UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

JOHN DONAGGIO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

No. 95-1842

ARLINGTON COUNTY, VIRGINIA;

WILLIAM K. STOVER, Chief,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

T. S. Ellis, III, District Judge.

(CA-94-1277-A)

Argued: January 31, 1996

Decided: February 28, 1996

Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: Michael Tarcissius Leibig, ZWERDLING, PAUL, LEIBIG, KAHN, THOMPSON & WOLLY, P.C., Fairfax, Virginia, for

Appellant. Ara Loris Tramblian, Deputy County Attorney, Arlington,

Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Barbara S. Drake, County

Attorney, Arlington, Virginia, for Appellees.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

An Arlington County police officer, John Donaggio, brought this

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County and its police

chief, William Stover, asserting violations of the First and Fourteenth

Amendment. Donaggio alleged that the defendants forced him to participate in a demonstration of uniformed officers at the Capitol building in Washington, D.C., to support legislation banning assault

weapons, legislation that Donaggio opposed. The district court

granted summary judgment to the defendants. Donaggio v. Arlington

County, 880 F. Supp. 446 (E.D. Va. 1995). We affirm.

As Donaggio concedes, Appellant's Brief at 3, the district court

"correctly stated" the undisputed material facts. See, Donaggio, 880

F. Supp. at 450-53. Accordingly, there is no need to restate them here.

After setting forth the facts, the district court held: (1) "[i]t was not

unconstitutional for the County, through Chief Stover, to organize and

pay its police officers to demonstrate in favor of the bill if the officers

voluntarily and knowingly agreed to do so" id. at 457; (2) because

Donaggio "was not compelled to take part in the demonstration at the

Capitol, his constitutional right to refrain from speaking was not

infringed," id. at 459-60; (3) even assuming that Donaggio was compelled to "speak" by being required to attend the demonstration, the

defendants were not liable to him because "they were not the authors

of the compulsion," id. at 460-61; and (4) in any event, qualified

immunity barred Donaggio's claim against Chief Stover. Id. at 463.

Donaggio appeals only the first holding.* He asserts that the dis-

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*Thus, Donaggio specifically disavows any appeal of the district

court's other holdings, including its conclusion that he was not forced to

attend the demonstration. Although Donaggio concedes that he was not

compelled to demonstrate, he nonetheless insists that his participation

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trict court erred in concluding "that no First Amendment issue [was]

raised" if Donaggio's participation in the demonstration was not compelled. Reply Brief at 4. We have carefully considered the briefs and

arguments of the parties and the authorities cited therein, and conclude that the district court properly rejected this argument. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated in the district court's thorough

opinion. See Donaggio, 880 F. Supp. at 453-57.

AFFIRMED

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was not voluntary because he objected to the speech. Relying on several

Supreme Court cases, e.g. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209

(1977), Donaggio asserts that a plaintiff need not"stand pat and fight"

compelled speech in order to challenge it, but must merely object to it.

Even if Donaggio is correct--a question we need not decide here--this

argument does not assist him. The critical flaw in Donaggio's reasoning

is that whether the plaintiff merely objects or fights, the speech must be

compelled in order to be actionable. Based on Donaggio's earlier concession and on the undisputed facts, Donaggio can at best claim that he

objected to speech that was not compelled. In contrast, each of the free

speech cases on which Donaggio relies involves a challenge to compelled speech. See e.g. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36.

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