PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

J. RONNIE JACKSON,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

No. 96-1273

CHARLES H. LONG, Individually, and

in his official capacity as Sheriff of

Buncombe County,

Defendant-Appellant.

TERESA A. PENLAND,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

No. 96-1274

CHARLES H. LONG, Individually, and

in his official capacity as Sheriff of

Buncombe County,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville.

Lacy H. Thornburg, District Judge.

(CA-94-137-T, CA-94-119-T)

Argued: September 25, 1996

Decided: December 17, 1996

Before RUSSELL, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote

the opinion, in which Judge Russell concurred. Judge Motz concurred

in the judgment only.
COUNSEL

ARGUED: William Alfred Blancato, BENNETT & BLANCATO,

L.L.P., Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sean Patrick

Devereux, WHALEN, HAY, PITTS, HUGENSCHMIDT, MASTER

& DEVEREUX, P.A., Asheville, North Carolina; C. Frank Goldsmith, Jr., GOLDSMITH, GOLDSMITH & DEWS, Marion, North

Carolina, for Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

When Buncombe County (North Carolina) Sheriff Charles H. Long

received a complaint from a female inmate in the Buncombe County

Detention Center that she had been raped by a jailer, Sheriff Long

conducted a brief investigation and then referred the matter to the

North Carolina Bureau of Investigation for a criminal investigation.

While the criminal investigation was continuing, Sheriff Long dismissed both the accused jailer and the matron on duty on the floor

where the incident allegedly occurred. He also issued a press release

announcing his action, and in further public comments, he stated that

if the dismissed jailers were cleared, they could reapply for their jobs.

Criminal charges filed against the jailer accused of the rape were ultimately dropped, and the matron on duty was never criminally

charged. Both, however, appeared to have been violating detention

center policy at the time of the alleged incident.

Both dismissed employees filed actions against Sheriff Long under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they were deprived of their property

interests in their employment and their liberty interests in their reputations without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment. They also alleged state law claims. Sheriff Long filed a

motion for summary judgment in which he asserted, among other

things, qualified immunity and immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The district court denied the motion and this interlocutory

appeal followed.

 2
Because we find that Sheriff Long's conduct was shielded by qualified immunity and that the dismissed employees failed to assert a sufficient claim against him in his official capacity, we reverse and

remand these actions to the district court with instructions to dismiss

the § 1983 claims filed against Sheriff Long.

I

When inmate Sharon Brock returned to the Buncombe County

Detention Center from work release on the evening of July 16, 1993,

she complained to the matron on duty that on the previous evening

she had been raped in her cell by Ronnie Jackson, the supervising

jailer on duty at the time of the alleged assault. Inmate Brock showed

the matron bruises on her pelvic region and scrapes on her chest and

labia which she claimed were produced during the attack. The matron

contacted her supervisor, and the Sheriff's Department immediately

began an investigation. When Sheriff Long learned of the allegations

the next morning, he suspended Jackson and another jailer, Teresa

Penland, with pay, pending the results of the investigation. Penland

was the matron on duty on the floor at the time of the alleged assault.

Jackson denied any sexual contact with inmate Brock, and Penland

denied any knowledge of an assault, but both cooperated with the

Sheriff's investigation, giving accounts of their interactions with

Brock on the day in question. While some details of their stories differed, both stated that Brock was upset and periodically tearful on

July 15, spending varying periods out of her cell on the telephone trying to arrange transportation for her work release the following day.

Both also acknowledged that Jackson had brought inmate Brock some

food and that another male jailer, Kelce Lytle, had accompanied Jackson to Brock's floor on that same day. Jackson and Lytle both

reported that Penland had escorted Lytle to see some inmates, leaving

Jackson unaccompanied on the women's floor for some period of

time, in violation of detention center policy.

Several days after commencement of the departmental investigation, Sheriff Long requested that the North Carolina State Bureau of

Investigation ("SBI") undertake an independent investigation into

potential criminal violations. When the SBI began its investigation,

the Sheriff's Department ceased its own. Although no one in the Sher-

 3
iff's Department participated in the SBI investigation, the SBI briefed

Sheriff Long on its progress. After Sheriff Long learned that Jackson

had failed a polygraph test when asked if he had ever had sexual contact with Brock and that Brock's own polygraph had been negative,

but inconclusive, he terminated the employment of both Jackson and

Penland on August 5, 1993. He refused to give any reason for the terminations, stating that these jailers served at his pleasure and it was

his pleasure to terminate them.

Upon dismissing Jackson and Penland, Sheriff Long issued a press

release as follows:

 As a result of an internal investigation by the Buncombe

County Sheriff's Department, two detention officers have

been dismissed from employment at the Buncombe County

Detention Center.

 The investigation was ordered by Sheriff Charles H. Long

after allegations were made of an alleged assault on an

inmate in the custody of the Buncombe County Jail.

 Sheriff Long has requested that the State Bureau of Investigation conduct an independent investigation into any possibl[e] criminal violation arising from this incident.

 Further information regarding this matter will not be

released at this time, pending investigation.

Long also made some public statements about the matter during the

next several days. He told The Asheville Citizen-Times that the jailers

were fired for violation of an unspecified departmental policy. The

article also attributed to Long the following statements:

 I did what was best for the department . . . . Any conduct

over there (jail) will not be tolerated if it will put me or the

county in peril.

Television station WLOS attributed the following to Sheriff Long:

 4
 Any time we have an assault, or anything that might be

of an unlawful nature it's a matter of concern . . . we have

a high liability in the detention center and we have a lot of

worry . . . we don't like for these things to happen.

WLOS reported Sheriff Long to have said that the jailers could reapply for their jobs if they were cleared of any wrongdoing.

News reports contained information from other sources, including

the plaintiffs themselves, revealing their names and the fact that the

nature of the assault was sexual. Jackson himself apparently informed

reporters that he had failed a polygraph test.

Almost two weeks after being fired, Penland sent a letter to Sheriff

Long requesting a "civilian board hearing." In her letter, postmarked

August 18, 1993, Penland alleged that her August 5 termination was

motivated by personal and not "occupational" reasons. Counsel for

Sheriff Long informed Penland that she was not entitled to any appeal

because she had missed the five-day deadline for disciplinary appeals

prescribed by departmental Policies and Procedures. Moreover, counsel advised Penland that there was no provision for appeal of a Sheriff's decision to terminate employment. He informed Penland,

nevertheless, that her dismissal would be automatically reviewed by

the "Sheriff's Review Board" at its next regular meeting. Jackson

never requested a hearing of any kind because, as he explained, Penland had advised him of the letter she had received in response to her

request for a hearing.

In May 1994, Jackson was indicted for second degree rape and sexual activity by a custodian. In the course of pursuing his criminal

defense, Jackson obtained numerous psychiatric records of inmate

Brock, revealing a history of mental illness. The records disclosed

that Brock had previously made unsubstantiated accusations of sexual

abuse against a variety of relatives, guardians, and acquaintances,

although her father did plead no contest to charges of sexual abuse.

After revelation of these documents, state prosecutors dismissed all

criminal charges against Jackson.

Jackson and Penland each filed actions against Sheriff Long, individually and in his official capacity, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

 5
under state law. They alleged that in firing them, Sheriff Long had

deprived them of their property interest in their employment and their

liberty interest in their reputations without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and of a parallel state constitutional provision. They also alleged under state law that Sheriff Long

had defamed them in making his comments to the press. The complaints did not separately allege constitutional tort claims against

Sheriff Long in his official capacity and did not allege that any regulation, policy, or practice of the Sheriff's Office formed a basis for the

conduct they alleged was illegal.

Sheriff Long filed a motion for summary judgment, contending (1)

that the plaintiffs did not have a property interest in their employment,

(2) that the plaintiffs were not deprived of any liberty interest since

all public statements were true and neither plaintiff had ever requested

a name-clearing hearing, (3) that the plaintiffs failed as a matter of

law to state a claim against him in his official capacity, (4) that in his

official capacity he was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity,

and (5) that in his individual capacity he was entitled to qualified

immunity.1

In denying Long's motion in all respects, the district court denied

Long's claims of immunity. It concluded that 1973 North Carolina

Session Law 297 granted Jackson and Penland a property interest in

continued employment; that Sheriff Long's statements to the press

"clearly suggest[ ] that the Plaintiffs were involved in an assault on

an inmate" and therefore they "were falsely stigmatizing"; that the

court had "insufficient information" to determine the Eleventh

Amendment immunity issue or whether the complaint alleged any

custom or policy sufficient to state a claim against Long in his official

capacity; and that the constitutional rights that Long allegedly violated were clearly established, but that factual issues existed "as to the

Defendant's actual conduct, and as to the reasonableness of this conduct." The court's opinion did not identify those factual issues.

_________________________________________________________________

1 Sheriff Long also moved for summary judgment on the state law

claims which are not before us.

 6
II

As a threshold matter, we must address Jackson's and Penland's

contention that we are without jurisdiction to decide these interlocutory appeals. Although interlocutory rulings on qualified immunity

are ordinarily immediately appealable as collateral orders, see

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525 (1985), Jackson and Penland

argue that in this case the district court concluded that disputed issues

of fact preclude determination of the qualified immunity defense and

that therefore under Johnson v. Jones, 115 S. Ct. 2151 (1995), these

appeals should be dismissed.

In Johnson, the court held that the district court's determination of

whether a fact was disputed for purposes of summary judgment was

not appealable. The district court had found that the plaintiff's excessive force claim was clearly established and that the plaintiff's facts,

if proven, would support a finding that the defendants violated the

plaintiff's constitutional rights. It concluded, however, that those facts

were in dispute. On appeal the defendants argued that the record contained "not a scintilla of evidence" consistent with the plaintiff's

claims. The Seventh Circuit, noting that the issue on appeal was

whether the district court was correct in finding a factual dispute,

declined to review the district court's order denying summary judgment. Affirming the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court observed

that appellate courts, which are not as well equipped as district courts

to review the issue of whether factual disputes exist, should not

review interlocutory district court orders making that finding. The

Court accordingly held that orders determining "whether or not the

pretrial record sets forth a `genuine' issue of fact for trial" are not

appealable. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. at 2159.

The Johnson principle is limited to the circumstance where the dispute on appeal is whether a factual dispute was created. If, however,

resolution of the factual dispute is immaterial to whether immunity

should be afforded, the underlying legal question about whether

immunity is to be afforded remains and may be appealed under

Mitchell as a collateral order. See 472 U.S. at 530; see also Behrens

v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 842 (1996) ("Denial of summary judgment often includes a determination that there are controverted issues

of material fact . . . and Johnson surely does not mean that every such

 7
denial of summary judgment is nonappealable"). As the Court in

Behrens explained, orders denying summary judgment are still

appealable under Mitchell "when they resolve a dispute concerning an

`abstract issu[e] of law' relating to qualified immunity . . . typically,

the issue whether the federal right allegedly infringed was `clearly

established.'" Id. (citations omitted; alterations in original).

In the case before us, the district court was troubled by whether

Jackson and Penland actually participated in the conduct for which

the announced investigation placed them under suspicion. It concluded that factual questions existed about whether the assault

occurred and whether, when charges were dropped, the plaintiffs were

stigmatized. While these may be disputed factual questions, they are

not material to the abstract question of Sheriff Long's immunity,

which depends on whether Sheriff Long violated clearly established

constitutional rights and whether he reasonably should have so

known. The facts which are relevant for determining whether Sheriff

Long has immunity must be taken from the viewpoint of Sheriff Long

at the time he terminated the jailers and not of an independent factfinder looking later in hindsight at whether the assault actually

occurred or whether Sheriff Long proved to be right in his decisions.

No factual question was raised about whether Sheriff Long reasonably believed that sufficient facts existed to initiate an investigation

or that he could, as a matter of state law, dismiss Jackson and Penland

as at-will employees.

Since the facts relevant to the nature of the complaint presented to

Sheriff Long and his response are not in dispute, we are left with the

legal questions of whether Sheriff Long's response violated clearly

established constitutional rights and, if so, whether Sheriff Long reasonably should have known that it did. This posture of undisputed

facts about Sheriff Long's belief is precisely that which enables us to

resolve immunity, as we should, before trial "at the earliest possible

stage of a litigation." See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646

n.6 (1987). This is important because qualified immunity is "an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation."

Behrens, 116 S. Ct. at 838 (quoting Mitchell , 472 U.S. at 526).

While Sheriff Long's challenge to the district court's interlocutory

ruling denying him Eleventh Amendment immunity on the alleged

 8
claim that he is liable in his official capacity would also be appealable

at this time, see Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf &

Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993), we do not reach the Eleventh

Amendment immunity because, as we explain below, no claims are

alleged against Sheriff Long in his official capacity.

III

On his appeal, Sheriff Long contends that he is entitled to qualified

immunity for the § 1983 claims that seek damages from him in his

individual capacity. This contention raises the legal questions of

whether Sheriff Long violated any clearly established constitutional

rights of plaintiffs in responding to the inmate's complaint against

them and, if the law clearly established those rights, whether a reasonable official in Sheriff Long's position would have known of those

rights. Because these are questions of law, we review them de novo.

See Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 313 (4th Cir. 1992).

Defining qualified immunity for public officials, the Supreme

Court has stated that "government officials performing discretionary

functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). "To determine whether a federal right was clearly established at the time of the

defendants' alleged conduct, we focus `not upon the right at its most

general or abstract level, but at the level of its application to the specific conduct being challenged.'" Zepp v. Rehrmann, 79 F.3d 381, 385

(4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Pritchett, 973 F.2d at 312).

Accordingly, to determine whether Sheriff Long should have

known that he was violating Jackson and Penland's constitutional

rights, we consider first whether those rights clearly existed and, if so,

then whether a reasonable officer in Long's position would have

appreciated he was violating those rights. Pritchett, 973 F.2d at 312.

Obviously, if no constitutional right existed, the inquiry ends, as Sheriff Long could not have known of a right that did not exist.

A

In this case, the dismissed jailers contend that in firing them without a hearing, Sheriff Long deprived them of a constitutionally pro-

 9
tected property right in their public employment as jailers. While

Sheriff Long does not contend that he in fact provided the jailers a

hearing, he claims that the jailers were at-will employees who served

at his pleasure and therefore cannot claim a property interest in their

employment. Resolution of that dispute is determined by reference to

state law. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344-45 (1976).

Under North Carolina law, employment is generally presumed to

be "at-will" in the absence of a contract establishing a definite

employment duration or a statute or ordinance restricting an employee's discharge. See Pittman v. Wilson County, 839 F.2d 225, 227 (4th

Cir. 1988). Rather than restricting the discharge of sheriff's employees, including jailers, North Carolina law explicitly grants sheriffs

exclusive power over employment decisions. See N.C. Gen. Stat.

§§ 153A-103 ("Each sheriff . . . elected by the people has the exclusive right to hire, discharge, and supervise the employees in his

office"). And North Carolina courts have interpreted this statute to

deny sheriffs' employees any property right in their employment. See

Peele v. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co., 368 S.E.2d 892, 894-95 (N.C.

App.), appeal dismissed, 323 N.C. 366, 373 S.E.2d 547 (1988).

Accord, Hughes v. Bedsole, 913 F. Supp. 420, 426 (E.D.N.C. 1994),

aff'd, 48 F.3d 1376 (4th Cir.), cert. denied , 116 S. Ct. 190 (1995).

Jackson and Penland, however, base their property right claim on

two specific sources of law: (1) 1973 North Carolina Session Law

number 297, applicable solely to the Buncombe County Sheriff's

Department, and (2) Policy 15 of the Buncombe County Sheriff's

Department Policies and Procedures.

The 1973 Session Law, which has never been codified, 2 establishes

_________________________________________________________________

2 The relevant portions of 1973 Session Law 297 provide:

 Section 3. Duties of Personnel Advisory Board. The duties

of the Personnel Board shall be as follows:

(1) to represent the public interest in the improvement of

personnel administration;

(2) to advise the Sheriff of Buncombe County concerning

personnel administration, including minimum standards of

 10
a three-member Personnel Advisory Board for the Sheriff's Department of Buncombe County, which is authorized to advise the Sheriff

on various personnel matters and "to hear appeals, receive evidence,

determine facts and make recommendations to the Sheriff in case of

employee appeals of suspension, demotion and dismissal." 1973 N.C.

Sess. 297, § 3(5) (emphasis added). Under§ 4 entitled "General Principles," the law states that "[a]ll appointments and promotions shall

be made solely on the basis of merit and fitness," id. at § 4(1), and

that "any employee who contends that he was demoted, suspended or

dismissed because of bias, political affiliation, or for reasons not

related to merit, fitness or availability of positions, shall have the right

to appeal to the Personnel Advisory Board," id. at § 4(3), but that ten-

_________________________________________________________________

employment established by the Criminal Justice and Training and Standards Council, and the methods used to publish

vacancies;

(3) to make any investigation which it may consider desirable concerning the administration of personnel in the

Department;

(4) to advise the Sheriff on such personnel rules as he shall

establish; and

(5) to hear appeals, receive evidence, determine facts and

make recommendations to the Sheriff in case of employee

appeals of suspension, demotion and dismissal.

 Section 4. General Principles.

(1) All appointments and promotions shall be made solely

on the basis of merit and fitness and all residents of Buncombe County shall be given equal opportunity for employment without regard to race, religion, color, creed and

national origin.

(2) Tenure of employees covered by this act shall be subject to good behavior, satisfactory work performance, necessity for performance of work, and the availability of funds.

(3) Any employee who contends that he was demoted, suspended or dismissed because of bias, political affiliation, or

for reasons not related to merit, fitness or availability of

positions, shall have the right to appeal to the Personnel

Advisory Board.

 11
ure of employees would remain "subject to good behavior, satisfactory work performance, necessity for performance of work, and the

availability of funds," id. at § 4(2).

Penland and Jackson contend that these provisions of the Session

Law should be interpreted to provide that they could be dismissed

only for cause. We do not believe, however, that the plain meaning

of the law's language supports that contention. Under a straightforward reading of the law, the Personnel Advisory Board in Buncombe

County is given the duty to investigate personnel matters in order "to

advise" the Sheriff on personnel policies and rules, and to hear

appeals from employee suspensions, demotions, and dismissals in

order to "make recommendations" to the Sheriff in respect to those

appeals. In short, as its name suggests, the Board's function is advisory.

While the law also includes "general principles," these relate to

how the Board must carry out its duties. We can find no provision that

confers on Sheriff's Department employees a substantive property

right in their employment. Indeed, while the law appears to give some

procedural rights (rights that the employees in this case did not elect

to use), the Board is given no right in the end to direct the Sheriff to

do anything. And procedural rights in themselves do not create substantive property rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985)

("`Property' cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its

deprivation any more than can life or liberty"); Olim v. Wakinekona,

461 U.S. 238, 250-51 (1982) (holding that the state may require procedures for reasons other than protection of substantive rights, but in

so doing does not create independent substantive right); see also

Beckham v. Harris, 756 F.2d 1032, 1037 n.8 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,

474 U.S. 903 (1985) (considering evidence that disciplinary guidelines in department personnel manual created an expectation that

employee could be fired only for violation of specified conduct insufficient to establish a property interest in continued employment).

Buncombe County Sheriff's Department Policy 15 likewise is procedural, providing Jackson and Penland with no substantive right to

retain their employment. The Policy provides procedures for "disciplinary action" and states, "The Sheriff may dismiss an employee for

 12
disciplinary violations at his discretion." An appeal of disciplinary

action may be taken to a "Sheriff's Advisory Board" if taken within

five working days of the action, and the Board then conducts a hearing, after which it must make a written recommendation to the Sheriff. The recommendation may suggest greater or lesser disciplinary

action, but the Sheriff is not bound by the recommendation. The policy provides, rather, that the Sheriff "may consider the report in making his final determination as to the action to be taken. In all cases,

the Sheriff's decision shall be final."

Thus, we conclude that Jackson and Penland have no property right

in continued employment, nor are they given substantive rights by the

procedural protections afforded -- procedures which Jackson and

Penland failed timely to use. See Loudermill, supra; Olim, supra;

Garraghty v. Virginia Dep't of Corrections, 52 F.3d 1274, 1285 (4th

Cir. 1995) (noting that state procedural requirements do not create a

property interest in those procedures).

B

Jackson and Penland also contend that Sheriff Long deprived them

of their liberty interest in their reputations without due process of law

in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. This claim is based on

Sheriff Long's public statements about his actions in terminating the

jailers and referring their conduct to the SBI for investigation. Jackson and Penland argue that even though Sheriff Long's statements

may have been literally true, the statements suggest to the public that

the two jailers were criminally responsible. Jackson and Penland also

contend that the Constitution requires that they be provided with a

due process "name-clearing" hearing.

Sheriff Long maintains that his statements about Jackson and Penland were entirely true. He observes that both Jackson and Penland

were subject to a departmental investigation for violations of departmental policy, both had been dismissed for violation of that policy,

both had been referred to the SBI for further investigation into possible violations of criminal law, and both could reapply for their jobs

if cleared. He maintains that his public announcements and comments

stated no more. He also noted that neither Jackson nor Penland

demanded any "name-clearing" hearing.

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It is well established that even if statements by public officials may

have been defamatory under state law, that tort alone does not constitute a constitutional deprivation. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226,

233 (1991); Zepp, 79 F.3d at 388. Rather, unjustified state action must

so seriously damage the plaintiff's reputation and standing in his community as to foreclose his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities. See Zepp, id.

In this case, Sheriff Long was confronted with a serious allegation

made against Jackson about his conduct at the detention center. Following an internal investigation, Long learned that Jackson had been

on inmate Brock's floor without escort and that jailer Penland, who

was on duty, failed to enforce a departmental policy that no males be

left alone with female inmates. Whether Sheriff Long's judgment was

right or wrong, he elected to terminate the at-will employment of both

Jackson and Penland and to refer the assault complaint to the SBI to

determine whether any criminal laws had been violated. In connection

with this incident of high public concern, Sheriff Long issued a press

release which accurately reported the complaint and his actions. He

also stated publicly that the employees could seek reemployment if

they were cleared. No one has alleged that Sheriff Long falsely

reported the complaint or his actions.

While there can be no doubt that the announcement of an investigation places suspicion on those persons being investigated, that suspicion is inherent when undertaking any investigation. If Jackson and

Penland suggest, however, that a constitutional deprivation of liberty

results from an employer's public announcement of a criminal investigation into his employees' job performances, they have advanced no

law supporting that suggestion. To impute knowledge to Sheriff Long

of a constitutional transgression, the right would have to be clearly

defined at the time.

C

The responsibility imposed on public officials to comply with constitutional requirements is commensurate with the legal knowledge of

an objectively reasonable official in similar circumstances at the time

of the challenged conduct. It is not measured by the collective hindsight of skilled lawyers and learned judges. And even that focused

 14
hindsight cannot, in this case, justify the conclusion that Sheriff

Long's dismissal of Jackson and Penland and his announcement of a

criminal investigation violated clearly established constitutional

rights. See Zepp, 79 F.3d at 388; Robertson v. Rogers, 679 F.2d 1090,

1092 (4th Cir. 1982). Absent clearly established law that proscribed

Sheriff Long's specific conduct, Sheriff Long should not be subjected

to suit. "Officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are

liable for transgressing bright lines." Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d

295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied , 506 U.S. 1080 (1993).

IV

As to the § 1983 claims purportedly made against Sheriff Long in

his official capacity, Sheriff Long asserts that plaintiffs' complaints

fail to state a claim against him in his official capacity because they

do not allege that a custom or policy was the basis of a violation of

the employees' constitutional rights. Long also asserts that he would

be immune from any such claim under the Eleventh Amendment.

While the captions on the complaints in this case do indicate that

Sheriff Long was sued in both his individual and official capacities,

he correctly observes that the complaints' allegations relate only to

Long's individual conduct. The complaints fail to allege a violation

of a Sheriff's Department regulation, policy, or practice that authorized any constitutionally proscribed action taken against Jackson and

Penland, and therefore the complaints fail to impute liability to the

Sheriff in his official capacity. See Greensboro Professional Fire

Fighters Ass'n, Local 3157 v. City of Greensboro, 64 F.3d 962, 964

(4th Cir. 1995). Indeed, we cannot conceive how, in the context of

this case, Jackson and Penland could have alleged a policy that commanded Sheriff Long's conduct in violation of their constitutional

rights because, as we observed in our discussion of qualified immunity, his conduct violated no established constitutional right.

While we ordinarily would decide an immunity claim before reaching the merits of the underlying claim, cf. DiMeglio v. Haines, 45

F.3d 790, 797 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that court should assess, before

anything else, qualified immunity issue), when the complaint alleges

no claim against which immunity would attach, we need not decide

the immunity issue. Rather, in a rare exercise of pendent appellate

 15
jurisdiction, see Taylor v. Waters, 81 F.3d 429, 437 (4th Cir. 1996);

DiMeglio, 45 F.3d at, 807-08; O'Bar v. Pinion, 953 F.2d 74, 80 (4th

Cir. 1991), we conclude that the district court should have granted

Sheriff Long's motion to dismiss the complaint against him in his

official capacity.

V

In summary, we conclude that Sheriff Long is entitled to qualified

immunity from the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims made against him in his

individual capacity and that the complaint does not adequately allege

a claim against him in his official capacity. Accordingly, we reverse

the district court's rulings on these issues and remand this case to the

district court with instructions to dismiss all federal claims asserted

against Sheriff Long.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

 16