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Cases No. 4:97cr9-RH/GRJ and 4:15cv487-RH/GRJ

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. CASES NO. 4:97cr9-RH/GRJ 

 4:15cv487-RH/GRJ

ANTHONY WILLIAMS,

Defendant.

_____________________________/

ORDER OF TRANSFER

By petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Anthony 

Williams challenges his federal sentence. Although the Northern District of 

Florida is the district of conviction, Mr. Williams is serving his sentence in the 

Middle District of Pennsylvania. This order transfers the petition back to that 

district—the district of confinement—where Mr. Williams originally filed it.

I. The Underlying Conviction and Sentence

A grand jury in this district indicted Mr. Williams for possessing a firearm 

as a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(e). A jury found 

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him guilty. On August 8, 1997, I sentenced Mr. Williams to 288 months in 

custody.

The first statute cited in the indictment, § 922(g), prohibits a felon from 

possessing a firearm. The second cited statute, § 924(e), is the armed-careercriminal statute; it applies when a felon possesses a firearm and has three previous 

convictions “for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on 

occasions different from one another.” The maximum sentence under § 922(g) is 

10 years. The minimum sentence under § 924(e) is 15 years, and the maximum is 

life. Mr. Williams’s 288-month sentence was legal only if he was an armed career 

criminal under § 924(e).

The presentence report concluded that Mr. Williams was an armed career 

criminal based on five prior Florida burglary convictions. A reasonable view of 

the law at the time—a view later explicitly adopted by the Eleventh Circuit—was 

that a Florida burglary conviction was an armed-career-criminal predicate offense. 

See United States v. Matthews, 466 F.3d 1271, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2006); see also

United States v. James, 430 F.3d 1150, 1156-57 (11th Cir. 2005), aff’d, 550 U.S. 

192 (2007); United States v. Gunn, 369 F.3d 1229, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004). This 

remained the law of the circuit until James was explicitly overruled by Johnson v. 

United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 603 F. 

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App’x 919, 923 (11th Cir.) (unpublished), vacated and remanded for 

reconsideration in light of Johnson, 136 S. Ct. 105 (2015).

At sentencing, Mr. Williams did not challenge the assertion that Florida 

burglary convictions are violent felonies within the meaning of § 924(e). He 

objected to being sentenced under that statute only on other grounds: he asserted 

that in one case he was treated as a “youthful offender” so that the conviction 

should not count at all and that the other four convictions were for two sets of two 

burglaries each that did not occur on “occasions different from one another.” I 

overruled the objection and sentenced Mr. Williams to 288 months in prison. This 

was within the guideline range for an armed career criminal. 

Mr. Williams appealed on other grounds. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

The Supreme Court denied certiorari.

II. Prior Collateral Attacks

In 1999, Mr. Williams filed a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 

again on other grounds. In 2000, I denied the § 2255 motion and denied a 

certificate of appealability. In 2001, the Eleventh Circuit denied a certificate of 

appealability. 

In 2007, Mr. Williams again moved for relief, again on grounds unrelated to 

the armed-career-criminal issue. He characterized the motion as arising under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The motion was properly viewed as a 

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Cases No. 4:97cr9-RH/GRJ and 4:15cv487-RH/GRJ

second or successive § 2255 motion, but either way—whether addressed under 

Rule 60(b) or under § 2255—Mr. Williams was not entitled to relief. I denied the 

motion, still in 2007.

In 2012, Mr. Williams filed a motion for relief under § 2255. He asserted 

the motion was not second or successive, but the assertion was frivolous; the 

motion plainly was second or successive. On the merits, the motion asserted that 

at sentencing, I should have determined whether Mr. Williams’s burglary 

convictions were violent felonies within the meaning of § 924(e) by looking to 

Shepard-approved documents. See Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005). 

This was wrong on the merits. See, e.g., Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 

2276 (2013) (applying the categorical approach, not the modified categorical 

approach that employs Shepard-approved documents, to determine that a 

California burglary is not a “violent felony” under § 924(e)). But right or wrong, 

this was Mr. Williams’s first assertion that his Florida burglary convictions were 

not “violent felonies.” I denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction, because a 

district court can consider a second or successive § 2255 motion only if the court 

of appeals has authorized its filing on grounds set out in the statute. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255(h). 

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III. This § 2241 Petition

In 2015, Mr. Williams filed this petition, explicitly invoking 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241, not § 2255. Mr. Williams filed the petition in the Middle District of 

Pennsylvania, the district of confinement, as proper for a § 2241 petition. The 

Middle District treated the petition as a motion under § 2255 and transferred the 

case to this district. 

The petition is before the court on the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation, ECF No. 113, and Mr. Williams’s more recent filings, ECF Nos. 

113, 114, and 115, none of which are explicitly denominated objections to the 

report and recommendation. The recommendation is for transfer of the petition 

back to the Middle District. I have reviewed the matter de novo. 

Under the law of the Eleventh Circuit, relief is available under § 2241 for a 

defendant who was sentenced as an armed career criminal under circuit law that 

was in place during a direct appeal and first § 2255 motion, who is serving a 

sentence longer than 10 years (the statutory maximum on a felon-in-possession 

conviction of a person who is not an armed career criminal), who is not an armed 

career criminal under the more recent “violent felony” decisions, and who cannot 

now obtain relief under § 2255 because any § 2255 motion would be second or 

successive. See Bryant v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium, 738 F.3d 1253 (11th 

Cir. 2013). Mr. Williams cannot meet these requirements, because at the time of 

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sentencing, the law of the circuit was not settled on the question whether a Florida 

burglary conviction was a “violent felony.” See Williams v. Warden, 713 F.3d 

1332 (11th Cir. 2013). 

So if Mr. Williams were in custody in the Eleventh Circuit, he would be 

unable to obtain relief on the merits under § 2241. But also under the law of the 

Eleventh Circuit, the petition can and perhaps must be transferred back to the 

Middle District. See Garcia v. Warden, 470 F. App’x 735 (11th Cir. 2012) 

(unpublished) (reversing this district’s denial of a § 2241 petition on the merits 

after the petition was erroneously transferred to this district). This order thus 

accepts the report and recommendation and transfers the petition back to the 

Middle District.

IV. More Recent Filings in This District

After the § 2241 petition was transferred to this district, the Supreme Court 

decided Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). Mr. Williams filed a 

motion to “combine and clarify” his § 2241 petition with a § 2255 motion in this 

court. Later, Mr. Williams filed in a single document a “supplemental” § 2241 

petition and § 2255 motion. To the extent these filings seek relief under § 2255, 

they are being addressed in a separate order issued today. To the extent these 

filings seek relief under § 2241, they are being returned to the Middle District of 

Pennsylvania for any appropriate treatment in connection with the § 2241 petition.

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V. File Maintenance

In this district, a § 2255 motion is maintained as part of the original criminal 

case but is assigned a separate civil case number for tracking purposes. Because 

the § 2241 petition was treated by the Middle District as a § 2255 motion, the clerk 

in this district has maintained the file as the clerk would maintain a § 2255 

motion—as part of the original criminal case. In directing the clerk to transfer the 

petition back to the Middle District, this order lists the documents that are related 

to the § 2241 petition. Had the § 2241 petition been docketed separately—as 

ordinarily would have been done with a § 2241 petition—these are the only 

documents that would be in the file. 

VI. Conclusion

For these reasons and those set out in the report and recommendation, 

IT IS ORDERED: 

1. The report and recommendation is accepted and adopted as the court’s 

further opinion.

2. The § 2241 petition, ECF No. 107, together with ECF Nos. 107-1, 108, 

109, 112, 113, 114, and 115, is transferred back to the Middle District of 

Pennsylvania. The clerk must take all steps necessary to effect the transfer. 

 SO ORDERED on December 30, 2015.

s/Robert L. Hinkle

United States District Judge

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