7

Chapter 1

American Revolution

By 1770, American colonists were increasingly dismayed about 

being the subjects of “taxation without representation.” The mixture of 

British soldiers—the enforcers of taxation—and American colonists—the 

enforcees—in close proximity to each other was a brewing powder keg. 

The spark that eventually set off the powder keg five years later actually 

occurred on 5 March 1770, when British soldiers and British Captain 

Thomas Preston rushed to King Street in Boston, Massachusetts, to calm a 

crowd of “motley” and “saucy” boys angry over the treatment of a colonial 

boy by a British soldier. When the British soldiers arrived, they were met 

by the growing crowd led by Crispus Attucks. Attucks was shouting, 

“[t]he way to get rid of these soldiers is to attack the main guard; strike at 

the root; this is the nest.” At some point during the commotion, shots rang 

out and five persons would become martyrs.1 This was the electrifying 

event that started the colonists on the road to independence. A stone placed 

above the site where four of the martyrs were buried read:

Long as in Freedom’s cause the wise contend,

Dear to your country shall your fame extend;

While to the world the lettered stone shall tell

Where Caldwell, Attucks, Gray and Maverick fell.2

Attucks was a fugitive slave who, as described by John Adams, stood 

at the head of a “motley rabble of saucy boys, Negroes and mulattoes, 

Irish Teagues, and outlandish Jack Tars.”3 Attucks had run away from 

his Framingham, Massachusetts, enslavement in 1750, at which time he 

was advertised as “a mulatto fellow, about 27 years of age, . . . 6 feet 2 

inches high, short, cur’l hair . . .”4 Thus, at the Boston Massacre, a full 

five years before the official start of the American War for Independence, 

the individual widely known as among the first to give his life in pursuit 

of American independence was of African descent. With Attucks’ death 

on King Street, two distinct issues had been set into motion. First, the 

revolutionary philosophy of liberty, equality, and fraternity for all—which 

would become a dichotomy of the era—was undeniably opened. Second, 

the question of what to do with the 20 percent of the colonial population 

that was of African descent became paramount. The second issue spawned 

two additional questions. If you allow them to fight, how could you 

consciously deny them their freedom? And, if you reject their combat 
8 

power, could you win the war against the most powerful country on 

the globe? This chapter will examine the first issue very briefly, and the 

second issue at length.

The revolutionary philosophy of liberty, equality, fraternity is most 

often associated with the French Revolution—which began in 1789, 

six years after the American Revolution ended—because European 

philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau, who wrote Social Contract

epitomizing the philosophy of revolution, was a Frenchman. It can be 

argued, however, that since Rousseau wrote of liberty, equality, fraternity 

in 1762, he was equally writing about the inevitable American Revolution 

as much as he was about the anticipated, but distant, French Revolution.5

The facts, therefore, are that a Frenchman coined the philosophy, but the 

American colonists were the first to put it into practice.

Rousseau’s philosophy was based on the premise that people, 

collectively or as individuals, had the right to depose a tyrant and restore 

freedom on themselves.6 When the American colonists adopted this 

philosophy against England, they should not have been surprised when 

their black population did so as well. Both white and black colonists 

were fighting for freedom from England. Colonists of African descent, 

however, took their cause one step further and also fought in hopes of 

obtaining freedom from their American oppressors. White colonists were 

well aware of this and made attempts early in the war to deny blacks the 

opportunity to serve. Why? Perhaps Mrs. Abigail Adams, wife and mother, 

respectively, of two future American presidents, expressed it best in 1774, 

when she wrote to her husband:

It always appeared a most iniquitous scheme to me to fight ourselves for what we are daily robbing and plundering from those 

who have as good a right to freedom as we have.7

In short, the war was beginning on a resounding note of hypocrisy. 

Slaves were to the colonists as the colonists were to the British Crown; 

each group oppressed the other outright. Most sensible colonists could 

not rightly see themselves fighting for freedom against an oppressor 

while at the same time they allowed oppressed subjects under them 

to fight. The gentlemanly chivalry of the era, which was still very 

much alive, would demand that they free all oppressed individuals, 

and their relatives who contributed to the cause. During summer 

1775, the Committee of Safety passed a resolution which stated: 
9

Resolved. That it is the opinion of this committee, that as the 

contest now between Great Britain and the Colonies respects 

the liberties and privileges of the latter, which the Colonies are 

determined to maintain, that the admission of any persons, as 

soldiers, into the army now raising, but such as are freemen, 

will be inconsistent with the principles that are supported, and 

reflect dishonor on this Colony; and that no Slaves be admitted 

into this army on any consideration whatever.8

Before the resolution, however, as will become evident in the following 

pages, Attucks and others at Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill had 

already served and died. Therein, thus, was the dichotomy of the American 

Revolution. The colonists were eventually forced to relook their policy. 

***

On the second issue of what to do with the 20 percent of the colonial 

population that was of African descent, it appears that pure necessity 

dictated that black soldiers, sailors, and marines would have to be used. 

Indeed, from Lexington and Concord to Yorktown, more than 5,000 blacks 

served in the colonial forces, roughly 1,000 others served in the British 

forces, and a few served with the French.9 Additionally, an unspecified 

number, both male and female, served in behind-the-scenes, nonmilitary 

roles.

When Paul Revere and William Dawes made their famous ride on the 

night of 18 April 1775 from Boston to Lexington—also hoping to reach 

Concord—warning the colonists that “the British are coming, the British 

are coming,” among the colonists who answered the call and handed the 

Redcoats their defeat in the initial engagements of the American Revolution 

were black volunteers. Among the recorded names of colonial militia/

minutemen of African descent who fought at Lexington and Concord 

are Peter Salem, Joshua Boylston’s Prince, Pompy, Cato Stedman, Cato 

Bordman, Cato Wood, Cuff Whittemore, Pomp Blackman, and Prince 

Estabrook. Estabrook was listed among the colonial casualties, and Salem 

and Whittemore joined many other blacks in the fight at Bunker Hill two 

months later.10 In fact, Salem is among the most noted, yet controversial, 

figures of Bunker Hill.

There is no doubt that Salem fought heroically during the Battle of 

Bunker Hill. In the heat of the battle as Major John Pitcairn, the British 

commander, mounted a redoubt in front of colonial soldiers, Salem was 
10 

in the forefront of those who faced the British Redcoats as both sides 

fired volleys at near point-blank range. Shortly after Pitcairn mounted the 

redoubt, he yelled, “The day is ours!” and then fell dead from wounds to 

his body. Controversy surrounds who actually fired the shot that killed 

Pitcairn. Several noted historians, to include John Hope Franklin, credit 

Salem with killing the major. Others, such as Benjamin Quarles, question 

who actually fired the bullet. Four things, however, are certain: Pitcairn 

was indeed killed on that day; Salem was in the firing line that fired the 

bullet; several contemporary accounts credit Salem; and most important, 

Pitcairn’s death turned the tide of the battle in favor of the colonists 

because they fought with much more zeal after his death.11 The exact 

number of persons of African descent who fought side by side with their 

white compatriots at the Battle of Bunker Hill will never be known. In 

addition to the ones intermingled throughout the battlefield, such as Salem 

and Whittemore, was Major William Lawrence’s company, “whose rank 

and file were all negroes [of whom] he always spoke with respect.”12

For their contributions in the early months of the war, General John 

Thomas, one of the two colonial brigade commanders in the Boston area, 

said, “we have some Negroes, but I look on them as equally serviceable 

with other men . . . many of them have proved themselves brave.”13

Regardless of the fact that Salem and other persons of African descent 

had proved themselves to be valuable at Lexington, Concord, and Bunker 

Hill, efforts were soon made to discontinue the use of black soldiers. The 

resolution of the Committee of Safety, as depicted on the previous page, is 

evidence of earlier efforts.

In October 1775, General George Washington, following the lead of 

the Committee of Safety but going one step further, and with the majority 

support of the council of war, declared that Negroes, free or slave, “be 

rejected [for military service] altogether.”14 As a result, the colonies 

followed suit, and the ban on Negro soldiers began. It is unclear whether 

Washington or Congress ever officially lifted the ban on Negro enlistment. 

It is crystal clear, however, that the ink on the ban had barely begun to 

dry before it was challenged in November 1775. Officially or not, within 

three years, all colonies, except South Carolina and Georgia, were freely 

enlisting soldiers of African descent, slave or free.15

Washington’s ban was seriously challenged on 7 November 1775. John 

Murray, Earl of Dunmore, commonly referred to as Lord Dunmore, issued 

a proclamation offering freedom to “all indentured servants, Negroes, or 

others,” if they joined “His Majesty’s Troops.”16 This generous offer from 

the British caused Washington, before the year was out, to ask Congress 
11

for permission to begin reenlisting free Negroes.17 Again, the colonies 

followed suit, and by spring 1778, evidence shows that most colonies were 

freely enlisting blacks, and some had been for more than a year, whether 

they were slave or free. In neither case was the shift in policy based on 

benevolence. General Washington shifted his stance in reaction to Lord 

Dunmore’s proclamation, and most colonies had wholly disregarded the 

October 1775 ban due to the necessity for manpower.

By all accounts, Lord Dunmore’s proclamation swayed less than 

800 slaves. The battles, foraging parties, and maritime missions they 

participated in perhaps did little for the British cause. In actuality, it 

probably hurt the British in the long run because Lord Dunmore’s actions 

caused the colonists to meaningfully accept the fact that blacks were going 

to be a factor in the war, whether they served for them or for the British. 

This was best illustrated by Seymour Burr, slave of Aaron Burr’s brother. 

One day Seymour Burr ran away to serve in the British army but was 

captured before he could join. Instead of punishment, Burr was allowed to 

join the Continental Army and promised his freedom after his enlistment 

was up. Burr lived as a free man in Massachusetts after the war.18 Clearly, 

manpower for either side was at a premium.

The early years of the war were difficult for the colonists. Bunker Hill, 

although Pyrrhic, was, nonetheless, a victory for the British. Additionally, 

although the British had been pushed out of Boston, they won a significant 

campaign during the summer 1776, culminating in a victory at the 

Washington Crossing the Delaware. (Prince Whipple and Oliver Cromwell depicted on 

right front.) Paul Girardet, after Emmanuel Leutze. (Print collection, Miriam and Ira D. 

Wallach Division of Arts, Prints, and Photographs. The New York Public Library, Astor, 

Lenox, and Teilden Foundations)
12 

Battle of Long Island in August. The seemingly bright spots in 1776 for 

Washington were his surprise twin victories at Trenton and Princeton, New 

Jersey, during mid-December through January 1777. Incidentally, two of 

the colonial troops who crossed the Delaware River with Washington 

on Christmas Day were black. They were Prince Whipple and Oliver 

Cromwell.19 Prince Whipple was the bodyguard for General William 

Whipple of New Hampshire, Washington’s aide.

As 1776 turned into 1777, continued British pressure and colonial 

failure to capitalize on victories at Trenton and Princeton led to 

increasingly difficult times for the colonists. Although Trenton and 

Princeton were colonial successes, they failed to attract the necessary 

soldiers to fill the ranks. Furthermore, by this time, the British had 

secured greater control of Quebec and much of the upper waterways in 

New York. By the fall, the British had made it as far south as Saratoga. It 

was there that the colonists finally gained much-needed victories at two 

battles—Freeman’s Farm, fought on 19 September, and Bemis Heights, 

fought on 7 October, near Saratoga. The colonial victories at Saratoga are 

rightfully considered turning points in the American Revolution because 

they resulted in swaying the French to enter the fray on the side of the 

colonists. The rigorous training offered by Baron Friedrich Wilhelm von 

Steuben at Valley Forge that winter is also rightfully considered a turning 

point during this dark period of the war. Another significant positive factor 

for the colonists during this period of the war was the increased infusion 

of black soldiers, both slave and free. 

***

Necessity caused every colony, except South Carolina and Georgia, 

to reach out to the last known reservoir of manpower. In May 1777, the 

same month that the British took control of Quebec, Connecticut began its 

campaign for permission to recruit and enlist soldiers of African descent, 

whether they were free or slave. Connecticut’s actions were soon followed 

by Rhode Island and Massachusetts. Connecticut’s General Assembly 

considered the use of “Negro and mulatto slaves” for military service. 

In return, the slaves would be offered their freedom, and their masters 

would receive a paid bounty. Although the General Assembly’s report was 

rejected in the upper house, “hundreds of black slaves and freemen were 

enlisted . . . in the regiments of . . . the Connecticut line.”20

On 2 January 1778, General James M. Varnum, of Rhode Island, 

complained to Washington that due to the small number of soldiers re-
13

maining in Rhode Island’s two battalions, then training at Valley Forge, 

junior field officers requested to make “one temporary battalion from the 

two.” Further, they suggested “that a battalion of Negroes [could] be easily raised there.”21 The following month, the General Assembly of Rhode 

Island authorized the use of “every able-bodied Negro, mulatto, or Indian 

man-slave” for military service. As was stipulated in Connecticut, owners 

of the slaves would be financially compensated, and slaves were to receive 

certificates of emancipation once discharged from the service.22 In April 

1778, Massachusetts followed suit, and all persons of African descent were 

legally authorized to enlist.23 The other eight colonies—New Hampshire, 

New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and 

North Carolina—in varying forms also enlisted black soldiers, despite 

the 1775 congressional ban. In New Hampshire, for example, persons of 

African descent, regardless of their status, were enlisted into service liberally by 1777. New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and North Carolina, 

largely beginning in 1777, regularly enlisted slaves as substitutes for their 

white masters.24 Although states such as Virginia and Delaware, respectively, insisted on either enlisting only free blacks or those with less than 

two years of servitude remaining, most able-bodied men, regardless of 

status, were enlisted after 1778.24 Last, due to a great need for manpower, 

Maryland, a Southern state, began enlisting slaves in 1777.25 In none of the 

above cases were persons of African descent enlisted because of a benevolent spirit within the colonies; the need for manpower drove all decisions. 

The contributions of these enlistees were, in many cases, quite significant. 

The service of persons of African descent in Connecticut offers an excellent depiction of how and why blacks came to be used. 

 ***

Like most states in 1776, Connecticut received a regimental quota 

to fill from the Continental Government. Connecticut was required to fill 

eight regiments. As the war dragged on, Connecticut found that it could not 

maintain its eight regiments without enlisting a portion of its population 

composed of persons of African descent. Free blacks joined for the same 

patriotic and monetary reasons that compelled whites to join. Slaves, on 

the other hand, joined—or more correctly, in most cases, were sent—for 

the promise of their freedom. Some slaves were sent to the Army in lieu 

of their masters. Some masters received a bounty for the service of their 

slaves, while other masters were released from their draft obligation by 

sending slaves in their stead. Regardless of the circumstances surrounding 

the enlistment of a slave, many did earn their freedom. Prince Duplex, 
14 

for example, who was the son of slave parents, enlisted for three years 

in 1777. After his discharge in 1780, he married, bought property, and 

eventually became active in his local community. He later moved to New 

York where he died a free man in 1825. Ironically, some slaves entered 

the Army without the promise of freedom at all. Jeff Sill, the slave of 

New Haven resident Samuel Hemingway, enlisted perhaps just for the 

adventure of being a soldier as opposed to being a slave. Sill understood 

that on completion of his enlistment he was to return to slavery. At the 

end of his first enlistment, Sill actually reenlisted for a second three-year 

obligation.26

In total, more than 289 persons of African descent served in Connecticut 

regiments. They fought mainly as infantry and generally made noteworthy 

contributions to their regiments. Regiments were generally integrated; 

however, in 1781, the Fourth Regiment did raise a “nonwhite” company.27

This company was one of two such companies known to have been 

formed in Connecticut. The other was a large company of 45 men and was 

“all black.”28 Connecticut’s 

blacks fought at Bunker Hill, 

Norwalk, Danbury, New 

London, and Fort Griswald, to 

name a few.29 One of the most 

heroic, yet tragic, accounts of a 

Connecticut black soldier was 

that of Jordan Freeman at the 

Battle of Grotan Heights on 

6 September 1781, near New 

London and Fort Griswald. 

Freeman was a slave and body 

servant of Colonel Williams 

Ledyard, the commander of 

forces at the battle. The British 

outnumbered the colonists 

800 to 150 as they attempted 

to take the port at New 

London. Although the British 

suffered heavy casualties, they 

eventually forced the colonists 

to surrender. As Ledyard was 

surrendering his sword to 

a British officer, the officer 

Marker at Fort Griswold depicting Jordon Freeman ready to spear Major William Montgomery. 

Montgomery led a British attack at this location 

in the Battle of Gronton Heights. (Connecticut 

Historical Commission photo)
15

took the sword, turned it on Ledyard, and stabbed him. During the thick 

of the battle, Freeman and another soldier speared British Major William 

Montgomery as he attempted to scale the walls of the fort. Freeman and 

another slave, Lambert Latham, were both killed during the battle.30

***

Regardless of the circumstances behind the enlistment of persons 

of African descent, the bottom line was that they fought and served 

throughout the American Revolution. There were few battles that did not 

have a black person involved. For example, in spring 1776, Joel Taburn, 

at the age of 15, enlisted in Nash county, North Carolina, where he served 

in at least four different units throughout the war until he was discharged 

in 1783. During his seven-year enlistment, Taburn served at the siege of 

Charlestown, the Battle of Eutaw Springs, and undoubtedly at many other 

engagements.31 In October 1776, at the age of 19, Philip Rodman enlisted 

at South Kingston, Rhode Island. Although Rodman only served for 13 

months, he was at some of the most significant engagements of the war, 

to include the battles of White Plains, Trenton, and Princeton.32 In spring 

1777, William Thomas enlisted at Charles City Court House, Virginia. 

During his first enlistment, Thomas served at the Battle of Monmouth. 

Discharged in February 1779, Thomas reenlisted in 1781 and served at 

the Siege of Yorktown.33 In May 1777, Isaac Perkins enlisted in North 

Carolina and served initially in the Tenth North Carolina Regiment and 

later in the Second North Carolina Regiment. It is unclear what actions 

Perkins served in; however, he was probably at the siege of Charlestown 

when he was taken as a prisoner of war. Perkins subsequently escaped his 

captors and lived to receive a pension from 1818 until his death in 1830.34

One last example shows that a free, 20-year-old “colored man” named 

George Buley enlisted in Prince George’s County, Maryland, in 1781. 

Buley only served for 9 months, but during that time, he participated in 

the Siege of Yorktown and guarded prisoners of war at Fredericksburg, 

Virginia.35 The Revolutionary War pension files have hundreds of records 

confirming the service of persons of African descent. These five selected 

depict the extent of the service rendered by such individuals. It, however, 

does not end there.

Although it is a fact, as stated earlier, that South Carolina and Georgia 

refused to enlist black soldiers, it is also a fact that they, like the other 

colonies, used black manpower during the war. In South Carolina, it was 

common practice to hire slaves out for military use. While the masters 
16 

would receive the pay, the slaves would serve in the artillery, in semimilitary roles, and perhaps in an occasional fighting role.36 Most of the 

identities and statehoods, as in the case of the young “waiter” who fired 

a key shot at the Battle of Cowpens to save an officer, have been lost to 

history.37 A former Georgia slave named Austin Dabney, who had been 

sent by his master to serve in his place, served in a Georgia artillery unit. 

During the Battle of Kettle Hill, which was one of the most noted and 

indeed toughest battles in Georgia, Dabney was seriously wounded in the 

thigh. For his service, Dabney was awarded 112 acres of land, nearly 40 

years after the war ended, for his “bravery and fortitude . . . in several 

engagements and actions.”38 Certainly, the names, identities, and numbers 

of many like Dabney and the young waiter in South Carolina have been 

lost. But there is a reason why many identities are saved in the North as 

opposed to in the South. Very few persons of African descent actually 

served in the South because Southerners were afraid to put weapons in the 

hands of a population of people that they did not trust. Slavery was not yet 

extremely brutal in the 18th century as it would become in the early half 

of the 19th century, but it was a harsh living and relative to the era. So, a 

Southerner putting a weapon in the hands of a slave in 1777 would be very 

analogous to a World War II German concentration camp guard giving a 

Jewish prisoner a weapon in 1942. In either case, the oppressed would 

have been very likely to use that same weapon against the oppressor. 

***

Service by persons of African descent was not limited to land warfare. 

From the beginning of the war, persons of African descent served in the 

Continental Marines, the Continental Navy, and other maritime forces. In 

Philadelphia’s Tun Tavern, considered the birthplace of the Marine Corps, 

at least two blacks, Isaac Walker and a man simply called Orange, were 

enlisted there. At least one black, probably John Martin, a black marine 

from Delaware, served with the marines who supported Washington at 

the Battle of Princeton.39 Five black marines served aboard the Navy’s 

Oliver Cromwell in 1777 and 1778 when it made its successful voyage 

off the Lesser Antilles and the Azores.40 Although few in numbers, which 

was in keeping with the tradition of the corps, black marines made a 

contribution.

It can be effectively argued that naval forces, whether they were 

continental, state, or private, would have been hard pressed were it not 

for the presence of persons of African descent. Their services ranged from 
17

cooks and servants to pilots of vessels. Ambrose Lewis enlisted in the 

Navy at Fredericksburg, Virginia, on 15 April 1776 and served aboard two 

vessels, the Page and the Dragon, until he was discharged on 16 April 

1779.41 For at least three reasons, the ratio of black to white sailors was 

much higher than the ratio of black to white soldiers. First, naval service 

was austere, difficult, and an unpopular occupation; second, there was a 

severe shortage of sailors; and third, and perhaps most important, many 

free-born New England, Virginia, and Maryland blacks were already 

skilled mariners.42 As in the case of the service of persons of African 

descent on land, it will never become clear how many blacks served in 

the naval and marine forces, but the fact is that they did serve, and their 

service enhanced Colonial success. 

***

At this point the three parts of the second issue introduced at the 

outset of this chapter must be revisited. The first part of what to do with 

the 20 percent of the colonial population that was of African descent has 

been addressed throughout the chapter. Quite simply, necessity basically 

required their service. The second part, if they are allowed to fight how 

could they consciously be denied their freedom; and the third part, if 

their combat power is rejected could the war be won, both require further 

analysis.

The second question of the denial of freedom is concretely supported 

but with paradoxical results. Based on the fact that four colonies—Vermont 

in 1777, New Hampshire and Pennsylvania in 1780, and Massachusetts 

in 1783—in some form abolished slavery before the war was over, and 

another four—Rhode Island and Connecticut in 1784, and New York and 

New Jersey in 1785—abolished slavery via gradual abolition shortly after 

the war ended, one could argue that the colonist’s conscience did get the 

best of them. The paradox, however, is that in all the middle and southern 

colonies, from Maryland to Georgia, the institution of slavery gradually 

became more embedded. Since the South was agriculturally based while 

the North was industrially based, labor was more of a necessity in the 

South. Furthermore, Eli Whitney’s invention of the cotton gin in 1793 

made cotton even more lucrative to grow. Cotton and the other agricultural 

cash crops of the South required large labor bases. The industrially based 

North needed more skilled labor. Thus, it may be argued that it was not 

conscience at all that swayed the North during the Revolutionary era but, 

rather, a supply and demand issue.
18 

Last, had the colonial forces rejected the service of persons of African 

descent it is debatable whether they would have won the war. One could 

soundly argue that even if the colonial forces had steadfastly adhered 

to Washington’s policy, black soldiers, sailors, and marines would have 

fought nonetheless. Their service, however, would have perhaps been 

for the British because they were going to fight for whoever gave them 

their freedom, thus adding significantly to England’s combat power. This 

would have also meant that less combat power would have been afforded 

colonial forces, therefore lowering their strength and resulting in their 

possible defeat. Another consideration that must be addressed when one 

calculates the service of blacks is the countless numbers of black men, 

women, and children who worked on fortifications; served as colonial 

servants; harvested crops; and acted as French soldiers, spies, and so forth. 

Although they are not included in the number of colonial soldiers, sailors, 

and marines who carried arms, are these persons not to be considered 

indirect combat multipliers?

In the end, the reader must ask himself, “what were the contributions 

of persons of African descent to the revolutionary cause, and did their 

contributions make a difference?” 

***

When the Revolutionary War officially ended on 3 September 1783, 

there was a great deal of uncertainty in the atmosphere.43 A young nation 

had been, once again, born out of conflagration, and a new people had to 

begin to make decisions and laws for themselves without “big brother” 

watching them. The first step was to become a nation without a monarchy. 

In 1788, after several years of postwar debate and political jockeying 

among the states, the Constitution of the United States was finally 

ratified.44 In 1789, the former commander in chief of the American Army 

became the first democratically elected president.

By this time, as discussed earlier, eight states had abolished slavery in 

some form or fashion. This, however, did not mean that life was pleasant 

or equal for all Americans. In virtually every walk of life, persons of 

African descent found themselves at a disadvantage, relegated to the least 

desirable societal roles, and officially denied many rights and privileges 

associated with being an American. This can be exemplified in the way 

that they were dealt with as soldiers, sailors, and marines between 1783 

and 1860. In fact, the Militia Act of 1792 limited military service to white 

male citizens between 18 and 45 years of age.45 Although the law stood 
19

in effect until 1862, men of color still served and fought throughout the 

period. 

***

In the 77 years that separated the American Revolution from the 

American Civil War, the United States participated in five military 

campaigns of significance—the Quasi-War, the War of 1812, the First 

Seminole War, the Second Seminole War, and the Mexican-American 

War. In each war, with the possible exception of the Mexican-American 

War, persons of African descent participated. Since their numbers in the 

Quasi-War and the First Seminole War were nebulous, there is little reason 

to examine their roles except to say that no definitive figure exists stating 

how many served as sailors during the Quasi-War, which was fought 

against the French from 1798 to 1800. During the First Seminole War, 

roughly 400 blacks fought with the Seminole tribe against U.S. forces.46

It was, however, during the War of 1812 and the Second Seminole War 

that persons of African descent made a significant impact. During the War 

of 1812, they fought with U.S. forces for America. During the Second 

Seminole War, they fought with Native Americans (The Seminole tribe of 

Florida) against American forces.47

The War of 1812, sometimes called the Second War for Independence, 

obviously has roots dating back to the American Revolution. The 

immediate causes, though, date to 1807, when British ships began to 

heavily impress sailors from American vessels, claiming that the sailors 

were British deserters. This impressment practice continued for several 

years until Congress declared war on England on 17 June 1812. Two ironic 

factors were associated with the impressment period leading up to the 

war. First, in spite of the Militia Act of 1792, persons of African descent 

had been filling positions as sailors on U.S. vessels since the Quasi-War. 

The most significant irony, however, occurred in 1807 when the British 

man-of-war Leopold seized the U.S. frigate Chesapeake and impressed 

four “U.S. citizens.” Request for the release of impressed sailors William 

Ware, Daniel Martin, John Strachan, and John Wilsons were demanded by 

President Thomas Jefferson’s administration on the grounds that they were 

“American citizens.”48 Interestingly enough, Ware, Martin, and Strachan 

were “Negroes.”

In fact, because of the harshness of naval life, large numbers of crews 

were manned by free blacks or black slaves. England, seeking to enforce 

its embargo act, mainly directed at Napoleon Bonaparte, felt safe in 
20 

impressing blacks because of the general U.S. sentiment toward blacks. 

Nonetheless, when the war officially began in 1812, the Navy had already 

been guilty of breaking the 1792 law. Throughout the entire war, persons 

of African descent made up more than 10 percent of all naval forces. 

They served on most of the existing naval ships and were believed to 

have fought in many of the major naval battles. Without doubt, however, 

during the Battle of Lake Erie, arguably the most significant naval battle 

of the war, one in every 10 to 12 sailors was of African descent. Oliver 

H. Perry, commander of the naval forces at Lake Erie, who had initially 

complained about being sent so many blacks, soon welcomed all ablebodied black sailors.49 Apparently, they had proved their value to Perry. 

Blacks continued to serve in the Navy long after the war was over. In an 

1862 letter to the Massachusetts Historical Society, Dr. Usher Parsons, the 

surgeon who had served in Perry’s fleet, wrote:

In 1814, our fleet sailed to the Upper Lakes to co-operate with 

Colonel Croghan at Mackinac. About one in ten or twelve of the 

crews were black.

In 1816, I was surgeon of the ‘Java,’ under Commodore Perry. 

The white and colored seamen messed together. About one in 

six or eight were colored.

In 1819, I was surgeon of the ‘Guerriere,’ under Commodore 

Macdonough; and the proportion of blacks was about the same 

in her crew. There seemed to be an entire absence of prejudice 

against the blacks as messmates among the crew. What I 

have said applies to the crews of the other ships that sailed in 

squadrons.50

Throughout the period between the War of 1812 and the American Civil 

War, blacks, although declining in numbers, remained on naval enlistment 

records. As late as 1859, enlistment records from Norfolk, Philadelphia, 

and Baltimore show that small numbers of blacks were still joining the 

Navy. By this time, however, they had been relegated to the positions of 

cooks.51

***

Unlike the Navy, the Marine Corps and Army were able to abide by 

the 1792 law well into the 19th century. The Marine Corps, as will become 

evident in chapter 4, successfully banned blacks until 1942. The Army on 
21

the other hand, used them as early as 1814. As in the Navy, it was a case 

of necessity for the Army. In 1814, the war was nearly over, and only two 

of the three states known to enlist blacks actually got an opportunity to use 

them. New York raised two regiments totaling more than 2,000 men, many 

of whom fought bravely. Pennsylvania organized a regiment of blacks as 

well, but the war ended before they saw action.52 The most noted units 

composed of black soldiers to serve during the war were undoubtedly two 

battalions of free black soldiers from New Orleans.

New Orleans was unique in that it had a sizable free black population 

in a period when most persons of African descent, North or South, were 

slaves. As early as 1812, Louisiana was the only state in the Union to enlist 

blacks, as long as they were free and had been property owners, into the 

militia. This is significant because those in New York and Pennsylvania 

were not enlisted into the militia; they were simply organized into formed 

regiments. On a few occasions, some persons of African descent, to include 

Isidore Honore, a free man of color, were commissioned as officers.53 Not 

even these militia forces, however, actually saw battle during the war.

The two battalions that actually fought during the Battle of New 

Orleans were recruited by General Andrew Jackson in 1814 out of a need 

for manpower to face the invading British, who were then threatening 

the southern shores of New Orleans. Jackson promised them that they 

would receive “the same bounty, in money and lands, as their white 

counterparts.”54 This prompted between 430 and 600 free blacks to join 

Jackson’s forces.55 Some of them, undoubtedly, had been in the state 

militia.

In addition to building the cotton-bag barricades that protected 

Jackson and participating in several skirmishes, as well as in the initial 

fight that occurred when the British landed, the two battalions served in 

frontline positions on 8 January 1815, the decisive day of the Battle of 

New Orleans.56 For their actions, Jackson praised them by saying that the 

“colored volunteers have not disappointed the hopes that were formed of 

their courage and perseverance in the performance of their duty.”57 The 

free black population of New Orleans would answer the call again during 

the American Civil War. But between the War of 1812 and the Civil War, 

another group of blacks would serve. This time, however, they fought 

against American forces. 

***
22 

Perhaps the proudest Native American heritage within the United 

States is that of the Seminoles. The Seminoles are the only Native 

American tribe to have not been completely beaten and forced from 

their homeland. Historian Kenneth W. Porter, author of the most recent 

definitive work on the role blacks played in the Seminole Wars, perhaps 

stated it best when he concluded that:

Of all U.S. conflicts with Native Americans, the Second 

Seminole War was the longest—at seven years—and the most 

expensive. It cost well over 20 million dollars, four times what 

Spain had received for Florida. It was also the deadliest, with 

more than 1,500 regular soldiers and sailors lost. In contrast, 

from 1866 to 1891, when the many tribes in the West were 

conquered, total U.S. Army losses were less than two thousand. 

Until the Vietnam conflict, the Second Seminole War was 

the longest war ever fought by the United States—and like 

[Vietnam], it did not end with an American victory.58

The Second Seminole War was indeed unique and costly in many 

ways. It officially began in December 1835 and officially ended in August 

1842.59 During that time, more than 10 significant battles were fought. In 

mid to late December 1835, Seminoles, joined by several hundred local 

slaves, destroyed a sugar plantation in the Saint Johns district and set an 

ambush along the southern tip of the Withlacoochee River—in presentday Sumter County—where Brevet Major Francis L. Dade and more than 

100 soldiers were killed. Dade’s Massacre, as the ambush on 28 December 

was subsequently called, was indeed brutal.60

A fair question that may come to mind for many readers at this point 

in the discourse, is why blacks would fight with Native Americans against 

whites. The answer is quite simple; blacks were fighting for freedom. Most 

of them were runaway slaves or descendants of runaway slaves. They had 

fled to Florida not for a love of the indigenous population but for freedom. 

To not fight and lose would be to just give up on freedom. Furthermore, 

by the time the Seminole War had begun, Black Seminoles were indeed 

Seminoles in every sense of the word. Many, by that time, were secondand third-generation Black Seminoles. Interracial marriages were the 

norm rather than the exception. They were family. Most, therefore, were 

simply fighting for their way of life.

On the night of 27 December, about 180 Seminoles, roughly 50 of 

whom were black, waited in the vicinity of Wahoo Swamp. At about 0800, 
23

Dade and his soldiers reached the ambush site. During the initial clash, 

roughly half of Dade’s soldiers became casualties. Dade himself was 

killed in the fight. For the next 5 1/2 hours, Dade’s soldiers fought from 

hastily acquired barricades and concealed locations within the Palmetto 

trees. Some accounts say that the soldiers were systematically stabbed and 

axed to death and that bodies were mutilated. Regardless of what actually 

occurred that day, only “three wounded men survived the carnage.” Blacks 

were a deciding factor on both sides of the ambush. Luis Pacheco, a local 

slave who had been hired out as a guide to assist Dade’s expedition, was 

believed to have led Dade’s men into the ambush. Pacheco ultimately survived the massacre and subsequently served with the Seminoles until he 

was captured and shipped to the Indian Territory in 1838. It was Pacheco 

who, many years later, said that the reported mutilations did not occur 

because Jumper, the principal chief at the ambush, would not allow it.61

Only three days later, roughly 200 to 250 Seminoles, including 30 to 

50 blacks, ambushed another U.S. force under the command of General 

Duncan L. Clinch about 100 miles upstream—in present-day Marion 

County—on the Withlacoochee River. Led by Chief Osceola, the most 

noted Seminole chief to emerge from the Second Seminole War, the First 

Battle of the Withlacoochee was not as decisive as Dade’s Massacre, but it 

surely established the Seminoles’ resolve. U.S. forces would have to deal 

with that resolve for many years to come. In January 1839, Osceola wrote 

Clinch a letter that would prove prophetic:

You have guns and so have we . . . you have powder and lead, 

and so have we . . . your men will fight, and so will ours, till the 

last drop of the Seminole’s blood has moisted the dust of his 

hunting ground.62

Although Osceola died of illness in a prison before the Second Seminole 

War ended, his words lived on. Many U.S. colonels and generals, such as 

Winfield Scott and Zachary Taylor, both of whom became famous leaders 

in American history, entered Florida to crush the Seminoles and their black 

allies. They all left without success, and they all found that a significant 

reason for the Seminole tribe’s success was, in part, due to the support they 

secured from their black brethren.

In this chapter, we have briefly studied the roles that black soldiers, 

sailors, and even a few marines played in three distinct wars: the American 

Revolution, the War of 1812, and the Second Seminole War. In each case, 

an argument can be made for, and against the viability of having black 
24 

soldiers on the left and right flank. Two facts, however, are constant, no 

matter how one decides to synopsize the black participation from war to 

war. First, in each case, the black fighting person was on the side that 

eventually won the war. Thus, maybe their presence did make some level 

of positive difference. Second, persons of African descent generally fought 

for a different type of freedom and way of life than their allies, with the 

possible exception of the Seminoles. True, in all three wars examined, the 

oppressed were fighting for freedom, but for the blacks, it usually meant a 

permanent loss of all freedoms should they lose.
25

Notes

 1. Three were killed on the spot, two mortally wounded.

 2. Joseph T. Wilson, The Black Phalanx: African American Soldiers in the War 

of Independence, The War of 1812 & The Civil War (Hartford, CT: American Publishing 

Company, 1890; reprint New York: Da Capo Press, 1994), 26-31. Benjamin Quarles, The 

Negro in the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 

1961), 4-7.

 3. John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom: A History of Negro Americans

(New York: A.A. Knopf, 1947; reprinted New York: Knopf, 1988), 65.

 4. Quarles, 4-5.

 5. Robert Ergang, Europe: From the Renaissance to Waterloo (Boston: Heath, 

1967), 641-42.

 6. Ibid. 

 7. Franklin, 66.

 8. Wilson, 33.

 9. Most of the persons of African descent who served with the French had been 

hired out as body servants, etc., to French officers. Two of the most noted foreign officers, 

Thaddeus Kosciuszko and the Marquis de Lafayette, had colonial slaves as servants of 

some sort. Agrippa Hull served for Kosciuszko. Perhaps the most famous French general/

colonial slave duo was Lafayette and James Armistead. Armistead sought and gained his 

master’s permission to serve under General Lafayette. Armistead, while serving as scout 

and spy for Lafayette during the Virginia campaign, gained information on an impending British surprise attack. With the information obtained from Armistead, Lafayette was 

able to save his army from a possible defeat. For his actions, three years after the war, the 

Virginia Legislature freed Armistead and compensated his master. The largest concentration of persons of African descent who served for the French was the Haitian brigade of 

roughly 545 “mulattoes and Negros” who sailed with the Comte d’ Estaing to Savannah, 

Georgia, in fall 1779 to assist American forces there. Incidentally, among this Haitian brigade were many of the same men who would defeat the French in 1802 during the Haitian 

Revolution, including Henri Christophe, the future king of Haiti.

10. Quarles, 9-10.

11. Wilson, 33-38; Quarles, 10; Franklin, 72.

12. Wilson, 38-39.

13. Bernard C. Nalty, Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the 

Military (New York, Free Press, 1986), 10.

14. Blacks in the United States Armed Forces, Morris J. MacGregor and Bernard 

C. Nalty, eds., 13 Vols. (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1977), Council of War 

at Cambridge, Massachusetts, 8 October 1775, Vol. I, Item #31. Minutes of a conference 

with General Washington by a committee of conference, 23 October 1775. Vol. I, Item #32. 

Hereafter cited as Morris, Blacks in the Armed Forces, Vol. I, Item#.

15. In November 1775, South Carolina did, however, pass a motion to use slaves as 

pioneers and laborers. This issue of using slaves as pioneers or laborers is a serious factor 

to consider when the question of “combat multiplier” is raised. For every black slave used 

in this fashion, a white person could be used to fight. Thus, pioneers and laborers inadvertently added to the combat power of a military force. This also became a factor with 

services of supply (SOS) troops during the world wars.

16. Proclamation by Lord Dunmore, governor of Virginia, 7 November 1775, 

Morris, Blacks in the Armed Forces, Vol. I, Item #23.
26 

17. General George Washington to President of Congress, 31 December 1775, 

Morris, Blacks in the Armed Forces, Vol. I, Item #37.

18. David O. White, Connecticut’s Black Soldiers, 1775-1783 (Chester, CT: Pequot 

Press, 1973), 21.

19. Franklin, 72.

20. Statement attributed to H.H. Trumbull, editor of the Public Records of the 

Colony of Connecticut; Morris, Blacks in the Armed Forces, Vol. I, Item #76.

21. J.M. Varnum to General George Washington, 2 January 1778; Morris, Blacks in 

the Armed Forces, Vol. I, Item #61.

22. Proceeding of the General Assembly of the State of Rhode Island and Providence 

Plantations, February Session, 1778; Morris, Blacks in the Armed Forces, Vol. I, Item 

#64.

23. Thomas Kench [to the Legislature of Massachusetts], 3 April 1778; Morris, 

Blacks in the Armed Forces, Vol. I, Item #53.

24. In Virginia, masters got around the enlistment ban by presenting their slaves as 

free men to recruiters. See Quarles, 69.

25. Ibid., 51-61.

26. White, 17-28.

27. The company of 18 men had at least five Indians. None, except Colonel Durkee, 

were believed to be white.

28. All black usually meant predominantly black. Officers, senior noncommissioned 

officers, and some lower enlisted men were white. Rhode Island raised the most successful 

all-black company. The company was sometimes called a regiment, but was actually too 

small with only 140 men. The Rhode Island regiment won distinction for its actions at the 

Battle of Rhode Island in 1778.

29. White, 29-35.

30. Quarles, 76; White, 29.

31. E.W. Morgan, Acting Commissioner, Bureau of Pensions, to Adjutant General, 

War Department, 8 August 1930, Data on Black Veterans of the Revolution; Morris, Blacks 

in the Armed Forces, Vol. I, Item #89.

32. Ibid., 16 October 1930.

33. Ibid., 2 May 1930.

34. Ibid., 8 August 1930.

35. Ibid., 29 January 1931.

36. Quarles, 71 and 75.

37. Perhaps one of artist William Ranney’s most famous Revolutionary War paintings, completed in 1845, is the best depiction of the blurred lines on the battlefield for 

slaves. An unidentified “black waiter” fired the pistol at the Battle of Cowpens that probably saved the life of Lieutenant Colonel William Washington, George Washington’s 

nephew. Since the Battle of Cowpens was fought in South Carolina, coupled with the fact 

that no one of note from the battle remembered or knew the waiter’s name, there is a strong 

probability that the waiter was a hired-out South Carolina slave.

38. Quarles, 75.

39. Nalty, The Right to Fight: African-American Marines in World War II

(Washington, DC: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps: 

Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO] distributor), 2-3.

40. Quarles, 86-87.

41. E.W. Morgan to Adjutant General, 16 October 1930, Morris, Blacks in the Armed 

Forces, Vol. I, Item #90.
27

42. Several factors account for the high percentage of black seamen during the 18th 

century. Maritime commercial capitalism is perhaps the most significant reason. In the 

South, “cash crops” were lucrative. In the Northeast, maritime ferrying of goods was lucrative. Many whites, therefore, taught, or had trained, their black slaves the skills of the sea. 

For example, as many as “25 percent of the male slaves in coastal Massachusetts during the 

1740s” were skilled seamen. W. Jeffrey Bolster, Black Jacks: African American Seamen in 

the Age of Sail (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997) 7. For more on the rise 

of black seamen during this era, see Black Jacks, 1-67.

43. Although the treaties of peace were signed on 3 September 1783, they were not 

ratified by the United States and Britain until 14 January 1784.

44. There were 13 states in the Union, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Georgia, 

Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maryland, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia, New 

York, North Carolina, and Rhode Island. Nine of them had to ratify the Constitution for it 

to be placed into effect. On 21 June 1788, New Hampshire became the ninth state to ratify. 

Before the end of the year, Virginia and New York had ratified, followed slowly by North 

Carolina in November 1798 and Rhode Island in May 1790.

45. Gary A. Donaldson, The History of African-Americans in the Military (Malabar, 

FL: Krieger Publishing Company, 1991), 24; Nalty, Strength for the Fight,19.

46. Kenneth W. Porter, The Black Seminoles: History of a Freedom-Seeking People

(Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1996), 19.

47. The word Seminole literally means “seceders.” During the latter part of the 

1700s, many lower Creeks, including Choctaws, Chickasaws, and some Cherokees had 

fled to Florida, subsequently banding together there with indigenous natives. They collectively became what many refer to as “the Seminole tribe” or the “Seminole nation.” 

Runaway blacks who joined with them became known as “the Black Seminoles.”

48. Wilson, 73-74.

49. Donaldson, 26; Nalty, Strength for the Fight, 21; Wilson, 78-80.

50. Ibid., 78.

51. W. Jeffrey Bolster, 223-24.

52. Franklin, 99. DOD Publication, Black Americans in Defense of Our Nation 

(Washington, DC: GPO, 1985), 29.

53. Act of the Legislature of Louisiana to Organize a Corps of Militia, 6 September 

1812, and Commission of Second Lieutenant Isidore Honore, 12 October 1812, Morris; 

Blacks in the Armed Forces, Vol. I, Items #103 and #104.

54. Wilson, 81.

55. The number of British and American forces to oppose each other in December 

1814 and January 1815 varies and so do the number of black soldiers. Whether you use 

the numbers of Franklin, 100-102; Nalty, Strength for the Fight, 25; or Wilson, 85, blacks 

composed more than 14 percent of the forces during the Battle of New Orleans.

56. Donaldson, 29.

57. Nalty, Strength for the Fight, 25.

58. Porter, 106-107.

59. The word officially is used very loosely here only because there was neither a 

declaration of war nor armistice. December 1835 simply marks the date of the first largescale battle between the Seminoles and U.S. forces, and August 1842 simply marks the date 

when U.S. leaders were authorized to end fighting with, and pursuit of, the Seminoles.

60. Porter, 38-40.

61. Ibid., 40-43.

62. Ibid., 44-46.
28 
29

Chapter 2

Civil War

In February 1862, as the Civil War entered into its 10th month, 

Frederick Douglass prophesied that “the side which first summons the 

Negro to its aid will conquer.”1 Although more than one year would elapse 

before the North began to officially muster black soldiers into service, it 

was the Militia Act of 17 July 1862 that authorized President Abraham 

Lincoln “to employ as many persons of African descent as he may deem 

necessary.”2 Throughout the war, approximately 178,892 persons of 

African descent served as combatants, and more than 38,000 of them gave 

their lives for the Union cause. They participated in 449 engagements, 

of which 39 were major battles. Perhaps the most telling statistic of all is 

the fact that in the latter months of the war, there were as many USCT in 

active Union service as there were Confederate troops in active service.3

This chapter will explore the military contributions of persons of African 

descent during the Civil War, thus allowing the reader to decide whether 

black soldiers were combat multipliers during that conflagration.

When the most pivotal war in U.S. history erupted on 12 April 1861, 

there were approximately 4 million persons of African descent living in 

America. Roughly 3.5 million were slaves, and about 500,000 were free.

All the slaves lived in the Southern slaveholding states below the MasonDixon Line, while free people of color lived in about every state of the 

Union, with the majority, obviously, living in the “free” states north of the 

Mason-Dixon Line.4

Of the many questions that were raised regarding these persons of 

African descent, this chapter analyzes three: What should the role of 

black people be and should they be allowed to serve for the North and/ 

or the South? If they serve, should they be issued weapons and used as 

combatants? Most important, if people of African descent are used in any 

capacity during the war, should they be granted freedom? The only one 

of these three questions that was being freely tossed around in 1861 was 

the second half of the first question: Should blacks be allowed to serve 

for either side? The people who were asking these questions were the 

radical Republicans, white and black abolitionists, and black intellectuals.

The one question that could not be pondered in 1861 but has exercised 

historians for more than a century is, What effect, if any, did persons of 

African descent have on the outcome of the Civil War?
30 

There were approximately 29 million people in America in 1861;

20 million lived in the North and 9 million lived in the South. Simple 

mathematics tilts the manpower scale in favor of the North. Moreover,

given that 3.5 million slaves and several hundred thousand free blacks 

were included in the population of the South, the imbalance increases 

considerably.

The question of what the role of blacks should be and if they should be 

allowed to serve for the North or the South, became an issue from the very 

start of the war. Interestingly enough, it was the South that first employed 

black soldiers. They were, however, soldiers in name only and they were 

largely confined to the New Orleans area. 

***

The Native Guards, as the unit was called, were three battalions of 

soldiers raised largely from among the free black population of New 

Orleans—many of them were the descendants of the battalion that fought 

there in 1815. All the enlisted soldiers and line officers were of African 

descent. Although Louisiana Governor Thomas Overton Moore and 

State Adjutant and Inspector General Maurice Grivot had approved and 

endorsed, respectively, the raising of the Native Guards in May 1861, 

they never allowed muskets to be issued to the units because Confederate 

officials distrusted the free blacks. So deep was this distrust that, even as 

Union Naval Commander David G. Farragut and his forces were closing 

in on New Orleans from the south and Union ground forces were handing 

the Confederates large numbers of casualties well north of New Orleans 

in the vicinity of Shiloh, Tennessee, Moore rejected the offer extended by 

the officers of the Native Guards to help defend the city. Subsequently, on 

1 May 1862, New Orleans fell into Union hands, and by 1 September, the 

Native Guards were serving for the Union.5

The Native Guards had become bitter due to the treatment and lack of 

trust they had received from their “countrymen” during the previous 16 

months. Furthermore, by September 1862, all notions of a short three- to 

five-month war were long gone, and the issue of slavery was no longer a 

hidden cause of the war; it was quickly moving to the front burners. The 

Native Guards decided to fight for what they considered to be a nobler 

cause, and Union General Benjamin F. Butler was willing to use them as 

soldiers.6

There is no doubt that the black population of New Orleans was 

unique among black populations in the South, but the manner in which 
31

the Confederate officials in New Orleans dealt with the Native Guards 

was representative of the entire Confederate attitude toward the notion 

of arming blacks.7 Nonetheless, there were many attempts throughout the 

war among Southerners to raise and use persons of African descent, slave 

and free, as combatants.

The first serious attempt came on 2 January 1864, when Confederate 

General Patrick R. Cleburne petitioned to raise slaves as fighting men 

because the North was using them as “a source of great strength in a 

purely military point of view.” Confederate President Jefferson Davis 

flatly rejected the idea and forbade any further discussion on the subject.

By the end of that same year, the cry erupted again, this time from a more 

powerful voice. Confederate Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin wrote 

on 21 December 1864, “the Negro will certainly be made to fight against 

us if not armed for our defense.” Again, the cry fell on deaf ears. Finally, 

on 11 January 1865, General Robert E. Lee, arguably the most respected 

Confederate figure, advised that the South “should employ them [Negroes] 

without delay.” Thus, on 13 March, Davis signed the Negro Soldier Law 

authorizing commanders to enlist slaves.8 By this point in the war, the 

decision was too late to do any good; the following month Lee surrendered 

to General Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox Courthouse and the war was 

over. The question one must ask himself is, Did the South miss a grand 

opportunity in “combat multipliers” by procrastinating on whether to use 

persons of African descent as combatants?9

Contrabands of war. Slaves reporting to General Benjamin Butler. (Culver Service)
32 

The debate of whether to arm persons of African descent to fight for 

the Union was similar to the one in the South. In the North, however, it 

was more accelerated. By summer 1862, the Union had reached a point 

the Confederates failed to reach until March 1865. Arming blacks in the 

North can be compared to an unattended water main in need of repair.

At first there are only drips of water escaping through the pipe. But 

before long, the drips turn into leaks, and the leaks eventually become 

an unstoppable waterspout. The drips started in May 1861 when Butler 

employed runaway slaves in his camp at Fortress Monroe, Virginia, and 

labeled them “contrabands.” Soon, contrabands were being employed 

at other Union camps.10 In fact, on 14 October 1861, Assistant Adjutant 

General William D. Whipple issued Special Order No. 72 that authorized 

officers in and near Fort Monroe, Camp Hamilton, and Camp Butler to 

employ the contrabands and pay the males $8 per day and the females $4 

per day.10 When Grant was investing Fort Henry on 6 February 1862 and 

Fort Donelson on 13 February 1862, General Henry W. Halleck urged him 

to “impress slaves to work on fortifications.”11

Just as in the South, however, there was a great hesitation about how far 

to go with these persons. Using black people as contrabands, laborers, or 

impressed slaves was one thing—in fact, the South used blacks throughout 

the war in this fashion—but arming them as soldiers was very different.

Clearly, arming the slaves would misrepresent the war to all Unionists and 

sympathetic Confederates, Northerner and Southerner, as a war to free 

“African slavery.” Furthermore, slaves running away to Union lines and 

serving as contrabands were already considered “a source of annoyance.”

Arming them would almost certainly make them uncontrollable. A part of 

the North’s hesitation to arm free blacks, was essentially the same as it was 

for the South; they worried about their trustworthiness. Commanders were 

advised that if they used contrabands they must keep them “under guard 

and not [allow them] to communicate with the enemy, nor [allow them] to 

escape.”12 After all, contrabands came from within the Confederate lines, 

and the war was still young. This trend of not arming blacks extended well 

into 1862 for land forces. Meanwhile, as land commanders were jockeying 

with this issue, maritime authorities turned the drip of the unattended 

water main into leaks. 

***

When Union naval forces assaulted the Hatteras inlet in August 1861, 

fugitive slaves were a part of at least one of the 32-pounder gun crews.13

As a result of these actions and other services rendered by black seamen, 
33

Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles approved the enlistment “of persons 

of color” not to exceed the rank of “boy.”14 These men were paid $10 per 

month.16 Throughout the war, as had been the case since the American 

Revolution, persons of African descent were easily enlisted into the Navy 

and served in all capacities from cooks and servants to gun crewmen and 

ship pilots. Several factors caused the Navy to accept blacks more readily 

than the Army. A black sailor on a vessel could be controlled and contained 

much more easily than a black soldier on land. Further, naval duty during 

this period was still extremely austere and arduous, thus unpopular. Since 

Northerners were not flocking to became sailors in the midst of a war, 

manpower shortages became critical early in the war. Last, but perhaps 

most important, because of the austerity and arduousness of naval service, 

sickness ran high among naval crewmen.15 Manpower, black or white, free 

or slave, became a sought-after commodity. Throughout the American 

Civil War, sailors of African descent made a lasting contribution. There 

were not many significant naval expeditions that did not employ them. And 

although the Union Navy was bound to defeat the Confederate Navy—

simply because the Confederate Navy was virtually nonexistent—sheer 

statistics are evidence of black Civil War naval contributions. Secretary of 

the Navy John P. Long, under President Theodore Roosevelt, produced a 

report in 1902, in which he concluded that although “no specific figures” 

were kept on “the number of colored men” to serve in the Navy during the 

Civil War, it is estimated that of the 118,044 enlistments during the war, 

roughly 29,511, or approximately 25 percent, were black.16 It took nearly 

a year, but the Army soon followed the Navy’s lead and began to arm 

persons of African descent. 

***

Initial arming of black troops occurred on a case-by-case basis.

Kansas, South Carolina, and Louisiana were the first states to arm black 

soldiers in fall 1862. In each case, aggressive abolitionist commanders 

were responsible for raising the units. In Kansas, the effort was led by 

Senator James H. Lane; in South Carolina, by Brigadier General Rufus 

Saxton; and in Louisiana, by Butler.

Kansas, the site of pre-Civil War conflagration in what became known 

as “bleeding Kansas,” had openly enlisted Negroes as early as October 

1861.17 Nothing substantial, however, developed from these enlistments.

The Militia Act of 1862 (July), which authorized the “enroll[ment of] 

persons of African descent [for] any service for which they may be 
34 

found competent,” and a philosophical change of attitude toward the use 

of blacks by Lincoln soon brought about a change. Lane, a proslavery 

democrat before becoming an abolitionist republican and a brigadier 

general commissioned by Lincoln, authorized two captains, H.C. Seaman 

and James M. Williams who were both known abolitionists, to enlist “both 

white and colored men.”18 The more successful of the two captains was 

Williams.

Williams was appointed on 4 August 1862, and he soon established 

a recruiting headquarters near Leavenworth, Kansas. By mid-October, 

Williams had recruited 500 men.19 Most, if not all, had only recently been 

slaves in Missouri and Arkansas. When the war broke out, fugitive slaves 

from those two slave states quickly fled to the free state of Kansas. They 

went from “clanking chains to clashing arms,” explained one colonel.

There were men such as Caesar Johnson who escaped from his Arkansas 

master. Initially, Johnson settled with the Cherokees in the Indian Territory 

but eventually made his way to Leavenworth via Lawrence, Kansas. Once 

in Leavenworth, Johnson enlisted in the First Kansas.20 Like other fugitive 

slaves when offered a chance to fight against a former master, Johnson 

did not hesitate. It was not long before the new recruits were tested. On 

28 October 1862, a detachment of 225 men was ordered into Missouri 

under the command of Seaman. They were soon surprise attacked by a 

Confederate Missouri State Militia force at Island Mound near Butler, 

Missouri. The soldiers of the First Kansas Colored Volunteers defeated 

their enemy at a cost of eight killed and 10 wounded. This engagement 

was “the first engagement [during the Civil War] in which colored troops 

were engaged.”21

While the First Kansas was undergoing recruitment and participating 

in raids like the one near Butler, Missouri, critical events and decisions 

were taking place that would soon help to officially federalize the First 

Kansas. On 17 September, Union forces had won a Pyrrhic victory at 

the Battle of Antietam in Sharpsburg, Maryland.22 As a result, on 22 

September, Lincoln issued the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, 

which ultimately became the Emancipation Proclamation on 1 January 

1863. The Emancipation Proclamation was the crowning action that forced 

the “unattended water main” to burst into full blast regarding enlisting 

black troops. Shortly thereafter, on 13 January, the First Kansas Colored 

Volunteers became the fourth regiment of black troops to be mustered into 

the Union Army. As these units were mustered into service, they became 

known as the USCT.
35

Between 13 January and 2 May 1863, four additional companies were 

recruited, bringing the First Kansas to a full 10-company regiment. On 

2 May, the First Regiment Kansas, Colored Volunteers, received orders 

to march to an encampment at Baxter Springs, Kansas, where it stayed 

until 27 June. The First Kansas was sent southward near Baxter Springs 

to support Grant’s westward advancement toward Vicksburg. While at 

Baxter Springs, the First Kansas participated in two engagements, one at 

Sherwood, Missouri, and the other in Jasper County, Missouri. The latter 

was unsuccessful for the First Kansas.23

On 27 June, the First Kansas was ordered to proceed to Fort Gibson, 

Indian Territory, 12 miles north of present-day Muskogee, Oklahoma.

During the march and after being stationed at Fort Gibson for only two 

weeks, the First Kansas participated in two significant engagements.

While en route to Fort Gibson, on 1-2 July, the First Kansas fought at 

Cabin Creek in the Cherokee nation as part of a mixed detachment. After 

brief skirmishing on 1 July, Confederate forces occupied strongpoints on 

the southern bank of Cabin Creek. Union forces occupied strongpoints 

on the northern bank. The following morning, the two forces engaged 

each other for more than 2 hours. Confederate forces were driven from 

their positions “in great disorder” and suffered 100 casualties and eight 

prisoners. Union casualties were three killed and 25 wounded.24 The 

skirmish at Cabin Creek was significant for two reasons. First, it was one 

of the few battles in which white and black soldiers—as well as Indian 

allies—fought side by side. Second, it changed the attitudes of many in the 

west about the fighting abilities and spirit of the black soldier. The words 

of an Irish democrat officer of the Third Wisconsin Cavalry who witnessed 

the skirmish were, “I never believed in niggers before, but by Jasus (sic), 

they are hell for fighting.”25

The First Kansas’ second engagement in 1863 was the Battle of Honey 

Springs on 17 July. During the battle, the First Kansas, again fighting as a 

mixed force, held the center of the Union line as it engaged Confederate 

forces from Texas and their Indian allies. During the battle, Williams 

moved his men opposite of the 29th and 39th Texas Regiments and an 

artillery battery. The First Kansas soldiers loaded their weapons, fixed 

bayonets, and advanced at shouldered arms “under a sharp fire” until they 

were “within 40 paces” of the Texans. At that point, Williams halted the 

First Kansas and began firing “well-directed buck and ball” into the enemy 

line until it went to ground and eventually abandoned its position. The 

2-hour battle resulted in 400 Confederate casualties and 100 prisoners, 
36 

perhaps many of them opposite the First Kansas sector. Conversely, of all 

the Union casualties on that day, the First Kansas, specifically, suffered 

five dead and 32 wounded. The First Kansas also captured one of the 

Texas regiment’s battle flags.26

The Battle of Honey Springs was not only significant for the First 

Kansas—indeed the battle was its most significant battle of the war—it 

was significant for all USCT. It helped put to rest, in the west, the notion 

that black soldiers would not or could not fight. General James G. Blunt, 

commander of the District of the Frontier and commander of the mixed 

forces at Honey Springs, spoke for many when he stated, “I never saw 

such fighting done as was done by the Negro regiment [at Honey Springs.]

They fought like veterans, with a coolness and valor that is unsurpassed.

They preserved their line perfect throughout the whole engagement and, 

although in the hottest of the fight, they never once faltered.”27

Throughout the war, the First Kansas continued to serve on the 

frontier. In September, it participated in a 100-mile pursuit across the 

Canadian River to Perryville, Chocktaw nation, and encamped at Fort 

Smith, Arkansas, in October. In December, the regiment relocated to 

Roseville, Arkansas, where it remained until it joined General Frederick 

Steele’s Camden Expedition in March 1864. The Camden Expedition and 

the Battle of Poison Springs, Arkansas, the latter a devastating defeat 

for the First Kansas, are just two of the several actions the First Kansas 

participated in until it was mustered out on 1 October 1865.28

***

While Lane and many unionists in the Department of the Frontier 

raised, enlisted, and effectively used soldiers of African descent, Saxton 

and others successfully accomplished the same in the Federal Department 

of the South. The effort to raise black soldiers in the Department of the 

South, headquartered in South Carolina, actually began on 31 March 

1862, when General David Hunter assumed command of the department.

Within a month, Hunter had put South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida 

under martial law and declared all slaves in those states “forever free.”

This decision was beyond Lincoln’s guidance and perhaps was the reason 

why he disapproved Hunter’s request “to arm the Negroes.”29 On 25 

August 1862, just four months after Hunter was denied permission to 

raise black soldiers, Saxton received orders from the War Department 

authorizing him to enlist “colored troops in the Sea Islands of South 

Carolina.”30 Why was Hunter denied permission to raise black troops and 

Saxton granted permission? First, Hunter was very hasty in his actions; 
37

the Lincoln administration was still trying to keep slavery on the back 

burner and could ill afford to have too many generals such as Hunter and 

John C. Fremont of Missouri freelancing.31 Saxton was more conciliatory 

in his actions. Second, a lot had happened in those four months to change 

the direction of the Lincoln administration: Shiloh and New Orleans had 

fallen into Union hands in April, the Second Confiscation Act and the 

Militia Act of 1862 had both been passed in July, the Native Guards had 

changed their allegiance in August, the First Kansas was actively recruiting 

black soldiers, and, perhaps the most important event, in August, all Union 

cavalry had to be withdrawn from that region to support General George 

B. McClellan’s Army of the Potomac.32 It was not long, before the Battle 

of Antietam, fought on 17 September, would allow Lincoln to issue the 

Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation.

Building on the manpower foundation that Hunter had raised during 

summer 1862, Saxton had enough men by early November to take the 

First South Carolina on its first expedition.33 Between 3 and 10 November, 

the First South Carolina raided along the Georgia and Florida coasts near 

the Bell and Sapello Rivers, engaging Confederate pickets and destroying 

saltworks, foodstuff, and other supplies. The expedition also doubled as 

a training exercise and recruiting drive. In all respects, the expedition 

was a success. The Savannah Republican wrote, “At the residence of 

Reuben King, Esq., they forced some fifty Negroes to accompany them.”

Furthermore, “they succeeded in capturing [Colonel McDonald], breaking 

up his salt-works and stealing a few things.” Recruitment was a success 

as well. When the expedition departed Beaufort on the 3 November, it had 

62 men. When it returned a week later, it numbered 156.34 A few weeks 

later the First South Carolina went out again, this time up the Doby River 

in Georgia, and achieved similar results. Colonel Oliver T. Beard, the 

commander of both expeditions, wrote, “On the last expedition . . . the 

fact was developed that colored men would fight behind barricades; this 

time they have proved by their heroism, that they will fight in the open 

field.”35

In the last week of November, Colonel Thomas Wentworth Higginson, 

a Massachusetts abolitionist and veteran of the 51st Massachusetts, took 

command of the First South Carolina and began to drill and discipline the 

unit. He was particularly impressed with one company made up entirely 

of Florida ex-slaves. To Higginson, they were the finest looking group of 

soldiers, white or black, that he had seen, both physically and in marching 

abilities. Crediting his white officers for their work in training the exslaves, on 16 December, Higginson wrote, 
38 

The officers are more kind and patient with the men than I should 

expect, since the former are mostly young, and drilling tries the 

temper; but they are aided by hearty satisfaction in the results 

already attained. I have never yet heard a doubt expressed among 

the officers as to the . . . drill and discipline [of the soldiers] and 

the pride they (the soldiers) take in the service.”

A few days later on 19 December, Higginson began to understand 

why these soldiers, who were only months, weeks, or a few days 

removed from slavery, worked so hard. “It is very interesting the 

desire they show to do their duty,” he wrote, “and to improve as 

soldiers; they evidently think about it, and see the importance 

of the thing; they say to me that we white men cannot stay and 

be their leaders always and that they must learn to depend on 

themselves, or else relapse into their former condition.36

After Christmas and Emancipation celebrations on 25 December 1862 

and 1 January 1863, Higginson felt that his regiment was ready. On 14 

January, shortly before taking his men on a 10-day expedition down the 

Saint Marys River into Georgia and Florida spreading the word about 

Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation to the slaves,37 Higginson wrote,

In speaking of the military qualities of the blacks, I should 

add, that the only point where I am disappointed is one I have 

never seen raised by the most incredulous newspaper critics—

namely, their physical condition. To be sure they often look 

magnificently to my gymnasium-trained eye . . . such splendid 

muscular development. . . . But their weakness is pulmonary; 

The First South Carolina Volunteers repelling a Confederate attack near the Doby River in 

Georgia. (The Harper’s Weekly)
39

pneumonia and pleurisy are their besetting ailments; they are 

easily made ill.” Higginson goes on to say, however, that “[a]s 

to availability for military drill and duty in other respects, 

the only question I ever hear debated among the officers is, 

whether they are equal or superior to whites. I have never heard 

it suggested that they were inferior.38

The Saint Marys Expedition, then and now, has always been relegated 

to a footnote. And, indeed, in the wake of the battles of Second Bull Run, 

Antietam, and Fredericksburg in the east, the Confederate invasion of 

Kentucky in the west, and initial stages of the Vicksburg campaign in the 

trans-Mississippi theater, the First South Carolina’s expedition pales in 

magnitude. Yet, it was successful, and its success had some immediate and 

lasting significance.

Lumber was quickly becoming a rare commodity in the Department 

of the South. Higginson knew that, so using gathering lumber as his 

rationale, he sought and gained permission to conduct an expedition. On 

23 January, Higginson and his men departed Camp Saxton, near Beaufort, 

South Carolina, to acquire as much lumber as possible. The expedition 

sailed with three steamers and 462 soldiers and officers.39 On the morning 

of 24 January, Higginson sailed into Saint Simon’s Sound on the coast of 

Florida. After learning of an abundance of railroad iron on Saint Simon 

and Jekyll Island, he and his men, many of whom had worked on the 

batteries in the area as Confederate laborers, went ashore. They gathered 

close to 100 railroad irons. On the 25th, the men did some foraging, and 

the main body left for Fort Clinch the following morning.40 From Saint 

Simon, the Ben De Ford, the largest of the three vessels, proceeded 

directly to Fernandina, Florida. The other two vessels, the Planter and the 

John Adams, the latter carrying Higginson, went down the Saint Marys 

River. The Planter eventually went down a separate tributary.

Once at Fort Clinch, a detachment under Higginson proceeded five 

miles inland to locate a Southern cavalry unit and distribute copies of the 

Emancipation Proclamation to local slaves. Some of the men of the First 

South Carolina had been slaves in this area and knew the countryside well.

This aided Higginson greatly on the night the Battle of the Hundred Pines 

was fought. The First South Carolina had defeated its first foe in pitched 

battle. As the expedition continued, Higginson learned from Southern 

newspapers and locals that they had killed one lieutenant and 10 other 

soldiers and caused the cavalry unit to retreat into the woods. The First 

South Carolina had only suffered one dead and a few wounded. Higginson 

explained the importance of the Battle of the Hundred Pines:
40 

I have made the more of this little affair because it was the first 

stand-up fight in which my men had been engaged, though they 

had been under fire, in an irregular way, in their small early 

expeditions. To me personally, the event was of the greatest 

value: it had given us all an opportunity to test each other, and 

our abstract surmises were changed into positive knowledge. 

Hereafter it was of small importance what nonsense might be 

talked or written about colored troops; so long as mine did not 

flinch, it made no difference to me.41

On the day after Hundred Pines, the men arrived at Saint Marys. After 

discerning that a particular house was being used by spies, Higginson 

ordered that it be burned. Some lumber was also gathered. Before leaving 

the town, the boats were fired upon, but the First South Carolina was 

already on its way, this time to Fernandina, Florida.

At Fernandina, Higginson met with Colonel Joseph Roswell Hawley 

of the Seventh Connecticut and Lieutenant Commander Hughes of the 

gunboat Mohawk. Hawley’s mission was to locate and bring some bricks 

back to Fort Clinch from a known brickyard, and Hughes’ mission was 

to gather information on the Berosa, a Confederate steamer operating in 

the area. Higginson jumped at the opportunity to continue both missions, 

especially when he realized that Corporal Robert Sutton, one of his black 

pilots, was from Woodstock, the location of the brickyard in question and 

the area where the Berosa was suspected to be operating. In both missions, 

the First South Carolina was successful. It learned that the Berosa “was 

lying at the head of the river . . . broken-down and worthless . . . and would 

never get to sea . . . [and that] the crew barely escape[d] with their lives.”42

In addition to bricks, the expedition acquired lumber, various livestock 

and other provisions, and destroyed some property. After receiving a few 

rounds from the bluffs as they were leaving, suffering one casualty, the Ben 

De Ford linked up with the Planter at Fernandina. The crew of the Planter

had also conducted a successful mission, destroying “extensive salt-works 

at Crooked River.” On 2 February, Higginson reported to Saxton back in 

Beaufort. The significance of the expedition is perhaps best explained by 

Higginson:

Slight as this expedition now seems among the vast events of 

the war, the future student of the newspaper of that day will 

find that it occupied no little space in their columns, so intense 

was the interest which then attached to the novel experiment of 

employing black troops. So obvious, too, was the value, during 

this raid, of their local knowledge and their enthusiasm, that it 
41

was impossible not to find in its successes new suggestions for 

the war.43

On 31 January 1863, while still on expedition, the First South Carolina 

became the fifth unit to be officially mustered into the USCT of the federal 

service.44

The First South Carolina never participated in any large-scale engagements or battles before it was mustered out on 31 January 1866. It 

did, however, participate in many other raids and expeditions in South 

Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. In March 1863, the First South Carolina, 

accompanied by a second Negro regiment, that eventually became the 

Second South Carolina Colored Volunteers, on 22 May, captured and 

occupied Jacksonville, Florida.45 In early April, the First South Carolina 

relieved the 55th Pennsylvania, then serving picket duty on Port Royal 

Island.46 But perhaps the most significant thing about the First South 

Carolina was that the men, unlike the First Kansas, were all slaves at 

the time of their enlistments.47 That fact alone made their presence in the 

Department of the South a double, if not triple, blow to the South. The first 

blow was that the South could no longer employ their services. The second 

blow was that now they were also fighting against the South. And last, 

they were no longer slaves, a vital part of the Southern infrastructure. 

***

Concurrent with the rise of the First Kansas and First South Carolina 

was the continuing development of the Native Guards. The Native 

Guards, as stated earlier, had initially served under the Confederate 

flag of New Orleans until summer 1862. Shortly after occupying New 

Orleans, Butler became aware of the Native Guards because of their 

frequent mention in the local newspapers. The “Negro officers” of the 

regiments had also approached Butler, inquiring about “the continuance 

of their organization and to learn what disposition they would be required 

to make of their arms.”48 Throughout the summer, Butler and the officers 

of the Native Guards kept in touch and forged a cooperative relationship.

On 14 August, Butler wrote Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton again, 

this time complaining of the “need [for] reinforcements [to go] with the 

Navy against Mobile.” Furthermore, he assured Stanton that the Native 

Guards stood ready to join him.49 Eight days later, Butler issued General 

Order #63, which, “Subject to the approval of the President of the United 

States,” required the members of the Native Guards to report for “the 

service of the United States.”50 On 27 September 1862, the First Louisiana 
42 

Native Guards was mustered into federal 

service; on 12 October 1862, the Second 

Louisiana Native Guards was mustered 

into federal service; and on 27 November 

1862, the Third Louisiana Native Guards 

was mustered in. They became the first 

three units composed of persons of African 

descent to be officially mustered into the 

Union Army. At this point, “the line officers 

of the First and Second Regiments were all 

Negroes,” while “the officers of the Third 

Regiment were both white and Negro.”51

From the time they were mustered in until 

spring 1863, the Native Guards regiments 

did their share of foraging and fatigue duty.

The First Native Guards, for example, 

helped the Eighth Vermont Regiment build 

nine culverts, open 52 miles of railroad, 

and rebuild a 435-foot-long bridge at Bayou des Allemands.52 Although 

the Second Louisiana Native Guards only saw action briefly, the First 

and Third got their chance to prove themselves during the Port Hudson 

Campaign from 27 May to 8 July 1863.

Influenced by several things, including a need for troops, General 

Nathaniel Banks, who had replaced Butler in December 1862, employed 

the fighting spirit of the Second Louisiana Native Guards in an expedition 

up the Mississippi Sound in April.53 He employed the First and Third 

Native Guards similarly on 27 May 1863. The combat record of the 

Second Louisiana Native Guards was extremely brief. In April, after 

many months of mundane duty at Ship Island, they received orders to 

conduct a reconnaissance mission up the Mississippi Sound to Pascagoula, 

Mississippi. On their return trip, they encountered and defeated a larger 

Confederate force. This was their only battle.54 The First and Third Native 

Guards did not have it so easy. Port Hudson, Louisiana, was important 

to Banks for at least two reasons. First, controlling it would allow 

Union forces to have greater access down the Mississippi River toward 

Vicksburg. Second, if Banks could open the Mississippi from the south, 

he could reinforce Grant who was at that time trying several schemes to 

take Vicksburg. With a total force of 20,000, Banks began his six-week 

Captain P.B.S. Pinchback, Second 

Louisiana Volunteers. (Photographs 

and Prints Division, Schomburg 

Center for Research in Black Culture, The New York Public Library, 

Astor, Lenox, and Tilden Foundations)
43

campaign for Port Hudson, a fort garrisoned with 12,000 Confederate 

troops.55

Port Hudson was a very-well fortified garrison. “Earthworks along 

the sinuous brow of an elevated bluff served as formidable protection 

against the artillery of the Union army.” Furthermore, “[t]here were 20 

siege guns and 31 field pieces inside the garrison. The approaches to 

the fort were fairly well protected against assaulting columns by natural 

gullies alternating with abatis of felled trees.” Opposed to this formidable 

defensive position was Banks’ army, which had to fight “from a field 

position in a dense forest of magnolias, surrounded by heavy undergrowth 

and ravines choked with felled or fallen timbers.”56 Around 0500 on the 

27th, Union artillery began bombarding the garrison, and at about 1000, 

three Union brigades began the assault. Although heavy Confederate 

artillery fell on the attacking forces, they got to within 200 or 300 yards of 

the fort before they were stalled. It was at that point that General William 

Dwight, commander of two of the brigades on the field that day, ordered 

the First and Third Louisiana Native Guards, then on the far right flank, to 

attack. Heavy artillery and musket fires drove the Native Guards back.57

Throughout the remainder of that first day, the First and Third Native 

Guards made five or six more charges against the garrison, getting to 

within pistol shot range.58 The results were disastrous. Of the 1,080 men 

in the two regiments, there were 154 casualties, including two of their 

black officers, Captain Andre Cailloux and Lieutenant John Crowder.59

The failure of Union forces to take Port Hudson caused Banks to conduct 

a siege operation. The willingness of the Native Guards to charge 

repeatedly across rough terrain “within pistol shot” of Confederate forces 

caused many to change their opinions about the fighting abilities of black 

soldiers. Within three weeks, Banks decided to conduct a second charge.

Heat and disease had caused casualty figures to increase. Banks sought 

volunteers for a “storming party” to assault the Port. “The entire First and 

Third Regiments of the Native Guards volunteered for the mission.” Due 

to attrition, however, only 93 men from both regiments were able to take 

part in the attack. The assaults on 15 June composed of white and black 

troops, possibly mixed, were just as disastrous as those on 27 May. As a 

result of the assaults and more than three more weeks of siege warfare, 

Union strength had dwindled down to 9,000. Fortunately for Banks, 

Confederate forces had also suffered greatly. They had been “reduced to 

3,000 half-starved men.” They finally capitulated on 8 July 1863—just five 
44 

days after Union victory at Gettysburg and four days after Union victory at 

Vicksburg.60 In fact, it was news of Vicksburg that caused the Confederate 

commander at Port Hudson to surrender.61

In the larger picture of the war, the campaign for Port Hudson was 

important to Union forces in the trans-Mississippi theater of war. Port 

Hudson and other Union campaigns and battles in that theater, such as the 

Battle of Millikens Bend, where two other Louisiana regiments of black 

troops had fought, directly affected Vicksburg. By having to garrison and 

fight at numerous forts and ports along the Mississippi River, Confederate 

forces that perhaps could have enabled Confederate victory at Vicksburg 

remained occupied and spread thin throughout the theater. For soldiers of 

African descent, it was significant for other reasons.

Just as the Battle of Honey Springs was important to the First Kansas 

and the Saint Marys Expedition and many other expeditions into Florida 

and Georgia were to the First South Carolina, so was Port Hudson to the 

Native Guards. The actions of the soldiers during this campaign helped 

to change attitudes about the abilities of black troops in the Department 

of the Gulf. A white engineer officer who had observed the actions on 27 

May wrote, “You have no idea . . . how my prejudices with regard to negro 

troops have been dispelled by the battle the other day. The brigade of 

Negroes behaved magnificently and fought splendidly . . . and [are] just as 

brave [as white soldiers.]”62 Even Banks, who would eventually downplay 

the role of the Native Guards as time passed, had written in his official 

report after the battle that the men of the Native Guards were among his 

most daring and determined troops at Port Hudson.63

The belief that black soldiers would not follow black officers into 

combat or that blacks were not capable of leading in combat was disproved 

at Port Hudson. Two of the most gallant officers of the First Louisiana 

Native Guards were Cailloux and his trusted lieutenant, Crowder. On the 

first advance on 27 May, Cailloux and Crowder both perished in battle.

Cailloux, “a man whose identity with his race could not be mistaken for he 

prided himself on being the blackest man in the Crescent City . . . fell at 

the head of his company.” The New York Times wrote: “he died the death 

of a hero, leading on his men in the thickest of the fight.” Crowder, who 

concealed the fact that he was 16 in order to receive a commission, was 

perhaps “the youngest officer in the Union Army.”64

***
45

The First Kansas, First South Carolina, and the three regiments of the 

Louisiana Native Guards are only five of the more than 139 regiments 

composed of soldiers of African descent to serve during the Civil War.65

In total, there were 120 regiments of infantry, 12 regiments of heavy 

artillery, seven regiments of cavalry, and 10 companies of light artillery.66

From Texas, which recorded only 47 black soldiers, to Louisiana, which 

recorded 24,952 black soldiers, men of African descent served in virtually 

every state of the Union.67 From the Battle of Fort Wagner in South 

Carolina where the 54th Massachusetts earned its fame to the siege of 

Petersburg in Virginia where eight black regiments of the 4th Division, 

IX Corps, served, to the surrender at Appomattox Courthouse, where 

black troops served on picket duty, soldiers of African descent served and 

fought.68

Although the official records state that 178,892 black soldiers served 

during the war, the actual number may never be known.69 Since many 

light-complexioned black troops passed as white at some point and served 

in white units, and since many black soldiers may have been enlisted into 

regiments under the same name as a previous soldier who had recently 

become a casualty, some historians have estimated that as many as 200,000 

black troops actually served.70 Whatever the figure might be, simply based 

on official records, soldiers of African descent constituted 12 percent of 

the Union forces at the end of the war.71

As readers are attempting to decide whether black soldiers were 

combat multipliers or not during the Civil War, perhaps the most 

significant figure of note is the fact that “black troops in the Union army 

toward the end [of the war] approximately equaled the total number of 

Confederate soldiers still present for duty.”72 One cannot dismiss the 

fact that hundreds of thousands of persons of African descent, troops or 

civilians, made contributions to the Union effort by serving as sentries, 

foraging parties, and fort/barricade builders and in a myriad of other 

positions that multiplied the strength of white Union forces significantly.

Nonetheless, even after the actions exemplified by the five USCT units 

examined here, there were many whites still opposed to arming “the 

Negro.” In response to such a group visiting Lincoln in August 1863, the 

president, whose attitude on the subject had been completely changed, 

replied, “You say you will not fight to free Negroes. Some of them seem to 

be willing enough to fight for you.”73
46 

Notes

 1. Dudley T. Cornish, The Sable Arm: Black Troops in the Union Army, 1861-1865

(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1987), 29.

 2. Extract From the Militia Act of 17 July 1862, Blacks in the Armed Forces, Vol. 

II, Item 15.

 3. Cornish, ix.

 4. The original Mason-Dixon Line, as surveyed in 1767, is the Maryland/

Pennsylvania state line.

 5. New Orleans Daily Picayune, 27 April 1861. Donald E. Everett, “Ben Butler and 

the Louisiana Native Guards, 1861-1862,” Journal of Southern History (24 May 1958),

204.

 6. W.E.B. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction in America: 1860-1880 (New York: 

Maxwell Macmillian International, 1935), 94-95; Major General Butler to Secretary of 

War E.M. Stanton, 25 May 1862; Headquarters Department of the Gulf, New Orleans, 

Louisiana, Elan A. Woodward and Richard D. Drum, eds., “The Negro in the Military of 

the United States, 1639-1886” (Microfilm 1888), hereafter cited as Negro in the Military.

 7. Charleston, South Carolina; Mobile, Alabama; and possibly Nashville, Tennessee; and Savannah, Georgia, were the only other Southern cities with a substantial free 

black population.

 8. James M. McPherson, The Negro’s Civil War:How American Blacks Felt and 

Acted During the War for the Union (New York: Ballantine Books, 1991), 245-48.

 9. Recent scholarship has shown that more blacks participated on the Confederate 

side during the Civil War than previously thought. Their reasons for serving varied. Most, 

however, simply went along with their master, their master’s son, or some other relative or 

acquaintance of their master. Some had been promised their freedom, while others served 

out of a sense of loyalty to a person. For further details refer to Charles Kelly, Forgotten 

Confederates: An Anthology About Black Southerners (Atlanta, GA: South Heritage 

Press, 1995) and Andrew Chandler Battaile, Black Southerners in Gray: Essays on AfroAmericans in Confederate Armies (Redondo, CA: Rand and File Publication, 1994). Also 

see Charles H. Wesley, “The Employment of Negroes as Soldiers in the Confederate 

Army,” The Journal of Negro History (July 1919), 239-53.

10. Department of Virginia, U.S. Army, Special Order No. 72, 14 October 1861, 

Blacks in the Armed Forces, Vol. II, Item 3. Some have argued that the term “contraband” 

was Union political double-speak to make the use of slaves a credible military necessity.

11. Major General H.W. Halleck to Brigadier General U.S. Grant, 8 February 1862; 

Ibid., Item 9.

12. Brigadier General A. McCook to General W.T. Sherman, 8 November 1861, 

Ibid., Item 8. Brigadier General W.T. Sherman to General McCook, 8 November 1861, 

Ibid., Item 6. Major General H.W. Halleck to Brigadier General U.S. Grant, 8 February 

1862, Ibid., Item 9.

13. Cornish, 17.

14. The rank of “boy” does not appear to be an official naval rank, thus it was 

perhaps simply developed during the Civil War for persons of African descent.

15. Order of the Secretary of the Navy to Commodore Wilkes, USN, regarding 

mortar vessels at Hampton Roads and contrabands for crews of vessel, 5 August 1862, 

Ibid., Item 53. Report of Acting Rear Admiral Porter, USN, regarding the need of men for 

the squadron, 26 October 1862, Ibid., Item 54.

16. Secretary of the Navy John P. Long to Representative C.E. Littlefield, 2 April 

1902, Ibid., Item 61. 

17. Cornish, 69-71.
47

18. Ibid., 73.

19. J.M. Williams to General T.J. Anderson, Adjutant General of Kansas, 1 January 

1866, Blacks in the Armed Forces, Vol. II, Item 28.

20. Glenn L. Carle, “The First Kansas Colored,” American Heritage (February/

March 1992), 82, 84.

21. J.M. Williams to General T.J. Anderson, Adjutant General of Kansas, 1 January 

1866, Blacks in the Armed Forces, Vol. II, Item 28.

22. More blood was shed at the Battle of Antietam in a single day than in any other 

Civil War battle. Union casualties were 12,350, while Confederate casualties numbered 

13,700. Tactically, the battle was a virtual draw. Strategically, however, it was a Union 

victory because the Confederates abandoned the battlefield and campaign and headed back 

south.

23. J.M. Williams to General T.J. Anderson, Adjutant General of Kansas, 1 January 

1866, Blacks in the Armed Forces, Vol. II, Item 28. 

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.; Cornish, The Sable Arm, 147.

26. J.M. Williams to General T.J. Anderson, Adjutant General of Kansas, 1 January 

1866, Blacks in the Armed Forces, Vol. II, Item 28. Also see Dudley Taylor Cornish, 

“Kansas Negro Regiments in the Civil War,” Kansas Historical Quarterly (May 1953), 

417-29.

27. Cornish, The Sable Arm, 146-47. 

28. J.M. Williams to General T.J. Anderson, Adjutant General of Kansas, 1 January 

1866, Blacks in the Armed Forces, Vol. II, Item 28.

29. Cornish, The Sable Arm, 33, 35.

30. Ibid., 79-80.

31. General John C. Fremont, commander of the Western Department, declared 

martial law and freed the slaves in Missouri on 30 August 1861. This was a devastating 

blow to the Lincoln administration because at this point in the war Lincoln was still 

strongly trying to attract Unionists in the South and keep the nation from further turmoil.

Actions such as freeing slaves was a recipe for disaster.

32. On 6 August 1861, the First Confiscation Act was issued that stated property 

(fugitive slaves) used by the owner’s consent and with his knowledge in aiding or abetting 

insurrection against the United States would be kept by the United States if captured. On 17 

July 1862, the Second Confiscation Act was issued, giving President Lincoln discretionary 

authority to use blacks who had escaped from Rebel masters and were thus emancipated as 

troops. The Second Confiscation Act appeared to complement the Militia Act of 1862.

33. Cornish, The Sable Arm, 92.

34. Ibid., 85-87.

35. Ibid., 88.

36. Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Army Life in a Black Regiment, (Boston: Fields, 

Osgood, & Co., 1870; reprint New York: W.W. Norton, 1984), 42, 51, 53.

37. McPherson, 169; Joseph T. Wilson, The Black Phalanx: African-American 

Soldiers in the War of Independence, The War of 1812 & The Civil War (Hartford, CT: 

American Publishing Company, 1890; reprint New York: Da Capo Press, 1994), 249.

38. Higginson, 72.

39. One of the steamers was the Planters, which runaway slave and maritime pilot 

Robert Smalls had delivered to the Union in Charleston Harbor the previous May. The 

story of Smalls and the Planter is an excellent example of how assets could be taken from 

Confederate forces and used by Union forces. Smalls is significant in Black military history 

because he, while serving as a South Carolina congressmen during the Reconstruction era, 
48 

nominated more African-Americans to the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, 

New York, than any other individual.

40. During this foraging mission, the unit took cattle, horses, and agricultural 

supplies and relocated some slaves. This is partly where the First, and later the Second 

South Carolina got its bad reputation. Like General William T. Sherman’s march to the sea, 

many saw this as looting and stealing, not as wartime foraging. General Higginson also 

stated that his men only burned property that was used directly to aid Confederate soldiers.

For the above reasons, expeditions into the South, especially by black soldiers, were highly 

controversial. The motion picture Glory depicts this sentiment very well in the scene where 

the 54th Massachusetts encounters a Southern black regiment.

41. Higginson, 88.

42. Ibid., 99.

43. Ibid., 103.

44. Report of the Provost Marshal General’s Bureau, 17 March 1866, part IV. A brief 

history of the recruitment of blacks for the Union Army during the war appears in Blacks 

in the Armed Forces, Vol. II, Item 48.

45. McPherson, 169.

46. Cornish, The Sable Arm, 93.

47. It is possible that a few could have been free men of color, but the likelihood of 

that in the Department of the South’s area was very slim.

48. Major General Butler to Secretary of War E.M. Stanton, 25 May 1862, H.W. 

Halleck, Department of the Gulf, New Orleans, Louisiana, Negro in the Military Reel 1, 

Vol. 2, 84.

49. Butler to Stanton, 14 August 1862, H.Q. Department of the Gulf, New Orleans, 

Louisiana, Ibid., Reel 1, Vol. 2, 945.

50. General Order No. 63, 22 August 1862, H.Q. Department of the Gulf, New 

Orleans, Louisiana, Ibid., Reel 1, Vol. 2, 956.

51. Mary F. Berry, “Negro Troops in Blue and Gray: The Louisiana Native Guards, 

1861-1863,” Louisiana History 8 (1967): 174-75.

52. Ibid., 178-79.

53. General Banks’ attitude toward “Negro soldiers” was much different than 

General Butler’s. While Butler was somewhat benevolent and receptive of their views,

in fact, he was the “creator” of the “contraband of War,” Banks was neither. In March, he 

had caused all the “Negro officers” of the Third Native Guards to resign. So, only the First 

Native Guards had Negro officers by the time the units went into battle.

54. Berry, 181-82.

55. Ibid., 186.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. Cornish, The Sable Arm, 142.

59. There were more than 74 officers of African descent who served in the Louisiana 

Native Guards units. They were descendants of the well-educated and financially stable 

free blacks of the New Orleans region of Louisiana. For more on the officers of the 

Louisiana Native Guards, see chapter 1 in Salter, “‘Sable Officers,’ African-American 

Military Officers: 1861-1948,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Florida State University, Tallahasse, 

Florida, 1996.

60. Berry, 187-89.

61. Ibid., 188-89.

62. Cornish, The Sable Arm, 142-43.

63. Berry, 189.
49

64. See New York Times, 13 June 1863 and 8 August, 1863; Joseph T. Glatthear, 

Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers (New York: 

Collier Macmillian, 1991), 124; Robert E. Greene, Black Defenders of America, 1775-

1973 (Chicago, IL: Johnson Publishing Co. , 1974), 59; Charles Vincent, Black Legislators 

in Louisiana During Reconstruction (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 

1976) 12-13; James M. McPherson The Negro’s Civil War: How Blacks Felt and Acted 

During the War (New York: Ballatine Books, 1991), 188-89.

65. See Appendix 1 for a listing of all USCT units during the Civil War.

66. Report of the Provost Marshal Generals Bureau, 17 March 1866, part IV. “A 

brief history of the recruitment of blacks for the Union Army during the war,” Blacks in the 

Armed Forces, Vol. II, Item 48.

67. Ibid.

68. The 54th Massachusetts and its road to the Battle of Fort Wagner was the 

subject of the popular movie Glory. For a complete primary-source history of the 54th 

Massachusetts, see Luis F. Emilio, A Brave Black Regiment: History of the Fifty-Fourth 

Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, 1893-1865 (Boston: The Boston Book Co., 

1894; reprint New York: Da Capo Press 1992).

69. Report of the Provost Marshal Generals Bureau, 17 March 1866, part IV. “A 

brief history of the recruitment of blacks for the Union Army during the war,” Blacks in the 

Armed Forces, Vol. II, Item 48. The official total to serve in the USCT is 186,017, but from 

their number must be subtracted 7,122 white officers.

70. P.B.S. Pinchback, a future captain in the Native Guards and first AfricanAmerican to serve as governor of a state—Louisiana—was perhaps the most well-known 

person to pass for white in a white regiment. Pinchback had enlisted and served for a time 

in a white regiment until his identity was “discovered.”

71. Cornish, The Sable Arm, 288.

72. Ibid., ix.

73. Carle, 90.
50 
51

Chapter 3

World War I

The Civil War is without doubt among the most pivotal events in 

American history, and it is surely the most pivotal event in American history for African-Americans because of the immediate results it spawned. 

Politically, the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments were all direct results 

of the war. Militarily, the Army Reorganization Act of 1866 was drafted 

mainly as a result of the war.

There is no mistaking the importance of the three postwar amendments to the newly freed slaves. The 13th Amendment, passed in 1865, 

stated that “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime . . . shall exist within the United States.” The 14th 

Amendment, passed in 1868, guaranteed that “all persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are citizens.” The 14th Amendment did, 

however, “exclud[e] Indians not taxed.” And last, the 15th Amendment, 

passed in 1870, gave “the right of citizens of the United States to vote 

[regardless of] race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”1 In short, 

the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments, respectively, freed the slaves, made 

them U.S. citizens, and afforded them the right to vote.

In summer 1866, Congress passed an act to reorganize the Army. 

The act, which authorized the Army to establish five artillery regiments, 

10 cavalry regiments, and 45 infantry regiments, stipulated that four of 

the infantry regiments and two of the cavalry regiments be “composed 

of colored men.”2 By 1869, the four infantry regiments had been 

consolidated into the 24th and 25th Infantry Regiments. The two cavalry 

regiments were designated the 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments. These 

four regiments were the start of black soldiers in the regular Army, and 

much of the history of the black military experience between the Civil War 

and World War I involved these units.

From 1866 to 1898, more than 12,500 African-Americans served in 

these regiments, earning 18 Medals of Honor. Their service was crucial 

to the opening of the American West. Roughly one in five U.S. Army 

soldiers who served on the Western frontier was African-American. 

They participated in skirmishes against Geronimo, Nana, and Victorio; 

built forts and roads; escorted wagon trains, stagecoaches, and mail runs; 

installed telegraph lines; and patrolled the Mexican border, among many 

other duties, much the same as all other frontier regiments. Their fierce 

fighting against Native Americans earned them their prestigious title of 
52 

“Buffalo Soldiers.” Although there are several legends associated with 

the origin of the name, one factor remains constant: Native Americans 

considered the buffalo to be among the most ferocious of fighters.3

From 1898 to 1918, Buffalo Soldiers fought in the Spanish-American 

War, the Philippine Insurrection, and Mexican border skirmishes during 

the Punitive Expedition, earning an additional five Medals of Honor. The 

Battle of San Juan Hill is a Buffalo Soldier victory as well as a Rough 

Rider victory, and the pursuit of Pancho Villa is a Buffalo Soldier success 

as well as a General John J. “Black Jack” Pershing success.4

The period between the Civil War and World War I was also the era 

when African-Americans began to earn regular Army commissioned 

officer status. To receive a regular Army officer commission, a young 

male had to be admitted to, attend, and graduate from the U.S. Military 

Academy (USMA) at West Point, New York.5 Between 1870 and 1889, 

approximately 27 young African-Americans were appointed to the 

USMA. Twelve passed the entrance exam and actually attended the 

academy for a period of time, but only three successfully completed the 

rigorous academic curriculum and survived social ostracism to earn the 

right to wear the shoulder boards of a regular U.S. Army commissioned 

officer.

In 1877, Lieutenant Henry Ossian Flipper was the first AfricanAmerican to graduate. After less than five years in active service, Flipper 

“It’s Up to Us Now.” Rick Reeves
53

was court-martialed and dishonorably discharged. Evidence eventually 

showed that Flipper was railroaded out of the Army, possibly due to racism.6

 Lieutenant John Hanks Alexander became the second AfricanAmerican to graduate from the USMA in 1887. Like Flipper, Alexander 

served in the black cavalry regiments on the Western Frontier. After more 

than six successful years on the frontier, Alexander was promoted to first 

lieutenant in October 1893 and subsequently assigned as Professor of 

Military Science and Tactics at Wilberforce University, Ohio, in January 

1894. Two months later on 26 March, Alexander abruptly died of apoplexy. In 1889, after five years at USMA, Charles Young became the third 

African-American graduate from West Point. After more than 30 years of 

service and promotion to the rank of full colonel, Young died while serving as attaché to Liberia in 1922.7

 Because of the “Jim Crow”8 laws and 

the “Separate but Equal” philosophy that sprang up in America after 1877, 

no other African-American graduated from USMA until 1936.9

Two serious “eyesores” were associated with the African-American 

military experience shortly after the turn of the century and the start of 

World War I. The first occurred in Brownsville, Texas, in 1906, and the 

second took place in Houston, Texas, in 1917. In Brownsville, on the night 

of 13-14 August 1906, a small riot erupted in which one person was killed, 

one wounded, and one injured. Although evidence was inconclusive, three 

companies (B, C, and D) of the 1st Battalion, 25th Infantry, stationed in 

Brownsville were accused of starting the riot and murdering and maiming 

innocent citizens. In November, President Theodore Roosevelt discharged 

the entire battalion (167 men) and barred them from further service, either 

in the military or civil service.10 Much of the black national community 

and its white supporters, and other whites who were simply enemies of 

Roosevelt, were outraged at the hasty and harsh treatment the regular 

Army soldiers received—to no avail, however, for the soldiers.

Eleven years later, another riot involving African-American infantrymen erupted. This riot was much more serious and thus cannot be 

analyzed in a capsule paragraph. At this point, the United States had 

officially entered World War I, and drafting and training American soldiers 

for deployment was well under way. The War Department had decided, 

however, not to use its four African-American regular Army regiments in 

Europe. The 9th Cavalry Regiment and the 25th Infantry Regiment were 

both stationed in the Pacific. The former was at Camp Luzon, Philippines, 

and the latter was at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. The 10th Cavalry 

Regiment and 24th Infantry Regiment were each put on border duty. The 
54 

10th was headquartered at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, while the 24th was 

headquartered at Camp Furlong, New Mexico. The 3d Battalion, 24th 

Infantry, was sent for duty to Houston, Texas, in July 1917. 

The veteran soldiers of the 3d Battalion, some of whom had seen 

action during the Spanish-American War and others during the latter part 

of the frontier days, arrived in Houston unwilling to accept the Jim Crow 

laws of the South. Within a month of their arrival, on 23 August, tempers 

began to flare. When one of the soldiers tried to stop a local policeman 

from beating a local black woman, the policeman beat the soldier with 

his pistol and arrested him. When a military policeman (MP) from the 

battalion came to check on the soldiers, the local policeman took offense 

at the MP’s behavior and pistol-whipped him also. Although the black MP, 

who was also arrested, was later released, rumors had spread throughout 

the battalion that he was dead. In the riot, which had been precipitated by 

the beating of a black woman and an unfortunate rumor, two black soldiers 

and 17 white men, including five policemen, were killed.11

Unlike the Brownsville riot, African-American soldiers, without doubt, 

did riot and perhaps kill their opponents in Houston. Like Brownsville, 

however, punishment was swift and harsh. Within a month, 156 members 

of the 3d Battalion, 24th Infantry, were court-martialed. At the conclusion 

of all trials, 19 soldiers were hanged, 41 received life sentences, and others 

received various punishments. There were five acquittals.12

Brownsville and Houston are two excellent military-related examples 

of what the state of race relations throughout America was like as much of 

Europe was speeding headlong into a war. Indeed, Jim Crowism and the 

separate but equal philosophy rooted in America in the early 1900s were 

the causes of racial riots whether they were initiated by angered blacks or 

outraged whites. Regardless of why there was a Brownsville or a Houston, 

however, two significant facts remain. First, those riots would negatively 

affect black-white military relations until after World War II. Second, 

those riots were not enough to negate the facts that America would need 

to call upon black citizens during the war and that the black citizens were 

going to answer that call. 

***

The war in Europe was inevitable. For centuries, the land north of 

the Mediterranean Sea and south of the North and Baltic Seas had been 

inextricably linked. For example, at least four of the major monarchs of 
55

the soon-to-be opposing forces in Europe were relatives. Queen Victoria 

had nine sons and daughters who were responsible for the many scattered 

monarchs in Europe. King George V of England, King Albert of Belgium, 

Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, and Czar Nicholas II of Russia were all 

descendants of Queen Victoria.13

It was virtually impossible for one European country to go to war 

against a neighbor without causing another country to enter. Prewar plans 

and political alliances were the causes of these entanglements, otherwise 

known as “entangling alliances.” The assassination of Archduke Francis 

Ferdinand of Austria on 28 June 1914 in Sarajevo was the spark that lit 

the fuse on the powderkeg that caused the entangling alliances to explode. 

Because of the assassination and failed negotiations that followed, 

Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on 28 July. In support of Serbia, 

Russia began to mobilize against Austria on 30 July. Germany, fearing 

that an unopposed early Russian mobilization would give Russia a marked 

advantage, began to mobilize and declared war against Russia on 1 

August. After failing to receive assurances from France that it would not 

mobilize in the event of a Russo-German conflict, Germany declared war 

on France on 3 August because Germany’s “lock-step” Schlieffen Plan 

dictated that it had to defeat France before it could turn and defeat Russia. 

For the Schlieffen Plan to be successful, Germany had to attack France 

through Belgium. By violating Belgian neutrality, Germany triggered 

an 1839 British-Belgian agreement, leading England to declare war on 

Germany on 4 August.14 Between 28 July and 6 August, a period of less 

than two weeks, seven nations—Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Germany, 

Russia, France, Belgium, and England—were at war. It would be nearly 

three years before the United States entered the Great War. 

***

The brewing European powderkeg, however, meant very little to the 

average American in 1914. Thus, it was no surprise that most AfricanAmericans gave it little or no thought at all. African-Americans were 

battling their own internal struggles. In 1914, there had been approximately 

69 documented lynchings.15 Thousands of Southern African-Americans 

were economic slaves of the sharecropping system. Each year a 

sharecropper, black or white, planted and harvested his crop only to find 

that his surplus was not enough to cover the landlord’s overhead. By 1914, 

many Southern tenant farmers were second-generation sharecroppers, 

obligated to their landlords for years of overhead. To add insult to injury, 
56 

the boll weevil had severely damaged much of the Southern agricultural 

economy around 1916.

African-Americans had the lowest paying jobs, traveled in segregated 

public transportation, and lived in the poorest neighborhoods in the 

country. Education was definitely separate but not nearly equal. During the 

school year of 1911-1912, Southern states spent $2.89 annually to educate 

a black child. Conversely, they spent $10.32 yearly to educate each white 

child. In 1917, an Atlanta school board discontinued a black seventh grade 

class to fund a local white school.16 Clearly, the state of “black” America 

when World War I erupted was bleak. That, however, did not stop roughly 

370,000 African-American soldiers from serving during the war.

Once the United States declared war against Germany on 6 April 1917, 

there were three sources of African-American manpower. In addition to 

the four regular Army regiments, which would not be deployed, several 

states had African-American National Guard units and the draft.

Surely, the best trained and most combat-ready African-American 

soldiers were the men of the 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments and the 

24th and 25th Infantry Regiments. But as we have already seen, these 

units were selected to remain on duty in the Pacific and along the 

United States-Mexico border. The War Department, however, did not 

completely overlook the four regiments. The first sergeants and senior 

noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the newly formed labor units were 

selected from “suitable enlisted men . . . from the . . . regular Army.”17

In addition, 250 former NCOs of the 10th Cavalry and the 24th and 25th

Infantry Regiments were selected to attend Officer Training School at Fort 

Des Moines, Iowa.18

The second likely source of manpower came from National 

Guard units. Seven states—New York, Illinois, Ohio, Massachusetts, 

Connecticut, Maryland, and Tennessee—and the District of Columbia 

(DC) had African-American National Guard units. One could argue that 

some of these National Guard units were as trained or as ready for combat 

as many regular Army units. The 9th Battalion, Ohio Infantry, which 

was formed before the Spanish-American War, was commanded by then 

Brevet Major Charles Young during that war, and “the 8th Illinois had 

seen actual combat service on the Mexican border.”19 The War Department 

began looking to the National Guard to fill NCO slots as a testament to 

their capabilities. The black National Guard units that became federalized 

during the war were the 15th New York Infantry; 8th Illinois Infantry; 

1st Battalion, DC Infantry; 9th Battalion, Ohio Infantry; 1st Separate 
57

Company, Massachusetts Infantry; Company L, 6th Massachusetts 

Infantry; 1st Separate Company, Connecticut Infantry; 1st Separate 

Company, Maryland Infantry; and Separate Company G, Tennessee 

Infantry.20 At the time of federalization, only the 15th New York and 8th

Illinois were near full-regimental strength. The 1st DC Infantry and the 9th

Ohio each had less than 1,000 men, and the various separate companies 

had roughly 150 men each.21

As white National Guard divisions were training and preparing 

themselves for overseas duty, they began one by one to point out that “it 

[was] impracticable to use the . . . (colored) . . . part of their Division.” The 

26th Division actually sailed to France, leaving both the Massachusetts 

and Connecticut Separate Companies in the United States. To solve the 

dilemma, the War Department decided to make a provisional (not full) 

division out of the National Guard units. The 15th New York and the 8th 

Illinois, respectively, became the 369th and 370th Infantry Regiments. 

The various units from DC, Ohio, Tennessee, Maryland, Massachusetts, 

and Connecticut all became the 372d Infantry Regiment. To round out 

the provisional division, draftees were trained and formed into the 371st 

Infantry Regiment. Collectively, the four regiments became the 93d 

Division (Provisional).22

The third likely source of manpower came from within the general 

population. In May 1917, the War Department passed the draft law, which 

required all men between 21 and 31 years of age to register for the draft. As 

a result, approximately 367,710 African-American citizens were inducted 

into the service.23 The majority of African-American draftees ended 

up serving in services of supply (SOS) units because many Americans 

believed that, regardless of evidence proving otherwise dating back to 

the Revolutionary War, African-American soldiers were unfit for combat 

service. To placate the African-American population, however, a number 

of the draftees were formed into a combat division. After careful screening, 

the “best” 26,000 African-American draftees were selected to form the 

92d Division. Unlike the 93d Division (Provisional), the 92d Division was 

organized and brought to full strength. Its four infantry regiments were 

the 365th, 366th, 367th, and 368th. The 349th, 350th, and 351st were the 

division’s three field artillery regiments. The division also included the 

317th Engineer Battalion; the 325th Signal Battalion; the 349th, 350th,

and 351st Machine Gun Battalions; the 316th Laundry Service Company; 

the 317th Trench-Mortar Battery; the 322d Butchery Service Company; 

and various other small specialty units. Like the 93d, each regiment of the 

92d and several of the specialty units were trained at separate locations 
58 

in the United States, only to be brought together as a complete division 

once in France.24 No other American division was organized and trained in 

that manner. Every other American division trained as a complete division 

while on American soil before being thrown into the fray. 

***

Between summer 1917 and spring 1918, American divisions remained 

busy organizing and training for combat. As early as December 1917, U.S. 

units, including the 369th Infantry Regiment, were on their way across 

the Atlantic. It has been estimated that only 20 percent of all AfricanAmerican soldiers who went to Europe saw actual combat. Certainly, the 

92d and 93d Infantry Divisions, both of which participated in combat, 

only accounted for a small percentage of the African-American combat 

personnel. Although nearly all of the National Guard soldiers (93d 

Division [Provisional]) and most of the regular Army transfer soldiers 

(92d Division) saw combat, most of the drafted African-American soldiers 

served in SOS, or labor, units. In fact, as the next segment of this chapter 

explores the service of African-American soldiers in France, the reader 

may conclude that a combat multiplier may not necessarily be a “trigger 

puller” or “cannon cocker.”

Once in France, African-American service members either served in 

labor units, pioneer infantry units, or in the two infantry divisions. Labor 

units were generally stationed well behind enemy lines and did manual 

labor. It has been estimated that one-third of all U.S. labor troops were 

African-American. Most pioneer infantry units, although they were not 

“infantry” units, were trained in the basics of infantry tactics and drill 

because of their potential to be deployed near the front. African-American 

pioneer infantry units, on the other hand, usually were pioneer infantry 

in name only. Most received little, if any, infantry training. They could, 

however, perform pioneering missions. 

From the outset, the War Department never intended to use most of 

the African-American drafted soldiers in combat units. Shortly after the 

first African-American draftees were called in September 1917, most 

were earmarked for labor units. Initially, labor companies numbered 200 

men.25 By the time units deployed, the War Department concluded that to 

make more efficient use of “laborers in uniform,” as the African-American 

draftees came to be called, 3,500-man battalions should be formed. By 

the time the war ended, the laborers in uniform had been organized into 

“46 engineer service battalions, 44 labor battalions, 24 labor companies . 

. . three stevedore regiments and two stevedore battalions.” Their duties 
59

included loading and unloading ships, both in the United States and 

abroad. They dug ditches; policed (cleaned) camps; hauled wood, stones, 

and coal; disposed of garbage; cared for animals and livestock; and cut 

trees. Once the war was over, they were given the worst assignment for 

any soldier, graves registration, which is locating, retrieving, recording, 

and reburying the dead.26 In these roles, nonetheless, their contributions 

were apparent. 

***

When U.S. convoys began sailing as early as June 1917, more than 

400 African-American civilian stevedores were on board. Their mission 

was to ensure that the ships were unloaded quickly. Gradually, as the 

draft took shape and the war continued, the civilian stevedores were 

replaced with SOS troops. Stevedores accomplished unheard-of tasks by 

working in shifts around the clock. On one particular occasion, stevedores 

unloaded 5,000 tons of cargo and 42,000 men with their gear in a single 

day. A stevedore unit in Bordeaux, France, unloaded nearly 800,000 tons 

of needed materials in a single month. At nearly all major French ports, 

laborers in uniform made it possible for men and materiel to get to the 

front expeditiously. A group of soldiers at Brest, France, unloaded 1,200 

tons of flour in 18 hours. In a competition of sorts against themselves, they 

unloaded an average of 2,000 tons daily for the next five days. Stevedore 

units would start work the moment ships docked and would not stop until 

the mission was complete. As one white observer noted, they “packed and 

unpacked the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in a manner never 

attempted since Noah loaded the Ark.” A white Southern journalist echoed 

that idea by saying, “The victory that we are going to win will not be an 

all-white victory by any . . . means.”27 It is not this type of work that makes 

war sound glamorous to the child bouncing on his grandfather’s knee, but 

it was, and is, this type of work that enhances the chance of victory in 

wars.

African-American pioneer infantry regiments were not organized until 

summer 1918. In addition to conducting labor tasks, they also went to the 

front. Of the 17 that were organized, seven earned the right to fly battle 

ribbons because of their proximity to the front. On many occasions, the 

line between laborer, technician, and infantryman merged as one for them. 

There is no doubt that the roles of combat support and combat service 

support troops are vital to a war effort, but as always, the soldiers in the 

combat units normally received much of the spotlight. This universal 

attitude was also true for African-American soldiers during the Great War. 
60 

Although the 92d and 93d Divisions were only roughly 20 percent of all 

African-American soldiers who went to Europe, their participation is more 

known by students of history.

As discussed earlier, the 92d and 93d Divisions were organized and 

trained beginning in fall 1917. The 92d was a complete division composed 

mainly of draftees. The 93d was a provisional division composed of 

national guardsmen, except for one regiment. Both divisions were trained 

“in a vacuum,” only to be brought together once in France. Before 

examining each division’s role, participation, and contributions to the war 

effort, a brief look at the general war situation will be helpful. 

***

After the entangling alliances erupted into full-blown war and the 

Schlieffen Plan was set into motion, the war on the Western Front evolved 

into a “race to the sea”—the English Channel—with each side desperately 

trying to outflank the other. Unable to outflank each other, both sides 

Black laborers in uniform performed incredible feats, unloading vital supplies in France. 

Here, men of the 301st and 303d Stevedores form a chain to empty a lighter at Brest. (U.S. 

Signal Corps No. 111-SC-18315, National Archives)
61

settled on their frontages and began to build bunkers, fortifications, and 

trenches. This defined the warfare on the Western Front for the next two 

years, trench warfare. Concurrently, the Germans were engaged in a 

much greater war, some would argue, on their Eastern Front against the 

Russians. Great innovations were introduced into warfare to break the 

stalemate of attrition warfare. Technological innovations included the 

tank and airplane, tactical innovations included shorter artillery barrages 

and shock troopers, and operations away from the main fronts, known 

as peripheral operations, were conducted at Gallipoli and the North Sea. 

None proved to be overly decisive.

By the time the United States declared war on Germany on 6 April 

1917, both the Allies and Central Powers had nearly “bled each other 

white.” Since all belligerents were proportionally attrited and tired, the 

war, especially on the Western Front—but also on the Eastern Front due 

to internal Russian strife—could have gone either way. It is correct to 

conclude that had the United States not entered the war, the Allies could 

have lost. It is not correct to conclude, however, based on the magnitude 

and length of the war before U.S. involvement, that the United States 

won the war. The question for this study, though, is whether the United 

States could have sustained itself enough to support the Allies without the 

support of its African-American soldiers. We have already seen that as 

much as one-third of all U.S. labor troops were African-American and that 

a fighting force cannot operate without support from noncombat forces. 

So, what about the other 20 percent of the African-American soldiers? The 

next sections will examine the contributions of the 93d Division, followed 

by those of the 92d Division. 

***

The 93d Division (Provisional) was officially organized in December 

1917. Wasting little time, the War Department deployed the 369th Infantry 

Regiment out of Hoboken on 12 December. The other three regiments 

sailed in February, March, and April.28 The 369th Regiment’s initial duties 

were as SOS troops. After three months of SOS duty, the regiment moved 

to Givry-en-Argonne on 12 March and was attached to the 16th Division 

(French). Following one month of training with the French, the 369th 

Regiment was given a 4.5 kilometer sector near the west bank of the Aisne 

River to defend. During the occupation of this sector from mid-April 

through 4 July, the 369th, which was only 1 percent of all American troops 

in France at the time, held roughly 20 percent of all territories assigned 
62 

to the AEF. In May, 369th’s Sergeant Henry Johnson, became the first 

American soldier to be awarded the French Croix de Guerre for singlehandedly killing four German soldiers and wounding approximately 32 

others. Johnson’s observation post teammate, Private Needham Roberts, 

perhaps inflicted some of the casualties, but he had been so severely 

wounded in the opening moments of the raid that he was able to offer 

Johnson very little help.29 Johnson and Roberts were among the first 

American heroes of the Great War. Although they epitomized the fighting 

will of many African-American soldiers in the 369th and, indeed, the other 

seven infantry regiments of the 92d and 93d Divisions, most American 

officials were still reluctant to praise or embrace them.

In June, the 369th continued to support the French 16th Division near 

Belleau Wood as the Germans continued their spring offensive. After 

successfully helping the 16th Division stop the Germans’ all-important 

spring attack, the 369th was reassigned to the French 161st Division in 

July to help spoil additional German attacks. The German spring and 

early summer attacks—also known as the Ludendorff Offensive—were 

extremely critical for the Germans, because they realized they had to break 

the will of the Allies and force a capitulation before most of the U.S. Army 

might was ready for action. With the help of the few American forces 

that had been committed by April, May, and June, essentially the U.S. 1st 

Infantry Division and U.S. 93d Division, the much-needed German victory 

was thwarted.30 Throughout the summer months, the 369th participated in 

the Champagne-Marne defensive and occupied several other key sectors 

in the 161st Division’s area of operations. These areas included the 

Beausejour subsector, the Calvaire subsector, and ultimately the SommeBionne area. The occupation of these zones was in preparation for the final 

offensive of the war, which was to be initiated on 26 September. Colonel 

William Hayward, the 369th’s white regimental commander was proud 

of his men’s performance during summer 1918. Commenting on their 

role, he said, “[t]he first thing I knew all there was between the German 

Army and Paris on a stretch of front a little more than four miles long was 

my regiment of Negroes. . . . No German ever got into a trench with my 

regiment who did not stay there or go back with the brand of my boys on 

him.”31

While the 369th was receiving its baptism in fire beginning in April, 

the other three regiments of the 93d Division were completing training 

with their French counterparts and moving into sectors near and on the 

front. The 370th joined the French 10th Division near the Swiss border 

on 1 June and was baptized in battle in July. One of the greatest moments 
63

in the 370th’s history came in August when the regiment captured 200 

machine guns, 45 trench mortars, and four cannons, and took nearly 1,900 

German prisoners.32 The 371st was sent to Rembercourt, 15 miles west of 

Verdun, in April as part of the famed French 157th Division.33 Because of 

its proximity to the front during training, the 371st became used to daily 

artillery barrages during two months of training with the 157th. The 371st 

finally began to see action in July, but much of it was raiding and patrolling 

missions. The 372d, on arriving in France in April, was also immediately 

assigned to a French unit. Initially assigned to the XIII Corps, on 26 May, 

it was assigned to the 63d French Division and began occupying the Aire 

sector on the Meuse-Argonne Front on 4 June. Throughout the remainder 

of the summer, the 372d, like its sister regiments, was bounced around 

from division to division, but it did not see any serious action until the final 

American/Allied offensive in September. By the last week of September, 

all regiments of the 93d Division were fully integrated into their French 

units, ready to assist in delivering the coup de grace to the Central Powers. 

The 369th, 371st, and 372d were with the French Fourth Army in the 

Meuse-Argonne, and the 370th was with the French Tenth Army in the 

Oise-Aisne.

From 26 September until the Armistice on 11 November, the Allies 

were poised from the English Channel to the Swiss Border, ready to go 

on the counterattack after reacting for the past several months to German 

offensives. With the Belgians and British on the left, the French and AEF 

on the right, and two French armies in the center—to which elements of 

the 93d Division were assigned—the Allies were in the position of either 

losing or winning the Great War. 

At 0525 on 26 September, a rolling barrage led elements of the French 

Fourth Army into battle. During the attack, the 3d Battalion, 369th Infantry, 

closed a gap that had developed between the French 163d Infantry on its 

right and the 2d Moroccan Division to its left. While closing the gap, the 

369th was able to continue the attack and subsequently capture the town 

of Riport. At 1530 and 1700, the 2d and 3d Battalions, respectively, attacked but had little success reaching their objectives. They had also 

suffered heavy casualties. By nightfall on the first day, the “3d Battalion, 

369th Infantry, was assigned to the assault echelon, the 2d Battalion to the 

support and the 1st Battalion to division reserve . . . the 371st and 372d 

Infantry Regiments [as part of the 157th Division] were . . . moved forward to . . . Butte du-Mesnil.”34 The 371st made its first attack during the 

Meuse-Argonne Offensive on 28 September, and the 372d had attacked 

on 27 September. For the next week and a half, the 369th, 371st, and 372d 
64 

Regiments performed as well as any other Allied regiment in the MeuseArgonne. Each had its good moments and bad moments. One regiment of 

the 93d Division though, achieved many accomplishments that no other 

American regiment could boast. During the Meuse-Argonne offensive, 

the 369th spent nine consecutive days in sustained attack—the average 

was four days. It had perhaps the largest percentage of French-speaking 

soldiers, owing to the fact that most of the African-American soldiers took 

time to learn the language. It spent an incredible 191 days in the trenches—more than any other U.S. unit. It was the first Allied unit to reach the 

bank of the Rhine River, and the entire unit earned the French Croix de 

Guerre.35 The 369th, also widely known as the Harlem Hellfighters, was 

among the most celebrated units to emerge from the Great War. As time 

passed, however, the 369th’s efforts soon became a footnote and eventually disappeared from many popular history accounts. Units such as the 3d 

Infantry Division, which definitely earned its name, “Rock of the Marne,” 

would be made legendary by numerous popular historical accounts.

While the 369th, 371st, and 372d Infantries fought in the MeuseArgonne Campaign, the 370th Infantry was fighting in the Oise-Aisne 

Campaign with the French Tenth Army. As discussed earlier, the 370th 

arrived in theater in April and saw its first action in July. The rest of 

the summer was fairly quiet for the 370th, but its troops finally began 

to proceed to the front on 14 September with the French 59th Division. 

“During the night of September 22-23, the 1st Battalion, 370th Infantry, 

relieved French troops in the front . . . 2nd Battalion was placed in support 

. . . and the 3rd Battalion in reserve. . . . The 370th took command of the 

left subsector of the French 59th Division on September 24.”36 Isolated 

enemy actions occurred on the division’s right flank between 25 and 27 

September. During this period, the 370th was involved in minor incidents 

on the left. Concurrently on 26 September, the Allied First Army (U.S.) and 

Fourth Army (French), with the 369th, 371st, and 372d attached, launched 

their Meuse-Argonne Offensive. As a result of the Meuse-Argonne 

Offensive, the German crown prince withdrew most of his forces opposite 

the Oise-Aisne sector to reinforce the Meuse-Argonne sector. News of 

the German withdrawal inspired the French Tenth Army to attack on 28 

September. Early on the 28th, the 370th Regiment had little success on 

its own right flank, but succeeded on its left in occupying its objective by 

noon. The overall objectives given the 59th Division on the 28th were first 

to control a bend in the canal near Pinon and east of Ferme de la Riviere 

to Ecluse and then to occupy a line from Lizy to Bois de Mortier. “The 

French 59th Division with three regiments in line, was to make a turning 
65

movement, pivoting on the 370th Infantry. . . . The 370th Infantry was 

charged with protecting the left flank of the division from attacks coming 

from the wooded area northwest of Anizy-le Chateau.”37 After three days 

of fighting, the division accomplished its mission except for 30 September, 

when elements of the 370th Regiment “became confused and lost,” the 

370th was successful on the left flank throughout the offensive.38

From 1 to 3 October, the 370th Regiment conducted mopup missions 

south of the canal and, along with the 59th Division, was taken out of frontline action on 6 October. Between 6 October and 4 November, the 370th 

Infantry Regiment performed in a support and reserve role and spent a 

fortnight (13 to 27 October) on road construction duty while it reorganized. 

The September fighting had taken a heavy toll on the 59th Division. The 

370th alone had suffered “450 to 600 killed and wounded.”39

On the night of 27-28 October, the 370th Infantry Regiment began its 

movement back toward the front to the north and east of Laon. The 59th

Division’s mission was “to join in the attack . . . and to be ready to pursue 

vigorously any German withdrawal.”40 The Germans finally made a move 

on the night of 4-5 November, and the 59th Division initiated pursuit on 5 

November and stayed with it until 11 November. Throughout the pursuit, 

the 370th did not fight as a regiment. Each battalion served separately with 

a different French regiment. As a regiment, the 370th was not awarded the 

Croix de Guerre, but 71 members of the regiment received the award.

Analogous with the way it was trained in the United States—

separately—the 93d Division fought separately. Nonetheless, the 93d 

Division’s record speaks for itself. Under French divisions and senior 

leaders, who treated and respected them as equals, the 369th, 370th, 371st,

and 372d Regiments enhanced the success of the French Fourth and Tenth 

Armies. With a total of 3,167 casualties—which was more than 32 percent 

of the division strength—the 93d Division more than shed its share of 

blood on French soil. 

***

The 92d Division was officially organized in November 1917. It did 

not reach full strength, however, until May 1918 and sailed for Europe in 

June. By 12 July, the entire division was finally in country. During the last 

week of August, most of the division (minus artillery) began occupying the 

Saint Die sector, and by late September, it had moved southwest of Verdun 

where it was assigned to the American I Corps. Between late August and 
66 

19 September, the 92d Division conducted many successful patrols. By 

the time it was rushed to the front for the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, set 

to begin on 26 September, it had been baptized. Patrols, though, were a far 

cry from frontline trench warfare.41

When the offensive began, the 365th, 366th, and 367th Regiments 

of the division were placed in reserve. The 368th Infantry Regiment 

was assigned to the Franco-American liaison detachment, known as 

Groupement Durand, to coordinate actions between the French Fourth 

Army and the American First Army. “The plan for the Meuse-Argonne 

offensive [was] that the First Army would advance rapidly east of the 

Argonne Forest, and that the main attack of the French Fourth Army would 

be made west of the Aisne River. By this enveloping action, the enemy was 

to be forced to evacuate his strong positions in the Argonne Forest.”42 As 

the two armies advanced, an 800-meter gap developed within the sectors 

between the armies. The 368th did its best as the gap developed, but its 

best was not nearly enough. The specific mission of the 368th was to “keep 

the enemy under surveillance and maintain contact [and maintain] liaison 

to both flanks.”43

At roughly 0525 on 26 September, the 2d Battalion, 368th Infantry, 

attacked. By the end of the day, it had not been successful in establishing 

liaison between the French and American forces. The 3d Battalion, except 

for Company G, that had initially established liaison and an organized 

front, also eventually lost contact with Allied forces by the end of the day. 

The 1st Battalion remained in division reserve. From that point on, things 

began to go downhill for the 368th Infantry. To further complicate matters 

for the 368th, during the attack, the French artillery failed to provide 

barrage fire, and no heavy wirecutters were issued to the battalion. As a 

result, the 368th was vulnerable to enemy fire and its movement hampered 

by its inability to cut through the wire.

On 27 September, the 368th continued its mission. For most of the 

morning, the 2d Battalion was confused and spent a lot of time trying to 

get organized. Once it did begin to advance late in the day, several companies became separated from each other. Concurrently, the 3d Battalion 

experienced a similar fate. It did not commence its attack until 1730 and 

failed to maintain liaison with units on its flanks and front. No noticeable 

progress was realised on 27 September, but 28 September proved to be another bad day for the 368th, although the 2d and 3d battalions attacked in 

the morning this time, neither was able to establish or maintain liaison. On 

that day, the 1st Battalion was finally put on notice to begin preparations 
67

Map 1. Meuse-Argonne Front
68 

to move out of the reserve.

At approximately 0055 on 29 September, the French command ordered the 1st Battalion to relieve the 3d Battalion. After a disorganized 

relief, both the 2d and 3d Battalions withdrew from frontline positions. On 

30 September, the entire regiment was ordered to withdraw from the front 

and directed to a rear area. Ironically, however, the 368th’s one success occurred in the wake of miscommunications during the withdrawal. The 1st 

Battalion did not receive the withdrawal order in time and, as a result, continued its mission and subsequently entered Binerville about 1600. First 

Battalion’s success was too little too late. When the 368th returned from 

the frontline, its reputation had preceded it. The other three regiments had 

already heard from critics that the African-American soldiers had shown 

no promise. Yet, within days, the entire division was ordered to participate 

in another crucial mission, and men of the 92d Division knew they were 

entering an uphill race. It had to be difficult to go into battle knowing that 

your leaders and fellow Americans felt disdain for you.

On 9 October, at approximately 2300, the 92d Division assumed 

command of the right flank sector of the First Army, IV Corps, in the 

Marbache sector. “The mission of the 92d Division was to hold the line 

of the First Army east of the Moselle. It was to harass the enemy by 

frequent patrols, thus ensuring control of the immediate foreground in the 

divisional sector.”44 For the remainder of the war, most of the actions of 

the division consisted of active patrolling in which many more casualties 

were suffered. Although the 92d Division successfully accomplished its 

patrolling missions throughout October and held its line during the last 

Allied offensive in November, it could not shake the scar inflicted on it by 

the 368th’s performance in late September. With a total casualty figure of 

1,294, the 92d Division, like its sister division, shed its share of blood on 

French soil.45

There is no doubt that the 368th performed poorly in battle between 

26 and 30 September. Several historians have raised interesting issues 

over the years concerning the 368th in the Meuse-Argonne. Why, after 

only a few months in theater and no combat experience beyond patrolling, was the 92d Division assigned such a difficult mission? Liaison duty 

between two adjacent units, especially in the heat of combat, requires not 

only coordination and synchronization but it also requires experience. 

The 92d Division possessed none of those qualities. For more than half 

a century after the Great War ended, no one other than veterans of the 

division and “nonmainstream” scholars and historians defended the 92d 
69

Division. Similar failures by white divisions were articulately defended. 

For example, on 29 September, elements of the 35th Division failed on 

the battlefield. The same writers who vociferously condemned the entire 

92d Division for 368th’s poor showing explained that “this was the 35th

Division’s first battle; liaison and headquarters organization proved inefficient; food and supplies were delivered with great difficulty; so morale 

disintegrated, and . . . the entire division fell back.”46 Clearly, there existed 

a double standard.

Another issue to consider when examining contemporary accounts of 

the 92d’s performance, as well as the 93d Division’s, was the percentage 

of African-American officers in each regiment. The higher the percentage 

of African-American officers, the lower the regiment was rated.47 In the 

overall scheme, percentages, ratios, comparisons, and so forth mattered 

little because all African-American soldiers were generally put in one 

category based on the least common denominator. If one was bad, they all 

were bad. If one was good, he was an anomaly. Noted historian Edward 

M. Coffman perhaps said it best, “On the very days in late September 

that the 368th had its difficulties . . . the 369th, 370th, 371st, and 372d 

were carrying out successfully their missions . . . in Champagne and the 

Oise-Aisne Sectors. And the 370th was officered largely by Negroes. The 

French praised these regiments but white Americans chose to remember 

the 368th.”48

***

It is completely possible at this point for the reader to make a 

logical conclusion about the participation and contributions of AfricanAmerican soldiers during the Great War and answer the question, “Were 

they combat multipliers?” There are, however, a few other factors to 

consider before analyzing their role. In addition to living in a socially, 

politically, and economically segregated society, yet asked to defend 

democracy in a faraway land, African-American soldiers, while the war 

was still raging, had to face and deal with German propaganda, secret 

directives issued by the United States to the French about the inferiority 

of blacks, discrimination against the highest-ranking African-American 

commissioned officers, lynchings, and much more.

Propaganda has long been a tool of war. Some belligerents have used 

it successfully, while others have failed. During the Great War, Germany 

employed a vigorous propaganda campaign directed at African-American 
70 

soldiers. During summer 1918, the Germans dropped leaflets into AfricanAmerican units’ lines stating:

Hello, boys, what are you doing over here? Fighting the 

Germans? Why? Have they ever done you any harm? Of 

course some white folks and the lying English-American 

papers told you that the Germans ought to be wiped out for 

the sake of humanity and Democracy. What is Democracy? 

Personal freedom; all citizens enjoying the same rights socially 

and before the law. Do you enjoy the same rights as the white 

people do in America, the land of freedom and Democracy, or 

are you not rather treated over there as second class citizens? 

Can you get into a restaurant where white people dine? Can you 

get a seat in a theater where white people sit? Can you get a seat 

or berth in a railroad car, or can you even ride in the South in 

the same street car with the white people?

And how about the law? Is lynching and the most horrible crimes 

connected therewith, a lawful proceeding in a Democratic 

country? Now all this is entirely different in Germany where 

they do like colored people; where they treat them as gentlemen 

and as white men, and quite a number of colored people have 

fine positions in business in Berlin and other German cities. 

Why, then, fight the Germans only for the benefit of the Wall 

Street robbers, and to protect the millions that they have loaned 

to the English, French, and Italians. 

You have been made the tool of the egoistic and rapacious rich 

in America, and there is nothing in the whole game for you but 

broken bones, horrible wounds, spoiled health, or death. No 

satisfaction whatever will you get out of this unjust war. You 

have never seen Germany, so you are fools if you allow people 

to make you hate us. Come over and see for yourself. Let those 

do the fighting who make the profit out of this war. Don’t allow 

them to use you as cannon fodder.

To carry a gun in this service is not an honor, but a shame. 

Throw it away and come over to the German lines. You will find 

friends who will help you.49

The crafty and greatly insightful leaflet prepared by the Germans in 

1918 still captures the soul of the 21st-century reader. But because of 

loyalty, patriotism, a strong scene of worth, and the hopes of returning 

to an America that in the end would embrace them, African-Americans 

were not swayed by the German propaganda machine.

Perhaps more damaging to the spirit of African-American troops was 
71

the American document titled “Secret Information Concerning Black 

American Troops,” issued in August 1918. Excerpts from the document 

speak for themselves:

1. It is important for French officers who have been called on 

to exercise command over black American troops, or to live in 

close contact with them, to have an exact idea of the position 

occupied by Negroes in the United States.

2. The American attitude on the Negro question . . . is unanimous 

on the “color question” and does not admit of any discussion.

The increasing number of Negroes in the United States (about 

15,000,000) would create for the white race . . . a menace 

. . . were it not [for] an impassable gulf [established] between 

them.

As this danger (large black population) does not exist for the 

French race, the French [have] become accustomed to treating 

the Negro with familiarity and indulgence.

This indulgence and this familiarity are matters of grievous 

concern to the Americans. They (white Americans) are afraid 

that contact with the French will inspire in black Americans 

aspirations. . . . It is of the utmost importance that every effort 

be made to avoid profoundly estranging American opinion.

Although a citizen of the United States, the black man is 

regarded by the white American as an inferior being.

CONCLUSION

1. We must prevent the rise of any pronounced degree of 

intimacy between French officers and black officers. . . . We 

must not eat with them, must not shake hands or seek to talk or 

meet with them outside of the requirements of military service.

2. We must not commend too highly the black American troop. 

. . . It is all right to recognize their good qualities and their 

services, but only in moderate terms.

Military authority cannot intervene directly in this question, but 

it can through the civil authorities exercise some influence on 

the population.50

The effect that this document had on the African-American/French 

relationship is unclear. It is clear, however, that most Frenchmen treated 

and respected African-American soldiers as equals.
72 

Among the most devastating blows to the African-American elite and 

soldier population was the treatment of African-American commissioned 

officers. Several field grade African-American officers were reassigned 

or relieved of leadership roles throughout the war. The 8th Illinois, 

which became the 370th, had African-American officers from Colonel 

Franklin A. Dennison, the regimental commander, on down to platoon 

leaders. Once in France, Dennison was relieved, allegedly for ill health. 

The highest-ranking African-American officer to serve in France was 

Lieutenant Colonel Otis B. Duncan, a battalion commander in the 370th. 

The most egregious injustice, though, was done to Lieutenant Colonel 

Charles Young.51 Young was the only African-American West Point 

graduate still on active duty when the United States entered the war. He was 

by far the senior-ranking African-American line officer in active service. 

With more than 27 years of successful active service, Young was as well 

qualified as any other commissioned officer to lead and command troops. 

During the Spanish-American War, he had commanded the 9th Battalion, 

Ohio Infantry. Young had led troops during the Punitive Expedition in 

1916 while serving under General John J. Pershing. In 1917, he was 

commanding a cavalry battalion in the 10th Cavalry Regiment. Obviously, 

this meant Young had white junior officers under his command. Led by 

First Lieutenant Albert B. Dockery, white officers began to complain 

about having to serve under a black officer. Not only was Young removed 

from his command position in spring 1917, as a result of these complaints, 

he was also forced to retire in the summer for alleged ill health—the same 

fate that would await Dennison of the 370th. 

After several unsuccessful attempts from the black elite and their white 

supporters, coupled with a 497-mile horseback ride by Young from his 

station in Ohio to Washington, DC, to prove his health, Young was still put 

on the retired list. Why was Dennison relieved? Why was Young retired? 

As stated, the official reasons were tied to health. Several historians, 

however, have suggested reasons other than health. It is interesting to note 

that in Young’s case, he had recently passed a physical examination with 

flying colors. More important, was the fact that due to Young’s seniority 

and successful service to that point, he was number six on the list to be 

promoted to colonel and would definitely have been promoted to brigadier 

general because of the rapid wartime promotion schedule.52 Jim Crow 

America was just not ready for an African-American general officer in 

1917. Forced retirement may have been the scapegoat solution because 

Young was brought back on active duty on 6 November 1918, just five 

days before the war ended.
73

 Through it all, the soldiers 

in the SOS units, pioneer units, 

and the 92d and 93d Divisions 

continued to serve, just like 

their fathers before them had 

done. Their beliefs and hopes 

were the same as their ancestors. 

Some believed, while others 

hoped, that this time their war 

participation would result in a 

positive change for their race; 

that America would welcome 

them home with open arms and 

a warm embrace of “well done 

my good and faithful servants.”

 Parades down New York’s 

Fifth Avenue in early 1919 

were jubilant for all returning 

American soldiers, especially 

for the Fighting 15th New York, 

Harlem Hellfighters, and the 

369th Regiment. It appeared 

that their beliefs and hopes of 

full equality and acceptance had 

come to fruition. It was not long, 

however, before mob violence 

proved that things had not changed much. Among the lynching victims of 

1919 were 10 African-American soldiers still in uniform. In fact, summer 

1919, known as Red Summer, was the worst season of mob violence in 

America after the turn of the century. The significant difference, was that 

victims included white, as well as black, casualties. After fighting for 

democracy on foreign soil, African-Americans returned with a new sense 

of fighting for democracy on their own soil.

A Harlem Renaissance-inspired poem written by Claude McKay, If 

We Must Die exemplifies it all:

If we must die, let it not be like hogs

Hunted and penned in an inglorious spot,

While round us bark the mad and hungry dogs,

Making their mock at our accursed lot.

West Pointer Charles Young in 1916, then a major leading U.S. troops in Mexico under Perhing’s 

command. Two years later he was fighting to stay 

on active duty, but lost that battle. (Adjutant 

General’s Office No. 94-UM-204046, National 

Archives; Underwood and Underwood)
74 

If we must die, O let us nobly die,

So that our precious blood may not be shed

In vain; then even the monsters we defy

Shall be constrained to honor us though dead!

O kinsmen! we must meet the common foe!

Though far outnumbered let us show us brave,

And for their thousand blows deal one deathblow!

What though before us lies the open grave?

Like men we’ll face the murderous, cowardly pack,

Pressed to the wall, dying, but fighting back!53

In this chapter, we have seen that the roles and participation of AfricanAmerican soldiers actually decreased during World War I. Whereas during 

the Revolutionary and Civil Wars, we see persons of African descent 

playing significant roles, relatively speaking, as fighting soldiers. During 

World War I, we see their level of participation decrease. Why? Because of 

the philosophy of the era, or attitude if you will, associated with the ending 

of Reconstruction in 1877. Post-1877 philosophy evolved into “separate 

but equal,” but it was all too often “separate but not equal.” During the 

post-Reconstruction era, there was a move to turn back the hands of time. 

One major way to ensure that the progress of blacks would not continue 

was to remove that which allowed them to demand equality. As stated in 

chapter 1, “how could you deny someone freedom [or progress], once you 

have allowed them to fight” for their country. As a result, their military 

roles were deliberately reduced to deny them any sense of “clout,” or 

deserving in the American way of life. As will become evident in the next 

chapter however the “New Negroes” and their white supporters were not 

giving up so easily.
75

Notes

 1. Lucius J. Barker and Twiley W. Barker, Jr., Civil Liberties and the Constitution: 

Cases and Commentaries (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1982), 690-91.

 2. War Department, Adjutant General’s Office, General Orders No. 56, 1 August 

1866. Blacks in the United States Armed Forces. Vol. III, Item 10.

 3. Native Americans dubbed the black cavalrymen Buffalo Soldiers because of the 

hue of their skin, the buffalo fur overcoats they wore in the winter, and their fierce fighting 

style. These three similarities reminded Native Americans of the buffalo. Native Americans 

respected the buffalo greatly; thus, the name Buffalo Soldier was given out of respect and 

was an “endearing term.”

 4. For more detail on the 9th and 10th Cavalry Regiments, refer to William H. Leckie, 

The Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of Negro Cavalry in the West. (Norman, OK: University 

of Oklahoma Press, 1967). For the 24th and 25th Infantry Regiments, refer to Arlen 

Fowler, The Black Infantry in the West, 1869-1891 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing 

Corp., 1971). For the Spanish-American War, refer to Willard B Gatewood, Jr., “Smoked 

Yankees” and the Struggle of Empire: Letters Fom Negro Soldiers, 1898-1902 (Urbana, IL: 

University of Illinois Press, 1971).

 5. Although there were rare occasions during the 19th century when a regular Army 

(RA) commission could be earned by competing. During an officer examination board at 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, nearly all RA commissions earned before the establishment 

of the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) and Officer Candidate School (OCS) programs in the 1910s came out of the USMA.

 6. Lieutenant Flipper was posthumously pardoned by President William J. Clinton on 

19 February 1999.

 7. Much of the information in the previous two paragraphs is taken from chapters 4, 

5, and 7 of a dissertation titled Sable Officers: African-American Military Officers, 1861-

1948 written by this author.

 8. Jim Crow was a character played by a white man, Thomas Dartmouth Rice, in black 

face in the 1830s. Rice portrayed blacks as bumbling fools. His song “weel a-bout and turn 

a-bout, and do just so, every time I weel about, I jump Jim Crow,” became a national hit in 

the 1830s. Eventually, Jim Crow came to symbolize blacks. “Jim Crow” laws are simply 

another name for “Black” laws, just slightly different eras. See Kenneth C. Davis, Don’t 

Know Much About History: Everything You Need to Know About American History, but 

Never Learned (New York: Crown, 1990), 215-16.

 9. In 1877, Southern democrats and Northern republicans made a compromise 

that catapulted Republican presidential candidate Rutherford B. Hayes into the White 

House and started the erosion of civil rights and liberties that the 13th, 14th, and 15th

Amendments had afforded to blacks. In 1896, the Supreme Court case Plessy versus 

Ferguson established “separate but equal” as “just and fair.”

10. For 66 years, the official verdict for the 167 men of 1st Battalion, 25th Infantry was 

guilty. Once all the evidence was looked at with fair and critical eyes six decades later, the 

men of 1st Battalion were honorably discharged. See John D. Weaver, The Brownsville 

Raid (New York: W.W. Norton, 1970; reprint College Station, TX: Texas A&M University 

Press, 1992).

11. Arthur E. Barbeau and Florette Henri, The Unknown Soldiers: African-American 

Troops in World War I (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1974; reprint New York, Da 

Capo Press, 1996), 27-29.

12. Ibid., 29-30.
76 

13. The family ties in Europe actually extend from Norway to Spain in various degrees. 

For further details, see Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of August (New York: Macmillan, 

1962; reprint New York: Bonanza Books, 1982), 1-14.

14. Clearly, this description of the European road to war is oversimplified. Much 

occurred during the month of negotiations, and many other factors affected the entangling 

alliances.

15. “The Lynching Industry,” Crisis (February, 1915), 197-98.

16. Salter, “Sable Officers,” 99-100.

17. War Department General Orders No. 125, 22 September 1917, Blacks in the United 

States Armed Forces, Vol. IV, Item 19.

18. Memorandum, Brigadier General Joseph E. Kuhn, Chief of War College Division, 

for the Chief of Staff, 15 May 1917, Ibid., Item 53.

19. Barbeau and Henri, 70-71.

20. Memorandum, Colonel William S. Graves for the Adjutant General, 31 December 

1917, “Training Cadres for Colored Units.”

21. Barbeau and Henri, 70-71.

22. Memorandum, Major T.W. Hammond for the Chief of Staff, 13 November 1917, 

Subject: Utilization of Colored Units of the National Guard and the Colored Draft. Blacks 

in the United States Armed Forces, Vol. IV, Item 21; Barbeau and Henri, 81.

23. Appendix, Table 73-A: Colored and White Inductions, compared by states. “Race 

and Color Groups,” A summary of the Status of Negroes Under the Draft Law, Blacks in 

the United States Armed Forces, Vol. IV, Item 15.

24. Memorandum, Major General Tasker H. Bliss for the Secretary of War, 3 September 

1917, Ibid., Item 6; Memorandum, Brigadier General Lytle Brown, Assistant Chief of 

Staff, for the Chief of Staff, 12 June 1918, Subject: Disposal of Colored Draft, Ibid., Item 

12; Barbeau and Henri, 81-85.

25. War Department General Orders No. 125, 22 September 1917, paragraph IV, Blacks 

in the United States Armed Forces, Vol. IV, Item 19.

26. Barbeau and Henri, 93-194, 104-105.

27. Ibid., 102-104.

28. Unless otherwise footnoted, the following paragraphs detailing the accounts of 

the 93d Division have come from 93d Division: Summary of Operations in the World 

War, prepared by the American Battle Monuments Commission, (Washington, DC: GPO, 

1944.

29. Barbeau and Henri, 116.

30. American Military History and the Evolution of Warfare in the Western World

Robert A. Doughty and Ira D. Gruber., eds. (Lexington, MA: DC Heath and Co., 1996),

619-21.

31. Barbeau and Henri, 118.

32. Ibid., 124.

33. The 157th is famous for its courageous defense of Verdun in 1915.

34. 93d Division: Summary of Operations in the World War, 13.

35. Barbeau and Henri, 121-29; Doughty and Gruber, 603.

36. 93d Division: Summary of Operations in the World War, 27.

37. Ibid., 28.

38. Barbeau and Henri, 125.

39. Ibid., 127.

40. 93d Division: Summary of Operations in the World War, 31.

41. Unless otherwise footnoted, the following paragraphs detailing the accounts of the 

92d Division have come from 92d Division: Summary of Operations in the World War.
77

42. Ibid., 9.

43. Ibid., 12.

44. 92d Division: Summary of Operations in the World War, 27.

45. Barbeau and Henri, 160, states 1,700 total casualties.

46. Ibid., 152-53.

47. For detailed analysis on the subject of African-American officer battlefield 

performance, see chapter IX in Salter, 135-49. The rank ordering of the battlefield 

performance of regiments in the 92d and 93d Divisions is interesting to examine. It appears 

that the higher the percentage of white officers in a regiment, the higher the postwar rating 

was. Of the four regiments in the 93d Division, the 371st had no black officers, the 369th 

had only five, the 372d had a large amount, and the 370th was all black. They were 

conveniently rank ordered as such. See Gerald W. Patton, War and Race: The Black Officer 

in the American Military, 1915-1941 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), 80.

48. Edward M. Coffman, The War to End All Wars: The American Experience in World 

War I (New York: Oxford Press, 1968), 320.

49. Barbeau and Henri, 148-49.

50. Crisis, May 1919, W.E.B. Dubois, ed. This document was written by Lieutenant 

Colonel Linard of the AEF Headquarters. Refer to Barbeau and Henri, 114.

51. For more on the dismissal of Lieutenant Colonel Charles Young, see Salter, 115-

19.

52. Ibid., Just as in today’s military, officer active duty promotions were generally based 

on performance plus time in service. Many West Pointers much younger than Young served 

as generals during World War I. Douglas MacArthur, West Point class of 1903, served as a 

brigadier general during the war. By all accounts, there is little reason why Young should 

not have been selected to command either the 92d or 93d Division. His performance was as 

solid as any other officer, and he definitely had seniority. Perhaps the real reason was that 

he would certainly have had to command white officers.

53. The Black Poets, Dudley Randall, ed. (New York: Bantam Books, reprint 1981), 

63.
78 
79

Chapter 4

World War II

After World War I, African-Americans began to experience some positive 

changes. The Harlem Renaissance, spurred on by the “New Negro,” was 

a very successful cultural awakening. Black artists, musicians, novelists, 

poets, stage actors, dancers, and educators began to achieve an enormous 

amount of success, both locally and internationally. The National 

Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was in 

its second decade of existence and was very successful. Its official organ, 

Crisis magazine, was making the country and the world aware of the black 

cause, and the NAACP’s Legal Defense Team was winning important civil 

liberty cases on behalf of African-Americans. In 1928, Oscar Depriest of 

Chicago was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives. Although the 

Great Depression hit African-Americans harder than any other group of 

Americans, they remained resilient. Progressing from being unable to 

vote during Abraham Lincoln’s presidency to electing democrat Franklin 

D. Roosevelt (FDR) into the White House in 1932. During FDR’s 

administration, African-Americans became a key part of the political 

structure. FDR’s administration appointed more African-Americans to 

government posts than any other administration; so much so that they 

were known as Roosevelt’s “Black Cabinet.” In 1936, Benjamin O. 

Davis, Jr. graduated from the USMA, becoming only the fourth AfricanAmerican to do so, and, in 1940, Benjamin O. Davis, Sr. was promoted to 

brigadier general. Although these successes did not guarantee a pleasant 

climate for African-Americans in general, they marked the beginning of a 

toehold, that would be expanded into a foothold to secure greater equality 

for African-Americans. 

In the military arena, however, things progressed even slower. The 

aspersions cast on all African-American soldiers because one regiment’s 

failure during five days of combat during World War I reinforced general 

post-reconstruction attitudes that African-American soldiers were a poor 

investment. As the military rapidly downsized following the war, it was 

not long before the four African-American regiments, the 9th and 10th 

Cavalry and the 24th and 25th Infantry Regiments, again became the only 

units with African-American soldiers. These regiments were completely 

relegated to menial duties that resembled nothing of the duties that had 

earned them the name Buffalo Soldiers and 23 Medals of Honor. Basically, 

they performed garrison duties at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Fort Meade, 

Maryland; West Point, New York; and Fort Riley, Kansas. 
80 

In the first decade after the war, several studies were conducted to 

determine how, if at all, African-American troops should be used in the 

future. A 1924 War Department study surveyed 84 faculty and class 

members at the U.S. Army War College, Carlislte Barracks, Pennsylvania, 

and came away with mixed conclusions. Seventy-six of the 84 officers 

surveyed felt that there was a place in the military for African-American 

soldiers, but that they should be excluded from technical branches such as 

aviation. The general consensus of these officers was that outside forces—

political or otherwise—would demand that African-American soldiers 

be used. Regardless of the fact that World War I findings concluded that 

they were ineffective—no matter how biased the findings—planning 

considerations should at least include them. Very few officers felt that 

African-American soldiers deserved to be in the military. One officer, 

however, went as far as to recommend that “individual Negroes [be 

assigned] at a ratio of about 2,000 to a division, 300 to a regiment, 20 to a 

rifle company, and one to an [infantry] squad.”1

Those opposed using African-American troops were just as adamant 

as always and staunchly held to the stereotypical views of the past. One 

lieutenant colonel who was surveyed stated, “the Negro race is thousands 

of years behind the Caucasian race in the higher psychic development.” 

Furthermore, he went on to say, white troops by their “bravery, confidence, 

honor, esprit, through generations of schooling and tradition are able to 

overcome the innate reactions of fear, fright, and the impulse of self 

preservation. All of this . . . is . . . lacking in the Negro race not many 

generations removed from that of an African primitive man and only one 

or two generations out of slavery.”2

For more than a decade following this initial study, subsequent War 

College classes debated and examined the issue and generally came away 

with the same conclusions. Any officer who was advancing in his military 

career spent some time at the War College and undoubtedly came across, 

and perhaps was influenced by, these reports. Nearly each class between 

1924 and 1937 reexamined and reanalyzed the issue. The interwar years 

were indeed lean years for the military as a whole. It was even leaner for 

African-American soldiers due, in part, to the prevailing attitudes that 

those studies fueled. 

In actuality, the conclusions of the 1924 survey and subsequent 

surveys are not surprising. These studies were in line with the official War 

Department 1922 Mobilization Plan. In this plan, there was virtually no 

mention of the four African-American Regular Army regiments, and all the 

African-American National Guard units were deemed the responsibility of 
81

the states. Significant changes to the Mobilization Plan, including the role 

of African-Americans, did not occur until 1937 and were not implemented 

until 1938.3 Further, in 1931, the War Department diverted manpower 

slots from the 10th Cavalry and 25th Infantry to expand the Army Air 

Corps, a branch that was closed to African-Americans. This move further 

reduced the abilities of these regiments to maintain strength and to achieve 

effective combat status.4 As a result of the World War I report card; the 

1922 Mobilization Plan, the 1924 War College study, and subsequent War 

College studies; the diversion of slots from black units to white units; and 

several other inequalities that cropped up in Jim Crow America during 

the interwar years, African-Americans made up less than 2 percent of 

all active duty and national guardsmen by the mid- to late 1930s.5 The 

inequity would soon be exacerbated by the fact that the Brownsville and 

Houston riot incidents would rear their ugly heads in the 1940 Selective 

Service debate. 

The outside agitation that some of the military officers had predicted 

in the 1924 survey began to come to fruition in the early 1930s. Walter 

White, secretary for the NAACP, on learning about the shifting of slots 

from the 10th Cavalry to the Air Corps, initiated a writing campaign to 

General Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army.6 White 

explained the chagrin of the “colored people” on learning of the diversion 

of slots, citing the fact that Mr. Albert Roberts, an African-American 

Air Corps applicant, apparently fully qualified,7 was denied entrance 

simply because “the War Department would not feel justified in mixing 

colored and white enlisted men in the same squadron.”8 Just how much 

of an effect White’s campaign—or the more detailed one initiated only 

one month later to President Herbert Hoover by Dr. Robert R. Morton, 

principal of Tuskegee Institute—had on the Army is up for debate.9 One 

thing is certain; if the War Department had any intentions of eliminating 

any of the African-American regiments, that plan was foiled. In response 

to Morton’s letter, MacArthur wrote—apparently Hoover forwarded his 

letter to MacArthur—that the 9th, 10th, 24th, and 25th Regiments “must 

be maintained in the Regular Army which can contribute most effectively 

to the national defense not only in an emergency but in preparations in 

time of peace for such an emergency.”10

In February 1938, the Pittsburgh Courier, one of the most widely 

read black newspapers in the country, initiated a two-year campaign 

pushing for an all-black division in the United States’ inevitable entry 

into the brewing war.11 The following year, the Crisis magazine published 

a serial article attacking the Army’s Jim Crow policy.12 In 1940 and 
82 

again in 1941, A. Philip Randolph initiated plans for a march on the 

nation’s capital to demand equality in the Armed Forces and the growing 

national defense industry.13 As a result of these increasing pressures from 

national organizations, black presses, activists (both white and black), 

and Roosevelt’s Black Cabinet—namely, Mary McLeod Bethune—

Roosevelt’s War Department administration approved some significant 

changes in September and October 1940. On 9 October, the White House 

released a seven-point policy change to the press:

1. Negro personnel in the Army will be in proportion to that in 

the general population (about 10 percent). 

2. Negroes will be maintained in each major branch. 

3. Negro reserve officers will be eligible for active duty. 

4. Negroes will be allowed to compete for Officer Candidate 

School (OCS) slots. 

5. Negroes will be trained as pilots and aviation mechanics and 

technical specialists. 

6. Negro civilians will be offered equal opportunity for 

employment at arsenals and Army posts. 

7. Racial segregation will be maintained.14

To put icing on the cake, in late September, just one week before the 

1940 presidential election, Roosevelt announced that Colonel Benjamin 

O. Davis, Sr., after more than 40 years of successful active service, had 

been placed on the brigadier general’s promotion list.15 Despite the fact 

that segregation would remain as official policy in the Army, all signs 

seemed to suggest that African-Americans were on the verge of complete 

equality in the military. Meanwhile, powers outside the continental United 

States were setting the wheels of war increasingly into motion. 

***

The period between 1914 and 1945 has often been referred to as one 

great war, meaning the interwar years were simply a period to allow some 

belligerents, unchecked, a respite to rebuild their war machines. That is 

exactly what occurred in the case of Germany. Although the Third Reich 

was officially born on 30 January 1933, when Adolf Hitler took the oath 

as chancellor of the German Reich, its origin easily dates back to that 

autumn, Monday, 11 November 1918, when the armistice was signed. For 

the next six months, the victorious Allies drafted the official terms of the 

armistice treaty and presented them, without condition, to German leaders 

on 7 May 1919. The terms, from the German perspective, were harsh 
83

and unacceptable. Without the means to resist or negotiate, the Germans 

accepted the agreements on the last day of the deadline, 24 June. The 

Treaty of Versailles was then signed on 28 June 1919, requiring Germany 

to return provinces to France (Alsace-Lorraine), Belgium, Denmark (parts 

of Schleswig), and Poland (including the eastern corridor to the Baltic Sea 

near Danzig). Further, it required Germany to turn over Kaiser Wilhelm 

II and roughly 800 other “war criminals,” accept all responsibility for 

the Great War, and pay large war reparations. Last, and perhaps most 

damaging, the treaty restricted the German military machine to a navy 

that was banned from building vessels larger than 10,000 tons and no 

submarines at all. No general staff was allowed to be formed, the army 

could have no more than 100,000 volunteers, and no tanks or planes were 

allowed at all.16 To the conservatives, which included Hitler, the “strict” 

terms of the Treaty of Versailles fueled the rise of the Nazi Party. 

Unfortunately for the world, the Treaty of Versailles went virtually 

unenforced. As early as 1925, the Nazi war machine was covertly forming, 

allowing a man who was from peasant Austrian stock, a high school 

dropout, an unknown soldier during World War I, and a postwar derelict to 

rise as German dictator by January 1933. Shortly thereafter, the chain of 

events that led to World War II began. 

In March 1938, Hitler annexed Austria; in September, he acquired 

the Sudetenland; and in March 1939, he marched into the remainder of 

Czechoslovakia and took it. On 1 September 1939, the first actual shots 

were fired when Hitler attacked Poland. In six weeks the Polish Campaign 

was over. On 10 May 1940, Hitler attacked France and six weeks later, 

France was defeated. By now much of the world was stunned, especially 

England, Hitler’s next target. Fortunately for England, Hitler’s forces 

could not negotiate the English Channel. 

Not to stand idly by, Russia had inadvertently involved itself in the 

ensuing war when it signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in 

August 1939. The pact guaranteed Germany freedom to attack Poland 

without worry of Russian support to Poland. After Germany conquered 

Poland west of Brest, Russia marched into eastern Poland and also 

launched an ill-conceived invasion in Finland. In August, the Soviets 

and Japanese had been engaged against each other in an operation in 

Nomonhan, Manchuria. Russian victory at Nomonhan and German 

success in the west prompted Japan to focus its attention more toward 

southeastern Asia. France and England had colonies there, and perhaps 

Japan hoped to capitalize on them while France and England focused 
84 

on Germany’s aggression. Meanwhile, on 19 June 1939, Italy declared 

war on France and England because it, like Germany, felt slighted by the 

Treaty of Versailles. By now most of the globe was at war for the second 

time in barely over two decades. Isolationist America, protected by the 

largest tank ditch in the world—the Atlantic Ocean—was next. 

Since signing the Treaty of Versailles, the United States had been 

determined to stay out of European affairs. It is true, however, that through 

billions of dollars of loans from American investors in the mid to late 

1920s and early 1930s, Germany was able to partially rebuild itself.17 It is 

also true that the United States had extended its influence into the Far East. 

Hawaii was heavily occupied, and U.S. bases existed in the Philippines. 

Even though Japan initiated attacks on China in 1937 and attacked a U.S. 

gunboat near China in December, the United States remained calm. As 

Hitler set his eyes on England after conquering France, Roosevelt assured 

England that the United States was committed to its stability and safety. 

It nonetheless took the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 

1941 to propel America into World War II. America had not been standing 

idly by. In 1939, industry slowly shifted toward wartime production. On 

16 September 1940, the first peacetime Selective Service Act was passed. 

Two antidiscrimination clauses in the act stated that all men between 18 

and 36 were eligible for service in the naval and land forces and that 

there could be no racial discrimination in selecting and training men. 

As previously discussed, African-Americans were further incorporated 

into the movement by FDR’s revised racial policy, released on 9 October 

1940. Things were looking up for the future of African-Americans in the 

military. 

***

In actuality, the service of African-Americans during World War II 

can best be described with the old cliché, “sometimes you have to take 

one step backward to gain two steps forward.” World War II was unlike 

the Revolutionary War and World War I. During the latter two, AfricanAmericans went on the battlefield from the outset of hostilities. World 

War II, however, was more like the Civil War, which slowly trickeled 

African-American soldiers into service; but, once allowed, they fought 

in significant numbers during the Civil War. African-Americans sent to 

the combat zones during World War II, however, were more often used 

as service and support troops, and their numbers never quite exceeded 

10 percent of the total population. Throughout the war and in the decade 
85

following the war, more significant changes for the better occurred, 

however slowly. 

Since this discourse is mainly focused on the soldier, most of the rest 

of the chapter will address the Army. Brief mention must, however, be 

made to the Marine Corps, the Navy, the Women’s Army Corps (WAC), 

and the Nurse Corps. 

When the Continental Marine Corps—established on 10 November 

1775—was reestablished in 1798 as the U.S. Marine Corps, it banned the 

enlistment of all “Negroes or mulattos.”18 This ban was not overturned 

until 144 years later. In May 1942, the Marine Corps finally announced 

that it would begin enlisting African-Americans. Private Howard Perry 

from Charlotte, North Carolina, became the first to arrive at Mumford 

Point, near Camp Lejeune, on 26 August. During the war, approximately 

19,168 African-Americans served in the Marine Corps. They were 

organized into two defense battalions, 12 ammunition companies, 49 

Marine Corps depot companies, and 1,200 served in a volunteer stewards’ 

branch. Thirteen thousand ultimately served overseas. Beginning in June 

1944, Mumford Point marines began to contribute to the war effort in the 

Pacific. On 15 June 1944, D-day on Saipan, the 3d Marine Ammunition 

Company encountered Japanese soldiers and subsequently helped to repel 

the enemy at Charon Kanoa. Several of the depot companies participated 

on the Marianas, Palau, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa.19 The first AfricanAmerican Marine Corps officer was not commissioned until 10 November 

1945; ironically, this was the 170th birthday of the Marine Corps.20

Like the Marine Corps, the Navy also banned the enlistment of blacks 

in 1798. As has already become evident, the Navy did not survive during 

much of the 19th century without the service of African-American sailors. 

With the introduction of the “Great White Fleet” around the turn of the 

century and better conditions for sailors, the Navy, now able to recruit 

more whites, eventually placed a ban on the further recruitment of AfricanAmericans in 1919. The Navy had slowed its recruitment of blacks since 

before the turn of the century. With the ban, which was not lifted until 

1933, the Navy’s African-American population dropped to 55 percent 

by 1932.21 By 1942, nine full years after the ban was lifted, the Navy’s 

African-American population had increased to approximately 5,026, or 2 

percent. At war’s end, more than 165,500 were in the Regular Navy, and 

throughout the course of the war, roughly 133,000 had served overseas.22

The total never exceeded 10 percent. Most of these men, however, served 

as stewards and messmen because the Navy would not promote “Negroes 
86 

[to] become petty officers or chief petty officers.”23 One of the American 

heroes at Pearl Harbor was Steward Dorie Miller, who came from below 

deck and shot down two Japanese aircraft. Miller was awarded the Navy 

Cross for his actions on that day.24 In May 1942, perhaps as a result of 

Miller’s actions but more likely because of outside pressure, the Navy 

announced a new policy. African-Americans could serve in a number 

of naval services, excluding combat vessels. In actuality, the situation 

remained nearly unchanged.25 By war’s end, African-Americans had 

served on only six seagoing vessels in positions other than stewards, 

servants, or messmen. Further, to maintain segregation, the crews of these 

six vessels were all black while the officers, until much later, were all 

white.26 Lost to history for nearly 50 years, the most famous of these allblack crew vessels was the USS Mason, Destroyer Escort (DE) 529. The 

Mason made a total of six escort missions in 1944 and 1945, is credited 

with possibly sinking one German U-boat, and received extraordinary 

commendations for one voyage in particular—Voyage NH 119 in October 

1944—for escorting a convoy of barges in tow, some with oil, at about 5 

miles per hour across the North Atlantic.27 Fifty-eight African-American 

males were commissioned by the Navy during the war, and two females 

earned commissions in the Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency 

Service (WAVES).28 In addition, 22 other African-American women were 

enlisted into the WAVES and four were allowed to join the ranks of naval 

nurses.29 Clearly, there was a lot of progress to be made by the Marine 

Corps and Navy. The progress was monumental, given the bans and 

polices that had existed only half a decade before. 

The plight in the Army was not significantly different. Its story, like 

the Navy’s, which had temporarily banned enlistments during the interwar 

years, was truly a classic tale of taking one step backward to gain two steps 

forward. When the Selective Service Act was passed in October 1939, the 

intent was to draft blacks on equal terms and conditions with their white 

counterparts. African-Americans were also to be drafted proportionally 

with their segment of the general population, which was just above 10 

percent. The Selective Service Act got off to an inauspicious start. 

When African-Americans volunteering for the draft showed up 

at induction centers, many centers turned them away. The First Army 

headquarters—Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 

Rhode Island, and Vermont—for example, secretly ordered its boards not 

to accept African-Americans in the initial draft. Many other draft boards 

throughout the country routinely rejected African-Americans with I-A 

registration classifications.30 As a result, at no time during the war did 
87

African-Americans reach their proportional 10 percent of the Army’s 

total strength. They did, however, come close by 1945. In December 

1941, there were 99,206 (6.32 percent); in December 1942, there were 

399,454 (7.95 percent); in December 1943, there were 633,448 (9.25 

percent); in December 1944, there were 691,521 (9.50 percent); and in 

September 1945, there were 653,563 (9.68 percent).31 Those who did find 

their way into active duty within the first year of the draft did not always 

find favorable welcomes. “In April 1941, during the prewar mobilization, 

a black soldier, Private Felix Hall, his hands bound behind him, was 

found hanging from a tree at Fort Benning, Georgia.”32 Throughout the 

year, brawls between black and white soldiers erupted at such places as 

Alexandria, Louisiana; Fayetteville, North Carolina; and Tampa, Florida. 

After the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, despite Jim Crowism and 

tensions between the races, many African-Americans decided that they 

had an obligation and right to fight for their country. Regardless of the 

racial climate, they were going to serve. 

The great majority of African-Americans, including women, served 

as service and support troops in signal units, smoke-generation units, 

quartermaster battalions, transportation battalions, port battalions, balloon 

battalions, chemical units, and medical units. Other African-Americans 

served in combat arms fields such as engineers, cavalry, infantry, and 

artillery—field, coastal, and antiaircraft. A few made their way into 

specialty units such as armor units, tank destroyer battalions, aviation 

units, and paratrooper units, and women served in the Nurse Corps. 

African-American men and women served also in the European and Pacific 

theaters. The following five case studies will demonstrate the wide range 

and depth of the African-American World War II military experience: the 

320th Barrage Balloon Battalion, the Red Ball Express (transportation), 

the 761st Tank Battalion, individual infantry replacements in Europe, and 

the 6888th Postal Battalion (women). There will also be brief mention of 

engineer units that built the Ledo Road and Alaska Highway, the Tuskegee 

Airmen, and the 555th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR). 

***

One of the most recognized photographs of the D-day invasion on 6 

June 1944, is that of the low-tethered, miniature blimp-looking balloons 

protecting the sea and ground forces from strafing German fighters. The 

320th Barrage Balloon Battalion, the only unit of its kind in the U.S. 

Army that operated the balloons, came ashore in landing craft with the 
88 

third wave on Omaha Beach. Although by summer 1944 the German 

Luftwaffe had suffered greatly, it was still able to launch a few aircraft. It 

would be difficult to calculate the full significance of the 320th Barrage 

Balloon Battalion. At least two FW-190s, however, were forced to fly 

higher than normal for strafing missions because of the 320th, causing 

them to be less effective. In addition to the 320th, another 1,200 AfricanAmerican soldiers who landed on Utah Beach on D-day were truck drivers 

and quartermaster soldiers.33 None of the nearly 2,000 African-American 

soldiers who stormed the beaches of Normandy on 6 June 1944 served 

as infantry. According to the opinion of one D-day veteran, Technical 

Members of the 555th in a parachute jump. (DOD,.Office, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Equal Opportunity and Safety Policy)

Generals Omar Bradley and James M. Gavin speak with personnel of the 555th. (DOD. 

Office, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity and Safety Policy)
89

End of the day at Omaha Beach. American equipment coming ashore in staggering numbers. (U.S. Coast Guard)

Sergeant Monroe Blackwell, “[T]he consensus of whites was they 

didn’t want blacks to get any glory, especially on that day.”34 Whether 

infantrymen, barrage balloon operators, truck drivers, or quartermaster 

suppliers, all Allied soldiers who stormed onto the five Normandy beaches 

on D-day caught hell and played a crucial role in establishing the foothold 

in Europe that led to further degradation of Hitler’s wehrmacht. 

After the beaches of Normandy were secured, it took the Allies another 

seven weeks before they were ready to launch Operation COBRA, the 

breakout from the Normandy beachheads. Critical to the pursuit operations 

that followed COBRA, was the flow of logistics along the long lines of 

communications (LOCs) to keep the attacking Allied forces supplied with 

“beans, bullets, and fuel.” Much of that LOC mission fell on the units that 

operated the trucks on the Red Ball Express, the White Ball Route, the 

Red Lion Route, the ABC (Antwerp-Brussels-Charleroi) Route, and the 

Green Diamond Route. On 25 August, shortly after Allied forces broke 

through the bocage, the Red Ball Express went into operation, running 

from Saint Lo to Paris. As the First and Third Armies continued to push 

toward the Rhine River, the LOC routes extended as well. By the time 

the Red Ball Express stopped operations on 13 November 1944, the 12th 

Army Group—the First, Third, and Ninth Armies—had extended well 

beyond Paris and was east of the Meuse River. The truckers of the Red 
90 

Ball Express had been right along with them. The fact that the retreating 

Germans had destroyed all the railroad lines in France made the mission 

of the truckers on the Red Ball Express even more significant. On an 

average day, approximately 899 vehicles, including general supply trucks, 

gasoline trucks, dump trucks, and ammunition trucks, traveled the Red 

Ball Express. The route was a reserved two-lane highway with one lane 

exclusively for eastbound traffic and the other exclusively for westbound 

traffic. If a vehicle mistakenly got caught up within a convoy going the 

wrong way, it was generally stuck until the mission was complete, because 

vehicles were not allowed to simply turn around.35 During the two and a 

half months of operations, 412,193 tons of supplies were delivered on the 

Red Ball Express, and approximately 121,873,929 ton-miles were traveled. 

As in any war, the missions of the SOS troops are not the glamorous ones 

that produce the “combat hero.” As in any war, their jobs were significant 

to the fight and dangerous in many other ways. One veteran of the 3418th 

Trucking Company explains:

As the combat troops moved further, of necessity we had to 

split the trip at a half-way point. One driver would drive from 

the beach to the half-way point, where another driver would 

take over. The second driver would take it to the front, return 

to the half-way point and the first driver would be on his way 

again back to the beach. All of this driving was done at night 

with black-out lights. . . . When General Patton was breaking 

through and running all over the place, it was the Red Ball that 

kept him supplied. . . . Our speed was 30 to 40 miles an hour no 

matter what the weather, and we drove every night.36

On many occasions, the line between SOS troops and combat troops 

became blurred. Drivers and crews sometimes had to stop and exit their 

vehicles, with weapons in hand, to join in combat actions. Approximately 

73 percent of the soldiers in the motor transport services who operated on 

the Red Ball Express were African-Americans.37

Although the Red Ball Express was the best-known transportation 

system, it was not the only route in the European Theater of Operations 

(ETO). There was the White Ball Route, initiated on 25 September, that 

transported supplies from Le Havre and Rouen to Beauvais and Reims in 

support of the campaigns in Belgium and northern France. There was the 

Red Lion Route, initiated on 16 September, that carried British fuel and 

other supplies from Bayeaux, France, to Brussels, Belgium, for the 21st 

Army Group. There was the ABC Route, started on 30 November, that 
91

Map 2. European Theater of Operation Routes
92 

carried supplies in the area for which it was named. The Green Diamond 

Route, operating from 10 October to 1 November, conveyed supplies from 

beaches and ports between Dol and Normandy. Each of these routes had a 

large percentage of African-American troops. Four of the nine companies 

on the Red Lion Route and one of the two battalions on the Green Diamond 

Route were African-American units.38

While the various SOS units were in full swing transporting supplies 

across France, the 761st Tank Battalion made its way into the ETO. The 

uniqueness of this battalion was simply due to its composition. The soldiers 

were black, but more significant, the battalion was a tank battalion. All 

other tank battalions in the ETO were exclusively composed of white 

soldiers.39 The 761st, rounding out the 5th Tank Group, was activated on 

1 April 1942; the 758th, initially the 78th, was activated on 1 June 1941; 

and the 784th was activated on 1 April 1943. Following more than two 

years of training at Camp Clairborne, Louisiana, and Camp Hood, Texas, 

the 761st finally received orders on 9 June 1944 to prepare for overseas 

movement.40

It was perhaps no coincidence that the 761st received orders within 

72 hours after the D-day invasion. Many of the units that burst through 

the bocage saw combat in North Africa and were battle worn. Further, the 

invasion of Normandy took a great toll on many Allied forces. Manpower 

and replacements were becoming increasingly critical. In fact, nearly all of 

the trained white armor units were committed or allocated. When General 

George S. Patton requested the best tank battalion the War Department 

had to offer, the 761st fit the bill. Patton addressed this issue in his colorful 

language when he spoke to the 761st shortly after it was attached to the 

26th Infantry Division, XII Corps, Third Army. One veteran recalls Patton 

telling them the response to his request was, “the best tank unit [is] black.” 

He countered with, “who the f--- asked for color, I asked for tankers!”41

The 761st landed on Omaha Beach on 19 October and was committed to 

battle on 31 October. 

Between 31 October 1944 and 6 May 1945, the 761st served with 

seven different divisions from three separate armies: the 26th Infantry 

Division, 87th Infantry Division, 17th Airborne Division, 95th Infantry 

Division, 79th Infantry Division, 103d Infantry Division, and 71st Infantry 

Division. Being a separate battalion and bastardized among units of the 

Third, Seventh, and Ninth Armies, the 761st operated almost continuously 

for 183 days.42 Throughout this period, the 761st fought in six countries—

France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, Germany, and Austria—and 
93

Above: View from right turret area, Sherman tank. Tank commander Sergeant Harold Gary. 

(U.S. Army Signal Corps photo)

Below: 761st in Sherman Tanks, medium M48, crossing the Moselle River at Moyenvic, 

France, 1944. (U.S. Army Signal Corps photo)
94 

was “responsible for inflicting thousands of enemy casualities and for 

capturing, destroying, or aiding in the liberation of more than 30 major 

towns, 4 airfields, 3 ammunition supply dumps, 461 wheeled vehicles, 

34 tanks, 113 large guns, 1 radio station, and numerous individual and 

crew-served weapons.”43 Of significant note were the battalion’s actions 

at Morville-les-Vic in France, Tilley in Belgium during the Battle of the 

Bulge, the Siegfried Line in Germany, and in Steyr, Austria. 

On 31 October, the 761st was attached to the 26th Infantry Division 

and received its first full-scale combat action between 8 and 13 November. 

The morale of the 761st was extremely high at this point, because, on 2 

November, Patton had given them one of his charismatic speeches: 

Men, you are the first Negro tankers to ever fight in the American 

Army. I would never have asked for you if you weren’t good. 

I have nothing but the best in my army. I don’t care what color 

you are as long as you go up there and kill those Kraut sons of 

bitches. Everyone has their eye on you and is expecting great 

things from you. Most of all, your race is looking forward to 

your achievements. Don’t let them down, and damn you, don’t 

let me down.44

The main battle during this period was the Battle of Morville-les-Vic. 

The 761st Tank Battalion was the spearhead battalion for the 26th Infantry 

Division, which reportedly was to create a hole for the 4th Armored 

Division at Morville. This was one of the few times the 761st fought as a 

battalion. Alpha Company advanced on the left, Bravo Company was in 

the center with the mission of getting into Morville, Charlie Company was 

on the (right) northwest side advancing onto the high ground to overwatch, 

and Delta Company had the screening mission. On the second day, after 

a tough fight on 9 November in which Charlie Company had seven tanks 

immobilized, the 761st, led by Bravo Company, succeeded in capturing 

Morville. The 4th Armored Division was able to exploit these gains. One 

German officer captured by the 26th Infantry Division, commenting on 

the actions of the 761st tankers, remarked, “Never before have I seen such 

bravery except once, and that was on the Russian front.”45

After Morville and fights in four other nearby towns, the men of 

the 761st Tank Battalion felt like veterans. Bravery previously hidden in 

some came out, and the fear of combat became evident in others. The 

single most important lesson learned by the men—especially the drivers—

was the zeroing technique employed by the German 88s. “The first shot 
95

Map 3. Battle of Morville-les-Vic, 9 November 1944.

would be long, the next one would be short, and, that third shot . . . would 

be right in there . . . it paid to not be there when it came . . . our drivers 

[by backing up and going forward to act as a moving target] kept us from 

being there.”46 After the Battle of Morville, the 761st made its way to the 

Bastogne-Saint Vith region, through the battles at Benestrof and Dieuze, 

to take part in the Battle of the Bulge. 

On 11 December, the 87th Infantry Division relieved the 26th Infantry 

Division, and shortly thereafter, the 761st was attached to the 87th. The 

87th Infantry Division was one of the many divisions in Patton’s Third 

Army poised on the southern flank of a bulge being created by the Germans 

in the Ardennes on 16 December. From 16 to 25 December, the Germans 

launched their last all-out attack before being forced east of the Rhine 

River. The Germans were able to penetrate 50 miles to the west before 

U.S. forces were able to counterattack when favorable weather conditions 

allowed close air support to resume on 26 December. From 26 December 

to 16 January 1945, U.S. forces reduced the bulge in preparation for the 

Rhineland Campaign. Tillet, a small town 8 miles northwest of Bastogne, 

was the mission of the 761st Tank Battalion during the Battle of the 

Bulge. 
96 

It was mid-December when the 761st received notice to move 

out toward the bulge. Joseph Kahoe, a platoon leader in the 761st, 

recalled, “Then the notice came to pull out. . . . At that level, we 

didn’t know anything about the Battle of the Bulge. . . . All we knew 

was that we were going to go off somewhere. We thought that it was 

crazy because what we were doing was driving all night and sleeping 

in the daytime, and we didn’t realize why. You know its no fun 

driving in blackout with tanks and then sit around all day long.”47

The 761st finally saw action on 31 December. En route to Tillet, 

it inflicted damage on several German-held French towns, including 

Reconge and Remagne. The big battle, however, started on 5 January 

and lasted until 9 January. The weather was bitter cold, so cold that one’s 

face literally froze. The Germans of the 13th SS Panzer Division fought 

brilliantly, making the infantrymen of the 87th and the tankers of the 761st 

pay dearly. The 761st finally took Tillet on 9 January. Capturing Tillet 

was significant because “the splitting of the enemy’s Saint Vith-Bastogne 

lines at points on the Houffalize-Bastogne Road . . . effectively preventing 

the enemy from exerting further pressure from that direction against the 

Bastogne area to the south.”48

After the Battle of the Bulge, the 761st penetrated 60 miles farther 

east; it was now serving with the 17th Airborne Division. On 3 February, 

the battalion entered Holland where it served brief tours under the 95th and 

79th Infantry Divisions. During this period—the Rhineland campaign—the 

761st participated in several other engagements and battles while making 

its way back through Luxembourg and Germany to the French-German 

border near Wissembourg, France. On 14 March, the 761st was attached 

to the 103d Infantry Divisions preparation for one of its most important 

missions, the spearhead of Task Force Rhine along the Siegfried Line in 

the 103d’s assigned sector. The spearhead mission to create a gap for the 

103d began on 20 March, when tanks from Charlie Company assaulted 

and softened up pillbox fortifications. Later that afternoon, tanks from 

Alpha Company entered the fight. For the next two days, advancing from 

town to town in the 103d’s sector, sometimes operating in only two-tank 

elements, the 761st helped punch a hole in the Siegfried Line. The next 

stop was the Rhine River and then on to link up with the Russians. 

On 29 March, the 761st joined the 71st Infantry Division, and it 

crossed the Rhine River on 31 March at Oppenheim. From that point on, 

the Germans were in fast retreat and the Allies were in hot pursuit. The 

761st went to Frankfurt, Fulda on 7 April, captured Coburg on 12 April, 

crossed the Danube River entering Regensburg on 27 April, to Landau, 
97

Map 4. Belgium. Battle of the Bulge, December 1944-January 1945.
98 

and finally crossed the Enns River into Austria on 4 May. It was about 

this time that the men of the 761st received the order that they would 

never forget. “You will advance to the Enns River, and you will wait there 

for the Russians!”49 Two days later, “Dog Company was located with the 

71st Division command post . . . to act as ‘honor guards,’ while German 

General Lothar von Rondulic, Commanding General of the German Army 

Group South, signed the surrender paper.”50 The war was over for the 

761st Tank Battalion. It had played a small but significant role in 183 days 

of combat. These tankers, however, were not the only African-Americans 

to serve as combat soldiers within the ETO. 

By summer 1944, manpower shortages were becoming critical. The 

campaigns in North Africa and Italy, as well as the war in the Pacific, were 

beginning to take a heavy toll on U.S. forces. Like the call that went out for 

tankers that netted the 761st, a similar call went out for riflemen. As early as 

July 1944, the ETO was experiencing shortages in riflemen. By December, 

something had to be done. After some debate in late 1944, Supreme Allied 

Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower expressed his desire “to continue 

fighting aggressively throughout the winter” despite heavy casualties. So 

he “decide[d] to infiltrate them [black soldiers] as individuals, into units 

already in the frontlines.”51 On 26 December, the commanding general 

of the ETO communication zone wrote to all commanders of “colored 

troops” in the theater, “The Supreme Commander desires to destroy the 

enemy forces and end hostilities in this theater without delay. . . . The men 

selected are to be in the grades of Private First Class and Private. NCOs 

may accept reduction in order to take advantage of this opportunity. . . . 

Your comrades at the front are anxious to share the glory of victory with 

you. Your relatives and friends everywhere have been urging that you be 

granted this privilege.”52 The first replacements began arriving for a sixweek training cycle in January and early February 1945. Although more 

than 4,562 volunteered, including several first sergeants who accepted 

rank reductions, only 2,800 were taken.53

A total of 53 platoons were formed, and beginning on 1 March, they 

were sent to the 12th Army Group and were further distributed to the 

1st, 2d, 9th, 60th, 78th, 89th, 99th, and 104th Infantry Divisions and the 

12th and the 14th Armored Divisions. Most divisions employed them 

as a company’s fourth rifle platoon. Depending on the situation, some 

received additional training from their gaining units, while others went 

directly into the fray.54 In most cases, the African-American infantrymen 

were a welcome sight. Private Harold Cothran, a white infantryman from 

Greenwood, South Carolina, when asked what he thought about the new 
99

Map 5. Germany and Czechoslovakia during World War II.
100 

platoon, answered, “I don’t care what color a man is as long as he’s up 

here helping to win this war.” Up there is where many African-American 

troops actually wanted to be, as expressed by Private First Class George 

Freeman of Dunn, North Carolina, “I came into the Army to fight, not to 

labor. That’s why I volunteered for this.”55

Clearly, the African-American “Joe” got into the war late, entering 

combat in March and April 1945, with V-E Day (Victory in Europe) 4 to 

60 days away. During this short time, the black GI proved to be not much 

different from his white GI counterpart. Some acted cowardly in battle, 

being mere mortals, while others proved to be brave and courageous. 

While commanders of the two armored divisions were satisfied but 

not extremely pleased with their African-American replacements, the 

commanders of the infantry divisions uniformly expressed high praise 

for their replacements.56 Overall, though, as was evident by a postwar 

survey given to 250 white officers and NCOs who led black soldiers, the 

introduction of African-Americans as infantrymen was well received on 

the frontlines (see survey below).57 This was true perhaps partly because 

of the old cliché “misery loves company” and partly because of the heroic 

deeds of black soldiers. 

Question: “How did you feel at first about serving in a company that had 

white platoons and colored platoons?”

 

White Officers White NCOs

Relatively unfavorable 64 percent 64 percent

Relatively favorable 33 percent 35 percent

No Answer 3 percent 1 percent 

Question: “Have your feelings changed since having served in the same 

unit with colored soldiers?”

 

White Officers White NCOs

No, still the same 16 percent 21 percent

Relatively favorable 77 percent 77 percent

No answer 7 percent 2 percent

Question: “How well did the colored soldiers in this company perform in 

combat?”
101

 

White Officers White NCOs

Not well at all 0 percent 0 percent

 

White Officers White NCOs

Not so well 0 percent 1 percent

Fairly well 16 percent 17 percent

Very well 84 percent 81 percent

Undecided 0 percent 1 percent

 

Such deeds were exemplified by men such as Private First Class Jack 

Thomas. While serving in the 60th Infantry, Thomas led his squad against 

a German tank that was laying heavy-caliber firepower in support of an 

enemy roadblock. As Thomas advanced, he threw two hand grenades at 

the enemy, wounding several. The Germans fired back, wounding two 

members of Thomas’ squad who were manning the rocket launcher. 

Thomas assumed control of the rocket launcher and fired back at the 

German tankers, preventing them from accomplishing their mission. 

Thomas then rescued one of the men who had been seriously wounded 

and, braving enemy fire, “carried him to safety.”58 Thomas won the 

Distinguished Service Cross for his actions on 9 April 1945. Perhaps 

because of similar actions by other men in replacement platoons, Major 

General Edwin F. Parker, commander, 78th Infantry Division, expressed 

to Brigadier General Benjamin O. Davis, Sr., when Davis visited the front 

in April to inquire about the replacement platoons, that he wished he could 

get more of such replacements.59

African-American infantrymen had another effect on the war effort, 

“competition-emulation.” In the 26th Infantry Division, one replacement 

platoon was engaged in continuous combat from 12 March to 8 May. It 

was estimated that the combat-efficiency level in the regiment the platoon 

was assigned to went up from 30 percent to 80 percent.60 As one officer 

who was surveyed stated, “each tried to make a good showing.”61 This 

may sound like a small thing, but it is believed that no matter how patriotic 

a soldier is on the field of battle, in the heat of it all, he is rarely thinking of 

“God and country,” but, rather, of his “buddy and himself.” Little means 

more to a soldier in battle than the opinion of his buddy; no one wants 

to be considered a coward. In the latter stages of World War II, America 

was a country divided, and Jim Crowism was still very much alive. White 

and black soldiers serving as comrades side by side on the frontlines had 

something to prove to each other, resulting in increased combat efficiency. 

No white man wanted to be seen as a coward by a black man, and likewise, 
102 

no black man wanted to be seen as a coward by a white man. White and 

black soldiers generally performed better when intermingled during World 

War II. Like their armored brethren in the 761st, the replacement platoon’s 

contributions were only a small part of a large war, but they still had 

significant meaning.62

The last group of African-Americans 

to be addressed were those who also 

served in the ETO, but at a good distance 

from harm’s way. They were, in fact, 

perhaps the most unique group of service 

persons of all the women of the 6888th 

Central Postal Directory Battalion. Major 

Charity Adams commanded the 6888th 

and eventually became the highestranking African-American female during 

World War II. 

Women have contributed, in some 

form or fashion, to the American military 

cause dating back to the Colonial era. 

During World War II, they again answered 

the call. Norman Rockwell’s famous poster, “Rosie the Riveter,” has come 

to symbolize the might that women added to the effort from the industrial 

realm. They, however, also donned military uniforms while serving in the 

Women’s Army Corps (WAC).63 The primary role of the WAC was to free 

men to be used for combat duties. During the war, more than 140,000 

women served in the WAC,64 and 6,500 of them were African-American.65

Being minorities and women, they had to deal with the “twin problems” 

of racism and sexism. Despite the twin problems, the 6888th deployed to 

Europe in February 1945 and accomplished its mission. 

By February 1945, white WACs had long been receiving assignments 

to overseas duty. The black press noted that African-Americans saw no 

reason why black WACs, who had been in service from its inception, 

were all stationed stateside. In mid-December 1944, Adams’ commanding 

officer asked, “How would you like to go overseas?” She had a matterof-fact answer, “when I first entered the service I wanted to go . . . 

[now] it makes no difference to me. . . . If I get orders to go, I’ll go.”66

In February 1945, five companies, eventually totaling more than 800 

women, arrived in England. Their mission was to sift through, sort, and 

redirect stalemated mail to frontline soldiers who were pushing Hitler’s 

army to the Rhine River.67 Adams and Captain Abbie Noel Campbell, her 

Rosie the Riveter. 
103

executive officer, arrived by plane in January. Adams and the more than 

900 African-American WACs who served overseas were all volunteers. 

Other volunteers did not successfully complete an intense screening and 

rigorous training process. Training included physical examinations, gas 

mask drills, obstacle course drills, and so forth.68 It can be said that the 

women of the 6888th were among the finest caliber of soldiers, male or 

female, to serve their country. 

On 12 February, the main body that arrived in England was greeted 

by Brigadier General Benjamin O. Davis, Sr. On 15 February, Lieutenant 

General John C.H. Lee, ETO Commander, Communications Zone, led 

them in a mass parade for Davis’ review. Shortly thereafter, the 6888th 

went to work for the war effort. By February, the Battle of the Bulge was 

over, and most frontline soldiers, indeed all soldiers in the ETO had not 

received mail for months. Any person who has spent time in uniform and 

away from loved ones understands the importance of a simple letter. In 

fact, one of the mottoes in the ETO was “no mail, low morale.”69 Thus, the 

significance of the 6888th’s contribution was in morale building. Its task 

was a monumental one. 

Margaret Y. Jackson, who served as an enlisted soldier in the 6888th 

and later earned a Ph.D. from Cornell University, recalled:

The 6888th Central Postal Battalion participating in a V-E Day parade in England.
104 

When the unit arrived at a rambling old discarded boys’ school 

in Birmingham, England, we were, after settling in our quarters, 

shown a gigantic auditorium with an extremely high ceiling. 

It contained nothing but mountains of mail and packages that 

almost touched the ceiling. Understandably, we were both 

appalled and intimidated by this extraordinary sight. Our orders 

were to redirect this mail, getting it to the ever-moving troops 

on the front lines and throughout the ETO. Of course, we 

realized the enormity of the task ahead of us: the necessity of 

reestablishing for thousands of constantly uprooted soldiers ties 

with their loved ones, relatives, and friends. These ties, we felt, 

would strengthen their morale and, hence, improve the overall 

performance of their duties, whatever they were.70

There were more than 7 million U.S. personnel in the ETO who 

required mail. This included Marine Corps and Navy personnel as well. 

In addition to what Jackson described, there were “six airplane hangars of 

Christmas packages [that] had been returned to the United Kingdom from 

the continent during the Battle of the Bulge.”71 The mission was made 

even more difficult due to the fact that many names were duplicates. For 

example, there were over 7,500 Robert Smiths.72 Often their nicknames, 

such as Bert, Bob, Robby, Rob, or Bobby were used. In such cases, the 

WACs had to resort to serial/service numbers. Additionally, Bert or Bobby 

may have been serving in a fast-moving frontline unit; therefore, he was 

likely to have submitted several address changes per month, which made 

the task of locating them that much more difficult.73

The battalion commander explained:

The system worked as follows: Every piece of mail was 

subjected to attempted delivery at the address on the face of the 

envelope. If the mail was undelivered at that address, it was sent 

on to the directory service, where an address card was on file for 

all U.S. personnel in the ETO. The directory service checked 

the files for a new address, and the mail item was forwarded 

for attempted delivery again. Each time a piece of mail was 

handled, the date and initials of the handler were noted on 

the face of the envelope. Each piece of mail was “worked” 

for thirty days and, if undeliverable, was returned to sender. 

As a result of this regimen, more than 65,000 pieces74 of mail per 

shift were handled, and mail finally reached thousands of soldiers.75 To 

accomplish this task, the 6888th worked seven days a week in three 8-hour 

shifts.76 The mountains of mail soon became only small hills. 
105

With few exceptions, one involving a general officer who failed 

to receive his mail, the 6888th received high praise for the work it 

accomplished while serving in Birmingham, England, and Rouen and 

Paris, France, between February 1945 and March 1946. The greatest 

rewards, however, according to Jackson, were from the soldiers on 

the streets who recognized them and knew who they were. “Wherever 

we went after work hours” in Birmingham, stated Jackson, “we were 

constantly approached by servicemen . . . profusely thanking us for the 

packets of mail and packages that they had been expecting for weeks or 

months, but had received only after our arrival.”77

Indeed, the approximately 824 enlisted WACs and their 31 commissioned officers, at peak strength, were never on the frontlines in harm’s 

way. They never had to fire a weapon at the enemy, and they never slept on 

the cold ground while enemy artillery fell from overhead. In some small 

way, perhaps enormous to many soldiers, they contributed to the victory 

in Europe.78

These ETO vignettes about the 320th Barrage Balloon Battalion, Red 

Ball Express, 761st Tank Battalion, infantry replacement platoons, and 

the 6888th Central Postal Directory Battalion have been carefully selected 

to offer the reader a look at some of the various ways African-Americans 

contributed to the war effort. There are similar service experiences in the 

Pacific, in Alaska, three of the seven engineer regiments that built the 

Alaska Highway were African-American units, and in China-Burma, 60 

percent of the engineers who worked on the Ledo Road were AfricanAmericans.79 Also, in March 1944, elements of the reactivated 93d 

Infantry Division began entering combat in Bougainville, and its sister 

division, the reenacted 92d Infantry Division, entered combat in Italy in 

August 1944. The 93d ended the war with a laudable record. The 24th 

Infantry, which was attached to it, was awarded a battle star for the unit’s 

campaign ribbon, and members were eligible for combat infantrymen’s 

badges. The 92d ended the war with the reputation of one of the worst 

divisions in the Army.80

Perhaps the most celebrated of all World War II African-American 

units was the 332d Fighter Group, better known as the Tuskegee Airmen. 

The 332d Fighter Group consisted of the 99th, 100th, 301st, and 302d 

Squadrons. From the time the 99th Pursuit Squadron, the first squadron 

of the 332d to be activated, flew its first mission on 2 June 1943 until 

the 332d Group was deactivated on 19 October 1945, over 900 AfricanAmerican pilots had flown more than 15,000 sorties. Collectively, the 
106 

group had destroyed roughly 350 enemy aircraft on the ground and at least 

111 in air-to-air combat, destroyed 17 vessels and 57 locomotives, and 

never lost an Allied bomber to enemy aircraft while on escort missions.81

The 555th PIR, the first African-American airborne soldiers, was trained 

in 1944. Before the war ended, the 555th PIR had conducted 376 firefighting missions—smoke jumps—in over 1,000 individual jumps on 

the U.S. Pacific Coast. The 555th PIR’s mission was to fight fires that 

had been started by Japanese atmospheric balloons that were launched 

from Japan, drifted over the Pacific Ocean, and were designed with an 

incendiary device that started a fire as the balloons descended on the U.S. 

West Coast.82

No one can say with certainty whether World War II would have turned 

out differently for the United States and its Allies if men and women of 

African descent had been left on the sidelines. What can be said with 

certainty, however, is that without their service and contributions, many 

of the successes that the United States achieved would have been very 

difficult to achieve or would not have occurred at all. A significant reason 

why Patton’s and other armies were able to push full steam ahead in 1944 

and 1945 without concern for dwindling LOCs was due, in large part, to 

units such as the Red Ball Express. Further, one contributing reason why 

those tank and infantry units were able to sustain their momentum in the 

push across the Rhine during the closing months of the war was because 

of the 761st Tank Battalion and individual black infantry volunteers. 

Similar conclusions can be made for the contributions of the 6888th Postal 

Battalion in Europe, the 93d Infantry Division in the Pacific, the Tuskegee 

Airmen over the skies of Europe, and a host of other African-American 

units that answered the call to the fray in either the Army, Navy, Marine 

Corps, WAC, or Army Air Corps. 

Although this discourse may seem to end on a cliff-hanging note, 

the fact of the matter is that it ends where the story of African-American 

military participation begins to take a significant turn. Shortly after 

World War II ended, President Harry S. Truman signed EO 9981, which 

dramatically affected the post-World War II military. We will discuss EO 

9981 briefly in the conclusion. The significant point for this chapter, is that 

the resilient determination of African-Americans during the interwar years 

and during World War II helped get the nation to a point where it was no 

longer realistic to deny them, men or women, full and equal participation 

in military service. The obvious answer to why EO 9981 was issued is 

World War II. 
107

Although blacks were still used sparingly as fighting soldiers during 

World War II, their contributions could not be downplayed. Had World 

War II lasted well into 1946, there is little doubt that African-Americans 

would have played an ever-increasing role as combat arms soldiers, 

sailors, air corpsmen, and marines. 

World War II was indeed the turning point for African-Americans 

in military service. It was not so much what they accomplished on the 

battlefield as it was what happened as a result of their service. The most 

significant difference between World War II and earlier wars was that 

African-Americans were not completely disbanded from the military 

when the war ended. 

From chapter 1, where we saw persons of African descent choosing 

to fight for freedom, to chapter 4, where we saw African-Americans 

choosing to fight for equality, the one constant that remained the same 

through the Revolutionary War, Civil War, World War I, and World War II 

was the black fighting patriotic spirit. The black soldier in 1780, fighting 

for freedom for himself from foreign oppression, believed in America; 

the soldier of African descent, who was fighting for freedom at Battery 

Wagner on 18 July 1863, believed in America; the black soldier in 1918, 

fighting for his rights as a citizen that had been granted to him a halfcentury earlier, yet denied them, believed in America; and, the AfricanAmerican soldier who fought for equality in 1944, after his forefathers had 

already theoretically secured his equality, believed in America. It all can 

be summed up in the words of an unknown World War I African-American 

soldier who said, “My country, right or wrong, my country.”
108 

Notes

 1. Extracts from Memorandum for the Commandant, Army War College, 30 August 

1924, Blacks in the Armed Forces, Vol. IV, Item 124. 

 2. Ibid. 

 3. Ulysses Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops (Washington, DC: Center of Army 

History, 1994), 32-41. 

 4. Ibid., 25. 

 5. Gary A. Donaldson, The History of African-Americans in the Military (Malabar, FL: 

Krieger Publishing Co., 1991), 103; Bernard C. Nalty, Strength for the Fight: A History of 

Black Americans in the Military (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 133. 

 6. Walter White to General Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff, 10 September 1931, 

Blacks in the Armed Forces, Vol. IV, Item 150. 

 7. Walter White to General Douglas MacArthur, 15 September 1931, Ibid., Item 151. 

 8. Major General George Van Horn Mosely, Acting Chief of Staff to Walter White, 21 

September 1931, Ibid., Item 152. 

 9. Robert R. Morton, Principal, Tuskegee Institute, to President Herbert Hoover, 27 

October 1931, Ibid., Item 154. 

10. General Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff, to Dr. Robert R. Morton, 18 November 

1931, Ibid., Item 156. 

11. Pittsburgh Courier, 19 February 1938 to 28 September 1940. 

12. Crisis, February and March 1939. 

13. John B. Kirby, Black Americans in the Roosevelt Era: Liberalism and Race (Knoxville, 

TN: The University of Tennessee Press, 1980), 53, 170-71. 

14. Lee, 75-76. 

15. Marvin Fletcher, America’s First Black General: Benjamin O. Davis, Sr., 1880-1970

(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1989) 83-85. 

16. William L. Shirer, Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany (New 

York: Simon & Schuster, 1960, reprint 1990), 57-59. Shirer’s classic book is perhaps the 

most detailed account of the Third Reich. Students interested in studying the rise of Hitler 

and the Third Reich should refer to this discourse. 

17. Ibid., 177. 

18. Bernard C. Nalty, The Right to Fight: African-American Marines in World War II

(Washington, DC: Marine Corps Historical Center, 1995), 2. 

19. “Negro Marines in World War II,” RG 107, National Archives, Washington, DC, 1-6. 

20. “The Negro in the Marine Corps,” Blacks in the Armed Forces, Vol. VI, Item 112, 1-

2. 

21. The Golden Thirteen: Recollections of the First Black Naval Officers, Paul Stillwell, 

ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993), XVII. 

22. Historical Selection, Bureau of Naval Personnel, “The Negro in the Navy in World 

War II,” Washington, DC, 1947, Blacks in the Armed Forces, Vol. VI, Item 101. 

23. “The Negro in the United States Navy,” Crisis (July 1940), 200-201. 

24. Nalty, Strength for the Fight, 186. 

25. “New Navy Policy,” Crisis (May 1942), 166. 

26. Nalty, Strength for the Fight, 143. 

27. “Proudly We Served: The Men of the USS Mason,” Video, Blue Jacket Enterprises, 

1995. 

28. Lieutenant Dennis Denmark Nelson, USNR, “The Integration of the Negro Into the 

United States Navy: 1776-1947,” (Master’s Thesis, Department of Sociology, Howard 

University, 1948) 158. 

29. Nalty, Strength for the Fight, 192. 
109

30. Taps for a Jim Crow Army: Letters From Black Soldiers in World War II, Phillip 

McGuire, ed. (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1993), XXVI-XXVII. 

The irony here is that within 35 years draft boards had swung 180 degrees. During the 

Vietnam conflict, minorities, the poor, and less-educated Americans were drafted at a 

disproportionately higher rate. Thirty percent of eligible blacks versus 18 percent of 

eligible whites were drafted during the 1960s. See John Hope Franklin, From Slavery 

to Freedom: A History of Negro American (New York: Knopf, 1947; reprint New York: 

Knopf, 1988), 488. African-Americans fit the bill for all three categories. 

31. Lee, 415. 

32. Nalty, Strength for the Flight, 164. 

33. Stephen E. Ambrose, D-day, June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II (New 

York: Simon & Schuster, 1944), 371-72. Lee, 592.

34. “Black Veterans Recall Their Role in D-day Invasion,” Jet Magazine (20 June 1994), 

4-6, 8. 

35. One veteran tells of a jeep driver who was missing for two days. When the driver 

finally returned, his captain asked him where he had been. In anger the driver replied, “On 

that goddamn Red Ball Express. I accidentally got into one of their convoys and it was 100 

miles later before I could get a chance to turn around.”

36. The Invisible Soldier: The Experience of the Black Soldier, World War II, Mary Penick 

Motley, ed. (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1975), 188. 

37. Lee, 633. 

38. All the information in the preceding paragraphs on the Red Ball Express was derived 

from Lee, 632-33; Motley, 187-88; and Department of Defense Publication, Black 

Americans in Defense of Our Nation (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 

1985), 99-101. 

39. On Christmas Day, a second all-black tank battalion, the 784th Tank Battalion, 

entered the ETO. The 758th Battalion, the third all-black tank unit, served in Italy, the 

Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO). 

40. Unless otherwise footnoted or a direct quote, the information in the following 

paragraphs detailing the 761st Tank Battalion is derived from the following sources: 

Captain Ivan H. Harrison, 761st Tank Battalion, Commanding, to the Commanding 

General, U.S. Forces, European Theater, 25 July 1945, “Recommendation for Award of 

Distinguished Unit Citation.” National Archives, Suitland, MD, RG 497, Entry 427, Box 

16792; Captain August W. Bremer, 761st Tank Battalion, S-2 Report, 6 August 1945, 

“761st Tank Battalion Wiped Out Equivalent of Three or Four German Divisions During 

Combat Period In Europe,” National Archives, same RG, entry, and box; Captain Ivan H. 

Harrison, 761st Tank Battalion, Commanding, to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, 

European Theater, 22 November 1945, “Recommendation for Award of Second Cluster to 

the Distinguished Unit Citation,” National Archives, same RG, entry, and box; David J. 

Williams, Hit Hard (New York, 1983); Major Joseph A. Kahoe, Jr., (Ret. ) oral interview 

conducted by this author, 8 December 1994; Trezzvant W. Anderson, Come Out Fighting: 

The Epic Tale of the 761st Tank Battalion, 1942-1945 (Salzburg, Austria: Salburger 

Druckerei und Verlag, 1941); George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It (Boston: Houghton 

Mifflin, Co., 1947; reprint New York: Bantam Books, 1980), 153; Lee, 121, 584-85, 672-

79; Motley, 149-66. Hit Hard was written by a veteran white 761st company commander. 

Come Out Fighting was written by a black reporter who traveled with the 761st during the 

war. 

41. Motley, 157. 

42. The Presidential Unit Citation (Army) for Extraordinary Heroism to the 761st Tank 

Battalion, U.S. Army, President Jimmy Carter. 
110 

43. Ibid. Furthermore, the 761st rarely got the chance to fight as a battalion. Joseph Kahoe, 

a platoon leader in Alpha Company, explains, “Now one of our problems was that . . . we 

had been trained to fight, hopefully as a battalion, but most of the time as a company and 

never any lower than a platoon. But when we got with the infantry it was just the opposite. 

. . . so, the way [we] were utilized is the thing that got to us because we weren’t trained that 

way. But it worked out.”

44. Williams, 143. Privately, however, Patton had some reservations. Shortly after his visit 

to the 761st, Patton wrote in his memoirs, War As I Knew It, “I inspected and made a talk 

to the 761st Tank Battalion. A good many of the lieutenants and some of the captains had 

been my sergeants in the 9th and 10th Cavalry. Individually they were good soldiers, but 

I expressed my belief at that time, and have never found the necessity of changing it, that 

a colored soldier cannot think fast enough to fight in armor.” Whether Patton would have 

changed his views if he had had time to edit his memoirs is only speculation. He died in a 

jeep accident in December 1945. 

45. Captain Harrison, 761st Tank Battalion, 25 July 1945, “Recommendation for Award of 

Distinguished Unit Citation,” National Archives, Suitland, MD, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 

16792. 

46. Anderson, 25. 

47. Kahoe interview. 

48. Captain Harrison, 761st Tank Battalion, 25 July 1945, “Recommendation for Award of 

Distinguished Unit Citation,” National Archives, Suitland, MD, RG 407, Entry 427, Box 

16792. 

49. Anderson, 89, 92. 

50. Ibid., 92. 

51. Letter, Dwight D. Eisenhower to General Bruce C. Clarke, 29 May 1967, Blacks in the 

Armed Forces, Vol. V, Item 101. 

52. Draft Memorandum, Commanding General, Communications Zone, ETO, for 

Commanders of Colored Troops, Com Z, 26 December 1944, Ibid., Item 98. 

53. Bureau of Public Relations Press Branch Release, 29 March 1945, Ibid., Vol. V, Item 

100; Lee, 693. 

54. Ibid., 695. 

55. Bureau of Public Relations Press Branch Release, 29 March 1945, Blacks in the Armed 

Forces, Vol. V, Item 100. 

56. Lee, 697, 699. 

57. Army Service Forces, Information and Education Division, “Opinions About Infantry 

Platoons in White Companies of 7 Divisions,” 3 July 1945, Blacks in the Armed Forces, 

Vol. V, Item 102. 

58. Lee, 698-707. 

59. Ibid., 698. 

60. Ibid., 697. 

61. Army Service Forces, Information and Education Division, “Opinions About Infantry 

Platoons in White Companies of 7 Divisions,” 3 July 1945, Blacks in the Armed Forces, 

Vol. V., Item 102. 

62. The 761st Tank Battalion also received its replacements as a result of the 26 December 

call for volunteers. See Anderson, 57; Lee, 691. 

63. On 15 May 1942, Public Law (PL) 77-554 established the Women’s Army Auxiliary 

Corps (WAAC). The WAAC was not an official part of the Army. On 1 July 1943, the 

WAAC became the WAC, an official corps of the Army, meaning these women were now 

soldiers. 
111

64. Bettie J. Morden, The Women’s Army Corps, 1945-1978 (Washington, DC: Center of 

Military History, 1990), 25. 

65. Martha S. Putney, When the Nation Was in Need: Blacks in the Women’s Army Corps 

During World War II (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1992), 1. Putney was a World War 

II WAC officer, then Martha S. Settle. This author interviewed Martha S. Putney, Ph.D., on 

9 December 1994. 

66. Ibid., 121. 

67. Charity Adams-Earley, One Woman’s Army: A Black Officer Remembers the WAC

(College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1989), 144, 147-48. Margaret Barnes 

Jones, recorded interview, sent to this author, 3 January 1995. 

68. Putney, 99; Adams-Earley, 122, 125. 

69. Adams-Earley, 151. 

70. Ibid., 100. 

71. Adams-Earley, 14, 150-51. 

72. Many have undoubtedly seen the movie “Saving Private Ryan.” The episode where 

actor Tom Hanks indeed finds a Private James F. Ryan, who turns out not to be James 

Francis Ryan, exemplifies the same problem the women of the 6888th experienced with 

mail. 

73. Adams-Earley, 149. 

74. Ibid., 148. 

75. Putney, 103; Adams-Earley, 151. 

76. Adams-Early, 150. 

77. Putney, 101-102. 

78. Ibid., 99. 

79. Lee, 609-10. 

80. Nalty, Strength for the Fight, 169-74. 

81. History of the 332d Fighter Group, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Roll 

B0279, Classification GP-332-HI, Frame 0835, October 1942-1947. Special Accounts, 

332d Fighter Group, April 1945, Frame 1753; Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., American: 

An Autobiography (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1991), 137. Davis 

commanded the 99th and eventually the 332d. 

82. For more on the 555th PIR, refer to Bradley Biggs, The Triple Nickles: America’s First 

All-Black Paratroop Unit (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1986). 
112 
113

Conclusion

Although black service members had fought in just about every 

American military conflict, with the possible exception of the MexicanAmerican War, hoping to obtain equality, there was little noticeable 

progress. Progress, however, was just on the horizon. 

After nearly 400 years of service on America’s battlefields, progress 

in the military, once it came, was swift for black servicemen. One decade 

after World War II ended, the military was virtually desegregated, 

although not completely integrated. Two decades later, it was, arguably, 

fully desegregated and integrated. What factors contributed to these rapid 

changes? Some have credited President Harry S. Truman’s EO 9981 for 

the quick change, while others have credited the Korean war. In actuality, 

it was perhaps a combination of both. 

On 26 July 1948, Truman issued EO 9981, which directed that “there 

shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed 

services without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin.”1 As a 

result, the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and newly formed Air Force all 

made some strides to integrate. The Air Force, however, was the only 

service to actually make any substantial progress. This was due, in large 

part, to the fact that the Air Force was a young service, not yet a year 

old, when the order was issued. The other services just simply failed to 

put much effort into integrating. Clearly, EO 9981 needed some type of 

enforcement organization or some event to force services to follow its 

mandates.2 The event soon came. 

In a surprise move on 25 June 1950, North Korean Communist forces 

attacked U.S.-supported South Korea. Within five years of victory in Japan 

(V-J Day), the United States found itself once again in conflict in Asia. 

Just like in 1941, when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the United 

States was not ready. Unlike in 1941, when United States involvement in 

the European war was imminent and some prewar preparations had been 

made, no prewar preparations had been made in 1949 and 1950, nor were 

many Americans interested in preparing for war. American forces went 

onto the Korean battlefield ill prepared and without the will of a nation to 

prepare itself for war. 

During the initial stages of the war, the nation went into the fight 

as it always had, with all-white units.3 High casualties soon plagued 

American forces. Due to apathy toward the war in Korea, Americans 

were not swarming to join the ranks as they had in 1939 to 1942. The 
114 

only viable manpower pool to select from was African-American units 

already in service. In an unprecedented move, albeit a somewhat forced 

one, American commanders were forced to substitute white soldiers and 

units with black soldiers and units into the fray. It was well documented 

that the first black unit to enter into battle on the Korean peninsula, the 

24th Infantry Regiment, performed poorly—as did most American units 

during the initial stages of the war. It was also true that by the time the 

Korean war was over, black soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines had 

gained a place of respect among the men and women they had served 

with in the Pacific.4 For the first time since the Spanish-American War, 

two black soldiers were awarded the Medal of Honor.5 By the end of the 

Korean war in 1953, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps in the 

Pacific had indeed become an integrated force. The military in Europe 

was still segregated, while the military in the United States was slowly 

moving toward integration. It appears that the bloodshed of war forced the 

military to do something that the Fahy Committee could not, implement 

Companies B and C, 24th Infantry, battle Communist counterattack on rocky mountain slopes on the Western Central Front. 
115

the mandates of EO 9981.6 Where great hardship did not exist, in Europe 

and the United States, progress was slow. 

During the peaceful years between the Korean war and the official start 

of the Vietnam war, the military defied social odds and indeed became a 

fully integrated and desegregated force.7 This did not mean that being 

in the military one was not racially discriminated against when outside 

the confines of a military installation. Secretary of State and former 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin L. Powell remembers 

one particular night very well in Columbus, Georgia, right outside Fort 

Benning, “Home of the Infantry,” in 1964. 

One night, exhausted and hungry, I locked up the house and 

headed back toward the post. As I approached a drive-in 

hamburger joint on Victory Drive, I thought, okay I know they 

won’t serve me inside, so I’ll just park outside. I pulled in, and 

after a small eternity, a waitress came to my car window. ‘A 

hamburger, please,’ I said. 

She looked at me uneasily. ‘Are you Puerto Rican?’ she asked. 

‘No,’ I said. 

‘Are you an African student?’ She seemed genuinely trying to 

be helpful. 

‘No,’ I answered. ‘I’m a Negro. I’m an American. And I’m an 

Army officer.”

‘Look, I’m from New Jersey,’ the waitress said, ‘and I don’t 

understand any of this. But they won’t let me serve you. 

Why don’t you go behind the restaurant, and I’ll pass you a 

hamburger out the back window.’

Something snapped. ‘I’m not that hungry,’ I said.8

As early as 1955 on most military installations, black soldiers, sailors, 

airmen, and marines no longer had to sit at the back of the bus, in the 

balcony of the theater, swim in separate pools, or sit outside to hopefully 

be served a hamburger. On duty, they were treated equally and received the 

same pay and allowances as their white counterparts. These great strides 

during the decade between Korea and Vietnam did not come without a 

high price. 

During the Vietnam war, the concept of using black soldiers took a 

180-degree turn from the sentiments when World War II ended, only two 

decades earlier. In 1945, although blacks had received limited recognition 

as fighting soldiers and had proved themselves capable in several previous 
116 

wars, they were not viewed as such. Even in 1950 when the Korean war 

broke out, no black fighting soldiers were seriously considered until the 

necessity for manpower became evident. By 1966, the United States was 

deeply involved in its third war in Asia, another unpopular war. High 

numbers of black soldiers were there from start to finish due to several 

factors. To increase the number of fighting soldiers, Secretary of Defense 

Robert S. McNamara’s regime instituted Project 100,000, which eased 

qualification standards for military service. The project’s goal was to assist 

“the unemployed and poorly educated by lowering standards, admitting 

them to the armed forces, and teaching them skills they could not 

otherwise acquire.”9 Although Project 100,000 was started with ostensibly 

benevolent sentiments, it primarily attracted the poor, uneducated, 

minority individuals. Many African-Americans fit perfectly into all three 

categories. It is not surprising, then, that a shocking 41 percent of the 

young men inducted as a result of Project 100,000 were black. 

African-Americans were more susceptible to the draft. Many affluent 

whites found loopholes to avoid the draft, while most of the uneducated 

found themselves filling the voids created by those vacancies. Two 

examples of how unfair the draft boards were is that only two of 1,500 

draft-age men in one Harvard graduating class went to Vietnam, while 

25 men from a working-class Boston neighborhood with a population of 

35,000 were killed in action.10 Throughout the 1960s, blacks were drafted 

at a 30-percent rate, while whites were drafted at an 18-percent rate.11

As a result of Project 100,000 and unfair draft boards, AfricanAmericans finally got what they had sought for more than 300 years, 

easy and fair entrance into the military. By 1967, blacks were about 11 

percent of the American population constituted more than 14 percent of 

the soldiers in combat units and were estimated to be a staggering 23 

percent of all combat casualties during the early years of the war.12 Over 

the course of the entire war, however, African-American casualty rates 

were about 12.4 percent, which was just over 1 percent higher than their 

national percentage.13 Similar shady draft and substituting practices put 

many Civil War-era poor whites in uniform while affluent whites stayed 

on the sidelines and watched. Eventually, these programs led to changing 

the phrase that had been coined during the Civil War by white soldiers as 

being “a rich man’s war, poor man’s fight” to a “white man’s war, black 

man’s fight” during the Vietnam war. 

These practices, future programs, and figures would not be completely 

lost on black America. Nobel Peace Prize winner Dr. Martin Luther 

King, Jr., as if clairvoyant, recognized the coming imbalance early and 
117

publicly came out against the war as early as 1965. Three years later, on 

4 April 1968, when King was assassinated, many black soldiers who had 

previously paid little or no attention to the antiwar rhetoric, immediately 

began to take note. Riots broke out in military units in all services. The 

Army, and indeed all military services, remained in a state of crisis for 

much of the next decade. Mixed in with this were the additional social 

problems of high drug and alcohol use, limited discipline, and lack of 

respect for authority. Everyday racism became the norm rather than the 

exception. Several events came to fruition before things started to change 

for the better—the all-volunteer Army, the ending of the Vietnam war, and 

the establishment of the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute 

(DEOMI) at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida. 

In 1973, the Army went to an all-volunteer force. Blacks, as well as 

poor whites, could no longer claim that their sons were being inducted 

into a “meat grinder” against their will to fight for a nation that was not 

willing to fight for them. The intent of President Richard M. Nixon’s 

administration was to reduce racial tensions, and it was successful in 

doing so. When the war ended in April 1975, the healing process began. 

As in any event, there has to be closure, good or bad, for progress to take 

root. In 1979, the Department of Defense took the initiative to accelerate 

the healing process by establishing the DEOMI. Initially established as the 

Defense Race Relations Institute (DRRI) in 1971, in addition to adding 

human relations to the race relations curriculum, DRRI’s mission was to 

establish racial harmony within the ranks by training Air Force personnel 

who would then be instructors at other installations around the country. 

Because of DRRI’s success, it was renamed DEOMI to incorporate the 

broader mission to support all services.14 Equal opportunity training is still 

conducted at Patrick Air Force Base today. 

***

By the mid-1980s, the American military was, without a doubt, 

once again the premiere fighting force in the world, both externally and 

internally. It has remained the most powerful force to this day and has 

proved itself to be on several occasions, most notably during Operation 

JUST CAUSE in Panama in 1989 and Operation DESERT STORM in the 

Persian Gulf in 1991. During both conflicts, African-American soldiers 

made up more than 25 percent of the fighting forces, and the top soldier 

was Powell, that same young soldier who could not buy a hamburger 

outside of Fort Benning in 1964. 
118 

General Colin L. Powell with troops in the Gulf during Operation DESERT STORM. 

(Department of Defense)

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin L. Powell using the “six-gun” method 

to call on reporters at the Pentagon. (Department of Defense)
119

Still, there are hurdles and barriers to cross. One question that is well 

beyond the scope of this study but needs further examination is, Why, 

even without a draft, was the African-American military population so 

high in the post-Vietnam conflicts? By just scratching the surface, two 

distinct answers come to the forefront. The first is truly ironic. Blacks had 

finally achieved what they had been fighting for the past 300-plus years—

full equality, acceptance, and respect as servicemen from their white 

counterparts. When they flew military aircraft, they flew like their white 

counterparts. When they sailed as the commander of a destroyer fleet, 

they sailed like their white counterparts. When they commanded troops in 

peacetime as well as war, they commanded like their white counterparts. 

And, when they studied and taught at the service academies, they studied 

and taught like their white counterparts. For the most part, the Army cliché 

that proudly states, “the only color in the Army is green” is genuinely true 

and can be applied to all branches of service. 

The second answer to why the black military population was—and 

indeed still is—high, was because much of America still had not followed 

the example set by the military and hired people based on their capabilities. 

As a result, while the economy may have been bright for some high school 

and college graduates, it was often dim for others. Thus, the military 

looked very attractive to many African-Americans. An article in Military 

Review synopsizes it clearly:

Direct economic incentives such as pay, cash bonuses, loan 

repayment programs and college money appeal most to those 

who have the greatest economic disadvantages. . . . In America, 

this means mostly poor, predominately inner city (and in some 

cases rural) youth. Continuing with business as usual will lead to 

an ‘economic conscription.’ Our military manpower acquisition 

programs will appeal only to the more disadvantaged segments 

of American youth.15

I believe that, given the relative success that African-Americans 

have achieved in the military in the past 50 years alone, the service of 

those World War II warriors was not in vain. Given the inroads that black 

men and women in uniform, and indeed all African-Americans, achieved 

during the World War II years, the service of those SOS troops and black 

doughboys on the Flanders fields in France during World War I was not 

in vain. Given the birth of the “new Negro” as a result of the pride that 

World War I soldiers brought back to America in 1919, the service of units 

such as the Native Guards, First South Carolina, 54th Massachusetts, and 
120 

First Kansas during the Civil War was not in vain. Given the 13th, 14th, 

and 15th Amendments that were each direct results of the American Civil 

War, the service of those American Revolution warriors was not in vain. 

So, like a domino chain, it took the combined advancements from all the 

wars mentioned in this discourse, in conjunction with the political and 

social struggles, and the help of Americans—both white and black—to put 

the black soldier, sailor, airman, marine, and coast guardsman on the same 

foundation as his white comrade in arms. 
121

Notes

 1. Lieutenant Dennis Denmark Nelson, USNR, “The Integration of the Negro Into the 

United States Navy, 1776-1947” (Master’s Thesis, Department of Sociology, Howard 

University, 1948), 161. 

 2. In actuality, President Truman had established the Fahy Committee in 1948 to ensure 

that his EO was being implemented. However, an executive order is not a law; therefore, 

implementation was still essentially at the discretion of each service. 

 3. The American Revolution, as was seen in chapter 1, was the one exception. 

 4. For many years, the 24th Infantry Regiment was labeled a unit of “cowards” who 

were neither willing nor able to fight. Indeed, when it went to the front and met the North 

Korean forces, it turned and ran. It quickly discovered that it was no match for the foe it 

had encountered. These actions were well publicized. The actions of the 24th Infantry, 

however, were exactly the same as the actions of most other American units that went to the 

Korean front during summer 1950. Only, as has been seen before in this study—especially 

during World War I, the 24th Infantry was held to a higher standard. Recent scholarship 

sponsored by the U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH) has finally told the full 

story. It does not exonerate the 24th for its actions; it simply puts them into perspective. For 

a full account see William T. Bowers et al., Black Soldier/White Army: The 24th Infantry 

Regiment in Korea (Washington, D C: CMH, 1996). 

 5. In 1997, President William J. Clinton awarded five World War II veterans the Medal 

of Honor posthumously. A sixth veteran was alive to receive his award. 

 6. The Fahy Committee, named for Georgian Charles Fahy, the committee chairman, 

who was a former U.S. Solicitor General, was formed in August 1948 to ensure that 

the Army, Navy, and Air Force carried out President Truman’s EO 9981 directives. The 

Fahy Committee asked each service to develop a program that would support EO 9981’s 

mission of desegregating the forces. The Fahy Committee was to then monitor—it could 

not force—the progress and report to President Truman. In January 1949, the services 

submitted their plans. Except for the Air Force, very little progress had been made to 

desegregate the military by the time North Korea crossed the 38th Parallel. 

 7. There was never an official declaration of war for the Vietnam conflict. Chronology 

of U.S. involvement is vague as to when and exactly how the United States officially got 

embroiled in Vietnam. As early as September 1945, America began to support French 

efforts to recolonialize Vietnam. In August 1950, the Military Assistance Advisory Group 

arrived in Vietnam. In October 1955, the United States recognized the rigged election of 

Ngo Dinh Diem, an anti-Communist. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy sent Special 

Forces to Vietnam. By the time the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was enacted on 7 August 

1964, the United States already had a long history of involvement in Vietnam. For a 

complete and detailed chronology, see George Moss, Vietnam: An American Ordeal

(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994). 

 8. Colin L. Powell, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 107-108. 

 9. Nalty, Strength for the Fight (New York: Free Press, 1986), 299. Also see Gary 

Donelson, History of African-Americans in the Military (Malabar, FL: Krieger Publishing 

Co., 1991), 157-58, 161. 

10. Bernard C. Nalty, 298. 

11. John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom: A History of Negro Americans (New 

York: A.A. Knopf, 1947; reprinted New York: Knopf, 1988), 488. 

12. Ibid., 491; Wallace Terry, Bloods: An Oral History of the Vietnam War by Black 

Veterans (New York: Random House, 1984), xiv. 
122

13. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity, “Negro 

Participation in the Armed Forces” (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 

1971), Vol. XIII, item 61. 

14. Nalty, 316, 331, 333, 346. Donelson, 171. 

15. Major Keith B. Hauk, U.S. Army, and Colonel Greg H. Parlier, U.S. Army, 

“Recruiting: Crisis and Cures,” Military Review (May-June 2000), 75-76.