J-S46003-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.C.U., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.C., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 473 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered January 18, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000615-2018, 

FID# 51-FN-001560-2016

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.U., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.C., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 474 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered January 18, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0001452-2016, 

FID# 51-FN-001560-2016
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IN THE INTEREST OF: A.R.U., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.C., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 478 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered January 18, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000616-2018, 

FID# 51-FN-001560-2016

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.U., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.C., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 479 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered January 18, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0001453-2016, 

FID# 51-FN-001560-2016

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED OCTOBER 22, 2019

T.C. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees entered January 18, 2019, 

that granted the petition of the Philadelphia County Department of Human 

Services (“DHS”), and involuntarily terminated her parental rights to her sons, 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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S.C.U. (born May 2008) and A.R.U. (born August 2013) (“Children”).1 Mother 

also appeals from the orders entered January 18, 2019, that changed 

Children’s permanent placement goals from return to parent to adoption.2 

After careful review, we affirm.

The trial court set forth the following factual and procedural history of 

this case:

On June 6, 201[6], [DHS] received [a] Child Protective Services 

(“CPS”) report alleging that Children’s sister, J.U., was raped by 

her stepfather [D.G.]. On June 7, 2016, [D.G.] was arrested and 

charged with rape by forcible compulsion, involuntary deviate 

sexual intercourse (“IDSI”), unlawful contact with a minor, 

aggravated indecent assault, sexual assault of a child and 

endangering the welfare of [a] child. [D.G.] was incarcerated at 

the Curran-Fromhold Correctional Facility (“CFCF”) in Philadelphia 

County.

After [D.G.]’s arrest, Mother refused to cooperate with DHS and 

with J.U.’s Child Advocate. Mother did not respond to telephone 

calls and/or provide access to [J.U.] On July 13, 2016, DHS 

received a General Protective Services (“GPS”) report that Mother 

was interfering with the criminal investigation by refusing to allow 

J.U. to testify against [D.G.] and that Mother planned to reside 

with [D.G.] if he was released from prison. Ultimately, Mother was 

____________________________________________

1 By decree on the same day, the court terminated the parental rights of F.C.U. 

(Father) and an unknown putative father. Father has not separately appealed, 

nor is he a party to the instant appeal; the unknown putative father has not 

appealed, nor is he a party to the instant appeal.

2 Although Mother filed notices of appeal on the dependency dockets for each 

child, she did not challenge the goal change in either her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement of errors complained of on appeal or in her brief. Accordingly, 

Mother has waived her challenges to the goal change. See Krebs v. United 

Ref. Co. of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that 

a failure to preserve issues by raising them both in the concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal and statement of questions involved portion 

of the brief on appeal results in a waiver of those issues). 
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arrested pursuant to a bench warrant issued against her in 

connection to Mother’s interference with the investigation. When 

Mother was arrested, police discovered correspondence between 

Mother and [D.G.] and evidence that she had bought one of the 

children to visit [D.G.] in prison. Thereafter, DHS obtained an 

Order for Protective Custody (“OPC”) and placed [Children] in 

foster care through the Jewish Family and Children Services 

(“JFCS”). On July 25, 2016, [Children] were adjudicated 

dependent. In addition to this adjudication, the [c]ourt instructed 

Mother per court order not to discuss the ongoing criminal matter 

involving [D.G. and J.U.] with any of her [c]hildren. Furthermore, 

the [c]ourt ordered Mother to be permitted supervised visitation.

On September 27, 2016, after a full hearing, the court found clear 

and convincing evidence that visitation between Mother and 

Children was to remain suspended because sufficient evidence 

had been presented as to Mother’s persistent violations of court 

orders. The [c]ourt found that Mother posed a grave threat to the 

Children during and after visitation. Mother had violated prior 

court orders to not visit the Children without supervision. The 

[c]ourt found that Mother continued to send text messages to 

[J.U.] and continued to interfere with the criminal investigation of 

[D.G.] despite court orders to cause no such interference. The 

[c]ourt also found that Mother had met the Children in secret 

without supervision and that Mother had encouraged the Children 

to lie to their foster parents and therapists. Mother appealed the 

[c]ourt’s decision to suspend visitation. See In Interest of A.U., 

[170 A.3d 1199 (Pa. Super. 2017) (unpublished memorandum)].

On May 3, 2018, the Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) 

provided revised Single Case Plan (“SCP”) objectives for Mother. 

These objectives were for Mother (1) to comply with all [c]ourt 

orders including but not limited to those orders in reference to 

visitation and the participation in CUA services; (2) to participate 

in mental health treatment and (3) to participate in domestic 

violence counseling.

The underlying Petition to Terminate Mother’s Parental Rights to 

Children was filed on July 30, 2018, after Mother failed to meet 

her SCP objectives. Specifically, Mother failed to participate in 

abuse counseling and mental health treatment and continued to 

maintain contact with [D.G.] 
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See Trial Court Opinion, 5/2/19, at 2-4 (internal citations to the record 

omitted).

The trial court conducted hearings on DHS’s petitions on November 30, 

2018 and January 11, 2019. DHS presented the testimony of Danielle 

Johnson-Kennedy, CUA case manager; Andre McKnight, DHS social work 

supervisor; forensic and clinical psychologist William Russell, Ph.D.; K.J., 

foster father; Detective Linda Blowes; and Dana Walker, CUA case aide. 

Mother testified on her own behalf and presented the testimony of Dr. 

Arundathi Jayatilleke, Mother’s rheumatologist; T.C., Mother’s father; and 

Yolanda West, Mother’s therapist.

Johnson-Kennedy testified that she is the current CUA case manager. 

See N.T., 11/30/18, at 9. At the time of the November hearing, Mother’s 

objectives were to maintain no contact with J.U., comply with all court orders, 

engage in mental health treatment and continue visitation, and follow all 

recommendations from the parenting capacity evaluation. Id. at 11-12.

Mother’s oldest son, H.U., began having behavioral issues in the foster 

home following the resumption of supervised visits. Id. at 17. Additionally, it 

appeared Mother was engaging in unauthorized contact with H.U. because 

H.U. was found in possession of gifts and extra money that foster father, K.J., 

had not given him. Id. at 20. Children were safe in their foster home and their 

needs were being met. See N.T., 1/11/19, at 5-6.

McKnight testified that the children came into the custody of DHS after 

J.U. had been sexually abused by D.G. and Mother was not letting J.U. testify 
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against D.G. See N.T., 11/30/18, at 39-40, 50-52. D.G. was later convicted 

of rape and other related crimes. Id. at 50. 

McKnight further testified that Children are bonded to their foster father 

and look up to him. Id. at 47-48. A.R.U. calls foster father “dad.” Id. at 174. 

Foster father meets all of Children’s needs and they are excelling in the home. 

Id. at 175-78. Additionally, A.R.U., who was previously nonverbal, is 

speaking. Id. at 176. 

McKnight did not believe that irreparable harm would result to Children 

if the parental bond was broken and that it was in Children’s best interests to 

change their goal to adoption. Id. at 177. He did believe Children would suffer 

harm if their bond to foster father was broken. Id. at 178.

McKnight testified that single case plan objectives were established for 

Mother including not to have third party contact with Children and receive 

mental health counseling. Id. at 144-45. However, Mother violated the court 

order regarding contact, and Mother’s therapist did not provide treatment 

records. Id. at 146-48. 

With regard to the stay-away orders, McKnight personally observed 

Mother and J.U. together at the grocery store and told Mother she could not 

be in contact with J.U. Id. at 153-54. Mother violated the stay-away order on 

multiple other occasions, but when confronted, placed the blame on other 

people. Id. at 149-157. 

There were also incidents where Mother gave Children inappropriate 

gifts including phones to S.C.U. and A.R.U. and a stun gun intended for J.U. 
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Id. at 157-60, 178-80, 186. Mother sent Children text messages through the 

phones despite the existence of a stay-away order. Id. at 157-60. At that 

time, S.C.U. was being disrespectful to his foster parent, and Children 

admitted in letters written to McKnight that Mother had told him to disrespect 

his foster parent. Id. at 185, 200-01.

McKnight testified that Mother’s visits were suspended from September 

2016 through August 2018. Id. at 208. With all of the factors above, McKnight 

felt there was no healthy parental bond between Mother and Children. Id. 

McKnight stated he had spoken with S.C.U., and S.C.U. wanted to stay with 

his foster father. Id. at 211-12. McKnight was removed from the matter due 

to false sexual abuse accusations brought by Mother. Id. at 170.

William Russell, Ph.D., performed a parental capacity evaluation of 

Mother and prepared a report in December 2017. See N.T., 11/30/18, at 59-

60. He recommended Mother attend individual mental health therapy for 

major depressive disorder and follow court orders. Id. at 65, 75-76. 

Dr. Russell noted Mother’s traumatic history, including physical abuse, 

domestic violence, and a stroke. Id. at 66. As a result, Mother has a childlike, 

immature way of coping with stress, and her level of functioning leads her to 

make parenting decisions based on judgments that do not consider all of the 

information. Id. at 66-67. Mother showed little insight into her own medical 

conditions and situation and her children’s needs, nor could she identify a 

support system. Id. at 69-70. Mother had been engaged in therapy but was 

no longer compliant with that recommendation. Id. at 81. 
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At the time he prepared the report, Dr. Russell did not feel that Mother 

was capable of providing safety and permanency to Children. Id. at 59-60. 

Additionally, Dr. Russell did not believe that Mother should be allowed to have 

unsupervised contact with Children. Id. at 77.

K.J., Children’s foster father, testified that S.C.U. had been placed with 

him for a year and several months, and A.R.U. for a year. See N.T., 11/30/18, 

at 105. In August 2018, K.J. discovered that S.C.U. had a cell phone in his 

possession that K.J. had not given him. Id. at 108-109. S.C.U. admitted 

Mother had given him the phone, and that Mother was texting with him. Id. 

at 109-11. 

K.J. testified that Children are doing well in his home and are a joy to 

have; S.C.U. calls K.J. “Uncle K.” and A.R.U. calls K.J. “dad.” Id. at 113. K.J. 

described his strong bond with Children. Id. at 120-21.

Detective Blowes testified that she was involved in the investigation 

regarding a third party report that McKnight had a sexual attraction to J.U. 

See N.T., 11/30/18, at 214-15. J.U. denied making the allegations and, 

following an investigation, Detective Blowes concluded that the accusations 

were unfounded. Id. at 215-218. Specifically, J.U. stated that Mother “made 

it up.” Id. at 218. Detective Blowes had previously been involved in 

investigations involving the family when J.U. made allegations against her 

stepfather, D.G. Id. at 217-22. 

Dana Walker testified that she is the CUA case aide serving as a 

visitation coordinator for Mother and Children. See N.T., 11/30/18, at 239-
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40. Visitation has been occurring since August 2018, and is biweekly on 

Wednesdays. Id. at 240. Mother has not missed any visits. Id. Mother brings 

gifts to the visits and after giving the gifts, S.C.U. chooses to play with the 

gifts on his own rather than interacting with Mother, unless instructed to by 

his older brother, H.U. Id. at 241. A.R.U. does not interact with Mother either 

and prefers to play with gifts or coloring books and crayons unless instructed 

otherwise. Id. at 242. 

Walker testified that she did not believe Children would suffer from 

irreparable harm if the relationship was severed because she did not observe 

a bond between Mother and Children. Id. at 243-44. She has asked S.C.U. if 

he would like to go home to Mother and he hunched his shoulders “like, ‘I 

don’t know.’” Id. at 249. Walker did not ask A.R.U. his preferences because 

he was only five years old. Id. at 250. 

Dr. Jayatilleke, a rheumatologist, testified that Mother has systemic 

lupus and Sjogren’s syndrome, both managed by oral medication. See N.T., 

11/30/18, at 125. In the past, Mother suffered from a stroke that rendered 

her mute, but she can communicate via writing or a computer. Id. at 125. Dr. 

Jayatilleke testified that in her opinion, Mother’s physical conditions would not 

affect her ability to care for Children but that she could not form an opinion 

on Mother’s mental capacity to parent. Id. at 128-29, 133-36.

T.C., Mother’s father and Children’s maternal grandfather, testified that 

he is available to serve as additional support for Mother in the event Children 

are reunited with her. See N.T., 11/30/18, at 255-56. T.C. testified that there 
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are twenty or thirty other members of the family available to offer support, 

including his sisters and brothers. Id. at 256. T.C. testified he is involved in 

all of his twenty-nine grandchildren’s lives as much as he is able. Id. at 257. 

T.C. lives four miles from Mother. Id. at 259. 

T.C. observed Mother interacting with Children and testified that they 

loved each other. Id. at 260. T.C. stated that Mother did not have issues 

caring for Children or providing for their needs, however, the last time he saw 

Mother interacting with Children was “a couple years ago.” Id. at 261-65. 

Additionally, he admitted there were periods of time where Mother would not 

speak to him, and that he did not live in Philadelphia. Id. at 267-71.

Yolanda West testified that she is Mother’s outpatient therapist. See

N.T., 11/30/18, at 276. At the time of the hearing, she had been meeting with 

Mother since approximately December 2017, initially every week and then 

biweekly. Id. at 277-78. 

Much of the therapy centered around the sexual assault of J.U. by 

Mother’s husband. Id. at 279-80. Mother admitted to West that she was still 

speaking to D.G. because she was trying to “get him to admit what he [had 

done to J.U.],” or to obtain proof and help with “having put him away.” Id.

at 281. Mother accepted responsibility for handling the situation in the wrong 

way, but, since then, there has been no contact. Id. West testified that, based 

on the work she had done with Mother, Mother’s mental stability had 

increased, Mother had setbacks she had worked through, and Mother met all 

of her compliances. Id. at 289. 
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West saw no reason Mother could not return to being an efficient parent, 

and believed Mother could provide stability and permanency for Children, and 

that Mother had gained insight into the issues that brought Children into care. 

Id. at 289. West stated that, although Mother had been repeatedly found in 

contempt for violation of court orders, these violations were related to “just 

wanting to see her kids.” Id. at 298-300. 

Mother testified that she was married to D.G. and he was living in her 

home at the time he assaulted J.U. See N.T., 1/18/19, at 12-15. Mother 

claimed that she visited D.G. while he was in custody, but only so she could 

prove his plea of innocence was false. Id. at 16. Although D.G. did not confess 

to her in person, Mother stated that he confessed in a letter that she gave to 

detectives. Id. at 17-19. Mother claimed that J.U. begged not to be brought 

to court. Id. at 28. Mother stated that during the court case she was there to 

support J.U., not D.G., and that she divorced D.G. as soon as she was able to 

afford it. Id. at 32-33.

Mother testified that she has lupus and suffered several strokes as a 

result of that condition. However, her medical conditions have never 

prevented her from caring for Children. Id. at 36-37. 

Mother testified that she attended therapy for a year and a month and 

that she was discharged because she had met her goals. Id. at 38-40. During 

her therapy sessions she worked on issues surrounding domestic violence and 

her depression. Id. at 40-41. Mother testified that she knew her 

noncompliance with court orders was wrong and that she had “messed up,” 
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and that the non-compliance negatively affected her children. Id. at 41-42. 

When asked to describe her bond with Children, Mother testified that she loves 

them very much. Id. at 44-45. 

On cross-examination, DHS introduced bench warrants issued when 

Mother failed to appear with J.U. at her court hearings, and text messages 

sent by Mother to J.U. and Children asking them to be dramatic, crying, and 

begging. Id. at 55-58. Mother admitted to being held in contempt several 

times and having continuing contact with D.G. while he was incarcerated. Id.

at 59-60. Mother admitted that she never filed a victim impact statement on 

J.U.’s behalf. Id.

Yalonda Houston, Esquire, Children’s child advocate, placed Children’s

preferences on the record. See N.T., 1/18/19, at 81-82. A.R.U., who was five 

years old, did not respond when asked if he understood adoption. Id. at 81. 

However, when asked if he would like his home with K.J. to be his forever 

home, A.R.U. responded “yes,” then ran away and began playing with the 

other children. Id. at 81. When asked if he would like his home with K.J. to 

be his forever home, S.C.U. responded that he would love to return to his 

mother but that it was the judge’s decision and, if adoption was the decision,

S.C.U. would like to remain with his current caregiver. Id. at 82. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the petitions and 

terminated Mother’s rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), 

and (b), and changed Children’s permanency goal to adoption. Mother timely 
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filed notices of appeal and statements of matters complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

On appeal, Mother raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of Mother pursuant to [23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)] without clear and 

convincing evidence of mother’s intent to relinquish her parental 

claim or refusal to perform her parental duties[?]

2. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of Mother pursuant to [23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2)] without clear and 

convincing evidence of mother’s present incapacity to perform 

parental duties[?]

3. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of Mother pursuant to [23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5)] without clear and 

convincing evidence to prove that reasonable efforts were made 

by Department of Human Services to provide [M]other with 

additional services and that the conditions that led to placement 

of the children continue to exist[?]

4. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of Mother pursuant to [23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8)] without clear and 

convincing evidence that the conditions that led to placement of 

the children continue to exist when Mother presented evidence of 

compliance with the goals and objectives of her family service plan 

and parenting capacity evaluation[?]

5. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of Mother pursuant to [23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)] without clear and 

convincing evidence that there is no parental bond between 

mother and children and that termination would serve the best 

interest of the children[?]

See Mother’s Brief at 7.

We review cases involving the termination of parental rights according 

to the following standards.
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The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted).

Termination requires a bifurcated analysis:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). To 

affirm, we need only agree with any one of the subsections of 2511(a), as well 

as subsection (b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) 

(en banc). Here, we focus our analysis on subsection (a)(2) and (b).

The relevant sections of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 provide that:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:
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***

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).

Essentially, Mother argues that the evidence does not support 

termination under this section because she has remedied the conditions 

causing the incapacity. See Mother’s Brief at 12. Specifically, Mother contends 

that she cooperated with the District Attorney by obtaining a written 

confession from D.G., developed insight to identify situations and relationships 

that could pose a threat to Children’s safety, and pointed to expansive family 

support from her father, T.C., and extended family. Id.

To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party 

must prove “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; 

(2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be 
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without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes 

of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.” 

See In Interest of Lilley, 719 A.2d 327, 330 (Pa. Super. 1998). The grounds 

for termination are not limited to affirmative misconduct, but include any

parental incapacity that cannot be remedied. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 

(Pa. Super. 2010). Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward the 

reasonably prompt assumption of full parental duties. Id. 

The court made the following findings:

I am going to address the credible facts in this case beginning with 

the fact that for 29 months these [C]hildren have been in care and 

away from the [M]other. Mother throughout the history of this 

case has been contemptuous, has failed to follow court orders, 

has tried to influence the outcome of a criminal case in which her 

daughter was a victim of a rape. I’m making that finding.

Additionally, I’m finding that Dr. Russell’s November 30, 2018 

testimony regarding [M]other’s parenting capacity is credible. He 

testified that [M]other couldn’t provide safety or permanency for 

these [C]hildren, that she made bad decisions as a result of her 

childish behavior and her immaturity, that she has a severe lack 

of decision making and a pattern of bad decisions which are quite 

obvious in her interactions with this [c]ourt and her contemptuous 

behavior.

He said: “She put on blinders[,”] meaning she lacked insight on 

how to care for these [C]hildren. And he based that on her 

shielding this child from testifying in the criminal case regarding 

her husband, [D.G.], and found that kind of decision-making was 

impaired. As to her ability to parent[,] he found that she was not 

being honest when he interviewed her[,] and that she could not 

provide safety for these [C]hildren.

Additionally, we heard about the bond that the children have with 

their caretaker in this case. Also[,] I heard from Mr. McKnight, the 

worker, who went on to testify that – onto various violations of 

the court order which he personally observed. Particularly 
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unauthorized conduct, physical conduct, between [M]other and 

[J.U.] in a supermarket which he observed and followed them, 

phones that were confiscated from the [C]hildren in violation of 

court orders. And also[,] we heard from the detective from SVU.

Additionally, throughout the history of this case, numerous 

hearings, we heard from Ms. Walker, the visitation coach, who 

testified that one of the [C]hildren, [A.R.U.], doesn’t have 

interaction with [M]other during visits and[,] in her opinion[,] has 

no parental bond. Mother has no parental bond with that child.

Mother’s witnesses included her father, [T.C.], who testified that 

there were 15 to 16 family members ready to care for the 

[C]hildren. I did find [T.C.’s] testimony to be credible. However,

[M]other never gave [T.C.] any phone number for the DHS worker 

or the CUA worker so he could follow up and explain to them that 

he had some potential caregivers for these [C]hildren which the 

[c]ourt was unaware of. And additionally, he hadn’t seen the 

children in over two years.

And today we heard from the [M]other regarding her attempts to 

file a victim impact statement on behalf of [J.U.] in the criminal 

matter where a child was raped. However, there was never any 

impact statement given by [M]other[,] despite invitations from 

the D.A.’s office[,] which the [c]ourt saw proof of through the 

introduction of [M]other’s documents and emails with the D.A.’s 

office and also subpoenas.

Mother’s cooperation, if any, with the District Attorney’s office,

which [led] to the guilty plea by [D.G.] to raping her daughter, 

was minimal at best and way after the fact. She in fact kept her 

child away intentionally from two preliminary hearings in this case 

and[,] I believe[,] was held in contempt by the criminal court. In 

addition, this [c]ourt on numerous occasions found her in 

contempt for violating court orders with regards to staying away 

from the children and any phone, text messaging or any form of 

contact[,] which she repeatedly violated.

So the [c]ourt is left with the inescapable conclusion that the best 

interest of these children dictates that Mother’s rights be 

terminated under 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8) and 2511(b). I 

make this finding in the best interest of the [C]hildren after taking 

into consideration the character and fitness of the parties 

involved.
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In other words, [M]other’s character and the foster parents’ 

character. And also the parental duties being performed for the 

past 23 months by each of the parties on behalf of the [C]hildren. 

And exclusively those parental duties have been performed by the 

foster parents.

Additionally, the need for stability and continuity and the 

children’s education, family life and community life[,] and also I’m 

taking into account the preference of the children based on their 

maturity and judgment. In this [A.R.U.], the five[-]year[-]old, 

didn’t understand the concept of adoption. However, the [C]hild 

did understand that, when asked by Ms. Houston, where the 

[C]hild preferred to live in particular would this foster home be a 

forever home for the [C]hild and the [C]hild indicated yes[,] that 

the [C]hild wanted the foster care to be the forever home.

With regard to [S.C.U.], the ten – or 11[-]year[-]old, the 

testimony was that the child would love to return to [M]other. 

However, the child left it up to the [c]ourt as to whether or not 

[C]hild would stay in foster care. And I’m finding that in the best 

interest of [S.C.U.], who is living with both the five[-]year[-]old, 

[A.R.U.], and another brother, [H.U.], in the foster home[,] that 

it is in their best interest to remain in that foster home because it 

is more likely the foster parents will maintain a loving, stable, 

consistent and nurturing relationship for the children.

And given the fact that the foster parents are providing for the 

daily needs of these children and [M]other’s continued 

contemptuous behavior with regard to court orders, I have no 

assurances that she would follow any dictates of the[c]ourt in the 

future because she has not followed any in the past other than 

completing some parenting and some mental health treatment. 

So for those reasons [M]other’s rights are terminated. The goal 

for these children is adoption.

See N.T., 1/18/19, at 91-96.

This reasoning is supported by the record. Rather than completing her 

goals and complying with court orders, evidence was introduced to show that 

Mother was likely still refusing to comply with court orders, and she had not
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identified a support system to DHS prior to the termination hearing. 

Additionally, her parenting capacity evaluation and Dr. Russell’s testimony 

showed that Mother was not capable of providing stability and permanency to 

Children at that time, nor should she have unsupervised visitation with 

Children. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly found by clear and 

convincing evidence that Mother’s parental rights to Children could be 

terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), based upon the finding that 

Mother evinced a continued incapacity – an inability to ensure that she would 

keep Children safe and remain compliant with her objectives – that resulted 

in Children being without essential parental care, the cause of which “cannot 

or will not be remedied.” See Lilley, 719 A.2d at 330; Z.P., 994 A.2d at 

1117.

Next, we must consider whether Children’s needs and welfare will be 

met by termination pursuant to Subsection (b). See Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. 

“In this context, the court must take into account whether a bond exists 

between child and parent, and whether termination would destroy an existing, 

necessary and beneficial relationship.” Id. The court is not required to use 

expert testimony, and social workers and caseworkers may offer evaluations 

as well. Id. Ultimately, the concern is the needs and welfare of a child. Id.

We have noted:

[b]efore granting a petition to terminate parental rights, it is 

imperative that a trial court carefully consider the intangible 

dimension of the needs and welfare of a child—the love, comfort, 
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security, and closeness—entailed in a parent-child relationship, as 

well as the tangible dimension. Continuity of relationships is also 

important to a child, for whom severance of close parental ties is 

usually extremely painful. The trial court, in considering what 

situation would best serve the child[ren]’s needs and welfare, 

must examine the status of the natural parental bond to consider 

whether terminating the natural parents’ rights would destroy 

something in existence that is necessary and beneficial.

Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (quoting In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1202 (Pa. Super. 

2000)). The trial court may equally emphasize the safety needs of the child 

and may consider intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability 

the child might have with the foster parent. See In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 

103 (Pa. Super. 2011). Where there is no evidence of a bond between the 

parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. In re: K.Z.S., 

946 A.2d 753, 763 (Pa. Super. 2008).

Mother argues that the court erred in terminating her parental rights 

because she and her [children] have a strong emotional bond, and she was 

their exclusive caregiver during the formative years of their lives. See

Mother’s Brief at 14. She contends that her ability to strengthen this bond was 

destroyed by the suspension of visitation with her children and that she was 

not a grave threat to children.

3

 Id.

____________________________________________

3

Initially, we note that Mother has previously litigated the issue of her 

visitation and whether she was a grave threat to Children. This Court affirmed 

the trial court’s order finding that Mother had moral deficiencies that posed a 

grave threat to children which justified a temporary suspension of visitation. 

See A.U., 170 A.3d at 1199 (Pa. Super. 2017). Mother did not appeal this 

decision to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
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Evidence was presented to show that A.R.U. does not have a bond with 

Mother. During visitations, A.R.U. prefers to play with toys and gifts rather 

than interacting with Mother. In the opinion of caseworker McKnight and 

visitation coach Walker, A.R.U. is not bonded with Mother. Attorney Houston, 

A.R.U.’s legal counsel, stated that A.R.U. preferred for his foster father and 

home to become his “forever home.” Mother testified that she loves A.R.U. 

However, this Court has stated that a parent’s own feelings of love and 

affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights. 

L.M., 923 A.2d at 512. 

With regard to S.C.U., there is some evidence that there is a bond with 

Mother. However, Walker testified that he also prefers to play with toys rather 

than interact with Mother during visitation, which indicates a lack of a bond. 

Further, McKnight testified that in his opinion the bond Mother shares with 

S.C.U. is not a healthy one. On the other hand, Attorney Houston, S.C.U.’s 

legal counsel, stated that S.C.U. loved Mother and would like to remain with 

her, indicating some evidence of a bond. But this testimony was tempered by 

Attorney Houston’s observation that S.C.U. was equally happy to remain in 

the care of his foster family.

Additionally, even beyond any bond with Mother, Children’s best 

interests are served by the permanency, stability, and safety provided by their 

relationship with their foster father. Testimony was presented to show that 

Mother did not have the capacity to safely parent Children. Additional 
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testimony was presented to show that Children have a strong bond with their 

foster father, who provides for their needs.

On this record, indicating that there is either no bond or an unhealthy 

bond between Mother and Children, clear and convincing evidence supports 

the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights with respect to 

2511(b), where adoption would best serve Children’s needs and welfare. See 

Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1126-27; K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763. 

Decrees affirmed. Orders affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/22/19