alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 _________________________________________

 Clerk

March 4, 2013

d0225

Order 

March 4, 2013

145153(38)

MARKELL VANSLEMBROUCK, a Legally

Incapacitated Minor, by and through her

Conservator, ERIC BRAVERMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

and SC: 145153

COA: 309680

Oakland CC: 2006-074585-NH

KIMBERLY A. VANSLEMBROUCK,

Plaintiff,

v

ANDREW JAY HALPERIN, M.D. and

WILLIAM BEAUMONT HOSPITAL,

Defendants-Appellants,

and

MICHIGAN INSTITUTE OF 

GYNECOLOGY AND OBSTETRICS, P.C.,

Defendant.

____________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s December 7, 

2012 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was 

entered erroneously.

VIVIANO, J., not participating.
#### In the Matter of Minerva Dean, Respondent, v Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, Appellant, and Transamerica Insurance Company et al., Respondents.

Order unanimously affirmed, with costs. Memorandum: On May 15, 1976, an automobile owned and operated by Dean and insured by appellant Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (Nationwide) was involved in an accident with an uninsured vehicle owned by Delaney. Dean sued Nationwide under the uninsured motorist provision in her insurance policy and sought arbitration of her claim. The company refused, however, to pay Dean’s claim for "pain and suffering” on the ground that she had not sustained a "serious injury” as that term is defined in subdivision 4 of section 671 of the Insurance Law. Instead, Nationwide petitioned for an order staying arbitration of her claim. Special Term denied Nationwide’s petition for a stay. We agree. The Comprehensive Automobile Insurance Reparations Act limits the traditional right to recover for noneconomic loss in tort actions between covered persons only (Insurance Law, § 673, subd 1; *Montgomery v Daniels,*38 NY2d 41, 47). As defined in the act, a "covered person” is a pedestrian or "any owner, operator or occupant of, a motor vehicle which has in effect the financial security required by [the Insurance Law]” (Insurance Law, § 671, subd 10). Since the Delaney vehicle was uninsured Delaney was not a "covered person” and Dean’s common-law tort action against him is in no way diminished by the provisions of the no-fault law *(Montgomery v Daniels, supra,*p 62). Accordingly, lack of a "serious injury” would not curtail Dean’s right to recover damages for pain and suffering. In the uninsured motorist clause of the insurance contract Nationwide promises to pay its insured, Dean, all sums she would be entitled to collect from an owner or operator of an uninsured vehicle. Therefore, Dean is not precluded from recovering from Nationwide such damages in the form of noneconomic loss as she is able to prove at arbitration. To hold otherwise would be to read into the uninsured motorist clause a restriction that does not exist. (Appeal from order of Onondaga Supreme Court—arbitration.) Present—Cardamone, J. P., Simons, Schnepp, Callahan and Witmer, JJ.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>           5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM
THERMO TERRATECH INC.'S
ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K FOR THE PERIOD ENDED APRIL 1,2000
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>        1,000

<S>                              <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                 YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                             APR-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                  APR-01-2000
<CASH>                                                  4,157
<SECURITIES>                                                0
<RECEIVABLES>                                          54,232
<ALLOWANCES>                                            2,695
<INVENTORY>                                             2,001
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                      137,697
<PP&E>                                                136,267
<DEPRECIATION>                                         66,311
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                        304,553
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                 106,964
<BONDS>                                               116,454
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                       0
<PREFERRED>                                                 0
<COMMON>                                                1,961
<OTHER-SE>                                             49,609
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                          304,553
<SALES>                                                     0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                      307,329
<CGS>                                                       0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                         243,382
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                       56,981
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                          715
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                      8,743
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                       (43,858)
<INCOME-TAX>                                            2,522
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                   (43,326)
<DISCONTINUED>                                              0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                           107
<CHANGES>                                                   0
<NET-INCOME>                                          (43,219)
<EPS-BASIC>                                           (2.27)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                           (2.27)


</TABLE>
#### The State ex rel. Childs, Appellant, *v.*Wingard, Warden, Appellee.

[Cite as *State ex rel. Childs v. Wingard*(1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 346.]

(No. 98-509

Submitted September 16, 1998

Decided October 14, 1998.)

*347
      *Tawan R. Childs, pro se.*

*Betty D. Montgomery,*Attorney General, and *Karen L. Killian,*Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

*Per Curiam.*

Childs asserts in his propositions of law that the court of appeals erred by dismissing his petition. Childs claims that his conviction is void because like the petitioner in *Ex parte McKnight*(1891), 48 Ohio St. 588, 28 N.E. 1034, he was charged in juvenile court with a different crime, *ie.,*aggravated murder, than the one upon which his extradition was obtained, *ie.,*murder. Childs argues that due to this defect, his bindover was also defective. For the following reasons, however, Childs’s claims are meritless.

First, *McKnight*is inapposite. In *McKnight,*the petitioner was extradited from New York to Ohio to be tried on a forgery charge, but he was subsequently tried and convicted of obtaining property by false pretenses. We granted a writ of habeas corpus and held at paragraph one of the syllabus that “[a] person surrendered to the authorities of this state by another state or territory on extradition proceedings cannot, while held in custody thereunder, be lawfully tried for a different crime than the one upon which his extradition was obtained, unless he voluntarily waives his privilege.” Unlike the petitioner in *McKnight,*
      *348Childs was ultimately tried for the same crimes for which he was extradited, *ie.,*murder and a firearm specification.

Second, *McKnight*preceded the enactment by the General Assembly of the predecessor to R.C. 2963.26. See G.C. 109-28. R.C. 2963.26 provides that “[a] person returned to this state by, or after waiver of, extradition proceedings, may be tried in this state for other crimes which he may be charged with having committed here, as well as that specified in the requisition for his extradition.” Based on R.C. 2963.26, the extradition and subsequent proceedings did not divest the common pleas court of jurisdiction. See *State v. Moore*(Nov. 3, 1993), Hamilton App. No. C-920927, unreported, 1993 WL 512868, where the court held that extraditing a defendant for a crime charged that was different from the ones for which he was eventually tried did not divest his trial court of jurisdiction.

Finally, the juvenile court bindover entry attached to Childs*s habeas corpus petition established full compliance with the bindover procedure. See *Gaskins v. Shiplevy*(1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 380, 382, 667 N.E.2d 1194,1196.

Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals properly dismissed the petition. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

*Judgment affirmed.*

Moyer, C.J., Douglas, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer, Cook and Lundberg Stratton, JJ., concur.
MEMORANDUM 

To: File 

From: Tab Tesnau 

Subject: Meeting with the Treated Wood Council 

Date: December 13, 2012 

On December 13, 2012, EPA met with representatives from the Treated Wood Council to discuss 

how treated wood is characterized within the context of the December 2011 Non-Hazardous 

Secondary Materials (NHSM) proposed rule. The representatives for the Treated Wood Council 

discussed a comparison of treated wood to resinated wood and how treated wood might be a 

potential candidate for a categorical determination as discussed in the December 2011 proposed 

rule. They also discussed a life-cycle assessment of treated wood. 

The Agency asked clarifying questions. Materials distributed during the meeting are attached. 

Invitees: 

Treated Wood Council Representatives included the following: 

Jeff Miller, Treated Wood Council 

Jane Luxton, Pepper Hamilton for Treated Wood Council 

Patrick Kirkman, Stella-Jones Corp 

Jeff Lloyd, Nisus Corp. 

Bill Sheeler, Zwicky Processing and Recycling 

EPA Representatives included the following: 

Lisa Feldt 

James Berlow 

Matt Straus 

Suzanne Rudzinski 

Sandra Connors 

George Faison 

Kenneth Dixon
Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

ROBERT ANDREW CONDON,

vs. Case No.: 3:19cv3613/RV/CAS

MARNE SUTTEN

_________________________________/

O R D E R

This cause comes on for consideration upon the magistrate judge=s 

Report and Recommendation dated December 4, 2019. (ECF No. 13). 

The parties have been furnished a copy of the Report and Recommendation 

and have been afforded an opportunity to file objections pursuant to Title 28, 

United States Code, Section 636(b)(1). Petitioner has filed a timely

objection.1

Having considered the Report and Recommendation, Petitioner’s 

objections, and the existence of the pending case in Kansas, I have 

determined that the Report and Recommendation should be adopted.

Accordingly, it is now ORDERED as follows:

 1 It has come to the court’s attention that on the same date Petitioner filed his initial motion in this case, 

he filed a substantially similar motion challenging his conviction in the District of Kansas. See Condon v. 

Sutten, D. KS, Case 5:19-cv-03192-JWL. Petitioner’s “supplement” to his Kansas petition (ECF No. 4) is 

virtually identical to his amended motion in this case (ECF No. 11). On November 29, 2019, Respondent 

filed an “Answer and Return, or in the Alternative, Motion to Summary Judgment” in the Kansas case, 

following which, on December 10, 2019, Petitioner moved to amend his petition to reflect the proper 

custodian/respondent. That case remains pending.
Page 2 of 2

Case No: 3:19cv3613/RV/CAS

1. The magistrate judge=s Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 

13) is adopted and incorporated by reference in this order.

2. Petitioner’s “Amended Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255” (ECF No. 

11) is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.

3. A certificate of appealability is DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED this 18th day of December, 2019.

/s/ Roger Vinson 

ROGER VINSON

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Exhibit
32.1





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED


PURSUANT
TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the quarterly report
of Sputnik Enterprises, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended
September 30, 2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (the “Report”), the undersigned, in the capacities and on the dates
indicated below, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to his
knowledge:





(1)           The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)           The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/ David LaDukeName:
              David LaDukeTitle:
              President, Chief Executive Officer, andTreasurer





November
12, 2010





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
Sputnik Enterprises, Inc. and will be retained by Sputnik Enterprises, Inc. and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
J-S22022-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

 Appellee

v.

FORREST ALLISON GRIBBLE,

 Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1394 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence July 30, 2015 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County 

Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-14-CR-0001040-2013

BEFORE: MUNDY, J., DUBOW, J., and STRASSBURGER, JJ.*

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED MAY 13, 2016

I respectfully dissent.

The record before us reveals that Appellant preserved only a claim that 

the motion to revoke was untimely filed because he had completed his ARD 

program before the Commonwealth filed its motion to revoke.1 Appellant’s 

issue on appeal that the Commonwealth failed to file its motion within a 

reasonable time as prescribed by Pa.R.Crim.P. 318 does not appear within 

the contents of the certified record received by this Court.2,3

 “[T]his Court 

 

1 See Order of Court, 11/5/2014 (granting the motion to revoke Appellant’s 

ARD despite the fact that Appellant received notice prior to the motion that 

he had “fulfilled all of the conditions” of the program.). 

2 Both the trial court and the Commonwealth acknowledge that, following 

the filing of the motion to revoke Appellant’s ARD, argument was held and 

the motion was granted. There is no transcript of this proceeding in the 

certified record nor is there an explanation for its absence. See Pa.R.A.P. 

1923 (“If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was 
J-S22022-16

- 2 -

cannot review a legal theory in support of that claim unless that particular 

legal theory was presented to the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 

72 A.3d 606, 610 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Rush, 

959 A.2d 945, 949 (Pa. Super. 2008)).

For this reason I would deem Appellant’s issue waived and would 

affirm his judgment of sentence.

 

made, or if a transcript is unavailable, the appellant may prepare a 

statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means, 

including his recollection.”).

3 At Appellant’s stipulated non-jury trial, defense counsel stated “We are 

having a non-jury trial to preserve the issue ... regarding [Appellant’s] ARD 

revocation. ... Our position is that the Commonwealth’s petition to revoke his 

ARD was untimely filed and it was an error of law to subsequently revoke 

him.” N.T., 5/11/2015, at 3. This bald assertion, without any accompanying 

argument regarding Pa.R.Crim.P. 318, is not enough to inform this Court if 

Appellant properly preserved this issue by raising it with the trial court 

below.
Dolan Chemical Laboratory 4001 Bixby Road Groveport, OH 43125 T: 614-836-4221, Audinet 210-4221 F: 614-836-4168, Audinet 210-4168 http://aepenv/labs 

## Water Analysis
Location: Mountaineer Plant Report Date: 2/20/2012 Sample Number: 120715-001 Date Collected:02/15/2012 08:00 Date Received:2/15/2012 

### 1st Stage Feed Units Parameter Result RL Analysis By Analysis Date/Time Method MDL ug/L Selenium, Se 422 0.5 DPC EPA 200.8 0.1 02/17/2012 12:56 

### Sample Number: 120715-002 Date Collected:02/15/2012 08:00 Date Received:2/15/2012 

## 2nd Stage Feed Units Parameter Result RL Analysis By Analysis Date/Time Method MDL ug/L Selenium, Se 12.9 0.5 DPC EPA 200.8 0.1 02/17/2012 13:01 

### Sample Number: 120715-003 Date Collected:02/15/2012 08:00 Date Received:2/15/2012 

## Bioreactor Effluent Units Parameter Result RL Analysis By Analysis Date/Time Method MDL ug/L Selenium, Se 1.59 0.5 DPC EPA 200.8 0.1 02/17/2012 13:06

THIS TEST REPORT RELATES ONLY TO THE ITEMS TESTED AND SHALL NOT BE REPRODUCED EXCEPT IN FULL WITHOUT WRITTEN APPROVAL OF THE LABORATORY. ALL TEST RESULTS MEET ALL OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ACCREDITING AUTHORITY, UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.

Brian Snyder, Chemist II Email bssnyder@aep.com Tel. 614-836-4224 Fax 614-836-4168 Audinet 210-4224

Mountaineer Plant, 120715 Page 1 of 1
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v John Lanahan, Appellant.

Third Department,

June 19, 1980

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*E. Stewart Jones, Jr.,*for appellant.

*Sol Greenberg, District Attorney (George H. Barber*of. counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Herlihy, J.

The sole issue upon this appeal is whether or not the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress an admission of guilt made after arrest.

*186At the suppression hearing held herein, the People presented the testimony of one police officer, Frank P. Connelly, an investigator with the New York State Bureau of Criminal Investigation. Connelly testified that on February 9, 1978 he placed the defendant under arrest and recited to the defendant his *Miranda*rights to remain silent and have an attorney; that the defendant acknowledged he understood these rights; that the defendant wanted to know what he was charged with; that Connelly responded that he would explain the details when "I get to the barracks”; that he brought the defendant to the barracks, did some paperwork, brought defendant into his office, removed the handcuffs and again recited the *Miranda*rights; and that he then recited the details of the charge as robbery of a gas station, stating also: "You did the job with a kid by the name of Lawless. You used Lawless’s car, you parked the car behind the bank, which is about a block behind the Gasland gas station, walked through the fields, stood behind the wooden fence. When the girl came out with the two moneybags, both of you stepped out from behind the fence. You told her to throw the money over and she threw you the money. Then you asked—one of you asked her for the car keys, told her not to do anything stupid, got in behind the fence again, ran back to the car and drove to your house and split the money up.” Connelly further testified that: "I said that is the robbery that you are charged with * * *. He said, I did it.”

The defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the admission of guilt; however, the record amply supports the conclusion of the trial court that the admission was made "spontaneously” and, accordingly, there was no involuntariness. Upon appeal the defendant calls our attention to the case of *People v Samuels*(49 NY2d 218), decided since the defendant’s conviction. While the defendant’s physical situation falls squarely within the ambit of *Samuels*(see, also, *People v Cullen,*50 NY2d 168), it nevertheless affords no relief as to a spontaneous declaration (see *People v Lynes,*49 NY2d 286, 293-295; cf. *Rhode Island v Innis,*446 US —, 48 USLW 4506).

The judgment should be affirmed.

Greenblott, J. P., Kane, Staley, Jr., and Mikoll, JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                                      5
<LEGEND>
     This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
consolidated balance sheet and the consolidated statement of operations and
is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                                            <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                  3-mos
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              Dec-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   Mar-31-1998
<CASH>                                         559,571
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               876,422
<PP&E>                                         10,701,454
<DEPRECIATION>                                 4,571,187
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 7,293,820
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          418,172
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       0
<OTHER-SE>                                     2,141,424
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   7,293,820
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               526,564
<CGS>                                          165,313
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  243,166
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               (3,573)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             116,053
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                5,605
<INCOME-TAX>                                   0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            5,605
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   5,605
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  0.33
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  0.33
        


</TABLE>