RESPONDING TO TERRORISM ACROSS THE TECHNOLOGICAL SPECTRUM

Bruce Hoffman

July 15, 1994
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The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S.

Government. This report is approved for public release; distribution is

unlimited.

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This study was originally presented at the U.S. Army War College

Fifth Annual Strategy Conference held April 26-28, 1994, with the

assistance of the Office of Net Assessment. The Strategic Studies

Institute is pleased to publish the paper as part of its Conference

Series.
FOREWORD

In April 1994, the Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute

held its annual Strategy Conference. This year's theme was "The

Revolution in Military Affairs: Defining an Army for the 21st Century."

Dr. Bruce Hoffman presented this paper as part of a panel examining "New

Technologies and New Threats."

Terrorism, of course, is not new. Hoffman warns, however, of the

changing nature of terrorism. In the past, terrorists have been

motivated by limited political and ideological objectives. Popular

images fostered by terrorist events like the bombing of PAN AM Flight

103 and the attack on the Marine Barracks in Beirut notwithstanding, in

the past the preponderance of terrorist attacks targeted specific

individuals or small groups. The weapons of choice were the pistol,

knife, and, on occasion, dynamite. Often the terrorist was a

highly-trained individual, a "professional" in pursuit of specific

political or ideological objectives.

Hoffman warns that, by comparison, the terrorists of today and

tomorrow are amateurs. Furthermore, they are likely to act from

religious and racial convictions rather than radical political or

ideological motivations. Their objective may be to kill large numbers of

people. Indeed, they may want to annihilate an entire race or religious

group. Not only are these amateurs less predictable and, therefore, more

difficult to apprehend before the incident occurs, they have at their

disposal lethal devices that range from the relatively simple fertilizer

bomb to biologically-altered viruses.

Military professionals and civilian planners must contend with

warfare at every level. The threat posed by the changing nature of

terrorism falls very much within their purview. For that reason, I

commend to you the following monograph.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE

Colonel, U.S. Army

Director, Strategic Studies Institute
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

BRUCE HOFFMAN is Director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program in RAND's

Army Research Division and a member of the senior research staff in

RAND's International Policy Department. He is also associate editor of

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, an academic journal published in the

United States and England. A graduate of Oxford University (where he

undertook his doctoral research), Dr. Hoffman holds degrees in

government, history, and international relations. In August 1994 he will

take the appointment as Senior Lecturer in International Relations at

the University of St. Andrews in Scotland.
RESPONDING TO TERRORISM ACROSS THE TECHNOLOGICAL SPECTRUM

The "revolution in military affairs," it is argued, heralds a new

era of warfare dominated by the American military's mastery of the

conventional battlefield. "Just as gunpowder, the mechanization of

battle, and atomic weapons previously changed the fundamental conduct

and nature of warfare, so will a combination of technological progress,

doctrinal sophistication, and innovative force employment in turn render

. . . existing methods of conducting warfare obsolete." The assumption

that U.S. armed forces alone will have the capability to harness all the

elements of this revolution is in large measure derived from the

demonstrated superiority of American combined arms over the much larger

Iraqi forces during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.1

 The effect, according to

one analysis, will be profound:

In any conventional conflict in which the United States or

any of the major Western powers is pitted against a Third

World adversary, the outcome is preordained. In effect, the

change is so significant that we have returned to the

military equation of the 19th century, when colonial wars

pitted small numbers of disciplined, well-trained Western

troops with rifles against hordes of tribal warriors armed

only with shields and spears.2

Equally significant, however, is that the revolution in military

affairs remains largely confined to the conventional battlefield only.

Indeed, as many observers of this phenomenon themselves concede, the

revolution will have little, if any, impact on American military

capabilities so far as countering terrorism, insurgency, or guerrilla

warfare.3

 Hence, while Operation DESERT STORM may be a model for the

revolution in military affairs occurring at the mid and high ends of the

conflict spectrum, the problems that U.S. forces encountered in Somalia,

for example, may be a more accurate and telling model for the types of

conflict at the low end of the spectrum that U.S. military forces are

more likely to find themselves involved. As our frustrating and

increasingly forgotten experiences in Vietnam more than a quarter of a

century ago demonstrate, this is by no means a new lesson. Indeed, in no

realm of conflict today is the asymmetry between American capability and

sophistication on the one hand and the crude, even primitive, ability of

an adversary to inflict pain on the other perhaps as salient or possibly

portentous as with terrorism.

Trends in Terrorist Tactics.

The contrast between the means and methods of modern warfare and

the tactics and techniques of contemporary terrorism is striking.

Whereas technological progress has produced successively more complex,

lethally effective and destructively accurate weapons systems that are

deployed from a variety of air, land, and sea platforms, terrorism has

functioned largely in a technological vacuum, aloof or averse to the

continual refinement and growing sophistication of modern warfare.

Terrorists continue to rely, as they have for more than a century,

on the same two basic "weapons systems": the gun and the bomb.

Admittedly, the guns used by terrorists today have larger ammunition

capacities and more rapid rates of fire than the simple revolver the

Russian revolutionary Vera Zasulich used in 1878 to assassinate the

governor general of St. Petersburg.4

 Similarly, bombs today require
smaller amounts of explosives that are exponentially more powerful and

more easily concealed than the sticks of TNT with which the Fenian

dynamiters terrorized London more than a century ago.5

The implication of terrorist reliance on these two weapons,

however, goes far beyond mere tactical convenience. It also suggests an

a priori reluctance or aversion to killing en masse given the

comparatively discrete numbers of casualties that can be inflicted with

even self-loading, rapid fire automatic weapons or powerful plastic

explosives. Despite its popularity as a fictional theme, terrorists in

fact have rarely contemplated--much less actively attempted--the

infliction of mass, indiscriminate casualties through the use of

chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. Indeed, of more than 8,000

incidents recorded in The RAND Chronology of International Terrorism

since 1968, only 52 evidence any indication of terrorists plotting such

attacks, attempting to use chemical or biological agents or to steal, or

otherwise fabricate on their own nuclear devices.6 Thus, terrorists seem

almost inherently content with the limited killing potential of their

handguns and machine guns and the slightly higher rates that their bombs

have at times achieved.

This self-imposed restraint is most clearly reflected in the

risk-averse tactical repertoire embraced by most terrorist groups.

Bombings, for example, account for nearly half (46 percent) of all

international terrorist attacks carried out since 1968: a proportion

that annually has rarely fallen below 40 percent or exceeded 50

percent.7

 The reliance on bombing by terrorists is not surprising given

that bombs provide a dramatic, yet fairly easy and often risk-free means

of drawing attention to the terrorists and their causes. Few skills are

required to manufacture a crude bomb, surreptitiously plant it, and then

be miles away when it explodes. Bombings are usually only one or two or

three person jobs and therefore do not require the same organizational

expertise, logistics, and knowledge required of more complicated or

sophisticated operations, such as kidnapping, barricade and hostage

situations, assassination, and assaults against defended targets.

Attacks on installations (including attacks with automatic weapons

as well as hand grenades, bazookas, and rocket- propelled grenades,

drive-by shootings, arson, vandalism, and sabotage other than bombing)

are a distant second to bombing, accounting for 22 percent of all

terrorist operations since 1968.8 Not surprisingly, perhaps, the

frequency of various types of terrorist attacks tends to decrease in

direct proportion to the complexity or sophistication required.

Accordingly, hijackings are the third most common tactic, accounting for

only 12 percent;9

 followed by assassination (6 percent);10 and,

kidnapping (1 percent).11

The fact that these percentages have remained largely unchanged

for more than a quarter of a century (with one exception12) also

provides compelling evidence that the vast majority of terrorist

organizations are not tactically innovative. Radical in their politics,

these groups are equally conservative in their operations, rarely

deviating from the familiar and adhering to an established modus

operandi that, to their minds at least, minimizes failure and maximizes

success. What innovation does occur is mostly in the methods used to

conceal and detonate explosive devices, not in their tactics or in their

use of nonconventional weapons (i.e., chemical, biological, or nuclear).
Terrorists, therefore, seem to prefer the assurance of modest

success to more complicated and complex--but potentially higher pay-off

(in terms of casualties and publicity)--operations. Indeed, this

explanation possibly accounts for the overall paucity of terrorist

"spectaculars" and the mostly limited number of casualties historically

inflicted in terrorist attacks (i.e., more often in the tens and

twenties, if at all, than in the low hundreds). Indeed, since the

beginning of the century fewer than a dozen terrorist incidents have

occurred that have resulted in the deaths of more than a 100 persons at

one time.13 The recent spate of suicide bombings in Israel by

Palestinians opposed to negotiations to resolve that long-standing

conflict underscores this point. Even when a terrorist deliberately

sacrifices himself in the course of the attack, seldom does the death

toll reach double figures: only seven persons, for example, tragically

lost their lives in the incident on April 6; five perished in the

following week's attack. The massive car bomb that exploded on Sunday,

April 24, 1994, in Johannesburg, South Africa, is another case in point:

despite the bombers' obvious intention to inflict mass indiscriminate

casualties, only nine persons were killed.

These proclivities, therefore, directly affect, if not limit, the

weapons technology that terrorists can and will use. Accordingly, based

on the historical record, future terrorist employment of either

high-tech weapons systems or weapons of mass destruction (i.e.,

chemical, biological or nuclear) would appear unlikely. However, both

the longevity of this trend and the self-imposed stasis of terrorist

technology could change dramatically as a result of three emerging

trends in terrorist activity:

• The resurgence of terrorism motivated by a religious imperative

and the implications that it has to trigger future acts of mass,

indiscriminate violence;

• The increasing "amateurization" of terrorism--a reflection, in

part, of the growth of religious terrorism but which also may contribute

to the loosening of previous self-imposed constraints on operations and

lethality; and,

• The increasing sophistication and evident growing tactical and

technological competence of certain veteran terrorist organizations

across the technological spectrum.

The Resurgence of Religious Terrorism.

One of the distinguishing features of international terrorism

during the past 15 years has been the resurgence and proliferation of

terrorist groups motivated by a religious imperative.14 In 1968, for

example, none of the 11 identifiable terrorist groups active throughout

the world could be classified as religious, that is, having aims and

motivations reflecting a salient religious character or influence.15 Not

until 1980, as a result of the repercussions from the revolution in Iran

the previous year,16 do the first "modern"17 religious terrorist groups

appear. Even so, despite the large increase in the total number of

identifiable international terrorist groups and concomitant increase of

ethnic separatist organizations (from 3 to 32), only 2 of the 64 groups

are predominantly religious in character and motivation (al-Dawa and the

Committee for Safeguarding the Islamic Revolution). Twelve years later,

however, the number of religious terrorist groups has increased nearly
six-fold while--at a time of increasingly strident assertions of ethnic,

national, and cultural uniqueness--the number of ethnic-separatist

terrorist groups has declined and--notwithstanding the end of the cold

war--the number of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist (or some idiosyncratic

interpretation of those dicta) has remained unchanged.

The implications of terrorism motivated by a religious imperative

for higher levels of lethality is evidenced by the violent record of

various Shi'a Islamic groups. Although these organizations committed

only 8 percent of all international terrorist incidents since 1982, they

are nonetheless responsible for 28 percent of the total number of

deaths.18 Moreover, contrary to its depiction and discussion in Western

news accounts, terrorism motivated by religion is by no means a

phenomenon restricted to Islamic terrorist groups exclusively in the

Middle East. Many of the characteristics of Shi'a terrorist groups, such

as the legitimization of violence based on religious precepts, the sense

of profound alienation and isolation, and the attendant preoccupation

with the elimination of a broadly defined category of "enemies," are

also apparent among militant Christian white supremacists in the United

States, in at least some radical Jewish messianic terrorist movements in

Israel, and among some radical Sikh movements in India.19

The fact that for many of these groups the elimination of whole

segments of society is a major objective of their terrorist campaigns

implies an almost axiomatic attempt to use weapons of mass destruction,

including chemical or biological warfare agents or radioactive

materials. During the past decade, for example, religious terrorists or

members of various "cults" have come closest to crossing the threshold

of terrorist use of bona fide weapons of mass destruction. They have,

for example, either attempted or at least pursued the idea of:

• Poisoning the water supplies of major American urban centers;20

• Dispersing toxic chemicals through internal building ventilation

systems;21

• Blowing up a religious shrine in hopes of provoking a

cataclysmic "holy war";22

• Staging indiscriminate, wanton simultaneous bombings of crowded,

busy urban centers;23 and,

• Contaminating food in public restaurants.24

That terrorists motivated by a religious imperative can

contemplate such massive acts of death and destruction is a reflection

of their belief that violence is a sacramental act or a divine duty.

Terrorism thus assumes a transcendental dimension,25 and its

perpetrators are seemingly unconstrained by the political, moral, or

practical constraints that affect other terrorists. Whereas secular

terrorists generally consider indiscriminate violence immoral and

counterproductive,26 religious terrorists regard such violence as both

morally justified and a necessary expedient for the attainment of their

goals. Religious and secular terrorists also have different perceptions

of themselves and their violent acts. Secular terrorists regard violence

as a way of instigating the correction of a flaw in a system that is

basically good or to foment the creation of a new system. Religious

terrorists, on the other hand, regard themselves not as components of a
system, but as "outsiders" seeking vast changes in the existing order.27

This sense of alienation enables the religious terrorist to contemplate

far more destructive and deadly types of terrorist operations than

secular terrorists and indeed to embrace a far more open-ended category

of "enemies" for attack: basically anyone who is not a member of their

particular sect or religious movement.

Given this constellation of characteristics and convergence of

motives and capabilities, religious terrorists therefore appear as the

most likely terrorist entity to eventually succeed in affecting some

dramatic act of violence using a weapon of mass destruction.

The "Amateurization" of Terrorism.

A series of terrorist incidents that occurred in the United States

during 1993 suggest that we may have to revise our notions of the

stereotypical terrorist organization.28

In the past, terrorist groups were recognizable as a group of

individuals belonging to an organization with a well-defined command and

control apparatus, who had been previously trained (however

rudimentarily) in the techniques and tactics of terrorism, were engaged

in conspiracy as a full-time avocation, living underground and

constantly planning or plotting terrorist attacks at times under the

direct control, or operating at the express behest, of a foreign

government. The amateurish World Trade Center bombers, however, may be

the model of a new kind of terrorist group: a more or less ad hoc

amalgamation of like-minded individuals sharing a common religion, the

same friends and frustrations, perhaps having family ties as well, who

simply gravitate toward one another for specific, perhaps even one-time,

operations.29 Rather than being tightly controlled from abroad, these

new part-time terrorists and independent free-lance groups are more

likely to be only indirectly connected to a central command authority or

a foreign government.

Moreover, since this more amorphous and perhaps even transitory

type of group will lack the "footprints" or modus operandi of an actual,

existing terrorist organization, it is likely to prove more difficult

for law enforcement to get a firm idea or build a complete picture of

the dimensions of their intentions and capabilities.30 Indeed, as one

New York City police officer only too presciently observed two months

before the Trade Center attack: it wasn't the established terrorist

groups--with known or suspected members and patterns--that worried him,

but the hitherto unknown "splinter groups," composed of new or marginal

members from an older group, that suddenly surface out of nowhere to

attack.31

Essentially part-time time terrorists, such loose groups of

individuals may be--as the World Trade Center bombers themselves appear

to have been--indirectly influenced or remotely controlled by some

foreign government or nongovernmental entity. The suspicious transfer of

funds from banks in Iran and Germany to a joint account maintained by

the accused bombers in New Jersey just before the Trade Center blast may

illustrate this more indirect or circuitous foreign connection.32

Moreover, the fact that two Iraqi nationals--Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and

Abdul Rahman Yasin-- implicated in the Trade Center conspiracy, fled the

United States (presumably to Iraq),33 in one instance just before the

bombing and in the other shortly after the first arrests, increases
suspicion that the incident may not only have been orchestrated from

abroad but may in fact have been an act of state-sponsored terrorism.34

Thus, in contrast to its depiction in the press as an incident of

terrorism perpetrated by a group of "amateurs" acting either entirely on

their own or, as one of the bomber's defense attorneys portrayed his

client as being manipulated by a "devious, evil . . . genius35 (Yousef),

the genesis of the Trade Center attack may be far more complex.

This use of amateur terrorists as "dupes" or "cut-outs" to mask

the involvement of some foreign patron or government could therefore

greatly benefit terrorist state sponsors who could more effectively

conceal their involvement and thus avoid potential military retaliation

by the victim country and diplomatic or economic sanctions from the

international community. Moreover, the prospective state sponsor's

connection could be further obscured by the fact that much of the

"amateur" terrorists equipment, resources and even some funding could be

self-generating. The explosive device used in the World Trade Center

bomb--constructed out of ordinary, commercially-available materials,

including lawn fertilizer (urea nitrate) and diesel fuel and costing

less than $400 to construct--illustrates this potential.36 Indeed,

despite the Trade Center bombers' almost comical ineptitude in avoiding

capture, they were still able to shake an entire city's--if not

country's-- complacency. Moreover, the single bomb used by these

"amateurs" proved just as deadly and destructive as the more "high-tech"

bombs constructed out of military ordnance, with timing devices powered

by computer micro chips and detonated by sophisticated timing mechanisms

used by their "professional" counterparts. It killed six persons,

injured more than a 1,000 others, gouged out a 180-ft wide crater six

stories deep, and caused an estimated $550 million in both damages to

the twin towers and in lost revenue to the businesses housed there.37

In this respect, this new breed of terrorists may represent even

more of a threat than their predecessors.38 While less control from some

central command authority may indeed be exerted, this may also result in

fewer constraints on the terrorists' operations and targets and fewer

inhibitions on their desire to inflict indiscriminate casualties.39 It

is suspected that the bombers' intent in attacking the World Trade

Center was to bring down one of the twin towers.40 Significant also is

that rather than having been deterred or otherwise affected by the

rapidity with which the FBI and other authorities "cracked" the Trade

Center case, the 15 individuals implicated in the follow-on plot,

uncovered in June 1993, to obtain the release of the Trade Center

bombers, had plotted even more egregious acts of violence. These

included the simultaneous bombing of the Holland and Lincoln tunnels and

George Washington Bridge used daily by thousands of commuters between

New Jersey and Manhattan; a car-bomb attack in the United Nations

building underground garage; a forced entry machine-gun and hand grenade

assault on the Federal Building in lower Manhattan housing the FBI New

York headquarters; and the assassinations of U.N. Secretary General

Boutros Boutros Ghali, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, New York

Senator Alfonse D'Amato, and Brooklyn assemblyman Dov Hilkind.41

The characteristics and attendant applications of this

"amateurization" of terrorism was further demonstrated by the rash of

independent, unconnected acts of "teenage" terrorism that occurred in

California and Washington State last summer. The first incident involved

the 20-year-old leader of a self-styled terrorist group calling itself

the "Fourth Reich Skinheads" and his 17-year-old co-conspirator, who
were arrested in Los Angeles and charged with planning a series of

bombings against a variety of Jewish targets that would culminate in a

machine-gun and hand grenade assault against a South Central Los Angeles

church as its worshippers emerged from Sunday services.42 The operation

had to be postponed, however, after one of the conspirators was refused

permission by his parents to borrow the family car for the attack.43

That same month, in an unrelated incident, a 19-year-old was

arrested and charged with bombing a Tacoma, Washington, National

Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) meeting hall

as the opening salvo in a terrorist campaign directed against rap stars,

synagogues and military installations throughout the Pacific

Northwest.44 Finally, in November, the putative leader of another

teen-age white supremacist group, the "Aryan Liberation Front," was

arrested in Northern California and charged with five fire bombings of a

synagogue, local office of the NAACP, the home of an Asian-American

local politician, and the state office that handles discrimination

claims in Sacramento.45 The youth-- who turned 18 the day after his

arrest--had called a television station after one attack to announce

that, "The A.L.F. takes full responsibility for the attack and promises

to contribute to armed struggles whether it be by rocks, Molotov

cocktails, bombs, guns, to effect the change in Jew capitalism and

America politically."46

In the past, terrorism was not just a matter of having the will

and motivation to act, but of having the capability to do so, the

requisite training, access to weaponry, and operational knowledge.

Today, however, it is clear that the means and methods of terrorism are

readily available and accessible to anyone with a grievance, agenda or

purpose or any idiosyncratic combination of the above. Whether abetted

tacitly or actively by a foreign patron or facilitated by commercially

obtainable published bomb-making manuals and operational guidebooks, the

"amateur" terrorist can be just as--and perhaps even more--deadly and

destructive than his more "professional" counterpart. Given the inherent

difficulty in tracking and anticipating this category of adversary--as

opposed to the often more established modus operandi and patterns of

existing terrorist groups--this new breed of terrorist may pose a

greater threat in the future.47

Improved "Professionalism" of Terrorists.

Paradoxically, while on the one hand terrorism frequently attracts

"amateurs," on the other, the sophistication and operational competence

of "professional" terrorists is also increasing. The professionals are

becoming demonstrably more adept in their trade craft of death and

destruction; more formidable in terms of their abilities of tactical

modification, adjustment and innovation; and able to operate for

sustained periods of time while avoiding detection, interception and

arrest or capture. More disquieting, these "professional" terrorists

seem to be considerably more ruthless as well.

An almost Darwinian principle of natural selection appears to

distinquish subsequent generations of existing terrorist groups, whereby

every new terrorist generation learns from its predecessors, becoming

smarter, tougher, and more difficult to capture or eliminate.48 For

terrorists, intelligence is not only an essential prerequisite for a

successful operation, but a sine qua non for survival. Successor

generations, therefore, routinely study the "lessons" from mistakes made
by former comrades who have been either killed or apprehended. Press

accounts, judicial indictments, courtroom testimony, and trial

transcripts are meticulously culled for information on security force

tactics and methods and are absorbed by surviving group members.

According to one German government official, terrorists belonging

to the Red Army Faction (RAF), for example, "closely study every court

case against them to discover their weak spots." Whereas, in the past,

German police could usually obtain fingerprints from the bottom of

toilet seats or the inside of refrigerators, RAF terrorists today apply

a special ointment to their fingers that, after drying, prevents

fingerprints and thus thwarts identification and incrimination.49 As a

spokesperson for the Bundeskriminalamt lamented, "The `Third Generation'

learnt a lot from the mistakes of its predecessors and about how the

police works . . . they now know how to operate very carefully."50

Indeed, according to a former member of the organization, Peter Juergen

Brock, currently serving the seventh year of a life sentence for murder,

the group "has reached maximum efficiency."51

Similar accolades have also been bestowed on the latest generation

of Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) fighters. The former General

Officer Commanding British Forces in Northern Ireland, General Sir John

Wilsey, has described the PIRA as "an absolutely formidable enemy. The

essential attributes of their leaders are better than ever before. Some

of their operations are brilliant in terrorist terms."52 Even the PIRA's

comparatively unsophisticated Loyalist terrorist counterparts are on

such a "learning curve as well." As one Royal Ulster Constabulary police

officer has noted, the Protestant groups "[m]ore and more . . . are

running their operations from small cells, on a need to know basis. They

have cracked down on loose talk. They have learned how to destroy

forensic evidence. And if you bring them in for questioning, they say

nothing."53

Not only are successor generations often smarter than their

predecessors, but they also tend to be both more sophisticated and

ruthless as well as less idealistic. For some, in fact, violence becomes

almost an end in itself--cathartic release, a self-satisfying blow

struck against the hated "system"--rather than being regarded as the

deliberate means to a specific political end embraced by previous

generations.54 A dedicated "hard core" of some 20 to 30 terrorists

today, for example, compose a third generation of Germany's RAF. In

contrast to the group's first generation, who more than 20 years ago

embarked on an anti-establishment campaign of nonlethal bombings and

arson attacks, the present generation has pursued a strategy of

cold-blooded assassination.55

During the past 7 years the RAF has murdered six prominent,

heavily guarded, Germans. Indeed, the group's almost relentless

targeting of well-protected individuals sets it apart from the vast

majority of terrorist organizations who typically aim for the "softer"

(i.e., easily accessed) rather than "harder" target.56 The RAF's last

victim was Detlev Rohwedder, a wealthy industrialist and chairman of the

Treuhandanstalt, or Public Trustee, the government agency charged with

overseeing the economic transition of eastern Germany. Rohwedder was

killed in April 1991 while he sat in his study with a shot fired from a

high-powered rifle.57 In December 1989, financier and Deutsche Bank

president Alfred Herrhausen was assassinated when a state-of-the-art

remote control bomb concealed in a parked bicycle and triggered by a
light beam was detonated just as Herrhausen's car passed.58 A similar

device was used the following July in an attempt to assassinate

Germany's top government counterterrorist official, Hans Neusel.59

Almost as disturbing as the assassinations themselves is the fact that,

until this past summer, the perpetrators--and their fellow conspirators-

-had eluded what is perhaps the most sophisticated antiterrorist

machinery in the world.60

The PIRA's relentless quest to pierce the armor protecting both

the security forces in Northern Ireland and the most senior government

officials in England illustrates the professional evolution and

increasing operational sophistication of a terrorist group. The first

generation of early 1970s' PIRA devices were often little more than

crude antipersonnel bombs, consisting of a handful of roofing nails,

wrapped around a lump of plastic explosive and detonated simply by

lighting a fuse. Time-bombs from the same era were hardly more

sophisticated. They typically were constructed from a few sticks of

dynamite and commercial detonators stolen from construction sites or

rock quarries and attached to ordinary battery powered alarm clocks.

Neither device was very reliable and often put the bomber at

considerable risk. The process of placing and actually lighting the

first type of device carried with it the inherent potential to attract

undesired attention while affording the bomber little time to effect the

attack and make good his or her escape. Although the second type of

device was designed to mitigate precisely this danger, its timing and

detonation mechanism was often so crude that accidental or premature

explosions were not infrequent, thus causing some terrorists

inadvertently to kill themselves.61

In hopes of obviating, or at least reducing, these risks, the

PIRA's bombmakers invented a means of detonating bombs from a safe

distance using the radio controls for model aircraft purchased at hobby

shops. Scientists and engineers working in the British Ministry of

Defence's (MoD) scientific research and development (R&D) division in

turn developed a system of electronic countermeasures and jamming

techniques for the Army that effectively thwarted this means of

attack.62 However, rather than abandon this tactic completely, the PIRA

began to search for a solution. In contrast to the state-of-the-art

laboratories, huge budgets, and academic credentials of their government

counterparts, PIRA's own R&D department toiled in cellars beneath

cross-border safe houses and backrooms of urban tenements for 5 years

before devising a network of sophisticated electronic switches for their

bombs that would ignore or bypass the Army's electronic

countermeasures.63

Once again, the MoD scientists returned to their laboratories.

They emerged with a new system of electronic scanners able to detect

radio emissions the moment the radio is switched on, just tens of

seconds before the bomber can actually transmit the detonation signal.

The almost infinitesimal window of time provided by this "early warning"

of impending attack is just sufficient to allow Army technicians to

activate a series of additional electronic measures to neutralize the

transmission signal and render detonation impossible.

For a time, this countermeasure proved effective as well. But

within the past 2 years the PIRA has discovered a means to outwit even

this countermeasure. Utilizing radar detectors, such as those employed

by motorists in the United States, in 1991 the group's bombmakers
fabricated a detonating system that can be triggered by the same type of

hand-held radar gun used by police throughout the world to catch

speeding motorists. Since the radar gun can be aimed at its target

before being switched on, and the signal that it transmits is nearly

instantaneous, no practical means currently exists that allows the time

needed either to detect or intercept the transmission signal.64 More

recently, PIRA R&D units have developed yet another means to detonate

bombs using a photo flash "slave" unit that can be triggered from a

distance of up to 800 meters by a flash of light. The device, which

sells for between 60 and 70 English pounds, is used by commercial

photographers to produce simultaneous flashes during photo shoots. The

PIRA bombers attach the unit to the detonating system on a bomb and then

simply activate it with a commercially-available, ordinary flashgun.65

 As with the new "photo flash" means of detonation, the

sophistication of a device is often its very simplicity. In recent

years, for example, the PIRA has mounted a highly effective campaign of

"economic warfare" using simple incendiary devices left in Belfast and

London department stores. These use a plastic cassette tape container, a

miniature detonator, a timing device powered by a radio battery, a small

amount of plastic explosive or explosive power, two or three capsules of

lighter fuel and some paper to ensure combustion. The devices are small,

highly portable, easily constructed and planted. They are nearly

risk-free to the bomber as the timer can usually be set for up to 12

hours. The cost is less than 5 pounds to produce.66 Thus far these bombs

have caused more than $15 million in property damage.67 The process of

planting the devices is typically a one person job, but allows that

person potentially to operate without detection over a wide area and

thus create an impression "of a concerted attack involving a large

team."68

 On a larger scale, bombs constructed out of ordinary,

commercially-available fertilizer (such as was used in the World Trade

Center bombing) have devastated commercial districts both in Northern

Ireland and in England. In April 1992, in what was described "as the

most powerful explosion in London since World War II," a bomb

constructed with up to a ton of fertilizer exploded outside the Baltic

Exchange building in the heart of the city's financial center, killing

three persons, wounding 90 others, and leaving a 12-foot wide crater. It

caused $1.25 billion in damage.69 Exactly a year later, a similar bomb

devastated the nearby Bishops Gate district, killing one person and

injuring 40 others. Initial estimates put the damage at $1.5 billion.70

Long a staple of PIRA operations, fertilizer costs on average 1 percent

of a comparable amount of plastic explosive. However, after

adulteration, fertilizer is far less powerful than plastic explosive.

Semtex explodes at about 8,000 yards a second and has a high explosive

rating of 1.3; improvised explosives explode at only about 3,000 yards a

second and range between 0.25 and 0.8 in rating. It also tends to cause

more damage than plastic explosives because the energy of the blast is

sustained and less controlled.71 Not surprisingly, therefore, the PIRA

bombers have earned a reputation for their innovative expertise,

adaptability, and cunning. "There are some very bright people around,"

the British Army's Chief Ammunitions Technical Officer (CATO) in

Northern Ireland recently remarked. "I would rate them very highly for

improvisation. PIRA bombs are very well made."72 A similar accolade is

offered by the staff officer of the British Army's 321 Explosives and

Ordinance Disposal Company: "We are dealing with the first division," he

said. "I don't think there is any organisation in the world as cunning
as the IRA. They have had 20 years at it and they have learned from

their experience. We have a great deal of respect for their skills . . .

not as individuals, but their skills."73 While not yet nearly as good as

the PIRA, the province's Loyalist terrorist groups are themselves

reportedly on a "learning curve": becoming increasing adept in the

construction, concealment and surreptitious placement of bombs.74

Even attacks that are not successful in conventionally- understood

military terms of casualties inflicted or assets destroyed can still be

a success for the terrorists provided that they are technologically

daring enough to garner media and public attention. Indeed, the

terrorist group's fundamental organizational imperative is to act even

if their action is not completely successful, but still brings them

publicity. This imperative also drives the persistent search for new

ways to overcome, circumvent or defeat governmental security and

countermeasures. Thus, while the PIRA failed to kill then Prime Minister

Margaret Thatcher at the Conservative Party's 1984 conference in

Brighton, the technological ingenuity involving the bomb's placement at

the conference site weeks before the event and its detonation timing

device powered by a computer microchip nonetheless succeeded in

capturing the world's headlines and providing the PIRA with a platform

from which to warn Mrs. Thatcher and all other British leaders: "Today

we were unlucky, but remember we only have to be lucky once--you will

have to be lucky always."75 Similarly, although the remote control

mortar attack staged by the PIRA on No. 10 Downing Street--as Prime

Minister John Major and his Cabinet met at the height of the 1991 Gulf

War--failed to hit its intended target, the attack nonetheless

successfully elbowed the war out of the limelight and shone renewed

media attention on the terrorists, their cause and their impressive

ability to strike at the nerve center of the British government even at

a time of heightened security.76 The PIRA's impressive ability to

capture headlines with daring, clever operations was most recently

demonstrated by the series of remote control mortar attacks on London's

Heathrow Airport in March. Three attacks in five days nearly paralyzed

all air traffic77 and provided the terrorists with an ideal propaganda

vehicle demonstrating terrorism's ineluctable paradox: that terrorists

can attack anywhere at anytime while the government's security forces

are powerless and unable to protect every conceivable target all the

time.78

Conclusion.

What do these trends suggest for the future? First, terrorists

will continue to rely on the same two basic weapons that they have used

successfully for more than a century: the gun and the bomb. What changes

we will see will be more in the realm of clever adaptations or

modifications to existing "off the shelf" technology (such as the PIRA

is so accomplished at) or the continued utilization of

readily-available, commercially- purchased materials that can be

fabricated into crude--but lethally effective and damaging--weapons

(such as the explosive device used by the World Trade Center bombers).

Their preference for this traditional arsenal is a reflection of an

operational conservatism imposed by the terrorist organizational

imperative to succeed. For this reason, terrorists must always keep

ahead of the technology curve. Thus, when confronted by new security

measures, terrorists will seek to find and exploit new vulnerabilities

or else simply change their tactics accordingly.
Second, the sophistication of these devices will be in their

simplicity. Unlike military ordnance, such as plastic explosive, for

example, the materials used in "home-made" bombs are both readily- and

commercially-available, thus they are perfectly legal to possess until

actually concocted or assembled into a bomb. These materials are also

far more difficult to trace or for experts to obtain a "signature." For

example, the type of explosive used in the 1988 in-flight bombing of Pan

Am 103 was Semtex H, a plastic explosive manufactured in Czechoslavakia

and sold primarily to other former-Warsaw Pact countries during the cold

war as well as to such well-known state sponsors of terrorism as Libya,

Iran, Iraq, Syria, and North Korea. Thus, for foreign governments

seeking to commission terrorist attacks or use terrorists as surrogate

warriors, the terrorists' use of such "home-made" materials carries with

it both advantage and appeal in possibly enabling the state sponsor to

avoid military retaliation or international sanction.

Third, a combination of the resurgence of terrorism motivated by a

religious imperative, the proliferation of "amateur" terrorist groups,

and the growing sophistication of established, more "professional"

groups is likely to lead to higher levels of lethality and destruction

than in the past. The erosion of the self-imposed constraints that have

hitherto inhibited the infliction of mass, indiscriminate casualties by

terrorists is evident in each of these categories. Indeed, terrorism

today increasingly reflects a deadly mixture of all three: it is

perpetrated by "amateurs"; motivated by religious enmity, blind hatred

or a mix of individually idiosyncratic motivations; and conceiveably

exploited or manipulated by terrorist "professionals" and their state

sponsors. In this respect, the availability of relatively sophisticated,

off-the-shelf weaponry such as hand-held, precision-guided

surface-to-air missiles, or the relative ease with which chemical or

biological warfare agents can be manufactured, suggests that terrorists

possessing this constellation of characteristics would have little

trouble crossing into the domain of either "high tech" weaponry or

weapons of mass destruction.79

Moreover, the post-cold war new world order and attendant

possibilities and payoffs of independence, sovereignty, and power may

entice both new and would-be nations along with the perpetually

disenfranchised to embrace terrorism as a solution to, or vehicle for

the realization of their dreams. Today, when old empires and countries

are crumbling and new ones are being built, the possession of a nuclear

bomb or the development of a chemical or biological warfare capability

may thus become increasingly attractive either to new nations seeking to

preserve their sovereignty or to would-be nations seeking to attain

their independence. In both instances, terrorists may find new roles for

their skills and expertise. Terrorists may be employed by countries

either to steal nuclear weapons or strategic material from another

country, or they may be paid to stage a covert nuclear, chemical, or

biological attack to conceal the involvement or complicity of their

state patron. In this respect, the lessons of Iraq's overt invasion of

Kuwait loom large. In the future, terrorists may become the "ultimate

fifth column": a clandestine, cost-effective force used to wage war

covertly against more powerful rivals or to subvert neighboring

countries or hostile regimes.

By the same token, ethnic/religious fanaticism--as previously

noted--could more easily allow terrorists to overcome the psychological

barriers to mass murder than could a radical political agenda. A
terrorist group of religious zealots, with state support, in a context

of ongoing violence (i.e., the civil wars occurring in the former

Yugoslavia or some new internecine conflict in one of the former Soviet

Union's republics) could see the acquisition and use of a chemical,

biological, or nuclear capability as a viable option. State sponsorship,

in particular, could provide terrorists with the incentives,

capabilities, and resources they previously lacked for undertaking an

ambitious operation in any of these domains. Combined with intense

ethnic enmity or a strong religious imperative, this could prove

deadly.80

One final observation seems in order: while the volume of

worldwide terrorism fluctuates from year to year, one enduring feature

is that Americans remain favored targets of terrorists abroad. Since

1968, the United States has annually headed the list of countries whose

nationals and property are most frequently attacked by terrorists.81

This is a phenomenon attributable as much to the geographical scope and

diversity of America's overseas commercial interests and the large

number of its military bases on foreign soil as to U.S. stature as a

superpower and leader of the free world. Terrorists, therefore, are

attracted to American interests and citizens abroad precisely because of

the plethora of readily available targets. Many terrorists believe that

it is easier to operate against Americans overseas than it is to strike

at targets in the United States. Furthermore, there is the symbolic

value inherent in any blow struck against U.S. "imperialism,"

"expansionism," or "economic exploitation." Almost obligingly, the

American press can be counted upon to provide publicity and exposure for

any attack on an American target, especially if there are civilian

casualties. These reasons suggest that, despite the end of both the

cold war and the ideological polarization that divided the world, the

United States will nonetheless remain an attractive target for

terrorists seeking to call attention to themselves and their causes.

Moreover, as the only superpower, the United States may likely be blamed

for more of the world's ills, and therefore could be the focus of more

terrorist attacks than before.82

Notes:

1. Michael J. Mazarr, et al., Military Technical Revolution: A

Structural Framework, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and

International Studies, March 1993, p. 15. See also, Antulioi J.

Echevarria and John M. Shaw, "The New Military Revolution: Post

Industrial Change," Parameters, Winter 1992-93, pp. 70-79.

2. Wayne K. Maynard, "Spears vs. Rifles: The New Equation of

Military Power," Parameters, Spring 1993, p. 149.

3. See, for example, Ibid., pp. 55-56; and, Mazarr, et al.,

Military Technical Revolution: A Structural Framework, pp. 16-17.

4. This act was the opening salvo in the Marodnaya Volya's

short-lived terrorist campaign against Tsarist rule. See Walter Laqueur,

Terrorism, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1977, pp. 11-12.

5. Ibid., pp. 12-13; and, Tom Pat Coogan, The IRA: A History,

Niwot, CO: Roberts Rhinehart, 1993, p. 12.

6. Among the more noteworthy exceptions are: reports that in 1979
German Red Army Faction terrorists were being trained at Palestinian

camps in Lebanon in the use of bacteriological weapons; the poisoning

with mercury that same year of Israeli Jaffa oranges exported to Europe

by Palestinian terrorists; a police raid of an RAF safe-house in Paris

that uncovered a miniature laboratory containing a culture of

Clostridium botulinum, used to create a botulinum toxin and earlier

threats by the group to poison water supplies in 20 German towns if

three radical lawyers were not permitted to defend an imprisoned RAF

member; the 1984 meeting of white supremacists in Mountain Home,

Arkansas, who, according to a Federal grand jury indictment, plotted and

began to stockpile cyanide with which to poison the water supplies of

Chicago and Washington, DC; suspicions that in 1986 terrorists in India

may have contemplated poisoning drinking water tanks there; the letters

sent to Western embassies by Tamil guerrillas claiming to have poisoned

Sri Lankan tea with potassium cyanide; and the minute traces of cyanide

discovered in Chilean grapes exported to the United States following

threats made by a left wing Chilean group. Source: The RAND Chronology

of International Terrorism. See also, Jeffrey D. Simon, Terrorists and

the Potential Use of Biological Weapons; A Discussion of Possibilities,

Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1989, R-3771 AFMIC, passim. Also, it has been

reported that various terrorist groups, including the RAF, Italy's Red

Brigades and some Palestinian organizations, reputedly "have recruited

microbiologists, purchased bacteriological experimentation equipment and

dabbled in sending toxins such as anthrax to potential victims." See

"Violence: A Buyer's Market," Jane's Defence Weekly, May 12, 1990, pp.

909-911.

7. Forty-four percent of all terrorist attacks between 1968/69

involved bombings; 53 percent in the 1970s; 49 percent in the 1980s, and

39.5 percent between 1990/93. Source: The RAND Chronology of

International Terrorism.

8. Eighteen percent both between 1968/69 and during the 1970s; 19

percent in the 1980s; and, 32 percent between 1990/93. Source: The RAND

Chronology of International Terrorism.

9. Hijackings accounted for 33 percent of all terrorist attacks

between 1968/69; 7 percent in the 1970s; 4 percent of the incidents in

the 1980s; and, 12 percent between 1990/93.

10. Three percent between 1968/69; 9 percent in the 1970s; 13

percent in the 1980s; and 13 percent between 1990/93.

11. Kidnappings accounted for just .01 percent of all terrorist

attacks between 1968/69; 9 percent in the 1970s; 10 percent in the

1980s; and, 6 percent between 1990/93. There were no barricade and

hostage situations recorded between 1968/69; though they accounted for 3

percent of all terrorist incidents during the 1970s; and just 1 percent

in both the 1980s and between 1990/93.

12. This is the dramatic rise between 1990/93 of attacks on

installations to 32 percent from the 19 percent recorded during the

1980s.

13. A bombing in Bessarabia in 1921; a 1925 bombing of a crowded

cathedral in Sofia, Bulgaria; a largely unrecorded attempt to poison

imprisoned German SS concentration camp guards shortly after World War

II; the crash of a hijacked Malaysian passenger plane in 1977; the arson
attack at a Teheran movie theater in 1979 that killed more than 400; the

1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon that killed 241; the

1985 in-flight bombing of an Air India passenger jet that killed all 328

persons on board; the simultaneous explosions that rocked an ammunition

dump in Islamabad, Pakistan, in 1988; the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103

in 1988 that killed 278 persons; the 1989 in-flight bombing of a French

UTA flight that killed 171; and the in-flight bombing, as in 1989, of a

Colombian Avianca aircraft in which 107 persons perished. As terrorism

expert Brian Jenkins noted in 1985 of the list upon which the preceding

is an expanded version: "Lowering the criterion to 50 deaths produces a

dozen or more additional incidents. To get even a meaningful sample, the

criterion has to be lowered to 25. This in itself suggests that it is

either very hard to kill large numbers of persons or very rarely tried."

Brian M. Jenkins, The Likelihood of Nuclear Terrorism, Santa Monica, CA:

RAND, P-7119, July 1985, p. 7.

14. Numbers derived from the analysis of incidents recorded in The

RAND Chronology of International Terrorism.

15. Admittedly, many "secular" terrorist groups have a strong

religious element: the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the various

Armenian groups that were active throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and

perhaps the Palestine Liberation Organization, as well. However, the

political aspect is the predominant characteristic of these groups, as

evinced by their nationalist or irredentist aims.

16. For a detailed analysis of these repercussions and indeed

Iran's sponsorship of international terrorism, see Bruce Hoffman,

"Recent Trends and Future Prospects of Iranian Sponsored International

Terrorism," in Yonah Alexander, ed., Middle Eastern Terrorism: Current

Threats and Future Prospects, New York and Toronto: G.K. Hall, 1994, or

the RAND Report, R-3783-USDP, March 1990, in which this analysis was

first published.

17. This form of terrorism has, of course, occurred throughout

history, although in recent decades it has largely been overshadowed by

nationalist/separatist or ideologically motivated terrorism. Indeed, as

David C. Rapoport points out in his seminal study of what he terms "holy

terror," the relationship between terrorism and religion is not new and

until the 19th century "religion provided the only acceptable

justifications for terror." See David C. Rapoport, "Fear and Trembling:

Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions," American Political Science

Review, Vol. 78, No. 3, September 1984, p. 659.

18. According to The RAND Chronology of International Terrorism, between 1982 and 1992 Shi'a terrorist groups committed 295 terrorist

incidents but were responsible for 1,134 deaths.

19. For a more detailed analysis of the phenomena and implications

of religious terrorism see Bruce Hoffman, "Holy Terror": The

Implications of Religion Motivated By A Religious Imperative, Santa

Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 1993, p. 6450.

20. According to a 1987 Federal grand jury indictment, 14 white

supremacists met at a rural so-called "survivalist" compound in Mountain

Home, Arkansas, in 1984 where they plotted to poison reservoirs in

Chicago, Illinois, and Washington, DC, and began stockpiling 30 gallons

of cyanide.
21. In 1987, the "Confederate Hammer Skins," a white supremacist

"skinhead" group planned to place cyanide crystals in the air

conditioning unit of a Dallas Jewish synagogue.

22. In 1984, two groups of Israeli Jewish fanatics plotted to blow

up Jerusalem's Dome of the Rock, Islam's third holiest shrine, in hope

of igniting a final battle between Moslems and Jews. Information

provided to the author by an American law enforcement official. See

also, Thomas L. Friedman, "Jewish Terrorists Freed By Israeli," The New

York Times, December 9, 1984; Grace Halsell, "Why Bobby Brown of

Brooklyn Wants To Blow Up Al Aqsa," Arabia, August 1984; Martin Merzer,

"Justice for all in Israel?", Miami Herald, May 17, 1985; and, "Jail

Term of Jewish Terrorist Reduced," Jerusalem Post (International

Edition), October 12, 1985. The information pertaining to the

terrorists' desire to provoke a cataclysmic holy war between Moslems and

Jews was verified by an American law enforcement officer, involved with

the investigation of Jewish terrorist incidents in the United States and

knowledgeable of the Jerusalem incident. For a detailed account of both

the Temple Mount "plot" and Jewish terrorist attacks on Arab targets in

Israel during 1983 and 1984, see Ehud Sprinzak, The Ascendance of

Israel's Radical Right, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1991.

23. In February and March 1993, Muslim terrorists allegedly

unleashed a massive bombing campaign in downtown Bombay, India, that

killed more than 400 persons and injured over a 1,000 others.

24. In 1984, followers of the Bagwhan Shre Rajneesh attempted to

poison with salmonella the salad bars of a small Oregon town in hopes of

influencing the outcome of a local election. Secular terrorists, it

should be noted, have also attempted to poison food supplies, such as

the Palestinian terrorists who poisoned Israeli oranges with mercury in

1979; the Tamil guerrillas who claimed to have contaminated Sri Lankan

tea shipments in 1986; and, Chilean terrorists who claimed to have

poisoned grapes exported from that country in 1988.

25. See, for example, Rapoport, "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in

Three Religious Traditions," p. 674.

26. Brian M. Jenkins, The Likelihood Of Nuclear Terrorism, Santa

Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, July 1985, P 7119, pp. 4-5.

27. See, for example, Amir Taheri, Holy Terror: The Inside Story

of Islamic Terrorism, London: Sphere Books, Ltd., 1987, pp. 7-8.

28. These included the bombing of New York City's World Trade

Center in February; the uncovering in June of a plot to free the

terrorists arrested for the Trade Center blast by destroying two

commuter tunnels and a bridge linking New Jersey to Manhattan, blowing

up the United Nations building, staging a forced entry attack on the

downtown Federal building housing the FBI's New York field office, and

assassinating various public officials; the unmasking the following

month of a conspiracy to carry out a machine gun and hand grenade attack

against a prominent African American church in Los Angeles as Sunday

services concluded; and the chain of bombings against a variety of

Asian, Jewish, and African-American targets in the Sacramento,

California, area last spring and summer.
29. In the case of the World Trade Center, the four bombers appear

to have jointed forces based on their attendance at the same place of

worship (a Jersey City, New Jersey, mosque). In one case as well, family

ties existed. (Irbahim A. Elgabrowny, who although not charged with the

Trade Center bombing specifically, was nonetheless implicated in the

crime and has been charged in the subsequent plot to free the bombers,

is the cousin of El Sayyid A. Nosair, who was also implicated in the

bombing, is among the 15 persons indicted in the follow-on plans to

obtain the bombers' release, and is already serving a prison sentence in

connection with the November 1990 assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane).

See Jim Mcgee and Rachel Stassen-Berger, "5th Suspect Arrested in

Bombing," The Washington Post, March 26, 1993; and, Alison Mitchell,

"Fingerprint Evidence Grows in World Trade Center Blast," The New York

Times, May 20, 1993.

30. For example, the arrests made in connection with the World

Trade Center bombing brought to light further evidence that, since 1985,

at least two other worshippers of the same Jersey City mosque that two

of the convicted bombers attended had been previously implicated in

terrorist acts in the New York metropolitan area. The first incident

involves the arrest, in December 1985, of Sultan Irahim El Gawli, an

Egyptian-born travel agent, by U.S. Customs Service officers. El Gawli

was convicted of attempting to export 150 pounds of C-4 plastic

explosives, 100 blasting caps, remote detonators and a 9-mm.

silencer-equipped pistol to Palestinian terrorists in Israel and the

Occupied Territories. He served 18 months in prison and has since been

released. The second is the assassination of Rabbi Meir Kahane by El

Sayyid A. Nosair, who also was born in Egypt and like El Gawli and the

two World Trade Center bombing suspects--Mohammed Salameh and Nidal

Ayyad--worshipped at the Masjid al-Salam Mosque in Jersey City. A search

of Nosair's home following his arrest uncovered bomb making manuals,

1,440 rounds of 7.62 ammunition used in AK-47 assault rifles, manuals on

the use of listening devices and explosive traps. See John Kifner,

"Kahane Suspect Is a Muslim With a Series of Addresses," The New York

Times, November 7, 1990; Mary B.W. Tabor, "Kahane Suspect Remains Focal

Point in Bomb Plots," The New York Times, May 23, 1993; and, John J.

Goldman, et al., "N.Y. Trial in Rabbi's Death Planted an Explosive

Seed," The Los Angeles Times, July 4, 1993.

31. Interview with RAND research staff, November 1992.

32. Federal authorities reported that they had traced nearly

$100,000 in funds that had been wired to some of the suspects from

abroad, including transfers made from Iran. An additional $8,000 had

been transferred from Germany into a joint bank account maintained by

two of the bombers. Ralph Blumenthal, "$100,000 From Abroad Is Linked to

Suspects in the Trade Center Explosion," The New York Times, February

15, 1993. According to one of the other convicted bombers, Mahmud

Abouhalima, funds had also been routed through the militant Egyptian

Islamic group, Gamat al-Islamiya, whose spiritual leader is Shiekh Omar

Abdel Rahman, now awaiting trial in connection with the June 1993 plot,

and by the radical transnational Muslim Brotherhood organization.

Additional financing reputedly was provided by and via Iranian

businesses and Islamic institutions in Saudi Arabia and Europe. Mary

B.W. Tabor, "Lingering Questions on Bombing," The New York Times,

September 14, 1994.
33. Ralph Blumenthal, "Missing Bombing Case Figure Reported to Be

Staying in Iraq," The New York Times, June 10, 1993.

34. According to Egyptian officials who interrogated Mahmud

Abouhalima, who had fled the United States to his native Egypt following

the bombing, the plan to attack the Trade Center was conceived in

Afghanistan by veterans of the "holy war" waged against Soviet

occupation of that country during the 1980s. Two "self-described Iranian

intelligence agents" and the two Iraqi fugitives noted above had

participated in the planning as well (Mary B.W. Tabor, "Lingering

Questions on Bombing," The New York Times, September 14, 1994). Another

of the convicted Trade Center bombers, Ahmad M. Ajaj, a Palestinian, had

worked in a Houston pizzeria until he was arrested upon entering the

United States from Pakistan on September 1, 1992. U.S. Customs agents

found in his possession four false passports, six volumes of bomb-making

manuals (that, according to prosecutors, contained formulas most likely

used to construct the Trade Center bomb), as well as two videotapes

demonstrating how to mix chemicals into explosives and how to stage a

bombing attack against a U.S. Embassy (Richard Bernstein, "Trade Center

Trial Nearing Close As Defense Team Rests Its Case," The New York Times,

February 15, 1993). See also, Mary B.W. Tabor, "Terrorism in New York:

Looking for Links," The New York Times, June 27, 1993; Richard

Bernstein, "Trial Deepens the Mysteries Of the Trade Center Blast," The

New York Times, November 15, 1993; Richard Bernstein, "4 Are Convicted

In Bombing At The World Trade Center That Killed 6, Stunned U.S.," The

New York Times, March 5, 1994; and, Richard Bernstein, "The Missing

Piece," The New York Times, March 5, 1994.

35. Richard Bernstein, "Lawyer in Trade Center Blast Case Contends

that Client Was a Dupe," The New York Times, February 16, 1994. See

also, Tom Morganthau, "A Terrorist Plot Without a Story," Newsweek,

February 28, 1994.

36. The Trade Center bomb was composed of some 1,200 lbs. of

"common sulfuric and nitric acids used in dozens of household products

and urea used to fertilize lawns." The detonating device was a more

complex and extremely volatile mixture of nitroglycerine enhanced by

tanks of compressed hydrogen gases that were designed to increase the

force of the blast. Richard Bernstein, "Lingering Questions on Bombing:

Powerful Device, Simple Design," The New York Times, September 14, 1994.

See also, Richard Bernstein, "Expert Can't Be Certain of Bomb Contents

at Trial," The New York Times, January 21, 1994. Richard Bernstein,

"Nitroglycerin and Shoe at Center of Blast Trial Testimony," The New

York Times, January 27, 1994; Richard Bernstein, "Witness Sums Up

Bombing Evidence," The New York Times, February 7, 1994; Edward Barnes,

et al., "The $400 Bomb," Time, March 22, 1993; and, Tom Morganthau, "A

Terrorist Plot Without a Story," Newsweek, February 28, 1994.

Similarly, in April 1988 a Japanese Red Army terrorist, Yu

Kikumura, was arrested on the New Jersey Turnpike while en route to New

York City on a bombing mission. Kikumura's mission was to carry out a

bombing attack against a U.S. Navy recruiting station in lower Manhattan

on April 15 to commemorate the second anniversary of the 1986 U.S.

airstrike against Libya. He is believed to have undertaken this

operation at the behest of Libya's Colonel Qaadafi. Between his arrival

in the United States on March 14 and his arrest a month later, Kikumura

traveled some 7,000 miles by car from New York to Chicago, through

Kentucky, Tennessee, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania purchasing
materials for his bomb along the way. Found in his possession were

gunpowder, hollowed-out fire extinguishers in which to place the

explosive materials and roofing nails as crude anti-personnel weapons.

Kikumura was sentenced to 30 years in prison. See Robert Hanley,

"Suspected Japanese Terrorist Convicted in Bomb Case in New Jersey," The

New York Times, November 29, 1988; and, Business Risks International,

Risk Assessment Weekly, Vol. 5, No. 29, July 22, 1988.

37. N.R. Kleinfeld, "Legacy of Tower Explosion: Security Improved,

and Lost," The New York Times, February 20,1993; and, Richard Bernstein,

"Lingering Questions on Bombing: Powerful Device, Simple Design," The

New York Times, September 14, 1994.

38. See, for example, William M. Carley and Timothy L. O'Brien,

"Web of Fear: New Kind of Terrorist, Amateur and Ad Hoc, Worried

Authorities," The Wall Street Journal, March 17, 1993; and, Robin

Wright, "New Breed of Terrorist Worries U.S. Officials," Los Angeles

Times, June 27, 1993.

39. Israeli authorities have noted this same pattern has emerged

among terrorists belonging to the Hamas organization currently active in

the West Bank and Gaza Strip in contrast to the more professional,

centrally controlled members of the mainstream Palestine Liberation

Organization terrorist groups. As one senior Israeli security official

noted of a particularly vicious band of Hamas terrorists: they "were a

surprisingly unprofessional bunch . . . they had no preliminary training

and acted without specific instructions." See Joel Greenberg, "Israel

Arrests 4 In Police Death," The New York Times, June 7, 1993; and Eric

Silver, "The Shin Bet's `Winning' Battle," The Jewish Journal (Los

Angeles), June 11-17, 1993.

40. Matthew L. Wald, "Figuring What It Would Take to Take Down a

Tower," The New York Times, March 21, 1993.

41. United States of America v. Siddig Ibrahim Siddig Ali, et al.,

Complaint Violation of 18 U.S.C. ## 371, 844 (i) June 23, 1993; United

States District Court, Southern District of New York, United States of

America v. Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman, et al., Indictment S3 Cr. 181,

August 25, 1993. See also, Robert D. McFadden, "F.B.I. Seizes 8, Citing

A Plot To Bomb New York Targets And Kill Political Figures," The New

York Times, June 25, 1993; William C. Rempel and Ronald J. Ostrow, "Bomb

Plot Reportedly Hinged on U.N. Link," Los Angeles Times, June 26, 1993;

Robert D. McFadden, "U.S. Says More Bomb-Plot Suspects Are at Large,"

The New York Times, June 26, 1993; Susan Sachs, "Egypt Links Trade

Center Blast to International Plot," Los Angeles Times, July 16, 1993;

Mary B.W. Tabor, "Second Bombing Plot Casts Shadow as First Nears

Trial," The New York Times, July 19, 1993; and, Mary B.W. Tabor, "U.S.

Plotters Discussed Kidnapping and Hostage Taking," The New York Times,

August 5, 1993.

42. Jim Newton, "Skinhead Leader Pleads Guilty to Violence, Plot,"

Los Angeles Times, October 9, 1993.

43. Information provided to author by one of the arresting police

officers, August 1993.

44. Associated Press, "Blast Called Part of Plot," Baltimore Sun,

July 31, 1993.
45. Associated Press, "California Teen Ager Is Arrested In

Bombings Aimed at Minorities," The New York Times, November 8, 1993. See

also, "White Supremacists Investigated In 4 Firebombings in Sacramento,"

The New York Times, October 6, 1993.

46. Quoted in Associated Press, "California Agency Hit In Hate

Crime Attack," The New York Times, October 15, 1993.

47. The lethal simplicity of bomb-making was graphically

demonstrated in a series of bombings carried out in upstate New York

just after Christmas 1993 by an aggrieved boyfriend against his lover's

family (who allegedly did not like him). Five persons were killed and

two others wounded by booby-trapped plastic toolboxes manufactured by

the boyfriend, a 53-year-old ex-convict, con-man and drifter, and a

56-year-old male accomplice. The bomber built prototypes of the

explosive devices at his mother's house, before storing the real bombs

in his accomplice's hotel room. The explosives used in the bombs had

been obtained by the accomplice who was able to purchase a case of

dynamite and 50 blasting caps in Kentucky using an alias. Jacques

Steinberg, "Motive in Fatal Bombings Is Unclear, Authorities Say," The

New York Times, December 31, 1993; and, Associated Press, "Judge Denies

Bail for Two Men Suspected in Upstate Bombings," The New York Times,

January 4, 1994.

48. See, for example, the discussion of Germany's Red Army Faction

in Peter Schere, "RAF Concentrates on New Target Spectrum," Die Welt,

December 18, 1991.

49. See Frederick Kempe, "Deadly Survivors: The Cold War Is Over

But Leftist Terrorists In Germany Fight On," The Wall Street Journal,

December 27, 1991.

50. Quoted in Adrian Bridge, "German police search for Red Army

Faction killers," The Independent (London), April 6, 1991.

51. Kempe, "Deadly Survivors: The Cold War Is Over But Leftist

Terrorists In Germany Fight On."

52. Quoted in Edward Gorman, "How to stop the IRA," The Times

(London), January 11, 1992.

53. Quoted in William E. Schmidt, "Protestant Gunmen Are Stepping

Up the Violence in Northern Ireland," The New York Times, October 29,

1991.

54. Ibid.

55. In April and June 1992 the RAF issued communiques offering to

suspend its terrorist campaign provided various conditions--involving

mostly the release of imprisoned RAF terrorists--were met by the German

government. For a detailed analysis of both the RAF and the two

communiques, see Dennis A. Pluchinsky, "Germany's Red Army Faction: An

Obituary," Studies In Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 16, No. 2,

forthcoming.

56. For a detailed analysis of the Herrhausen attack and the RAF

modus operandi in attacking protected persons see Dennis Pluchinsky,
"The RAF and the Herrhausen Assassination," in U.S. Department of State,

Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Terrorist Tactics and Security Practices, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, DOS 10099, February 1994, pp.

3-12.

57. Adrian Bridge, "German police search for Red Army Faction

killers," The Independent (London), April 6, 1991; Stephen Kinzer, "Red

Army Faction Is Suspected in German Killing," The New York Times, April

3, 1991; and, Bernard Adamczewski, "United Germany Divided by Terror,"

Conflict International, Vol. 6, No. 3, p. 1.

58. Pluchinksy, "The RAF and the Herrhausen Assassination," pp.

3-12.

59. "Bonn's Top Terror Expert Survives Bomb," The Independent

(London), July 28, 1990; and Ian Murray, "German Police Chief Survives

Car Bomb," The Times (London), July 28, 1990. As one German federal

investigator observed: "When the RAF kills, it usually gets the sort of

people who are impossible to replace." Quoted in Kempe, "Deadly

Survivors: The Cold War Is Over But Leftist Terrorists In Germany Fight

On."

60. In a July 1993 shootout at a rural railway station in the

former East Germany, RAF terrorist Wolfgang Grams and a member of the

crack German GSG-9 counterterrorist unit were shot dead and another RAF

terrorist, Birgit Hogefeld, was captured. Until that incident, not one

member of the group's "Third Generation" been either killed or

apprehended. See Stephen Kinzer, "Germany's Anti-Terror Unit Buffs Its

Image," The New York Times, August 18, 1993; and, Stephen Kinzer,

"German Terrorist's Death Is Called a Suicide," The New York Times,

January 14, 1994.

61. David Rose, "Devices Reveal IRA Know-How," The Guardian

(London), May 18, 1990.

62. Michael Smith, "IRA Use of Radar Guns in Bombings Described,"

Daily Telegraph (London), May 20, 1991.

63. See also, David Hearst, "IRA Mines Gap in Army Security," The

Guardian (London), April 10, 1990; David Hearst, "`Human Bomb' Fails to

Explode," The Guardian (London), November 24, 1990; Jamie Dettmer and

Edward Gorman, "Seven Dead in IRA `Human' Bomb Attacks," The Times

(London), October 25, 1990; Will Bennett, "Terrorists Keep Changing

Tactics To Elude Security Forces," Independent (London), December 17,

1991.

64. Ibid.

65. Nicholas Watt, "IRA's Russian Roulette Detonator," The Times

(London), March 16, 1994; and, "Photoflash Bomb Threat To the Public,"

The Scotsman (Edinburgh), March 16, 1994.

66. Duncan Campbell, "Video Clue to IRA Store Blitz: Simplicity of

Incendiary Device Makes Disruption Easy," The Guardian (London),

December 24, 1991.

67. James F. Clarity, "On Ulster Border, Grim Days For Grenadier

Guards," The New York Times, February 23, 1994.
68. Campbell, "Video Clue to IRA Store Blitz: Simplicity of

Incendiary Device Makes Disruption Easy."

69. William E. Schmidt, "One Dead, 40 Hurt as Blast Rips Central

London," The New York Times, April 25, 1993. See also, William E.

Schmidt, "With London Still in Bomb Shock, Major Appoints His New

Cabinet" The New York Times, April 12, 1992; "Delays Seen in London,"

The New York Times, April 13, 1992; Peter Rodgers, "City Bomb Claims May

Reach _lbn," The Independent (London), April 14, 1992; and David

Connett, "IRA City Bomb was Fertilizer," The Independent (London), May

28, 1992.

70. William E. Schmidt, "One Dead, 40 Hurt as Blast Rips Central

London," The New York Times, April 25, 1993; and Richard W. Stevenson,

"I.R.A. Says It Placed Fatal Bomb; London Markets Rush to Reopen," The

New York Times, April 26, 1993.

71. Roger Highfield, "Explosion Could Have Wrecked City Centre,"

Daily Telegraph (London), August 13, 1993.

72. Ian Graham, "Official: IRA Using `Bigger, Better,' Bombs,"

London Press Association, January 23, 1992.

73. Edward Gorman, "Bomb Disposers Mark 21 Years in Ulster," The

Times (London), November 7, 1992.

74. Graham, "Official: IRA Using `Bigger, Better' Bombs."

75. Quoted in "Outrage Not a Reason for Inaction," Manchester

Guardian International Edition, October 21, 1984.

76. Stewart Tendler, "A Crude and Lethal Weapon to Thwart the

Security Forces," The Times (London), February 8, 1991; and, Will

Bennett, "Simple Bombs Improved But Lack Accuracy," Independent

(London), February 8, 1991.

77. "I.R.A. Fires 5 Mortars at a London Airport," The New York

Times, March 10, 1994; John Darnton, "2d Mortar Attack on Heathrow," The

New York Times, March 12, 1994; and, John Darnton, "I.R.A. Attacks and

Threats Close London Airports," The New York Times, March 14, 1994.

78. Aphorism originally coined by Brian Jenkins.

79. According to a 1990 report, for example, "Canberra bombers,

Rapier missiles and tube artillery" can be readily obtained on the

international black market. It similarly notes that while terrorist

groups as diverse as Germany's Red Army Faction, Italy's Red Brigades

and various Palestinian organizations reputedly "have recruited

microbiologists, purchased bacteriological experimentation equipment and

dabbled in sending toxins such as anthrax to potential victims"; they

have to date not done so. See "Violence: A Buyer's Market," Jane's

Defence Weekly, May 12, 1990, pp. 909-911. See also, "Guns: Buyer's

Market," The Economist, May 16, 1992.

80. Thesis originally advanced by the author in collaboration with

Peter deLeon in The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism: A Reexamination, Santa

Monica, CA: RAND, N-2706, January 1988.
81. Followed by Israel, France, Great Britain, West Germany, the

Soviet Union, Turkey, Cuba, Spain, and Iran. Source: The RAND Chronology

of International Terrorism.

82. One can envision ethnic, nationalist, and irredentist

minorities turning to the United States for support and intervention

which, if not provided, could act as a catalyst for increased

anti-American terrorism designed to coerce the United States to

intervene on their behalf or to punish it for not intervening. Of

course, terrorism designed to protest or reverse U.S. intervention in

local conflicts (such as was the case in Lebanon during the 1980s) is

likely to continue as well.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William A. Stofft

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Colonel John W. Mountcastle

Director of Research

and

Conference Organizer

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Author

Dr. Bruce Hoffman

Editor

Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mr. Daniel B. Barnett

Conference Cover

Mr. Lawrence C. Miller

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler