IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION THREE

IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE 

OF 

MICHELLE MINDERMAN,

Appellant,

and

SEAN MINDERMAN,

Respondent.

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No. 34829-6-III

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

FEARING, J. — Michelle Minderman appeals numerous decisions and procedures 

from her marital dissolution trial. We substantially affirm the dissolution court. 

FACTS

Sean and Michelle Minderman married on July 19, 1997 in Spokane. The 

marriage produced two children, an eight-year-old boy and a thirteen-year-old girl at the 

time of a January 2016 trial. Sean and Michelle separated on March 28, 2012. We 

provide the daughter a pseudonym, Mary. 

FILED

MAY 9, 2019

In the Office of the Clerk of Court

WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
No. 34829-6-III 

In re Marriage of Minderman 

2

Sean Minderman is a businessman and a professional bass fisherman. Sean 

competes in four tournaments per year, each which requires a one week excursion. Sean 

has accumulated over $500,000 in tournament winnings and sponsorships during his 

career, but, at the time of trial, he no longer garnered a national ranking. Sean also owns 

an optical business called Frame Factory, Incorporated. Sean’s optical company earned

$106,936 in 2011, $76,952 in 2012, $106,356 in 2013, and $87,041 in 2014. 

Michelle Minderman owns a financial investment firm. She earned a net income 

of $105,076 in 2012, $148,943 in 2013, and $175,909 in 2014. In 2015, her monthly net 

income equaled $22,001.86. 

PROCEDURE

In March 2012, Michelle Minderman filed this dissolution proceeding. She 

requested primary custody of the two children with Sean Minderman to enjoy a midweek overnight visit and every other weekend until Monday morning. Michelle did not 

then request any visitation restrictions. In May 2012, Sean petitioned for equal custody. 

In July 2012, Michelle responded to Sean’s request by accusing him of reckless driving, 

intoxication, illicit drug use, viewing pornography, and abuse. Michelle requested that 

the court restrict Sean’s visitation time with the children. 

In October 2012, the dissolution court entered a temporary parenting plan wherein 

the children stayed with Michelle eight overnights and Sean six overnights in a two week 

period. The court appointed a guardian ad litem, Mary Ronnestad. An arbitrator 
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resolved the disposition of property and liabilities. The dispute concerning the parenting 

plan pended for three years. In the interim, the parties abided by the October 2012 

temporary parenting plan. 

During the pendency of the dissolution proceeding, guardian ad litem Mary 

Ronnestad periodically spoke with each child, the parents, teachers, and school 

counselors. Ronnestad reviewed the two children’s medical reports. In February 2014, 

Ronnestad filed a report that noted Mary desired more time with her father. After the 

filing of the guardian report, Michelle Minderman alleged that Mary was suicidal and that 

Mary’s counselor was ineffective. 

After February 2014, Michelle Minderman reported, to Child Protective Services, 

abuse of Mary by Sean. Michelle claimed that Mary found a dildo in Sean’s bathroom, 

photographed the device, and sent the photo to Michelle. Ronnestad thereafter filed 

another report that recommended continuation of the October 2012 parenting plan. 

Michelle called the Kid’s Clinic, a pediatric care facility in Spokane, and reported Mary

as suicidal. 

Trial proceeded in January 2016. Guardian ad litem Mary Ronnestad testified at 

trial about the significant conflict between the parties and its effect on the children, 

especially Mary. Ronnestad averred that Mary’s psychologist, Lisa Christian, discerned 

no suicidal behavior in Mary. 

Over the objection of Michelle Minderman, social worker Rita Zorrozua testified 
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at trial. Zorrozua mentioned Richard Gardner’s theory of parental alienation and the 

nuances and levels of “parental alienation syndrome.” Report of Proceedings (RP) at 

541-46. Zorrozua knew nothing about the Minderman family. 

The trial court entertained testimony from the children’s assistant school principal, 

Janet Boyd. Boyd testified that Michelle informed her that Mary struggled to arrive at 

school on time. Boyd thought this struggle occurred “on mom’s time.” RP at 9. Boyd 

averred that she occasionally saw Sean at the school. 

Melinda Mertens, Mary’s resource math teacher, testified about Mary’s grades, 

reading level, and individualized education plan. According to Mertens, Michelle 

involved herself more than Sean in Mary’s education. 

After trial testimony, the dissolution court entered 138 findings of fact, many 

which document disquieting events about the children. The court found that Michelle 

Minderman “engaged in a pattern of abusive use of conflict and parental alienation.” 

Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 273. Nevertheless, the trial court entered an equal parenting plan 

with no restrictions on either parent. The court designated Sean the custodian: 

The father is designated the custodian of the children solely for 

purposes of all other state and federal statutes which require a designation 

or determination of custody, to include the relocation statute. This 

designation shall not affect either parent’s rights and responsibilities under 

this parenting plan.

CP at 276. 
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For purposes of calculating any child support obligation, the trial court found 

Michelle’s monthly net income to be $16,152.00 and Sean’s to be $8,119.32. The 

dissolution court ruled Michelle to be the obligor parent. By using the standard 

calculation for child support obligations, the court ordered Michelle to monthly pay Sean

$957.60 for Mary and $774.73 for their son, for a total of $1,732.33. 

During the presentment hearing on March 11, 2016, Michelle Minderman’s

counsel asked for a deviation on child support: 

MS. BROWN: Your Honor, Mr. Crouse and I discussed perhaps this 

is better done in a formal Motion for Reconsideration. We’re essentially 

requesting that the Court deviate from the standard calculation because of 

the shared 50/50 parenting. Certainly that is within the discretion of the 

Court. 

There are plenty of funds in both households for the children. So the 

Court is not prohibited from deviating from standard calculations, and the 

worksheets we submitted yesterday showed the requested deviation based 

on a 50/50 residential schedule. That is within the Court’s discretion. 

I understand from Mr. Crouse that Mr. Minderman would like to 

respond to that request in a more formal way. If the Court would like to do 

it that way, we’re fine with doing an actual Motion for Reconsideration or 

we can get a decision today.

RP at 842-43. The dissolution court responded:

THE COURT: You can do it. Here’s the way I look at it, though. 

When the original I know Mr. Minderman at least from my memory did not 

file a schedule way back when temporary orders were set up, but way back 

when three years ago when this was originally set up, Ms. Minderman’s 

income was way different than what she reported to the Court. 

At this time, I’m not going to deviate. If you want to make a formal 

motion and let them respond, that would give me more time to really think 

about it because just of[f] the cuff three years of child support he paid to her 

based on the income they used her worksheets and then it’s found out that 
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those first three years the income didn’t match up to what she had indicated 

in that.

RP at 843. 

On March 11, 2016, the dissolution court entered a final order of child support. 

The court entered, in section 3.8 of the order captioned “Reasons why Request for 

Deviation Was Denied,” the language: “Does not apply.” CP at 287. 

On March 21, 2016, Michelle Minderman filed a motion for reconsideration of the 

order of child support. She argued that good reason existed under RCW 26.19.075 to 

grant a deviation of $429.83 per month from the standard child support calculation. On 

April 27, the dissolution court signed a letter ruling denying the motion for 

reconsideration. Michelle filed a second motion to reconsider on May 23, 2016, in which 

she asked the court to reverse its refusal to award her reimbursement of expenses for the 

care of Mary. The trial court also denied this motion. 

LAW AND ANALYSIS

On appeal, Michelle Minderman assigns numerous errors to dissolution 

proceedings and the trial court’s rulings. 

Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred when it allowed Sean Minderman’s attorney 

to ask prejudicial and leading questions? 

Answer 1: The trial court did not err when allowing leading questions, but, 

assuming any error, Michelle Minderman establishes no prejudice. 
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Michelle Minderman contends that Sean’s counsel, during direct trial 

examinations, improperly led Sean’s testimony and the testimony of Sean’s expert, Rita 

Zorrozua, which questioning resulted in detriment to Michelle. Michelle cites forty-six 

of the one hundred and thirty-eight findings of fact that she contends contain judicial 

opinions and inappropriate comments unfairly highly critical of Michelle’s parenting. 

She maintains that these findings illustrate the taint resulting from the leading questions 

of Sean’s counsel. Sean argues the trial court did not err because any leading questions 

did not prejudice Michelle. 

Michelle Minderman provides few examples of purported leading questions by 

Sean’s counsel during direct examination of Sean and Rita Zorrozua. In the first 

example, Sean’s attorney directed Sean to look at an exhibit and asked: “Looking at the 

declaration, and you can look at Page 1. Is that what you represented to the Court under 

oath had occurred at the bottom of Page 1 under your declaration?” RP at 141. 

Michelle’s counsel interposed no objection. 

Sean Minderman’s trial attorney showed Rita Zorrozua an example of Michelle’s 

temporary declarations and inquired: 

Q [Sean’s Attorney:] And then if you look at line 8, the mother 

makes a statement that since the children were born, Sean has only been 

active in their life as he desires? 

A [Zorrozua:] Yes. 

Q [Sean’s Attorney]: If you look at line 45 through 50, you’ll see 

then the allegation, over the past two years Sean has been removed from the 

children’s life as his optical business with the subjective audited by 
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Premera. This audit has caused an extreme amount of stress on Sean and 

the family including the children. This audit has caused already high level 

of anxiety to amp up, as well as cause him to be more withdrawn, 

depressed, erratic, irrational and angry towards the children, and on the next 

page, it continues.

He has spent several nights out gambling and drinking with his 

friends in order to help him cope with his overall overly stressful audit 

situation?

RP at 565. Michelle’s trial counsel immediately asked: “Your Honor, is there a question 

in all of this?” RP at 565. Sean’s counsel responded that he was laying a foundation for 

later questions. Michelle’s attorney objected and asked for a continuing objection “on 

questions of this sort.” RP at 566. The trial court did not sustain the objection and 

instructed Sean’s counsel to “stick to hypothetical versus declaration.” RP at 566. 

Michelle’s counsel again asked the court for a continuing objection to those types of 

questions. Zorrozua’s testimony continued. 

ER 611(c) provides that leading questions should not be used in direct 

examination of a witness “except as may be necessary to develop the witness’ 

testimony.” The trial court has wide discretion to permit leading questions and will not 

be reversed absent abuse of that discretion. State v. Delarosa-Flores, 59 Wn. App. 514, 

517, 799 P.2d 736 (1990). 

Case law reveals that this court rarely proclaims reversible error because of the 

asking of leading questions. In State v. Torres, 16 Wn. App. 254, 554 P.2d 1069 (1976), 

the prosecutor continuously, intentionally, and consistently asked leading questions to the 
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end that the court found the prosecutor contemptuous. The State’s attorney also referred 

to the accused with racial references. The prosecutor repeatedly mentioned the 

defendants’ refusal to testify during trial. This court held that “[w]hile the asking of 

leading questions is not prejudicial error in most instances, the persistent pursuit of such a 

course of action is a factor to be added in the balance.” State v. Torres, 16 Wn. App. at

258. This court granted a new trial only because of the combined error of violating the 

privilege against self-incrimination and the racial references. State v. Torres, 16 Wn. 

App. at 264-65. Torres inferentially suggests that repeated use of leading questions, 

which even lead to a finding of contempt, do not suffice for reversible error. 

Michelle Minderman argues that the findings of fact reveal the net effect of the 

leading questions resulting in the dissolution court reaching the conclusion that Michelle 

alienated her children from their father. We disagree. Sean’s trial counsel asked few 

leading questions and the questions functioned to set a foundation for other testimony. 

The dissolution court heard substantial evidence from witnesses, other than Sean and Rita 

Zorrozua, of Michelle’s alienating behavior. Guardian ad litem Mary spoke of a pattern 

of questionable allegations asserted by Michelle regarding Mary’s change of behavior. 

Michelle alleged that Sean exposed Mary to a dildo, that Mary was suicidal, and that her

counselor was no longer a good fit for her. Michelle reported to Child Protective 

Services that Sean abused the children. The dissolution court relied extensively on the 

guardian ad litem’s report and testimony in the court’s findings. 
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Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred by providing Sean Minderman’s attorney 

with legal advice on how leading questions could be admissible? 

Answer 2: Since Michelle fails to forward law to support her contention that the 

trial court erred by supplying legal advice, we decline to review this assignment of error. 

Michelle Minderman also contends that the trial court erred when advising Sean’s 

attorney on how to gain admission of his leading questions. Nevertheless, Michelle 

provides no argument or citation to authority related to this assigned error. This court 

does not review errors alleged, but not argued, briefed, or supported with citation to 

authority. RAP 10.3; Valente v. Bailey, 74 Wn.2d 857, 858, 447 P.2d 589 (1968). Thus, 

we decline to address the assignment of error. 

Issue 3: Whether the trial court erred when entering findings of fact that included 

prejudicial dicta comments, hearsay statements, and opinions not factual in nature? 

Answer 3: We decline to address this assignment of error because Michelle 

Minderman fails to assign error to discrete findings. 

The trial court entered 138 findings of fact and seven conclusions of law. 

Michelle Minderman complains that over fifty findings constitute opinions, incomplete 

sentences, dicta, prejudicial comments, hearsay, or inappropriate references to temporary 

orders. She argues that this court should, at the least, remand for entry of suitable 

findings, or, at most, grant a new trial. We decline to address this assignment of error. 
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RAP 10.3 provides, in part:

(g) Special Provision for Assignments of Error. . . . A separate 

assignment of error for each finding of fact a party contends was 

improperly made must be included with reference to the finding by number. 

The appellate court will only review a claimed error which is included in an 

assignment of error or clearly disclosed in the associated issue pertaining 

thereto.

Michelle Minderman failed to comply with RAP 10.3(g). Michelle Minderman’s 

assignment of error 3 reads:

By entering Findings of Fact that included a significant number of 

prejudicial dicta comments, hearsay statements, and opinions that were not 

factual in nature.

Opening Br. of Appellant at 5. Minderman does not number any of the alleged 

inappropriate findings. 

Issue 4: Whether the trial court erred when it referenced the parties’ temporary 

parenting orders as proof that a final shared parenting plan would be appropriate in 

violation of the Kovacs case.

Answer 4: No. The trial court did not rely on the temporary plan for the basis of 

the final plan. 

Michelle Minderman observes that the trial court’s findings of fact six to eighteen 

reference the parties’ successful performance under the temporary parenting plan, and,

thus, the findings imply that the court should enter a final plan of equal residential time

based on the temporary plan. She contends use of the temporary plan as a precedent 
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violated the rule promulgated in In re Marriage of Kovacs, 121 Wn.2d 795, 854 P.2d 629 

(1993), that a trial court cannot reference temporary plans when ordering final plans after

trial. 

Findings of fact six through eighteen declare:

6. In March of 2012, this case was filed by [Michelle] and she

requested at that time primary custody with the standard parenting plan for 

Mr. Minderman to have a mid week overnight visit and every other 

weekend until Monday morning.

7. At that time, she did not request any restrictions, and there was 

nothing in the request that would signify to the Court there were any huge 

issues with Mr. Minderman’s parenting.

8. However, in May of 2012, Mr. Minderman requested a 50/50 

parenting plan where the parties would then share custody, indicating that 

the parties had been doing this since separation.

9. In July of 2012, [Michelle] then filed a response to his request 

and accused him of reckless driving, drinking, drug use, pornography and 

abuse which included a domestic violence arrest in 2005 which was 

apparently dropped.

10. She asked the Court to restrict his time with the children 

because of these huge issues.

11. In October of 2012, the Court set up the current parenting plan 

where the mother had 8 overnights and the father had 6 overnights in a two 

week period, and the Court also appointed a Guardian ad Litem.

12. In setting up this 8/6 plan, the Court didn’t make any findings 

that Mr. Minderman had any of the issues that would concern the Court or 

limit his time with the children.

13. Though [Michelle] tried to get the Court to reconsider this 

parenting plan many times, the Court did not find her claims reliable 

considering her earlier request for a normal parenting plan.

14. During the three years that this case has churned through the 

court system and the various judicial officers, the parties continued their 8/6 

plan with a 50/50 plan during the summer.

15. There was no change in the last three years though the parties 

filed numerous continuances in the matter, some because of changes of 
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counsel and many because the Guardian ad Litem had to investigate 

different issues that popped up throughout the case.

16. There were several motions filed by [Michelle] asking to restrict 

Mr. Minderman’s time with the children though none were successful.

17. Mr. Minderman made several motions that the Court found to 

have merit, including the fact that [Michelle] would not allow the kids to 

have phone contact with him, and the Court Commissioner had to intervene 

and order phone contact.

18. The Commissioner did note that Mr. Minderman did not 

retaliate when he had the children, but would allow phone contact with 

their mother during this time.

CP at 296-97. 

According to Kovacs, the trial court may not draw presumptions from a temporary 

parenting plan when entering a permanent parenting plan. In re Marriage of Kovacs, 121 

Wn.2d at 809 (1993). Nevertheless, the decision does not preclude the dissolution court 

from references to the temporary plan in findings of fact. 

Michelle Minderman relies on In re Marriage of Combs, 105 Wn. App. 168, 19 

P.3d 469 (2001), wherein this court applied the Kovacs’ rule. In Combs, the court 

believed both parents were equally qualified to be the permanent primary residential 

parent. The court then broke the “tie” by relying on the fact that the mother had 

performed well as the primary residential parent during the temporary plan. This court

concluded that the court abused its discretion by designating the mother the permanent 

primary parent based on her success as the temporary primary parent. 

The Minderman dissolution court merely referenced that Michelle and Sean

operated under a temporary parenting plan for three years. The trial court did not opine 
No. 34829-6-III 

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that the parties operated a temporary 8/6 parenting plan with success. The court relied on 

no presumption in favor of continuing with the temporary plan. The dissolution court 

relied on substantial evidence that equal residential time served the best interests of the 

children. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion when entering the final 

parenting plan.

Issue 5: Whether the trial court erred by approving a child support worksheet that 

failed to show how Michelle’s net income was determined?

Answer 5: No.

RCW 26.19.035(3) requires that the parties complete child support worksheets in 

every dissolution proceeding in which the court awards child support. The statute affords 

no exceptions. In re Marriage of Sievers, 78 Wn. App. 287, 305, 897 P.2d 388 (1995). 

Data contained in the child support worksheet constitutes findings of fact for the child 

support order. In re Marriage of Daubert, 124 Wn. App. 483, 492, 99 P.3d 401 (2004),

abrogated on other grounds by In re Marriage of McCausland, 159 Wn.2d 607, 152 P.3d 

1013 (2007). 

We rarely reverse child support awards. In re Marriage of Griffin, 114 Wn.2d 

772, 776, 791 P.2d 519 (1990). The spouse who challenges an award must show that the 

trial court manifestly abused its discretion. In re Marriage of Griffin, 114 Wn.2d at 776. 

A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on 

untenable grounds. In re Marriage of Kovacs, 121 Wn.2d at 801 (1993). A court’s 
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decision is based on untenable grounds if the factual findings are unsupported by the 

record. In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997). 

Appellate courts review factual findings for substantial evidence and for legal error. In re 

Parentage of O.A.J., 190 Wn. App. 826, 830-31, 363 P.3d 1 (2015). 

Michelle Minderman contends that the final child support decision rested on a 

child support worksheet prepared by Sean’s attorney, which worksheet did not explain 

how he arrived at Michelle’s net income. In turn, Michelle contends the dissolution court 

committed error by failing to explicate the basis of her $16,152 monthly net income 

figure. 

Although Michelle Minderman posits the inadequacy of the child support 

worksheet, the underlying issue becomes whether substantial evidence supports the trial 

court’s child support order. We find sufficient evidence. The dissolution court reviewed 

multiple income tax statements of both parties. On this evidence, the court adopted, but 

incidentally changed, the worksheets that Sean presented. The trial court, based on 

Michelle’s returns, averaged her income from her wealth management business over a 

three year period. The court found that Michelle’s monthly net income, based on a three 

year average, was $16,152 at the time of trial. Substantial evidence supported this 

finding.

Michelle also argues that the court should have included all of her business taxes, 

unemployment taxes, social security taxes, and labor and industry taxes flowing from her 
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16

investment firm business. According to Michelle, such an exercise would have lowered 

her income and support obligation. We reject this contention because Michelle provided 

a net monthly income of $16,152 on her own worksheet. To the extent that the trial court

erred, Michelle invited the error. In re Marriage of Morris, 176 Wn. App. 893, 900, 309 

P.3d 767 (2013). 

Issue 6: Whether the trial court erred when it entered a child support order that 

failed to recognize that Michelle Minderman asked for a deviation from the standard 

calculation because of the equal residential schedule and failed to enter findings as to 

why it denied the request? 

Answer 6: We remand for the trial court to enter findings of fact in response to 

Michelle Minderman’s deviation request. 

Michelle Minderman next complains that the trial court entered no finding of fact 

in response to her deviation request as demanded by In re Parentage of A.L., 185 Wn. 

App. 225, 340 P.3d 260 (2014). Sean does not contend that Michelle failed to timely 

request a deviation. 

According to In re Parentage of A.L., the dissolution court determines the standard 

calculation of child support and nominates the obligor, after which the court, if requested, 

considers whether to deviate from the standard calculation. The dissolution court must 

perform a statutory analysis, under RCW 26.19.075(1)(d), if the court considers a 

deviation based on residential schedule. 
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If the court considers a deviation based on residential schedule, it 

must follow a specific statutory analysis:

The court may deviate from the standard calculation if the child 

spends a significant amount of time with the parent who is obligated to 

make a support transfer payment. The court may not deviate on that basis 

if the deviation will result in insufficient funds in the household receiving 

the support to meet the basic needs of the child or if the child is receiving 

temporary assistance for needy families. When determining the amount of 

the deviation, the court shall consider evidence concerning the increased 

expenses to a parent making support transfer payments resulting from the 

significant amount of time spent with that parent and shall consider the 

decreased expenses, if any, to the party receiving the support resulting from 

the significant amount of time the child spends with the parent making the 

support transfer payment.

In re Parentage of A.L., 185 Wn. App. at 237; RCW 26.19.075(1)(d). The trial 

court must enter written findings of fact supporting the reasons for any deviation 

or denial of a party’s request for deviation. RCW 26.19.075(3); In re Parentage of 

A.L., 185 Wn. App. at 237. 

The Minderman dissolution court entered no finding of fact on its refusal to 

deviate from the child support schedule. The court instead entered “Does not 

apply” and directed Michelle to present a formal motion if she wished. Both Sean 

and Michelle later moved the court for reconsideration. Michelle asked the court 

to find good cause to grant her request for a deviation from the standard 

calculation. The trial court entered a written ruling denying the motion for 

reconsideration for child support by either party. The court, however, did not 
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directly respond to the request for a deviation. Therefore, we remand to the 

dissolution court to enter one or more findings of fact in response to the entreaty. 

Issue 7: Whether the trial court erred by entering a parenting plan without 

indicating the plan served the children’s best interests?

Answer 7: We decline to address this assignment of error. 

Michelle Minderman argues the trial court erred by entering a parenting plan 

without any substantive conclusions of law and without indicating the plan served the 

children’s best interests. Nevertheless, in her opening brief, Michelle does not address 

this assignment of error. She provides no argument or citation to authority related to this 

assignment. This court does not review errors alleged but not argued, briefed, or 

supported with citation to authority. RAP 10.3; Valente v. Bailey, 74 Wn.2d at 858

(1968). 

Issue 8: Whether the trial court erred by declaring Sean Minderman the primary 

custodian when granting the parties equal residential time? 

Answer 8: We decline to address this assignment of error. 

Michelle Minderman next argues that the trial court erred by entering a parenting 

plan that declared Sean as the primary parent with the greatest amount of parenting time, 

even though the plan ordered exactly equal time for both parents. Nevertheless, in her 

opening brief, Michelle does not address this assignment of error. She provides no 

argument or citation to authority related to this assignment. This court does not review 
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errors alleged but not argued, briefed, or supported with citation to authority. RAP 10.3; 

Valente v. Bailey, 74 Wn.2d at 858. 

Issue 9: Whether we should remand to a new trial judge? 

Answer 9: No. 

Finally, Michelle asks that we require a new judge to preside on remand due to the 

prejudicial comments toward Michelle in the court’s findings. We deny the request. To 

the extent the court entered prejudicial comments in findings of fact, sufficient evidence 

supported the comments. Our order of remand pertains only to a narrow issue, on which 

the court already ruled. 

Issue 10: Whether this court should award Sean Minderman reasonable attorney 

fees and costs incurred on appeal?

Answer 10: No. 

RCW 26.09.140 allows this court to award a party attorney fees and costs against 

the other party in a martial dissolution appeal. In awarding attorney fees on appeal, the 

court examines the merits of the issues on appeal and the financial resources of the 

respective parties. In re Marriage of Griffin, 114 Wn. 2d at 779-80 (1990). Sean 

Minderman asks for an award.

We deny Sean Minderman’s request for an award of attorney fees. The 

dissolution court awarded Sean substantial property. Sean received the family home 

valued at $450,000, Hauser Lake property valued at $165,000, an Arizona parcel valued 
No. 34829-6-III 

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at $196,000, and his Frame Factory business valued at $284,000. He holds substantial 

assets to pay fees. See In re Marriage of Griswold, 112 Wn. App. 333, 353, 48 P.3d 

1018 (2002). 

CONCLUSION 

We affirm all rulings of the trial court except the court's refusal to grant a child 

support deviation. Without directing the court how to rule, we remand for the dissolution 

court to enter one or more findings of fact in response to Michelle Minderman' s request 

for the deviation. We deny Sean Minderman an award of reasonable attorney fees and 

costs on appeal. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 

2.06.040. 

WE CONCUR: 

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