NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, 

v.

JULIE PEREZ, Appellant. 

No. 1 CA-CR 20-0047 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2018-0145466-002 

The Honorable Julie A. LaFave, Judge Pro Tempore 

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Eric Knobloch

Counsel for Appellee 

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Jesse Finn Turner 

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 5-18-2021
STATE v. PEREZ

Decision of the Court

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Cynthia J. Bailey delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop joined.

B A I L E Y, Judge:

¶1 Julie Perez appeals her convictions and sentences for 

possession of dangerous drugs (methamphetamine) and possession of drug 

paraphernalia. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 While patrolling an area near a casino around 2:00 a.m., 

Scottsdale Police Officer Maki saw a car traveling with only one working 

headlight. Maki followed the car, observed it weaving within its lane, then 

initiated a traffic stop. At the stop, Maki approached the car and spoke with 

its two occupants: Christine Peters, the driver, and Perez, the front-seat 

passenger. Maki acquired their driver’s licenses, along with the car’s 

registration and insurance information. The car was registered to Peters’ 

son. In conducting a record check from his patrol car, Maki learned that 

both Peters and Perez had prior convictions, some of which were for drugrelated offenses.

¶3 Following the record check, Maki asked Peters if he could 

search the car. Peters declined, explaining the car belonged to her son. She

permitted Maki to search her purse, however, and he found no contraband

inside. Meanwhile, Officer English arrived at the scene to conduct a 

driving-under-the-influence (“DUI”) investigation, based on Maki’s 

observations of Peters’ driving behavior and her bloodshot, watery eyes. 

1 Because the superior court’s denials of two suppression motions are the 

only issues raised on appeal, “[w]e restrict our review to consideration of 

the facts the trial court heard at the suppression hearing[s],” State v. 

Blackmore, 186 Ariz. 630, 631 (1996), viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to upholding the court’s suppression orders, State v. Weakland, 246 

Ariz. 67, 69, ¶ 5 (2019). 
STATE v. PEREZ

Decision of the Court

3 

Peters agreed to perform field sobriety tests, and English ultimately 

concluded that Peters was not impaired. 

¶4 Once English had completed the DUI investigation, Maki

informed Peters that the officers had determined she was not impaired but

further told her that he still suspected that “something else is going on here 

tonight.” Maki asked Peters if she was aware of anything in the car that he 

“should be concerned about.” She replied that her son smokes marijuana

and that she was not sure what he kept in the car. Maki soon told Peters he 

believed there might be a pipe or marijuana inside the car, then continued, 

“I’m not going to take you to jail. It’s not worth my time. It’s not worth 

your time. But I do want you to be honest with me about it.” Peters 

responded that there might be a marijuana pipe in the car. 

¶5 After approximately three minutes had passed in this

exchange, Peters invited Maki to search her backpack, retrieved it from the 

car, and handed it to Maki. Maki’s search revealed three pipes commonly 

used to smoke methamphetamine and a scale coated with apparent 

methamphetamine residue. Having discovered the contraband, the officers 

conducted a warrantless search of the car and its contents, including Perez’s 

purse. In Perez’s purse, the officers found methamphetamine and a pipe.

¶6 A grand jury indicted Perez on one count each of possession 

of dangerous drugs (methamphetamine) and possession of drug 

paraphernalia. The grand jurors charged Peters in the same indictment 

with possession of methamphetamine for sale and possession of drug 

paraphernalia.2

¶7 Before trial, codefendant Peters moved to suppress all

evidence seized during the traffic stop, asserting that Maki had improperly 

coerced her consent to search the backpack and that the illegal backpack 

search required suppression of the evidence gathered in the subsequent car 

search as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” In denying Peters’ suppression 

motion, the superior court found that, based on its review of video from 

Maki’s body-worn camera (“BWC”),3 the State had established that Peters

“volunteer[ed]” her backpack through a “validly obtained consent.” 

2 Peters eventually entered a plea agreement with the State resolving the 

charges before trial. 3 The BWC video was the only evidence the superior court considered at 

the hearing. No witnesses testified. 
STATE v. PEREZ

Decision of the Court

4 

¶8 Perez never sought to join her codefendant’s motion, nor did 

she otherwise challenge the constitutionality of the backpack search before 

the superior court. Instead, citing Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 

(2015), Perez separately moved to suppress the drug evidence seized from

the car, arguing Maki impermissibly prolonged the detention. The court 

held an evidentiary hearing on Perez’s motion at which Maki testified, and 

the State introduced into evidence both Maki’s BWC video and a copy of 

his police report.

¶9 At the suppression hearing, Maki explained why he 

suspected Peters and Perez were engaging in criminal activity. Maki 

testified that the first “red flag” he noticed was the area in which they were

traveling:

I’ve dealt with individuals coming from and going to the 

[casino], which is east of that location. . . . There’s a high, high 

concentrated drug area where there’s a lot of drug 

transactions, a lot of drug dealers, as well as drug users who 

will frequently go to the casino to either pick up or to sell 

different types of various drugs.

¶10 Another factor drawing Maki’s suspicion was “the criminal 

history for both subjects, [because] both indicated drug[-]related history.” 

He also observed that their behavior was “odd” and “very nervous.” Maki 

additionally cited the “time of night, being that it was roughly 2:00 in the 

morning. There’s very few cars on the road, this is a time of night that we 

also experience a lot of other criminal activities.” Maki further noted “the 

fact that . . . [they had] driven past other gambling facilities to go to this 

facility . . . [when] they lived on the other side of the valley.” 

¶11 Finally, Maki described that “their relationship was kind of 

unclear of how they actually know each other . . . [and] was a little odd.” 

Maki explained that such a relationship suggested drug-related activity

because in his “prior contact with individuals that might be in the area 

either to commit various criminal related activities or . . . partake in drug 

use together, they don’t necessarily know each other that well . . . they know 

very little about each other.” 

¶12 The superior court found Maki’s testimony credible and 

denied Perez’s motion. In so doing, the court concluded that extending the 

detention was reasonable because Maki “has the criminal history, he has 

the information, and he starts asking questions that go hand in hand with 
STATE v. PEREZ

Decision of the Court

5 

the reasons he articulated to continue the stop.” The court further 

explained its decision as follows: 

The initial reasons, headlight, I think that’s a decision that he 

could have made. And before he testified that’s why I said, 

don’t tell me he was just waiting around to decide whether or 

not to do the headlight and, in the interim, do all these things. 

Well, it turns out he didn’t. That’s a decision he hadn’t made 

yet. But, in the interim, he allocated all of those other bases to 

believe there’s something afoot here, given the location, the 

criminal activities, experience in the past, combined with the 

criminal history and what he gains from the driver, Ms. 

Peters. 

¶13 A jury found Perez guilty as charged. The superior court 

sentenced Perez as a category-three repetitive offender to concurrent terms 

of imprisonment for each conviction, the length of which was six years. We 

have jurisdiction over Perez’s timely appeal pursuant to Article 6, Section 

9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) §§ 

12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶14 On appeal, Perez challenges the superior court’s denials of the 

two suppression motions. Supra ¶¶ 7-8. The Fourth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution protects individuals against unreasonable 

searches and seizures, and evidence seized in violation of its protection is 

generally excluded from a criminal trial.4 State v. Peoples, 240 Ariz. 244, 247, 

¶¶ 8-9 (2016). “We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s factual 

findings on [a] motion to suppress, but review de novo the trial court’s 

ultimate legal determination that the search complied with the Fourth 

Amendment.” State v. Gilstrap, 235 Ariz. 296, 297, ¶ 6 (2014). 

4 Because Perez neither cites the Arizona Constitution nor presents separate 

argument based on it, we analyze the issue only under the federal 

constitution. State v. Dean, 206 Ariz. 158, 161, ¶ 8 n.1 (2003); see State v. 

Juarez, 203 Ariz. 441, 444, ¶ 14 (App. 2002) (“[E]xcept in cases involving 

‘unlawful’ warrantless home entries, Arizona courts have not yet applied 

Article 2, Section 8 to grant broader protections against search and seizure 

than those available under the federal constitution.”); see also State v. 

Sanchez, 200 Ariz. 163, 166, ¶ 8 (App. 2001) (waiving issue because 

defendant failed to develop argument on appeal). 
STATE v. PEREZ

Decision of the Court

6 

I. Perez lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the 

backpack search. 

¶15 For the first time on appeal, Perez argues that Peters’ consent 

to search the backpack was involuntary, thereby invalidating the 

subsequent car search and rendering inadmissible the evidence seized. 

Because Perez did not raise this issue before the superior court, we apply 

fundamental-error review. See State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 398, ¶ 34 (2006) 

(reviewing for fundamental error a suppression argument first raised on 

appeal); see also State v. Marahrens, 114 Ariz. 304, 305-06 (1977) (waiving 

suppression issue when defendant neither joined codefendant’s motion nor 

raised the issue at trial). To show fundamental error, a defendant carries 

the burden to demonstrate (1) the superior court committed error, (2) the 

error was fundamental under the circumstances of the case, and (3) 

resulting prejudice. State v. Escalante, 245 Ariz. 135, 142, ¶ 21 (2018). 

¶16 “Fourth Amendment rights . . . may not be vicariously 

asserted.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978) (quotation omitted). 

Consequently, “[i]t has long been the rule that a defendant can urge the 

suppression of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment 

only if that defendant demonstrates that his Fourth Amendment rights were 

violated by the challenged search or seizure.” United States v. Padilla, 508 

U.S. 77, 81 (1993). 

¶17 Although “[o]ur courts have sometimes referred to this 

requirement as ‘standing’ for the sake of brevity,” the inquiry turns on 

“whether a defendant possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy 

applying Fourth Amendment principles rather than traditional standing 

principles.” Peoples, 240 Ariz. at 247, ¶ 8 (citations omitted). “To have a 

legitimate expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment, a 

person must show both ‘an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy’ and 

that the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as 

‘justifiable’ under the circumstances.” State v. Allen, 216 Ariz. 320, 323, ¶ 13 

(App. 2007) (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)). 

¶18 Applying these principles here, Perez does not argue, much 

less demonstrate, that she maintained any expectation of privacy in Peters’ 

backpack. To the contrary, the uncontested evidence shows that the 

backpack belonged exclusively to Peters and that Perez never asserted a 

privacy or property interest in it. See State v. Tarkington, 218 Ariz. 369, 370, 

¶ 7 (App. 2008) (“In order to challenge a search, a person must first show 

he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched.”). 

Accordingly, Perez has not met her burden to establish standing to 
STATE v. PEREZ

Decision of the Court

7 

challenge the backpack search as unconstitutional. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134 

(“A person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through 

the introduction of damaging evidence secured by the search of a third 

person’s premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment 

rights infringed.”). 

¶19 Nevertheless, for the first time in her reply brief, Perez5 cites 

United States v. Perez, 689 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1982), to argue she “should be 

able to challenge misconduct which directly led to the search” because her

purse was in the car and searched. Her reliance on Perez is misplaced. In 

Perez, several codefendants had hired “a man named Sanchez”6 to transport 

heroin for them, using his truck. Id. at 1337. The codefendants hid four 

pounds of heroin in the truck’s gas tank, and one defendant traveled as a 

passenger in Sanchez’s truck while the other codefendants followed closely 

in another vehicle to conduct surveillance. Id. Customs officers asked 

Sanchez if they could search his truck, and Sanchez consented to a search 

of the truck. Id. A narcotics dog alerted to the gas tank, and officers found 

four pounds of heroin in the subsequent search. Id.

¶20 The Ninth Circuit held that the codefendants had a legitimate 

expectation of privacy in Sanchez’s truck because (1) the codefendants had 

made a “formalized arrangement” with Sanchez to transport the heroin and 

(2) the codefendants “kept the truck under close surveillance” for 

approximately 160 miles to ensure “no one interfered with the carrying out 

of their plan and the delivery of their property.” Id. at 1338. Perez thus 

supports the proposition that a defendant “may have a legitimate 

expectation of privacy in a place or object he does not own” only if the

defendant first shows a formal arrangement indicating joint control and 

supervision over the place searched or item seized. Id.; see, e.g., United States 

v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 671 (9th Cir. 1991). 

¶21 Unlike in Perez, no evidence in this case indicates, nor does

Appellant assert, that the codefendants had entered a formal arrangement 

of joint control and supervision related to Peters’ backpack. And Appellant 

points to no evidence that she “took reasonable precautions to maintain [a] 

privacy interest” in the backpack, as the defendants in Perez did. Perez, 689 

5 We refer to Perez as Appellant in ¶¶ 19-21 to avoid confusion with the 

defendant of the same surname in the Ninth Circuit case.

 

6 The opinion does not provide Sanchez’s full name, also stating that he died 

before trial. 
STATE v. PEREZ

Decision of the Court

8 

F.2d at 1338. Therefore, Appellant’s argument based on Perez is without 

merit. 

¶22 Moreover, even if we were to conclude that Perez has the 

requisite standing, other circumstances support the superior court’s finding

that Peters’ consent was voluntary. See State v. Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. 299, 

301-03, ¶¶ 1, 11 (2016) (explaining that “[a]lthough the Fourth Amendment 

generally prohibits warrantless searches, they are permitted if there is free 

and voluntary consent to search,” which “[t]he [S]tate must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence”). Voluntariness is a factual question 

determined from the totality of circumstances involved. State v. Butler, 232 

Ariz. 84, 88, ¶ 19 (2013); see also Valenzuela, 239 Ariz. at 302, ¶ 11. 

¶23 Consistent with the superior court’s ruling, the BWC video 

shows Peters expressly offered her backpack to Maki, and did so absent any 

question, instruction, or prompt from the officer. See State v. Sweeney, 224 

Ariz. 107, 111, ¶ 12 (App. 2010) (explaining appellate court may 

independently review video evidence). That she immediately retrieved the 

backpack from the car and handed it to Maki further bolsters the superior 

court’s conclusion. See, e.g., State v. Hernandez, 244 Ariz. 1, 5, ¶ 17 (2018) 

(noting conduct may communicate consent). That Peters granted consent 

for the backpack search while steadfastly refusing to permit the car search

also supports the court’s conclusion. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 

218, 227 (1973) (considering the knowledge of the right to refuse consent as 

one factor in determining voluntariness). 

¶24 Furthermore, Peters never withdrew or limited her consent. 

See State v. Becerra, 239 Ariz. 90, 92, ¶ 9 (App. 2016) (“Even after a person 

initially consents to a search, she nevertheless remains free to withdraw or 

narrow the scope” of consent). She was not handcuffed, nor had the officers 

drawn their weapons. See State v. Laughter, 128 Ariz. 264, 266-67 (App. 

1980). And there is no evidence showing the officers used threats or force 

to gain her consent. Id. at 266. 

¶25 Perez counters that Maki coerced Peters’ consent by telling

her he would not take her to jail, asserting the comment constituted an 

impermissible promise of leniency. But Maki’s comment was made while 

the two discussed whether the car contained her son’s marijuana or his 

pipe. Perez thus fails to show that Maki’s statement improperly induced 

Peters’ consent, given that Maki never mentioned the backpack and learned 

of its existence only when Peters disclosed it. 
STATE v. PEREZ

Decision of the Court

9 

¶26 To the extent the isolated comment suggests possible 

coercion, it did not alone compel the superior court to conclude that Peters’

will had been overcome, given the context and the totality of the 

circumstances. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225-26 (describing the test for 

voluntariness as whether “defendant’s will was overborne”). Therefore, 

assuming arguendo Perez has standing to assert her challenge, the superior 

court did not err in denying Peters’ suppression motion. 

II. Maki had developed reasonable suspicion to justify extending the

detention. 

¶27 Perez next argues the superior court erred in denying her 

suppression motion. Specifically, she asserts that “everything after Officer 

English completed his investigation was an illegal detention under 

Rodriguez” because the State failed to establish additional reasonable 

suspicion. We note that she does not challenge the propriety of the initial 

traffic stop, nor does she contend the delay from the DUI investigation was 

unconstitutional. Furthermore, she concedes “the car was searched via a 

proper application of the automobile exception and incident to arrest.”

¶28 “[T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop 

context is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic 

violation that warranted the stop,” and “[a]uthority for the seizure thus 

ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should 

have been—completed.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). 

At that point, “the driver must be permitted to proceed on his way without 

further delay or questioning” unless: (1) the encounter becomes consensual, 

or (2) during the encounter, the officer develops “a reasonable and 

articulable suspicion that the driver is engaged in illegal activity.” State v. 

Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 23, ¶ 22 (App. 2007). If the police unjustifiably prolong 

a detention, even if the intrusion is de minimis, the seizure violates the 

Fourth Amendment. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354-56. 

¶29 Reasonable suspicion requires “some minimal, objective 

justification for an investigatory detention,” a standard that is “something 

short of probable cause” but more than a mere hunch. Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 

23-24, ¶ 25 (quotations omitted). In assessing whether reasonable suspicion 

exists, courts examine all relevant factors collectively, even when each in 

isolation may have an innocent explanation. Id. A trained and experienced 

officer may be “able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct 

which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer.” Brown v. 

Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (1979); see Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 24, ¶ 26 (deferring to 

an officer’s ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions).
STATE v. PEREZ

Decision of the Court

10 

“[A] suspect’s criminal history is part of the ‘totality of the circumstances’ 

that informs an officer’s reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” State v. 

Woods, 236 Ariz. 527, 530, ¶ 12 (App. 2015).

¶30 As a threshold matter, we find unpersuasive the State’s 

contention that “this case is not a Rodriguez extension” because, when Peters 

consented to the backpack search, Maki had not yet decided whether to 

issue a warning for the headlight violation. The record shows the officers 

had detained the codefendants for approximately twenty-two minutes

before Peters granted consent. In that amount of time, Maki reasonably 

should have decided whether to issue a warning for such a traffic violation. 

See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354. Because the State does not argue the 

encounter became consensual, and Maki extended the detention to question

Peters on matters unrelated to the traffic violation, we must determine 

whether he had reasonable suspicion to do so. 

¶31 Here, Maki articulated several objective reasons for 

suspecting that Peters and Perez may have been involved in transporting 

illegal drugs: (1) they had recently visited a casino located in a high-drugcrime area at a time when such criminal activity is prevalent; (2) they had 

traveled a significant distance from where they lived, passing other casinos 

on their way; (3) their criminal histories, which included drug-related 

crimes; (4) their nervous behavior; and (5) their unclear relationship, which, 

by Maki’s account, resembled a trait he had observed among groups of 

drug users in the area. 

¶32 Although each reason alone may have an innocent 

explanation, we do not “parse out each individual factor, categorize it as 

potentially innocent, and reject it.” State v. O’Meara, 198 Ariz. 294, 296, ¶ 10 

(2000). Instead, “[t]here is a gestalt to the totality of the circumstances test.” 

Id. Considered in the aggregate and properly deferring to the officer’s 

training and experience, it was reasonable for Maki to infer from the cited

factors that the codefendants were involved in criminal activity.

¶33 Perez nonetheless relies on Sweeney to argue that Maki failed

to demonstrate reasonable suspicion because the “factors [he identified] 

would not serve to eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers.” 

We find Sweeney to be distinguishable. In Sweeney, at a traffic stop, an 

officer initially gave the defendant a warning, informed him he was free to 

go, and “wished him a safe trip” before engaging him in further, consensual

conversation. 224 Ariz. at 109, 113, ¶¶ 3-5. The officer soon requested 

consent to search the car and to conduct a dog sniff. Id. at 109-10, ¶ 5. The 

defendant declined both requests and attempted to leave. Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. At 
STATE v. PEREZ

Decision of the Court

11 

that point, the officer grabbed the defendant, detained him, and ordered 

him to stand in front of the patrol car until another officer arrived. Id. at 

110, ¶ 6. The police eventually searched the vehicle and discovered cocaine.

Id. 

¶34 On appeal, this court concluded that the second seizure was 

unlawful because it was ultimately triggered by the defendant’s refusal to 

consent, reasoning “the invocation of one’s constitutional rights cannot 

constitute a circumstance that gives rise to reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 115, 

¶ 32. The record does not reflect, and Perez does not assert, that such 

circumstances are present here. Accordingly, because Maki had developed

reasonable independent suspicion that the codefendants were committing 

drug-related crimes, we detect no error in the superior court’s ruling. 

CONCLUSION

¶35 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the superior court’s 

denials of the suppression motions and Perez’s convictions and sentences.