Opinion filed December 19, 2013

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-11-00365-CR

__________

SHARON LYNNE CORBIN, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 104th District Court

Taylor County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 17793B

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The jury found Sharon Lynne Corbin guilty of aggravated assault and

assessed her punishment at confinement for five years. In two points of error, 

Appellant asserts that the trial court improperly sustained objections to two hearsay 

statements that she sought to introduce. We affirm.

I. Trial Evidence

Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, but some facts 

are provided for context. Appellant had moved to Texas from South Carolina and 
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temporarily lived at Bill Guinn’s house with his daughter, Lillie “Kat” Guinn.

Robert Tettleton, Kat’s fiancé, also lived there. Appellant, Kat, and Tettleton 

decided one late afternoon to go to Guitars and Cadillacs Bar in Abilene to drink 

and dance. They saw Amber Laird at the bar, and after they had spent some time

there together, they all returned to Guinn’s house.

Appellant, Laird, Kat, and Tettleton continued to drink and socialize in the 

dining room. Appellant claimed that, later in the night, Laird threatened “to blow 

[Appellant’s] f-----g brains out.” Laird and Kat denied that Laird threatened 

Appellant. Kat testified that, as the night wore on, Appellant became angry

because the group had discussed her personal issues.

Laird and Kat testified that, still later while they and Tettleton were in the 

bedroom, Appellant entered the bedroom, pulled a knife from her purse that was on

the couch in that room, and held the knife to Laird’s throat. Laird testified that 

Appellant used the knife to cut Laird’s upper chest near her neck and that 

Appellant used her fingernails to scratch the back of Laird’s neck, her upper lip,

and her nose.

1 Tettleton called the police;2 Officer Kevin Pruitt and Officer Joshua 

Ward responded.

Officers Pruitt and Ward arrived, and Officer Ward took Appellant’s

statement and Kat’s statement. Officer Ward testified that Appellant smelled of 

alcohol, appeared to be intoxicated, and was very agitated. He reported that

Appellant said, “I only did what [Laird] deserved.” He also reported that Kat gave 

him Appellant’s knife and a field statement. Officer Ward testified that he and

Officer Pruitt arrested Appellant.

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The trial court admitted nurse Amy Cullers’s testimony about Laird’s emergency room condition 

and Laird’s emergency room medical records and photos that documented her injuries.

2

The trial court also admitted the 911 audio recording of Tettleton’s call.
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At trial, Appellant denied that she threatened Laird or that she scratched her

or cut her with the knife, but she admitted that she owned the knife and that it was 

in her back pocket. Appellant claimed that Laird and Tettleton had fabricated the 

assault to keep Appellant from telling Kat that Laird and Tettleton had sex that 

night in Kat’s bedroom while Kat was asleep in that same bedroom. When crossexamined about how she had reached across Tettleton to attack Laird, Appellant 

said that she did not reach across Tettleton because he was on the other side of the 

bed and that she never pulled out her knife.

Appellant attempted to testify about Laird’s intent to file a false police report

against her because she threatened to disclose to Kat that Laird had sex with 

Tettleton. Appellant also tried to testify that Laird had “clawed” and “hit”

herself—to make it look like Appellant injured her—and that Laird had said she 

was going to have Appellant arrested. The trial court sustained the State’s hearsay 

objections to the statements. But the trial court did admit Appellant’s testimony 

that Laird had “clawed” and “hit” herself.

II. Discussion and Analysis

Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying 

at a trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 

TEX. R. EVID. 801(d). “In order for hearsay to be admissible, it must fit into an 

exception provided by a statute or the Rules of Evidence. TEX. R. EVID. 802.”

Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). “Once the opponent 

of hearsay evidence makes the proper objection, it becomes the burden of the 

proponent of the evidence to establish that an exception applies that would make 

the evidence admissible in spite of its hearsay character.” Taylor v. State, 268 

S.W.3d 571, 578–79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing Martinez v. State, 178 S.W.3d 
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806, 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), and Cofield v. State, 891 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1994)).

The trial court has the discretion to admit an out-of-court statement if it falls

within an exception to the general hearsay exclusion rule. Lawton v. State, 913 

S.W.2d 542, 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Mosley v. 

State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). This court does not conduct a 

de novo review, but uses an abuse of discretion standard to review the trial court’s 

evidentiary rulings. See Coffin v. State, 885 S.W.2d 140, 149 (Tex. Crim. App.

1994). “An abuse of discretion occurs ‘only when the trial judge’s decision was so 

clearly wrong as to lie outside that zone within which reasonable persons might 

disagree.’” Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 595 (quoting Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 

682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).

Appellant contends that she should have been allowed to testify that Laird

threatened to file a “false” assault charge against her because she intended to tell

Kat that Laird had sex with Tettleton. Appellant testified, “Laird made the 

comment that . . . Kat[] would not believe what was going on, that she was 

knocked out, and . . . would stay that way. . . . Laird made the comment that [Kat] 

wouldn’t believe . . . what had happened and continued to scratch--.” The State 

objected on hearsay grounds; defense counsel argued that the evidence went to

Laird’s state of mind. The court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to 

disregard. Appellant argues that the statement was not hearsay because the 

statement related to the declarant’s state of mind. TEX. R. EVID. 803(3). Appellant 

is correct that the statement was not hearsay, but for a different reason. In this 

case, a statement by Appellant about Laird’s beliefs—concerning Kat’s potential 

rejection or acceptance of Appellant’s claim that Laird slept with Tettleton—was 

not offered to prove the truth of what Laird or Kat actually believed, but was 
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simply offered to show that Laird made a statement that may have evinced a

motive or intent by her to lie.

The trial court should have overruled the State’s objection to Appellant’s 

statement because the statement was not hearsay. But because Appellant testified 

about the difficulties she and Laird had that evening, because she testified about 

the sexual liaison between Laird and Tettleton, and because she testified about 

Laird’s and Tettleton’s intention to continue their sexual relationship, the trial 

court’s error was harmless if it did not affect Appellant’s substantial rights. 

TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259.

Appellant also contends that the trial court should have allowed her to testify 

that Laird was going to injure herself in order to support the assault charge.

Appellant stated, “Laird started clawing herself and hitting herself in the face, 

stating the fact that she was gonna call the law and have me arrested for . . . cutting 

her with my knife.” The trial court sustained the State’s hearsay objection. But a

statement is not hearsay if it is offered to describe one person’s observations about 

how another person acted, unless that person’s actions were intended to be a 

substitute for verbal expression. See TEX. R. EVID. 801(a).

The trial court later allowed the following from Appellant, “[Officer Ward] 

and I spoke and I told him about [Laird] and about her clawing herself and hitting 

herself,” and other similar testimony. Because the “clawing and hitting” evidence

was admitted later, the trial court’s error was harmless if it did not affect 

Appellant’s substantial rights. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259.

Appellant further asserts that Laird’s statement that she was “gonna call the 

law” evinced Laird’s state of mind concerning her future conduct and was 

admissible under TEX. R. EVID. 803(3). Rule 803(3) is an exception to the hearsay 

rule that allows the admission of a person’s out-of-court statement concerning her

then existing state of mind, including “intent, plan, [or] motive” and, thus,
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including a statement of intended future conduct. TEX. R. EVID. 803(3); see 

Saldivar v. State, 980 S.W.2d 475, 495 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, 

pet. ref’d). Laird never called the police; Officer Ward testified that Appellant said 

Laird got what she deserved; and Kat testified that Appellant attacked Laird. The 

trial court’s decision to sustain the hearsay objection to Laird’s statement that “she 

was gonna call the law” was outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. We 

disregard the error if it did not affect Appellant’s substantial rights. TEX. R.

APP. P. 44.2(b); Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259.

A substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and injurious 

effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. Ballard v. State, 110 S.W.3d 538, 544 

(Tex. App.—Eastland 2003, pet. dism’d, untimely filed). We review the whole 

record to determine whether the error influenced the jury’s verdict. Ballard, 110 

S.W.3d at 544 (citing Mosley, 983 S.W.2d at 259). One factor we consider is the 

overwhelming evidence of guilt. Ballard, 110 S.W.3d at 544 (citing TEX. R.

APP. P. 44.2(b) and Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).

The jury heard Officer Ward testify that Appellant was intoxicated and agitated and that she told him that Laird got what she deserved. Laird and Kat 

testified that Appellant attacked Laird. Laird never called the police. Tettleton 

called 911, and the jury heard that call. Amy Cullers, the emergency room nurse,

testified about Laird’s injuries. Appellant took the stand and admitted that she had 

several drinks and that she passed out on the way home from the bar.

Appellant denied that she assaulted Laird, and she also denied that she 

reached across Tettleton to cut Laird, but she admitted that she had a knife on her 

and that she had a prior conviction in South Carolina for assault on a correctional 

employee. The trial court admitted the following evidence about Laird’s state of

mind: (1) Laird threatened “to blow [Appellant’s] f-----g brains out”; (2) Laird and 

Tettleton had sex while Kat was asleep in the bedroom; and (3) Laird injured 
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herself to support the aggravated assault charge. Appellant used all of this evidence to vigorously challenge the State’s case.

We have reviewed the record as a whole, and we cannot say that any error in 

the evidentiary rulings of the trial court substantially affected Appellant’s rights. 

We overrule Appellant’s two points of error.

III. This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

MIKE WILLSON

JUSTICE

December 19, 2013

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.