorities to rely on classified source information in holding terrorist suspects. 

Ease of travel within Schengen visa countries also makes Western Europe attractive to terrorists. We are concerned that some 

European States have at times demonstrated an inability to prosecute successfully or hold many of the terrorists brought before 

their courts. 

I think that I will cut back on this a little. I don’t want to go 

too long. One of the things that we need to focus on quite a bit is 

our ability to track terrorism financing. Most countries in Europe 

have good laws against terrorist financing, but some of the financial transfers do slip past regulators in the formal economy. 

I would like to thank the Subcommittee Members for their sustained support of an amendment to reform the law on designating 

foreign terrorist organizations. This provision represents the type 

of legislation that will allow my staff and their counterparts in 

other departments to direct their efforts more productively against 

terrorists and their supporters. Thank you for that. 

We work with our European partners on a whole range of CT efforts; on information sharing, on arresting members of cells, interdicting terrorist financing, and beyond Europe as well. 

14

And what I think I will do is stop, because I am going to go too 

far beyond, but I would be very pleased to answer your questions, 

and you have the full testimony for the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pope follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM T. POPE, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY COORDINATOR, 

OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Thank you Madame and Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittees for 

this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss European cooperation with 

the United States in the Global War on Terrorism. Cooperation with Europe is vital 

to our ability effectively to prosecute that war—against enemies that threaten all 

of us, on both sides of the Atlantic. 

I will summarize my formal written statement and ask that you include my full 

testimony in the record. 

However, before beginning, I would like to express my deepest condolences to the 

people of Russia who have suffered horrific terrorist attacks leading to the deaths 

of so many people in recent weeks. Our thoughts and prayers are with them, especially the parents of the innocents who died in the carnage at the school. I can only 

imagine their grief and their loss—we all weep with them. As with the horror in 

Madrid in March, the pitiless and indefensible attacks in Russia only strengthen our 

resolve to try to deter future atrocities and see the culprits caught and punished. 

Europe’s abhorrence of terrorism was strengthened by the horror of the train 

bombs in Madrid, the repeated suicide bombings in Uzbekistan, the series of attacks 

in Turkey, and, most recently, the tragic events in Russia. Europeans well know the 

price terrorism exacts, internationally and domestically. 

Mr. Chairman, the scope of the terrorist threat makes clear that no one country 

can hope to succeed in defeating it alone: As President Bush has stressed on numerous occasions, the global threat we face requires a global strategy and a global response—and this is exactly what we are seeking to do, both bilaterally with our 

partners, and by aggressively mobilizing the United Nations and other international 

organizations to fight terrorism in every corner of the globe. In that effort, Europeans have been among our closest and most reliable partners: Cooperation has 

been forthcoming, and rapid response to immediate threats the norm. 

With your permission, I thought I could begin with a brief overview of U.S. counterterrorism efforts: Following the September 11 attacks, the U.S. Government developed a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, which outlined the policy 

framework for coordinated actions to prevent terrorist attacks against the United 

States, its citizens, its interests, and its friends around the world. We have implemented this strategy to act simultaneously on four fronts:

• Defeat terrorist organizations of global reach by going after their sanctuaries, 

leadership, finances, and command, control and communications;

• Deny further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by cooperating 

with other states to take action against these international threats;

• Diminish the underlying conditions that terrorists seek to exploit by enlisting 

the international community to focus its efforts and resources on the areas 

most at risk; and

• Defend the United States, its citizens, and interests at home and abroad.

To achieve these ambitious aims, we have sought, with great success, to create 

and sustain a broad international coalition: 

Our multilateral counterterrorism (CT) efforts start at the United Nations. UN 

Security Council Resolution 1373, adopted with strong U.S. leadership shortly after 

9–11, places binding obligations on all UN member states to:

• Prevent and suppress terrorist financing by criminalizing financing, planning, 

preparing or perpetrating terrorist acts;

• Prohibit nationals from making funds or economic resources available to terrorists;

• Freeze funds and financial assets of terrorists and related entities;

• Refrain from supporting terrorist entities, take necessary steps to prevent 

commission of terrorist acts, and prevent use of territory for terrorist acts;

• Deny safe haven and prevent movement of terrorists across borders;

• Exchange operational information and enter into agreements to prevent and 

suppress terrorism, including ratifying the 12 CT conventions and protocols;

15

• Ensure refugee/asylum laws prevent abuse by terrorists; and

• Prohibit active and passive assistance to terrorists.

UNSCR 1373 also created the UN Counterterrorism Committee (CTC) to monitor 

implementation of its obligations, and to maintain countries’ will to continue the 

struggle. Earlier this year, the UNCTC was revitalized to strengthen the fight 

against terrorism within the United Nations by giving the CTC further means to 

fulfill its mandate of monitoring implementation of 1373. A new Counterterrorism 

Executive Director position was also created. 

Regional and functional organizations are also crucial to building a seamless global CT web. Functional organizations like the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization can set international CT 

standards and best practices. Regional groups around the world, including the European Union, can and do encourage their member states to adopt these standards 

and best practices, and help in their implementation. 

An example of how the United States is working with such organizations to improve CT efforts involves four different multilateral groups, each doing what it does 

best:

• The G–8, which includes several of European partners, developed a set of 

guidelines and best practices to improve the security of travel documents, including the use of biometrics.

• ICAO reviewed these guidelines and best practices and agreed to adopt them 

as international standards.

• The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) agreed in 

a Ministerial decision last December to a U.S.-initiated proposal for all 55 

OSCE member states to adopt and implement the ICAO standards and best 

practices.

• The G–8 Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG) focused part of its last meeting on bringing donor attention to document security assistance needs in the 

OSCE region and beyond.

G–8 actions in these areas will serve as a first step in further bolstering the security of travel. As with G–8 document security standards, the next steps will be to 

export completed standards and practices to other organizations for broader adoption, and then to help those lacking the means to implement them. 

Let me now turn to our cooperation with the European countries and institutions: 

The European Union has been a solid partner in sustaining the global coalition 

against terrorism. Following 9/11, the European Council adopted an Action Plan to 

identify areas, such as police and judicial cooperation, humanitarian assistance, 

transportation security and economic and finance policy, to help fight terrorism. The 

EU and the United States signed Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements at our June 2003 Summit that will expand law enforcement and judicial cooperation. 

The Madrid bombings provided additional impetus for action. Since then, EU 

members have agreed, among other things, to reinforce operational cooperation, improve the effectiveness of border information systems, and bolster technical assistance to third countries. They have also named an EU Counterterrorism Coordinator, 

whose job is to monitor and encourage implementation of EU agreements on enhancing counterterrorism capabilities. 

At the recent U.S.–EU Summit, our European partners and we renewed our commitment to further develop our cooperation against terrorism and agreed to work 

together: to deepen the international consensus and enhance international efforts to 

combat terrorism; to prevent access by terrorists to financial and other economic resources; to develop measures to maximize our capacities to detect, investigate and 

prosecute terrorists and prevent terrorist attacks; to protect the security of international transport and ensure effective systems of border control; to develop further 

our capabilities to deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack; to diminish the 

underlying conditions that terrorists can seize to recruit and exploit to their advantage; and to target our external relations actions towards priority developing countries where counterterrorism capacity or commitment to combating terrorism needs 

to be enhanced. 

This is the type of multilateral CT effort and cooperation that the United States 

seeks to promote, a goal clearly shared by our G–8 and EU partners. 

Let me turn now to the broader question how we see the war on terrorism in Europe: 

European nations are active participants in a variety of multilateral organizations 

that have made contributions in counterterrorist efforts, including the G–8, the FiVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:54 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\091404\95829.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
16

nancial Action Task Force (FATF), the Organization for Security and Cooperation 

in Europe (OSCE), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The capabilities of our Western European partners are excellent. European intelligence and security forces are well 

aware of the threat posed by Islamic extremism and generally do an effective job 

of monitoring extremists. They have successfully forestalled numerous incipient 

mass casualty attacks since 9–11, including some on U.S. facilities in Europe. 

Terrorist activity and the presence of terrorist support networks in Europe remains a source of concern, however; as we all know, much of the planning for 9–

11 took place in Europe, and terrorist support networks continue to exist on the continent despite the best efforts of security services and European governments. I 

would note that in Germany, for example, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution’s annual report concluded that Islamic extremists represent the largest 

threat to that country’s internal security and remain the main focus of German authorities. 

Efforts to combat the threat in Europe are sometimes complicated by the fact that 

some countries have legal impediments to taking firm judicial action against suspected terrorists, often stemming from asylum laws that afford loopholes, inadequate CT legislation, or standards of evidence that lack flexibility in permitting law 

enforcement authorities to rely on classified-source information in holding terrorist 

suspects. Ease of travel within Schengen visa countries also makes Western Europe 

attractive to terrorists. We are concerned that some European states have at times 

demonstrated an inability to prosecute successfully or hold many of the terrorists 

brought before their courts. 

Differing perspectives on the dividing line between legitimate political or charitable activity and support for terrorist groups similarly clouds the picture. For example, the EU as a whole has been reluctant to take steps to block the assets of 

charities linked to Hamas and Hizballah, even though these groups repeatedly engage in deadly terrorist attacks, and the ‘‘charitable’’ activities help draw recruits. 

These groups derive a considerable portion of their funding from Europe, and funds 

allegedly raised for ‘‘humanitarian’’ purposes are easily diverted to the commission 

of terrorist acts. Even laying aside the contentious issue of the death penalty, European sentences in general are often significantly less stringent than those in the 

United States, and provisions for mandatory remission of sentences frequently more 

generous. 

We all need to improve our ability to track terrorism financing. Most countries 

in Europe have good laws against terrorism financing, but some of the financial 

transfers slip past regulators in the formal economy. Some transactions move 

through informal, largely illegal, channels. A propos of this subject, I would like to 

thank Subcommittee members for their sustained support of an amendment to reform the law on designating Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This provision represents the type of legislation that will allow my staff and their counterparts in 

other Departments to direct their efforts more productively against terrorists and 

their supporters. 

To address these potential weaknesses, the United States continues to work closely with European partners to strengthen CT legislation and to help improve abilities 

to restrict terrorists’ freedom of action, block assets, and address social conditions 

that contribute to the spread of terrorism. 

Despite occasional hiccups, I would stress that the contributions of European 

countries in sharing vital information, arresting members of terrorist cells, interdicting terrorist financing and logistics, and assisting in rebuilding Afghanistan 

have been and continue to be, vital elements in the war on terrorism. Successes in 

the campaign against terrorism have, to a large degree, been a result of the unprecedented level of cooperation and mutual support among the United States and our 

partners around the world. 

European countries are moving to overcome some of the impediments to pursuing 

terrorists that existed before 9–11. We want to continue to work with our European 

partners to identify areas where there is work to be done and ways in which we 

can collaborate more effectively. Let me briefly address some of them: 

All of us, including the United States, need to improve coordination between our 

law enforcement and intelligence agencies. There have been significant advances 

since September 11, 2001, but we can still do better. 

We remain concerned about the activities of state sponsors of terrorism in supporting some of the world’s deadliest terror organizations. It is the policy of the 

United States to see that these nations cease their support for international terror. 

Only then can they be considered members of the international community in good 

standing. We remain particularly concerned with the activities of Syria and Iran, 

which are actively engaged in supporting the activities of Palestinian rejectionist 

17

terrorist groups and Hizballah, which pose a threat to regional security and the conclusion of a just and lasting Middle East peace. We continue to urge our EU and 

G–8 partners to keep the pressure on state sponsors to change their behavior, particularly regarding support for HAMAS, Hizbullah and others. 

All of us must look for ways to remedy deficiencies in legal, financial and enforcement tools:

• European countries need to fulfill their commitments to ratify and implement 

all the UN CT conventions and protocols.

• States must ensure the criminalization of material and logistical support for 

terrorism (and in some cases, terrorism itself); impose strict punishments on 

convicted terrorists; and lower barriers to use of intelligence in law enforcement. Laws against document fraud need to be strengthened across the 

board.

• All countries need to have a national ability to freeze administratively terrorist assets.

• Legal or technical impediments to closer cooperation among countries on intelligence and information exchanges must be removed. The EU and its member states need to re-examine fundamentally the ways in which strict privacy 

laws can impede the sharing of information for law enforcement purposes.

• EU member states need to accelerate efforts to complete bilateral agreements 

with the United States to implement the U.S.–EU Extradition and Mutual 

Legal Assistance Agreements.

At the same time, we need to continue to look for ways to develop cooperative 

U.S.–European CT programs to assist less-capable countries. Many countries need 

assistance in developing their capabilities to counter terrorism and strengthen their 

legal framework. There is more than enough work for all of us. 

Addressing the factors that reduce our ability to cooperate even more effectively 

will be a long-term effort. Differing legal, cultural and historical traditions and practices will complicate the process. However, there is no doubt that all us are increasingly aware of both the threat and the deficiencies that limit our abilities to address 

it. 

As I noted earlier, terrorism is a global threat to citizens of all countries. To win 

the global war against this threat, we must and will continue to work closely together to address the deficiencies that hinder us and to build on our many successes. 

At this point I would be pleased to take any questions. 

Thank you.

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Pope. We are pleased to have you 

here today, and Mr. De Vries, it is a pleasure to have you. As I 

understand it, you are an American citizen as well, and so we are 

glad to have you here to share your views with us. You are recognized for 10 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF GIJS DE VRIES, COUNTERTERRORISM 

COORDINATOR, EUROPEAN UNION 

Mr. DE VRIES. Thank you very much, Madame Chair. Indeed, as 

someone born in The Bronx in New York City, it is a particular 

privilege for me to be with you here today. Terrorism is a global 

source and it must be tackled and countered globally. 

The European Union is fully committed to do so and to act in 

close concertation with the United States. I am particularly 

pleased, therefore, to reflect today, together with Mr. William Pope, 

on our joint efforts. 

Terrorism constitutes an attack on mankind’s most fundamental 

values; the right to a life lived in peace, freedom, and dignity—the 

very values on which both the United States and the European 

Union have been founded, and which we are pledged to uphold in 

the world. 

18

The terrorists’ intentional and indiscriminate killing of civilians 

is a cynical denial of the respect for the sanctity of life in which 

our civilization is based. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and 

security of person. 

If this is true for adults, it is the more true for minors. Few 

crimes can be more abhorrent or despicable than terrorism perpetrated on children. We grieve with the relatives of the children 

killed in suicide attacks perpetrated in Israel, such as Ariel Atash, 

the 3-year-old boy who was killed recently in the attack on a bus 

in Be’er Sheva. We recoil before the horrors visited earlier this 

month upon the children, parents and teachers of the Beslan school 

in Russia. We must act to forestall terrorism wherever possible and 

to resist it wherever it occurs. 

Terrorists and those who aid and abet them must be brought to 

justice. Though no cause can justify terrorism, we must, however, 

address the factors contributing to situations in which terrorism 

thrives. And we must deepen international cooperation to combat 

terrorism based on respect for fundamental rights and freedoms. 

There can be no trade-off between effective counterterrorism and 

human rights. Each is a precondition of the other. 

As you know, on March 11, Spain was rocked by the biggest terrorist attack ever to have hit the European continent. Europe’s 3/11 

has strengthened the Union’s resolve to combat terrorism. Meeting 

in March and June, the European Council has agreed additional 

actions—additional to the measures adopted since the tragic events 

of 9/11—in the form of more than 100 legislative and policy initiatives. 

They range from the decision to facilitate intelligence cooperation 

by the creation, on the proposal of Secretary General Solana, of a 

center for intelligence analysis, to measures to combat identity 

fraud and to create a European evidence warrant. 

Europol, the European Police Office, is increasingly being used 

by national law enforcement agencies as a channel of communication and coordination. Its caseload last year rose more than 40 percent over 2002. The Eurojust caseload went up 50 percent. 

Of course it is not enough to adopt measures in the European 

Union. We have to implement them in the Member States. That is 

not yet happening at a sufficiently quick pace. We need, therefore, 

to improve our record and the European Council has identified the 

need to speed up implementation. My own responsibilities as EU 

Coordinator include the regular monitoring of progress in this regard. 

The international dimension, as Mr. Pope has already outlined, 

is essential. We must effectively cooperate with our partners and 

leaders, and most importantly, with our partners across the Atlantic. The transatlantic partnership here and everywhere remains irreplaceable. There is no doubt in my mind that where we act together, Europe and America together constitute the world’s most 

powerful force for peace and stability. 

It is important to keep each other appraised at an early stage of 

possible policy proposals and we welcome the enhanced dialogue on 

terrorism-related issues, such as the policy dialogue on border and 

transport security which we started earlier this year. 

19

The EU welcomes the forward-looking and very specific EU–U.S. 

declaration that we adopted in June. I look forward to discussing 

its implementation with Secretary Ridge and Attorney General 

Ashcroft later this month. 

And I was heartened by the recent report by CSIS which concluded, and I quote, that:

‘‘. . . [T]he commonality of understanding of the threat and 

potential for joint action between the United States and its European partners is reflected by the fact that intelligence and 

law enforcement cooperation between the U.S. and European 

countries is, by general consent and in general, excellent.’’

Now, we have to universalize our efforts to combat terrorism. It 

means that we have to make sure that all Member States of the 

United Nations, including all the EU Member States, ratify and 

implement the 12 U.N. conventions in the fight against terrorism. 

We must also help third-world countries improve their counterterrorism capacity. The EU, already during the enlargement negotiations, has provided substantial financial aid to help its applicant 

Member States to modernize their police structures and to support 

judicial and related performance. 

More than a billion euro has been earmarked to continuing to do 

so in the years ahead. In addition, there are more than 360 million 

euro worth of Commission-funded projects in justice and home affairs which are directly relevant to the fight against terrorism to 

aid third-world countries. 

These funds are expected to grow. Let me also mention the African Peace Facility which the Union created of 250 million euro, 

which should support the African Union in its efforts to peacekeeping and conflict prevention on the African continent, which 

could help address some of the causes of terrorism. 

Let me also draw attention to another element of the EU’s contribution to the fight against terrorism at the international level. 

The EU makes a significant contribution militarily to the maintenance of stability in a number of crisis or post-crisis areas, whether 

through its own operations—such as in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—or through the EU Members States’ contributions to NATO operations, such as ISAF in Afghanistan where 23 

out of the 25 EU Member States have forces deployed. 

The EU Member States command five Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams currently operating in Afghanistan. Since August of this 

year, Eurocorps took over the responsibility for the NATO-led 

international security assistant force in Kabul. And as you mentioned, Madam Chair, for a period of 6 months it will command the 

operations of almost 7,000 soldiers from 33 nations. 

Let me briefly touch upon the issue of weapons of mass destruction. The EU security strategy proposed by Secretary General 

Solana identified WMD and terrorism as two of the most serious 

threats facing Europe. Surely the ultimate nightmare scenario is 

weapons of mass destruction falling in the hands of terrorists. 

We therefore wish to strengthen our WMD policy by including a 

nonproliferation clause as an essential element in our external 

agreements. We wish to apply the protocol to the nonproliferation 

treaty and support its universal application, support disarmament 

20

in Russia, cooperate with IEA and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and strengthen export controls. 

And we wish also to look at the identification and tracing of illicit small arms and light weapons. The new EU treaty, the constitutional treaty, should improve significantly the decision-making 

process in the EU by making it easier to adopt legislation on terrorism and related issues. It is particularly the case through the 

extention of qualified majority voting to a number of key elements 

of the fight against crime, particularly terrorism. 

However, the European Union is not a Federal State. It cannot 

be compared directly to the functioning of the United States. 

Though the role of the Union in the fight against terrorism is without a doubt a growing one, there remain limits to its powers. Most 

of the instruments and competence in the fight against terrorism 

remain in the hands of the Member States. 

The European Council has created neither a European FBI nor 

a European CIA. The approach of the European Council was to 

have the European Union assist national forces to do their work 

better across frontiers. The EU approach is bottom-up rather than 

top-down because the reverse, as our constitutional history has 

shown, would probably have taken too long. The hard work of 

tracking down potential terrorists and preventing attacks and 

bringing suspects to justice remains the preserve of national services. 

But they need to exchange information and cooperate across borders and to help them to do so, the Union’s programs have been 

extending, not just within the Union, but increasingly and fortunately with partners and like-minded countries such as the United 

States. 

Terrorism will remain a long-term challenge. There will be no 

quick solutions nor easy ones. While there will be silent successes, 

there will also be setbacks. 

One thing is certain: Close international cooperation, particularly 

across the Atlantic, remains crucial to our task. The European 

Union and its Member States are determined to play their full 

part. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. De Vries follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GIJS DE VRIES, COUNTERTERRORISM COORDINATOR, 

EUROPEAN UNION

Thank you for the invitation to be with you today. I appreciate the opportunity 

to discuss with you the policy of the European Union in the fight against terrorism. 

Terrorism is a global scourge. It must be countered globally. The European Union 

is fully committed to do so, and to act in close concertation with the United States. 

I am particularly pleased, therefore, to reflect today, together with Mr William 

Pope, on the joint efforts of the European Union and the United States in the field 

of counter-terrorism. 

Terrorism constitutes an attack on mankind’s most fundamental values: the right 

to a life lived in peace, freedom and dignity—the very values on which both the 

United States and the European Union have been founded and which we have 

pledged to uphold in the world. The terrorists’ intentional, indiscriminate killing of 

civilians is a cynical denial of the respect for the sanctity of life on which our 

civilisation is based. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person, 

as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights rightly states. If this is true for 

adults, it is the more true for minors. Few crimes can be more abhorrent or despicable than terrorism perpetrated on children. We grieve with the relatives of the 

children killed in suicide attacks perpetrated in Israel, such as Ariel Atash, the 

three-year old boy who was killed in the recent attack on a bus in Be’er Sheva. We 

21

recoil before the horrors visited earlier this month upon the children, parents and 

teachers of the Beslan school in Russia’s North Ossetia. As citizens we struggle to 

comprehend the indifference of terrorists to the suffering they cause. As public servants our task is to protect our fellow-citizens to the extent possible. Faced with such 

unmitigated manifestations of evil, the world must respond firmly and decisively. 

We must act to forestall terrorism whenever possible and to resist it wherever it 

occurs. Terrorists and those who aid and abet them must be brought to justice. 

Though no cause can justify terrorism, as we must continue to expound, we do need 

to address the factors contributing to situations in which terrorism thrives. And we 

must deepen international cooperation to combat terrorism based on respect for fundamental rights and freedoms in accordance with international law. We must be 

careful not to deliver recruitment propaganda to al Qaeda and its supporters. Violating the rule of law in the fight against terrorism is not only morally undesirable, 

but also ineffective in the long run. There can be no trade-off between effective 

counter-terrorism and human rights; indeed, each is a precondition of the other. 

The tragic events of 9/11 have jolted America. They triggered a strong response 

in Europe as well. At the level of the European Union, a wide range of measures 

were agreed. They range from the introduction of a European Arrest Warrant to 

speed up extradition procedures to the creation of new agencies, such as Eurojust, 

which brings together prosecutors and magistrates from all EU member states. The 

criminal law of the 25 member states is being aligned so that terrorism is prosecuted and punished in the same manner throughout the EU. 

On March 11 of this year, as you know, Spain was rocked by the biggest terrorist 

attack ever to have hit Europe. Europe’s 3/11 has strengthened the EU’s resolve to 

combat terrorism. Meeting in March and again in June, the European Council 

agreed an additional plan of action including more than 100 legislative and policy 

initiatives. These measures, covering the Presidencies of the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the UK, are to be agreed between now and the end of 2005. They aim 

to increase cooperation in fields ranging from intelligence sharing to law enforcement and the control of financial assets to make it easier to find, detain and bring 

to justice terror suspects. The EU also resolved to step up cooperation with multilateral organizations and like-minded countries. 

In its Declaration of 25 March, the European Council emphasised the need for a 

comprehensive approach in response to the threat posed by terrorism and in this 

context welcomed Javier Solana’s decision to appoint me to the post of EU CounterTerrorism Coordinator to coordinate the work of the Council in combating terrorism. 

It is a challenging task. As you know from your own experience, to be effective, this 

fight requires coordinated action by many different agencies with different cultures 

and mandates. I am of course not responsible for coordinating individual Member 

States’ national counter-terrorism structures or operations—that is a matter for the 

countries themselves. But there is much important work to be done at the European 

level, which requires joint action by 25 countries, in areas from critical infrastructure protection to relations with third countries. 

Let me now briefly highlight some of the initiatives taken by the European Council earlier this year. In the fight against terror, information—its collection and dissemination—is crucial. Among other steps, the European Council has invited the 

Commission to bring forward proposals to facilitate the exchange of personal information for the purpose of combating terrorism. Furthermore, to facilitate intelligence cooperation the European Council has endorsed Secretary-General Solana’s 

proposal to create, in the Council Secretariat, a centre for intelligence analysis, 

which will bring together experts from both the intelligence services and the security services. This will help the Union to develop an integrated analysis of the terrorist threat. 

The European Union is working on several measures to combat identity fraud. 

These aim at introducing biometric identifiers (digitalized pictures and fingerprints) 

in visas, residence permits for third country nationals and EU citizens’ passports, 

as well as in the future Visa Information System. This will be one of the biggest 

biometric systems in the world, holding millions of biometric files of all foreign nationals who apply for a Schengen visa. The Union already uses biometric features 

in its automatic fingerprint identification system, Eurodac, which allows member 

states to compare fingerprints of all asylum seekers in order to prevent the duplication of asylum requests. In 2003, during its first year of operation, Eurodac processed more than 250,000 fingerprints, and revealed that in more than 17,000 cases 

the same person had already made at least one asylum application in another country. 

Europol, the European Police Office, is increasingly being used by national law 

enforcement agencies as a channel of communication and coordination. In 2003 

Europol’s case load rose to 4,700—an increase of 40% over the previous year. 

22

Eurojust, the European Judicial Co-operation network’s case-load went up 50% over 

the same period. To speed up cooperation even more, the European Commission has 

proposed that each member state should designate a single police service and judicial authority for information exchanges. The Council is currently considering a proposal to oblige member states to inform both Europol and Eurojust about all persons 

investigated, prosecuted or convicted for acts of terrorism. Meanwhile, Europol and 

Eurojust have already concluded an agreement to enhance cooperation amongst 

themselves. 

To further enhance cooperation in the field of law enforcement, the Commission 

has proposed to create a European Evidence Warrant for the purpose of obtaining 

evidence that already exists in another member state. The next stage, as envisaged 

by the Commission, would be to provide for the mutual recognition of orders for evidence that does not yet exist, such as interviews of suspects. Ultimately, a single 

consolidated instrument might replace the current mutual legal assistance arrangements in the same way that the European arrest warrant will replace the old procedures of extradition. 

Of course, where the EU adopts legislation to facilitate cross-border cooperation, 

it is essential that the necessary implementing measures are adopted swiftly at national level. This is not yet the case across the board. We therefore need to improve 

our record. The European Council has identified the need to speed up implementation. My own responsibilities as EU Coordinator include the regular monitoring of 

progress in this regard. 

It is perhaps inevitable that the focus of EU work following the Madrid attacks 

has been primarily on the more internal aspects of the fight against terrorism. It 

is essential to ensure that Europe has the right mechanisms in place both to prevent such attacks and to deal with the consequences if prevention efforts fall short. 

But the international dimension is also crucially important. Today’s terrorism 

knows no borders. To combat it effectively we must continue to co-operate with our 

partners and neighbours. And perhaps the closest co-operation we have is with our 

partners across the Atlantic. The original action plan adopted by the European 

Council in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 underlined Europe’s commitment to solidarity with the US in the fight against terrorism and this was reiterated by the 

Council in March and June of this year. We have made significant advances such 

as the Mutual Legal Assistance and Extradition agreements signed in 2003 and now 

going through the ratification process. The agreements reached on Passenger Name 

Records and on the Container Security Initiative, show that when we work together 

we can find mutually acceptable solutions, even to sensitive problems. 

The key is to keep each other informed at an early stage of new policy proposals 

which might have an impact on our partners so that we can seek to resolve potential differences before legislation is enacted. The EU side very much welcomes the 

enhanced dialogue now in place on terrorism-related issues such as the new Policy 

Dialogue on Border and Transport Security whose first meeting I attended earlier 

this year. Such dialogue is important because, inevitably, there are differences of 

perspective between us in some areas. The assessment of the right balance between 

private liberties and public security with respect to data protection is one of these. 

But these differences of perspective should not—and do not—impede our continuing 

co-operation which is ongoing in a wide range of areas, as was highlighted by the 

EU–US declaration on combating terrorism adopted at our summit in June. This set 

an ambitious agenda for the months ahead, which I look forward to discussing with 

Secretary Ridge and Attorney-General Ashcroft later this month. And I was heartened to see that the recent CSIS report on the Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism 

concluded that ‘‘the commonality of understanding of the threat and potential for 

joint action between the US and its European partners is reflected by the fact that 

intelligence and law enforcement co-operation between the US and European countries is, by general consent and in general, excellent’’. 

Co-operation at the wider international level is also essential. The UN and its 

agencies play a vital role both at the political level, through the work of the Security 

Council’s Counter-terrorism Committee (UNCTC) and at the technical level where 

bodies such as the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) play a crucial role in developing global standards for transport security. The adoption of the IMO International Port Facility and 

Vessel Security code which came into force earlier this year owed much to EU–US 

co-operation within IMO. The UNCTC provides a valuable framework for assessing 

international efforts to implement the resolutions and Conventions relevant to terrorism. To have a real impact, counter terrorism efforts must be as universal as possible. All countries must implement the commitments set out in relevant UN resolutions and Convention and the international Community should help those unable 

to do so. 

23

The EU, through the efforts of its Member States and of the European Commission, is a major provider of technical assistance in this as in other fields. The Commission has a proven track record in building capacity within the police and judiciary, border security, as well as countering terrorist financing and money laundering. 

Already during the enlargement negotiations the EU provided substantial financial 

aid to help the applicant member states to modernise their police structures and to 

support judicial and related reforms. More than 1 billion Euro has been earmarked 

to continue assisting the new member states in the field of internal security during 

the period 2004–2006. 

Projects are under way in these areas world-wide. It is always difficult to put an 

accurate figure on what in many cases are multi-annual, multi-component programmes. But a rough estimate is there are now some ÷360 million worth of ongoing Commission funded projects in the justice and home affairs fields which are directly relevant to the fight against terrorism, and these funds are expected to grow. 

They are additional to the counter-terrorism aid provided by individual Member 

States. There is also important work being done through EU external assistance 

programmes to tackle terrorism at its roots. Development assistance has an impact 

on the environment within which terrorist groups flourish. It can erode the support 

base for terrorist networks and movements through its focus on poverty reduction, 

land reform, governance, the fight against corruption, post-conflict reconstruction 

and the promotion of participatory development processes. As you know, the EU, 

with its member states, is responsible for some 55% of official development assistance globally, and some 66% of grant assistance. 

But development assistance alone cannot address the underlying factors contributing to the rise of the new terrorism. As noted in the European Security Strategy, 

‘‘the most recent wave of terrorism is global in scope and is linked to violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of 

modernisation, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies’’. The same CSIS report I quoted earlier posed a number of very pertinent questions on this aspect of the fight against terrorism. I do 

not think any of us has all the answers to those questions. But it is clear that we 

are unlikely to succeed in our fight against this scourge if we do not begin develop 

policies which seek to address these underlying factors. I welcome the EU–US commitment to work together to tackle terrorism’s complex causes as set out in the 

June Summit statement. 

I should also draw attention to another element of the EU’s contribution to the 

fight against terrorism at the international level. The EU makes a significant contribution militarily to the maintenance of stability in a number of crisis or post-crisis areas, whether this be through our own ESDP operations (which have so far 

been deployed in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in the Democratic Republic of Congo and will soon be deployed in Bosnia), or through EU Members 

States’ contributions to NATO operations. An important example of this is the European contribution to ISAF in Afghanistan where 23 out of the 25 EU member States 

have forces deployed and where we are working in close co-operation with the US. 

EU Member States command five Provincial Reconstruction Teams currently operating in Afghanistan. Since August 2004 Eurocorps, which comprises military contributions from its framework nations, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and 

Spain, took over the responsibility for the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul. For a period of six months it will command the operations of almost 7000 soldiers from 33 nations. This is in addition to the support 

being provided by individual EU Member States to the operation Enduring Freedom 

Coalition and the extensive EU support to the overall reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. Another important EU contribution to stability and conflict prevention 

is the creation by the EU of the African Peace Facility, worth 250 million Euro, 

which should support the African Union in its efforts to peace-keeping and conflict 

prevention on the African continent 

While still in the international arena, let me briefly touch on the issue of Weapons 

of Mass Destruction. The EU’s security strategy adopted last December identified 

WMD and terrorism as two of the most serious threats facing Europe. And the ultimate nightmare scenario for all those of us involved in the security field is the acquisition by terrorists of WMD. Non-proliferation is therefore a key concern in our 

relations with third countries. A non-proliferation clause will be inserted as an essential element in the EU’s external agreements. All EU Member States apply the 

additional protocol to the Non-Proliferation treaty and support its universal application. We are supporting disarmament in Russia. We are enhancing our cooperation 

with the IAEA and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. We 

are working to improve export controls to prevent proliferation of NBC material and 

24

conventional weapons. We also support the creation of a multilateral binding instrument for the identification and tracing of illicit small arms and light weapons. 

Returning to the EU itself, I should flag up that the draft constitutional Treaty, 

to be signed in Rome on 29 October, should improve significantly the decision-making process in the EU making it easier to adopt legislation on terrorism and other 

international crime. The draft Treaty provides for the extension of qualified majority 

voting to a number of important areas in the Justice and Home Affairs field, notably 

the approximation of (substantive and procedural) criminal law, mutual recognition 

of judicial decisions, the development of Europol and Eurojust. And of course the 

abolition of our famous ‘‘pillars’’ should make it easier to design properly integrated 

EU policies in this as in other areas. 

But even with improved decision making powers, the EU is not a federal state 

and its powers and responsibilities cannot be compared directly compared to those 

of the USA. As I hope I have explained in my evidence today, a wide-ranging set 

of measures has been agreed in order for the EU to complement and support the 

work of national governments in the field of counter-terrorism. The role of the EU 

in this field is without doubt a growing one. However, in appraising the role of the 

Union it is important to understand not only the scope of its work, but also the limits to its powers. The role of the Union is still relatively limited. Most of the instruments and competences in the fight against terrorism remain in the hands of the 

Member States. Take Europol, for instance. Europol’s main role is to assist national 

police forces through the exchange and analysis of information; its operational role 

is limited to supporting joint investigative teams at the request of a Member State. 

Similarly, the role of SitCen, the centre for intelligence in the Council Secretariat, 

is to analyse information; operational work remains the exclusive competence of the 

national security and intelligence services. The European Council has neither created a European FBI nor a European CIA; the European Council’s approach is bottom-up, not top-down. When the Council created a European Network and Information Security Agency earlier this year, it stipulated that its tasks would be without 

prejudice to the competences of Member States covered by Titles V and VI of the 

Treaty, in particular activities concerning public security or areas of criminal law. 

Through its legislative work and policy initiatives the EU can do a lot to help national authorities work together internationally. The hard work of tracking down potential terrorists, preventing attacks and bringing suspects to justice remains the 

preserve of national services. 

Terrorism will remain a long-term challenge. There will be no quick solutions, nor 

easy ones. While there will be silent successes there will also be setbacks. One thing 

is certain: close international cooperation, including across the Atlantic, remains 

crucial to our task. The European Union and its member states are determined to 

play their full part.

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. De Vries. I ask unanimous consent 

that the Center for Strategic and International Studies Report on 

the Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism be entered into the record. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

[The information referred to follows:]

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES—INITIAL FINDINGS

AUGUST 2004

THE TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE ON TERRORISM

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism was established out of the conviction 

that the events of September 11, 2001 and the ensuing war on terrorism have created unprecedented challenges for the transatlantic community. The emergence of 

a capable and undeterrable foe with the resolve to inflict massive casualties would 

alone test the capacities of the civilized world. But the problem posed by jihadist 

terror has been compounded by a number of additional issues. Among these are differing assessments in many capitals of the nature of the threat and the respective 

roles played by rogue states and non-state groups, such as al Qaeda. Disagreements 

over the root causes of the new terrorism and the appropriate means for remedying 

these grievances have further strained relations at exactly the moment when agreement and joint action is most needed. 

Accordingly, in 2004 the Center for Strategic and International Studies launched 

the Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism to promote an open and timely discourse 

25

of the issues listed above between transatlantic and counterterrorism experts from 

the United States and Europe. The following document summarizes the initial findings and recommendations of the core group of participants. 

Many at CSIS contributed to make this effort possible. The project was co-directed 

by Daniel Benjamin, Senior Fellow in the International Security Program; Robin 

Niblett, Director of the Europe Program; and Julianne Smith, Deputy Director of 

the International Security Program. Margaret Cosentino and Kathleen McInnis handled the complicated logistics and planning involved in bringing the participants together and provided invaluable research support. 

Above all, we are grateful to the European Union, the CSIS Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership, and the Heinrich Boell Foundation for their generous support of this project. 

INTRODUCTION

Beginning in 1998 with the bombing of two U.S. embassies in East Africa, we 

have witnessed the most serious wave of terrorist violence in modern history. Although there have been periods in which the number of casualties from terrorist violence have rivaled or exceeded the toll of the last six years, the sheer lethality of 

these recent individual attacks has been pathbreaking, and, as is widely agreed, the 

threat to peace and stability has never been greater. 

Past periods of intense terrorist violence have typically resulted from significant 

but essentially unrelated spates of violence committed by disparate groups in different parts of the world. Today, that has changed, with the large preponderance 

of attacks caused by the single, albeit hydra-headed jihadist movement. Moreover, 

terrorism before the 1990s did not threaten to cause a catastrophic level of damage 

and loss of life, as was the case during the attacks of September 11, 2001—and no 

groups harbored serious aspirations to employ weapons of mass destruction, as al 

Qaeda does today. In short, while terrorism was once a tertiary security concern, 

few would dispute that it now constitutes the main security threat to the United 

States and Europe. 

Yet during the period in which the new threat of international terrorism has 

emerged, the United States and Europe have experienced an increasing divergence 

in their approaches to sustaining international security and stability. At times, our 

perspectives appear to be those of people inhabiting different planets—Mars and 

Venus, to use the famous example of one American commentator. Even before the 

attacks of September 11, 2001, both sides of the ocean were adjusting to radically 

changed historical circumstances, including the end of the Cold War and the unification of Europe. Where these major events inevitably weakened the glue of alliance, 

specific irritants have also increased the tension—irritants such as the disagreements over the Kyoto Protocol on Global Warming, the International Criminal 

Court, missile defense, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Biological 

Weapons Convention. 

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, there was a brief moment of extraordinary solidarity and a sense that the transatlantic community might re-group 

around the new threat of international terrorism. This moment quickly passed, and 

ties worsened, most specifically over the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, which arguably 

brought the transatlantic relationship to its lowest point in more than a half-century. 

Against this backdrop, and with the conviction that the new terrorist threat is indeed one that we face in common, the Center for Strategic and International Studies 

initiated a project at the start of 2004 to assess the understanding of terrorism 

among experts, policymakers, and the public in the United States and Europe. This 

‘‘Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism’’ consisted of three high-level meetings in 

2004 that brought together some of the foremost experts from the realm of academia, government, and the think tank world to discuss their perspectives on the 

key issues related to the phenomenon of international terrorism. 

The first meeting of the Dialogue was held in Brussels in January, the second in 

Madrid in June, and the third in Washington in July. Participants included strategic thinkers on the Atlantic community, scholars of Islam, leading current and 

former intelligence officials, journalists, and high-ranking policymakers. Over the 

course of the three meetings, participants assessed the nature of the new terrorist 

threat and considered key drivers that have contributed to its spread. More specific 

issues included the ideological nature of contemporary jihadists, the possibility of a 

terrorist attack involving a weapon of mass destruction, the relationship of such 

conditions as poverty and education to the new terrorism, and the public understanding of the threat on both sides of the Atlantic. Discussion of these over-arching 

issues drew on the participants’ knowledge of developments in such disparate places 

26

as Southeast Asia and Western Europe, the Maghreb and Pakistan, North America 

and the Middle East. 

This white paper captures the principal areas of agreement and disagreement 

that arose among U.S. and European participants in our Transatlantic Dialogue on 

Terrorism. Its purpose, as we outline in the Conclusion, is to help determine where 

U.S. and European policy makers should place their greatest efforts over the coming 

years if they are to work successfully together to mitigate the threats posed by 

international terrorism and, at the same time, reduce its growth. 

It has become a truism that terrorism is a global problem that requires a global 

solution. Our Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism suggests that the fundamentals 

of a common understanding of the severity and significance of the threat are in 

place. However, much more needs to be done both to develop a shared understanding of what is driving the continued rise of radical Islamism and to come to 

agreement upon the coordination and implementation of specific U.S. and European 

policies that will counter it. Not surprisingly, much more joint thinking and dialogue will be necessary before we can truly begin to meet the long-term challenges 

of the new terrorism. 

THE NATURE OF THE THREAT: THE RADICAL ISLAMIST CHALLENGE OF BIN LADEN AND

HIS FOLLOWERS

The international security landscape has been transformed by the advent of catastrophic terrorism—one of the most radical and rapid transformations in history. 

After September 11, 2001, al Qaeda’s brand of terrorism was seen instantly on both 

sides of the Atlantic as an unequivocal, transcendent threat. The precise nature of 

the threat, however, has received surprisingly little attention. Such questions as 

whether this violence was the work of a small, confined group or emanates from a 

significant and expanding base have been little examined. As a result, we chose to 

focus the first session of the Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism on developing a 

better understanding of radical Islam’s ideology and identity, its organizational advantages, and its spread. It was clear from these discussions that there is considerable expertise and elements of a shared understanding on both sides of the Atlantic 

of the evolving nature of the threat of international terrorism, which we have 

sought to capture below. 

Ideology and Identity 

Radical Islamist violence is a phenomenon driven in part by global religious revival. The ideology that animates these terrorists has numerous historical roots—

in, for example, the reaction to colonialism in the early 20th century; the writings 

of such figures as Maududi and Qutb, based on Wahhabit principles; and the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood in the first third of the last century. More recently, the jihadist movement in the 1970s and 1980s in Egypt and the experience 

of Muslim resistance to the Soviet Union in Afghanistan have been formative ones. 

Adding momentum has been the emergence of a sort of ‘‘born again’’ movement 

among Muslims, some of whom become jihadists. The jihadists reject many conventional Islamic understandings and focus heavily on sacrifice and expiation, both reflected strongly in the last will and testament of the September 11 terrorist Mohammed Atta. 

A key challenge in addressing the ideology of radical Islamism is navigating the 

overlapping and complex motivations of its adherents. Many of them describe themselves as engaged in a form of class warfare in which they are disputing the current 

allocation of global resources. Many also consider themselves to be locked in a conflict of values where one side is asserting the superiority of its value system over 

all others, whether they are Christian, Jewish, Hindu, moderate Muslim or secular. 

Radical Islamists tend to deride other belief systems as either materialist or pagan, 

translating a range of grievances into a compelling religious idiom. These various 

dichotomies are merged into a single supranational identity of opposition, which can 

take profoundly violent forms. 

While much public discussion of the jihadist threat suggests the origins of the 

movement are tied directly to Osama bin Laden, the Saudi terrorist’s achievement 

lies more in the realm of strategy. Where radical Islamists had focused their violence on the ‘‘apostate’’ regimes of the Muslim world and—in Afghanistan—on the 

Soviet Union and its Afghan supporters, bin Laden achieved a strategic revolution 

by refocusing the struggle on the United States and the West. In doing so, he has 

been able to capitalize on the growing resentment of the Muslim diaspora, especially 

in Europe. His organization and other like-minded ones have also shown a genius 

for capitalizing on and furthering a shared sensibility of grievance among disparate 

Muslim populations around the globe. 

27

Today, the ideological nature of the threat is one of its most dangerous aspects. 

Because ‘‘bin Ladenism’’ provides a broad-reaching set of explanations to the grievances of many disparate groups within the Islamic world, the potential for the rapid 

spread of the ideology far beyond its current group of adherents must be a paramount concern for policymakers in both the United States and Europe. 

Organizational Advantages 

The movement continues to gain strength over a broad geographical span. In addition to various cells all over the Middle East, there is considerable evidence of an 

ongoing process of radicalization of Muslim minorities in Southeast Asia, Europe, 

South America, and even in North America and Australia. 

Members of the various groups in this movement are united by their sense of occupying a singular space with little or no connection to the countries in which they 

live. Radicalization is not limited, therefore, to regions of the world that are economically deprived. The movement spreads quite easily among the privileged, particularly in Europe, where more and more affluent Muslim parents are ‘‘losing’’ their 

children to jihadist groups in London, Paris, and other European cities. 

However, it is the movement’s loose and evolving organizational qualities that 

make its spread so prevalent and worrisome. For example, there is strong evidence 

that the movement is mutating inside Europe. European cells of al Qaeda appear 

to be motivated by the same goals, but they differ greatly in leadership, dependence 

on centralized networks, recruitment, ideology, and financing. (European jihadist 

groups tend to rely on financing of operations through small-scale criminal activities—smuggling, credit card fraud—and less on the Islamist NGOs that have had 

such a profound impact in the Middle East and Asia.) The movement is now gaining 

in operational flexibility thanks to indigenous activists and relies less and less on 

veterans of the Afghan jihad. 

Another example of the movement’s dangerous ability to capitalize on circumstances is its effort to recruit Muslim converts. Moreover, while al Qaeda once 

refused to cooperate with people like Saddam Hussein for religious reasons, there 

is suggestive evidence now that jihadists are willing to partner in ‘‘joint ventures’’ 

with other groups and individuals even if they are non-Muslim. The antiglobalization movement is one growing subject of concern in this regard. 

The Varieties of Ideological Diffusion 

The tools and methods that jihadists now use to sustain the growth of their ideology make it extremely difficult for national governments to undermine the movement’s appeal. First, jihadists have become adept at using their deeds as propaganda. Each attack advertises the movement’s zeal, mission, and capabilities. And 

the fact that each act tries to exceed the last sends a very powerful recruiting message, one that resonates particularly well among youth. The attacks of September 

11 continue to have a resonance as the most dramatic demonstration ever of the 

jihadist determination to do what ‘‘moderate’’ Muslim governments are accused of 

not doing: defending Muslim interests. 

Second, al Qaeda does not discriminate between the well-off and underprivileged, 

constantly finding ways to penetrate all social classes. It targets youth that are unemployed or dissatisfied during typical periods of rebellion or identity crisis (particularly for those Muslims living in predominantly non-Muslim countries) as well as 

those who work and live in more affluent neighborhoods. In fact, wealth appears to 

have little or no impact on the spread of radical Islamism and, in some wealthy regions in the Gulf, extremism is becoming more and more common. Participants in 

the Transatlantic Dialogue cited examples of Arabian Gulf parents giving their children huge gifts only to see those children turn around and sell them in order to 

donate money to radical charities. 

Third, jihadists are becoming more innovative in their use of recruiting tools. 

They rely on a wide range of techniques and strategies ranging from ‘‘coffee shop 

and pool table circuits’’ in affluent neighborhoods to movies that can be circulated 

on DVD to the Internet and online chat rooms. Thanks to advances in globalized 

communications, there is now a direct connection between fresh converts—in North 

America for example—and radical Islamist leaders sitting halfway around the 

world. The need to travel to strengthen a new sense of identity has to some extent 

been eliminated. 

How U.S. Policy Plays into the Calculus 

In addition to all of the innovative tools and methods that the jihadists themselves employ to recruit new members, two exacerbating conditions—the lack of a 

Middle East Peace Process and the war in Iraq—have strengthened the appeal of 

the ideology, 

28

From the start, jihadists portrayed the war in Iraq as a war against Islam. The 

fact that the United States has failed thus far to find weapons of mass destruction 

in Iraq or provide any conclusive evidence that Saddam Hussein had links to al 

Qaeda has only fueled such accusations and, consequently, spurred a steady stream 

of new jihadist recruits. Moreover, the failure to establish security in Iraq or provide 

basic services, such as electricity and water, has provided more grist for radicals. 

They have been able to contrast those conditions with the rapid success of the U.S. 

military in battle to argue that instead of improving the living conditions of Muslims, America and its allies are only interested in occupying Muslim lands and subjugating their inhabitants. 

Similarly, jihadists have exploited America’s effective withdrawal from active diplomacy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Experts from both sides of the Atlantic 

concur that the plight of the Palestinians was of little consequence to the jihadists 

originally, but, recognizing the importance of the issue to the global Muslim community, they have attached themselves to it with great success. Inadvertently, the 

United States has left the recruitment field wide open to the radicals by taking few 

actions on the Israeli-Palestinian question since the September 11 attacks that 

could be perceived as demonstrating a sustained concern for the fate of Muslims. 

Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Even as the terrorist movement associated with al Qaeda seeks to expand its 

human and resource base, U.S. and European policymakers must also remain focused on thwarting the movement’s quest to expand its destructive capabilities. The 

jihadist movement seeks to inflict damage on the West in numerous ways with 

which we are all familiar. One particular aspect of their violent ambitions, however, 

deserves special attention: the desire to acquire and use a weapon of mass destruction. The issue is of particular concern because of allegations that this danger is either exaggerated in the United States or underappreciated in Europe. 

Although Europeans and Americans may differ somewhat in their assessments of 

the likelihood that al Qaeda or another jihadist group will succeed in acquiring or 

fabricating a major weapon of mass destruction—most likely an improvised nuclear 

device or a highly dangerous, weaponized pathogen—there is little disagreement 

among experts about whether the intention to do so exists. The jihadist movement 

has a strong desire to inflict mass casualties coupled with the determination of terrorists to outdo themselves with each subsequent attack. With such a strong interest in catastrophic violence, radical Islamists continually look for novel ways to 

achieve massive destruction. The terrorists also appear to possess the determination 

and patience to undertake long-term planning to acquire and use such weapons. 

Both Europeans and Americans admittedly view such a catastrophic attack as a 

relatively low probability event, though how low is a matter of some debate. Still, 

bearing in mind al Qaeda’s expressed intent to acquire nuclear capabilities, policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic must place a priority on preventing a nuclear 

attack and allocate resources accordingly. 

Especially worrying is recent evidence that suggests that al Qaeda and other 

groups are increasingly interested in acquiring biological weapons. (The impetus 

came, ironically, from the terrorists’ reading of Western media accounts of the potential destructiveness of the weapons and our societies’ vulnerabilities to them. 

This is just one of a number of indications of the feedback loop connecting Western 

anxieties and jihadist strategy—a seeming inevitability in a globalized world.) The 

growth of the global biotechnology industry, as well as the diffusion of biological research, translates into an increasing potential for terrorist groups to acquire these 

weapons. 

Al Qaeda has been attempting to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction 

in their jihadist cause almost since the group’s inception. Viewing the United States 

as the power behind Middle Eastern regimes, al Qaeda believes that causing massive bloodshed is the only way to force a change in U.S. policy. The next logical step, 

which appears to have been made, is to do so by striving to use an unconventional 

weapon to attack either the United States or its allies. A WMD attack would cause 

maximum disruption, maximum casualties, and corresponds well to al Qaeda’s apocalyptic mentality. 

Al Qaeda members have repeatedly met with different officials and scientists in 

order to understand how to acquire and use nuclear weapons in their jihad. Recovered documents suggest they are actively pursuing a nuclear capability. Although 

these documents mostly reflect a crude understanding of nuclear weapons design, 

some are relatively sophisticated. Any previous ambiguity regarding the use of 

WMD according to Islam has also now been clarified. The ‘‘Treatise on the Legal 

Status of Using Weapons of Mass Destruction against Infidels’’ establishes the intellectual and moral framework for these attacks against non-Muslims. 

29

Three years after September 11, and with jihadists having expressed a desire to 

carry out a much larger-scale operation, one major question arises: why haven’t 

there been any other major attacks? Is al Qaeda in the middle of a planning cycle? 

Or is the acquisition and use of a weapon of mass destruction too difficult? While 

it is certainly to be hoped that the international community has made it impossibly 

difficult to acquire WMD, these are open questions that need to be investigated 

more thoroughly. 

Thus far, there is no evidence that al Qaeda has acquired either a nuclear or significant biological weapons capability. Given the large number of scientifically capable members, however, the possibility that the group or some other jihadist group 

will acquire WMD will grow over time. Al Qaeda itself has taken numerous blows 

from post-September 11 counterterrorism efforts, and its capabilities have probably 

been diminished. But these positive results have been undermined by the galvanizing effects of September 11 and subsequent attacks in Europe, the Middle 

East, and South East Asia on Islamist groups around the world. 

Overall, there has been a process of both splintering and energizing. Given how 

many of the newly galvanized groups are appearing in the developing world—with 

little exposure to al Qaeda training under bin Laden in Afghanistan—it is a reasonable assumption that most of these terrorists have lower technical skills than al 

Qaeda trainees. In light of the mobilization of European radicals, however, it is entirely possible that a new cell or organization could emerge with superior skills. In 

short, the WMD threat is not going away, and as barriers to entry for, say, biological weapons fall, the conclusion of participants in the Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism is that the overall danger is growing. 

UNDERLYING DRIVERS AND POTENTIAL REMEDIES

While the first session of the Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism found general 

agreement among European and American policy experts on the severity and resilience of the threat from Islamic extremism, there is a general perception that transatlantic differences are most noticeable over the best way to neutralize it and reverse its spread. We chose, therefore, to focus the second and third sessions of our 

dialogue on transatlantic perspectives of four key factors that contribute to the 

radicalization of an ideology, and in particular, the militarization of Islam. Those 

four factors—poverty, the role of Muslim NGOs, demographics, and the 

radicalization of education—can dramatically influence Muslim values and communities and trigger major ideological shifts. Because certain policy choices can also 

have a significant impact on the growth and spread of extremism, we dedicated part 

of sessions two and three to the Middle East Peace Process. Our assumption was 

that the success of future transatlantic strategies for combating terrorism rests on 

whether or not the two sides of the Atlantic can reach a common understanding of 

how all of these key drivers come together to fuel radical Islamism. Only then can 

a constructive transatlantic dialogue begin. 

Poverty and Development Assistance 

The international community has long debated the degree to which poverty can 

be linked to the growth and spread of terrorist groups. While our dialogue did not 

seek to resolve this debate, we did consider ways in which poverty could contribute 

to the spread of jihadist terrorist groups within failing and failed states. Participants recognized that the lack of economic opportunity can often serve as a driving 

force toward extremism in places where there are weak political and legal institutions and governance, lack of economic and financial transparency, and isolated populations, whether that isolation is physical, social, or political. In these areas, poverty is viewed as a ‘‘push’’ value—a catalyst that can steer people towards terrorist 

groups and activities they might not otherwise choose under better societal circumstances. 

Despite a common recognition of the importance of addressing poverty as part of 

a wider strategy to reduce the appeal of radical Islamist violence, there are 

divergences in European and American attitudes on the use of development assistance as an instrument in the war on terrorism. U.S. policy makers currently believe 

that development assistance can play a supporting role to more tactical counter-terrorism operations, while Europeans tend to consider success in countering radical 

Islamic groups as only a secondary benefit of assistance. Their primary goal is to 

alleviating the suffering from poverty around the world and hope that the secondary 

goal of lessening the lure of radicalism will be a by-product of their efforts. 

Recent changes in U.S. aid programs as compared to current development assistance policy in the United Kingdom exemplify these differences. Prior to September 

11, U.S. development policy focused on sustainable development and traditional programs of poverty reduction, but they were by no means an integral part of broader 

30

1 U.S. Agency for International Development, ‘‘Summary of FY 2005 Budget Request,’’

<http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/summary.html>

U.S. security strategy. The U.S. government has since significantly stepped up monetary support of assistance programs, granting a robust budget increase to the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID). In 2001, USAID received $7.8 billion in funding; in 2003 the agency’s budget soared to $12.6 billion, a 38% increase.1

This increase highlights the hope that U.S. development assistance might play a key 

role in combating terrorism through programs to prevent failed states and reverse 

the course of economically motivated radicalization. 

U.S. officials see a secondary benefit to the revamped programs as well; they believe that a new emphasis on development assistance can minimize the appearance 

of American hubris and help promote a positive, multilateral agenda for the Muslim 

world. The hope in this case is that an increase in U.S. foreign aid will foster good 

governance, encourage countries to become coalition partners, and create future 

leaders on whom the U.S. can rely as allies and work cooperatively with on security 

issues. The emphasis of these programs, therefore, is on countries with whom the 

United States is already engaged in the war on terrorism, including Afghanistan, 

Iraq, and Pakistan. 

European aid organizations take a slightly different approach to the question of 

development assistance as a tool in the war on terrorism. They believe they can 

make a difference in the effort to combat terrorism but they remain committed to 

poverty reduction as their primary goal. For example, the Department for International Development (DFID), the UK’s equivalent of USAID, made very few 

changes to its aid programs after September 11 and continues to focus on poverty 

reduction in all corners of the world without any special concentration on those regions that tend to be hotbeds of terrorist activity. While they believe their foreign 

aid programs can have a positive impact on the extended war on Islamic extremism, 

they will not allow resources for this effort to be diverted as part of a short-term 

counter-terrorism strategy. As such, DFID takes a long-term view that supporting 

institution-building and economic growth outside the current security hotspots will 

save new regions from becoming states that could breed terrorism five to ten years 

down the road. This difference in approach demonstrates that DFID holds a markedly different definitional view of terrorism—it acknowledges Islamic extremism as 

a grave threat, but also views far leftist groups in Latin America, ethno-separatists 

movements, and violence perpetrated by states as similarly dangerous. 

Muslim NGOs 

Despite the differences in attitudes regarding how and when to use development 

assistance in the war on terrorism, European and American experts at our dialogue 

expressed a strong interest in using at least portions of their foreign aid to address 

the phenomenon of radical Muslim non-government organizations (NGOs). These organizations are one of the key tools used by jihadist groups to spread their ideology. 

By providing social services that the state often cannot, they draw in loyal and fresh 

recruits who are often desperate for any form of assistance. 

While Americans and Europeans agree that reducing the power and influence of 

these Muslim NGOs is critical, neither side of the Atlantic has found an effective 

way to do so. Routing assistance to a population without coming into direct competition with local NGOs is extremely challenging. Western NGOs bring problems such 

as proselytization and the risk of having Westerners in country. They are also often 

far behind the radical organizations in terms of building a clientele and a place in 

the country. 

Trying to work directly with the radical NGOs is equally challenging. USAID has 

tried to increase its cooperation with moderate Muslim NGOs, but has had little 

success influencing their politics. DFID tried another route. It spent considerable 

time in the 1990s working to strengthen state capacities to compete with the radical 

NGOs, but failed to alter the influence of those organizations in any substantive 

way. 

One solution might be to support the work of international NGOs as opposed to 

U.S. or European run groups. These international NGOs could then partner with 

a strong contingent of local Muslim organizations, which might enable them to provide services instead of more radical groups. 

Demography 

It is said that revolution is carried on the backs of young men. The explosive 

growth of the youth cohort coming of age in the Islamic world is an extraordinary 

trend that could have significant security ramifications in the greater war on terrorism. This youth bulge signals a demographic shift that will be a revolutionary 

31

2 Richard Cincotta, Robert Engelman, and Daniele Anastasion. ‘‘The Security Demographic: 

Population and Civil Conflict After the Cold War,’’ Population Action International, 5 May 2004. 

<http://www.populationaction.org/resources/publications/securitydemographic/index.html> 3 Ibid. 

4 U.S. Agency for International Development, ‘‘Pakistan—Program Briefing’’, 30 August 2004. 

<http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asialnearleast/countries/pakistan/pakistanlbrief.html>

development in the rise and spread of Islamic fundamentalism, especially in Muslim 

countries that combine persistent lack of opportunity with a lack of legitimacy for 

their political institutions. 

Ample evidence suggests that periods of rebellion and civil strife occur in tandem 

with periods of unusually large youth bulges most notably when they coincide with 

high unemployment rates and a scarcity of resources. For example, in the 1990s, 

countries in which young adults composed 40% or more of an entire population were 

more than twice as likely to experience an outbreak of civil conflict than those below 

this level.2 As a result, a major challenge for the transatlantic partners in the coming years will be to address the demographic challenge throughout the Middle East. 

The Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism spent part of its third session looking 

at the results of a recently released study, ‘‘The Security Demographic,’’ conducted 

by Population Action International. The study examines the influence of certain 

stress factors and the likelihood of conflict associated with the combination of two 

or more of these trends—youth bulge, urban population growth, and resource scarcity. The four countries most associated with the spread of Islamic fundamentalism 

and recruitment by organizations linked to al Qaeda—Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan 

and Saudi Arabia—all have two or more of the above stress factors that lead to demographic risk of conflict.3 Pakistan, for example, has an unemployment rate of 

nearly 40% among its youth population aged 15—20.4 This could lead to a surge of 

violent extremism, exacerbated by the lack of professional and recreational opportunities as well as a growing gender gap. 

Despite the seriousness of the issue, European and American experts agree that 

demographic issues are rarely given much weight by political leaders. Instead, there 

is a tendency to deny or delay reaction to these issues because readily available solutions do not exist. However, combating the trends that can contribute to the 

growth of Islamic extremism requires elected officials to create a bold, long-term vision, and commit substantial financial and human resources to deal with the challenges associated with demographics. 

Governments in North America and Europe should commit to programs that invest in training and job creation, promote entrepreneurship, support family planning services and female education, and increase access to economic opportunity for 

both male and female populations so that the youth bulge can become an asset in 

countries where there is a glut of employment. Iran can be singled out as a hopeful, 

if cautious and incomplete example of the possibility of countries to engage in a 

democratic transition even with the youth population gaining in momentum and 

size. 

Radicalization of Education 

There was broad agreement among the participants in the Dialogue that education can be a critical factor in either the growth or decline of radicalism. The 

madrassas in Pakistan and Southeast Asia tend to be, by and large, benign institutions, but a significant number of these schools are a breeding ground for Islamic 

fundamentalism. 

Madrassas in Pakistan underwent a transformation of purpose during the 1980s. 

The tithe was made available for local religious leaders’ discretionary spending, and 

much of that funding went to the local religious schools. Although only a relatively 

minor percentage of madrassas can be accused of prepping students for jihadism 

and terrorist acts, some are clearly used as recruiting stations by Islamist groups. 

Certain schools even offer weapons training and their graduates have gone on to 

fight in Kashmir and Chechnya. In Pakistan, the madrassas, mosques, and jihadi 

sectarian groups form a dangerous triangle of terrorist breeding grounds and reinforce each other’s messages of anti-Westernism and anti-secularism. 

Madrassas are seen as a ‘‘draw’’ factor for terrorist groups. Like radical Muslim 

NGOs, these schools are part of a private social sector that frequently provides services the state cannot, such as room and board or additional monetary assistance for 

families of students. Indeed, the loyalty of the public shifts towards those who can 

deliver the greatest economic opportunities. While madrassas are not necessarily 

the most important factor contributing to Islamic extremism, when viewed in tandem with the coming youth cohort and the lack of quality secular education, they 

32

5The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘‘Fact Sheet: Visit of President Musharraf 

to Camp David,’’ 24 June 2003. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/06/20030624–

4.html> 6The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘‘U.S. and Indonesia Joint Statement,’’ 22 

October 2003. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031022–1.html>

can lead to greater recruitment by terrorist groups in these countries and a 

strengthened Islamist ideology in the youth bulge. 

Similarly, in Southeast Asia, there is a small but troublesome proportion of 

madrassas that have links to Islamist groups—about 100 to 120 are of particular 

concern. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has used its authority and resources to set up 

schools in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. While JI has been 

known to do the majority of its recruitment at secular universities, there are cases 

when it sends its talent scouts to mosques and madrassas. 

Reforming education in these countries is a long-term project, one that both sides 

of the Atlantic have found particularly challenging. Most countries like Pakistan 

simply do not have the resources necessary to crack down on the small number of 

madrassas that train and harbor young terrorists. Furthermore, if the West were 

to try to exert a heavy hand in the educational processes of these countries, it would 

only catalyze a serious ideological backlash. For that reason, financial resources and 

innovative strategies for tackling the educational challenge are both in short supply. 

For example, in 2002 the United States pledged $100 million over the five years to 

the Pakistanis for educational reform programs, which is a minimal amount when 

compared to the total $3.5 billion annual U.S. aid package to Pakistan.5 President 

Bush also offered a six-year, $157 million plan to Indonesia 6 last year for education 

assistance, clearly a positive step forward, but still insufficient compared to the 

sums the United States spends on other programs aimed at reducing the spread of 

jihadist terrorist groups. 

The Middle East Peace Process 

There is a polarized debate on whether a linkage exists between the success of 

the Middle East peace process and the war on terrorism. Both the Arab world and 

many countries in Europe believe that the rise of Islamic extremism is inherently 

tied to the success of the Middle East peace process, and some even see it as the 

most important factor to be addressed. One European commentator made the analogy that the Middle East is a cancer and Iraq and Afghanistan are emblematic of 

the tumor metastasizing. 

The United States also considers the Arab-Israeli conflict to be a contributing factor to the overall success of the war on terrorism. However, in the eyes of many 

U.S. policymakers (from both political parties), its resolution is not imperative within the larger context of its war against international terror. Supporters of this position cite the fact that periods of great success in the peace process over the last decade have often coincided with increases in terrorist activity. That particular linkage 

is easy to understand—it is a clear objective of terrorist groups to try to derail the 

peace process and inflame hardliners in Israel who can block its progress and simultaneously mobilize the radicals. 

Whether the Palestinian issue is a substantive factor in the ideology of Islamist 

terrorism or whether it merely plays a symbolic role has been another subject of 

transatlantic debate. It is hard to know, for example, exactly how deep the linkages 

between the Palestinians and al Qaeda run. Some believe that the Palestinians realize that an association with al Qaeda is not productive for their overall cause and 

that, while Osama bin Laden has been known to reference the Palestinian cause, 

it is largely rhetorical. What seems more certain is the fact that the Palestinian 

cause is an attractive symbol for a disenfranchised youth elsewhere in the world 

and therefore a powerful recruiting tool. 

Regardless of the linkages debate, most of the participants of the transatlantic 

dialogue on terrorism agreed that the stakes are too high in the Middle East to fail 

to move the peace process forward. Unfortunately, though, there was also consensus 

that advances in the peace process are now waning from a lack of investment in 

its success from all sides. With Iraq eclipsing virtually all other security concerns, 

the United States has failed to dedicate the necessary resources and attention to 

the Middle East peace process, which in turn has given the Arab world an excuse 

for inaction. And Europe, recovering from one of the most dramatic rifts in transatlantic history and lacking viable alternatives, has also failed to bring real traction 

to the issue. 

33

Soft vs. Hard Power Instruments 

Participants in our dialogue agreed that confronting the challenge of international 

terrorism could only benefit from increased transatlantic dialogue and cooperation 

on all of the factors listed above. They recognized, however, that several problems 

stand in the way. The first, mentioned above, is that both the United States and 

Europe already have extensive programs in place—whether they be in the field of 

development assistance, trade liberalization, or social planning—and brining these 

into some form of deliberate synchronization will take a great amount of time and 

effort. 

Second, they were concerned that the weakened state of the overall transatlantic 

relationship at both the elite and public levels might make such cooperation all the 

harder to achieve. Recent polls such as the Pew Global Attitudes Project and Transatlantic Trends conducted by the German Marshall Fund show that Americans—at 

both the elite and public level—remain much more comfortable relying on a full 

spectrum of counter-terrorism instruments, including the use of force, when dealing 

with the new threat of international terrorism. Europeans, while generally quite 

comfortable with the use of force in theory, stress that is should only be used when 

absolutely necessary (with limited indications where such red lines exist), with a 

preference for forms of engagement or soft power in the interim. On this count, the 

U.S. decision in 2002–2003 to overthrow Saddam Hussein as part and parcel of its 

approach to lessening the long-term threat of international terrorism has contributed to a dramatic collapse in European support not only for U.S. leadership on the 

world stage, but also, specifically, for U.S. leadership in the war on terrorism. The 

Pew figures confirm this point dramatically. 

This brings us to the third point of concern. Americans worry that cooperation in 

the war on terrorism can only be sustained for a short duration when such divisiveness persists in the broader transatlantic relationship. In contrast, European policymakers, even those whose relations with the United States are most strained, like 

the French, often give the impression that the political and operation spheres can 

be kept separate, and that political disagreement over Iraq, for example, should not 

be allowed to undermine transatlantic cooperation in the specifics of combating 

international terrorism. 

On balance, participants in the dialogue believed that continued high-level political tension might not unduly weaken efforts to strengthen operational aspects of 

transatlantic counter-terrorism, including intelligence sharing. However, this tension might limit the commitment of U.S. and European policymakers toward developing innovative new transatlantic approaches to help tackle the underlying contributing factors to the rise of Islamic radicalism, discussed above. 

CONCLUSION

During the course of this Transatlantic Dialogue on Terrorism, we found, on balance, that there were broad areas of agreement among U.S. and European experts 

on terrorism, counter-terrorism, radical Islam, and security. Thus, for example:

• European and American experts differ little in their assessment of the gravity 

of the threat—and, against expectations, some Europeans take a more downbeat view of the evolution of the threat than do some Americans.

• There was wide agreement that the search by jihadist terrorist groups for 

weapons of mass destruction is an especially worrying trend that deserves the 

full attention of policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic.

• While it is often said that Americans see the struggle against terror as a ’war’ 

that will end in victory or defeat, and Europeans are more apt to speak of 

managing a long-term threat, in fact, the differences among discussants on 

this fundamental question were minimal and more often rhetorical.

• The ideological nature of the new terrorism and the search by its adherents 

for technologies and capabilities of great destructiveness suggest that this 

threat will be an enduring phenomenon that cannot be decisively defeated by 

a series of arrests or military actions. It was widely agreed that, although the 

effort to stop terrorists must remain unrelenting, there are no quick fixes, nor 

are there likely to be any singular, decisive moments.

• Differences of opinion in the broader public on these issues reflect differing 

political contexts and cultural characteristics that have little to do with the 

terrorist phenomenon. They are, however, indicative of the extent to which 

political leaders in the United States and Europe have failed to bridge the 

gap and build a sense of common purpose.

34

• The commonality of understanding of the threat and potential for joint action 

between the United States and its European partners is reflected by the fact 

that intelligence and law enforcement cooperation between the United States 

and European countries is, by general consent and in general, excellent.

• At the same time, both European and U.S. experts are candid in acknowledging that we still have a very limited understanding of the origins of the 

jihadist movement and of the ideological dynamics that sustain it.

Importantly, therefore, the most substantive transatlantic differences revolve not 

around the straw man of a U.S. preference for military solutions against terrorism 

and a European preference for tackling the ‘‘soft’’ root causes, but rather around 

how specifically to address some of the underlying causes of the rise of the new terrorism. For example:

• What is the most effective way to use development assistance as an instrument in combating terrorism? Should the United States and countries in Europe focus on regions that might breed terrorism in the future or on the current list of countries that are known to be spreading jihadist ideology such 

as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Iran?

• How can the West best deal with the problem of NGOs that provide social 

services and spread a radical Islamist ideology? Is it through building state 

capacity? Building international NGOs to compete with the local, radical 

NGOs? Should Western governments support moderate Islamist or foreign 

NGOs as competitors?

• How can the United States and Europe push forward a reform agenda for 

education in Muslim countries with insufficient state resources without setting off a cross-cultural firestorm?

• How can policymakers in both Europe and the United States be encouraged 

to tackle long-term demographic challenges? Is job creation the best chance 

the West has to prevent the youth bulge from breeding extremism? If so, 

what does this mean for U.S. and European approaches to their regional and 

multilateral trade and investment initiatives? How can the United States and 

Europe best promote family planning and female education without overstepping cultural boundaries?

• What steps can Europe and the United States take together to prevent WMD 

from getting into the hands of radical Islamist groups?

• It is important to note, however, that the transatlantic differences are not all 

in such tactical areas. Both U.S. and European leaders and experts are well 

aware that coming to some conclusion on the Arab-Israeli peace process could 

have a significant long-term effect on the vitality of the new terrorism, notwithstanding the separate and unique drivers that have led to its rise. That 

said, how should the international community revitalize interest and commitment to the Middle East Peace Process? Does the initiative need to come from 

the United States, Europe, or the Arab world more broadly?

Some of these questions are already the focus of transatlantic debate. Others, 

however, are only now being posed. This means that we are a long way from having 

a reliable compass—a set of comprehensive understandings to guide policymaking—

that will help us address these and many more fundamental questions for dealing 

with the long-term problems of Islamic radicalism. If we are to begin this work effectively, governments on both sides of the Atlantic need to make such a common 

agenda a top priority of the work of the transatlantic community. Closing the transatlantic differences over questions such as the Middle East Peace Process or how 

to engage Iran are clearly essential. But crafting real-world approaches to confront 

the phenomenon of international terrorism will also require a new level of coordination across the full spectrum of government policy-making in Europe and the United 

States.

Ms. DAVIS. I would now like to yield 5 minutes to Chairman 

Gallegly for questions. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Madame Chairman. I would like to 

ask both Mr. Pope and Mr. De Vries if they could answer this question for me, and I understand that you must limit your comments 

to what is appropriate in an open session. 

First to Mr. Pope. Do you feel that American policymakers differ 

in their assessment of the likelihood that an al-Qaeda or Jihad 

35

group will succeed in acquiring or fabricating a major weapon of 

mass destruction? 

Mr. POPE. Certainly there is no doubt at any level, whether it is 

policy level or practitioner level, in Europe or here or anywhere 

else, certainly al-Qaeda wants to get one. They are trying. Bin 

Laden is on the record and we know from other ways that he and 

others are trying. 

Now, whether they will get one is unknown and also I must say 

that I know that we are doing everything humanly possible to prevent that. There are parts of the U.S. Government trying to prevent that and I believe that the Europeans are trying as well. 

We have really excellent cooperation in the more practical prevention areas. I am trying not to go beyond, as you suggested. At 

the policy level, there may be people somewhere who believe that 

bin Laden is not trying it. But I think everybody on either side of 

the Atlantic or anywhere else would be very ill-advised to assume 

that there will never be any possibility that bin Laden, or those 

like him, could acquire any kind of weapon of mass destruction. He 

has said that he wants to do it, and others are going to try it. So 

I believe pretty much that everybody understands that that is the 

intention. We are putting up every possible roadblock to doing that. 

But is impossible to predict that that can’t happen on either side 

of the Atlantic. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Before I go to Mr. De Vries, as a follow-up to your 

response and your reference to bin Laden: We obviously know that 

bin Laden as an individual—and not as al-Qaeda, but as the individual leader—has been reduced in his ability to really operate. Do 

you believe that his ability to operate and function in accomplishing these goals as the principal leader is much advanced beyond impotence? 

Mr. POPE. They are significantly reduced. Not just his ability but 

beyond him. The al-Qaeda organization is very significantly reduced from what it was on September 12th, 2001. There is no question about that. And bin Laden himself is a hands-on CEO, or was 

a hands-on CEO, who very much liked to run his organization and 

run various parts of it at the same time. That is extremely difficult 

for him at this point. 

But I don’t think it would be prudent for anybody to believe that 

he had given up trying, or that others who are inspired by him, or 

who are associated with him, are trying to do. And I think everybody knows that we are trying, and we are trying everything possible to prevent it. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. The same question for Mr. De Vries, but I would 

remind you that my question went beyond al-Qaeda because certainly there are other Jihadist groups that we have to be equally 

as concerned with that have not had as much central focus by our 

efforts to deal with international terrorism. Mr. De Vries. 

Mr. DE VRIES. I would concur with the statement by Mr. Pope. 

This is a serious risk, even though perhaps for the immediate future we should not discount the possibilities of attacks with conventional means. That remains a serious threat in Europe. 

We have to be on our guard for the possibility that terrorist 

groups lay their hands on weapons of mass destruction. Ricin has 

been mentioned. There was a case of ammonium nitrate in the 

36

United Kingdom not too long ago. So these efforts are real, even 

though technically it is not easy to use weapons of mass destruction for terrorist purposes. 

But we have to pay close attention to this phenomenon, including 

to the organization of what, in technical terms, is called the consequence management, the civil protection dimension. 

The Union has decided that it wants to devote additional attention to this civil-related protection side and to look at whether or 

not Member States have sufficient capabilities in this field. And 

whether the cooperation should not be further enhanced, and 

whether that should not extend across the Atlantic as indeed was 

indicated in the EU–U.S. summit statement of June, to which I referred. 

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Madame Chairman. 

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Gallegly. Mr. Wexler. 

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you very much. Mr. De Vries, you have the 

most pleasing Bronx accent that I have ever heard. I was happy 

that Mr. Pope highlighted as well as he did the degree of cooperation between the United States and Europe in terms of anti-terror 

police work, intelligence work, finance work, and so forth. 

I think that on our side of the Atlantic that we made some terrible blunders in not highlighting that cooperation even more, particularly at the depths of the debate with respect to the war in 

Iraq. In that context, however, it is hard, I think, for most Americans to understand some of the official actions that the European 

Union takes. For instance, most recently on September 10th, if I 

understand it correctly, an EU representative in Lebanon, Patrick 

Renault, met with Mr. Nazrala, the Hizbullah leader. Hizbullah 

and Hamas, of course, have been on all terrorist sponsored lists by 

the State Department since the list’s inception. Hamas, the political wing, just recently being put on the European list. 

As I understand it, the meeting between the European Union 

representative in Lebanon was an EU Commission-sanctioned 

meeting. If I understand the press reports, the two gentlemen at 

the end of the meeting talked about strengthening relations between the European Union and Hizbullah, and the future work 

that the two would be doing. Is this a part of the European Union 

strategy? What does the European Union hope to gain, if I may 

ask, with this approach in respect to Hizbullah? And if I could ask 

Mr. Pope before we go, to analyze how we are cooperating with the 

European Union with respect to our anti-terror policy, specifically 

our policy with respect to Iran? 

I hear that there is a raging venomous debate within the Administration. One camp taking a particularly strident posture, possibly 

based in the Defense Department. Another camp possibly based in 

the FBI, or the CIA, or the State Department, that vehemently disagrees with what they perceive to be the advocacy in the Defense 

Department. 

You as the coordinator, I presume, must hear both sides and 

make recommendations. I would be curious if you could share with 

us what the two arguments are and why it has become, at least 

as press reports acknowledge, as venomous as it is? Mr. De Vries. 

Mr. DE VRIES. Thank you. The accent is probably a transatlantic 

one, Mr. Wexler. On Hizbullah, I have not been privy to the conVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:54 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\EUROPE\091404\95829.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
37

versations of 3 days ago between the two gentlemen to which you 

refer, but I trust that the European Commission representative will 

have made crystal clear the position of the European Union with 

respect to terrorism. 

And that position includes that the Palestinian leadership should 

clearly and unequivocally renounce terrorist violence and terrorist 

acts against innocent civilians. Without that kind of an approach—

showing the Israeli people, therefore, that they are fully committed 

to peace and to their obligations under the roadmap—there can not 

be stable progress toward peace in that region. 

And I trust that the EU representative, in whatever context 

those conversations may have taken place, will have made crystal 

clear that this remains the bedrock of our policy. 

Mr. WEXLER. And if I may just quickly ask, has the European 

Union instigated any discussion with respect to classifying 

Hizbullah as a terrorist group, or is that not anything that has 

been discussed at this point? 

Mr. DE VRIES. The military wing, as far as I know, is on our terrorist list, including several individuals associated with Hizbullah. 

Mr. WEXLER. So if I may, Mr. Nazrala, who he has met with, 

would be considered to be the leader of the non-military wing, because I presume that you only meet with those groups that your 

own list sanctions as terrorist groups, correct? 

Mr. DE VRIES. Indeed, and I have no information about this particular individual. I would be happy to follow that up in writing if 

you would like me to. 

Mr. WEXLER. Okay. Thank you very much. Mr. Pope. 

Mr. POPE. In terms of a broad Iran policy, that really is a bit beyond my lane. That really falls under others. Of course I do hear 

things and we are particularly interested in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the CT aspect. 

We follow and listen to other aspects of what we think that Iran 

may be doing and where they may be trending. What we are particularly concerned about is that they indeed are at the top of our 

bad list on the State-sponsored terrorism, and it is a country on 

which we want to try to find ways to exert maximum pressure and 

not to, in any way, facilitate international terrorism. 

What I am saying is that I don’t really feel qualified to go too 

far beyond the terrorism part of it. But on terrorism, they are at 

the top of our list of State-sponsors of terrorism, and we do try to 

find every possible lever, and it is difficult when they are publicly 

almost a complete pirannah, as far as you are concerned, to put 

pressure. But we are looking for ways to do that. 

They are—Mr. Pope, for example, you were just asking about 

groups. They are a key supporter of the group called Hizbullah. 

And Hizbullah, as I think you noted, has long been a noted terrorist organization by us and continues to be. 

And these kinds of discussions—if I could just for a second turn 

it back to the Europeans and with all the superb cooperation that 

we had on police, intelligence, and actually finding and tracking individuals and breaking up cells—some areas where we have not 

had total agreement relate to groups like Hizbullah, sponsored by 

or in part by Iran, that had been at the top of our foreign terrorist 

list for a long time. 

38

And we have had less success, to be very frank with you, in Europe on the full designation of all of these groups. The EU has 

moved, for example, on Hamas a little bit further than was indicated. In 2003, they designated Hamas in its entirety as a terrorist 

organization and prior to that it had only been the military wing 

that was. 

But they may have designated a few key Hizbullah leaders. 

‘‘They’’ meaning the EU, a few key Hizbullah leaders. But in general it has been an area where we have not come to a complete congruence with the EU yet. 

Ms. DAVIS. We have a series of votes coming up, but we are going 

to take a few more questions. Mr. Rohrbacher. 

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Yes. Thank you very much, and just for the 

record, there is a large number of Americans who believe, with the 

exception of Great Britain, that the Europeans are not reliable allies anymore. And I think there is reason for that and I am glad 

to hear some of the new statistics out that suggest that maybe 

there have been commitments. Let me note that some of the agreements made in the past by our European allies did not materialize. 

I would just note the Balkans—and we made agreements 10 years 

ago about who would have responsibility and what would happen 

in the Balkans—and the United States still seems to be playing a 

big role there. And I know that the Europeans are as well but some 

of the rebuilding and some of the other commitments that were 

made have not materialized. Let me note that when you hear all 

this talk about globalism and we are going to take the global approach. 

And could you correct me if I am wrong, but wasn’t it some of 

our major European allies that were involved in this undermining 

of the Oil-for-Food Program that we had when we tried to work 

through a global and economic approach to Iraq? Maybe we should 

start with that question. 

I mean, how can we trust our European allies today when those 

very same European allies are now being accused of undermining 

the economic sanctions we had to deal with the problem in Iraq? 

And now that we have had this military force, those same allies 

are nitpicking at us and backbiting us. You might as well, Mr. De 

Vries, go first. 

Mr. DE VRIES. Well, perhaps it would be appropriate to point out 

that the EU has put its money where its mouth is in terms of contributing to the build-up of Iraq. That I think is essential. 

We must help the Iraqi Government to meet the expectations of 

its people and to bring a tangible improvement to their living conditions. Clearly that is essential to stability and to the future of 

Iraq. Our interest in Iraq is to have it develop into a stable democratic country at peace with its neighbors. 

So that is why the Union at the Madrid conference pledged over 

1.25 billion United States dollars for Iraq’s reconstruction and has 

so far provided 300 million in assistance for reconstruction, humanitarian aid, demining and delivery of public services. 

Mr. ROHRBACHER. That was 21⁄2 billion that was pledged when? 

Mr. DE VRIES. I beg your pardon? 

Mr. ROHRBACHER. When was the 21⁄2 billion pledged, did you 

say? 

39

Mr. DE VRIES. That was pledged on the 24th of October of last 

year. 

Mr. ROHRBACHER. And how much has been delivered? 

Mr. DE VRIES. At least 300 million has been delivered through 

June 2004. 

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Well, I personally will be watching that very 

closely. It just seems to me that when you hear this type of talk 

about globalist approaches and relying on our European allies, to 

me this is old talk and did not work and we are still in the Balkans 

because we decided to reach out and solve this problem along with 

our European allies. 

And we now are still there. We tried, as I said, Oil-for-Food and 

we tried to work the situation out with Iraq and we were undermined by our European allies. Let me ask you this in terms of 

globalist approaches. 

Does China not play a role in this proliferation of nuclear weapons throughout the world? Am I mistaken when I look at Pakistan 

and these various places that have nuclear weapons, North Korea 

and elsewhere, but doesn’t China really play a role in this? 

And doesn’t China have a veto power in the Security Council of 

the United Nations? So, when you talk about globalism and going 

with the United Nations, why should we rely on the United Nations when it is the world’s worst human rights abuser, and the 

world’s biggest proliferator has veto power? 

Mr. DE VRIES. Madam Chairman, I take that to be more of a rhetorical question. The United Nations has been structured a long 

time ago and discussions are taking place about its possible restructuring. But it exists in its current form and I believe that it 

has an important role to play in a great many respects. And it is 

seen as a very powerful dimension of international legitimacy 

across the globe. This is why the Union, for example, in terms of 

the Member States contributing to NATO forces, for example in Afghanistan, came to build on United Nations decisions. 

The same applies when we sent troops to the former Republic of 

Macedonia and to the Democratic Republic of Congo to assist in 

stabilizing programs. 

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Well, I know that the United Nations has a 

great deal of credibility and our European allies used to have a 

great deal of credibility and they may well in the future. It depends 

on what we see and what actions we take. 

Reports that we have gotten from U.N. officials in various places, 

including Afghanistan, are reports of people who have large houses 

and big staffs. And they are spending huge amounts of the money 

that is supposed to go for reconstruction for their own benefits and 

for their own good life in the third-world. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. Rohrbacher, if I may interrupt. I need to go 

vote. I would hope that this panel would remain here until I can 

return and ask questions. I know that the Chairwoman wants——

Mr. ROHRBACHER [presiding]. I am now officially the Chair, and 

let me say, Mr. Sherman, that my 5 minutes is about up, and I 

will—but if you would prefer, we could recess until after the votes. 

Is that your preference, or would you rather——

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, I will try to get it in then before we leave. 

40

Mr. ROHRBACHER. Right now? All right. The Chair recognizes Mr. 

Sherman and he has already had his chance to spit-out all of these 

good tidings or whatever, and you did not object to the report. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Mr. De Vries, the last time that Europe was confronted with a vicious organization that had a military wing and 

a political wing, you had Goebbels over there doing the political 

propaganda in the political wing. 

You had Goering and others heading various branches of the 

military wing. Would you have thought it acceptable for a European citizen to do business with the political wing of the Nazi party 

and divide that separate from the military wing? 

And if not why is it okay for Europe to provide aid and comfort 

to those who have so much blood on their hands by saying, oh, 

these are just the politicians? 

Mr. ROHRBACHER. The Chair would give him a chance to answer, 

because you bring up some good points and you need to let him answer. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I think we need to suspend the hearing and go 

vote. We have 5 minutes for the vote. 

Mr. ROHRBACHER. With that recommendation, the Chair holds 

this hearing in recess. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So it will give you plenty of time to think of the 

answer. 

[Recess.] 

Ms. DAVIS [presiding]. The joint Committee will come back to 

order. Mr. De Vries, we welcome the efforts of the European Union 

to create the position of the Counterterrorism Coordinator that you 

hold. But in this country the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator has a budget and a dedicated staff, and we have a full-time 

Department of Homeland Security. 

I am told that you barely have an office and are low on staff, and 

not much of a budget, and no real authority to compel Union States 

to cooperate with you. Based on that, can you effectively carry out 

the large responsibilities you have been given without the direct resources necessary? And how do you respond to charges from skeptics that the Counterterrorist Coordinator’s position lacks sufficient 

clout, visibility, and enforcement capabilities to be truly effective? 

Mr. DE VRIES. Thank you, Madame Chair, for allowing me the 

possibility to clarify that. Enforcement capability according to the 

treaty, and we are a community of law, is vested in national Governments. And as the Member States did not resolve to change the 

treaty on that point, that remains the situation. So in terms of 

Member States complying with the EU law, it is their responsibility and the responsibility of the European Commission to hold 

Member States to account and to take them, if necessary, to the 

European Court of Justice should they act in violation of EU law. 

Having said that, there is not just the legal approach but a political one as well. In that process the European Council plays a 

major role. We have seen the Union expand now on May 1st from 

15 to 25 countries. That has made the Union stronger but it has 

also made the Union more complex. 

So my role is to support the Secretary General, and through him 

the European Council, in managing the political coherence of the 

Union. That is why in order to strengthen the coordination on 

41

counterterrorism, I was pleased, together with the Irish presidency, 

to offer proposals to the European Council in June for a meeting 

on framework and for a set of priorities which the European Council adopted. 

And I shall be reporting to the European Council again in December and every 6 months after that on implementation. So that 

at the political level, we keep the focus on this issue. 

I will also be discussing indeed this week with the Permanent 

Representatives Committee (the Ambassadors of the Member 

States in Brussels) on the state of the implementation of the new 

legislation, and indeed also of the international agreements, including the two with the United States in the field of extradition and 

mutual legal assistance. 

So that the permanent Ambassadors in Brussels can play their 

role in helping Member States to implement. So that is the implementation side, and I have already referred to the suggestions that 

have been offered in terms of the European Union programs. I am 

currently working with Mr. Solana and the Commission to prepare 

the European Council meeting of December in terms of the four 

strategic priorities that we will be focusing on; financing of terrorism, civil protection, critical infrastructure protection, and 

mainstreaming of counterterrorism in foreign affairs. 

My own staff at the moment is comprised of a task force in the 

Secretary General of the Council of Ministers, supported by a fiveperson team for me personally. A budget that can be compared to 

Homeland Security, the European Union does not have and cannot 

have because we do not have the Federal authority vested in Brussels like you have here in the central Government. 

Ms. DAVIS. I certainly wish you much success with that. 

Mr. De Vries, in the CSIS study, it has been suggested that there 

is an ongoing process of radicalization in Muslim communities in 

Europe. That bin Laden has been able to capitalize on the growing 

resentment of Muslim despair in Europe. And then we hear that 

more and more affluent Muslims and parents are raising their children to Jihad groups in London, Paris and elsewhere. What is the 

current assessment of the radicalization of Muslims living in Europe? 

And I have heard that there may be 15 million Muslims in Europe, and if only 1 percent radicalize, then you have a problem. 

Can you shed a little light on that? 

Mr. DE VRIES. It is, as you appreciate, difficult to generalize 

about so big a section of the population but it is certainly the case 

that there are pockets of radicalization and they are worrisome. 

It is all the more important to make sure that we do everything 

that we can to strengthen our dialogue with moderate Muslims in 

Europe, and indeed elsewhere in the world. We must counter the 

strategy of the radicals that consists in designating those who follow the true path and those who must be considered as apostates. 

The overwhelming majority of Muslims in Europe is committed 

to democracy, to human rights preservation, and to freedom of religion, including the freedom to decide one’s own interpretation of 

Islam. 

Those Muslims, I think, are critical in the success of our fight 

against terrorism. They should be encouraged to speak out and I 

42

am heartened to see that in France, subsequent to the kidnapping 

of two French journalists recently, there has been overwhelming 

support from the Muslim community publicly for their release. 

That is important and we must address the role of moderate 

Islam, and we must indeed also address the causes of discontent 

and frustration that exists in that section of the population. 

We must also bear in mind that in other parts of the population 

there is an increasing tendency toward taking a negative view of 

Muslims in general. We must therefore be careful on both sides of 

the religious divide in Europe that we do not see a process of 

radicalization. That requires political measures and economic 

measures, and this is part of the agenda of the Union to address—

not through legislation—but through a process of comparing best 

practices and learning from each other. 

And indeed as I believe Mr. Sherman has indicated before, it will 

also be very helpful to learn from the U.S. experience in integrating the Muslim community here. 

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. De Vries. I know that you have to 

go but I want to ask one quick question, Mr. Pope. Is the job of 

affecting counterterrorism and cooperation made any more difficult 

because of the diminution of what aspects of this effort are EU responsibilities versus the responsibilities of the individual nations 

within Europe? 

Mr. POPE. Thank you for that question. What we have tried to 

do—and I know that the time is short, and I will sum up as best 

I can, but what we have tried to do, especially since September 

11th, is work in all avenues possible. And I mentioned quite a bit 

about multilateral and United Nations, and the U.N. resolution, 

and the EU we talk a lot about, because that is the topic. 

But we also work a lot around the world bilaterally. We work 

with individual European countries as well as with countries in 

Asia, Africa and other places. And the bilateral relationships in Europe, exactly because of what the Minister said, remain really important. 

And without going into a lot of detail on exactly what we are 

doing with each one of them, it has not really been a problem. If 

I could have just 1 more minute, as I am going to run out of time 

on this. 

A really key underlying issue that has not really come out very 

much—and I don’t mean just here today, but I mean in general—

is the kind of layers of what we are working on, because right after 

September 11th, you had the one absolutely essential thing that 

had to be done above all, and that was Afghanistan. 

You had to clear out the main and most important terrorist base 

in the entire world and there was nothing else that could remotely 

compare with it. Then you had a whole series of efforts going on, 

including with Europe, for enhanced information sharing and law 

enforcement, and capacity building for countries that wanted to do 

the right thing but didn’t have the capabilities. 

And still some military activities all overlaid by diplomacy, and 

that is important and that is still going on. But there was yet another level of activity that we have alluded to on several occasions 

here, and I alluded to it in my remarks. And that is what I called—

it is not an official government designation, it is me—but I call it 

43

a kind of remake of the international system, because what makes 

the newspapers is the hunt for bin Laden and the hunt for breaking up terrorist cells and that kind of thing. 

But there is a whole level of activity going on in terms of travel 

documents, biometrics in passports, remaking ICAO to be also an 

antiterrorist kind of activity. The IMO (the International Maritime 

Organization) and many, many other organizations—and that is 

like the ocean liner that takes a long time to get going but it is 

starting to pick up speed. 

So what gets covered in the paper is the hunt and the breaking 

up of the cells, but there is this other aspect of cooperation with 

major ramifications in the one other part of the world that really 

has a sophistication and the resources with us—for example, to basically force the world into proper travel documents—is the Europeans. Thank you. Sorry for rambling on there. 

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Pope. We have been joined by Mr. 

Chris Smith of New Jersey. Mr. De Vries, if you could stay with 

us just a second longer. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHER SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. And I thank the distinguished Chair for yielding and I have just one question, Mr. Pope. 

And both of you might want to take a stab at it. But one of the 

points that the 9/11 Commission made was that travel documents 

are the equivalent of weapons in the hands of terrorists. And you 

made a very sweeping and a very strong statement in that regard. 

We have looked into this, and I am sure that you are aware of 

this, that there are 12 existing EU conventions dealing with financing and a myriad of other issues related to terrorism. But there is 

not one dealing with travel documents or travel. There are a number of U.N. resolutions, Security Council resolutions, and there 

does not seem to be the kind of enforcement capability and visibility to compel States, or at least to encourage States, to become 

part of a more effective way of traveling or cracking down on travel 

irregularities. 

What is your view on the advisability of perhaps working toward 

a U.N. convention on travel, focusing on mitigating terrorism? 

Mr. POPE. To be very honest with you, I don’t know how practical 

that would be right now. I am not saying no. I am just saying that 

is one that I would have to get back and look at and we would be 

happy to get you some more information. 

[The information referred to follows:]

RESPONSE SUPPLIED TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE IN WRITING BY WILLIAM T. POPE TO

QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

We agree that stopping the movement of terrorists across national borders must 

be a priority in our global war on terrorism. We have examined further the proposal 

for a new international terrorism convention banning terrorist travel with other 

parts of this Administration and have concluded that such a convention would be 

unwise and a distraction from other efforts that are well underway toward achieving 

the same goals. 

States already have international legal obligations to prevent terrorist travel: 

UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1373 obligates all States to ‘‘[p]revent 

the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures 

for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel 

documents.’’

Security Council resolution 1373 was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and contains binding provisions. Members have the same legal obligation to 

44

carry out the binding provisions of the resolution as would parties to an international convention. Moreover, all 191 members of the United Nations have an 

international legal obligation to carry out the binding provisions of this resolution 

whereas States may choose whether or not to become parties to a convention and 

the convention is in force only in those states that have become parties to the convention. 

There are additional obligations with respect to persons designated as being associated with Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban. UNSCRs 1267, 1333 and 

other relevant resolutions, most recently UNSCR 1526, obligate all UN Member 

States to ‘‘prevent the entry into or the transit through their territories’’ of individuals designated by the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee as being associated with AlQaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban. 

Seeking negotiation of a convention banning terrorist travel poses risks for U.S. 

interests without offering any appreciable benefits: 

Two sets of negotiations on international terrorism conventions at the UN have 

been at impasse since 2001 over the definition of ‘‘terrorism’’ and whether states can 

be ‘‘terrorists.’’ A new negotiation on terrorist travel would necessarily raise the 

same politicized issues of who is a terrorist. Negotiating a new treaty is, under the 

best of circumstances, a very lengthy procedure. Members must first negotiate the 

text, consulting with their capitals at each stage. States then must decide whether 

to become parties, legislatures must decide whether to approve—all in all, it generally takes years to achieve the final result. 

Our experience tells us that developing countries might well use such negotiations 

to establish rights of free travel for those people not determined to be terrorists, 

thus potentially adding to our immigration control burdens. 

The focus should be on worldwide implementation of existing obligations: 

We are doing this: 

The Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee is monitoring States’ efforts 

to implement the terrorist travel ban under UNSCR 1373. As a member of this committee, we are taking steps to ensure that it emphasizes the importance of States’ 

compliance with the travel ban. 

We also intend to work with the UN 1267 Sanctions Committee Monitoring Team 

to strengthen implementation of the travel ban against individuals designated as 

being associated with Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden or the Taliban. 

The G8 developed a set of standards and best practices to improve the security 

of travel documents. 

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) adopted the G–8 recommended standards on passport issuance security as international standards. Further, ICAO has issued specifications for biometric passports, and over 25 countries 

already are working to issue biometric passports within the next 12 to 18 months. 

The Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) agreed in a Ministerial decision last December to a U.S.-initiated proposal for all 55 OSCE member 

states to adopt and implement the ICAO standards and best practices. 

We are working to encourage other regional organizations, including the OAS, to 

do the same. 

State Department representatives would be pleased to have an opportunity to discuss this matter in greater detail with Mr. Smith at his convenience.

Mr. POPE. But I can tell you a little bit about what we are doing 

in the absence of that, and I mentioned a little bit in my earlier 

remarks. My boss, who unfortunately is not here or would be testifying today, is very interested in this subject. It is in this range of 

issues, the big, slow moving, but very transformational issues that 

I was talking about. 

With the OSCE, the European organization in Europe, we are 

working very hard with them on travel document standardization. 

And frankly there are 55 members who represent a very significant 

portion of everything that you could measure in the world, and we 

believe that when that comes to be, and it needs to come to be, that 

even if there is not yet a convention, and it is a very interesting 

idea, that when it comes to be it is going to kind of be like the huge 

snowball rolling downhill. 

It is going to really compel everybody to get into that, and it 

needs to be done, because if you look at your passport or my passVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:54 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\EUROPE\091404\95829.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
45

port, it is not hugely different than it was 50 years ago. It is a picture glued on a piece of paper. 

It has more features in it now than it used to but the forgers are 

really good across the world, and what we need, and we are not 

there yet either as well as the Europeans are not there, we really 

need something that is undefeatable, like irises, the biometrics, and 

the fingerprints. 

So I don’t know the answer exactly. It is an interesting idea but 

we must get there, because your initial point about being a weapon 

in hand is absolutely right. We must stop their ability to counterfeit. 

Mr. DE VRIES. And perhaps to follow on if I may. There are two 

initiatives that are germane to the concern raised by Congressman 

Smith on actions taken by the Union at the moment. 

One is to move from the current generation of passports to biometric passports, passports that have biometric identifiers. That 

would be a major step forward in the fight against crime, in the 

fight against identity fraud. Terrorists and those who support them 

are masters at changing their identity, and to make passports biometrically identifiable, I think would be an important step to 

counter their capacity. 

Secondly, we have to globally strengthen our cooperation in the 

field of lost and stolen passports. That, I think, is also a critical 

factor and I am pleased that here, too, the U.S. and the EU have 

decided to work more closely together and strengthen the role of 

Interpol. 

And the EU expects, before the end of the year, that the Commission will come forward with the legal initiative on that and to 

have a legal basis for EU Member States to provide all of that information to Interpol. 

That would be another international organization and global 

weapon, not yet a convention, but a practical tool to strengthen 

global cooperation in this crucial area. 

Mr. CHRISTOPHER SMITH OF NEW JERSEY. Thank you very much. 

Ms. DAVIS. Mr. De Vries and Mr. Pope, we certainly appreciate 

you being patient and staying with us, and we thank you for being 

with us today. 

Unfortunately, if you heard the buzzers, we have more votes, 

which is going to take us about 45 minutes. So rather than hold 

you here, we are going to dismiss the second panel. I apologize to 

you for bringing you out and having to stay this long, but hopefully 

we can have you back at some other point in time to testify before 

the Committee. 

I do apologize. That is the way that things go here in Congress, 

and you know that, but I don’t think it would be right to hold you 

here for another 45 minutes or so. But thank you all for being here, 

and with that the Committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:05 p.m., the Subcommittees adjourned.] 

(47)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRUCE SWARTZ, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

CRIMINAL DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

1. INTRODUCTION

Thank you for this opportunity to testify about our cooperation with the European 

Union in the fight against terrorism. Since September 11th, the Department of Justice has made it one of our highest priorities to strengthen our counter-terrorism 

cooperation with the European Union and its Member States. As the tragic events 

in Madrid earlier this year demonstrate yet again, the United States and Europe 

face a common terrorist enemy. Terrorist groups linked to Al Qaeda have repeatedly 

attempted to engage in terrorist acts in Europe, both against European and United 

States targets. Thus, the critical importance of our law enforcement and counterterrorism cooperation with the EU is beyond question. 

2. COOPERATION PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 11TH

In strengthening its cooperation with the European Union, the Department of 

Justice has built on a foundation laid long before September 11th. As the EU grows 

and evolves, it is constantly moving toward greater integration, especially in the 

field of Justice and Home Affairs, which was recently renamed ‘‘Justice Freedom 

and Security.’’ Greater centralization on these issues is only likely to continue, as 

reflected in the proposed new EU constitution. 

In the mid-1990’s, the Department of Justice recognized that the EU’s enhanced 

integration in the law enforcement field would inevitably affect our bilateral enforcement relationships with Member States. We therefore established a senior level position housed at the U.S. Mission to the European Union in Brussels to attempt to 

address these issues. With me today is Mark Richard, our Department of Justice 

attache ́ to the European Union. Mr. Richard, who was my predecessor as Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General, is the Department’s leading expert on international 

criminal law, and the architect of our framework of international mutual legal assistance and extradition treaties. In Brussels, he works with the FBI, DEA and ICE 

attache ́s, to coordinate law enforcement issues across US law enforcement agency 

lines. Together with the Department’s Office of International Affairs, Mr. Richard 

is the central law enforcement coordinator for the United States on matters involving the EU, and he works closely with the DHS, the State Department, and the 

Treasury Department. 

The Department of Justice also has long co-chaired, with the Department of State, 

meetings on Justice and Home Affairs with each incoming Presidency of the EU. 

These meetings, which are part of the Transatlantic Dialogue with the EU, have 

been highly useful in helping to set common law enforcement agendas. 

To be sure, it is important to keep in mind the limitations of the EU when it 

comes to cooperating in the fight against terrorism and crime at an operational 

level. The EU has no police force that can make arrests or conduct searches and 

seizures; it has no criminal prosecutors and no EU criminal code; and finally, it has 

no EU judiciary with criminal jurisdiction. In short, we must continue to rely primarily on our bilateral relationships for operational assistance. Nonetheless, it is 

equally clear that we must do more than simply work with Member States—we 

must also work with the EU institutions that make policies and decisions that increasingly affect the ability of Member States to cooperate with us. 

48

3. POST 9/11 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INITIATIVES

Recognizing that the events of September 11th made our relationship with the EU 

even more vital, the Department of Justice has undertaken a number of initiatives 

to strengthen that relationship. First, we have successfully negotiated agreements 

to permit sharing of counter-terrorism and criminal information with Europol. We 

expect these agreements to pay dividends as the EU Member States increasingly 

look to Europol as a central point of coordination for counter-terrorism data. 

Second, we have assigned a Department of Justice prosecutor to work with 

Eurojust, which brings together in the Hague liaison prosecutors from the EU member states. While Eurojust also is an evolving organization, we hope that it will 

serve as a vehicle for prosecutors from the United States and EU Member States 

to meet and discuss ‘‘lessons learned’’ from our terrorism investigations and prosecutions. 

Third, Attorney General Ashcroft has worked tirelessly to build personal relationships with his counterparts, both bilaterally in the Member States and in the EU 

itself. In particular, he has met on a number of occasions, both here and abroad, 

with outgoing EU Justice and Home Affairs Commissioner Vitorino—who has done 

so much in his time as Commissioner to advance the cause of EU/US counter-terrorism and law enforcement cooperation, and to whom we would like to use this opportunity to express again our deep appreciation. We also would like to pay tribute 

to Sir Adrian Fortescue, the first Director General for JHA Affairs, who passed 

away this summer; his tireless work to strengthen US/EU relationships will not be 

forgotten, and has been ably carried forward by his successor, Jonathan Faull. Finally, Attorney General Ashcroft also highly values the opportunities he has had to 

meet with Mr. DeVries, the EU’s new Terrorism Coordinator, who is also appearing 

before you today. The strength of the relationships that have developed is evidenced 

by the fact that the Attorney General was honored to be the first foreign justice 

minister to be invited to address the convocation of all the EU Justice and Home 

Affairs Ministers, in Copenhagen, in 2002. The Attorney General, joined by DHS Assistant Secretary Hutchinson, will again meet with the Justice and Home Affairs 

Ministers—now representing 25 nations—in The Hague at the end of this month. 

Fourth, together with the Department of Homeland Security and the Department 

of State, the Department of Justice co-chairs a new Border and Transportation Security Dialogue with the EU. Created during this past year, the Dialogue is intended to ensure close consultation with the EU on border and transportation issues 

that play a critical role in our joint counter-terrorism efforts, including issues relating to Passenger Name Records and the US VISIT program. The Dialogue met earlier this spring in Brussels, and is scheduled to meet again this November. 

Finally, and perhaps most important, on June 25, 2003, the Attorney General 

signed on behalf of the United States the first ever treaties negotiated between the 

United States and the European Union as a whole. These treaties—one dealing with 

extradition and one dealing with mutual legal assistance—will give us additional 

tools to combat terrorism, organized crime, and other serious forms of criminality. 

The mutual legal assistance treaty, for instance, provides for the formation of joint 

investigative teams, the use of video-technology for taking testimony, and the provision of information regarding suspect bank accounts. The extradition treaty updates 

the oldest treaties in force between the US and EU member states, which currently 

permit extradition for only a limited range of listed offenses; henceforth, extradition 

will be available for a broad range of serious offenses punishable under both States’ 

laws. Significantly, these treaties accomplish these goals not by supplanting our existing bilateral relationships, but by building upon and supplementing them. Thus, 

they modernize, but do not replace, the bilateral arrangements now in place. In The 

Hague at the end of this month, we expect that Attorney General Ashcroft will sign 

the first of a number of the bilateral protocols that will implement these new treaties. As the Attorney General stated when signing the treaties in 2003, ‘‘They are 

deeply emblematic of the good will between the U.S. and EU that enabled us to 

maintain our focus on enhancing cooperation in the face of common threats, and not 

allow differences in our legal systems to thwart our abilities to cooperate.’’

4. NEXT STEPS

We expect this close cooperation to gain further strength during the current 

Dutch Presidency of the EU. The Dutch will host a terrorist financing seminar next 

week at which the U.S. will participate. We had fruitful Justice and Home Affairs 

consultations in The Hague in July of this year, and both Attorney General Ashcroft 

and Secretary Ridge will be meeting with their counterparts in The Hague this fall. 

Our experts plan to meet to discuss a variety of potential issues, including increased 

exploitation of terrorist financing data, and analytical approaches regarding terVerDate Mar 21 2002 11:54 Nov 05, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 F:\WORK\EUROPE\091404\95829.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL
49

rorism recruiting. We look forward to increased engagement with Europol and 

Eurojust. 

Experience also has repeatedly shown that when the US and the EU are in agreement on specific issues we have the collective ability to advance the law enforcement 

agenda in other international contexts. In recent years, this has happened with respect to the UN Conventions on Organized Crime and Corruption, as well as with 

the Council of Europe Cyber-crime Convention. We also will continue to coordinate 

our G–8 anti-terrorism and crime efforts with those of the EU, through the participation of four EU Member States in the G–8 itself, and the participation of the EU 

Commission as a member of the G–8 Lyon (anti-crime) and Roma (counter-terrorism) expert groups. 

To be sure, there remain challenges in our cooperation with the European Union 

and its institutions. Perhaps the most persistent of these issues is that of data privacy. Of course, the United States, no less than the European Union, places a high 

value on the privacy of personal data. But our systems have evolved different mechanisms for protecting that data. Both sides have worked diligently to understand 

each other’s data protection systems, and we have been able to move forward in several contexts on agreeing to share law enforcement related information. But we expect that these discussions will continue as we increasingly work together. Our goal 

is to continue to protect personal privacy, while ensuring the rapid sharing of information vital to our counter-terrorism and law enforcement efforts. 

5. CONCLUSION

The EU is only going to grow in its influence as it expands and presents a unified 

approach on law enforcement issues. The Department of Justice is committed to 

working in close partnership with the EU in this regard, while still maintaining our 

critical bilateral relationships with EU Member States. We believe that this commitment is essential in light of the common terrorism threat we both face. In signing 

the US/EU extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties, Attorney General 

Ashcroft noted that ‘‘In the months since September 11th, our law enforcement partners in EU member states have stood shoulder-to-shoulder with us in the fight 

against international terrorism.’’ We cannot win this fight alone, and the EU and 

its Member States are critical law enforcement allies. 

Thank you. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE C. STEWART VERDERY, JR., ASSISTANT

SECRETARY FOR POLICY AND PLANNING, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Good afternoon, Chairman Davis, Chairman Gallegly and distinguished members 

of the Subcommittees, thank you for the invitation to address the Subcommittees 

on Europe and on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights 

about DHS-European Union cooperation on counterterrorism. I also want to thank 

William Pope and Bruce Swartz from the Departments of State and Justice as well 

as Mr. DeVries from the European Union (EU) who join me here today for their 

partnership and collaboration in the fight against terrorism. I wish to note that Secretary Ridge will be in The Hague in a few days for the EU Troika meeting to meet 

with his counterparts representing three consecutive EU Presidencies. I am very 

pleased with the progress that DHS and the European Union are making each day 

in addressing many issues of mutual concern related to combating terrorism, enhancing transportation security and bolstering border enforcement through improved cooperation and information sharing. 

As you are keenly aware, the U.S. has an especially close partnership with the 

European Union, and, since its formation, DHS has been a key player in establishing many transatlantic initiatives and agreements. Truly it may be said that it 

is one of our best relationships. Certainly, the challenges of the post-9/11 environment can only be tackled and surmounted with the cooperation and assistance of 

our close European partners and other foreign counterparts. 

The greatest challenge facing each one of the witnesses before you today is to secure our borders and homeland from another terrorist attack while preserving our 

most cherished values and maintaining a free, safe and open society. Each day, DHS 

is working with our counterparts at State, Justice, Commerce and other agencies 

to improve our ability to identify terrorists and criminals while finding ways to facilitate legitimate trade and travel. We are enhancing security by focusing on how 

we produce and examine documents, taking a fresh look at security at our ports of 

entry, improving and expanding watch lists and how they are vetted, and exploring 

ways to share data with our counterparts that can help identify and thwart terrorists. All of these efforts are pursued in the context of protecting and respecting the 

50

civil liberties and individual privacy of U.S. citizens, residents, and visitors. It is our 

feeling that our efforts to combat terrorism threats and protect our borders require 

the assistance, counsel and partnership of our allies, especially our transatlantic 

neighbors in Europe. 

The 9–11 Commission Report stated: ‘‘The U.S. government cannot meet its own 

obligations to the American people to prevent the entry of terrorists without a major 

effort to collaborate with other governments. We should do more to exchange terrorist 

information with trusted allies, and raise U.S. and global border security standards 

for travel and border crossing over the medium and long term through extensive 

international cooperation.’’ The bombings in Madrid, the more recent hostage crisis 

in Beslan, Russia and the Australian Embassy bombing in Jakarta also serve as 

vivid reminders to us that terrorism is an international threat that cannot be conquered alone. DHS understands that we must engage in a global effort each day, 

through collaboration, information sharing and ongoing dialogue to ensure that our 

efforts are informed, coordinated, and effective. 

As part of this effort, we are working well with our partners on improving standards for travel documents, aviation safety, port security and the exchange of 

watchlist information. The appropriate and secure use of biometric identifiers will 

assist in all these efforts. We use biometric identifiers as tools to help prevent the 

use of fraudulent travel documents and identities so that we can be more confident 

and secure about our admissions and screening decisions. DHS is currently conducting a review of the use of biometrics to ensure that we are coordinating the implementation of biometric technology across the Department. In the international 

arena, we are working closely with our European counterparts in the International 

Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and other international fora to discuss how to 

advance biometric methodologies, both in chip technology and electronic readers, by 

establishing standards to ensure global interoperability. The United States recently 

hosted an e-passport interoperability test session. Approximately 130 persons from 

18 nations, representing over 50 organizations were able to establish basic interoperability for a broad set of prototype e-passports and readers. International cooperation on these issues is vital, specifically in regard to ensuring global interoperability and addressing privacy concerns. 

The 9/11 Commission Report advised us that we needed to look even more closely 

at our aviation security initiatives and give special attention to improving each of 

the layers of the security system. DHS recognizes that there is no single solution 

to prevent airplanes from being used as weapons of terrorism. The improvements 

in the layered approach include using biometric identifiers to deter visa fraud, sharing lost and stolen passport information through Interpol, promoting a global standard for machine readable passports, using airline passenger data appropriately, expanding no-fly lists, screening domestic and international passengers against no-fly 

lists, including more travelers in US–VISIT, boosting airline security utilizing Federal Air Marshals on international flights of concern, hardening cockpit doors, and 

offering voluntary programs for arming pilots on passenger and cargo planes for domestic flights. Simultaneously, we are committed to avoiding unnecessary procedures that would harm the United States’ ability to welcome students, tourists, and 

business travelers and instead are seeking ways to facilitate safe and secure travel. 

To facilitate domestic travel, the Transportation Security Administration has 

launched Registered Traveler (RT) Pilots at five airports throughout this summer. 

The RT Pilot Programs will test the use of biometric technology, security assessments and adjustments in screening procedures to determine whether customer 

service can be improved without degrading security. Similarly, CBP is currently examining ways in which we can leverage the technology to facilitate bonafide, frequent travelers in the international environment. Our investments and efforts within the aviation context aim to minimize burdens on our citizens’ and visitors’ livelihoods while we pursue our main mission of protecting their lives. 

We in DHS are working closely with the EU, both with our counterparts in the 

European Commission and the current Dutch Presidency, to ensure that developments and initiatives in border and transport security are discussed, coordinated, 

and clarified before they are implemented. Through ongoing communication and dialogue with the EU we are seeking to avoid transatlantic surprises and diplomatic 

differences. While we are working well together, we need to better understand the 

internal structures, dynamics and unique bureaucracy of the EU, especially as the 

EU further develops its own division of authorities between the Commission, Parliament, Council and Member States. 

We are taking such steps every day. Let me briefly touch on some of the ongoing 

topics and means for discussions that we have with our European partners that can 

be viewed as true achievements and positive, practical steps we have taken to tackle 

the security challenges we face together. 

51

LOST AND STOLEN PASSPORT DATA

Together with our colleagues in the Department of State, who are responsible for 

the U.S. passport system, and our foreign counterparts, DHS is addressing security 

challenges posed by lost and stolen passports. We share this effort with our partners 

in Europe and around the world. Across the globe, international border control authorities continue to seek timely and accurate information concerning the validity 

of travel documents presented at consular posts and their borders. In most cases, 

countries are able to identify the misuse of their own lost or stolen travel documents 

when presented at their own borders, but there is a reluctance of many nations to 

compromise the privacy of their citizens by sharing personal data with other governments or international agencies. 

However, we are making progress. For example through the efforts of the Departments of State and Justice, the U.S. has provided over 300,000 records of Lost and 

Stolen passports to the Interpol’s lost and stolen document database, which is available to border authorities worldwide. We hope that many more of our European 

partners will join us in this effort. 

Additionally, the US is initiating a scoping study to assess a technology concept 

that helps address this concern. The Enhanced International Travel Security (EITS) 

concept uses distributed databases as a mechanism to allow real-time exchange of 

to the basic information needed—i.e., a ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ response—concerning the validity of a document without requiring visibility into the data that allows that determination. The approach would be very similar to that already used worldwide by 

the banking industry to support ATMs. Developing better systems for international 

sharing of information, and expanding participation to more countries will improve 

our ability to identify and screen travelers before they enter our country. 

CONTAINER SECURITY INITIATIVE (CSI)

On April 22, 2004, the United States and the European Community signed an 

agreement to intensify and broaden cooperation on customs matters. The objectives 

of the agreement include, among other things, the prompt expansion of Customs and 

Border Protection’s (CBP) Container Security Initiative (CSI) to more ports in the 

European Community. 

CSI addresses the threat to border security and global trade posed by terrorist 

misuse of a maritime container. CSI proposes a security regime to ensure that all 

containers identified as posing a potential risk for terrorism are identified and inspected at foreign ports before they are placed on vessels destined for the United 

States. Specifically, CSI requires the electronic transmission of cargo manifest information 24 hours before the vessel is loaded at the foreign port. This allows us to 

use these data to assess the risk before the cargo is loaded onto vessels. 

Through CSI, U.S. officers work with host country customs administrations to establish security criteria for identifying high-risk containers. Those administrations 

use non-intrusive technology to quickly inspect the high-risk containers before they 

are shipped to U.S. ports. Additional steps are taken to enhance the physical integrity of inspected containers while en route to the United States. 

The CSI agreement signed in April with the EU sets the stage for enhanced cooperation between the United States and our European partners on CSI and related 

matters. It will lead to enhancements in our mutual efforts to prevent terrorists 

from exploiting the international trading system. The success of the agreement has 

served to broaden cooperation and mutual assistance in customs matters between 

the European Community and the United States including establishing minimum 

standards for risk-management techniques and improving public-private partnerships to secure and facilitate international trade. 

CSI is a fully reciprocal program. Japanese and Canadian officers are currently 

stationed and working in key U.S. ports to screen containers destined for their respective countries. We expect and hope others will do so in the future. 

PASSENGER NAME RECORD (PNR) DATA

In addition to expanding cooperation in container screening, the United States 

and the European Commission signed an international agreement on May 28, 2004 

permitting the transfer of passenger data to be used for screening passengers. I personally served as the lead for the U.S. interagency team negotiating for over one 

year until we succeeded in establishing a mutually acceptable legal framework to 

allow DHS to access passenger name record (PNR) data from the airlines that carry 

passengers between Europe and the United States. In 1995, the European Parliament and Council issued a ‘‘Data Protection Directive’’ that set forth detailed requirements for the utilization and sharing of personal data. Prior to our resolution 

52

of these issues with the Commission, airlines found themselves in a position where 

they would be subject to fines from EU member states if they provide PNR data 

to the United States. 

PNR information is just one of many tools used by CBP to fulfill its mission. PNR 

is an essential tool in allowing CBP to accomplish its key goals: (1) PNR data helps 

us make a determination of whether a passenger may pose a significant risk to the 

safety and security of the United States and to fellow passengers on a plane; (2) 

PNR data submitted prior to a flight’s arrival enables CBP to facilitate and expedite 

the entry of the vast majority of visitors to the United States by providing CBP with 

an advance and electronic means to collect information that CBP would otherwise 

be forced to collect upon arrival; and (3) PNR data is essential to terrorism and 

criminal investigations by allowing us to link information about known terrorists 

and serious criminals to co-conspirators and others involved in their plots, as well 

as to potential victims. Sometimes these links may be developed before a person’s 

travel, but at other times these leads only become available days or weeks or 

months later. In short, PNR enables CBP to fulfill its anti-terrorism and law enforcement missions more effectively and allows for more efficient and timely facilitation of travel for the vast majority of legitimate travelers to and through the United 

States. 

Over the course of our negotiations, both sides worked together to reach a workable solution that outlines the type of data that may be transferred, the period of 

time it can be retained, and the purpose for which it may be used. Additionally, the 

final arrangement includes requirements for aggressive and important passenger redress mechanisms, including a channel for direct access by European Data Protection Authorities to the Chief Privacy Officer at the Department of Homeland Security on behalf of European citizens. 

While this agreement was signed by the EU and the Secretary of Homeland Security in May, matters related to the agreement are currently being challenged by the 

European Parliament before the European Court of Justice. We are, nevertheless, 

confident that the agreement is legally sufficient and will improve the safety of air 

passengers. We have been encouraged by the Commission’s efforts, especially the 

support we have received from European Commissioner of Internal Market, Frits 

Bolkestein; Commissioner for External Relations, Chris Patten; Commissioner for 

Justice and Home Affairs, Antonio Vitorino and Director General Jonathan Faull 

throughout the negotiations. We consider this agreement an historic achievement 

that helps protect both the privacy of travelers and the borders of the United States 

and the European Union. 

VISA WAIVER PROGRAM AND US–VISIT

Another area on which we are working to make significant enhancements involves 

the Visa Waiver Program and US–VISIT. DHS, with the assistance of Department 

of State, is in the process of completing the country evaluations required under the 

Visa Waiver Program statute. These reviews involve site visits to each of the participant countries. Overall, the cooperation of the VWP countries’ governments has 

been exceptional. 

Additionally, on September 30, 2004, nationals from VWP countries will be enrolled in US–VISIT when they travel to the United States. We have been working 

diligently, engaging in all forms of outreach to ensure the countries and their citizens are prepared for the upcoming expansion of the program. 

The first phase of US–VISIT was launched on January 5, 2004, when DHS deployed the new biometric entry capabilities at 115 airports and 14 seaports and 

began testing a biometric departure confirmation system at two locations. Since 

then, millions of foreign visitors have been processed without impacting wait times 

and it is working. US–VISIT has helped to prevent hundreds of criminals and immigration violators from entering the country. Before the biometric component of US–

VISIT, these people might have passed undetected through our system and into our 

country. US–VISIT’s experience with biometrics is demonstrating that our ability to 

identify who entered and left the country is significantly improved with the addition 

of biometric identifiers. In August, US–VISIT began expanding the pilot exit capabilities to additional sites and in December, entry capabilities will be expanded to 

the 50 busiest land border ports of entry. 

Another important issue on which we have been in constant communication with 

our EU partners relates to the biometric passport deadline established by the Enhanced Border Security Act (EBSA). The Act required that VWP travelers with 

passports issued after October 26, 2004, have passports with an embedded biometric 

chip. It also required VWP countries to certify by October 26, 2004, that they have 

a program to issue biometrically enhanced passports that comply with International 

53

Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards. Working together with the Department of State, we approached Congress asking for an extension of this deadline. 

Just last month, the President approved a statutory extension of one year, during 

which we will work diligently with our foreign partners on the technological advancements necessary to produce biometric passports by that date. VWP countries 

understand that enrolling VWP applicants in US–VISIT will alleviate some of the 

security concerns associated with that year-long extension and in the long-term will 

improve document and border security. 

SECURE FLIGHT

As illustrated by the lengthy PNR negotiations, passenger screening has been an 

issue of transatlantic debate. For over a year, DHS has been working with its EU 

counterparts to explain the previously proposed but now replaced, CAPPS II program that, admittedly, created an abundance of concern on both sides of the Atlantic. DHS has responded to these critiques by creating a new program, Secure Flight, 

which differs from earlier proposed systems by focusing screening efforts on looking 

for known or suspected terrorists, rather than using them for other law enforcement 

purposes. In addition, the new program will also include a redress mechanism 

through which people can resolve questions if they believe they have been unfairly 

or incorrectly selected for additional screening. This program, while domestic in 

focus, is a major step forward as DHS’ Transportation Security Administration will 

take over responsibility for checking airline passengers’ names against terrorist 

watch lists—a function currently administered by each airline individually. When 

in place, Secure Flight will help move passengers through domestic airport screening more quickly and reduce the number of individuals selected for secondary 

screening—while fully protecting passengers’ privacy and civil liberties. 

Passengers on international flights will continue to be checked against names in 

the consolidated Terrorist Screening Center database by CBP, through its Advanced 

Passenger Information System (APIS). These checks are mandated by U.S. law and 

we expect to issue a proposed rule in this area in the near future aimed at screening 

passengers earlier. As I mentioned before, advanced screening of our passengers 

through the use of PNR and advanced passenger data are key elements of our strategy to identify and stop persons of concern before they are able to board a flight. 

U.S.–EU DIALOGUE

Last April, Under Secretary Asa Hutchinson traveled to Brussels to lead a U.S. 

delegation to the inaugural meeting of the new Policy Dialogue on Border and 

Transport Security. The EU delegation was led by Director General Faull. The purpose of this new group was to establish a forum where issues of transport and border security could be addressed at a policy level. This first semi-annual meeting successfully discussed a wide range of issues and included experts from Homeland Security, Justice, and State on the U.S. side and the European Commission Directorates of Transport, Internal Market, Justice and Home Affairs and External Relations as well as representation from the EU Presidency, demonstrating an effort by 

both sides to bring all concerned parties to the table and avoid compartmentalizing. 

This ongoing formal dialogue is to provide a mechanism to communicate problems 

or initiatives on the horizon. 

Delegates at the inaugural meeting took the opportunity to address many of the 

issues I have already mentioned, including biometrics, the US–VISIT and Visa 

Waiver Programs, joint initiatives on lost and stolen passports, ‘‘flights of concern’’ 

and air marshals. This meeting was appropriately timed to enable parties to discuss 

issues on which we have been working collaboratively before the US–EU Summit 

held in June of this year. 

Coordinated efforts and continuous dialogue are certainly the key elements to a 

successful transatlantic strategy. The Policy Dialogue is an umbrella over a series 

of US–EU working groups that meet more regularly to exchange information on new 

developments in the area of cargo, aviation and transport security technology, legislation and policy. We are already preparing for the next meeting of the Policy Dialogue, which is scheduled to be held in Washington, D.C. in mid-November. 

We are honored to be joined today by EU Counterterrorism Coordinator, Mr. Gijs 

DeVries, who is a key part of EU’s work in the counterterrorism arena and is a valued partner to the United States. His support and that of his colleagues within the 

EU structure has been invaluable to DHS as we carry out our daily mission and 

meet formidable challenges that we can only overcome by collaborating and exchanging ideas and methods. I am certain that each of us here before you today 

agree that in order to succeed in the global fight against terrorism, we must take 

54

every opportunity to strengthen our relations and communications between leaders 

on both sides of the Atlantic. 

RESPONSES FROM GIJS DE VRIES, COUNTERTERRORISM COORDINATOR, EUROPEAN

UNION, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE JO ANN

DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 

AND CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

Question: 

A recent publication on the transatlantic dialogue on terrorism produced by the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) suggested that the United 

States and Europe have experienced an increasing divergence in their approaches to 

sustaining international security and stability and that political leaders in the 

United States and Europe have failed to bridge the gap and build a sense of common 

purpose. 

Mr. de Vries, are Europeans willing to follow the U.S. lead on combating terrorism 

or do they have other ideas which would require a different ‘‘European’’ approach? 

Response: 

The EU and US strategies to combat terrorism have a lot in common. The Madrid 

bombings have shown us that Europe is as vulnerable as the US. We are facing the 

same threat. We both believe that no country can win this fight alone and that 

transatlantic cooperation is key. Our common understanding in the fight against 

terrorism is now reflected in the joint EU–US Declaration adopted at the June Summit, and the same CSIS report notes that our cooperation in many fields relevant 

to the fight against terrorism is, by general consent and in general, excellent. 

We are in this together, but this does not mean that our response is or has to 

be exactly alike. Our systems differ in some respects, and we have to live with these 

differences. But they cannot and will not detract us from our commitment to fight 

terrorism and to protect our citizens. 

Question: 

In Mr. Pope’s testimony he mentioned there are some United Nations counter-terrorism conventions and protocols that many European countries have not yet ratified. 

Can you point out a few specific ones? 

Can you explain why these have not been ratified? 

Response: 

Only about one third of all member states of the UN have ratified the 12 UN Conventions. The European Union is committed to ensuring universal adherence to, 

ratification and full implementation of UN Conventions on Terrorism and related 

Protocols. The European Union regularly monitors the state of ratification and implementation of the United Nations counter-terrorism Conventions and Protocols. 

The vast majority of all 25 EU Member States have ratified the 12 UN Conventions and Protocols relating to the fight against terrorism. In a very small number 

of instances some EU Member States have not been in a position to complete the 

ratification procedures yet for technical domestic reasons. 

As an example, the UN Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings of 

15 December 1997 has not been ratified by two out of the 25 EU Member States. 

As stated in the EU Declaration of 25 March on Combating Terrorism in response 

to the 11 March Madrid attacks, EU Member States are speeding up their internal 

legislative process so as to ensure full implementation of all UN Security Council 

Resolutions, UN Conventions on Terrorism and related Protocols. 

Question: 

How many of the 25 member states of the European Union have placed the EUwide arrest warrant into national law? 

Response: 

23 of the 25 EU Member States have implemented the Framework Decision on 

the European arrest warrant. They issue and execute European arrest warrants. 

One additional Member State has adopted legislation to implement the Framework 

Decision on the European arrest warrant. It is expected that the legislation in that 

Member State will enter into force on 1 November 2004. 

55

Question: 

Has the EU completed its new initiatives under the Schengen Information System? 

Has the EU finalized its Strategy for Customs Cooperation? How might these contribute to an effective strategy against terrorist operations in Europe? 

Response: 

In April 2004, the Council has adopted a Regulation concerning the introduction 

of some new functions for the Schengen Information System, including in the fight 

against terrorism (Council Regulation (EC) No 871/2004 of 29 April, published in 

the OJ L 162 of 30.4.2004, p. 29) and is waiting for the last national parliamentary 

reservation to be lifted in order to adopt, before the end of the year, the corresponding Council Decision concerning the introduction of some new functions for 

the Schengen Information System, including in the fight against terrorism. 

Legislative initiatives on SIS II are awaited from the Commission in the first 

months of 2005. 

On 30 March 2004, the Council adopted its Strategy for Customs Cooperation and 

the corresponding Work Plan. While generally meant to improve the customs cooperation with a view to combating smuggling, fraud, cross-border organised crime 

and other threats, several actions set out in the work plan specifically aim at enhancing the role of customs authorities in the fight against terrorism. This includes 

border management, inter-agency co-operation, threat assessment, training etc. In 

this framework, a project group has been set up to discuss an action plan to take 

forward customs counter-terrorism initiatives. The first report of this group was recently approved by the Customs Cooperation Working Group and the project group 

has been requested to continue its work and ensure the follow-up of the proposed 

action plan. 

Question: 

To what extent do European jihadist or other radical groups rely on small-scale 

criminal activities to finance their operations? 

Response: 

Intelligence suggests indeed that new methods may have been developed, or initiated by terrorist networks, for financing/fundraising. Based on findings at Europol 

regarding the micro-financing of terrorism, it has been identified that some terrorist 

support cells appear to finance their activities through the sale of forged or stolen 

documentation as well as through the sale of counterfeit goods. The Counter-terrorist Task Force set up at Europol has therefore decided to evaluate the possible 

profit derived from these criminal activities. Preventive and repressive measures are 

planned to result from the intelligence-findings. 

Question: 

Many experts agree that bin Laden’s followers and other jihadist groups care little 

for the plight of the Palestinians or the Iraqis but they use the U.S. position on the 

Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the occupation of Iraq, including the bloody fight 

against Sunni and Shiite insurgents, as effective recruiting tools for their cause. 

Mr. de Vries, to what extent do the Europeans believe the lack of progress in the 

Israeli-Palestinian conflict affects efforts to prevent the further recruitment of new 

radicals? 

Response: 

For the EU, the Arab/Israeli conflict is a major factor of instability in its immediate neighbourhood. This conflict has brought suffering and hardship to many people in the region. It has led to extremism and terrorism in the region. It has also 

been exploited by terrorists elsewhere for their own propaganda. The EU is committed to working towards resolving the Arab/Israeli conflict, together with its partners of the Quartet and the parties directly concerned. We want to see an end to 

the suffering of the Israelis and the Palestinians. We also believe that a peaceful 

resolution of the conflict, along the lines of the roadmap defined by the Quartet, 

would deprive al-Qaeda of one of its propaganda tools and thus help bring about 

a safer world for all of us. 

56

RESPONSES FROM GIJS DE VRIES, COUNTERTERRORISM COORDINATOR, EUROPEAN

UNION, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE JOSEPH

R. PITTS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENN- SYLVANIA

Question: 

I understand that a certain airport in Europe has instituted a neighborhood watch 

program where the community is educated to identify suspicious behavior surrounding the airport. On one occasion, an individual participating in the program 

identified suspicious behavior to appropriate security. As a result, two men with and 

SA–7 were arrested in an apparent attempt to shoot down a commercial aircraft. Are 

similar airport neighborhood watch programs being instituted throughout Europe? 

Response: 

The European Union is currently not involved in instituting airport 

neighbourhood watch programs. The responsibility for the control and surveillance 

of borders and thus of airports, lies with the Member States. As far as we are 

aware, currently only one Member State has instituted such a program. 

One of the EU’s priorities is to establish an integrated management of the external borders of the Member States. The creation of an European Borders Agency will 

represent an important step towards the realisation of this integrated borders management concept. The adoption of the draft Council Regulation setting up the Agency is foreseen to take place at the end of October 2004 in order that the Agency 

can become operational in May 2005. This Agency will have a certain number of 

specialised branches and one of them will deal with air borders. 

Already in 2003, following the adoption of a plan for the management of the external borders, Member States decided to set up an Air Borders Centre (ABC) to reinforce the operational cooperation with regard to border control at airports. The ABC, 

which will become a part of the future Agency, was established in Italy and has developed a communication system between Member States’ airports. 

Question: 

Throughout the Muslim world, human rights are often violated in the name of 

combating terrorism. What efforts is the EU undertaking to ensure the protection of 

human rights throughout the Muslim communities in Europe? 

Response: 

The Member States of the EU have all signed up to the European Convention of 

Human Rights, which for the past 50 years has created a very powerful system for 

the protection of human rights in Europe, including the right to have human rights 

adjudicated by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. The Convention’s rights apply to all persons within Europe, whatever their religion. Moreover, 

in the new Constitutional Treaty of the EU a Charter for Human Rights has been 

included. 

Having said that, we should not fool ourselves—racism and xenophobia are on the 

rise in some of our Member States, and our governments must stay vigilant towards 

such tendencies, coming from far right groups as well as from the far left. 

Islamophobia, as well as anti-semitism, and all other forms of racism and xenophobia have to be combated wherever we find them. Those of us involved in the 

fight against terrorism have a particular responsibility to ensure full respect for 

human rights as well as to reject firmly the identification of terrorism and extremism with any religion, culture, ethnic group, nationality or race. 

RESPONSES FROM WILLIAM T. POPE, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF

THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TO

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY THE HONORABLE JO ANN DAVIS, A

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, AND

CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

Question: 

Trans-Atlantic travel security is a very important issue when addressing counterterrorism initiatives. The plane bombings in Russian exposed many shortfalls in 

their airport security. How are the U.S. and the EU working together toward a common, effective standard of security at airports and on trans-Atlantic flights? 

Response: 

The State Department has assisted the Department of Homeland Security with 

several initiatives overseas. For more complete information, please refer to DHS.

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• After the plane bombings in Russia, TSA issued Security Directives and 

Emergency Amendments requiring additional security measures on flights 

from Russia to the United States.

• DHS recently concluded an agreement with the European Commission to 

allow Customs and Border Protection access to EU-origin Passenger Name 

Record data. We are also working with the EU regarding further upcoming 

screening programs including Secure Flight and collection of Advanced Passenger Information (APIS) data prior to takeoff.

• Under the pilot Immigration Security Initiative, DHS has placed US immigration officials in certain European airports to inspect travel documents and attempt to prevent inadmissible persons from boarding US-bound flights. 

Question: 

A recent publication on the transatlantic dialogue on terrorism produced by the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) suggested that the United 

States and Europe have experienced an increasing divergence in their approaches to 

sustaining international security and stability and that political leaders in the 

United States and Europe have failed to bridge the gap and build a sense of common 

purpose. Has the U.S. government been willing to accept different ideas and approaches to addressing the terrorist threat from the Europeans? 

Response: 

Yes. We continue to work closely with our European partners to combat terrorism. 

A major part of that effort involves the exchange of information and ideas on how 

best to respond to evolving threats. No one country can win the fight against terrorism alone; continuing exchanges on latest developments and best practices is a 

key aspect of our worldwide effort. 

Question: 

The CSIS study on transatlantic counter-terrorism cooperation raised the concern 

that the current weakened state of the overall transatlantic relationship at both the 

elite and public levels as a result of a broad range of issues, but highlighted by Iraq 

and U.S. Middle East policy, could make long-term cooperation more difficult and 

could limit the development of innovative new transatlantic approaches to help tackle 

global terrorism or the rise of Islamic radicalism. Do you see a lack of long term cooperation on counter-terrorism as a consequence of our other transatlantic disputes? 

Response: 

No. Our European partners recognize the nature and the scope of the terrorist 

threat. Whatever political disagreements may occur in other areas, we continue to 

cooperate closely on counterterrorism. Both we and the Europeans recognize that we 

face a common threat and therefore have a common interest in cooperating to defeat 

it. 

Question: 

Many of the recent terrorist attacks, such as the attack last week against the Australian Embassy in Jakarta or the March 11 bombings in Madrid, seemed to have 

been carried out by terrorist groups affiliated or inspired by al Qaeda, but not under 

the direct control or direction of Bin Laden. How has this changed the way we both 

plan a strategy to counter terrorism? 

Response: 

Our CT strategy continues to evolve to meet what is an ever-changing threat. As 

Al Qaeda’s centralized command has been degraded, groups affiliated with, but not 

under al Qaeda’s direct control continue to pose a significant threat. Such groups 

are present in Europe and we, and our European partners, are seeking to coordinate 

our efforts to combat them. 

Question: 

The CSIS study on terrorism suggested that there is ‘‘an ongoing process of 

radicalization of Muslim minorities in Europe’’ . . . that bin Laden’s movement has 

been able to ‘‘capitalize on the growing resentment of the Muslim diaspora in Europe’’ 

and that’’ in Europe more and more affluent Muslim parents are ‘‘losing’’ their children to jihadist groups in London, Paris and elsewhere.’’ What is the current assessment of the radicalization of Muslim communities in Europe? 

Response: 

Extremist groups on the fringes of Europe’s Muslim communities continue to seek 

to recruit and propagandize, and particularly seek to target young people. However, 

58

the vast majority of Muslims in Europe have no interest in and nothing to do with 

violent extremism. 

Question: 

Our Committee has questioned the effectiveness of U.S. attempts to conduct effective public relations and public diplomacy toward Muslims. How is Europe addressing its Muslim communities? 

Response: 

European countries with sizeable Muslim communities are seeking to work 

through moderate Muslim community leaders to isolate and counterbalance the 

small group of radical extremists that have sought to gain a foothold. These efforts 

include outreach, education, and programs aimed at increasing economic opportunity for disadvantaged communities within their countries. 

Question: 

Much has been reported about the activities of radical Islamic clerics and their role 

in inciting young Muslims to either sympathize with or join radical Islamic terrorist 

groups. How are European capitals dealing with this issue? 

Response: 

As noted above, efforts to combat violent extremism are broadly-based and centered around moderate community leaders. Efforts at recruitment by radical clerics 

are also being addressed through a variety of means—ranging from prosecution to, 

in some cases, expulsion of foreign radicals. 

Question: 

Many experts agree that bin Laden’s followers and other jihadist groups care little 

for the plight of the Palestinians or the Iraqis but they use the U.S. position on the 

Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the occupation of Iraq, including the bloody fight 

against Sunni and Shiite insurgents, as effective recruiting tools for their cause. To 

what extent do you agree or disagree with that assessment? 

Response: 

It is difficult to assess the true motives of these killers, apart from their desire 

to spread death, terror, and chaos. We have clearly seen their willingness to make 

outrageous claims and demands on the civilized world, and use whatever stated motivations are most expedient for their crimes. 

Question: 

To what extent do the Europeans believe the lack of progress in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict affects efforts to prevent the further recruitment of new radicals? 

Response: 

Clearly, some violent extremists have sought to use unresolved conflicts such as 

the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, among others, to motivate new recruits. Europeans 

share our view that no cause can justify the murder of innocents, no matter what 

pretext the killers claim as their rationalization. 

Question: 

In the past weeks, the Muslim community in Italy has joined others in that country 

in unequivocally condemning the kidnapping of two Italian women who were providing humanitarian aid and relief services in Baghdad. The same solidarity between Muslims and non-Muslims was seen in France following the kidnapping of two 

French journalists in Iraq. Is this evidence that radical Islamists are losing some of 

their influence in the Islamic community in Europe? 

Response: 

Most Muslim communities in Europe have nothing to do with violent extremism 

and the vast majority of European Muslims do not support radical extremist groups. 

We are gratified that more and more Muslim community leaders in Europe—and 

throughout the world—are speaking out against terrorist outrages perpetrated by 

those falsely claiming to represent the world’s Muslims.

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