DEPARTMENTWIDE PROGRAM EVALUATION

of the 

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 

TRANSPORTATION PROGRAMS

FINAL REPORT

MARCH 2000

Preface

On March 9, 1999, US Transportation Secretary Rodney E. Slater announced the 

formation of a multi-modal team to conduct a Departmentwide program evaluation 

to document and assess the effectiveness of the Department’s hazardous materials 

transportation safety programs. It was conducted as part of the Secretary's

ONE-DOT effort to help enhance the safety of the American people when

hazardous materials are being transported commercially. This report on the DOTwide Hazardous Materials Program Evaluation has been prepared in accordance 

with the schedule set out in Section IX, Program Evaluations, of the DOT 

Strategic Plan 1997-2002. 

The program evaluation found that the Department's hazardous materials program 

is working reasonably well, but it needs to be improved through Departmentwide 

strategic planning and program coordination, more focused delivery, and better 

data. A number of additional issues were also identified requiring further

assessment and analysis. DOT's senior leadership has already taken action to 

implement the recommendations contained in this report. They have agreed to 

establish an institutional capacity under the Associate Deputy Secretary and

Director, Office of Intermodalism, to act as a central focal point to administer and 

deliver a DOT-wide hazardous materials program that will provide for more

effective deployment of the Department's hazardous materials resources.

###

Table of Contents

Page

Executive Summary .................................................................................................... i

Chapter 1 – Introduction, Background, Objectives

Scope, and Methodology...................................................................... 1

Chapter 2 – Hazardous Materials Laws and Secretarial Delegations .................. 9

Chapter 3 – Hazardous Materials Shipments, Movements,

and Growth Forecast ...........................................................................13

Chapter 4 – Hazardous Materials Incidents..........................................................19

Chapter 5 – Program Delivery ................................................................................27

Chapter 6 – Program Delivery Analysis and 

Improvement Strategies......................................................................37

Chapter 7 – Data Analysis and Improvement Strategies.....................................51

Chapter 8 – Conclusions, Recommendations, and 

Senior Leadership Response ..............................................................61

Chapter 9 – Areas for Further Analysis.................................................................67

Appendix I Hazardous Materials Law

Appendix II Hazardous Materials – Related Secretarial 

Delegations to DOT Agencies

Appendix III Federal Register Notice Announcing Three Focus

Group Meetings

Appendix IV Methodology

Appendix V Data Sources Used by HMPE

Appendix VI Form DOT 5800.1 – Hazardous Materials Incident Report

Appendix VII Operating Administrations’ Hazardous Materials

Organizational Charts

Appendix VIII Description of Violation Categories Identified in Table 6

Appendix IX Calendar Year 1998 Agency Inspections

Appendix X Program Evaluation Sponsors and Team Members

Departmentwide Program Evaluation 

of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Programs

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the Departmentwide hazardous materials program evaluation

are: (1) to document current hazardous materials movements, Operating

Administrations'1 programs, and program delivery and (2) to assess the

effectiveness of the Department of Transportation's (DOT) overall hazardous

materials program as it affects each step in the hazardous materials transportation 

process, from packaging manufacturer to delivery to the end user; recommend 

improvements; and, identify areas for further study. The evaluation is intended to 

allow the Department to determine the effectiveness of the current hazardous

materials programs, including the effectiveness and efficiency of DOT’s allocation 

of its hazardous materials resources. 

RESULTS IN BRIEF

There are roughly 300 million hazardous materials shipments in the nation each 

year and the vast majority of these shipments arrive at their destinations safely. 2 

In 1998, there were 15,322 incidents, including 429 serious incidents; 13 deaths; 

and 198 injuries. Although this is a relatively good safety record, given the

number of shipments and movements, there remains the potential for catastrophic 

incidents in the transportation of hazardous materials where multiple fatalities, 

serious injuries, large-scale evacuations, and other costs to society could result. 

For example:

• Chemical oxygen generators on a commercial airliner ignited causing 

the crash of Valujet Flight 592 into the Florida Everglades in 1996 

killing 110 passengers and crew.

• Unleaded gasoline spilled during unloading of a cargo tank in Biloxi, 

Mississippi, in 1998 resulting in 5 hazardous materials fatalities, the 

evacuation of over 80 people, and the closure of an interstate highway.

 

1

 In this report, the term Operating Administrations refers to the United States Coast Guard, the Federal Aviation 

Administration, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, the Federal Railroad Administration, and the 

Research and Special Programs Administration. 

2

All data used in the report that provides a measure of the volume of hazardous materials in transportation such as 

shipments, movements, and tons, represent domestic quantities only.
ii

• Phosphoric acid being transported in intermodal freight containers on a 

barge were lost over the side or crushed in heavy seas in April 1998. 

Cleanup costs in the Morgan City, Louisiana, area totaled almost

$1 million. 

• A flatbed tractor-trailer hauling black powder in an intermodal freight 

container overturned on Interstate-95 in Springfield, Virginia, in June 

1999, inconveniencing 250,000 highway users and costing society

$25 million due to traffic delays even though there was no release of 

hazardous materials. 

• Over 16,250 gallons of chlorine were released when a freight train

derailed in Alberton, Montana, in April 1996 resulting in 1 fatality,

787 hospitalizations, 1,000 evacuations, and over $4.5 million in

cleanup costs.

Total tons of hazardous materials produced are forecast to grow by 2 percent per 

year. Growth in the amount of hazardous materials transported by air and

intermodally could be 4 times and 3 times faster, respectively, than the overall 

production growth. Therefore, the potential risk to the public may also increase 

unless effective safeguards are in place. The Department has responsibility for 

protecting the public from the inherent risks associated with transporting

hazardous materials. 

The Hazardous Materials Program Evaluation (HMPE) team found that DOT’s 

hazardous materials program works reasonably well but needs to be improved. 

The hazardous materials program lacks the Departmentwide strategic planning and 

direction necessary to ensure effective deployment of resources, and there are not 

reliable and sufficient data upon which to make informed program decisions. The 

program evaluation’s major findings were:

• DOT has not achieved a Departmentwide approach to implementing its 

hazardous materials programs. Overall, the program lacks sound

strategic planning and coordinated DOT-wide direction. No

institutional capacity exists in the Department for setting

Departmentwide policy and program objectives, or coordinating budget 

and resource strategies. In addition, DOT's Strategic Plan does not 

highlight the risks associated with hazardous materials, and the

importance of hazardous materials is not emphasized in four of the five 

Operating Administrations' individual safety programs.

• Shippers of hazardous materials generally receive less attention

DOT-wide than carriers, yet they offer the greatest opportunity to

improve safety. Shippers are a common element across the Operating 

Administrations, perform critical functions early in the transportation
iii

stream, and can impact safety system-wide. Currently, shippers account 

for roughly only 5 percent of all hazardous materials inspections

conducted by the Department, although some detailed shipper

inspections can take several hours to several days.3 Yet, analysis and 

public comment repeatedly identify the shipper, more often than the 

carrier, as the party most culpable for noncompliance with the

Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR). Shippers introduce

hazardous materials into the transportation stream and their actions can 

affect the ability of carriers to safely deliver a product. The team

recommends an institutional capacity to be responsible for planning and 

coordinating DOT-wide actions, including additional emphasis on

shippers. Such a DOT-wide effort would have a more synergistic effect 

and should result in more efficient and effective use of resources. 

• Human error continues to be the single greatest contributing factor in 

hazardous materials incidents and DOT has not been effective in

changing this trend. The training requirements in the HMR need to be 

improved to change industry safety practices and ensure that those

responsible for handling hazardous materials are adequately trained. 

• DOT should develop a coordinated Departmentwide outreach program

to increase the awareness of the traveling public. Passengers need to 

better understand the risks inherent in the transportation of hazardous 

materials they introduce into transportation. Passengers, often

unintentionally, carry hazardous materials aboard a plane, train, ship, or 

bus, either in carry-on baggage or as stowed luggage. Also, drivers of 

passenger vehicles need to better understand the risks associated with 

placarded hazardous materials vehicles and gain an appreciation of the 

widespread consequences that could occur as a result of unsafe driver 

practices.

• DOT’s lack of reliable data hampers program delivery decisions. DOT 

needs to have more reliable, accurate, and timely data to measure

program effectiveness and make informed program delivery and

resource decisions.

• The total amount of resources used by the Department to carry out the 

hazardous materials program is not easily identified. In fact, only one 

Operating Administration (the Research and Special Programs

Administration (RSPA)) has a budget line item for its hazardous

materials program. The budgets for the other Operating

 

3

 Chapter 6 of this report discusses the variance in time between shipper, carrier, and vehicle inspections.
iv

Administrations’ hazardous materials programs are less visible because 

they are combined in their overall safety programs. 

The HMPE team recommends the hazardous materials program be improved by: 

• Strengthening strategic planning and coordination by establishing an

institutional capacity in the Department to administer and deliver a

coordinated hazardous materials program with the authority to establish 

DOT-wide policy, program objectives, and priorities and focus budget 

and resource strategies. For example, if analysis of inspection and

incident data revealed that improper preparation of closure devices on 

plastic drums was becoming a problem, the recommended institutional 

capacity would be able to develop DOT-wide objectives and strategies 

to address the issue.

• Enhancing program delivery by identifying and focusing more on highrisk or problem shippers, more effectively using all available tools at 

DOT’s disposal, and identifying other critical points in the

transportation stream for program focus. For example, problem

shippers, such as those with many hazardous materials incidents, may 

be targeted for inspections, while infrequent hazardous materials

shippers may benefit more from outreach. 

• Using strike force inspections to cross-train inspectors as well as

enforce regulations. Strike force operations concentrate inspectors from 

the Operating Administrations and other Federal, state, and local

agencies at intermodal locations for a specific time period to conduct 

hazardous materials inspections of more than one mode of

transportation that use the targeted location. In addition to enforcing 

compliance, strike force operations can be used to train inspectors from 

one Operating Administration on the issues, problems, and regulatory 

requirements of another Operating Administration.

• Improving outreach aimed at the traveling public by better educating

passengers on what materials are hazardous and should not be carried 

aboard, or placed in stowed luggage on, planes, trains, and buses, and

better educating the driving public on the dangers associated with

hazardous materials carried over the nation’s highways.

• Strengthening the training regulations by tasking the institutional

capacity to work with RSPA, the other Operating Administrations, and 

industry to identify ways to ensure hazardous materials employees are 

adequately trained to carry out their jobs in a safe manner. 
v

• Enriching the quality of hazardous materials data by tasking the Bureau 

of Transportation Statistics to work with the Operating Administrations 

to determine data needs, collection strategies, and analytical techniques.

• Assign to the new institutional capacity the task of addressing several 

regulatory and programmatic issues identified by the team during the 

program evaluation, but which were too complex or time consuming for 

this program evaluation. These issues are described later in this

executive summary. 

BACKGROUND

Safety is Paramount

Types of hazardous materials range from relatively innocuous products, such as 

hair spray and perfumes, to bulk shipments of gasoline by highway cargo tanks 

and anhydrous ammonia by railroad tank cars. Annually in the United States,

there are at least 300 million hazardous materials shipments totaling

approximately 3.2 billion tons. In 1998, there were roughly 15,000 incidents 

related to hazardous materials shipments resulting in 13 deaths and 198 injuries.4 

This is a relatively good safety record given the amount of hazardous materials 

traffic. There remains, however, the potential for hazardous materials incidents 

with catastrophic consequences. In many respects, the hazardous materials

program is analogous to aviation safety programs because the devastating

consequences that a single mishap can produce are an unacceptable outcome. 

High risk, low probability events do not lend themselves to traditional cost-benefit 

analysis for deciding resource allocations. In these cases, DOT strives for zero 

tolerance and tries to organize its efforts and resources to achieve the goal as 

efficiently as possible. The public has the right to expect the government,

shippers, and carriers to make every reasonable effort to protect it against even the 

remote possibility of a hazardous material disaster. 

From 1993 through 1998, the annual number of hazardous materials incidents 

reported to DOT averaged 14,488 with relatively little variation in the number 

each year. During the same period, serious incidents averaged about 418 and

ranged from 357 in 1993 to a high of 464 in 1996. RSPA defines a serious 

incident as one involving: a fatality or major injury due to a hazardous material; 

closure of a major transportation artery or facility or evacuation of six or more 

persons due to the presence of a hazardous material; or a vehicle accident or 

 

4

 As of February 2000, 1999 data were not available.
vi

derailment resulting in the release of a hazardous material.5 DOT's Performance 

Plan sets a goal of 411 or fewer serious incidents for the year 2000. Table 1 shows 

the number of, and consequences resulting from, serious incidents for 1990

through 1998.

Table 1

Serious Hazardous Material Incident History From 1990 Through 1998

Year

Total 

Reported 

Incidents

Number of 

Serious 

Incidents

Number of 

Fatalities

Number of 

Injuries

Number of 

Persons 

Evacuated

Amount of 

Property 

Damage

1990 8,879 402 8 423 12,123 $32,353,276

1991 9,110 403 10 439 10,502 $38,350,611

1992 9,310 375 15 600 29,186 $35,164,057

1993 12,830 357 15 627 18,237 $22,801,551

1994 16,087 429 11 577 18,398 $44,185,413

1995 14,743 409 7 400 11,444 $30,903,281

1996 13,950 464 12011,175219,556 $46,849,243

1997 13,994 417 12 225 24,587 $33,393,504

1998 15,322 429 13 198 9,181 $45,497,550

Total 114,225 3,685 211 4,6643153,214 $329,498,486

Source: RSPA, Biennial Reports on Hazardous Materials Transportation, and RSPA Hazardous Materials Information 

System (HMIS) incident database as of October 21, 1999.

1. 110 deaths were the result of the ValuJet incident in 1996. 

2. A single rail incident in Montana involving chlorine resulted in injuries to 787 people. 

3. In summarizing serious incident injuries for the biennial report, RSPA combines hospitalization (serious) injuries with 

minor injuries. 

Figure 1 shows the trend in serious incidents from 1990 through 1998.

Figure 1

Serious Incidents 1990-1998

Source: RSPA Biennial Report on Hazardous Materials Transportation and HMIS

data as of October 21, 1999.

 

5

 To meet the definition of serious, the persons evacuated are to be part of “the general public” and not transportation 

employees. 

0

100

200

300

400

500

199019911992199319941995199619971998

YEAR

SERIOUS INCIDENTS
vii

DOT Safety Issues

In the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of 1974, Congress stated its

intention to improve the regulatory and enforcement authority of the Secretary of 

Transportation to protect the nation against the risks to life and property, which are 

inherent in the transportation of hazardous materials in commerce.6 The Act 

allowed the Secretary to draw together previously fragmented regulatory and

enforcement authority and provided the flexibility to organize the hazardous

materials programs within DOT. The Secretary delegated authority and

responsibility to the Operating Administrations to establish their respective

programs, but created no organization with authority to coordinate and oversee a 

DOT-wide hazardous materials program. 

HMPE Established by Strategic Plan

In the Department of Transportation’s Strategic Plan for 1997-2002, DOT stated 

that it would undertake a multi-modal hazardous materials program evaluation in 

FY 1999. The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993

requires Federal departments to prepare Strategic Plans to bring about a

fundamental transformation in the way government programs and operations are 

managed and administered. One of GPRA's purposes is to improve Federal

program effectiveness and public accountability by promoting a new focus on

results, service quality, and customer satisfaction.

On March 9, 1999, the Secretary announced the formation of a Hazardous

Materials Program Evaluation (HMPE) team to conduct a DOT-wide hazardous 

materials program evaluation. The HMPE team included at least one member 

from the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard), the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) 

(formerly a part of the Motor Carrier and Highway Safety core business unit 

within the Federal Highway Administration), the Federal Railroad Administration 

(FRA), the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), and the Office 

of Inspector General. A number of prior reviews of the hazardous materials

program have been conducted by an internal DOT task force, the U.S. General 

Accounting Office, and the Transportation Research Board. 

The HMPE team concentrated its efforts on cross-modal hazardous materials. 

Cross-modal hazardous materials activities are covered by Title 49 Code of

Federal Regulations (CFR) related to rulemaking and hazardous materials program 

procedures, and the HMR, 49 CFR Parts 171-180, which govern the packaging 

and safe transport of hazardous materials by air, highway, rail, and water. 

Cross-modal movements increase the risk of an incident occurring because these 

 

6

 Public Law 93-633
viii

movements involve multiple handlings (loadings and unloadings) by

transportation providers, and the majority of hazardous materials incidents are

attributed to human error. Figure 2 depicts the numerous movements and

handlings that can occur in only one shipment of hazardous materials.

Figure 2

Depiction of Air Shipment Requiring Multiple Movements

The program evaluation did not include single-mode movements of hazardous 

materials that are not governed by the HMR, specifically, bulk shipments by water 

(involving only the Coast Guard) and pipeline shipments (involving only RSPA). 

The HMPE team reviewed hazardous materials legislation and regulations;

analyzed mission and function statements; reviewed prior internal and external

reports; and interviewed hazardous materials managers and field personnel. In

addition, the HMPE team analyzed responses to questions published in a Federal 

Register Notice (FR Doc. 99-17175) and results of focus group meetings;

reviewed the Department’s and Operating Administrations’ Strategic and 

Performance plans; analyzed work plans, budgets, resources, and incident data;

and participated in field inspections and enforcement activities.

The HMPE team used data from 1990 to 1998 to identify trends. To determine 

current conditions, the HMPE team used 1998 data to the maximum extent

possible. However, when 1998 data were unavailable, the HMPE team used the 

most recent official data. October 21, 1999 is the latest data that was used by the 

Air or Other Express

Delivery Shipment

1 Shipment: 6 Movements: 10 Handlings

Delivery

Pick-up

Consolidation

Consolidation

To Airport

From Airport

Airport Sorting

Center

Air

Air

NOTE: As movements increase, the risk of an incident occurring

also increases.

Consignee

Shipper / Manufacturer

Initiate the

Transportation 

Cycle

Cycle 

Complete
ix

HMPE team from RSPA’s various databases. During February, the Operating

Administrations with hazardous materials responsibilities and selected Secretarial 

Officers reviewed drafts of the report together with the executive summary and 

provided the HMPE team with their technical and substantive comments which

were incorporated in the final report. The HMPE team met, at the direction of the 

Deputy Secretary, with senior Operating Administration and Secretarial office

officials to decide on the attributes and placement of the institutional capacity.

FINDINGS 

DOT's Hazardous Materials Programs Lack DOT-wide

Coordination, Direction, and Strategic Planning

DOT is responsible for ensuring the safe transport of hazardous materials by

setting standards, inspecting carriers, shippers, and packaging manufacturers, and 

providing planning and training grants to those responding to hazardous materials 

incidents. The Secretary has delegated his regulatory authority to RSPA and his 

enforcement authority to FAA, FMCSA, FRA, RSPA, and the Coast Guard. The 

HMPE team found the Department's current hazardous materials program could be 

improved in the areas of program management and program delivery. 

Specifically, the team found:

• No institutional capacity exists in DOT that is responsible for

establishing Departmentwide policy and program objectives, and

overseeing budget and resource strategies. Without Departmentwide

direction and oversight, DOT is unlikely to deploy its resources as

effectively as it could. For example, more benefit might be achieved 

from a coordinated outreach and education program designed for

infrequent shippers (most of which are multi-modal shippers) with the 

resource support of all of the Operating Administrations than could be 

accomplished through the uncoordinated efforts of the individual

Operating Administrations.

• Hazardous materials programs are not emphasized in the Strategic Plan. 

DOT's Strategic Goal for Safety does not describe how the Department's 

hazardous materials program will contribute to achieving DOT's safety 

goal, nor does it include any hazardous materials performance measures 

or candidate indicators. Except for RSPA, the lack of emphasis on

hazardous materials in the strategic plan lessens the importance of

hazardous materials in the Operating Administrations’ overall safety

programs. 

Earlier studies reached the same conclusion about the need for better planning and 

direction: 
x

In a September 1978 report the Secretary and Deputy Secretary agreed to a 

recommendation made by a Departmentwide team to establish a standing

committee to provide a Departmental focal point for carrying out all

hazardous materials programs.7 

A 1981 NTSB report on hazardous materials incidents caused by trucks

found that RSPA had been unsuccessful in coordinating the Operating

Administrations’ hazardous material programs because RSPA was unable to 

exert influence over the larger Operating Administrations.8 The NTSB report 

found a need for clear and strong direction from the Secretary. 

Yet, almost 20 years later, the HMPE team found that the hazardous materials 

programs still lack such direction. Each Operating Administration develops

hazardous materials programs, priorities, strategies, and objectives independently 

of the other Operating Administrations and without DOT-wide coordination.

DOT's Hazardous Materials Program 

Delivery Could Be Improved

The HMPE team uses the term hazardous materials “program delivery” to

designate the entire suite of activities undertaken by the Operating Administrations 

to increase compliance with the provisions of the HMR. Activities encompassed 

by program delivery include standards development, inspections, comprehensive 

assessments, compliance reviews, investigations, enforcement actions, civil

penalties, training, and outreach.

Funding for the five Operating Administrations’ hazardous materials programs

supports five distinct enforcement and outreach programs resulting in an overall 

concentration on carriers. The five programs employ the equivalent of 256

hazardous materials field inspectors who are responsible for hundreds of

thousands of shippers and carriers. In 1998, these inspectors conducted about 

115,000 inspections, including 614 inspections of manufacturers of highway cargo 

tanks, rail tank cars, cylinders, fiberboard boxes, and drums; 5,228 shipper

inspections; 19,299 carrier inspections; and, 89,633 railcar inspections.9 Table 2 

shows the number of inspections performed at each location where inspectors 

intervene in the transportation stream.

 

7

 U.S. Department of Transportation, Deputy Secretary’s Report of the Hazardous Materials Task Force, September 1978.

8

 NTSB Safety Effectiveness Evaluation, Federal and State Enforcement Efforts in Hazardous Materials Transportation by 

Truck, NTSB-SEE-81-2, February 1981.

9

 Not included are 133,000 roadside inspections of commercial motor vehicles carrying hazardous materials conducted 

by the states under FMCSA's grant program. 
xi

Table 2

Number of Inspections by Point of Intervention – 1998

Point of Intervention

Agency Packaging/ 

Manufacturing Shipper Carrier/ Forwarder

Vehicles/ 

Railcars Total

FAA N/A 20813,349 N/A 3,557

FMCSA 20 147 1,927 133,6742135,768

FRA 134 3,617 5,124 89,633 98,508

RSPA 46031,2564 N/A N/A 1,716

Coast Guard N/A 0 8,89950 8,899

Total 614 5,228 19,299 223,307 248,448

1. Reflects only Repair Station Assessments conducted for 1998. The FAA did conduct hazardous material 

shipper inspections in 1998; however, this activity was not tracked. 

2. Vehicle inspections performed by state resources under the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program.

3. Includes container manufacturers and cylinder retesters/reconditioners.

4. Includes shippers and shipper observations, freight terminals/docks, and exemption and approval holders.

5. Includes both vessels examined and intermodal freight containers inspected.

N/A means not applicable to the agency.

Source: Operating Administrations’ Inspection Databases

The ONE-DOT HMPE team found program delivery could be improved by

placing additional emphasis on (1) shipper inspections and outreach, (2) outreach 

programs for the traveling public, and (3) training for the hazardous materials 

community.

• More emphasis should be placed on shippers. Shippers introduce 

hazardous materials into the transportation stream and are responsible 

for correctly classifying the hazardous material. All subsequent

compliance hinges upon proper classification. If a hazardous material is 

incorrectly classified, it cannot be packaged or labeled properly. 

Consequently, carriers and emergency response personnel will not be 

aware of the hazardous properties of the material. Focusing more on 

shippers helps ensure safe packaging and correct communication of the 

dangers of the hazardous material before it enters the transportation 

stream. The HMPE team found that 40 percent of violations discovered 

during carrier inspections can be traced to shippers and some unknown 

portion of another 37 percent could be shipper violations, but available 

information did not allow a further refinement. DOT should devote 

more effort toward identifying problem or high-risk shippers and

directing more outreach and inspections to those shippers to reduce the 

number of noncompliant shipments being offered to carriers.

The result of the HMPE team's analysis that shippers are more often at 

fault parallels the results of a 1993 report by the TRB.10 TRB reported 

 

10 Transportation Research Board, National Research Council, Hazardous Materials Shipment Information for 

Emergency Response, Special Report 239, 1993.
xii

that emergency responders expressed concern about the frequency of 

missing or incorrect placards and shipping papers (shipper

responsibilities) at hazardous materials incidents.11 Using Federal

Highway Administration (FHWA) data reflecting 1992, TRB reported

that during roadside inspections, violations of federal requirements for 

placarding occur in about 30 percent of the trucks inspected, and

violations of shipping paper requirements occur in about 25 percent. 

FHWA fiscal year 1998 data are slightly worse with improper

placarding found on 32 percent of the hazardous materials vehicles

inspected and violations of shipping papers found during 26 percent of 

inspections. A 1989 General Accounting Office report on FRA

estimated that 75 percent of all hazardous materials releases could be 

traced to safety problems at shipper facilities.12

The HMPE team's review of FAA data for the past 3 years showed that 

88 percent (139 of 158) of FAA's significant penalty assessments,

defined as $50,000 or more, were against shippers. These assessments 

were incident-driven: the cases were developed from inspections or

investigations of shippers performed as a result of hazardous materials 

incidents reported by carriers. FAA found that these shippers were 

offering hazardous materials for transportation when they were not

packaged, labeled, marked, classed, or in condition for shipment in

conformance with the HMR. FAA also found that certain shippers were 

not ensuring that their employees were trained to properly package and 

handle hazardous materials. For example, in November 1999, FAA

assessed a significant penalty against a shipper who offered for air

transportation 525 cigarette lighters containing flammable gas. The

lighters were in a fiberboard box and were not properly packaged,

labeled, or marked. While a significant monetary assessment is

indicative of its seriousness, additional emphasis via outreach and

training, as well as inspections, could make a major contribution toward 

shipper compliance and transportation safety. The modal Operating

Administrations currently focus on shippers in reaction to a violation. 

They should instead be more proactive and focus additional resources 

on high-risk or problem shippers.

• Educating the traveling public. The traveling public is largely unaware 

of the dangers of the hazardous materials they enter into the

transportation system or actions they take on the nation’s highways that 

 

11 Although placarding is a joint shipper/carrier responsibility, in the highway mode the shipper is required to provide 

the necessary placards (49 CFR 172.506).

12 U.S. General Accounting Office, DOT Should Better Manage Its Hazardous Materials Inspection Program, 

GAO/RCED 90-43, November 1989.
xiii

could affect safety. Except in the air mode, there are no requirements to 

warn the traveling public of the restrictions in the HMR on carrying

hazardous materials in transportation. Recent outreach efforts, such as 

the distribution of a brochure titled “These Fly...These May Not,” have 

reached only a small percentage of the traveling public. Every day

millions of travelers board planes, trains, ships, and buses unaware of 

the dangers of hazardous materials they may be carrying. Another area

requiring improvement involves passenger vehicle driver awareness. 

The majority of hazardous materials fatalities are the result of highway 

incidents. These fatalities are primarily related to accidents involving 

passenger vehicles and motor carriers hauling flammable liquids such as 

gasoline, and the fatalities are often non-truck occupants. The single 

largest “driver” reason for truck crashes is a failure of the driver of a 

passenger vehicle to yield. Drivers of passenger vehicles need to be 

made aware of the severe consequences that could occur as a result of 

their unsafe driving practices - the crash of a vehicle hauling hazardous 

materials. 

The HMPE team also found that current notification rules warning the 

airline traveling public of the dangers associated with transporting

hazardous materials are ineffective. The requirement to notify airline 

passengers may be satisfied by posting a sign at ticket counters and

boarding areas. The sign must be legible and prominently displayed. 

HMPE team members usually had difficulty locating these required

notices in airports, and often had difficulty reading them because they 

were mounted at knee level, in baggage scale areas, or had baggage 

blocking them. 

• Human error is a major contributor to hazardous materials incidents. 

Human error continues to be the single greatest contributing factor in 

hazardous materials incidents and DOT has not been effective in

changing this trend. RSPA data show that roughly 80 percent of

hazardous materials incidents are attributable to human error. RSPA,

with input from the other Operating Administrations and industry,

should identify training improvements for hazardous materials

employees and areas of the HMR training requirements needing

improvement. For example, there is a requirement that hazardous

materials employees be trained and tested for general hazardous

materials awareness and job-specific safety requirements. However,

there is no requirement that they be trained in order to demonstrate a 

minimum level of knowledge. Figure 3 depicts the modal breakdown 

by cause for 1998 hazardous materials incidents.
xiv

Figure 3

Incident Cause by Mode – 1998

0

20

40

60

80

100

Air

Highway

Rail

Water

Percent

Human Error

Package Failure

Vehicular

Accident/Derailment

Other

Source: Source: RSPA HMIS incident database as of October 21, 1999.

Lack of Reliabl e Data Hampers 

Program Delivery Decisions

The Department is hampered by inadequate information with which to measure 

program effectiveness and make informed program delivery and resource

decisions. DOT lacks reliable information on the amount and types of hazardous 

materials being shipped and parties who ship and carry hazardous materials. 

Furthermore, the Department does not receive reports on all hazardous materials 

incidents, and the reports the Department does receive are often incomplete and 

inaccurate.

• DOT does not have comprehensive information on hazardous materials 

manufacturers, carriers, freight forwarders, and shippers. For example, 

RSPA established a Unified Shippers Enforcement Data System

(UNISHIP) database for the Operating Administrations to record and

track shippers who have violated the HMR. This information would be 

helpful in identifying repeat offenders for inspection and in establishing 

the amount of a subsequent penalty. However, the Operating

Administrations do not update the database with enforcement results 

frequently enough to make it useful to inspectors. An additional

example is RSPA's registration database that only contains information 
xv

on one segment of the hazardous materials industry -- those shippers 

that ship or offer for shipment very dangerous or very large quantities of 

hazardous materials. 

The information reported on DOT's reporting form for hazardous

materials incidents, Form 5800.1, is often inaccurate and/or incomplete 

and, therefore, subject to misinterpretation during analysis. For

example, the HMPE team analyzed the incident reports for 1996 to 

determine if our assessments of incident causes would match those of 

RSPA’s contractor personnel.13 

The HMPE team's results were markedly different than RSPA's. RSPA 

reported that package failure was the cause of 15.4 percent of all

incidents versus the HMPE team's analysis of incident report data that 

determined a rate of 34.6 percent. The HMPE team also found three 

serious incidents that were not included in RSPA’s database. Table 3 

compares RSPA’s causal data with the HMPE team’s analysis.

Table 3

Distribution of Incident Causes

Cause

RSPA

Determined Cause

(percent of total)

Program Evaluation Team 

Determined Cause

(percent of total)

Human Error 80.7 61.0

Package Failure 15.4 34.6

Vehicle Accident/Derailment 2.4 2.6

Other 1.5 1.8

Total 100 100

Source: RSPA, Biennial Reports on Hazardous Materials Transportation, and RSPA HMIS incident 

remarks subsystem report for 1996.

In a 1981 report, GAO stated that, historically, the Department of

Transportation did not have the critical information necessary to manage 

its hazardous materials program.14 The HMPE team found this problem 

still exists almost 20 years later. Furthermore, no single entity within 

the Department has overall responsibility to develop and execute a

data/information plan or analyze the data for use in directing the

Department's hazardous materials program.

The Department is hampered by the lack of reliable, accurate, and

timely information on which to evaluate program effectiveness and base 

 

13 1996 was selected because it is DOT's baseline year for the hazardous materials performance goal.

14 U.S. General Accounting Office, Programs For Ensuring The Safe Transportation of Hazardous Materials Need 

Improvement, GAO/RCED-81-5, November 1980.
xvi

program delivery decisions. A more complete and accurate collection 

and analysis of data would permit the Department to effectively

measure its overall effectiveness, issue and implement proactive safety 

regulations, develop risk management methodologies, and make

effective resource deployment decisions.

• The amount of DOT resources (both staffing and budget) actually used 

to carry out the hazardous materials program is not readily known by 

the Department. Only one Operating Administration has a separate

budget line item for hazardous materials, and the HMPE team had

difficulty determining resources applied to the hazardous materials

program DOT-wide. 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Strategic Planning and Program Direction

The HMPE team has concluded that the Department has not taken a DOT-wide 

approach in administering the hazardous materials program. The Department

lacks strategic planning and a coordinated DOT-wide program direction for

hazardous materials. As a result, the Department is unlikely to improve and,

because of forecasted growth, may not maintain the existing level of safety in

hazardous materials transportation. To achieve a ONE-DOT approach to

hazardous materials safety, the Department should:

• Establish an institutional capacity, complementary to the Operating

Administrations at the Departmentwide level, to facilitate program

coordination and direction to provide for more effective deployment of 

DOT’s hazardous materials resources. The institutional capacity would 

administer and deliver a Departmentwide hazardous materials program 

to strengthen strategic planning, program coordination, and program

delivery. It would have the authority to establish DOT-wide policy,

program objectives and priorities, and focus budget and resource

strategies. A Departmentwide hazardous materials program can best be 

instituted by delegating authority to a new or existing entity to be

responsible for the program. Essential attributes of the new institutional 

entity should be to:

• serve as the principal adviser to the Secretary on all intermodal

hazardous materials matters;

• act as the focal point for review of hazardous materials policies,

priorities, and objectives;
xvii

• provide oversight for planning and budgeting strategies for

hazardous materials programs DOT-wide;

• resolve disputes among Operating Administrations on hazardous

materials issues; 

• provide external reviews and continual monitoring of DOT’s

hazardous materials programs; and 

• coordinate DOT-wide hazardous materials outreach and data

activities.

The new institutional capacity also should be tasked with addressing

several regulatory and programmatic issues identified by the team during 

the program evaluation, but which were too complex or time consuming 

for this program evaluation. These issues are described later in this 

executive summary. 

Program Delivery

The Department needs to refocus its efforts to improve its impact on hazardous 

materials safety. Shippers of hazardous materials and the traveling public should 

receive more attention by DOT to improve safety earlier in the transportation

stream. We recommend that the Secretary take the following actions to improve 

program delivery:

• Develop strategies and actions to identify and focus more on high-risk 

or problem shippers through development of better data, more outreach 

activities, and inspections.

• Develop a method to improve the use of strike force inspections to 

cross-train inspectors as well as enforce regulations.

• Develop a coordinated, Departmentwide outreach program that is

well-designed, visible, and directed toward the traveling public. 

• Develop strategies and actions to increase the effectiveness of activities 

targeted at the human factor contribution to incidents. The institutional

capacity should plan and ensure implementation of a coordinated plan 

of action, including outreach, inspections, and strengthening training

standards to improve industry safety practices.

Sufficient and Reliable Data

The Department is hampered by the lack of reliable, timely, and accurate

information with which to evaluate program effectiveness and base program
xviii

delivery decisions. As a result, the Department is unable to gauge its effectiveness 

or accurately assess its impact on achieving hazardous materials safety or better 

develop risk-based regulations. To improve the quality and quantity of hazardous 

materials data, the HMPE team recommends that the Secretary:

• Task the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, supported by the Operating 

Administrations, to review and analyze all existing databases containing 

hazardous materials information to make the data more useful in

supporting a DOT-wide hazardous materials program. The project

would also identify additional hazardous materials program data needs, 

including better information on incident causes, and establish and

implement a plan to acquire the needed data.

• Require the modal Operating Administrations to identify in their

budgets the funding and staffing levels being used to carry out their 

hazardous materials programs.

ADDITIONAL HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED

During the program evaluation, the team identified a number of issues that should 

be addressed by the Department, but which were too complex and time-consuming 

for this program evaluation. However, the HMPE team believes that DOT needs 

to resolve these issues for DOT to operate an effective, vigilant, and visible

ONE-DOT hazardous materials program. The Department should task the new

institutional capacity with addressing the following issues: 

• Gain a better understanding of the nature of shipper and carrier practices

related to undeclared hazardous materials shipments to determine whether

additional Departmental efforts or resources are needed. 

• Continue to clarify and improve the effectiveness of the hazardous materials 

regulations. During focus group meetings, several attendees commented on the 

difficulty for individuals or small businesses to use the regulations correctly. 

• Review the adequacy of the Performance Oriented Packaging regulations. 

Comments made at the focus group meetings and the HMPE team's analysis of 

incident reports show a much higher percentage of incidents related to package 

failure than is currently identified by DOT.

• Continue to increase DOT’s cooperation with the United States Postal Service 

to identify any potential safety gaps as they relate to hazardous material

shipments in the United States mail system. 

• Continue DOT’s efforts to reauthorize its hazardous materials safety program, 

including expanding inspection authority to open packages suspected to be
xix

non-compliant or containing hidden shipments of hazardous materials as has 

been proposed in the Hazardous Materials Reauthorization Act as well as in the 

ongoing rulemaking. Until DOT inspectors are aided by material changes in 

inspection and enforcement authority, the Department should identify ways to 

better use and improve upon its current inspection and enforcement strategies.

• Identify a measure for the performance plan that more fully reflects activities 

and outcomes over which the HMR have influence, rather than the current 

“serious incidents” measure. A proper performance measure would allow the 

Department to accurately assess the success of the hazardous materials

program.

DOT's SENIOR LEADERSHIP RESPONSE

The program evaluation found that DOT's hazardous materials programs works

reasonably well but needs to be improved through DOT-wide strategic planning 

and program coordination, more focused delivery, and better data.

To address the recommendations contained in the report, DOT's Deputy Secretary 

met with the HMPE Sponsors (the Assistant Secretary for Budget and

Programs/Chief Financial Officer, the Inspector General, and the Administrator, 

Research and Special Programs Administration) and the HMPE team on

December 14, 1999, to provide input and direction. The Deputy Secretary asked 

for two subsequent meetings with the HMPE Sponsors, the HMPE team, and

DOT's Senior Leadership Team (comprised of DOT's Secretarial Officers and

Heads of Operating Administrations) on January 13, and March 16, 2000. During 

February, the Heads of Operating Administrations with hazardous materials

responsibilities and selected Secretarial Officers reviewed drafts of the report and 

provided the HMPE team with their technical and substantive comments which

were incorporated in the report.

On January 13th, the HMPE team briefed the Senior Leadership Team on each of 

the recommendations contained in the report. At this meeting, the Deputy

Secretary asked the HMPE team to meet with senior policy representatives from 

each of the affected Operating Administrations to develop an implementation

strategy to establish the recommended institutional capacity to coordinate

hazardous materials programs in the Department. The HMPE team and the policy 

representatives met on February 4 and 7, 2000, to discuss various organizational 

locations and structures for the institutional capacity.

On March 16th, the HMPE team met with the Senior Leadership Team to report 

on a proposal to implement an institutional capacity developed by the combined 

HMPE and policy team on February 4th and 7th. A unanimous decision was 

reached by the Senior Leadership Team to place this capacity in the Office of 
xx

Intermodalism under the Associate Deputy Secretary. It was also agreed during 

this meeting that DOT should begin drafting Secretarial delegations to place the 

additional necessary responsibilities and authorities under the Associate Deputy

Secretary. On March 16th, the HMPE Sponsors tasked RSPA's Office of the 

Chief Counsel to work with the Department's Assistant General Counsel for

Regulation and Enforcement to start drafting appropriate delegations. The draft 

delegations are expected to be completed shortly and coordinated within DOT. 

Once the institutional capacity is in place and staffed, its first task will be to 

oversee implementation all of the recommendations in the report related to

coordination, program delivery, and data and oversee the areas identified for

further analysis. DOT's Senior Leadership Team also supported the

recommendation that the Operating Administrations and the Bureau of

Transportation Statistics work together to improve specific program delivery and 

data issues following issuance of the report. 
1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND, OBJECTIVES, 

SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

Documenting DOT’s hazardous materials program, as it was intended and as it 

actually functions, was a primary objective for the HMPE team. The law,

regulations, and Secretarial delegations taken together describe the intended

hazardous materials program. A description of the hazardous materials

transportation law and applicable provisions is set forth in Appendix I. Secretarial 

delegations and regulations flowing from the authority established in the law are 

described in Appendix II.

INTRODUCTION

Department of Transportation (DOT) is responsible for ensuring the safety of the 

public from the inherent risks associated with transporting hazardous materials. 

DOT currently lists approximately 3,000 shipping descriptions for various

hazardous materials such as poisons, chemicals, pesticides, radioactive materials, 

explosives, oil, and gasoline. These materials, if accidentally released, can pose 

risks to public health and safety, property, and the environment. For example, a 

train derailment in 1996 in Alberton, Montana, spilled several thousand gallons of 

chlorine, and resulted in 1 death, 787 hospitalizations, evacuation of over 1,000 

people, and over $4.5 million in cleanup costs. 

Annually, there are at least 300 million domestic shipments of hazardous materials 

in the United States.1 Ninety-four percent of hazardous materials shipments are 

moved by truck; 5 percent by air; and less than 1 percent by rail, water, and

pipeline.2 (See Chapter 3 for a detailed description of shipments and movements.) 

Over 3.2 billion tons of hazardous materials are shipped annually in domestic

commerce. 

The majority of hazardous materials are transported safely in the United States. 

Although a large volume of hazardous materials moves in bulk either by water or 

by pipeline, most instances of hazardous materials releases occur in non-bulk 

movements by truck, rail, or air transport. The highway, air, and rail modes

 

1

 RSPA study on Hazardous Materials Shipments prepared by the Office of Hazardous Materials Safety, October 1998. 

The accuracy of these figures and all other numbers describing hazardous materials activities is uncertain. However, 

this is the only source of shipment and movement information available.

2

The team uses shipments as the relative measure rather than tons or ton-miles because it is shipments that are 

proportional to handling, and risk of an incident increases during the act of loading or unloading. 
2

accounted for approximately 84 percent, 9 percent, and 7 percent, respectively, of 

hazardous materials incidents in 1998. Water transport accounted for less than 

1 percent of the incidents. 

In 1998, 15,322 hazardous materials incidents were reported to the Department. 

RSPA considered 429 of these serious because the incident resulted in a fatality or 

major injury due to a hazardous material; closure of a major transportation artery 

or facility or evacuation of six or more persons for due to the presence of a

hazardous material; or a vehicle accident or derailment resulting in the release of a 

hazardous material.3 During 1998, there were 13 fatalities, 198 injuries (including 

22 that required hospitalization), and $45 million in property damage reported to 

RSPA. 

The probability of a serious hazardous materials incident occurring is low, but 

potential consequences can be catastrophic. The 1996 crash of Valujet Flight 592 

into the Florida Everglades killing all 110 persons aboard is an example of a

hazardous materials incident with catastrophic results. According to DOT’s

reports, 10 other deaths in 1996 resulted from hazardous materials transportation 

incidents.

Property damage figures maintained by DOT, however, understate the full cost of 

hazardous materials incidents. The costs associated with evacuations, closures of 

transportation arteries, emergency responses, or societal costs, such as lost lives; 

injuries; and delays to the traveling public, are usually not reported to RSPA. 

These costs could be substantial but are very difficult to determine. For example, 

on June 2, 1999, a flatbed tractor-trailer hauling black powder in an intermodal 

freight container overturned on Interstate-95 in Springfield, Virginia. Although 

the black powder packaging complied with Federal regulations, and no explosion 

or release of the hazardous material occurred, the incident closed the highway for 

10 hours and, according to FHWA, affected an estimated 250,000 highway users. 

The FHWA estimated the value of time lost to the traveling public at $25 million.

BACKGROUND

Pre-Department of Transportation

As early as 1852, the Steamboat Inspection Service regulated the transportation of 

“dangerous articles,” such as explosives and acids. In 1866, the first Federal law 

was passed to regulate the transportation of hazardous materials, specifically

shipments of explosives and flammable materials such as nitroglycerin. An 1871 

statute established criminal sanctions against persons who transported specific

 

3

 See Chapter 4 for more information on hazardous materials releases/incidents.
3

hazardous commodities on passenger vessels in United States navigable waters in 

violation of the Treasury Department regulations. In 1887, Congress gave the 

Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) authority to regulate commercial

transportation by the railroads.4 

In 1908, Congress passed the Explosives and Other Dangerous Articles Act, which 

formed the basis for the laws governing hazardous material transportation for

more than six decades5. It authorized the ICC to issue regulations covering the 

packing, marking, loading, and handling of explosives and other dangerous 

substances in transit and prescribed criminal penalties for shippers or carriers who 

violated ICC regulations. In addition, several states further regulated hazardous 

materials in commerce and formulated their own regulations which, in many

cases, extended to interstate carriers passing through those states.

From 1908 to 1967, Congress expanded the ICC’s regulatory authority over

hazardous materials as rules originally designed for the railroads were applied to 

other modes of transport. The ICC developed its hazardous materials regulations 

through issuing orders and special permits.

Regulatory authority over highway transportation was given to the ICC in 1935 by 

the Motor Carrier Act.6 The Coast Guard, under the Department of the Treasury, 

was required to adopt ICC regulations for classification of hazardous materials and 

for marking, labeling, and certifying portable containers by water in 1940 by the 

Transportation Act of 1940.7 The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), in conjunction 

with safety officials of the Department of Commerce, developed the first

regulations for transportation of hazardous materials by air carriers in the early 

1940s.

Post-Department of Transportation

In 1966, Congress transferred the authority to regulate the transportation of

hazardous materials from the ICC, the Department of the Treasury, and CAB to a 

new Federal agency, DOT. Within DOT, separate modal administrations were 

established and given responsibility for individually developing and enforcing

hazardous materials transportation standards, and data collection and storage

standards for their respective mode of transportation.

 

4

 24 Stat. 379, 1887.

5

 35 Stat. 554, 1908.

6

49 Stat. 543, 1935.

7

 54 Stat. 898, 1940.
4

Persistent administrative and organizational difficulties in the early 1970s led

DOT to seek legislation to consolidate hazardous materials regulatory authority. 

However, little happened until a 1973 crash of a 707-cargo jet hauling several 

barrels of nitric acid. The National Transportation Safety Board accident

investigation revealed a general lack of compliance with existing requirements, the 

overall complexity of the regulations, lack of industry familiarity at the working 

level with Federal regulations, and lack of sufficient government oversight. 

In response to this incident, on January 3, 1975, the Hazardous Materials

Transportation Act of 1974 (HMTA) was signed into law.8 The HMTA

authorized the Secretary of Transportation to draw together previously fragmented 

regulatory and enforcement authorities governing the movement of hazardous

materials in commerce into one consolidated and coordinated body of law. 

The Secretary of Transportation subsequently delegated regulatory responsibility 

for hazardous materials to the RSPA. Enforcement authority remained the

responsibility of the United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard), the Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA), the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA),

the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), and RSPA. 

In 1990, Congress amended and strengthened the HMTA by enacting the

Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act.9 This law required DOT 

to issue safety regulations for the transportation of hazardous materials in foreign, 

interstate, and intrastate commerce. It also raised the maximum civil penalty for 

violations of any regulation issued under the HMTA from $10,000 to $25,000, and 

for the first time required a $250 minimum penalty for any violation. Currently, 

the maximum civil penalty is $27,500 as a result of the Federal Civil Penalties 

Inflation Act of 1990.10

The HMTA was codified in 1994 in Title 49 United States Code (49 U.S.C.) and is 

now referred to as the Federal hazardous material transportation law (HMTL).11 

Appropriate sections of the HMTL are in Appendix I. The HMTL is the current 

statute regulating hazardous materials transportation in the United States. While 

the HMTL provides the primary multi-modal authority for DOT’s hazardous

materials program, other relevant statutes are mode-specific.12 

 

8

 Public Law 93-633.

9

 Public Law 101-615.

10 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2461, as amended by the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-134).

11 Title 49 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq.

12

 Among these are: 49 U.S.C. § 20101 et seq., formerly the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970; 49 U.S.C. § 40101 et 

seq., formerly the Federal Aviation Act of 1958; 49 U.S.C. § 31101 et seq., formerly the Motor Carrier Safety Act; and 

marine transportation laws, 33 U.S.C. § 1221 et seq. (the Ports and Waterways Safety Act) and 46 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq. 
5

Effective October 9, 1999, the Secretary of Transportation rescinded the FHWA 

Administrator’s authority to perform motor carrier safety functions and operations. 

The Secretary redelegated the authority to the Director of the Office of Motor 

Carrier Safety and then, on January 5, 2000, to the newly established Federal 

Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA).

Hazardous Materials Program Evaluation

The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 199313 required each 

agency to develop strategic plans that cover a period of at least 5 years and include 

the agency’s: mission statement; long-term strategic goals; and a description of 

how the agency intends to achieve those goals and objectives. The plan should 

include a description of the operational processes, skills and technology, and the 

human, capital, information, and other resources required to meet the goals and 

objectives.14 GPRA's purpose was to improve Federal program effectiveness and 

public accountability by promoting a new focus on results, service quality, and

customer satisfaction. The Hazardous Materials Program Evaluation (HMPE) was 

established by the DOT Strategic Plan 1997-2002.

The DOT Strategic Plan sets forth the overall direction, vision, and mission of the 

Department through the year 2002 and focuses the Department's efforts on five 

strategic goals: Safety, Mobility, Economic Growth and Trade, Human and

Natural Environment, and National Security. On March 9, 1999, the Secretary

announced the formation of a ONE-DOT HMPE team to conduct a

Departmentwide hazardous materials program evaluation. The Assistant Secretary 

for Budget and Programs/Chief Financial Officer, the Inspector General, and the 

Administrator of RSPA sponsored the program evaluation. RSPA and the Office 

of Inspector General (OIG) members co-chaired the HMPE team comprised of 

members from these offices as well as the Coast Guard, FAA, FHWA, and FRA. 

The Department has one hazardous materials safety goal in the fiscal year 2000 

Performance Plan. The goal is to reduce the number of serious hazardous

materials incidents in transportation to 411 or fewer in 2000, from a peak of 464 in 

1996.15

 

13 Public Law 103-62.

14 Ibid.

15 Over the past 5 years, the number of serious incidents involving hazardous materials reported to the Department has 

ranged from 358 in 1993 to 464 in 1996. 
6

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

The objectives of the Departmentwide hazardous materials program evaluation

were: (1) to document current hazardous materials movements, the Operating

Administrations' programs, and their program delivery, and (2) to assess DOT’s 

overall hazardous materials program as it affects each step in the hazardous

materials transportation process, from packaging to receiver, and recommend

appropriate improvements and areas for further study. 

The HMPE team concentrated its efforts on nonbulk hazardous materials

movements that cross modal boundaries because they usually involve a

Departmentwide program and coincide with the intent for a DOT-wide review. 

Intermodal hazardous materials activities are covered by 49 Code of Federal

Regulations (CFR) related to rulemaking and hazardous materials program

procedures. Specifically, the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR), 49 CFR 

Parts 171-180 govern the packaging and safe transportation of hazardous materials 

by air, highway, rail, and water. The program evaluation did not include bulk

shipments by water (involving only the Coast Guard) and pipeline shipments

(involving only RSPA), because they are not covered by the HMR but are covered 

by 33 CFR Parts 125-199; 46 CFR Parts 1-199; and 49 CFR Parts 181-199. Also, 

the program evaluation did not focus on program issues relating solely to an

individual Operating Administration’s hazardous materials program.

The HMPE team used data from 1990 to 1998 to identify trends. To determine 

current conditions, the HMPE team used 1998 data to the maximum extent

possible. However, when 1998 data were unavailable, the HMPE team used the 

most recent official data. October 21, 1999 is the latest data used by the HMPE 

team from RSPA’s various databases. 

The HMPE team reviewed hazardous materials legislation and regulations;

analyzed mission and function statements; reviewed prior internal and external

reports; and interviewed hazardous materials managers and field personnel. In

addition, the HMPE team analyzed written responses to questions published in

Federal Register Notice, FR Doc. 99-17175 (see Appendix III) and the results of 

three focus group meetings; reviewed the Department’s and Operating

Administrations’ Strategic and Performance plans; analyzed work plans, budgets, 

resources, and incident data; and participated in field inspections and enforcement 

activities.

The HMPE team conducted an analysis of the Strategic and Performance Plans 

developed by the Operating Administrations to identify hazardous materials goals 

and performance measures and reconciled them with the Department’s Strategic 

and Performance Plans. The HMPE team participated in the various Operating 
7

Administrations’ inspection activities. Observations made during these activities 

were used to develop issues and identify the strengths and weaknesses of the 

Department’s hazardous materials programs. 

The HMPE team attended the Cooperative Hazardous Materials Enforcement

Development conference in Salt Lake City to get a better understanding of state 

and local enforcement personnel, first responders, and industry’s views concerning 

DOT’s hazardous materials program. The Department’s senior hazardous

materials managers from each Operating Administration were interviewed to

provide a fuller understanding of their program’s operations and to identify

program strengths and weaknesses. The team also evaluated Operating

Administration databases used to record inspection results and hazardous materials 

incidents. 

The HMPE team briefed DOT’s senior leadership in January 2000 on the team’s 

findings and recommendations, and in March 2000 on strategies for implementing 

the recommendation to establish an institutional capacity for overseeing a

Departmentwide hazardous materials program. The implementation strategies

were developed by the HMPE team working with senior policy officials from the 

Department in meetings lasting one and one-half days. During February 2000, the 

Operating Administrations with hazardous materials responsibilities and selected 

Secretarial Officers reviewed drafts of the report together with the executive

summary and provided the HMPE team with their technical and substantive

comments which were incorporated in the final report. In addition, on February 4 

and 7, 2000, the HMPE team and the senior policy representatives from the

Operating Administrations and selected Secretarial offices met at the direction of 

the Deputy Secretary to discuss various organizational locations and structures for 

the institutional capacity. (See Appendix IV for a complete description of the 

methodology used in the program evaluation.)
8
9

CHAPTER 2

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS LAW 

AND SECRETARIAL DELEGATIONS

Documenting DOT’s hazardous materials program, as it was intended and as it 

exists, was a primary objective for the HMPE team. This chapter discusses the 

laws and Secretarial delegations that form the DOT hazardous materials program.

Federal Hazardous Materials Transportation Law 

The stated purpose of the HMTL is to provide adequate protection against risks to 

life and property inherent in the transportation of hazardous materials in

commerce. The intent of the HMTL is to improve the Secretary of

Transportation’s regulatory and enforcement authority. When the Secretary 

decides that transporting a group or class of material in a particular amount and 

form could pose an unreasonable risk to health, safety, or property, then that 

material, group, or class of materials is designated as hazardous. 

The HMTL applies to a person or entity transporting hazardous materials in

commerce or causing hazardous materials to be transported in commerce. The 

HMTL also applies to the manufacturing, fabricating, marking, maintaining,

reconditioning, repairing, or testing of a packaging or container that is represented, 

marked, certified, or sold as qualified for use in the commercial transport of 

hazardous materials.

The HMTL requires DOT to maintain a central reporting system and to provide 

information for emergency response to hazardous materials transportation

incidents.16 To carry out this mandate, RSPA maintains the Hazardous Materials 

Information System (HMIS), which includes data reported by carriers over the 

past 30 years. HMIS data are used by Federal, state and local officials, private 

emergency response organizations, and others. In addition, the Coast Guard

maintains, with the support of RSPA, an around-the-clock National Response

Center. Also, approximately every 3 years, RSPA publishes and distributes to the 

emergency response community an Emergency Response Guidebook. 

 

16 Title 49 U.S.C. § 5121.
10

Delegations by the Secretary of Transportation

The Secretary of Transportation has delegated hazardous materials responsibilities 

to the Operating Administrations. Regulatory responsibility for hazardous 

materials was delegated primarily to RSPA, while enforcement authority was

delegated to the Coast Guard, FAA, FHWA,17 FRA, and RSPA. The provisions 

governing each mode of transportation and the authority and responsibility for 

DOT’s Operating Administrations are summarized in Appendix II. 

Under the HMTL, RSPA is solely responsible for: issuing rules and regulations 

governing the safe transportation of hazardous materials (except for highway

routing); issuing, renewing, modifying, and terminating exemptions and

approvals; and making administrative determinations18 of whether state, local, or 

Indian tribe requirements (1) are preempted by the HMTL or (2) may remain in 

effect under a waiver of preemption. In addition, RSPA has the authority to

require registration and payment of fees by certain shippers and carriers. 

RSPA has primary enforcement jurisdiction over container manufacturers (except 

modal-specific bulk packaging), reconditioners, and retesters, and a shared

authority with the other Operating Administrations over shippers of hazardous 

materials, exemption holders, and persons required to register as hazardous

materials shippers. RSPA also represents DOT in international organizations

working to assure the compatibility of domestic regulations with the regulations of 

bodies such as the International Maritime Organization, the International Civil

Aviation Organization, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and 

Economic and Social Council, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. 

FAA is delegated inspection and enforcement authority with respect to hazardous 

materials transportation by air and bulk packagings used in air transport. FAA

also has the authority to enforce the Federal Aviation Act provisions as they relate 

to the transportation of such materials by air, and authority to devise and carry out 

procedures for monitoring and enforcing provisions of regulations with respect to 

the transportation of radioactive materials on passenger-carrying aircraft.

The Coast Guard is delegated inspection and enforcement authority with respect to 

all regulations applicable to vessel carriers and shippers by water and for bulk

packages used for marine transport. Under laws in addition to the HMTL, the 

 

17 On January 9, 1999, FHWA’s authority to perform motor carrier safety functions and operations was redelegated to 

the Director of the Office of Motor Carrier Safety, then, on January 5, 2000, to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration (FMCSA).

18 Except for highway routing determinations and waivers of preemption issued by FMCSA.
11

Coast Guard issues regulations for hazardous materials being transported in bulk 

by vessel. 

FRA has inspection and enforcement authority with respect to all regulations

applicable to rail carriers, shippers by rail, and manufacturers of tank cars. Under 

authority independent of the HMTL, FRA may issue orders to deal with dangers 

caused by the transportation of hazardous materials over unsafe track or by unsafe 

rail carriers.

FMCSA has inspection and enforcement authority with respect to all regulations 

applicable to motor carriers, shippers by highway, and manufacturers of cargo 

tanks. As authorized by the HMTL, FMCSA has the authority to issue regulations 

for highway routing of hazardous materials and highway safety permits for

hazardous materials transportation, and preemption determinations and waivers of 

preemption concerning highway routing requirements. 

More specific regulatory functions for each Operating Administration are set forth 

in Appendix II.
12
13

CHAPTER 3

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SHIPMENTS, MOVEMENTS

AND GROWTH FORECAST

This chapter provides an overview of domestic hazardous materials shipments and 

movements, the extent of the hazardous materials industry, and the trends in

hazardous materials incidents. No central data system exists in the Department to 

support the hazardous materials program. Therefore, the HMPE team used outside 

information and databases maintained by the individual Operating Administrations 

that were designed to support larger safety programs. The data presented here are 

imperfect, but they represent the best data available. Data deficiencies are

discussed in Chapter 7 and Appendix V.

Hazardous Materials Shipments and Movements

A RSPA study estimated that there are 800,000 domestic shipments and

1.2 million movements of hazardous materials in the United States each day, and 

that 3.2 billion tons are shipped and 3.9 billion tons are moved each year.19 A 

shipment, as defined by RSPA, is equivalent to a delivery to a final destination, 

and may involve several movements. A movement, on the other hand represents 

each intermediate transfer of the hazardous material as it moves through the

transportation stream. 

Delivering a shipment of hazardous materials to its final destination often involves 

multiple handling and reshipments, depending on the product and the mode(s) of 

transport. Some shipments, for example, small packages in air cargo, usually

require at least three movements: movement from the manufacturer by truck to the 

airline; movement by the airline; and movement by truck from the airline to the 

end user. Figure 1 depicts a single air shipment that required six movements to 

reach its final destination. 

 

19 RSPA study prepared by the Office of Hazardous Materials Safety on Hazardous Materials Shipments, October 

1998. 
14

Figure 1

Depiction of Air Shipment Requiring Multiple Movements

Table 1 shows the estimated number of shipments, movements, and tons moved by 

mode of transportation for 1996. These figures present the best available data, but 

are estimates (see Appendix V for discussion of data limitations). For estimates of 

the number of movements in highway, air, rail, and water sectors, RSPA assumed 

movement factors of 1.5, 2.0, 3.0, and 2.0 times the respective number of

shipments. For example, in the rail sector, a factor of 3.0 was used to reflect the 

frequency with which rail cars may be reconfigured within a train or switched 

from one train to another, usually after passing through a rail switching yard. 

Air or Other Express

Delivery Shipment

1 Shipment: 6 Movements: 10 Handlings

Delivery

Pick-up

Consolidation

Consolidation

To Airport

From Airport

Airport Sorting

Center

Air

Air

NOTE: As movements increase, the risk of an incident occurring

also increases.

Consignee

Shipper / Manufacturer

Initiate the

Transportation 

Cycle

Cycle 

Complete
15

Table 1

Domestic Bulk and Packaged Shipments and 

Movements by Mode of Transportation

Mode Daily

Shipments

Percent

of Total

Daily

Movements

Percent

of Total

Daily Tons 

Moved

Percent of

Tons Moved

Highway 768,907 94 1,154,450 92 3,794,970 50.69

Air 43,750 5 87,500 7 8,098 0.11

Rail 4,315 <1 12,945 1 1,136,748 15.19

Water 335 <1 670 <1 2,545,850 34.01

Total 817,307 1,245,565 7,485,666

Source: RSPA Hazardous Materials Shipments, October 1998. Table does not include pipeline data, which account for 

less than 1 percent of total daily shipments and movements (although a greater share of tons and ton-miles), because 

pipeline movements were not included in the program evaluation. Mode-to-mode comparisons of shipments and 

movements are not appropriate. For example; Table 1 reports highway shipments and water shipments equally, but a 

single vessel may contain upwards of 3,000 forty-foot truckloads. 

Manufacturer, Shipper, and Carrier Populations

According to US Department of Commerce 1993 Commodity Flow Survey data, 

there were 14,537 establishments engaged in the manufacture of hazardous

materials.20 Using information contained in the 1997 Commodity Flow Survey, 

RSPA estimated that approximately 47,000 firms are shipping significant

quantities of hazardous materials. This figure, however, does not include small or 

occasional shippers. DOT officials have used the figure of 75,000 to represent the 

universe of hazardous materials shippers in the United States. However, this

figure may be understated because many “firms” or shippers have multiple

business locations. 

Similarly, the number of carriers handling hazardous materials is also unknown 

because not all Operating Administrations have a systematic process for updating 

their files.21 Information in existing DOT databases, such as FMCSA's22 Motor 

Carrier Management Information System database and U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers Waterborne Transportation data, contained approximately 500,000

potential carriers of hazardous materials. About 43,000 carriers are dedicated 

hazardous materials transporters that primarily move petroleum products and

corrosives in cargo tank trucks. Yet, every carrier known to the Department can 

knowingly, or even unknowingly, carry hazardous materials. Table 2 shows the 

number of hazardous materials carriers contained in the Operating

 

20 Source: US Department of Commerce 1993 Commodity Flow Survey data. The survey is conducted every 5 years 

and samples establishments, not shippers or carriers, and produces national estimates.

21 The HMR defines carriers as a person (company) that operates one or more transport vehicles.

22 On October 9, 1999, FHWA’s authority to perform motor carrier safety functions and operations was redelegated to 

the Director of the Office of Motor Carrier Safety and then, on January 5, 2000, to the FMCSA.
16

Administrations’ databases, which potentially could carry hazardous materials. A 

complete description of the DOT databases on hazardous materials information is 

provided in Appendix V.

Table 2

Number of Potential 

Hazardous Materials Carriers

Mode Number of Carriers

Air* 3,500

Highway 497,908

Rail 559

Marine 1,300

Total 503,267

* Includes both domestic and foreign carriers with the potential to carry hazardous 

materials.

Sources: FAA Air Carrier data; FMCSA National Carrier Census Summary Report; FRA 

Inspection Database; and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Waterborne Transportation 

Lines of the United States, Calendar Year 1997, Volume 1, National Summary.

Vehicle, Vessel, and Aircraft Populations

Approximately 444,000 vehicles and vessels are dedicated to hazardous materials 

transport, primarily highway tank trucks and railroad tank cars. Potentially,

another 7.6 million vehicles, vessels, and aircraft could carry hazardous materials 

on a periodic basis. When one considers the potential for hazardous materials to 

be undeclared, either due to economics or lack of knowledge, any vehicle, vessel, 

or aircraft could carry hazardous materials. The fleet breakdown by mode is 

shown in Table 3.

Table 3

Hazardous Materials Fleet/Vehicles

Mode

Dedicated HM 

Fleet/Vehicles

Additional 

Potential HM 

Fleet

Total Potential 

Fleet

Truck 195,000 6,436,000 6,631,000

Rail 238,000 1,078,000 1,316,000

Waterborne111,000 68,000 79,000

Air (commercial 

aircraft)2,3 0 12,000 12,000

Total 444,000 7,594,000 8,038,000

1

 Represents both United States and foreign flag vessels including barges.

2

 The figures are based on the air fleet of carriers who “will carry” hazardous materials. 

3

 Aircraft are not typically dedicated to hazardous materials transport. 
17

Information on the numbers of hazardous materials manufacturers, shippers,

carriers, and transport fleet of vehicles is indicative of the potential size and 

scope of the hazardous materials industry that DOT is responsible for regulating. 

Forecasts of Growth in Hazardous Materials Movements

A forecast by the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) 23 projects that tons 

of chemicals produced will grow by 2 percent annually. We applied the projected 

annual growth rate of 2 percent to the baseline RSPA estimate of 3.2 billion tons 

of all hazardous materials shipped in 1996, including both chemicals and

petroleum products. This resulted in a forecast of 5.1 billion tons of hazardous 

materials being shipped by the year 2020, about 59 percent higher than today. A 

forecast prepared by DRI/McGraw Hill estimated growth of roughly 2.5 percent 

per year through 2003. The second forecast also estimated that air and intermodal 

growth would be 4 times and 3 times faster, respectively, than overall growth in 

hazardous materials shipments.

 

23 In May 1999, CMA provided a growth forecast to the RSPA Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials.
18
19

CHAPTER 4

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS INCIDENTS

This chapter provides information on the number, location, cause, and trends in 

hazardous materials incidents. The chapter also provides the modal distribution of 

incidents and a discussion of serious hazardous materials incidents. 

A hazardous material incident is an unintentional release of hazardous material from 

a package during the course of transportation, including loading, unloading, and

temporary storage. All incidents are required to be reported to RSPA within 30 days. 

Additionally, certain incidents require immediate notification to the Department’s 

National Response Center if, as a direct result of the hazardous material, there is a 

death, an evacuation of the public lasting one or more hours, or the altering of the 

operational flight pattern of an aircraft.24

Approximately 97 percent of hazardous materials incidents are minor and do not have 

serious consequences. A typical hazardous materials incident might be a fiberboard 

package leaking flammable liquids that is discovered during the loading or unloading 

of a truck where no one is injured. From 1990 through 1998, nearly 115,000 

hazardous materials incidents, an average of roughly 12,700 per year, were reported 

to RSPA.25 In 1998, there were 15,322 incidents, 70 percent more than reported in 

1990. Most of the increase occurred between 1992 and 1994. RSPA attributes the 

majority of that increase to more stringent reporting requirements and closer oversight 

of the hazardous materials community to ensure that incidents are reported. Figure 2 

shows the number of reported hazardous materials incidents from 1990 through 1998.

Figure 2

Hazardous Materials Incidents From CY 1990 Through CY 1998

Source: RSPA, Biennial Reports on Hazardous Materials Transportation,

and RSPA HMIS incident database as of October 21, 1999.

 

24 49 CFR Subpart 171.15.

25 Figures obtained from RSPA HMIS database as of October 21, 1999. The accuracy and completeness of the data 

have been questioned by an internal RSPA study, several GAO reports, and by the 1986 Office of Technology 

Assessment study of the Hazardous Materials program. (See Chapter 7 and Appendix V for further discussion of data 

limitations.) Incident data represents interstate shipments only; intrastate incidents were required to be reported 

beginning October 1, 1999.

0

3000

6000

9000

12000

15000

18000

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

Incidents
20

However, as discussed more fully in Chapter 7 of this report, the HMPE team 

found there are serious questions concerning the accuracy and completeness of 

incident data reported to RSPA and contained in the HMIS. This affects the 

Department’s ability to identify trends, evaluate the impact of the hazardous

materials program on safety, and determine incident causes. 

Figure 3 depicts the distribution of incidents in 1998 by mode of transportation. 

About 84.4 percent of the reported incidents occurred, or were reported, while the 

hazardous material was in the possession of highway carriers, 9percent by air 

carriers, 6.5 percent by rail carriers, and 0.1 percent by water carriers. 

Figure 3

Distribution of All 1998 Hazardous Materials Incidents by Mode

Highway

84.4%

Water

0.1%

Rail

6.5%

Air

9.0%

Source: RSPA HMIS incident database as of October 21, 1999.

RSPA data also show that 43 percent of hazardous materials incidents occurred in 

industrial areas, 49 percent in commercial areas, 2 percent in residential areas, and 

1 percent in agricultural areas. By type of community, 44 percent occurred in 

urban areas, 37 percent in suburban areas and 14 percent in rural areas. 

Furthermore, RSPA data showed that 55 percent of the incidents were found

during unloading, 19 percent during loading, 18 percent enroute (nonaccident),

2 percent enroute (involving vehicular accidents or derailments), and 6 percent 

within a terminal or storage site. RSPA personnel stated that although the

majority of incidents are discovered and reported as having occurred during

unloading, they could have occurred in transit or during loading. Therefore, this 

data may not accurately indicate the location in the transportation stream where 

incidents are actually occurring.

Trend lines showing total hazardous materials incidents and the air, highway, and 

railroad modes’ contributions to the total number of hazardous materials incidents 

over the past decade are depicted in Figure 4. The water mode averaged less than 
21

10 reported incidents per year and, thus, could not be reflected on the chart. The 

lack of water-borne incidents is a result of a number of factors such as carriers are 

not required to file incident reports unless the incident occurs while the vessel is in 

the navigable waters of the United States; or, spills are reported to the Coast Guard 

in accordance with the requirements of the Clean Water Act rather than the

HMTL. As mentioned previously, RSPA attributes the increase of incidents from 

1992 through 1994 to improved carrier awareness of reporting requirements and 

closer oversight of the hazardous materials community to ensure that incidents are 

reported. 

Figure 4

Hazardous Materials Incidents by Mode, From 1990 Through 1998

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

16000

18000

199019911992199319941995199619971998

Year

Incidents

all

highway

railroad

air

Source: RSPA, Biennial Reports on Hazardous Materials Transportation, and RSPA HMIS incident database as 

of October 21, 1999.

Serious Incidents

In 1998, 429 incidents were categorized as serious, roughly 3 percent of all 

incidents that year. RSPA defines serious incidents as those incidents that

involve: a fatality or major injury due to a hazardous material; closure of a major 

transportation artery or facility or evacuation of six or more persons due to the 

presence of a hazardous material; or a vehicle accident or derailment resulting in 

the release of a hazardous material.26 The Department has established as a goal in 

its Performance Plan for fiscal year 2000, to reduce the number of serious

incidents to 411 or fewer.

From 1990 through 1998, RSPA received reports on 3,685 serious incidents,

which resulted in 211 deaths and 4,664 injuries. Reported property damage was 

 

26 To meet the definition of serious, the persons evacuated are to be part of “the general public” and not transportation 

employees. 
22

roughly $329 million. Table 4 shows the annual number of hazardous materials 

incidents, serious incidents, fatalities, injuries, persons evacuated, and property

damage from 1990 through 1998.

Table 4

Serious Hazardous Material Incident History From 1990 Through 1998

Year

Total 

Reported 

Incidents

Number of 

Serious 

Incidents

Number of 

Fatalities

Number of 

Injuries

Number of 

Persons 

Evacuated

Amount of 

Property 

Damage

1990 8,879 402 8 423 12,123 $32,353,276

1991 9,110 403 10 439 10,502 $38,350,611

1992 9,310 375 15 600 29,186 $35,164,057

1993 12,830 357 15 627 18,237 $22,801,551

1994 16,087 429 11 577 18,398 $44,185,413

1995 14,743 409 7 400 11,444 $30,903,281

1996 13,950 464 12011,175219,556 $46,849,243

1997 13,994 417 12 225 24,587 $33,393,504

1998 15,322 429 13 198 9,181 $45,497,550

Total 114,225 3,685 211 4,6643153,214 $329,498,486

Source: RSPA, Biennial Reports on Hazardous Materials Transportation, and RSPA HMIS incident database as 

of October 21, 1999.

1

 110 deaths were the result of the ValuJet incident in 1996. 

2

 A single rail incident in Montana involving chlorine resulted in injuries to 787 people.

3

 In summarizing serious incident injuries for the biennial report, RSPA combines hospitalization (serious) injuries 

with minor injuries. 

The HMPE team believes HMIS's property damage data is misleading because it 

seriously understates total economic losses. Information on costs associated with 

product losses, carrier damage, property damage, and decontamination/cleanup

costs are included on DOT Form 5800.1, which is to be completed after each 

incident (see Appendix VI). However, costs associated with evacuations, closures 

of transportation arteries, and emergency responses are rarely reported. For

example, the flatbed tractor-trailer hauling black powder in an intermodal freight 

container that overturned on Interstate-95 in Springfield, Virginia on June 2, 1999, 

did not explode or release any black powder. Yet FHWA estimated this single 

incident, which blocked traffic for 10 hours, cost $25 million in terms of traffic 

delays.27 The carrier, however, reported damages of only $120,000.

Further supporting the view that losses are understated is a contractor study

commissioned by the FHWA which examined accidents and incidents that

occurred in 1996 involving flammable liquids transported by motor vehicles. The 

study estimated that the economic losses associated with 3,766 accidents and

incidents totaled $482 million. The economic losses included in the FHWA study 

 

27 On January 9, 1999, FHWA’s authority to perform motor carrier safety functions and operations was redelegated to

the Director of the Office of Motor Carrier Safety and then, on January 5, 2000, to the FMCSA.
23

differ from the HMIS database, primarily because the study places a dollar value 

on injuries ($200,000 each), fatalities ($2 million each), and traffic delays ($15 per 

person per hour). The study also included intrastate accidents and incidents,

whereas the HMIS was then limited to interstate incidents. Beginning in

FY 1999, intrastate highway motor carriers were required to report incidents

involving hazardous materials. RSPA has not yet analyzed the FY 1999 HMIS 

information to distinguish intrastate from interstate incidents.

RSPA incident data contained in the HMIS also showed that highways accounted 

for 79 percent of serious incidents for 1998. Figure 5 depicts the distribution of 

1998 serious incidents by transportation mode.

Figure 5

Serious Incidents by Mode for 1998

Railway

16%

 Air

5 %

Highway

 79%

Source: RSPA HMIS incident database as of October 21, 1999.

The distribution of serious incidents by mode differs significantly from the

distribution of incidents overall. Rail accounts for only 6.5 percent of all incidents 

(depicted in Figure 3), but 16 percent of serious incidents (Figure 5). Due to the 

large bulk quantities and the class of hazardous materials carried by railroads, a 

rail incident is often more serious. 

RSPA 1998 data show that gasoline is the commodity most frequently involved in 

serious incidents, comprising 15 percent of all serious incidents. Overall, various 

types of flammable liquids and corrosive materials account for 57 percent of 

serious incidents.
24

Causes of Incidents

According to RSPA data, human error is the largest contributing factor to

hazardous materials incidents. Over the past 5 years, 80 to 85 percent of

hazardous materials incidents were attributed to human error. As we will point 

out, our analysis suggests this statistic may be unreliable based upon deficiencies 

in RSPA’s causal classification process. Data for 1998 show that human error 

caused 85.5 percent of hazardous materials incidents, package failure 11.3 percent, 

and vehicular accident/derailment 2.1 percent. The percentages are significantly 

different for serious incidents. Roughly 73 percent of serious hazardous materials 

incidents are attributed to a vehicle accident or derailment while human error is 

identified as the cause in approximately 19 percent of serious hazardous materials 

incidents. (See Figure 6.)

Figure 6

Hazardous Materials Incident Causes – 1998

All Incidents Versus Serious Incidents

Human Error

85.5%

Package

Failure

11.3%

Other

1.1%

Vehicular

Accident /

Derailment

2.1%

All Incidents

Vehicular Accident

Derailment

73.1%

Human

Error

19.5%

Other

1.1%

Package

Failure

6.3%

Serious Incidents

Source: RSPA HMIS incident database as of October 21, 1999.

Figure 7 shows the modal breakdown by cause for all 1998 hazardous materials 

incidents, using the most complete data available. Except for the water mode,

which has very few reported incidents, the vast majority of incidents were

attributed to human error. 
25

Figure 7

Incident Cause by Mode – 1998

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Air

Highway

Rail

Water

Percent

Human Error

Package Failure

Vehicular Accident/Derailment

Other

Source: RSPA HMIS incident database as of October 21, 1999.

As discussed throughout the report, the accuracy of the incident cause data is 

uncertain. The Form 5800.1, used to report incident information to RSPA, does 

not directly document causality. Instead, RSPA contract personnel who review

the form, especially the narrative description of the incident, determine the

probable cause. If a cause cannot be determined from the available information,

the contract employees categorize the cause as human error. The accuracy of the 

data compiled by the contractor personnel is limited by the quality of the narrative 

portion of the Form 5800.1 and the experience of the contractor personnel. The 

contractor personnel, according to RSPA, have no field experience as hazardous 

materials inspectors or work experience in the hazardous materials industry. 

Additionally, only 25 percent of contractor personnel have undergone some form 

of hazardous materials classroom training. 

The HMPE team believes this could result in incidents being incorrectly

categorized. For example, an incident report narrative noting that an employee 

dropped a box and released hazardous materials would be categorized, without 

additional information, as human error. However, if the box was dropped within 

the performance standard height for that particular package and there was a
26

release, the cause of the incident might more appropriately be categorized as a 

package failure. 

To evaluate the accuracy of RSPA’s classification procedures, the HMPE team

analyzed all 13,950 incident reports for 1996. Our conclusions are markedly

different from RSPA's. For example, RSPA reported that package failure was the 

cause of 15.4 percent of all incidents versus our determination of 34.6 percent. 

The five HMPE team members who reviewed these incidents all have inspection 

backgrounds. Their collective knowledge is based on more than 80 years

experience performing inspections of hazardous materials carriers and they are 

trained to look at incidents from a root cause standpoint. Table 5 compares 

RSPA's data with the HMPE team's analysis.

Table 5

Distribution of Incident Causes

Cause

RSPA

Determined Cause

(percent of total)

Program Evaluation Team 

Determined Cause

(percent of total)

Human Error 80.7 61.0

Package Failure 15.4 34.6

Vehicle Accident/Derailment 2.4 2.6

Other 1.5 1.8

Total 100 100

Source: RSPA, Biennial Reports on Hazardous Materials Transportation, and RSPA HMIS incident 

remarks subsystem report for 1996.

Our analysis suggests that the lack of program knowledge by contractor personnel 

is compounded by the data limitations presented in the Form 5800.1. RSPA has a 

current rulemaking to revise the form that could improve the quality of reported 

data, but it does not have plans for giving the contract employees training. 
27

CHAPTER 5

PROGRAM DELIVERY

This chapter describes the intervention methods and activities the Department uses 

to deliver the hazardous materials program to the hazardous materials

community.28 The HMPE team uses the term hazardous materials “program

delivery” to designate the entire range of activities undertaken by the Operating 

Administrations to increase safety. These program delivery activities include

DOT actions regarding regulations, inspections, assessments, compliance reviews, 

investigations, enforcement actions, civil penalties, training, and outreach. 

Hazardous Materials Program Organization and Resources

At the headquarters and field levels, the Operating Administrations’ hazardous

materials programs are organizationally similar but differ in the level and type 

(Federal and/or state) of resources supporting these programs.29 Each of the 

Operating Administrations engages in inspections and reviews, enforcement, civil 

penalty processing, and outreach activities. Each has a field structure, primarily 

devoted to compliance efforts, which is supported by headquarters staff. 

FAA has 70 inspectors located at 28 international gateway airports, supported by 

25 specialists in 10 regional offices. These inspectors and specialists are

supported by 12 attorneys and 6 headquarters staff. The Coast Guard has

51 container inspectors, billeted in 26 coastal ports, supported by a 9-person 

training and assistance team, and a headquarters staff of 6 program managers and 

1 attorney. FRA has 47 inspectors in the field, directed by a field specialist in 

each of 8 regional offices, which are directed by a headquarters staff of 7 program 

managers and supported by 1 attorney.

While FMCSA30 has by far the largest segment to regulate, the motor carrier 

industry, it has the fewest field inspectors. Its 13 hazardous materials specialists 

provide support to the state programs, and they are in turn supported by

10 divisional hazardous materials program managers. At the headquarters level,

there are three FMCSA program managers and one attorney. RSPA’s hazardous 

materials program includes 119 individuals, including 32 inspectors, 28 of which 

 

28 The HMPE team uses the term “intervention” to include: any assessment, inspection, enforcement, review, 

investigation, or outreach activity aimed at assessing or improving hazardous materials community compliance with the 

hazardous materials regulations.

29 Organizational charts illustrating placement of the hazardous materials programs within each Operating

Administration are set forth in Appendix VII.

30 On October 9, 1999, FHWA’s authority to perform motor carrier safety functions and operations was redelegated to 

the Director of the Office of Motor Carrier Safety and then, on January 5, 2000, to the FMCSA.
28

are field specialists located in 5 regional offices, with 4 field investigators, 2 

enforcement program managers, and 1 administrative support staff located at

headquarters. RSPA’s headquarters Office of Hazardous Materials Safety

employs 82 personnel who provide program support in five other broad categories: 

(1) standards development, (2) science and engineering support, (3) exemptions 

and approvals, (4) initiatives and training, and (5) planning and analysis. Five 

attorneys support RSPA’s hazardous materials program.

The similarities among DOT’s Operating Administrations begin to fade with the 

use of state inspectors. The FRA arranged for 22 state employees to conduct 

inspections, enforcement, and outreach functions in concert with FRA's Federal 

program. No Federal funding is provided by FRA to the participating states to 

conduct inspections; however, FRA does provide funds for training. The Office of 

Motor Carrier Safety, now part of FMCSA, has the most unique organization of 

the five Operating Administrations involved in hazardous materials regulation

enforcement. Its approach has been to provide Federal funding to states through 

the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Grant Program.

31 The result has been

approximately 2,100 federally funded state (including the District of Columbia

and Puerto Rico) employees conducting roughly 2.1 million roadside inspections 

of motor carriers, including approximately 130,000 inspections of hazardous 

materials carriers annually. 

As discussed more fully in Chapter 6, shippers of hazardous materials generally 

receive less attention Departmentwide than carriers, yet they offer the greatest 

opportunity to improve safety. The Coast Guard, FRA, and FMCSA focus

primarily on carriers while FAA’s work plan shows an equal emphasis on carriers 

and shippers. RSPA uses its 28 inspectors in its hazardous materials program to 

concentrate on shippers, package manufacturers, retesters, reconditioners, and

repair facilities 

Collectively, DOT's hazardous materials program employed the equivalent of 252 

field personnel, 117 headquarters employees, and 19 attorneys who managed and 

delivered a hazardous materials program DOT-wide in 1998. They performed

approximately 126,000 inspections and enforcement actions at an estimated cost 

of about $37 million. This represented roughly 1.6 percent of DOT’s 1998 safety 

program funding.

 

31 The Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Grant Program is a FMCSA program to assist states in implementing of vehicle 

safety and hazardous materials compliance and enforcement.
29

Rulemaking

The Secretary of Transportation delegated regulatory authority for the

transportation of hazardous materials under the HMTL to the RSPA

Administrator. The Office of Hazardous Materials Standards within RSPA is

responsible for producing and maintaining national safety standards for hazardous 

materials for all modes of transportation and is typically responsible for 30 or 

more rulemakings in any given year. Under the umbrella of RSPA-promulgated 

hazardous material regulations, the Operating Administrations operate

mode-specific hazardous materials programs. 

The Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) contribute to transportation safety 

by setting two broad requirements, containment and hazard communication. First, 

the HMR establishes a packaging system to ensure that hazardous materials are 

placed in packages that are compatible with the material and strong enough to 

withstand the rigors of transportation without leaking. Second, the HMR creates a 

communication system to ensure that the hazards associated with the commodity 

are clearly communicated to employees on the loading dock, emergency

responders, and anyone else who might handle the shipment. In short, the HMR 

strives to prevent hazardous materials from leaking out of their packages, and to 

communicate the presence of the specific hazards on packages, shipping

documents, and transportation vehicles or vessels. 

The rulemaking activities RSPA undertakes are coordinated with the affected

modal administrations. For example, the FRA drafts the applicable railroad

hazardous materials regulations and processes them through RSPA for 

promulgation. The Coast Guard ensures the correctness and consistency of the 

rules with the other maritime portions of the Federal regulations and with the most 

recent amendments to the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code. 

FMCSA, with RSPA assistance, drafts regulations related to specifications for 

cargo tanks and processes them through RSPA for promulgation, while FAA

generally limits its involvement to coordination with RSPA on aviation-related 

rulemaking efforts. 

On the international front, DOT supports a uniform, global approach to the safe 

transportation of hazardous materials through participation in international

organizations. According to RSPA officials, the US objective is to promote a

worldwide system that affords the necessary consistency between modal and

regional regulations that will guarantee the free movement of shipments. DOT

officials are actively involved in a number of forums including: the UN

Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods; the Dangerous

Goods Panel of the International Civil Aviation Organization; the International
30

Maritime Organization’s Subcommittee on Dangerous Goods, Solid Cargoes and 

Containers; and, the North American Free Trade Agreement Land Transportation 

Standards Subcommittee.

Data Collection

Each of the Operating Administrations collects and analyzes data associated with 

hazardous materials program delivery. Such data, if complete and accurate, could 

facilitate the measurement of intervention effectiveness, the identification of

recalcitrant shippers and carriers, the development of risk management

methodologies, and the allocation of resources.

RSPA maintains the HMIS, which is the source of safety data related to hazardous 

materials. The HMIS contains information on hazardous materials incidents,

exemptions and approvals, enforcement actions, and other elements that support 

the regulatory program. Carriers in every mode of transportation, upon discovery 

of an unintentional release of hazardous materials, are required to file a report on 

DOT Form 5800.1. RSPA contractor personnel enter information from the form 

into the HMIS. 

The Unified Shippers Enforcement System (UNISHIP), another RSPA-maintained 

database, is a cross-modal system to store information on enforcement actions

taken against shippers and, to a limited extent, carriers and package manufacturers. 

The system allows enforcement personnel to determine if past violations of the 

hazardous materials regulations have been pursued by any DOT agency with

respect to a particular entity or individual. 

The other Operating Administrations also maintain relevant hazardous materials 

databases. The Coast Guard maintains the Marine Safety Information System

which contains performance histories for vessels, facilities, involved parties, and 

hazardous cargoes. The Coast Guard also maintains the Container Inspection

Program Information System to record the results of intermodal freight container 

inspections. 

FRA maintains the Railroad Inspection Reporting System. This system records 

inspection reports noting such items as location, date, and areas of noncompliance. The information is used for identifying areas for additional focus and 

other program support needs. The FRA Office of Chief Counsel maintains the 

Enforcement Case System. This system records and tracks enforcement actions 

taken against companies or individuals found in non-compliance with regulations. 

FMCSA maintains the Motor Carrier Management Information System, which

contains records of all inspections, revi ews and enforcement actions conducted on 

carriers and shippers. FAA’s Airport and Air Carrier Inspection Reporting System 
31

captures inspection and outreach activity and incident data associated with the air 

transport of hazardous materials. A new module is currently being developed in 

FAA’s Airport and Air Carrier Inspection Reporting System to capture shipperrelated contact data. Another FAA database, the Enforcement Investigative

System, is used to identify trends with respect to a particular air carrier, shipper, or 

freight forwarder, and allows field personnel to obtain the violation history of 

particular individuals or entities.

Compliance and Enforcement

In 1998, the Operating Administrations recorded 126,150 hazardous materials

intervention activities ranging from the physical inspection of cargo tank cars,

detailed compliance assessments or reviews of carriers, on-site post-incident 

investigations, resolution of violation cases, and outreach efforts. In addition,

state employees conducted about 130,000 hazardous materials inspections under 

FMCSA's Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program. However, care must be taken 

when analyzing performance based solely on the data representing intervention

activity levels because the scope and depth of interventions vary greatly among the 

Operating Administrations. 

The complexity of inspections affects the level of resources and time needed to 

perform interventions among DOT’s Operating Administrations. For example,

FAA conducted 2,559 air carrier assessments and inspections, of which 1,410 

consisted of a comprehensive assessment, usually requiring 15-20 staff-hours of 

fieldwork. An air carrier assessment is a systematic evaluation of an entire

operating facility, such as United Airlines’ operations at Chicago-O'Hare 

International Airport. A typical assessment includes: reviewing enforcement

history and previous assessments; reviewing training programs and records;

monitoring carriers' acceptance procedures of hazardous materials shipments; and, 

inspecting hazardous materials packages to ensure shipper compliance with the 

HMR and International Civil Aviation Organization technical instructions. 

The combined federal and state FRA inspection force conducted 89,633 rail tank 

cars and other rail car hazardous materials inspections, which typically take from 

10 to 15 minutes per car. FRA inspectors also performed 3,617 shipper

inspections, which range from half-a-day to an entire week, depending on the size 

of the facility and complexity of its operations. In addition, FRA conducted 134 

inspections of tank car manufacturers or repair facilities, and 5,124 inspections of 

carriers or freight forwarders. 

Coast Guard container inspections, which include an examination of the shipping 

papers, the container Safety Approval Plate, the external and internal structural 

condition of the container, the placarding, stowage, segregation, labeling and
32

packaging of the hazardous materials within the container, typically take 15 to 30 

minutes. The Coast Guard also inspects freight forwarders, which perform both 

shipper and carrier functions such as document preparation, and intermodal

container loading, and blocking and bracing. Additionally, the Coast Guard

checks a variety of HMR requirements while conducting inspections of both

domestic and foreign freight ships including reviewing dangerous cargo manifests, 

placarding, and cargo segregation and stowage. The HMR related portion of

freight vessel examinations typically takes from 30 to 60 minutes. 

RSPA inspects cylinder-retesting facilities, which include a review of records,

observing the calibration of testing equipment and the actual testing of cylinders. 

Additionally, RSPA inspects manufacturer, inspection and repair facilities for

intermediate-bulk containers, portable tanks, and performance-oriented-packaging. 

RSPA also conducts shipper inspections, including those shippers who hold

exemptions or approvals or who have had a complaint filed against them. All of 

these inspections typically range in time from 2 to 8 hours, depending on the 

complexity of their operation. 

Civil Penalty Process

Enforcement logically flows from inspection activities. Enforcement of the

hazardous materials regulatory requirements is an important tool for improving

compliance with the HMR. In 1998, the 5 DOT Operating Administrations

initiated 24,609 enforcement actions, which included 1,487 civil penalty cases,

7,826 letters and reports of warning, 343 tickets, and 15,200 out-of-service orders. 

A total of $11.1 million in civil penalties was collected, although penalties

collected generally relate to enforcement actions initiated or taken in prior years.

The Operating Administrations’ civil penalty processes share the same core

components. Detection of a violation triggers the process in each Operating

Administration. An investigation follows to collect evidence, document that all 

the elements of a violation are present, and identify the culpable party. 

Enforcement options are weighed to determine the appropriate penalty. In

determining civil penalty assessments, the Operating Administrations must

consider nine statutorily mandated factors: (1) the nature of the violation;

(2) circumstances of the violation; (3) extent of the violations; (4) gravity of the 

violations; (5) degree of culpability; (6) history of prior offenses; (7) ability to 

pay; (8) effect on ability to stay in business; and (9) such other matters as

warranted. 

Enforcement options include civil penalties, letters of warning, tickets, and

detention orders. Only RSPA uses tickets while only the Coast Guard uses
33

detention orders.32 The losses associated with detained or “frustrated” shipments 

are often a more severe penalty than a monetary fine and are “considered” when 

assessing the monetary penalty. Violators are offered opportunities for a hearing, 

and final decisions are rendered and penalties may be assessed.

One of the complaints voiced by industry during focus group meetings and in

written responses to a HMPE Federal Register notice was that the violations cited

and the penalties assessed varied significantly among the various regional offices 

within an Operating Administration, and among the Operating Administrations. 

For example, one Operating Administration may cite a carrier who failed to

properly describe a hazardous material on the shipping papers with a single

violation (49 CFR 172.200(a)). Another Operating Administration may cite a

carrier with 6 or more violations for the same set of circumstances. Specifically, 

the Operating Administration may cite separate violations because the shipping 

papers did not include the proper shipping name, the hazard class, the

identification number, and the packaging group of the hazardous material. 

Typical penalty assessments and amounts actually collected are also indicative of 

differences among the Operating Administrations. During fiscal year 1997,

average monetary penalties assessed ranged from $7,600 per civil penalty action 

for RSPA to $1,400 for the Coast Guard. Differences in typical penalty amounts 

among the Operating Administrations can also be attributed to the fact that each 

mode uses its own set of guidelines for assessing penalties for violations of

specific regulations that are common to all. Notifications of the various penalty 

guidelines are not uniform either. FRA and RSPA published their guidelines in 

the Code of Federal Regulations. FAA's guidelines were published in the Federal 

Register. The Coast Guard issued its guidelines in an agency order, whereas 

FMCSA guidelines are incorporated in its Uniform Fine Assessment software 

program.

In 1998, DOT inspectors identified 95,361 violations of the HMR. These

violations ranged from failing to have evidence of registration on a transport

vehicle, to more serious safety violations such as filling a damaged cylinder with 

compressed gas, transporting a hazardous material displaying a POISON label

with foodstuffs, and a failure to ensure the structural serviceability of a freight 

container carrying class 1 explosives.33

The most frequently cited violation of the hazardous materials regulations,

representing over 20 percent of the violations identified, relates to the type of 

 

32 Detention orders are used by the Coast Guard based on authorities other than the HMR. 

33 A class 1 explosive is any substance or article, including a device, designed to function by explosion or by chemical 

reaction within itself.
34

placards each bulk packaging, freight container, transport vehicle, or rail car

containing hazardous material must have on each side and at each end of the 

vehicle. The importance of a placard cannot be overstated. It constitutes the first 

warning that hazardous materials are present to those handling the materials and to 

emergency response personnel in the event of an accident. The next three most 

frequently cited violations deal with the preparation of the shipping papers,

emergency response information, and general shipping and packaging

requirements in that order. Together, these four areas accounted for 53 percent of 

the violations identified in 1998; in most instances, these types of violations are 

the fault of the shipper. 

Outreach and Partnering

Each Operating Administration has implemented outreach programs designed to 

inform the industry and the public of the principles and application of the

hazardous materials regulatory systems. These outreach efforts include

distribution of informational brochures and pamphlets, presentations to various 

organizations and groups, individual contacts with shippers and carriers, and use 

of safety alerts and bulletins to provide better understanding of and compliance 

with the HMR. 

RSPA’s outreach program involves activities and programs designed to foster

understanding and compliance with the HMR. One RSPA initiative is the

operation of the Hazardous Materials Information Center (HMIC). Using a toll 

free telephone number, callers can resolve HMR issues with an Information Center 

Specialist. Additionally, callers have the ability to access an Automated Fax-Back 

system to obtain information on RSPA issued opinions, recent rulemaking actions, 

and specific exemptions. Callers also can be transferred to RSPA’s Office of 

Hazardous Materials Initiatives and Training (OHMIT) to obtain informational

brochures, literature, training tapes, and a training program contained on a

compact disk for computer use. HMIC officials estimated that more than 50,000 

telephonic contacts are made annually.

RSPA also oversees the development and distribution of the Emergency Response 

Guidebook. The Emergency Response Guidebook was developed jointly by the 

U.S. Department of Transportation, Transport Canada, and the Secretariat of

Communications and Transportation of Mexico. It is intended to be used by

firefighters, police, and other emergency service personnel who are usually the 

first to arrive at the scene of a transportation incident involving a hazardous

material. The Emergency Response Guidebook provides first responders with

information to quickly identify the specific or generic classification of the 

hazardous material(s) involved in the incident and protect themselves and the

general public during the initial response phase of the incident. To date, more than 
35

seven million copies of the Emergency Response Guidebook have been

distributed, without charge, to the emergency response community. 

The RSPA also operates the Transportation Safety Institute (TSI) and sponsors the 

Cooperative Hazardous Materials Enforcement Development (COHMED)

program. TSI’s Hazardous Materials and Transportation Safety Division provides 

hazardous materials training for Federal agencies, industry, and state and local 

enforcement and emergency response personnel to better understand the

complexities of the HMR and the motor carrier safety regulations. In FY 1998, 

approximately 2,400 officials attended 96 TSI classes and seminars. COHMED is 

an intergovernmental/industry partnership serving as a focal point for information 

sharing on hazardous materials transportation issues and delivery of services. 

More than 600 representatives of these various groups participated in the two 

COHMED conferences held in calendar year 1999. 

An example of a FRA outreach program is the Safety Assurance and Compliance 

Program (SACP). The SACP process, which focuses on cooperative partnerships 

with railroads and systemic safety problems, consists of three major components: 

the safety profile, the safety action plan, and monitoring and enforcement. During 

the safety profile phase, FRA reviews a railroad to identify systemic safety issues 

and develops a safety profile of a railroad. In response to the safety profile, a 

railroad prepares and implements a safety action plan to address issues identified 

in the safety profile. FRA monitors a railroad’s compliance with the safety action 

plan through continued follow-up with the railroad and the use of traditional sitespecific inspections. 

Typical of the other Operating Administrations’ partnering activities is the Coast 

Guard’s coordination of Multi-Agency Strike Force Operations, FAA’s

Hazstrikes, and FRA’s Multi-modal inspections. FRA, for example, participated 

in over 70 multi-modal inspection activities in 1998. These operations can bring 

together inspectors from all the modes, as well as the Drug Enforcement Agency, 

Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, United States Customs Service, Animal 

Plant & Health Inspection Service, and state and local agencies to one port or air 

terminal area for a concentrated inspection activity. A typical strike force activity 

is of a week’s duration. In addition to hazardous materials, areas of joint

inspection include drug interdiction, traffic/vessel safety, weapons of mass

destruction interdiction, and others. Check points are staffed by representatives 

from all agencies to maximize effectiveness and efficiency.
36
37

CHAPTER 6

PROGRAM DELIVERY ANALYSIS 

AND IMPROVEMENT STRATEGIES

The HMPE team concludes that an institutional capacity in DOT, located in either 

an existing or newly established office, is needed to identify areas where the 

Department's resources could be deployed more effectively by coordinating

policy, strategy, and program objectives. 

Hazardous Materials Program Needs 

Coordination, Direction, And Strategic Planning

The Secretarial delegations do not assign responsibility for managing and 

delivering a Departmentwide hazardous materials program to a single agency

within DOT. Therefore, no entity in the Department is responsible for setting

DOT-wide hazardous materials policy, establishing program objectives, or

coordinating inspection/enforcement and outreach strategies. Neither is there

central responsibility for overseeing budget and resource decisions from a

Departmentwide perspective or for managing program databases. Without

Departmentwide direction and oversight for the hazardous materials program,

DOT will not be able to deploy its resources as effectively as it could and the risk 

to the public from hazardous materials will not be minimized.

Several earlier studies reached similar conclusions as the HMPE team about the 

need for better planning and direction for the Department’s hazardous materials 

program. For example, in September 1978, a review conducted by a

Departmentwide task force under the direction of the then Deputy Secretary

recommended establishing a standing committee to provide a Departmental focal 

point for carrying out all hazardous materials programs.34 As a result of that 

report, the Secretary, in 1978, agreed to institute a committee headed by the RSPA 

Administrator with the Administrators of FAA, FRA, and FHWA, the 

Commandant of the Coast Guard, and Secretarial officers as its members. 

The 1978 task force recommended establishing a committee as a long-term 

solution, and cautioned that the committee should not be allowed to degrade over 

time. Specifically, the report stated “Care should be taken to prevent the Standing 

 

34 U.S. Department of Transportation, Deputy Secretary’s Report of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Task 

Force, September 1978.
38

Committee from becoming a committee which discusses, but has no power to act, 

and gradually ceases to meet altogether.” However, this is exactly what occurred. 

According to information provided by RSPA management, the appointed

committee held only a few meetings. Instead, for many years RSPA’s Associate 

Administrator for Hazardous Materials has chaired meetings attended by lowerlevel Operating Administration staff who deal with hazardous materials issues.

NTSB conducted a review that also had findings consistent with this report. 

NTSB’s 1981 report on hazardous materials carried by trucks reported that RSPA 

had been unsuccessful in coordinating the modal hazardous material program

because the agency was unable to exert influence over the larger Operating

Administrations. The NTSB report documented a need for strong and clear

direction from the Secretary.35 Yet, almost 20 years later, the HMPE team found 

many of the same problems still affect the Department’s hazardous materials 

program.

DOT's Strategic Plan and annual performance plans are intended to provide

greater focus on the Department’s strategic goals and help the Department manage 

for results. Unfortunately, DOT's Strategic Plan does not adequately address 

hazardous materials. Hazardous materials are not specifically addressed under the 

Strategic Goal for Safety and are only discussed as a candidate indicator under 

DOT's Strategic Goal for Human and Natural Environment. The low-level 

emphasis and lack of direction for the hazardous materials program in DOT’s 

strategic and annual performance plans contribute to the continued uncoordinated 

aspects of the Operating Administrations’ hazardous materials programs.

DOT's Performance Plan for 2000 contains a hazardous materials performance 

goal to reduce the number of serious hazardous materials incidents in

transportation to 411 or fewer in 2000 from a peak of 464 in 1996. However, the 

serious-incident measure does not capture the hazardous materials program's

performance. This is because the causes of most serious hazardous materials 

incidents are highway crashes due to driver fatigue, speeding, or other driver error. 

Because the HMR have no direct impact on reducing or controlling these factors, 

the performance goal does not measure hazardous materials program

effectiveness. 

DOT-Wide Program Coordination is Needed 

The program delivery weakness is due primarily to the absence of a mechanism 

within DOT to ensure coordination or to develop objectives, strategies, or

 

35 NTSB Safety Effectiveness Evaluation, Federal and State Enforcement Efforts in Hazardous Materials 

Transportation by Truck, NTSB-SEE-81-2, February 1981.
39

priorities for the Department's or the Operating Administrations’ overall hazardous 

materials outreach, inspection, and enforcement activities. The Operating

Administrations do not run their hazardous materials programs with a

Departmentwide perspective, but rather run individual programs that are subsets of 

larger overall safety programs. There are opportunities to improve program

delivery because over 14,000 hazardous materials incidents occur annually, and

many, especially those in the air mode, have the potential for catastrophic

consequences. 

DOT needs to establish an institutional capacity for administering and delivering a 

coordinated DOT-wide hazardous materials program. Establishing a

Departmentwide hazardous materials program with coordinated strategies, policies 

and program objectives would result in a more effective deployment of resources 

by focusing on problem areas identified through data and risk analyses, and by

being able to quickly respond to emerging problem areas by redeploying

resources. 

Until such an institutional capacity is established and has the ability to identify 

resource priorities, the HMPE team recommends that the Department improve 

program delivery by placing additional emphasis on (1) shippers, (2) outreach

programs, and (3) human factors/training.

Additional Emphasis Needed on Shippers, Outreach 

Programs, and Training

Congress has charged DOT to use its regulatory and enforcement authority to 

protect the nation against the risks to life and property inherent in the

transportation of hazardous materials in commerce. The vast majority of

hazardous materials is packaged in conformance with DOT’s regulations and

arrives at their destinations safely. Shippers and carriers have an interest in safety 

and, given the volume of shipments, the industry has a relatively good safety

record. About 14,000 hazardous materials incidents are reported annually, and the 

vast majority (97 percent) do not meet RSPA’s criteria for a “serious” incident. 

The extent to which DOT’s and the Operating Administrations’ efforts contribute 

to hazardous materials safety is difficult to measure and evaluate. 

The HMPE team found that the hazardous materials programs cannot be measured 

solely by shipment and incident statistics. The programs operate as an element of 

the Operating Administrations' larger safety programs, and these broader safety

programs often have a greater impact on reducing serious hazardous materials 

incidents than the hazardous materials programs themselves. For example,

73 percent of serious hazardous materials incidents are caused by motor vehicle 

crashes and railroad derailments, which generally are not directly affected by the 
40

hazardous materials program, but rather by the overall safety programs of FMCSA 

and FRA. Yet these crashes and derailments would have been recorded as serious 

hazardous materials incidents since they involved a hazardous material and are 

currently used to measure the success of the hazardous materials program. 

The HMPE team found that many elements of the hazardous materials program 

were working well. For example, there is multi-agency cooperation in

coordinating rulemaking activities, routine bi-monthly program meetings among 

the Operating Administrations’ staffs with hazardous materials responsibilities,

and periodic joint inspections conducted by two or more Operating

Administrations at airports, marine terminals, and other locations. However, there 

are opportunities to improve hazardous materials program delivery by increasing 

inspection and outreach emphasis on shippers, expanding outreach to the traveling 

public, and improving training for hazardous materials handlers. 

The HMPE team concludes that Departmentwide program management and

program delivery could be improved by establishing an institutional capacity with 

DOT-wide hazardous materials responsibilities. The new entity should have the 

following essential attributes related to cross-modal hazardous materials duties 

and responsibilities to:

• serve as the principal adviser to the Secretary on all intermodal

hazardous materials matters;

• act as the focal point for review of hazardous materials policies,

priorities, and objectives;

• provide oversight for planning and budgeting strategies for hazardous 

materials programs DOT-wide;

• resolve disputes among Operating Administrations on hazardous

materials issues; 

• provide external reviews and continual monitoring of DOT’s hazardous 

materials programs; and 

• coordinate DOT-wide hazardous materials outreach and data activities.

The new institutional capacity also should be tasked with addressing several

regulatory and programmatic issues identified by the team during the program

evaluation, but which were too complex or time consuming for this program

evaluation. These issues are described in Chapter 9. 

Other benefits result from establishing an institutional capacity, not the least of 

which are the ability to improve customer service to the hazardous materials

community. In addition to being the focal point for hazardous materials policies, 
41

priorities and objectives, the institutional capacity could be the focal point for 

contacts by the hazardous materials industry. 

A number of the team’s findings are supported by previous departmental studies. 

The need for DOT-wide planning and direction for the hazardous materials

program was identified in a 1978 internal DOT study. In 1981, NTSB reported on 

the need for strong and clear direction from the Secretary in the hazardous

materials program. Finally, the team does not believe the DOT Strategic Plan for 

1997– 2002 provides adequate direction for the Department’s hazardous materials 

program.

Greater Emphasis On Shippers

The Operating Administrations, with the exception of RSPA, have deployed their 

hazardous materials inspectors primarily at carrier operations. However,

investigation and experience repeatedly identify the shipper, more often than the 

carrier, as the party most culpable for noncompliance with the HMR. The shipper 

is at the beginning of the transportation stream and the actions or inactions of 

shippers critically impact the safety of all those subsequently involved in

transporting hazardous materials. 

Safety in transportation begins with the proper classification and preparation of the 

material for shipment. As summarized in a certification on the shipping paper (a 

requirement of the hazardous materials regulations), the shipper must ensure that 

materials are properly classified, described, packaged, marked, labeled,

documented, and in proper condition in accordance with the HMR. Once the 

package enters the transportation stream, if shippers have properly fulfilled their 

regulatory responsibilities, the package should withstand all forces incidental to 

the normal course of transportation. Table 6 details violations cited during

inspections conducted in 1998.
42

Table 6

Violations Detected in 19981

Section Description FAA FMCSA FRA RSPA USCG Total

Shipper Violations

Special Provisions 0 0 10 0 0 10

Shipping Papers 3654 10190 2938 174 80 17,036

Marking 1587 2300 1767 47 73 5,774

Labeling 1137 854 39 23 24 2,077

Emergency 

Response 1743 4754 110 34 6 6,647

General 

Requirements -

Shipping & Packing 103 2806 2984 476 49 6,418

Specifications for 

Tank Cars 0 0 269 0 0 269

Percentage of Total 

Violations

40.1%

Shipper or Carrier 

Violations

Program Procedures 0 3046 74 21 0 3,141

General 139321290 174 9 12032,986

Placarding 2 15640 4192 2 136 19,972

Training 751 0 2809 294 11 3,865

Specifications for 

Packagings 5 2340 1 160 9 2,515

Maintenance of 

packages 0 2787 62 2 0 2,851

Percentage of Total 

Violations

37.0%

Carrier Violations 257 16316 5068 2 157 21,800

Percentage of Total 

Violations

22.9%

Totals 10,632 62,323 20,497 1,244 665 95,361

1

 See Appendix VIII for a description of the violations identified in Table 6.

2

 Primarily violations of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) technical instructions, which is authorized by 49 CFR 

171.11 as an alternative to many of the hazardous materials regulations.

3

 Primarily violations of the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code, which is authorized by 49 CFR 171.12 as an 

alternative to many of the hazardous materials regulations. 

Source: Operating Administrations’ enforcement databases and team analysis.

To determine how often shippers were found at fault, the HMPE team analyzed 

the 1998 violations of the HMR. As presented in Table 6, review of these data 

showed that roughly 40 percent of the violations were attributed to shipper

functions, 37 percent could be attributed to either the shipper or the carrier, and 

almost 23 percent were attributed to the carrier. 
43

The HMPE team believes additional effort should be placed on identifying high 

risk or problem shippers and address these individuals or companies on a

Departmentwide basis. The Department conservatively estimates that there are 

75,000 hazardous materials shippers in the United States, a total too great to be 

effectively inspected by DOT’s limited inspector workforce. However, analysis of 

available information would assist the Department in targeting specific shippers. 

For example, the team’s analysis of reported hazardous materials incidents for 

1998 determined that 74 shippers were related to 29 percent of the nearly 15,000 

reported incidents. However, two-thirds of these shippers have never been

inspected or have not been inspected within the past 5 years. Further analysis of 

DOT’s hazardous materials data should result in the further refinement and

identification of problem shippers and a more effective use of inspection

resources.

In addition, during the analysis of 1998 incidents, the team identified one problem 

shipper that appeared in 208 incidents reported by several different carriers and 

modes of transportation. Further analysis of 1993 to 1998 incidents, the motor 

carrier enforcement database, and UNISHIP showed this shipper has been the

subject of closed enforcement cases by FAA, FRA, RSPA and Coast Guard, but 

no highway enforcement cases. Yet, highway carriers reported 99 percent of these 

incidents. Over the past 7 years, the annual number of incidents for this shipper 

has increased almost 850 percent. 

The result of the HMPE team's analysis, that shippers are more often at fault, 

parallels the results of a 1993 report by the Transportation Research Board

(TRB).36 TRB reported that emergency responders expressed concern about the 

frequency of missing or incorrect placards and shipping papers (shipper 

responsibilities) at hazardous materials incidents.37 Using FHWA data reflecting 

1992, TRB reported that during roadside inspections, violations of federal

requirements for placarding occur in about 30 percent of the trucks inspected, and 

violations of shipping paper requirements occur in about 25 percent. FHWA fiscal 

year 1998 data is slightly higher with improper placarding found on 32 percent of 

the hazardous materials vehicles inspected and violations of shipping papers found 

during 26 percent of inspections. A 1989 General Accounting Office report on 

FRA estimated that 75 percent of all hazardous materials releases could be traced 

to safety problems at shipper facilities.38

 

36 Transportation Research Board, National Research Council, Hazardous Materials Shipment Information for 

Emergency Response, Special Report 239, 1993.

37 Although placarding is a joint shipper/carrier responsibility, in the highway mode the shipper is required to provide 

the necessary placards (49 CFR 172.506).

38 U.S. General Accounting Office, DOT Should Better Manage Its Hazardous Materials Inspection Program, 

GAO/RCED 90-43, November 1989.
44

The HMPE team's review of FAA data for the past 3 years indicated that 139 of 

158 (88 percent) of FAA's significant penalty assessments, defined as $50,000 or 

more, were against shippers. FAA found that these shippers were offering

hazardous materials for transportation by air when they were not packaged,

labeled, marked, classed, or in condition for shipment by air as required by the 

HMR. FAA is also finding that some shippers are failing to ensure employees are 

trained to properly package and handle hazardous materials. For example, in

November 1999, FAA assessed a significant penalty against a shipper who offered 

for air transportation 525 cigarette lighters containing flammable gas. The

lighters, contained in a fiberboard box, were not properly packaged, labeled, or 

marked and the shipper's employees were not properly trained. 

The HMPE team also analyzed the HMR to determine the criticality of the

shipper's role in hazardous materials. The HMPE team determined that

approximately half of the HMR, roughly 500 pages, pertain to the shipper. During 

focus group meetings, it was reported that many small or one-time shippers are 

barely aware of the HMR, let alone capable of interpreting the complex provisions 

applicable to their shipments. 

No DOT-wide Emphasis on Shippers

Lack of DOT-wide emphasis on shippers may be due in part to the fact that no 

organization within the Department has been delegated overall responsibility for 

reviewing each Operating Administration's enforcement and outreach programs,

relative to shippers of hazardous materials, or for addressing problems with 

shippers. The HMPE team believes this is, in large part, because each Operating 

Administration, except for RSPA, has the responsibility for ensuring compliance 

with appropriate safety requirements for both carriers and shippers using that 

mode. 

The modal orientation of the Operating Administrations has logically led to their 

safety programs focusing on carriers.39 Moreover, compliance enforcement of the 

HMR is a small part of each Operating Administration’s larger safety program. 

As a result, hazardous materials compliance generally receives little emphasis 

(hazardous materials expenditures only represented 1.6 percent of the 1998 safety 

budgets of the Operating Administrations with hazardous materials

responsibilities) and shipper compliance with the HMR even less. 

The HMPE team attempted to determine the degree of emphasis placed on

shippers during Operating Administration inspection activities. Table 7 shows the 

 

39 FAA’s work plan calls for one shipper inspection for each carrier inspection performed.
45

number of inspections performed in 1998 at the point where DOT intervenes in the 

transportation stream.

Table 7

Number of Inspections by Point of Intervention – 1998

Point of Intervention

Agency Packaging/ 

Manufacturing Shipper Carrier/ Forwarder

Vehicles/ 

Railcars Total

FAA N/A 20813,349 N/A 3,557

FMCSA 20 147 1,927 133,6742135,768

FRA 134 3,617 5,124 89,633 98,508

RSPA 46031,2564 N/A N/A 1,716

USCG N/A 0 8,89950 8,899

Total 614 5,228 19,299 223,307 248,448

1 Reflects only Repair Station Assessments conducted for 1998. The FAA did conduct hazardous material 

shipper inspections in 1998; however, this activity was not tracked. 

2. Vehicle inspections performed by state resources under the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program.

3. Includes container manufacturers and cylinder retesters/reconditioners.

4. Includes shippers and shipper observations, freight terminals/docks, and exemption and approval holders.

5. Includes both vessels examined and intermodal freight containers inspected.

N/A means not applicable to the agency.

Source: Operating Administrations’ Inspection Databases

Table 7 shows DOT-wide that only 2 percent of all inspections are shipper

inspections. However, this is misleading because it does not take into account the 

large variance in time and resources used to conduct these inspections. For

example, a railcar inspection can take 5 to 15 minutes while a shipper inspection 

can take 2 or more days. The HMPE team could not compute the amount of 

inspectors' time spent at shippers because the Operating Administrations’

inspector time distribution records do not provide the needed amount of detail. 

The team believes more emphasis should be placed on shippers because they are a 

common element across the Operating Administrations and they perform critical 

functions early in the transportation stream. Shippers can impact safety 

system-wide, particularly if the shipment is handled more than once or involves 

more than one mode of transportation.

An Effective Outreach Program is Needed to Influence

Industry and the Traveling Public

The Department's limited inspection force can reach only a small portion of the 

hazardous materials community. With an estimated 1.2 million daily movements 

involving thousands of shippers and carriers, the Department's 256 hazardous

materials inspectors can oversee only a very small percentage of the hazardous 

materials community. The Department must rely on industry and the public’s 

voluntary compliance with the HMR if high levels of safety are to be maintained. 
46

The HMPE team conducted a series of focus group meetings with representatives 

of the hazardous materials community, during which the participants cited

frequent contact and outreach as the most effective interaction between the

Department and the hazardous materials community. Industry believes the HMR 

are too complex for error-free implementation and that outreach is an effective 

means to educate industry and improve compliance. Most Operating

Administrations do not maintain detailed statistics on outreach operations and

attendance. RSPA data, however, showed that its enforcement office personnel 

conducted or participated in 45 outreach presentations to over 3,600 participants, 

such as shippers, packaging manufacturers, and Federal, state, municipal, and

local agency officials in 1998. FAA data showed 83 outreach efforts, including 

presentations, briefings, and training workshops in 1998.

Additional outreach efforts should be directed toward the traveling public who 

often, unknowingly, bring hazardous materials into the transportation stream. 

Every day millions of travelers board planes, trains, ships, and buses unaware of 

the danger from the hazardous materials they may be carrying. The HMPE team 

also found that there are no Federal requirements to warn the traveling public of 

the restrictions on carrying hazardous materials in transportation, except in the air 

mode. 

Even in the air mode, the team found that current passenger notification rules are 

ineffective. The HMR requires passenger and cargo facilities to post notifications 

pertaining to hazardous materials restrictions. According to the regulations,

posting a sign at ticket counters and boarding areas may satisfy the requirement to 

notify airline passengers. However, the size and placement of the sign is not 

specified in the regulations. HMPE team members usually had difficulty locating 

the required notices in airports, and often had difficulty reading them when they 

were discovered because the notices were mounted at knee level in scale areas or 

were blocked by baggage. The team believes additional steps need to be taken 

much earlier in the transportation stream to increase awareness by the traveling 

public of the dangers posed by hazardous materials. 

The consequences of hazardous materials incidents on aircraft can be particularly 

serious. According to air traffic data, the 50 largest United States airports account 

for over 650 million passengers each year. As a method of informing air

passengers of potential risks, during 1996-1997, RSPA and FAA jointly created 

and distributed 6 million copies of a brochure titled "These Fly...These May Not" 

and placed them at major airports. The brochure described commonly carried

consumer commodities, such as nail polish remover, that can pose a hazard in air 

travel when transported in sufficient quantities. FAA has investigated five

incidents where micro-torches packed inside checked baggage either caught fire or 
47

exploded during loading or unloading. Recognizing this weakness, FAA has

developed and distributed to manufacturers and establishments selling the

micro-torches a brochure to educate them about the dangers associated with the 

torches. Increased awareness, on the part of the traveling public, about the

dangers of hazardous materials offers an opportunity for improving transportation 

safety, particularly flight safety. 

Outreach efforts also need to concentrate on vehicular travelers. Highway deaths 

constitute the majority of all hazardous materials incident fatalities. According to 

FMCSA’s annual profile of large truck crashes, the majority of the fatalities are 

the result of highway crashes between passenger vehicles and hazardous materials 

carriers hauling flammable liquids. FMCSA’s annual profile also reports that

roughly 75 percent of crash fatalities involve non-truck occupants, and based on 

police accident reports, 75 percent of the crashes were the result of some action of 

the driver of the passenger vehicle, primarily failure to yield. The HMPE team 

believes outreach directed at passenger vehicle drivers is another area warranting 

further attention. Passenger vehicle drivers should be taught to be sensitive to the 

need to provide sufficient clearance or operating distance for large trucks hauling 

hazardous materials, and taught to recognize the placarded carriers. Their actions 

could result in severe consequences involving a crash of a heavy truck hauling 

hazardous materials.

The HMPE team concluded that coordinated outreach programs could have a more 

effective impact. For example, the team’s analysis of HMIS reported incidents for 

1998 determined that 23 percent were from infrequent shippers. Infrequent

shippers are too randomly situated to warrant any intervention except through

some form of broad-based outreach. However, the HMPE team found that the 

Operating Administrations have not coordinated their outreach or training

programs and no departmental organization has been given the authority or

responsibility to coordinate these programs. The Department’s hazardous

materials outreach program would benefit from such a coordinated ONE-DOT 

effort. 

As part of the program evaluation, the HMPE team participated in individual

Operating Administration hazardous materials inspections and multi-modal strike 

force types of inspection activities. Although the various state and Federal

inspectors exhibited knowledge of their modal specific and general requirements 

pertaining to hazardous materials, the team found improved cross-modal training 

would be beneficial to DOT inspectors. For example, the HMPE team found that 

inspectors from one Operating Administration were not fully aware of the more 

stringent blocking and bracing requirements for other modes of transportation. In 

addition, inspector training concerning use of hazardous materials segregation

charts and modal specific quantity or packaging limitations could be improved. In 
48

light of the ever increasing multi-modal nature of hazardous materials shipments, 

the team believes there is a need to review the training programs of DOT

inspectors to ensure all DOT inspectors receive an adequate level of baseline 

training that gives the inspectors an understanding of the unique responsibilities 

and requirements for each mode of transportation. 

The team also believes that the Department’s hazardous materials program could 

be improved by the use of strike force inspection activities to cross-train inspectors 

as well as enforce regulations. Strike force operations concentrate inspectors from 

the Operating Administrations and other Federal, state, and local agencies at

intermodal locations for a specific time period to conduct hazardous materials 

inspections of all modes of transportation using that targeted location. In addition 

to enforcing compliance, strike force operations can be used to train inspectors 

from one Operating Administration on the issues, problems, and regulatory 

requirements of the other Operating Administrations.

DOT Needs to Give More Attention to the 

Role of Training in Hazardous Materials Incidents

Both shippers and carriers must extensively rely on, and have little opportunity to 

confirm, each other’s compliance with the HMR. The shipper has the greatest 

control over whether the material is properly classified, described, packaged,

marked, labeled, documented, and in proper condition for transportation. In many 

cases, the carrier cannot view the packages offered by the shipper, particularly if 

they are offered in an intermodal container or truck trailer. Conversely, when the 

carrier owns the package, such as a cargo tank motor vehicle, the shipper expects 

the package to conform to the hazardous materials regulations necessary for their 

shipment. 

Regulatory compliance and transportation safety require hazardous materials

employees to be trained. Congressional concern over the training of hazardous 

materials employees was expressed in 1974 and again in 1990. A 1990 Act 

required the Secretary to prescribe training requirements that hazardous materials 

employers must give hazardous materials employees on the safe loading,

unloading, handling, storage, and transportation of hazardous materials.40 RSPA

issued training regulations in 1992.

However, the HMPE team found that employee training is still a problem. RSPA 

data show that from 1991 through 1998, human error was the contributing factor 

in roughly 80 percent of hazardous materials incidents and that the training

standard has had no discernable influence on the percentage of hazardous

 

40 Public Law 101-615.
49

materials incidents attributable to human error.41 Figure 8 shows the percentage of 

incidents caused by human error from 1991 through 1998.

Figure 8

Percentages of Hazardous Materials Incidents 

Attributable to Human Error - 1991 through 1998

Source: RSPA, Biennial Reports on Hazardous Materials Transportation, and RSPA HMIS incident 

database as of October 21, 1999.

The HMPE team believes hazardous materials safety could be improved by

ensuring that hazardous materials employees are adequately trained. The

provisions in the HMR employee-training standard do not ensure employees are 

adequately trained to carry out their functions. There is no requirement to show

that a minimum level of knowledge was obtained. For example, while there is a 

requirement that hazardous materials employees be trained and tested for general 

hazardous materials awareness and job-specific safety requirements, there is no 

standard curriculum, no requirement that employees have to actually pass the test, 

and no requirement for the employer to maintain a copy of the employees’ test 

results. 

In addition, decisions about which employees need to be trained and how much 

training they need to receive is left to the discretion of the employer. As a result, 

it is difficult for the Operating Administrations to evaluate the competency of 

hazardous materials employees who handle hazardous materials. A more stringent 

training requirement could reduce the number of incidents caused by human error, 

the leading cause of hazardous materials incidents. 

 

41 Although the HMPE team’s analysis of 1996 HMIS data identified a lower percentage of hazardous materials 

incidents attributable to human error than RSPA’s statistics, 62 percent versus 81 percent, human error continues to be 

the single greatest contributing factor in hazardous materials incidents.

0

20

40

60

80

100

19911992199319941995199619971998

Average

Years

Percentages
50

Compliance with the HMR by a well-informed, fully-trained workforce is

essential. There is a need to do more to address the human error factor by

achieving more through training, education and outreach. Ensuring that shippers 

and carriers adequately train employees may be DOT’s best approach to achieving 

better compliance with the HMR.

Potential Legislative, Regulatory, and Other Issues

The HMPE team also identified potential legislative, regulatory, and other issues 

related to DOT’s Hazardous Materials Program that could benefit from further 

assessment and analysis. These include: gaining a better understanding of industry 

practices related to undeclared shipments; examining ways to clarify and improve 

the effectiveness of the hazardous materials regulations, including a review of the 

adequacy of "performance-oriented packaging" requirements; increasing

cooperation with the United States Postal Service to identify potential safety gaps 

related to hazardous materials shipments by mail; enhancing enforcement 

authority; and identifying better measures for the DOT-wide performance plan that 

more fully reflect the hazardous materials program. Chapter 9 contains a detailed 

discussion of these areas.
51

CHAPTER 7

DATA ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT STRATEGIES

The HMPE team was sufficiently hampered in its ability to obtain data to perform 

analysis that it concluded that data deficiency problems are an important issue to 

bring to the attention of DOT leadership. The lack of sufficient, reliable, and 

timely information limits the Department’s ability to make informed program

delivery decisions. All facets of the program are affected, from program planning 

through inspections and outreach to estimating resource needs. The team also 

found the Department does not have a coordinated, DOT-wide plan to improve its 

hazardous materials data or use the data to manage the program.

DOT Does Not Have Accurate Information 

On the Hazardous Materials Industry

The Department's hazardous materials programs are hampered by a lack of

sufficient, reliable, and timely information on which to evaluate the effectiveness 

of actions taken or base program delivery decisions. Although the Department has 

general information, it does not have specific, detailed information on the

hazardous materials community. Specifically, the Department does not have

sufficient information on the:

• population and identity of shippers and carriers of hazardous materials;

• frequency, amounts, and types of hazardous materials each shipper or 

carrier transports;

• number of hazardous materials incidents occurring annually and their 

causes; and

• amount of funding and staffing resources the Department spends on

hazardous materials activities. 

Identification of Shippers and 

Carriers of Hazardous Materials

None of the data systems employed by the Department have been designed to 

contain sufficient information on shippers and carriers of hazardous materials for

DOT to effectively manage its programs. This lack of information is evident upon 

review of key DOT databases, such as RSPA’s registration database; DOT’s

Unified Shippers Enforcement Data System (UNISHIP); and, FMCSA’s Motor

Carrier Management Information System database.
52

Shipper Identification

Under the HMTL some, but not all, hazardous materials shippers and carriers are 

required to register annually with the Department.42 A shipper or carrier must 

register if it offers or transports: 

• certain quantities of dangerous radioactive materials; 

• certain quantities of explosives;

• certain quantities of the most lethal poison by inhalation; 

• hazardous materials in bulk packages that have a capacity of more than 

3,500 gallons; or 

• shipments of non-bulk packages of 5,000 pounds or more that require 

placarding. 

RSPA has recently issued a final rule to expand the registration criteria to include, 

with limited exception, all placarded shipments of hazardous materials.43 While 

this action will help to fill in some of DOT’s information gaps, RSPA could use its 

full authority to extend the registration requirement to all shippers and carriers of 

hazardous materials. The registration process is also exempt from the

requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 and RSPA could collect 

additional information without significant paperwork obstacles.44 Therefore,

RSPA could require all shippers and carriers to register and provide some

information on hazardous materials, which would assist the Department in

implementing its hazardous materials program.45 

No DOT-wide Shipper Identification Number

The Department does not have a single shipper identification number used by all 

Operating Administrations in their compliance records. The HMPE team believes 

such an identification number is necessary to track shipper compliance with the 

HMR. In 1981, NTSB recommended RSPA develop a Departmentwide common 

shipper designator for all compliance records.46 RSPA’s final response, dated 

July 8, 1994, indicated that such a system, “UNISHIP,” would fill this need.

 

42 49 CFR Part 107.601-620.

43 Docket No. RSPA-99-5137 (HM-208C) Federal Register/Vol. 65, No. 30, Page 7297, February 14, 2000.

44 Title 49 U.S.C. § 5108(i).

45 RSPA can establish volume/quantity thresholds below which registered infrequent shippers and carriers would not 

pay a registration fee. 

46 NTSB Safety Effectiveness Evaluation, Federal and State Enforcement Efforts in Hazardous Materials 

Transportation by Truck, NTSB-SEE-81-2, February 1981. 
53

The HMPE team has found that UNISHIP does not meet the 1981 NTSB

recommendation to “Develop and use a common shipper identifier in all DOT

hazardous materials compliance records.” Rather, the HMPE team found that the 

Operating Administrations do not use or reference the UNISHIP identification

number in their compliance databases, but instead assign their own unique

identifiers. This results in inconsistent identifiers within the Department for a 

single shipper with no ability to track problem shippers.

Other UNISHIP Weaknesses

DOT developed the UNISHIP system in response to a 1991 General Accounting 

Office audit report that found that neither RSPA nor the other Operating

Administrations maintain complete noncompliance or violation histories on

shippers and carriers.47 The HMPE team found that the UNISHIP database does 

not include a complete history of all shipper compliance inspections. Instead, it 

contains only closed enforcement cases pertaining to shippers, (including freight 

forwarders). The lack of current inspection information or pending enforcement 

actions limits UNISHIP’s effectiveness. Sharing information on enforcement

actions would assist the Operating Administrations in identifying and prioritizing 

shippers to inspect. Such information would also be useful in determining

appropriate penalty amounts to assess violators since agencies are required by

statute to consider prior knowledge and violations when assessing penalties.48

Another UNISHIP database limitation is the lack of timely information. The 

Operating Administrations are not updating the database frequently enough for it 

to be of maximum value to all inspectors. RSPA has asked, because it has no 

DOT-wide authority to require, the Operating Administrations to voluntarily

update the database quarterly. Our review found that only FAA and RSPA were 

doing so; the other Operating Administrations were providing only annual

updates. We also found that, with minor exception, only FAA and RSPA were 

using the UNISHIP database. In 1998, DOT employees accessed UNISHIP 629 

times, 51 percent by FAA, 47 percent by RSPA, and 2 percent by the other

Operating Administrations. 

Carrier Identification

There are 46,000 full-time hazardous materials motor carriers registered with

DOT. The most recent audit of the FMCSA noted there were serious data

 

47 U.S. General Accounting Office, Information Strategy Needed for Hazardous Materials, GAO/IMTRC-91-50, 

November 1991

48 Title 49 U.S.C. § 5123.
54

completeness, accuracy, and timeliness issues with carrier profiles.49 

Consequently, the Department does not know how many other general carriers are 

hauling hazardous materials. As noted earlier, there are roughly 500,000 potential

hazardous materials carriers in the United States. The Department also does not 

have sufficient data on the quantity, type, and frequency of hazardous materials 

products transported. Although the Operating Administrations have developed

some of this information, it is not complete, and no specific DOT requirement 

exists to develop a system to obtain complete information. Furthermore, none of 

the Operating Administrations have authority to require carriers to report this 

information. For example: 

• FMCSA is in the process of revising its regulations to require carriers to 

submit periodic updates, but such updates would not include the

quantity or frequency of data mentioned above. 

• FRA, because of Interstate Commerce Commission (now Surface

Transportation Board) regulations, receives waybill data. However,

even these limited shipment data are not comprehensive enough to

ascertain the number of shipments and movements by class of

hazardous materials. 

• The Department of Commerce and BTS’s Commodity Flow Survey

(CFS) contains data on hazardous materials. The data are limited

because they focus on commodities and sample only domestic

manufacturers, only some of which are hazardous. The Commodity 

Flow Survey is further limited because it is conducted only every 5 

years and does not include reshippers or major retail companies. 

• RSPA’s internal study of incident report data includes a

recommendation to provide classification codes to support limited

matching with CFS data. This October 1998 study is still in draft, and 

CFS data released since then use more extensive classification systems 

that provide greater possibilities for matching. 

As indicated above, these data collection limitations hamper DOT’s ability to 

effectively allocate scarce resources. There are initiatives within the Department 

to improve data. However, these initiatives lack the coordination and emphasis 

necessary to meet Departmentwide needs. 

 

49 Office of Inspector General, Motor Carrier Safety Program, Report No. TR-1999-091, April 1999
55

Data on Shipments and Movements of 

Hazardous Materials Not Reliable

The Department does not have reliable hazardous materials traffic estimates. The 

best available data on hazardous materials flows are derived from CFS data. In 

1998, RSPA’s Office of Hazardous Materials Safety conducted a study to

determine the number of hazardous material shipments and movements occurring 

in the United States.50 The information collected from the Census Bureau’s 1993 

CFS was used in conjunction with other data to develop shipment and movement 

estimates. However, the CFS is not designed to capture specific information on 

the transportation of hazardous materials shipments or movements. Rather, the 

survey was a broad sample of 200,000 domestic manufacturers that produce and 

ship commodities, only some of which are hazardous. RSPA is in the process of 

updating its shipment and movement study using information from the 1997 CFS. 

The CFS contains an improved method for identifying hazardous materials. 

The CFS covers shippers in manufacturing, mining, wholesaling, and selected

retail establishments. However, it does not include shipments by governments; 

service industries, such as hospitals, and other sources of hazardous materials 

shipments. Furthermore, the CFS does not cover imports or shipments between 

foreign origins and destinations that move through the United States (particularly 

between Canada and Mexico). The biggest limitation is that the CFS sample is 

designed to collect general commodity information; it is not targeted at hazardous 

materials shipments. 

Finally, CFS is further limited for hazardous materials program purposes because 

it does not sample governments, foreign establishments, and most business

establishments in the retail and service sectors, many of which ship hazardous 

materials. For example, a nationwide retail outlet shipping lawn chemicals, and 

many similar businesses transporting such items as pool supplies and chlorine 

bleaches would not be sampled. Yet these establishments, sometimes referred to 

as reshippers, are responsible for introducing large volumes of hazardous materials 

into the transportation stream, either via shipments or transporting the products 

themselves. 

Need to Improve and Expand DOT’s 

Hazardous Materials Information System 

RSPA's Hazardous Materials Incident Reporting Subsystem (HMIRS), a part of 

the HMIS, is intended to be the DOT repository of hazardous materials incident 

 

50 RSPA study prepared by the Office of Hazardous Materials Safety on Hazardous Materials Shipments, October 

1998.
56

information. Carriers that experience an unintentional release of hazardous

materials during transportation, including loading, unloading, or temporary

storage, are required to submit an Incident Report Form DOT 5800.1, to RSPA

(see Appendix VI). This incident is then entered into the HMIRS. However, the 

team’s review of the HMIRS found that all incidents are not reported, and the data 

are incomplete in numerous areas, particularly in identifying the root cause of 

incidents. As discussed in Chapter 4, the HMPE team performed an independent 

analysis of 1996 incident reports and found many inaccuracies with regard to the 

causes of hazardous materials incidents. For example, the HMPE team’s analysis 

identified human error as the cause of 62.4 percent of hazardous materials

incidents versus 80.7 percent identified by RSPA.

In addition, the HMPE team compared information contained in reports to the 

National Response Center (NRC), which receives all telephonic reports of

incidents, with HMIRS information. The team found incidents, both serious and 

nonserious, that were not reported to RSPA. For example, the HMPE team

reviewed 12 NRC incident reports which appeared to meet RSPA’s criteria for 

serious incidents. The following 3 serious incidents were not included or reported 

correctly in the HMIRS: 

• A tank truck overturned and spilled 10,000 gallons of gasoline, which 

polluted a local river and resulted in road closure. HMPE telephone 

discussions with the on-scene coordinator determined the vehicle rolled 

over while negotiating a tight entrance ramp. Based on a review of the 

NRC summary report, this incident should be considered a serious

incident because of the road closure. Yet, our review of the HMIS

determined that the motor carrier had not filed an incident report with 

RSPA. 

• A tank truck rolled over and spilled 3,500 gallons of diesel oil, which 

caught fire and subsequently leaked into a nearby storm drain. HMPE 

telephone discussions with the on-scene coordinator indicated the

interstate highway was closed for several hours during cleanup

operations. Therefore, this incident meets the definition of a serious 

incident. Our review of the HMIS, however, determined that the motor 

carrier had not filed an incident report with RSPA.

• A flatbed tractor-trailer overturned and spilled 44,000 pounds of sodium 

hydrosulfide, which reacts with water. HMPE telephone discussions with 

the on-scene coordinator indicated the initial fire department response 

was to use water to combat the fire. This action caused explosions and 

elevated the degree of danger. Because of the fire and explosion, the 

cleanup took 36 hours and involved the evacuation of several families, as 
57

well as a road closure. Thus, this incident should be considered a serious 

incident. Our review of HMIS data determined a report had been filed 

within 2 weeks of the incident. However, the report did not indicate the 

fire, explosions, and road closure. The vehicle (package) was incorrectly 

reported as a cargo tank when in fact the hazardous materials were packed 

in 2-ton tote bins loaded on the flat-bed trailer. Finally, the report did not 

correctly identify the hazard class. 

In 1986, the Office of Technology Assessment conducted an examination of the 

HMIS and found that approximately 50 percent of the most serious hazardous 

materials incidents may not be reported. The Office of Technology Assessment 

identified intrastate highway and bulk marine transport incidents as significant

omissions.51 An October 1998 draft report on a review of the HMIRS conducted 

by RSPA noted the level of underreporting of incidents is unknown but could be 

significant.52 The underreporting of hazardous materials incidents can seriously 

influence the level of resources deemed appropriate to ensure the safe transport of 

hazardous materials. The Department needs to be able to better define the level 

and types of hazardous materials activity in the transportation stream so that it can 

deploy appropriate resources for maximum benefit. Beginning with fiscal year 

1999, the hazardous materials incident-reporting requirement was extended to

intrastate motor carriers, which should better capture the full extent of hazardous 

materials incidents.

The HMPE team also reviewed 1996 incident reports, the baseline year for DOT’s 

hazardous materials performance goal, to identify reporting patterns that could

indicate inaccurate reporting, such as questionable damage report figures. One 

large motor carrier that accounted for 1,459 incidents - 10 percent of the year's 

total - was reviewed by the HMPE team in more detail. The review showed that 

for over 90 percent of the incidents, the carrier reported the same incident

consequences ($125 in damages, no injuries, and no evacuations), regardless of the 

type or quantity of material involved or the location of the incident. At the least, 

these apparently standard entries should have led RSPA to question the accuracy 

of the reports and suggests RSPA's review of incident reports is not adequate. 

Improved data would indicate the true extent of damage caused by carriers

reporting to RSPA and assist DOT in better determining resource allocation.

RSPA does not validate incident data unless the incident involves a fatality or a 

serious injury, or the quality of information is such that the carrier must be

contacted. RSPA officials told us they were aware of some of the problems, such 

 

51 Office of Technology Assessment, Transportation of Hazardous Materials, July 1986.

52 RSPA Office of Hazardous Materials Planning and Analysis, Hazardous Materials Information System (HMIS) 

Incident Reporting Subsystem Review, October 1998. 
58

as failures to report the exact cause of an incident or where an incident actually 

occurred (versus where the spill was discovered). Currently, RSPA has an open 

rulemaking to address a number of these deficiencies.

RSPA’s draft HMIS review report found that the system does not contain

information sufficient to conduct risk analysis. Such information includes

transportation system conditions; loading, unloading, storage and transfer facility 

conditions; detailed packaging information; and vehicle and human factors

information. This report also found that HMIS data are limited in their ability to 

support cause-and-effect analyses, primarily because insufficient information is 

collected on root cause. For example, the root cause of a leak from a loose valve 

may be that corrosion prevented the valve from being sufficiently tightened. This 

lack of adequate information could lead DOT to take inappropriate action directed 

at the training of employees rather than at the maintenance of tank cars. 

The draft study also examined additional data sources, both within and external to 

DOT, to determine whether they could be used in conjunction with HMIRS to 

address any identified data needs. The study concluded that weaknesses in the 

existing HMIRS data could not be supplemented by using these additional data. 

Budget and Staffing Data Not Readily Available

With the exception of RSPA, the Operating Administrations do not have line items 

in their budgets for hazardous materials activities. For example, FAA officials 

estimated that 70 percent of their budget for Dangerous Goods and Cargo Security 

was used for dangerous goods (hazardous materials) activities. FRA's estimate, on 

the other hand, is based on the ratio of hazardous materials staffing to total Office 

of Safety staffing. The HMPE team, working with Operating Administration

personnel, developed estimates showing the Department spent $36.6 million on 

the hazardous materials program in 1998, which equates to 1.6 percent of the 

Department's total safety budget. Table 8 shows the HMPE team’s breakdown of 

the Department's estimated hazardous materials program funding for 1998 by

Operating Administration.
59

Table 8

1998 Estimated Hazardous Materials

Program Funding by Operating Administration

Agency Total Safety Budget

($ million)1

Hazardous 

Materials Budget2

($ million)

Hazardous Materials as 

a Percent of Safety

FAA $ 986 $ 8.0 0.8

FMCSA 365 2.5 0.6

FRA 86 6.5 7.5

RSPA 60 15.4 25.7

USCG 866 4.2 0.5

Total $2,363 $36.6 1.6

1

 Source: DOT Performance Plan Fiscal Year 2000 (which contained 1998 budget data). 

2

 Source: Information gathered by HMPE team from agency organizational data and modal HMPE 

team member program knowledge.

The HMPE team also estimated that 389 staff years were spent on hazardous 

materials activities in 1998. This consisted of 256 years by inspectors, 113 by 

headquarters personnel (87 of which are RSPA employees) and 20 by attorneys. 

Table 9 shows the breakdown by Operating Administration of the estimated

staffing for the hazardous materials program in 1998. 

Table 9

1998 Estimated Hazardous Materials Program

Staffing by Operating Administration

Agency Field Inspectors/ 

Specialists

Headquarters

Personnel Attorneys Total

FAA 95 6 12 113

FMCSA 23 3 1 27

FRA 55 7 1 63

RSPA 32 82 5 119

USCG 51 15 1 67

Total 256 113 20 389

Source: Information gathered by HMPE team from agency organizational data and program officials. 

More accurate information on hazardous materials funding and staffing is needed 

by the Department to accurately assess program effectiveness and sufficiency of 

resource deployment. Such determinations are required under the GPRA and

could serve to target resources in a more effective manner. 

Need for a Departmentwide Data System Widely Recognized

Over the past 20 years, several reports conducted by or for the Department have 

criticized the lack of a single Departmentwide data system. The 1978 DOT Task 

Force found that each Operating Administration “involved with hazardous
60

materials performs its own data collection and data analysis.... These information 

systems are inadequate for comprehensive program planning and analysis.”53 The 

report recommended that the Department’s hazardous materials data collection

systems be strengthened and centralized and become the basis for hazardous

materials program planning, regulation development, enforcement, and program

evaluation.

The 1980 GAO report found that the Department had not developed an

information system that is complete or accurate, or which allowed for

comprehensive planning and analysis of the hazardous materials program. As a 

result, the Department can neither determine the extent of problems involved in 

transporting hazardous materials nor ensure Congress - and the American public -

that it is using its limited staffing and funding resources in the most efficient and 

effective manner.54 The report also stated that, historically, DOT did not have the 

critical information necessary to manage its hazardous materials program. The 

HMPE team concluded that these findings are still valid.

The 1993 TRB report stated that no comprehensive national census or

representative sample of hazardous materials incidents exists.55 The report

recommended DOT’s incident reporting processes “...should formally coordinate 

to ensure that data are defined and collected uniformly, duplicate reporting is 

avoided, and data collection is designed to serve essential program evaluation and 

research needs.”

The HMPE team found that the conditions cited in these earlier reports are

basically unchanged. The Department continues to operate hazardous materials 

programs without the benefit of reliable data. It is extremely difficult for the 

Department, because of data deficiencies, to meet its statutory requirement to 

report on the effectiveness of the hazardous materials enforcement activities, and 

the degree of voluntary compliance.56 Furthermore, the lack of quality data

severely limits the Department’s ability to perform any level of program analysis 

or have confidence that it has sufficient resources to discharge its responsibilities. 

Data limitations also prevent DOT from reporting on the effectiveness of the 

hazardous materials program as it is required to do in its biennial report to

Congress on hazardous material transportation. 

 

53 U.S. Department of Transportation, Deputy Secretary’s Report of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Task 

Force, September 1978.

54 U.S. General Accounting Office, Programs For Ensuring The Safe Transportation of Hazardous Materials Need 

Improvement, GAO/RCED-81-5, November 1980. 

55 Transportation Research Board, Hazardous Materials Shipment Information for Emergency Response, Special 

Report 239, 1993. 

56 Title 49 U.S.C. § 5121.
61

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS,

AND SENIOR LEADERSHIP RESPONSE 

DOT-wide Hazardous Materials Program Coordination Issues

DOT has not achieved a Departmentwide approach to implementing its hazardous 

materials program. Moreover, the program lacks sound strategic planning and 

coordinated DOT-wide direction. As a result, DOT is unlikely to improve, and 

because of forecasted growth may not maintain, the existing level of safety in

hazardous materials transportation. 

The HMPE team concluded that the Department's hazardous materials program 

needs to be more focused and better coordinated to ensure a high level of safety 

and establish an effective, vigilant, and visible ONE-DOT hazardous materials 

program. We conclude that little has changed over the past 20 years in terms of 

strategic planning, program direction, and program delivery despite

recommendations for change by both internal DOT and external groups. Need for 

a Departmental focal point on hazardous materials continues to be critical. 

An earlier effort by the Department to correct these problems by establishing a 

Standing Committee, chaired by the RSPA Administrator, failed to adequately

institutionalize oversight responsibility. The Department needs to develop and

implement an improved and lasting Departmentwide approach for its hazardous 

materials program if it intends to improve strategic planning and program

coordination and achieve a hazardous materials program that reflects ONE-DOT. 

The team makes the following recommendations:

Recommendation 1. We recommend that the Secretary create an institutional 

capacity, complementary to the Operating Administrations at the Departmentwide 

level, to facilitate program coordination and direction to provide for more effective 

deployment of DOT’s hazardous materials resources. The institutional capacity 

would administer and deliver a Departmentwide hazardous materials program to 

strengthen strategic planning, program coordination, and program delivery. It

would have the authority to establish DOT-wide policy, program objectives and 

priorities, and focus budget and resource strategies. A Departmentwide hazardous 

materials program can best be instituted by delegating authority to a new or

existing entity to be responsible for the program.
62

The HMPE team believes there are several attributes that are essential to the new 

institutional capacity achieving a DOT-wide hazardous materials program. Its

delegated mission must be to: 

• serve as the principal adviser to the Secretary on all intermodal

hazardous materials matters;

• act as the focal point for review of hazardous materials policies,

priorities, and objectives;

• provide oversight for planning and budgeting strategies for hazardous 

materials programs DOT-wide;

• resolve disputes among Operating Administrations on hazardous

materials issues; 

• provide external reviews and continual monitoring of DOT’s hazardous 

materials programs; and 

• coordinate DOT-wide hazardous materials outreach and data activities.

The new institutional capacity also should be tasked with addressing several 

regulatory and programmatic issues identified by the team during the program

evaluation, but which were too complex or time consuming for this program

evaluation. 

By delegation of authority, the Secretary should establish a Departmentwide

hazardous materials safety organization, located either within the Office of

Intermodalism or as a separate organization within RSPA. The first tasks of this 

organization should be to implement the recommendations of this report and

oversee the examination of the issues identified in this report as areas for further 

analysis identified in Chapter 9.

Recommendation 2. We recommend that the Department should place more 

emphasis on hazardous materials in its Strategic Plan Goal for Safety and in its 

Performance Plan. Revisions to the Strategic Plan and Performance Plan would 

help ensure the Department fulfills its responsibility to adequately protect the 

nation against risks inherent in the transportation of hazardous materials. DOT’s 

revised strategic plan needs to: (1) specifically identify and address hazardous 

materials safety within DOT’s broader safety goal; (2) provide a statement,

together with appropriate strategies, to recognize and achieve DOT’s additional 

hazardous materials responsibilities related to uniformity, efficiency, and

emergency response; and (3) ensure that the appropriate operating administrations 

within DOT are held accountable for achieving the hazardous materials strategic 

and outcome goals. DOT’s performance measure(s) also need to be revised to 

fully reflect DOT’s safety and related responsibilities. Developing a set of

measures is identified in Chapter 9 as an area meriting further examination.
63

Program Delivery Issues

The Department needs to focus its program delivery efforts differently to maintain 

or improve the existing level of safety. Shippers of hazardous materials receive 

less attention than warranted due to their importance to the safe transport of

hazardous materials and by inspection results; yet they provide the Department 

with the greatest potential to impact safety early in the transportation stream. 

Human error continues to be the single greatest contributing factor to hazardous 

materials incidents and DOT has not been effective in changing this trend. 

Finally, the traveling public is largely unaware of the dangers inherent in carrying 

hazardous materials in all transportation modes. The HMPE makes the following 

recommendations to improve program delivery: 

Recommendation 1. We recommend that the Department’s new institutional 

capacity develop DOT-wide strategies and actions to focus more outreach and

inspections on high risk or problem shippers. Shippers are the entry point for 

hazardous materials in commerce and their level of compliance with the HMR

impacts everyone in the transportation stream, including emergency responders. 

Recommendation 2. We recommend that RSPA work with the other Operating 

Administrations and industry to enhance the regulations addressing training and

the enforcement of those requirements. Training is one of the most effective tools 

available to the Department to improve compliance with the HMR. Rigorous 

training efforts targeted to high-risk points in the process are likely to be effective 

in reducing hazardous materials incidents. Such a targeted training program

would allow the knowledge of hazardous materials risks to filter downstream to 

dock workers, drivers, re-shippers, and infrequent users/shippers. Key elements of 

a training standard should include training targeted to material operators, handlers, 

and shippers and testing to ensure that those who handle hazardous materials are 

knowledgeable about how to deal safely with them and with the potential for

serious consequences if the hazardous materials are improperly handled.

Recommendation 3. We recommend that the newly established institutional 

capacity work with the Operating Administrations to review the training programs 

of DOT inspectors to ensure all DOT inspectors receive an adequate level of 

baseline training that gives the inspectors an understanding of the unique

responsibilities and requirements for each mode of transportation. 

Recommendation 4. We recommend that the institutional capacity at the DOTwide level should coordinate an effort for the Operating Administrations to

develop a nationwide hazardous materials awareness program for the traveling

public. One element of such a program could include broadcasting information on 

the dangers of hazardous materials in luggage or items commonly shipped as
64

cargo. A second element would raise the public’s awareness to the dangers of 

providing insufficient clearance or operating distance to large trucks hauling

hazardous materials. A broad nationwide campaign could mirror the successful 

public service announcements used by DOT’s National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration to increase seat belt usage. The traveling public needs greater 

awareness about the dangers posed by hazardous materials. 

Data Issues

The Department is hampered by the lack of accurate and complete information 

with which to evaluate program effectiveness and to make basic program delivery 

and resource decisions. In addition, the Department is unable to precisely gauge 

the effectiveness of its hazardous materials program or develop better risk-based 

regulations. The HMPE team makes the following recommendations.

Recommendation 1. We recommend that the Department task the Bureau of 

Transportation Statistics to lead a project, supported by the Operating

Administrations and coordinated by the new institutional capacity at the

DOT-wide level, to identify data needs and develop plans to acquire the necessary 

data and analyze that data. The project should include an evaluation of the costs 

and benefits of acquiring data on the:

• population and identity of shippers and carriers of hazardous materials;

• frequency, amounts, and types of hazardous materials each shipper or 

carrier transports; 

• number of hazardous materials incidents occurring annually; and 

• causes of hazardous materials incidents.

Recommendation 2. We recommend that the Department task the Bureau of 

Transportation Statistics to identify and implement ways to improve the HMIS and 

UNISHIP databases to increase their usefulness to the Operating Administrations. 

The HMIS should include more specific information on incident causes. Modes 

should be required to more frequently report shipper inspection results to RSPA 

for inclusion in the UNISHIP database. These actions would improve RSPA's 

ability to determine incident causes and assist the Department in identifying repeat 

offenders for inspection and establishing penalty amounts.

Recommendation 3. We recommend that BTS and RSPA work together to 

design a process to more fully evaluate and analyze existing incident data to

develop a better understanding of the root causes of hazardous materials incidents. 

Identifying root causes would assist the Operating Administrations in finding ways 

to resolve the problems, especially if root causes go beyond hazardous materials 
65

and are directly related to broader safety issues, such as operator fatigue or

excessive speed, or unsafe driving practices by other drivers.

Recommendation 4. We recommend that the Secretary delegate to the newly 

established institutional capacity authority to develop a consistent approach for the 

Operating Administrations to conduct on-site investigations to determine the root 

causes of hazardous materials incidents. 

Recommendation 5. We recommend that RSPA accelerate improvements to the 

accuracy and completeness of incident data on causes and locations of incidents 

reported on DOT Form 5800.1. 

Recommendation 6. We recommend that the new institutional capacity work 

with the Operating Administrations and Assistant Secretary for Budget and

Programs/Chief Financial Officer to improve identification of budget and staffing 

information.

DOT'S SENIOR LEADERSHIP RESPONSE

The program evaluation found that DOT's hazardous materials programs works

reasonably well but needs to be improved through DOT-wide strategic planning 

and program coordination, more focused delivery, and better data.

To address the recommendations contained in the report, DOT's Deputy Secretary 

met with the HMPE Sponsors (the Assistant Secretary for Budget and

Programs/Chief Financial Officer, the Inspector General, and the Administrator, 

Research and Special Programs Administration) and the HMPE team on

December 14, 1999, to provide input and direction. The Deputy Secretary asked 

for two subsequent meetings on January 13, and March 16, 2000 with the HMPE 

Sponsors, the team, and DOT's Senior Leadership Team (comprised of DOT's

Secretarial Officers and Heads of Operating Administrations). During February, 

the Heads of Operating Administrations with hazardous materials responsibilities 

and selected Secretarial Officers reviewed drafts of the report and provided the 

HMPE team with their technical and substantive comments which were

incorporated in the final report.

On January 13th, the HMPE team briefed the Senior Leadership Team on each of 

the recommendations contained in the report. At this meeting, the Deputy

Secretary asked the HMPE team to meet with senior policy representatives from 

each of the affected Operating Administrations to develop an implementation

strategy to establish the recommended institutional capacity to coordinate

hazardous materials programs in the Department. The HMPE team and the policy 
66

representatives met on February 4 and 7, 2000, to discuss various organizational 

locations and structures for the institutional capacity.

On March 16th, the HMPE team met with the Senior Leadership Team to report 

on a proposal to implement an institutional capacity developed by the combined 

HMPE and policy team on February 4th and 7th. A unanimous decision was 

reached by the Senior Leadership Team to place this capacity in the Office of 

Intermodalism under the Associate Deputy Secretary. It was also agreed during 

this meeting that DOT should begin drafting Secretarial delegations to place the 

additional necessary responsibilities and authorities under the Associate Deputy 

Secretary. On March 16th, the HMPE Sponsors tasked RSPA's Office of the 

Chief Counsel to work with the Department's Assistant General Counsel for

Regulation and Enforcement to start drafting appropriate delegations. The draft 

delegations are expected to be completed shortly and coordinated within DOT. 

Once the institutional capacity is in place and staffed, its first task will be to 

oversee implementation all of the recommendations in the report related to

coordination, program delivery, and data and oversee the areas identified for

further analysis. DOT's Senior Leadership Team also supported the

recommendation that the Operating Administrations and the Bureau of

Transportation Statistics work together to improve specific program delivery and 

data issues following issuance of the report. 
67

Chapter 9

AREAS FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS

During the program evaluation, the HMPE team identified a number of issues that 

merit a more detailed examination by DOT. The issues were too complex and 

time-consuming for this program evaluation. However, the team believes the

Department should task the new institutional capacity with coordinating the

development of these issues.

Area 1: DOT should gain a better understanding of undeclared shipments 

and their impact on transportation safety. 

DOT should gain a better understanding of the nature of shipper and carrier

practices related to undeclared shipments, explore methods for estimating the

volume, types, and frequency of undeclared shipments, and develop appropriate 

targeting strategies and safeguards to address the problem. The shipping and

transportation of undeclared or "hidden shipments" of hazardous materials is one 

of the most dangerous practices in transportation. DOT has proposed legislation 

to reauthorize its hazardous materials transportation safety program, one element 

of which is to enhance DOT's enforcement authority to open and examine

packages DOT inspectors have reason to believe contain hazardous materials. 

The Operating Administrations, primarily FAA, have data on a number of

incidents related to undeclared shipments of hazardous materials. Since 1993, the 

majority of FAA’s enforcement cases have involved undeclared hazardous

materials. FAA is experiencing incidents caused by passengers packing prohibited 

hazardous materials, such as pesticides and micro-torches, in stowed luggage or 

materials carried on board. The National Transportation Safety Board found that 

improperly packaged and undeclared hazardous materials caused the loss of 110 

lives on ValuJet flight 592 in the Florida Everglades on May 11, 1996. But the 

ValuJet incident is not the sole example. The section-by-section analysis

accompanying DOT's proposed legislation provides additional examples of

undeclared shipments. 

The problem of undeclared shipments is not limited to air transportation; it has 

been experienced in virtually every mode of transportation. The RSPA's HMIS 

indicates that there were hundreds of carrier-reported incidents (usually releases of 

hazardous materials) involving undeclared or hidden hazardous materials. 

Specifically, from January 1990 through July 1998, there were approximately

1,887 carrier-reported incidents involving a release of undeclared hazardous
68

materials and resulting in 110 deaths and 175 injuries.57 Because many releases 

are not reported, including those in intrastate highway transportation that were 

only required to be reported beginning in FY 1999, these statistics understate the 

severity of the problems caused by shipments of undeclared hazardous materials. 

In addition, these statistics cover only those shipments in which a release occurred 

that drew attention to the undeclared material. There is a concern by hazardous 

materials inspectors and the team that these shipments represent only a small 

percentage of the total number of undeclared or hidden hazardous materials

shipments. An element of the examination should also analyze the legal and

logistical obstacles that prohibit generalized (where no indication of hazardous 

materials are evident) search and screening of passenger baggage and cargo to find 

hazardous materials, especially when the item is offered for transportation by air. 

Area 2: DOT should examine ways to clarify and improve the HMR.

DOT needs to better understand the extent to which the HMR may be improved to 

optimize compliance and hazardous materials safety and then take appropriate

action. Based on information developed during three focus group meetings

conducted by the HMPE team, as well as written comments provided by industry, 

the complexity of the regulations is one of the primary reasons for noncompliance 

with the HMR. 

During the July 22, 1999, focus group meeting, panelists and interested parties in 

the audience expressed concern that the regulations were too complicated,

frequently inconsistent, and unclear. One theme that developed during the

meeting was that there were too many regulatory exceptions to the requirements 

contained in the HMR.

Others attending the meeting noted that it was difficult for infrequent or one-time 

shippers to understand the regulations, and that many of the processes in the

regulations defy logic. For example, the numbering process related to the hazard 

classes, such as class 1 for explosives, and class 8 for corrosives, does not appear 

to have any significance, while the order of the packing group numbers (1, 2 and 

3) does have meaning related to the degree of hazard posed by the material. For 

example, 1 equates to a higher risk than 2 or 3. As a result, it is difficult for an 

infrequent or new user to determine what scale is being used by DOT to highlight 

risk. That is, is a 1 always high risk and a 3 or 9 lower risk? 

A drum manufacturer gave another reason he believed attempting to comply with

the regulations was a nightmare. He said his company had over 300 separate sets 

 

57 All 110 deaths were the result of the ValuJet incident in 1996.
69

of drum styles, but it was unclear how frequently the individual drums or styles 

needed to be tested or retested. The Department should undertake an examination 

to identify compliance problems due to the complexity of the HMR and determine 

whether the regulations can be simplified and clarified to improve compliance.

Consumer commodities/other regulated materials is another example in which the 

HMR may be ineffective or confusing. The HMR defines a consumer commodity 

as a material that is packaged and distributed in a form intended or suitable for 

sale through retail sales agencies or instrumentalities.58 The problem with this 

definition (combined with the exceptions in the HMR) is that almost any material, 

even otherwise prohibited materials, may be reclassified as a consumer

commodity and find its way aboard a passenger-carrying mode of transportation. 

Butane, for example, is forbidden aboard passenger-carrying aircraft. However, 

the HMR allow for a packaging exception whereby the material can be packaged 

in limited quantities consisting of 4 ounces or less, then reclassified as a consumer 

commodity and loaded aboard a passenger aircraft. As a result of this

reclassification, an airline operating a passenger aircraft could load its entire cargo 

space with this product and still be in technical compliance with the requirements 

of the HMR, but safety could be compromised. The NTSB has actively

investigated some of these incidents and issued a safety recommendation to RSPA 

and FAA calling for additional regulatory requirements.

Area 3: DOT should review the adequacy of the Performance Oriented

Packaging (POP) Standards to determine whether the regulations are

improving safety as intended.

In 1990, RSPA issued the final rule on POP Standards, which substantially revised 

most packaging requirements for hazardous materials and aligned them with the 

United Nations Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous Goods. The 

"new" performance-oriented or POP Standards eliminated numerous specification 

standards and was intended to allow shippers flexibility in the design and selection 

of most packages, while ensuring that the strength of the package is appropriate 

for the degree of hazards posed by the material it contains. This requirement, 

which became effective in October 1996 and was adopted internationally, is the 

current standard used by package manufacturers for most hazardous materials

packaging. In order to test packagings against POP Standards, RSPA has

contracted with a testing facility at the U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics 

Support Activity, Packaging, Storage and Containerization Center located in

Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania.

 

58 49 CFR Subpart 171.8
70

According to DOT's HMIS, package failures are the cause of roughly 11 to

15 percent of all hazardous materials incidents during any given year. The HMPE 

team’s independent analysis of over 13,000 incident reports (DOT Form 5800.1) 

for 1996 found that approximately 35 percent of those incidents reported to RSPA 

should have been attributed to package failure instead of the 15 percent

determined by RSPA’s HMIS analysis. 

If package failures are a frequent cause of incidents, then the effectiveness of the 

POP Standards or the desire of package manufacturers to comply with the

standards may be called into question. During focus group meetings held by the 

HMPE team, industry personnel admitted that metal drums might be becoming

more marginal since POP requirements have been in place. A number of parties 

indicated that the thickness of drum walls is thinner because there is no puncture 

test requirement. The problem with thinner wall drums was also discussed during 

our interview of a RSPA manager who stated that airlines are experiencing

increased levels of package failure from drum punctures. 

Both the Spanish and Italian Governments have provided working papers to the 

United Nations Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods. The 

papers indicate a “gradual reduction” in the performance of packages, specifically 

in air transport. DOT should determine whether the various POP Standards

provide an adequate level of packaging safety.

Area 4: DOT should work with the United States Postal Service to identify 

and resolve any potential safety gaps related to hazardous materials

shipments in the U.S. mail.

DOT does not have authority to inspect the U.S. mail (including parcels) placed in 

transportation and, without adequate safeguards, the public is placed at risk. For 

example, approximately 20 percent of cargo aboard passenger-carrying aircraft 

consists of U.S. mail. Although the United States Postal Service (USPS) requires 

such shipments to comply with the HMR, active regulatory inspection and

enforcement of such shipments by USPS inspectors does not occur. This may 

represent a significant problem, especially when hazardous materials shipments 

are improperly prepared or undeclared. The frequency of hazardous materials 

incidents occurring in the mail is unknown by the Department since USPS

maintains its own incident reporting system. DOT needs to work more closely 

with the USPS to determine the magnitude of hazardous materials incidents

occurring in the U.S. mail, identify any safety gaps, and develop strategies to 

improve safety.
71

Area 5: DOT's Hazardous Materials Inspection and Compliance Authority 

Needs To Be Examined.

The HMTL does not clearly define the circumstances under which DOT may open 

packages suspected to be in noncompliance or thought to contain hidden or

undeclared hazardous materials. Unlike other DOT-enforced safety statutes, the 

HMTL does not authorize DOT to issue emergency orders to address imminent 

hazards. Clarifying and expanding the inspection and enforcement authorities 

through the proposed Hazardous Materials Reauthorization Act, submitted by

DOT to the Congress in February 1999, would improve the effectiveness of

hazardous materials inspection and compliance actions, as well as the overall

hazardous materials program. DOT should continue its efforts to strengthen the 

inspection and enforcement authorities of DOT inspectors. 

Area 6: DOT Needs to Develop More Effective Performance Measures for 

the Hazardous Materials Program.

The goal for hazardous materials contained in the Department's Performance Plan 

for Fiscal Year 2000 is to reduce the number of serious hazardous materials 

incidents in transportation from a peak of 464 in 1996 to 411 or fewer in 2000. 

However, the Department's hazardous materials program will have little or no 

direct impact on this goal because the cause of most serious hazardous materials 

incidents is outside the scope of activities affected by the HMR. Any candidate 

measure used to assess the effectiveness of the hazardous materials program

should address activities and outcomes over which the HMR have influence. 

APPENDIX I

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SELECTED PORTIONS OF

TITLE 49 – UNITED STATES CODE

TRANSPORTATION SUBTITLE III

GENERAL AND INTERMODAL PROGRAMS

CHAPTER 51 - TRANSPORTATION OF HAZARDOUS 

MATERIAL

Sec. 5101. Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is to provide adequate protection against the risks to 

life and property inherent in the transportation of hazardous material in

commerce by improving the regulatory and enforcement authority of the

Secretary of Transportation. 

Sec. 5102. Definitions

In this chapter -

(1) ''commerce'' means trade or transportation in the jurisdiction of the United States -

(A) between a place in a State and a place outside of the State; or (B) that affects trade or 

transportation between a place in a State and a place outside of the State. 

(2) ''hazardous material'' means a substance or material the Secretary of

Transportation designates under section 5103(a) of this title. 

(3) ''hazmat employee'' - (A) means an individual - (i) employed by a hazmat

employer; and (ii) who during the course of employment directly affects hazardous

material transportation safety as the Secretary decides by regulation; (B) includes an

owner-operator of a motor vehicle transporting hazardous material in commerce; and (C) 

includes an individual, employed by a hazmat employer, who during the course of

employment - (i) loads, unloads, or handles hazardous material; (ii) manufactures,

reconditions, or tests containers, drums, and packagings represented as qualified for use 

in transporting hazardous material; (iii) prepares hazardous material for transportation;

(iv) is responsible for the safety of transporting hazardous material; or (v) operates a 

vehicle used to transport hazardous material. 

(4) ''hazmat employer'' - (A) means a person using at least one employee of that 

person in connection with - (i) transporting hazardous material in commerce; (ii) causing 

hazardous material to be transported in commerce; or (iii) manufacturing, reconditioning, 

or testing containers, drums, and packagings represented as qualified for use in

transporting hazardous material; (B) includes an owner-operator of a motor vehicle

transporting hazardous material in commerce; and (C) includes a department, agency, or 

instrumentality of the United States Government, or an authority of a State, political 
APPENDIX I

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subdivision of a State, or Indian tribe, carrying out an activity described in subclause 

(A)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this clause (4). 

(5) ''imminent hazard'' means the existence of a condition that presents a substantial 

likelihood that death, serious illness, severe personal injury, or a substantial

endangerment to health, property, or the environment may occur before the reasonably 

foreseeable completion date of a formal proceeding begun to lessen the risk of that death, 

illness, injury, or endangerment. 

(6) ''Indian tribe'' has the same meaning given that term in section 4 of the Indian

Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (25 U.S.C. 450b).

(7) ''motor carrier'' means a motor carrier, motor private carrier, and freight forwarder 

as those terms are defined in section 13102 of this title. 

(8) ''national response team'' means the national response team established under the 

national contingency plan established under section 105 of the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9605).

(9) ''person'' in addition to its meaning under section 1 of title 1 - (A) includes a 

government, Indian tribe, or authority of a government or tribe offering hazardous 

material for transportation in commerce or transporting hazardous material to further a 

commercial enterprise; but (B) does not include - (i) the United States Postal Service; and 

(ii) in sections 5123 and 5124 of this title, a department, agency, or instrumentality of the 

Government.

(10) ''public sector employee'' - (A) means an individual employed by a State, political 

subdivision of a State, or Indian tribe and who during the course of employment has 

responsibilities related to responding to an accident or incident involving the

transportation of hazardous material; (B) includes an individual employed by a State,

political subdivision of a State, or Indian tribe as a firefighter or law enforcement officer; 

and (C) includes an individual who volunteers to serve as a firefighter for a State,

political subdivision of a State, or Indian tribe.

(11) ''State'' means - (A) except in section 5119 of this title, a State of the United States, 

the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, the Virgin Islands, 

American Samoa, Guam, and any other territory or possession of the United States

designated by the Secretary; and (B) in section 5119 of this title, a State of the United 

States and the District of Columbia. 

(12) ''transports'' or ''transportation'' means the movement of property and loading,

unloading, or storage incidental to the movement.
APPENDIX I

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(13) ''United States'' means all of the States. 

Sec. 5103. General regulatory authority 

(a) Designating Material as Hazardous. - The Secretary of Transportation shall designate 

material (including an explosive, radioactive material, etiologic agent, flammable or

combustible liquid or solid, poison, oxidizing or corrosive material, and compressed gas) 

or a group or class of material as hazardous when the Secretary decides that transporting 

the material in commerce in a particular amount and form may pose an unreasonable risk 

to health and safety or property.

(b) Regulations for Safe Transportation. - (1) The Secretary shall prescribe regulations 

for the safe transportation of hazardous material in intrastate, interstate, and foreign

commerce. The regulations - (A) apply to a person - (i) transporting hazardous material in 

commerce; (ii) causing hazardous material to be transported in commerce; or (iii) 

manufacturing, fabricating, marking, maintaining, reconditioning, repairing, or testing a

packaging or a container that is represented, marked, certified, or sold by that person as 

qualified for use in transporting hazardous material in commerce; and (B) shall govern 

safety aspects of the transportation of hazardous material the Secretary considers

appropriate. (2) A proceeding to prescribe the regulations must be conducted under

section 553 of title 5, including an opportunity for informal oral presentation. 

Sec. 5121. Administration

(a) General Authority. - To carry out this chapter, the Secretary of Transportation may 

investigate, make reports, issue subpoenas, conduct hearings, require the production of 

records and property, take depositions, and conduct research, development,

demonstration, and training activities. After notice and an opportunity for a hearing, the 

Secretary may issue an order requiring compliance with this chapter or a regulation

prescribed under this chapter.

(b) Records, Reports, and Information. - A person subject to this chapter shall - (1) 

maintain records, make reports, and provide information the Secretary by regulation or 

order requires; and (2) make the records, reports, and information available when the 

Secretary requests.

(c) Inspection. - (1) The Secretary may authorize an officer, employee, or agent to 

inspect, at a reasonable time and in a reasonable way, records and property related to -

(A) manufacturing, fabricating, marking, maintaining, reconditioning, repairing, testing, 

or distributing a packaging or a container for use by a person in transporting hazardous 

material in commerce; or (B) the transportation of hazardous material in commerce. 
APPENDIX I

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(2) An officer, employee, or agent under this subsection shall display proper credentials 

when requested. 

(d) Facility, Staff, and Reporting System on Risks, Emergencies, and Actions. - (1) The 

Secretary shall - (A) maintain a facility and technical staff sufficient to provide, within 

the United States Government, the capability of evaluating a risk related to the

transportation of hazardous material and material alleged to be hazardous; (B) maintain a 

central reporting system and information center capable of providing information and

advice to law enforcement and firefighting personnel, other interested individuals, and 

officers and employees of the Government and State and local governments on meeting 

an emergency related to the transportation of hazardous material; and (C) conduct a

continuous review on all aspects of transporting hazardous material to decide on and take 

appropriate actions to ensure safe transportation of hazardous material. (2) Paragraph (1) 

of this subsection does not prevent the Secretary from making a contract with a private 

entity for use of a supplemental reporting system and information center operated and 

maintained by the contractor. 

(e) Report. - The Secretary shall, once every 2 years, prepare and submit to the

President for transmittal to the Congress a comprehensive report on the transportation of 

hazardous materials during the preceding 2 calendar years. The report shall include - (1) a 

statistical compilation of accidents and casualties related to the transportation of

hazardous material; (2) a list and summary of applicable Government regulations, 

criteria, orders, and exemptions; (3) a summary of the basis for each exemption; (4) an 

evaluation of the effectiveness of enforcement activities and the degree of voluntary

compliance with regulations; (5) a summary of outstanding problems in carrying out this 

chapter in order of priority; and (6) recommendations for appropriate legislation. 

Sec. 5123. Civil Penalty

(a) Penalty. - (1) A person that knowingly violates this chapter or a regulation prescribed 

or order issued under this chapter is liable to the United States Government for a civil 

penalty of at least $250 but not more than $25,000 for each violation. A person acts 

knowingly when - (A) the person has actual knowledge of the facts giving rise to the 

violation; or (B) a reasonable person acting in the circumstances and exercising

reasonable care would have that knowledge. (2) A separate violation occurs for each day 

the violation, committed by a person that transports or causes to be transported hazardous 

material, continues.

(b) Hearing Requirement. - The Secretary of Transportation may find that a person has 

violated this chapter or a regulation prescribed under this chapter only after notice and an 

opportunity for a hearing. The Secretary shall impose a penalty under this section by

giving the person written notice of the amount of the penalty.
APPENDIX I

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(c) Penalty Considerations. - In determining the amount of a civil penalty under this 

section, the Secretary shall consider - (1) the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of 

the violation; (2) with respect to the violator, the degree of culpability, any history of 

prior violations, the ability to pay, and any effect on the ability to continue to do business; 

and (3) other matters that justice requires. 

(d) Civil Actions To Collect. - The Attorney General may bring a civil action in an

appropriate district court of the United States to collect a civil penalty under this section. 

(e) Compromise. - The Secretary may compromise the amount of a civil penalty imposed 

under this section before referral to the Attorney General. 

(f) Setoff. - The Government may deduct the amount of a civil penalty imposed or

compromised under this section from amounts it owes the person liable for the penalty. 

(g) Depositing Amounts Collected. - Amounts collected under this section shall be 

deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. 

Sec. 5124. Criminal Penalty

A person knowingly violating section 5104(b) of this title or willfully violating this 

chapter or a regulation prescribed or order issued under this chapter shall be fined under 

title 18, imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both.

Sec. 5125. Preemption

(a) General. - Except as provided in subsections (b), (c), and (e) of this section and unless 

authorized by another law of the United States, a requirement of a State, political 

subdivision of a State, or Indian tribe is preempted if - (1) complying with a requirement 

of the State, political subdivision, or tribe and a requirement of this chapter or a

regulation prescribed under this chapter is not possible; or (2) the requirement of the 

State, political subdivision, or tribe, as applied or enforced, is an obstacle to

accomplishing and carrying out this chapter or a regulation prescribed under this chapter. 

(b) Substantive Differences. - (1) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section and 

unless authorized by another law of the United States, a law, regulation, order, or other 

requirement of a State, political subdivision of a State, or Indian tribe about any of the 

following subjects, that is not substantively the same as a provision of this chapter or a 

regulation prescribed under this chapter, is preempted: (A) the designation, description, 

and classification of hazardous material. (B) the packing, repacking, handling, labeling, 

marking, and placarding of hazardous material. (C) the preparation, execution, and use 

of shipping documents related to hazardous material and requirements related to the 

number, contents, and placement of those documents. (D) the written notification,
APPENDIX I

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recording, and reporting of the unintentional release in transportation of hazardous

material. (E) the design, manufacturing, fabricating, marking, maintenance,

reconditioning, repairing, or testing of a packaging or a container represented, marked, 

certified, or sold as qualified for use in transporting hazardous material. (2) If the 

Secretary of Transportation prescribes or has prescribed under section 5103(b), 5104, 

5110, or 5112 of this title or prior comparable provision of law a regulation or standard 

related to a subject referred to in paragraph (1) of this subsection, a State, political 

subdivision of a State, or Indian tribe may prescribe, issue, maintain, and enforce only a 

law, regulation, standard, or order about the subject that is substantively the same as a 

provision of this chapter or a regulation prescribed or order issued under this chapter. The 

Secretary shall decide on and publish in the Federal Register the effective date of section 

5103(b) of this title for any regulation or standard about any of those subjects that the 

Secretary prescribes after November 16, 1990. However, the effective date may not be 

earlier than 90 days after the Secretary prescribes the regulation or standard nor later than 

the last day of the 2-year period beginning on the date the Secretary prescribes the 

regulation or standard. (3) If a State, political subdivision of a State, or Indian tribe 

imposes a fine or penalty the Secretary decides is appropriate for a violation related to a 

subject referred to in paragraph (1) of this subsection, an additional fine or penalty may 

not be imposed by any other authority.

(c) Compliance With Section 5112(b) Regulations. - (1) Except as provided in paragraph 

(2) of this subsection, after the last day of the 2-year period beginning on the date a 

regulation is prescribed under section 5112(b) of this title, a State or Indian tribe may 

establish, maintain, or enforce a highway routing designation over which hazardous

material may or may not be transported by motor vehicles, or a limitation or requirement 

related to highway routing, only if the designation, limitation, or requirement complies 

with section 5112(b). (2)(A) A highway routing designation, limitation, or requirement 

established before the date a regulation is prescribed under section 5112(b) of this title 

does not have to comply with section 5112(b)(1)(B), (C), and (F). (B) This subsection 

and section 5112 of this title do not require a State or Indian tribe to comply with section 

5112(b)(1)(I) if the highway routing designation, limitation, or requirement was

established before November 16, 1990. (C) The Secretary may allow a highway routing 

designation, limitation, or requirement to continue in effect until a dispute related to the 

designation, limitation, or requirement is resolved under section 5112(d) of this title.

(d) Decisions on Preemption. - (1) A person (including a State, political subdivision of a 

State, or Indian tribe) directly affected by a requirement of a State, political subdivision, 

or tribe may apply to the Secretary, as provided by regulations prescribed by the

Secretary, for a decision on whether the requirement is preempted by subsection (a),

(b)(1), or (c) of this section. The Secretary shall publish notice of the application in the 

Federal Register. The Secretary shall issue a decision on an application for a

determination within 180 days after the date of the publication of the notice of having 

received such application, or the Secretary shall publish a statement in the Federal
APPENDIX I

(Page 7 of 7)

Register of the reason why the Secretary's decision on the application is delayed, along 

with an estimate of the additional time necessary before the decision is made. After 

notice is published, an applicant may not seek judicial relief on the same or substantially 

the same issue until the Secretary takes final action on the application or until 180 days 

after the application is filed, whichever occurs first. (2) After consulting with States, 

political subdivisions of States, and Indian tribes, the Secretary shall prescribe regulations 

for carrying out paragraph (1) of this subsection. (3) Subsection (a) of this section does 

not prevent a State, political subdivision of a State, or Indian tribe, or another person 

directly affected by a requirement, from seeking a decision on preemption from a court of 

competent jurisdiction instead of applying to the Secretary under paragraph (1) of this 

subsection. 

(e) Waiver of Preemption. - A State, political subdivision of a State, or Indian tribe may 

apply to the Secretary for a waiver of preemption of a requirement the State, political 

subdivision, or tribe acknowledges is preempted by subsection (a), (b)(1), or (c) of this 

section. Under a procedure the Secretary prescribes by regulation, the Secretary may

waive preemption on deciding the requirement - (1) provides the public at least as much 

protection as do requirements of this chapter and regulations prescribed under this

chapter; and (2) is not an unreasonable burden on commerce. 

(f) Judicial Review. - A party to a proceeding under subsection (d) or (e) of this section 

may bring a civil action in an appropriate district court of the United States for judicial 

review of the decision of the Secretary not later than 60 days after the decision becomes 

final. 

(g) Fees. - (1) A State, political subdivision of a State, or Indian tribe may impose a fee 

related to transporting hazardous material only if the fee is fair and used for a purpose 

related to transporting hazardous material, including enforcement and planning,

developing, and maintaining a capability for emergency response. (2) A State or political 

subdivision thereof or Indian tribe that levies a fee in connection with the transportation 

of hazardous materials shall, upon the Secretary's request, report to the Secretary on - (A) 

the basis on which the fee is levied upon persons involved in such transportation; (B) the 

purposes for which the revenues from the fee are used; (C) the annual total amount of the 

revenues collected from the fee; and (D) such other matters as the Secretary requests. 

APPENDIX II

(Page 1 of 12)

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS-RELATED SECRETARIAL 

DELEGATIONS TO DOT AGENCIES

The Secretary of Transportation has delegated Hazardous Materials Transportation 

Law responsibilities to the Operating Administrations in DOT. DOT’s current 

delegations of authority, with the exception of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration (FMCSA) delegations, do NOT reflect the 1994 codification of 

Title 49 of the United States Code or other statutory changes over the past several 

years. The delegations have not been updated by DOT’s Office of General 

Counsel. 

A brief description of the delegations of authority is listed below. The actual 

delegations, as set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations, follow. 

The Coast Guard is delegated inspection and enforcement authority with respect 

to packaged and bulk hazardous materials transportation by water and the

authority to issue the regulations and exemptions governing the bulk transportation 

of hazardous materials in the marine mode. 

FAA is delegated inspection and enforcement authority with respect to hazardous 

materials transportation by air and to air-mode-specific bulk packagings; authority 

to carry out the Federal Aviation Act provisions as they relate to the transportation 

of such materials by air; and authority to devise and carry out procedures for 

monitoring and enforcing provisions of regulations with respect to the

transportation of radioactive materials on passenger-carrying aircraft.

FRA is delegated inspection and enforcement authority with respect to

transportation or shipment of hazardous materials by railroad, including the

manufacture, fabrication, marking, maintenance, reconditioning, repair or testing

of containers which are represented, marked, certified, or sold for use in the bulk 

transportation of hazardous materials by railroad.

FMCSA is delegated inspection and enforcement authority with respect to

transportation or shipment of hazardous materials by highway, including the

manufacture, fabrication, marking, maintenance, reconditioning, repair, or test of 

containers which are represented, marked, certified, or sold for use in the bulk 

transportation of hazardous materials by highway. FMCSA is also responsible for 

issuing regulations governing the routing of hazardous materials in the highway

mode. 
APPENDIX II

(Page 2 of 12)

RSPA is delegated authority to issue the hazardous materials regulations; issue 

exemptions from requirements of the law or hazardous materials regulations; issue 

emergency response planning and training grants to States and American Indian

tribes; and require registration and payment of fees by certain shippers and

carriers. In addition, RSPA has inspection and enforcement authority concerning 

any regulatory exemption or approval; administering the requirements for

telephonic or written report of a hazardous material incident; formulating

packaging requirements (except modal-specific bulk packaging requirements); and 

setting any requirements related to shippers of hazardous materials for

transportation (except those offering a hazardous material in a modal-specific bulk 

packaging). 

RSPA’s regulatory hazardous materials functions are more extensive than the

other four Operating Administrations. Under the HMTL, RSPA issues the

Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR). Except for FMCSA’s authority to

establish highway routing, RSPA is solely responsible for: issuing rules and

regulations governing the safe transportation of packaged hazardous materials;

issuing, renewing, modifying and terminating exemptions and approvals; and

making administrative determinations of whether state, local, or Indian tribe

requirements (1) are preempted by the HMTL, or (2) may remain in effect under a 

waiver of preemption. RSPA also develops the national regulatory program for 

hazardous materials transportation for all of the modes. 

RSPA’s regulation development process involves the use of data, information, and 

experience to assess the risk hazardous materials present in transportation. RSPA 

develops the HMR based on the actual and perceived risks of commodities,

transportation data/trends (including incidents/accidents) and actual transportation 

experience. The HMR cover five primary areas:

• Hazardous materials definition/classification;

• Hazard communication (e.g., shipping papers, marking, labeling, and 

placarding);

• Packaging requirements;

• Operational rules; and

• Training.

The HMR provide a uniform set of requirements for hazardous materials

transportation that apply to the transportation of hazardous materials in intrastate, 

interstate, and foreign commerce by aircraft, railcar, vessel and motor vehicle. 

They also generally facilitate foreign trade by being compatible with international 

hazardous materials transportation regulatory requirements. 
APPENDIX II

(Page 3 of 12)

International Standards

RSPA and affected modal administrations represent DOT in international

organizations, working to assure the compatibility of domestic regulations with the 

regulations of international bodies. For example, the Coast Guard together with 

RSPA work closely with the International Maritime Organization and the FAA

and RSPA work with the International Civil Aviation Organization. RSPA also 

represent DOT in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and

Economic and Social Council, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. 

International standards and agreements also affect U.S. regulations governing

hazardous materials transportation. For example, the Non-bulk Performanceoriented Packaging Standards1

 are based on the United Nations Recommendations 

on the Transport of Dangerous Goods. Any change to the international standards 

affects transportation of hazardous materials in the United States. International 

standards and agreements that affect U.S. regulations include: 

• United Nations Recommendations on the Transport of Dangerous

Goods;

• International Maritime Organization’s International Maritime

Dangerous Goods Code;

• International Civil Aviation Organization’s Technical Instructions on

the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air; 

• International Atomic Energy Agency’s Regulations on the Safe

Transportation of Radioactive Materials; and 

• Safety of Life at Sea Convention.

 

1

49 CFR Subpart 178.500
APPENDIX II

(Page 4 of 12)
APPENDIX II

(Page 5 of 12)

TITLE 49--TRANSPORTATION Subtitle A--Office of the Secretary of 

Transportation PART 1—

ORGANIZATION AND DELEGATION OF POWERS AND DUTIES—

Sec. 1.46 Delegations to Commandant of the Coast Guard

The Commandant of the Coast Guard is delegated authority to:

* * * * *

(f) Administer Executive Order 11459 (34 FR 5057), relating to approval of 

containers for transport under Customs seal.

* * * * * 

(l) Carry out the functions vested in the Secretary by sections 104(i), 104(j), 

311(b), 311(j) (2) and (3), 311(m)(2), 312, and 402(b)(6) of the Federal 

Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1321), as amended by the Oil 

Pollution Act of 1990 (August 18, 1990; Pub L. 101-380; 104 Stat. 484), 

and sections 4202(b) (2) and (3) of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.

(m) Carry out the functions assigned to the Secretary by Executive Order 12777 

(3 CFR, 1991 Comp.; 56 FR 54757) in sections 1(b), 2(a), 2(b)(2), 2(c), 

2(d)(2), 2(e)(2), 2(f), 2(g)(2), 3, 5(a)(2), 5(b)(1) and (3), 6, 7(a) (1) and (3), 

7(b), 7(c), 7(d), 8(d), 8(f), 8(g), 8(h), 9, and 10(c), excepting that portion of 

section 2(b)(2) relating to the establishment of procedures, methods, and 

equipment and other requirements for equipment to prevent and to contain 

discharges of oil and hazardous substances from pipelines, motor carriers, 

and railroads; and further excepting the exercise of the authority in section 

2(d)(2) over motor carriers and railroads, other than for operations incident 

to the transfer of oil or hazardous substances to or from vessels, and the 

exercise of the authority in section 2(d)(2) over pipelines.

(n) * * * (4) Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978 (92 Stat. 1471), except 

sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12 and 13 of Sec. 2 to the extent that those sections 

pertain to the operation of the St. Lawrence Seaway; 

* * * * *

(t) Carry out the functions vested in the Secretary by 49 App. U.S.C. 1801-

1819, and 46 App. U.S.C. 3306(a)(5) to the extent they relate to
APPENDIX II

(Page 6 of 12)

regulations and exemptions governing the bulk transportation of hazardous 

materials that are loaded or carried on board a vessel without benefit of 

containers or labels, and received and handled by the vessel carrier without 

mark or count, and regulations and exemptions governing ships' stores and 

supplies.

(u) Carry out the functions vested in the Secretary by 49 U.S.C. 1808(a), (b), 

and (c) and 1809 and 1810, relating to investigations, records, inspections, 

penalties, and specific relief, so far as they apply to the transportation or 

shipment of hazardous materials by water.

* * * * *

(y) Carry out the functions and responsibilities vested in the Secretary by the 

Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, as amended (49 U.S.C. 1671 et 

seq.) relating to rulemaking so far as it applies to liquefied natural gas 

facilities adjacent to the navigable waters of the United States: Provided, 

that such rulemaking is in accordance with the Memorandum of

Understanding between the Coast Guard and Materials Transportation

Bureau executed on February 7, 1978, for regulation of such facilities. 

Sec. 1.47 Delegations to Federal Aviation Administrator

The Federal Aviation Administrator is delegated authority to: 

(a) Carry out the powers and duties transferred to the Secretary of

Transportation by, or subsequently vested in the Secretary by virtue of,

section 6(c)(1) of the Department of Transportation Act (49 U.S.C.

1655(c)(1)), including those pertaining to aviation safety (except those

related to transportation, packaging, marking, or description of hazardous 

materials) and vested in the Secretary by section 308(b) of title 49 U.S.C. 

and sections 306-309, 312-314, 1101, 1105, and 1111 and titles VI, VII, IX 

(excluding section 902(h)), and XII of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as 

amended.

* * * * *

(i) Carry out the functions vested in the Secretary by section 902(h)(2) of the 

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, as it relates to enforcement of 

hazardous materials regulations as they apply to the transportation or

shipment of such materials by air. 
APPENDIX II

(Page 7 of 12)

(j) Carry out the functions vested in the Secretary by 49 U.S.C. 1807 as it 

relates to the establishment of procedures for monitoring and enforcing

provisions of regulations with respect to the transportation of radioactive 

materials on passenger-carrying aircraft. 

(k) Carry out the functions vested in the Secretary by 49 App. U.S.C. 1808 (a), 

(b), and (c), 1809 and 1810 relating to investigations, records, inspections, 

penalties and specific relief so far as they apply to the transportation or 

shipment of hazardous materials by air, including the manufacture,

fabrication, marking, maintenance, reconditioning, repair, or test of

containers which are represented, marked, certified, or sold for use in the 

bulk transportation of hazardous materials by air.

* * * * *

(m) Carry out the functions vested in the Secretary by sections 4(a) and 5(c) of 

Executive Order 12316 of August 14, 1981 (46 FR 42237, Aug. 20, 1981) 

(delegating sections 107(c)(1)(c) and 108(b), respectively, of the

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 

of 1981, Pub. L. 96-510), insofar as they relate to aircraft.

(n) Carry out the functions vested in the Secretary by section 3(d) of the Act to 

Prevent Pollution from Ships (33 U.S.C. 1902(d)) as it relates to ships 

owned or operated by the Federal Aviation Administration when engaged 

in noncommercial service.

* * * * *

(u) Carry out the functions assigned to the Secretary by Executive Order 12465 

(February 24, 1984) (3 CFR, 1984 Comp., p. 163) relating to commercial 

expendable launch vehicle activities. 

Sec. 1.49 Delegations to Federal Railroad Administrator

The Federal Railroad Administrator is delegated authority to: 

(s)(1) Carry out the functions vested in the Secretary by 49 App. U.S.C. 1808 (a), 

(b), and (c), 1809, and 1810 relating to investigations, records, inspections, 

penalties, and specific relief so far as they apply to the transportation or 

shipment of hazardous materials by railroad, including the manufacture,

fabrication, marking, maintenance, reconditioning, repair or test of

containers which are represented, marked, certified, or sold for use in the 
APPENDIX II

(Page 8 of 12)

bulk transportation of hazardous materials by railroad. (2) Carry out the 

functions vested in the Secretary by 49 App. U.S.C. 1813 (a) and (b); and 

1817.

* * * * *

(ee) Carry out the functions vested in the Secretary by sections 9, 10, 11, 12, 

and 13 of the Sanitary Food Transportation Act of 1990 (Pub. L. 101-500; 

104 Stat. 1213), with respect to transportation by railroad. 

* * * * *

(gg) Carry out the functions vested in the Secretary by sections 16 and 21 of the 

Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act of 1990 (Pub. L. 

101-615; 104 Stat. 3244 (49 App. U.S.C. 1813 note and 1817 note)). 

(hh) Exercise the authority vested in the Secretary by Section 601 (d) and (e) of 

the National and Community Service Act of 1990 (45 U.S.C. 546 note) as it 

relates to the discharge of human waste from railroad passenger cars. 

(ii) Carry out the functions and exercise the authority delegated to the Secretary 

in section 2(d)(2) of Executive Order 12777 (3 CFR, 1991 Comp.; 56 FR 

54757), with respect to rail transportation, relating to the approval of means 

to ensure the availability of private personnel and equipment to remove, to 

the maximum extent practicable, a worst case discharge, the review and 

approval of response plans, and the authorization of railroads, subject to the 

Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1321), to operate without 

approved response plans, except as delegated in Sec. 1.46(m).

Sec. 1.53 Delegations to the Administrator of the Research and

Special Programs Administration.

The Administrator of the Research and Special Programs Administration is 

delegated authority to exercise powers and perform duties, including duties 

under the specified statutes as follows:

* * * * *

(b) Hazardous materials. (1) Sections 101-121 of the Hazardous Materials

Transportation Act of 1975 (49 App. U.S.C. 1801-1819), as amended by 

the Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act of 1990 (104 

Stat. 3244), except as delegated by Secs. 1.46(t), 1.47(j), 1.48(u)(2), and 
APPENDIX II

(Page 9 of 12)

1.49(s)(2), and except that the enforcement activities of the Research and 

Special Programs Administration (RSPA) shall be limited to any matter 

relating to or concerning any of the following: 

(i) Any violation of an exemption or approval issued under that Act; 

(ii) Any violation of any requirement for a telephonic or written report 

of a hazardous materials incident or any other reporting requirement 

imposed under that Act; 

(iii) Any manufacture, fabrication, marking, maintenance, 

reconditioning, repair, testing, or retesting of any packaging, except 

modal-specific bulk packaging, which is represented, marked,

certified, or sold for use in the transportation of hazardous materials, 

including any United Nations standard or DOT specification or

exemption packaging; 

(iv) Any manufacture, fabrication, marking, maintenance,

reconditioning, repair, testing, or retesting of any modal-specific 

bulk packaging, which is represented, marked, certified, or sold for 

use in the transportation of hazardous materials, including any

United Nations standard or DOT specification or exemption

packaging, only when requested by the modal administration with

primary responsibility for such activity; 

(v) Any carrier of hazardous materials only when requested by the

modal administration with primary responsibility for inspecting such 

carrier; 

(vi) Any offeror of any hazardous material for transportation with respect 

to its offering of any hazardous material for transportation in: (A) 

Any modal-specific bulk packaging only when requested by the

modal administration with primary responsibility for inspecting such 

packaging; or (B) Any other packaging. 

This delegation to the Administrator of RSPA does not limit the

enforcement authority of the Administrators of FHWA, FRA, and FAA,

and the Commandant of the Coast Guard under the Hazardous Materials 

Transportation Act, as amended. Those agencies have enforcement

authority over all aspects of the transportation or shipment of hazardous 

materials by their respective modes, including the manufacture, fabrication, 

marking, maintenance, reconditioning, repair, testing, or retesting of any

bulk packaging intended or represented as intended for use in the

transportation of hazardous materials by their respective modes.

(b)(2) * * * (4) Section 16, 25, 26, and 29 of the Hazardous Materials

Transportation Uniform Safety Act of 1990 (Pub. L. 101-615; 104 Stat. 

3244 (49 app. U.S.C. 1813 note, 1804 note; 29 U.S.C. 655 note)). (5) 
APPENDIX II

(Page 10 of 12)

Section 406 of the ICC Termination Act of 1995 (Public Law 104-88) 

relating to the issuance of regulations concerning the use of certain fiber 

drum packagings for the transportation of liquid hazardous materials,

including contracting for a study by the National Academy of Sciences.

* * * * *

(d) Intermodal transport. (1) Section 4(e) of the International Safe Container 

Act (Pub. L. 95-208, 91 Stat. 1475). 

* * * * *

(j) Section 8 of the Independent Safety Board Act Amendments of 1990 (Pub. 

L. 101-641; 104 Stat. 4654 (49 app. U.S.C. 1804 note)). 

(k)(1) Carry out the functions and exercise the authority delegated to the Secretary 

in Executive Order 12777 (3 CFR, 1991 Comp.; 56 FR 54757) in section 

2(b)(2) relating to the establishment of procedures, methods, and equipment 

and other requirements for equipment to prevent discharges from, and to 

contain oil and hazardous substances in, pipelines, motor carriers, and

railroads. (See 49 CFR 1.46 and 1.66.) (2) Carry out the functions and

exercise the authority delegated to the Secretary in section 2(d)(2) of

Executive Order 12777 (3 CFR, 1991 Comp.; 56 FR 54757) relating to the 

issuance of regulations requiring the owners or operators of pipelines,

motor carriers, and railroads, subject to the Federal Water Pollution Control 

Act (33 U.S.C. 1321), to prepare and submit response plans, except as 

delegated in section 1.46(m). 

* * * * *

(l) University Grants Program. Sections 11(b) and 11(c) of the Federal Transit 

Act, as amended, 49 U.S.C. App. 1607c(b) and 1607c(c), except for the 

provisions in sections 11(b)(8)(b) and 11(b)(10). [Amdt. 1-130, 43 FR

5516, Feb. 9, 1978]
APPENDIX II

(Page 11 of 12)

Sec. 1.73 Delegations to Director, Office of Motor Carrier Safety

The Director of the Office of Motor Carrier Safety is delegated authority to:

* * * * *

(d)(1) Carry out the functions vested in the Secretary by 49 U.S.C. 5121(a), (b), 

and (c), 5122(a) and (b), 5123, and 5124, relating to investigations, records, 

inspections, penalties, and specific relief so far as they apply to the

transportation or shipment of hazardous materials by highway, including

the manufacture, fabrication, marking, maintenance, reconditioning, repair 

or test of containers which are represented, marked, certified, or sold for 

use in the bulk transportation of hazardous materials by highway. 

(d)(2) Carry out the functions vested in the Secretary by 49 U.S.C. 5112 relating to 

highway routing of hazardous materials; 5109 relating to motor carrier

safety permits, except subsection (f); 5125(a) and (c)-(f), relating to

preemption determinations or waivers of preemption of hazardous materials 

highway routing requirements; 5105(e) relating to inspections of motor

vehicles carrying hazardous material; 5119 relating to uniform forms and 

procedures; and 5127(f) and (g) relating to credits to appropriations and 

availability of amounts. 

* * * * *

(h) Carry out the functions vested in the Secretary by 49 U.S.C. 5708 relating 

to food transportation inspections; 5710 relating to the Secretary’s powers 

to administer the sanitary food transportation regulations; 5711 relating to 

enforcement of sanitary food transportation regulations and applicable 

penalties; 5712 and 5714 relating to federal-State relations; and 5113 and 

31144 relating to safety fitness of owners and operators.

(i) Carry out the functions vested in the Secretary by 49 U.S.C. 5118 relating 

to the use of inspectors to promote safety in the highway transportation of 

radioactive material; and 49 U.S.C. 31142(f) relating to application of State 

regulations to government-leased vehicles and operators.

* * * * *

(k) Carry out the functions and exercise the authority delegated to the in

section 2(d)(2) of Executive Order 12777 (3 CFR, 1992 Comp., p. 351), 

with respect to highway transportation, relating to the approval of means to 
APPENDIX II

(Page 12 of 12)

ensure the availability of private personnel and equipment to remove, to the 

maximum extent practicable, a worst case discharge, the review and

approval of response plans, and the authorization of motor carriers, subject 

to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. 1321), to operate 

without approved response plans, except as delegated in Sec. 1.46(m)
APPENDIX III

(Page 1 of 6)

FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE ANNOUNCING THREE FOCUS GROUP MEETINGS

WORKING BETTER TOGETHER

INFORMATION: NOTIFICATION OF UPCOMING ACTIVITYDepartment-Wide Program Evaluation of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Programs

In the enclosed Federal Register notice, the Department of Transportation is announcing a series 

of three focus group meetings to discuss issues with interested parties concerning DOT's

hazardous materials safety programs and to request comments from parties unable to attend the 

meetings.

This is to advise you about these upcoming meetings and provide you with an opportunity to 

participate either in person or through your written comments. Your support in this effort is 

greatly appreciated. If you have any questions, please contact Ms. Jackie Goff, 202-493-0326, 

or George Whitney, 202-366-4831, Co-Chairs, DOT-wide Program Evaluation of the Hazardous 

Materials Transportation Programs, or e-mail your comments to: 9.awa-dot-hmpe@faa.gov 

Thank you.

Enclosure

APPENDIX III

(Page 3 of 6)

36734 Federal Register/Vol. 64, No. 129/Wednesday, July 7, 1999/Notices

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Office of the Secretary

Research and Special Programs Administration

Department-Wide Program Evaluation of the 

Hazardous Materials Transportation Program 

(HM Program Evaluation)

AGENCY: Office of Inspector General (OIG) and 

Research and Special Programs Administration 

(RSPA), DOT. 

ACTON: Notice of meetings and request for 

comments.

SUMMARY: The Department of Transportation 

(DOI) is announcing a series of three HM Program 

Evaluation Focus Group Meetings to discuss issues 

with interested stakeholders concerning DOT's 

hazardous materials safety programs and to request 

comments form parties unable to attend the series of 

meetings. Each meeting will concentrate on a specific 

topic and likely involve six to ten members 

pre-selected from the hazardous materials community 

for each focus group. Other interested parties are 

invited to observe each meeting and will be given the 

opportunity to ask questions and raise issues. Focus 

Group Meeting #I will focus on the "Effectiveness and 

Adequacy of DOT's Hazardous Materials Regulatory 

Program." Focus Group Meeting #2 will focus on the 

"Effectiveness of DOT's Approach for Gaining 

Compliance." Focus Group Meeting #3 will focus on 

"Measuring DOT's Performance in Hazardous 

Materials Safety." This action is In support of the 

internal DOT-wide Program Evaluation of the 

Hazardous Materials Transportation Programs (HM 

Program Evaluation) which DOT announced in the 

Federal Register on March 9,1999. The HM Program 

Evaluation will document and assess the effectiveness 

of DOT's hazardous materials transportation safety 

programs in order to improve safety and 

environmental protection. Your participation in these 

HM Program Evaluation Focus Group Meetings and 

responses to the issues raised in this notice and during 

the meetings will assist DOT in identifying issues that 

the HM Program Evaluation team may address and 

evaluate as it continues Its efforts. 

DATES. Comment Date: Comments must be received 

on or before August 27, 1999.

Public Meeting Dates: Public meetings will be held 

on July 22. 1999, August 11, 1999. and August 17. 

1999. Meetings are scheduled from 9 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. 

ADDRESSES: Written Comments: Address 

written comments to HM Program Evaluation Team, 

U.S. Department of Transportation. 400 Seventh 

Street, SW, Room 2438, Washington, DC 20590--

Persons wishing to receive confirmation of receipt of 

their comments should include a self-addressed 

stamped postcard. You may also submit comments by 

e-mail at: -9.awa-dot-hmpe@faa.gov".

Public Meetings: The July 22, 1999

meeting will be held in Room 2230 of

the DO * T Headquarters Building (Nassif

Building) 400 Seventh Street, SW.

Washington, DC 20590-0001. The

August 11. 1999, meeting will be held

in the Illinois/Minnesota Rooms of the

FAA Building, 2300 East Devon Avenue, Des Plaines, 

IL. The August 17, 1999, meeting will be held in 

Room 2230 of the DOT Headquarters Building 

(Nassif Building) 400 Seventh Street, SW, 

Washington, DC 20590-0001. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Jackie A. Goff, 202-493-0326. or George Whitney, 

202-366-4831, Co-Chairs, HM Program Evaluation 

Team, U.S. Department of Transportation; Room

2438. 400 Seventh Street SW, Washington, DC 

20590-0001. For information on facilities or services 

for individuals with disabilities or to request special 

assistance at the meetings, contact Ms. Goff or Mr. 

Whitney. If you are unable to attend one or more of 

these meetings or wish to provide additional 

comments, we welcome your written responses no 

later than August 27, 1999. If you would like your 

comments considered during a specific meeting for 

which you will be unable to attend, your comments 

should be received by the team at least 5 working days 

prior to that specific meeting and sent to the DOT 

address provided above or e-mailed to: 

-9.awadot-hmpe@faa.gov".

I. Background

On March 9,1999, DOT published a Notice in the 

Federal Register (64 FR 11528) announcing the 

initiation of an internal Department-wide Program 

Evaluation of the Hazardous Materials Transportation 

Programs (HM Program Evaluation). In that Notice it 

was announced that the HM Program Evaluation team 

is staffed by 10 full-time persons, including at least 

one full-time person from the OIG and RSPA and 

each of the following Operating Administrations: The 

United States Coast Guard (USCG): the Federal 

Aviation Administration (FAA); The Federal 

Highway Administration (FHWA); and the Federal 

Railroad Administration (FRA).

The HM Program Evaluation team is examining the 

Federal hazardous materials transportation law, the 

program structure defined by the delegation of 

authority within DOT, and assessing program 

delivery. The HM Program Evaluation is intended to 

allow DOT to determine the effectiveness of the 

current hazardous material programs, including the 

division of responsibilities across and within modes, 

and the allocation of resources dedicated to specific 

functions. The HM Program Evaluation is also 

focusing on cross-modal issues and will include an 

analysis and critique of DOT's current program 

intervention tools including regulation, education, 

training,
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36735 Federal Register/Vol. 64, No. 129/Wednesday, July 7, 1999/Notices

outreach, inspection, and enforcement. This will 

position DOT to potentially increase safety and 

environmental protection when hazardous materials 

are in commerce.

The scope of the HM Program Evaluation is 

limited to those activities covered by 49 CFR Part 

106 (Rulemaking Procedures), Part 107 (Hazardous 

Materials Program Procedures), and the Hazardous 

Materials Regulations (HMR), 49 CFR Parts 

171-180. International shipments of hazardous 

materials are also included in the scope of the HM 

Program Evaluation to permit a review of the 

International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code 

(IMDG) and the International Civil Aviation 

Organization's Technical Instructions on the 

Transportation of Dangerous Goods by Air (ICAO), 

both of which are authorized by HMR as alternative 

standards for many of the requirements in the HMR 

for shipments destined for export or that are being 

imported. The team will be examining whether the 

current programs are achieving the stated purpose of 

the Federal hazardous materials transportation law.

11. HM Program Evaluation Meetings and Issues

DOT's intent is to use Information gathered 

during three focus group meetings to further develop 

issues for consideration by the HM Program 

Evaluation team. We anticipate that each focus 

group will consist of approximately six to ten 

pre-selected individuals from the hazardous 

materials community. To maximize the benefits of 

the focus groups, they will be comprised of 

individuals having expertise in hazardous materials 

transportation who are likely to be affected by the 

outcome of the HM Program Evaluation. Our aim Is 

that members of the focus groups will be 

representative of the community of shippers, 

carriers, packaging manufacturers, hazmat 

employees, enforcement personnel, emergency 

responders, trade associations. labor representatives 

and other interested parties involved with the 

transportation of hazardous materials. In addition to 

the focus group members, other interested parties are 

invited to observe at each focus group meeting. 

They will have an opportunity to raise issues and ask 

questions. The issues to be discussed during the 

three different focus groups are outlined below.

Focus Group Meeting # 1. Washington, DC, July 22, 

1999: "Effectiveness and Adequacy of DOT's 

Hazardous Materials Regulatory Program"

Focus Group Meeting #1 will focus primarily on 

issues involving the effectiveness and adequacy of 

DOT's regulatory program. Rulemaking procedures 

for the hazardous materials program are in 49 CFR 

Part 106. These procedures address petitions for 

rulemaking, advance notices and notices of proposed 

rulemaking, final rules, interim final rules, and direct 

final rules. In addition to these procedural rules, the 

rulemaking process Is governed by a variety of 

statutes and Executive Orders. Procedures 

concerning exemptions to regulations are in 49 CFR 

Part 107. Exemptions authorize the regulated 

industry to perform functions that are not otherwise 

authorized by the Hazardous Materials Regulations. 

The regulatory scheme requires that the agency must 

rind that the exemption establishes a level of safety 

at least equal to that required by the regulation. If 

the regulations do not establish a level of safety. the 

agency must find that the exemption is consistent 

with the public interest.

In Focus Group Meeting #1, we are interested in 

determining how well DOT's hazardous materials 

regulatory system is minimizing risk. The hazardous 

materials regulatory system is designed to reduce the 

risks associated with the transportation of hazardous 

material shipments. Reduction of risk is the major 

way in which DOT improves the overall level of 

safety in the transportation system. Questions related 

to this issue include:

* Based on your experiences with the regulatory 

system for hazardous materials (domestic and 

international), can you identify areas in which 

deficiencies exist that increase the risk of 

shipping hazardous materials?

* How would you describe your experiences In 

attempting to comply with the regulations contained 

in 49 CFR in terms of their ease of use and your 

perception that you take the required actions to 

reduce the risk of hazardous materials in 

transportation?

* What, if any, measures could DOT implement 

that would lower the risk that hazardous materials 

may pose while in the transportation system?

Another aspect that has the potential to impact the 

safety of the transportation system is the act of 

shipping or transporting undeclared hazardous 

materials (undeclared or "hidden" shipments are 

shipments offered for transportation, or subsequently 

transported, that are not identified as

hazardous materials as required by regulation). DOT 

is generally only made aware of an undeclared 

shipment of hazardous materials after a related 

accident or incident occurs or if it is otherwise 

reported to DOT. Questions related to this issue 

include:

* To what extent are you aware of any problems 

associated with undeclared shipments of hazardous 

materials?

* What detection methods, if any, have you 

implemented to recognize potential shipments of 

undeclared hazardous materials?

*What prevention methods would you offer to 

DOT to reduce the practice of shipping or 

transporting undeclared shipments?

* Are undeclared shipments a result of ignorance 

or willfulness? Please describe.

* What is your experience concerning undeclared 

shipments occurring within the different modes of 

transportation (air, highway, rail and water)?

* Do you believe that either the risk level or 

volumes of activities associated with undeclared 

shipments is equal among the modes? Please 

describe.

An important segment of the Hazardous Materials 

Regulations is hazard communication. Hazard 

communication under the HMR is addressed in five 

components: Shipping papers, marking, labeling, 

placarding, and emergency response information. 

Questions related to this issue include:

* To what extent does the current regulatory 

system provide adequate hazard communication 

Information on shipments in transit?

* Are there other sources of information that 

provide hazard communication information and 

could they become the basis for an industry 

standard? For example, is there other information or 

documents in use related to hazardous materials in 

transit besides the information provided on a 

shipping paper that could be standardized or 

combined in one document?

The regulatory system permits the establishment 

of exceptions and exemptions that are intended to 

safely and efficiently expedite the movement of 

certain hazardous materials. Questions related to this 

issue include:

* Do exceptions and exemptions complicate the 

understanding of the regulations?

* Do exceptions and exemptions achieve an 

adequate level of safety?

* How would you recommend that DOT achieve 

its intended goal of safely and efficiently moving 

hazardous materials differently given the industry 

need for and benefit of these alternatives?
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36736 Federal Register/Vol. 64. No. 129/Wednesday, July 7, 1999/Notices

* What do you see as the major enforcement or 

emergency response concerns related to DOT's use 

of exceptions and exemptions?

Focus Group Meeting # 2, Chicago, IL, August 11, 

1999: "Effectiveness of DOT's Approach for Gaining 

Compliance '

Focus Group Meeting #2 will focus primarily on 

issues involving reducing violations, means of 

intervention, and improving compliance with the 

regulations. To improve the level of compliance by 

industry DOT focuses its efforts at a variety of 

intervention points in the transportation system, 

including activities at the packaging, manufacturer, 

offeror and transporter stages. Intervention methods 

include regulations, education, training. outreach, 

inspection and enforcement. With respect to 

intermodal shipments, more than one modal 

administration has the opportunity to intervene with 

the same shipment as it passes from one mode of 

transportation to another.

DOT engages in numerous activities to provide 

information and improve awareness of and 

compliance with the safety requirements. These 

outreach activities include: Publishing notices in the 

Federal Register; issuing press releases-, using 

Internet web pages: conducting training seminars 

and public meetings; participating in stakeholder 

conferences; and distributing pamphlets, brochures, 

videos, and CD ROMS.

In Focus Group Meeting #2, we are interested in 

determining how effective DOT's approach is for 

reducing violations and increasing compliance. 

Questions related to this issue include:

* Historically, compliance inspection data reveal 

that placarding and shipping paper deficiencies are 

the most cited violations. How would you 

recommend that DOT increase compliance in these 

areas?

* Based on your experiences with DOT, please 

comment on which of DOT's intervention methods 

are most effective (regulations. education, training, 

outreach, inspection and enforcement). Why?

* Where do you believe DOT's intervention 

could be most effective (at the packaging, 

manufacturer, offeror or transporter stages) and what 

intervention approach should DOT employ?

* What are your observations and experiences 

regarding the depth and quality of DOT's 

compliance inspections? Please be specific, if 

possible, in your comments with respect to 

individual operating administrations

within DOT (USCG, FAA, FHWA, FRA, 

and RSPA).

* Are DOT inspectors helpful in providing 

compliance assistance and in explaining

non-complying conditions? If possible, please be 

modal specific.

* What current DOT outreach efforts (e.g., 

informational pamphlets, seminars, classroom 

training and on-site assistance) do you have 

experience with and which are the most effective?

* What other, if any, DOT outreach activities do 

you suggest?

DOT's efforts to influence the level of compliance 

with the HMR involve use of the civil penalty 

assessment process including notices of probable 

violation, final orders, administrative law Judge 

hearings, ticketing, and alternative means of dispute 

resolution, including alternatives to traditional 

enforcement. Questions related to this issue include:

* Do you believe civil penalties are effective in 

pining compliance?

* Can you recommend ways to improve the civil 

penalty program?

* What are your major concerns about the 

process DOT uses for determining the penalty 

amounts in relationship to a violation of the HMR?

The HMR include training requirements which 

are intended to ensure employees are competent to 

fulfill their roles; however, the adequacy of the 

scope or frequency of the required training is 

unknown. DOT has observed that many shippers and 

carriers employ the services of third-party trainers 

(i.e., non-governmental parties who provide training 

on the HMR). Questions related to this issue 

include:

* Do you believe the existing training standards 

are adequate to ensure all personnel responsible for 

the safe transportation of hazardous materials 

understand the pertinent requirements of the HMR?

* If not, how would you modify the training or 

employee competency requirements to improve this 

aspect of the safety scheme?

DOT currently uses a variety of approaches to 

work with state personnel to gain compliance with 

the HMR. These approaches include: (1) Providing 

funding to states to increase compliance with the 

HMR through the deployment of wide-scale 

inspections and enforcement activities; (2) using a 

mix of Federal and state inspectors in some of 

DOT's operating administrations-, and (3) 

conducting inspections and other activities using 

only Federal DOT inspectors. Questions related to 

this issue include:

* How effective are DOT's different approaches 

of using Federal and/or state personnel as an 

intervention practice?

* Please explain if, and why, one approach is 

better than another.

Domestic and foreign shipper practices have the 

potential to significantly affect hazardous materials 

safety and influence the level of compliance with the 

HMR. Deficiencies discovered by modal inspectors 

are typically tracked back to the original shipper to 

rectify the deficiency. Such corrective follow up is 

more difficult for import shipments. Effective 

outreach overseas is a challenge. Questions related 

to this issue include:

* If you are an importer of hazardous materials, 

how frequently do you receive hazardous materials 

that do not comply with the regulations?

* To the extent that there are noncomplying 

shipments, what do you believe is the major reason 

(ignorance or willfulness)? Please describe.

Focus Group Meeting #3, Washington DC, August 

17,1999: "Measuring DOT's Performance in 

Hazardous Materials Safety"

Focus Group Meeting #3 will focus primarily on 

issues involving DOT's performance measures as it 

relates to minimizing the risk of hazardous materials 

transportation. In this meeting, we are concerned 

about DOT's performance with regard to reducing 

HM safety risks and In determining the best 

measures of success.

In DOT's Performance Plan for Fiscal Year 2000, 

the primary hazardous materials safety performance 

goal is to reduce the number of serious HM 

incidents in transportation (to 411 or fewer in the 

year 2000 from a peak of 464 in 1996.) DOT defines 

a serious hazardous materials incident as one that 

involves a fatality or major injury due to a hazardous 

material, closure of a major transportation artery or 

facility or evacuation of six or more persons due to 

the presence of a hazardous material, or a vehicle 

accident or derailment resulting in the release of a 

hazardous material.

Trends In serious Incidents in the past decade 

have been fairly stable –

averaging about 407 per year since 1990. In a 

typical year, serious hazardous materials incidents 

account for 10-15 deaths (with the notable exception 

of 1996, when the Valuejet crash resulted in 110 

deaths,) and fewer than 300 major injuries. Because 

of the inherent risk in handling and transporting 

hazardous materials, there are limits to how far the 

number of incidents could be reduced. Furthermore, 

serious incidents often require mitigation measures 

that are mode specific and might not benefit all 

hazardous materials operations.
APPENDIX III

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36737 Federal Register/Vol. 64, No. 129/Wednesday, July 7, 1999/Notices

There are safety advocates who maintain that any 

unintentional release, large enough to be reportable, 

is a flag indicating safety risks or flaws in operating 

and handling procedures. Minimizing these releases, 

many experts argue, should be the goal of the 

regulatory agencies. Looking at all reported 

hazardous materials incidents-serious and nonserious-there has been an overall decline since the 

high of 16,000 in 1983, with the numbers fluctuating 

between fewer than 10,000 in 1990 to under 14,000 

last year. Assessing changes in the total number of 

incidents to be used as a measure of effectiveness in 

conjunction with close integration of the incident 

reporting system in the entire process of hazardous 

materials intervention-from training, inspection, and 

enforcement could be used by DOT to identify the 

underlying causes of many incidents.

In Focus Group Meeting #3, we are interested in 

gauging DOT's success and in developing appropriate 

measures or candidate measures. 

Questions related to this issue include:

* Are serious incidents the best measure of our 

success in reducing risk in hazardous materials 

transportation?

* Is the goal of reducing the number of serious 

incidents by a targeted amount the best alternative?

* Would trends in all unintentional releases of 

hazardous materials be a better Indicator of how well 

we have succeeded in controlling the risk of 

hazardous materials in transportation?

* How can we best measure the success of the 

hazardous materials program? How would you 

evaluate the overall effectiveness of the hazardous 

materials intervention program in addressing the 

level of risk hazardous materials pose in 

transportation?

Issued in Washington, DC on June 30. 1999

Jackie A. Goff,

Co-Chair, Hazardous Materials Program Evaluation 

Team.

George Whitney,

Co-Chair, Hazardous Materials Program Evaluation 

Team. [FR Doc. 99-17175 Filed 7-6-99; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910-60-P
APPENDIX IV

(Page 1 of 9)

METHODOLOGY

The Secretary’s Strategic Plan for 1999–2002 requires the Assistant Secretary for 

Budget and Programs, along with the Inspector General, to work with the

Operating Administrations to develop and implement a comprehensive 5-year 

program evaluation plan to be included in the FY 2000 Performance Plan. The FY 

2000 Performance Plan included a multi-modal program evaluation of the

Department’s Hazardous Material Compliance and Enforcement Program. 

The objectives of the department-wide hazardous materials program evaluation

were: (1) to document current hazardous materials movements, Operating

Administrations' programs, and program delivery, and (2) to assess the

effectiveness of the Department of Tr ansportation's (DOT) overall hazardous

materials program as it affects each step in the hazardous materials transportation 

process, from packaging to receiver, recommend improvements, and identify areas 

for further study. The evaluation was jointly led by the Research and Special 

Programs Administration and the Office of Inspector General.

Announcing the Program Evaluation and Establishing the HMPE Team

The HMPE sponsors, DOT’s Assistant Secretary for Budget and Programs/Chief 

Financial Officer, the Inspector General, and the Administrator of the Research 

and Special Program Administration, issued a memorandum on November 3,

1998, notifying the other heads of DOT organizations with hazardous materials 

responsibilities, FAA, FHWA, FRA, and the Coast Guard, of initiation of the 

program evaluation. The memorandum requested each of the DOT organizations 

to select an experienced hazardous materials member of their staff for the program 

evaluation Team. The Hazardous Materials Program Evaluation (HMPE) Team

consisted of one member from each of the Operating Administrations (Coast

Guard, FAA, FRA, FHWA, and RSPA) and the OIG. The HMPE Team was

supported by one staff from the VOLPE1 Center and two OIG auditors. The 

Operating Administrations’ team members have over 80 years experience in the 

hazardous materials area. The HMPE team was co-chaired by a representative 

from RSPA and the OIG.

Program Evaluation Design Methods

The evaluation was designed to employ a combination of complementary

analytical techniques including process and efficiency/effectiveness evaluation

 

1

 Volpe Center provided a senior economist to support the Team.
APPENDIX IV

(Page 2 of 9)

methodologies. For example, the evaluation strategy used the process evaluation 

methodology to assess the extent to which DOT’s hazardous materials

transportation program has been implemented as intended. 

ONE-DOT Partnering for Excellence Workshop

The HMPE Team, along with hazardous materials field inspectors, managers, and 

legal counsel from each Operating Administration, participated in a 2-day 

ONE-DOT Partnering for Excellence Workshop2. The Team spent 1.5 days

learning to work as a cross-modal team and identifying cross-modal projects that 

require shared resources and collaborative effort. The balance of the 2 days was 

used developing issues, discussing methodologies, and writing action plans to 

accomplish the work required under Objective 1 of the program evaluation.

Communications Plan and Glossary of Terms

The HMPE Team recognized a need for a communication plan and a glossary of 

common terms. The purpose of the communication plan was to outline the 

process, procedures and guidelines the Team used to:

• Keep the public apprised about the program evaluation and invite their 

input;

• Inform the Secretary of Transportation, Operating Administrators, and

Sponsors about the Team’s activities and emerging issues; and

• Track Team generated documents.

The HMPE Team found that the same terms used by the Operating

Administrations, within the Department’s hazardous materials program, had

different meanings. Therefore, the Team developed a Glossary of Terms to use 

throughout the HMPE. 

Request for Program Data

Operating Administration HMPE Team members provided hazardous materials

program data for their organizations. The Team members provided information 

on: 1) program structure (organization), 2) financial resources (total safety versus 

dedicated hazardous materials), 3) personnel resources allocated to the program 

(expressed in Full Time Equivalents), plus a description of their duties and

responsibilities, 4) Operating Administration policies, procedures, and plans

pertaining to hazardous materials, 5) hazardous materials laws and regulations,

 

2

 Counsel from FHWA did not participate in the Partnering for Excellence Workshop.
APPENDIX IV

(Page 3 of 9)

and 6) carrier, shipper, and incident statistics, and 7) anything else the Team

needed to know about their hazardous materials program. 

Analysis of Department’s Strategic/Performance Plans

The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 requires that each 

Department prepare a 5-year Strategic Plan and an Annual Performance Plan. The 

Department’s Strategic Plan Goal for Safety does not specifically address

hazardous materials safety. The Performance Plan for FY 2000 contains one goal 

under Safety pertaining to hazardous materials transportation: “Reduce the number 

of serious hazardous materials incidents in transportation, to 411 or fewer in 2000 

from a peak of 464 in 1996.” The HMPE Team conducted an analysis of the 

Strategic/Performance Plans developed by the Operating Administrators to

identify hazardous materials goals and performance measures and whether they

were consistent with the Department’s goal.

First Federal Register Notice Announces Program Evaluation

The Department issued a Federal Register notice on March 9, 1999, announcing 

the start of the HMPE and formation of the HMPE Team. The Federal Register 

notice included the HMPE objectives and scope of the HMPE. Hazardous

materials shipments by pipelines and bulk shipments by tanker vessel were

excluded, since these two areas, while important, do not generally involve more 

than one mode and would not fall within the cross-modal intent of the HMPE.

Modal Inspections

To gain personal experience about the multi-modal inspection process, the HMPE 

Team participated in inspection exercises conducted by each mode as well as two 

intermodal inspection activities. Although each modal Team member had

extensive hazardous materials inspection experience (ranging from 27 years to 10 

years, and totaling over 80 years for the entire Team), the Team believed it was 

important to observe how each Operating Administration performed hazardous

materials inspections.

Over a 2-month period the HMPE Team observed and participated in: (1) a multimodal Hazardous Materials Strike Force (HAZSTRIKE) at Baltimore

International Airport (BWI) and Baltimore’s Dundalk Marine Terminal; (2) RSPA 

inspections throughout New Jersey and in Seattle, Washington; (3) FMCSA’s

“Shipper Check 1999”; (4) railroad inspections in Chicago; and, (5) a week long 

multi-modal HAZSTRIKE at Boston’s Logan International Airport. The Team
APPENDIX IV

(Page 4 of 9)

also toured RSPA’s independent testing facility in Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania, and 

observed containers being tested to ensure they meet DOT specifications for

transporting hazardous materials.

Observations from participating in the Operating Administrations’ inspections and 

intermodal HAZSTRIKEs were used by the Team to develop an understanding of 

the Department’s interagency hazardous materials program, and to identify issues 

on which to focus interviews of the Operating Administration hazardous materials 

program managers. The information gathered during field observations were also 

used in developing questions for focus group meetings conducted with industry 

and the general public. 

HAZSTRIKE at Baltimore International Airport and Dundalk Marine

Terminal

The 2-day HAZSTRIKE at the Baltimore International Airport (BWI) and the

Dundalk Marine Terminal were two separate activities, with the FAA coordinating 

the inspections at BWI and the Coast Guard coordinating inspections at the

Dundalk Marine Terminal. At BWI, the HMPE Team observed FAA inspectors 

conducting dangerous goods/cargo security assessments of major air carriers and 

indirect air carriers (freight forwarders), who tender cargo to air carriers. During 

the assessments, FAA evaluated compliance with the hazardous materials and

cargo security regulations. The HMPE Team joined the inspection teams in

tracing hazardous material shipments upstream from the air carriers to the indirect 

air carrier to the original shipper. The Team also participated in truck stops at the 

airport to identify and check compliance with hazardous materials regulations by 

vehicles transporting hazardous materials to/from the airport.

At the Dundalk Marine Terminal, the HMPE Team participated in inspections of 

trucks entering and exiting the terminal. Participants in the marine terminal 

inspections were DOT inspectors and representatives from the U.S. Customs

Service, Maryland State Department of Transportation, the Maryland State Patrol, 

and the Port Police. While working with the Coast Guard and U.S. Customs, the 

HMPE Team requested the Coast Guard and U.S. Customs to open a number of 

containers to allow the Team to determine compliance of the shipment with

hazardous materials regulations. 

RSPA Inspections

Hazardous materials are transported in various types of containers, including

boxes, drums, and cylinders, that must meet certain specifications established by 
APPENDIX IV

(Page 5 of 9)

RSPA in 49 CFR Parts 178 through 180. To gain an understanding of RSPA’s 

inspection activities, HMPE Team members accompanied RSPA inspectors on a 

variety of inspections in New Jersey and Seattle, Washington. The inspections 

included drum reconditioners; steel, plastic, and fiber drum manufacturers;

cylinder retesters; cylinder manufacturers; a medical waste shipper and disposal 

site; hazardous materials shippers including explosive shippers; and third-party 

testing laboratories. 

Team members also inspected a third-party testing facility which conducts tests of 

containers and certifies to the manufacturers that the containers meet DOT

specifications for transporting hazardous materials. This experience gave the

HMPE Team a fuller understanding of the various United Nations and DOT

package specifications. 

RSPA’s Independent Testing Facility – Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania

Hazardous materials are transported in various types of containers such as boxes, 

drums, and cylinders that must meet specifications established by RSPA in

49 CFR Parts 178 through 180. There are many domestic and international

manufacturers of hazardous materials containers. Most of the manufacturers 

self-certify that their packagings meet the performance specifications contained in 

the hazardous materials regulations. To test manufacturers’ compliance with the 

regulations, RSPA has contracted with the U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistic 

Support Center package testing facility in Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania. At the

facility, the Team observed package testing for leakproofness, hydrostatic

pressure, and various drop tests, as well as testing procedures for other small 

package tests. The Team also learned about the small package testing selection 

process and the equipment used to perform tests. 

FMCSA’s “Shipper Check 1999”

The HMPE Team participated in FMCSA’s annual “Shipper Check” activity. The 

primary purpose of “Shipper Check 1999” was to identify hazardous materials 

shippers so FMCSA could plan future inspections at shippers’ facilities. Four 

HMPE Teams worked with state and FMCSA inspectors at motor carrier

terminals. 

Railroad Inspections in Chicago

From April 25 through 30, 1999, the HMPE Team participated in inspections of 

hazardous materials moving by railroad in the Chicago metropolitan area. 
APPENDIX IV

(Page 6 of 9)

Intermodal trailers were opened and inspected for compliance with hazardous

materials regulations. Hazardous materials packages were traced to a United

Parcel Service facility and observed during transfer at that facility. 

HAZSTRIKE at Boston’s Logan International Airport

Logan International Airport in Boston, Massachusetts was the site of a major

unannounced HAZSTRIKE that the HMPE Team participated in from March 29 

through April 2, 1999. The normal duration of a HAZSTRIKE is 5 to 8 days. The 

Team participated in assessments of air carriers, indirect air carriers, and shippers 

to ensure compliance with HMR requirements. The assessments involved a

review of shipping paper documents and training records for employees involved 

in transporting hazardous materials. The 70 inspectors from 11 different agencies 

who participated in the HAZSTRIKE were from:

• Federal Aviation Administration – Special Agents from eight regions,

• United States Customs Service,

• Department of Commerce – Bureau of Exports,

• United States Postal Service,

• Massachusetts Port Authority Fire-Rescue,

• Massachusetts State Police, and 

• The HMPE Team.

The HAZSTRIKE inspectors were divided into six Teams: four to conduct

assessments of air carriers, indirect air carriers, and shippers; and two to conduct 

motor carrier inspections. HMPE Team members joined the six Teams and

participated in all facets of the HAZSTRIKE. The HMPE Team received a

briefing on cargo security and then participated in an exercise that tested the 

package acceptance practices of nine air carriers. Team members visited the

Federal Express Airport Cargo Facility to observe and gain an understanding of 

the hazardous materials sorting/distribution process.

The Team also visited the United States Postal Service (USPS) Airport Mail

Facility, viewed the mail sorting/distribution process, and received a briefing on 

the USPS policy for the acceptance and handling of parcels containing hazardous 

materials. The Team thought it was important to observe USPS because millions 

of packages are entered into the transportation stream daily by USPS, but it is 

statutorily exempted from the hazardous material regulations. 
APPENDIX IV

(Page 7 of 9)

COHMED Conference in Salt Lake City, Utah

The HMPE Team participated in a Cooperative Hazardous Materials Enforcement 

Development (COHMED) conference. The COHMED program is an outreach

activity of RSPA. COHMED works to promote coordination, cooperation,

education and communication for Federal, state, local agencies and industry

having enforcement, response, and management responsibilities for the safe

transportation of hazardous materials.

During the Conference’s General Session, the HMPE Team provided the 

objectives of the program evaluation. The HMPE Team members discussed issues 

participants had about the HMPE and DOT’s hazardous materials program. Team 

members also attended break-out sessions which covered topics ranging from

training requirements to exemptions.

The COHMED conference afforded the HMPE Team a better understanding of the 

advantages and deficits of the various hazardous materials programs from the

perspective of industry, first responders, and enforcement personnel. The

break-out sessions gave the Team an opportunity to learn what parts of the

hazardous materials program are working well and what needs improving from

those who work with hazardous materials on a daily basis. It also gave industry an 

opportunity to express their concerns to the HMPE Team.

Second Federal Register Notice Announces Focus Group 

Meetings with the Hazardous Materials Community

The HMPE Team sought broader input from the hazardous materials industry,

emergency responders, and the public at large concerning the transportation of 

hazardous materials. On July 7, 1999, the HMPE Team announced in the Federal 

Register that it would conduct three public focus group meetings to solicit

comments concerning the Department’s Hazardous Materials Programs. The first 

meeting was held on July 22, 1999, in Washington, DC, and addressed the

“Effectiveness and Adequacy of DOT’s Hazardous Materials Regulatory

Program.” The second meeting was held on August 11, 1999, in Chicago, Illinois, 

and addressed the “Effectiveness of DOT’s Approach for Gaining Compliance.” 

The third meeting was held on August 17, 1999 in Washington, DC, and discussed 

methods for “Measuring DOT’s Performance in Hazardous Materials Safety.” 

The Federal Register Notice included specific questions under each topic that 

served to focus the discussion at the meetings. The Federal Register notice also 

offered the public the opportunity to provide written responses to the questions 

contained in the notice.
APPENDIX IV

(Page 8 of 9)

An independent professional facilitator conducted the focus group meetings to 

ensure they were conducted in a neutral manner and that everyone’s comments 

were considered. Each meeting had a panel of 6 to 14 individuals representing the 

community of shippers, carriers, packaging manufacturers, hazardous materials 

employees, enforcement personnel, emergency responders, trade associations,

labor representatives, and other interested parties involved in the transportation of 

hazardous materials. An audience of 30 to 60 individuals attended the focus group 

meeting. The HMPE Team used information gathered during the focus group

meetings and written responses to questions in the Federal Register Notice to 

further develop issues concerning DOT’s hazardous materials program.

Interviews of Hazardous Materials Program Managers within the 

Department

The HMPE Team interviewed DOT hazardous materials officials and received

briefings on program activities to gain a better understanding of programs and

intervention techniques. The HMPE Team interviewed the:

• Associate Administrator for Hazardous Materials Safety RSPA

• Director, Office of Hazardous Materials Initiatives and Training RSPA

• Director, Office of Hazardous Materials Enforcement RSPA

• Director, Office of Hazardous Materials Technology RSPA

• Acting Director, Office of Hazardous Materials Standards RSPA

• Coordinator, International Standards RSPA

• Director, Field Activities Marine Safety and 

 Environmental Protection Directorate USCG

• Director, Office of Motor Carrier Enforcement FMCSA

• Hazardous Materials Team Leader FMCSA

• Manager, Dangerous Goods and Cargo Security Division FAA

• Staff Director, Hazardous Materials Division FRA

• Research Analyst (Contract) BTS

Briefings and Meetings

September to December, 1999 – The HMPE team conducted a series of briefing 

for the HMPE Sponsors (Assistant Secretary for Budget and Programs/Chief

Financial Officer, the Inspector General, and the Administrator, Research and

Special Programs Administration) to present the results for Objective 1, program 

descriptions, and Objective 2, program critique. During this period the Team

further refined findings and developed report recommendations. 
APPENDIX IV

(Page 9 of 9)

December 14, 1999 – The team briefed DOT’s Deputy Secretary and HMPE

Sponsors on evaluation results, at which time the Deputy Secretary asked the team 

to brief DOT’s Senior Leadership Team (comprised of DOT’s Secretarial Officers 

and heads of Operating Administrations). 

January 13, 2000 – The team briefed the Senior Leadership Team on each of the 

recommendations contained in the report and the Deputy Secretary asked the 

HMPE team to meet with senior policy representatives from each of the affected 

Operating Administrations to develop an implementation strategy to establish the 

recommended institutional capacity to coordinate hazardous materials programs in 

the Department. 

February 4 and 7, 2000 – The enhanced team (HMPE team and senior policy

representatives) met to discuss various organizational locations and structures for 

the institutional capacity. The enhanced team made recommendations on the

placement of an institutional capacity within DOT and key characteristics they

believed such an organization should possess.

February, 2000 – The Heads of Operating Administrations with hazardous

materials responsibilities and Secretarial Officers reviewed drafts of the report and 

provided the HMPE team with their technical and substantive comments which

were incorporated in the report. 

March 16, 2000 – The team briefed the Department’s Senior Leadership Team on 

strategies to implement the institutional capacity recommendations developed by 

the enhanced HMPE team on February 4 and 7. A unanimous decision was 

reached by the Senior Leadership Team to place this capacity in the Office of 

Intermodalism under the Associate Deputy Secretary. The Deputy Secretary 

directed that DOT should begin drafting Secretarial delegations to place the

additional responsibilities and authorities under the Associate Deputy Secretary. 

March 20, 2000 – The team met with a delegation drafting team comprised of 

representatives from RSPA’s Office of Chief Counsel and the Department’s

Assistant General Counsel for Regulation and Enforcement to discuss the

responsibilities and authorities necessary for the Office of Intermodalism to carry 

out the HMPE team’s recommendations.

APPENDIX V

(Page 1 of 9)

DATA SOURCES USED IN THE HMPE

An essential component of hazardous materials measurement and evaluation is 

complete and accurate data. Such data permits identification of causal factors 

contributing to hazardous materials incidents, so that program processes for

improving hazardous materials safety can be established. The HMPE team

realizes that all data are imperfect in some fashion and present some degree of 

uncertainty. Therefore, the understanding of data limitations is critical to manage 

for results. However, very little quality data are available within the Department 

on the transportation of hazardous materials.

The HMTL requires DOT to maintain a central reporting system1 and to provide 

information for emergency response to hazardous materials transportation

incidents. To carry out this mandate, RSPA maintains the Hazardous Materials 

Information System (HMIS), which includes data reported by carriers over the 

past 30 years. HMIS data are made available to Federal, state, local, and private 

emergency response organizations. RSPA works with the Coast Guard and EPA

to maintain an around-the-clock National Response Center and publishes and

distributes an Emergency Response Guidebook approximately every three years. 

While not statutorily required by HMTL, the DOT agencies carrying out the

HMTL maintain a number of other data systems that track hazardous materials 

incidents, inspections, and enforcement cases.

Hazardous Materials Data Sources

The HMPE team combined data from a number of sources to conduct the

evaluation. However, the HMPE team found that with few exceptions, existing 

information sources have deficiencies that limit their value in supporting

hazardous materials program evaluation. This appendix lists the sources of

information the team believed appropriate for evaluating the department’s

hazardous materials programs. Gaps in information or limitations are noted in 

bold:

• Vehicle Inventory and Use Survey (VIUS), 1992, formally known as the 

Truck Inventory and Use Survey (TIUS). This document is used by

Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) to determine the number of 

vehicles being used to transport hazardous materials and the distances 

they travel. (However, the data is not reliable because VIUS double 

counts trucks carrying hazardous materials. This is due to multiple 

placarded loads being counted as multiple trucks. Also, the survey 

 

1

 49 United States Code § 5121
APPENDIX V

(Page 2 of 9)

sample size is insufficient to provide detailed information such as 

specific hazard by type of truck.)

• Commodity Flow Survey, 1993, (Period 1988-1992). Conducted by the 

Bureau of Census and compiled and distributed by the BTS. This

document was used to determine the volume of hazardous materials

transported in the United States on a daily and annual basis. (This is a 

survey based upon sampling the domestic industry that is

conducted every 5 years. While the Commodity Flow Survey’s 

(CFS) main strength is its multimodal nature, it has limitations. 

The CFS generally reflects shipments from the point of

manufacture to first destination but excludes most establishments in 

retail. Finally, it is not focused on hazardous materials and does not 

define products within the meaning of Title 49 Code of Federal 

Regulations.) 

• Commodity Flow Survey, 1997, (Period 1993-1997). This CFS includes 

hazardous materials as a reportable element. However, this document 

was in draft during most of the evaluation. Therefore it became

available too late in the program evaluation (December 1999) to provide 

sufficient time for incorporation of usable data into this evaluation.

Although CFS is the most comprehensive source of data on the 

domestic movements of goods and materials, some industries and 

commodities and most domestic movement of imports are not

included. Also, it continues to exclude most retail establishments. 

• RSPA’s Biennial Report on Hazardous Materials Transportation,

(reporting period 1991-1997). These reports were used to analyze the 

data reported to Congress by RSPA on hazardous materials

transportation in the United States. (The Biennial Report simply

compiles data given to RSPA by the Operating Administrations. 

The accuracy or the consistency of the data contained in the

Biennial Report is not verified by RSPA before publication, or 

analyzed to meet the DOT requirement to report on program

effectiveness and voluntary compliance. Rather it is used by RSPA 

to report to Congress on the transportation of hazardous materials 

in the United States.)

• Transportation Research Board, Hazardous Materials Shipment

Information for Emergency Response, Special Report 239, 1993. This 

report to Congress discusses RSPA’s further efforts to meet the
APPENDIX V

(Page 3 of 9)

requirements of Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety

Act. The study devoted significant effort to analyzing past hazardous 

materials transportation incidents, as well as the HMIS.

• Directory of Transportation Data Sources, 1996. Published by the

Bureau of Transportation Statistics. This document was used to identify 

sources of data about the transportation of hazardous materials. The

HMPE team analyzed three sources of data identified in the directory.

• California Commercial Motor Vehicle (CMV) Accident Statistics, 1996. 

Prepared by FMCSA’s San Francisco, CA. Office. This document was 

prepared using data from the California traffic records system, which 

tracks injuries, fatalities, and property damages. The report concluded 

that non-commercial drivers are responsible for 69% of all CMV fatal 

accidents, and that improved "public" outreach is necessary to reduce 

this percentage. (The report noted that most police reports failed to 

record the amount of property damages. The report does not

segregate data by hazardous material or non-hazardous material, 

and does not indicate commodities carried. Therefore, we were 

unable to determine number of hazardous material fatalities to test 

against RSPA’s HMIS data). 

• Large Truck Crash Profile: The 1997 National Picture, 1998. Prepared 

by the Analysis Division of the Office of Motor Carrier Safety. The 

report notes, in part, that: 

ÿ the Motor Carrier Management Information System only receives 

62% of the truck and bus crash reports; 

ÿ the rate of injuries and fatalities is increasing; 

ÿ failure to yield/ran out of traffic lane is the largest single driver 

reason for crashes. 

(The sources used by the report did not provide any in-depth data 

on the causes or reasons for truck and bus crashes. Without this 

data, there is no way to validate the causal representations used in 

the report.)

• RSPA Draft report on A National Risk Assessment for Hazardous

Materials Transportation, 1998. This report was prepared by the
APPENDIX V

(Page 4 of 9)

Argonne National Laboratory for RSPA's Office of Hazardous Materials 

Technology. The report notes as a limitation that any assessment of 

risk is limited by the quantity and quality of data available to the

Department. For this reason, the data in the HMIS is multiplied by a 

factor of 150 percent to more closely equate to what should be reported. 

The report also noted the lack of causal data about incidents, and the 

lack of package reporting on incident forms. (The report is in draft 

and undergoing a peer review. The report makes several

assumptions and, by their own admission, uses unsupported

percentages to adjust data deficiencies. Therefore, the only

information used pertains to the known data limitations of HMIS.) 

• RSPA’s Report on Hazardous Materials Shipments, 1998. Prepared by 

the Office of Hazardous Materials Safety. This report was used as a 

source of information on shipments, movements, and tonnage of

hazardous materials shipped within the United States. (In this report, 

RSPA acknowledged data limitations as follows:)

“This report deliberately uses the word ‘estimate.’ It does not 

presume to provide dispositive, unchallengeable ‘counts.’ It is well 

known, for example, that industries continually undertake

operational changes to increase efficiencies, reduce risk, or both. In 

gasoline distribution, for example, the present trend is toward use 

of larger vehicles and fewer reshipments of product. Even as U.S. 

daily consumption of petroleum products has grown steadily from 

17 million barrels per day in 1992 to close to 19 million barrels per 

day in 1998, the number of daily petroleum product shipments

could be declining, depending upon corporate distribution and fleet 

utilization strategies. Thus, these estimates may be viewed as

subject to continuing review and re-calibration. Suggestions from 

industry and other knowledgeable sources regarding how to

improve the underlying data assumptions and the accuracy of the 

overall estimates are welcome.”

• National Transportation Statistics, 1998. Published and distributed by 

the BTS. Chapter 3, Table 3.6 lists hazardous materials safety and

property damage. The source for this information is RSPA’s HMIS, 

which at the time was limited to interstate incidents. Also, there is a 

known potential for underreporting of incidents to the HMIS. See 

discussion of Hazardous Materials Data Collection. 
APPENDIX V

(Page 5 of 9)

• Risk/Benefit Cost Analysis for Prohibiting Hazardous Materials in

External Piping of MC 306/DOT 406 Cargo Tank Motor Vehicles,

1999. This report was prepared by RSPA's Office of Hazardous

Materials Technology. The report indicates it is a preliminary report 

that provides a "...first-cut look at risks inherent in the current system, 

the level of technology development and possible ways to eliminate or 

reduce risk...." The report identifies the limitations on the exact

numbers of tank trailers in flammable or combustible liquid service, and 

notes that for the period 1990-1997, 57 gasoline fatalities accounted for 

over 75% of flammable and combustible fatalities. The report also notes 

the problems with underreporting of damages in incident reports, and as 

such applies a factor of 150% to adjust all HMIS data for both interstate 

and intrastate incidents. (The report is preliminary and notes several 

shortfalls in HMIS data reporting. The use of unsupported

percentages by RSPA to adjust for the HMIS’s data deficiencies 

limited the report’s usefulness.) 

• Hazardous Materials Risk Assessment: Year Portrait of Hazardous 

Materials Accidents/Incidents and Impacts, 1999. This is a final report 

prepared by Battelle for the Office of Motor Carrier Safety. The report 

notes, "This project was designed to assist the Department of

Transportation (DOT) in achieving their strategic goal of reducing the 

rate and severity of transportation fatalities and injuries in hazardous 

materials transportation and of reducing the dollar loss from highconsequence, reportable transportation accidents." However, this report 

only covers phase I, which characterizes the shipment impacts for one 

year of Class 3 hazardous material shipments. The report notes the lack 

of data, "...there is no good national source of traffic flow data

comparable to HMIS and Safetynet for accidents and incidents." 

However, data was used from state databases to supplement DOT data. 

The state data indicated that these other databases reported 18 fatalities 

due to hazardous materials versus the 11 reported in HMIS. 

(Difference in fatalities may be due to RSPA's requirement that 

only hazardous materials “caused” deaths are counted. The other 

reporting databases do not have the necessary means to identify

deaths by hazardous materials versus deaths caused by the

accident.) 
APPENDIX V

(Page 6 of 9)

Hazardous Materials Data Collection

The team also analyzed the Department’s system for capturing hazardous

materials data reported to the Congress, the HMIS maintained by RSPA and its 

subsystem, the Incident Reporting Subsystem. Information contained in the HMIS 

is reported (telephonically) to the National Response Center and in writing to 

RSPA on DOT Form 5800.1. Data in the HMIS were compared to calls to the 

National Response Center, state databases, and other data sources to verify its 

accuracy. The 1999 Battelle study identified above found that RSPA’s HMIS 

database has not received written reports (Form 5800.1) for all serious

hazardous material incidents. Battelle conducted a review of eight states and 

found a total of 18 hazardous materials related fatalities in 1996. For the 

same reporting period, the HMIS reported only 11 fatalities only one of which 

was found in the Battelle study (indicating 17 were not in HMIS). 

In addition, RSPA issued a draft report on October 28, 1998 identifying the

problems or limitations with the HMIS data. RSPA stated: 

“These include concerns about the accuracy of the reported

data, particularly related to underreporting and misreporting....

Since these data (HMIS data) do not address changes over time 

in the transportation environment, they do not provide a

complete picture. These reasons also limit the data’s ability to 

predict future incident characteristics and support risk analysis. 

Risk analyses also require more data than the Incident

Reporting Subsystem currently provides, specifically data

related to transportation system conditions; conditions at

loading, unloading, storage and transfer facilities; packaging; 

the material; the environment; the vehicle; and human factors. 

Human factors are particularly important to understand

because the data showed that more than three-quarters of all 

reported incidents are attributed to human error. Risk analyses 

and cause and effect analyses are important in supporting

rulemaking initiatives and efforts to improve safety.

The data are also limited in their ability to support cause and 

effect analysis, primarily because insufficient information is

collected on root cause, which is the fundamental underlying 

reason that leads to an incident. For example, the root cause of a 

leak from a loose valve may be that corrosion prevented the 

valve from being sufficiently tightened.”
APPENDIX V

(Page 7 of 9)

Office of Technology Assessment Reports

• U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Report on the

Transportation of Hazardous Materials, 1986. This document was used 

primarily to gain a historical background of the hazardous materials 

program within the Department.

• U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment. Gearing up for

Safety: Motor Carrier Safety in a Competitive Environment,

OTA-SET-382, September 1988. This document was used primarily to 

gain a historical background on larger safety risks pertaining to carriage 

by commercial truck. 

Prior NTSB, DOT, General Accounting Office, and OIG Reports Considered 

by the HMPE Team. 

NTSB Reports

Safety Effectiveness Evaluation of Federal and State Enforcement Efforts in 

Hazardous Materials Transportation by Truck, 

NTSB-SEE-81-2, February, 1981

DOT Reports

Report of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Task Force 

September, 1978

GAO Reports

Programs For Ensuring The Safe Transportation of Hazardous Materials Need

Improvement

GAO/CED-81-5, November 4, 1980

Enhancing Policy and Program Effectiveness Through Improved Management

GAO/RCED-87-3, April 13, 1987
APPENDIX V

(Page 8 of 9)

DOT Should Better Manage Its Hazardous Materials Inspection Program

GAO/RCED-90-43, November 17, 1989

Information Strategy Needed for Hazardous Materials

GAO/IMTRC-91-50, September 25, 1991

OIG Reports

Hazardous Materials Program – Federal Railroad Administration – Region 7

Report No. R9-FR-5-006, April 7, 1995

Railroad Safety Program

Report No. R9-FR-7-003, December 19, 1996

Management Advisory, Hazardous Materials Registration Program

Report No. TR-1998-110, April 3, 1998

Aviation Security

Report No. AV-1998-134, May 27, 1998

Review of Security Controls Over Air Carrier Shipments

Report No. AV-1998-149, June 2, 1998

Dangerous Goods/Cargo Security Program

Report No. AV-1998-178, July 23, 1998

Container Inspection Program – USCG

Report No. MA-1998-200, September 8, 1998

Aviation Safety

Report No. AV-1999-069, March 30, 1999

Motor Carrier Safety Program

Report No. TR-1999-091, April 26, 1999
APPENDIX V

(Page 9 of 9)

Transportation Research Board (TRB) Studies and Information Services

The HMPE team utilized the TRB library and online Transportation Research

Information Services (TRIS). The TRIS database is the world’s largest and most 

comprehensive bibliographic resource on transportation information. 

Literature Search

The HMPE team reviewed appropriate technical, industry and government 

produced articles, House and Senate conference reports, and other available data.

APPENDIX VI

(Page 1 of 2)

DOT Form 5800.1 - Hazardous Materials Incident Report
APPENDIX VI

(Page 2 of 2)

DOT Form 5800.1 - Hazardous Materials Incident Report
APPENDIX VII

(Page 1 of 6)

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

OFFICE OF CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY

DANGEROUS GOODS PROGRAM

Dangerous Goods and

Cargo Security

Program Manager

Dangerous Goods and

Cargo Security Field

Agents

Civil Aviation Security

Field Office Managers

CASFO's

Dangerous Goods and

Cargo Security

Coordinators

Regional Security

Division Managers

(10 Regional Offices)

Office of Civil Aviation

Security Operations

Associate Administrator

for Civil Aviation

Security
APPENDIX VII

(Page 2 of 6)

FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS PROGRAM PRIOR TO JANUARY 5, 2000

Safety Research and

Motor Carrier Standards

Divisions

State Directors

Hazardous Materials

Activities

Resource Centers (4)

Hazardous Materials

Specialists

Data Analysis and

Information Systems

Technology Evaluation

and

Development

Cross-Cutting

Functions

National and International

Safety Programs

Hazardous Materials

Team

Motor Carrier

Enforcement

Office of Motor Carrier

and Highway Safety
APPENDIX VII

(Page 3 of 6)

FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS PROGRAM AS OF JANUARY 5, 2000

Administration Research, Technology and

Information Management

* Policy and Program Planning

* Strategic Planning

* Regulatory Development

* Legislation

Policy, Plans

and

Regulations

Bus and Trucks

Standards and

Operations

Policy and

Program Development

* Enforcement Procedures

* Compliance Reviews

* Regulation Implementation

* Hazardous Materials

Enforcement

and

Compliance

* State Programs

MCSAP, CDL

*Safety Action Programs

Motor Carrier

Safety Programs

Service Centers

Eastern, Southern

Midwestern,

Western

State Offices

52 State Directors

Field Operations

Eastern, Southern

Midwestern, Western

4 Area Administrators

Enforcement and

Program Delivery

Assistant Administrator

(Chief Safety Officer)

Administrator

&

Deputy Administrator
APPENDIX VII

(Page 4 of 6)

FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION

OFFICE OF SAFETY HAZARDOUS MATERIALS PROGRAM

Railroad Safety

Specialist

Hazardous Materials

Railroad Safety

Inspectors

Hazardous Materials

Regional Administrator

(8 Regions)

Railroad Safety

Specialists

Hazardous Materials

Industrial Hygenist Engineer

Staff Director

Hazardous Materials

Division

Director

Office of Safety

Office of Safety

Associate Administrator

for Safety
APPENDIX VII

(Page 5 of 6)

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

CONTAINER INSPECTION/HAZARDOUS MATERIALS PROGRAM

Hazardous Materials

and

Container Inspection

Counsel

Office of Marine

and

International Law

Chief Counsel

Container Inspection

Training and

Assistance Team

Container

Inspection/Hazardous

Materials Program

Manager

Port & Facilities

Compliance Division

Office of

Compliance

Field Activities

Directorate

Hazardous Materials

Standards Division

Office of Operating

and Environmental

Standards

Standards Directorate Resource Directorate

Assistant Commdant for

Marine Safety and

Environmental Protection

Hearing Officer

Container

Inspector

Chief,

Port Operations

Department

Marine Safety Office

Captain of the Port

District

Commander

Commandant
APPENDIX VII

(Page 6 of 6)

RESEARCH AND SPECIAL PROGRAMS ADMINISTRATION

OFFICE OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY

International

Standards

Coordinator

Office of Hazardous

Materials Standards

Office of Hazardous

Materials Initiatives

and Training

Office of Hazardous

Materials Exemptions

and Approvals

Eastern Region Central Region Western Region Southwest Region Southern Region

Office of Hazardous

Materials

Enforcement

Office of Hazardous

Materials Technology

Office of Hazardous

Materials Planning

and Analysis

Associate Administrator
APPENDIX VIII

(Page 1 of 9)

Description of Violation Categories Identified in Table 6

In 1998, DOT inspectors identified 96,474 violations of Hazardous Materials 

Regulations. Specific examples of the most frequently encountered violations in 

each of the broad categories identified in Table 6 in Chapter 6 of this report are 

summarized below. 

49 CFR Part 107 – Hazardous Materials Program Procedures

Part 107 prescribes procedures RSPA’s Associate Administrator of

Hazardous Materials Safety and the Office of Chief Counsel use in carrying 

out their duties under the laws pertaining to the transportation of hazardous 

materials.

Violations of Part 107 were:

• Failure to submit registration for cargo tank motor vehicle

manufacturer, repair facility or assembly activity.

• Failure to register as a hazardous materials shipper or carrier and pay 

the registration fee.

• Failure to have a copy of the Certificate of Registration or the

registration number on a transport vehicle.

49 CFR Part 171 – General information, Regulations, and Definitions

Part 171 prescribes requirements of the Department of Transportation governing: 

the offering of hazardous materials for transportation and transportation of

hazardous materials; the representation that a hazardous material is present in a 

package, container, rail car, aircraft, motor vehicle or vessel; the manufacture,

fabrication, marking, maintenance, reconditioning, repair, or testing of packaging 

or a container presented, marked, certified, or sold for use in transporting of 

hazardous materials; and the use of terms and symbols prescribed for the marking, 

labeling, placarding, and description of hazardous materials and packagings used 

in their transport.

Violations of Part 171 were:

• Failure to immediately make the required telephonic notification of a 

hazardous materials incident.
APPENDIX VIII

(Page 2 of 9)

• Failure to prepare and submit the required Hazardous Materials Incident 

Report when an unintentional release of hazardous materials occurred in 

transportation. 

• Failure to comply with the provisions of the International Civil Aviation 

Organization Technical Instructions for the transportation of hazardous 

materials by aircraft.

• Failure to comply with the provisions of the International Maritime

Dangerous Goods Code for the transportation of hazardous materials by 

vessel.

• Failure to comply with the provision of the Canadian Transportation of 

Dangerous Goods Regulations for the transportation of hazardous

materials from Canada.

49 CFR Subpart 172.200 – Shipping Papers

Subpart 172.200 prescribes the manner in which each person who offers a 

hazardous material for transportation must describe the hazardous material 

on the shipping papers. 

Violations of Subpart 172.200 were:

• Failure to provide a shipping paper with a shipment of hazardous

materials.

• Failure to properly describe a hazardous material on a shipping paper.

• Failure to properly certify a hazardous materials shipping paper,

including no certification, no signature, and incorrect or improper

language description.

• Failure to meet the prescribed format requirements.

• Failure to properly certify a shipment for transportation by aircraft.

• Failure to include an exemption number in association with the shipping 

description when required.

49 CFR Subpart 172.300 – Marking 

Subpart 172.300 prescribes the manner in which each package, freight

container, and transport vehicle containing hazardous material must be

marked.
APPENDIX VIII

(Page 3 of 9)

Violations of Subpart 172.300 were:

• Failure to properly mark a package with the required shipping name or 

identification number.

• Failure to properly mark a package with conforming orientation arrows 

when liquid hazardous materials are contained in them.

• Failure to mark a transport vehicle with an identification number when 

required.

• Marking a package with a proper shipping name and identification

number for hazardous materials when the package does not contain a

hazardous material.

• Marking a package with an obscured or illegible shipping name or

identification number.

• Failure to provide or affix identification numbers on placards, orange 

panels, or white square-on-point backgrounds.

49 CFR Subpart 172.400 – Labeling 

Subpart 172.400 prescribes the manner in which each package or containment 

device must be labeled.

Violations of Subpart 172.400 were:

• Failure to affix a required label to a package.

• Affixing a hazardous materials warning label to a package, when a

hazardous material was not present or the label did not represent the 

hazard of the material in the package.

• Failure to affix a required subsidiary hazard warning label to a package 

containing hazardous materials when required.

• Failure to properly affix a hazard warning label.

• Affixing a label or similar display on a package that conflicts with a 

required hazard warning label.

49 CFR Subpart 172.500 – Placarding 

Subpart 172.500 prescribes the type of placarding that must be displayed on 

each side and each end of bulk packaging, freight container, unit load devi ce, 

transport vehicle, or rail car containing any quantity of hazardous material.
APPENDIX VIII

(Page 4 of 9)

Violations of Subpart 172.500 were:

• Failure to display a required placard.

• Displaying a placard that is not authorized or one that does not represent 

the hazard of the material being transported.

• Failure to display a required subsidiary hazard class placard.

• Displaying a placard which is obscured.

• Failure to provide or affix placards as required.

• Display of placards that do not meet prescribed specifications, format, 

color, or content.

• Display of a sign or other display that conflicts with a DOT hazard

placard.

49 CFR Subpart 172.600 – Emergency Response Information 

Subpart 172.600 prescribes requirements for providing and maintaining

emergency response information during transportation of hazardous materials and 

at facilities where hazardous materials are loaded, stored incidental to

transportation, or otherwise handled during any phase of transportation.

Violations of Subpart 172.600 were:

• Failure to provide emergency response information as required.

• Failure to include an emergency response telephone number on a

shipping paper.

• Failure to monitor the emergency response telephone number while the 

hazardous material is in transportation.

• Providing an emergency response telephone number of a third party,

when not authorized by the third party to do so. 

• Failure to include the required information as part of the emergency

response information.

49 CFR Subpart 172.700 – Training 

Subpart 172.700 prescribes requirements for training of hazardous materials

employees by hazardous materials employers.

Violations of Subpart 172.700 were:

• Failure to train a hazardous materials employee.
APPENDIX VIII

(Page 5 of 9)

• Failure to comply with the recurrent training requirement for hazardous 

materials employees.

• Failure to test a hazardous materials employee.

• Failure to maintain records of training.

• Failure to certify that a hazardous materials employee has been properly 

trained and tested.

• Failure to ensure that training records and certifications are readily

accessible.

49 CFR Part 173 – Shippers – General Requirements of Shipments and

Packagings 

Part 173 prescribes requirements for preparing hazardous materials for shipments 

by air, highway, rail or water, or any combination thereof; and inspection, testing, 

and retesting responsibilities for persons who retest, recondition, maintain, repair 

and rebuild containers used or intended for use in the transportation of hazardous 

materials

Violations of Part 173 were:

• Offering hazardous materials for transportation that were not properly 

prepared for transportation.

• Offering hazardous materials in salvage drums which were not

authorized, or which were improperly prepared.

• Failure to meet the provisions of Subpart 173.4 for a “small quantity” 

shipment of hazardous materials.

• Offering a packaging that was incompatible with the hazardous

material.

• Offering hazardous materials for transportation in a packaging which is 

not authorized.

• Offering hazardous materials for transportation aboard an aircraft which 

did not meet the requirements of Subpart 173.27 - General requirements 

for transportation by aircraft.

• Using packaging that was not properly reconditioned, retested, or

authorized for reuse.

• Packaging compressed gas in a cylinder that was damaged, out-of-test, 

or otherwise not suitable for transportation.
APPENDIX VIII

(Page 6 of 9)

49 CFR Part 174 – Carriage by Rail 

Part 174 prescribes requirements, in addition to those contained in parts 171, 172, 

173, 179, and 180, to be observed when transporting hazardous materials in or on 

rail cars. 

Violations of Part 174 were:

• Failure to inspect a hazardous material car before acceptance.

• Failure to expedite tank car shipments of hazardous materials.

• Acceptance of a hazardous materials car without shipping papers.

• Failure to possess a shipping paper during transportation.

• Transportation of a hazardous material car in a train without a document 

indicating the position in the train of each loaded, placarded car.

• Transporting a tank car without having the proper marking and

placarding.

• Improper transportation of an Inter-Modal portable tank.

• Failure to properly unload a tank car.

49 CFR Part 175 – Carriage by Aircraft 

Part 175 prescribes requirements, in addition to those contained in parts 171, 172 

and 173, applicable to aircraft operators transporting hazardous materials aboard 

aircraft. 

Violations of Part 175 were:

• Failure to properly accept and inspect a hazardous material shipment.

• Failure to properly secure hazardous materials packages within a cargo 

hold of an aircraft.

• Failure to display hazardous materials warning signage within the

airport terminal(s) or cargo facility.

• Exceeding the 25kg weight limitations when loading an aircraft in

non-accessible locations.

• Failure to train airline personnel.

49 CFR Part 176 – Carriage by Vessel 

Part 176 prescribes requirements, in addition to those contained in parts 171, 172, 

and 173, when transporting hazardous materials by vessel. 
APPENDIX VIII

(Page 7 of 9)

Violations of Part 176 were:

• Transporting a hazardous material aboard a vessel, without a properly

prepared Dangerous Goods Manifest that lists only those materials

subject to the requirements of 49 CFR or the International Maritime 

Dangerous Goods Code.

• Failure to properly block or brace hazardous materials within a transport 

vehicle or freight container aboard a vessel to prevent movement in any 

direction.

• Failure to segregate hazardous materials by distance or the presence of 

one or more steel bulkheads or decks, between incompatible hazardous 

materials.

• Failure to ensure the structural serviceability of freight containers and 

vehicles carrying Class 1 (explosive) materials on ships.

• Failure to meet the requirements applicable to motor vehicles or

mechanical equipment powered by internal combustion engines when

carried as cargo on a vessel.

49 CFR Part 177 – Carriage by Public Highway

Part 177 prescribes requirements, in addition to those contained in parts 171, 172, 

173, 178 and 180, to be observed when transporting hazardous materials by motor 

vehicle. 

Violations of Part 177 were:

• Accepting an improperly prepared hazardous material for transportation.

• Failure to comply with applicable Motor Carrier Safety regulations in 

49 CFR parts 390 through 397.

• Failure to provide driver training to the operator of a motor vehicle 

transporting hazardous materials.

• Accepting a hazardous material for transportation without a properly

prepared shipping paper.

• Failure to maintain a shipping paper or emergency response information 

as required.

• Failure to properly secure a package containing a hazardous material.

• Transporting a hazardous material displaying a POISON label with

foodstuffs.

• Failure to properly segregate a hazardous material from another

hazardous material.
APPENDIX VIII

(Page 8 of 9)

49 CFR Part 178 – Specifications for Packagings

Part 178 prescribes the manufacturing and testing specifications used for the 

transportation of hazardous materials in commerce. 

Violations of Part 178 were:

• Failure of a packaging manufacturer to provide proper closing

instructions.

• Marking packaging as meeting the requirements of the HMR when the 

packing does not meet either specification or performance requirements.

• Marking a packaging with a specification when the packaging was not 

properly manufactured or tested.

• Failure to maintain the required test records.

• Manufacturing or certifying a specification cargo tank as meeting the 

requirements of the HMR, when the manufacturer is not properly

registered or does not otherwise meet the requirements.

49 CFR Part 179 - Specifications for Tank Cars

Part 179 prescribes requirements for construction of tank cars for pressure and 

non-pressure service, multi-unit tank car tanks, cryogenic liquid tanks, and

seamless steel tanks.

Violations of Part 179 were:

• Failure of pressure relief devices.

• Improper specification marking of tank cars.

• Failure in the general specification of pressure tank cars.

• Failure in the general specification of non-pressure tank cars.

49 CFR Part 180 – Continuing Qualification and Maintenance of Packagings

Part 180 prescribes requirements pertaining to the maintenance, reconditioning, 

repair, inspection and testing of packagings, and other functions having an effect 

on the continuing qualification and use of a packagings. 

Violations of Part 180 were:

• Failure to properly conduct continuing qualification, maintenance, or

periodic retesting of packaging used for hazardous materials.
APPENDIX VIII

(Page 9 of 9)

• Failure to conduct or conduct properly the required requalification or 

periodic retests of packaging for hazardous materials. 

• Failure to maintain the required records for the requalification,

maintenance, or periodic tests of packaging for hazardous materials. 

• Failure to properly repair or modify packaging for hazardous materials.

49 CFR Part 180. – Subpart F – Qualification and Maintenance of Tank Cars

Subpart F prescribes the requirements for maintenance and testing of tank cars.

Violations of Part 180 Subpart F were:

• Failure to properly mark the tank car with the date[s] of inspection and 

testing.

• Failure to properly report and maintain records in accordance with the 

record retention requirements. 

APPENDIX IX 

(Page 1 of 6)

Calendar Year 1998 Agency Inspections 

FAA Activities

FAA conducted 3,559 inspections in calendar year (CY) 1998 including 3,119 air 

carriers, 232 indirect air carriers and 208 FAA authorized repair stations. FAA’s 

“comprehensive assessments” include a complete review of compliance with all 

relevant rules and standards. A comprehensive air carrier assessment, such as 

United Airlines operations at Chicago-O'Hare International Airport for example, 

would involve the systematic evaluation of an entire operating facility. 

Comprehensive air carrier assessments take 15 to 20 hours, which includes

preparation time:

• reviewing previous assessment and enforcement history of the air

carrier; 

• reviewing hazardous materials training programs and related training

records; 

• monitoring carriers' acceptance procedures for hazardous materials

shipments; 

• inspecting hazardous materials packages to ensure shipper compliance 

with the HMR and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); 

• observing storage, handling, loading and securing of hazardous

materials packages within the air cargo facility and aboard aircraft; 

• reviewing shippers' declarations located in the air carriers' 90 day file;

• reviewing the air carriers Store Department to ensure aircraft

replacement parts containing hazardous materials are being properly

packaged for shipment; and 

• assessing notification to flight crews that hazardous materials are aboard 

a particular aircraft. 

FAA also conducted, but did not track, shipper assessments in 1998 that revi ew 

one or more areas of compliance and are referred to by FAA as “supplemental 

assessments.” To track these assessments FAA is developing an automated

shipper assessment-tracking module is being developed to add to the existing

Airport and Air Carrier Inspection Reporting System. 

FAA initiated 257 enforcement actions as a result of assessments conducted in 

1998. 
APPENDIX IX 

(Page 2 of 6)

FAA also conducted 1500 on-site investigations of incidents or discrepancies in 

1998. An incident, as defined by 49 CFR Parts 171.15 and 16, involves the 

unintentional release of hazardous materials. Discrepancies, defined under 49 

CFR 175.31, involve an undeclared or improperly prepared hazardous materials 

shipment. On-site investigations involve the collection of information and

evidence from the carrier or shipper directly or indirectly (for example,

photographs, air waybills, statements, and bills of lading) in order to determine if 

violations of the HMR or ICAO occurred. Depending on the complexity of the 

incident or discrepancy, an average investigation could take a few hours, days, or 

weeks to complete. 

1,386 enforcement actions were initiated as a result of on-site investigations. FAA 

enforcement actions can be categorized as administrative or legal. Administrative 

action is a letter of warning or correction; and legal enforcement action is a Notice 

of Proposed Civil Penalty Assessment.

FMCSA Activities

In FY 1998, FMCSA employees conducted 1,650 compliance reviews of

hazardous materials carriers. In addition, through funding provided by the $80 

million MCSAP grant program, state employees conducted 444 compliance

reviews and about 133,000 roadside inspections of motor carriers transporting

hazardous materials. Compliance reviews are comprehensive inspections

conducted at a carrier’s office and include driver qualifications, driver hours of 

service records, vehicle maintenance and inspection records, financial records, and 

handling of hazardous materials (practices and procedures). A compliance review 

takes approximately 16 to 20 hours to complete. Of which at least 5 hours are 

devoted to hazardous materials activities. After the compliance review has been 

completed, another 16 hours usually is required if an enforcement case is initiated. 

Depending upon the severity of the violation, additional time maybe required to 

for preparation of out-of service orders, or attendance at a hearing.

State personnel usually conduct roadside inspections at weigh stations or highway 

rest areas. There are five levels of roadside inspections ranging from a level I, 

which is the most comprehensive and includes a complete review the driver's 

records and a thorough vehicle mechanical safety check, to a level V which is a 

limited inspection of the driver only. On average a roadside inspection takes 

approximately 30 minutes. During 1998, state employees performed 65,585 level 

I; 44,299 level II; 20,786 level III; 487 level IV; and 2,517 level V inspections. In 

addition, state personnel can perform special or terminal operations inspections. 
APPENDIX IX 

(Page 3 of 6)

FMCSA and States initiated over 16,500 enforcement actions in 1998 including 

165 enforcement actions taken by FMCSA as a result of compliance reviews. All 

enforcement actions initially involve civil penalty assessments. Hazardous

materials violations are calculated using the Hazardous Material Uniform Fine 

Assessment software program. Depending on whether or not the violator requests 

a hearing the final settlement may result in monetary or non-monetary penalty. 

Non-monetary may include the use of consent orders or other agreements between 

FMCSA and the party subject to enforcement action. 

FMCSA does not have a process for tracking or recording hazardous material 

incident or accident investigations. However, during 1998 FMCSA conducted at 

least nine on-site hazardous materials incidents or accidents investigations. 

Significant accidents and/or incidents are those that result in multiple fatalities, 

numerous injuries, high property damage or any combination thereof. Also

investigated are hazardous materials incidents that result in unusual interest such 

an explosion and substantial fire. The FMCSA Director for the state in which the 

incident/accident occurs makes a determination if an investigation is necessary to 

gather evidence on-site, to determine the cause of the incident, and the need to 

prepare an report of investigation. Both significant incidents and

accident/incidents are investigated. 

FRA Activities

FRA conducted a over 98,000 hazardous materials inspections in 1998 including 

71 multi-modal inspections, 134 tank car manufacturers and repair facilities, 3,600 

shippers of hazardous materials, 5,100 carriers and freight forwarders, and over 

89,000 inspections of hazardous materials rail cars, intermodal portable tanks, and 

various other containers. 

Tank car manufacturers and repair retest facilities has become an integral part of 

safety assurance. Title 49 CFR Subpart 179.7 requires each tank car facility to 

have a quality assurance program. Inspections of these facilities can usually be

accomplished within a day. 

Shipper inspections take at least half-day. High volume shippers require more 

time and are inspected at more frequent intervals. An inspection of a large shipper 

may take as long as an entire workweek.

Freight forwarder inspections are usually conducted as an ancillary inspection to 

rail intermodal inspections when evidence is uncovered suggesting the freight
APPENDIX IX 

(Page 4 of 6)

forwarder violated a regulation. Freight forwarder inspections usually require 2 to 

4 hours.

Inspection of tank cars is done at shipper or consignee facilities, rail yards, sidings,

interchange points, and various other locations. Inspection of a single tank car averages 

ten minutes but could be longer if non-compliant conditions are found or the car requires 

particular attention. Rail cars other than tank cars usually require approximately 10

minutes to inspect. 

Intermodal facility inspections take a day to obtain documentation, conduct the 

inspection, and write a report. Enforcement case preparation, if necessary, will 

add to the time. Inspection of Container on Flat Car or Trailer on Flat Car usually 

takes approximately 10 minutes to complete.

FRA inspections of “waybilling facilities” include evaluation of training records, 

special instructions for hazardous materials, yard inspections of railcars, car

handling, train placement of hazardous materials cars, and acceptance and

interchange (between carriers) of cars. These inspections routinely require

approximately 2 hours per inspection. 

FRA initiated 325 and closed 349 hazardous materials enforcement cases during 

1998. This number reflects both cases initiated in past years and new cases 

finalized in 1998. FRA primarily uses civil penalties and letters of warning to 

impose compliance. FRA will also stop shipments until unsafe hazardous

materials conditions are corrected. 

FRA does not separately track hazardous materials incident investigations from all 

other accident investigations. On-site incident investigations require the inspector 

to thoroughly examine all packagings involved in an effort to determine the level 

of compliance with the packaging specification, marking, labeling, and

documentation requirements, and to determine the cause of a package failure if 

one is identified. Incident investigations may be conducted as a primary

investigation if extensive damage, evacuation, major injury or a fatality occurs, or 

as an ancillary investigation conducted during an inspector's routine inspection at 

a shipper or carrier facility for all other incidents. Average incident investigations 

take approximately 5 hours to complete, but catastrophic incidents have taken

several weeks to complete. 
APPENDIX IX 

(Page 5 of 6)

RSPA Activities

RSPA conducted approximately 1,700 inspections in 1998. The primary focus of 

RSPA inspections is ensuring compliance with packaging specifications,

packaging testing requirements, and exemptions and approvals. RSPA inspectors 

also examine hazardous materials shipments for proper packaging, classification, 

marking, labeling, and shipping documentation. Inspections are conducted at

package manufacturing facilities; facilities involved in retesting, reconditioning,

and repairing packages such as cylinders or metal drums; shipper facilities; and 

transportation interchange points such as ports. RSPA inspectors also purchase 

packaging and packaged hazardous materials on the open market and have

independent labs or the Army conduct tests for compliance with the regulations. 

RSPA revived its package-testing program in 1996. Under an interagency

agreement with the U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Activity,

Packaging, Storage, and Containerization Center at Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania,

RSPA began to purchase packaging for testing. RSPA’s testing focuses on

packages designed and marked for hazardous materials in Packing Group I (the 

most stringent packaging requirement), with high specific gravity, and high

internal pressures. Before testing is performed, RSPA obtains the manufacture 

design qualification test reports and manufacturer’s package closing instructions. 

RSPA notifies the manufacturer of any package that fails and initiates enforcement 

actions if warranted. 

In addition to package testing, RSPA conducts a materials testing program to

respond to complaints about misclassification. For example, misclassification of a 

material as a primarily flammable versus a corrosive would effect its packaging 

characteristics. In this case, RSPA inspectors purchase small packaged samples of 

hazardous materials for laboratory analysis. 

RSPA closed 783 enforcement cases in 1998 reflecting both cases initiated in prior 

years and new cases finalized in 1998. RSPA is the only Operating

Administration to use administrative tickets as a means of facilitating monetary 

civil penalty enforcement action closure. Tickets are usually issued for nonserious violations, which include failure to prepare a written report of hazardous 

materials incident as required by 49 CFR Subpart 171.16. RSPA does not have a 

process for tracking or recording incident or accident investigations, since their 

participation is dependent upon invitation by applicable Operating Administration. 
APPENDIX IX 

(Page 6 of 6)

Coast Guard Activities

The Coast Guard conducted 8,899 inspections in 1998. These included 3,656 

intermodal freight container inspections on the waterfront and 5,243 freight vessel 

examinations (includes both U.S. and foreign flag vessels). Intermodal freight 

container inspections include an examination of the shipping papers, container 

Safety Approval Plate, structural condition of the container, container placarding, 

and stowage, segregation, labeling and packaging of the hazardous materials

within the container. 

Freight vessel examinations ensure compliance with all the applicable provisions 

in Code of Federal Regulations Titles 33, 46, and 49. With respect to the HMR, 

the following areas are examined during a freight vessel examination: hazardous 

materials training records; the dangerous cargo manifest; and the marking,

labeling, placarding, stowage, segregation and securing of both packaged and

containerized cargo. 

A 1994 Memorandum of Understanding between the Coast Guard and the

National Cargo Bureau, Inc. (NCB) established a cooperative container inspection 

effort, and defined the services each organization would provide. Per the 

agreement, the Coast Guard accepts NCB Certificates of Loading as prima facie 

evidence of compliance with HMR. Consequently, Coast Guard container

inspectors need not re-inspect hazardous material containers that have NCB

Certificates of Loading. In 1998 NCB certified the loading of 2,778 containers.

The Coast Guard also conducted 443 investigations involving hazardous materials 

in 1998, 206 as a result of reported releases of hazardous materials and 237 

because of violations discovered during inspections. Inspections of intermodal 

shipments of hazardous materials may involve a shipper, freight consolidators,

freight forwarders, carriers, waterfront facilities, and import or export brokers and 

agents. When violations are discovered, each party’s role in the shipments is 

investigated to determine whom to hold responsible

The Coast Guard initiated 829 enforcement actions in 1998 including 191 civil 

penalty cases, 46 letters of warning, and 592 detention actions that stop the

movement the freight until unsafe conditions are corrected. Coast Guard does not 

maintain a formal tracking or reporting system specifically for incident or accident 

investigations. 
APPENDIX X

(Page 1 of 1)

Department of Transportation

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS PROGRAM EVALUATION

SPONSORS AND TEAM MEMBERS

DOT Sponsors

Peter “Jack” Basso – Assistant Secretary for Budget and Programs/Chief 

Financial Officer

Kenneth M. Mead – Department of Transportation Inspector General

Kelley S. Coyner – Administrator, Research and Special Programs 

Administration

HMPE Co-Chairs

Jackie A. Goff – Office of Inspector General

George A. Whitney – Research and Special Programs Administration

Core HMPE Team Members

Delmer F. Billings – Research and Special Programs Administration

Raymond Kasey – Federal Railroad Administration

Curnis King – Federal Highway Administration, 

Office of Motor Carrier Safety 

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration

Mark Lendvay – Federal Aviation Administration

CAPT Geoffrey Powers – United States Coast Guard

Edward M. Stulginsky – Office of Inspector General

HMPE Support Team Members

Bahar Barami – Volpe National Transportation Systems Center

Greggory S. Bond – Office of Inspector General

Kirk A. Gillett – Office of Inspector General