J-S40024-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37 

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee :

:

 v. :

:

RAVANNA SPENCER, :

:

 Appellant : No. 1912 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the PCRA Order October 10, 2014, 

Court of Common Pleas, Erie County, 

Criminal Division at No. CP-25-CR-0000433-2013 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., DONOHUE and STRASSBURGER*, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY DONOHUE, J.: FILED JULY 27, 2015 

 Ravanna Spencer (“Spencer”) appeals from the order of court 

dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546 (“PCRA”). For the following reasons, we vacate and 

remand for further proceedings. 

 While incarcerated on an unrelated conviction, Spencer threw urine on 

a corrections officer. He was subsequently charged with multiple offenses in 

relation to that incident. On July 3, 2013, Spencer pled guilty to disorderly 

conduct and harassment.1 The matter proceeded immediately to sentencing 

and the trial court sentenced Spencer to six to twelve months of 

incarceration.2 At the conclusion of the plea and sentencing hearing, 

 

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5503(a)(4), 2709(a)(1). 

2

 This is an aggravated-range sentence. The statutory maximum is twelve 

months of incarceration. See Guideline Sentencing Form, 7/5/13. 
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Spencer’s counsel stated that Spencer waived his post-trial and appellate 

rights “so that he [could] be shipped back to his home prison as soon as 

possible.” N.T., 7/3/13, at 15. There was no further mention of Spencer’s 

purported waiver of appeal rights, in either oral or written form. 

 On June 9, 2014, Spencer filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. On June 

16, 2014, the PCRA court appointed counsel (“Counsel”). On August 22, 

2014, Counsel filed a motion seeking to withdraw from representation 

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1998), and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988). In response 

to Counsel’s Turner/Finley letter, Spencer sent the trial court a letter 

contesting Counsel’s motion to withdraw, in which he argued against 

Counsel’s conclusion that the issues he raised in his pro se petition were 

without merit. Spencer mailed this document to the trial court on 

September 8, 2014. On the same date, the PCRA court granted Counsel’s 

petition to withdraw and issued its notice of intent to dismiss Spencer’s PCRA 

petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 (“Rule 907 notice”).3 

Spencer then filed a response to the Rule 907 notice of intent to dismiss, in 

which he reiterated not only his defense of the issues he raised in his PCRA 

petition, but also raised new allegations of trial counsel ineffectiveness and 

 

3

 In connection with granting Counsel’s request to withdraw, the PCRA court 

authored a detailed opinion addressing the issues raised by Counsel in his 

Turner/Finley letter and agreeing with Counsel that they were without 

merit. PCRA Court Opinion, 9/8/14. 
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claims of Counsel’s ineffectiveness. On October 10, 2014, the PCRA court 

denied Spencer’s PCRA petition without addressing any of the claims 

Spencer raised for the first time in his response to the Rule 907 notice. This 

timely appeal follows. 

Spencer raises seven issues for our review.4 As we address them, we 

are mindful that “there is no absolute right to an evidentiary hearing on a 

PCRA petition, and if the PCRA court can determine from the record that no 

genuine issues of material fact exist, then a hearing is not necessary.” 

Commonwealth v. Springer, 961 A.2d 1262, 1264 (Pa. Super. 2008). “A 

reviewing court must examine the issues raised in the PCRA petition in light 

of the record in order to determine whether the PCRA court erred in 

concluding that there were no genuine issues of material fact and in denying 

relief without an evidentiary hearing.” Id. 

 Spencer raises two claims in which he alleges that the trial court 

lacked jurisdiction over him. Spencer’s Brief at 5. As a general matter, 

when a defendant has pled guilty, the only claims he may bring under the 

PCRA relate to the validity of his plea or the legality of his sentence. 

Commonwealth v. Rounsley, 717 A.2d 537, 538 (Pa. Super. 1998) 

(“[A]fter a defendant has entered a plea of guilty, the only cognizable issues 

in a post-conviction proceeding are the validity of the plea of guilty and the 

legality of the sentence.”). As these issues challenge the authority of the 

 

4

 We have reordered these issues for purposes of our discussion. 
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trial court to impose Spencer’s sentence, they implicate the legality of his 

sentence; accordingly, Spencer can raise them in a PCRA action. 

Commonwealth v. Archer, 722 A.2d 203, 209 (Pa. Super. 1998) (en 

banc); Rounsley, 717 A.2d at 538. Nonetheless, they afford him no relief. 

Spencer first argues that because the district attorney did not sign the 

criminal complaint, it was void and therefore the case “should have been 

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” Spencer’s Brief at 27. Spencer cites 

Commonwealth v. Belcher, 392 A.2d 730 (Pa. Super. 1978), in support of 

his position. This reliance is misplaced. Belcher provides that the criminal 

information, not the criminal complaint, must be signed by a district attorney 

for it to be valid. Id. at 731.5 Even if Spencer meant to challenge the 

validity of the criminal information, our review of the record reveals that the 

signature of a member of the Erie County District Attorney’s office is clearly 

affixed to Spencer’s criminal information. Thus, there is no merit to this 

claim. 

Spencer also argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over him 

because Pennsylvania’s constitution “lacks a savings clause permitting it to 

enact laws, statutes and [a] penal code.” Spencer’s Brief at 27. This is an 

 

5

 We further note that this Court overruled Belcher in Commonwealth v. 

Veneri, 452 A.2d 784, 788 (Pa. Super. 1982) (“[W]e believe that Belcher is 

incorrect law and must be overruled. We instead hold that the signature 

requirement of Pa.R.Crim.P. 225(b) is directory only and that its absence 

renders an information merely voidable and curable by amendment if 

properly raised in a pre-trial motion to quash.”). 
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argument that pro se appellants frequently raise, which we have consistently 

and roundly rejected. This Court recently detailed the faults in this 

argument and explained precisely why it is a frivolous claim in 

Commonwealth v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 865, 873-75 (Pa. Super. 2015). 

We now turn to Spencer’s two claims that the PCRA court erred by 

denying his petition without considering his allegations of Counsel’s 

ineffectiveness. Spencer’s Brief at 10.6 As noted above, the PCRA court did 

not address any of the new claims that Spencer raised in his response to the 

Rule 907 notice. It reasoned that “as [Spencer] has had the benefit of filing 

a pro se petition and a review by [Counsel], he may not add new claims now 

apparently because he is unhappy with this Court’s determination that the 

original claims lack merit.” PCRA Court Order, 10/10/14, at n.1. The PCRA 

court is partially correct. 

Where the petitioner does not seek leave to amend 

his petition after counsel has filed a Turner/Finley

no-merit letter, the PCRA court is under no obligation 

to address new issues. In contrast, where the new 

issue is one concerning PCRA counsel's 

representation, a petitioner can preserve the issue

by including that claim in his Rule 907 response or

raising the issue while the PCRA court retains 

jurisdiction. 

 

6

 Specifically, Spencer alleges that Counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 

trial counsel’s ineffectiveness for (1) not filing an appeal when Spencer 

requested that he do so and (2) not moving to withdraw Spencer’s guilty 

plea. Spencer’s Brief at 11. 
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Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080, 1085 (Pa. 2014) (internal citations

omitted). Accordingly, Spencer properly raised claims of Counsel’s 

ineffectiveness in his response to the Rule 907 notice. The PCRA court 

should have considered these before denying Spencer’s petition. 

Accordingly, we remand this case so that the PCRA court can review and 

decide the issues Spencer raised regarding Counsel’s ineffectiveness, 

including the appointment of counsel and holding an evidentiary hearing if it 

should determine that either issue merits a hearing.

7

 See Commonwealth 

v. Johnson, 64 A.3d 622, 623-24 (Pa. 2014) (holding that PCRA court 

improperly found issues raised by pro se petitioner waived and remanding 

case for consideration of issues and appointment of counsel and evidentiary 

hearing if necessary). 

 

7

 One of these issues alleges that trial counsel did not file a direct appeal 

when Spencer requested that he do so, and that Counsel was ineffective for 

failing to raise this claim on his behalf. Spencer’s Brief at 11. In support of 

this claim, Spencer points to a letter he sent to trial counsel, which he 

attached to his pro se PCRA petition, in which he told trial counsel that he 

wanted to withdraw his plea and file an appeal. See id.; PCRA Petition, 

6/9/14, at Attachment 2. Our law provides that failing to file an appeal 

when requested to do so by a defendant amounts to ineffectiveness per se. 

See Commonwealth v. Halley, 870 A.2d 795, 801 (Pa. 2005); 

Commonwealth v. Lane, 81 A.3d 974, 981 (Pa. Super. 2013). Yet, as 

noted above, Spencer purportedly waived his direct appeal rights at the time 

of sentencing. See N.T., 7/3/13, at 15. For such a waiver to be valid, 

however, it must be made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. 

Commonwealth v. Doty, 997 A.2d 1184, 1187 (Pa. Super. 2010). The 

only evidence of Spencer’s supposed waiver is a statement made by trial 

counsel, as detailed above. Accordingly, it appears that there are genuine 

issues of fact as to whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file an 

appeal or whether there was a valid waiver of appellate rights. 
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Spencer’s remaining issues challenge the PCRA court’s dismissal of his 

claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to “challenge a 

presumptive chemical test,” “investigate [his] mental state” with regard to a 

possible “mental health/insanity defense,” “obtain exculpatory video 

evidence” 8 and promising that he would receive a sentence of only three to 

six months. Spencer’s Brief at 4, 24. Spencer alleges that these instances of 

ineffectiveness induced him to plead guilty. 

We begin with Spencer’s claim that trial counsel induced his plea by 

promising that he would receive a three to six month sentence. Spencer’s 

Brief at 15. The PCRA Court rejected this claim on the basis that at the plea 

hearing, Spencer acknowledged that he could receive a sentence up to the 

statutory maximum, both orally and in writing. PCRA Court Opinion, 9/8/14, 

at 6. The record supports this conclusion, as it reveals that the trial court 

informed Spencer that he could be sentenced up to one year and ninety days 

of incarceration on the charges, and he acknowledged this. N.T., 7/3/13, at 

11; Statement of Understanding Rights Prior to Guilty/No Contest Plea, 

 

8

 When presenting these three issues in his statement of questions raised 

on appeal in his appellate brief, Spencer did not phrase his challenges to 

these instances of alleged ineffectiveness in terms of inducing his plea. See

Spencer’s Brief at 4. However, he makes this argument in his discussion of 

these issues. We could find these claims waived for failure to include them 

in his statement of questions involved. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a). We decline 

to do so in this instance. As we explain infra, Spencer preserved these 

issues by raising them obliquely in his initial PCRA petition and then directly 

in his response to the Rule 907 notice. We decline to let his failure to 

precisely frame the issues in this one instance foreclose our review thereof. 
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7/3/13, ¶ 4. Further, the record reveals Spencer’s acknowledgement that 

the trial court was not bound by any sentencing recommendation and that 

he was not made any promises as to the sentence he would receive. 

Statement of Understanding Rights Prior to Guilty/No Contest Plea, 7/3/13, 

¶¶ 5, 6. Accordingly, we find no error in the PCRA court’s determination that 

this issue is without merit. 

The PCRA court did not address the remaining three claims of 

ineffectiveness in its opinion, as it was of the opinion that they did not 

extend so far as to implicate the validity of Spencer’s plea. PCRA Court 

Opinion, 9/8/14, at 7. However, a close reading of Spencer’s initial, pro se 

PCRA petition and his response to the Rule 907 notice reveals that Spencer 

did allege that trial counsel’s failure in these regards induced his decision to 

enter a guilty plea. Accordingly, Spencer is entitled to have the PCRA court 

consider them. Therefore, on remand, the PCRA court shall consider these 

claims and hold a hearing on them if so required. 

Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction 

relinquished. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 7/27/2015