of Chickamauga, 

18-20 September 1863 

Dr. WiEliam Glenn Robertson 

Lieutenant Colonel Edward P. Shanahan 

Lieutenant Colonel John I. Boxberger 

Major George E. Knapp 

Combat Studies institute 

U.S. Army Cammand and General Staff College 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900 

1992 
Library of Congress CataIoging-in-Publicat

Staff ride handbook for the BattIe ofC%ickamauga, M-2

1863 I by WilIiam Glenn Robertson . . . [et al. I . 

p. cm. 

Includes bibliographical references (p. 1. 

1. Chiekamauga (Ga. ), Battleof, 1863. 2. C

National Militry Park (Ga. and Ten&-Guidebooks. 

William Glenn, 1944- . II. U.S. Army Command 

ColIege. Combat Studies Institute. 

1475.81 .S73 1992 

973.7’356~20 
I. CivilWarArmies ..................................... 

Organization ......................................... 

Weapons ............................................. 

Tactics .............................................. 

Logistical Support .................................... 

EngineerSupport ..................................... 

Communications Support .............................. 

Medical Support ...................................... 

II. Chickamauga Campaign Overview ..................... 

III. Suggested Route and Vignettes ........................ 

Introduction ......................................... 

Dayl(19September1863) ............................ 

Day 2 (20 September 1863) ............................ 

IV. Support for a Staff Ride to Chickamauga ...........

Appendixes 

A. order of Battle: Army of the Cumberland . . . . ‘ 

B. Order of Battle: Army of Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . 

C. Chiekamauga Medal of Honor Recipients . . . . , 

D. Meteorological Data Relevant to the Chickamaug

Campaign . . . . ..I............U...~......I....I..... 

Bibliography . I . , , . I , . . . . . I . . . . . . . . I . . . . . . . s I . . . . . 

The Authors of the Handbook . . . . . I . . . , . , . . . . . . . . . . 

..* 111 
l-19 September 1863 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

3. Reorganization of the Army of Tennessee, 

19--2OSeptember1863 ..~...............,..~..,..... 

4. Regimental line of battle from march column . . . . 

5. Maneuvering brigades at Chickamauga, 

20September1863 . . . . ..~............~...........U... 

6. The”grandcolumn” . . . , . . . . . . ~. . . . . . . *. . . . . . . . 

Maps 

1. Sites of maps 2 through 5 in relation ta the Chickam

and Chattanooga National Military Park for day 

2. Day 1, stands 1 through 16 .............................. 

3. Dayl,standsl?through20 ............................. 

4. Day 1, stands 21 through 25 ............................. 

5. Day l,stands26thraughZS ............................. 

6. Sites of maps 7 through 10 in relation to the Chickam

and Chattanooga National Military Park for day 

7. Day 2, stands 1 through 15 .............................. 

8. Day2,stands 16 through22 ............................. 

9. Day2,stands23through28 ............................. 

10. DayZ,stands29through39 ............................. 

V 
4. Types of artillery available at the Battle of 

Chickamauga . . ..I.....I.............~........I.....~ 

5. Variety of weapons in WiIder’s brigade, 

30September1863 . . . . ..l............................. 

6. Sample of Federal logistical data . 1 . e . . . . . . . . . 

7. Casualties of the battle s . . . . . v , . . ‘ . . . . . . . . . . . 

vii 
peace had become too far removed from the reality of w

about for ways to make the study of conflict more real 

had no experience in combat. Eventually, he arrived 

calIed the Staff Ride, which consisted of detailed classr

actual campaign followed by a visit to the sites assoc

campaign. Although Wagner never lived to see the Sta

the Leavenworth curricula, an associate of his, Majo

implemented the Staff Ride at the General Service and 

1906. In July of that year, Swift led a contingent of twe

Chattanooga, Tennessee, to begin a two-week study 

campaign of 1864. 

The Staff Ride concept pioneered at Leavenworth 

years of the twentieth century remains a vital 

professional development today. At the U.S. Army 

General Staff College, the Army War College, ROTC de

units throughout the world, U.S. Army officers are 

vicariously in peacetime through the Staff Ride met

methodology (in-depth preliminary study, rigorous fi

integration of the two) need not be tied to a forma

environment. Units stationed near historic battlefields 

the intellectual and emotional stimulation provided by 

haIlowed ground where soldiers once contended for t

causes. Yet units may find themselves without many o

information on a particular campaign that are readily 

academic environment, For that reason, the Combat S

has begun a series of handbooks on significant camp

provide practical ir&ormation to assist officers to condu

these campaigns on their own. These handbooks are no

used as a substitute for serious study by Staff R

participants. Instead, they represent an effort to as

locating sources, identifying teaching points, a

meaningful field study phases. As such, they represent 

from which a more meaningful professional developm

may be crafted. 

ix 
trail network that permits access to all significan

Thus, the park is an excellent physical laborato

conflict at the tactical and human level. Fina

proximity. to the city of Chattanooga, Tennessee

easily supportable logistically for Staff Ride group

this campaign offers a great opportunity for study 

officer, as generations of American soldiers have a

The StaffRide Randbook for the Bat&z of C

September 1863, provides a systematic approach t

great Civil War battle. Part I describes the organiz

and Confederate Armies, detailing their wea

logistical, engineer, communications, and medical 

In part II, the Chickamauga campaign is di

battIe in historical perspective and illustrating ho

the overall context of the Chickamauga campaign. 

Part III furnishes a suggested route to follu

firsthand, concrete view of how the battle develop

route, various phases of the battle can be discus

points made concerning the evolving battIe. Also in 

vignettes by participants in the battle that describ

insights into the emotional disposition of the comb

Part IV furnishes current information on the 

sources of assistance, and logistical data for condu

addition, appendixes give order of battle inform

armies, meteorological data, and a list of Medal o

the battle. A bibliography is also provided, 
men were organized into 198 companies scattered acro

79 different posts. At the start of the war, 183 of these 

either on frontier duty or in transit, while the remain

coastal artillery batteries, guarded the Canadian bord

coast or 1 of the 23 arsenals. In 1861, this Army 

command of Lieutenant General Winfield Scott, the 75y

the Mexican-American War. His position as genera

traditional, not statutory, because secretaries of war 

designated a general to be in charge of the field forces 

congressional approval The field forces themselves 

through a series of geographic departments, whos

reported directly to the general in chief. This depar

frequently modified, would be used by both sides throu

War for administering regions under Army control. 

Army administration was handled by a system o

senior officers were, by 1860, in the twilight of long 

technical fields. Six of the ten bureau chiefs were ove

old. These bureaus, modeled after the British sys

directly to the War Department and were not subject 

the general in chief. Predecessors of many of today’s 

and combat service support branches, the following bu

established by 1881: 

Quartermaster Medical 

Ordnance Adjutant Gener

Subsistence Paymaster 

Engineer Inspector Gene

Topographic Engineer* Judge Advocate 

During the war, Congress elevated the Office of the P

and the Signal Corps to bureau status and created a C

Note that no operational planning or intelligence 

American commanders before the Civil War had never 

structure. 

This system provided suitable civilian control and 

support to the small field army prior to 1861. Ultimate

*Merged with the Engineer Bureau in 1863. 

1 
Raising the Armies 

With the outbreak of war in April 1861

monumental task of organizing and equip

exceeded the prewar structure in size and co

maintained control of the Regular Army, 

initially created a regular force, mostly on pap

the North lost many of its officers to the So

exceptional quality. Qf 1,108 Regular officers 

1861,270 ultimately resigned to join the South

15,135 enlisted men, however, Ieft the ranks. 

The Federal government had two basic o

Regular Army. It could be divided into trainin

for newly formed volunteer regiments or be ret

a reliable nucleus for the Federal Army in com

Scott envisioned a relatively small force to d

therefore insisted that the Regulars fight as 

Regular units fought well at the First Battle o

battles, Scott’s decision ultimately limited the 

on the war. Battle losses and disease soon 

Regulars, and officials could never recruit su

the face of stiff competition from the state

volunteer regiments. By November 1864, m

been so depleted that, they were withdrawn fro

war, therefore, was fought primarily with volu

the vast majority of wham had no previous 

experience. 

Neither side had diEeuIty in recruiting 

required to fill the expanding ranks. In 

Abraham Lincoln called for 75,000 men from 

3-month period, This figure probably represe

guess as to how many troops would be neede

quickly. Almost 92,000 men responded, as th

“organized,” but untrained, militia companies

Bull Run in July 1861, these ill-trained and 

generally fought much better than they were 
As the war continued and casualty lists grew

volunteering faded, and both sides ultimately resorted 

to help El1 the ranks. The Confederates enacted the fi

law in American history in April 1862, followed 

government’s own law in March 1863. Throughou

experiments in American conscription, both sides ad

programs in less than a fair and efficient way. Con

tended to exempt wealthier citizens, and initially, dra

substitutes or pay commutation fees. As a result

capability, and morale of the average conscript was poo

men, particularly in the South, enlisted to avoid the 

considered a conscript. Still, conscription or the threat 

ultimately helped provide a sufficient quantity of so

sides. 

Conscription was never a popular program, and 

particular, tried several approaches to limit 

requirements. These efforts included offering lucrativ

fees paid to induce volunteers to fill required quotas. 

Federals offered a series of reenlistment bonuses, in

thirty-day furloughs, and the opportunity for veteran 

maintain their colors and be designated as %etera

infantry regiments. The Federals also created an Inva

renamed the Veteran Reserve Corps) of men unfit for f

who performed essential rear-area duties, The Union 

almost 179,000 blacks, mostly in federally organiz

regiments By February 1864, blacks were being co

North as well. In the South, recruiting or conscripting 

politically sensitive that it was not attempted until Ma

late to influence the war. 

Whatever the faults of the manpower mobilizati

impressive achievement, particularly as a first effor

Various enlistment figures exist, but the best estim

approximately 2 million men enlisted in the Federa

1861-65.0f that number, 1 million were under arms 

war. Because the Confederates’ records are incom
organized was generally the same for Fede

reflecting the common roots for both armies. 

war with a Regular Army organized into an 

musket-equipped structure. Each of the 10 pr

cvnsist.ed of ten 87-man companies with 

strength of 878, At the beginning of the war, 

Regular infantry regiments with a ne

organizational structure. The new regiments 

with a maximum authorized strength of 2

battalion, with eight loo-man companies, wa

the prewar regiment. Essentially an effvrt to 

the new structure was unfamiliar to most lea

a variant of the vld structure for newly fvrm

The Federal War Department established 

regimental organization with a strength that 

1,046 (varying in authorized strength by up 

The Confederate Congress fixed its la-compa

1,045 men. Combat strength in battle, how

lower because of casualties, sickness, leaves

straggling. 

The battery remained the basic artillery 

and larger formal groupings of artillery eme

the eastern theater. Four understrength Reg

the U.S. Army at the start of the war, and o

added in 1861, for a total of sixty batterie

batteries were volunteer organizations. A 

consisted of 6 guns and had an authorized stre

battery of six X£er Napoleons could 

organized as “horse” or flying artillery, can

individual mounts, and more horses than men 

bat,tery. Their Confederate counterparts, plag

and available manpower, usuaIly operated 

often with guns of mixed types and calibers

seldom reached their initially authorized m

soldiers. 
ost caayecotued to use te oe aate

to describe their units throughout the war. The Federal

companies or troops into squadrons, with four to s

comprising a regiment. Confederate cavalry units, org

prewar model, authorized ten 76man companies per re

volunteer cavalry units on both sides also formed into s

battalions. Later in the war, both sides began to merge 

regiments and brigades into division and corps organizati

For both sides, the unit structure above regiment

similar to today’s structure, with a brigade controlling 

regiments and a division controlling two or more brig

brigades generally contained regiments from more th

while Confederate brigades often had several regiments 

state. In the Confederate Army, a brigadier gen

commanded a brigade, and a major general commanded 

Federal Army, with no rank higher than major gener

often had colonels commanding brigades and brigad

commanding divisions. 

The large numbers of organizations formed, as sho

are a reflection of the politics of the time. The War Depa

considered making recruitment a Federal responsibil

proposal seemed to be an unnecessary expense for 

initially envisioned. Therefore, the responsibility f

remained with the states, and on both sides, sta

continually encouraged local constituents to form n

regiments. This practice served to strengthen support f

and national politicians and provided an opportunity 

high rank for ambitious men. Although such local recr

regiments with strong bonds among the men, it also h

the ranks of existing regiments with new replacement

progressed, the Confederates attempted to funnel repl

units from their same state or region, but the Federal

create new regiments. Existing Federal regiments deta

home to recruit replacements, but these efforts 

successfully compete for men joining new local regimen

formed regiments thus had no seasoned veterans to trai
Infantry 19 regular regiments 

2,125 volunteer regiment8 

60 volunteer battalions 

351 separate companies 

Artillery 5 regular regiments 

61 volunteer regiments 

17 volunteer battalions 

408 separate batteries 

Cavalry 6 regular regiments 

266 volunteer regiments 

45 battaliona 

78 separate companies 

The Leaders 

Because the organization, equipment, tac

Confederate and Federal Armies were simila

units in battle often depended on the quality a

individual leaders. General officers were appo

central governments. At the start of the war, 

all, of the more senior officers had West’ Point 

experience. In 1861, Lincoln appointed 126 g

82 were, or had been, professional officers. Je

eighty-nine, of which forty-four had received 

The remainder were political appointees, bu

FederaI and seven Confederate generals 

experience. 

Of the volunteer officers who comprised th

for both armies, colonels (regimental comma

*Legions were a form of combined arms team, wi\b a

They were a 

war, legions P 

proximately t&e strength of a large regimen

ost their combined arms orgamzatlon. 
Much has been made of the West Point backgrou

who ultimately dominated the senior leadership po

armies, but the graduates of military colleges were 

such institutions to command divisions, corps, or arm

though many leaders had some combat experience fro

War era, very few had experience above the company 

in the peacetime years prior to 1861. As a result, th

initially conducted at any level by ‘“professional offic

terminology. Leaders became more professional thro

and at the cost of thousands of lives. General Willia

would later note that the war did not enter its “pro

until 1863. 

CiviE War Staffs 

In the Civil War, as today, the success of 

organizations often depended on the effectiveness of t

staffs. Modern staff procedures have evolved only gra

increasing complexity of military operations. This ev

from complete in 1861, and throughout the war

personally handled many vital staff functions, most no

and intelligence. The nature of American warfa

midnineteenth century had not yet clearly ove

capabilities of single commanders. 

Civil War staffs were divided into a ““general sta

corps.“’ This terminology, defined by Winfield Scott 

from modern definitions of the terms. Table 2 lis

positions at army level, although key functions are re

to regimental level. Except for the chief of staff and 

who were considered personal staf?? and would often 

commander was reassigned, staffs mainly contained re

the various bureaus, with logistical areas being be

Later in the war, some truly effective staffs began to 

was the result of the increased experience of the off
jg

Assistant inspector general 

staff Carps 

Engineer 

Ordnance 

Quartermaster 

Subsistence 

Medical 

Pay 

Signal 

Provost marshal 

Chief of artilIery 

George B. McClellan, when he appointed his 

chief of staff, was the first to officially use this title

senior commanders had a chief of staff, this posi

any uniform way and seldom did the man in th

central coordinating authority of the chief of 

headquarters. This position, along with most othe

used as an individual commander saw fit, making 

somewhat different under each commander. This 

chief of staff was among the most important sh

during the Civil War. An equally important weak

any formal operations or intelligence staff. Liais

also ill-defined, and various staff officers or sol

function with little formal guidance. Miscommu

knowledge offriendly units proved disastrous time 

The Armies at Chickamauga 

Major General William S. Rosecrans’ Army 

was organized into four infantry corps and a cava

1). Eleven infantry divisions would see action 

Roseerans’ effective strength was over 80,000 m

would be available for the battle; most of the 

several additional units were securing th

communication, which stretched to Nashville. Alth
w 
famous “fighting McCook family”) were Wes

although I&Cook was a young and immature 

Rosecrans’ other corps commander, Thomas L. 

veteran of the Mexican War, was relatively in

command. David S. Stanley, an exceIlent caval

became ill in midcampaign and was replaced j

battle by the ineffective Robert B. Mitchell. A

division commanders would prove inadequate, on 

was served by a better-than-average set of Civil W

On the Confederate side, General Braxto

Tennessee grew to almost 60,000 men in the th

Battle of Chickamauga. (For a comparison of R

effective strengths, see table 3.) Bragg% men w

though some regiments had no battle experie

reinforcements who would arrive by 20 Septe

contained eleven infantry divisions, organized in

(For the organization of the Army of Tennesse

1863, and its reorganization on 19-00 Septemb

and 3.) Bragg’s senior subordinates were probab

Federal counterparts, Unfortunately, many ha

commander and tended to question many of h

Hill, Simon B. Buckner, William H. T. Walker, a

West Pointers, as was Episcopal Bishop Leonida

day of battle, James Langstreet, a West Po

reputation from service under Robert E. Lee in V

along with 7,700 men. Joseph Wheeler and Na

latter a particularly gifted soldier) commanded 

corps. The quality of some of Bragg’s divisio

exceptional: Alexander P. Stewart and Patrick 

among the best division commanders of the entire 

Rosecrans’ army staff was better organ

Although both men tended to handle too many 

Rasecrans’ log?stical staff was more experienced, 

of staff, Brigadier General (later President) Jam

operational assi&ant during the battle. Bragg’s 
duty) 

p ,

4 Sep - 1,100 Engineers on Iines of 

communication duty 

16 Sep + 2,700 McN

Brig

S&P - 1,306 Post’s (Davis’) brigade 18 Ssp +4,000 Law

guarding trains 19-20 Sep +3,700 Ker

10 Sep -2,100 Wagner’s CWood's) 

Hum

brigade garrison in 

Chattanooga 19 Sep 62,200 19-20 Sap 67,300 

more loosely run and employed lax procedures. Bragg 

use his staff more haphazardly, sending whoever se

liaison missions, including his chief of staff who ne

coordinated staff activities. Much of Bragg’s personal ti

tu logistical details. Atrocious staffprocedures in Leonid

headquarters contributed to the confusion and delays s

initiation of the Confederate attack on 20 September. 

Rosecrans’ army was in excellent fighting trim. H

the Stones River and Tullahoma campaigns had allow

and his soldiers had the high morale that only a series 

bring. In addition, he carried only 4 percent of his men o

a remarkably low figure for the Civil War. Morale 

support in Bragg% army could not match that of 

Nevertheless, his soldiers possessed a stubborn pride bo

and they were defending their home regions. In additio

knew of the coming reinforcements from Virginia. 

Weapons 

During the 185Os, in a technological revolut

proportions, the rifle-musket began to replace t

inaccurate smoothbore musket in ever-increasing nu

Eurape and America. This process, accelerated by 


caliber rifle. In appearance, the riflemusket 

smoothbore musket. Roth were single-shot muz

rifled bore of the new weapon substantially inc

accuracy. The rifling system chosen by the United 

by Claude Mini&, a French Army officer. Wherea

round, nonexpanding ball, the Mini& system 

eylindro-conoidal projectile sIightly smaller than 

dropped easily into the barrel. When the powder 

a fulminate of mercury percussion cap, the re

expanded the base of the bullet into the rifled 

projectile a ballistic spin. 

The Model 1855 Springfield rifle-musket wa

arm to use the hollow-base, .58-caliber Ii&x% 

modified Model 1861 was the principal infantry 

War, although two subsequent models in 1863 w

equal quantities. The Model 1861 was 56 inches l

inch barrel, and weighed 9 pounds 2 ounces. It 

2l-inch socket bayonet (with an l&inch trian

socket) and had a rear sight graduated to 500 

effective range of the Springfield rifle-musket w

yards, although it had killing power at 1,000 ya

penetrate 11 inches of white-pine board at 200 y

at 1,000 yards, with a penetration of 1 inch b

equivalent of disabling a human being. Range 

increased by the use of the new weapon, but th

still obscured by the clouds of smoke produced 

propellant. 

TQ load a muzzle-loading rifle, the soldier t

in hand and tore the end of the paper with his t

the powder down the barrel and placed the bullet 

using a metal ramrod, he pushed the bullet fir

until seated. He then cocked the hammer and 

cap on the cone or nipple, which, when struck by 

the gunpowder. The average rate of fire was thre

A well-trained soldier could possibly load and 
imported models. The best, most popular, and most nu

foreign weapons was the British .577-caliber Enfield rifle

which was 54 inches long (with a 39-inch barrel), weigh

(9.2 with the bayonet), could be fitted with a socket ba

H-inch blade, and had a rear sight graduated to a range 

The Enfield design was produced in a variety of forms, 

short barreled, by several British manufacturers and 

American company. Of all the foreign designs, the Enfiel

resembled the Springfield in characteristics and cap

United States purchased over 436,000 Enfield-pattern w

the war. Statistics on Confederate purchases are mo

ascertain, but a report dated February 1863 indicates th

Enfields and 9,715 short Enfields had been delivered 

with another 23,000 awaiting delivery. 

While the quality of imported weapons varied, expe

the Enfields and the Austrian Lorenz rifle-muskets ve

foreign governments and manufacturers took advantag

initial demand for weapons by dumping their obsaofete w

American market. This practice was especialty prevalen

the older smoothbore muskets and comverted flintlocks. 

challenge, however, lay in maintaining these weapons 

ammunition and replacement parts for calibers rangin

.79. The quality of the imported weapons eventually im

procedures, standards, and astuteness of the purchasers 

the most part, the European suppliers provided needed 

the newer foreign weapons were highly regarded. 

All told, the United States purchased about 1,165

rifles and muskets during the war, nearly all within 

years. Of these, 110,853 were smoothbores. The rem

primarily the French Mini4 rifles (442501, Austrian 

(226,294), Prussian rifles (59,918), Austrian Jagers 

Austrian Bokers (187,533). Estimates of total Confeder

range from 340,000 to 400,000. In addition to the Enfield

the Confederacy (mentioned above), 27,000 Austrian 

British muskets, and 2,020 Brunswick rifles were also p

30,000 Austrian rifles awaiting shipment. 
the breechloaders was the singleshot Shar

carbine and rifle models. The Model 1859 rifl

47 118 inches long, and weighed 8 3/4 pounds, wh

caliber, 39 l/8 inches long, and weighed 7 314 

used a linen cartridge and a pellet primer fe

Sharps carbines were issued to Federal cavalry 

The best known of the repeaters was pro

Spencer, -52 caliber, which also came in both rif

The rifle was 47 inches long and weighed 10 po

was 39 inches long and weighed 8 l/4 pound

infantry unit to use Spencer repeating rifles i

John T. Wilder’s “Lightning Brigade” on 24 J

Gap, Tennessee. The Spencer was also the first 

U.S. Army that fired a metallic rimfire, sel

Soldiers loaded rounds through an opening in 

which fed into the chamber through a tubular 

of the trigger guard. The hammer still had to 

before each shot. 

Better than either the Sharps or the Spenc

Never adopted by the US. Army in large quan

privately by soldiers during the war. The Hen

.44-caliber rim&e cartridge repeater. It was 

weighed 9 I.14 pounds. The tubular magazine lo

the barrel had a fifteen-round capacity with an 

chamber. of the approximately 13,500 Henry

10,000 saw limited service. The government pur

The Colt repeating rifle (or revolving carb

was available to Civil War soldiers in limited 

was produced in several lengths and calibers, th

32 inches to 42 l/Z inches, while its calibers we

-36 and .44 calibers were made to chamber s

caliber had five chambers. The Colt Firearms 

primary supplier of revolvers, the .44-caliber 

.36-caliber Navy revolver being the most p

purchased). This was because they were simple, 
g

that saw extensive use during the Civil War, the 

accounted for approximately 20,000 in 1861. The H

replaced by a variety of carbines, including the Me

(14,495), Maynard 52 caliber (20,002), Gallager .53 

Smith .52 caliber (30,062), Burnside .56 caliber (55,5

.54 caliber (80,512). The next step in the evolutionary 

repeating carbine, the favorite by 1865 being the Sp

seven-shot repeater (94,194). Because of the South’s I

capacity, Confederate cavalrymen had a more difficu

themselves. Nevertheless, they too embraced the firep

choosing shotguns and muzzle-loading carbines a

weapons. In addition, Confederate cavalrymen made 

battlefield salvage by recovering Federal weapons

South’s difficulties in producing the metallic-rimme

required by many of these recovered weapons limited 

Field ArtiEZery 

In 1841, the U.S. Army selected bronze as the s

for fieldpieces and at the same time adopted a new 

artillery. The 1841 fieId artillery system consis

smoothbore muzzIe-loaders: 6- and 1Bpounder guns; 

pounder howitzers; and E£er mountain howitz

War battery usually consisted of six fieldpieces-four 

howitzers, A 6-pounder battery contained four d-poun

E-pounder howitzers, while a 12pounder battery had 

guns and two 2Cpounder howitzers. The guns fired 

spherical case, grapeshot, and canister rounds, while 

shell, spherical case, grapeshot, and canister rounds. 

The 6-pounder gun (effective range 1,523 yards) 

fieldpiece used from the time of the Mexican War unt

By 1861, however, the 1841 artillery system based 

was obsolete. In 1857, a new and more versatile fie

pounder gun-howitzer (Napoleon), Model 1857, appea

Designed as a multipurpose piece to replace exis

howitzers, the Napoleon fired canister and shell, like 
theater. 

TabIe 4. Types of Artillery AvdabIe 

Battle of Chickamauga 

Bore 

3.67 88.4 60 300 

A%2 788 a3 300 

4.62 220 52.31 2T7 

4.62 

5.82 1,318 69 1,126 

6-pounderJames 3.8 880 60 300 

lo- pmderPam%t, s.0 890 74 soa 

1863 

3-inchordlnaoce f&e 3.0 816 69 300 

(Rcdmdi 

1,227 66 1.1% 

Another new development in field artillery 

of rifling. Although rifled guns provided greater 

smoothbores were generally more reliable and 

ammunition was semifixed, so the charge and th

loaded separately. In addition, the canister loa

perform as well as that of the smoothbore. Initially

were rifled on the James pattern, but they soon 

because the bronze rifling eroded too easily. T

artillery was either wrought iron or cast iron 

reinforcing band. 

The most commonly used rifled guns were th

and the Rodman, or S-inch ordnance rifle. The Pa

iron piece, easily identified by the wrought-iron 

breech. The lo-pounder Parrott was made in tw

1861 had a 2.9-inch rifled bore with three land

slight muzzle swell, while the Model 1863 versi

and no muzzle swell. The Rodman or ordnance r
smoothbores and an elongated projectile, known as a 

guns. Solid shot, with its smashing or battering effec

counterbattery role or against buildings and massed 

conical-shaped bolt lacked the effectiveness of the can

it tended to bury itself on impact instead of bounding a

like a bowling ball. 

Shell, also known as common or explosive 

spherical or conical, was a hoIlow projeetiIe filled w

charge of black powder that was detonated by a time 

designed to break into jagged pieces, producing an 

effect, but the low-order detonation seldom produced 

to five fragments. In addition to its casualty-producin

had a psychological impact when it exploded over the 

It was also used against field fartifications and in a 

role. Case or case shot far both smoothbore and rifle

hollow projectile with thinner walls than shell. The 

filled with round lead or iron balls set in a matrix 

surrounded a small bursting charge. Case was prima

antipersonnel role. This type of round had been inve

Shrapnel, a British artillery afflcer, hence the term “‘sh

Lastly, there was canister, probably the most effe

the round of choice at close range (400 yards or fess) 

troops. Canister was essentially a tin can filled with i

in sawdust with no internal bursting charge. When 

disintegrated, and the balls followed their own paths t,

canister round for the 12-pounder Napoleon consisted 

1 1/2-&h iron balls packed inside an elongated t

extremely close ranges, men often loaded double cha

By 1861, canister had replaced grapeshot in tbe ammu

field batteries. 

W~aponsatCh;tckmauga 

The variety of weapons available to both armies 

War is reflected at Chickamauga. A 5 June 1863 in

from the Army of the Cumberland listed the fol

Springfields; 29,277 Enfields; 4,352 Austrian rifles; 
.54 caliber (Mississippi and Austrian rifles); 3,00

rifles; and 900 .70-caliber Brunswick rifIes, ,Ml

Bokers. The remainder probably belonged to the 

and Oladowski reported those as Sharps, Mayn

models, as well as shotguns and musketoons. 

The tremendous variety of weapons and ca

required on the battlefield by each army 

sustainment problems that ranged from produc

to supplying soldiers in the field. AmazingIy, op

affected by the lack of ammunition, alth

standardization extended down to regimental lev

5 shows the variety of weapons even within Wilde

Table 5. Variety af Weapons in Wilder

30 September 1863 

Regiment spemsrs Enfields Colts 

SZd Illinois 172 280 

98th Illinois 364 9 

123d Illinois 26‘2 

17th Indiana 464 

72d Indiana 127 43 - 

Total 1,369 323 9 

The Army of the Cumberland at Chicka

batteries of artillery assigned, but during the 

batteries were not present on the field. One was w

Post’s brigade guarding the trains, the other w

George II. Wagner% brigade in Chattanooga. Th

were available supported their respective briga

tubes; of those, 103 were rified and 98 were 

Federal batteries consisted of six guns except 

States, with four; Battery M, 4th United State

Indiana with ten, and the Chicago Board of Trade 

The Army of Tennessee had 40 l/2 batteries 

the total number of tubes is more difficult to 
Carolina with three, Havis” Georgia with three, and M

Georgia with two. Refer again to table 4 for the major typ

available to the two armies during the Battle of Chickama

The effectiveness of artillery at Chickamauga 

because of the rugged terrain and the dense vegetation, 

the Federals’ advantage in numbers of longer-range rim

negated by the lack of good fields of fire. For the most par

both sides simply followed the brigades to which they w

Certainly on 19 September, they spent most of their 

unlimbering, and limbering weapons. As the victors, the 

acquired the spoils of the battle, including the artillery

report after the battle acknowledged the loss of thirty-nin

by the Army of the Cumberland. Because the capture

usually an improvement over their own pieces, many 

batteries incorporated the Federal weapons into their ow

shortly after the close of the battle. 

Tactics 

Tactical Doctrine in 1861 

The Napoleonic Wars and the Mexican War we

influences on American military thinking at the beginnin

War. The campaigns of Napoleon and Wellington pro

lessons in batt,le st’rategy, weapons employment, and lo

American tactical doctrine reflected the lessons learne

(1846-48). However, these tactical lessons were mislea

in Mexico relatively small armies fought only seven pi

Because these battles were so small, almost all the ta

learned during the war focused at the regimental, 

squadron levels. Future Civil War leaders had learne

about brigade, division, and corps maneuver in Mexico, y

were the basic fighting elements of both armies in P&61-6

The U.S. Army% experience in Mexico validated 

principleEcparticularly that of the offensive. In Mexico, 

differ greatly from those of the early nineteenth cent

-. 
In Mexico, American armies employed artill

both offensive and defensive battle situations. In 

moved as near to the enemy lines as possible-nor

musket range-in order to blow gaps in the en

infantry might exploit with a determined char

artillery blasted advancing enemy lines with cani

the enemy attack got within musket range. C

army’s flanks and rear but held itself ready to char

became disorganized or began to withdraw. 

These tactics worked perfectly well with the 

of the Napoleonic and Mexican Wars. The inf

accurate up to 100 yards but ineffective against 

beyond that range. Rifles were specialized weap

accuracy and range but slow to load and therefore 

line troops. Smoothbore cannon had a range up 

shot but were most effective against infantry wh

ranges under 400 yards. Artillerists worked their 

fear of infantry muskets, which had a limited 

cantinued to use sabers and Iances as shock weapo

American troops took the tactical offensive in 

battles with great success, and they suffered 

Unfortunately, simiIar tactics proved to be obsol

because of a major technological innovation fielde

rifle-musket. This new weapon greatly increased 

and accuracy and loaded as fast as a musket. The 

version of the rifle-musket in 1855, and by the b

War, rifle-muskets were available in moderate 

weapon of choice in both the Union and Confederat

war, and by 1862, large numbers of troops on b

muskets of good quality. 

Official tactical doctrine prior to the beginni

did not clearly recognize the potential of the new r

1855, the most influential tactical guide was Gen

three-volume work, infantry Z’czctics (18351, base

models of the Napoleonic Wars. It stressed 
introduced his manual as a response to the rifle-musket

to appreciate the weapon’s impact on combined arms 

essential shift the rifle-musket made in favor of the d

Tuetics was the standard infantry manual used by b

outbreak of war in 1861. 

If Scott’s and Hardee’s works lagged behind 

innovations, at Ieast the infantry had manuals to esta

basis for training. Cavalry and artillery fell even fu

recognizing the potential tactical shift in favor of rifle-

The cavalry’s manual, published in 1841, was based o

that focused on close-order offensive tactics. It favored 

cavalry attack in two ranks of horsemen armed with 

The manual took no natice of the rifle-musket% pote

give much attention to dismounted operations. Similar

had a basic drill book delineating individual crew actio

tactical manual. Like cavalrymen, artillerymen showe

the potential tactical changes that the rifle-musket imp

Regular Army infantry, cavalry, and artillery 

became proficient in the tactics that brought success i

first volunteers drilled and readied themselves for the 

officers and noncommissioned officers taught the lesso

the Napoleonic Wars and validated in Mexico, Thus, 

entered the Civil War with a good understanding of 

had worked in the Mexican War but with little under

the rifle-musket might upset their carefully practiced 

Early War Tactics 

In the battles of 1861 and 1862, both sides emp

proven in Mexico and found that the tactical offensiv

successful-but only at a great cost in casualties. Me

weapons in the defense generally ripped frontal assau

if the attackers paused to exchange fire, the slau

greater. Rifles also increased the relative number of 

flanking units now engaged assaulting troops wit

enfilading fire. Defenders usually crippled the first as

a second line of attackers could come forward in supp
against riflemuskets, cavalry and artillery 

discoveries of their own. Cavalry learned that 

charge did not work against infantry armed 

Cavalry, hawever, continued its traditional intellig

screening roles and found its place as the “‘eyes a

Artillery, on its part, found that it could not 

canister range as it had in Mexico, because th

accurate beyond that distance. Worse yet, at ra

were safe from rifle fire, artillery shot and shell w

than canister. Ironically, rifled cannon did not 

boost to artillery effectiveness that the rifle-m

infantry. The increased range of cannons proved 

the broken and wooded terrain over which so ma

were fought. 

There are several possible reasons why Civ

continued to employ the tactical offensive long a

the defensive was superior. Mast commanders b

was the decisive form of battle. This lesson cam

Napoleonic Wars and the Mexican-American Wa

chose the tactical offensive usually retained 

defenders. Similarly, the tactical defensive depe

enemy choosing to attack at a point convenient 

continuing to attack until badly defeated. Altho

occurred often in the Civil War, a prudent comm

count on it for victory. Consequently, few comman

the defensive form of battle if they had the option t

The offensive may have been the decisive form 

very hard to coordinate and even harder to control

often tried to attack the enemy% flanks and rear 

success because of the difficulty involved. Not onl

have to identify the enemy’s flank or rear corre

move his force into position to attaek and then 

with attacks made by other friendly units. (Fo

moving a regiment into line of battle from march 

Command and control of the type required to c

was quite beyond the ability of most Civil 

Therefore, Civil War armies repeatedly attacked 
II 

II 

II 
fronts against specific objectives became a stand

ever-growing casualty lists. 

Later War Taeties 

Poor training may have contributed to high 

in the war, but casualties remained high and eve

the armies became experienced. Continued 

resulted because tactical developments failed 

weapons technology. Few commanders unders

musket strengthened the tactical defensive

commanders made offensive innovations that 

success. When an increase in the pace of advan

defending firepower (as Hardee suggested it wo

advancing in more open order. But this sort of 

appropriate mass to assault and carry prepared 

command and control problems beyond the ability 

to resolve. Late in the war, when the difficulty 

fortifications under heavy fire became appa

expedients were employed. Attacking solidly e

often required whole brigades and divisions movi

rapidly cover intervening ground, seize the obje

the inevitable counterattack. Seldom successfu

prepared defenses, these attacks were genera

tremendous casualties and foreshadowed the ma

of World War I. Sometimes, large formations att

over short distances without, halting to fire. This 

success at Spotsylvania Court House in May 186

Union division attacked and captured an ex

Confederate line. The attack succeeded becau

crossed the intervening ground very quickly 

preparation and without stopping to fire their r

Confederate defenses, the Union troops attemp

success by continuing their advance, but loss of 

made them little better than a mob. Counterat
g

retain coherent formations if the terrain were suitably 

often, brigade attacks degenerated into a series of poo

regimental lunges through broken and waoded terrain 

commanders were often on the main battle line tryin

regimental fights. Typically, defending brigades stood 

and blazed away at attackers as rapidly as possible. Vol

did not continue beyond the first round. Most of the time

as soon as they were ready, and it was common for two 

together, one loading for the other to fire. Brigades 

invulnerable t,o attacks on their front and flanks if units 

right held their ground or if reinforcements came up 

threat. 

An example of this sort of brigade maneuver 

Chickamauga on the morning of 20 September 1

Confederates attacked the extreme left of the Unio

General John C. Breckinridge’s Division attempted to 

left, while Major General Patrick R. Cleburne”s Div

frontally. Two of Breckinridge’s brigades, led by Brig

Daniel W. Adams and Brigadier General Marcellus A. 

the Union flank and threatened its rear, but Briga

Benjamin H. Helm’s brigade ran into Major Gene

Thomas’ main line and made no gains. Meanwhile, C

brigades, under Brigadier Generals Lucius E. Polk, J

and S. A. M. Wood attacked into the strength of the Un

reinforcements, hawever, drove off Adams and Stovail 

line easily defeated the frontal attacks (see figure 5). 

Two or more brigades comprised a division. Wh

attacked, its brigades often advanced in sequence, from 

vice versa-depending on terrain, suspected enemy 

number of brigades available to att’ack. At times, divi

with two or more brigades leading, followed by one or 

ready to reinforce the lead brigades or maneuver to the 

more divisions comprised a corps that might conduct an 

of a larger plan controlled by the army commander. Mo

of divisions attacked under the control of a corps-leve
E 

f 
role by employing this tactic, especially after repeati

loading rifles gave it the firepower to contend with ene

contrast, artillery found that it could add its firepow

musket and tip the balance even more in favor of the tac

but artillery never regained the importance to offen

that it held in Mexico If artillery had developed an 

system, as it did prior to World War I, it might hav

contribute more to offensive tactics. Still, both sides em

decisively in defensive situations throughout the war. 

The most significant tactical innovation in the Civ

widespread use of field fortifications after armies reali

offensive’s heavy cost. It did not take long for the dea

the rifle-musket to convince soldiers to entrench ev

halted. Eventually, armies dug complete trenches wit

halting in a position. Within twenty-four hours, armi

defensive works that were nearly impregnable to fron

this respect, this development during the American C

clear forerunner of the kind of warfare that came to d

War I. 

Summary 

En the Civil War, the tactical defense dominate

offense because assault format,ions proved inferior to 

firepower. The rifle-musket, in its many farms, provided 

and caused the following specific alterations in tactics d

@ It required the attacker, in his initial disposit

farther away fram the defender, thereby increasing th

which the attacker had to pass. 

o It increased the number of defenders who 

attackers (with the addition of effective enfilading fire). 

* It reduced the density of both attacking 

formations. 

@ It created a shift of emphasis in infantry b

firef’ighm rather than shock attacks. 
acquired equivalent weapons and tactics. 

* It forced artillery to abandon its basic offe

of moving forward to within canister range of defe

Tactics at Chickamauga 

By September 1863, CiviI War battle tactic

point that brigades were the basic maneuver un

fought the Battle of Chickamauga by maneuv

attacking or defending along brigade lines o

division commander controlled attacks made by 

under his command. This required tremendou

synchronization, which the Civil War comman

failed to provide. Further, the Chickamauga ba

wooded, which made brigade and divisional m

dif&ult. Much of the tactical confusion at Chicka

the difficulty of maneuvering large bodies of tro

terrain with a command system that depend

commands. 

At Chickamauga, the armies exhibited bas

way they employed their divisions and brigades 

most often advanced with all regiments on line s

brigades generally advanced with two regiment

following in a second line. Use of these formatio

usually meant that a Confederate brigade wou

brigade of similar size, giving Confederate division

wider front. There was less uniformity within e

level, but Union divisions tended to defend with 

and one brigade to the rear in support, Did the

evolving doctrinal ideas? Were they responses to 

of the terrain? Did commanders choose these met

ability to control their units ? Perhaps the 

personalities, experiences, and abilities of the 

sides. Essentially, the Army of the Cumberland 

battle. Major General William S. Rosecrans conc

rapidly as possible in a position from which he co

operational offensive or fall back on Chattanoog
brigades, Adams and Stovalls, reached the Union re

position to cooperate with attacks against Thom

complications of coordinating this maneuver, howeve

surely as the rifle-musket fire from Union reinforceme

to the spot. Merely turning Thomas’ flank was not dam

cause the Union line to crumble. Thomas’ men staye

fortifications, defeated Confederate attacks to their 

reinforcements turn back the threat to their flank and 

Lieutenant General James Longstreet”s assault o

the stroke that routed Rosecrans’ center, was a fluk

center, a column af three divisions organized in five 

have been more an adaptation to space than a co

Although it was well organized and gallantly led, th

had the singular advantage of striking a vacant stretc

Had that line been properly held, Longstreet’s atta

failed or, at best, achieved only local success at a heavy 

the confused breakthrough once again demonstrated 

Civil War tactical maneuvers, even in a case where 

broken and routed. Although the Confederates held a 

for over an hour, they could not exploit it because th

control to do so did not exist. Later, Longstreet”s atta

Snodgrass Hill position were typical frontal assaults t

coordinated and culminated in heavy losses. 

At Chickamauga, both armies employed shortsigh

seldom achieved long-range, coordinated objectives

however, profitably deviated from the norm. One Co

Major General Alexander P. Stewart’s Divisian, effecti

unique battle drill. Stewart moved his brigades forwar

brigades, and when a brigade ran short of ammuniti

another into its place. This had the effect of keepin

pressure of firepower against the Union defenders, wh

Stewart% attack. Another unit that, had great tact

Chickamauga was Union Colonel John T. Wilder% m

brigade. Its five mounted infantry regiments, mos

Spencer repeating rifles, fought dismounted and were 

oversized battery of artillery. In two important firef
northern flank at Chickamauga. 

In sum, Chickamauga was like most othe

terms of tactics. Attacks were piecemeal, fronta

and they generally failed to dislodge defenders. 

innovations, such as the rotation maneuver use

and the open order employed by Forrest’s cav

better chance of success. Employed defensive

clearly showed how repeating rifles could d

battle. Unfortunately, these innovations were 

than the rule. The same tactics that failed 

Fredericksburg, and Murfreesboro failed again 

Logistical Support 

Victory on Civil War battlefields seldom h

quantity of tactical logistics. On the operation

however, logistical capabilities and concerns a

and sometimes the outcomes of campaigns. And 

the logistical advantage shifted inexorabEy to th

controlled the majority of the financial and indu

nation, and with their ability to import any n

ultimately created the best-supplied army the 

Despite suffering from shortages of raw mater

generated adequate ordnance, but they faltere

ability to acquire other war materiel. The foo

armies was often on the verge of collapse, large

of the transportation network were compounde

mismanagement. Still, the state of supply withi

sides depended more on the caliber of the peop

than on the constraints of available materiel. 

One of the most pressing needs at the st

sufficient infantry and artillery weapons. 

outmoded muskets were on hand for both side

private hands, but the Federals initially had on
for captured Confederate Enfields, and in the Battle o

up to one-third of tbe Confederates were still armed 

Modern artillery pieces were generally available 

quantities, though the Confederates usually we

Although breech-loading technology was availa

Canfederates had imported some Whit#worths from E

loading smoothbore or rifled cannon were the standard 

both armies. 

With most of the government arsenals and private 

capability located in the North, the Federals ultima

sufficient modern Qrearms for their armies, but the C

accumulated adequate quantities-either from battlefi

through the blockade. In addition, exceptional manage

Confederate Ordnance Bureau led to the creation of a s

throughout the South that produced large quantities o

weapons. 

The Northern manufacturing capability permitte

eventually to produce and outfit their forces with repe

best of which had been patented before 1861. Initially

North’s conservative Ordnance Bureau would not risk 

new, unproven standard weapon that could lead to s

huge quantities of ammunition in the midst of an exp

1864, after the retirement of Chief of Ordnance James 

President Lincoln’s urging, Federal cavalry receiv

Spencer repeating carbines, which greatly inc

capabilities. 

Both sides initially relied on the states and lo

provide some equipment, supplies, animals, and foodst

progressed, more centralized control over production 

emerged under both governments. Still, embezzlement 

common probIems for both sides throughout the war. 

its preponderance of railroads and developed waterw

supply and adequate distribution systems. The South

problem was subsistence. Arguably, the South produc

during the war to provide for both military and civ

mismanagement, parochial local interests, and 
medical ambulances, but conflicts of i

manageable. Department and army comman

resources directly from the bureaus, and 

considerable power as they parceled out occas

When essential equipment and supplies 

through normal channels, some commanders 

to procure them. One example of this practi

Wilder, who personally contracted for Spenc

brigade in the Army of the Cumberland. WiIde

personal loan to purchase the weapons, and 

from their pay. The Federal government pick

rifles’ worth was demonstrated in the Tullah

campaigns. 

Typically, materiel flowed from the fac

directed by the responsible bureaus. Supplie

advanced depots, generally a city on a majo

safely within the rear area of a department. 

armies established temporary advance depot

transpartation. From these points, wagons 

forward to the field units. This principle is 

modern theater sustainment organization. 

The management of this logistical sy

crucial A corps wagon train, if drawn by s

would be spread out from five to eight miles, 

terrain, weather, and road conditions. The wa

of hauling 4,000 pounds in optimal condition

that load in mountainous terrain. Sustenanc

major restriction, because each animal req

pounds of hay and grain a day to stay healthy 

and hard to handle, this forage was a major co

planning. Wagons delivering supplies more 

from the depot could be forced to carry exce

forage, If full animal forage was to be carried, 

wagons to support a corps increased dr
and without command sanction wherever an army went

command policy during Ulysses S. Grant’s Vicksburg 

William T. Sherman’s Atlanta campaign. Rosecran

endure pressure from Washington and wait for the corn 

starting his campaign in August 1863 was an example 

impact of animal forage on operations and also an ill

commander who understood some of the complexities o

major campaign. 

hgistics at Cftickamauga 

Supplies for Rosecrans’ Chicskamauga campaign 

Louisville (a base depot) to Nashville (an advanced depo

depots established near the Tennessee River at Steven

City, Bragg’s supply system, however, was ma

complicated. Because Virginia could not produce e

sustain Robert E. Lee’s army continuously, the 

government designated Georgia as the sustainment are

of Northern Virginia, with Atlanta as the primary dep

that Bragg could not draw supplies from Atlanta even 

barely 106 miles away. Although Bragg was ultimately 

the Atlanta depot, such policies created bureaucratic 

Confederate Army commanders throughout the 

established advance depots along the Western and Atlan

Resaca, Dalton, and Catoosa Station (near Ringgold) a

progressed. 

Once Rosecrans left his rail lines by crossing the Te

wagons became even more crucial. Major General 

h&Cook’s XX Corps, which contained three division

Chickamauga campaign, used over 850 wagons and am

by over 4,700 mules and horses. These wagons, in add

routine daily supplies, tools, tentage, and personal ba

carried three weeks* rations and enough ammunition 

major battles, as well as three days’ forage for the 

sample of logistical data, see table 6). During moveme

wagons received priority, followed by food, medical. it

supplies. Sutlers (private businessmen selling “luxurie
%farchi& rat&n lper man per day): j 

1 lb, hard bread (hartackl 

3/4 lb. salt pork or l/4 Ib. fresh meat 

1 oz. coffee 

3 oz. sugar and salt 

Forage (per fume per day): 

14 lbs. hay and 12 16s. grain 

Fereonal equipment: 

Includes rifle, bayonet, 60 rounds of 

ammunition, haversack, 3 days’ 

rations, blanket, shelter half, 

canteen, personal items 

precursors of the present-day post exchanges

wagons. Logisticians had learned early to push 

as possible, so this train followed its units on 

within a few miles of the forward units when 

the start of the Battle of Chickamauga, the bu

to Chattanooga and relative safety, but ammun

with the divisions. 

Units at Chickamauga used two techn

resupply during the battle. Either small groups 

move back to the wagons to hand-carry the 9

ammunition forward or regiments withdrew 

wagons to refit. Artillery batteries usually se

rear to replenish their stocks. Although no wri

the subject, many units on both sides had e

remarkably effective methods to handle resu

numbw of battle reports, descriptions of resup

some of the standard operating procedures th

schools today, 

Engineer Support 

Engineers on bath sides performed many 

campaign. Engineers trained at West Point w

- 
py 

This cadre expanded to a four-company Regular engi

Congress aIso created a single company of topograph

which joined the Regular battalion when the engineer b

in 1863. In addition, several volunteer pioneer reg

containing up to 2,000 men, supported the various fie

Corps of Engineers also initially cont,rolIed the fled

Corps, which provided aerial reconnaissance. The Confe

Engineers, formed as a small staff and one company of s

and pontoniers in 1861, grew more slowIy and gene

details and contract labor rather than established uni

engineers and craftsmen. 

Engineer missions for both sides included c

fortifications; repair and construction of roads, bridges

cases, railroads; demalition; limited construction of 

construction or reduction of siege works. The Federa

Engineers, a separate prewar bureau, performed reco

produced maps. The Confederates, however, never s

functions in creating their Corps of Engineers. Experie

first year of the war convinced the Federals that all eng

should be merged under a single corps because qual

officers tended to perform all related functions. As 

Federals also merged the Topographic Engineers into 

Engineers in March 1863. 

Bridging assets included wagon-mounted ponto

carried either wooden or canvas-covered pontoon boa

equipment, trained engineer troops could bridge even l

matter of hours. The most remarkable pontoon bridge 

the 2,200-foat bridge built by Army of the Potomac en

over the James River-one of over three dozen pontoon 

support of campaigns in the east that year. In 1862, th

began developing pontoon trains after t,hey had o

effectiveness. In fact, during the Atlanta campaign o

Joseph Johnston had four pontoon trains available 

army. 
While the Federal engineer effort expa

materiel as the war progressed, the Confederate 

hampered by major problems. The relative

organized engineer units avaiIabEe forced Co

rely heavily on details or contract labor. Findin

however, was often difficult because of competin

slave owners were reluctant to provide labor 

crucial to their economic survival. Despite cong

to conscript ZQ,OQO slaves as a labor force, sta

continua!Ey hindered efforts to draft slave 

problem concerned the value of Confederate cu

required huge sums for men and materiel, ye

were small, and ahhough congressional appro

the war, inflation greatly reduced effective pu

problem was the simple shortage of iron res

limited the Confederates* ability to increase r

produce iron tools. 

In 1861, maps for both sides were also in 

areas in the interior, they were nonexistent. 

the Federals developed a highly sophisticated 

Federal topographic engineers performed per

develop base maps reproduced them by s

distributed them to field commanders. Pho

presses, and eventually photochemical process

ability to reproduce maps quickly. Western 

operated far from base cities, carried equipmen

campaigns with their army headquarters. 

production exceeded 21,060 copies. Confede

never approached the Federal effort in 

Confederate topographers initially used traci

maps. Not until I.864 did the use of photogr

widespread in the South. 

Engineers at Chickamauga 

Engineers in neither ‘the Army of the Cu

of Tennessee had a tactical role in the Ba
yp, 

nearly 950 men. The technical expertise and construc

these men were supplemented by infantry detailed to p

labor, such as cutting trees and demolishing building

material. 

During the Chickamauga campaign, the 1st Mi

tre&le bridge across the Tennessee River at Bridgeport 

by two Federal divisions. The Pioneer Brigade was s

railway southward from Nashville, building bridges a

as well as constructing platforms at t.he temporary dep

Alabama. A company from this brigade built the pontoo

the Tennessee River at Caperton”s Ferry. Althoug

infantry, neither unit was involved in combat during 

although elements of the 1st Michigan had fought wit

Stones River ten months earlier. 

Bragg’s engineers consisted of 4 companies wi

effective strength of just over 390 men. These compa

details of infantrymen, were supervised by Bragg’s 

Captain S. W. Presstman. Limited information about 

exists, although one of the companies built and mainta

bridge across the Tennessee River at Chattanooga 

evacuated the city in early September. 

The engineer staff officers at the army headqu

armies created maps. The Army of the Cumberland 

portable photochemical process for reproducing maps 

therefore created, updated, and distributed maps to 

level. Federal maps depicted the gross terrain feature

and existing towns, including the locations of various 

but at best, these maps were only general guides. A

through areas, commanders noted new roads and ot

their maps and forwarded that information to the arm

updated maps could be made and issued. Despite th

long-term control over the area, their maps were hard

or more available than the Federal maps. Bragg’s chi

personally tasked with reconnaissance and mapping 

army evacuated Chattanooga. 
Communioations Suppo

Communications systems used during the 

line-of-sight signaling, telegraphic systems, an

time-honored courier methods, The telegraph 

strategic and operational communications, 

provided operational and limited tactical poss

were most heavily used for tactical cammunicatio

The Federal Signal Corps was in its infancy 

Major Albert 6. Myer having been appointed 

1866. His organization grew slowly and becam

as the Signal Corps in March 1663 and achie

November of that year. Throughout the w

remained small, its maximum strength reach

and men, most of whom were on detached servic

also indirectly influenced the formation of th

Service. Among the men who assisted Myer in 

wigwag signaling system* was Lieutenant E. P

used wigwag signals to the Confederates’ adva

Battle of Bull Bun and later organized the Con

Q&iaIly established in April 1862, the Confed

attached to the Adjutant and Inspector Ge

attained the same size as its FederaI counterp

men uhimately being detailed for service. 

Myer also fought hard to develop a Federal 

This field service utilized the Beardslee devic

machine operated by turning a wheel to a spec

eliectrical impulse that keyed the machine at th

letter. Although less reliable than the standard 

key, the Beard&e could be used by an opera

hours’ training and did not require bulky batte

*MyeF’s wigwag system, patented in 186&, used Eve se

vfa single flag. Four number groups represented Ltters oft

words and phrasea, The system could aho be employed 

totchea. 
when Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton relieved My

chief in November 1863 and placed all telegraph act

Military Telegraph Service. 

Although the Confederate Signal Corps” visual 

capabilities were roughly equal to those of the Federa

field telegraph operations remained too limited to b

significance. The Confederates’ existing telegraph 

strategic communications capabilities similar to those 

but the Tack of resources and factories in the South for 

precluded their extending the prewar telegraph network

Communications at Chiekamartga 

The Chiekamauga campaign presents, particul

Federal side, a view of the complexities of the early d

integration of different communications systems. The 

system operated by the U.S. Military Telegraph S

strategic communications. Thus, army commanders 

receive messages from Washington on the same day. T

Cumberkand’s chief signal officer, Captain Jesse Merrill

capabilities of this fixed network by developing ?rain

over 106 miles af uninsulated wire and poles on wago

extend the tellegraph lines to the advancing army. Usi

Merrill’s trained civilian operators established a n

stations east of the Tennessee River in early Septemb

September, Rosecrans ordered Merrill to link th

headquarters with Chattanooga. Ry the morning of 

Merrill had established stations at Crawfish Spring 

Glenn”s cabin, aIong the Dry Valley Road wes

headquarters, and at Major General Gordon G-anger’s 

headquarters at Rossville. 

The Signal Corps detachment of the Army of th

under Captain John C. Van Duzer, contained five f

Beardslee devices. These Ylying trains,” operated by 

men, carried some 460 slender pales and 10 miles 

telegraph wire on wagons. Although this system cou

directly with the Military Telegraph Service, it did lin
sight and weather conditions permitted. W

employed semaphore techniques, the Federa

wigwag system. Both sides used simple codes. T

two concentric rotating disks, one cantaining 

numbers and the second containing the lette

prearranging the set of the wheels, the Federal

and change the set if necessary. This system 

evidence exists that the Confederates broke 

Confederates used a sheet with rows of letters, 

from a modern communications code book, an

words to modify the encoding sequence. 

procedures were often sloppy, and entries in F

this code was frequently broken. Although th

of some use in transmitting orders, they usually 

providing information about enemy activities, 

both armies were often visible from suitable 

limited capabilities and the commanders’ la

telegraph and signal flag systems precluded a

battle itself. 

The courier system, using mounted st

soldiers to deliver orders and messages, was 

communications option short of commanders 

Although often effective, this system was frau

couriers were captured, killed, or delaye

destinations; commanders misinterpreted or 

situations changed by the time a messag

weaknesses of the courier system, though no

did tend to compound other errors or mis

campaign. For instance, Bragg, using couriers

subordinates to attack Major General Jame

division in McLemore’s Cove on 10 Septembe

sent to notify Lieutenant General Daniel H. H

the attack on the morning of 20 September 

general in the dark woods. The Federals

information offered by one of Thomas’ couriers 

issue (by courier) the order that moved Briga
lines provided by Merrill’s military telegraph trains, th

‘“flying trains” (with Beardslee devices), the Signal Cor

stations, and the numerous couriers provided by eac

Most of these systems were not compatibEe, thereb

transfer of the form of message at each node. Moreov

systems were under the control of different men, 

including the army commander, fully understood 

capabilities or problems of the overall system. 

Medical Support 

Federal and Confederate medical systems follo

pattern. Surgeons general and medical directors for 

served many years in the prewar Medical Departm

hindered by an initial lack of administrative experien

large numbers of casualties, as we11 as the state of me

the midnineteenth century. Administrative procedures 

experience, but throughout the war, the simp1e lack 

about the true causes of disease and infection led to ma

than direct battlefield action. 

After the disaster at the BattIe of First Bull Ru

Medical Department established an evacuation and tre

developed by Surgeon Jonathan Letterman At the hea

were three precepts: consolidation of field hospitals a

decentralization of medical supplies down to regimen

centralization of medical control of ambulances at all 

casualty evacuated from the front line normally receiv

a regimental holding area immediately to the rear. F

wagons or ambulances carried wounded men to a 

hospital, normally within a mile of the battle lines. Se

men could then be further evacuated by wagon, rail, 

general hospitals located usually in towns a

communication in the armies’ rear areas. 

Although the Confederate system followed the 

principles, Confederate field hospitals were often 

brigade rather than division level. A second differen
Confederacy had also introduced rear area w

were intended to handle convalescents en route 

Procedures, medical techniques, and me

sides were virtually identical. Commanders d

leaving the battle lines to escort wounded ba

practice was common, especially in less-d

established technique for casualty evacuation 

litter and ambulance dut.y. Both armies used b

for this task. Casualties woufd move or be assi

line, where litter bearers evacuated them 

ambulances or supp1y wagons. Ambulances 

two- or four-wheel carts with springs to limi

made even short trips agonizing for woun

division surgeons staffed consolidated field 

considerations were the availability of wate

supplement the hospital tents, and security 

rifle fire. The majority of operations performed 

aftermath of battle were amputations, Appro

Civil War wounds occurred in the extremities, 

shattered any bones that it hit. Amputation 

then available to limit the chance of serious 

were genera11y well supplied with chloroform

drugs, though shortages did occur on the 

surgeons often I&coked critical drugs and medic

Medical Support at Chickammga 

Although the Letterman system had b

Army of the Tennessee by mid-1863, the Ar

medical system was then still in transition In 

Director Glover Perin, a veteran of sixteen 

service, had inherited an evacuation system i

measure, he convinced Rosecrans to give qu

ambuIanees, but they were to respond to t

directors or surgeons. This transitional syst

1864, when Perin finally was able to impleme

more fully, 
gg

standard pattern, except for its unique general h

Surgeon Samuel Stout, Bragg% general hospital dire

general hospitals to be mobile. Thus, general hospitals 

Chattanooga and the surrounding towns evacuated an

themselves closer to Atlanta in as little as seventy-two 

withdrew from Chattanooga. In a series of gen

established between Dalton and Marietta, Bra

Department had nearly 7,500 available hospital beds. 

During the Battle of Chickamauga, seven Fe

hospitals gathered around Crawfish Spring, two mile

battlefield, and one was established around the Cloud 

of the battlefield. Two division hospitals were formed i

battle lines in Dyer Field and near Snodgrass Hill unti

forced them to displace rearward. On 20 September, 

battle line collapsed, the hospitals at Crawfish Spring 

evacuated to Chattanooga but were forced to leav

seriously wounded and 52 surgeons to be captured by th

The Confederates used a mix of consolidated divisio

hospitals, which were set up generally along Chickam

most of the battle. 

The greatest challenge for medical staffs occurred 

The Confederates, already short of doctors and with 

stockage levels barely adequate for their own needs, h

numbers of wounded Federal troops in addit,ion to their 

Federal wounded captured at hospitals and the thous

wounded on the battlefield-added to the almost 15,

battle injuries-initially overwhelmed the Confedera

took the Confederates almost two weeks to finish 

battlefield, and many soldiers lay for six to ten days 

any medical attention. On 30 September, the Confeder

1,740 of the most seriously wounded Federals to Chatt

flag of truce. The Federal challenge after the battle 

because of the smaller numbers of wounded under th

over 4,000 Federal casualties initially made their way 

to Chattanooga, where the surgeons made every eff
them to the safer hospitals across the river. By 2

af these wounded remained in medical facilities 

Federal and Confederate casualties, see table 7.) 
again would that Southern army seriously threate

territory. Also in July, John C. Pemberton’s Army 

surrendered 30,000 men at Vicksburg. Thus, in mid-

Tennessee was the only theater in which the Confede

suffered a major reversal. The last Confederate 

signi&ance, General Braxton Bragg% Army of Tenne

middle Tennessee and Chattanooga against Major Gene

Rosecrans’ Army of the Cumberland. They faced ea

Murfreesboro, where they had fought a great battle at th

Although western Tennessee had fallen to the U

1862, much of middle and eastern Tennessee rem

Confederate control in the summer of 1863. The area wa

both sides for many reasons. President Abraham 

particularly interested in liberating eastern Tennesse

many loyal Unionists lived there. The most direct ra

between Virginia and the western part of the Confedera

through Knoxville. In the apportionment of commissa

Confederate armies in the east depended on this retion f

Middle and eastern Tennessee contributed essential po

the Confederate commissary, as well as copper and 

percussion caps and gunpowder. 

Chattanooga was an important military objective 

because of its position as a gateway through the 

Mountains into the South’s heartland. A city of approx

people, it was a central rail junction The Memphis a

Railroad ran west to the Mississippi River. The N

Chattanooga Railroad entered Chattanooga from midd

The Western and Atlantic Railroad ran to the sou

Atlanta. To the northeast ran the East Tennessee 

Knoxville, Bristol, and Lynchburg, Virginia, with c

Richmond. Furthermore, the South had valuable 

quartermaster, and ordnance depots in Chattanooga. 

Confederate hospitals were located in and near the 

connection througb Atlanta linked Chattanooga with 

iron production centers in Georgia and Alabama. Mo

41 
defilesHoover%, Liberty, Bellbuckle, and Guy

gaps ran several roads as well as the railroad 

Chattanooga. Behind the hills about forty 

Murfreesboro lay the Duck River, a deep, na

fords. Beyond the Buck, the country was roug

hills rising to a high, rolling plateau called t

topsoil of that desolate area barely covered 

temporarily held rain, creating massive qua

Fifteen mifes beyond the Duck River, another 

flowed westward out of the barrens. In turn, t

the range of mountains known as the Cum

Tullahoma campaign, a preliminary phase 

campaign, would occur in the area between 

Cumberland Plateau. 

East of the high plateaus and gorges 

Mountains, and generally parallel to them, la

River. Rising in east Tennessee and flowing ge

it entered northeast Alabama, the Tennes

mountains west of Chattanooga in a canyon 

South of the river, the land rose sharply to 

Mountains, then dropped almost as sharply int

Creek before rising again to Lookout Mounta

ridges that slant southwest across the Tenne

border. The northern end of Lookout Mountai

three significant roads in 1863. The main road 

followed the Tennessee River valley along a 

northern promontory of the mountain where 

Moccasin Bend. The next crossing was fourte

Chattanooga at Stevens Gap. Last was a rough 

more than twenty miles farther south at Wins

Beyond Lookaut Mountain lay Missionary 

Chattanooga’s eastern flank. East of Missio

branehes of Chiekamauga Creek watered a se

gently rolling hills. After a three-week camp

banks of the Tennessee River and traversing 

the two armies found themselves confronting 

sides of West Chickamauga Creek. 
flow resulted in a staIemate in middle Tennessee, follo

of Stones River in January 1863. After that bloody 

withdrew to the Duck River and assumed the defens

corps at SheIbyville and another at Wartrace, both in 

His cavalry screened both flanks, and infantry cant

mountain gaps to his north through which he expe

Army to advance. Rosecrans occupied Murfreesboro 

content to remain there in spite of repeated urging 

administration to move forward. 

Both Rosecrans and Bragg thought their pos

Rosecrans had about 80,000 men to Bragg% 50,000, bu

percent of the Union Army had to guard supply 

Confederate raids. Rosecrans’ cavalry force was weak, 

argument repeatedly in delaying his advance. Bragg’

problems were that Vicksburg had priority in the wes

Lee’s army in the east drew much of its subsistence fro

which Bragg% army operated. Bragg had to detach 

army to aid Vicksburg, and this eliminated, at least 

’ idea that he should take the offensive against Rosecra

for Bragg, Rosecrams declined to advance. Soon, events 

west concluded with Confederate defeats at Gettysburg 

Both sides shifted their focus to middle Tennessee. 

Under severe pressure from Washington, Rasecra

forward on 24 June 1863. He used his cavalry and 

carps as a diversion toward Shelbyville, then moved 

body to turn the Confederate right flank between 

Manchester. Despite a pouring rain, bottomless roads

fights for the gaps through rough country south o

Rosecrans successfully autflanked the Confederate

withdrew to Tullahoma after less than a week of mane

next sought to cross the Elk River and seize control o

line. Again, Bragg narrowly escaped the trap and withd

to Chattanooga, which he occupied on 4 July. In nine 

maneuvering, Raseerans forced Bragg out of Tennesse

than 600 casualties. This brilliant and relatively blood

known as the Tullahoma campaign. 
Rosecrans advance. In response, on 16 August, 

preparation and rest, Roseerans sent the Army of 

the Cumberland Mountains toward the Tenness

front. En less than a week, his army closed to the 

forces near Stevenson and Bridgeport, Alabama

Tennessee. The next forward movement would 

across the Tennessee River, where Bragg’s vetera

When Rosecrans pushed the Army of the C

wide Tennessee River in early September 1863, 

to capture Chattanooga, Tennessee. Delaying h

the end of the summer when the corn ripened a

Nashville was repaired, in late August, he m

deception operation to mislead the Confederate 

brigades demonstrated opposite Chattanooga an

of the Army of the Cumberland quietly gathered 

far below the city shielded by Sand and Lookou

who had kept his infantry force concentrated ne

badly served by Major General Joseph Wheeler’s 

screened the river line below Chattanooga. Con

and refitting after the arduous Tullahoma campa

men were mainly located far back from the rive

any of the crossings. NOF did they provide 

information of Federal activity. Blinded by a b

would have to cross the Tennessee River north of 

to support Major General Ambrose E. Burns

Tennessee, Bragg and his principal subordinates 

the Federal crossings from a civilian. 

In early September, Rosecrans divided h

segments and began a wide-front advance that 

Bragg’s army out of Chattanooga without a 

General Thomas L. Crittenden’s XXI Corps adv

Chattanooga along the railroad that passed throu

Mountain. Major General George II. Thomas’ XIV 

and Lookout Mountains and entered McLemore

LaFayette, Georgia. Major General Alexander N

followed Major General David S. Stanley’s Caval
September. Rather than retreat beyond the mounta

railroad to his base at Atlanta, however, Bragg elec

army concentrated near LaFayette, Georgia. There, shi

Mountain, a spur of Lookout, the Army of Tennessee 

arrival of reinforcements and seize any opportunity 

scattered elements of the Army of the Cumberland in d

Major General Simon B. Buckner’s forces from east Te

felt confident enough to strike the leading division o

Corps with overwhelming force in NcLemore’s Cove. Un

Bragg, the leader of the expedition, Major Gener

Hindman, took counsel of his fears and dallied for tw

making a serious attack. Failing in McLemore’s Cov

turned northward to destroy a portion of Crittenden’s 

Lee and Gordon’s Mill on West Chiekamauga Creek. T

entrusted to Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk, who 

to engage the Federals as Bragg proposed. Frustra

failures, Bragg paused at LaFayette for several days w

additional troops from Mississippi and Virginia to appe

On discovering that Bragg’s army was not in 

Atlanta and recognizing the dangerous position his 

Rosecrans hastily began to concentrate his scattered 

them northward to cover Chattanooga. Because of the 

the rough terrain, McCook”s XX Corps was the slo

Delayed by faulty information, inadequate reconnaiss

sheer difficulty of moving thousands of men and anim

foot mountains, McCook did not join Thomas’ 

McLemore’s Cove until 17 September. Together, the 

continued northward toward Crittenden’s position a

Gordon’s Mill. Their route generally followed the wes

Chickamauga Creek, with Missionary Ridge on their le

Bragg would attempt to cut him off from Chattanoo

ordered Thomas on 18 September to make a night m

beyond Crittenden’s position at the mill. 

His spirits raised by the continued arrival of r

Bragg devised a new battle plan. Believing that Cr

Corps was the northernmost unit of Rosecrans’ army, 
of the Federal Army and driving the enti

McLemore’s Cove and away from Chattanooga

forces seized the crossings, Polk’s Corps and Hill

Federals along Chickamauga Creek. 

By the evening of 18 September, Bushrod 

Major General John R. Hood and leading ele

General James Longstreet’s Corps from Virginia

Bridge and had advanced southward into the fo

Road. Walker and Buckner had also gaine

Chickamauga Creek, although Walker’s men 

casualties for Alexander% Bridge. They, too, biv

in the woods north of what’ they believed to be 

Because they had not gained the main north-so

LaFayette and Rossville, however, they were un

Corps as it marched northward through the nigh

on LaFayette Road at the Kelly farm. The only 

when a brigade of Major General Gordon Gra

attempting to regain Reed’s Bridge, bumpe

elements of Johnson’s Confederates at a road jun

Believing that they had destroyed Reed’s 

single Confederate brigade west of the creek, @

early on the morning of 19 September. On t

informed Thomas, who resolved to destroy the 

Thomas sent Brigadier General John M. Brann

into the forest toward Reed’s Bridge. Near Jay’

met one of Brigadier General Nathan B. Forr

covering the Confederate army’s right rear, and 

For the remainder of the day, both Rosecrans an

more than feed reinforcements northward to ext

attempt to stabilize the situation. Their efforts 

terrain, which consisted primarily of a thic

occasionally by a few small fields. Neither com

fight a battle in the thickets between Chick

LaFayette Road; Bragg had hoped to fight in th

the south, while Rosecrans had hoped to rea
pp

and Crittenden to assist Thomas. As the’day progresse

Buckner’s Corps joined Polk and extended the Co

southward. Pressing forward with great spirit, B

shattered one of Crittenden’s divisions, gained LaFay

threatened to split the Federal army in the vicinity of 

farm. Federal reinfarcements from both north and 

penetration finally forced the Confederates to relinquis

withdraw eastward into the forest, Hood’s Corps then m

threat to the vital road in the vicinity of the Viniard 

finally fought to a bloody standstill by elements of a

corps When darkness closed the fighting, the Fede

LaFayette Road, but Thomas’ men had been pressed b

defensive position around Kelly Field. 

During the night, the Army of the Cumberland 

coordinated defense on the following day. Thomas st

position on the army’s left with log breastworks, &C

slightly to refuse the army’s right flank, and Crittend

reserve position behind the army% center. Within th

lines, Bragg brought forward several divisions that 

engaged and devised an offensive plan. This plan 

coordinated attack, beg&&g on the Confederate rig

southward, that would again attempt to flank the Fe

drive it southward away from Chattanooga. Longs

during the night permitted Bragg to reorganize his five 

into two wings, with Longstreet commanding the Le

divisions and Polk the Right Wing of five division

General Daniel H. Hill’s Corps, now under Polk’s Righ

begin the attack at sunrise. Unfortunately, a combinati

work and the lack of initiative by senior commanders 

from learning of his critical mission until the day was w

When the Confederate attack finally began-four 

of Hill’s divisions actually got around Thomas’ flank 

severa hundred yards into the Federal rear before bein

timely arrival of Federal reinforcements. The 

unsupported, because Hill had used Walker’s Corps 
forward and was joined by the remainder 

Fortuitously, Hood’s column struck a segment 

was momentarily devoid of troops and crashed 

The apening in the Federal line was the 

series of events and misperceptions that 

morning. Even before the action began on the 

been calling for reinforcements, and he conti 

the Confederate attacks. Both Rosecrans and 

from the army’s center and right toward the 

movements, Rosecrans came to believe that 

Federal right-center, and he responded by ord

Thomas J. Wood’s division, already in line, to 

gap. Again, because of a combination of circ

actually no gap in the Federal line until Wood’

MeCook agreed to fill Wood’s space, but Hood’

before Wood could act, and the Federal line was 

As Longstreet’s troops burst into Dyer 

both sides of the break failed to reestablis

Roseerans, McCook, and Crittenden, along w

Federal divisions, were all swept from the 

commanders finished the day in Chattanooga

brigades and fragments of several others rallied 

on high ground known as Horseshoe Ridg

Separated from the remainder of the Federa

holding the Kelly Field enclave, the units on 

to make a last stand. Just as they were abo

Bushrod Johnson’s Confederates, they were 

General James B. Steedman’s division of Ch

Although Confederate units continued to 

defenders throughout the remainder of 

unable to drive the Federals from the ridge. 

sundown, Thomas received a message from Ro

surviving Federal units to Rossville. Mueh 

conducted cleanly, although the last units to le

heavily and several regiments were left beh

Nevertheless, Thomas successfully gathered 
heavily at Chiekamauga. Rosecrans had lost 16,170 k

and missing out of about 62,000 engaged, while Bragg 

total of 18,454 casualties out of approximately 67,000 

losses meant that neither army could do much until t

men and materiel had been replenished. While Bra

remainder of Longstreet% command en route from V

exchanged prisoners from the Vicksburg campaign, t

Cumberland received far more massive reinforcements 

Army of the Potomac and the Army of the Tennessee

reinforcements would ultimately join the Army of the 

sweeping Bragg’s army from Tennessee. 

Because his victory at Ghickamauga was not e

meaningful way, Bragg’s triumph was short-lived. 

Confederate victory in the western theater, the battle s

buy a little more time for the Southern cause. Federa

Virginia and Mississippi were diverted from their prim

rescue the Army of the Cumberland, thereby affecting 

for Federal victory in those areas Otherwise, the grea

lives by both sides had little effect. Because they ha

while others stayed, Rosecrans, MeCook, and Crittende

military careers blighted as a result of the battle. Nor 

Bragg and Longstreet, gain much from their succ

distinguished were George Thomas (thereafter known 

Chickamauga) and the thousands of soldiers who con

respective causes in the woods bordering the”‘River 

largest battle in the western theater. 
boudaes ote Ccaauga ad Cattaooga a

Park. More than 1,000 monuments, plaques, and artille

park assist the visitor in interpreting the actions 

Virtually all of these markers are connected by a seri

permit access to all important parts of the bat

combination of markers and trails makes the battlefield 

park an excellent sit’e for studying a major Civil War 

the insights to be derived from such a study remain rele

of any era in studying their profession Indeed, s

formally acknowledged in the enabling legislation as 

for the creation of the park in 1890. 

Because the battlefield is so vast and the interpret

numerous, military visitors may find it difficult to c

aspects of the battle in any meaningful way. Some may 

the field quickly in its totality; others may choose to c

particular unit, branch, or phase of the action. 

This section of the handbook contains a series o

and vignettes for a Staff Ride of the Battle of Chickama

the full two days. As presented, the route for each d

nearly eleven miles of walking and can require ten h

complete. Each stand contains a description of the actio

its vicinity, a vignette highlighting those events, and 

teaching points that can be used to stimulate discus

current military relevance of the historical action. Thes

be used selectively to tailor a Staff Ride to an indi

objectives and the time available. 

The ten route maps in this handbook are a

topographical map of the Chickamauga and Chattan

Military Park that is available for purchase at the Visit

most expeditious way to travel to the numbered stands 

Staff Ride route arrows on maps 2 through 5 and 7 thr

routes usually follow the nearest available trail or ro

stands, Maps 1 and 6 provide an overview of the com

&owing the position of the various maps in relation to 

underbrush and gently rolling terrain make it easy to 

stand or monument while walking cross-country. If a 

57 
, p

and the entrances to some unimproved roads a

Visitors need to pay particular attention to find

arounds and parking only in authorized areas, 

the roads 
Map 1. Sites of maps 2 through 5 in relation to the Chickamaug

Chattanooga National Mibtary Park for day 1 
different from that of today. First, the area was 

primary or old-growth forest with large number

Second, the inhabitants required large quantities 

fences, and fuel, and they had consumed large quan

and brush. Third, stock ran freely in the forest, 

the understory. As a result, in 1863, visibility 

frequently 150 to 200 yards, although patches of 

this range in certain areas. Today, succeeding gro

forest far different from that of September 1863, w

visibility. 

Teachiftg Points: Tactical doctrine and formations 

cover. 

Situ.cztion 2: Minty”s final delay position, 18 Sep

Colonel Robert H. G. Minty’s cavalry brigade initia

forward (east) of Reed’s Bridge along the ridgelin

Vine Creek. Fighting dismounted, Minty’s me

General Bushrod R. Johnson’s four brigades into l

short time, the weight of the Confederate attack 

back, and his orderly delay became a footrace fo

Reed’s Bridge. &Iinty formed his new line just e

while his cavalrymen attempted to destroy the br

Johnson’s t,roops forced Minty to abandon the ef

bridge, and the Confederates crossed it between 15

been delayed since 1200. Minty withdrew his fo

Jay’s Mill and then down Brotherton Road to LaFa

reached a position near Viniard Field, There, he jo

Wilder’s forces in forming a blocking position ad

Road. 

Teaching Points: Covering foree operations, delay, 

site. 

Sifuation J: After crossing the West Chickamauga 

site downstream and at Reed’s Bridge, which 

Johnson’s force reached this road junction, then tu

iMill Road. By nightfall, most Confederates 

intersection, except for some rear-echelon troops 
Battery I-c. 

5th U.S. Artillerv mnn,,mpn+ 

Starkweather’s 

brigade 

plaque 

b 

74th Indian 

B3d Ohi;, 

ttery A, 1st Michigander 

Light Artillery 

Willich’s Brigade plaque 

monument nd Semple’s Ba

LJohn Ingraham’s grave 

Scogin’s Battery plaque 

Maney’s Brigade plaque 

Map 2. Day 1, stands 1 thrwgh 16 
the night, supported by Colonel John 6. Mitche

Reserve Corps. Meanwhile, Federal pickets adv

Around 0300, 19 September, M&oak sent the a

Infantry Regiment forward to destroy Reed’s Bridge

fire to the bridge but failed to destroy it before retu

line. Back at the line, the regiment found McCoo

preparing to retreat, Leaving the area, McCook r

isolated M&air’s Brigade west of the Chickamau

events in motion that triggered the battle. 

Vignette: “Eli Shields was in the lead when we ran 

and had the nerve to sing out in a clear voice, 

thoughtful Johnny replied, “Keep your dam [sic

pulled Shields off and pushed him back into th

immediate sight and hearing of the enemy, then c

and picked up one after another, and placed them 

until we had taken twenty-two prisoners. Among 

several belonging to a band, and their instrument

them. There was also a rebel major, whose horse, 

gave to Colonel h&Cook.‘” (Henry J. Aten, Nistory 

Regiment Illinois Vhnteer Infantry, Hiawatha, K

Teaching Poink: Effect of false assumptions, 

significant events. 

Stand 2 

Jay’s Mill 

@&v-section of Jay’s Mill Road and Brotherton 

S&&ion: 18 September 1863, p.m. Late in the 

Johnson’s Division reached this road junction. Joh

turn onto Brotherton Road, but Major General Jo

point, took command of the column and directed 

Jay’s Mill Road toward Alexander’s Bridge. 

Confederate cavalry arrived from the south to scr

rear and established a picket line not far south of J

19 September 1863, a.m. Before sunrise, a 

Georgia Cavalry approached the mill and found 
General Nathan B. Forrest and Brigadier General 

arrived and ordered elements of Davidson’s Brigade ta 

These units encountered Colonel John T. Croxton’s 

and fled in panic back to the mill. Momentarily, the ent

brigade was thrown into confusion, but finally, Forres

Davidson rallied the brigade and formed it into line. 

for reinfarcements. For the next hour, Davidson’s Br

lead brigzrde (Croxton’s) of Brannan% 3d Division, XIV 

Vignette: “Before the bugle could sound the mount, hal

was in the saddle-we had dismounted in column-and 

need to form . . I the notes of the bugle had not died a

the order Face Right! Head of column to left! Forward! 

we went for the crest of the hill. The 6th had just ab

form of an inverted L when the demoralized and 

troopers came down upon us aver the crest with a rush 

to swamp us in the wildest confusion. . . . Wild eyed, ha

withaut guns many of them wounded and bleeding, tw

riderless horses by the score, some frenzied by wounds 

on three legs leaping painfully, men yelling at the to

“Git boys! The woods are full of Yankees.“” (J. W. M

Boynton, 8 December 1900, Unit Files, Chick

Chattanooga National Military Park, Fort Oglethorpe, 

Teaching Points: Meeting engagement, reconnaissance

Stand 3 

Croxtan’s Brigade 

(74th lndiamt monument bee map21~ 

Situation: 19 September 1863, a.m. Brigadier Ge

Brannan’s division had marched through the night 

morning was stretched out along LaFayette Road in 

Kelly Field. In the meantime, Major General George 

received word from McCook about the Confederate brig

the west side of Chickamauga Creek. In response, T

Brannan to deploy his brigades in line of battle and to 

Reeds Bridge to locate and destroy this “lone” brigad
about one mile, the Federal skirmishers m

advance elements of Davidson’s Brigade, and t

woods west of Jay’s Mill. Although neither com

fight in the woods bordering Chickamauga Cre

additional units into the fight as they arrived. 

Vignette: “At sunrise we halted by the road long 

of coffee. On we went again and by 9 a.m. our s

the enemy-Soon the 2nd Brigade were [sic] 

halted in the edge of a wood, very soon our ski

the run and a troop of RebeI Cavalry came rus

on to our skirmishers-steady boys, wait for th

our Cal--on came the cavalry, the advance had 

seeing us. One tremendous volley rang along th

was smoke, then dust from struggling steeds, 

were running here and there, save which not

cavalry troop. Thus began the battle of Chieka

cavalry charges and seen them in print but this 

the kind I had witnessed and truly it was a 

Kellenberger, Corporal, Company I, 10th India

to a friend, 15 November 1863, Unit Files

Chattanooga National Military Park, Fort Ogle

Teaching Points: Meeting engagement, comman

Stand 4 

King’s Brigade 

(Battery R, 5th U.S. Artillery monume

Situ&ion 1: 19 September 1863, a.m. When Forr

for Davidson’s troops, he met General Brax

General William H. T. Walker, the Reserve Co

vicinity of Alexander’s Bridge. In response to 

support, Walker directed CoIonel Claudius C

brigade northward. Beginning his advance at a

into action on Davidson% left, flanking Croxton

to this new threat, Croxton faced south with s
brigade on the left, Colonel Benjamin F. Scribner’s 

right, and Brigadier General John C. Starkweather

support, Seribner came up on Croxton’s right, wh

Croxton to withdraw and resupply. King’s brigade

Regular units, entered the position vacated by Crox

southeast, the direction in which Wilson had retire

Confederates on his right flank, King began to orie

toward the new threat but was hit by Brigadier Gene

Liddell’s Confederate division. Caught in a vulnerabl

brigade broke and could not be rallied u&I it pass

Derveer’s position on Reed% Bridge Road. 

Vignette: “I pushed everything to the front, my first 

enemy before them for a mile, and meeting General A

commander, at about 10 a.m., was ordered to make a ne

angles with the other. I only had time, however to ge

Infantry and battery in position before being a

overwhelming force. At this time the troops on my rig

ground to the enemy in confusion. I immediately gav

battery to limber up but it could not be done as the hors

brought up to the guns were shot down. 

“The officers and men, finding it impossible to r

with their pieces (firing) until they were forcibly take

the enemy. It was at this time that I lost the First Batt

Infantry (made prisoners), with the exception of 5 

officers and 62 rnenm /Brigadier General John H. King

the RebeZZion: A Compilation of the CQWaZ Records o

Confederate Armies [Washington, DC: U.S. Govern

Gffice, 1699; reprint, Wilmington, NC: Braadfoot P

19851, vol. 36, pt. 1,309. Hereafter referred to as 0.R.) 

Tea.clcZng Points: Nature of nonlinear battlefield, infle

unit cohesion, discipline, rallying a broken unit, r

battle. 

Situation 2: 19 September 1663, a.m. First Lieutena

Burnham’s Battery H, 5th U.S. Artillery (four 12poun

and two Xl-pounder Parrotts) supported Kings brigade
Teaching Points: Difficulties of artillery opera

limited fields of fire, infantry support of t

importance of battle drills. 

Situation 3: 19 September 1863, a.m. On Re

Derveer’s brigade had repulsed both Confede

an attack by Brigadier General Matthew 

Walker’s Reserve Corps by the time King’s ro

out’ of the woods. Chasing King’s Regulars were 

who had already overrun another of Baird’s br

The pursuing Confederates were stopped 

appearance of Van Derveer’s men in their fron

by the approach of Croxton’s brigade on thei

Liddell’s Division withdrew eastward across Br

Vignette: “Then the firing broke out again . . .

of skirmishers--then the terrific file firing 

artillery, then the ‘rebel yell,’ and the firing g

We stood attentive and expectant for a few mi

line of men in blue appeared coming toward 

speed accelerated by the firing and yell

Confederates who were close behind them. I do 

appalling spectacle than this was for a few mi

it with grim composure, lying down until the 

passed over our line, then rising and blazing a 

faces, which abruptly ended the yelling and th

expected such a reception, and all efforts of the

their men in line for a fight, were in vain The

their turn until out of range and out of sigh

Confederate Brigade of Liddell’s Division.‘” (L

Bishop, ‘2d Minnesota Infantry, ““Van 

Chickamauga,‘” Glimpses of &e PJatiort’s Stru

Aug. Davis, Publisher, 190916:7--8.1 

Teaching Points: Command and control, disc

units. 
brigade. Before he could change directions, Starkweathe

Croxton’s withdrawing troops. Next, Starkweather f

toward the sounds of the fighting. As he attempted to r

by tucking them back, his front and right were stru

Daniel 6. Govan’s Brigade of Liddell’s Division. Disorie

and struck from an unexpected direction, Starkw

collapsed and raced to the rear. The brigade eventually 

quarters of a mile north of this position. Late in 

Starkweather’s and Scribner’s brigades moved back in

support of Brigadier General Richard W. Johnson’s divis

Vignette: ‘We had marched thus but a short distance 

the slope of a hill when we were suddenly opened on b

enemy’s infantry lying concealed below its crest. ‘. . . 

and confusion on the right of the regimen&it wavers

Our left companies now break and follow the right in 

Twenty-fourth Illinois and Twenty-first Wisconsin 

kneeling to the rear of us. We pass over them and t

companies in their rear. But the companies have melt

stricken mob, and even brave men, seeing the whole 

quicking to the rear, have but poor encouragement 

handed, the storm of lead that is hurtling after them. 

in rear of the Twenty-fourth Illinois, and do all I ca

retreating fugitives-but it is only for a. moment. The 

attack the second line in overwhelming numbers, and 

fourth and Twenty-fmt, after a very few volleys, wav

The fight is ended, so far as our brigade is concerned. W

and move rapidly to the rear, disorganized and de

enemy, however, cannot follow us. Heavy firing on bo

evidence that they still have their hands full. Our pace 

near the colors, and try to gather the stragglers aroun

heart’s in my mouth. I feel more like crying than any

‘Old Brigade’ that we have all been boasting about is 

we, who never ran before, are completely broken up-not 

a company left.” (Lieutenant John M. Johnston, 79th 

Infantry, The New Era, Lancaster, PA, 16 September 1

Teaching Points: Unit panic, rallying broken units. 
to withdraw, relieving pressure on Croxton. Se

advance until he reached Winfrey Field, where h

Scribner had assumed that there were friendly fo

this proved to be false when reports from his s

that Confederates were on his right Chiddell’s Div

meet this threat, Scribner bent back his two right 

Wisconsin and 33th Indiana. 

V&m&e: “About this time I was informed by my 

enemy was passing to our rig&. . . X I was immed

that my right was being turned. Dr. Miller, m

coming up, reported the enemy in my rear; that 

hands. As information like this came in I dispatc

general commanding division, and t.brew a compa

my right and rear. Scarcely had their deployme

when the enemy opened upon them a destructive 

to the right by causing the Thirty-eighth Indiana 

to the rear and to change the Tenth Wisconsin 

Thirty-eighth Indiana and limber the battery to t

two regiments, employed but a few moments; this

fire. The enemy charged down upon me along my 

in canister and shell I bad now dispatched eve

orderly with information of my position, asking fo

my intention to hold my place with desperatio

arrived; for I felt that the safety of the forces on m

holding this position. I bad observed a line of o

passing to the left. I sent to the officer fur assistan

orders.” (Colonel Benjamin F. Scribner, in O.R., v

Teaching Points: Reconnaissance, security. 

Stand 7 

Van Pelt’s Battery 

(Battery A, 1st Michigan Light Artillery monu

S&c&on: 19 September 1863, a.m. Well known in 

its reputation gained at the Rattle of Stones 

consisted of six l£er Parrotts. Naw co
six guns were lost. 

Vignette 2: August Bratnober of the supporting 10

Infantry: “Early in the morning of the 19th we were mo

again and directly behind a line of battle that was then 

bullets were whistling and shells were flying over us a

to be pushed into the fight any minute. Not a man ha

Soon our battery passed in front of us on the run and w

to follow. . . . They drew up in line and we were ordered d

of it and ordered to lie down; this was called supporting 

then had our knapsacks on and were lying down at ful

faces with heads down hill. Every body felt that this w

could not roll over to reload in that condition. Soon the 

firing; the concussion of the guns was terrific and w

bumped against the guns at every discharge. Directly o

were driven in and we saw the enemy coming out of the 

the ravine from us. Then the cannon began in earnest b

plainly that they were dring too high. On they came thr

deep, then they charged, after the front line fired the n

through them, the first line reloading as they came on

had orders to wait for the command before firing and w

fairly stunned them but we could not reload without rais

artillery horses were mostly shot early in the attack. W

and lost our battery right there. On they came firing 

manner and we lost a lot of our men . . . and when we 

what there was left, we found we had lost half of the reg

and wounded.” (August Bratnober Account, Unit Files

and Chattanooga National Military Park, Fort Oglethor

Vignette 2: Gallant defense of the guns: “Lieutenant 

command of the Battery, in dying at his guns, has give

of the war an incident that will form one of the brighte

grow to be attached to their guns, the natural result of 

discipline which inculcates that it is a great dishonor to 

Van Pelt was proud of his guns. They had grown to be 

enemy. . . . The men, too, loved the guns, and they sea

on that day with their blood. The principal among them 

With his horses killed, his men dead, and his support
Chattanooga and Missionary Ridge [Lansing, 

Printing Company, lS99l,170-71.) 

Teaching Points: Face of battle, infantry suppo

battery, leadership. 

Stand 8 

Colonel Philemon P. Baldwh 

@%&man BakcZwin sitell pyramid, WE’lzfrey F

Situation: 19 September 1863, a.m. Johnson’s 2d 

had left its bivouac site near Crawfish Spring aro

was ordered to report to Thomas. Around 1200

arrived in the Kelly Field area and was ordered t

of Baird’s division. Johnson deployed Colonel Ph

brigade on the left, Brigadier Genera1 August Wi

right, and Colonel Joseph B. Dodge’s brigade in 

division soon made contact with Major Gen

Cheatham’s Division and, after a fight of severa

Confederates back to and beyond Winfrey Field. 

moved into position at the northwest end of Winfre

repulsed an assault by Liddell’s Division befor

occurred until sunset, when Major General P

launched his division in a night attack against 

When the attack began, Baldwin was with the 

Regiment in his second line. As his first line crum

forward, then back to the 6th Indiana. Ordering a 

in the ensuing confusion. 

Vignetie: “His confidence in the old Sixth in a ca

suppose, brought him back near it, and just on it

left the moment before. But by this time the rebe

he, as I suppose, concluded that a counter charge 

meet the enemy, and immediately rode through 

on the Sixth Indiana to follow him. This, of course

the two fires, which were only a few yards apart, 

horse were killed instantly. The regiment, very s

an order which never should have been given. . . . 
criticisms of Colonel Baldwin, I do not wish to be unde

to reflect upon his character and reputation as a brave

but merely in this particular case, that under the 

judgment was at fault. Rut the mistake cost the brave 

as he died where he fell and he and his personal effe

hands of the enemy.” CC. C. Briant, History of Else 

In&no VolunCeer Inf&tiry IIndianapolis, IN: Wm. B

233--34-j 

Teadzing Polnbs: Command and control, chain of comm

of command. 

Stand 9 

Baldwin’s Brigade 

(1st Ohio monutnent.[see map 23 

Sitruation: 19 September 1863, p.m. Lieutenant C

Langdon’s 1st Ohio Infantry Regiment was the right f

Baldwin’s brigade of Johnson’s division. Because the 

front permitted the enemy to approach his positio

Langdon sent his skirmishers forward beyond the field. 

the skirmishers were pushed back by another Confe

Still concerned about his front, Langdvn sent out ano

skirmishers, but they were unable to stop the 

Confederate line and were recalled. Langdon’s 

subsequently outflanked w&n the unit on his right w

and the 1st Ohio had to withdraw hastily. 

Vignette: “About sunset my skirmishers were pre

serious loss to within a few yards of the regiment, w

exposed to so hot a fire from the enemy that I recalled 

the enemy into the open field, . . . Finding the enemy 

enter the open, and the firing having increased on 

Company A again into the field as skirmishers to prev

getting too close to my front u,nobserved, the nature 

being such as to raise an apprehension of that characte

was in the act of deploying when it found itself expos

fire on its right flank, and immediately took position 
irregular file fve ran along my front from right 

to the enemy in my front. Meantime, I strove 

heard to stop the firing and to calI the regimen

seconds the regiment on my right was broken 

in great confusion, and while I was striking m

down) with the flat of my sword to get their ,a

was seen within 46 yards of my right flank 

perpendicularly to it. 1 was barely able to get 

time to see the rebel colors flaunted almost in 

guns being mostly unloaded I directed them 

Colonel Bassett Langdon, in Q.R., vol. 30, pt. 1,

Teceching Points: Command and control, cohe

pressure. 

Stand PO 

Cleburne’s Night Attack 

(Catvert’s and Sempte’s Batteries ptaqu

Sittcation I: Wood’s Brigade, 19 September 1

afternoon, Cleburne’s Division of Lieutenant G

Corps was brought from south of the battle

Confederate right. By 1806, Cleburne”s three 

behind Cheatham’s and Liddell’s Divisions. Gl

almost a mile with Brigadier General Lucius E

right, Brigadier General S. A. M. Wood’s Brig

Brigadier General James Deshler’s Brigad

conferring with Bragg, Hill ordered Clebur

Cheatham% and Liddell’s positions. On the 

opposition and passed beyond Baldwin’s flank. 

advanced out of the woods into Winfrey Field, 

while the left made contact with Willieh’s 

regiments neared the Federal front’, the attack 

became fragmented. In the darkness, the fi

confusion. 

Vignetie: “About this time Major McGaughy 

‘march in retreat,’ which was obeyed in ba

retreating in confusion. a , . I then asked Major 
halt, but led them in the retreat, I attribute the co

retreat to a want af the ptsper command over their me

the officers of Companies E and G, to the darkness of th

failure af the left wing ta hear the command %etreat,’ 

that the right wing was being driven back, and TV the 

previous to receiving the order to retreat our line was fir

times from the rear.” (Captain Fr e d eriek A. Ashford, 

Infantry Regiment, Wood’s Brigade, in OR., val. 30, pt. 

Teaching Points: Command and control in a night attack

Slfuatioa 2: Shortly after Wood% assault was stalled, C

of artillery, Majar T. R. Hotchkiss, brought forw

Arkansas and Semple’s Alabama Batteries. In daylight, 

would have been suicidal, but in the darkness, the e

relatively safe and put on a spectacular but relatively in

Nevertheless, the artillerymen claimed that their 

decisive. 

V&r&e: “General W&s brigade had fallen back unde

from the enemy’s guns, when I moved up at a trot and le

war into the Yankee ranks, and in a brief per&l the 

confusion. Night closed the bloody scene, and we slu

victorious field,” (First Lieutenant Thomas J, Key

Calve&s Arkansas Battery, in OR., vol. 30, pt. 2,186.) 

TeacEting Points: Face of battle, combined arms. 

Stand 11 

WilGh’s Brigade 

(wil&h’s &&ad@ plaque, picnic area [see ma

Siftccrtlon: 19 September 1663, p.m. By midafternoo

brigade, in the center of Johnson’s division, had reac

That nigh& when Cleburne’s Division attacked, Willich

sti1.i in place, although it was under orders to withdraw
infantry streamed at once into our front and bo

regiments were swept back to the second line. 

came into disarder. Then they received the co

colors’; repeated by many men and officers; a

regiments formed one solid line, sending d

masses, who immediately fell back from the f

answer with a single round. 

“‘On my left, the Third Brigade had also 

right, the Second Brigade appears to have lo

once, a line of rebels poured from the right a

right flank. One regiment only, the Thirty-secon

and the enemy soon disappeared. Then I fell s

and coming to the general line of battle, I found 

designated the pIace for the brigade to bivoua

August Willich, in O.R., vol. 30, pt. 1,539.) 

Teaching Points: Command and control at n

night. 

Stand 12 

Battle Casualties 

(John Ingraham’s grave [see m

Situation II 19 September 1863. Cheatham’s D

divisions of Johnson and Major General Jo

ground and held its position for more th

withdrawing. In Brigadier General John K. 

Cheatham’s right, were many local men. On

Ingraham, was killed, and his friends later bu

Ingraham’s grave is the only ane marked on t

his sacrifice represents all of the 34,624 cas

Chickamauga. Of that number, 24,430 were w

the medical facilities of either side could 

Confederates held the field at the end of 

responsible far most of the wounded of both 

medical training and treatment was marginal, 
avoided. They informed me that from what they had he

the other brigade hospitals, the men were in a much wo

theirs. I . . As we rode out of the yard I tried to look neith

or left, for I knew there were many pairs of eyes looki

from the sheds and tents. I could do nothing for them, a

the case I try to steel my heart against their sorrow

cooking in the rain; it seemed like hard work keeping 

As we rode out the tents of the different field hospitals 

when we thought of the inmates and their sufferings, it 

add to the gloom.” (Kate Cumming, civilian nurse, 

1863, in Kate: The Journal of Q Canfederate Nurse 

Lauisiana State University Press, 19591,152-53.1 

Situation 2: A total of 3,969 men were killed at Chickam

a graves registration organization, the Confederates c

combat troops to care for the dead. Nevertheless, so

received special treatment. 

Vignette: “‘It was about 10 o’clock when in line of b

ordered to charge. Brother Rufus repeated his request 

with them in the charge. He was in command of ou

stopped but the regiment moved forward at double quick

battle, Private Douglas Cater eventually found his b

dead, robbed, and shot in the head. He cradled the bo

throughout the night. The next day,] when the regimen

move forward a detail of men was left to go to the wa

and picks to bury our dead. Dr. Gus Hendrick, a 

company, obtained a spade and pick and he and I dug 

for his brother and one for mine. It took a long time 

work to get these graves ready. We wrapped blanke

bodies of our brothers and placed them in these crude 

were no caskets, no flowers, but there were loving han

the earth on these blanket enshrouded forms and cut 

the rough boards which marked the place where th

(Douglas John Cater, Company I, 19th Louisiana Infan

Adams’ Brigade, in William D. Cater, “As It Was,” the S

John Cater’s Life, 1981,173-76. 
, p

weapon in 1863. As such, it is representative o

weapons used by both armies at Chickamauga. 

respective Iogistics pipelines, Major General W

General Braxton Bragg faced the challenge of 

modern weapons into a winning combined arm

unknown to other centuries. 

Teaching Points: Force modernization. 

Stand 14 

Maney’s Brigade 

Waney’s Brigade plaque [see 

Situation: 19 September 1863, p.m. Around 1

George LManey’s Brigade advanced to this 

Jacksons Brigade. Maney’s Brigade, in turn, w

on its flanks and held its position for only 

matter how serious the situation, however, the 

something humorous to distract them from the 

Vignette: “[Our] brave chaplain rode along wit

string-haltered horse, as we advanced to the 

exhorting the boys to be brave, to aim low, and 

they were wild beasts. He was eloquent and pa

he only had a gun he Eao would go along as a p

hear his voice echo and re-echo over the hills. 

patriotism to a pitch of genuine bravery and 

seen exhibited, when fliffr flwfft fluff, fluff, FLU

BOQM and a shettell screams through the air. T

listen, like an old sow when she hears the win

boys, that he who is killed will sup tonight in 

hollered at the top af his voice, ‘Well, parson, y

supper with us.” BOOM! whiz, a bomb burst, 

moment put spurs to his horse and was seen to 

almost every soldier yelled out, ‘The parson 

eats supper.“’ (Sam R. Watkins, “Co. Aytch”: 
(Preston Smith shellpyramid [see map21

Sitwztion: 19 September 1863, pm. Dodge’s brigade 

position on the right of Jahnson’s division when nigh

brigade was the target of Deshler’s Brigade, the left un

Division. In the darkness, Deshler’s Brigade veered 

uncovered Brigadier General Preston Smith’s Brigad

advancing in Deshler’s support, Believing himself to 

line, Smith had not covered his front with skirmishers. 

encounter was a shock to both sides. 

Vignette I (Confederate perspective): “The enem

impossible to drive us from our positian, sullenly retire

and comparative quiet prevailed alang our lines unt

General Smith, being informed a night attack was de

was ordered that so soon as General Deshler’s briga

advance to his frunt, to move his brigade forward as Ge

support. After having advanced in this order some 

engagement was commenced on the right, and extend

brigade, in our front. Advancing a short distance farthe

dark, a portion of this brigade became somewhat confus

on our line. General Smith ordered them to move forwa

was obeyed, and we continued to advance but a short 

they a second time fell back on our line and were again 

by General Smith. Instead of moving direct to the fron

to the left and uncovered the two right regiments of G

brigade. In the darkness General Smith did not know 

time coming upon troops at a halt in his immediate f

them to belong to General Deshler’s command, he and C

H. King, volunteer aide, rode to the front to ascertain 

riding up to the line (which proved to be the enemy) 

was in command of these troops, he was discovered to b

officer, and he and Captain King were both killed. I a

was in front of my regiment, accompanied by Captain D

assistant adjutant-general to General Smith, to know 

delay of what I supposed to be a portion of General Des

Riding up to a soldier, I asked him to what comman

Discovering that I was a Canfederate officer, he fired 
To the Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania Regime

the stand of colors and handed them to Captain 

Tennessee Regiment, and ordered him to turn 

captured (about 300 in number), over tv Gene

Alfred J. Vaughn Jr., 13th Tennessee Infantry 

30, pt. 2, 107-41 

Vignette 2 (Federal perspective): “<The Seventy

was on the extreme right of the division, and 

considerably in advance of the troops on its 

seemed thoroughly beaten, no immediate 

Willick [sic], however, immediately ordered C

detachment to the right to ascertain how wide 

troops and next of the line. Two companies, u

Pyfer, were dispatched, who soon returned 

mile and a quarter. General WiIlick ordered 

and said that troops would be sent to fill the g

rebel column of fresh troops attacked with g

gap was not filled, and the Seventy-sevent

Seventy-ninth Illinois, with flanks exposed, 

with an overpowering hostile force. With a coo

paralleled, the men held their ground, and wh

and the line enfiladed, there were signs of wav

the colors, and with unwonted heroism, and d

by their example, with fresh enthusiasm to m

hold the ground. The action became desperate

to distinguish friend from foe was difficult. In 

rebel general Preston Smith was shot down 

General having taken the Sergeant for one of 

in the act of striking him with his sword for 

But the odds were too great, and that little ban

yield, all the field offkers, seven line officers, 

Seventy-seventh falling into the hands of 

escaped retired during the night. . . .” (Captain 

W. Skinner, ed., Penrtsylvania at Chickama

[Harrisburg, PA: W. S. Ray, State Printer, 189
(North edge of Brock Field [see map 2/) 

Situation: 19 September 1863, p.m. Entering the 

afternoon on the right of Johnson’s division was Palme

XXI Corps. Palmer’s division advanced in echelon of 

Brigadier General WilIiam B. Hazen’s brigade leading. 

the edge of the woods west of the field, first against S

then against Brigadier General Gtho F. Strahl’s. 

ammunition, Hazen’s brigade was relieved around 15

General John B. Turchin’s brigade of Major Gene

Reynolds division, XIV Corps. Hazen withdrew to Poe 

ammunition trains were located. Turchin deployed 

Brigadier General Charles Cruft’s brigade of Palm

Around 1660, in response to a Confederate attack on 

Turchin and Cruft attacked south and west into the Co

blunting the attack. Around 1700, Turehin and Cruft 

position near Kelly Field. 

Vignette: “The enemy being repulsed on my front, 

General Willich advanced to the front and left, and 

General Hazen being withdrawn, my brigade was isola

troops. I decided to take to the right, and formed in two 

of General Cruft’s brigade, of Palmer’s division. 

“Shortly afterward, at about 4:30 p.m., the enemy 

columns on our front; there was wavering and indecision

a charge. The brigade yelled, rushed forward, and d

back in confusion, taking some prisoners. The brigade o

charged with us. After consulting General Cruft, we 

back, to reform our line, on the original position. Thi

received orders from the general commanding to jo

Brigade, which I subsequently did, and that closed the 

General John B. Turchin, in Q.R., vol. 30, pt. 1,474.) 

Teaching Poi&s: Ammunition resupply, local counteratt
Division to assist the Confederates around Br

instructions on where to enter the fight, Ste

Cheatham’s Ieft and formed his division in colu

1400, Brigadier General Henry D. Clayton’

leading unit, engaged elements of Brigadier 

Cleve’s and Palmer’s divisions, which had fo

Marcus J. Wright’s Brigade of Cheatham’s 

When Clayton’s green troops exhausted their 

replaced them with Brigadier General Joh

Clayton’s Brigade then withdrew to resupply. I

was replaced by Brigadier General William 

1630, by rotating his brigades into the figh

Cleve’s units from their position on the hig

Brotherton cabin. Clayton’s Brigade then re

penetrated to Dyer Field. Unfortunately, 

unsupported, and his units west of LaFayette 

forced back by the approach of Brannan’s and 

Negley’s divisions. Stewart had achieved a l

without support, his tactical success could not b

Vignette: ‘“About 11 o’clock we moved by the 

yards in rear of Johnson’s division, and soo

farther, halting immediately in rear of the left 

which was then hotly engaged. His left briga

overpowered and repulsed, was relieved by Brig

immediately in my front. I followed this mov

near to Clayton’s line that many of my comma

few killed before I could return the fire. The 

little under the combined fire of the enemy’s a

until General Clayton reported his ammunition 

“At about 2 p.m., in obedience to orders 

the major-general commanding, I reheved hi

enemy in an unbroken forest, rendered the mo

the dense undergrowth which for more than 2

my entire line; and the difficulties were still 

smoke of battle and the burning of the woods

to distinguish objects 20 paces in advan
Carnes’ Tennessee 

Map 3. Day 1, stands 17 though 20 
my line steadily advanced without faltering a

enemy had been driven beyond the tangled unde

line completely routed. A stubborn resistance 

supported by artillery posted upon a slight acc

pouring showers of canister upon us for a few 

progress; but again we advanced, driving back 

and beyond the summit of the ridge, until my righ

center and left had passed the crest. Unfortunat

moment when the rout of the second line was 

complete as the disaster to the first a few minute

the enemy appeared on my right flank, and ha

compelling the Eighteenth and Forty-fifth Ten

retire rapidly and in some confusion under a 

This necessitated the withdrawal of the center a

support upon my right for a mile, and none in my 

yards, and which was then not in motion.” (Briga

Brown, in OR., vol. 30, pt. 2,370-71.1 

Teaching Points: Leadership, initiative, trainin

formations, synchronization, depth. 

Stand 18 

Carries’ Tennessee Battery 

(Cat-n& Tennessee Battery pla

woods soufh of Brotherton Road [se

Situation: 19 September 1863, p.m. Captain 

Battery, consisting of two g-pounder smoothbore

howitzers, supported Wright’s Brigade of C

Around 1330, the battery went into action on t

firing canister because of the nearness of the en

no infantry support on its left, the direction 

reinforcements approached the battlefield. So

action, the battery was attacked on its left an

division. After many of the men and most of the 

remaining gunners withdrew hastily on foot. The 

guns back to the road, where they were rec

advancing infantry. From a complement of sev
, py p, p

Federals with canister. In the heavy fighting which 

followed, many of the men and horses were soon killed o

Carnes, seeing the impossibility of saving his guns ifour 

pressed back, sent his orderly to report the situation 

commander and ask for help. Receiving reply to hold 

long as possible, Capt. Carnes dismounted his officers 

and put them and the drivers of the disabled horses 

replace the cannoneers as they were shot down, and, giv

double charges of canister at close range, drove back 

front; but as he had no support on his left, the Federals 

t,he battery until it was almost surrounded. Finding i

hold out longer, Carnes sent his few surviving men to 

with his sergeant, fired his left gun a few times as rapidly 

keep back the fast closing lines, and then he and his se

to their horses, which were tied near by. The sergeant, 

was riddled with bullets from a volley that passed over 

he was in the act of mounting, wounding his horse. Ma

the now narrow opening to the rear, Capt. Carnes esca

being well mounted and a good rider. His horse was st

of times, and could barely carry his rider till he reach

coming from the rear, and fell just after he passe

advancing Confederate line.” (T. L. Massenburg, 

Carnes’s Battery at Chickamauga,” Confederate Vetera

18981:518. 

Teaching Points: Small-unit leadership, combined arms

Stand 19 

E. A. King’s Brigade 

(King’s brigade plaque, Broth-ton Field [see m

Situation: 19 September 1863, p.m. While advancin

Palmer’s division, Colonel Edward A. King’s brigade 

division was diverted to support Van Cleve’s divisi

Indiana Regiment was left in this position to support th

Indiana Batteries along this ridge overlooking LaFayett

remaining regiments went into position on the right 
Vignette: “My four mountain howitzers were w

Illinois Volunteers detached from the brigade o

Sergeant Anderson, Seventy-second Indiana 

fighting. Sergeant Anderson was wounded se

Edwards, Seventeenth Indiana Volunteers took 

work till all support left them and the enemy w

of his pieces, when he succeeded in escaping w

and the limber of the other. Either of these men 

commissions of the miserable shoulder-strapped 

the support to run away from the pieces in 

(Captain Eli Lilly, in OX., vol. 30, pt. 1,467.) 

Teaching Points: Strength of the defensive, rapid 

Stand 20 

Johnson’s (FuEton’s) Briga

(Johnson’s Brigade plaque, south edge ofBrotkrto

S&&don: 19 September 1863, p.m. Around 

Fulton’s Brigade, the right of Johnson’s Divisi

Road south of Stewart’s attack, then swung nor

flank of Van Cleve’s position on the Brotherton 

Johnson% attacks were not coordinated but, 

each other. Part of Brigadier General Thom

division, moving north in turn, now struck J

[southern) ff ank. In this movement, two regime

G. Warker’s brigade of Wood’s division came u

the vicinity of Viniard Field, fired into Fultan

back across LaFayette Road in disarray. 

Vignette: “When we had gone about half way 

troops moving by the flank in the direction o

regiment. Before we could determine who the

‘halt,’ ‘front,’ were given by the commander o

and they immediately discharged a volley a

stampede of our men ensued. So sudden and un

from our rear that every man seemed to act fo

orders. I was too far from my regiment to give a
“‘Immediately after the discharge of the first 

enemy I turned to Iook at the fate of my regiment. I sa

of the men were making their way out in the only dir

they could possibly escape, and I saw at once that if I 

the line at all, the men who were left there would be p

could reach them. All of my regiment that escaped mo

flank about 209 yards, and then filed to the rear and 

right of the brigade.‘* (Lieutenant Colonel Watt 

Tennessee Infantry Regiment [Fulton’s left unit], in O

481.1 

TeactLing Points: Coordination between units, comm

nonlinear battlefield. 

Stand 21 

MeNair’s Brigade 

(39th North Carolina marker, Glenn Field [see 

Situation: 19 September 1863, p.m. When Bushrod Jo

advanced around 1500, Brigadier GeneraI John Greg

on the left of the first line, with McNair’s Brigade in 

process of defeating part of Brigadier General Jeff

division, Gregg’s troops became scattered. The 39th 

and 25th Arkansas Infantry Regiments of McNair’s 

over the left of Gregg’s Brigade and continued their a

to this point. Here, the advance was halted and 

enfilading fire from Wilder’s mounted infantry brigade 

the 18th Indiana Battery on the south side of the field 

of Wood’s division from Lee and Gordon’s Mill. 

Vignette: “Moved rapidly forward, and getting near 

(then under a terrific fire) [we] charged impetuously 

passing over the left of Gregg’s brigade, and drove th

flight through the thick woods, across the Chattanoog

small house 100 yards on, and into the cornfields b

distance altogether of about three-quarters of a m

advance Lieutenant-Colonel Hufstedler fell wounded 

this advanced and exposed position was immediately m

force was ordered back to the woods.” (Colonel David 

North Carolina Infantry Regiment, in O.R,, vol. 30, pt. 

TeacFLilrg Points: Width of a division front, initiative, 

at’tack. 

Stand 22 

18th Indiana Battery 

(Edge of Glenn Field and astride ditch, 

north of Viniard Field (see map 41) 

Situation: 19 September 1863, p.m. Early on this mo

mounted infantry brigade withdrew to a defensive pos

western edge of Viniard Field. When Davis’ division and 

division were routed from Viniard Field and the woo

through Wilder’s line. Armed with seven-shot Spencer r

Wilder’s men haIted the charge of Brigadier Gene

Robertson’s and Brigadier General Henry L. Benning

Hoods Division. The Confederates then took refuge 

gully, which curved around in front of Wilder’s position

the ditch is clogged with vegetation, but in 1863, it wa

Eli Lilly positioned two of his six 3-inch rifles to cov

firing down its long axis. The effect of the canister fire w

on the trapped Confederates. 

Vignette: “At 4:OO p.m., Major General John B. Hood

division attacked Davis’ division in an assault that drov

west of the road and to Wilder’s line. Lieutenant Sc

canister at the advancing line, and the four guns on 

obliquely into the Rebels. The Johnnies reached the ra

the position, in which they took shelter from the firi

seven shooters. 

‘“Captain Lilly understated the effect of his guns in 

with his report saying that his guns fired “until the

ravine when they fell back in disorder except a few w

the ravine and were captured.’ Henry Campbell wrot

moved forward two guns on the left to a position wher
py p

fell in heaps, and I had it in my heart to order the 

the awful sight.‘” (John Rowell, Yankee Artiller

Civil War With Eli Lillfs Indiana Battery [Kn

Tennessee Press, 19751,117.) 

Teaching Points: Analysis of terrain, initiativ

integration of fires. 

Stand 23 

Wilder% Brigade 

(I 7th Indiana rnomment [see m

Sttuationr 19 September 1863, p.m. As you face 

stretched from the gully on your left along the 

edges of this field. The present (19322 tree line 

exist in 1863, permitting a field of fire beyond 

extending into Viniard Field. Leaving their ho

the rear, Wilder’s men fired from the protectio

Each man bad ample ammunition for his repeati

his persan and 200 rounds in a nose bag on his 

weapon of advanced technology that permitted a 

prone position CSpencer repeating rifle), Wilder% 

clear its front throughout the day. In addition, t

ralIying point for broken formations of Davis’

General Philip H. Sheridan’s divisions. 

Vignette: “Suddenly I saw many of our soldiers c

woods en the east side of the field, followed by m

till I could not doubt but that our men were bei

Along the road to our right, across the open fie

they came running. Before they were across the 

out of the woods on the east side in hot pursuit 

wait till our men were through our line as 

improvised fortifications, and then we began to 

Rebels as fast as our Spencer repeating rifles 

Lilly’s battery was sweeping the field with can

for human beings to face long, but the Rebels cam

a deep ditch or gully about 15 or 20 yards in front 
could fire again he had reached the woods and was lost t

“Again and again, a11 day each side charged back a

the field. Often we could not see a dozen yards in fron

smoke, but never did the enemy once reach us. We held 

Many times during the day we had to renew ou

ammunition. We shot so much that before night each m

pile of empty shells, and I remember one time that 

soldiers near me in a lull of the fighting compared pile

one had done the most shooting.” (Theodore PetzoIdt, 

Mounted Infantry, in ltry War Story, Porbland, OR, 1917

Teaching Points: Effects of new technology, face of 

leadership, use of terrain, fire discipline, training. 

Stand 24 

Heg”s Brigade 

@ieg shell pyramid [see map 411 

Situation: 19 September 1863, p.m. Colonel Hans C. 

went into action in the woods east of LaFayette Roa

Davis” division. Around 1400, Heg became heavily 

Gregg’s Brigade of Bushrod Johnson’s Division. He&s m

back across the road, rallied, attacked again, and were 

more. Benning’s and Robertson’s Brigades eventually 

this point, but when darkness fell, Federal units contro

Late in the day, as he rallied his unit in a final countera

mortally wounded at this spot. 

Vignette: Colonel Heg’s Iast letter to his wife, Gunild, 

1863: ‘“Do not feel uneasy for me. I am well and in go

trusting to my usual good luck. I shall use all,the caution 

am capable of and leave the rest to take care of itself. . . 

say nothing about the prospects of getting home-but 

present campaign is ended--I am certain of being 

(Theodore C. Blegen, ed., The Civil War Letters of 

Christian Heg [Northfield, MN: Norwegian-American 

Association, 19361,245--46.) 
was the tactical objective far both sides on this p

seven Federal brigades and four Confederate br

forth over this ground from 1400 to 1800 

significant advantage. After dark, both sides w

leaving hundreds of wounded and dead behind

cries of the wounded greatly affected those who 

could do little to help. 

Viggnetter “When night settled down at last firing 

. . . From the field in front of me and I began t

wounded. Some in the delirium of the fever fro

calling ‘Father, Oh Father, come quick,” while o

Mother,’ but no mother could hear. Others were 

a sister, while stme calIed for a wife. . . , But the 

and which ranged from a low moan to a loud w

water!’ We had orders not to move from our 

match, not to go to sleep or to make any unnec

listening to that cry for ‘water, water’ for a little 

no longer. As quickly as possible, I slipped out of 

field in front of us. I had no water in my can

thought probably I could find some. It was now 

dimly see the outlines of those lying on the gr

was making no sound I went to him and shaking 

whispered: ‘partner.’ There was no reply. He 

shoulders from the ground and slipped the cante

Good, the canteen was nearly full of water. I w

wha was calling for water and gave it to him. 

grabbed it and began to drink. No sooner did the 

the vicinity observe that some one was near w

began to beg for some. I made it go as far as I co

When the canteen was empty I looked about for 

find none. Returning to the first man to whom I 

who by his voice I had judged to be German, 

language. I had guessed right. He told me that 

Illinois. He had been wounded in the bowels and 

that he could live. I tried to cheer him as best I 

can say at a time Iike this. He said that he did 

troubled him to think what would become of t
lines, but it would have done them no good for we coul

care of them there if I had. So I left them in their t

misery and went back to our lines. Luckily my abse

discovered.” (Theodore Petzoldt, 17th Indiana Infant

1My War Story, Portland, OR, 1917,106-8.1 

Teaching Points: Analysis of terrain, face of battle, hu

Stand 26 

General Braxton Bragg’s Headquarters 

Situation: 19 September 1863, p.m. The headquarters 

of Bragg’s Army of Tennessee was located in this vicin

During the evening, Bragg formed his army in

Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk commanding the 

Lieutenant General James Longstreet the Left Wing

Polk but left it to Polk to inform the third lieutenant 

H. Hill, of the reorganization. After arriving at Catoos

1400, Longstreet made his way to Bragg’s headquarte

briefed on the plan for the next day, and retired for th

plan differed little from his earlier efforts. Once agai

turn the Federal left. The attack was to be execute

divisions from right to left. 

Vignette: “In the evening, according to my custom in 

General Lee, I rode back to Army headquarters 

Cammander-in-Chief the result of the day upon my p

there met for the first time several of the principal off

of Tennessee, and, to my surprise, not one spoke in 

regarding the result of the battle in which we were 

found the gallant Breckinridge, whom I had knawn f

seated by the root of a tree, with a heavy slouch ha

When, in the course of brief conversation, I stated th

the enemy the following day, he sprang to his feet, 

me save that which I had brought from the train upon m

did my men have a single wagon, or even ambulance 

convey the wounded. They were destitute of almost everyt

say, except pride, spirit, and forty rounds of ammunition 

(John Bell Hood, Advance and R&eat [Philadelphia, PA

M’Fetridge, 18$01,62.) 

Teachircg Po&ts: Command post locations, command

reorganization during battle, 

Stand 27 

18th Indiana Battery 

(Alexander house site [see map 51) 

Si&atisn: 18 September 1863, a.m. As part of the mo

screening the left of the Army of the Cumberland, Wild

took a position at Alexander’s Bridge. Captain Eli Lilly’s 

Battery was positioned here on this slight rise overlooking 

In 1863, the ground between this position and the bridge 

open fields and pasture, giving Lilly’s guns a clear field of 

Lilly detached his four mountain howitzers to accomp

Indiana and 123d Illinois Regiments to reinforce Mint

Bridge. At about 1230, skirmishers from Brigadier Gener

Walthall’s Brigade of Liddell’s Division appeared beyon

Lilly opened fire with four of his 3-inch rifles. Cover

Wilder’s men managed to dismantle the bridge despite 

vigorous attack. Blocked at Alexander’s Bridge, Lidde

continued downsteam and crossed at Byram’s Ford. 

Vignette: ‘“Soon after the line had been formed a column o

Infantry issued from the woods, passed across the fields 

and formed line of Battle reaching from the road on th

woods on the right. We opened out on them with consid

sending percussion Shell right through their line. Soo

placed a Bat. of 2 guns on a slight hill directly opposit

fired 4 times, we made it so hot for them that they left in a 

first shell came very close to gun No. 2-it struck the g

front-ricocheted and struck the corner of the log hous
yp

to stop a small bullet. We all knew, from the soun

strike some place close by, and it was a great relief 

the logs above our heads,” (Henry Chambers, 18

Journal, Unit Files, Chickamauga and Chattanoog

Park, Fort Oglethorpe, GA.1 

Teaching Points: Combined arms, integrating o

delay; bridge defense. 

Stand 28 

Leonidas Polk’s Headquarters 

(Alexander-$ Bridge [see map 58 

Sitrcation: 19 September 1863, p.m. Polk’s headqua

the vicinity of Alexander’s Bridge, probably abo

south. After receiving his orders from Bragg, Po

headquarters; issued written orders to Hill, Walk

and then went to bed. The only person left on duty a

was a clerk. Walker and Cheatham received the

messenger failed to find Hill. Meanwhile, Hi11 t

headquarters but was unsuccessful. When Polk’s 

to AIexander’s Bridge and reported his inability 

told not to disturb Polk or the senior staff. Becau

unable to locate Polk’s headquarters, he did not 

had been ordered to initiate the attack at dawn. 

other reasons, the scheduled 0530 attack did not be

later. 

Vignette: “On the night of September 19, I was on d

as courier. About 12 o’clock a dispatch was handed 

Lieutenant-General Hill. I left immediateIy in sea

having been informed that General Hill was nea

was unable to find General Hill after searching fo

hours. In my search I came up with General C

inquiry of him for General Hill. He informed me th

of his whereabouts. I also met with General Breck

him the same inquiry and received of him the s

going in every direction and inquiring of all the 

Map 6. Sites of maps 7 through IO in relation to the 

Chattanooga National Wlilitary Park fo
been a meeting engagement. After a night of pl

reorganization, Rosecrans chose to conduct a coordinated 

September, and Bragg proposed to launch a delibera

daylight. Major General John C. Breckinridge’s Divis

Corps, on the Confederate right Rank, was to initiate the 

entire army. Divisions south of Breckinridge were to jo

successively until the entire line was engaged. Bragg ha

attack to commence at ‘“day dawn,” which was shortly b

(05471, but a series of difficulties and subsequent decisio

Breckinridge from moving before 0930. His troops had 

knowledge of the location of the Federal line. 

Breckinridge formed his division with his three brig

Major General Daniel W. Adams’ Brigade on the righ

General Marcellus StovalYs Brigade in the center, a

General Benjamin H. Helm’s Brigade on the left. This po

the axis of advance of Adams’ Brigade, about 300 yards f

of the division’s line of departure. 

VignetEe: “At 1.25 a.m. an order was shown me (just r

Lieutenant-General Polk and addressed to my division 

and directing them to advance at once upon the enemy

given for the issue of the order directly to them was tha

Polk) had not been able to find the corps commander. 

replied to the note, saying that Brigadier-General Jackso

his corps, was at right angles to my line; that my men 

their rations, and that they could finish eating wh

adjusting the line of battle. General Polk soon after cam

and made no objection to this delay. At 8 o’clock G

himself came on the field, and I then learned for the first 

attack had been ordered at daylight. However, t

preparations for battle had not been made up to this hou

could not be made without the presence of the comma

The position of the Yankees had not been reconnoitered. 

of battle had not been adjusted, and part of it was at right 

rest. There was no cavalry on our flanks, and no orders 

strength or position of the reserves. My own line had b

north and south to correspond to the position of the e
Slocomb’s Battery plaque 

Bri dges’ llfinois 9 

Ba Feet% ,, olaoue _. 0 

rida monument 

104th Illinois 

monument 

29th In 

60%~ North 

monument 

19th U.S. 

2 monument r. 

\‘” w Oe

Map 7. Day 2, stands 1 through 15 
(Walker shell pyramid [see map 71) 

Situation: 20 September 1863, a.m. Initially, Walk

consisting of Brigadier General States R. Gist’s a

Divisions, was in reserve on Polk’s left flank, formed a

behind Cheatham’s Division. During the delay in the 

attack, Polk moved Walker’s Corps behind Hill’s C

Breekinridge”s withdrawal around 1100, Walker% trcmps 

forward separately. About noon, Gist% Division attack

fortified position northeast of Kelly Field. Instead of e

partial success achieved by Breckinridge, Hill deployed W

into the fight piecemeal. As a result, they were defeated in 

Vl’gneCCe: “‘Before I got into my position, and while mar

flank to gain the ground to the right, I was sent for by Ge

[go to] his support. General Polk was with my comm

received the order. I marched rapidly forward in line of b

the time in double-quick, and reported to General Hill. 

was with me. General Hill informed me on my arrival that 

brigade. I told him there was one immediately behin

remarked he wanted Gist’s brigade. I informed him that 

left and had just come up.. (General Gist had a few minutes 

put in command by me of General E&or’s and Colon

brigades, and Colonel Colquitt had command of Gist’s 

ordered General Gist’s brigade immediately into the fig

Breckinridge, a part of whose division had fallen back and 

which was hard pressed. I refer you to General Gist’s r

performance of his command. 

“‘General Walthall was detached to the left to th

Brigadier-General Polk by Hill or Polk. My command 

disposed of, brigades being sent in to take the places of 

only occupation was to help form the detached portions of 

as they came out from a position I felt certain they would 

when they were sent in. My division commanders received 

direct from General Hill, and I refer you to the

Breckinridge’s division having fallen back, General 

reported Cleburne’s division on Breekinridge’s left rauted

Corps having fallen back in the detachments in which th
Stand 3 

Helm’s Brigade (the ‘“Orphan B

Situation: 20 September 1863, a.m. Helm’s Briga

Breckinridge’s Divisian. As Helm”s men advan

the woods, his three left regiments passed jus

Federal breastworks and were devastated by 

Baird% division posted northeast of Kelly Field

to rally his shattered regiments and was mortal

side of his brigade continued forward with Stov

of Helm’s unit was destroyed. 

Vignette: Y&era1 Breckinridge, whose presenc

frequently along the line. General Helm was mo

infusing courage into the eager command. Et 

Before the Battle,’ that can not be put on canva

about to commence the greatest engagement o

past nine o’clock the Fourth regiment was de

brigade, and commanded by the fearless Nuckols

the enemy. It was short work, for he gave the c

soon our Enfields rang out lustily through the 

severely in the charge, but the enemy was d

behind breastworks covering part of a brigade 

now moved forward and as soon as we felt the 

charged, and the second day’s battle began in ea

Ninth and a smal portion of the Forty-First 

fortifications and suffered terrible slaughter

mortally wounded. Major Rice F. Graves, the gr

also mortally wounded, besides very many of 

men were shot down during repeated attempts 

(Fred Joyce, “Orphan Brigade at Chickamau

Bivot~~c 3 [September 18841:31.) 

Teaclhing Points: Security, reconnaissance, effec
his subordinate commanders received their orders direct

around 0630. Although Breckinridge had begun his mo

Alexander’s Bridge at about 0300 and was in his att

around sunrise, the troops had not been fed, and other un

were not ready. Hill decided to bring up rations and mod

positions, a decision reluctantly approved by Polk. Delay

this decision prevented the “day dawn’” attack from be

0930. Bragg was outraged. 

Vignette I: “About 11 o’clock on the night of the 19th, 

reached his headquarters near Alexander’s Bridge, and 

that he was to attack the enemy at daylight the next 

instructed me to issue orders at once to Lieutenant-Gene

Major-General cheatham to make the attack at that- tim

me to send General Hill’s orders to him at Thedford’s Fo

he had heard, General Hill’s headquarters were establishe

These orders were accordingly issued at 11.30 p.m& Gen

corps was to be held in reserve. A copy of the orders was h

on the spot. During the night the courier who b

Cheatham’s orders returned, bringing back the envelope 

that he had delivered the orders. The courier bearin

General Hill was directed ta Thedford’s Ford, and order

for and End the general. He failed to deliver his orders

after daylight (perhaps before sunrise) General Polk inst

issue orders directly to Generals Breckinridge and Cleb

the attack, notifying them that General Hill could not be 

orders were prepared and placed in the hands of a staff off

ordered to proceed in haste and deliver them. . . , 

afterward another staffofficer was dispatched with verbal 

same officers and to the same effect. The general then rod

accompanied by his staff.” (Lieutenant Colonel Thom

Polk% assistant adjutant general, in O.R., vol. 30, pt. 2,5&

Vignette 2: “I could Bnd no courier at Alexander’s Bridgep 

could not find you. My divisions are getting their rations 

be ready to move for an hour or more. Breekinridge’s wa

have got lost between Thedford’s Ford and this place. Et w

you to examine the line from ane end to the other bef
role of personality, relationship among senior com

Stand 5 

Calquitt’s (Gist’s) Brigade 

(Colquitt shell pyramid[see ma

Situation: 20 September 1863, a.m. Gist’s Brigade 

arrived at Catoosa Station from Rome, Georgia

19-20 September. It then spent the predawn 

ordnance train to Alexander’s Bridge. On arrivi

found that Walker wanted him to assume comm

that Walker eould concentrate on commanding 

turn, Colonel Peyton Colquitt moved up to camma

the morning attack developed, a gap appeared be

and Cleburne’s Divisions. To fill the gap, Hill 

Brigade. Ordered to support Breckinridge, CoIq

line, but without skirmishers, and prepared 

Breckinridge. Passing almost through the exac

Brigade had met destruction, Colquitt’s troops st

situation and were enfiladed by Federals behi

across Battle Line Road. Mortally wounded, Colq

command approximately thirty minutes. The 

withdrew under covering fire from the remainde

remained in reserve for the rest of the battle

dominated Hill’s thinking was never fully c

Colquitt’s Brigade were 49 killed, 251 wounded

percentage of loss was 34.28. 

Vignette: “About 11 or 12 we catch it. [Adjutan

riding together in front of left center, [Colonel] S

Regt, [Major] Jones in front of left, when a tremen

on our left and down our line! [Colonel] Stevens 

blooded stallion, sword in hand, and sings out ‘Ch

10th Co., by companies left half wheel.’ The com

he was on parade. While [Adjutant] Palmer, [Maj

getting the left co. into the new line, Palmer 

wounded. I got the two left companies in line & g
mortally wounded, and wondered why the other regime

come up. Riding to the right of the 24th [my horse] got a 

his neck, and my sword was shot out of my hand. One of 

it to me, and as I sheathed it a canister shot struck it mi

scabbard, and in a moment more I got a bad wound in m

turned the command over to [Captain] Hill, was soon unco

loss afblood. . . . Never was a regiment subjected to a seve

discipline than was our gallant regiment when it chan

under that never to be forgotten flank fire. Here we are

Col., & Major, unable to do anything for the comfort 

command. Stevens has just said, ‘Well, Capers, the me

taught obedience, & the captains that are left are equal t

and responsibilities, & I have no fears for the Regiment.“’ 

Colonel Ellison Capers, 24th South Carolina Infantry 

[Colquitt’s left regiment], Unit Files, Chickamauga and 

National Military Park, Fort Oglethorpe, GA.) 

Teaching Points: Lack of security, fog and friction of war, 

Stand 6 

John Beatty’s Brigade 

(104th Illinois monument [see map 71) 

Sitzcation: 20 September 1863, a.m. At dawn on 20 Se

northern (left) flank of the Federal army (Baird’s division) 

woods south of this field. Recognizing the need to cont

junction at the McDonald house (present Park Visitor Cen

requested the return of Negley”s division, which was in 

Brotherton cabin several division sectors to the south

ordered Negley to move at 0630, but Negley was unable 

position until relieved. He immediately dispatched his res

Brigadier General John Beatty’s unit. The remainder 

division waited until it was relieved by Wood’s division‘ 

Beatty moved his brigade into position north of Baird’s le

his regiments to cover the division sector until the rest o

arrived. To accomplish this, he deployed two regiments 

of the ravine between this point and the road junctio
quarter of a mile distant. I represented to him th

that in advancing it I would necessarily leave a lo

my right and General Baird’s left, and also that 

position indicated to me by General Thomas, Me r

to advance was imperative; that I would be su

Negley. I could not urge objections further, and 

rapidly as possible toward the point indicated. 

““The Eighty-eighth Indiana (Colonel Hump

moved into position without difficulty. The Fo

(Lieutenant-Colonel M&tire), on its right, me

opposition in advancing through the woods, but 

ridge. The One hundred and fourth IlIinois (

Hapeman) and the Fifteenth Kentucky (Colonel T

became engaged almost immediately, and being 

advanced slowly. The enemy, in strong force, pre

front and on the right ff ank, preventing them from 

regiments on their Ieft. 

“At this time I sent an aide to request Gene

King to throw in a force to cover the interval betw

right, and dispatched Captain Wilson, my assista

to the rear to hasten forward General Negley to 

regiments forming the right of my brigade were c

a force that they were compelled to halt, and ult

which they did in good order, contesting the gro

retired.” (Brigadier General John Beatty, in O.R., 

Teaching Points: Key terrain (road junction), has

frontage. 

Stand 7 

Reserve Cmps 

(Florida monument [see nap 7

Sifuationr 20 September 1863, a.m.-p.m. Grang

began the day at M&fee’s Church, guarding th

several miles north of this point. @anger had bee

to support Thomas. At approximately 1030, Gran
alternate route west of the road to join Thomas. This swin

ultimately brought Steedman and his two brigades to Sno

Tea&rag Points: Initiative, role of reserves. 

Stand 8 

Slocomb’s Battery 

(Sloeomb’s Batterjr plaque, west ofLaFayette Road [se

Si~uatiorc: 20 September 1863, a.m. Captain Charles 

Battery (four Napoleons and two 6-pounder James rifle

Adams” Brigade in its advance to LaFayette Road. W

regiments turned southward, Slocomb had to decide whe

his guns acrass the ravine in the rear of this position. D

safety to be found in the rear, Slocomb crossed the rav

position here, while Adams’ Brigade continued its driv

behind the Federal flank. After the brigade entered th

Confederate attack stalled when Adams was woun

infantrymen hastily withdrew, Slocomb’s Battery c

retreat. 

Vignette: “I was engaged in reforming my regiment w

that, Brig. Gen. D. W. Adams having been disabled by 

command of the brigade devolved upon me. I at once asc

there was no support on the left of the brigade, and 

command to form on the rear slope of the hill upon whic

Slocombs battery, Washington Artillery, was posted. 

been accomplished, I left the line in charge of Cal. D

Sixteenth and Twenty-fifth Louisiana Volunteers, and ha

left, where I observed several regiments falling back. On

once moved to the support of the line on the left, and dire

Labouisse, assistant inspector-general, to bring up anoth

through the woods to the same position. With Capta

assistance, he succeeded in placing two regiments in p

were believed to belong to the brigade on our left. The 

Alabama Volunteers and Austin’s battalion, whi

participated in the charge, but had been ordered to oppos

of a column of the enemy’s infantry reported on our ri
Teaching Points: Command and control, confusion

acceptance of risk. 

Stand 9 

Bridges’ Illinois Battery 

@3ridges”lllimis Battery plaque, west oflaFayette 

Situation: 20 September 1863, a.m. Captain Lym

(two Napoleons and four 3-inch rifles) supported B

this position. At 0930, it fired on Confederates 

northeast. When Beatty’s troops were driven back 

Battery covered their withdrawal. The battery w

two brigades on its front and flank. Bridges lost tw

others and rejoined Negfey on Snodgrass Hill. 

Vignette: “The enemy were now pouring out af the 

400 yards in our front and right, being the ground 

had advanced but haIf an hour previously. 

“As soon as the battle-flags of the enemy eme

and there was no doubt about its being the enem

my full battery, the first rounds with case-sh

canister. 

‘“His advance was checked for an instant, whe

line again, he steadily advanced upon me. 

“‘While my guns were being worked under the 

our front, some of my men and horses were disable

from the woods upon my right. While under this 

ordered me to retire. I gave the order and found al

pieces were either killed or disabled; 5 cannone

detachments and 3 cannoneers of the other were d

“The enemy was each moment closing his 

front and right, firing as they advanced, and the

chance of getting these pieces off through the 

ordered the remnant of my men still at the guns to 

__---_-.- . 
Teaching Points: Initiative, fighting unsupported. 

Stand 10 

StovaII’s Brigade 

(60th North Ctwotim monument, north end ofKelly Fi

Situation: When Breckinridge”s Division turned 

McDonald Field, Adams’ Brigade was west of LaFay

StovalYs Brigade was east of it. Adams” Brigade was m

Colonel Timothy R. Stanley’s brigade from Negley’s d

Brigade brushed past the Federal left flank and reach

edge of Kelly Field. Just as Stovall entered the field, 

with resting units, trains, and artillery teams, he e

Derveer% brigade of Brannan’s division. Van De

ordered forward from a reserve position farther 

happened to enter Kelly Field at the same time 

movement brought Van Derveer out of the woods no

house, facing westward. Finding Confederates on his 

Derveer wheeled his brigade to the left at the same t

attacked out of the woods. 

Vignetie: “Cur brigade moved by the left flank n

opposite Kelly’s Field, and then facing eastward, ma

strip of thick woods and underbrush to the main road

into the field. EIere westood for a moment, the brigad

rear of and facing east towards, our main line of batt

wuods, was not to be seen from our position. . , . Along 

the field, and perhaps 50 yards from the left of our left 

thick woods with underbrush, into which nothing co

our position. We had hardly halted, when, with a cr

and a cloud of gray smoke from the edge of the woods o

was filled with bullets, and our men began to fall. A c

face this attack was instantly commenced, and was 

run; but before it brought us face to face with our ene

of our men, and nearIy all of the horses in the brigad

wounded. As our men came into line the 2d Minn

Indiana rushed down to the edge of the woods, and fo
retired back among the trees and brush, wher

stubbornly resisted our further advance; but aft

perhaps fifteen or twenty minutes, they with

(Lieutenant Colonel S. W. Bishop’ 2d Minnesota 

“Van Derveer’s Brigade at Chickamauga,” Glim

Struggle [Minneapolis, UN: Aug. Davis, Publisher

Teaching Points: Use’of reserves, initiative, luck’ 

Stand 11 

Dodige’s Brigade 

&Mi India;)tca monument [see map 

Situation: 20 September 1863, a.m. Dodge’s b

division had suffered heavily on the previous d

positioned as Johnson’s reserve brigade. Early o

September, it was sent to extend the left of Bai

LaFayette Road. Shortty after Dodge reac

Breckinridge’s attack swept forward. Although 

stopped in front of Dodge, most of Stovall’s Brigade 

and headed for the Federal trains area at Kelly Fi

options: charge into StovaIl’s flank, fire into Stov

his own left flank and hope that someone else wou

He chose the third option. Was he right? What wou

Temhing Points: Commander’s intent, miss$on, ta

Stand 12 

Joha Kirtg% Brigade 

(19th U.S. monument [see map 

Situation: 20 September 1863, a.m.--pm. King’s 

of Baird’s division and, for a time, represented th

flank. King deployed his regiments in four 

breastworks of felled trees. InitiaBy, the 1st Batt

was sent forward to a slight rise just beyond the 

this position. From there’ the Regulars enfiladed 

it advanced westward across their front and mort
Tea;c&ng PO&S: Unit history, strength of the defense, 

withdrawal under pressure. 

Stand 13 

Thomas* Defensive Line 

(10th Wisconsin monument [see map 711 

Situation: 20 September 1863, a.m.-p.m. While Eightin

this location on 19 September, Thomas surveyed the ter

and selected a defensive position for the next day. Th

roughly in a semicircle around the northern, eastern

perimeter of Kelly FieId, a few yards into the wood

eastern face of the line was on rising ground. During th

‘Xl September, Thomas’ men hastily fortified their positi

logs, and felled trees. Four divisions, each with local res

line, making it virtually impregnable from the front. 

September, Baird’s, Johnson’s, Palmer’s, and Reyn

experienced no dif&ulty in holding this position, but wh

army’s right flank collapsed, the Kelly Field line bec

and had to be evacuated. The evacuation was orderly a

became disorderly, especially at this end of the line. 

Vignette: ‘“As soon as it was light we were marched to t

with the rest of our brigade, the 15th U.S. Regulars on 

time we were in good fighting condition, everybody wa

ahead and do something. We were about out of provis

water was scarce with us. All the forenoon we were m

the woods without seeing the enemy, though bullets cam

and several were hit. About noon we were ordered to la

breastworks and get behind it quick. The Rebels frequ

on our left, while we were rolling logs together, and w

the regulars. Later the attack became general along o

had to work on aur breastworks at intervals when we 

attacked. Gradually we put in logs crosswise to proteet 

a flanking fire and by three o’clock we had entrenche

well that we had no trouble to drive them back. We be

get, quite near to us before firing and in that way did g

We could see the line come up through the underbrush 
time shells were dropping just in front of us

behind us, then we could see troops marching r

to our left. We still held the fort when suddenly 

the left, where we supposed our own troops 

sufficiently strong there our fire did not check 

and made as best we could for our rear, only 

completely surrounded. It was everyone for him

ran to where our flag was held up and suppo

when I found that all there were prisoners 

Several more of my company were hit running 

our men was shot dead just as we both raised up 

turned to fire once more as we ran but fell dead

saw him fall and when we returned after being 

bent over him and found he had never move

16th Wisconsin Infantry Regiment, Diary, Un

and Chattanooga National Milit,ary Park, Fort 

Teaching Points: Terrain analysis, strength 

units, planning ahead. 

Stand 14 

DeshEer’s Brigade 

(Deshler shell pyramid [see m

Situation: 20 September 1863, a.m. Cleburne”s 

advanced to the attack with Polk’s Brigade 

Brigade in the center, and Deshler”s Brigade 

pinched out of line by Stewart’s Division, Des

Wood’s men on this ridge around midmorning. 

from the Federal breastworks (Johnson’s an

Deshler’s Brigade could advance no farther and 

of its ammunition. Coming forward to check 

supply, Deshler was hit in the chest by an art

instantly. Colonel Roger Q. Mills immediately 

the brigade and held the position, although he w

Vign&e: ‘“About 12 m. our supply of ammunit

and Z sent a courier to Brigadier General Desh
endanger his Eife in going to examine the cartridge box

amount of ammunition his men had, he cheerfully sta

brave the tempest of death that raged on the crest of th

gone but little way when he fell-fell as he would wish 

very center of his brigade, in the midst of the line, betw

and surrounded by the bodies of his fallen comrades. He 

own blood upon the spot watered by the best blood of his 

“A messenger from Colonel Wilkes’ regiment infor

fact soon after General Deshler fell; aIso that Colone

wounded and not with the regiment. Just at this critica

ammunition was exhausted, and no one knew where 

assumed command, and supposing that the enemy wo

soan as the firing ceased, I ordered bayonets fixed and 

boxes of the wounded and dead to be gathered, and o

them to be given to each man to load his gun with, and 

reserve to repel an assault. While this order was b

Lieutenant-Colonel Anderson, who was on the left of 

sent Lieutenant Graham to inform me that the four left 

not been firing. Being at too great a distance from the 

the good sense to prevent them from wasting their 

unnecessarily. I immediately ordered those four compan

on the hill, where the fire was hottest, and ordered Lieu

Anderson to take command of them, and hold the hill a

till I could get ammunition and have it distributed. I so

ammunition and refilled my cartridge boxes. 

‘“At this time one of the major-general’s staff ca

informed me that I was ordered to hold the hill on wh

was formed; that I was not permitted to advance, and m

it were possible to hold my position. I therefore moved m

once some 20 or 30 paces to the rear of the crest and on 

hill, for cover, leaving a body of sharpshooters behind t

of the hill to keep up a fire with the enemy. . . . 

“‘The troops of my command, both officers and men

the greatest bravery, coolness, and self-possession du

engagement. They advanced with a steady step, unde

shell, canister, and musketry, to their posit,ion, an
but as brave men and good soldiers they obeyed 

general and held the hill. . . . 

“I feel it my duty . . . to record here the na

William 6. McCann, of Company A, Fifteenth T

worthy of honorable mention for conduct more tha

on the field. . . . Private McCann was under my 

upright, cheerful, and self-possessed in the very ha

cheered up his comrades around him, and after he 

ammunition, gathered up the cartridge boxes of the 

and distributed them to his comrades. He bore h

through the entire contest, and fell mortally wo

volleys of the enemy. I promised him during the 

would mention his good conduct, and as he was b

field he turned his boyish face upon me and, with 

smile, reminded me of my promise.” (Colonel Ro

Texas Infantry, in OX., vol. 30, pt. 2, B88--90. 

Teaching Points: Face of battle, leadership, coolnes

Stand 15 

Edward King’s Brigade 

@kg shell py=amid [see map 71

S&&ion: 20 September 1863, a.m.-p.m. The stren

around Kelly Field is clearly apparent, especially 

units and availability of local reserves is consider

Federal divisions (eleven brigades) were five Co

(sixteen brigades), but the Confederates never a

than two divisions at a time. Nevertheless, rather 

extending it to the critical McDonald crossroads, 

remain strong in the center and call on Rosecrans 

This calculated decision ultimately led to the cris

the Federal army’s right collapsed, Thomas’ line 

from the units beyond the right of Reynolds’ div

Reynolds withdrew Edward King’s brigade behin

and placed it in this vacated position” King, 

commanding a volunteer brigade, was noted for his 

- ------- 

lllllh 
yg p

fire fram the enemy’s musketry which was turned upan

fine looking man, clad in a large blue overcoat and c

and slowly dawn our line, as composed as if he was in 

be came to my company I said to him, ‘I would like to 

are?“He said, ‘Cal. King of Reynolds’ Division.’ He stop

toward the enemy, telling us how they were moving, 

see as he was standing up, and leisurely passed an. 

wonder to me he was not killed instantly but I think 

more than it seemed to worry him.“’ (Captain Orville T

74th Indiana Infantry Regiment, Medal of Honor winne

Henry Boynton, 26 November 1895, Chickamauga an

National Military Park, Fort Ogletborpe, GA.1 

Teaching Points: Terrain analysis, leadership, with

pressure. 

Stand 16 

53. A. M. Wood’s Brigade 

(Alabama monumenE [see map 81) 

Situ&ion: 20 September 1863, a.m. This monument, c

the participatian of Alabama traapq is near the dividin

the two wings of Bragg’s army. Cleburne’s Division of 

and Stewart’s Division of the Left Wing overlapped 

Cheatham’s Division, the army’s largest, was pinched 

entirely. No coordination took place between the win

night and little during the morning of 20 September. 

Canfederates wasted a great deal of combat power wh

were unable to join the fight at this paint. 

Teaching Points: Coordination, boundaries. 

Stand 17 

Longstreet’s ‘“Grand Column” 

(Bushrad Johnson monument [see map 8

Sitzdion: 20 September 1863, a.m. During the morn

rearranged his lines slightly while waiting for Polk’s 
monument 

E 

rmp u. uay L, stands 16 thraugh 22 
farmed. 

Teaching Points: Coordinated attack, assault column 

attack, commander% intent, mission, objective. 

Stand 18 

Stewart’s Division and Benning’s Briga

S&&ion: 26 September 1863, a.m. Although part of L

Wing, Stewart’s Division responded to a direct order 

began its attack prematurely, Entering Poe Field, 

himself caught within an angle of the Federal line. T

bloodily repulsed but not before Stewart’s left 

LaFayette Raad. By the time Langstreet’s column b

Stewart’s Division was in retreat. When the column 

fire fram Brannan’s Federal division caused part of 

echelon, Bennings Brigade, to veer northward to take 

in flank. Benning gained the southern end of Poe F

there. Beyond supporting some artiIlery batteries th

Federals in Kelly Field, Benning’s Brigade participate

the battle. 

Vignette 1: Stewart’s attack. ‘“In about fifteen minut

command, the regiments still being shielded by rud

breastworks of logs and bushes hastily thrown up, a

forward from the brigadier-general commanding. 

command, and my boys moved with alacrity aver ou

gained some 66 or 70 yards, I ordered double-quick with 

was obeyed to a man, the men almost assuming the r

an unbroken line. Firing from the enemy’s sharpshoote

was constant in our front, but mare injury was inflicte

the left flank, there seeming to be no support an th

brigade. On emerging [from the] woods inltol an open, 

could see our stubborn foe definitely resisting our m

field. Grape, canister, and musket-shot here greatly 

command, but swerving not it bare steadily onward. N
s, .- .z 

.- a 
with their assistance, reached the position the regimen

befare this murderous charge. . f . After some littIe time 

a party to bring or to assist in bringing the wounded 

feared they would burn, as the grass and bushes 

(Lieutenant Colonel R. Dudley Frayser, 15/37th Ten

Regiment, in Q.R., vol. 30, pt. 2,397.) 

Vignette 2 Benning’s attack. “Shouts began ta go up 

and we knew it was our boys. It soon spread along the 

enemy was firing away all along the line. On the left

heavy but retiring, the cannon seeming to play a smal

yell of victory became louder and fiercer as the sun 

seemed ta be no enemy in our front. General Benning o

forward a short distance to see what was in front. W

afraid of firing into our own men and being fired into 

as ordered and came to the Chattanooga road. I was 

enemy sending men across attempting to reinforce t

back and told what I had seen. General Benning sug

and sent a courier to the division cammander for it. In 

number of pieces were sending shell down that road 

watched . . e the shot as it would rise, curve over and 

very spot aimed among the demaralized Federals. W

pressed forward then? Evidently they were broken and 

field, perhaps were leaving then. Incompetent fools we

fruits of a great victory ta fly fram us. I can see naw h

waited,” CBenjamin Abbott, Bennings adjutant and in

to Green Haygoad, 26 September 1863, quoted in Mills 

Mother Dan3 Griewe About Me. If I Get KiEEed, 1% 

Letters From Georgia Soldiers in the Ciwil Wctr [S

Beehive Press, 19771,275.) 

Teaching Points: Caordination, timing of attacks, lea

battle. 
eyodsad egeys dsosbou00, 

Brannan’s right brigade (Connell’s) but wa

thereafter, Benning’s attack struck Connell% br

right flank. By 1130, the head of the Conf

outflanked Brannan’s position and begun to atta

rear. Brannan’s division attempted to reorient i

threat but was soon forced to withdraw. Be

accupied this ground. 

Vignette: ‘“I came upon a young officer and fo

wounded and suffering very much. I saw at once 

if I could do anything for him. He replied, ‘I am 

and bury me decently.’ I promised him a

circumstances. . , . I had him moved in the hut a

he died. As far as I could I complied with his re

grave with a board on which I carved his name 

J. Hall] with my knife. . . , As soon as I found Ha

took from my pocket a small vial of morphia and 

grain, and he was reIieved very soon of pain 

rationally. I had carried this little vial during a

might be wounded and left suffering on the fiel

me, but it was now to relieve an enemy. 

“These little incidents . . . serve to show . . 

barbarians. In my own heart before the battle I 

these men who had invaded our soiI . . . and ye

we soldiers were touched with pity for these 

enemies. It was not the place to discuss right an

a question of humanity.” (Benjamin Abbott t

September 1863, quoted in Mills Lane, ed., “De

About Me. If I Get Killed, I%I only Be Dead.” 

Soldiers in the Civil War [Savannah, GA: Beeh

76. 

Teaching Points: Flank attacks, face of battle, in
and Colonel Charles G. Harkers), plus Colonel Sid

brigade from Van Cleve”s division. Barnes was on 

Brannan’s division, Harker in the center, and Buell 

1045, Wood received a message from Rosecrans order

up on Reynolds as fast as possible and support him

assumed that Brannan’s division was not in line and th

between Wood and Reynolds. Brannan, however, rem

forcing Wood to move to the rear frst, then pass b

before joining Reynolds. Although Rosecrans was 

behind him, Wood did not request clarification of the o

Major General Alexander M. McCook that the gap thu

be filled, Wood obeyed the order at once. Barnes and 

the position safely, but Buell’s brigade was caught 

shattered by Longstreet’s advance, Hood’s colum

through the gap and split the Federal army. 

Teaching Points: Clarity of orders, obedience to orde

of subordinates, coordination procedures, role of perso

Stand 21, 

Bushmd Johnson’s Division 

(East edge of south Dyer FieEd[see map 

Sibuztion: 20 September 1863, a.m. Beginning its 

1110, Bushrod Johnson% Division led Hood’s Corps a

Road, past the Brotherton cabin, and into the gap 

division. Although Johnson’s right brigade was slow

fire from Brannan, the remainder of the division s

Buell’s brigade and broke out into the broad Dyer Fie

in motion, numerous Federal units scattered to the 

Bringing up his reserve brigade, Johnson pressed forw

Vignette: “Our lines now emerged from the forest into 

the border of long, open fields, over which the enemy 

under cover of several batteries, which were arrange

of a ridge on our right and front., running up to the co

field, and of one battery on our left and front posted o

the edge of the woods, just at the corner of a field nea
made up a battle scene of unsurpassed grandeu

gave me the last order I received from him on th

keep ahead of everything.’ How this order wa

determined by those who investigate all the d

(Brigadier General Bushrod R. Johnson, in OX

58.) 

Teaching Points: Agility, initiative, mission-type 

Stand 22 

Deas” Brigade 

(Tanyard [see map 81) 

Situation: 20 September 1863, a.m. At approxi

that Johnson began his attack, Major General 

who was on Johnson’s left, also began his advan

caught Davis’ division moving to fill the gap 

Davis’ brigades broke and were driven to t

Sheridan’s division, which had been ordered no

was moving into the sauthern end of Dyer Field

leading brigade was also broken, Brigadier Gen

brigade made a stand on a hill west of the field

advance of Brigadier General Zachariah 

Hindman’s Division. Deas received some 

unexpected source when the 15th Alabama In

General E. McIver Law’s Brigade arrived in his 

Vignette: ‘“At the first fire of the enemy, so un

regiment exhibited a momentary hesitancy an

my ordering “charge,’ it moved at double-quick

scaled the enemy’s works, and pursued thei

shattered ranks through the woods and underg

the borders of another open field, the enemy w

some houses, potash-works, and rail breastwork

was not even a momentary hesitancy, but with 

rapidity of step, we drove the enemy from th

slaughter,and pursued them through the open 

an elevated skirt of heavy open woods, where w
up by a leftoblique march in fine arder, and, joinin

regiment, we continued to pursue the enemy for some 

fields, woods, roads, and hills, until we passed over the 

af the enemy into the hills, where we passed also 

artillery, and found we had utterly cut the enemy’s 

(Colonel Samuel K. McSpadden, 19th Alabama Infan

Deas’ Brigade, in O.R., vol. 30, pt. 2,334.) 

Teaching Points: confusion of battle* improvisation

amicicide. 

Stand 23 

ManigauIt’s Brigade 

(Large field east of Wilder Tawer [see nap 

S&&ion: 26 September 1863, p.m. Brigadier Gene

Manigault’s Brigade represented the left of Hindm

Manigault’s Brigade crossed LaFayette Road about 11

the west. The three left regiments of the brigade we

field when they were engaged by Wilde&s brigade, ass

Indiana Mounted Infantry. Manigault expected supp

from Colonel Robert C. Triggs Brigade of Brigadier G

Preston’s Division, but he did not receive it. Wilder’s fi

decimated Manigault’s regiments and forced them a

across LaFayette Road. After re-forming the brigade, M

advanced, this time to the northwest. 

Vignette: “The fire we got under when first we became 

morning exceeded anything I ever before or after expe

seemed alive with bullets, and an offficer afterwards r

‘General, all you had to do was to hold out your hand, 

Out of about 800 men that came into the full fury of th

300 were shot down in a space of time certainly not 

minutes.‘* (Arthur L. Manigault, in R, L. Tower, ed., A 

to War [Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 
Longstreet shell pyramid 

67) Resecrans shell pyramid t 

Lai igade plaque 

Lytle pyramid 4 

Yilder 

‘ower 

Map 9. Day 2, stands 23 through 
Situatian 1: 19-20 September 1863. At about 1130 

Rosecrans and his staff moved here from Cra

accompanied by his headquarters guard, the 15t

Cavalry Regiment, the 10th Ohio Infantry Regime

Battalion Ohio Sharpshooters. Charles Dana, the as

of war, also accompanied Rosecrans. A signal corps d

telegraph wire to Rossville, with a branch to Thoma

this position on the right of the army, Rosecrans attte

the battle by using the sound of the guns as a gu

Rosecrans assembled his commanders at the cabin 

widow, to determine the following day’s actions. Una

attack and unwilling to retreat, Rosecrans beIieved h

the key terrain. He therefore elected to defend the 

one more day with Thomas’ XIV Corps on the left, Mc

on the right, and Major General Thomas L. Crittenden

reserve. Granger, commanding the Reserve Corps 

unable to attend the meeting. Although those present 

exhausted, the conference lasted into the early hour

and was followed by impromptu entertainment. Early 

of 20 September, Rosecrans rode north to inspect his 

orders for his headquarters to move northward behind 

of the army. 

Vignette: “Widow Glenn’s log house was, like all th

kind, provided with a large fire-place, in which a 

burning-perhaps the only fire within 15 square mil

the order given not to light fires on that night for a

remains of a candle were stuck into a reversed bay

dimly the battle map, which was spread out upon a c

fire in the large chimney place flared up from 

illuminating the faces of those who took part in th

There was Major-General Rosecrans, sitting, in f

sword, on the edge of a rustic bed frame, bending tow

the scantily furnished room, listening and somet

General Thomas, who sat near the fire, occupying the 

had been left by the widow Glenn. There were 

commanding corps, divisions and brigades, some sitti

hewn barren floor, with their backs against the wa
Teaching Points: Headquarters location, comma

intent, sleep plan. 

Situation 2: 20 September 1863, a.m. After 

Sheridan’s division occupied this position with 

reserve on its right rear. Sheridan’s troops re

the position until about 1130, when they were 

northeast to assist Davis’ division. As Manigau

across Glenn Field, Wilder’s brigade, which o

repulsed the attack. Wilder then prepared to att

flank of Longstreet’s Left Wing. Ke was prevente

arrival of Assistant Secretary of War Dana, who 

to Chattanooga. By the time Dana was dispose

attack the Confederate flank was past, and Wild

from the field. 

Vignette: “Lieutenant-Colonel Thruston, chief 

staff, soon appeared and notified me that the lin

back and dispersed, and advised that I had bett

Mountain, I determined, however, to attempt 

General Thomas at Rossville, and was arrang

purpose when General Dana, Assistant Secreta

said that ‘our troops had fled in utter panic; th

than Bull Run; that General Rosecrans wa

captured;’ and strongly advised me to fall back 

over Lookout Mountain to prevent the rebel occ

staff officers now came up and reported that 

Sheridan a mile and a half to the rear and left, 

that he ‘was trying to collect his men and joi

Rossville, and that I had better fall back to the 

now, at 4 p.m,, did so with great reluctance, 

number of wagons loaded with ammunition, a g

a number of caissons, a great many stragglers, 

straying beef-cattle.” (CoIonel John T. Wilder, 

449.) 

TeacFLing Points: Flexibility, audacity, leadersh
path of Davis’ troops as they were driven back in disorde

spread to Laiboldt’s brigade and threatened the 

Sheridan’s division as well. Only Lytle’s brigade stoo

when its commander was killed and its flanks turned, 

to the west. 

Vignette I: “Our position was in an open field, about th

then came a pine thicket, furnishing a fine protection 

advance through. At twelve o’clock M. [noon] we were 

bayonets and charge across the field and meet the 

coming eight lines deep toward us. On reaching the edg

orders came for us to halt and fire. This was amid a 

flying from our front, right, and left. Sergeant Lewis, re

bearer, fell just before we halted, wounded in the leg. I 

Newlin and Brown to carry him from the field. Neither o

heard of after the battle. Art. Terre11 fell dead within 

pierced through the temples by a ball. Enoch Smith 

killed, and John Bostwick wounded; I ordered Sam Boe

off, but he did not get him, for before reaching him Boen 

save his own life. The flag was taken up by one of th

immediately after Lewis fell; he soon fell; taken up by a

Then a retreat was ordered. I grasped the colors and c

the field. I was not struck, only by a buckshot, and tha

haversack, checked by striking my tin cup. The regim

‘pell mell;’ could not be rallied to be effective again durin

(Captain Tilmon D. Kyger, Company C, 73d Illin

Laiboldt’s brigade, in W. H. Newlin, A History of the 

Regiment offllirwis Infantry Volunteers, Springfield, IL

Vignette 2: “Our brigade now wheeled into line. As we a

hill, we met the 2d brig. [Laiboldt’sl coming back in 

Sheridan spoke cheerfully telling us to keep cool and w

check them but I am almost ashamed to own that 

different. We gained the crest of the hill and layed dow

Rebs yelling Iike demons. We received them coolly an

checked them in front, but soon a more serious difficult

were flanking us and we had nothing to oppose to them

back to the foot of the hill, we then rallied and charged 
Rosecrans said charge them once for Old Rossie b

use, we had done all that could be done without 

Private, 36th Illinois Infantry Regiment, Lytle’s 

Files, Chickamauga and Chattanooga National 

Oglethorpe, GA.) 

Teaching Points: Confusion, panic. 

Stand 26 

Lytle’s Brigade 

(Lytle shell pyramid [see map 9

Situation: 20 September 1863, a.m. Lytle’s br

division moved from the Widow Glenn’s cabin 

position about 1130. The brigade was following La

of Sheridan’s division, which advanced into the s

Field to support Davis’ division. When the Confed

Davis and Laiboldt, Lytle tried to rally his brigade 

brief time, he was successful, until he was hit thre

foot, and mouth) and killed. When the brigade 

field, Lytle’s body was left behind. The Confedera

ground recognized Lytle, a well-known poet fro

placed a guard over the body. Eventually, Ly

returned to the Federals for burial. 

Vignette: “‘While riding through the woods yester

dead body of General Lytle, of Cincinnati, Ohio. 

once. We had been friends in the old days, as our 

us. A Confederate soldier was standing guard o

what I learned from the guard it appeared that a 

troops, under command of General Zach. Deas, wh

charge Longstreet made, had struck Lytle’s brig

behind rude entrenchments of logs and rails. Thes

Deas’s men, driving Lytle’s back. About this tim

and his men, retreating, left his body where he fe

by his uniform as a general officer, and Captai

Deas’s staff, took charge of his watch and pap

sentinel on guard over the body. Dismounting, 
He wore high riding-boots, a regulation overcoat, d

While standing beside the body, General Preston rod

‘Who have you there?’ I replied, ‘General Lytle, of C

said General Preston, ‘General Lytle, the son of my 

Lytle! I am very sorry indeed it is so;” and he dismounte

affected. After asking the sentinel his instructions, a

same answer I had obtained, he said to him, ‘See th

man.’ We then mounted and rejoined the division, whi

the road. 

“‘Lytle’s body was returned in an ambulance to h

flag of truce, and, as he was known to the gentlemen 

army to be a gallant and chivalrous soldier, as well as 

beautiful poem entitled, ‘Anthony and Cleopatra,’ a

grieved at his taking off. As the ambulance contain

passed on its way to the enemy’s lines the road was li

and men, who testif?ed their respect for the dead Gen

their hats and looking on silently.*’ (William Miller 

and Battle With the Washington Artillery [Boston, M

Co., 18851,286-87.) 

Teaching Point: Humanity in war. 

Stand 27 

F&Id Headquarters, Army of the Cumbe

(Rosecrans shell pyramid, 

&all at west edge of aauth Dyer Field [see m

Situation: 20 September 1863, a.m. On returning from 

Rosecrans established his field command post o

midmorning. The position was hardly vacant: the 15

Cavalry waited behind the ridge, a large ordnance tra

the rear, Van Cleve’s division and Crittenden were o

north. As the battle grew in intensity, Rosecrans orde

move and support Thomas. Crittenden asked and rec

to accompany his last division, and he followed it e

point, Wood’s division began to pull out of line in 

infamous order, while Davis and Sheridan also put th
gg 

completely disorganized. Said a reporter for a Lo

The scenes I witnessed here were such as c

comprehended from description. . . . Men came 

careless of curses and entreaties, consternation pic

feature. . . , Guns, knapsacks, blankets, cartridge

that could impede the flight were cast away.” (J. C

North Reports the Civil War [Pittsburgh, PA: Unive

Press, 19551,455-56.) 

Teaching Points: Command post location, leaders

impact of unexpected events. 

Stand 28 

Longstreet’s Left Wing 

(Longstreet shell pyramid [see map 

Situation: 20 September 1863, p.m. By early afte

Left Wing, especially Hood’s massive column, had 

success than could have been expected. Moving for

Johnson’s brigades, Longstreet and his small 

headquarters at this spot. While Longstreet wat

units pursued fleeing Federals in all directions. G

Federal resistance began to grow on Snodgrass Hill

his units paused to reorganize, Longstreet, Major 

Buckner, and their staffs ate lunch. During the 

from Bragg called Longstreet to army headquarte

situation. Longstreet rode to Bragg’s headquarters 

away, reported his success, and asked for reinforce

the wing reserve, Preston’s Division, was uncomm

the request for reinforcements, so Longstreet 

headquarters around 1500 and ordered Preston fo

units had already begun to assault Snodgrass Hill, 

not change their focus. The result was a serSes of 

unsuccessful frontal assaults. No effort was mad

end of the Snodgrass Hill line, although both flanks 

Vignette: ‘“3 p.m. While our division was resting 

occasional fire of a battery posted on Horseshoe 
ridge yonder, not many though. If we had had our Virg

we could have whipped them in half the time. By th

‘don’t you want some guns for your command? I thin

have captured fifty to-day.’ 

“I told him I did, and would like to make a chang

those we have being very indifferent. 

“‘Well,’ he said, ‘you can have as many as you wan

““General, hadn’t you better put that in writing? 

“EIe laughed, and instructed Latrobe to write 

guns.” (William Miller Owen, Preston’s staff, In. Camp 

the Washington Artillery [Boston, MA: Tichnar and Co

Teaching Points: Branches and sequels, seeing the bat

Stand 29 

Harker’ Brigade 

(North end of north Dyer Field [see map 

Sitrc*ttian: 20 September 1863, a.m.-p.m. Harker’s 

second of Woods units to move out of line after Wood r

to move north and support Reynolds. The brigade 

Brannan’s division northward through Dyer Field. Ju

the field, he was halted by Wood and reoriented, fir

south. Quickly changing front, the brigade formed 

across the northern end of Dyer Field. From this p

directed a local counterattack that routed parts of Law

Divisions. While the Confederates were rallying in t

the field, Hood rode to assist them and was serious

counterattack advanced to about this position. Br

Joseph B. Kershaw’s Division then charged Harker, 

over the crest of the hill northwest of Dyer Field 

Snodgrass Hill. 

Vignette I: “The enemy fled in confusion, and disapp

We pursued 400 yards and lay down behind a prostr

was upon another less tenable, but parallel ridge to th
40th Ohio 

menu ment 

Snodgrass 

cabin 

a Sirwell’s 

121st 

menu 

plaque 

Division plaque 

L Preston’s 

Map 10. Day 2, stands 29 through 3
, 

to my left gave way, and then that upon my right. M

thinking this meant for all to retire, arose and faced 

almost instantly resumed their position. The enemy 

themselves prolonged my line to the right, occupied 

there, and enfiladed my line with a destructive fire. Li

commanding Company C, fell dead, when Sergt. A

assumed command of his company. Lieutenant Barne

Company E, went down with a broken thigh, and Lieu

was placed in command. Captain Yeomans carried o

upper leg, but he remained with his company during t

severe pain. Numbers fell dead and more were seriousl

the line was firmly maintained, Lieutenant Clark c

‘They can kill us, but whip us never.’ Seeing no relie

regiment to the ridge in rear. In doing so, some troops p

through my right wing, which caused a little confusion 

ranks were closed immediately, and the crest occupied 

by General Wood.” (Colonel Emerson Opdycke, 125th 

Regiment, in O.R., vol. 30, pt. 1,708.) 

Vignette 2: “We wrestled with the resolute foe till a

when, from a skirt of timber to our left, a body of Federa

upon the immediate flank and rear of the Texas brig

forced to suddenly change front. Some confusion nece

was at the time on my horse, upon a slight ridge abou

yards distant, and galloped down the slope, in the m

who speedily corrected their alignment. At this mom

splendid division, led by its gallant commander, cam

Kershaw’s line formed. . . an angle with that of the Fe

in full view in an open space near the wood. I rode 

command, ordered a change of front forward on his r

promptly executed under a galling fire. With a shout 

front, the Confederates rushed forward. . . . About t

pierced with a Minie ball in the upper third of the rig

from my horse upon the side of the crushed limb and 

say. . .- into the arms of some of the troops of my old 

had directed so long a period, and upon so many fields 
Stand 30 

Kershaw’s Brigade 

(South Carolina monument [see 

Sit2tatian: 20 September 1863, p.m. Kershaw, 

Division (Kershaw’s and Brigadier General Be

Brigades] forced Harker’s brigade back from D

over this hill into the ravine to the north. F

Brigade unsuccessfully assaulted the Federal t

and were driven back to cover in the ravine. Ke

and his men were pinned in the ravine. Hump

moved into position on the Federal Bank but 

opportunity and was permitted by Longstreet 

distance. Kershaw’s men kept up the fire agai

Humphreys” troops remained inactive for the re

Vign&e: “In our first general advance. . . as th

brow of the hill, just before striking the ene

company and the other color company, being c

pressure of the flanks on either side, became fo

disorganized mass. A sudden discharge of g

batteries, as well as from their sharpshooters 

threw us in greater confusion, and many 

unexpectedly. A Sergeant in my company, T. C

a EearfuI wound in the abdomen. Catching my 

begged to be carried off. “Oh! for Cod’s sake, 

bleed to death or have my life trampled out! 

But the laws of war are inexorable, and none c

care for the wounded, and those whose duty i

matters were unfortunately too often far in the 

safety for themselves, to give much thought or 

soldiers. Before our lines were properly adjuste

was beyond the aid of anyone. He had died from 

(D. Augustus Dicker& 3d South Carolina 

Kershaw’s Brigade, in History of Kershaufs &

Elbert H. Au11 Co., 1899; reprint, Dayton, OH

Bookshop, 13761,279.) 
Situation: 20 September 1863, p.m. When Kershaw’s 

the ravine south of Vittetoe Road, Preston’s Divisio

forward from the vicinity of the Brotherton cabin at a

Brigadier General Archibald Gracie’s Brigade on the r

John H. KelIy’s on the left, the division assaulted S

about 1630. The attacks continued for more than o

hours. By sundown, Gracie’s Brigade had gained a toe

of the hill but could advance no farther. Of the 2,003 

Gracie carried into action, 725 became casualties 

wounded, and 27 missing)-36 percent casualties in 1 

Vignette: “‘In order to reach the breastworks where th

posted we had to pass over the top of a ridge severa

from their position, then go down a slope into a rav

steep side of Snodgrass Hill. The moment we appeared 

were greeted by a ferocious volley of musketry. We ha

a few steps when Lieutenant Colonel Holt was mort

ordered him carried to the rear. A few minutes later 

glancing ball on the inside of my left ankle. . . . We had 

the bottom of the ravine before many of our men h

killed outright, more wounded. . . . When I saw how 

butchered and discovered no ranking officer of the 

charge, I endeavored to get the men to move forward 

to fire and reload. I saw General Gracie coming along 

line on foot. I ran to him and asked what orders he wis

He said: “Tell the men for God’s sake to go forward. 

the line repeating the General’s order. The roar of 

deafening that the men could scarcely hear me. While 

up the hill toward the breastworks and the battalion 

rapidly enough, I went in front of the line and motio

come on faster. It occurred to me that I did not want 

back. Just after I had turned to face the enemy a Minie 

left breast a little below the collar bone. . . . Lieutenant 

one or two others ran to me and asked what they co

answered: ‘Never mind me. Go on faster!“’ (John Mass

Battalion, Alabama Legion, Reminiscences [Nashville, 

House of the M.E, Church, South, l.9161,186-87.) (J
bSirwell”s brigude pEa+e, east end of Snadgras

Situation: 20 September 1863, p.m. Thomas’ field 

the foot of the reverse slope of this hill. During 

battle, Thomas rode back and forth between th

Field positions issuing orders and inspiring confi

During one of Thomas’ absences, he diverted Neg

brigade to this vicinity. In a verbal message deliv

one of Thomas’ aides, the corps commander ord

all available artillery and orient it toward the 

crossroads to cover the corps* left flank. Negley 

this point approximately 50 guns, 50 Embers, 5

plus ‘2 infantry regiments and 4 companies 

addition, he gathered many of the ammunition 

withdrawn to the rear as the battle progres

discovered that, from this point, the guns could f

the McDonald house but could not control the c

loss of the artillery and ammunition because 

Federal right, Negley made a fateful decision to 

1330, he and his remaining infantry left the fie

before Brigadier General James H. Steedman a

brigades of troops and 95,000 rounds of ammu

saved the artillery, Negley ultimately lost his co

actions. 

Vignetie: “‘On the evening of the 12th I prescribe

S. Negley; also on the two days following, which 

the 15th and 16th he was confined to his bed, ha

diarrhea. On the 17th the command moved, he 

the precaution to have an ambulance near to 

arrived at camp very much exhausted. The ev

command moved; he was up and on duty most of 

was busy with the command all the day, it bein

morning and evening. This night he was m

exposure, want of sleep, rest, and sickness, and w

rest he could that night to enable him to be on d

he slept in bivouac this night with the comm
Teaching Points: Command post location, improvisat

decisions. 

Stand 33 

Defense of Snodgrass Hill 

(Yard of &m&grass cabin [see map 101

Situation: 20 September 1863, p.m. Harker’s brigade 

on the eastern end of Snodgrass Hill after being dr

Field. Harker took advantage of the strongest positio

deployed his four regiments in two lines. On Harker’s 

from Brannan’s, Negley’s, Van Cleve’s, and Wood’s div

extended the Federal line to the west. Harker’s men a

fragments fended off the initial assaults of Kershaw a

by Hindman”s and Preston’s Divisions. Eventually, 

extended the Federal line even farther westward. 

Vignette I: “General Brannan, having rallied a part 

it, together with fragments of other commands, form

my right, while my brigade formed in two lines to the 

fronting to the south and nearly perpendicular to Re

then on my left. 

“It wiEl be seen that the right and a part of the 

Cleve’s division being completely swept away, our l

and in the form of a crochet [hook], must resist nearly 

force in our front, or itself be swept away, and the g

Cumberland-the pride of the nation--be utterly ro

troops, appreciating the importance of their position, 

to the last. Nobly did they redeem their promise. Fr

until nightfall this line was repeatedly attacked, 

unbroken. . . . It affords me great pleasure to refer to 

firing of the regiments of my brigade on the afternoo

have remarked before that while occupying a part o

position’ they were formed in two lines. 

‘They were lying a little below the northern or ea

hill; the front line fling by volley would retire, whe
g pp, yg 

Note: A wide variety of evidence indicates th

monuments in the vicinity of Snodgrass Hill 

incorrectly located. While correct placement is 

appears that most Federal markers should b

one brigade front to the west. 

Stand 34 

Van Derveer’s Brigade 

S&~&on: 20 September 1863, p.m. On this 

several brigades made their stand. Anchoring 

to the west was another relatively intact 

brigade of Brannan’s division. Although C

repeated assaults, this position was also h

Monuments to Confederate units on the forwa

below the crest indicate how near the Confede

the Federal fine. 

Vignette: “The slope in our front was now we

and we could see the gray legs of the front line, 

crossed the road at the foot and commenced 

following, each containing more men than we

of defenders. “Don’t waste any cartridges no

instruction given, (and this was quite unn

commenced firing-and the men in gray com

seemed to bow their heads to the storm of b

way among and over their fallen comrades w

the slope by hundreds, they came bravely and 

they approached nearer, and the firing in the

more deadly, they seemed to lose the assuring 

the vacancies rapidly increased, they began 

got’em, see’em wabble” were the first words 

since the firing had begun-then they hatted 

wildly into the tree taps, then turned and 

slope, carrying the second line with them,” (L

_-.. 
(Preston’s Divisionplaque, foot of Srwdgrass Hill [

Situation: 20 September 1863, p.m. After Longstreet 

reinforcements from Bragg, he committed his own re

Division, to the assault on Snodgrass Hill (Horseshoe 

Brigade attacked the eastern end of the ridge, while 

assaulted the sector west of this position. On being 

and Gracie’s men rallied under the slight protection 

road at the foot of the ridge. Initially, Trigg’s Briga

reserve, but it eventually joined the battle west of Kell

Preston% Division carried into action 4,078 officers a

them untested in battle. The division suffered a 

casualties, a loss of 33 percent in 1 112 hours. 

Vignette: “The position held by the enemy is a very G

precipitous, and dii%cult to climb, but the day is wear

time should be lost. Longstreet determines to put in 

Preston’s 5,000, and sends for the General, and orde

advance. ‘It shall be done,’ replies Preston, and 

Attention! is given down the lines of the three briga

troops spring to their arms; it is their fast baptism o

are whipped they won’t know it. 

“The lines are dressed, and at the commands, F

the 5,000 move on in beautiful order. The enemy ope

but up the hill our men advance; now the enemy’s bu

upon the lines, and men fall to the right and left, de

but the rest move on undismayed, firing rapidly as t

the artillery and infantry fire is too hot for them, alt

fought most gallantly, and, halting under the cr

protection is had, the lines are dressed, and G

reassuring them by his presence, rides down the 

examines each man’s cartridge-box, and says, ‘Men, 

bayonet,-the bayonet,- we will give them the bayon

and all cry out, ‘Go ahead, General! we are no

Confidence restored by the General’s coal demeano

enthusiasm of the troops raised to the highest pitch, 

the front and centre of his line, and leads the way w
p

Stand 36 

Johnson’s (Fulton’s) Brigad

(Johnson’s Brigade plaque [see n

Situation: 20 September 1863, p.m. At about 14

Division advanced toward the western end of Ho

Brigade was on the right and Johnson% (Fulton’

with Dent’s and York% Batteries in support. F

and was turning Brannan’s flank when he was 

the advance of Steedman’s fresh division. A

reorganize, Fulton and Gregg assaulted again, 

McNair’s Brigade and part of Manigault’s B

Division. The fighting continued until Steedm

sunset. 

Vignscte: “My line was again ordered forward, t

50 yards of the batteries and but one piece firing

most desperate struggle for the possession of this 

Ridge. The battle raged furiously and the tide 

the balance. Charge after charge was repulse

charge again. Again our line fell back, and the 

and determined officers rallied again their fas

again moved forward. Here offticers and men b

Appeals to love of home and wounded comrade

“moment were made, and never did men rush 

daring, desperate, and defiant. The enemy’s tre

show that our fire was terribly effective upon 

boxes bad been replenished as required, and st

Again more ammunition was supplied and the 

and heavy, The enemy was now slowly giving 

our now shattered remnants. Another charge

men and cheers of the offleers, and forward we p

the victory was ours and the enemy in full re

engagements lasted four long hours, during wh
(221 st Ohio monument[see map 101) 

Situation: 20 September 1863, p.m. Late in the mor

commanding the Reserve Corps near Rossville, decide

three brigades toward the sounds of battle. Granger a

under Steedman reached the vicinity of the Snodgras

1400. Their timely arrival was one of the most drama

the battle. Thomas first considered placing Steedman 

left but quickly changed his mind and sent the two 

right of Van Derveer’s brigade. Steedman’s brigades, l

General Walter C. Whitaker and Colonel John G. Mit

the reverse slope of the ridge and ran headlong into Bu

Confederate troops advancing up the other side. A

struggle, Steedman% troops held the crest of the 

remainder of the afternoon. Around sunset, the two F

quietly withdrew northward and joined the retreating 

Cumberland. 

Vignette: “My men fought them by firing until out of a

when I sent to Colonel Mitchell for orders and was dire

hill at the point of the bayonet, I bid farewell to home 

the 113th. I gave the order and the men obeyed with 

the hill we went, but the Rebels seemed not very anxio

to stay back, and I let the men fall back over the crest a

with the few men from the cover of trees who had supp

with cartridges from the boxes of their dead and wou

we kept the hill until night when we received orders to 

into the fight with 345 men and officers, counting my

the fight 127 killed, wounded and missing as follo

wounded 95, missing 10. No comment is necessary on t

no one can begin to realize what it required for men 

(Colonel Darius B. Warner, 113th Ohio Infantry Regi

brigade, in a letter home, 27 September 1863

Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military 

Oglethorpe, GA.1 

Teaching Points: Timing, luck, leadership. 
Hill. Granger, who had spent most of the 

cannoneer in the yard of the Snodgrass cabin

long after Thomas, leaving subordinate com

devices. Ry nightfall, Wood, Brannan, a

withdrawn their commands from the ridge 

probably inadvertently, were three regiments, 

Ohio, and 89th Ohio. All three had been deta

commands earlier and had been serving temp

units. As their ammunition ran out, the regim

hold their position with bayonets. The withdraw

the flanks of these regiments permitted Kelly’s 

Preston’s Division to surround the three reg

capture them in the darkness. 

Vignette: “‘I was unable to communicate with 

general officer was designated to whom I 

continued to hold our position. The cartridge-

wounded were carefully searched, also t

ammunition that might be carried there in th

wounded, and by this means obtained sufficie

the enemy in their assault upon our position ab

‘“In this assault the enemy crossed the 

carried his banners up the hill to with[inl26 y

repulsed, and did not retire in good order. 

battery had range upon our position, inflicting 

also setting fire to the leaves and brush in o

advanced under cover of the smoke. The wou

fire, were removed. 

‘“A heavy line af skirmishers continued t

Ere upon this line exhausted our ammunitio

sundown, at which time the Second Regimen

relieved us. A further search for ammunition 

round each for the men composing my com

become very much reduced in numbers, 

“At this time Colonel Van Derveer (w

ordered me to occupy a position on the extre
also opened upon our left, which took effect both upo

our right and ourselves. During the misundersta

occasioned, a part of my men escaped under cover of th

‘San Derveer having withdrawn the troops under his 

command was unsupported, and both flanks were ex

lost our stand of colors, which were made sacred to us 

many comrades who fell in their defense and for their 

fields as well as on the unfortunate field of Chickam

Arnold McMahan, 21st Ohio Infantry Regiment, in O.R

389.) 

Teaching Points: Fate of attached units, leadership. 

Stand 39 

End of the Battle 

&m&-ass cabin [see map IO]) 

Situ&ion: 20 September 1863, p.m. As darkness fell on 

Federal units withdrew quietly northward, leaving th

the Confederates. Too exhausted to mount a meaningf

Army of Tennessee halted where it had fought. Most 

sleep, but many attempted to aid the wounded or sough

Losses on both sides were appalling. 

V&n&e: “Night finally put an end to the outrage

thorough was the exhaustion of the troops from long c

that at the close of this day there was indeed a cessatio

Gracie’s brigade having been so terribly shattered, w

dark. The troops constituting the relief occupied the 

down upon their arms, and slept amid the dead. I

possible to distinguish the living from the dead, so pr

slumber of the former. Silence reigned upon the 

comparative silence. An attentive ear would have ca

there, a low plaintive wail, sob or sigh, from the coun

Being one of the few survivors of the 1st Battalion 

unharmed, the writer was called upon to go with a squ

and convey to the field-hospital the wounded of the 
gg

lurid glare was cast by scores of flaming rai

agonized features of the many victims of the 

canopy for the sufferers save the heavens-no 

earth-and no pillows save billets of wood-. . . 

witnessed many death wenes occurring simultan

hospital we hurried, sick at heart, to the rende

After much diniculty, we found the remnant o

left of 2301~now a mere squad-huddled arou

face was powder stained and haggard to the las

little talking; our thoughts were of our fallen co

of what was spoken araund that fire that nigh

‘Jim, poor fellow, was shot down at the first vo

his face and never spoke.’ ‘Bird, they say, is mo

a good boy.’ “During the fight I passed brother A

wounded. I could not stop to help him. The poor 

me, and summoning all his strength, waived 

enemy.“’ CLewelIyn A. Shaver, 1st Battalion

Gracie”s Brigade, A History of the Sixtieth Alaba

Alabama Brigade /Montgomery, AL: Barrett 

18671,17-19.) 

Teaching Paint: Cost of the battle. 
Leavenworth has conducted the Chickamauga Staff Rid

for the Command and General Staff Officer Course f

years. The Staff Ride Team has designed Staff Rides 

military units and groups and can provide advice an

every aspect of the Chickamauga campaign. The comm

include extensive files, detailed knowledge of the camp

and familiarity with the Chickamauga and Chattan

Military Park and surrounding area. 

Address: U.S. Army Command and General S

Combat Studies Institute 

ATTN: ATZL-SW1 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-69

Telephone: AUTGVGN 552-341413831 

Commercial (913) 684-34143831 

b. The National Park Service maintains the Chi

Chattanooga National Military Park, which includes 

at Chickamauga and Lookout Mountain. The Nationa

staff can provide advice and assistance to any group 

the park. The Visitor Center at Chickamauga includes 

an impressive collection of shoulder arms and a boo

picnic areas are located throughout the park, but res

are located only at the Visitor Center. Because some re

use of the park exist, any military group should coor

with the park headquarters before the actual battlefield 

Address: Superintendent 

Chickamauga and Chattanooga Nati

Park 

P.G. Box 2126 

Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia 30742 

Telephone: (404) 866-9241 

2. Logistics. 

a. Meals. 

(1) No facilities exist within the park itself, 

restaurantq grocery stores, and fast-food establishmen

in Fort Oglethorpe, which is within minutes of the park 
pppg

practice can be time consuming. In addition, lea

lunch tends to break the participants’ concentra

study. 

(3) One person with a car or van can easil

breaks or meals, Most of the fast-food restauran

offer take-out service and hot or cold drinks (ma

in advance for large groups). Consider brin

insulated beverage jugs. Also, soft drinks and sn

more cheaply at a home station commissary than 

forget standard items such as trash bags. 

b. Lodging. 

(1) Numerous motels can be found in t

Perhaps the largest concentration is near the 

Interstate 75, east of Chattanooga. Many motels 

large groups. 

(2) For military groups, the National Gua

Catoosa, Georgia, can provide billeting, 

commitments. 

Address: Catoosa Area Training Cente

Route 1, Box 1336 

Tunnel Hill, Georgia 307559

Telephone: (404) 9354897 

3. Medical. 

The nearest civilian hospital is in Fort Ogle

of the Visitor Center. No military medical 

immediate area. 

4. Other Considerations. 

a. Ensure that the group has proper clothing

gloves, etc., for inclement weather. Because t

and muddy, comfortable boots or hiking shoes a
d. Maintain good relations with the park of&ials 

unusual requirements well in advance. Be sure to obey 

e. Traffic along roads in the park is often heavy. 

crossing roads, and walk along the shoulders whenever 
1st Battalion Ohio Sharpshooters, Capt. Gershom M. B

10th Ohio Infantry, Lt. Cal. William M. Ward 

15th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Col. William J. Palmer 

XTVARMYCORPS 

Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas 

General Headquarters 

Provost Guard 

9th Michigan Infantry, Col. John G. Parkhurst (Not eng

guarding trains and performing provost duty) 

Escort 

1st Ohio Cavalry, Company L, Capt. John D. Barke

1ST DIVISION 

Brig. Gen. Absalom Baird 

1st Srigade 

Col. Benjamin F. Scribner 

39th Indiana, Lt. Cal. Daniel F. GrifEn 

2d Ohio, Lt. CoE. Obadiah C. Maxwell, Maj. William T. Beatty, Captda

33d Ohio, Col. Oscar F. Moore 

94th Ohio, Maj. Rue P. Hutchins 

16th Wisconsin, Lt. Col. John H. Ely, Capt. Jacob W. Roby 

2d Brigade 

Brig. Gen. John C. Starkweather 

24th Illinois, Cal. Geza Mihalotxy, Capt. August Mauff 

79th Pennsylvania, Col. Henry A. Hambright 

1st Wisconsin, Lt. Col. George B. Bingham 

21st Wisconsin, Lt. Cal. Harrison C. Hobart, Capt. Charles H. Walker 

3d Brigade 

Brig. Gen. John H. King 

15th United States, tst Battalien, Capt. Albert B. Dod 

16th United States, 1st Battalion, Maj. Sidney Coolidge, Capt. R. E. A

18th United States, 1st Battalion, Capt. George W. Smith 

18th United States, 2d Battalion, Capt. Henry Haymond 

19th United States, 1st Battalion, Maj. SamueI K. Dawson, Capt. Edm

Arr&?ry 

Indiana Light, 4th Battery (2d Brigade), Lt. David Flansburg, Lt. He

147 
Brig. Gen.Jahn Beatty 

104th Illinois, Lt. Gal. Douglas Hapeman 

42d Indiana, Lt. Col. William T. B. M&&ire 

88th Indiana, Col. George Humphrey 

15th Kentucky, Cal. Marion C. Taylor 

2d Brigade 

Cal. Timothy R. Stanley 

Gol. William L. Stoughton 

19th Illinois, Lt. Cal. Alexander W. R&en 

1 lth Michigan, Col. William L. Stoughtan, Lt. Cal. Melvin Yud

18th Ohio, Lt, Col. Charles H. Grosvenor 

3d Btigode 

Cd. William Sirwell 

37th Indiana, Lt. Cat. William D. Ward 

2lst Ohio, Lt. Col. Dwells, M. Stoughton, Maj, Arnold McM

Vantine 

74th Ohio, Capt. Joseph Fisher 

78th Pennsylvania, Lt. Cal. Archibald Blakeley 

Artillery 

Illinais Light, Bridges’ Battery (1st Brigade), Capt. Lyman Br

1st Ohio Light, Battery G (3d Brigade>, Capt. Alexander Mars

1st Ohio Light, Battery M (2d Brigade), Capt. Frederick Schu

3D DIVISION 

Brig. Gen. John M. Brannan 

lstBriga& 

Col. John M. ConneIl 

82d Indiana, Col. Morton C. Hunter 

17th Ohio, Lt. Gal. Durbin Ward 

3 1 at Ohio, Lt. Cal. Frederick W. Lister 

38th O’hio, Cal. Edward H. Whelps (Not engaged; tram guard) 

ZdBrigade 

6~1. John T. Croxton 

Col. William H. Hays 

10th Indiana, Cal. William B. Carroll, Lt. Gal. Marsh B. Taylo

74th Indiana, Gal. Charles W. Chapman, Lt. 601. Myron Bake
2d Minnesota, Col. James George 

9th Ohio, Col. Gustave Kammerling 

85th Ohia, Lt. Col. Henry V. N. Boynton 

AtiiELry 

let Michigan Light, Battery D (1st Brigade), Capt. Josiah W. CX-mreh 

1st Ohio Light, Battery C C2d Brigade), Lt. Marco B. Gary 

4th United States, Battery I (3d Brigade), Lt. Frank G. Smith 

4TH DIVISION 

Maj. Gen. Jaseph J. Reynolds 

1stBrigade 

(Detached from its division and serving as mounted infan

Col. John T. Wilder 

92d Illinois, Col. Smith D. Atkins 

98th Illinois, Col. John 3. Funkhouser, Lt. Cal. Edward Kitehell 

123d Illinois, Cal. James Monroe 

17th Indiana, Maj. William T. Jones 

72d Fndiana, Cal. Abram 0. Miller 

2d Brigade 

Cal. Edward A. King 

Col. Milton S. Robinson 

68th Indiana, Capt. Harvey 3. Espy 

75th Indiana, Col. Milton S. Robinson, Lt. Cal. William O’Brien 

101st Indiana, Lt. Col. Thomas Doan 

105th Ohio, Maj, George T. Perkins 

3d Brigade 

Brig. Gen. John B. Turchin 

18th Kentucky, Lt. Col. Hubbard K. Milward, Capt. John B. Heltemes 

1 lth Ohio, Col. Philander P. Lane 

36th Ohio, Col. William G. Jones, Lt. Cal. Hiram F. Devol 

92d Ohio, Cal. Benjamin D. Fearing, Lt. CQI. Douglas Putnam Jr. 

Artillery 

Indiana Light, 18th Battery (1st Brigade), Capt. Eli Lilly 

Indiana Light, 19th Battery (2d Brigade), Capt. Samuel J. Harris, Lt. 

Indiana Light, 21st Battery (3d Brigade), Capt. William W. Andrew 
2d Kentucky Cavalry, Campany I, Lt. George 

ET DIVISION 

Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis 

l&b&a& 

(Not engaged; guarding supply train

Cal. P. Sidney Post 

59th Illinois, Lt. Cal. Joshua C. Winters 

74th Illinois, Col. Jason Marsh 

15th Illinois, Cal. John E. Bennett 

22d Indiana, Col. Michael Gooding 

Wisconsin Light Artillery, 5th Battery, Capt. George Q. Gard

2d Brigade 

Brig. Gen. William P. Carlin 

21st Illinois, Cal. John W. S. Alexander, Capt. Chester K. Kn

38th Illinois, Lt. Col. Daniel H. Gilmer, Capt. Willis G. White

81st Indiana, Capt. Nevil B. Boone, Maj. James E. Calloway 

1Qlst Ohio, Lt. Col. John Messer, Maj. Bedan B. McDanald, C

Minnesota Light Artillery, 2d Battery (Capt. William A. 

artillery), Lt. Albert Woodbury, Lt. Richard L. Dawley 

3d &&a& 

Col. Hans C. Heg 

Cal. John A. Martin 

25th Illinois, Maj. Samuel D. Wall, Capt. Wesford Taggart 

35th Illinois, Lt. Col. William P. Chandler 

8th Kansas, Col. John A. Martin, Lt. Col. James L. Abernathy 

15th Wisconsin, Lt. Col. Ole C. Johnson 

Wisconsin Light ArtilIery, 8th Battery, Lt. John D. McLean 

2D DIVISION 

Brig. Gen. Richard W. Johnson 

1st Brigade 

Brig. Gen. August Willich 

88th Illinois, Lt. Col. Duncan J. Hall, Maj. William D. William

32d Indiana, Lt. Col. Frank Erdelmeyer 

38th Indiana (detached from its brigade and serving as mou

J I Harrison 

15th Ohio, Lt. Col. Frank Askew 
30th Indiana, Lt. Cal. Orrin D. Hurd 

77th Pennsylvania, Cal. Thomas E. Bose, Capt. Joseph J. Lawson 

Ohio Light Artillery, 20th Battery, Capt. Edward Grosskopff 

3d Brigade 

Col. Philemon P. Baldwin 

Col. William W. Berry 

6th Indiana, Lt. Cal. Hagerman Tripp, Maj- Calvin D. Campbell 

5th Kentucky, Col. William W. Berry, Capt. Jahn M. Huston 

1st Ohio, Lt. Col. Bassett Langdon 

93d Ohio, Col. Hiram Strong, Lt. Cal. William H. Martin 

Indiana Light Artillery, 5th Battery, Capt. Peter Simonson 

3D DIVISION 

Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan 

~SCBl+gdQ 

Brig. Gen. William H. Lytle 

Cal, Silas Miller 

3,6th Illinois, Col. Silas Miller, Lt. Col. Porter C. Olson 

88th Illinois, Lt. Cal. Alexander S. Chadbourne 

2lst Michigan, Col. William B. McCreery, Maj. Seymour Chase 

24th Wisconsin, Lt. Coi. Theodore S. West, Maj. Carl van Baumbach 

Indiana Light Artillery, 11th Battery, Capt. Arnold Sutermeister 

2d Brigade 

CoI. Bernard Laiboldt 

44th Illinois, Col. Wallace W. Barrett 

73d Illinois, Col. James F. Jaquess 

2d Missouri, Maj. Arnold Beck 

15th Missouri, Col. Joseph Conrad 

1st Missouri Light Artillery, Battery G (Capt. Henry Hescock, chief 

Lt. Gustavua Schueler 

3d Brigade 

Cd. Luther P. Bradley 

Cal. Nathan H. Walworth 

22d Illinois, Lt. Cal. Francis Swanwick 

27th Illinois, Cal. Jonathan R. Miles 

42d Illinois, Col. Nathan H. Walwarth, Lt. Cal. John A. Hotter&em 
15th Illinois Cavalry, Company K, Capt. Samu

1ST DIVISION 

Brig. Gem Thomas J. Wood 

1 st Briga& 

Col. George P. Buell 

106th Illinois, Col. Frederick A. Bartleson, Maj. Charles M. H

58th Indiana, Lt. Col. James T. Embree 

13th Michigan, Col. Joshua B. Culver, Maj. Willard G. Eaton 

26th Ohio, Lt. Cal. William H. Young 

2d Brigade 

(Stationed at Chattanooga and not enga

Brig. Gen. George D. Wagner 

15th Indiana, Cal. Gustavus A. Wood 

48th Indiana, Cal. John W. Blake 

57th Indiana, Lt. Col. George W. Lennard 

97th Ohio, Lt. Col. Milton Barnes 

3d Brigade 

Col. Charles G. Harker 

3d Kentucky, Col. Henry C. Dunlap 

64th Ohio, Col. Alexander McIlvain 

65th Ohio, Lt. Col. Horatio N. Whitbeck, Maj. Samuel C. Brow

125th Ohio, Col. Emerson Opdycke 

Artillery 

Indiana Light, 8th Battery (1st Brigade), Capt. George Estep 

Indiana Light, 10th Battery (2d Brigade) (stationed at Chat

Lt. William A. Naylor 

Ohio Light, 6th Battery (3d Brigade), Capt. Cullen Bradley 

2D DIVISION 

Maj. Gen. John M. Palmer 

1 st Brigade 

Brig. Can. Charles Cruft 

31 st Indiana, Col. John T. Smith 

1st Kentucky (five companies detached as wagon guard), Lt. 

2d Kentucky, Col. Thomas D. Sedgewick 

90th Ohio, Cal, Charles H. Rippey 
3d Brigade 

Cal. William Grose 

84th Illinois, Cal. Louis H. Waters 

36th Indiana, Lt. Col. Oliver H. P. Carey, Maj. Gilbert Trusler 

23d Kentucky, Lt. Cal. James C. Foy 

6th Ohio, Cal. Nicholas L. Anderson and Maj. Samuel C. Erwin 

24th Ohio, Cal. David J. Higgins 

krti~~ery 

Capt. William E. Standart 

1stOhio Light, Battery B (1st Brigade), Lt. Norman A. Baldwin 

1st Ohio Light, Battery F (2d Brigade), Lt. Giles J. Cockerill 

4th United States, Battery H (3d Brigade), Lt. Harry C. Cushing 

4th United States, Battery M (3d Brigade), Lt. Francis L. D. Russell 

Umttackd 

11th Illinois (battalion) (not engaged), Capt. E. Hibbard Topping 

3D DIVISION 

Brig, Gen. Horatio P. Van Cleve 

1st Brigode 

Brig. Gen. Samuel Beatty 

79th Indiana, Cal. Frederick Knefler 

9th Kentucky, Col. George H. Cram 

17th Kentucky, Cal. Alexander M. Stout 

19th Ohio, Lt. Col. Henry G. Stratton 

2d Brigade 

Col. George F. Dick 

44th Indiana, Lt. Col. Simeon C. Aldrich 

86th Indiana, Maj. Jacob C. Dick 

13th Ohio, Lt. Cal. Elhannon M. Mast, Capt. Horatio G. Cosgrove 

59th Ohio, Lt. Col. Granville A. Frambes 

3d Brigade 

Col. Sidney M. Barnes 

35th Indiana, Maj- John I?. Dufficy 

8th Kentucky, Lt. Cal. James D. Mayhew, Maj. John S. Clark 

2lst Kentucky (stationed at Whiteside’s and not engaged), Cd. S. Wo
RESERVE CORPS 

Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger 

IST DIVISION 

Brig. Gen. James B. Steedman 

l&Brigade 

Brig. Gen. Walter 6. Whitaker 

96th Illinois, Cal. Thomas E. Champion 

115th Illinois, Cal, Jesse H. Moore 

84th Indiana, Col. Nehon Trusler 

22d Michigan (temporarily attached), Col. Heber Le Favour, 

Capt. AIonzo M. Keeier 

40th Ohio, Ct. Cal. William Jones 

89th Ohio (temporarily attached), Col. Caleb H. Carlton, Cap

Ohio Light Artillery, 18th Battery, Capt. Charles C. Aleshire 

2d Brigade 

Col. John G. Mitchell 

78th Illinois, Lt. Cal. Carter Van Vleck, and Lt. George Green 

98th Ohio, Capt. Moses J. Urquhart, Capt. Armstrong J. Tho

113th Ohio, Lt. Cal. Darius B. Warner 

12lst Ohio, Lt. CoE. Henry B. Banning 

1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery M, Lt. Thomas Burton 

2D DIVISION 

Brig. Gen. James D. Morgan 

2d Brigade 

Col. Daniel McCook 

85th Illinois, Col. Caleb J. Dilworth 

66th Illinois, Lt. Col. David W. Magee 

125th Illinois, Cal. Oscar F. Harmon 

52d Ohio, Maj. James T. Holmes 

69th Ohio (temporarily attached), Lt. Col. Joseph H. Brigbam 

2d Illinois Light Artillery, Battery I, Capt. Charles M. Barne

CAVALRY CORPS 

Brig. Gen. Robert B. Mitchell 

1ST DIVISION 

Col. Edward M. McCook 
2d Indiana, Maj. Joseph B. Presdee 

4th Indiana, Lt. Cal. John T. Deweese 

2d Tennessee, Lt. Col. William R. Cook 

1st Wisconsin, Cal. Oscar H. La Grange 

1st Ohio Light Artillery, Battery D (section), Lt. Nathaniel M. Newe

3d Brigade 

Col. Louis D. Watkins 

4th Kentucky, Col. Wickliffe Cooper 

5th Kentucky, Lt. Cal. William T. Hoblitzell 

6th Kentucky, Maj. Louis A. Gratz 

2D DIVISION 

Brig. Gen. George Crook 

fstl3tigad.e 

Col. Robert H. G. Minty 

3d Indiana (battalion), Lt. Col. Robert Klein 

4th Michigan, Maj. Horace Gray 

7th Pennsylvania, Lt. Col. James J. Seibert 

4th United States, Capt. James B. McIntyre 

2d Brig& 

Col. Eli Long 

2d Kentucky, CoE. Thomas P. Nicholas 

1st Ohio, Lt. Col. Valentine Cupp, Maj. Thomas J. Patten 

3d Ohio, Lt. Cal. Charles B. Seidel 

4th Ohio, Lt. Cal. Oliver P. Robie 

Artillery 

Chicago (Illinois) Board of Trade Battery,Capt. James H. Stokes 
Headquarters 

Escort 

Capt. Guy Dreux 

Dreux’s Company Louisiana Cavalry, Lt. 0. De Bu

Holloway’s Company Alabama Cavalry, Capt. E. M. Ho

RIGHT W?NG 

Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk 

ESMW-6 

Greenleaf’s Company Louisiana Cavalry, Capt. Leeds G

CHEATHAM’S DIVISION (ofPolk’s Corps) 

Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham 

Escort 

Company G, 2d Georgia Cavalry, Capt. Thomas M. M

Jackson’s Brigade 

Brig, Gen. John K. Jackson 

1st Georgia (Confederated, 2d Battalion, Maj. James Clark Gordon 

5th Georgia, Col. Charles P. Daniel 

2d Georgia Battalion Sharpshooters, Maj. Richard H. Whiteley 

5th Mississippi, Lt. Cal. W. L. Sykes, Maj. John B. Herring 

8th Mississippi, Cal. John C. Wilkinson 

Smith’s Brigade 

Brig. Gen. Preston Smith 

Col. AlfredJ. Vaughn Jr. 

1 lth Tennessee, Col. George W. Gordon 

12th Tennessee/47th Tennessee, Cal. William M. Watkins 

l&h Tennesseell54th Tennessee, Col. A. J. Vaughn Jr., Lt. Col. R. W

29th Tennessee, Col. Horace Rice 

Dawson’e (battalion) Sharpshooters (composed of two compani

Tennessee, two from the 12th and 47th Tennessee [consolidated

164th Senior Tennessee), Maj. J. W. Dawson, Maj. William Gree

Mane-y% Brigade 

Brig. Gen. George Maney 

1st TennesseeB7th Tennessee, Cal. Hume R. Feild 

4th Tennessee (Provisional Army), Cal. James A. McMurry, Lt. C

Maj. Oliver A. Bradshaw, Capt. Joseph Bostick 
28th Tennessee, Cal. Sidney S. Stanton 

38th Tennessee and Maj. Thomas B. Murray’s (Tennessee) B

51st Tennessee/EiZd Tennessee, Lt. Cal. John G. Hall 

Strahl’s B&x?.e 

Brig. Gen. Gtho F. Strahl 

4th Tennesseei5th Tennessee, Cal. Jonathan J. Lamb 

19th Tennessee, Cal. Francis M. Walker 

24th Tennessee, Col. John A. Wilson 

3lst Tennessee, Col. Egbert E. Tansil 

33d Tennessee, Col. Warner P. Jones 

Artillery 

Maj. Meiancthon Smith 

Carries’ (Tennessee) Battery, Capt. William W. Carnes 

Scogin’s (Georgia) Battery, Capt. John Scogin 

Scott’s (Tennessee) Battery, Lt. John H. Marsh, Lt. A. T. Wa

Smith’s (Mississippi) Battery, Lt. William B. Turner 

Stanford’s (Mississippi) Battery, Capt. Thomas J. Stanford 

HILL’S CORPS 

Lt. Gen. Daniel H. Hill 

CLEBURNE’S DIVISION 

Maj. Gen. Patrick R. Cleburne 

Escort 

Sanders” Company Tennessee Cavalry, Capt

Woo& Brigade 

Brig. Gen. S. A. M. Wood 

16th Alabama, Maj. John H. McGaughy, Capt. Frederick A

33d Alabama, CoE. Samuel Adams 

45th Alabama, CoE. E. B. Breedlove 

18th Alabama Battalion, Maj. John H. Gibson, Col. Samuel 

32d Mississippif45th Mississippi, Col. M. P. Lowrey 

15th Miseissippi Battalion Sharpshooters, Maj- A. T. Hawki

POWS Brigoak 

Bdg. Gen. Lucius E. Polk 

1st Arkansas, Col. John W. Colquitt 

3d Confederatel5tb Confederate, Cal. J. A. Smith 
6th Texas Infantry/l&h Texas Infantry11 5th Texas Cavalry (dismoun

Mills, Lt. Cal. T. Scott Anderson 

17th Texas Cavalry (dismountedX/l%b Texas Cavalry (dismountedl~rt

(dismountedY2Fith Texas Cavalry (dismountedl, Col. F. C. Wilke

Coit, Maj.WilIiam A. Taylor 

ArtiE1er.y 

Maj. T. R, Hotcbkiss 

Capt. Henry C. Semple 

Calvert’s (Arkansas) Battery, Lt. Thomas J. Key 

Douglas’(Texas) Battery, Capt. James P. Douglas 

Semple’s (Alabama) Battery, Capt. Henry C. Semple, Lt. R. W. Goldtb

BRECKINRIDGE’S DIVISION 

Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge 

E&XWt 

Foules’Company Mississippi Cavalry, Capt. H. L. Fo

Helm’s Briga& 

Brig. Gea Benjamin H. Helm 

Col. Joseph II. Lewis 

4Ist Alabama, Cal. Martin L. Stansel 

2d Kentucky, Lt. Col. James W. Hewitt, Lt. Col. James W. Moss 

4th Kentucky, Col. Joseph P. Nuckois, Maj. Thomas W. Thompson 

6th Kentucky, Col. Joseph H. Lewis, Lt. Col. Martin H. Gofer 

9th Kentucky, Col. John W. Caldwell, Lt. Col. John C. WicklifYe 

Adams’Brigade 

Brig. Gen. Daniel W. Adams 

Col. Randall L. Gibson 

32d Alabama, Maj. John C. Kimbell 

13th Louieianaf2Oth Louisiana, Col. Randall L. Gibson, Cal. Leon v

M, Dubroca 

16th Louisian&bth Louisiana, Col. Daniel Gober 

12th Louisiana, Lt. Cal. Richard W. Turner, Maj. Loudon Butler, Cap

14th Louisiana BattaEion, Maj. J. E. Austin 

StovalE’s Srigade 

Brig. Gen. Marcellus A. Stovall 

1st Floridal3d Florida, Cal, WilIiam S. Dilworth 

4th Florida, CoI. W. L. L. Bowen 
() y, p

Slocomb’s (Louisiana) Battery, Capt. 6. H. Slocomb 

RESERVE CORPS 

Maj. Gen. William H. T. Walkar 

WALKER’S DIVISION 

Brig. Gen. States R. Gist 

Gist% Brigade 

Brig. Gen. States R. Gist 

Cal. Peyton H. Colquitt 

Lt. Cal. Leroy Napier 

46th Georgia, Col. Peyton H. Colquitt, Maj. A. M. Speer 

8th Georgia Battalion, Lt. Col. Leroy Napier, Maj. Z. L. Watte

16th South Carolina (not engaged, at Rome), Col. James McC

24th South Carolina, Cal. Clement H. Stevens, Lt. Col. ElIison 

Ector’s Brigade 

Brig. Gen. Matthew D. E&or 

Stone’s (Alabama) Battalion Sharpshooters, Maj. T. 0. Stone 

Pounds (Mississippi) Battalion Sharpshooters, Capt. M. Pou

29th North Carolina, Col. William B. Creasman 

9th Texas, Col. William H. Young 

10th Texas Cavalry (serving as infantry), Lt, Col. C. R. Earp 

14th Texas Cavalry (serving as infantry), Col. J. L. Camp 

32d Texas Cavalry (serving as infantry), Cal. Julius A. Andre

Wilson’e Brigude 

Cal. Claudius C. Wilson 

25th Georgia, Lt. Col. A. J. Williams 

29th Georgia, Lt. George R. McRae 

30th Georgia, Lt. Col. James S. Boy&on 

1st Georgia Battalion Sharpshooters, Maj, Arthur Shaaff 

4th Louisiana Battalion, Lt. Cal. John McEnery 

Artillery 

Ferguson’s (South Carolina) Battery (not engaged, at Romel,

Howell’s (Georgia) Battery (formerly Martin’s), Capt. Evan P
WI Arkansas, Lt. Cal. George F. Baucum, Maj. A. Watkins 

1st Louisiana U%gulars), Lt. Cal. George F. Baucum (6th Arkansas)

63th Arkansas) 

Brig. Gen. Edward C. Walthall 

24th Mississippi, Lt. CoE, R P. McISelvaine, Maj. W. C. Staples, Capt. 

J. D. Smith 

27th Mississippi, Cal. James A. Campbell 

29th Mississippi, Col. WiIliam F. Brantly 

30th Mississippi, Col. Junius I. Scales, Lt. Cal. Hugh A. Reynolds

Johnson 

34th Mississippi, Maj. William G. Pegram, Capt. H. J. Bowen, Lt. Cal

(30th Mississippi) 

ArtilEery 

Capt. Charles Swett 

Fowler’s (Alabama) Battery, Capt. Wilham H. Fowler 

Warren Light ArtiElery (Mississippi Battery), Lt. H. Shannon 

Lt. Gen. James Longstreet 

HINDMAN‘S DIVISION (of Polk’s Corpsl 

Maj. Gen. Thamas C. Hindman 

Brig. Gen. Patton Anderson 

LenoiJs Company Alabama Cavalry, Capt. T. M. Len

Brig. Gen. Patton Anderson 

Col. J. H. Sharp 

7th Mississippi, Col. W. H. Bishop 

9th Mississippi, Maj. T. H. hynam 

10th Mississippi, Lt. Col. James Barr 

41st Mississippi, Col. W. F. Tucker 

44th Miisissippi, Col. J. H. Sharp, Lt. Cal. R. 0. Kelsey 

9th Mississippi Battalion Sharpshooters, Maj. W. C. Richards 

Garrity’s (Alabama) Battery, Capt. James Garrity 
17th Alabama Battalion Sharpshooters, Capt. James F.-Nabe

Dent’s (Alabama) Battery (formerly Robertson’s), Capt. S. H. 

Manigault’s Brigrade 

Brig. Gen. Arthur M. Manigault 

24th Alabama, Cal. N. N. Davis 

28th Alabama, Cal. John C. Reid 

34th Alabama, Maj. John N, Slaughter 

10th South Carolina/fSth South Carolina, Cal. James F. Press

Waters’(AIabama) Battery, Lt. Charles W. Watkins 

BUCKNER’S CORPS 

Maj. Gen. Simon B. Buckner 

Escort 

Clark’s Company Tennessee Cavalry, Capt. J

STEWART’S DIVISION 

Maj. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart 

Johnson’s Brig&e 

(Part of Johnson’s Provisional Divisio

Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson 

Col. John S. F&on 

17th Tennessee, Lt. CoI. Watt W. Floyd ,’ 

23d Tennessee, Col. R. H. Keeble 

25th Tennessee, Lt. CoI. R. B. Snowden 

44th Tennessee, Lt. Col. John L. McEwen Jr., Maj. G. M. Craw

Bate’s Brigade 

Brig. C&n. William B. Bate 

58th Alabama, Col. Buehrod Jones 

37th Georgia, &I. A. F. Rudler,Lt. Col. Joseph T. Smith 

4th Georgia Battalion Sharpshooters, Maj. T. D. Caswell, C

Towers 

15th Tennesseel37th Tennessee, Cal. R. C. Tyler, Lt. CoI. R. D

Tankesley 

20th Tennessee, Col. Thomas B. Smith, Maj. W. M. Shy 
, y 

23d Tennessee Battalion, Maj. Tazewell W. Newman, Capt. W. P. Sim

Clayton’s Brigade 

Brig. Gem Henry D. Clayton 

18th Alabama, Col. J. T. Holtzclaw, Lt. Col. R. F. Inge, Ma& P. F. Hunle

36th Alabama, Col. Lewis T. Woodruff 

38th Alabama, Lt. Col. A. R. Lankford 

Maj. J. Wesley Eldridge 

1st Arkansas Battery, Capt. John T. Humphreys 

T. H. Dawson’s (Georgia) Battery, Lt. R. W. Anderson 

Eufaula Artiilery (Alabama Battery), Capt. McDonald Oliver 

Company E, 9th Georgia Artillery Battalion (Eillington W. York’s Ba

S. Everett 

PRESTON’S DIVISION 

Brig. Gen. William Preston 

Grack”s Brigade 

Brig. Gen. Archibald Gracie Jr. 

43d Alabama, Col. Young M. Moody 

1st Alabama Battalion (Hilliard’s Legion), Lt. Col. John H. Holt, 

Huguley 

2d Alabama Battalion (Hilliard’s Legion), Lt. Cal. Bolling Hall Jr., Ca

3d Alabama Battalion (Hilliards Legian), Lt. Cal. John W. A. Sanford 

4th Alabama Battalion (artillery battalion, Hilliard’s Legion, serving 

John D. McLennan 

63d Tennessee, Lt. Cal. Abraham Fulkerson, Maj. John A. Aiken 

Trfggfs Brigade 

Cal. Robert C. Trigg 

1st Florida Cavalry (dismounted), Cal. 6. Troup Maxwell 

6th Flarida, Cal. J. J. Finley 

7th Florida, Col. Robert Bullock 

54th Virginia, Lt. Col. John J. Wade 

3dBrigade 

Col. John It. Kelly 

65th Georgia, Col. R. H. Moore 
Peeples (Georgia) Battery, Capt. Tyler M. Peeples 

Wolihin’s (Georgia) Battery, Capt. Andrew M. WoIihin 

RESERVE CORPS ARTILLERY 

Maj. Samuel C. Williams 

Baxter’s (Tennessee) Battery, Capt. Edmund D. Baxter 

Darden’s (Mississippi) Battery, Capt. Putnam Darden 

Kolb’s (Alabama) Battery, Capt. R, F. Kolb 

McCants’(FIorida1 Battery, Capt. Robert P. M&ants 

JOHNSON’S DIVISION 

(This division was a provisional organization embracin

time, Robertson’s, Gregg’s, and MeNair’s Brigades. On 19 

attached to Longstreet’s Corps under Maj. Gen. John B. Hoo

Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson. 

Gregg’s Brigade 

Brig. Gen. John Gregg 

Col. Cyrus A. Sugg 

3d Tennessee, Cal. Calvin H. Walker 

16th Tennessee, Cal. William Grace 

36th Tennessee, Lt. Col. James J. Turner, Capt. Charles S. D

41st Tennessee, Lt. Cal. James D. Tillman 

56th Tennessee, Col. Cyrus A. Sugg, Lt. Col. Thomas W. Bea

Robertson, Col. Calvin H. Walker (3d Tennessee) 

1st Tennessee Battalion, Maj. Stephen H. Colms, Maj. Chri

Tennessee) 

7th Texas, Col. H. B. Granbury, Maj. K. M. Vanzandt 

Bledsoe”s (Missouri) Battery, Lt. R. L. Wood 

MciVair’~ Brigade 

Brig. Gen. Evander McNair 

Col. David Coleman 

1st Arkansas Mounted Riffles fdismounted), Col. Robert W. 

2d Arkansas Mounted Rifles (dismounted), Col. James A. W

25th Arkansas, Lt. Col. Eli Hufstedler 

4th/3Ist Arkansas and 4th Arkansas Battalion (consolidated

39th North Carolina, Col. David Coleman 

Culpeper’s (South CarolinaIBattery,Capt. James F. Culpep
Kers)bawsBriga& 

Brig. Gen. Joseph B. Kershaw 

2d South Carolina, Lt. Col. Franklin Gaillard 

3d South Carolina, Col. James D. Name 

7th South Carolina, Lt. Col. Elbert Bland, Maj. John S. Hard, Capt. E

dtb South Carolina, Col. John W. Henagan 

15th South Carolina, Col. Joseph F. Gist 

3d South Carolina Battalion, Capt. Joshua M. Townsend 

Humphreys’Brigade 

Brig. Gen. Benjamin G. Humpbreys 

13th Mississippi, Lt. Col. Kennon McElroy 

17th Mississippi, Lt. Cal. John C. Fiser 

18th Mississippi, Capt. W. I?. Hubbard 

Zlst Mississippi, Lt. Cal. D. N. Moody 

HOOD’S DIVISION 

Maj. Gen. John B. Hood 

Brig. Gen. E. McIver Law 

Lam’s Briga& 

Brig. Gen. E. McIver Law 

Col. James L, Sheffield 

Cal. William F. Perry 

4th Alabama, Cal. Pinckney D. Bowles 

15th Alabama, Gol. W. C. Oates 

44th Alabama, Col. William F. Perry 

47th Alabama, Maj- James M. Campbell 

48th Alabama, Lt. Col. William M. Hardwick 

Robertson’s Brigade 

(Served part of the time in Johnson’s Provisional Divis

Brig. Gen. Jerome B. Robertson 

Col. Van I-I. Manning 

3d Arkansas, CoI. Van H. Manning 

1st Texas, Capt. R. J. Harding 

4th Texas, Lt. Col. John P. Bane, Capt. R. II. Bassett 

5th Texas, Maj. J. C. Rogers, Capt. J. S. Cleveland, Capt. T. T. Clay 
Maj. Felix H. Robertson 

Barret’s (Missouri) Battery, Capt. Overton W. Bar-ret 

Le Gardeur”s (Louisiana1 Battery (not mentioned in the rep

on 31 August, and Captain Le Gardeur, etc., reliev

Tennessee on 1 November X863), Cap+ G. La Gardeur 

Havis’(Georgia1 Battery, Capt. M. W. Havis 

Lumsden’s (Alabama) Battery, Capt. Charles L. Lumsden 

Massenburg’s (Georgia) Battery, Capt. T. L. Massenburg 

CAVALRY 

Maj. Gen. Joseph WheeIer 

WHARTON-S DIVISION 

Brig. Gen. John A. Wharton 

1st Brigade 

Cd. C. C. Crews 

Malone’s (Alabama) Regiment, Cal. J. 6. Malone Jr. 

2d Georgia, Lt. Col. F. M. Ison 

3d Georgia, Col. R. Thompson 

4th Georgia, Col. Isaac W. Avery 

2d Brigade 

Col. Thomas Harrison 

3d Confederate, Col. W. N. Estes 

3d Kentucky, Lt. Col. J. W. Griffith 

4th Tennessee, Lt. Cal. Paul F. Anderson 

8th Texas* Lt. Col. Gustave Cook 

11 th Texas, Cal. G. R. Reeves 

White’s (Tennessee) Battery, Capt. B. F. White Jr. 

MARTIN’S DIVISION 

Brig. Gen. William T. Martin 

l&Brigade 

Col. John T. Morgan 

1st Alabama, Lt. Col. D. T. Blakey 

3d Alabama, Lt. Col. T. H. Mauldin 

51st Alabama, Lt. Cal. M. L. Kirkpatrick 

8th Confederate, Lt. Col. John S. Prather 
Escort 

Jackson’s Company Tennessee Cavalry, Capt. J. C. Jac

ARMSTRONG’S DIVISION 

Brig. Gen. Frank C. Armstrong 

Armstrong% Brigade 

Col. James T. Wheeler 

3d Arkansas, CoI. A. W, Hobson 

2d Kentucky, Lt. Col. Thomas G. Woodward 

6th Tennessee Battalion, Lt. Cal. James H. Lewis 

18th Tennessee Battalion, Maj. Charles McDonald 

Forrest’s Brigade 

Cal. George G. Dibrell 

4th Tennessee, Col. William S. McLemore 

8th Tennessee, Capt. Hamilton McGinnis 

9th Tennessee, Cool. Jacob B. BitTIe 

16th Tennessee, Cal. Nicholas Nickleby Cox 

I lth Tennessee, Cal. Daniel Wilson Holman 

Shaw’s Battalion, 0. P. Hamilton’s Battalion, and R. D. All

(consolidated), Maj. Joseph Shaw 

Huggins’tTennessee) Battery (farmerly Freeman’s), Capt A. L. Huggi

Morton’s (Tennessee) Battery, Capt. John W. Morton Jr. 

PEGRAM’S DIVISION 

Brig. Gen. John Pegram 

Daui&on’a Brig&e 

Brig. Gen. H. B. Davidson 

1st Georgia, Gol. d. J. Morrison 

6th Geargia, Col. John R. Hart 

6th North Carolina, CQE. George N. Folk 

Rucker‘s (1st Tennessee) Legion, CoI. E. W. Rucker (12th Termessee 

W. Day, and 16th Tennessee Battalion, Capt. John Q. Arnold E

12th Battalionll 

Huwald‘s (Tennessee1 Battery, Capt. Gustave A. HuwaId 
N. T. N. Robinsons (Louisiana) Battery (one section), Lt. Wi
Entered Service at: 

Birtir: Washington County, Pennsylvania. 

Date oflswe: 27 January 1894. 

C&&ion: Most distinguished gallantry in battle. 

Myers, George S. 

Rank and Organi.zatim: Private, Company F, 10lst Ohio Infantry. 

Place an&?&e: At Chickamauga, Georgia, 19 September 1863. 

Entered Set-vim at: 

Birtlr: Fairfield, Ohio. 

Dote ofhsw: 9 April 1894. 

Citation: Myers saved the regimental colors by greatest personal de

Reed, Axe1 H. 

Rank and Organization: Sergeant, Company K, 2d Minnesota Infant

P&ace and Date: At Chickamauga, Georgia, 19 September 1863; a

Tennessee, 25 November 1863. 

Entered Service at: 

Birth: Maine. 

Date of Issue: 2 April 1898. 

Wation: While in arrest at Chickamauga, Georgia, Reed left his 

voluntarily went to the line of bat&Is, secured a rifle, and fou

the two-day battle; Reed was released from arrest in recognitio

Missionary Ridge, he commanded his company and gallantly 

the first to enter the enemy’s war& be was severely wounded

declined a discharge and remained in active service to the end 

Richey, WiBiam E. 

Rusk ad Organization: Corporal, Company A, 15th Ohio Infantry. 

P&xx andDate: At Chickamauga, Georgia, 19 September 1863. 

Entered Service at: 

Birth: Athens County, Obio. 

Date of&sue: 9 Navember 1893. 

Citation: While on the extreme front, between the lines ofthe comba

handedly captured a Confederate majorwho was armed and m

169 
Citation: While exposed to a galling fire, Chamberlain 

regiment, found its location, procured ammunition 

returned with the ammunition to his own company. 

Cilley, Clinton A. 

Rank and Qrgunizatian: Captain, Company C, 2d Minnesota 

Place andDate: At Chickamauga, Georgia, 20 September 1

Entered Service ab: Farmington, New Hampshire. 

Birth: Rockingham County, New Hampshire. 

Date oflssue: 12 June 1895. 

Ci&ztion: Cilley seized the colors of a retreating regiment a

attack. 

Porter, Horace 

Rank adOrgani.satim: Captain, Ordnance Department, U

Place and D&e: At Chickamauga, Georgia, 20 September 1

Entered Service at: Pennsylvania. 

Birth: Pennsylvania. 

Date ofIssue: July 1902. 

Citation: While acting as a volunteer aide at a critical m

broken, Porter rallied enough fugitives to hoM the g

enough to effect the escape of wagon trains and batterie

Taylor, Anthony 

Run& and Organization: First Lieutenant, Company A, 15th 

PktceandDate: At Chickamauga, Georgia, 20 September 1

Entered Service at: 

Birth: Burhngton, New Jersey. 

Date aflssue: 4 December 1893. 

Cihtian: Taylor held out to the last with a small farce aga

numbers of the enemy. 

Whitney, William 0. 

Rank and &ganieutim: Sergeant, Company B, 1 lth Michig

Piace andDate: At Chickamauga, Georgia, 20 September 18

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

py y p

The temperature dropped precipitously into the 30s during 

September, making the morning of 20 September very cold with 

On the morning of 20 September, a heavy fog covered the battle a

Chickamauga Creek. The fog was enhanced by smoke from the 

midmorning, the fog had dissipated. 

On 20 September, sunrise occurred at 0547, sunset at 1800, and 

nautical twilight) at 1930. 

The moon reached first quarter on 20 September and set at appro

on that night. 

I.73 
Robertson, William G. The StuflRide. U.S. Army Center of Military 

Thii pamphlet outlines the philosophy behind St& Bides and o

how to create one. 

II. Campaign. 

Cist, Henry M. The Army oftk Cumberland, New York: Charles Scr

Written by a junior staff officer, this comprehensive account is fl

pro-Bosecrans bias. 

Connelly, Thomas. Autumn of Glory: The Army of Tennessee, 1862-1

Louisiana State University Prsss, 1971. 

Although strongly anti-Bragg, the Chickamauga chapters are 

analysis of the Confederate side currently in print. 

Van Home, Thomas B. History of the Army of the Cumberland: 

Campaigns, and BattEas. 2 ~01s. Cincinnati, OH: Ogden, Cam

Reprint. Wilmington, NC: Broadfoot Publishing Co., 1988. 

Written by a member of George Thomas’ staif who had acces

account is especially useful on Thomas and the XIV Corps. 

The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records 

Canjkderate Armies- Vol. 30 (4 parts). Washington, DC: U.S. G

GfBce, 1899. Beprint. Wilmington, NC: Broadfoot Publishing C

Essential for any detailed study, this work contains battle rep&

messages, and miscellaneous reporta. 

West Point At&w of American Wars. Vol. 1 I New York: Praeger, 195

Griess, Thomas E., ed. A&s for the American CittiJ War. W

History Series. Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group, 1986. 

This useful set of campaign maps contains some minor inaccurac

dispositions. A&o, the terrain of Lookout Mountain is misreprese

across the mountain exist. 

III The Battle. 

Tucker, Glenn ChicRamauga: Bloody Bat& in the West. Dayton, 

Press, 1984. 

Flawed by extensive digressions and lack of analysis, this book 

most detailed modern account of the battle. 
1962. Reprint. Wilmington, NC: Broadfoot Publishing C

This very useful primer, whose superb illustrations enh

offers an excellent foundation for the study of specific battles. 

DanieI, Larry J. Cannoneers in Gray: The Field Artillery 

f861-1886. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 

The Chickamauga chapter is useful more for organiza

tactical details. 

Griffith, Paddy. Battle in the Ciuil War. Nottinghamshire, En

This inexpensive, highly useful primer covers a complex 

perspective. 

Morelock, Jerry. “Ride to the River of Death: Cavalry Oper

Campaign.” Military Review 64 (October 1984):~~-21. 

Focusing solely on operations of the opposing cavalry 

that aspect of the campaign from a modern perspective. 

Thomas, Dean S. Cannons: Intro&&on to i2iiv2 War Artillery. 

Publications, 1985. 

This very helpful primer describes the technical charac

artillery weapons employed at Chickamauga. 

V. Combat Support and Combat Service Support. 

Brown, Joseph Willard. The Signal Carps, USA., in the W

MA: U.S. Veteran Signal Corps Association, 1896. 

This book provides both general background information 

activities and specific material on Union signal activity in th

GiHett, Mary C. The Army MedicaE Department, 1818-2865

Washington, DC: US. Army Center of Military History, 

An exhaustive treatment of its subject, this work 

information only. 

Hugton, James A. Tire Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 17

Series. Washington, DC: Offree of the Chief of Militar

Army, 1966. 
, y gg, p

Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981. 

This book provides data on almost every subject relating to the 

Civil War, except its campaigns. 

VI. Biographies (Federal). 

Warner, Ezra S. Generals in Blue. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ

Be printed 1984. 

Short biographical sketches of 583 Federal general officers are in 

Rasecrans 

Lamers, William M. The E&e of Glory: A Biography of General Wi

Cr.%% New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961. 

The only modem biography of Bosecrans, this work also presen

view of the man. 

Thomas 

Cleaves* Freeman. Rock of Chiekamuuga: The Life of General G

Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1948. 

This book is a &id, though relatively general, account of Thoma

I&Kinney, Francis F. Education in Vioknce: Tke Life of George 

History of the Army af the Cumberland. Detroit, ML Wayne Stat

1961. Reprint. Chicago, IL: Americana House, 1991. 

Although suffering from a pedestrian writing style, this book is 

of George Thomas. 

VII Biographies (Confederatel. 

Warner, Ezra J. Generals in Gray. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ

Reprinted 1983. 

This work contains short biographical sketches of all Confederat
University of Alabama Press, 1991. 

More positive in tone than McWhiney’s volume, Hallo

Chickamauga utility. 

Buckner 

Stickles, Arndtt M. Simon Bolivar Buckner: Borderland Kni

of North Carolina Press, 1940. Reprint. Wilmington, 

co., 1987. 

This book is a useful but not especially perceptive bio

Chickamauga. 

Cleburne 

Pnrdue, Howell, and Elizabeth Purdue. Pat Cleburne, Confe

Biogmphy. Hillsboro, TX: Hill Junior College Press, 19

This work is a detailed study of one of the most com

commanders. 

Forrest 

Henry, Robert Selph. *First With the MO&’ Forrest. India

1944. 

Henry’s work is one of the best of the many biographies 

VIII Films. 

The Battle of Chickomauga. 60 min. Columbia, MD: Classic 

This Elm contains some excellent graphics and is the be

the battle. 

U.S. Department of the Army. .68 Rifled Mwiket. TVT 21

PouaderNapa&on. TVT 21-86 (706968DAl. 16 min. 

Created by the Department of History at West Poin

demonstrations of actual weapons, as well as background in
024,1982, DMA 3953 I NW-Series V845; Fort Oglethorpe TN

024, 1982, DMA 3953 PV NE-Series V845. For sale by US. 

Reston, VA 22092; Tennessee Department of Conservation, 

Nashville, TN 37219; U.S. Tennessee Valley Authority, Chatta

Knoxville, TN 37902. 

These two 1:24,000 modern topographic map sheets cover 

surrounding area from Rossville to the town of Chickamauga (Crawf

“Chickamauga Battlefield Location Map for Monuments, Marke

Reproduced from U.S. Geological Survey, 1934, Chickamauga 

National Military Park, GA (Chickamauga Battlefield), Sca

National Park and Monument Association, 1986. 

This map, available in a waterproofed version, covers the battlef

order of battle and alphabetical listing of monuments, markers, and 

It is available through the park bookstore. 
Dr. Wilkm Glenn Robertson 

Lieutenant Colonel 

- Edward P. Shanahan - 

181 

of Richmond, he received 

degrees in history from 

Virginia. He is the auth

Richmond: The Ber

Campaign; The Petersbu

Battle of Old Men and Y

Run chapter in Americ

1776-1965; Leavenwor

Counterattuck on the N

Center of Military Histor

The Stuff Ride. Dr. Ro

directs Staff Rides to all 

theater Civil War battlef

Lieutenant Colon

Shanahan is a military 

and member of the Staff 

Combat Studies Institu

Command and General 

received his commission 

Eastern Kentucky Univ

Kentucky, and his MS. 

The Pennsylvania S

University Park, Penn

served as a scout pilot in 

S3 and executive offi

battalion in Germany. H

instructor in geograph

professor of history at 

Academy. 
St&Rides of all the major western-theater Civil War battle

Major ’ 

- George E. Knapp - 

Major Geor

instructor at the 

U.S. Army Com

College. He is a 

College in Mobi

degree in history 

Missouri at K

USACGSC gradu

as an enlisted 

commission in 

Candidate Scho

infantry compa

Division (Forwa

Fort Leavenwort

TRADOC Analy

School of Advanc

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING 

182 
COMBAT STUDIES ENSTITUTE 

-~~SS~~~S 

The Combat Studies lnstit@e wa8 established on 18 June 1

department within the U.S. Army Command and General 

Leavenworth, Kansas. CSI has the folkwing missions: 

1. Frepare and present instruction in military history at USACG

USACGSC departments in integrating military history into the

2. Serve as ttte U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s ex

devekqment and c0ardination of an integrated, progressive 

history instr,ruction in the TFL%DW service school system. 

3. Canduct research cm historical. topics pertinent ta the doctrinal 

and publish the rest& in a variety of formats for the Active 

Componenta. 
I-- 

1 

U.S. Army Command and General St

Fort Leavenwcrrth, Kansas 6602