GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on Defense, Committee on 

Appropriations, House of 

Representatives

May 2000 DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS

Antiarmor Munitions 

Master Plan Does Not 

Identify Potential 

Excesses or Support 

Planned Procurements

GAO/NSIAD-00-67

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-00-67 Defense Acquisitions

Contents

Letter 3

Appendixes Appendix I: Antiarmor Requirements Modeling Practices 16

Appendix II: Quantity and Cost of Antiarmor Systems Under 

Development and Procurement 20

Appendix III: Projected Antiarmor Weapon Production Funding, 

Fiscal Year 2000 to Completion 21

Appendix IV: Comments From the Department of Defense 22

Appendix V: GAO Staff Acknowledgments 24

Tables Table 1: Army Direct Fire Antiarmor Weapons Used Against 

Targets, as a Percentage of Combat Requirement 17

Table 2: Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps Air Antiarmor 

Weapon Usage Against Target Types 18

Table 3: Comparison of Marine Corps Ground Model Results 

and Manual Calculations 19

Figures Figure 1: Comparison of Technology Levels of Main Battle Tanks 

of the Countries in the Two-Regional Conflict Threat 

Scenario 8

Figure 2: Percentage of Mobile Armored Targets Allocated to the 

Army and the Air Force, 1997-98 12

Abbreviations

BAT/ATACMS Brilliant Antiarmor Submunition/Army Tactical Missile

 System

DOD Department of Defense

JSOW Joint Stand-Off Weapon

MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System

MPIM Multipurpose Individual Munition

RADAM Remote Area Denial Artillery Munition

SADARM Sense and Destroy Armor Munition

SFW Sensor Fuzed Weapon

WAM Wide Area Munition
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United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-282444 Letr

May 5, 2000

The Honorable Jerry Lewis

Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In its report on the Fiscal Year 1999 Defense Appropriations Bill, the House 

Committee on Appropriations expressed concern that the military services 

are continuing to develop and procure an increasing number of tank-killing 

weapons at a time when potential adversaries have smaller armored forces. 

The Committee also questioned whether current antiarmor acquisition 

plans are appropriate and directed the Secretary of Defense to develop an 

Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan. According to the report, the plan should 

identify the projected armored threat and the projected quantity of all 

antiarmor weapons, whether fielded or in development, with the purpose 

of identifying and eliminating excess antiarmor capability. The Department 

of Defense (DOD) was directed to submit the plan with its fiscal year 2000 

budget submission. 

Before the Master Plan was issued, we reported that DOD’s inventory of 

antiarmor weapons had remained at 1990 Cold War levels (in terms of 

overall quantities and types), while the number of armored targets under 

current planning scenarios had dropped to less than 20 percent of the 

number considered in 1990.1

 Previously, guidance issued by the Secretary 

of Defense establishing the most demanding level of threat U.S. forces must 

be prepared to counter and setting forth the war-fighting strategy had been 

based on a large-scale Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat involving thousands of 

armored vehicles; but the guidance is now based on a much smaller 

armored threat from two regional conflicts occurring simultaneously.2

1

Defense Acquisitions: Reduced Threat Not Reflected in Antiarmor Weapon Acquisitions

(GAO/NSIAD-99-105, July 22, 1999).

2

The Defense Intelligence Agency identifies the number and types of enemy armored targets 

in each scenario that each service needs to destroy. The commanders in chief allocate 

responsibility for the targets among the military services. On the basis of these allocations, 

the services determine their antiarmor weapon requirements. 
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Since 1990, DOD has invested billions of dollars to further increase its 

antiarmor weapon capabilities. According to the President’s fiscal year 

2000 budget submission, DOD expects to spend about $17.9 billion 

developing and producing additional antiarmor weapons from fiscal year 

2000 until all the programs are completed.

The plan3

 was sent to Congress on August 25, 1999, several months after 

the fiscal year 2000 budget submission. At your request, we reviewed 

DOD’s Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan to determine whether it provided 

the data and analyses necessary to (1) identify excess antiarmor weapons 

currently in the inventory or under development and (2) support current 

acquisition plans. 

Results in Brief DOD’s Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan did not identify any excess 

antiarmor weapons or provide the data and analyses needed to identify 

such excesses. Instead of identifying the types and quantities of antiarmor 

weapons needed to meet requirements under current planning scenarios, 

the plan only described the types of antiarmor weapons in the inventory 

and under development and identified the number and types of armored 

systems possessed by nine countries it considered potentially hostile to the 

United States. The total capabilities and quantities of the armored systems 

possessed by these countries substantially exceeds those in the current 

two-regional conflict threat scenario. The plan acknowledged that the tank 

threat from the countries identified in that scenario is low, but the plan did 

not identify potential excesses in antiarmor weapons resulting from major 

reductions in the armor threat since 1990. Further, the modeling practices 

the services used to identify individual antiarmor weapons quantity 

requirements routinely generated excessive requirements. Specifically, we 

found that (1) the Air Force added more targets to the model than it is 

responsible for, (2) the services added large quantities of weapons to their 

models to allow for uncertainties, (3) the services projected the use of 

sophisticated and expensive antiarmor guided weapons against unarmored 

targets, and (4) the Marine Corps and the Army did not always accept their 

model’s results and used manual calculations to support higher antiarmor 

weapon requirements. 

3

The plan was classified as secret.
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The plan provided little data and analyses to support the services’ plans to 

spend about $17.9 billion on 15 antiarmor weapon acquisition programs. In 

support of acquiring the new systems, the plan described various types of 

improvements and technological advances in the designs of armored 

systems and noted the potential proliferation of armored systems with 

these advanced designs. The plan also described the capabilities of 

individual antiarmor weapons that were being acquired by the services and 

noted that the new weapons would provide improved lethality and 

effectiveness. However, the plan also indicated that the existing antiarmor 

weapon inventory is more than adequate to defeat the threat as defined in 

the Secretary of Defense’s planning guidance. Further, the plan did not 

assess the effects of combined joint service capabilities and changes in 

war-fighting strategies on the requirements for these weapons. For 

example, under the 1990 Cold War threat scenario, the Army was expected 

to play the dominant role in halting a massive Soviet/Warsaw Pact armored 

invasion, but under current war-fighting plans, the Air Force is to have the 

largest (and still growing) share of armored targets. Nevertheless, the 

Army’s planned procurement costs for antiarmor weapons from fiscal year 

2000 to completion account for about 80 percent ($14 billion) of DOD’s 

total procurement budget for antiarmor weapons. An assessment of the 

joint antiarmor capabilities of the services and changes in war-fighting 

requirements could identify opportunities to significantly reduce 

requirements for certain antiarmor weapons currently being acquired. 

We are issuing a matter for congressional consideration either (1) to 

restrict funding for antiarmor weapons until the Secretary of Defense 

provides Congress with the antiarmor weapon analysis directed in the 

conference report on the fiscal year 2000 appropriations bill or (2) to 

establish an annual funding cap on the procurement of antiarmor weapons 

and require that DOD establish priorities among the multitude of antiarmor 

weapons now available or being developed. 
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Background DOD currently has a large inventory of 40 different types of antiarmor 

weapons capable of destroying tanks, armored combat vehicles, and 

artillery. These weapons include various types of ground- and air-fired 

guided missiles, tank rounds, rockets, and mines. DOD is currently funding 

the production of 15 new antiarmor weapon systems.4

DOD issued its first Antiarmor Master Plan in 1985 and updated it annually 

until 1990. The 1990 Antiarmor Master Plan still reflected the Cold War 

threat and focused on the antiarmor weapons that would be needed to 

prevail in a Central European conflict. The plan was not updated until 1999. 

In the October 1999 conference report on the fiscal year 2000 Defense 

appropriation bill,5

 the congressional conferees noted that the 1999 Master 

Plan lacked the analyses needed to support the services’ claimed antiarmor 

weapons requirements. In their report, the conferees directed the Secretary 

of Defense to provide another antiarmor weapon analysis with the fiscal 

year 2001 budget request. Although the budget has been submitted, the 

Secretary has not yet provided the analysis as directed. 

Master Plan Did Not 

Provide Data and 

Analyses Needed to 

Identify Excess 

Weapons 

The 1999 Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan did not identify any excess 

antiarmor weapons or provide the data and analyses needed to identify any 

such excesses. Key to identifying any excess antiarmor weapons is an 

assessment of the types and quantities of antiarmor weapons needed to 

defeat the threat outlined in the planning scenarios.6

 Although such data is 

available, the plan only described various types of antiarmor weapons in 

the inventory or under development and identified the number and types of 

armored systems possessed by nine countries it considered potentially 

hostile to the United States—including some countries of the former Soviet 

Union. The total capabilities and quantities of the armored systems 

possessed by these countries substantially exceeded those in current threat 

scenarios. According to DOD officials, no attempt was made to determine 

whether the weapon systems presented in the Master Plan were justified on 

4

The Antiarmor Master Plan shows 19 systems under procurement. One of them, however, is 

for a modification, and three others are for practice rounds. Procurements of combat 

weapons thus total 15. 

5

H.R. Conference Report 106-371, page 214 (1999). 

6

According to DOD Instruction 3000.4, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall 

develop policy guidance on munition requirements in the Defense planning guidance. 
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the basis of the threat depicted in the Secretary of Defense’s planning 

guidance. 

Plan Did Not Identify 

Potential Excesses 

Resulting From Reduced 

Threat 

The plan did not assess the impact of reductions in the threat scenarios on 

antiarmor weapons requirements. As we previously reported, the number 

of potential enemy armored targets outlined in the planning guidance has 

decreased considerably since 1990.7

 During the Cold War, the services 

considered the greatest threat to be a massive land attack spearheaded by 

thousands of armored vehicles in Central Europe. Today’s conditions, 

however, are significantly different, and military planners consider smaller 

regional conflicts as the basis for developing war-fighting plans and 

requirements. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency’s latest 

biannual out-year threat report, issued in 1997, the number of armored 

targets that the United States is likely to face is less than 20 percent, the 

number considered in 1990.8

Iraq and North Korea are currently the most likely opponents the United 

States would face in a regional conflict scenario. The armored systems 

possessed by these two counties were included in the Master Plan but 

accounted for a small percentage of the total number it identified.9

 In 

addition, the plan concluded that the armored systems that would be used 

by the two countries under the two-conflict scenario are low technology 

threats. Our review of the Secretary of Defense’s planning guidance shows 

that the two countries are unlikely to acquire significant improvements in 

their armored capabilities in the foreseeable future. Intelligence officials 

believe the likelihood that either country will obtain such technologies in 

significant quantities is extremely low. Figure 1 shows a comparison of 

tank technology levels of the two countries in 1999 and projected in 2004. It 

shows that high technology tanks are expected to increase from 1 percent 

of the total in 1997 to 9 percent in 2004, with low technology tanks still 

accounting for 64 percent of the total in 2004. 

7

Defense Acquisitions (GAO/NSIAD-99-105, July 22, 1999).

8

The next report is scheduled to be released later this year.

9

Russia and the Ukraine, both of the former Soviet Union, account for over half of the 

systems identified in the plan. 
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Figure 1: Comparison of Technology Levels of Main Battle Tanks of the Countries in 

the Two-Regional Conflict Threat Scenario

Source: DOD’s Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan.

According to intelligence officials, the proliferation of high technology 

systems is not materializing as quickly as originally estimated, and the two 

countries are economically disadvantaged. Further, an arms embargo and 

sanctions by the United Nations limit one country from procuring 

additional weapons.

Quantity Requirements for 

Antiarmor Weapons May Be 

Significantly Overstated 

Each of the military services determines the type and quantities of 

antiarmor weapons it needs on the basis of target allocations provided by 

the commanders in chief. On the basis of the number and types of armored 

targets they are assigned, the services determine the types and quantities of 

antiarmor weapons they need to (1) defeat the assigned targets, (2) equip 

forces not assigned to the two-theater conflict, (3) ensure that forces 

assigned to the conflict have a ready supply of weapons left over after the 

conflict ends, and (4) conduct training. The services use war-fighting 

simulation models that determine the number of weapon systems needed 

to defeat the threat. Each service is responsible for designing its own threat 

models and determining its underlying assumptions.
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Our review of how the services determine their antiarmor weapon 

requirements found several modeling practices that routinely generated 

excessive requirements. Specifically, we found the following: 

• The Air Force added more targets to the model than were assigned. For 

example, it increased the number of allocated targets by 13 to

21 percent—depending on the type of target—for additional flexibility. 

• The services added large quantities of weapons to their models to allow 

for uncertainties. For example, according to Army data, an average of 

only 3 percent of its direct fire antiarmor weapons would be used 

against assigned targets, with the remaining 97 percent required to 

compensate for uncertainty factors such as missing targets and shooting 

at wrong targets. 

• The services projected the use of sophisticated and expensive antiarmor 

guided weapons against unarmored targets. For example, two of the Air 

Force’s newer and more advanced antiarmor weapons (the Joint StandOff Weapon BLU-108 variant and the Sensor Fuzed Weapon) are 

expected to be used against unarmored targets over 60 percent of the 

time. 

• In some cases, the Marine Corps and the Army did not accept their 

models’ results and used manual calculations to support higher 

requirements. For example, the Marine Corps increased its 

requirements for the Predator short-range assault weapon by 

289 percent over the model’s calculation. 

The services’ antiarmor weapon requirements’ modeling practices are 

discussed in more detail in appendix I. 

Plan Provided Limited 

Support for New 

Antiarmor Weapon 

Acquisitons 

The Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan did not provide the data and analyses 

necessary to support DOD’s current acquisition plans. The military services 

currently have 15 different types of antiarmor weapons under development 

or in production. According to the President’s fiscal year 2000 budget 

submission,10 DOD plans to spend a total of over $24 billion procuring these 

weapon systems, of which $17.9 billion will be used from fiscal year 2000 

through program completion. Of the $17.9 billion, $8.3 billion will be spent 

in fiscal years 2000-05 and $9.5 billion in fiscal year 2006 and beyond. 

Appendix II shows planned costs and procurement quantities of each 

10DOD classifies the costs of the systems contained in the Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan. 

We used unclassified fiscal year 2000 budget submission documentation to determine costs. 
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weapon system based on the fiscal year 2000 budget request. Appendix III 

shows funding by fiscal year from 2000 through 2005 and to completion. 

As support for acquiring the new systems, the plan described various types 

of improvements and technological advances in armored system designs 

and noted the potential proliferation of armored systems with these 

advanced designs. The plan also described the capabilities of individual 

antiarmor weapons being acquired by the services and noted that the new 

weapons would provide improved lethality and effectiveness. The plan 

indicated that the existing inventory of antiarmor weapons is more than 

adequate to defeat the threat as defined in the scenario. The plan stated 

that “by preparing for a North Atlantic Treaty Organization/Warsaw Pact 

conflict involving massive Soviet armed forces, the United States would 

certainly be prepared for conventional regional conflicts.” Further, the plan 

did not assess the effects that combined joint service antiarmor capabilities 

and changes in war-fighting strategies could have on requirements for new 

systems.

Master Plan Did Not Assess 

Potential Excesses 

Resulting From Joint 

Service Capabilities 

The plan did not assess the impact of joint service antiarmor capabilities on 

acquisition requirements. Such an assessment could identify unnecessary 

overlap and duplication among the services’ antiarmor capabilities. 

Instead, the plan simply incorporated the services’ antiarmor inventory 

data and procurement plans without assessing them on a joint basis. While 

each antiarmor weapon acquisition program described in the plan has gone 

through the requirement determination and acquisition approval process in 

each service and in DOD, we previously reported that these processes have 

not been effective in preventing overlap and duplication in weapon 

capabilities and requirements.11

In our prior work, we found that the services conduct extensive analyses to 

justify major acquisitions but that these analyses can be narrowly focused 

and do not fully consider alternatives. For example, when the Navy carried 

out its analyses to justify the development of an antiarmor variant of the 

Joint Standoff Weapon, it did not fully consider available alternatives such 

as the Air Force’s Sensor Fuzed Weapon with Wind Corrected Munitions 

Dispenser, which uses the same submunition, carries more submunitions, 

and is cheaper than the proposed variant. However, the Joint Standoff 

11High-Risk Series: An Update (GAO/HR-99-1, Jan. 1999) and Weapons Acquisitions: Guided 

Weapon Plans Need to Be Reassessed (GAO/NSIAD-99-32, Dec. 9, 1998).
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Weapon was chosen as the more cost-effective weapon. A subsequent Air 

Force analysis showed that the Sensor Fuzed Weapon would be more costeffective and potentially more suitable. 

DOD has a structure and process to review requirements from a joint 

perspective, but they are not effective. Operational requirements for new 

weapons are reviewed by all the services, the Defense Acquisition Board, 

and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to help define and validate 

system requirements, examine trade-offs, and explore alternatives. In 1998, 

however, we reported that officials in both the Office of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense view their roles as 

members of these organizations in determining weapon requirements as 

only advisory.12 We concluded that DOD’s lack of an effective process to 

assess joint mission capabilities and requirements adequately makes the 

Department unable to determine the need for and priority of planned 

antiarmor investments. 

In addition to not assessing joint service capabilities, the plan did not take 

into account allied forces and their contribution to antiarmor capability. 

DOD expects its allies to be responsible for 29 percent of the anticipated 

threat in the two-conflict scenario. 

Plan Did Not Identify 

Potential Weapon Excesses 

From Changes in Warfighting Plans

Under the1990 Cold War threat scenario, the Army was expected to play 

the dominant role in halting a massive Soviet/Warsaw Pact armored 

invasion. However, current war-fighting plans, based on the threat, call for 

the Air Force to have the largest (and still growing) share of armored 

targets. Nevertheless, the Army’s planned procurement costs for antiarmor 

weapons from fiscal year 2000 to completion account for about 80 percent 

($14 billion) of DOD’s total procurement budget for antiarmor weapons. 

Depending on how they plan to conduct the war, the commanders in chief 

allocate the number of targets contained in the planning scenarios among 

individual services. According to these plans, the Air Force has the highest 

percentage of total mobile armored targets, and its share of these targets 

has increased from 20 to 29 percent. The Navy’s share has increased from 6 

to 9 percent; the Marine Corps’ target share has remained constant at about 

12 percent. The Army’s share has remained the same at about 21 percent. 

12Weapons Acquisitions: Guided Weapon Plans Need to Be Reassessed (GAO/NSIAD-99-32, 

Dec. 9, 1998).
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The U.S. allies’ share has decreased from 40 to 29 percent. Figure 2 shows 

the percentage of all mobile armored targets in two hypothetical major 

conflicts for the Army and the Air Force in 1997 and 1998.

Figure 2: Percentage of Mobile Armored Targets Allocated to the Army and the Air 

Force, 1997-98

Source: DOD’s Phased Threat Distribution.

The antiarmor weapon quantity requirements described in the Antiarmor 

Munitions Master Plan also do not reflect changes in the Army’s warfighting strategy. After submitting the Master Plan, the Army Chief of Staff 

announced plans to develop a lighter and more mobile force in response to 

concerns about the difficulties and limitations of transporting and 

supporting the large and heavy M1A1 tank and other armored systems. To 

respond more quickly to contingencies, and to become more mobile and 

more rapidly deployable, the Army has begun transitioning to a lighter, 

smaller, more fuel-efficient and reliable force. Although the transition will 

take a number of years, it will significantly impact the Army’s antiarmor 

weapon requirements. However, the Master Plan shows substantial 

investments in heavy armored capabilities such as the improved 

120-millimeter tank rounds.
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Congress Found Master 

Plan Inadequate 

In its October 1999 conference report on the fiscal year 2000 defense 

appropriation bill, the conferees stated that the 1999 Master Plan did not 

show any evidence of future prospects for reducing the number of 

antiarmor programs and little evidence of rigorous critique of claimed 

requirements.13 The congressional conferees directed the Secretary of 

Defense to provide, with his fiscal year 2001 budget request, an evaluation 

of (1) the joint effectiveness of existing antiarmor weapons in addressing 

the threat described in defense planning guidance and (2) the ability of 

planned antiarmor weapons to fill the shortfalls in capabilities described in 

threat scenarios. DOD has submitted its fiscal year 2001 budget, but the 

Secretary has not yet provided the analysis directed by the conference 

report. 

Conclusions The Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan did not provide the data and analyses 

needed to identify any excesses in antiarmor weapons or to support 

current antiarmor weapon acquisition plans. Specifically, the plan did not 

address the joint effectiveness of existing antiarmor weapons in addressing 

the threat described in the Secretary of Defense’s guidance or the way 

planned antiarmor weapons are expected to fill any shortfalls in 

capabilities described in threat scenarios. Although the congressional 

conferees directed the Secretary to provide such data and analyses with the 

submission of the fiscal year 2001 defense budget request, the Secretary 

has not yet done so. As a result, congressional decisionmakers have limited 

ability to assess the services’ plans to spend about $17.9 billion to develop 

and produce antiarmor weapons from fiscal year 2000 to program 

completion. 

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration 

Should Congress not receive the data and analyses directed by the 

conference report on the fiscal year 2000 Defense appropriation bill, it 

should consider restricting fiscal year 2001 funding for antiarmor weapons 

until such information is provided. Alternatively, Congress may wish to 

impose an annual funding cap on the procurement of antiarmor weapons to 

permit some modernization but requiring DOD to establish priorities and 

choose among the multitude of antiarmor options now available or being 

developed.

13H.R. Conference Report 106-371, page 214 (1999). 
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Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of our report, DOD stated that we had identified 

several areas where the munitions requirement process could be improved 

and noted that a working group had been tasked to review the existing 

process and recommend changes. DOD also offered several explanations 

of why additional antiarmor weapons beyond those needed to kill expected 

targets may be justified. They stated that the requirements process also 

permits the services to base their requirements on the amount of munitions 

needed to fully arm a given force structure. Further, they stated that, while 

the services plan to fight in fully joint operations, each service equips and 

trains its forces to ensure that it retains strategic and tactical flexibility. 

Finally, DOD stated that its update of the Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan 

would address these issues more fully. If DOD’s working group addresses 

the problems that we identified with the requirements process, we believe 

that will be a step in the right direction.

Nevertheless, DOD was directed to identify and eliminate excess antiarmor 

capability. However, the August 1999 Plan was found to be inadequate to 

support the services’ claimed antiarmor requirements. Subsequently, DOD 

was directed to submit additional data and analyses of its antiarmor 

weapons and capabilities with its fiscal year 2001 budget. However, it did 

not do so. Accordingly, we continue to believe that Congress should 

consider restricting DOD’s funding for antiarmor weapons until such 

information is provided.

DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix IV.

Scope and 

Methodology

To determine whether DOD’s Antiarmor Munitions Master Plan provided 

the data and analyses necessary to identify excess antiarmor weapon 

capability, we evaluated the plan’s results and discussed the plan with 

representatives from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 

Acquisition and Technology, Washington, D.C.; the Office of Program 

Analysis and Evaluation, Washington, D.C.; and the Institute for Defense 

Analysis, Alexandria, Virginia. We compared the plan’s threat with the 

Secretary of Defense’s guidance, the out-year threat report, and the phased 

threat distribution. We discussed the information with representatives from 

the Defense Intelligence Agency, Bolling Air Force Base, Maryland, and the 

U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Crystal City, Virginia. We 

also analyzed DOD’s process for developing the requirement quantities 

depicted in the Master Plan. We analyzed the services’ munitions 

requirement models that generated the different quantities of antiarmor 
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weapons needed to defeat the current threat as defined in the Defense 

Intelligence Agency’s out-year threat report. We discussed the requirement 

data and our analyses with representatives from the Center for Army 

Analysis, Fort Belvoir, Virginia; the Air Force Director for Operational 

Requirements, Arlington, Virginia; the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations 

Assessment Division, Washington, D.C.; and the Marine Corps Combat 

Development Command, Quantico, Virginia.

To determine whether the Master Plan provided the necessary data and 

analyses necessary to support DOD’s current acquisition plans, we 

compared the weapon systems contained in the plan with DOD’s current 

acquisition plans. We reviewed the fiscal year 2000 budget submission, the 

commanders in chief’s target allocations, changes in war-fighting 

strategies, and our prior reports. 

We conducted our review from May 1999 through January 2000 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable William S. Cohen, 

Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the Army; 

the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary of the Air Force; the 

Honorable Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; General James L. Jones, 

Commandant of the Marine Corps; Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of 

Management and Budget; and other interested congressional committees 

and parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or William Graveline at (256) 650-1400 

if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Major 

contributors to this report are listed in appendix V.

Sincerely yours,

James F. Wiggins

Associate Director

Defense Acquisitions Issues
Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-00-67 Defense Acquisitions

Appendix I

Antiarmor Requirements Modeling Practices ApApenednxidexiIs

The services are responsible for destroying the number of targets assigned 

to them by the commanders in chief. The services use war-fighting 

simulation models to determine the number of weapon systems needed to 

defeat the threat. Our review of these models found several practices that 

routinely generate excess requirements.

The commanders in chief’s target allocations include an optional flexibility 

factor to either increase or decrease the service’s share of allotted targets. 

The Air Force used this factor to increase the number of allocated armored 

targets in its model by 13 to 21 percent (the percentage varied according to 

the target type). The Navy and the Army did not use this factor in their 

models, and the Marine Corps said it was unable to determine whether the 

factor had been included because only the results of the model are 

available, not the input data. Representatives of the commanders in chief 

stated that they believe using the flexibility factor results in overstated 

requirements and that a flexibility factor is not needed because their office 

goes through a very rigorous process in developing initial target 

allocations. They recommended that the flexibility factor be eliminated in 

the next target allocation. A new target allocation process is being 

developed, but it is unknown at this time whether the flexibility factor will 

be included. 

All the services incorporated large uncertainty factors into their models, 

increasing the numbers of needed combat weapons well beyond those 

needed to destroy allocated targets. Uncertainty factors include logistical 

delays or losses, poor weather, and wrong targets. According to Army data, 

an average of only 3 percent of its combat requirement would be used to 

destroy assigned targets; additional weapons needed to compensate for 

uncertainty factors account for the remaining 97 percent. Table 1 shows the 

percentage of Army direct fire antiarmor weapons used against allocated 

targets. For example, only 1.1 percent of the Army’s Javelin system combat 

requirement is used for weapons needed to destroy assigned targets. 
Appendix I

Antiarmor Requirements Modeling Practices

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-00-67 Defense Acquisitions

Table 1: Army Direct Fire Antiarmor Weapons Used Against Targets, as a Percentage 

of Combat Requirement

In the Air Force, weapons expected to be used against assigned targets 

accounted for an average of 60 percent of the combat usage requirement. 

The remaining 40 percent is attributed to uncertainties. The Marine Corps 

was unable to provide us with percentage figures. The Navy uses three 

classified uncertainty factors similar to those of the other services. Some of 

these factors, such as poor weather, are already taken into account by the 

commanders in chief. When they develop initial target allocations, the 

commanders in chief allocate more targets than the number available in the 

theaters to compensate for some of these uncertainties. 

The Navy/Marine Corps Air, and the Air Force also use a significant portion 

of some expensive antiarmor weapons against unarmored targets. This 

practice also increases requirements. In its models, for example, the 

Navy/Marine Corps Air uses about 80 percent of its TOW and Hellfire 

missiles against unarmored and lower-value targets such as trucks. It could 

instead use its less expensive saboted light armor penetrator, high 

explosive antiarmor munition, or other weapons and save the more 

expensive and more capable weapons for more heavily armored targets. 

Similarly, two of the Air Force’s newer and more advanced antiarmor 

weapons (the Joint Stand-Off Weapon BLU-108 variant and the Sensor 

Fuzed Weapon) are expected to be used against unarmored targets over 

60 percent of the time. All four weapons were designed and justified 

primarily as tank-killing weapons. Table 2 shows the percentage of combat 

requirements for Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps Air antiarmor weapons 

to be used against armored and other targets. 

Weapon 

Weapons fired against targets as a percentage

of combat requirement

Javelin 1.1

Copperhead 2.1

M919 25-mm gun round 2.8

TOW Missile 3.6

120-mm tank rounds 6.6

2.75-in. Hydra rockets 8.2

Hellfire 11.1

Longbow 14.5
Appendix I

Antiarmor Requirements Modeling Practices

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-00-67 Defense Acquisitions

Table 2: Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps Air Antiarmor Weapon Usage Against Target Types

The Army and the Navy/Marine Corps Air also allowed their models to 

destroy more targets than allocated, again increasing weapon usage. 

According to the most recent analyses available, the Army and the 

Navy/Marine Corps Air destroyed 17 percent and 21 percent more tanks, 

respectively, than they were assigned, inflating their weapon requirements. 

Finally, in some cases, the Marine Corps Ground and the Army did not 

accept the number of weapon systems recommended by their models for 

combat usage. In their latest requirements report, they instead favored 

using a higher estimate obtained by a manual calculation. They told us that 

the numbers provided by the models had been too low and that manual 

calculations had been necessary. The Marine Corps Ground compared the 

results of the model with a manual calculation of the number of munitions 

each weapon can hold and selected the higher number. Table 3 shows the 

increases in some Marine Corps Ground weapon requirements because of 

these higher manual calculations. 

Weapon

Percent used

against tanks

Percent used against

armored combat

vehicles

Percent used against

artillery

Percent used against

other targets

Air Force

CBU-87 <1 <1 0 99

CBU-103 3 7 3 87

Sensor Fused Weapon 21 6 10 62

JSOW (BLU-108) 12 13 13 61

Maverick G 0 0 74 25

Maverick K 41 19 27 14

Maverick H 65 4 30 1

Maverick D 100 0 0 0

Navy/Marine Corps Air

IR Maverick 16 4 <1 79

Hellfire 10 6 4 80

Laser Maverick 15 4 <1 81

TOW 10 6 4 80

Rockeye 36 23 16 25

JSOW (BLU-108) 71 23 6 <1
Appendix I

Antiarmor Requirements Modeling Practices

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-00-67 Defense Acquisitions

Table 3: Comparison of Marine Corps Ground Model Results and Manual Calculations

The Army disregarded its modeled results when calculating one of its 

antiarmor weapon requirements. According to Army officials, the Army did 

not use the model’s results if weapon usage results were so low that other 

formulas based on usage could not be calculated. This was the case, they 

said, for the Javelin antiarmor weapon. According to the Army’s May 1999 

requirement update, only 180 Javelins were expected to be fired at targets 

in the model. This low usage was insufficient to calculate the remaining 

portion of the combat requirement using the model formula. Consequently, 

the Army used a manual calculation to finalize the combat requirement. 

Using the manual calculation, the number of Javelins needed for combat 

was determined at 16,848.

Weapon

Combat usage

based on model

results

Combat usage based on

manual calculations

Combat usage in

latest requirement

report

Percent above

modeled requirement

Predator 1,139 4,523 4,428 289

M829 tank round 6,030 13,050 13,050 116

TOW 2A/B missile 5,172 10,837 10,836 109

Javelin 1,264 2,214 2,214 75

Saboted Light Armor 

Penetrator ammunition 

647,010 541,680 758,989 17

25-mm gun round 169,232 124,335 170,288 0.6

Dual Purpose Improved 

Conventional Munition

48,879 23,882 48,879 0

Copperhead 1,335 99 1,335 0

High Explosive Antiarmor 

rocket

10,216 4,640 10,216 0
Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-00-67 Defense Acquisitions

Appendix II

Quantity and Cost of Antiarmor Systems 

Under Development and Procurement ApendxiI

(then-year dollars in millions)

Weapon Service

Quantity to be

procured Total cost

Cost through

fiscal year 1999

Cost, fiscal year

2000 to

completion

Brilliant Antiarmor 

Submunition/Army Tactical Missile 

System (BAT/ATACMS) 

Army 19,554 $4,284 $149 $4,135

M26 Multiple Launch Rocket System 

(MLRS) 

Army 12,378 3,485 109 3,376

Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW) 

BLU-108

Navy/ Air Force 5,955 2,369 22 2,347

Javelin Army/Marine 

Corps

 26,956 3,324 1,494 1,830

Sense and Destroy Armor Munition 

(SADARM)

Army 50,000 2,057 266 1,792

Wide Area Munition (WAM) Army 33,991 1,708 49 1,658

Longbow Hellfire Army 12,905 2,092 1,005 1,087

Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW) Air Force 4,237 1,434 925 509

Predator Marine Corps 18,190 492 0 492

Tank round M829A2/E3 Army 242,000 1,694 1,438 256

Remote Area Denial Artillery 

Munition (RADAM)

Army 428,000 194 0 194

M919 25-mm gun round Army 1,791,000 242 188 54

Multipurpose Individual Munition 

(MPIM)

Army 3,521 147 0 147

Volcano Army 184,000 412 412 0

M830A1 tank round Army 76,000 533 533 0

Total $24,467 $6,590 $17,877
Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-00-67 Defense Acquisitions

Appendix III

Projected Antiarmor Weapon Production 

Funding, Fiscal Year 2000 to Completion ApendxiI

(then-year dollars in millions)

Weapon 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

2006 to

completion

BAT/ATACMS $226 $228 $264 $374 $340 $372 $2,331

M26 MLRS Rocket 3 10 41 63 66 98 3,095

JSOW BLU 108 111 246 233 227 231 241 1,058

Javelin 400 437 413 406 41 52 81

SADARM 55 64 77 93 155 84 1,264

WAM 10 23 56 57 57 57 1,398

Longbow Hellfire 308 300 236 195 26 22 0

SFW 61 102 88 87 86 85 0

Predator 0 27 27 28 54 55 301

Tank round M829A2/M829E3 0 0 41 72 72 71 0

RADAM 48 48 49 49 0 0 0

M919 25-mm gun round 30 24 0 0 0 0 0

MPIM 0 2 24 23 48 50 0

Volcano 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

M830A1 tank round 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total $1,252 $1,511 $1,549 $1,674 $1,176 $1,187 $9,528
Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-00-67 Defense Acquisitions

Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxiIV
Appendix IV

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-00-67 Defense Acquisitions
Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-00-67 Defense Acquisitions

Appendix V

GAO Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiV

Acknowledgments Beverly Breen, Laura Durland, William Gillies, Bobby Hall, and Roy 

Karadbil made key contributions to this report.

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