Subject: STANDARD OPERATING 

PROCEDURES FOR FLIGHT DECK 

CREWMEMBERS

Date: 2/27/03

Initiated By: AFS-210

AC No: 120-71A

1. PURPOSE.

a. General. Standard operating procedures (SOPs) are universally recognized as basic to 

safe aviation operations. Effective crew coordination and crew performance, two central concepts

of crew resource management (CRM), depend upon the crew’s having a shared mental model of 

each task. That mental model, in turn, is founded on SOPs. This advisory circular (AC) presents 

background, basic concepts, and philosophy in respect to SOPs. It emphasizes that SOPs should 

be clear, comprehensive, and readily available in the manuals used by flight deck crewmembers. 

b. Using this Advisory Circular. This AC is designed to provide advice and 

recommendations about the development, implementation, and updating of SOPs. Appendix 1, 

Standard Operating Procedures Template, provides many important topics that should be 

addressed in SOPs. Stabilized Approach, characterized by a constant-angle, constant-rate of 

descent ending near the touchdown point where the landing maneuver begins, is among the SOPs 

specifically identified in this AC and is described in Appendix 2, Stabilized Approach: Concepts 

and Terms. These and the other appendices represent a baseline and a starting point. Start-up 

certificate holders and existing certificate holders should refer to the Template in Appendix 1, to 

Stabilized Approach in Appendix 2, and to the other appendices in developing comprehensive 

SOPs for use in training programs and in manuals used by their flight deck crewmembers. 

c. What’s New in this Advisory Circular. AC 120-71A revises and supersedes the earlier 

version, AC 120-71. Many minor changes have been made to improve clarity, accuracy, 

completeness, and consistency. Two significant changes are the conversion of the term pilot not 

flying (PNF) to pilot monitoring (PM) and the addition of a related Appendix addressing “Crew 

Monitoring and Cross-Checking.” It is increasingly acknowledged that it makes better sense to 

characterize pilots by what they are doing rather than by what they are not doing. Hence, pilot 

flying (PF) remains an appropriate term and is unchanged in this AC. But the term pilot not 

flying misses the point. Studies of crew performance, accident data, and pilots’ own experiences 

all point to the vital role of the non-flying pilot as a monitor. Hence, the term pilot monitoring 

(PM) is now widely viewed as a better term to describe that pilot. The term PM is used liberally 

throughout this AC. In those instances where the older term PNF appears, it should be 

understood that pilot monitoring (PM) is the preferred meaning. 
AC 120-71A 2/27/03 

2. CANCELLATION. This AC cancels AC 120-71, Standard Operating Procedures for Flight 

Deck Crewmembers, dated August 10, 2000. 

3. SCOPE. Appendix 1 consolidates many topics viewed by operators and by the FAA as 

important to be addressed as SOPs in air carrier training programs and in the manuals used by air 

carrier flight deck crewmembers. This AC does not list every important SOP topic or dictate 

exactly how each topic should be addressed by a certificate holder. Instead, this AC offers a 

baseline of topics to be used as a reference. In practice, each certificate holder’s manuals and 

training programs are unique. Each certificate holder could omit certain topics shown in the 

template when they do not apply, and, on the other hand, could add other topics not shown in the 

template when they do apply. This AC contains guidance intended for use primarily by Title 14 

of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 119 certificate holders authorized to conduct 

operations under part 121. But operators of aircraft under 14 CFR parts 135, 125, 91, and others 

should also find this guidance useful. 

4. RELATED REGULATIONS. 14 CFR part 121, sections 121.133, 121.141, 121.401; 

14 CFR part 125, section 125.287; 14 CFR part 135, section 135.293. 

5. RELATED READING MATERIAL.

a. AC 120-51 as amended, Crew Resource Management Training. 

b. AC 120-48, Communication and Coordination between Flight Crewmembers and Flight 

Attendants. 

c. AC 120-54, Advanced Qualification Program. 

d. AC 121-32, Dispatch Resource Management Training. 

NOTE: ACs may be obtained by choosing “Advisory Circulars” at the following 

FAA public Web site: 

http://www.airweb.faa.gov

e. Controlled Flight into Terrain Education and Training Aid (Flight Safety Foundation, 

ICAO, and Federal Aviation Administration) http://www1.faa.gov/avr/afs/afs200/afs210/index.cfm

f. Flight Safety Digest, Nov. 98 – Feb. 99 (Flight Safety Foundation). 

g. Approach-and-landing Risk Awareness Tool, as revised (Flight Safety Foundation) 

http://www.flightsafety.org/pdf/alar_risk_tool.pdf 

h. CFIT Checklist, as revised (Flight Safety Foundation): 

http://www.flightsafety.org/pdf/cfit_check.pdf 

Page 2 Par 2 
2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

i. Human Performance Considerations in the Use and Design of Aircraft Checklists (FAA). 

http://www1.faa.gov/avr/afs/afs200/afs210/index.cfm

j. FAA Flight Standardization Board (FSB) Reports. 

http://www.opspecs.com/AFSData/FSBRs/Final/ 

6. BACKGROUND.

a. Many aviation safety organizations including the FAA have recently reaffirmed the 

importance of SOPs. 

b. For many years the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has identified 

deficiencies in standard operating procedures as contributing causal factors in aviation accidents. 

Among the most commonly cited deficiencies involving flightcrews has been their noncompliance with established procedures; another has been the non-existence of established 

procedures in some manuals used by flightcrews. 

c. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has also recognized the importance 

of SOPs for safe flight operations. Recent amendments to ICAO Annex 6 establish that each 

member state should require that SOPs for each phase of flight be contained in the operations 

manual used by pilots. 

d. Non-government aviation safety organizations such as Flight Safety Foundation, 

(Alexandria, VA) have concluded that airlines perform with higher levels of safety when they 

establish and adhere to adequate SOPs. 

e. In 1997 the FAA joined with representatives from the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA) and from a broad cross-section of aviation organizations to form the 

Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST). Chartered by the White House to reduce the 

commercial aviation accident rate by 80 percent in 10 years, this Team chose controlled flight 

into terrain (CFIT) as one of the first major aviation hazards to be addressed in meeting this 

challenge. The Team used a data-driven approach to identify interventions with the highest 

possible safety leverage, and to develop a comprehensive agenda to implement those 

interventions. 

f. In its study of CFIT accidents, a CAST analysis team including the FAA corroborated the 

findings of the NTSB, ICAO, and other groups. Almost 50 percent of the 107 CFIT 

interventions identified by that analysis team related to the flightcrew’s failure to adhere to SOPs 

or the certificate holder’s failure to establish adequate SOPs. Subsequent CAST teams 

confirmed their analysis further. 

g. This AC is in large part the final report and end-product of one of the CAST sub-teams, a 

group comprised of subject matter experts in aviation human factors, in airline operations, and in 

flightcrew training. 

Par 5 Page 3
AC 120-71A 2/27/03 

7. THE MISSION OF SOPs. To achieve consistently safe flight operations through adherence 

to SOPs that are clear, comprehensive, and readily available to flight crewmembers. 

8. APPLYING THE SOPs TEMPLATE AND OTHER APPENDICES. Generally, each 

SOP topic identified in the template (following as Appendix 1) is important; the certificate 

holder should address them in some manner, if applicable. Stabilized Approach (Appendix 2) is 

a particularly important SOP. Other important SOPs, such as those associated with special 

operating authority or with new technology, are not shown in the template, but should be 

addressed as well, when applicable. Because each certificate holder’s operation is unique, the 

certificate holder should develop the specific manner in which SOPs are addressed. Topics 

expanded and illustrated in the Appendices are for example only, and represent renditions of

SOPs known to be effective. No requirement is implied or intended to change existing SOPs 

based solely on these examples. An SOP topic shown in the Appendices may be addressed in 

detail, including text and diagrams, or in very simple terms. For example, an SOP may be 

addressed in a simple statement such as: “ABC Airlines does not conduct Category 3 

approaches.” 

9. KEY FEATURES OF EFFECTIVE SOPs. 

a. Many experts agree that implementation of any procedure as an SOP is most effective if: 

(1) The procedure is appropriate to the situation.

(2) The procedure is practical to use. 

(3) Crewmembers understand the reasons for the procedure. 

(4) Pilot Flying (PF), Pilot Not Flying (PNF) / Pilot Monitoring (PM), and Flight 

Engineer duties are clearly delineated. 

(5) Effective training is conducted. 

(6) The attitudes shown by instructors, check airmen, and managers all reinforce the 

need for the procedure. 

b. If all elements (above) are not consistently implemented, flightcrews too easily become

participants in an undesirable double standard condoned by instructors, check airmen, and 

managers. Flightcrews may end up doing things one way to satisfy training requirements and 

checkrides, but doing them another way in “real life” during line operations. When a double 

standard does appear in this way, it should be considered a red flag that a published SOP may not 

be practical or effective for some reason. That SOP should be reviewed and perhaps changed. 

10. THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING THE REASONS FOR AN SOP. 

a. Effective Feedback. When flight crewmembers understand the underlying reasons for an 

SOP they are better prepared and more eager to offer effective feedback for improvements. The 

Page 4 Par 7 
2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

certificate holder, in turn, benefits from more competent feedback in revising existing SOPs and 

in developing new SOPs. Those benefits include safety, efficiency, and employee morale. 

b. Troubleshooting. When flight crewmembers understand the underlying reasons for an 

SOP, they are generally better prepared to handle a related in-flight problem that may not be 

explicitly or completely addressed in their operating manuals. 

11. COLLABORATING FOR EFFECTIVE SOPs. 

a. In general, effective SOPs are the product of healthy collaboration among managers and 

flight operations people, including flightcrews. A safety culture promoting continuous feedback 

from flightcrews and others, and continuous revision by the collaborators distinguishes effective 

SOPs at airlines of all sizes and ages.

b. New operators, operators adding a new aircraft fleet, or operators retiring one aircraft fleet 

for another must be especially diligent in developing SOPs. Collaborators with applicable 

experience may be more difficult to bring together in those instances. 

c. For a startup certificate holder, this AC and its appendices should be especially valuable 

tools in developing SOPs. The developers should pay close attention to the approved airplane 

flight manual (AFM), to AFM revisions and operations bulletins issued by the manufacturer, and 

to the applicable Flight Standardization Board (FSB) report issued by the FAA. Desirable 

partners in the collaboration would certainly include representatives of the airplane 

manufacturer, pilots having previous experience with the airplane or with the kind of operations 

planned by the operator, and representatives from the FAA, including the principal operations 

inspector (POI), members of the Certificate Management Team, and members of the 

Certification, Standardization, and Evaluation Team (CSET). It is especially important for a new 

operator to maintain a periodic review process that includes line flightcrews. Together, 

managers and flightcrews are able to review the effectiveness of SOPs and to reach valid 

conclusions for revisions. The review process will be meaningful and effective when managers 

promote prompt implementation of revisions to SOPs when necessary. 

d. An existing certificate holder introducing a new airplane fleet should also collaborate 

using the best resources available, including the AFM, operations bulletins, and the FSB report. 

Experience has shown that representatives of the airplane manufacturer, managers, check airmen, 

instructors, and line pilots work well together as a team to develop effective SOPs. A trial period 

might be implemented, followed by feedback and revision, in which SOPs are improved. By 

being part of an iterative process for changes in SOPs, the end user, the flight crewmember, is 

generally inclined to accept the validity of changes and to implement them readily. 

e. Long-established operators should be careful not to assume too readily that they can 

operate an airplane recently added to the fleet in the same, standard way as older types or 

models. Managers, check airmen, and instructors should collaborate using the best resources 

available, including the AFM, operations bulletins, and the FSB report to ensure that SOPs they 

develop or adapt for a new airplane are in fact effective for that aircraft, and are not inappropriate 

carryovers.

Par 10 Page 5
AC 120-71A 2/27/03 

12. SUMMARY. Safety in commercial aviation continues to depend on good crew 

performance. Good crew performance, in turn, is founded on standard operating procedures that 

are clear, comprehensive, and readily available to the flightcrew. This AC provides an SOPs 

template and many other useful references in developing SOPs. Development of SOPs is most 

effective when done by collaboration, using the best resources available including the end-users 

themselves, the flightcrews. Once developed, effective SOPs should be continually reviewed 

and renewed. 

/s/ Louis C. Cusimano, for 

James J. Ballough 

Director, Flight Standards Service

Page 6 Par 12 
2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

NOTES ON APPENDICES 

The following appendices contain examples of standard operating procedures (SOPs) that are 

identical or similar to some SOPs currently in use. Those examples do not represent a rigid FAA 

view of best practices, which may vary among fleets and among certificate holders, and may 

change over time. 

Some of the examples may be readily adapted to a certificate holder’s flightcrew training and 

operating manuals for various airplane fleets. Others may apply to a certain airplane fleet and 

may not be adaptable apart from that fleet. 

In some cases a term shown in an appendix is a term used by a certificate holder, not the 

equivalent term used by the FAA. Example: Where the FAA would use the term “height above 

touchdown,” or HAT, the example shows that the certificate holder has used the term “above 

field elevation,” or AFE.

Page i (and ii)

2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

 Appendix 1

APPENDIX 1 

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES TEMPLATE 

A manual or section in a manual serving as the flightcrew’s guide to standard operating 

procedures (SOPs) may double as a training guide. The content should be clear and 

comprehensive, without necessarily being lengthy. No template could include every topic that 

might apply unless it were constantly revised. Many topics involving special operating authority 

or new technology are absent from this template, among them ETOPS, PRM, SMGS, RNP, and 

many others. 

The following are nevertheless viewed by industry and FAA alike as examples of topics that 

constitute a useful template for developing comprehensive, effective SOPs: 

• Captain’s authority 

• 

• 

• 

Use of automation 

The operator’s automation philosophy 

Specific guidance in selection of appropriate levels of automation 

Autopilot/flight director mode control inputs 

Flight management systems inputs 

Monitoring of automated systems and Flight Mode Annunciator (FMA) 

Cross checking of FMS routing with ATC clearance during preflight 

Checklist philosophy 

 Policies and procedures 

(Who calls for; who reads; who does) 

Format and terminology 

Type of checklist 

 Challenge-Do-Verify 

 Do-Verify

 Walk-arounds 

Checklists 

Safety check -- power on 

 Originating/receiving 

 Before start 

 After start 

Before taxi 

 Before take-off 

 After take-off

 Climb check 

 Cruise check 

 Preliminary landing 

 Landing 

 After landing

Page 1
AC 120-71A 2/27/03 

Appendix 1

 Parking and securing 

 Emergency procedures 

 Non-normal/abnormal procedures 

• Communications 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Who handles radios 

Primary language used 

 ATC

On the flight deck 

Keeping both pilots in the loop 

Company radio procedures 

Flight deck/cabin signals 

 Cabin/flight deck signals 

Briefings 

CFIT risk considered (see example, paragraph 4 h in this AC) 

 Special airport qualifications considered 

 Temperature corrections considered 

 Before takeoff 

 Descent/approach/missed approach 

Approach briefing generally done prior to beginning of descent 

Flight deck access 

On ground/in flight 

 Jumpseat 

Access signals, keys 

Flight deck discipline 

PF/PM duties and responsibilities 

Sterile cockpit 

Maintaining outside vigilance 

 Monitoring/cross-checking 

Transfer of control 

 Additional duties 

 Flight kits 

 Headsets/speakers 

 Boom mikes/handsets 

 Maps/approach charts 

 Meals 

Altitude awareness 

 Altimeter settings 

 Transition level 

 Callouts (verification of)

Minimum safe altitudes (MSA) 

Page 2
2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

 Appendix 1

 Temperature corrections

Monitoring during last 1000 feet of altitude change 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Report times 

Check in/show up 

On flight deck 

Checklist accomplishment 

Maintenance procedures 

 Logbooks/previous write-ups 

 Open write-ups 

Notification to maintenance of write-ups 

Minimum equipment list (MEL) 

Where it is accessible 

Configuration Deviation List (CDL) 

Crew coordination in ground de-icing 

Flight plans/dispatch procedures/takeoff and landing calculations 

 VFR/IFR 

 Icing considerations 

 Fuel loads 

 Weather package 

Where weather package is available 

Departure procedure climb gradient analysis 

Boarding passengers/cargo 

 Carry-on baggage 

Exit row seating 

 Hazardous materials 

 Prisoners/escorted persons 

 Guns onboard 

 Count/load 

Pushback/powerback 

Taxiing 

All engines running 

Less than all engines running 

On ice or snow 

Prevention of runway incursion 

Crew resource management (CRM) 

 Crew briefings 

 Flight attendants 

 Flightcrew 

Page 3
AC 120-71A 2/27/03 

Appendix 1

• Weight & balance/cargo loading 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Who is responsible for loading cargo, and securing cargo 

Who prepares the weight & balance data form; who checks it 

 Copy to crew 

Flight deck/cabin crew interchange 

 Boarding 

Ready to taxi 

 Cabin emergency 

 Prior to take-off/landing

Take-off 

PF/PM duties and responsibilities 

Who conducts it 

 Briefing, IFR/VFR 

Reduced power procedures 

Tailwind, runway clutter 

Intersections/land and hold short procedures (LAHSO) 

Noise abatement procedures 

Special departure procedures 

 Flight directors 

 Use of: Yes/No 

 Callouts 

Clean up 

Loss of engine 

Transfer of control, if appropriate 

Rejected takeoff 

After V1 

 Actions/callouts 

Flap settings 

 Normal 

Nonstandard and reason for 

 Crosswind 

Close-in turns 

Climb 

 Speeds 

 Configuration 

Confirm compliance with climb gradient required in departure procedure 

Confirm appropriate cold temperature corrections made 

Cruise altitude selection

 Speeds/weights 

Page 4
2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

 Appendix 1

• Position reports/pilot weather reports (PIREPs) 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

ATC – including PIREPs of hazards such as icing, thunderstorms, and turbulence

 Company 

 

Emergency descents 

Holding procedures 

Procedures for diversion to alternate 

 

Normal descents 

Planning and verbalizing beginning of descent point 

Risk assessment and briefing (see example, paragraph 4.g in this AC) 

 Speedbrakes: Yes/No 

Flaps/gear use 

Icing considerations 

 Convective activity 

Ground proximity warning system (GPWS or TAWs) 

 Escape maneuver 

TCAS 

Windshear 

Avoidance of likely encounters 

 Recognition

Recovery / escape maneuver 

Approach philosophy 

 Monitoring during approach 

Precision approaches preferred 

Coordinate with ATC and plan ahead to avoid rushed approaches 

Stabilized approaches standard 

Use of navigation aids 

Flight management system (FMS)/autopilot 

Use, and when to discontinue use 

 Approach gates 

Limits for stabilized approaches 

Use of radio altimeter 

Go-arounds: Plan to go around on every approach; change plan to land when visual, or 

when conditions permit in low-visibility operations – only if stabilized 

Individual approach type 

All types, including engine-out 

Page 5
AC 120-71A 2/27/03 

Appendix 1

• For each type of approach 

• 

• 

 Profile 

Airplane configuration for conditions 

 Visual approach 

 Low visibility 

 Contaminated runway 

 Flap/gear extension 

Auto spoiler and auto brake systems armed and confirmed armed by both pilots, in 

accordance with manufacturer’s recommended procedures (or equivalent 

approved company procedures) 

 Actions and callouts 

Go-around / missed approach 

When stabilized approach gates are missed 

Actions and callouts (see example, Appendix 4) 

 Clean-up profile 

Landing 

Actions and callouts during landing 

Close-in turns 

 Crosswind 

 Rejected 

Actions and callouts during rollout (see example, Appendix 18) 

 “No Spoilers” callout 

Reverse thrust “Overboost” callout 

Transfer of control after first officer landing 

Page 6
2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

 Appendix 2

APPENDIX 2 

STABILIZED APPROACH: CONCEPTS AND TERMS 

A stabilized approach is one of the key features of safe approaches and landings in air carrier 

operations, especially those involving transport category airplanes. 

A stabilized approach is characterized by a constant-angle, constant-rate of descent approach 

profile ending near the touchdown point, where the landing maneuver begins. A stabilized 

approach is the safest profile in all but special cases, in which another profile may be required by 

unusual conditions. 

 

All appropriate briefings and checklists should be accomplished before 1000’ height above 

touchdown (HAT) in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), and before 500’ HAT in 

visual meteorological conditions (VMC) 

Flight should be stabilized by 1000’ HAT in IMC, and by 500’ HAT in VMC. 

An approach is stabilized when all of the following criteria are maintained from 1000 HAT (or 

500 HAT in VMC) to landing in the touchdown zone: 

The airplane is on the correct1

 track.

The airplane is in the proper landing configuration. 

After glide path intercept, or after the final approach fix (FAF), or after the derived flyoff point (per Jeppesen) the pilot flying requires no more than normal bracketing 

corrections

2

 to maintain the correct track and desired profile (3° descent angle, nominal) 

to landing within the touchdown zone. Level-off below 1000’ HAT is not recommended. 

The airplane speed is within the acceptable range specified in the approved operating 

manual used by the pilot. 

The rate of descent is no greater than 1000 feet per minute (fpm). 

If an expected rate of descent greater than 1000 fpm is planned, a special approach 

briefing should be performed. 

• 

• If an unexpected, sustained rate of descent greater than 1000 fpm is encountered 

during the approach, a missed approach should be performed. A second approach 

may be attempted after a special approach briefing, if conditions permit. 

Power setting is appropriate for the landing configuration selected, and is within the 

permissible power range for approach specified in the approved operating manual used 

by the pilot.

Page 1
AC 120-71A 2/27/03 

Appendix 2

APPENDIX 2 (continued) 

When no vertical guidance is provided: Vertical guidance may be provided to the pilot by way 

of an electronic glideslope, a computed descent path displayed on the pilot’s navigation display, 

or other electronic means. On approaches for which no vertical guidance is provided, the 

flightcrew should plan, execute, and monitor the approach with special care, taking into account 

traffic and wind conditions. To assure vertical clearance and situation awareness, the pilot not 

flying should announce crossing altitudes as published fixes and other points selected by the 

flightcrew are passed. The pilot flying should promptly adjust descent angle as appropriate. A 

constant-angle, constant-rate descent profile ending at the touchdown point is the safest profile in 

all but special cases. 

Visual contact. Upon establishing visual contact with the runway or appropriate runway 

lights or markings, the pilot should be able to continue to a safe landing using normal 

bracketing corrections, or, if unable, should perform a missed approach. 

No visual contact. The operator may develop procedures involving an approved, standard 

MDA buffer altitude or other approved procedures to assure that descent below MDA 

does not occur during the missed approach. If no visual contact is established 

approaching MDA or an approved MDA buffer altitude,

 or if the missed approach point 

is reached, the pilot should perform the published missed approach procedure. (OpSpec 

paragraph C073 provides for special authorization under certain conditions to go below 

the MDA while executing a missed approach.) Below 1000’ HAT, leveling off at MDA 

(or at some height above MDA) is not recommended, and a missed approach should be 

performed. 

Note 1 : A correct track is one in which the correct localizer, radial, or other track guidance has been set, tuned,

and identified, and is being followed by the pilot. Criteria for following the correct track are discussed in FAA 

Advisory Circulars relating to Category II and Category III approaches. Criteria for following track in operations 

apart for Category II and Category III are under development. 

Note 2 : Normal bracketing corrections relate to bank angle, rate of descent, and power management. 

Recommended ranges are as follows (operating limitations in the approved airplane flight manual must be observed, 

and may be more restrictive):

Bank angle Maximum bank angle permissible during approach is specified in the approved operating

manual used by the pilot, and is generally not more than 30°; the maximum bank angle

permissible during landing may be considerably less than 30°, as specified in that 

manual.

Rate of descent ± 300 fpm deviation from target

Power management Permissible power range is specified in the approved operating manual used by the pilot

Overshoots Normal bracketing corrections occasionally involve momentary overshoots made 

necessary by atmospheric conditions. Such overshoots are acceptable. Frequent or 

sustained overshoots caused by poor pilot technique are not normal bracketing 

corrections. 

Page 2
2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

 Appendix 3

APPENDIX 3 

(examples) 

ATC COMMUNICATIONS 

and 

ALTITUDE AWARENESS

ATC Communications: SOPs should state who (PF, PM, FE/SO) handles the radios for each 

phase of flight, as follows: 

PF makes input to aircraft/autopilot and/or verbally states clearances while PM confirms input is 

what he/she read back to ATC. 

Any confusion in the flight deck is immediately cleared up by requesting ATC confirmation. 

If any crewmember is off the flight deck, all ATC instructions are briefed upon his/her return. 

Or if any crewmember is off the flight deck all ATC instructions are written down until his/her 

return and then passed to that crewmember upon return. Similarly, if a crewmember is off ATC 

frequency (e.g., when making a PA announcement or when talking on company frequency), all 

ATC instructions are briefed upon his/her return. 

Company policy should address use of speakers, headsets, boom mike and/or hand-held mikes. 

Altitude Awareness: SOPs should state the company policy on confirming assigned altitude. 

Example: The PM acknowledges ATC altitude clearance. 

If the aircraft is on the autopilot then the PF makes input into the autopilot/altitude alerter. PF 

points to the input while stating the assigned altitude as he/she understands it. The PM then 

points to the input stating aloud what he/she understands the ATC clearance to be confirming 

that the input and clearance match. 

If the aircraft is being hand-flown then the PM makes the input into the Altitude

Alerter/autopilot, then points to the input and states clearance. PF then points to the alterter 

stating aloud what he/she understands the ATC clearance to be confirming that the alerter and 

clearance match. 

Example: If there is no altitude alerter in the aircraft then both pilots write down the clearance, 

confirm that they have the same altitude, and then cross off the previously assigned altitude. 

Page 1 (and 2)

2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

 Appendix 4

APPENDIX 4 

(example) 

NORMAL GO-AROUND -- ACTIONS and CALLOUTS

Callouts: shown in “BOLD TEXT” -- Actions: shown with bullets (•) in plain text

Go-around PF PM

“GO AROUND” 

• Press either GA switch 

“GO-AROUND POWER” 

• Verify thrust levers move to 

GA power 

• Rotate towards 15° pitch 

attitude, then follow flight 

director commands “FLAPS 

20”

• Verify GA annunciates 

• Select flaps 20 

• Verify thrust levers move to 

maintain 2,000 FPM climb rate 

“POWER SET” 

Positive Rate of

Climb • Verify positive rate of climb 

“GEAR UP” 

• Execute published missed 

approach or proceed as 

instructed by ATC 

“POSITIVE RATE” 

• Position gear lever UP

• Advise ATC 

• Monitor missed approach 

procedures

At or above 

400’ AFE 

“LNAV” or “HEADING 

SELECT” • Select LNAV or HDG SEL 

• Verify LNAV or HDG SEL 

annunciates 

Climbing 

through 1,000’ 

AFE 

“REF 80” 

“FLAPS_____” 

(Retract flaps on flap retraction 

speed schedule) 

• Set command airspeed 

cursor to VREF 30 + 80 

• Select proper flap setting, 

when requesting 

At flap 

retraction speed 

“FLAPS UP, AFTER 

TAKEOFF CHECKLIST” 

• Retract flaps 

• Accomplish checklist 

Page 1 (and 2)

2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

 Appendix 5

APPENDIX 5 

(example) 

SINGLE ENGINE GO-AROUND -- ACTIONS and CALLOUTS

Callouts: shown in “BOLD TEXT” -- Actions: shown with bullets (•) in plain text

PF PM

Go-around “GO AROUND”

• Press either GA switch 

“GO-AROUND POWER”

• Advance thrust lever to GA 

power 

• Rotate towards 10° pitch

attitude, then follow flight

director commands 

“FLAPS 5”

• Verify GA annuciates 

• Verify GA power set 

• Select flaps 5 

“POWER SET”

Positive Rate of 

Climb • Verify positive rate of climb

“GEAR UP” 

• Position gear lever UP 

• Advise ATC

•• Execute airport specific “Engine Failure Missed Approach,” 

published missed approach, or proceed as instructed by ATC, as 

appropriate 

At or above 400’ 

AFE, or lower if 

Engine Failure

procedure specifies 

a turn prior to 400’

AFE 

“LNAV” or “HEADING 

SELECT”

• Select LNAV or HDG SEL 

• Verify LNAV or HDG SEL 

annunciates 

• Monitor missed approach 

procedure 

Climbing through

1,000’ AFE or

obstruction 

clearance altitude

(OCA), whichever

is higher 

“REF 80”

“FLAPS_____” 

(Retract flaps on flap retraction

speed schedule) 

• Set command airspeed cursor to

VREF 30 + 80 

• Select proper flap setting, when

requested 

At flap retraction 

speed 

“FLAPS UP”

• Retract flaps

At 

VREF 30 + 80

“MAXIMUM CONTINUOUS 

THRUST AFTER TAKEOFF 

CHECKLIST”

• Press CON on TMSP 

• Set MCT 

“POWER SET”

• Accomplish After Takeoff 

Checklist 

Page 1 (and 2)

2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

 Appendix 6

APPENDIX 6 

(example) 

SINGLE ENGINE VISUAL LANDING -- PROFILE 

Page 1 (and 2)

2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

 Appendix 7

APPENDIX 7 

(example) 

SINGLE ENGINE ILS APPROACH -- ACTIONS and CALLOUTS 

Callouts: shown in “BOLD TEXT” -- Actions: shown with bullets (•) in plain 

text

PF PM

Initial 

Approach 

“FLAPS 1, REF 60” 

“FLAPS 5, REF 40” 

• Select flaps 1 

• Set command airspeed 

cursor to VREF 30 + 60 

• Select flaps 5 

• Set command airspeed 

cursor to VREF 30 + 40 

When Cleared •• Verify Nav radio tuned to appropriate ILS frequency 

for the 

Approach 

• Select APP mode 

• Verify LOC and G/S 

annunciates white (armed) on 

ADI 

LOC Alive 

• Verify localizer indication 

“LOCALIZER ALIVE” 

LOC Capture •• Verify LOC annunciates green (captured) on ADI 

GS Alive 

• Verify G/S indication 

“GEAR DOWN, FLAPS 20, 

VREF 20 + 5, SINGLE 

ENGINE LANDING 

CHECKLIST” 

“GLIDESLOPE ALIVE” 

• Position gear lever DOWN 

• Select flaps 20 

• Set command airspeed 

cursor to VREF 20 + 5 

• Complete Single Engine 

Landing Checklist 

GS Capture 

“GLIDESLOPE CAPTURE”

Page 1 (and 2)

2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

 Appendix 8

APPENDIX 8 

(example) 

APPROACH PROFILE: LNAV, LOC, or LOC B/CRS

Page 1 (and 2)

2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

 Appendix 9

APPENDIX 9 

(example) 

LNAV, LOC, or LOC B/CRS APPROACH -- ACTIONS and CALLOUTS 

Callouts: in “BOLD TEXT” -- Actions: with bullets (•) in plain text 

PF PM

Initial Approach “FLAPS 1 REF 60” 

“FLAPS 5, REF 40” 

• Select flaps 1 

• Set command 

airspeed cursor to 

VREF 30 + 60, if 

requested 

• Select flaps 5 

• Set command 

airspeed cursor to 

VREF 30 + 40, if 

requested 

2-1/2 miles from

FAF 

“GEAR DOWN, FLAPS 

20, REF 20, LANDING 

CHECKLIST” • Position gear lever 

DOWN 

• Select flaps 20 

• Set command 

airspeed cursor to 

VREF 30 + 20, if 

requested 

• Initiate Landing 

Checklist 

1⁄2 mile prior to 

FAF 

“FLAPS 30, REF 5” 

• Set/Request MDA or 

MDA Buffer Altitude 

• Select flaps 30 

• Set command 

airspeed cursor to 

VREF 30 + 5, if 

requested 

• Set altitude, if

requested 

Page 1
AC 120-71A 2/27/03 

Appendix 9

APPENDIX 9 (continued)

At FAF •• Start timing, if appropriate 

Select/Request V/S • Set V/S, if 

requested 

• Monitor descent 

At 1,000’ AFE 

• Verify altitude 

• Stabilized approach 

“1,000 ft.” 

PF PM

At 100’ above 

MDA (or MDA 

buffer altitude) 

• Verify altitude 

“100 ABOVE” 

• Divide time 

between monitoring 

instruments and 

scanning outside for 

runway environment 

AT MDA (or 

MDA buffer) “SET MISSED 

APPROACH ALTITUDE” 

• Execute missed approach 

“MINIMUMS” 

• Set missed 

approach altitude 

•• Call out appropriate visual cues 

“LANDING” 

“RUNWAY IN 

SIGHT” 

• Monitor speed and 

sink rate 

(Runway 

environment IS 

in sight)

•• See landing procedure 

“GO-AROUND” 

“MISSED 

APPROACH 

POINT, NO 

CONTACT”

—or— 

(Runway 

environment 

NOT in sight or 

a safe landing is 

NOT possible)

•• See go-around procedure 

Page 2
2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

 Appendix 10

APPENDIX 10 

(example) 

ENGINE FAILURE AT or ABOVE V1 -- PROFILE 

Page 1 (and 2)

2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

 Appendix 11

APPENDIX 11 

(example) 

ENGINE FAILURE AT or ABOVE V1 -- ACTIONS and CALLOUTS 

Callouts: in “BOLD TEXT” -- Actions: with bullets (•) in plain text 

PF PM

•• Pilot first noting Engine Failure 

“ENGINE FAILURE” 

Engine Failure 

“SET MAX 

POWER” • Advance thrust 

levers to maximum 

takeoff thrust

“POWER SET” 

VR

• Rotate towards 10°

pitch attitude

“ROTATE” 

Positive rate of climb 

• Verify positive rate 

of climb 

“GEAR UP” 

“POSITIVE RATE” 

• Position gear lever 

UP 

• Maintain F/D 

commanded attitude 

“ADVISE ATC,”

when appropriate 

• Monitor speed and 

attitude 

• Advise ATC 

•• Comply with airport specific “Engine 

Failure After Takeoff” procedure (if published); 

otherwise, fly runway heading 

After lift-off

“HEADING 

SELECT” • Select HDG SEL 

• Verify HDG SEL 

annunciates 

• Position A/T arm

switch OFF 

Page 1
AC 120-71A 2/27/03 

Appendix 11

APPENDIX 11 (continued) 

ENGINE FAILURE AT or ABOVE V1 -- ACTIONS and CALLOUTS 

Callouts: in “BOLD TEXT” -- Actions: with bullets (•) in plain 

text

Climbing PF PM

through 

1,000’ AFE 

or 

obstruction 

clearance 

altitude 

(OCA), 

whichever is 

higher 

“VERTICAL SPEED 

PLUS 100” 

• Reduce pitch and 

accelerate 

“FLAPS______” 

(Retract flaps on flap 

retraction speed schedule) 

• Select VERT SPD 

to +100 FPM 

• Select proper flap 

setting, when 

requested 

At flap 

retraction 

speed 

“FLAPS UP” 

• Retract flaps 

At 

VREF 30 + 80 

“FLIGHT LEVEL 

CHANGE, MAXIMUM 

CONTINUOUS 

THRUST, ENGINE 

_______ CHECKLIST, 

AFTER TAKEOFF 

CHECKLIST” • Select FL CH 

• Press CON on 

TMSP 

• Set MCT 

“POWER SET” 

• Accomplish 

appropriate checklist 

“ENGINE _________ 

CHECKLIST 

COMPLETE” 

• Accomplish After 

Takeoff Checklist 

Page 2
2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

 Appendix 12

APPENDIX 12 

(example) 

WINDSHEAR – TAKEOFF WHILE on the RUNWAY -- RECOVERY TECHNIQUE 

Takeoff While on The Runway 

Recovery Technique 

• THRUST 

• Apply thrust aggressively (Firewall Power) 

• PITCH 

• Push go-around switch 

• Rotate toward 15° no later than 2,000 ft. remaining 

• Increase beyond 15° if required to lift off

• Follow flight director commands 

Note: After lift-off, follow After Lift-off Recovery Technique

After Lift-off/On Approach Windshear 

Recovery Technique 

• THRUST 

• Apply thrust aggressively (Firewall Power) 

• PITCH 

• Push either go-around switch 

• Adjust toward 15°

• Follow flight director commands 

• Increase beyond 15° if required to ensure 

acceptable flight path 

• Always respect stickshaker 

• CONFIGURATION 

• Maintain existing configuration 

Note: With a WINDSHEAR warning, if normal commands do not result in a substantial rate of 

climb, the AFDS smoothly transitions to a 15° pitch attitude or slightly below the pitch limit 

indicator, whichever is less. 

Page 1 (and 2)

2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

 Appendix 13

APPENDIX 13 

(example) 

GROUND PROXIMITY WARNINGS 

Refer to the FOM for Ground Proximity Warning System general procedures. See Chapter 13 

(in this handbook) for the system description. 

BELOW GLIDESLOPE ALERT 

If a GLIDESLOPE alert is activated between the altitudes of 1,000’ and 150’ AGL, application 

of power sufficient to bring the airplane back up toward the glideslope beam center will cancel 

the alert when it is less than 1.3 dots below the glideslope. The allowable deviation increases to 

2.7 dots at 50’ AGL. This deviation causes an offscale deflection on the glideslope deviation 

scale. 

GPWS WARNING ESCAPE MANEUVER 

If a GPWS “PULL UP” warning or “TERRAIN” alert occurs at night or in IMC, perform the 

following maneuver entirely from memory: 

Callouts: in “BOLD TEXT” -- Actions: with bullets (•) in plain 

text 

Step PF PM

 1 

Thrust 

• Auto throttles – disconnect 

• “FIREWALL POWER,”

set firewall thrust 

Pitch 

• Autopilot – disconnect 

• Roll wings level 

• Rotate (3°/sec) to 20°

pitch attitude. If GPWS 

warning continues – increase 

pitch (respect 

stickshaker/buffet) 

 2 

Configuration 

• Speedbrakes – retract 

• Do not alter gear/flap 

configuration 

 3 • Climb to safe altitude 

 4 

• Resume normal flight. 

Retract flaps on flap 

retraction speed schedule. 

• Verify all actions have 

been completed and call out 

any omissions 

• Monitor radio altimeter, 

and call out information on 

flight path (e.g., “300 FEET 

DESCENDING; 400 FEET 

CLIMBING,” etc.) 

• Call out safe altitude (e.g., 

“MSA IS 3,400 FEET”) 

• Advise ATC 

Page 1 (and 2)

2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

 Appendix 14

APPENDIX 14 

(example) 

DESCENT PLANNING GUIDE for VISUAL APPROACHES 

Page 1 (and 2)

2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

 Appendix 15

APPENDIX 15 

(example) 

DESCENT PLANNING for VISUAL APPROACHES 

DESCENT PLANNING for VISUAL APPROACHES 

At each airport, ATC has established descent profiles to vector aircraft to intercept an instrument 

approach. However, pilots are cleared for visual approaches with the descent profile at the 

discretion of the pilot. If the pilot’s descent profile does not result in a stabilized visual approach 

by 500’ AFE, then a missed approach must be executed (FOM page 5-37). 

Visual approaches can be difficult. The wide range of variables, such as position and altitude 

when cleared for the approach, the lack of glideslope information, and establishing separation 

from a variety of visual traffic all contribute to the complexity. The secret to flying a good 

visual approach is accurate descent planning. This requires analysis at sequential points during 

the descent/approach, and making corrections to altitude and airspeed. 

The Descent Planning Guide provides suggested reference points or “gates” to assist in analyzing 

the descent to arrive at 500’ AFE in a stabilized condition. As you progress through these 

“gates,” it is important that any deviations be corrected immediately to arrive at the next “gate” 

within the parameters. The longer the delay in making a correction, the greater the chance of 

arriving at 500’ AFE in an unstabilized condition. 

During the early stages of the descent, corrections to altitude and/or airspeed can usually be done 

using speedbrakes. If in the latter stages of the descent/approach, or if speedbrakes are not 

effective in correcting to the desired airspeed/altitude, consider extending the landing gear to 

assist in increasing rate of descent and/or deceleration. Extending flaps and slats to increase 

deceleration or descent rate is not as effective as the use of speedbrakes and gear extension. 

Utilizing the FMC to reference the landing runway is an excellent technique for a visual 

approach. This will easily establish a DME reference to the landing runway for the targeted 

“gates.” The key to a successful visual approach is to plan and make corrections early. 

Page 1 (and 2)

2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

 Appendix 16

APPENDIX 16 

(example) 

PRELIGHT 

Preflight 

Preflight (Page 1 of 2) 

CAPTAIN FIRST OFFICER

The first pilot on the flight deck will determine the aircraft maintenance status prior to actuating 

switches and controls. 

Brief the lead flight attendant (see FOM, 

chapter 9). 

Accomplish the captain’s preflight. 

After fueling is complete, verify that the fuel 

load on board meets the requirements of the 

dispatch release and is adequate for the route 

of flight. 

Accomplish the exterior preflight. 

Accomplish the first officer’s preflight. 

Record the current ATIS information. 

Note: The captain may accomplish this step if 

it will expedite the departure process. 

When the fuel slip becomes available, review 

it for any discrepancies, and perform the 

reasonableness check (see FOM, chapter 5). 

Verify that the fuel on board meets the 

requirements of the dispatch release and the 

flight plan. 

Check the ECAM FUEL page to verify the 

total fuel load and the proper distribution. 

Obtain and print the ATC clearance using ACARS Predeparture Clearance (PDC) procedures. If 

ACARS PDC is not available, obtain the ATC clearance using voice procedures at a time 

convenient to both crewmembers. The captain may ask the first officer to call for the clearance 

or the first officer may initiate the call after ensuring the captain is prepared to listen as the 

clearance is received. The captain will monitor the clearance as it is copied by the first officer. 

Verify that the proper clearance altitude and 

transponder code are set. 

Ensure that the cleared route is the active 

FMGC route, or modify as required. 

Set the clearance altitude in the FCU ALT 

window. 

Set the transponder code. 

Verify that the cleared route is the active 

FMGC route. 

Page 1
AC 120-71A 2/27/03 

Appendix 16

APPENDIX 16 (continued) 

(example) 

PREFLIGHT 

Preflight (Page 2 of 2) 

CAPTAIN FIRST OFFICER

Set the required navigation frequencies and courses for the departure. If required, use the RAD 

NAV page to modify the frequencies and courses. 

Caution: Frequencies and courses set by the pilot must be cleared when no longer required. 

Review the preliminary MGL (see FOM, chapter 8). This will enable the crew to plan the 

anticipated runway, flap setting, and FLEX capability. 

At a convenient time prior to engine start, give 

a pilot briefing to ensure an understanding by 

both pilots as to the conduct of the flight (see 

FOM, chapter 9). 

♦ Call for the PREFLIGHT CHECK. Verify, 

as appropriate, and respond to the 

PREFLIGHT CHECK.

Read, verify as appropriate, and respond to the 

PREFLIGHT CHECK. 

Announce “PREFLIGHT CHECK 

COMPLETE.” 

If the takeoff weight data becomes available 

prior to engine start, complete the initialization 

on INIT page B. Insert ZFW and BLOCK 

FUEL. 

Page 2
2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

 Appendix 17

APPENDIX 17 

(example) 

CREW BRIEFINGS 

Pilot Briefing 

The purpose of the pilot briefing is to enhance communications on the flight deck and to promote 

effective teamwork. Each crewmember is expected to perform as an integral part of the team. 

The briefing should establish a mutual understanding of the specific factors appropriate for the 

flight. 

A pilot briefing will be given prior to starting engines for the first flight of the day (subsequent 

flight, if applicable). The captain determines the length and detail of the briefing. Factors to 

consider include: 

• Experience level of the pilots 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Special MEL procedures as a result of inoperative components 

Altimeter setting units 

Use of delayed engine start and/or engine out taxi procedures 

Presence of armed passengers, when applicable 

When personnel occupy the extra crew seat(s), ensure they understand the use of 

oxygen/interphone operations and emergency exits, and sterile flight deck procedures. 

Takeoff Briefing 

A Takeoff Briefing will be given prior to takeoff. Factors to consider include: 

Takeoff weather conditions 

Runway surface conditions 

NOTAMS 

Departure review 

Obstructions and high terrain 

Closeout weight and balance message/takeoff numbers 

Critical conditions affecting the GO/NO GO decision (e.g., gross weight limited takeoff, wet 

or slippery runway, crosswind, aircraft malfunctions) 

Birdstrike potential, if applicable 

Page 1
AC 120-71A 2/27/03 

Appendix 17

APPENDIX 17 (continued) 

(example) 

CREW BRIEFINGS 

Flight Attendant Briefing 

The purpose of the flight attendant briefing is to develop a team concept between the flight deck 

and cabin crew. An ideal developed team must share knowledge relating to flight operations, 

review individual responsibilities, share personal concerns, and have a clear understanding of 

expectations. 

Upon flight origination or whenever a crew change occurs, the captain will conduct a verbal 

briefing, preferably with all the flight attendants. However, preflight duties, passenger boarding, 

rescheduling, etc. may make it impractical to brief the entire flight attendant complement. 

Regardless of time constraints, company policy is that the captain must brief the lead flight 

attendant. The briefing will be supplemented with a completed Flight Attendant Briefing Form. 

The briefing should cover the following items: 

Logbook discrepancies that may affect flight attendant responsibilities or passenger comfort 

(e.g., coffee maker inop, broken seat backs, manual pressurization, etc.) 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

Weather affecting the flight (e.g., turbulence – including appropriate code levels, 

thunderstorms, weather near minimums, etc.). Provide the time when the weather may be 

encountered rather than a distance or location (e.g., “Code 4 Turbulence can be expected 

approximately one hour after takeoff.”) 

Delays, unusual operations, non-routine operations (e.g., maintenance delays, ATC delays, 

re-routes, etc.) 

Shorter than normal taxi time or flight time which may affect preflight announcements or 

cabin service. 

Any other items that may affect the flight operation or in-flight service such as catering, fuel 

stops, armed guards, etc. 

A review of the sterile flight deck policy, responsibility for PA announcements when the 

Fasten Seat Belt sign is turned on during cruise, emergency evacuation commands, or any 

other items appropriate to the flight. 

During the briefing, the captain should solicit feedback for operational concerns (e.g., does 

each person understand the operation of the emergency exits and equipment). The captain 

should also solicit feedback for information which may affect expected team roles. Empower 

each crewmember to take a leadership role in ensuring all crewmembers are made aware of 

any potential item that might affect the flight operation. 

The lead flight attendant will inform the captain of any inoperative equipment and the 

number of flight attendants on board. 

The captain will inform the lead flight attendant when there are significant changes to the 

operation of the flight after the briefing has been conducted.

Page 2
2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

 Appendix 18

Appendix 18

(MD-80 example) 

Landing Rollout – Actions and Callouts 

Callouts: shown in “BOLD TEXT” – Actions: shown with bullets

PF PM 

• Moves throttles to Idle • Observes Spoiler Lever moves aft to EXT 

position. 

• If spoiler lever does not move aft to EXT 

position, PM calls, “NO SPOILERS” and 

moves lever to full extend position and up to 

latched position. 

• Deploys Thrust Reversers 

• Maintains directional control and 

initiates braking as required 

• Monitors Thrust Reverser Deployment 

• Advises PF of thrust reverser status 

• Advises PF if 1.6 EPR is exceeded on dry 

runway or 1.3 EPR is exceeded on a wet or 

contaminated runway. (Suggested EPR limits 

may be exceeded in the event of an emergency) 

• Monitors airspeed and announces, 

 “80 KNOTS” 

• Reduces reverse thrust to achieve idle 

reverse thrust by 60 knots. 

If First Officer is PF, a positive transfer of controls shall occur during landing roll-out in 

accordance with company procedures 

• Clearing runway, retracts spoilers and 

announces, “FLAPS UP, AFTER 

LANDING CHECKLIST” 

• Confirms retraction of ground spoilers and 

selects flaps to 0/RET position. 

Page 1 (and 2)

2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

 Appendix 19

Appendix 19

(examples)

Crew Monitoring And Cross-Checking 

Background

Several studies of crew performance, incidents and accidents have identified inadequate flight 

crew monitoring and cross-checking as a problem for aviation safety. Therefore, to ensure the 

highest levels of safety each flight crewmember must carefully monitor the aircraft’s flight path 

and systems and actively cross-check the actions of other crew members. Effective monitoring 

and cross-checking can be the last barrier or line of defense against accidents because detecting 

an error or unsafe situation may break the chain of events leading to an accident. Conversely, 

when this layer of defense is absent, errors and unsafe situations may go undetected, leading to 

adverse safety consequences. It is difficult for humans to monitor for errors on a continuous basis 

when these errors rarely occur. Monitoring during high workload periods is important since these 

periods present situations in rapid flux and because high workload increases vulnerability to 

error. However, studies show that poor monitoring performance can be present during low 

workload periods, as well. Lapses in monitoring performance during lower workload periods is 

often associated with boredom and/or complacency. 

Crew monitoring performance can be significantly improved by developing and implementing 

effective SOPs to support monitoring and cross-checking functions, by training crews on 

monitoring strategies, and by pilots following those SOPs and strategies. This Appendix focuses 

on the first of these components, developing and implementing SOPs to improve monitoring. 

A fundamental concept of improving monitoring is realizing that many crew errors occur when 

one or more pilots are off-frequency or doing heads-down work, such as programming a Flight 

Management System (FMS). The example SOPs below are designed to optimize monitoring by 

ensuring that both pilots are “in the loop” and attentive during those flight phases where 

weaknesses in monitoring can have significant safety implications. 

Review and modification of existing SOPs 

Some SOPs may actually detract from healthy monitoring. Operators should review existing 

SOPs and modify those that can detract from monitoring. For example, one air carrier required a 

PA announcement when climbing and descending through 10,000 feet. This requirement had the 

unintended effect of “splitting the cockpit” at a time when frequency changes and new altitude 

clearances were likely. When the air carrier reviewed its procedures it realized that this 

procedure detracted from having both pilots “in the loop” at a critical point and consequently 

decided to eliminate it. 

Another carrier required a company radio call to operations once the aircraft had landed. A 

critical review of procedures showed that this requirement, although sometimes necessary, had 

resulted in runway incursions because the first officer was concentrating on making this radio 

Page 1
AC 120-71A 2/27/03 

Appendix 19

call and not fully monitoring the captain’s taxi progress. The procedure was modified so that 

crews make this call only when necessary and then only once all active runways are crossed, 

unless unusual circumstances warrant otherwise (such as extensive holding on the ground.) 

In addition to modifying existing SOPs, operators may consider adding sections to the SOP 

manual to ensure that monitoring is emphasized, such as: 

High-level SOPs that send an over-arching message that monitoring is a very important 

part of cockpit duties. 

• 

• 

Examples: 

A. Change title of “Pilot Not Flying” (PNF) to “Pilot Monitoring” (PM). 

B. The SOP document could explicitly state that monitoring is a primary responsibility of 

each crewmember. 

Example: 

Monitoring Responsibility 

3⁄4 The PF will monitor/control the aircraft, regardless of the level of automation 

employed. 

3⁄4 The PM will monitor the aircraft and actions of the PF. 

Rational: 

A. Several air carriers have made this change because they feel it is better to describe what 

that pilot should be doing (monitoring) rather than what he/she is not doing (not flying). 

B. Although some SOP documents do define monitoring responsibilities for the PF, this role 

is often not explicitly defined for the PNF (PM). In many cases non-monitoring duties, 

such as company-required paperwork, PA announcements, operating gear and flaps, are 

clearly spelled-out, but seldom are monitoring duties explicitly defined for each pilot. 

SOPs to support monitoring during airport surface operations 

(also refer to AC 120-74) 

Examples: 

A. Both pilots will have taxi charts available. A flight crewmember—other than the pilot 

taxiing the aircraft—should follow the aircraft’s progress on the airport diagram to ensure 

that the pilot taxiing the aircraft is following the instructions received from ATC. 

B. Both pilots will monitor taxi clearance. Captain will verbalize to FO any hold short 

instructions. FO will request confirmation from Captain if not received. 

C. When approaching an entrance to an active runway, both pilots will ensure compliance 

with hold short or crossing clearance before continuing with non-monitoring tasks (e.g., 

Page 2
2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

 Appendix 19

FMS programming, Airborne Communications Addressing and Reporting System

(ACARS), company radio calls, etc.).

Rational: Pilot-caused runway incursions often involve misunderstanding, not hearing a 

clearance or spatial disorientation. These SOPs are designed to do several things.

A. The requirement for both pilots to have taxi charts out ensures that the pilot who is not 

actively taxiing the aircraft can truly back-up the pilot who is taxiing. 

B. Requesting that both pilots monitor the taxi clearance and having the captain verbalize 

any hold short instructions is a method to ensure that all pilots have the same 

understanding of the intended taxi plan. 

C. The requirement to suspend non-monitoring tasks as the aircraft approaches an active 

runway allows both pilots to monitor and verify that the aircraft stops short of the 

specified holding point. 

SOPs to support improved monitoring during vertical segments of flight 

(also refer to Appendix 3 of this document, “ATC Communications and Altitude 

Awareness”)

• 

Examples: 

A. PF should brief PM when or where delayed climb/descent will begin.

B. Perform non-essential duties/activities during lowest workload periods such as cruise 

altitude or level flight. 

C. When able, brief the anticipated approach prior to top-of-descent. 

D. During the last 1,000 feet of altitude change both pilots should focus on the relevant 

flight instruments to ensure that the aircraft levels at the proper altitude. (When VMC one 

pilot should include scanning outside for traffic; however, at least one pilot should focus 

on ensuring that the aircraft levels at the proper altitude.) 

Rational: A study on crew monitoring conducted by NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System 

(ASRS) revealed that three-quarters of the monitoring errors in that study occurred while the 

aircraft was in a vertical phase of flight, i.e., climbing, descending or approach. These SOP 

statements ensure that proper attention can be devoted to monitoring during vertical phases 

of flight. 

A. The ASRS monitoring study highlighted that a number of altitude deviations occurred 

when crews were given an altitude crossing restriction, but then failed to begin the 

descent in a timely manner. Briefing the anticipated top-of-descent point not only 

promotes healthy CRM, but also allows the other pilot to “back up” the planned descent 

point and ensure the descent begins at the proper point. Example: “We'll begin our 

descent at 80 DME.” 

B. Studies likewise show that in order to minimize the chance of a monitoring error, crews 

should schedule performance of non-essential duties/activities during the lowest 

workload periods, such as cruise altitude or level flight. 

C. Briefing the anticipated instrument approach prior to descent from cruise altitude allows 

greater attention to be devoted to properly monitoring the descent because the crew is

Page 3
AC 120-71A 2/27/03 

Appendix 19

not having to divide attention between reviewing the approach and monitoring the 

descent. It also allows greater attention to be devoted to the contents of the approach 

briefing, which can increase situation awareness and understanding of the intended plan 

for approach and landing. 

D. Many altitude deviations occur because pilots are not properly monitoring the level off. 

This SOP statement is to ensure that pilots concentrate on ensuring the aircraft levels at 

the proper altitude, instead of being distracted by or performing non-monitoring tasks. 

• SOPs to support improved monitoring of automation 

Examples: 

A. Before flight, the routing listed on the flight release must be cross-checked against the 

ATC clearance and the FMS routing. 

B. When making autoflight systems inputs, comply with the following items in the acronym

CAMI: 

C onfirm FMS inputs with the other pilot when airborne 

A ctivate the input 

M onitor mode annunciations to ensure the autoflight system performs as desired 

I ntervene if necessary. 

C. During high workload periods FMS inputs will be made by the PM, upon the request of 

PF. Examples of high workload include when flying below 10,000 feet and when within 

1000 feet of level off or Transition Altitude. 

D. Pilots should include scanning of the Flight Mode Annunciator as part of their normal 

instrument scan, especially when automation changes occur (e.g., course changes, 

altitude level off, etc.). 

Rational: 

A. It is not unusual for the routing that is loaded in the FMS to be different from the routing 

assigned by ATC, especially in those cases where the flight plan is uplinked directly into 

the FMS, or when an FMS stored company route is used. Various studies have 

demonstrated that FMS programming errors made during preflight are not likely to be 

caught by flightcrews during flight. Therefore it is critical that these items be crosschecked before takeoff. 

B. The above-mentioned ASRS monitoring study found that 30 percent of the monitoring 

errors in that study’s dataset occurred when a crewmember was programming a Flight 

Management System (FMS). Another NASA-funded study showed that even experienced 

pilots of highly automated aircraft sometime fail to adequately check the Flight Mode 

Annunciator to verify automation mode status. The acronym “CAMI” can be used to help 

emphasize cross-checking of automation inputs, monitoring and mode awareness. 

C. The statement concerning FMS inputs during high workload allows the PF to concentrate 

on flying and monitoring by simply commanding FMS inputs during highly vulnerable 

times. Several ASRS reports indicate problems with failure to level-off and failure to reset 

altimeters to proper settings. Therefore, the definition of “high workload” should include 

those vulnerable phases. 

Page 4
2/27/03 AC 120-71A 

 Appendix 19

D. Automated flight guidance systems can have mode reversions and can sometimes 

command actions that are not anticipated by pilots. Therefore, pilots should include the 

Flight Mode Annunciator into their normal instrument scan. Special attention should be 

given to periods of course changes, altitude level off, etc.)

Page 5 (and 6)