J-A27038-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

FREDERICK T. FRY, INDIVIDUALLY 

AND AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 

ESTATE OF JEAN ANN FRY 

Appellant

v.

MONTROSE MINUTE MEN, INC.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 50 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered December 8, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County 

Civil Division at No(s): 2020-00487

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and COLINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: JULY 28, 2023

Frederick T. Fry, individually and as administrator of the estate of Jean 

Ann Fry, appeals from the order granting summary judgment in favor of 

Montrose Minute Men, Inc. (“Minute Men”). On appeal, Fry presents seven 

issues, all of which touch upon his underlying contention that the lower court 

erred in its summary judgment determination. After an extensive review of 

the record, we disagree and affirm. 

As background,

[o]n January 15, 2019, the [“]Minute Men crew[”] was dispatched 

to the Fry residence for a complaint of dizziness which required 

lifting assistance. The crew arrived about a half hour after [Jean 

Ann Fry, the] [d]ecedent fell. The crew consisted of Shawn 

Frampton, a paramedic, and Amy Johnson, the emergency 

____________________________________________

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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medical technician (EMT). Decedent was still on the floor in the 

kitchen when Frampton and Johnson entered the house. Decedent 

was conscious, alert, and oriented and reported no neck pain or 

dizziness to Frampton. Frampton palpated [d]ecedent’s neck and 

back before lifting her. Fry pulled a dining room chair over and 

Frampton and Johnson lifted [d]ecedent onto the chair. Decedent 

refused to be transported to the hospital so Frampton sent 

Johnson out to the ambulance to bring in refusal paperwork and a 

heart monitor. A minute later, [d]ecedent’s eyes rolled back in her 

head and she became semi-responsive and then unresponsive. 

Frampton felt for a pulse and when he found no pulse, he moved 

her to the floor and started CPR on [d]ecedent. Johnson came 

back into the house and Frampton sent her back out to the 

ambulance to call for assistance because [d]ecedent was in 

cardiac arrest. A second crew from the Minute Men was 

dispatched. Johnson came back into the residence with equipment 

and helped Frampton with compressions. Frampton tried to start 

an intravenous line (IV) but was unsuccessful. He then 

successfully placed an intraosseous device (IO) in order to 

administer epinephrine to [d]ecedent. Two members of the Hop 

Bottom Hose Company were dispatched and arrived eight minutes 

later. The additional dispatched members of the Montrose Minute 

Men arrived, including James Krupinski and Robert Getz, and 

assisted with CPR then helped moved [d]ecedent to a backboard 

to transfer her to the ambulance. In the ambulance, Frampton and 

Getz continued performing CPR and Frampton administered 

additional doses of [e]pinephrine. Frampton tried to intubate 

[d]ecedent but there was [a] “peanut butter” like substance in her 

airway which he tried to suction out. He was unsuccessful. They 

arrived at the hospital and CPR was continued. Decedent was 

pronounced dead approximately 15 minutes later.

Fry stated that Frampton and Johnson arrived to his 

residence about a half hour after [d]ecedent fell. Decedent was 

still on the floor in the kitchen and Fry brought a chair from the 

dining room into the kitchen and Frampton and Johnson lifted 

[d]ecedent into the chair. Decedent said she did not want to go to 

the hospital and Frampton informed Fry that they could not make 

her go to the hospital. Decedent started to slur her words and 

went unconscious. Decedent was moved from the chair to the floor 

and Frampton started performing chest compressions. Johnson 

was sent outside. A second crew arrived. They took [d]ecedent to 

the hospital and Fry followed in his own vehicle. At the hospital, 

Fry was told that [d]ecedent had died. Fry called the coroner after 
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he received the death certificate because the coroner did not list 

the cause of death as an accident. Fry asked the coroner to change 

the death certificate because Fry believed [d]ecedent’s fall was 

the cause of her death. 

Frampton ha[d] 20 years’ experience as a paramedic. The 

Fry call came in at 9:39 p.m. as an “Alpha” or low priority call, 

and he and Johnson were dispatched at 9:44 p.m. Frampton 

agreed that protocols apply to all emergency medical service 

(EMS) calls and if you do not follow protocol and obtain a history 

or perform a physical examination, you do not know how to treat 

the patient. He agreed that the physical exam is documented. 

Initial treatment for cardiac arrest is CPR. Frampton agreed that 

he did not have a cardiac monitor or equipment to place an IV at 

the time of the cardiac arrest. Frampton also agreed that for 

cardiac arrest, per protocol, epinephrine is generally given every 

three to five minutes. He agreed that the documentation indicates 

that he gave epinephrine at ten-minute intervals. It took him 12 

minutes to administer the first dose of epinephrine because he 

was performing CPR and trying to initiate the unsuccessful IV and 

subsequent successful IO. He did not call medical command 

because there is no cell phone coverage or sufficient radio 

coverage in Hop Bottom where the Fry residence is located. 

Frampton conceded that he did not try to use his phone but from 

past experience, he knows there is no cell coverage in that area. 

Johnson explained that on January 15, 2019, she was an 

EMT for the Minute Men who was paid a $20 stipend to do a shift 

which covered her fuel and meal cost. She explained that cardiac 

arrest was a high priority condition and protocol indicates 

administration of oxygen, treatment and immediate transport to 

[an] appropriate medical facility. Performance of a focused, headto-toe, physical exam is [necessary] and that exam should be 

documented unless it is trumped by something else. If the patient 

goes into cardiac arrest, that becomes the focus.

Robert Getz explained that he was a paid EMT for the Minute 

Men but at the time of the incident on January 15, 2019, he was 

responding as a volunteer because it was an off-duty or a second 

duty call.

James Krupinski has been an EMT since 1986. He was 

operations manager for the Minute Men on January 15, 2019. He 

ran the day-to-day operations and was responsible for payroll, 
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taxes and bills and he did the hiring and firing of personnel. The 

Minute Men has a combination of paid employees and volunteers. 

The Minute Men does in-house training of EMTs outside of the 

required continuing education credits. The training is available 

through the regional office and could be two to six times a year. 

The Minute Men have policies and procedures that the EMTs and 

paramedics are expected to follow for documentation and patient 

care and all EMTs must follow the statewide basic life support 

(BLS) protocols and paramedics must follow the statewide 

advanced life support (ALS) protocols. Krupinski does not know if 

medical command was contacted at the time of the Fry call. 

Contact is usually made by cellphone but there is no cellphone 

coverage in Hop Bottom and radio coverage is uncertain in certain 

areas of Susquehanna County.

Fry provided the report of Kimberly D. Freeman who is a

physician[,] board-certified in emergency medicine and 

emergency medical services. Dr. Freeman indicated that 

[d]ecedent had a history of hypertension, atrial fibrillation and had 

a breast biopsy the day before the incident. Following [d]ecedent’s 

death, no autopsy was performed and the cause of death was 

listed as myocardial infraction, atrial fibrillation and hypertension. 

She believed that Frampton and Johnson breached the standard 

of care which caused and/or increased the risk of death of

[d]ecedent in the following ways: 1) Frampton moved [d]ecedent 

to a chair without a documented medical exam; 2) Frampton did 

not document use of a “pit crew” for CPR after additional crew 

members arrived; 3) Frampton and Johnson did not bring 

equipment into the Fry home which delayed optimal initiation of 

resuscitation; 4) [r]hythm and pulse checks every two minutes 

were not documented; 5) Frampton attempted an IV as [a] first 

attempt for vascular access rather than [a] tibial IO which is 

required per ALS protocol; 6) ETCO2 was not 

observed/documented as required by ALS protocol; 7) 

consideration/documentation of reversible causes of cardiac 

arrest was not done; 8) epinephrine was administered at 10 

minute intervals when ALS protocol calls for administration every 

3-5 minutes; 9) airway placement times were not documented 

and a secondary/rescue airway option was not considered 

following failed attempts to intubate; 10) reasons for deviation 

from protocol were not documented as required; and 11) there 

was a failure to contact medical command as required before 

transport and/or when 20-40 minutes of ALS unsuccessful 

resuscitative efforts had been completed. Dr. Freeman offered the 
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following opinion:

[Decedent] suffered a cardiac arrest in the presence of 

Paramedic Frampton and EMT Johnson of the Montrose 

Minute Men when they responded to her residence for a fall. 

The resuscitation that ensued was compromised by the fact 

that the equipment was not brought into the house, delaying 

optimal resuscitation due to the lack of rescuers at her side 

and the lack of equipment to perform resuscitation. 

Thereafter, the wrong initial vascular access was used, the 

wrong epinephrine dosing interval was used, pulse and

rhythm checkers were not performed every two minutes, 

and reversible causes were not considered. In addition, 

airway management by unsuccessful intubation attempts 

required CPR interruption rather than using a rescue device, 

and airway management was not documented adequately. 

Finally, ETCO2 was never documented and Medical 

Command was not contacted before transport as is required 

by protocol. ... In conclusion, within a reasonable degree of 

medical certainty, all of the foregoing deviated from the 

standard of care in EMS care and increased the risk of harm 

and ultimately death of [decedent]. 

Fry also provided the report of William G. McDonald, PhD, FACPE, 

NR-Paramedic. McDonald believed that the following actions were 

outside of the standard of care: 1) the crew failed to bring in 

diagnostic or treatment equipment when responding to a call for 

possible fainting; 2) [d]ecedent was placed in a chair prior to 

performance of an initial assessment; 3) rhythm checks were not 

performed every two minutes per protocol; 4) CPR pit crew 

approach was not documented; 5) Frampton attempted an IV line 

before attempting an IO when protocol directs to attempt an IO 

first; 6) while several attempts as endotracheal intubation were 

documented, Frampton did not document any attempt to remove 

the peanut butter in the airway manually or with finger sweeps; 

7) Frampton did not document the use or attempted use of an 

alternative airway device; 8) Frampton failed to administer 

epinephrine every 3-5 minutes as directed in Protocol 3031A; 9) 

Frampton did not document any attempt to call medical command 

either by radio or phone prior to moving or transporting the 

patient. McDonald then offered the following opinion:

The EMS crew from the Montrose Minute Men should 

have initially carried their equipment with them into the Fry 
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home regardless of the call type. In this case, the call type 

(per the CAD) was fainting. This should have prompted the 

crew to think about possible medical conditions that could 

have possibly taken place. If the crew carried the equipment 

in and performed a thorough initial assessment, (checking 

the airway, breathing and circulations) initial vital signs, an 

EKG, SPO2 reading, and blood glucose level they would have 

determined whether [decedent] was stable enough to be 

moved into a sitting position in a chair. Once [decedent] 

suffered the cardiac arrest, she was place[d] on the floor. 

CPR was initiated, however, protocol 3031A I/O placement 

was not properly followed, requirements of [e]phinephrine 

every 3-5 minutes was neglected, there were three failed 

endotracheal intubation attempts, and no attempts to use 

alternate airway or manually clear the airway. These 

treatments were all outside the standard of care and 

recklessness. ... It is my opinion with a reasonable degree of 

professional certainty that the EMS crew that responded to 

assist [decedent] acted in a reckless manner and breached 

the standard of care in addition to the Pennsylvania 

Statewide BLS Protocol 201 and the Pennsylvania Statewide 

ALS protocols ... by not entering the location with proper 

diagnostic and treatment equipment and failing to perform 

an initial assessment before moving [decedent] as directed 

in 3031A.

The Minute Men proved the report of Howard K. Mell who is a 

physician[,] board-certified in emergency medicine and 

emergency medical services. Dr. Mell disagreed with the opinions 

of Dr[s]. Freeman and McDonald that there was a deviation from 

the standard of care when the first responders failed to bring in 

equipment, explaining that the Minute Men were “not dispatched 

to provide medical service in this case, they were dispatched to 

help [decedent] up off the floor.” Dr. Mell disputed the opinions 

that moving [d]ecedent to a chair prior to performing an initial 

assessment was a breach of the standard of care, explaining that 

Frampton had palpated [d]ecedent’s spine and spoke with her 

before assisting her to the chair. Dr. Mell also disputed the 

opinions that Frampton violated protocol by attempting an IV prior 

to attempting an IO; violated protocol by not obtaining an ETCO2 

measurement; and, violated protocol by not considering reversible 

causes of cardiac arrest. Dr. Mell stated that the timing of the 

epinephrine doses does not represent a breach of the standard of 

care. He further opined that Frampton did not violate the standard 
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of care by not considering the use of an advanced airway after 

failed intubation attempts. As for the conclusion by Dr[s]. 

Freeman and McDonald that Frampton violated the standard of 

care and protocols by not contacting medical command, Dr. Mell 

indicated that because contact with medical command was 

impossible due to the location, the crew had no choice but to 

transport [d]ecedent to the hospital. Finally, Dr. Mell disagreed 

with the opinions of Dr[s]. Freeman and McDonald that lack of 

documentation was a violation of the standard of care. He offered 

the following opinion:

I can confidently state with medical certainty that: 1. The 

responding Montrose Minute Men (Paramedic Shawn 

Frampton, EMT Amy Johnson, EMT James Krupinski, and 

EMT Robert Getz) did not violate the standard of care 

expected of EMS providers during their treatment of 

[decedent] on January 15, 2019. The actions or inactions of 

Montrose Minute Men EMS [p]roviders did not lend, in any 

way, to the injuries suffered by the [decedent]; and 3. While 

tragic, the events that occurred were an almost immutable 

chain of events set into motion by a combination of 

[decedent’s] pre-existing conditions, and her suffering a 

cardiac arrest geographically distant to an advanced medical 

center, and were possibly complicated by the fall she 

suffered immediately prior to her cardiac arrest. The EMS 

providers on the scene responded admirably to a very 

difficult situation.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/8/21, at 3-11 (footnotes and record citations omitted)

(some alterations in original).

Fry filed the present action on May 12, 2020. Predicated on his 

contention that the Minute Men’s actions were causally or contributorily 

related to his seventy-one-year-old wife’s death, Fry’s complaint sought

damages against that entity, alleging wrongful death, a survival action, a claim 

for gross negligence/recklessness, a claim for corporate liability as to 

negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, and a claim for negligent infliction 
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of emotional distress. Eventually, after preliminary objections, which, inter 

alia, involved the striking of Fry’s negligent hiring and retention claims (but 

not negligent supervision), Minute Men filed an answer to Fry’s complaint on 

December 15, 2020.

Approximately eight months later, on August 30, 2021, the Minute Men 

filed a motion for summary judgment, principally asserting that Fry has shown 

no evidence of gross negligence or willful misconduct, which correspondingly 

meant, as a matter of law, Fry could not recover damages. The Minute Men 

also presented ancillary arguments contesting: (1) Fry’s claim for punitive 

damages; (2) Fry’s negligent supervision claim; and (3) Fry’s negligent 

infliction of emotional distress claim. Much like the rationale underpinning the 

Minute Men’s chief contention, those additional arguments challenged Fry’s 

ability to prove the elements of each cause of action based on the evidentiary 

record that had been amassed. The motion followed months of discovery, 

which specifically involved the taking of depositions and the exchanging of 

expert reports. Ultimately, after oral argument, the court granted the Minute 

Men’s motion for summary judgment as to all claims contained in Fry’s 

complaint.

Resultantly, Fry filed a timely notice of appeal from the lower court’s 

determination. Thereafter, the relevant parties complied with their respective 

obligations under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925, and as such, 

this matter is ripe for review.
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On appeal, Fry presents seven issues for this Court’s review:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion or commit an error of 

law in its interpretation of the standard for granting summary 

judgment?

2. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment in favor 

of the Minute Men on the issue of gross negligence where 

genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether there was 

an extreme departure from its standard of care?

3. Did the trial court err in finding that the actions and omissions 

of Shawn Frampton and Amy Johnson failed to rise to the level 

of gross negligence where the record is replete with genuine 

issues of material fact?

4. Did the trial court err in granting immunity under the 

Emergency Medical Services System Act ([EMSSA]), see Act of 

August 18, 2009, P.L. 308, as amended, 35 Pa.C.S. § 8101 et 

seq., as genuine issues of material fact exist as to the extreme 

departure from the standard of care constituting gross 

negligence from the Minute Men and its agents?

5. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment as to Fry’s 

punitive damages claim without reviewing the merits when 

genuine issues of material fact exist as to the gross negligence 

of the Minute Men, precluding it from immunity under the 

[EMSSA]?

6. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment as to Fry’s 

negligent supervision claim without reviewing the merits when 

genuine issues of material fact exist as to the gross negligence 

of the Minute Men, thereby precluding it from immunity under 

the [EMSSA]?

7. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment as to Fry’s 

negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, as there are 

genuine issues of material fact as to the Minute Men’s gross 

negligence?

See Appellant’s Brief, at 12-13.

All of Fry’s claims allege that the trial court’s grant of summary 
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judgment was inappropriate. Correspondingly, we note that our standard of 

review of the trial court's grant of summary judgment is de novo, and our 

scope of review is plenary. See Pyeritz v. Commonwealth, 32 A.3d 687, 

692 (Pa. 2011); American Southern Insurance Co. v. Halbert, 203 A.3d 

223, 226 (Pa. Super. 2019). A grant of summary judgment in favor of a 

defendant is appropriate only where the material facts are undisputed and, 

additionally, that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on those 

undisputed facts or, conversely, where, after discovery, the plaintiff has failed 

to produce evidence of facts essential to his cause of action against that 

defendant. See Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2; Kibler v. Blue Knob Recreation, Inc., 

184 A.3d 974, 978–79 (Pa. Super. 2018); Criswell v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 

115 A.3d 906, 909 (Pa. Super. 2015). To determine whether there is a genuine 

dispute of a material fact that precludes summary judgment or whether the 

plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence to support a cause of action, we must 

view the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as the non-moving 

party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact 

must be resolved against the defendant movant. Criswell, 115 A.3d at 908-

09; Petrina v. Allied Glove Corp., 46 A.3d 795, 798 (Pa. Super. 2012). Even 

though summary judgment cannot be granted against a plaintiff based on the 

credibility of oral testimony other than the plaintiff's admissions, oral 

testimony of witnesses other than the plaintiff may be considered in 

determining whether the plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence of the 
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essential elements of his cause of action. See Winwood v. Bregman, 788 

A.2d 983, 985 (Pa. Super. 2001).

The lower court found that the claims in Fry’s complaint all sounded in 

negligence, with those claims being asserted against both the Minute Men, as 

an entity, and its agents, those who rendered medical services on Fry’s wife. 

Fry, therefore, was required to prove that the Minute Men and/or its agents 

owed him or his wife a duty of care, that the Minute Men and/or its agents

breached that duty, that there was a causal relationship between that breach 

of duty and his or her injury, and that Fry or his wife suffered actual loss. See 

Koziar v. Rayner, 200 A.3d 513, 518-19 (Pa. Super. 2018); Collins v. 

Philadelphia Suburban Development Corp., 179 A.3d 69, 73 (Pa. Super. 

2018). The determination as to whether a duty exists is a question of law. 

See Walters v. UPMC Presbyterian Shadyside, 187 A.3d 214, 221-22 (Pa. 

2018); Baumbach v. Lafayette College, 272 A.3d 83, 89 (Pa. Super. 2022).

The court found that Shawn Frampton and Amy Johnson, acting in their 

capacities as paramedic and EMT, respectively, did not demonstrate gross 

negligence or willful misconduct on January 15, 2019. As such, they, and by 

extension the Minute Men, were absolved of any potential liability given the 

language of the EMSSA. The EMSSA states that “[n]o EMS agency, EMS 

agency medical director or EMS provider who in good faith attempts to render 

or facilitate emergency medical care authorized by this chapter shall be liable 

for civil damages as a result of an act or omission, absent a showing of gross 
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negligence or willful misconduct.” 35 Pa.C.S. § 8151(2). In defining “gross 

negligence,” this Court has interpreted the phrase to be liability that is 

“premised on facts indicating more egregiously deviant conduct than ordinary 

carelessness, inadvertence, laxity, or indifference.” Bloom v. Dubois 

Regional Medical Center, 597 A.2d 671, 679 (Pa. Super. 1991). Specifically, 

“[t]he behavior of the defendant must be flagrant, grossly deviating from the 

ordinary standard of care.” Id. While, generally, it is for a jury to decide

whether an act or failure to act constitutes gross negligence, such a 

determination “may be removed from consideration by a jury and decided as 

a matter of law only where the case is entirely free from doubt and there is 

no possibility that a reasonable jury could find gross negligence.” Feleccia v. 

Lackawanna College, 215 A.3d 3, 20 n.12 (Pa. 2019) (citation omitted).

The court summarized Fry’s two expert reports:

Dr[s]. Freeman and McDonald believed that the actions of the 

Minute Men crew in failing to carry equipment into the Fry home, 

failing to perform an initial assessment prior to moving [d]ecedent 

to a chair, failing to follow protocol for IO placement, failing to 

administer epinephrine every three to five minutes, and failing to 

use an alternate airway or manually clear the airway after three 

failed intubation attempts were deviations from the standard of 

care.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/8/21, at 14 (footnote omitted). However, the court 

concluded that “[e]ven viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Fry, 

[it did] not find that the actions of Frampton and Johnson alleged to be grossly 

negligent were flagrant, grossly deviating from the standard of care or an 

extreme departure from ordinary care.” Id. The court continued:
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The crew’s failure to bring in diagnostic equipment when 

they arrived at the Fry residence hardly rises to an extreme 

departure from the standard of care or shows a conscious, 

voluntary omission in reckless disregard of a legal duty. At most, 

the failure of the crew to bring equipment when they first arrived 

at the Fry home may – or may not – rise to a level of ordinary 

negligence. And while it is undisputed that Frampton did not 

document whether he performed an initial assessment of 

[d]ecedent prior to moving her to a chair, it is unclear that 

Frampton failed to perform any assessment of [d]ecedent. As 

indicated by Dr. Mell, it is highly unusual for an EMS provider to 

specifically list their assessment. Furthermore, if Frampton had 

failed to perform an initial evaluation of [d]ecedent, failure to 

perform this assessment does not rise to the level of gross 

negligence. Additionally, insertion of an IO after a failed attempt 

at insertion of an IV and failing to use an alternate airway or 

manually clear the airway after three failed intubation attempts 

do not rise to the level required to establish gross negligence on 

the part of the Minute Men crew. Even if these actions were 

deviations from the standard of care, they do not demonstrate a 

significant departure from how a reasonably careful person would 

act under similar circumstances. Finally, it is undisputed that the 

epinephrine dosing, as documented, was not in line with 

[s]tatewide protocols as to timing. Nevertheless, while it is 

possibly that the epinephrine dosage timing might – or might not 

– be sufficient to establish ordinary negligence, it does not reach 

the level of gross negligence. In other words, there is no 

suggestion that Frampton acted in reckless disregard of the 

consequences or acted with substantially more than ordinary 

carelessness, inadvertence, laxity, or indifference when 

administering the epinephrine to [d]ecedent while also performing 

CPR.

Id., at 15-16 (footnote omitted). 

Beyond finding no indicia of gross negligence, the court also determined

that Fry failed to present evidence of willful misconduct by the Minute Men or 

its agents, and in so finding, Fry was therefore prohibited from an alternative 

basis to surmount the EMSSA’s immunity. See 35 Pa.C.S. § 8151(2); see

also Trial Court Opinion, 12/8/21, at 16. The court concluded that the Minute 
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Men’s immunity under the EMSSA foreclosed Fry from punitive damages and

prevented any likelihood of recovery as to his negligent infliction of emotional 

distress claim. See id., at 17-18. 

All seven of Fry’s arguments are premised on challenging the court’s

immunity finding. Fry contends that he “established [the Minute Men’s] gross 

negligence through thorough and well-supported expert reports.” Appellant’s 

Brief, at 44. Specifically, “Dr. McDonald meticulously outlined, in his eleven ... 

page report, how the actions and omissions of the Montrose Minute Men were 

both reckless, beyond the ordinary standard of care, and in conscious 

disregard for the care and life of the decedent.” Id. Fry also states that Dr. 

Freeman’s report establishes materially the same. See id., at 45. 

Distilled down, Fry argues that his expert reports, by themselves, create 

inherent issues of fact that are necessary for jury adjudication. However, other 

than citing two pieces of “authority,” one from this Court and another from a 

trial-court level decision, even accepting everything contained within his 

expert reports as true, Fry has failed to show that the Minute Men, or its 

agents, engaged in any kind of behavior that could be considered grossly 

negligent or willful misconduct. 

Fry relies on the aforementioned Bloom decision to baldly insinuate that 

the facts underpinning that case are applicable here. Bloom, which was an 

appeal taken at the pleadings stage of trial and involved a suicide attempt by 

one of the plaintiffs, resulted in a finding that the complaint pleaded facts 
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sufficient to possibly allow for a finding of gross negligence. See 597 A.2d at 

679. In particular, “[t]he complaint alleged that the defendants, who held 

themselves out as competent to provide psychiatric treatment to one on the 

position of [one of the plaintiffs], completely failed to diagnose her mental 

condition and treat her in a manner that would protect her from serious 

physical harm.” Id. The complaint “further averred that upon admission the 

defendants were informed of [one of the plaintiff’s] mental disorder and 

nevertheless failed to take adequate precautions to assure her safety.” Id.

Bloom cautioned, though, that “it [was] not certain whether the plaintiffs can 

develop evidence that will demonstrate that the defendants’ failure was 

flagrant enough to be characterized as a gross deviation from the applicable 

standard of care.” Id. While both Bloom and the present matter involve 

circumstances of a medical nature, Fry has not shown Bloom to have any 

direct applicability; the fact of the matter is that there were wholly different 

conditions present when the Minute Men rendered aid on the decedent and, 

importantly, Bloom features a disposition at the pleadings stage. 

Fry’s proceeding citation to Clifford v. Community Medical Center is 

equally, if not more, inapposite. See 59 Pa. D. & C. 5th 399 (Lacka. Co. 2016). 

To start, Fry only describes this case in two sentences. From these two 

sentences, Fry frames that trial court’s conclusion, which was responsive to a 

motion for summary judgment, as holding that “the physicians should have 

known that abruptly changing patient’s medication could have been an 
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aggravating factor of the suicide itself.” Appellant’s Brief, at 50. Even 

accepting Fry’s recounting of the court’s legal analysis, Clifford involved a 

suicidal decedent that had been evaluated by several medical professionals in 

a clinical setting. 

It is unclear what persuasive value Fry is attempting to extract from this 

case. Although he attempts to bridge the gap between Clifford and the 

present matter by stating that the Minute Men were “fully aware of the 

protocols required to administer proper and appropriate emergency services 

and care to decedent[,]” id., as best can be discerned, the court’s opinion in 

Clifford did not imply that cognizance of protocols and, by implication, that

the failure to administer ‘proper and appropriate’ emergency services 

inherently, or as a matter of law, constitutes gross negligence. Moreover, we 

emphasize that Clifford is not precedential. 

The rest of Fry’s brief is dedicated to record citations and conclusory 

averments attempting to establish that the Minute Men’s actions were grossly 

negligent. In particular, Fry suggests, or reiterates his belief, that the Minute 

Men’s agents did not follow the required protocols, did not perform an initial 

assessment of the decedent, did not clear the decedent’s airway prior to 

performing CPR, and did not administer epinephrine at the correct interval. 

See id., at 50-52. However, we are constrained by Fry’s total lack of support 

tending to show that liability stemming from any of the Minute Men or its 

agents’ actions have been: (1) found by a jury or appellate court under similar 
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or analogous circumstances to constitute gross negligence or willful 

misconduct; or (2) able to conceptually survive a motion for summary 

judgment. Without evidence of either, even reviewing the record in a light 

most favorable to Fry, there is no indication that there is a triable issue of 

material fact that would ultimately allow him to recover on any of the claims 

asserted in his complaint.

Without any materially significant issues for a jury to resolve and, too,

through the court’s determination that the Minute Men and its agents were 

shielded from civil liability as none of their actions constituted gross negligence 

or willful misconduct, we affirm the lower court’s order granting summary 

judgment.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/28/2023