No. 35 December 7, 2023 673

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON

PNW METAL RECYCLING, INC., dba Rivergate Scrap Metals,

dba RS Davis Recycling,

dba PNW Auto Parts, dba Orient Auto Parts and Recycling, an Oregon corporation; Schnitzer Steel Industries, Inc., an Oregon corporation; and Pacific Recycling, Inc.,

an Oregon corporation, Respondents on Review,

v.
OREGON DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, an agency of the State of Oregon,
Petitioner on Review

. (CA A171317) (SC S069412)

On review from the Court of Appeals.*

Argued and submitted November 17, 2022.

Denise G. Fjordbeck, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed the opening brief for petitioner on review. Carson L. Whitehead, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the reply brief for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.

Jon W. Monson, Cable Huston LLP, Portland, and Crystal S. Chase, Stoel Rives LLP, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondents on review. Also on the brief were Nicole M. Swift and Nicole A. W. Abercrombie, Cable Huston LLP, Portland, and Kirk B. Maag, Stoel Rives LLP,
Portland.

______________

* On judicial review from a decision of the Department of Environmental Quality. 317 Or App 207, 505 P3d 462 (2022).674 PNW Metal Recycling, Inc. v. DEQ

Lindsay Thane, Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt PC, Portland, filed the brief for amici curiae Northwest Pulp & Paper Association, Oregon Business & Industry Association, Oregon Farm Bureau, Oregon Forest Industries Council, and Oregonians for Food and Shelter.

Jennifer Gates, Pearl Legal Group, Portland, filed

the brief for amicus curiae Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries Pacific Northwest Chapter.

Before Flynn, Chief Justice, Duncan, Garrett, DeHoog, and Masih, Justices, and Balmer and Walters, Senior Judges, Justices pro tempore.**

GARRETT, J.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated. The judi

cial review is dismissed.
**Nelson, J., resigned February 25, 2023, and did not participate in the deci

sion of this case. Bushong and James, JJ., did not participate in the consideration

or decision of this case.

______________

** Nelson, J., resigned February 25, 2023, and did not participate in the decision of this case. Bushong and James, JJ., did not participate in the consider

ation or decision of this case.Cite as 371 Or 673 (2023) 675

GARRETT, J.

Under ORS 459.205, a person operating a solid waste disposal site must obtain a permit from the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ). Before 2018, DEQ did not apply that permit requirement to facilities that disman

tled and recycled used vehicles, even if those facilities also disposed of other solid waste. Petitioners operate facilities that engage in both vehicle and nonvehicle recycling and which, therefore, historically were not subject to the permit requirement. 1 In 2018, DEQ informed petitioners that the agency had changed its view of the relevant statutes and that, based on that revised interpretation, petitioners would be required to obtain permits.

Petitioners initiated this challenge under ORS 183.400, contending that DEQ’s change of position consti

tuted a “rule” under the Oregon Administrative Procedures Act (APA); that DEQ had adopted the rule without follow

ing APA rulemaking procedures; and that DEQ could not lawfully promulgate a rule in any event because DEQ lacks rulemaking authority. Agreeing with petitioners that DEQ had improperly adopted a rule, the Court of Appeals held DEQ’s decision invalid. PNW Metal Recycling, Inc. v. DEQ

, 317 Or App 207, 213, 505 P3d 462 (2022).

DEQ sought review, which we allowed. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that petitioners’ rule challenge under ORS 183.400 must be dismissed. DEQ’s internal decision to adopt a new interpretation of a statute is not, by itself, a “rule.” We vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and dismiss the judicial review.

I. BACKGROUND

This case presents an important question of admin

istrative law, the resolution of which turns on several dis

tinct statutory schemes. A brief overview of those statutes will provide helpful context for understanding the facts that led to this dispute. Accordingly, we begin by describing,

1 In requesting judicial review of the validity of an agency rule, the party requesting review is denominated the “petitioner.” ORS 183.400. Thus, although PNW Metal Recycling et al. are the respondents on review in this court, we refer to those participants as “petitioners” throughout this opinion.676 PNW Metal Recycling, Inc. v. DEQ

first, the relevant provisions of the APA; second, statutes establishing DEQ and setting out its authority; and third, statutes regulating solid waste disposal. After doing so, we
discuss the historical facts.

A. Oregon APA Requirements

Executive branch agencies perform functions that can be described as legislative (adoption of rules), executive (enforcement of statutes and rules), or adjudicative (deter

mination of rights and obligations in particular cases). In all events, an agency’s authority is defined by the legisla

ture. An agency is a creature of statute, and the scope of its substantive power is set forth in and circumscribed by its enabling statute. See SAIF v. Shipley , 326 Or 557, 561, 955 P2d 244 (1998) (“[A]n agency has only those powers that the legislature grants and cannot exercise authority that it does not have.”); Trebesch v. Employment Division , 300 Or 264, 267, 710 P2d 136 (1985) (“The authorizing statutes will specify whether rulemaking or adjudication authority, or both, are delegated to the agency and will indicate the agen

cy’s tasks, the breadth of the agency’s discretion to carry out these tasks, and the process by which they are to be accom

plished.”). For example, an enabling statute might articu

late a legislative policy objective such as clean air or clean water, direct an agency to further that goal, and authorize the agency to undertake specific actions in doing so, such as promulgating rules, issuing permits or licenses, and initiat

ing enforcement actions.

In ORS chapter 183, the APA, in turn, sets out a series of procedures that generally govern state agencies in the performance of those functions, as well as judicial review of agency action. At the heart of the APA is the distinction between procedures applicable to an agency’s exercise of its legislative function—which results in a “rule”—and those governing an agency’s use of its executive and adjudicatory powers—which are exercised through “orders,” sometimes following “contested cases.”

“Rules,” as a species of lawmaking, are meant to apply generally. Subject to exceptions discussed further below, the APA defines “rule” as “any agency directive,Cite as 371 Or 673 (2023) 677

standard, regulation or statement of general applicability that implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy, or describes the procedure or practice requirements of any agency.” ORS 183.310(9). ORS 183.325 to 183.410 set out detailed requirements for agency rulemaking proceedings, including the requirements of public notice and opportu

nity for comment by interested persons, ORS 183.335; filing and publication of rules, ORS 183.355, ORS 183.360, ORS 183.365; and a provision invoked in this case by which a per

son may challenge the validity of a rule by filing a petition with the Court of Appeals, ORS 183.400.

“Orders,” in contrast, are particularized. Subject to exceptions, the APA defines “order” as “any agency action expressed orally or in writing directed to a named person or named persons, other than employees, officers or members of an agency. ‘Order’ includes any agency determination or decision issued in connection with a contested case proceed

ing.” ORS 183.310(6)(a).

A “contested case” is defined as follows:

“(a) ‘Contested case’ means a proceeding before an

agency:

“(A) In which the individual legal rights, duties or privileges of specific parties are required by statute or Constitution to be determined only after an agency hearing at which such specific parties are entitled to appear and be heard;

“(B) Where the agency has discretion to suspend or revoke a right or privilege of a person;

“(C) For the suspension, revocation or refusal to renew or issue a license where the licensee or applicant for a license demands such hearing; or

“(D) Where the agency by rule or order provides for hearings substantially of the character required by [cer

tain other provisions of the APA].

“(b) ‘Contested case’ does not include proceedings in which an agency decision rests solely on the result of a test.”

ORS 183.310(2). In ORS 183.411 to 183.471, the APA prescribes procedures for contested cases, including678 PNW Metal Recycling, Inc. v. DEQ

requirements of notice, opportunities for discovery, intro

duction of evidence, representation by counsel, and entry of final orders with findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The APA thus contemplates that, as a general mat

ter, an agency’s application of law or policy to particular facts will occur through an order (sometimes following a contested case), while an agency action that “implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy” in a way that has “general applicability,” ORS 183.310(9), will occur through rulemaking. But that general distinction has an important exception. The APA also provides:

“A rule is not valid or effective against any person or party until the rule is filed in accordance with this section. However, if an agency, in disposing of a contested case,

announces in its decision the adoption of a general policy applicable to the case and subsequent cases of like nature the agency may rely upon the decision in disposition of later

cases .”

ORS 183.355(6) (emphasis added). Thus, in a contested case proceeding, an agency may make a statement that otherwise has the character of a rule—because it is an “adoption of a general policy” applicable not only to the case but to “cases of like nature.” And, in that event, the agency may apply the policy prospectively even though it was adopted without the notice-and-comment features of formal rulemaking. To put it another way, the fact that an agency makes a statement of policy that is consistent with the definition of “rule” does not mean that the agency must make that statement through rulemaking proceed

ings. See Homestyle Direct, LLC v. DHS , 354 Or 253, 265- 66, 311 P3d 487 (2013) (“Merely because a given adminis

trative standard or policy satisfies the statutory definition of a ‘rule’ under the [APA] does not necessarily mean that it is invalid unless preceded by notice and comment rulemaking proceedings.” (Citing ORS 183.355(6).)). As we will explain later in this opinion, in some circumstances an agency must use rulemaking rather than the contested case process to announce policy; whether that is so, how

ever, is determined not by the APA, but, instead, by the agency’s substantive enabling statutes.Cite as 371 Or 673 (2023) 679

B. DEQ and EQC

The legislature has enacted an extensive statutory scheme for environmental protection, addressing matters ranging from solid waste management (ORS chapter 459) to air quality (ORS chapter 468A) to water quality (ORS chap

ter 468B) to hazardous waste (ORS chapters 465 and 466), among others.

ORS chapter 468 establishes two entities with sig

nificant responsibility for administering and enforcing that regulatory scheme: the Environmental Quality Commission (EQC) and DEQ. ORS 468.010 provides that the EQC con

sists of five members appointed by the Governor and con

firmed by the Senate. ORS 468.015 states that the func

tion of EQC is to “ establish the policies for the operation of [DEQ].” ORS 468.020(1) provides that EQC “shall adopt such rules and standards as it considers necessary and proper in performing the functions vested by law in the [EQC],” with such adoption of rules and standards to be made “[i]n accordance with the applicable provisions of [the APA].” Thus, the EQC has an express grant of authority to make “rules” that are necessary to carry out the functions vested in it by statute.

DEQ is separately created by ORS 468.030, which provides that the department exists “under” EQC and con

sists of a “[d]irector” and other personnel. ORS 468.040 pro

vides that the DEQ director is appointed by the EQC and serves at the pleasure of the commission. ORS 468.035 sets out a list of specific functions to be performed by DEQ “[s] ubject to policy direction by [EQC],” and ORS 468.045(1) (c) generally provides that the purpose of DEQ, through its director, is to “[a]dminister and enforce the laws of the state concerning environmental quality.”

The statutory scheme accordingly contemplates a basic division of functions whereby EQC has the responsi

bility to establish “policies” for the operation of DEQ and the authority to adopt “rules and standards” to carry out its statutory duties, while DEQ is directed to “[a]dminister and enforce” the environmental laws “[s]ubject to policy direc

tion” by EQC.680 PNW Metal Recycling, Inc. v. DEQ

C. Solid Waste Disposal and Permitting

Among numerous subjects of environmental regu

lation, the legislature has enacted a statutory scheme for “solid waste management,” codified in ORS chapter 459.

“Solid waste” is defined to mean

“all useless or discarded putrescible and nonputrescible materials, including but not limited to garbage, rubbish, refuse, ashes, paper and cardboard, sewage sludge, septic tank and cesspool pumpings or other sludge, useless or discarded commercial, industrial, demolition and construc

tion materials, discarded or abandoned vehicles or parts thereof , discarded home and industrial appliances, manure, vegetable or animal solid and semisolid materials, dead
animals and infectious waste as defined in ORS 459.386.
‘Solid waste’ does not include:

“(a) Hazardous waste as defined in ORS 466.005.

“(b) Materials used for fertilizer or for other produc

tive purposes or which are salvageable as such materials are used on land in agricultural operations and the grow

ing or harvesting of crops and the raising of animals.

“(c) Woody biomass that is combusted as a fuel by a facility that has obtained a permit described in ORS
468A.040.”

ORS 459.005(25) (emphasis added). As defined, solid waste includes a wide range of material, including, as relevant to this case, “discarded or abandoned vehicles or parts thereof.”
Id.

ORS 459.045 addresses rulemaking by EQC in the area of solid waste management. ORS 459.045(1) states that EQC “shall” adopt rules pertaining to certain aspects of solid waste management, and ORS 459.045(2) states that the commission “may” adopt other rules; that statute does not, however, specifically address rulemaking with respect to the issuance or denial of permits. The parties have iden

tified no statute, and we are aware of none, that grants DEQ rulemaking authority on that subject.

Several provisions of ORS chapter 459 deal with “disposal sites.” As relevant here, ORS 459.205 states thatCite as 371 Or 673 (2023) 681

“a disposal site shall not be established, operated, main

tained or substantially altered, expanded or improved, and a change shall not be made in the method or type of dis

posal at a disposal site, until the person owning or con

trolling the disposal site obtains a permit therefor from the Department of Environmental Quality as provided in ORS

459.235.”

Under that statute, DEQ is charged with issuing permits for “disposal sites.” The legislature has defined a “disposal site” as follows:

“(a) ‘Disposal site’ means land and facilities used for the disposal, handling or transfer of, or energy recovery, material recovery and recycling from solid wastes, includ

ing but not limited to dumps, landfills, sludge lagoons, sludge treatment facilities, disposal sites for septic tank pumping or cesspool cleaning service, transfer stations, energy recovery facilities, incinerators for solid waste delivered by the public or by a collection service, compost

ing plants and land and facilities previously used for solid waste disposal at a land disposal site.

“(b) ‘Disposal site’ does not include:

“* * * * *

“(D) A site operated by a dismantler issued a certifi

cate under ORS 822.110.”

ORS 459.005(8). Thus, the definition of a “disposal site” that cannot be operated without a permit from DEQ excludes sites operated pursuant to a “certificate under ORS 822.110.” ORS 822.110 is part of the Oregon Vehicle Code and pro

vides for the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT) to issue a “dismantler certificate” to entities that meet spec

ified requirements.

To summarize, the legislature has provided that DEQ shall be responsible for administering a mandatory permit program for solid waste disposal sites, ORS 459.205, and the legislature has further provided that “solid waste” includes “discarded or abandoned vehicles or parts thereof.” ORS 459.005(25). At the same time, the legislature has stated that a “disposal site” for which permits are required

does not include a “site” operated by a person that has obtained a vehicle “dismantler certificate” from ODOT. ORS682 PNW Metal Recycling, Inc. v. DEQ

459.005(8)(b)(D). We refer to that statute throughout this opinion as the “auto-dismantler exception.” The interplay among those provisions is central to the parties’ arguments

in this case.

D. Factual Background

The relevant facts are largely procedural and are undisputed. Petitioners operate scrap metal recycling facil

ities that accept and process both vehicular and nonvehicu

lar materials. Those materials fall within the statutory defi

nition of “solid waste” under ORS 459.005(25). Petitioners also, however, hold vehicle dismantler certificates issued by
ODOT under ORS 822.110.

Before the events giving rise to this case, DEQ had not applied ORS 459.205, the statute that requires permits for solid waste disposal sites, to facilities that hold vehicle dismantler certificates, even if those facilities engaged in other solid waste disposal functions. Instead, DEQ required a facility to obtain a solid waste disposal permit only if the facility had no vehicle processing operations. The record does not reflect the reason for that historical practice by DEQ.

A March 2018 fire at a Portland automobile shred

ding facility (not operated by either of the petitioners) prompted DEQ to undertake a review to “identify potential gaps in environmental regulation of automobile disman

tlers.” In an internal memorandum in August of that year, DEQ staff noted the following about the auto-dismantler exception:

“DEQ historically has applied the statutory exemption from solid waste management regulation as applying to an entire operation, even if that operation includes solid waste other than automobiles. Nevertheless, the statutory exemption could be applied narrowly to only cover auto dis

mantling operations—leaving other solid waste activities subject to regulation.”

Interpreting the auto-dismantler exception in ORS 459.005(8)(b)(D) more narrowly was just one of several options that the staff memorandum identified. Other options included: (1) maintaining the status quo; (2) formallyCite as 371 Or 673 (2023) 683

adopting new administrative rules for “interpreting the [auto-dismantler] exclusion”; (3) proposing a bill to the leg

islature to “remove or clarify the auto dismantler exemp

tion”; and (4) proposing a bill to the legislature to “direct DEQ to issue permits or take other specific actions.”

In July and November 2018, following separate site inspections of petitioners’ facilities, DEQ informed petition

ers in writing that their facilities would be subject to the permitting requirement for nonvehicular waste processing, even though those facilities held dismantling certificates from ODOT. In December, DEQ staff met with representa

tives of petitioner PNW Metal Recycling. At that meeting, DEQ staff acknowledged that, “historically, we’ve said, if you had the DMV [auto-dismantler] certificate, then you’re not defined as a disposal site by law.” DEQ staff then explained the agency’s change of view, viz. , that “[DEQ has] clarified

* * * that, for those facilities that accept other types of waste materials in addition to vehicles, they are a disposal site, and they should be regulated under a DEQ permit.” During the meeting, agency staff also indicated that DEQ intended to apply the permitting requirement to other similarly situ

ated facilities, not just petitioners.

Petitioners chose to challenge DEQ’s decision by initiating this proceeding under ORS 183.400, which pro

vides that “[t]he validity of any rule may be determined upon a petition by any person to the Court of Appeals.” ORS 183.400(1). Petitioners argued that DEQ’s new interpre

tation of the auto-dismantler exception was a “rule,” that DEQ had failed to follow rulemaking procedures, and that DEQ lacked rulemaking authority. Petitioners advanced only those procedural arguments; they did not argue that DEQ’s new interpretation was substantively incorrect. DEQ sought to dismiss, arguing that ORS 183.400 is inapplica

ble because the agency had not promulgated a “rule.” The Appellate Commissioner concluded that the question of whether the challenged action was a rule warranted resolu

tion by a panel.

Before the Court of Appeals panel, petitioners pressed their arguments that DEQ’s decision to change its interpretation of the auto-dismantler exception constituted684 PNW Metal Recycling, Inc. v. DEQ

a new rule, that the rule had been adopted without follow

ing APA rulemaking procedures, and that DEQ lacked the statutory authority to engage in rulemaking in any event. In response, DEQ agreed that, if the agency’s decision con

stitutes a rule, it is invalid, but argued that no rule had been adopted.

The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioners. After consulting the definition of “rule” in ORS 183.310(9) (“any agency directive, standard, regulation or statement of gen

eral applicability that implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy, or describes the procedure or practice require

ments of any agency”), the Court of Appeals concluded that DEQ’s action met that definition. PNW Metal Recycling, Inc.

, 317 Or App at 213. Relying on its own case law, that court reasoned that DEQ’s evolving interpretation of the auto-dis

mantler exception showed that multiple interpretations are “reasonable,” and DEQ’s decision to change its interpretation was therefore a “new exercise of agency discretion[,] which must be promulgated as a rule to be valid.” Id. at 212 (inter

nal quotation marks omitted). The Court of Appeals rejected DEQ’s argument that the agency’s action was not “generally applicable,” noting that the agency had stated its intention to apply its new interpretation to other similarly situated facilities in addition to those operated by petitioners.

DEQ sought review of the Court of Appeals deci

sion, which we allowed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Brief Overview

At the outset, we note the peculiar posture of the case before us. This proceeding is ostensibly a challenge under ORS 183.400 to the validity of DEQ’s “rule.” But the agency disputes that it adopted any rule; moreover, the gravamen of petitioners’ argument is that rulemaking was required and did not occur. Petitioners further contend that, although rulemaking was required, DEQ could not have done it, because the agency lacks statutory authority to pro

mulgate rules; only EQC can do that. In sum, petitioners argue that DEQ made a decision that constitutes a “rule”; that DEQ did not comply with rulemaking procedures andCite as 371 Or 673 (2023) 685

lacked the power to do so; but that the type of decision DEQ made is nevertheless one that required rulemaking.

As discussed below, DEQ’s internal decision to adopt a new interpretation of the auto-dismantler exception was not a “rule.” In explaining that conclusion, we address certain premises underlying petitioners’ arguments and the Court of Appeals decision that are not entirely cor

rect. Petitioners contend, for example, that DEQ’s decision to change its interpretation of the auto-dismantler excep

tion was a discretionary policy choice that could only be made through rulemaking. Implicit in that argument is the assumption that, if an agency’s action makes “policy” or is otherwise consistent with the definition of rule in ORS 183.310(9), then that action must occur through rulemaking procedures. That assumption is contrary to our case law. As noted earlier in this opinion, the APA provides that agency announcements of policy may also occur in contested cases.
But the APA does not determine when one of those mecha

nisms or the other must be used. In several cases, this court has explained that agencies must use rulemaking in certain circumstances; when that is so, however, it is not because
the APA requires it. Whether an agency must use rulemak

ing in a particular situation is a function of the agency’s substantive authority as defined by its enabling statutes.

Petitioners have not attempted to demonstrate that the legislature intended for the application of the auto-dis

mantler exception to be handled through rulemaking. Without a properly developed argument that rulemaking was the required path, petitioners are left to rely solely on the APA’s definition of “rule” to argue that DEQ’s actions were procedurally improper. Based on the larger context of the APA and principles of administrative law set out in this court’s cases, we conclude that petitioners are mistaken.

B. Definition of “Rule”

ORS 183.310(9) provides, in full:

“ ‘Rule’ means any agency directive, standard, regula

tion or statement of general applicability that implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy, or describes the pro

cedure or practice requirements of any agency. The term686 PNW Metal Recycling, Inc. v. DEQ

includes the amendment or repeal of a prior rule, but does
not include:

“(a) Unless a hearing is required by statute, internal management directives, regulations or statements which do not substantially affect the interests of the public:

“(A) Between agencies, or their officers or their employ

ees; or

“(B) Within an agency, between its officers or between employees.

“(b) Action by agencies directed to other agencies or other units of government which do not substantially affect the interests of the public.

“(c) Declaratory rulings issued pursuant to ORS 183.410 [(agency determination of applicability of rule or statute to petitioner)] or 305.105 [(declaratory rulings by department)].

“(d) Intra-agency memoranda.

“(e) Executive orders of the Governor.

“(f) Rules of conduct for persons committed to the phys

ical and legal custody of the Department of Corrections, the
violation of which will not result in:

“(A) Placement in segregation or isolation status in excess of seven days.

“(B) Institutional transfer or other transfer to secure confinement status for disciplinary reasons.

“(C) Disciplinary procedures adopted pursuant to ORS 421.180 [(disciplinary procedures)].”

This court has not previously decided a case turning on the definition of “rule,” although we have observed that the defi

nition is broad. See, e.g.

, Morgan v. Stimson Lumber Company

, 288 Or 595, 602-03, 607 P2d 150 (1980) (“[A]n agency makes a rule, within the broad meaning of that term, when it does nothing more than publish its official position on how it interprets a requirement, standard, or procedure[.]”).

Before proceeding further, we pause to be clear about petitioners’ assertion as to the nature of the “rule” that DEQ adopted. Petitioners rely on the 2018 staff memorandumCite as 371 Or 673 (2023) 687

proposing a different interpretation of the auto-dismantler exception; petitioners further rely on DEQ’s written and oral communications explaining that decision to petitioners. Petitioners do not contend, however, that any such document or communication, alone or in the aggregate, constitutes the rule. (Petitioners also acknowledge that the definition of “rule” specifically exempts “intra-agency memoranda.”) Rather, petitioners cite those documents and communica

tions as “evidence” of the rule, which petitioners describe as follows: “It is DEQ’s decision to change that interpretation based on a discretionary choice to impose additional over

sight to achieve certain policy goals which constitutes the ‘rule’ under ORS 183.310(9).” Similarly, the Court of Appeals concluded that DEQ’s decision to change its interpretation was a “new exercise of agency discretion[,] which must be promulgated as a rule to be valid.” PNW Metal Recycling,
Inc.

, 317 Or App at 212 (internal quotation marks omitted).

As a textual matter, it is doubtful that DEQ’s inter

nal decision about how to interpret the statute—as opposed to some expression of that decision—satisfies the definition of a rule in ORS 183.310(9). An agency’s internal decision about how to construe a statute is not self-executing. ORS 183.310(9) refers to an “agency directive, standard, regula

tion or statement of general applicability that implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy.” The APA does not further define “directive, standard, regulation or statement of general applicability,” but those terms appear to contem

plate a decision that has been made manifest or apparent in some way. In that regard, petitioners argue that DEQ’s action can be described variously as a

“ ‘directive’ (because it directed certain action), a ‘standard’ (because it established criteria for whether an auto dis

mantler needs to apply for a solid waste permit), a ‘regu

lation’ (because it had the effect of regulating certain auto dismantlers by requiring them to apply for a solid waste permit), and a ‘statement’ (because its actions were memo

rialized in at least the 2018 memorandum and in oral statements by senior DEQ staff).”

None of those points is implausible. Importantly, however, that aspect of petitioners’ argument shifts the focus from DEQ’s interpretive decision to the manner in which DEQ688 PNW Metal Recycling, Inc. v. DEQ

articulated that decision. Yet petitioners simultaneously contend that it is DEQ’s “decision” alone that constitutes the
rule.

In short, although petitioners rest their arguments on ORS 183.310(9), their arguments based on that definition are somewhat inconsistent. As a result, that statutory text cannot quite support the weight that petitioners place on it. More importantly, the definition of “rule” does not exist in a vacuum, and the viability of petitioners’ theory ultimately depends on whether it comports with the text of the defini

tion when understood in the context of the APA as a whole. We turn to that question.

C. Other APA Provisions

As noted earlier in this opinion, agencies are crea

tures of statute. The legislature, in creating an agency, determines what powers the agency will have, including the powers of rulemaking, adjudication, or both. Shipley , 326 Or at 561; Trebesch , 300 Or at 267. Agencies often (though not always) are granted an array of powers that can be described as legislative (rulemaking), executive (enforcing statutes and rules), and adjudicative (resolving particular cases). An agency with rulemaking authority is subject, by default, to the procedural requirements of the APA, unless the legis

lature specifies otherwise. See ORS 183.335 (setting forth process for notice, content, and public comment on proposed rules). The rulemaking process includes the opportunity for the public to provide information to the agency in response to proposed rules and for interested parties to request hear

ings. Id.

Agencies also may have adjudicatory functions. Those functions include the authority to hear contested
cases and “other than contested cases”—to resolve cases and issue orders. ORS 183.310(2) (defining “contested case”); ORS 183.310(6) (defining “order”). As noted earlier, the APA specifically allows agencies to use the contested case process to adopt general policies that may be applied prospectively to different parties. ORS 183.355(6). The announcement of such a general policy may have the hallmarks of a “rule” under the APA’s definition of that term, ORS 183.310(9),Cite as 371 Or 673 (2023) 689

because it is an interpretation or statement of law or policy that will have prospective effect; yet the APA allows such statements of policy to be made in a contested case proceed

ing rather than through rulemaking.

The APA also provides that a person may seek a “declaratory ruling” from an agency “with respect to the applicability to any person, property, or state of facts of any rule or statute enforceable by it.” ORS 183.410. Such rulings are specifically excluded from the definition of “rule.” ORS 183.310(9)(c). Moreover, ORS 183.410 provides that a declar

atory ruling is reviewable by the Court of Appeals “in the manner provided in ORS 183.480 [(judicial review of agency orders)] for the review of orders in contested cases.” The APA thus contemplates that a request under ORS 183.410 is another avenue, in addition to rules and contested cases, through which an agency might issue a statement that announces or implements an interpretation of law or policy. Such statements are reviewable as if they had been issued in

an order following a contested case proceeding. The legisla

ture has provided distinct paths to judicial review for differ

ent types of agency actions. 2 By specifying that declaratory rulings and adoptions of policy in connection with contested cases are reviewable as orders, the APA makes clear that not all announcements and interpretations of law or policy are “rules” subject to facial challenge under ORS 183.400.

For those reasons, petitioners’ focus on the vari

ous ways in which DEQ’s action is consistent with the APA definition of “rule” is incomplete. Petitioners’ arguments proceed from the premise that, if an agency makes a policy choice, that choice requires rulemaking. But that is not so. See Homestyle Direct , 354 Or at 266 (“[T]he APA provides that agencies are authorized to adopt general policies that

2 The APA contains separate provisions for judicial review of rules and

orders. See ORS 183.400 (review of rules); ORS 183.410 (review of declaratory rulings regarding the applicability of a rule or statute to an adverse party); ORS 183.482 (review in contested cases); ORS 183.484 (review in other than contested cases); see also ORS 183.400(1) (stating that a person may not bring a rule chal

lenge under that statute “when the petitioner is a party to an order or a con

tested case in which the validity of the rule may be determined by a court”); ORS 183.400(2) (providing mechanism—separate from that which allows a party to challenge a rule in the Court of Appeals under ORS 183.400(1)—through which a party can challenge a “rule” during an enforcement proceeding).690 PNW Metal Recycling, Inc. v. DEQ

otherwise would qualify as ‘rules’ during contested case proceedings, without going through notice-and-comment rulemaking.”). 3

D. Case Law

As just explained, the APA provides that rulemak

ing and contested case proceedings are both avenues through which agencies may announce policy. That is not to say that agencies may freely choose between those mechanisms. In several cases, this court has addressed the circumstances in which agencies must engage in rulemaking as a predi

cate to enforcement. Those cases arose in a different posture than this one: They involved judicial review of a contested case rather than a rule challenge. Nevertheless, because the administrative law principles discussed in those cases pro

vide helpful context for understanding and resolving peti

tioners’ arguments in this case, we discuss them below.

The question of whether and when an agency must use rulemaking proceedings was first addressed in Megdal v. Board of Dental Examiners , 288 Or 293, 605 P2d 273 (1980). In Megdal , the board revoked the petitioner’s license to practice dentistry pursuant to the board’s statutory authority to regulate the profession and discipline licensees for “unprofessional conduct.” 288 Or at 295. The statute did not define “unprofessional conduct”; although the board had rulemaking authority, the board also had not promulgated rules defining that term.

This court concluded that the undefined term “unprofessional conduct” reflected a delegation from the leg

islature to the board “to expand the list of conduct deemed unprofessional for disciplinary purposes by rules.” Id. at 316. We further reasoned that the board could lawfully have interpreted “unprofessional conduct” to include the type of fraudulent business practice in which the petitioner had engaged. But because the board had not done so, no source

3 This point should not be taken to mean that if an agency chooses the rulemaking path when it could have chosen a different path, it may be excused from complying with applicable rulemaking procedures. Situations may arise in which an agency chooses to announce policy through a rule even though the agency could have used the contested case process. If the agency chooses to announce a rule, it must act consistently with the APA in doing so.Cite as 371 Or 673 (2023) 691

of law permitted the sanction. See id. at 321 (“No such rule having been made to proscribe the kind of conduct charged against petitioner, there was no legal ground on which to revoke his license.”). In short, Megdal held that the statute in question delegated a policymaking function to the board, which could not be exercised in the first instance through adjudication.

Two years after Megdal , this court decided Ross v. Springfield School Dist. No. 19 , 294 Or 357, 657 P2d 188 (1982), a teacher discipline case. After being terminated from the Springfield School District, the petitioner sought review by the Fair Dismissal Appeals Board (FDAB) under ORS 342.905, which affirmed the dismissal. Id. at 359. Before this court, the petitioner argued that “prior rulemak

ing pursuant to the [APA] is required under [ Megdal ] before the FDAB may engage in adjudication in individual cases.”
Id. at 367. We disagreed, explaining that Megdal involved statutory terms of “delegation,” whereas FDAB’s statu

tory authority was merely “interpretive.” Id. We concluded, “When applying terms of complete legislative expression, an agency may interpret statutory standards either by an interpretive rule or by order in a contested case.” Id. at 368- 69 (emphases added).

In Trebesch , we further refined the analysis for determining whether prior rulemaking was required. In that case, the claimant was denied unemployment benefits based on the agency’s determination that the claimant had not fulfilled the statutory requirement of a “systematic and sustained effort to obtain work.” 300 Or at 266. On judicial review, the claimant argued that the Employment Division was required to have promulgated a rule defining that stat

utory phrase before using it as a basis to deny benefits in an individual case. The claimant argued that the phrase was “unavoidably delegative,” id. at 269, such that rulemak

ing was required under Megdal . The agency relied on Ross

, arguing that the agency’s role was limited to interpreting the phrase. Trebesch , 300 Or at 269-70.

Although that dichotomy had its origins in Megdal and Ross , we explained that the analysis was more nuanced—whether rulemaking was required could not be692 PNW Metal Recycling, Inc. v. DEQ

determined solely by characterizing the statutory term as delegative or not:

“[C]ategorizing a statutory term for purposes of the scope of judicial review does not by itself compel a particular con

sequence with regard to rulemaking.

“* * * * *

“ Megdal does not mean that all terms delegating pol

icymaking discretion can be applied only after rulemak

ing. Nor does Ross mean that terms delegating interpretive responsibility may always be applied as the agency chooses, either by rule or by adjudication. Both cases address only the requirement for rulemaking in the individual agencies

at issue in the cases.

“It is always possible for the legislature explicitly to require an agency to define any type of statutory term by rulemaking. * * * In the absence of an explicit directive, the breadth and kind of responsibility delegated to the agency by the statutory term (fact-finding, applying an ambigu

ous law, or developing policy) will be one, but not a dispos

itive, factor which may indicate an implicit directive from the legislature for rulemaking. In addition, the tasks the agency is responsible for accomplishing, and the structure by which the agency performs its mandated tasks, all of which are specified in an agency’s authorizing legislation, must be examined as a whole in order to discern the legis

lature’s intent with regard to rulemaking.”

Trebesch

, 300 Or at 269-70. Trebesch held, in short, that whether an agency is required to take action through rulemaking as opposed to another path is a function of how the legislature intended for that agency to perform the task in question, as reflected in the agency’s enabling statutes.

We applied the Trebesch analysis three years later

in Forelaws on Board v. Energy Fac. Siting Council , 306 Or 205, 760 P2d 212 (1988). That case presented the question whether the Energy Facility Siting Council (EFSC) had lawfully determined that a company’s industrial waste was not “radioactive waste” under ORS 469.300(17). Id. at 207. By rule, EFSC had defined “thresholds of radioactivity that pose hazards to public health,” and the legislature had incorporated those standards into the statutory definitionCite as 371 Or 673 (2023) 693

of “radioactive waste.” Id. at 215. At issue in Forelaws was EFSC’s application of those statutory standards to “evalu

ations of radon-222 concentrations.” Id. at 213. EFSC had announced that application in “interpretive rulings,” and the petitioners argued that EFSC was required to have done so through formal notice-and-comment rulemaking. Id. We explained that “EFSC’s interpretations of [the standard] are within the APA’s definition of ‘rule,’ and EFSC could have made these interpretations in rulemaking proceedings
under the APA.” Id. at 213-14. We also observed that, under ORS 183.355(6),

“an agency may sometimes, in the course of deciding a con

tested case, state propositions that it also could adopt in rulemaking proceedings. If an agency is required to adopt a rule through rulemaking proceedings, that requirement must be found through an analysis of the specific statutory scheme under which an agency operates and the nature of the rule that the agency wishes to adopt.”

Id. at 214 (citing Trebesch , 300 Or at 267). We ultimately
concluded in Forelaws that, although EFSC’s enabling stat

utes gave the agency “broad authority to set policies,” which suggested a legislative intent to require rulemaking, the particular issue in Forelaws involved a narrower question on which the legislature had already made a complete policy choice, with EFSC’s role being limited to interpretation. Id.

at 215-16.

In sum, “[w]hether an agency is required to adopt a policy that qualifies as a ‘rule’ solely by means of rulemak

ing procedures depends on whether the legislature has declared that rulemaking is the sole acceptable means of adopting the particular policy at issue.” Homestyle Direct

, 354 Or at 266 (emphasis in original). That determination, in turn, requires “analysis of the specific statutory scheme under which an agency operates and the nature of the rule that the agency wishes to adopt.” Forelaws , 306 Or at 214.

Importantly, the APA itself, including its definition of “rule,” is of no help in resolving whether the agency must engage in rulemaking as a predicate for enforcement and adjudication. As to that question,694 PNW Metal Recycling, Inc. v. DEQ

“[t]he answer is not found in the constitution, * * * or in a common law, that is, a judge-made common law of admin

istrative agencies; nor may it be divined from the state administrative procedures act, * * * which does no more than set uniform procedures for state agencies. Rather, the answer is a matter of statutory interpretation, the rele

vant statutes being those regulating the particular agency whose action is challenged. We seek to derive the legisla

ture’s intent from an analysis of the statutes by which a particular agency operates. The authorizing statutes will specify whether rulemaking or adjudication authority, or both, are delegated to the agency and will indicate the agency’s tasks, the breadth of the agency’s discretion to carry out these tasks, and the process by which they are to be accomplished.”

Trebesch , 300 Or at 267.

The foregoing cases also instruct that, in deter

mining the legislature’s intent as to whether rulemaking is required, the nature of the statutory terms being applied is especially important, though not dispositive. Where a stat

utory term is delegative and the agency has broad rulemak

ing authority, that has supported a conclusion that the legislature intended for the agency to engage in rulemak

ing. Forelaws , 306 Or at 214. Where an agency’s rulemak

ing authority is more circumscribed or where a statutory term calls only for interpretation and application, that has supported a conclusion that rulemaking was not required, absent some contrary indication of the legislature’s intent. Coffey v. Board of Geologist Examiners , 348 Or 494, 502-03, 235 P3d 678 (2010).

We have referred to statutory terms calling for interpretation and application as either “exact” or “inex

act” terms, both of which charge an agency with carrying out the legislature’s complete expression of policy, as com

pared to “delegative terms,” which “delegate” some level of policymaking authority to an agency. Springfield Education
Assn. v. School Dist. , 290 Or 217, 224-26, 228, 621 P2d 547 (1980). Exact terms “impart relatively precise mean

ing” and involve agency factfinding. See id. at 223-24 (giv

ing examples of exact terms as “21 years of age, male, 30 days, Class II farmland, rodent, Marion County”). “InexactCite as 371 Or 673 (2023) 695

terms,” on the other hand, are still a “complete” expression of policy, but are less precise. Id. at 224. An inexact term often requires an agency to determine what the legislature intended by the term, and that determination is a question of law. Id. In Coffey , we explained that Megdal ’s requirement for rulemaking prior to adjudication had been applied to an incomplete legislative policy, whereas Coffey presented an expression of “complete” legislative policy. Coffey , 348 Or at 502-03. That complete legislative policy was expressed as a list of four sanctions, graduated in severity. Because impos

ing one sanction from a menu of sanctions was more analo

gous to interpreting and applying law than to making new law, no prior rulemaking was required. Id. at 503.

Those cases demonstrate that, when this court has determined that the legislature intended for an agency to engage in rulemaking before adjudication, an important factor has been our conclusion that the statute required the agency to formulate policy to fill in an incomplete expres

sion by the legislature. By the same token, when a statute reflects a complete policy statement by the legislature, such that the agency’s function has been merely interpretive, that has been a reason to conclude that the agency could state its interpretation during enforcement and adjudication without first promulgating a rule.

E. Summary

With the foregoing principles in mind, we return to the reasoning by which petitioners argue, and the Court of Appeals concluded, that DEQ adopted a rule. As noted above, petitioners do not identify any specific statement or communication by DEQ as the “rule” but contend, instead, that the rule consists of DEQ’s internal “decision” to adopt a new interpretation of the auto-dismantler exception—a decision that reflects a “discretionary choice” that DEQ made for “policy” reasons. Necessarily, therefore, petitioners distinguish DEQ’s decision from an adoption of policy that an agency may permissibly make in a contested case pro

ceeding under ORS 183.355(6). Similarly, although it did not address ORS 183.355(6), the Court of Appeals relied on its own case law to conclude that DEQ’s new interpretation of the auto-dismantler exception demonstrated that multiple696 PNW Metal Recycling, Inc. v. DEQ

interpretations were “reasonable”; and, because the agency’s new interpretation was not “necessarily required” by the statute itself, it was therefore a “policy-based decision” and a “new exercise of agency discretion” that could only occur through rulemaking. PNW Metal Recycling, Inc. , 317 Or App

at 212-13.

Those analyses flow from premises that are flawed. First, the focus on the fact that DEQ adopted different interpretations at different times, and on DEQ’s reason for making the change, is misplaced. Petitioners assume from

the fact that DEQ desired a change in policy that the stat

ute authorized DEQ to make a discretionary policy choice and that DEQ had to effectuate that choice in a particu

lar manner—but neither assumption is necessarily correct. That the text of a statute is amenable to multiple interpreta

tions does not mean that an agency has been delegated the authority to choose among them. Whether that is so depends on whether the statutory wording is inexact or delegative. A statute with inexact terms may be subject to alternative plausible interpretations, but the meaning of those terms is still a question of law, not agency prerogative. Springfield
Education Assn. , 290 Or at 224.

Relatedly, the fact that DEQ interpreted the auto-dismantler exception differently before and after 2018
does not establish that the statute confers “discretion” on the agency to make a policy choice. Delegative and inexact terms both require further interpretive work by an agency, but only the former entail policymaking. Coffey , 348 Or at 502-03, 508. Thus, although it is true that DEQ adopted dif

ferent interpretations of the auto-dismantler exception at different times, it does not follow that the statute confers discretion on DEQ to make a policy decision. If the statute contains inexact rather than delegative terms—a question not addressed by the parties and which we do not resolve today—then DEQ’s revised interpretation is either correct or incorrect as a matter of law. And that is so regardless of whether DEQ had “policy-based” or “regulatory” motives for revising its interpretation. If a reviewing court were to conclude that the auto-dismantler exception reflects a com

plete expression of legislative policy, then DEQ’s currentCite as 371 Or 673 (2023) 697

interpretation would stand or fall on its merits; neither DEQ’s reason for adopting it, nor the fact that DEQ previ

ously interpreted it differently, would be of any moment.

In addition, even assuming that DEQ’s new inter

pretation of the auto-dismantler exception is fairly char

acterized as an exercise of delegated policymaking rather than interpretation of an inexact statutory term—a ques

tion that, we reiterate, has not been developed and is not squarely presented here—the legislature did not intend for rulemaking to be the path for every adoption of policy by an agency. A conclusion that rulemaking is required must be based on detailed analysis of the substantive statutory scheme; the APA does not provide an answer. Trebesch , 300 Or at 267. Petitioners have not developed an argument— rather, they appear to have assumed—that the statutes addressing solid waste disposal reflect a legislative intent that the interpretation and application of the auto-disman

tler exception must occur through rulemaking rather than through a contested case as allowed by ORS 183.355(6). That question is critical, however: If the legislature did not intend to require rulemaking on that issue, then, under our case law, the agency is permitted to make its decision through the contested case process. Although we need not resolve that question now, we observe that the parties’ apparent agreement that DEQ lacks rulemaking authority in this area would seem to cut against a conclusion that the legis

lature intended to require rulemaking as a prerequisite for interpreting the auto-dismantler exception. 4

F. Petitioners Have Not Identified a “Rule” Subject to Review Under ORS 183.400

In sum, if DEQ’s decision to reinterpret the auto-dismantler exception constitutes a rule, it is not for all the reasons petitioners have argued. Neither the fact that DEQ has adopted different interpretations nor DEQ’s rea

son for making the change bears on whether rulemaking

4 Petitioners might argue that the statutory scheme contemplates that the required rulemaking be done by EQC, the entity that provides policy direction to DEQ. That may be true; on the other hand, the solid waste disposal statutes specifically direct DEQ to take certain actions regarding the issuance of permits, and it is not clear that those directives are conditioned on whether any rules have been promulgated by EQC. In any event, we need not resolve that issue here.698 PNW Metal Recycling, Inc. v. DEQ

was required or whether DEQ’s action here was a rule. To the extent that petitioners contend that a rule challenge
under ORS 183.400 must be available to review an agency’s policy choice, that view is mistaken for the reasons we have explained; review of an order in a contested case is another mechanism. Stripped of those considerations, petitioners’ argument reduces to the proposition that DEQ’s interpretive
choice itself is a “rule” as defined by ORS 183.310, such that it may be challenged in a proceeding under ORS 183.400. For several reasons, that proposition is wrong.

Once again, ORS 183.310(9) states that, subject to exceptions, a rule is “any agency directive, standard, regu

lation or statement of general applicability that implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy, or describes the pro

cedure or practice requirements of any agency[.]” Several exceptions are of note here. First, ORS 183.310(9)(d) exempts “[i]ntra-agency memoranda.” Second, ORS 183.310(9)(a) exempts “internal management directives, regulations or statements which do not substantially affect the interests of the public.” Third, ORS 183.310(9)(c) exempts “[d]eclaratory rulings issued pursuant to ORS 183.410[.]” ORS 183.410 provides that, “[o]n petition of any interested person, any agency may in its discretion issue a declaratory ruling with respect to the applicability to any person, property, or state of facts of any rule or statute enforceable by it.” Such rulings are reviewable by the Court of Appeals in the same manner

as orders in contested cases. Id.

With those exceptions in mind, along with the other principles discussed above, we conclude that petitioners have not identified a rule. As explained earlier in our discussion of the text of ORS 183.310(9), an agency’s interpretive deci

sion , standing alone, is an awkward fit with the definition’s reference to a “directive, standard, regulation or statement.” Moreover, DEQ has yet to take any action that is “generally applicable” in the sense meant by ORS 183.310(9). Arguably, DEQ’s interpretive choice can be thought of as generally applicable in the sense that DEQ has an apparent intention to apply it to petitioners and similarly situated entities in the scrap-metal recycling industry. But in light of the APA as a whole, “applicable” in this context must require somethingCite as 371 Or 673 (2023) 699

more than an agency’s prospective intent. See Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 105 (unabridged ed 2002) (defin

ing “application” as “employment as a means: specific use”). If DEQ had done nothing more than circulate an internal agency memo announcing a revised interpretation of the auto-dismantler exception, that memo would be generally applicable in the same sense that petitioners urge here, but it would not be a “rule,” because intra-agency memoranda are specifically excluded from the definition. Deeming the
“decision” itself to be the rule in that situation would under

mine the point of the exception that allows the agency to announce its decision internally. Moreover, it would be pecu

liar if the interpretive choice reflected in the memo consti

tuted a rule while the expression of that choice in the memo did not. By referring to statements, directives, regulations,or standards of “general applicability” and excluding intraagency memoranda and “internal management directives, regulations or statements which do not substantially affect the interests of the public,” the definition of “rule” contem

plates an expression of an agency decision that has “general applicability” in the sense that it is made operative— i.e. , the agency somehow has communicated the decision in a way that purports to bind those subject to it.

In addition, if petitioners’ view was correct, that would frustrate the provisions of the APA making clear that an agency may use the contested case process to interpret statutes and adopt policy. An agency’s use of ORS 183.355(6) as the means to state an interpretive choice will, presum

ably, be preceded by the choice itself. On that point, peti

tioners advance a curious argument. They acknowledge that ORS 183.355(6) allows an agency to interpret a statute in a contested case proceeding, but they argue that, if the deci

sion to adopt that interpretation precedes the contested case proceeding and is made “for policy or regulatory reasons,” then the action requires rulemaking.

That distinction is untenable. Petitioners seem to suggest that the APA allows agencies to interpret a statute or announce policy through the contested case process only so long as the agency does so without forethought, and with

out a “policy or regulatory” purpose. That is not a realistic700 PNW Metal Recycling, Inc. v. DEQ

account of how agencies operate. The APA requires agencies to give notice to affected parties before beginning a contested case, ORS 183.413, and we presume that, in the ordinary course, agencies will decide what a statute means before they prosecute violations of it. Petitioners’ argument that such a decision requires rulemaking would nullify the provisions of the APA that allow agencies to use the contested case pro

cess for “adoption of a general policy applicable to the case and subsequent cases of like nature.” ORS 183.355(6).

Finally, petitioners’ argument that an interpretive choice is a “rule” is difficult to square with a provision they do not address—ORS 183.310(9)(c), which exempts “declaratory rulings” from the definition of rule. ORS 183.410, as noted earlier, allows an interested person to request an agency’s ruling “with respect to the applicability to any person, prop

erty, or state of facts of any rule or statute enforceable by it.” Such a ruling is subject to judicial review—but, signifi

cantly, in the manner afforded to final orders in contested

cases . ORS 183.410. Just as with ORS 183.355(6), therefore, an agency’s declaration about a statute’s applicability is not necessarily reviewable as a rule. That is further evidence that the agency’s internal decision about how to interpret the statute—which will necessarily precede any declaratory ruling under ORS 183.410—is not a rule, either.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that an agency’s interpretive decision is not, itself, a rule, although the generally applicable expression of such a decision could

be. 5 Here, however, DEQ did not communicate its decision to anyone but petitioners. DEQ’s revised interpretation of the auto-dismantler exception and its stated intention to require petitioners to obtain a permit are, at this point, precursors to DEQ’s initiation of an enforcement action that may lead to a contested case proceeding.

Judicial review of a final order in a contested case would present an opportunity for petitioners, should they

5 Petitioners correctly point out that the Oregon APA differs from the fed

eral Administrative Procedures Act in that regard. The federal APA specifically exempts “interpretative rules” from rulemaking requirements. 5 USC § 553(b); Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n , 575 US 92, 96-97, 135 S Ct 1199, 191 L Ed 2d 186 (2015). The Oregon APA contains no such exemption; on the contrary, the definition of “rule” encompasses statements that “interpret” law. ORS 183.310(9).Cite as 371 Or 673 (2023) 701

wish, to argue that DEQ’s revised interpretation of ORS 459.005(8)(b)(D) is incorrect as a matter of law. Alternatively, petitioners may seek to demonstrate, under the Trebesch line of cases, that the solid waste disposal statutes reflect a legislative intent that the agency “promulgate rules in advance of adjudication,” 300 Or at 267, i.e. , that rulemak

ing is the required path for adopting an interpretation of the auto-dismantler exception. As yet another alternative, petitioners may choose to avail themselves of ORS 183.410, which enables them to request a “declaratory ruling” from DEQ as to the applicability of the auto-dismantler excep

tion. Such a ruling would be reviewable in the manner of a final order in a contested case.

For the foregoing reasons, petitioners have failed to identify a “rule” subject to challenge under ORS 183.400. Accordingly, we vacate the Court of Appeals’ decision and dismiss the judicial review.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated. The judicial review is dismissed.