CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE

A

STUDY

 MAY 2004

Options for

Changing the

Army’s Overseas

Basing

CBO
Port of

Bremerhaven

Wiesbaden

1st Armored Division

Friedberg

1st Brigade, 

1st Armored Division

Baumholder

2nd Brigade,

1st Armored Division

Ramstein

Air Base

86th Airlift Wing

Spangdahlem

Air Base

52nd Fighter Wing

Wurzburg

1st Infantry

Division

Schweinfurt

2nd Brigade,

1st Infantry

Division

Grafenwoehr

Training

Center

Vilseck

3rd Brigade,

1st Infantry

Division

Hohenfels

Combat Maneuver

Training Center

Major U.S. Military Facilities in Germany
The Congress of the United States O Congressional Budget Office

CBO

Options for Changing

the Army’s Overseas Basing

May 2004

A

STUDY
Notes

Unless otherwise indicated, all years referred to in this study are fiscal years and all dollar 

amounts are in 2004 dollars.

Numbers in the text and tables may not add up to totals because of rounding.
Preface

The Department of Defense is currently reevaluating how many forces it should continue to base overseas and where it should station them. Changes under consideration include 

moving troops now based overseas back to the United States and using periodic rotations to 

maintain a presence in Europe and South Korea. Also under consideration is establishing 

bases in Eastern Europe, which the Administration believes might be better suited than current bases to act as staging areas for deploying forces to contingencies outside Europe.

This Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study—prepared at the request of the Senate Budget Committee—examines several alternatives for changing the overseas basing of U.S. forces, 

focusing on Army units in Europe and South Korea. The alternatives cover a wide range of 

options, including ideas that have been discussed by the Administration. This analysis estimates the costs and savings associated with the alternatives as well as their effects on Army 

units and personnel. In keeping with CBO’s mandate to provide objective, impartial analysis, 

the report makes no recommendations.

Frances M. Lussier of CBO’s National Security Division prepared this study under the general supervision of J. Michael Gilmore. Adam Talaber provided valuable assistance in analyzing the time needed to deploy Army forces around the globe and the availability of Army 

forces for contingencies. Matthew Schmit estimated the costs of the various alternatives and 

wrote Appendix B. Allison Percy and Chad Goldberg made important contributions to 

research and fact-checking. Perry Beider, Robert Dennis, Arlene Holen, Elizabeth Robinson, 

Christopher Williams, and Dennis Zimmerman offered thoughtful comments on an earlier 

draft, as did W. Michael Hix of the RAND Corporation. (The assistance of an external 

reviewer implies no responsibility for the final product, which rests solely with CBO.)

Christian Spoor edited the study and prepared it for publication; Christine Bogusz and Juyne 

Linger proofread it. Cindy Cleveland prepared numerous drafts of the text and tables, and 

Maureen Costantino produced the cover and maps. Annette Kalicki prepared the electronic 

versions of the report for CBO’s Web site (www.cbo.gov).

Douglas Holtz-Eakin

Director

May 2004

Summary ix

1 Introduction 1

Changes in U.S. Overseas Basing in the Past 25 Years 2

Reasons to Change Overseas Basing Further 5

2 Current Basing of U.S. Forces Overseas 7

Forward-Based Versus Forward-Deployed Forces 7

U.S. Forces Based in Europe 8

U.S. Forces Based in East Asia and the Pacific 10

Concerns About the Current Basing of U.S. Forces Overseas 12

3 Alternative Basing Schemes for Army Forces 17

Policy Choices and Their Implications 17

Measures for Evaluating the Effects of Changes 

in Overseas Basing 21

Alternatives That Would Change the Army’s Overseas 

Basing While Maintaining Current Force Levels 22

Alternatives That Would Cut the Level of Army Forces 

Stationed Overseas in Half 34

Alternatives That Would Remove Almost All Army Forces 

Stationed Overseas 41

Conclusions 46

A Current Basing of Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps 

Forces Overseas 51

B How CBO Estimated the Costs of the Alternatives 

in This Report 57

C Deployment Tempo and Rotation Ratios for Active 

Army Forces 71

CONTENTS
vi OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Tables

S-1. Permanent Basing of U.S. Active-Duty Military Forces, by Region xi

S-2. Comparison of Alternatives with the Current Basing of Army Forces xiv

1-1. The U.S. Military’s Overseas Infrastructure 5

1-2. The Share of the U.S. Military’s Overseas Infrastructure in Germany 

and South Korea 6

2-1. U.S. Bases and Forces Stationed in Europe and Asia 9

3-1. Attributes of the Overseas Basing of Army Forces 18

3-2. Location of Permanent Army Forces Under Current Basing 

and Alternatives 1A, 1B, and 1C 23

3-3. Costs and Savings of Alternatives 1A, 1B, and 1C Relative to 

Current Basing 24

3-4. Family Separation and Unit Turnover for Enlisted Personnel 

Under Current Basing and Alternatives 1A, 1B, and 1C 26

3-5. Time Needed to Deploy a Heavy Brigade Combat Team by Sea 28

3-6. Effect of Alternatives 1A, 1B, and 1C on the Time Needed 

to Deploy a Heavy Brigade Combat Team by Sea 31

3-7. Location of Permanent Army Forces Under Current Basing 

and Alternatives 2A and 2B 35

3-8. Costs and Savings of Alternatives 2A and 2B Relative to 

Current Basing 36

3-9. Time Needed to Deploy a Division Base by Sea 37

3-10. Effect of Alternatives 2A and 2B on the Time Needed 

to Deploy Army Units by Sea 38

3-11. Family Separation and Unit Turnover for Enlisted Personnel 

Under Current Basing and Alternatives 2A and 2B 39

3-12. Location of Permanent Army Forces Under Current Basing 

and Alternatives 3A and 3B 42

3-13. Costs and Savings of Alternatives 3A and 3B Relative to 

Current Basing 43

3-14. Effect of Alternatives 3A and 3B on the Time Needed 

to Deploy Army Units by Sea 44

3-15. Family Separation and Unit Turnover for Enlisted Personnel 

Under Current Basing and Alternatives 3A and 3B 45

3-16. Comparison of All of the Alternatives with Current Basing 48
CONTENTS vii

A-1. U.S. Bases and Forces Stationed in Europe, by Service 52

A-2. U.S. Bases and Forces Stationed in East Asia and the Pacific, 

by Service 54

B-1. Summary of Cost Factors Used in the Estimates 58

B-2. Categories of Potential Costs or Savings for Each Alternative 67

B-3. One-Time Costs or Savings of the Alternatives 68

B-4. Annual Costs or Savings of the Alternatives 69

C-1. Effect of Various Deployment Tempos on Rotation Ratios 

for Active-Component Units 72

Figures

S-1 Countries That Host Permanent Bases for Major U.S. Military Forces x

1-1. U.S. Military Forces Permanently Stationed Overseas, by Region, 

1980 to 2002 3

1-2. U.S. Military Forces Permanently Stationed Overseas, by Service, 

1980 to 2002 4

3-1. Locations with the Fastest Deployment by Sea to Potential Areas 

of Conflict 20

3-2. Army Personnel Available for Sustained Deployment to Overseas 

Operations Under Alternatives 1A, 1B, and 1C 29

3-3. Changes to U.S. Installations in South Korea Under the Land 

Partnership Plan 30

3-4. Army Personnel Available for Sustained Deployment to Overseas 

Operations Under Alternatives 2A and 2B 40

3-5. Army Personnel Available for Sustained Deployment to Overseas 

Operations Under Alternatives 3A and 3B 46

3-6. Army Personnel Available for Sustained Deployment to Overseas 

Operations Under All of the Alternatives 50

C-1. Average Share of Time That a Soldier in an Average Unit Would 

Spend Deployed Under Various Deployment Tempos 73

Box

3-1. The Options for Overseas Basing Analyzed in This Report 21

Summary

For more than half a century, the United States has 

stationed large numbers of military personnel overseas—

legacies of the forces that were in place in Germany and 

Japan at the end of World War II and in Korea when hostilities there ceased in 1953. Through the early 1990s, 

U.S. forces stationed overseas were considered to be on 

the front lines of the Cold War. Since then, the United 

States has cut its overseas forces in half: from about 

400,000 active-duty personnel in 1990 to the current 

level of about 200,000 (excluding troops taking part in 

temporary operations, such as those in Afghanistan and 

Iraq). Nevertheless, the placement of those forces around 

the globe remains roughly the same as it was during the 

Cold War (see Summary Figure 1).

The Bush Administration and some Members of Congress have called for a review of the U.S. military’s overseas basing posture, arguing that it is a vestige of the Cold 

War and is not well suited to the current strategic environment. The Administration has stated that stationing 

large numbers of U.S. forces—particularly heavy Army 

units—on big, expensive bases far from the location of 

likely conflicts is not in U.S. interests.

This study by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 

examines issues related to the current basing of U.S. 

forces overseas. It focuses on the Army, which has more 

permanent installations and personnel outside the United 

States than any other service. Most of the discussion of 

changing U.S. basing overseas has focused on Army 

forces in Europe and South Korea, so this study looks primarily at those two areas.

CBO’s analysis points to several conclusions:

B Because the United States has invested heavily over 

the past 50 years in base infrastructure for its troops 

stationed overseas, any major shifting of forces—

either between overseas locations or to the United 

States—would require significant spending to provide 

that infrastructure somewhere else. 

B There would be limited annual savings to offset the 

large initial investment needed to restation U.S. 

forces, unless U.S. presence overseas was greatly reduced. In that case, annual savings could exceed 

$1 billion, but the net up-front investment would be 

substantial—on the order of $7 billion. 

B Restationing Army forces would produce, at best, only 

small improvements in the United States’ ability to respond to far-flung conflicts. The reason is that deploying Army units to many potential trouble spots from 

the likely locations of new bases would not be significantly faster than deploying them from current bases.

B Bringing forces that are permanently stationed in Europe and South Korea back to the continental United 

States (CONUS) and maintaining a presence in those 

regions through unit rotations would reduce the need 

for infrastructure overseas. It would also reduce instability in Army units by lessening the extent to which 

soldiers come and go, thus potentially enhancing unit 

cohesion. But maintaining the current level of overseas 

presence with unit rotations would limit the forces 

available for other operations—including the occupation of Iraq—and could hurt retention in the Army by 

increasing family separation. 

B If large numbers of forces were relocated from overseas, the need for additional basing in CONUS for 

tens of thousands of personnel could preclude some of 

the closings that might otherwise occur as part of the 

2005 round of base realignments and closures 

(BRAC).
x OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Summary Figure 1.

Countries That Host Permanent Bases for Major U.S. Military Forces

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Personnel numbers reflect permanent basing as of the end of 2002.

a. Includes Alaska, Hawaii, and U.S. territories.

b. Includes personnel afloat.

Current Basing of U.S. Forces Overseas

The U.S. military has about 197,000 active-duty personnel stationed permanently outside the United States—the 

bulk of them in Europe and Asia (see Summary Table 1). 

That force level excludes more than 150,000 military personnel who are on temporary assignment in Iraq and Afghanistan. The distinction between permanent and temporary stations is important, because the United States 

has made significant investments in foreign countries so 

the military personnel who are based there—often on 

three-year tours with their families—will have many of 

the amenities they would enjoy at home. Less-extensive 

infrastructure is needed in countries like Iraq, where U.S. 

forces are deployed without their families on a temporary 

basis. This study looks at how changing the permanent 

stationing of U.S. forces overseas and the associated basing infrastructure would affect active-duty Army personnel, Army combat forces, and the defense budget.

More than half of the U.S. troops stationed permanently 

on foreign soil are in Germany and South Korea. The 

Army accounts for more than three-quarters of U.S. personnel in those countries, with 56,000 soldiers at more 

than 250 bases in Germany and 28,000 soldiers at 80 

bases in South Korea. Those two nations are also home to 

a significant portion of the Army’s total combat force of 

10 divisions: two divisions (each with two of their three 

brigades) are based in Germany, and one division (with 

two of its three brigades) is stationed in South Korea.

The Administration has raised a number of concerns 

about the current basing of Army forces overseas:

B In the current global environment, the location of future conflicts is unpredictable, so the Army may need 

to become more agile and expeditionary (less tied to 

specific locations). 

South Korea

28,000 Army

10,000 Air Force

Personnel

United Kingdom

10,000 Air Force Personnel Germany

56,000 Army

15,000 Air Force

Personnel

United Statesa

393,000 Army

365,000 Navyb

308,000 Air Force

149,000 Marine Corps b

Personnel

Army Division

Air Force Fighter Wing

Marine Expeditionary Force

Navy Carrier Battle Group

Legend

Japan

6,000 Navy

14,000 Air Force

20,000 Marine Corps

Personnel

Italy

4,000 Air Force

Personnel
SUMMARY xi

Summary Table 1.

Permanent Basing of U.S. Active-Duty Military Forces, by Region

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: This table reflects the permanent basing of U.S. forces at end of 2002. Thus, it excludes forces on temporary assignment in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

a. Includes forces based in Alaska and Hawaii as well as trainees and personnel moving between assignments.

b. Personnel based on board ships are included under the United States.

c. Includes 145,000 personnel afloat.

d. Includes 5,000 personnel afloat.

B The U.S. military’s overseas basing infrastructure has 

become too large, in the Administration’s view; in 

other words, the United States should strive to reduce 

its “footprint” overseas. 

B Army forces stationed in Germany could take too long 

to deploy to conflicts in Africa or the Caspian Sea region of Central Asia. 

B The Army’s bases in South Korea are small, scattered, 

obsolete, and located close to the border, well within 

range of North Korean artillery.

B Some overseas bases (particularly those in South Korea) that were formerly isolated are becoming increasingly surrounded by commercial and residential 

communities, leading to greater friction with the local 

populace. 

B The practice of assigning 28,000 soldiers to South Korea on one-year tours—rather than the longer postings 

usual in Europe—contributes to high annual turnover 

in Army units, which reduces their cohesion and warfighting capability.1

Europe

Asia and

Pacific Other

United

Statesa Total

Army

Divisions 2 1 0 7 10

Personnel 60,000 30,000 4,000 393,000 487,000

Air Force

Tactical fighter wings 3 3 0 9 15

Personnel 34,000 23,000 3,000 308,000 368,000

Navyb

Carrier battle groups 0 1 0 11 12

Personnel 10,000 6,000 2,000 365,000c 383,000

Marine Corpsb

Marine expeditionary forces 0 1 0 23

Personnel 1,000 20,000 4,000 149,000d 174,000

Personnel from All Services 105,000 79,000 13,000 1,215,000 1,412,000

1. Because conditions at many bases in South Korea are not suitable 

for accommodating soldiers’ families, almost all soldiers who serve 

tours there do so unaccompanied by family members. To reduce 

family separation, the Army limits those tours to one year. Tours 

in Germany, by contrast, typically last for three years, and soldiers 

may bring their families with them.
xii OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

In the spring of 2003, the Administration accelerated an 

ongoing review of the military’s overseas basing structure. 

The detailed results of that review have not been officially 

released, although public statements by Administration 

officials have indicated some of the changes being considered.2

Alternative Basing Schemes 

for Army Forces

CBO examined seven alternative ways in which the Army 

might alter its basing of forces in Europe and South Korea. None of the alternatives explicitly reflects the Administration’s plans, because those plans are still under review. 

However, the alternatives incorporate several aspects of 

changes to overseas basing that the Administration has either announced formally or discussed informally, such as 

keeping the current number of Army forces stationed 

overseas but reducing their footprint and moving some of 

them closer to locations of potential conflicts; making the 

Army more expeditionary by using unit rotations to 

maintain overseas presence; or reducing the size of the 

Army’s overseas presence by restationing forces to the 

continental United States.

Because details of the Administration’s plans were unavailable, CBO could not estimate the costs of the alternative approaches relative to those plans. Rather, CBO 

compared the estimated costs or savings that would result 

from each alternative—both during a 10-year implementation period and annually thereafter—with the costs of 

maintaining the Army’s current basing structure in Europe and South Korea. In addition, CBO examined how 

each option would compare with the current basing 

scheme in terms of four measures: 

B The time needed to deploy Army forces to overseas locations that Administration officials have cited as close 

to where conflicts could occur in the future—specifically, Nigeria and Azerbaijan (potentially important 

future sources of oil) and Uganda and Djibouti (potential staging bases for conducting operations in Africa and the Arabian Peninsula to counter instability 

and terrorism); 

B The number of Army forces available for missions 

other than providing overseas presence in Europe and 

South Korea;

B The amount of time that the average enlisted soldier 

would be separated from his or her family over a 10-

year period;3

 and

B The degree of turnover among enlisted personnel in 

Army units based in CONUS.

Those measures were chosen because of their importance 

and their ability to be quantified, but they do not represent all of the ways to evaluate the benefits and drawbacks 

of different basing schemes. For example, changing the 

basing of U.S. forces overseas would have political and 

military implications. Such implications are difficult to 

predict and to quantify, however, so CBO did not attempt to evaluate them in depth.

Nearly all of the options in this study incorporate changes 

to Army basing in both Germany and South Korea. The 

implications of each option were considered individually 

for the two theaters as well as for the Army as a whole. 

Only the overall effects are described below, although the 

implications for each theater are discussed in the main 

text of the report. 

Alternatives That Would Maintain 

the Current Level of Army Forces 

Stationed Overseas

Without altering the number of Army forces based overseas, the Department of Defense (DoD) could make several changes to the basing of those forces to address concerns about their footprint, deployment times, and cost. 

One change would be to revise DoD policy so that soldiers assigned to tours in Europe were not accompanied 

by their families. DoD could also consolidate bases in 

Germany and South Korea and move Army units in Europe (either permanently or temporarily) closer to locations of likely conflicts. Several of the options in this 

2. See, for example, Bradley Graham, “U.S. May Halve Forces in 

Germany,” Washington Post, March 25, 2004, p. A1.

3. CBO looked at the effects on enlisted personnel over a 10-year 

period because enlisted personnel make up 83 percent of the 

Army, and 10 years is long enough that a typical soldier would 

have a high probability of serving at least one tour in South Korea 

and one in Europe as well as at least two tours in the continental 

United States.
SUMMARY xiii

study incorporate those latter two changes, to varying degrees, to reflect near-term actions that the Administration 

is reportedly considering.

Make European Tours Unaccompanied 

One approach to reducing the size and cost of the Army’s 

European infrastructure would be to make Army tours in 

Europe unaccompanied. If the approximately 60,000 

Army personnel assigned to units in Europe served oneyear tours without their dependents rather than threeyear tours with their families, the United States would no 

longer need to provide housing, schools, and support for 

some 80,000 dependents overseas. As a result, it could 

save about $50 million per year in construction costs at 

European bases, CBO estimates, and another $200 million per year on educating soldiers’ children and providing special pay and allowances to personnel overseas. 

However, shortening tours to one year would increase the 

Army’s annual moving costs by $225 million, because 

three times as many soldiers would be moving between 

Europe and CONUS every year. And leaving more families in the United States would raise yearly costs for housing allowances by $100 million. Consequently, making 

tours unaccompanied but shorter would actually increase 

the Army’s annual costs by $75 million, in CBO’s estimate.4 (The Army would be reluctant to make unaccompanied overseas tours longer than one year because of 

concern that family separations of that length would hurt 

soldiers’ morale and retention.)

Besides raising annual costs, this approach would require 

a net one-time investment of $825 million, CBO estimates (see Summary Table 2). The reduced need for family housing at European bases could allow some planned 

construction projects to be cancelled. But those savings 

would be more than offset by the costs of building more 

barracks in Europe for unaccompanied troops. (Under 

current policy, soldiers without dependents are housed in 

barracks, which are cheaper to maintain than family 

housing units. Existing family quarters could be used for 

unaccompanied soldiers, but they would need to be modified to house individuals rather than families.)

Making all tours in Europe unaccompanied would also 

adversely affect soldiers’ overall quality of life and increase 

turnover among enlisted personnel in CONUS-based 

units. Over 10 years, an enlisted soldier would typically 

spend almost 60 percent more time away from his or her 

family—3.6 years rather than the current average of 2.3 

years—because of the threefold increase in time spent on 

unaccompanied tours. The greater frequency of overseas 

tours would also raise the percentage of enlisted personnel leaving CONUS-based units each year from 37 percent to 47 percent. More family separations and shorter 

assignments in the United States during enlisted soldiers’ 

careers would most likely reduce the Army’s ability to retain soldiers in the force.

Make Minor Changes in German and South Korean 

Basing and Rotate Combat Troops from Germany 

to Eastern Europe 

This alternative would consolidate bases in Germany and 

South Korea in line with two plans announced by the Administration. The Efficient Basing Germany plan would 

close 13 small bases in central Germany and move the 

units and personnel stationed there to a single installation 

in the Grafenwoehr area in eastern Germany. The Land 

Partnership Plan, signed by representatives of the United 

States and South Korean governments in March 2002, 

would reduce the number of troop installations in South 

Korea by 18, mainly by closing and consolidating many 

bases north of the capital, Seoul.

In addition, this alternative would put Army combat 

forces closer to potential conflicts by rotating brigade 

combat teams based in Germany on six-month deployments to forward operating bases (FOBs) in Eastern Europe. The FOBs would be built at or near three existing 

facilities in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. Because they 

would be relatively spartan installations, the forward 

bases would be less expensive to build and operate than 

typical permanent (and more elaborate) installations in 

Germany. 

This option would require a net one-time investment of 

about $1.4 billion to $2.9 billion, mainly to consolidate 

bases in Germany and South Korea and to establish 

FOBs in Eastern Europe. (The range reflects varying assumptions about what share of costs the host nations 

might bear.) After implementation, this alternative would 

cost about $225 million more per year than current basing, primarily to operate the FOBs and support rotations 

to them (see Summary Table 2).

Rotating brigade combat teams (BCTs) to Eastern Europe would allow them to deploy more quickly to the

4. The costs and savings associated with each alternative are discussed in detail in Appendix B. 
xiv OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Summary Table 2.

Comparison of Alternatives with the Current Basing of Army Forces

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: BCTs = brigade combat teams; CONUS = continental United States; n.a. = not applicable.

a. Assuming use of active-duty forces only and a range of rotation ratios (the total number of units necessary to keep one unit on a rotational deployment at any given time).

Army Personnel

 Available for 

Operationsa

Army Forces Stationed

Overseas

Costs or Savings (-)

(Millions of 2004 dollars)

Assuming High 

Rotation 

Ratio

Assuming Low 

Rotation 

Ratio

Germany and 

Eastern Europe

South

Korea

OneTime Annual

Current Basing 56,000 28,000 n.a. n.a. 44,000 64,000

Change from Adopting Alternative

Alternatives That Would 

Maintain the Current Level of 

Army Forces Stationed Overseas

Make European Tours 

Unaccompanied

0 0 825 75 0 0

Make Minor Changes in German 

and South Korean Basing and 

Rotate BCTs from Germany to 

Austere Bases in Eastern Europe

0 0 1,375 to 2,925 225 -6,000 -8,000

Consolidate Bases in South Korea 

and Establish Permanent Bases in 

Eastern Europe

0 0 2,875 to 4,950 25 0 0

Alternatives That Would Cut the 

Level of Army Forces Stationed 

Overseas in Half

Halve Forces Stationed Overseas 

and Maintain Current Level of 

Overseas Presence by Rotating 

Six BCTs from CONUS

-25,000 -13,000 8,375 to 9,350 0 -28,000 -34,000

Halve Forces Stationed Overseas 

and Rotate One BCT from Germany 

to Eastern Europe

-29,000 -13,000 4,825 to 5,800 -500 +2,000 -1,000

Alternatives That Would 

Remove Almost All Army Forces 

Stationed Overseas

Move Nearly All Forces to CONUS 

and Continuously Rotate Three 

BCTs to Europe and South Korea

-50,000 -27,000 6,800 to 7,350 -925 -9,000 -15,000

Eliminate Virtually All Army 

Presence Overseas

-53,000 -27,000 6,800 to 7,350 -1,175 +10,000 +4,000

Continued
SUMMARY xv

Summary Table 2.

Continued

b. Based on deploying from the closest location in Europe or using the set of equipment prepositioned afloat in Diego Garcia.

c. Based on deploying from Germany or Qatar.

d. Based on deploying from South Korea or Hawaii.

e. The current level of turnover (the share of personnel who leave U.S.-based units each year, including for a permanent change of station 

overseas) is shown in percent. Changes from that level are shown in percentage points.

Number of Days to Deploy Years of Family Separation for 

Enlisted Personnel Over 10 Years Annual 

Turnover 

in CONUS 

Units 

(Percent)e

To European

Theater

(Baku, Azerbaijan)

To Asian

Theater

(South Korea) Unaccompanied 

Tours

Time 

Deployed Total

Heavy 

BCTb

Division 

Basec

Heavy 

BCT

Division 

Based

Current Basing 23 28 0 0 0.6 1.7 2.3 37

Change from Adopting Alternative

Alternatives That Would 

Maintain the Current Level of 

Army Forces Stationed Overseas

Make European Tours 

Unaccompanied

0 0 0 0 +1.3 0 +1.3 +10

Make Minor Changes in German 

and South Korean Basing and 

Rotate BCTs from Germany to 

Austere Bases in Eastern Europe

-6 0 0 0 0 +0.3 +0.3 0

Consolidate Bases in South Korea 

and Establish Permanent Bases in 

Eastern Europe

-6 0 0 0 +0.2 0 +0.2 +2

Alternatives That Would Cut the 

Level of Army Forces Stationed 

Overseas in Half

Halve Forces Stationed Overseas 

and Maintain Current Level of 

Overseas Presence by Rotating 

Six BCTs from CONUS

-6 +1 0 +23 -0.3 +0.7 +0.4 -5

Halve Forces Stationed Overseas 

and Rotate One BCT from Germany 

to Eastern Europe

-6 0 0 0 -0.3 +0.1 -0.2 -6

Alternatives That Would Remove 

Almost All Army Forces 

Stationed Overseas

Return Nearly All Forces to CONUS 

and Continuously Rotate Three 

BCTs to Europe and South Korea

-6 +1 0 +23 -0.5 +0.4 -0.1 -9

Eliminate Virtually All Army 

Presence Overseas

0 +1 +7 +23 -0.5 0 -0.5 -9
xvi OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Mediterranean and Caspian regions (such as Baku, Azerbaijan) than they can from Germany, although no more 

quickly to Africa or the Middle East. However, constantly 

rotating BCTs from Germany to Eastern Europe could 

mean that the four combat brigades stationed in Germany—which are now generally available to be deployed 

out of the country—would not be immediately available 

for other missions. Consequently, the number of activeduty personnel that the Army could keep deployed on 

overseas operations on a sustainable basis would drop 

from the current level of 44,000 to 64,000 personnel to 

38,000 to 56,000. (The ranges reflect uncertainty about 

rotation ratios, or the total number of units needed to 

keep one unit deployed at any given time.) Another 

drawback of this option is that it would increase total 

family separation for enlisted personnel by 13 percent 

over 10 years because family members would not accompany soldiers on rotations to Eastern Europe.

Consolidate Bases in South Korea and Establish 

Permanent Bases in Eastern Europe 

This alternative would go farther than the previous option in reducing the footprint of U.S. forces in Germany 

and South Korea and potentially speeding deployment of 

Army forces in Europe to likely trouble spots. Rather 

than closing roughly one-quarter of the 80 Army bases in 

South Korea, this option would consolidate all U.S. 

forces in that country at two large installations south of 

Seoul—as the Administration and the South Korean government recently agreed to do. And rather than rotate 

combat forces to temporary forward bases in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria, this option would establish three 

permanent bases in those countries and relocate a BCT 

(about 4,000 soldiers) from Germany to each one.

Because the new bases in Eastern Europe would host soldiers on one-year unaccompanied tours, they would not 

have to be as elaborate as the bases that now house U.S. 

soldiers in Germany. Nevertheless, this option would entail a net up-front investment of $2.9 billion to $5.0 billion to build new bases in Eastern Europe and South Korea and move units to them (see Summary Table 2 on 

page xiv).

Once implemented, this alternative would cost only 

about $25 million more each year than current basing 

and would have several advantages. It would speed deployments to the Mediterranean and Caspian regions, 

make U.S. forces in South Korea less vulnerable to North 

Korean artillery or to being overrun during a North Korean attack, close many isolated and obsolete facilities in 

South Korea, and make it feasible to increase the share of 

accompanied Army tours in that country from the current level of 10 percent (2,800 soldiers) to 25 percent 

(7,000 soldiers). However, because 12,000 Army personnel would serve one-year unaccompanied tours in 

Eastern Europe rather than three-year accompanied tours 

in Germany, the total number of unaccompanied tours 

worldwide would rise under this option, increasing family separation and annual turnover in CONUS units. 

Alternatives That Would Cut

the Level of Army Forces Stationed 

Overseas in Half

Although the Administration has indicated that fewer 

Army personnel will probably be based overseas in the future, it has not said where forces will be cut or by how 

much. To cover a wide range of possibilities, the rest of 

the options that CBO examined would reduce the extent 

of the Army’s presence overseas from current levels by 

changing permanent basing and, in some cases, introducing unit rotations. Those options would relocate between 

38,000 and 80,000 personnel now based overseas to the 

continental United States.

Transferring tens of thousands of Army troops back to 

the United States could complicate preparations for the 

round of base realignments and closures being planned 

for 2005. Because of BRAC rounds carried out in the 

1980s and 1990s, the Army has little or no excess capacity at bases in CONUS.5 Thus, increasing the population 

of Army personnel in CONUS—as these options would 

do by as much as 23 percent—would require building 

new facilities in this country. If closing existing bases is 

considered during the upcoming BRAC round, the need 

to house forces in the United States that are now stationed overseas could preclude some of those closures.

Two of the options for cutting overseas forces that CBO 

examined would relocate roughly half of the Army personnel stationed in Germany and South Korea to the 

United States. The first would move all combat forces—

brigades and divisions—from Germany and South Korea 

to CONUS, leaving the support forces now based there 

5. Those four previous BRAC rounds eliminated many bases and 

facilities that were no longer necessary because of the large reductions in U.S. military forces that occurred during the 1990s.
SUMMARY xvii

in place. However, it would maintain roughly the current 

level of overseas presence by rotating BCTs from the 

United States to those two regions. The other option 

would reduce the level of overseas presence by moving 

half of both the combat and support forces based in Germany and South Korea to CONUS and not rotating any 

units back.

Halve Forces Stationed Overseas and Maintain 

the Current Level of Overseas Presence 

by Rotating Six BCTs from CONUS 

Some Administration officials have suggested that a rotational scheme would be a better way than current basing 

to maintain the present level of combat presence in Europe and South Korea. In line with that suggestion, this 

alternative would relocate all Army combat units based in 

Germany and South Korea to the United States and rotate six brigade combat teams overseas on six-month deployments. Three of the 4,000-person BCTs would rotate 

to forward operating bases in Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania; another would go to an existing base in Germany; 

and the other two would rotate to two new consolidated 

installations in South Korea. To enable all active Army 

brigades to take part in the overseas rotations, this option 

would buy two sets of equipment for the Army’s new 

Stryker BCTs and preposition one set in Europe and one 

in South Korea. 

This alternative would be the most expensive approach in 

this study to implement, requiring net one-time spending 

of $8.4 billion to $9.4 billion to construct new basing in 

the United States for returning units, to purchase equipment sets for prepositioning, and to establish three FOBs 

in Eastern Europe (see Summary Table 2 on page xiv). 

Thereafter, it would cost about the same each year as current basing.

Using a rotational scheme to maintain combat presence 

in Europe and South Korea would have both advantages 

and disadvantages. It would reduce annual turnover in 

CONUS units from 37 percent to 32 percent (by cutting 

one-year tours in South Korea) and lessen the time 

needed to deploy BCTs to the Caspian region by six days. 

However, getting a division base—everything in a division besides the BCTs, such as headquarters, aviation, 

and support units—to potential conflicts in the European 

or Asian theater would take longer under this alternative, 

because no divisional units would remain in Germany or 

South Korea. For operations in Baku, Azerbaijan, the delay would be only one day (the units would come from 

CONUS and their equipment from prepositioned stocks 

in Qatar). But for a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, the 

delay could stretch to 23 days (as divisional units deployed from Hawaii), during which time the BCTs in 

South Korea would have to operate without divisional 

support. They would receive some support from the extensive Army assets that would remain stationed in South 

Korea, as well as from assets of the U.S. Air Force and the 

South Korean army. But it is unclear how well the BCTs 

would be able to perform in combat without command 

and control provided by a divisional headquarters.

Other drawbacks of this approach are that it would reduce the availability of active Army brigades for other 

missions and increase family separation. Depending on 

assumptions about rotation ratios, the Army would need 

19 to 24 brigades to support a total of six BCT rotations 

to Europe and South Korea. Thus, it would be able to 

sustain only 16,000 to 30,000 active-duty troops in other 

missions outside Europe and South Korea—less than half 

of the level possible under today’s basing structure. Moreover, because the increased time that a soldier would 

spend deployed over 10 years would more than offset the 

decreased time spent on unaccompanied tours in South 

Korea, average family separation over 10 years would rise 

by about 17 percent. That rise would be enough, according to some of the Army’s experts, to degrade retention—

perhaps seriously.

Halve Forces Stationed Overseas and Rotate 

One BCT from Germany to Eastern Europe 

In this alternative, the Army forces permanently stationed 

in Germany and South Korea would be cut by about half. 

One division, its two brigades, and additional supporting 

units would be returned to CONUS from Germany; one 

of the brigades and some divisional units from the 2nd 

Infantry Division, as well as supporting units outside the 

division, would move to CONUS from South Korea. 

The Army forces remaining in South Korea, including 

one brigade and the division headquarters, would be 

based at a consolidated installation south of Seoul. The 

two brigades still in Germany would each rotate periodically—for one three-month exercise per year, for example—to three FOBs in Eastern Europe, using equipment 

prepositioned there.

Those changes would require a net up-front investment 

of $4.8 billion to $5.8 billion to move forces to the 

United States and provide basing for them, set up three 

FOBs in Europe, and consolidate bases in South Korea. 
xviii OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Once this option was implemented, however, it would 

save the Army $500 million per year compared with the 

cost of current basing (see Summary Table 2 on page xiv).

This approach to halving the Army’s overseas presence 

would have several advantages. It would reduce annual 

turnover in CONUS units from 37 percent to 31 percent 

and decrease the amount of family separation that enlisted soldiers experience over 10 years by about 9 percent. It could also speed deployments to the Mediterranean, Black Sea, and Caspian regions. Moreover, this 

alternative would have a fairly small effect on the availability of Army forces for other contingencies. Moving 

one brigade from South Korea to CONUS would slightly 

increase the number of troops available, but under some 

assumptions, that increase would be insufficient to offset 

the greater demand on brigades in Europe. As a result, 

the total active-Army forces available for overseas operations would range from 46,000 to 63,000 under this alternative, rather than 44,000 to 64,000 under the current 

basing strategy.

Alternatives That Would Remove 

Almost All Army Forces 

Stationed Overseas

Although the Administration has not suggested such a 

drastic change in the near future, CBO also analyzed two 

approaches that would greatly reduce the Army’s permanent overseas presence by moving nearly all of the Army 

forces stationed in Germany and South Korea back to the 

United States. Doing that would require a net one-time 

investment of $6.8 billion to $7.4 billion, CBO estimates, but thereafter would save at least $900 million per 

year compared with current basing. The first alternative 

would rotate combat teams overseas from the United 

States on a limited basis; the second would keep most 

Army forces in CONUS, deploying them overseas only in 

the event of a crisis.

Return Nearly All Forces to CONUS 

and Continuously Rotate Two BCTs to Europe 

and One to South Korea 

This option would relocate the vast majority of Army 

forces now in Germany and South Korea to CONUS but 

maintain half the current combat presence in those regions through a rotational scheme. It would establish 

three FOBs in Eastern Europe and locate prepositioned 

equipment and small reception forces (1,000 personnel) 

at each of them, as well as at a consolidated base south of 

Seoul. Another 3,000 troops would be stationed in Germany for administrative and reception purposes. Two 

BCTs from CONUS would rotate to Eastern Europe every six months, occupying two of the three forward bases 

at any given time. One BCT would rotate on a continuing basis from CONUS to South Korea.

Those changes would have both positive and negative effects. Once they were carried out, they would save the 

Army more than $900 million per year (see Summary Table 2 on page xiv). Furthermore, annual turnover in CONUS units would fall from 37 percent to about 28 percent because of the decline in the number of unaccompanied tours. Total family separation would decrease 

slightly, since the increased time spent on deployments 

would almost offset the reduction in time spent on unaccompanied tours. The impact on deployment times 

would be mixed. BCTs would be able to reach the Mediterranean and Caspian regions more quickly, but a division base would take an additional day to arrive in the 

European theater. Of more concern, a division base could 

take up to 23 days to deploy to South Korea, with all of 

the implications discussed earlier. And despite the concentration of forces in CONUS, maintaining three brigade rotations to Europe and South Korea would reduce 

the forces available for other contingencies by about 

9,000 to 15,000 personnel from today’s levels. 

Eliminate Virtually All Army Presence Overseas 

This approach—the most significant change of all of the 

options—would remove Army forces from Germany and 

South Korea and rebase them in CONUS for use in future conflicts. Small reception forces would be stationed 

in Germany (2,000 personnel), Eastern Europe (1,000), 

and South Korea (1,000) to maintain prepositioned 

equipment and provide support for periodic exercises. 

For that reason, and because one set of equipment for a 

heavy brigade would be prepositioned in Romania or 

Bulgaria, the United States would be able to deploy a brigade combat team to conflicts in the Caspian region just 

as quickly as from current bases.6

 With unaccompanied 

tours all but eliminated, family separation would decline 

6. Although equipment would be prepositioned in Bulgaria or 

Romania, Army personnel might need up to a week to fly to those 

locations from CONUS, draw their equipment, and organize 

themselves into a fighting force. That delay would negate any 

advantage over current basing gained by positioning sets of brigade equipment in Eastern Europe.
SUMMARY xix

by 22 percent from the current level, and annual turnover 

in CONUS units would fall by 24 percent. Without brigades tied to the defense of South Korea, 4,000 to 10,000 

more troops could be available for sustained overseas operations than would be available today. Finally, this option would save $1.2 billion annually—more than any 

other alternative that CBO examined (see Summary Table 2 on page xiv).

This approach would represent a significant departure 

from U.S. posture during the past 50 years, when the 

Army has maintained a significant combat presence in 

Germany and South Korea. Unlike the other alternatives, 

this option would not station or rotate any forces to 

South Korea that would be able to respond to an attack 

immediately. Instead, Army personnel might need up to a 

week to fly to South Korea from CONUS, retrieve their 

equipment from the prepositioned set, and organize 

themselves into a fighting force. The absence or presence 

of one Army brigade at the onset of hostilities might not 

be crucial, because the South Korean army would be able 

to respond immediately, as could the South Korean and 

U.S. air forces stationed in the region. However, the deterrent value of a U.S. brigade that was always present in 

South Korea might be more important than its tactical 

contribution.

1

Introduction

The United States maintains an extensive network of 

overseas military bases, as it has since the end of World 

War II. Those installations—scattered throughout the 

world and numbering more than 700—enable the U.S. 

military to maintain a permanent presence on all seven 

continents. The pattern of that presence was established 

in the aftermath of World War II and the Korean War 

and reinforced during the Cold War by the need to defend the United States and its allies from potential Soviet 

and North Korean aggression. 

In recent years, members of both the Congress and the 

Administration have called for a reassessment of the military’s overseas basing strategy. Last year, the Congress established the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States as part of its 

bill appropriating funds for military construction for 

2004.1 The commission is charged with assessing the 

number of U.S. forces permanently based overseas, examining the condition of their facilities, and determining 

what changes may be necessary. The commission is due 

to report back to the Congress by December 31, 2004. 

For its part, the Administration stated in its September 

2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report that the existing 

system of overseas bases is inadequate for the current strategic environment.2

 To address that concern, the Administration accelerated an ongoing review of U.S. basing 

strategy in the spring of 2003. Although Administration 

officials have discussed several potential changes—such as 

halving the number of U.S. troops stationed in Germany—the final results of that review and official recommendations for change have not yet been formally released.3

This study by the Congressional Budget Office looks at 

the current worldwide basing posture of the U.S. military. It focuses on the Army, which has far more personnel stationed permanently overseas than any other service.4

 Because the bulk of the Army’s overseas forces are 

based in two locations that are legacies of the Cold 

War—Germany and South Korea—this study looks in 

detail at those areas. It discusses some of the consequences of the Army’s current basing policies and explores alternative strategies that would address concerns 

raised about those policies. The alternatives are analyzed 

in terms of their costs or savings, their ability to speed deployment of U.S. forces to potential trouble spots, and 

their effects on family separation, the stability of Army 

units based in the continental United States, and the 

availability of U.S. forces for operational deployments. 

CHAPTER

1. U.S. House of Representatives, Making Appropriations for Military 

Construction, Family Housing, and Base Realignment and Closure 

for the Department of Defense for the Fiscal Year Ending September 

30, 2004, and for Other Purposes, conference report to accompany 

H.R. 2559, Report 108-342 (November 4, 2003), sec. 128, pp. 

10-12.

2. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (September 30, 2001), p. 25.

3. For information about some of the changes reportedly under consideration, see Bradley Graham, “U.S. May Halve Forces in Germany,” Washington Post, March 25, 2004, p. A1.

4. All mentions in this study of forces based overseas refer to activeduty personnel permanently stationed on land outside the United 

States and its territories, as of the end of fiscal year 2002. Thus, 

they exclude forces on temporary deployments overseas (such as in 

Afghanistan or Iraq) and the roughly 22,000 personnel based on 

board ships off foreign shores.
2 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Changes in U.S. Overseas Basing

in the Past 25 Years

Despite cutting its overseas forces in half in the early 

1990s, the United States continues to maintain a significant military presence around the world. At the end of 

2002, almost 200,000 active-duty U.S. troops were stationed on shore in foreign countries, down from almost 

430,000 at the end of 1980 (see Figure 1-1).5

Geographic Distribution

The number of U.S. military personnel stationed in Europe declined dramatically after the fall of the Berlin Wall 

and the collapse of the Soviet Union—from about 

320,000 in 1989 to about 110,000 in 1995. Nevertheless, Europe continues to host the largest population of 

U.S. military personnel based on shore in foreign countries.

The next-biggest contingent of U.S. forces stationed on 

foreign territory is based in East Asia: roughly 40,000 

personnel in Japan and 38,000 in South Korea. Throughout the 1980s, another 6,000 to 11,000 U.S. service 

members were based in Japan, and about 15,000 were 

stationed in the Philippines. Those personnel—who were 

primarily from the Air Force—were withdrawn in the 

early 1990s during the general contraction of the U.S. 

military, when the overall size of the active-duty force 

shrank by 30 percent.

The remainder of U.S. forces based overseas have been 

stationed in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, and numerous other places around the globe. In 

all, those other forces have ranged from 5,000 to 20,000 

personnel during the past quarter century.

The percentage of U.S. forces based overseas decreased 

less dramatically during that period than the overall number did. For example, although the number of personnel 

stationed in Europe fell by two-thirds, the share of U.S. 

forces based there declined by about half: from 15 percent in 1980 to 8 percent in 2002 (see Figure 1-1). The 

number of personnel based in East Asia declined only 

slightly during those years, but the share of U.S. military 

forces stationed in that region actually rose from 5 percent to 6 percent.

Differences Between the Services

Because the services differ in mission and in the mobility 

of their forces, they also vary in where and to what extent 

their personnel are based overseas. The Army has accounted for the largest share of U.S. forces stationed outside the United States during the past 25 years (see Figure 

1-2). Army units have generally required significant resources and time to move between continents; thus, 

Army forces that might be needed on short notice to defend U.S. allies in Europe or East Asia have been based 

close to areas of likely conflict. That was the case during 

the Cold War, when four Army divisions and associated 

support units were stationed in Germany to deter or defend against a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. It is 

also the reason that Army forces are stationed in South 

Korea. 

The number and fraction of Army forces based overseas 

have decreased since 1980—from over 250,000 personnel, or more than one-third of the Army’s active-duty soldiers, to slightly more than 90,000 personnel in 2002, or 

about one-fifth of the active Army. Nevertheless, the 

Army continues to station a larger share of its forces overseas than any other service and almost as many people as 

all of the other services combined.

In terms of number of installations, the Army also represents the biggest U.S. presence overseas. According to the 

Department of Defense’s most recent Base Structure Report, the Army maintains the highest number of overseas 

installations—with by far the most buildings and the 

greatest total replacement value—of all of the services (see 

Table 1-1).6 Thus, the Army has a much bigger overseas 

“footprint” than the Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps 

does.

Those other services’ combat forces are more mobile than 

Army forces (to varying degrees) and therefore are less 

widely based around the globe. Air Force aircraft can deploy to anywhere in the world in a matter of days. However, that service’s supporting units, equipment, and mu5. Data for forces stationed overseas are provided as of the end of 

2002 to exclude the effects of stop-loss orders (temporary stoppage of exits from active duty) and activation of reservists related 

to recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

6. Based on data from Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, 

Department of Defense Base Structure Report: Fiscal Year 2003 Baseline (June 2003), available at www.defenselink.mil/news/

Jun2003/basestructure2003.pdf.
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 3

Figure 1-1.

U.S. Military Forces Permanently Stationed Overseas, by Region, 1980 to 2002

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Excludes forces afloat.

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

East Asia and Pacific Europe Western Hemisphere Middle East Other

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

0

5

10

15

20

25

Active-Duty Personnel

Share of Active-Duty Personnel Stationed Overseas

Thousands

Percent
4 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Figure 1-2.

U.S. Military Forces Permanently Stationed Overseas, by Service, 1980 to 2002

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Excludes forces afloat.

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

Army Air Force Navy Marine Corps

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

Active-Duty Personnel

Share of Active-Duty Personnel Stationed Overseas

Air Force

Marine Corps

Navy

Thousands

Percent

Army
CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 5

Table 1-1.

The U.S. Military’s Overseas Infrastructure

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Installations and Environment, Department of Defense Base Structure Report: Fiscal Year 2003 Baseline (June 2003), available at 

www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2003/basestructure2003.pdf.

Notes: Excludes bases in Hawaii and in U.S. territories, such as Guam.

n.a. = not applicable.

a. Includes only facilities owned (rather than leased) by the United States.

b. Total space in all buildings, owned or leased.

c. Includes costs to replace excess U.S.-owned facilities awaiting disposal.

d. Excludes Antarctica.

nitions are not as mobile. Thus, like the Army, the Air 

Force established numerous overseas bases during the 

Cold War and stationed approximately one-fifth of its 

active-duty personnel at them. The Navy and Marine 

Corps, in part because of their sea-based nature, have stationed fewer of their personnel on shore overseas, in 

terms of both relative and absolute numbers. The Navy 

bases only about 5 percent of its personnel on shore outside the United States, a share that has remained relatively constant since 1980.7

 The Marine Corps has stationed a much larger proportion—roughly 12 percent to 

16 percent—of its forces on shore overseas during the 

past 20 years.8

Reasons to Change 

Overseas Basing Further

The Administration argues that U.S. forces overseas, as 

now configured, are not adequate for the new strategic 

environment. Current security strategy calls for having 

agile forces that are not necessarily based where future 

conflicts will occur—because that cannot be predicted—

but that are nonetheless stationed outside the United 

States and are prepared to deploy quickly to wherever 

conflicts might erupt.

The need for change to meet new security demands is 

greater for the Army than for other services, for at least 

two reasons. First, land forces are inherently less mobile 

than ships and aircraft, so the Army cannot react and 

move to a developing crisis as easily as the Navy and Air 

Force can. Second, the Army’s overseas basing structure is 

more concentrated than the Navy’s and Air Force’s are. 

Roughly 90 percent of the Army’s overseas personnel—

and 80 percent of its overseas installations—are located 

in Germany and South Korea (see Table 1-2), generally at 

bases that have been in use for 50 years. Defense anaArmy Navy Air Force

Marine

Corps Total

Number of Installations 381 44 275 2 702

Number of Buildingsa 26,100 5,800 9,600 3,400 44,900

Total Square Footageb

 (Millions) 204 32 53 12 301

Total Present Replacement Valuec

(Billions of dollars) 46 21 39 6 112

Number of Countries and Foreign 

Territories with Installations 9 23d 23 1 n.a.

7. Between 9 percent and 13 percent of the Navy’s personnel were 

based overseas on board ships during the 1980s. That share fell to 

4 percent by 1997, but it has been as high as 11 percent in recent 

years. 

8. The Marine Corps bases 1 percent to 6 percent of its forces on 

board ships in foreign ports.
6 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Table 1-2.

The Share of the U.S. Military’s Overseas Infrastructure in Germany 

and South Korea

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Installations and Environment, Department of Defense Base Structure Report: Fiscal Year 2003 Baseline (June 2003), available at 

www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2003/basestructure2003.pdf; Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate of Information Operations and Reports, Department of Defense Active-Duty Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by 

Country (309A) (September 30, 2002); and other Defense Department data.

Note: * = less than 0.5 percent.

a. As of September 30, 2002.

b. Onshore personnel only.

c. Includes costs to replace excess U.S.-owned facilities awaiting disposal.

lysts and Administration officials argue that Germany is 

no longer close to likely sites of future conflicts and that 

Army forces in South Korea are stationed dangerously 

close to the North Korean border. For those reasons, 

much of the discussion about modifying the overseas basing of U.S. forces has focused on Army units and installations in Germany and South Korea.

The next chapter looks in detail at the current basing of 

Army forces in those two countries, with particular attention to how it affects the lives and careers of soldiers and 

the Army’s force structure. Chapter 2 also briefly describes the major facilities that the other services maintain 

in Germany and South Korea. Chapter 3 examines alternative ways to change the basing of Army forces to better 

meet the new strategic environment and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative.

Army Navy Air Force

Marine

Corps Total

Active-Duty Personnel Permanently Stationed Overseasa

Total Number 94,000 18,000b 60,000 25,000b 197,000

Percentage of Total

Germany 60 1 26 2 35

South Korea 30 0 16 * 19

Other countries 10 99 58 98 46

Facilities Overseas

Total Present Replacement Valuec

(Billions of dollars) 46 21 39 6 112

Percentage of Total

Germany 65 0 23 0 35

South Korea 17 1 10 0 11

Other countries 18 99 67 100 54
2

Current Basing of U.S. Forces Overseas

Permanently stationing forces overseas gives the U.S. 

military a strategic advantage—but at a price. That price 

is paid not only in terms of budgetary cost but in terms of 

the personnel, units, and equipment needed to support 

forces stationed outside the United States. This chapter 

examines the U.S. forces stationed in Europe and East 

Asia and the budgetary and personnel cost of keeping 

them there.

Forward-Based Versus 

Forward-Deployed Forces

U.S. forces can be maintained overseas on either a permanent or a temporary basis. Units or personnel that are in a 

foreign country on a permanent basis are said to be forward based or forward stationed. In contrast, units and 

their associated personnel that are in a foreign country for 

a limited time—typically six months or a year—while 

taking part in an exercise or operation are said to be forward deployed. (An example of such forces is those now 

deployed in Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom.) Although 

the distinction may appear to be semantic, it has important consequences for military forces and personnel.

Forward-Based Units

Units that are permanently based outside the United 

States remain in place while individuals assigned to the 

units come and go. For example, the 2nd Infantry Division (2nd ID) has been stationed in South Korea since 

the 1950s, when the Korean War ended. While the division, with its headquarters and subordinate units, remains in place, some 13,000 Army soldiers rotate 

through it on one-year unaccompanied tours.1 In other 

locations, such as Germany, U.S. military personnel serve 

three-year tours with units stationed there and can bring 

their families with them.

With the help of its allies, the United States has built up 

significant infrastructure overseas to support forwardstationed units, assigned personnel, and their families. 

Almost all overseas bases that permanently house large 

numbers of U.S. service members include all of the 

amenities of bases in the United States—such as commissaries, chapels, exercise facilities, and post offices. In addition, in places where families may accompany service 

members, the Department of Defense (DoD) has established schools for military dependents. In Germany 

alone, DoD runs 70 schools for more than 30,000 children who are dependents of U.S. military personnel and 

DoD civilians.

Another aspect of forward-based units is that personnel 

serving with them are considered on permanent assignment instead of temporary duty and thus undergo a “permanent change of station” (PCS) when they move from 

an assignment in the United States to an assignment 

overseas. In a PCS move, service members can take along 

their household goods (including automobiles) at the 

government’s expense, regardless of whether they are accompanied by family members. 

The fact that personnel are assigned to—and move in 

and out of—forward-based units on an individual basis 

creates continual turnover in those units. With the threeyear tours common in Germany, one-third of the individuals in a particular unit will turn over every year, and 

CHAPTER

1. Most of the roughly 15,000 soldiers assigned to units in South 

Korea other than the 2nd ID also rotate through their units on 

one-year unaccompanied tours. However, approximately 10 percent of them are on accompanied tours, in which the Army pays 

to move soldiers’ families to South Korea and provides facilities 

for dependents while the soldiers are on assignment there. Those 

tours typically last for two or three years.
8 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

the entire population will turn over in three years. Moreover, when individuals complete a tour with a forwardbased unit, they are generally assigned to a different unit 

in the United States than the one they served in before 

going overseas.

Forward-Deployed Units

Forward-deployed forces—such as those now in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Kosovo—are overseas on a temporary basis 

only. The United States does not anticipate having forces 

stationed in Iraq for the next 50 years, as it has done in 

Germany. Rather, it anticipates that once Iraq is secure, 

U.S. troops will be withdrawn and not replaced. As a 

consequence, the United States has no plans to build 

elaborate bases to house U.S. forces in Iraq. 

Likewise, for the most part, military personnel are not assigned to duty in Iraq the same way they are to duty in 

South Korea or Germany. If a unit based in the United 

States, such as the 82nd Airborne Division, is assigned to 

duty in Iraq for a year, all of the personnel associated with 

the division who are eligible will deploy to Iraq for 12 

months.2 Neither soldiers’ personal belongings (beyond 

some individual items) nor their families will accompany 

them. Furthermore, so far as possible, all of the individuals assigned to the unit will deploy and stay with it for 

the entire period and return to the home base together.3

Those deployed forces are often included in tallies of U.S. 

forces overseas, but in fact they are officially considered 

to be overseas on a temporary basis, even though some 

operations supported by rotational deployments have 

continued for years.4

U.S. Forces Based in Europe

The United States has about 100,000 military personnel 

forward based in Europe. The bulk of them are stationed 

in Germany, where the United States has maintained 

forces since the end of World War II, originally as an occupation force and later as part of NATO’s defense during the Cold War. Although the size of U.S. forces in Europe declined by two-thirds after the collapse of the 

Berlin Wall, the need to maintain the current levels is being questioned by some defense analysts and Administration officials.

Army Forces

The Army accounts for about 60 percent of active-duty 

U.S. personnel stationed in Europe. Despite significant 

cuts in those personnel after the unification of Germany 

and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the 

Army continues to base two of its 10 divisions and one of 

its four corps in Europe. Thus, a significant portion of 

the Army’s combat power is stationed on that continent, 

primarily in Germany. 

Nevertheless, the Army’s combat units (divisions and brigades) account for less than half of the service’s activeduty personnel in Europe. Each of the two divisions stationed in Germany—the 1st Armored Division and the 

1st Infantry Division (mechanized)—has only two of its 

three combat brigades and about 12,500 of its total 

16,000 personnel based in Germany.5 The Army’s other 

combat unit in Europe—the 173rd Airborne Brigade, 

based in Vincenza, Italy—has about 1,000 personnel assigned to it. Thus, the Army’s permanent active-duty 

combat forces in Europe total about 26,000 people (see 

Table 2-1). 

Another 27,000 or so active-duty personnel are assigned 

to what the Army calls combat-support (CS) units, such

2. Not all of the soldiers assigned to a division would deploy with it. 

On average, 4 percent of Army personnel are ineligible to deploy 

overseas at any given time for various reasons, such as pregnancy, 

other health concerns, and family emergencies. Additional soldiers—as many as 35 percent in peacetime—may be ineligible 

because of Army personnel policies designed to ensure soldiers’ 

quality of life. For a discussion of Army deployment rates in 

peacetime, see Bruce R. Orvis, Deployability in Peacetime, DB351-A (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002).

3. Some attrition, necessitating individual replacements, will inevitably occur over a deployment of six to 12 months.

4. For example, the United States has provided a small force to support the peacekeeping efforts of the Multinational Force and 

Observers (MFO) in the Sinai Peninsula since 1982. Battalionsized units of about 1,000 soldiers deploy for six-month assignments with the MFO. Similarly, units have been supporting operations in Bosnia and Kosovo on six-month deployments since 

1996 and 1999, respectively. All told, the Army maintained an 

average of about 15,000 soldiers on operational deployments from 

1997 through early 2001.

5. The third brigade of each of those divisions is based at Fort Riley, 

Kansas. Although the 1st Armored and 1st Infantry Divisions 

each have about 16,000 personnel assigned to them, when taking 

part in an operation they would typically be accompanied by several support units, which might include a total of about 24,000 

personnel. As a consequence, a division and its accompanying 

support units—known as a division slice—would include a total 

of about 40,000 personnel.
CHAPTER TWO CURRENT BASING OF U.S. FORCES OVERSEAS 9

Table 2-1.

U.S. Bases and Forces Stationed in Europe and Asia

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Installations and Environment, Department of Defense Base Structure Report: Fiscal Year 2003 Baseline (June 2003), available at 

www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2003/basestructure2003.pdf; Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate of Information Operations and Reports, Department of Defense Active-Duty Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by 

Country (309A) (September 30, 2002); and other Defense Department data.

Note: More-detailed breakdowns for the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps appear in Tables A-1 and A-2 in Appendix A.

a. Includes the replacement value of excess facilities that the United States still owns.

b. Onshore personnel only.

c. Excludes forces based in Hawaii and in U.S. territories, such as Guam.

Forward-Based Personnel 

(Thousands) Installations

Combat

Support and 

Administration Total

Total

Number

Number with 

Replacement

Value of More

Than $1 Billion

Total

Replacement

Value (Billions

of dollars)a

Europe

Army

Belgium 0 1 1 10 0 1

Germany 25 31 56 255 3 30

Italy 1 1 2 16 0 1

Other 0 1 1 13 0 1

Subtotal 26 34 60 294 3 33

Air Force 14 20 34 201 5 22

Navyb 0 10 10 15 2 7

Marine Corpsb 0 1 1 0 0 0

Total 40 65 105 510 10 62

East Asia and the Pacificc

Army

Japan 0 2 2 15 0 3

South Korea 13 15 28 80 2 8

Subtotal 13 17 30 95 2 11

Air Force 14 10 23 67 5 18

Navyb 0 6 6 16 6 9

Marine Corpsb 10 10 20 2 2 6

Total 37 43 79 180 15 44
10 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

as artillery, and combat-service-support (CSS) units, such 

as transportation. CS and CSS units provide various 

kinds of support to combat brigades and divisions. The 

other 7,000 or so active-duty Army personnel based in 

Europe are assigned to what could be termed administrative units, such as medical facilities, NATO headquarters 

in Brussels, and contracting agencies. In all, about 43 percent of Army forces in Europe are assigned to combat 

units, 45 percent to support units, and 12 percent to administrative duties. (The breakdown for Army forces in 

Germany is similar: 45 percent combat, 45 percent support, and 10 percent administrative.)

Army Bases 

The Army maintains an extensive network of bases in Europe, encompassing almost 300 installations. Like its personnel, the vast majority of the Army’s overseas infrastructure (255 installations) is in Germany. The largest 

and some of the most expensive Army bases in Europe are 

at Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, Germany. Those two 

training facilities—which provide ranges and space where 

Army units can practice tactics and maneuvers—cover 

52,000 acres and 40,000 acres, respectively, and have a 

combined replacement value of more than $1.5 billion.6

The Army also maintains 33 barracks for unaccompanied 

soldiers and 36 “villages” for family housing in Germany, 

which have a replacement value of roughly $14 billion. 

Other Army installations in Germany include five hospitals, five hotels, 15 smaller training areas, nine airfields, 

four depots, three golf courses, a Boy Scout camp, and a 

Girl Scout camp. That infrastructure is designed to enhance soldiers’ morale and, to some extent, replicate the 

facilities and conveniences that would be found around 

many Army bases in the United States.

Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Forces and Bases

The other three services have fewer forces stationed in 

Europe than the Army does. In addition, they have not 

concentrated their forces and bases on that continent in 

Germany to the extent that the Army has. 

The Air Force maintains the second largest presence in 

Europe after the Army, with 34,000 active-duty personnel and 201 installations in 12 countries. The largest contingent (15,000 active-duty personnel) is based in Germany, but the Air Force also has relatively large numbers 

of people in the United Kingdom (10,000) and Italy 

(4,000). The service’s major combat units are distributed 

similarly, with Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy 

each hosting one fighter wing. (For more details about 

the distribution of Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps 

personnel and installations in Europe and Asia, see Appendix A.) 

The greatest number of Air Force installations in Europe 

are located in Germany. The base at Ramstein, Germany, 

is the main air hub for U.S. forces from all services flying 

to or from other parts of the world, including the United 

States and the Middle East. The Air Force also has strategically important installations in the United Kingdom 

and Greenland. The air bases at Mildenhall and Lakenheath in the United Kingdom were used extensively to 

support U.S. operations against Libya and during Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom. The Air Force’s 

facility in Thule, Greenland, includes a radar that is designed to provide early warning of an intercontinental 

ballistic missile attack and is expected to be part of the 

Bush Administration’s network of missile defenses. Thus, 

although the Air Force does not have as many installations in Europe as the Army does, several of its bases have 

played—and continue to play—major roles in supporting 

U.S. military operations.

The Navy and Marine Corps, because of the nature of 

their activities, have a far smaller onshore presence. Neither service bases any combat forces on shore in Europe, 

although the Navy has 10,000 support and administrative personnel there, and the Marine Corps has 1,000.7

In addition, the Navy maintains 15 installations in Europe, including two air stations (in Iceland and Italy). 

U.S. Forces Based in East Asia 

and the Pacific

After Europe, the region with the largest permanent U.S. 

military presence overseas is East Asia and the Pacific, 

where approximately 80,000 personnel are stationed (see 

6. That and other replacement values cited in this study are based on 

data from Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, Department of Defense Base Structure Report: Fiscal Year 2003 Baseline

(June 2003), available at www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2003/

basestructure2003.pdf. That publication lists the replacement values of current U.S. defense facilities, including excess facilities that 

the United States still owns.

7. The Navy and Marine Corps have additional personnel based on 

board ships that may be anchored in European waters.
CHAPTER TWO CURRENT BASING OF U.S. FORCES OVERSEAS 11

Table 2-1 on page 9). Virtually all of them are based in 

two countries: Japan, where all four services have a significant presence, and South Korea, where the Army and the 

Air Force have stationed combat forces. In addition, the 

Navy and Air Force maintain a small number of installations (and fewer than 1,000 permanent personnel) in 

Australia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and Singapore.

Army Forces

Since the Korean War, the Army has maintained a major 

presence in South Korea, where 28,000 Army personnel 

are now based. Their mission is to enforce the 1953 

cease-fire that ended hostilities under the auspices of the 

United Nations as well as to deter an attack by North Korea—or, should deterrence fail, help to repel an invasion 

or mount a counterattack to expel the invading force. Today, the 2nd ID is stationed in northern South Korea 

with two of its combat brigades, accounting for about 

13,000 troops. (The division’s third brigade is based at 

Fort Lewis, Washington.) Of the other 15,000 Army personnel in South Korea, about 13,000 are assigned to 

combat-support and combat-service-support units that 

are part of the Eighth Army, which serves as the highlevel command organization for the Army in South Korea. The remaining 2,000 Army personnel in that country are assigned to units that perform administrative 

tasks. 

The Army’s representation elsewhere in the region is limited to Japan, where about 2,000 personnel are stationed. 

Those forces provide forward presence and support for 

regional contingencies and are also charged with helping 

to defend Japan if necessary. They include one specialforces battalion, some CS and CSS units, and several 

hundred soldiers assigned to administrative units. 

Army Bases 

The Army has a total of 95 installations in East Asia—80 

in South Korea and the rest in Japan. The most expensive 

Army installation in the region is Yongsan Garrison, located in the center of Seoul. It is home to 7,000 military 

personnel assigned to the headquarters of U.S. Forces 

Korea and other command organizations and has a replacement value of $1.3 billion. The Army’s 15 installations in Japan, which support a much smaller force, include a housing area, three ammunition depots, and 

other logistics facilities, such as a port, a pier, and a fuelhandling facility.

Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Forces and Bases

Although both the Navy and the Air Force have installations in several East Asian countries, their bases and 

forces are concentrated in Japan (see Appendix A for 

more details). On the basis of replacement value, Navy, 

Marine Corps, and Air Force installations in Japan represent 88 percent of the three services’ investment in the region.

Air Force. The Air Force has 23,000 airmen stationed in 

East Asia and the Pacific, with more than half of them 

based in Japan. Half of the personnel in Japan are assigned to support and administrative units, although 

7,000 are associated with the tactical fighter units stationed there. In contrast, the majority of the 10,000 Air 

Force personnel stationed in South Korea are combat 

forces, associated with the two fighter wings based in that 

country.

The Air Force maintains a total of 67 installations in Asia 

to support and house its forces. Japan hosts the majority 

of them (44) as well as several large or valuable installations, such as Kadena Air Base, the nearby Kadena Ammunition Storage Annex, and Misawa Air Base. Together, those three installations have a replacement value 

of $9 billion. Air Force installations in South Korea are 

not as extensive as those in Japan, but they include two 

large air bases: one at Kunsan on the western coast and 

one at Osan, less than 50 miles south of the North Korean border. Those two bases have a combined replacement value of about $3 billion.

Navy. Since World War II, the Navy has had a significant 

presence and interest in East Asia. The base at Yokosuka, 

Japan—home to the Seventh Fleet and the aircraft carrier 

Kitty Hawk—is considered the Navy’s largest and most 

strategically important overseas installation in the world. 

Furthermore, the Kitty Hawk’s air wing, which is based 

in Japan when the carrier is in port, is the Navy’s only 

forward-stationed air wing. All told, the Navy has about 

6,000 personnel based on shore in Japan. 

To support its presence in Japan, the Navy maintains 12 

installations, six of which are estimated to have a replacement value of more than $1 billion each. Its facilities at 

Yokosuka alone have a combined value of $5.7 billion. 

The Navy also operates a base at Sasebo, which hosts an 

amphibious squadron, and a naval air facility at Atsugi. 

In all, the Navy’s installations in Japan have an estimated 

replacement value of approximately $9 billion.
12 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Naval forces and installations in South Korea are much 

less extensive. Because the primary mission of U.S. Naval 

Forces Korea is to provide leadership and expertise in naval matters to area military commanders, there are no naval seagoing units permanently assigned to South Korea. 

Most of the Navy’s facilities in South Korea are colocated 

with those of the Army at the Yongsan Garrison. 

Marine Corps. The Marine Corps’s only division-sized 

unit stationed overseas—the III Marine Expeditionary 

Force (MEF)—has been based on the Japanese island of 

Okinawa since 1971. To support the 20,000 marines stationed in Japan, including the MEF’s 17,000 personnel, 

the Marine Corps maintains two large installations: 

Camp Butler, which covers 78,500 acres (or about onequarter) of Okinawa, and Iwakuni Air Station on the island of Honshu. Those two installations represent a total 

U.S. investment of $6.5 billion.

Concerns About the Current Basing 

of U.S. Forces Overseas

Asserting that the current basing structure is incapable of 

meeting future U.S. needs, the Administration in 2003 

accelerated an ongoing strategic review of that structure. 

The goal of the review is to develop a plan for forward 

basing that will make U.S. forces more agile and better 

able to respond to an unpredictable and ever-changing 

global geopolitical situation. (Results of the review have 

not yet been officially released.) Defense analysts outside 

the Administration have voiced similar criticisms of the 

military’s current basing structure. The rest of this chapter examines some of the concerns that have been raised 

from both inside and outside the Administration about 

the forward basing of U.S. forces.

Issues Common to Various Services

Some concerns apply, to varying degrees, to all four services and their bases outside the United States. Those 

concerns include frictions with host nations, the cost of 

maintaining forward bases, the ability of forces stationed 

overseas to respond to likely conflicts, and the enduring 

utility of U.S. installations overseas.

Host-Nation Conflicts. All of the services are subject to 

disputes with the governments of host nations and their 

citizens over land use and the proximity of U.S. forces to 

civilian population centers and activities. Conflicts about 

land use have arisen because U.S. bases that were originally in remote locations have become increasingly surrounded by suburban or urban development. An example 

is the land occupied by the U.S. Yongsan Garrison in 

what is now downtown Seoul—land that local South Koreans envision using for other purposes. In various places 

around the world, U.S. training exercises conducted near 

sizable local populations have disrupted the lives of residents because of noise, destroyed private property, and 

resulted in the loss of life through accidents.8

 As U.S. 

military personnel come into closer proximity with 

spreading urban or suburban populations, such incidents 

could become more common and affect support for the 

continued presence of large U.S. forces on foreign soil.

The Cost of Basing Forces Overseas. Maintaining forward-based forces entails a marginal cost, in part because 

installations overseas, particularly in Europe, are more expensive to operate and support than those in the United 

States. Additional marginal costs include the familyseparation pay given to military personnel on unaccompanied tours and the cost of moving active-duty service 

members, their goods, and sometimes their dependents 

to and from assignments overseas. The Congressional Research Service estimated that the total annual cost of basing 100,000 U.S. forces from all services in Europe rather 

than the United States was on the order of $1 billion to 

$2 billion in 1996.9

The Ability of Forces Based Overseas to Respond to 

Likely Conflicts. Administration officials have questioned 

whether U.S. forces that are stationed primarily in Germany and South Korea are positioned appropriately to 

respond to probable future conflicts. They argue that 

conflicts are much more likely to occur in Africa, Western Asia, or the Middle East than anywhere in Western 

Europe. Similarly, conflicts may occur in Asia at locations 

other than on the Korean Peninsula. (For example, civil 

unrest has occurred recently in Indonesia and the Philippines.)

Although all of the services have personnel stationed in 

Germany and all but the Navy in South Korea, that concern is most relevant for the Army because of its concen8. For example, two South Korean girls were killed in 2003 when 

they were struck by an Army armored vehicle during training 

exercises.

9. Stephen Daggett, Defense Budget: Alternative Measures of Costs of 

Military Commitments Abroad, CRS Report for Congress 95-726F 

(Congressional Research Service, June 16, 1995).
CHAPTER TWO CURRENT BASING OF U.S. FORCES OVERSEAS 13

tration of forces in those countries.10 Most of the Administration’s public statements about altering the current 

basing of U.S. forces abroad appear to focus on Army 

units.

The Utility of the Current Overseas Basing Structure. Although Administration officials have questioned the usefulness of some of the military’s existing overseas infrastructure, they have said that some bases have obvious 

enduring utility. For example, the Air Force’s Ramstein 

and Osan air bases serve as major hubs in Germany and 

South Korea, respectively. Army and other personnel and 

some equipment pass through those facilities when they 

arrive from the United States or depart for other parts of 

the globe, such as the Middle East. Those large installations—in which the United States has invested heavily to 

expedite the movement of forces and equipment into and 

out of Europe and Asia—are of high strategic value, and 

the Administration has explicitly stated that it will retain 

them. The training areas at Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, 

which provide facilities unavailable anywhere else in Europe, will also be retained.

Issues Specific to the Army

As noted above, various characteristics set the Army apart 

in terms of forward basing: it has far more personnel stationed overseas than any other service, those forces are located in places that appear to be legacies of the Cold War, 

and Army units require the most time and expense to be 

transported to conflicts away from where they are based. 

For those reasons, many concerns about the present U.S. 

basing structure focus on that service.

Army Forces in Europe. The main concern expressed by 

Administration officials about the Army forces now based 

in Europe seems to be the amount of time they would 

need to respond to a conflict in the region. Although the 

two Army divisions stationed in Germany were well 

placed to defend NATO from Soviet attack, they cannot 

deploy quickly to conflicts outside Germany. For example, three months elapsed between the decision to move 

the 1st Armored Division from Germany to Iraq in 

March 2003 and its arrival in that theater. 

Military and Administration officials have indicated that 

the need for U.S. intervention is much more likely in Africa, Eastern Europe, or Western Asia than in Western 

Europe. General James Jones, chief of U.S. European 

Command, said last year that “Africa is replete with ungoverned spaces for attracting the merchants of terrorism, 

radical fundamentalism, weapons of mass destruction 

and all kinds of criminality, and I think we’re going to see 

more of that.”11 General Charles Wald, deputy commander of U.S. European Command, said that the area 

around the Caspian Sea should be of keen interest to Europeans and that ensuring the safe flow of oil from that 

region should be a NATO mission.12 He also pointed out 

that the United States currently imports up to 15 percent 

of its oil from Nigeria and that the share could increase to 

25 percent in the next decade, making that nation of strategic importance.13

Those statements by U.S. commanders in Europe suggest 

that the Administration may be assessing how to speed 

the deployment of U.S. forces to places such as Nigeria, 

Uganda, Azerbaijan, and Djibouti. (Nigeria and Baku, 

Azerbaijan, are sources of oil; Uganda and Djibouti are 

potential staging bases for conducting operations in Africa to counter instability and terrorism.) As was the case 

with Iraq, moving a division, or even part of one, from 

Germany to any of those locations would take a considerable amount of time. The two divisions based in Germany are heavy divisions (equipped with tanks and armored vehicles), so the most efficient way to transport 

their equipment is by sea.14 Moving one heavy brigade 

combat team from Germany to locations in Africa or the 

Caspian region would take between 20 days and a 

month, and transporting an entire division’s equipment 

would take another four days—in all cases, only about 

five days faster than moving the same types of units from

10. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps units can take a considerable 

amount of time to establish efficient operations in remote locations. Nevertheless, in some cases, they can provide a more rapid 

initial response than can Army forces that do not have staging 

bases near a conflict.

11. John T. Correll, “European Command Looks South and East,” 

Air Force Magazine, December 2003.

12. Ibid.

13. Vince Crawley, “Oil May Drive Troop Staging,” Army Times, September 22, 2003, p. 30.

14. The reason is that U.S. transport aircraft (C-17s) can carry only 

one M1 tank at a time. Moving an entire heavy division would 

require about 1,500 C-17 flights, and moving one brigade combat 

team from the division would take up to 500 flights. Since the 

U.S. military is projected to have only about 140 C-17s by 2005, 

transporting heavy divisions and brigades by air is not practical.
14 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

the United States.15 Those lengthy deployment times 

have raised questions about the utility of the Army forces 

now based in Germany.

Another issue concerning those forces is the cost of keeping them in Europe rather than at bases in the continental United States. The Congressional Budget Office 

(CBO) estimates that it costs about $1 billion more per 

year to maintain about 56,000 Army forces in Germany 

than if those troops were stationed in the United States—

both because running bases and providing family housing 

and schools is more expensive in Germany than in the 

United States and because the Army must pay for overseas allowances and moves to and from assignments in 

Europe. If those forces are not needed to respond to any 

likely future conflict in the immediate region, observers 

might ask, why should the United States spend $1 billion 

each year to keep them there?

Army Forces in South Korea. Concerns about the 28,000 

Army forces stationed in South Korea differ from those 

associated with Army forces based in Europe. Very few 

defense analysts question the need to keep substantial 

U.S. forces based in South Korea to deter North Korea 

from invading or attacking its southern neighbor. Instead, their concerns relate to four main issues: the condition and location of U.S. bases in South Korea, the instability in Army units that results partly from supporting 

large numbers of one-year tours in South Korea, the quality of life of soldiers assigned to those tours, and whether 

Army units based in South Korea should be made more 

available to respond to conflicts elsewhere in the region.

Problems with Bases in South Korea. The condition and location of the Army’s installations in South Korea are less 

than desirable. According to U.S. military officials in that 

country, many of the Army’s bases are obsolete, poorly 

maintained, and in disrepair, including some Quonset 

huts from the Korean War era that still house soldiers.16

Most lack the amenities found at other U.S. bases overseas, and soldiers assigned to them are authorized to receive hardship duty pay of $150 per month.

In addition, Army bases in South Korea are relatively 

small, spread out, and vulnerable. Units of the 2nd ID 

are scattered among 17 installations located north of the 

capital, Seoul, and within 30 miles of the North Korean 

border. That area is well within range of North Korean 

artillery placed along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) that 

runs between the two countries. Should North Korea attack South Korea, U.S. forces at those bases would be 

vulnerable to barrages from large numbers of artillery 

tubes. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has argued 

that removing U.S. soldiers from such an immediate 

threat would give them an advantage in surviving and responding to an attack.17

Another issue about U.S. bases in South Korea that has 

been raised recently concerns the large U.S. enclave in the 

center of Seoul known as the Yongsan Garrison. That 

640-acre installation was on the outskirts of the city when 

it was built, but it is now in downtown Seoul, occupying 

valuable real estate and causing tensions with the local 

populace.

Instability in Army Units. The need to support forces stationed in South Korea causes turbulence in Army units 

based in the continental United States (CONUS). Because duty in South Korea is considered hazardous and 

bases there are spartan, family members do not accompany 90 percent of the soldiers serving tours in South Korea. Unaccompanied tours are limited to one year to minimize family separation, which means that almost the 

entire population of Army personnel in South Korea 

turns over every year. That turnover has a ripple effect on 

Army units based in CONUS, which must provide soldiers to replace those leaving South Korea and integrate 

new personnel.18

CBO estimates that, on average, warfighting units in 

CONUS experience turnover of 37 percent of their enlisted personnel every year, as soldiers leave for tours outside the continental United States, take administrative as15. Those numbers are explained in detail in Chapter 3.

16. General Accounting Office, Defense Infrastructure: Basing Uncertainties Necessitate Reevaluation of U.S. Construction Plans in South 

Korea, GAO-03-643 (July 2003), p. 5.

17. See David J. Lynch, “DMZ Is a Reminder of Status in Korean 

Crisis,” USA Today, December 23, 2003, p. 11; and Thom 

Shanker, “Rumsfeld Reassures Seoul on Regrouping G.I.s,” 

New York Times, November 18, 2003, p. A10.

18. Although most personnel sent to South Korea each year come 

from CONUS-based units (because the Army generally tries not 

to assign soldiers to back-to-back tours outside the continental 

United States), some are drawn from the pool of new recruits 

completing their training.
CHAPTER TWO CURRENT BASING OF U.S. FORCES OVERSEAS 15

signments in places such as the Pentagon, or leave the 

Army altogether.19 Some Army officials, notably the 

former Secretary of the Army, Thomas White, have asserted that high turnover in Army units reduces their cohesion and warfighting capability. The need to replace 

virtually all of the enlisted personnel in South Korea each 

year contributes about 6 percentage points of the total 37 

percent turnover in CONUS warfighting units, CBO 

estimates.20

Quality of Life in South Korea. Maintaining Army forces 

in South Korea on unaccompanied tours adversely affects 

the quality of soldiers’ lives by contributing to family separation. An enlisted soldier spending 10 years in the 

Army could, on average, expect to spend a total of 0.6 

years on unaccompanied tours, according to CBO’s calculations. Although that is a small percentage overall, 

some specialties and junior enlisted personnel are more 

heavily represented in South Korea than in the Army as a 

whole, so their numbers could be much higher. Serving 

on unaccompanied tours has been shown to decrease the 

likelihood that a soldier will reenlist, which means that 

maintaining forces in South Korea under current basing 

arrangements may have an adverse effect on retention.21

Availability of Army Units in South Korea. Because the 

Army forces based in South Korea are generally viewed as 

a deterrent to hostile behavior by North Korea, the 2nd 

ID and its two brigades have been considered unavailable 

to participate in any operations outside the Korean Peninsula. (By contrast, Army units based in Germany have 

been used in operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq.) 

The unavailability of the 2nd ID results partly because 

the division is based far from transportation hubs and 

partly because its units, which include many bulky and 

heavy vehicles, are not easy to deploy elsewhere.

Secretary Rumsfeld recently raised the possibility of realigning the Army’s forces in South Korea to make them 

more suitable for use in regional contingencies throughout Asia.22 He proposed making those forces more mobile by replacing their heavy armored vehicles with lighter 

and more modern vehicles and by moving them closer to 

transportation hubs south of Seoul. That and other alternatives for altering the overseas basing of Army forces are 

analyzed in the next chapter.

19. Personnel assignments and career tracks vary greatly between 

enlisted personnel and officers in the Army. This analysis focuses 

on the enlisted force because it represents the vast majority of 

Army personnel—approximately 400,000 out of the Army’s total 

strength of about 480,000. 

20. CBO used a model of personnel turnover in its analysis that is 

based on a model developed by RAND. In its analysis, RAND 

estimated similar rates for both total annual enlisted turnover and 

the contribution from the need to support tours in South Korea. 

See W. Michael Hix and others, Personnel Turbulence: The Policy 

Determinants of Permanent Change of Station Moves, MR-938-A 

(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1998).

21. See General Accounting Office, Military Personnel: Longer Time 

Between Moves Related to Higher Satisfaction and Retention, GAO01-841 (August 2001).

22. Robert Marquand, “U.S. Redeployments Afoot in Asia,” Christian 

Science Monitor, November 18, 2003.

3

Alternative Basing Schemes

for Army Forces

AA s discussed in the previous chapter, critics have 

raised concerns about various aspects of the Army’s overseas basing, including the extensive infrastructure that the 

Army maintains overseas to support its troops, the additional expense involved in stationing personnel outside 

the United States, the time needed to deploy Army forces 

in Germany to conflicts elsewhere, and the turnover in 

units based in the continental United States caused by the 

continual need to provide soldiers for units based in 

South Korea. This chapter explores ways to address some 

of those concerns by altering the basing of Army forces in 

Europe and South Korea. The Congressional Budget Office analyzed seven alternative basing schemes and compared their effects on the ability of Army forces to respond to conflicts overseas, on the quality of soldiers’ 

lives, and on budgetary costs or savings.

Policy Choices and Their Implications

Any proposed remedy to a concern about current basing 

will require trade-offs because it will incur additional 

costs or exacerbate some other problem. To demonstrate 

the effects of changing various aspects and policies that 

underlie the current basing of Army forces overseas, CBO 

examined the implications of varying four attributes of 

that basing (see Table 3-1):

B The size of the Army’s overseas presence in Europe and 

South Korea (in terms of the number of personnel or 

combat units based there);

B The location of Army combat forces stationed in Europe and South Korea;

B The method used to sustain Army forces overseas—

whether units are stationed permanently in one overseas location and individuals take turns serving in 

them, or (as in Iraq) entire units rotate from U.S. 

bases to overseas locations for short periods of time 

and then return home; and 

B Whether family members accompany soldiers on individual tours overseas.

Reducing the Number of Army Forces Overseas

Shrinking the Army’s forward presence by moving personnel and forces back to the United States would address 

several concerns about current overseas basing. It would 

reduce the annual costs of maintaining those forces, the 

amount of family separation that soldiers experienced, 

and the extent of turnover in CONUS units. To illustrate 

the effect of large changes in overseas force structure, the 

alternatives in this report include two different size cuts 

in Army presence overseas—to about half of the current 

level and to just 5 percent to 10 percent of the current 

level. 

The United States could realize significant savings—approaching $1 billion per year, CBO estimates—if 95 percent of the Army forces now stationed in Germany were 

moved back to CONUS. The reason is that costs for base 

operations, military housing, schools for Army children, 

and pay and allowances for personnel are lower in the 

United States than in Germany. If 95 percent of the 

Army forces stationed in South Korea were returned to 

the United States, smaller savings would result—more 

than $200 million annually.

CHAPTER
18 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Table 3-1.

Attributes of the Overseas Basing of Army Forces

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Relocating large numbers of overseas forces to the United 

States, however, would require finding new basing for 

them. A 50 percent reduction would mean bringing more 

than 40,000 soldiers back to the United States, which 

would increase the total Army population in CONUS by 

about 12 percent. A 95 percent reduction would mean 

the return of 80,000 soldiers, which would boost the 

number of Army personnel in CONUS by about 22 percent. Such large increases in the Army’s CONUS population would have serious implications. Because of the various rounds of base realignment and closure (BRAC) that 

have occurred since the late 1980s, the Army has little excess capacity at its bases to absorb so many additional 

troops and units. A 2002 Army study suggests that virtually no excess barracks space exists at seven of the largest 

Army bases that would be expected to receive units returning from overseas (Forts Benning, Bragg, Campbell, 

Drum, Hood, Lewis, and Riley).1

 Two bases (Forts Polk 

and Bliss) together have about 3,300 excess barracks 

spaces, according to the study, but those barracks would 

need refurbishing. In addition, returning combat units 

would require maintenance and administrative facilities, 

most of which would probably need to be built from 

scratch. Constructing new housing units and facilities, or 

even refurbishing old ones, would be quite expensive—

requiring a multibillion-dollar investment if the forces in 

Germany and South Korea were reduced by 50 percent or 

more, CBO estimates.

The BRAC round planned for 2005 could be complicated by the return of so many troops, according to Administration officials. Former DoD Comptroller Dov Zakheim said recently that “BRAC does . . . make it difficult 

to move our forces directly to where they ought to go if 

you don’t want them to be overseas.”2 Moreover, since 

Current Basing

Alternative Values

Considered by CBO

Attribute Germany South Korea

Germany and

Eastern Europe South Korea

Size of Overseas Presence

Army personnel 56,000 28,000 Half or almost none Half or almost none

Combat forces

Divisions 2 1 1 or none none

Combat brigades 4 2 2 or none 1 or none

Location of Combat Forces Germany North of Seoul Consolidated in

Germany or moved to

Eastern Europe

Consolidated

north of Seoul

or south of Seoul

Method of Sustainment Permanent basing

with individual

rotations

Permanent basing 

with individual

rotations

Temporary

deployments with

unit rotations

Temporary

deployments with

unit rotations

Tour Policy 3-year tour

accompanied

by families

1-year tour

unaccompanied

by families

1-year tour

unaccompanied

by families

Small increase in share

of tours that can be

accompanied

1. See Department of the Army, the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis and the Operations Research Center for Excellence, “Unit Rotation Study” (briefing prepared for Lt. Gen. John 

LeMoyne, July 10, 2002). However, DoD material supporting the 

Secretary of Defense’s March 2004 certification of the need for the 

2005 BRAC round indicates that overall, the Army’s infrastructure exceeds its current needs by 29 percent. How much of that 

excess infrastructure might be suitable for basing units now 

located overseas is unclear.

2. Vince Crawley and Gina Cavallaro, “Base-Closing Politics Delay 

Troop Transfers from Europe,” Army Times, February 16, 2004, 

p. 16.
CHAPTER THREE ALTERNATIVE BASING SCHEMES FOR ARMY FORCES 19

moving troops back to the United States from overseas 

would require construction of new facilities, such construction would tip the Pentagon’s hand as to which installations it would like to keep open after the 2005 

BRAC round.3

 Some Members of Congress, including 

the Chairman of the Military Construction Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, have argued 

that it makes no sense to contemplate closing bases in the 

United States if additional housing may be needed in the 

near future for forces returning from overseas.4

Changing the Location of Army Forces Overseas 

CBO examined several ways to alter where troops are 

based overseas to address concerns about the vulnerability 

of Army forces in South Korea and the time needed to 

deploy Army units to future conflicts. One way—moving 

troops in South Korea away from the demilitarized zone, 

perhaps to consolidated bases south of Seoul—could reduce the susceptibility of Army forces to attack by North 

Korean artillery close to the border. (CBO did not look at 

the option of moving Army forces in South Korea to 

bases anywhere else in the Pacific theater, for two reasons. 

First, those forces are stationed in South Korea specifically to deter attack by the North Koreans, and second, 

Marine Corps forces based in Okinawa already have the 

mission of responding to contingencies in the region.)

In Europe, moving combat units based in Germany to 

Eastern Europe could enable Army forces to respond to 

conflicts in the area more quickly. Today, forces going to 

Europe, Africa, or the Middle East would probably either 

deploy from Germany along with their equipment or deploy from the United States and meet up with equipment 

prepositioned aboard ships that are usually located at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. CBO found that by 

comparison, basing Army combat brigades in Poland, 

Bulgaria, or Romania—locations that press articles indicate the Administration is considering—would give the 

Army quicker access only to certain areas. Specifically, deploying from Poland would be quicker only if forces were 

going to countries with ports on the Baltic Sea, such as 

Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Russia (see Figure 3-1). 

Deploying from Romania or Bulgaria would be quicker 

to countries with ports on the Mediterranean Sea or 

Black Sea, including most of North Africa and the Caucasus region.

On the downside, however, establishing any new permanent bases (either in Eastern Europe or in South Korea) 

could require significant investment by the United 

States—$2 billion to $4 billion, CBO estimates. Pursuing any relocation of forces overseas might be difficult 

now because of the need to invest in overseas bases that 

could eventually be closed as U.S. forces were returned to 

the United States.

Switching from Individual Rotations 

to Unit Rotations

CBO also looked at the possible implications of changing 

the way the Army maintains overseas presence. Instead of 

the current practice, in which Army units based overseas 

remain in place and individuals rotate through them, entire units could be based in the United States and then rotate to South Korea or Europe (or units based in Germany could rotate to Eastern Europe) on six-month or 

one-year deployments. Such a system would yield the 

benefits of bringing overseas forces back to the United 

States, such as lowering annual costs and decreasing turnover in CONUS units. 

In addition, a rotational system would mesh well with the 

unit-manning scheme that the Army is introducing into 

its personnel and force management structure.5

 Under 

that scheme, the Army will synchronize personnel assignments with unit rotations and deployments in order to 

reduce turnover during the organization and training period leading up to a unit’s deployment. (CBO estimates 

that under current policies, a typical unit could lose almost three-quarters of its enlisted personnel during the 

two years before a deployment.) According to Army leaders, unit manning will allow commanders to build a high 

level of cohesion in their units, thus improving the performance of brigade combat teams (BCTs), which may 

need to deploy to dangerous places on short notice. If 

that unit-manning scheme is applied to all active-duty 

brigades, as the Army says it plans to do, then a system 

that included rotating BCTs from CONUS to Europe 

and South Korea would allow greater unit cohesion than 

the current practice of moving individual soldiers into 

and out of units on a continual basis.

3. Ibid.

4. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, Deployment of U.S. Forces in 

Europe, Heritage Lecture No. 782 (Washington, D.C.: Heritage 

Foundation, April 2003), available at www.heritage.org/Research/

Europe/hl782.cfm.

5. See “Unit Manning: How It Will Work,” Army Times, September 

15, 2003, p. 9.
20 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Figure 3-1.

Locations with the Fastest Deployment by Sea to Potential Areas of Conflict

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Rotating units to maintain overseas presence, however, 

would have a deleterious effect on the availability of the 

Army’s active-duty brigades for other contingencies. Multiple units are necessary to sustain the deployment of one 

unit overseas on rotation, since while that unit is deployed, other units are recovering from deployment, conducting training, or preparing to deploy. Typically, the 

period of recovery, training, and preparation lasts two, 

three, or even four times as long as the deployment, 

which means that a total of three to five units are needed 

to support each unit deployed.6 In analyzing the ability of 

the United States to support the current occupation of 

Iraq, CBO assumed ratios of 3.2 to 4 units to each unit 

deployed.7

 (For a discussion of how CBO arrived at those 

ratios, see Appendix C.) With those ratios, the Army 

would need three to four brigades to support one BCT 

rotation to Europe or South Korea from CONUS. Thus, 

rotating units from CONUS to maintain a continuous 

presence overseas would tie up additional units that 

would be either deployed or recovering from recent rotations. As a result, the United States would have less capability than it does today to sustain any other long-term 

commitments.

Deployment from

Germany Fastest

Deployment from

Poland Fastest

Deployment from

Bulgaria and Romania Fastest

Deployment from

Diego Garcia Fastest

Diego Garcia

Germany

Poland

Bulgaria

Romania

Germany

Poland

Bulgaria and Romania

Diego Garcia

Areas Where Fastest,

Starting from:

Potential Area of

Conflict:

6. The Marine Corps uses a cycle of two periods off and one period 

deployed to support its presence on Okinawa.

7. See Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the U.S. Military’s 

Ability to Sustain an Occupation of Iraq (September 3, 2003), 

p. 11.
CHAPTER THREE ALTERNATIVE BASING SCHEMES FOR ARMY FORCES 21

Changing the Family Policy for Overseas Tours

The Army has a different policy for tours in Europe than 

for those in South Korea. Soldiers assigned to tours in 

Europe remain there for three years and can be accompanied by their families. Soldiers assigned to tours in 

South Korea go for one year, and in 90 percent of the 

cases, their families do not accompany them. CBO examined the effect of changing that policy as it applies to all 

tours in Europe and of changing the degree to which it 

applies in South Korea.

The need to support family members who accompany 

soldiers on assignment in Europe has led to the development of a large infrastructure there, including family 

housing and schools. Eliminating accompanied tours 

would eliminate the need for such extended infrastructure. However, doing that would have disadvantages, 

such as increasing the total time that soldiers spend away 

from their families and boosting annual turnover in 

CONUS units by about 25 percent (assuming that unaccompanied tours last for one year and accompanied 

tours for three years).

Measures for Evaluating the Effects 

of Changes in Overseas Basing 

To exemplify the specific advantages and disadvantages of 

varying those four attributes of overseas basing, CBO designed and analyzed seven alternative basing schemes. 

Most of them represent a combination of changes that 

would apply to Army forces in both Germany and South 

Korea.8

 The alternatives progress from relatively small 

changes to major shifts in policy and would result in 

widely varying levels of Army presence overseas (see Box 

3-1). They incorporate several aspects of changes that the 

Administration has either announced formally or discussed informally. However, none of the alternatives reflect the Administration’s official plans for overseas basing, because those plans are still being worked out and, 

when this report went to press, had not yet been officially 

released. 

Box 3-1.

The Options for Overseas Basing Analyzed in This Report

Alternatives That Would Maintain the Current 

Level of Army Forces Stationed Overseas

1A. Make European tours unaccompanied

1B. Make minor changes in German and South 

Korean basing and rotate brigade combat 

teams (BCTs) from Germany to forward operating bases in Eastern Europe

1C. Consolidate Army forces in South Korea at 

two bases south of Seoul and establish permanent bases in Eastern Europe

Alternatives That Would Cut the Level of Army 

Forces Stationed Overseas in Half

2A. Halve forces stationed overseas by returning 

combat forces based in Germany and South 

Korea to the continental United States 

(CONUS) and maintain the current level of 

overseas presence in those theaters by rotating six brigade combat teams from CONUS

2B. Halve the number of combat and support 

personnel stationed in Germany and South 

Korea and rotate one BCT from Germany 

to Eastern Europe

Alternatives That Would Remove Almost All 

Army Forces Stationed Overseas

3A. Return nearly all forces to CONUS and 

continuously rotate two BCTs to Europe 

and one to South Korea

3B. Leave only small forces in Germany and 

South Korea to support periodic exercises or 

the return of U.S. forces in a crisis

8. Although the changes in each theater could be made independently, the policy implications are in many cases the same for both 

theaters. In all cases, the discussion of the effects of an alternative 

addresses the implications for each theater individually as well as 

the combined effect on the Army as a whole.
22 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

CBO used several measures to compare the alternatives 

with each other and with the Army’s current basing strategy. The first measure is the cost of implementing an alternative—including one-time costs to carry out the 

changes and any annual recurring costs or savings that 

might accrue thereafter. (The methods that CBO used to 

estimate costs or savings are explained in detail in Appendix B.) Because information was not available to compare 

costs with those of the Administration’s plans, CBO instead compared the costs or savings that would result 

from each of the options with the costs of maintaining 

the basing structure as it existed at the end of 2003. 

With some of the alternatives, funds for construction that 

would otherwise have been needed to replace current facilities at overseas bases (according to the 67-year schedule that is the Administration’s goal) would not be necessary.9

 The potential savings that might be realized over 10 

years are noted. Furthermore, some of the alternatives include construction of new facilities in South Korea, in 

which case that nation’s government might assume some 

of the costs of construction, as it has in the past. Because 

CBO could not predict the extent to which South Korea 

would contribute to the costs of basing U.S. forces in that 

country, the estimate for each alternative includes a range 

of costs that the United States would bear if South Korea 

paid part of the construction expenses.10

The other measures that CBO used focus on U.S. military capability. Specifically, CBO looked at how a revised 

basing strategy might affect military capability in terms of 

several metrics:

B The time needed to deploy heavy units from Europe 

by sea to various possible sites of future conflicts, as 

cited in recent press articles—in particular, Nigeria, 

Uganda, Azerbaijan, and Djibouti.11 Because all Army 

combat units now based in Germany are heavy forces 

equipped with tanks and armored vehicles, the only 

practical way to transport them to conflicts, especially 

in relatively remote locations, is by sea. For alternatives that would station or preposition lighter units 

overseas, CBO used the additional metric of changes 

in the time needed to deploy those lighter units by air.

B The availability of Army forces for duty in contingencies outside Europe or South Korea.

B The percentage of turnover (or turbulence, as the 

Army calls it) among enlisted personnel in units based 

in CONUS.

B The amount of family separation that the average enlisted soldier would experience during a 10-year career.

In addition, changing the basing of U.S. forces overseas 

could have political and military consequences, such as 

affecting relations with allies, deterring or encouraging attacksby hostile neighbors, and altering the stability of a 

region. CBO was unable to predict or quantify such consequences, so instead it chose to compare the alternatives 

on the basis of measurable effects on today’s Army. 

Alternatives That Would Change 

the Army’s Overseas Basing While 

Maintaining Current Force Levels

The Department of Defense could alter the basing of 

Army forces overseas in several ways to address concerns 

about the number and size of forces and installations (the 

Army’s “footprint”), deployment times, and cost without 

affecting the current level of forward presence. One way 

would be to change current policy so that soldiers assigned to tours in Europe would not be accompanied by 

their families. Two other changes that public statements 

suggest are being considered by the Administration are 

consolidating bases in Germany and South Korea and 

basing some units (either permanently or temporarily)

9. For information about DoD’s goals to sustain, restore, and modernize facilities, see Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, 

Annual Report to the President and Congress, 2002, p. 114, available 

at www.defenselink.mil/execsec/adr2002/pdf_files/chap9.pdf.

10. Preliminary plans for construction for the next 10 years indicate 

that the South Korean government may contribute up to 65 percent of construction costs for basing U.S. forces. Alternative 1B, 

however, would carry out basing changes in South Korea that are 

part of an agreement between the United States and South Korea 

under which the latter would pay 85 percent of costs.

11. Nigeria and Baku, Azerbaijan, are cited as places where the United 

States might need to protect sources of oil. Djibouti and Entebbe, 

Uganda, are cited as possible locations for staging bases to support 

the war on terrorism. See Vince Crawley, “Oil May Drive Troop 

Staging,” Army Times, September 22, 2003, p. 30, and Eric 

Schmitt, “Pentagon Seeking New Access Pacts for Africa Bases,” 

New York Times, July 5, 2003, p. A1.
CHAPTER THREE ALTERNATIVE BASING SCHEMES FOR ARMY FORCES 23

Table 3-2.

Location of Permanent Army Forces Under Current Basing 

and Alternatives 1A, 1B, and 1C

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

a. Brigade combat teams (BCTs) would rotate from Germany to Eastern Europe so that at any given time, two BCTs would be in Germany and 

two would be in Eastern Europe.

closer to locations of possible conflicts, such as in Eastern 

Europe. The first three options that CBO analyzed would 

make those changes, to differing degrees, while maintaining current force levels overseas (see Table 3-2).

Alternative 1A: Make European Tours 

Unaccompanied

Following the approach that the Army uses in South Korea, this option would make 90 percent of tours in Europe unaccompanied to reduce the size and cost of the 

Army’s infrastructure in the region. Thus, most of the approximately 60,000 soldiers assigned to Europe would 

serve one-year tours without their dependents. As a result, the Army would need to provide housing, schools, 

and other support for only a small fraction of the roughly 

80,000 dependents of active-duty personnel stationed in 

Europe. However, because the Army would need to provide additional housing suitable for unaccompanied soldiers and would have to pay to move personnel every year 

rather than every three years, this alternative would cost 

$825 million up front to implement and about $75 million per year thereafter, CBO estimates (see Table 3-3).

The largest expense associated with this option would be 

a one-time investment of $1.7 billion for construction—

primarily to build barracks in Europe for soldiers on unaccompanied tours (who, like single soldiers, typically live 

together in barracks). The Army could convert housing

Europe

Germany

Eastern

Europe

South

Korea

Continental

United States

Current Basing

Army Personnel 56,000 0 28,000 355,000

Divisions 20 1 6

Combat Brigades 4 0 2 23

Alternative 1A: Make European Tours Unaccompanied

Army Personnel 56,000 0 28,000 355,000

Divisions 20 1 6

Combat Brigades 4 0 2 23

Alternative 1B: Make Minor Changes in German and South Korean Basing

and Rotate BCTs from Germany to Eastern Europe

Army Personnel 56,000 0 28,000 355,000

Divisions 20 1 6

Combat Brigades 4

a a 2 23

Alternative 1C: Consolidate Bases in South Korea

and Establish Permanent Bases in Eastern Europe

Army Personnel 44,000 12,000 28,000 355,000

Divisions 20 1 6

Combat Brigades 1 3 2 23
24 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Table 3-3.

Costs and Savings of Alternatives 1A, 1B, and 1C Relative to Current Basing

(Millions of 2004 dollars)

Europe South Korea Total

Alternative 1A: Make European Tours Unaccompanied

One-Time Costs or Savings (-)

Construction

New facilities overseas 1,625 0 1,625

New facilities in CONUS 75 0 75

Existing facilities -875 0 -875

Equipment 000

Moving 0 0 0

Total One-Time Costs 825 0 825

Annual Costs or Savings (-)

Base operationsa -50 0 -50

Rotations 000

Personnelb 125 0 125

Total Annual Costs 75 0 75

Alternative 1B: Make Minor Changes in German and South Korean Basing

and Rotate BCTs from Germany to Eastern Europe

One-Time Costs or Savings (-)

Construction

New facilities overseas 1,275 350 to 2,175 1,625 to 3,450

New facilities in CONUS 000

Existing facilities -200 -125 to -400 -325 to -600

Equipment 000

Moving 25 50 75

Total One-Time Costs 1,100 275 to 1,825 1,375 to 2,925

Annual Costs

Base operationsa 150 0 150

Rotations 75 0 75

Personnelb 0 0 0

Total Annual Costs 225 0 225

Continued
CHAPTER THREE ALTERNATIVE BASING SCHEMES FOR ARMY FORCES 25

Table 3-3.

Continued

(Millions of 2004 dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Notes: These numbers represent incremental costs or savings (those that would occur relative to the cost of maintaining the current base 

structure). For more details about the components of these costs and savings, see Tables B-2 through B-4 in Appendix B.

CONUS = continental United States; BCTs = brigade combat teams.

a. Includes operating costs and recurring construction costs for existing bases and new forward operating bases.

b. Includes costs for housing, schools, allowances, and permanent-change-of-station moves.

units that are now used by soldiers with families into 

housing for unaccompanied personnel, which would be 

less expensive than constructing new barracks. But doing 

so would result in higher annual costs thereafter, because 

barracks are cheaper to operate and maintain than family 

housing units. 

Nearly half of the $1.7 billion in new construction costs 

would be offset by money that the Army would save by 

cancelling construction projects that would otherwise be 

needed to replace facilities for soldiers’ families in Europe 

on the schedule that DoD has set as its goal. CBO estimates that over the 10-year implementation period assumed in this analysis, those one-time construction savings would total $875 million, bringing the net cost of 

carrying out this option to $825 million.

On an ongoing basis, this approach would significantly 

reduce the size of the student body at DoD-supported 

schools in Europe. Currently, more than 20,000 dependent children of Army personnel in Europe attend 

DoD schools. If demand for those schools was reduced to 

a level commensurate with that experienced in South Korea, the number of students would fall to around 3,500, 

producing annual savings of about $125 million.12Another $50 million in annual savings would result from reduced construction costs for family housing.

Europe South Korea Total

Alternative 1C: Consolidate Bases in South Korea

and Establish Permanent Bases in Eastern Europe

One-Time Costs or Savings (-)

Construction

New facilities overseas 2,275 1,375 to 3,950 3,650 to 6,225

New facilities in CONUS 25 0 25

Existing facilities -725 -250 to -750 -975 to -1,475

Equipment 000

Moving 75 100 175

Total One-Time Costs 1,650 1,225 to 3,300 2,875 to 4,950

Annual Costs or Savings (-)

Base operationsa -25 0 -25

Rotations 000

Personnelb 25 25 50

Total Annual Costs 0 25 25

12. That figure represents net savings after taking into account 

increased annual spending in the United States for additional 

DoD schools and aid to public schools for the larger number of 

soldiers’ children who would remain in the United States while a 

parent was on duty in Europe.
26 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Table 3-4.

Family Separation and Unit Turnover for Enlisted Personnel 

Under Current Basing and Alternatives 1A, 1B, and 1C

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: CONUS = continental United States; BCTs = brigade combat teams.

Conversely, some annual costs would rise after this alternative was implemented. An additional $100 million per 

year would be needed to maintain quarters for soldiers in 

Europe and to pay housing allowances for families left in 

the United States. Moreover, the annual cost of moving 

soldiers and their belongings for a permanent change of 

station would rise by $225 million as a result of making 

PCS moves to Europe more frequent. Because those 

recurring costs would exceed the recurring savings described above, CBO estimates that converting three-year 

accompanied tours in Europe to one-year unaccompanied tours would end up raising annual costs by $75 million.

Besides costing more than the status quo, this alternative 

would adversely affect soldiers’ overall quality of life and 

increase the turbulence in CONUS units. The total time 

that enlisted personnel spent away from their families on 

unaccompanied tours over 10 years would rise from an 

average of 0.6 years under current practices to an average 

of 1.9 years (see Table 3-4). Adopting this alternative 

would also result in shorter CONUS tours: they would 

last for an average of 2.1 years rather than the current 2.7 

years. Those shorter assignments, combined with increased family separation, would be likely to decrease retention among enlisted personnel.13 In addition, reducing the length of tours in Europe from three years to one 

year would increase annual turnover in CONUS units 

from 37 percent to 47 percent because enlisted personnel 

would be sent to units in Europe more frequently. 

This approach would not change the size or locations of 

Army forces stationed overseas, so it would not alter the 

number of forces available for contingency operations or 

the time needed to deploy combat units to conflicts.

Alternative 1B: Consolidate Bases in South Korea 

and Germany and Rotate Brigade Combat Teams 

from Germany to Eastern Europe

This alternative involves two sets of changes to respond to 

two different concerns. First, it would reduce the footprint of U.S. forces in Germany and South Korea by consolidating some of the smaller installations in those countries into a lesser number of larger compounds, in accord 

with existing Administration plans. Second, it would attempt to make Army forces in Europe more agile and responsive to future conflicts (or “expeditionary”) by rotating brigade combat teams from Germany to austere 

forward operating bases (FOBs) in Eastern Europe. CBO 

estimates that those changes would cost between $1.4 billion and $2.9 billion to implement and then $225 million per year thereafter (see Table 3-3).

Years Away from Home During a 10-Year Period Annual Turnover

in CONUS Units

(Percent)

Unaccompanied

Tours

Time

Deployed Total

Current Basing 0.6 1.7 2.3 37

Alternative 1A: Make European Tours 

Unaccompanied 1.9 1.7 3.6 47

Alternative 1B: Make Minor Changes in German 

and South Korean Basing and Rotate BCTs from 

Germany to Eastern Europe 0.6 2.0 2.6 37

Alternative 1C: Consolidate Bases in South Korea 

and Establish Permanent Bases in Eastern Europe 0.8 1.7 2.5 39

13. See General Accounting Office, Military Personnel: Longer Time 

Between Moves Related to Higher Satisfaction and Retention, GAO01-841 (August 2001).
CHAPTER THREE ALTERNATIVE BASING SCHEMES FOR ARMY FORCES 27

The Efficient Basing Germany Initiative. This option 

would carry out the Administration’s Efficient Basing 

Germany (EBG) plan, which calls for closing 13 small 

bases in central Germany and moving the displaced units 

to a single installation in the Grafenwoehr area in eastern 

Germany. According to the Army, those changes will improve the readiness of the affected units of the 1st Armored Division (AD) by giving them modern facilities 

and immediate access to the training ranges at Grafenwoehr. It will also reduce the force-protection requirements and safety risks associated with those units’ current 

bases. Further, the Army argues that the EBG plan will 

improve the well-being of soldiers and their families by 

providing them with large, well-staffed facilities in a 

modern environment. 

CBO estimates that moving 3,400 personnel and their 

approximately 5,000 dependents and building new or 

renovated facilities for them would cost about $550 million. That cost would be partly offset by one-time construction savings of about $200 million from closing old, 

outdated facilities.

Rotation of BCTs from Germany to Eastern Europe. This 

alternative would also extend the Army’s European presence farther east by setting up austere forward operating 

bases in three NATO countries—one base each in Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland—and rotating brigade combat 

teams there from Germany. General James Jones, commander of U.S. forces in Europe, and other Administration defense officials have endorsed the use of austere 

FOBs as launching points for operations in more-remote 

corners of the globe. In recent years, U.S. military aircraft 

have used bases in Romania and Bulgaria as staging areas 

for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. And since 1996, the United 

States and Britain have been sending units to exercises at 

the extensive Drawsko Pomorskie and Wedrzyn training 

areas and firing ranges in Poland once used by Soviet 

forces. 

The three FOBs in this alternative would be set up at or 

near existing military facilities in Poland, Romania, and 

Bulgaria, using as a model Camp Bondsteel, a temporary 

base that provides housing for U.S. troops taking part in 

peacekeeping operations in Kosovo.14 Such bases should 

be less expensive to build and maintain than the typical 

permanent installation in Germany. Nevertheless, they 

would provide some of the amenities of a permanent 

base, such as fitness facilities, laundries, and a post exchange. 

In this option, combat teams of 4,000 soldiers from the 

four brigades stationed in Germany would rotate to those 

forward bases on six-month stints. The rotation schedule 

would be such that at any time, two BCTs would be in 

Germany and two in Eastern Europe (meaning that one 

of the three FOBs would be unoccupied at any given 

time). To avoid the necessity of transporting all of the 

equipment associated with two BCTs to and from Germany every six months, brigade-sized sets of equipment 

would be prepositioned at each of the three forward 

bases.15

The primary rationale for establishing forward operating 

bases in Eastern Europe would be to increase the Army’s 

ability to respond quickly to conflicts. However, as discussed earlier, basing Army combat brigades in Poland, 

Bulgaria, or Romania would not necessarily provide 

much advantage in speeding deployment of BCTs to such 

potential hot spots as Nigeria, Uganda, Azerbaijan, and 

Djibouti. Only if the Army needed to send a heavy BCT 

to Baku, Azerbaijan, would deploying from any of the 

three Eastern European bases be quicker than current 

practice. That advantage would amount to reducing deployment time from the current 23 days to 17 days if 

bases in Romania or Bulgaria were used (see Table 3-5). 

Another aspect of sending forces to conflicts is that BCTs 

rarely deploy to an operation without additional support 

from their parent division. This option would not base 

any division headquarters or support units in Eastern Europe. Rather, units of the 1st Armored Division and 1st 

Infantry Division not associated with their BCTs would 

remain in Germany.16 Transporting those units’ equipment—referred to as the division base—would require 

additional airlift or sealift and more time. As a consequence, the division base would generally arrive in the

14. The FOBs could be established at the Krzesiny Air Base outside 

Poznan, Poland; near the Black Sea port of Burgas or the Sarafovo 

airfield in Bulgaria; and at the Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base or 

the Black Sea port of Constanta in Romania.

15. CBO assumed that the Army has, or will have in the next several 

years, enough excess equipment to preposition a heavy BCT set at 

each of the forward bases.

16. Besides BCTs, a division includes headquarters, helicopters, some 

artillery units, maintenance units, and other supporting elements.
28 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Table 3-5.

Time Needed to Deploy a Heavy 

Brigade Combat Team by Sea

(Days)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Numbers in bold indicate the shortest times to a particular 

destination.

a. Specifically Baku, Azerbaijan.

b. Afloat set of equipment for a brigade combat team.

theater of operations four to 11 days after the BCT, depending on the destination. Because this alternative 

would not alter the stationing of the two division bases 

now in Germany, it would not speed their deployment to 

conflicts in the region.

Alternative 1B would have two main drawbacks compared with the current basing of forces in Europe. First, 

constantly rotating BCTs from Germany to Eastern Europe could degrade their readiness and availability to deploy rapidly to operations elsewhere. In this option, two 

of the four BCTs now stationed in Germany would be 

forward-deployed to Eastern Europe for six months, and 

the other two would have just returned from such a rotation. In many cases, units returning from a rotation need 

three to six months to reach a high level of readiness 

again, because returning soldiers tend to take leave, spend 

time with their families, or report for school or new assignments that were deferred while they were on rotation. 

If this alternative was adopted, the two BCTs recovering 

from rotation, as well as the ones deployed to Eastern Europe, would probably not be immediately available for 

other missions. That would mark a change from the current availability of combat brigades stationed in Germany, which have participated extensively in operations 

in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq. 

How would the unavailability of the four brigades based 

in Europe affect the Army’s ability to conduct other missions? Under the current basing scheme, the Army could 

sustainably keep a force of 44,000 to 64,000 active-duty 

personnel deployed to contingencies outside the United 

States or Europe, CBO estimates (see Figure 3-2).17 If 

four brigades were unavailable to support the rotations 

needed to maintain operations elsewhere, that number 

would fall by 6,000 to 8,000—to a range of 38,000 to 

56,000 personnel.

A second disadvantage of Alternative 1B would be the increased family separation experienced by soldiers stationed in Germany. Because of the austere conditions at 

the FOBs, family members would not accompany soldiers on rotations there. As a result, the amount of time 

that families of soldiers assigned to deployable units were 

separated would increase from the current average of 85 

days per year to 97 days per year.18 Soldiers do not spend 

their entire career in deployable units, however, so the 

current time spent deployed over a 10-year career is considerably less than 850 days—closer to 630 days, or 1.7 

years. This alternative would raise that time by 18 percent, to an average of 2.0 years (see Table 3-4). 

The total time that a soldier is away from his or her family is a combination of time spent deployed to training 

exercises and operations and time spent on unaccompanied tours. The frequency of unaccompanied tours overDestination

Nigeria Azerbaijana Uganda Djibouti

Under Current Basing

Diego Garciab 19 23 20 12

Germany 20 24 32 21

With Bases in Eastern Europe

Bulgaria 20 17 26 15

Diego Garciab 19 23 20 12

Germany 20 24 32 21

Poland 21 24 32 22

Romania 20 17 26 15

Change in Shortest 

Time from Current 

Basing 0 -6 0 0

17. That estimated range is based on rotation ratios of 3.2:1 to 4.1:1 

(as explained in Appendix C). It assumes that only active Army 

forces would sustain the deployment, that no active forces were 

deployed elsewhere (such as Afghanistan or the Sinai) on a continuing basis, and that no brigades were designated as ready brigades and unavailable for deployment. It does assume, however, 

that two active brigades would be upgrading their equipment as 

part of the Army’s transformation plan and would be unavailable 

for operations.

18. Those numbers represent the time deployed to training exercises 

and operations averaged over all of the soldiers in deployable 

units. Some soldiers would spend much more time deployed, and 

some almost none. See Ronald E. Sortor and J. Michael Polich, 

Deployments and Army Personnel Tempo, MR-1417-A (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001).
CHAPTER THREE ALTERNATIVE BASING SCHEMES FOR ARMY FORCES 29

Figure 3-2.

Army Personnel Available for 

Sustained Deployment to Overseas 

Operations Under Alternatives 1A, 

1B, and 1C

(Thousands of active-duty personnel)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Areas with dashed lines represent ranges based on differing 

assumptions about rotation ratios (see Appendix C).

seas would not change under this alternative. Consequently, total family separation would increase by only 13 

percent: from the current average of 2.3 years over a 10-

year career to 2.6 years. Although it is impossible to predict what effect that increase would have on soldiers’ morale, the relatively short and predictable rotations to Eastern Europe might not adversely affect retention, judging 

from experience.19

Setting up three FOBs in Eastern Europe and rotating 

two BCTs there every six months would entail both onetime and recurring costs. CBO estimates that the three 

austere bases in Eastern Europe would cost a total of 

about $750 million to establish and about $150 million a 

year to operate and maintain.20 Rotating two BCTs from 

Germany every six months would require another $75 

million a year, bringing the total annual costs of this alternative to $225 million.

Several defense analysts have suggested that significant logistical costs might be associated with shifting forces from 

Germany to Eastern Europe. According to Prof. Frederick 

Kagan of the U.S. Military Academy, besides paying for 

the new bases, the United States might have to invest significant funds to create or upgrade infrastructure in Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania to bring training areas up to 

U.S. standards.21 Other analysts have argued that even 

basic services—such as clean and safe drinking water, reliable electrical power, and proper sewage treatment—are 

not available on a consistent basis in Eastern Europe and 

that providing them will require a major U.S. investment.22

In addition, Stuart Drury of the Office of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff argues that deploying to conflicts would be 

much more difficult from Eastern European countries because many roads there are not capable of accommodating military traffic and many railroads are narrow-gauge 

and ill-suited for large military cargo.23 Finally, he points 

out, Black Sea ports are not capable of handling the same 

volume of cargo as the ports of Rotterdam in Holland or 

Bremerhaven in Germany. Moreover, transiting out of 

the Black Sea is often slow because of bottlenecks at the 

Bosporus and Dardanelles. In the past, NATO has invested funds to improve the transportation infrastructure 

of its newest members, including Poland and Bulgaria; 

thus, future NATO investments could include upgrades 

to seaports, training ranges, and railroad tracks that 

would address some of those concerns.

The Land Partnership Plan in South Korea. In addition 

to the various changes in European bases and operations, 

this option would consolidate the Army’s bases in South 

Korea as outlined in the Land Partnership Plan (LPP). 

That plan, as agreed to by representatives of the United 

States and the Republic of Korea in March 2002, would

19. James Hosek and Mark Totten, Does Perstempo Hurt Reenlistment? 

The Effect of Long or Hostile Perstempo on Reenlistment, MR-990-

OSD (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1998).

 Current

 Basing

Alternative

 1A

Alternative

 1B

Alternative

 1C

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

20. Those estimates assume that the United States would have to bear 

the full expense of building and operating the FOBs, including 

costs of utilities, support and reception, security, and similar services. It is possible that the host nations might pay some of those 

costs, but in the absence of any historical precedent, and considering the state of the Polish, Bulgarian, and Romanian economies, 

CBO assumed that the United States would bear the full cost.

21. Statement of Frederick W. Kagan, Associate Professor of Military 

History, U.S. Military Academy, before the House Armed Services 

Committee, February 26, 2003.

22. Stuart P. Drury, The Argument Against Relocating U.S. Forces in 

Europe (National Defense University, April 24, 2003), p. 9, available at www.ndu.edu/library/n4/n035605i.pdf.

23. Ibid., p. 10.
30 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Figure 3-3.

Changes to U.S. Installations in South Korea Under the Land Partnership Plan

Source: General Accounting Office, Defense Infrastructure: Basing Uncertainties Necessitate Reevaluation of U.S. Construction Plans in 

South Korea, GAO-03-643 (July 2003).

reduce the number of U.S. troop installations by 18, primarily by closing and consolidating many of the bases 

north of Seoul (see Figure 3-3). According to the General 

Accounting Office, many of the facilities slated to be 

closed are outdated and provide few amenities for soldiers.24 The LPP would not alter the overall level of 

Army forces in South Korea or change any policies affecting personnel there. Rather, it would make the basing 

structure in South Korea less dispersed and would replace 

or modernize some of the most outmoded facilities.

The total cost to the United States of implementing the 

LPP would depend on how much of the relocation expense South Korea was willing to bear. Construction 

costs to carry out the plan would total approximately 

$2.2 billion, CBO estimates. However, the South Korean

Unchanged

Closing

New

Merging Camp Nimble

H-220 Heliport

Camp Yongin Suwon

Air Base

Osan Air Base

Kunsan Air Base

Chongju Air Base

Camp Chinhae

Kimhae Air Base

Camp Bonifas

Camp Greaves

Camp Garry Owen

Camp Giant

Camp Humphreys

Kwangju

Air Base

Camp Stanton

Camp Edwards

Camp Howze

Camp Market

Camp Colbern

Yongsan Garrison

Camp Casey

Camp Hovey

Camp Castle

Seoul

Camp Red Cloud

Camp Jackson

Camp Stanley

Camp Sears

Camp Essayons

Camp LaGuardia

Camp Kyle

Camp Eagle

Camp Long

Camp Walker

Camp Henry

Taegu Air Base

Camp Carroll

Camp Mu Juk

Pohang

K-16 Airfield

R-510

Camp Page

Camp Hialeah

Noksan

24. General Accounting Office, Defense Infrastructure: Basing Uncertainties Necessitate Reevaluation of U.S. Construction Plans in South 

Korea, GAO-03-643 (July 2003).
CHAPTER THREE ALTERNATIVE BASING SCHEMES FOR ARMY FORCES 31

Table 3-6.

Effect of Alternatives 1A, 1B, and 1C on the Time Needed to Deploy 

a Heavy Brigade Combat Team by Sea

(Days)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

a. Specifically Baku, Azerbaijan.

b. Based on deploying from the closest location in Europe or using the set of equipment prepositioned afloat in Diego Garcia.

government had at one point agreed to assume as much 

as 85 percent of the cost of carrying out the LPP, which 

would reduce the U.S. share of the up-front investment 

to $350 million.25 In addition, CBO estimates, the plan 

would produce one-time savings of $125 million to $400 

million by closing outmoded facilities.26

Implementing the Land Partnership Plan could have various benefits, such as improving conditions for Army personnel in South Korea and easing tensions between the 

United States and South Korea over land use. However, 

agreements reached between high-ranking U.S. and 

South Korean officials in the summer of 2003 may have 

superceded the LPP with a much more far-reaching realignment of U.S. bases (considered in Alternative 1C below).

Combined Effects of Alternative 1B. Overall, this option 

would reduce the number of Army bases in Germany by 

13 (5 percent) and the number in South Korea by 18 (23 

percent). It would also establish a presence in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria by building austere forward operating bases. Units rotating from Germany to those bases 

could deploy more quickly to areas in the Mediterranean 

and the Caspian region, though not to Africa or the Middle East (see Table 3-6). However, rotating units to Eastern Europe would reduce the number of Army forces immediately available for other missions and increase family 

separation. It would have no effect on turnover in 

CONUS units.

According to CBO’s estimates, establishing this basing 

structure in both Europe and South Korea would require 

a total up-front investment ranging from $1.4 billion to 

$2.9 billion—$1.1 billion for construction and moving 

costs in Europe and $275 million to $1.8 billion for corresponding costs in South Korea (depending on the U.S. 

share). After implementation, this alternative would cost 

the Army an additional $225 million per year, mainly to 

operate the FOBs in Eastern Europe and support rotations to them.

Alternative 1C: Establish Permanent Bases 

in Eastern Europe and Consolidate Forces 

in South Korea at Two Bases South of Seoul

This approach would make more-extensive changes in 

both theaters than would the previous alternative. It 

would extend the Army’s full-time presence in Europe 

farther east by establishing three permanent bases in Eastern Europe rather than three austere forward bases. In addition, it would reduce the vulnerability of U.S. forces in 

Destination

Nigeria Azerbaijana Uganda Djibouti

Shortest Time Based on Current Basing 19 23 20 12

Change in Shortest Time from Adopting Alternativeb

Alternative 1A: Make European tours unaccompanied 0 0 00

Alternative 1B: Make minor changes in German

and South Korean basing and rotate BCTs from 

Germany to Eastern Europe 0 -6 0 0

Alternative 1C: Consolidate bases in South Korea

and establish permanent bases in Eastern Europe 0 -6 0 0

25. Ibid., p. 11.

26. The range of savings reflects cost sharing by the South Korean 

government of as much as 65 percent of construction that had 

been planned at those facilities.
32 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

South Korea by moving them to two consolidated bases 

south of Seoul rather than keeping the numerous installations envisioned in the Land Partnership Plan. Because of 

its broader scope, this alternative would cost far more to 

implement than the previous options: a total of $2.9 billion to $5.0 billion, CBO estimates. After that, however, 

it would add only $25 million to the Army’s annual costs 

(see Table 3-3 on page 24).

Effects of Alternative 1C on Forces in Europe. This option would relocate three brigade combat teams from 

Germany to permanent installations in Eastern Europe— 

one each in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria. (The two division headquarters and one BCT would remain based in 

Germany, as they are now.) This option would therefore 

yield the same improvements in deployability as the previous alternative, but it would not require the constant 

rotation of BCTs. Furthermore, the Army could maintain 

a presence in all three countries continuously and thus 

would not need to keep duplicate sets of equipment at 

bases in Germany and Eastern Europe. 

To avoid the need to establish expensive family-support 

infrastructure at the new bases—each of which would 

host about 4,000 soldiers—tours in Eastern Europe 

would be unaccompanied and last for one year. Those 

bases would not be as elaborate as the ones that are now 

home to U.S. forces in Germany; however, building them 

would still cost more than $2 billion, CBO estimates. In 

addition, moving the units and their equipment to Eastern Europe would entail one-time costs of $75 million, 

and keeping families in the United States that would now 

be sent overseas would require DoD to build additional 

dependent schools in the United States, at a cost of $25 

million. On the flip side, reducing the number of soldiers 

based in Germany would yield one-time savings of $725 

million from canceling construction projects there, CBO 

estimates. Thus, the total up-front cost of establishing a 

permanent military presence in Eastern Europe under 

this option would be almost $1.7 billion. After that, 

however, additional annual costs would be negligible, in 

CBO’s estimation.

Compared with the current basing of Army forces in Europe, this alternative would have the advantage of extending the Army’s presence eastward and speeding deployments to the Mediterranean, Black Sea, and Caspian 

regions by six days. If the heavy BCT remaining in Germany was replaced by a lighter Stryker BCT, airlift could 

be used to deploy it to conflicts in the region in less time 

than a heavy BCT would need to deploy by sea. Furthermore, the Stryker BCT could deploy to locations such as 

Baku by air far faster than a similar unit could deploy 

from CONUS—in roughly nine days rather than about 

20 days, based on an analysis by RAND.27

This alternative would have several disadvantages, however, compared with the current basing of Army forces in 

Europe. First, the 12,000 soldiers who would be on unaccompanied tours in Eastern Europe would experience 

greater family separation. Second, turbulence in CONUS 

units would increase slightly in order to support more 

one-year tours. Third, any logistics costs associated with 

upgrading infrastructure in Eastern Europe would apply 

to this alternative as well as to Alternative 1B. 

This option might also violate existing treaties and agreements between the United States and Russia. The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security 

Between NATO and the Russian Federation, which Russia and all NATO members signed in 1997, has reportedly been interpreted by Russia as a promise by NATO 

that its members will not permanently station forces in 

Eastern Europe as the alliance grows.28 Furthermore, basing U.S. soldiers in Eastern Europe could violate limits 

on troops and weapons contained in the Conventional 

Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, which were the result of 

negotiations among many parties in the 1980s and subsequent rounds in the 1990s. Russia might strongly object 

to the permanent basing of U.S. forces in Eastern Europe, 

especially if it violated the CFE treaty’s regional ceilings 

on equipment. 

Effects of Alternative 1C on Forces in South Korea. This 

alternative would make far more extensive changes in 

South Korea than the previous option because it would 

consolidate all U.S. forces at two large bases south of 

Seoul—Camp Humphreys and nearby Osan Air Base. 

That relocation would put Army personnel out of range 

of North Korean artillery and shut many isolated and ob27. Alan Vick and others, The Stryker Brigade Combat Team: Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Options, MR1606-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002).

28. Drury, The Argument Against Relocating U.S. Forces in Europe, 

p. 11.
CHAPTER THREE ALTERNATIVE BASING SCHEMES FOR ARMY FORCES 33

solete facilities. Furthermore, by closing the Yongsan Garrison in Seoul, it would remove U.S. forces from an urban area with a high population density. Moreover, by 

basing all Army forces within a short distance of Osan Air 

Base, this approach would facilitate the movement of 

units and personnel into and out of the country.

Concentrating U.S. forces in two enclaves would make it 

easier to support a larger number of Army dependents in 

South Korea, because soldiers would no longer be scattered among numerous remote outposts. Thus, this alternative would increase the share of soldiers on tour in 

South Korea who could be accompanied by their families 

from the current 10 percent to 25 percent.29 As a result, 

of the 28,000 Army personnel stationed in South Korea, 

about 7,000 would be on accompanied (three-year) tours, 

compared with about 2,800 under current policy.

The Administration has reportedly been negotiating with 

the South Korean government to work out the details of 

the basing changes outlined in this alternative.30 Although those details have not been officially announced, 

Secretary Rumsfeld and other Administration officials 

have alluded to the advantages of such changes, saying it 

would be desirable to concentrate U.S. forces at moreefficient facilities and remove them from the immediate 

range of North Korean artillery, thereby making them 

more survivable and better able to respond to a North 

Korean attack.

In the absence of detailed Administration plans, CBO estimated that building and refurbishing facilities at Camp 

Humphreys and Osan Air Base to house 28,000 Army 

personnel could cost roughly $4 billion. Another $100 

million could be needed to move units from their current 

bases to the new facilities. The Administration is still negotiating with the South Korean government about the 

specifics of the planned relocations, particularly that of 

Yongsan Garrison, so it is not clear how much of the relocation costs South Korea might bear. On the basis of 

previous cost-sharing agreements, CBO assumed that 

South Korea might pay up to 65 percent of the costs, 

meaning that U.S. costs for the construction in South 

Korea associated with this alternative would range from 

$1.4 billion to $4.0 billion (see Table 3-3 on page 24). 

Using the same cost-sharing range, CBO estimated that 

the United States might save $250 million to $750 million by canceling planned construction projects in South 

Korea while this alternative was being implemented. As a 

result, the net one-time costs in South Korea, including 

moving costs, could range from $1.2 billion to $3.3 billion.

Once implemented, those changes in South Korea would 

have relatively small effects on costs, family separation, 

and personnel turnover. As a result of increasing accompanied tours in that country, the Army would see its annual costs rise by $25 million, CBO estimates. And although the quality of some soldiers’ lives would improve, 

family separation for the average enlisted soldier over a 

10-year period would decrease by just 0.1 years (36 days). 

Likewise, turnover in CONUS units would decline by 

less than 1 percentage point.

Combined Effects of Alternative 1C. Basing Army forces 

in Eastern Europe, as envisioned in this option, would 

enable them to deploy more quickly to the Caspian region. But stationing Army personnel there on one-year 

unaccompanied tours, even when combined with the reduction in such tours in South Korea, would raise the total number of unaccompanied Army tours worldwide by 

roughly 8,000. That increase would boost total family 

separation above the current level and increase turnover 

in CONUS units slightly (see Table 3-4 on page 26). 

In the long run, consolidating bases in South Korea could 

improve relations between that nation and the United 

States. However, permanently moving forces from Germany to Eastern Europe could raise concerns with Russia 

that would need to be addressed. 

Finally, this alternative would require a net one-time investment of $2.9 billion to $5.0 billion: approximately 

$1.7 billion to build new bases in Eastern Europe and 

move Army forces there, and the remainder to consolidate bases in South Korea. But it would yield minimal 

annual savings to offset those one-time costs (see Table 3-

3 on page 24).

29. In April 2003, General Leon LaPorte, commander of U.S. forces 

in Korea, advocated increasing the share of accompanied tours to 

25 percent. Roughly half of the soldiers who are assigned to South 

Korea are married.

30. See Norimitsu Onishi, “U.S. and South Korea Try to Redefine 

Their Alliance,” New York Times, December 26, 2003; and Martin 

Nesirky, “U.S. in South Korea to Cut DMZ Role but Still in 

Charge,” Reuters, April 27, 2004.
34 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Alternatives That Would Cut 

the Level of Army Forces Stationed 

Overseas in Half

Although the Administration has indicated that the size 

of Army forces based overseas will probably decline, it has 

not officially said where or by how much. To illustrate a 

range of possibilities, the rest of the options examined in 

this study would reduce the number of Army personnel 

permanently stationed in Europe and Asia, returning between 38,000 and 80,000 of them to the United States. 

In some cases, those approaches would also alter the level 

of overseas presence provided by the Army and introduce 

unit rotations. Returning such large forces to the continental United States would most likely require significant 

refurbishment of current U.S. bases and could affect 

some of the closures of facilities being contemplated as 

part of the 2005 round of base realignment and closure.

Two options that CBO examined would move roughly 

half of the Army forces now stationed in Germany and 

South Korea to the United States but result in different 

levels of overseas presence. Alternative 2A would relocate 

all of the combat forces (brigades and divisions) stationed 

in those countries to CONUS, leaving the support forces 

currently based there in place. It would then rotate BCTs 

from CONUS to maintain roughly the same level of 

overseas presence as exists today. That alternative would 

cost more to implement than any other approach considered in this study: $8.4 billion to $9.4 billion. Alternative 

2B would cut the amount of Army presence overseas by 

moving roughly half of both the combat and support 

forces now based in Germany and South Korea to 

CONUS, with only periodic rotations of one BCT from 

Germany to Eastern Europe. That option would cost less 

to carry out, $4.8 billion to $5.8 billion, and could result 

in recurring savings of $500 million per year.

Alternative 2A: Halve the Forces Stationed Overseas 

and Maintain the Current Level of Overseas 

Presence by Rotating Six BCTs from CONUS

Some Administration officials, including the commander 

of U.S. forces in Europe, have suggested that rotating 

units from the United States to overseas bases on periodic 

deployments would be preferable to the current basing 

scheme. The Marine Corps uses such a system to sustain 

its presence on Okinawa: it rotates units to the island 

from the United States for seven-month tours and then 

replaces them with fresh units. This alternative would follow the lead of the Marines by rotating Army units from 

the United States for six-month tours in Germany and 

South Korea to maintain the current level of combat presence there.

Effect of Alternative 2A on Forces in Europe. Under this 

option, all of the units associated with the 1st AD and 1st 

ID in Germany would return to the United States. That 

move would mean relocating about 25,000 Army personnel (see Table 3-7) and 33,000 family members. To maintain essentially the same level of Army presence in Europe, four BCTs of 4,000 personnel each would be sent 

to Europe every six months for temporary deployments—three to new forward operating bases in Poland, 

Bulgaria, and Romania and one to an existing base in 

Germany.

Those changes would entail one-time costs on the order 

of $4.2 billion, CBO estimates, with the bulk of the 

money paying for construction (see Table 3-8). About $1 

billion would be needed to build three FOBs in Eastern 

Europe and to refurbish one base in Germany. A much 

greater amount—about $2.8 billion—would be necessary 

to build or refurbish facilities in the United States to 

house the returning units. However, cutting the number 

of forces stationed in Germany by half would yield onetime construction savings of $1.5 billion.

The Army could avoid shipping the rotating units’ equipment from CONUS to Europe and back every six 

months by maintaining duplicate sets of equipment in 

Europe. If the Army wished to draw on its entire pool of 

33 active brigades—five of which are scheduled to be 

equipped with Stryker vehicles—to support the rotations, 

it would need to preposition equipment suitable for those 

brigades in Europe.31 Therefore, CBO’s estimate of the 

costs of this alternative includes $1.6 billion to purchase a 

set of equipment for a Stryker brigade combat team 

(SBCT).

31. CBO’s analysis is based on the structure of the Army as it stood at 

the end of fiscal year 2003, which included 33 active brigades. In 

early calendar year 2004, the Army announced that it will reorganize its combat structure to create 43 to 48 brigades. The Army 

has said it does not plan to increase its overall number of personnel to carry out the restructuring. Presumably, then, the new, 

more numerous BCTs will be smaller than those based on the current structure. As a result, more of the new BCTs—or additional 

support units—will be needed to maintain the same level of overseas presence.
CHAPTER THREE ALTERNATIVE BASING SCHEMES FOR ARMY FORCES 35

Table 3-7.

Location of Permanent Army Forces Under Current Basing 

and Alternatives 2A and 2B

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: BCTs = brigade combat teams; CONUS = continental United States.

a. Brigades would rotate from CONUS so that, at any given time, one would be in Germany.

b. Brigades would rotate from CONUS so that, at any given time, three would be in Eastern Europe.

c. Brigades would rotate from CONUS so that, at any given time, two would be in South Korea.

d. Brigades rotating from CONUS to Europe and South Korea would mean that, at any given time, 23 brigades would be in CONUS.

e. The division headquarters and some additional units from the divison base would remain in South Korea.

f. Brigades would rotate from Germany periodically so that one would be in Eastern Europe about 50 percent of the time.

Germany

Eastern

Europe

South

Korea

Continental

United States

Current Basing

Army Personnel 56,000 0 28,000 355,000

Divisions 20 1 6

Combat Brigades 4 0 2 23

Alternative 2A: Cut Overseas Forces by Half

and Rotate Six BCTs from CONUS to Europe and South Korea

Change from Current Basing

Army personnel -25,000 0 -13,000 38,000

Divisions -2 0 -1 3

Combat brigades -4 0 -2 6

Result

Army personnel 31,000 0 15,000 393,000

Divisions 00 0 9

Combat brigades a b c 29d

Alternative 2B: Cut Overseas Forces by Half

and Rotate One BCT from Germany to Eastern Europe

Change from Current Basing

Army personnel -29,000 0 -13,000 42,000

Divisions -1 0 0 1

Combat brigades -2 0 -1 3

Result

Army personnel 27,000 0 15,000 397,000

Divisions 10 1e 7

e

Combat brigades 2

f f 1 26
36 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Table 3-8.

Costs and Savings of Alternatives 2A and 2B Relative to Current Basing

(Millions of 2004 dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Notes: These numbers represent incremental costs or savings (those that would occur relative to the cost of maintaining the current base 

structure). For more details about the components of these costs and savings, see Tables B-2 through B-4 in Appendix B.

CONUS = continental United States; BCTs = brigade combat teams.

a. Includes operating costs and recurring construction costs for existing bases and new forward operating bases.

b. Includes costs for housing, schools, allowances, and permanent-change-of-station moves.

Europe South Korea Total

Alternative 2A: Cut Overseas Forces by Half

and Rotate Six BCTs from CONUS to Europe and South Korea

One-Time Costs or Savings (-)

Construction

New facilities overseas 1,000 1,275 to 2,800 2,275 to 3,800

New facilities in CONUS 2,750 1,425 4,175

Existing facilities -1,525 -300 to -850 -1,825 to -2,375

Equipment 1,550 1,550 3,100

Moving 375 275 650

Total One-Time Costs 4,150 4,225 to 5,200 8,375 to 9,350

Annual Costs or Savings (-)

Base operationsa -75 75 0

Rotations 200 100 300

Personnelb -200 -100 -300

Total Annual Costs or Savings -75 75 0

Alternative 2B: Cut Overseas Forces by Half

and Rotate One BCT from Germany to Eastern Europe

One-Time Costs or Savings (-)

Construction

New facilities overseas 750 825 to 2,350 1,575 to 3,100

New facilities in CONUS 3,200 1,425 4,625

Existing facilities -1,775 -300 to -850 -2,075 to -2,625

Equipment 000

Moving 425 275 700

Total One-Time Costs 2,600 2,225 to 3,200 4,825 to 5,800

Annual Costs or Savings (-)

Base operationsa -200 0 -200

Rotations 25 0 25

Personnelb -225 -100 -325

Total Annual Savings -400 -100 -500
CHAPTER THREE ALTERNATIVE BASING SCHEMES FOR ARMY FORCES 37

Once those changes were implemented, they would produce $75 million in net annual savings, CBO estimates. 

The reason is that the lower costs of supporting fewer 

bases and dependents in Germany would more than offset the additional costs of operating three FOBs in Eastern Europe and rotating forces through them.

The main advantage of this alternative would be to reduce the U.S. footprint in Germany. In addition, like 

Alternatives 1B and 1C, this option would speed deployment of heavy BCTs to the Mediterranean, Black 

Sea, and Caspian regions. Moreover, by prepositioning 

equipment for an SBCT, which can feasibly be transported by air, this alternative would make it possible to 

deploy an SBCT to conflicts in the region faster than 

such a unit could be deployed from CONUS under current basing arrangements.

Among its disadvantages, Alternative 2A could harm soldiers’ quality of life and decrease retention by causing additional family separation. Currently, soldiers serving in 

Europe can take their families with them. Under this option, however, the 16,000 soldiers serving in Europe on 

rotations with BCTs would be deployed without their 

families. According to the head of the Army Personnel 

Command’s retention office, relying on rotational forces 

in Europe would take a substantial toll on retention: in 

the late 1990s, soldiers with families who returned to 

U.S.-based units from six-month deployments overseas 

had 39 percent lower retention rates than similar soldiers 

who returned from tours in Europe with their families.32

That experience suggests that the European portion of 

this alternative—which would increase average family 

separation because of deployment by about 30 percent—

could hurt Army retention.

In addition, although this option would reduce some deployment times for BCTs, the same cannot be said for the 

time needed to get the rest of a division (the division 

base) to locations of possible conflicts. Indeed, this alternative could result in a small delay compared with current basing, because no divisional units would remain in 

Germany. As a result, such units, or their equipment, 

would have to come either from the United States, where 

the divisions would be based, or from prepositioned

Table 3-9.

Time Needed to Deploy a Division Base 

by Sea

(Days)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Numbers in bold indicate the shortest times to a particular 

destination.

a. Specifically Baku, Azerbaijan.

b. Prepositioned division set of equipment.

stocks in Qatar.33 For operations in Nigeria, deploying a 

division base from the United States would take no 

longer than it would take from Germany (see Table 3-9). 

But for operations in Azerbaijan, Uganda, or Djibouti, it 

would take three days longer to move a division base 

from the United States than from Germany. 

For those areas, equipment sets prepositioned in Qatar 

could reach the theater most quickly, but those sets do 

not include the approximately 80 helicopters associated 

with a division.34 Assuming that the helicopters could be 

airlifted in the two to four weeks it would take for the rest 

of the division’s equipment to arrive by sea, then relying 

on the prepositioned division base at Qatar would be 

more timely than waiting for equipment to arrive from 

the United States. Nevertheless, for operations in Baku, 

Azerbaijan, deploying the division base from Qatar 

would take only one day longer than it would now take 

to deploy that base from Germany.

Effect of Alternative 2A on Forces in South Korea. As it 

would with forces in Europe, this alternative would move 

the 2nd Infantry Division and its units from South Korea 

to the United States and then rotate two BCTs continuously back to South Korea. Those changes would mean

32. Jon R. Anderson, “Transforming EUCOM, Part 4: Efforts to 

Build a Mobile Force Could Close Some Bases in Europe,” European Stars and Stripes, June 18, 2003.

Destination

Nigeria Azerbaijana Uganda Djibouti

Germany 25 28 36 25

Qatarb 28 29 27 18

United States 25 31 39 28

33. The United States currently has equipment for several units from 

a division base prepositioned in Qatar. The equipment includes 

that for a divisional cavalry squadron, an aviation brigade (exclusive of helicopters), artillery units, and some engineering equipment, such as bulldozers and bridgelayers.

34. The Army does not preposition helicopters in part because it does 

not have excess helicopters available in its inventory.
38 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Table 3-10.

Effect of Alternatives 2A and 2B on the Time Needed to Deploy Army Units by Sea

(Days)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: BCTs = brigade combat teams; CONUS = continental United States.

a. Specifically Baku, Azerbaijan.

b. Based on deploying from the closest location in Europe or using the set of equipment prepositioned afloat in Diego Garcia to European or 

African destinations.

c. Based on deploying from Germany or Qatar to European or African destinations and from South Korea or Hawaii to Asian destinations.

restationing 13,000 personnel to the United States and 

rotating 8,000 soldiers to South Korea every six months. 

As a result, the total number of Army personnel in South 

Korea at any given time would be 5,000 less than the current level of 28,000. To enhance the survivability of the 

rotating forces, they would be based at two consolidated 

camps south of Seoul, as in Alternative 1C.

Because new basing would be needed in both South Korea and the United States, the Korean portion of this alternative would require at least as much up-front investment as the European portion: $4.2 billion to $5.2 

billion, CBO estimates. The one-time costs to move units 

to the United States and base them there would total 

about $1.7 billion, and the costs for new bases in South 

Korea would range from $1.3 billion to $2.8 billion (depending on cost-sharing agreements with the South Koreans). Additional one-time costs of about $1.6 billion 

would result from buying an SBCT equipment set to 

preposition in South Korea to accommodate any Stryker 

brigades taking part in the rotations there. Those onetime costs would be offset slightly by one-time savings of 

$300 million to $850 million from canceling construction projects in South Korea. 

Thereafter, rotating two BCTs to South Korea twice a 

year and maintaining their equipment and facilities 

would add about $175 million to the Army’s annual 

costs. However, lower costs for PCS moves and for allowances to soldiers based overseas would save about $100 

million per year, resulting in net annual costs of about 

$75 million for the Korean part of this option.

Destination

Nigeria Azerbaijana Uganda Djibouti

South

Korea

Heavy Brigade Combat Team

Shortest Time Based on Current Basing 19 23 20 12 0

Change in Shortest Time from Adopting Alternativeb

Alternative 2A: Cut overseas forces by half and rotate 

six BCTS from CONUS to Europe and South Korea 0 -6 0 0 0

Alternative 2B: Cut overseas forces by half and rotate 

one BCT from Germany to Eastern Europe 0 -6 0 0 0

Division Base

Shortest Time Based on Current Basingc 25 28 27 18 0

Change in Shortest Time from Adopting Alternativec

Alternative 2A: Cut overseas forces by half and rotate 

six BCTS from CONUS to Europe and South Korea 0 +1 0 0 +23

Alternative 2B: Cut overseas forces by half and rotate 

one BCT from Germany to Eastern Europe 0 0 0 00
CHAPTER THREE ALTERNATIVE BASING SCHEMES FOR ARMY FORCES 39

Table 3-11.

Family Separation and Unit Turnover for Enlisted Personnel 

Under Current Basing and Alternatives 2A and 2B

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: CONUS = continental United States; BCTs = brigade combat teams.

The advantages of this alternative, compared with current 

basing of U.S. forces in South Korea, would be to reduce 

the number of one-year unaccompanied tours, decrease 

turnover in CONUS units, and remove U.S. troops from 

locations close to the DMZ. However, this alternative 

would also move the 2nd ID’s division base from South 

Korea to CONUS. Since the Army has no division-base 

equipment prepositioned anywhere in the Asian or Pacific region, divisional units would have to deploy from 

Hawaii in the event of a crisis on the Korean peninsula. It 

could take more than three weeks for elements of the 

25th Infantry Division based in Hawaii to reinforce the 

brigades in South Korea, which means that the BCTs in 

South Korea would have to operate without support from 

that division’s helicopters, artillery, and many trucks and 

resupply vehicles during those weeks. Nevertheless, the 

BCTs would have other possible sources of support, such 

as the considerable assets that the Army would retain in 

South Korea and the assets of the U.S. Air Force and the 

South Korean military. 

Combined Effects of Alternative 2A. The overall effect of 

this approach would be to station an additional six brigade combat teams and three division headquarters and 

associated units—with a total of 38,000 soldiers—in 

CONUS. Moving so many troops and large units to the 

United States would most likely require new facilities or 

significant refurbishment of existing U.S. bases, which 

CBO estimates could cost about $4.2 billion. 

Overall, this alternative would have several advantages. It 

would speed up deployment of brigade combat teams to 

the Caspian and Mediterranean regions by six days, reduce turnover in CONUS units from 37 percent to 32 

percent by reducing one-year tours, and move Army 

forces in South Korea to less vulnerable locations (see Tables 3-10 and 3-11). It would also mesh well with the 

unit-manning scheme that the Army is introducing into 

its personnel and force management structure. 

This option would have a negative effect, however, on the 

readiness and availability of the Army’s active brigades. 

Assuming that 3.2 to 4.0 units are necessary to sustain 

the deployment of one unit overseas on rotation (see Appendix C), the Army would need 19 to 24 brigades to 

support the four-BCT rotations to Europe and the twoBCT rotations to South Korea. With BCTs tied up in Europe and South Korea or recovering from recent rotations, the Army would have less capability than it does today to sustain other long-term commitments. CBO 

estimates that the active Army would be able to maintain 

a deployed force of only 16,000 to 30,000 troops overseas—less than half the number that can be sustained under today’s basing structure (see Figure 3-4).

In addition, this option’s rotational approach would increase family separation, potentially harming retention. 

Although the average amount of time that enlisted personnel spent on unaccompanied tours would decrease, 

their time spent on deployments would rise significantly 

(see Table 3-11). All told, total family separation over a 

10-year period would increase by about 17 percent, from 

an average of 2.3 years to 2.7 years. According to some of

Years Away from Home During a 10-Year Period Annual Turnover

in CONUS Units

(Percent)

Unaccompanied

Tours

Time

Deployed Total

Current Basing 0.6 1.7 2.3 37

Alternative 2A: Cut Overseas Forces by Half and Rotate 

Six BCTS from CONUS to Europe and South Korea 0.3 2.4 2.7 32

Alternative 2B: Cut Overseas Forces by Half and Rotate 

One BCT from Germany to Eastern Europe 0.3 1.8 2.1 31
40 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Figure 3-4.

Army Personnel Available for 

Sustained Deployment to Overseas 

Operations Under Alternatives 2A 

and 2B

(Thousands of active-duty personnel)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Areas with dashed lines represent ranges based on differing 

assumptions about rotation ratios (see Appendix C).

the Army’s retention experts, such a large increase could 

reduce retention, perhaps seriously.

Alternative 2B: Halve the Forces 

Stationed Overseas and Rotate One BCT 

from Germany to Eastern Europe

This alternative is based on the premise that although the 

United States should maintain a military presence in both 

Europe and South Korea, the current global environment 

allows the size of that presence to be reduced. This option 

would cut the level of both combat and support units 

based in South Korea and Germany approximately in half 

and restation those forces in the United States. Specifically, one division, with its two combat brigades, and 

14,500 support and administrative personnel would remain in Germany; one brigade combat team, some divisional units (including the headquarters), and about 

9,000 support and administrative personnel would stay 

in South Korea. This option would also rotate combat 

forces from Germany to forward operating bases in Eastern Europe.

Effect of Alternative 2B on Forces in Europe. Under this 

alternative, Army forces in Europe would be reduced by 

29,000 personnel, with all units associated with the 1st 

AD and some from the V Corps returning to CONUS. 

The 1st ID would remain in Germany, and the 173rd 

Airborne Brigade would remain in Italy. As in Alternative 

1B, three FOBs would be built (one each in Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria), and the two brigades remaining in 

Germany would rotate to those bases periodically—say, 

for one three-month exercise per year for each brigade. 

The Army would preposition equipment sets at each of 

the FOBs so units could deploy from them to a crisis 

should the need arise. 

The up-front costs of making those changes in Europe 

would total $2.6 billion, CBO estimates—$425 million 

to move units to CONUS, $3.2 billion for new basing 

there, and $750 million for FOBs in Eastern Europe, offset by $1.8 billion in savings from canceled construction 

in Germany (see Table 3-8 on page 36). Recurring savings from those changes would amount to $400 million a 

year, CBO estimates, primarily because restationing 

forces now in Europe to the United States would lower 

the costs of overseas allowances, base operations, and PCS 

moves.

Like Alternatives 1B, 1C, and 2A, this option could 

speed deployment of a BCT to the Mediterranean, Black 

Sea, and Caspian regions. However, it would suffer from 

less-pronounced disadvantages than the other alternatives. Although it would increase family separation and 

reduce the number of forces available for other contingencies, those effects would be small. Average time deployed over 10 years would rise by 6 percent, from a total 

of 1.7 years to 1.8 years. Similarly, rotating brigades periodically from Germany to Eastern Europe might reduce 

the number of troops available for ongoing operations 

outside Europe by, at most, 3,000 soldiers, or 5 to 7 percent.

Effect of Alternative 2B on Forces in South Korea. By 

cutting the Army’s permanent presence in South Korea to 

about 15,000 personnel, this option could save about 

$100 million a year and reduce both turnover in CONUS units and family separation due to unaccompanied 

tours. The total average time that enlisted personnel 

would spend on unaccompanied tours over 10 years 

would decline from 0.6 years to 0.3 years. And turnover 

among enlisted personnel in CONUS units would drop 

from 37 percent to 31 percent (see Table 3-11 on page 

39). 

 Current

 Basing

Alternative

 2A

Alternative

 2B

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70
CHAPTER THREE ALTERNATIVE BASING SCHEMES FOR ARMY FORCES 41

CBO estimates that the one-time costs to move about 

13,000 troops from South Korea—7,000 of which would 

be associated with one brigade and additional units from 

the 2nd ID—to the United States and provide basing for 

them would total about $1.7 billion. The costs to consolidate the remaining Army forces in South Korea at Camp 

Humphreys and Osan Air Base south of Seoul would 

range from $825 million to $2.4 billion. Taking into account the savings from canceled construction projects, 

the total up-front costs to implement the Korean portion 

of this alternative would range from $2.2 billion to $3.2 

billion, CBO estimates (see Table 3-8 on page 36).

Combined Effects of Alternative 2B. By basing a larger 

percentage of Army forces in the United States than is 

now the case, this alternative would lower annual costs by 

$500 million, reduce turnover in CONUS units by 16 

percent, and reduce family separation for enlisted soldiers 

by 9 percent. In addition, by removing one combat brigade from South Korea, it would slightly increase the 

combat forces that would be based in CONUS and thus 

available for other contingencies. However, because this 

alternative would periodically rotate BCTs in Europe, the 

extra brigade available in CONUS could, under some assumptions, be offset by the increased demand on brigades 

in Europe. As a consequence, this alternative would result 

in roughly the same number of forces being available for 

sustained overseas operations as under current basing: 

46,000 to 63,000 personnel (see Figure 3-4).

CBO estimates that Alternative 2B would require a onetime investment of $4.8 billion to $5.8 billion. Funds 

would be needed to move forces to the United States and 

provide basing for them ($5.3 billion), establish three forward operating bases in Eastern Europe ($750 million), 

and consolidate bases in South Korea ($825 million to 

$2.4 billion). Those costs would be offset by $2.1 billion 

to $2.6 billion in savings that CBO estimates would result from the reduced need for construction projects to 

replace facilities in Europe and South Korea on a 67-year 

cycle.

This option would reduce the level of U.S. combat presence overseas, which could entail some security risks, particularly in South Korea. Some observers would argue 

that now is not the time to reduce forces in that country, 

especially when North Korea is apparently making 

progress toward developing the capability to produce nuclear-armed missiles. However, although this alternative 

would cut Army forces in South Korea by 13,000 personnel (including one combat brigade), in the event of a crisis the United States could still call on the combat power 

of the Marine division stationed in Okinawa and three 

Air Force fighter wings based in South Korea and Japan, 

as well as the South Korean military.

Alternatives That Would Remove 

Almost All Army Forces 

Stationed Overseas

Although the Administration has not suggested such a 

dramatic change in the near future, CBO also examined 

two alternatives that would return almost all of the Army 

forces now stationed in Germany and South Korea to the 

United States. Such a large-scale relocation would require 

a net one-time investment of $6.8 billion to $7.4 billion, 

CBO estimates, but thereafter it would save at least $900 

million a year compared with current basing. The first of 

these two alternative would rotate a few brigade combat 

teams overseas; the second would keep most Army forces 

in CONUS, deploying them overseas only when necessary.

Alternative 3A: Return Nearly All Forces to CONUS 

and Continuously Rotate Three BCTs Overseas

This option would move most of the Army’s current 

forces in Germany and South Korea back to the United 

States and set up limited rotations of combat teams overseas. Rather than rotating six BCTs (four to Europe and 

two to South Korea) as in Alternative 2A, this option 

would rotate only two BCTs to Europe and one to South 

Korea.

Effect of Alternative 3A on Forces in Europe. Some 

50,000 soldiers, all combat units, and most other Army 

units in Germany would be restationed in CONUS under this alternative. About 3,000 personnel would remain 

in Germany for administrative and reception purposes. 

Another 3,000 would move to Eastern Europe, where the 

Army would set up three FOBs and permanently station 

1,000 troops at each one (see Table 3-12). In addition, 

two BCTs from CONUS would rotate to those bases every six months, for a total of four rotations each year. 

Thus, at any given time, two BCTs would be in Eastern 

Europe, occupying two of the three forward bases.

This alternative would make the Army’s presence in Europe similar in nature to the presence it has had in the 

Middle East since the early 1990s. Between the two wars
42 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Table 3-12.

Location of Permanent Army Forces Under Current Basing 

and Alternatives 3A and 3B

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: CONUS = continental United States; BCTs = brigade combat teams.

a. Brigades would rotate from CONUS so that, at any given time, two would be in Eastern Europe.

b. Brigades would rotate from CONUS so that, at any given time, one would be in South Korea.

c. Brigades rotating from CONUS to Europe and South Korea would mean that, at any given time, 26 brigades would be in CONUS.

Germany

Eastern

Europe

South

Korea

Continental

United States

Current Basing

Army Personnel 56,000 0 28,000 355,000

Divisions 20 1 6

Combat Brigades 4 0 2 23

Alternative 3A: Return Almost All Overseas Forces to CONUS 

and Rotate Three BCTs to Europe and South Korea

Change from Current Basing

Army personnel -53,000 3,000 -27,000 77,000

Divisions -2 0 -1 3

Combat brigades -4 0 -2 6

Result

Army personnel 3,000 3,000 1,000 432,000

Divisions 00 0 9

Combat brigades 0 a b 29c

Alternative 3B: Eliminate Virtually All Army Presence Overseas

Change from Current Basing

Army personnel -54,000 1,000 -27,000 80,000

Divisions -2 0 -1 3

Combat brigades -4 0 -2 6

Result

Army personnel 2,000 1,000 1,000 435,000

Divisions 00 0 9

Combat brigades 0 0 0 29
CHAPTER THREE ALTERNATIVE BASING SCHEMES FOR ARMY FORCES 43

Table 3-13.

Costs and Savings of Alternatives 3A and 3B Relative to Current Basing

(Millions of 2004 dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Notes: These numbers represent incremental costs or savings (those that would occur relative to the cost of maintaining the current base 

structure). For more details about the components of these costs and savings, see Tables B-2 through B-4 in Appendix B.

CONUS = continental United States; BCTs = brigade combat teams.

a. Includes operating costs and recurring construction costs for existing bases and new forward operating bases.

b. Includes costs for housing, schools, allowances, and permanent-change-of-station moves.

Europe South Korea Total

Alternative 3A: Return Almost All Overseas Forces to CONUS 

and Rotate Three BCTs to Europe and South Korea

One-Time Costs or Savings (-)

Construction

New facilities overseas 750 225 975

New facilities in CONUS 5,650 2,950 8,600

Existing facilities -3,125 -300 to -850 -3,425 to -3,975

Equipment 000

Moving 750 450 1,200

Total One-Time Costs 4,025 2,775 to 3,325 6,800 to 7,350

Annual Costs or Savings (-)

Base operationsa -450 -25 -475

Rotations 100 50 150

Personnelb -400 -200 -600

Total Annual Savings -750 -175 -925

Alternative 3B: Eliminate Virtually All Army Presence Overseas

One-Time Costs or Savings (-)

Construction

New facilities overseas 500 225 725

New facilities in CONUS 6,075 2,950 9,025

Existing facilities -3,350 -300 to -850 -3,650 to -4,200

Equipment 000

Moving 800 450 1,250

Total One-Time Costs 4,025 2,775 to 3,325 6,800 to 7,350

Annual Savings (-)

Base operationsa -525 -25 -550

Rotations 000

Personnelb -425 -200 -625

Total Annual Savings -950 -225 -1,175
44 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

in Iraq, the Army rotated units to Kuwait every four 

months for training exercises as well as to provide a level 

of presence in the region. Beginning in 1999, those rotating units were supported by several hundred Army personnel permanently stationed in Kuwait. 

U.S. presence in Europe would be much less noticeable 

and obtrusive under this option than it is today, and the 

cost of supporting it would be much smaller: $750 million less per year than under current basing (see Table 3-

13 on page 43). The time needed to deploy a BCT to Azerbaijan would decrease, but deployment time for a division base would increase because the base would have to 

be sent from CONUS or drawn from prepositioned 

stocks in Qatar (see Table 3-14). 

One-time costs to implement the European portion of 

this alternative would amount to about $7.2 billion, 

CBO estimates—$5.7 billion for basing in CONUS, 

$750 million for FOBs in Eastern Europe, and $750 million for moving units from Germany to the United 

States. Those costs would be offset by one-time savings of 

$3.1 billion in planned construction, resulting in a net 

up-front cost of $4.0 billion.

Effect of Alternative 3A on Forces in South Korea. In a 

similar vein, this option would move 27,000 of the 

Army’s 28,000 personnel from South Korea to CONUS 

and would rotate one BCT back from CONUS on a continuing basis to maintain a presence there. The remaining 

1,000-person reception force, rotated BCT, and preposiTable 3-14.

Effect of Alternatives 3A and 3B on the Time Needed to Deploy Army Units by Sea

(Days)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: BCTs = brigade combat teams; CONUS = continental United States.

a. Specifically Baku, Azerbaijan.

b. Based on deploying from the closest location in Europe or using the set of equipment prepositioned afloat in Diego Garcia to European or 

African destinations.

c. Based on deploying from Germany or Qatar to European or African destinations and from South Korea or Hawaii to Asian destinations.

Destination

Nigeria Azerbaijana Uganda Djibouti

South

Korea

Heavy Brigade Combat Team

Shortest Time Based on Current Basing 19 23 20 12 0

Change in Shortest Time from Adopting Alternativeb

Alternative 3A: Return almost all overseas forces to 

CONUS and rotate three BCTs to Europe and South Korea 0 -6 0 0 0

Alternative 3B: Eliminate virtually all Army presence 

overseas 0 0 0 0 +7

Division Base

Shortest Time Based on Current Basingc 25 28 27 18 0

Change in Shortest Time from Adopting Alternativec

Alternative 3A: Return almost all overseas forces to 

CONUS and rotate three BCTs to Europe and South Korea 0 +1 0 0 +23

Alternative 3B: Eliminate virtually all Army presence 

overseas 0 +1 0 0 +23
CHAPTER THREE ALTERNATIVE BASING SCHEMES FOR ARMY FORCES 45

Table 3-15.

Family Separation and Unit Turnover for Enlisted Personnel 

Under Current Basing and Alternatives 3A and 3B

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: CONUS = continental United States; BCTs = brigade combat teams.

tioned equipment would be located at a single consolidated base south of Seoul. Like Alternative 2A, this option would not leave a division base in South Korea, 

which means that elements from the 25th ID in Hawaii 

would need to deploy to that country in the event of a 

crisis, adding more than three weeks to the current deployment time (see Table 3-14). 

CBO estimates that returning the Army forces now in 

South Korea to the United States would save $175 million a year. Before it could realize those recurring savings, 

however, the Army would need to spend a total of $3.6 

billion—including $3.0 billion to provide basing in CONUS for the returned units, $450 million to move them 

from South Korea, and $225 million to build a new consolidated base south of Seoul. At the same time, this option would avoid $300 million to $850 million in construction costs in South Korea, resulting in a net onetime cost of $2.8 billion to $3.3 billion (see Table 3-13 

on page 43).

Combined Effects of Alternative 3A. Overall, this approach would base more than 95 percent of the Army’s 

forces in the United States and rely on short-term rotations to provide limited overseas presence. It would reduce the number of troops stationed overseas by a total of 

77,000 and decrease the number of unaccompanied tours 

by 21,000. Consequently, this alternative would significantly lessen annual turnover among enlisted personnel 

in CONUS units: from the current level of 37 percent to 

28 percent (see Table 3-15). It would also save $925 million annually by lowering the costs associated with maintaining forces overseas. 

Besides those advantages, this option would have several 

drawbacks. As in Alternative 2A, the Army’s BCT in 

South Korea would have to operate without the support 

of a division base during the three weeks that the base 

might take to arrive from Hawaii. Furthermore, despite 

the concentration of forces in CONUS, the Army would 

have fewer troops available for other contingencies than it 

does today. The need to maintain two brigade rotations 

to Europe and one to South Korea would limit the force 

that the active Army could sustain overseas to 35,000 to 

49,000 personnel, compared with 44,000 to 64,000 under the current basing structure (see Figure 3-5). Finally, 

although this approach might eliminate the need for $3.4 

billion to $4 billion in overseas construction, CBO estimates, it would still require a significant up-front investment to carry out: $6.8 billion to $7.4 billion.

Alternative 3B: Eliminate Virtually All 

Army Presence Overseas

The final option in this analysis would return almost all 

troops from Germany and South Korea to CONUS, leaving only small reception forces in Germany, Eastern Europe, and South Korea to maintain prepositioned equipment and provide support for occasional exercises. Thus, 

the Army’s presence outside Italy would be only periodic, 

akin to U.S. presence in other countries that host prepositioned U.S. equipment, such as Qatar and Bahrain before Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

Years Away from Home During a 10-Year Period Annual Turnover

in CONUS Units

(Percent)

Unaccompanied

Tours

Time

Deployed Total

Current Basing 0.6 1.7 2.3 37

Alternative 3A: Return Almost All Overseas Forces to 

CONUS and Rotate Three BCTs to Europe and South Korea 0.1 2.1 2.2 28

Alternative 3B: Eliminate Virtually All Army Presence 

Overseas 0.1 1.7 1.8 28
46 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Figure 3-5.

Army Personnel Available for 

Sustained Deployment to Overseas 

Operations Under Alternatives 3A 

and 3B

(Thousands of active-duty personnel)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Areas with dashed lines represent ranges based on differing 

assumptions about rotation ratios (see Appendix C).

Such an approach would have numerous benefits. The 

Army’s annual costs would decline by $1.2 billion, CBO 

estimates. By retaining prepositioned sets of equipment 

for a heavy brigade in Germany, Romania or Bulgaria, 

and South Korea, the United States would be able to deploy BCTs to most locations in the same time frame as 

with current basing. (The one exception would be the 

added time necessary for Army units to respond to a crisis 

in South Korea, discussed below.) Moreover, by all but 

eliminating unaccompanied tours, this option would reduce both average family separation and turnover in CONUS units by more than 20 percent from current levels. 

And without brigades tied to the defense of South Korea 

or rotating to Eastern Europe, the Army would have an 

additional 4,000 to 10,000 active-duty soldiers available 

for other contingencies (see Figure 3-5).

Of course, this alternative would represent a significant 

departure from the U.S. military posture of the past half 

century. Not only has the Army maintained a significant 

combat presence in Germany and South Korea during 

that time, but it has also invested in a substantial support 

and mobility infrastructure in those countries, much of 

which would be abandoned under this alternative. 

Moreover, unlike all of the other alternatives examined in 

this study, this option would not leave any BCTs in South 

Korea. As a result, it would increase the time needed for 

Army forces to respond to a crisis in that country. Although a set of equipment for a brigade combat team 

would be prepositioned in South Korea, the personnel associated with a BCT would require five to seven days to 

fly to South Korea from CONUS, retrieve their equipment, and organize themselves into a fighting force—

meaning that it could take a week for the U.S. Army to 

respond to a North Korean attack with an armored force 

(see Table 3-14 on page 44). Of course, the South Korean 

army, which has 560,000 soldiers and 22 divisions, would 

be able to respond immediately, as could the South Korean air force and the three U.S. fighter wings stationed 

in South Korea and Japan. Thus, the absence or presence 

of one Army brigade at the onset of hostilities might not 

be crucial. However, the brigade’s deterrent value might 

be of greater importance than its tactical contribution.

Like the previous alternative, this option would require a 

net one-time investment of $6.8 billion to $7.4 billion to 

carry out, CBO estimates. Constructing facilities in the 

United States would cost $6.1 billion for forces returning 

from Europe and $3.0 billion for forces coming from 

South Korea. In addition, the Army would probably need 

to spend $500 million for one FOB in Germany and another in Bulgaria or Romania (for equipment and periodic exercises) and $225 million for a reception base 

south of Seoul. Finally, moving units from Europe and 

South Korea to CONUS would cost $800 million and 

$450 million, respectively. Those various costs would be 

partly offset by one-time savings of $3.7 billion to $4.2 

billion from canceling construction projects planned for 

South Korea and Germany (see Table 3-13 on page 43).

Conclusions

Because the United States has invested heavily over the 

past 50 years in base infrastructure for troops stationed 

overseas, any major shifting of forces would require a significant expenditure to replicate that infrastructure somewhere else. Even options to reduce the footprint of Army 

forces in Europe or South Korea that the Administration 

is considering involve expanding and refurbishing bases 

in the continental United States to accept forces removed 

from Europe, establishing forward operating bases in new 

locations outside western Europe, and building new consolidated facilities in South Korea. Because soldiers’ morale is important to the Army, it wants to build any new 

 Current

 Basing

Alternative

 3A

Alternative

 3B

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70
CHAPTER THREE ALTERNATIVE BASING SCHEMES FOR ARMY FORCES 47

bases or facilities to standards that would enhance soldiers’ quality of life. The only exception might be new 

forward operating bases, which could be located in Eastern Europe or Africa and house transient units—those 

serving stints of, at most, six months.

CBO’s analysis suggests that there would be little annual 

savings to offset the substantial up-front investment 

needed to restation U.S. forces unless overseas presence 

was reduced significantly. If that was the case, annual savings might total more than $1 billion, but the net initial 

investment would amount to about $7 billion (see Table 

3-16).

Improvements resulting from the restationing of U.S. 

forces overseas could include political and military benefits, such as regional stability, which CBO did not attempt to measure, as well as an increase in the Army’s 

ability to respond to far-flung conflicts, which CBO did 

examine and found to be small. The reason for the relatively small increase is that the United States and Germany have invested heavily in the German transportation 

network, with the result that U.S. military equipment 

based in Germany can move to large port and air facilities 

on good roads and an extensive rail network. That is not 

the case for locations in Eastern Europe or Africa. Furthermore, the time required to deploy heavy units by sea 

to many potential trouble spots is not significantly 

shorter from Eastern Europe than it is from Germany. 

Moreover, for many ports in Africa, it takes much longer 

to deploy a heavy brigade combat team from Eastern Europe than to deliver the prepositioned set of equipment 

that is maintained on board ships at Diego Garcia in the 

Indian Ocean.

Maintaining overseas presence through rotations from 

CONUS rather than permanently stationing forces in 

Europe and South Korea would have the advantage of 

shrinking the U.S. footprint abroad. It would reduce the 

need for infrastructure overseas for both troops and families, and it would lessen turnover in Army units, potentially enhancing cohesion. It would also fit well with the 

Army’s proposed conversion to unit manning. Moreover, 

synchronizing unit-manning schedules with deployment 

rotations should avoid some of the problems the Army is 

now experiencing with its individual rotation system. 

However, the Army has argued in the past that it needs 

three to five units (in various stages of recovery, training, 

or transit) to keep one unit deployed at any given time. 

Trying to sustain a rotation of six brigade combat teams 

overseas—four to Europe and two to South Korea—with 

the Army’s 33 active brigades could be difficult and might 

leave few brigades available for other missions (see Figure 

3-6 on page 50). Furthermore, maintaining a presence in 

Europe based on unaccompanied rotations would be a 

change from today’s practice, in which soldiers serving individual tours in Europe can take their families. Unaccompanied deployments to Europe from CONUS, 

though probably short, would increase family separation 

over the long run and could decrease retention.

In short, whatever major changes the United States makes 

in its strategy for overseas basing will be costly. In the first 

half of the 1990s, the Department of Defense greatly reduced the size of the forces it based in Europe, but it also 

shrank the active-duty military as a whole. Consequently, 

DoD did not need to provide new housing, basing, and 

infrastructure for displaced troops at that time. Today, 

however, there is very little demand for reducing the size 

of the U.S. military. As a result, any changes in basing 

will mean that infrastructure that the United States has 

built overseas during the past half century will be returned to the host nations and will need to be replicated 

elsewhere, either in the United States, at new locations in 

Europe, or in South Korea.35

35. In the past, the United States has received relatively little remuneration for facilities that it has turned over to host countries. For 

example, while reducing its forces in Germany in the mid-1990s, 

the United States returned hundreds of facilities to the German 

government, for which it received about $3 million in cash and 

about $200 million in improvements (such as maintenance of 

sewer systems and modernization of barracks) at remaining U.S. 

facilities in Germany; see General Accounting Office, European 

Drawdown: Status of Residual Value Negotiations in Germany, 

GAO/NSIAD-94-195BR (June 1994). In South Korea, the government is assuming some of the costs for relocation of U.S. 

troops in exchange for the return of installations being vacated by 

those troops. 
48 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Table 3-16.

Comparison of All of the Alternatives with Current Basing

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: BCTs = brigade combat teams; CONUS = continental United States; n.a. = not applicable.

a. Assuming use of active-duty forces only.

Army Personnel

 Available for 

Operationsa

Army Forces Stationed

Overseas

Costs or Savings (-)

(Millions of 2004 dollars)

Assuming High 

Rotation 

Ratio

Assuming Low 

Rotation 

Ratio

Germany and 

Eastern Europe

South

Korea

OneTime Annual

Current Basing 56,000 28,000 n.a. n.a. 44,000 64,000

Change from Adopting Alternative

Alternatives That Would 

Maintain the Current Level of 

Army Forces Stationed Overseas

1A: Make European Tours 

Unaccompanied

0 0 825 75 0 0

1B: Make Minor Changes in 

German and South Korean Basing 

and Rotate BCTs from Germany to 

Austere Bases in Eastern Europe

0 0 1,375 to 2,925 225 -6,000 -8,000

1C: Consolidate Bases in South 

Korea and Establish Permanent 

Bases in Eastern Europe

0 0 2,875 to 4,950 25 0 0

Alternatives That Would Cut the 

Level of Army Forces Stationed 

Overseas in Half

2A: Halve Forces Stationed 

Overseas and Maintain Current 

Level of Overseas Presence by 

Rotating Six BCTs from CONUS

-25,000 -13,000 8,375 to 9,350 0 -28,000 -34,000

2B: Halve Forces Stationed 

Overseas and Rotate One BCT 

from Germany to Eastern Europe

-29,000 -13,000 4,825 to 5,800 -500 +2,000 -1,000

Alternatives That Would 

Remove Almost All Army Forces 

Stationed Overseas

3A: Move Nearly All Forces to 

CONUS and Continuously Rotate 

Three BCTs to Europe and South 

Korea

-50,000 -27,000 6,800 to 7,350 -925 -9,000 -15,000

3B: Eliminate Virtually All Army 

Presence Overseas

-53,000 -27,000 6,800 to 7,350 -1,175 +10,000 +4,000

Continued
CHAPTER THREE ALTERNATIVE BASING SCHEMES FOR ARMY FORCES 49

Table 3-16.

Continued

b. Based on deploying from the closest location in Europe or using the set of equipment prepositioned afloat in Diego Garcia.

c. Based on deploying from Germany or Qatar.

d. Based on deploying from South Korea or Hawaii.

e. The current level of annual turnover is shown in percent, and changes from that level are shown in percentage points.

Number of Days to Deploy Years of Family Separation for 

Enlisted Personnel Over 10 Years Annual 

Turnover 

in CONUS 

Units 

(Percent)e

To European

Theater

(Baku, Azerbaijan)

To Asian

Theater

(South Korea) Unaccompanied 

Tours

Time 

Deployed Total

Heavy 

BCTb

Division 

Basec

Heavy 

BCT

Division 

Based

Current Basing 23 28 0 0 0.6 1.7 2.3 37

Change from Adopting Alternative

Alternatives That Would 

Maintain the Current Level of 

Army Forces Stationed Overseas

1A: Make European Tours 

Unaccompanied

0 0 0 0 +1.3 0 +1.3 +10

1B: Make Minor Changes in 

German and South Korean Basing 

and Rotate BCTs from Germany to 

Austere Bases in Eastern Europe

-6 0 0 0 0 +0.3 +0.3 0

1C: Consolidate Bases in South 

Korea and Establish Permanent 

Bases in Eastern Europe

-6 0 0 0 +0.2 0 +0.2 +2

Alternatives That Would Cut the 

Level of Army Forces Stationed 

Overseas in Half

2A: Halve Forces Stationed 

Overseas and Maintain Current 

Level of Overseas Presence by 

Rotating Six BCTs from CONUS

-6 +1 0 +23 -0.3 +0.7 +0.4 -5

2B: Halve Forces Stationed 

Overseas and Rotate One BCT 

from Germany to Eastern Europe

-6 0 0 0 -0.3 +0.1 -0.2 -6

Alternatives That Would Remove 

Almost All Army Forces Stationed Overseas

3A: Move Nearly All Forces to 

CONUS and Continuously Rotate 

Three BCTs to Europe and South 

Korea

-6 +1 0 +23 -0.5 +0.4 -0.1 -9

3B: Eliminate Virtually All Army 

Presence Overseas

0 +1 +7 +23 -0.5 0 -0.5 -9
50 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Figure 3-6.

Army Personnel Available for Sustained Deployment to Overseas Operations 

Under All of the Alternatives 

(Thousands of active-duty personnel)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: Areas with dashed lines represent ranges based on differing assumptions about rotation ratios (see Appendix C).

 Current

 Basing

Alternative

 1A

Alternative

 1B

Alternative

 1C

Alternative

 2A

Alternative

 2B

Alternative

 3A

Alternative

 3B

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70
A

Current Basing of Air Force, Navy,

and Marine Corps Forces Overseas

Ah lthough it touched on all of the services, Chapter 

2 focused in detail on the Army forces now stationed in 

Europe and East Asia. This appendix completes the picture by providing similar detail about the other services’ 

personnel and bases in those two important regions.

The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps have fewer 

forces stationed in Europe than the Army does and a 

more widely scattered infrastructure and basing network. 

The Air Force has the second largest presence in Europe 

after the Army, with 34,000 active-duty personnel based 

there. The Navy and Marine Corps have much smaller 

contingents in Europe, with 10,000 personnel and 1,000 

personnel, respectively, based on shore.1

Together, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps outnumber the Army in East Asia, with a total of 49,000 active-duty personnel on shore.2 Unlike the Army, which is 

focused on South Korea, those services’ bases and forces 

are concentrated in Japan. On the basis of replacement 

value, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force installations in 

Japan represent 88 percent of the three services’ investment in East Asia.

The Air Force in Europe

The Air Force has 34,000 personnel stationed in Europe, 

scattered across the region. As with the Army, the largest 

contingent is based in Germany, which hosts 15,000 Air 

Force personnel (see Table A-1). But the Air Force also 

has relatively large numbers in the United Kingdom 

(10,000) and Italy (4,000). The remaining 5,000 Air 

Force personnel are dispersed among bases in Turkey, 

Portugal, Greenland, and various other European countries.

Three major Air Force combat units are based in Europe: 

the 52nd Fighter Wing in Germany, the 48th Fighter 

Wing in the United Kingdom, and the 31st Fighter 

Wing in Italy. Together, those three units account for 

about 14,000 service members, or about 40 percent of 

the Air Force personnel based in Europe. The other 

20,000 personnel are associated with support or administrative units.

Like its forces, the Air Force’s installations are scattered 

throughout Europe. The largest number are in Germany 

(55 out of 201). Of those, the air base at Ramstein, which 

hosts the 86th Airlift Wing, is the main hub for U.S. 

forces from all of the services flying to or from other parts 

of the world, including the United States and the Middle 

East. It occupies 3,100 acres and has a replacement value 

of $3.1 billion, the second highest of any U.S. military facility in Europe (behind the naval air station at Keflavik, 

Iceland).3

 In addition, Spangdahlem Air Base, which is 

home to the 52nd Fighter Wing, is valued at $1.5 billion.

APPENDIX

1. The Navy and Marine Corps have additional personnel based on 

board ships that may be anchored in European waters.

2. The discussion of forces based in East Asia and the Pacific does 

not include those based in Hawaii or U.S. territories, such as 

Guam.

3. Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense for Installations and Environment, Department of Defense 

Base Structure Report: Fiscal Year 2003 Baseline (June 2003), available at www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2003/basestructure2003. 

pdf.
52 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Table A-1.

U.S. Bases and Forces Stationed in Europe, by Service

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Installations and Environment, Department of Defense Base Structure Report, Fiscal Year 2003 Baseline (June 2003), available at 

www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2003/basestructure2003.pdf; Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate of Information Operations and Reports, Department of Defense Active-Duty Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by 

Country (309A) (September 30, 2002); and other Defense Department data.

Note: * = less than 500; ** = less than $500 million; U.K. = United Kingdom.

a. Includes the replacement value of excess facilities that the United Sates still owns.

b. Onshore personnel only.

Forward-Based Personnel

(Thousands) Installations

Combat

Support and 

Administration Total

Total 

Number

Number with 

Replacement

Value of More 

Than $1 Billion

Total

Replacement

Valuea

(Billions of dollars)

Army (Total Europe) 26 34 60 294 3 33

Air Force

Germany 5 10 15 55 2 9

Greenland 0 * *1 1 3

Italy 4 * 4 34 0 2

Portugal 0 1 1 20 0 1

Turkey 0 2 2 19 1 1

U.K. 5 5 10 50 1 5

Other 0 2 2 22 0 1

Subtotal 14 20 34 201 5 22

Navyb

Iceland 0 1 11 1 3

Italy 0 5 55 0 2

Spain 0 1 14 1 1

U.K. 0 1 1 3 0 **

Other 0 1 1 2 0 **

Subtotal 0 10 10 15 2 7

Marine Corpsb 0 1 1 0 0 0

Total 40 65 105 510 10 62
APPENDIX A CURRENT BASING OF AIR FORCE, NAVY, AND MARINE CORPS FORCES OVERSEAS 53

The Air Force has three other installations in Europe 

with replacement values exceeding $1 billion: one in 

Greenland, one in Turkey, and one in the United Kingdom. Although the Air Force has few people stationed in 

Greenland, it maintains a facility in Thule with an earlywarning radar that will provide a vital link in any system 

to defend the United States and its allies from ballistic 

missiles. The Thule installation represents a U.S. investment of $2.7 billion. In Turkey, Incirlik Air Base, valued 

at $1.1 billion, is home to the 39th Air Base Wing and 

serves as a prime staging location to reach many of the 

world’s trouble spots. In the United Kingdom, the air 

base at Lakenheath (home of the 48th Fighter Wing) has 

a replacement value of $1.5 billion.

The Navy and Marine Corps in Europe

The Navy and Marine Corps have far fewer personnel 

and installations ashore in Europe than the Army or the 

Air Force, and neither service has any combat forces 

based on shore in Europe. The Navy divides 10,000 support and administrative personnel among 15 installations, including two air stations (one in Iceland and one 

in Italy). The Marine Corps has about 1,000 support and 

administrative personnel based at other services’ facilities 

(the Marines do not have any bases in Europe).

One of the Navy’s installations, the Keflavik Air Station 

in Iceland, represents the largest U.S. military investment 

in Europe—with an estimated replacement value of $3.4 

billion. The base is a legacy of World War II, when the 

British and then the Americans used it as a staging area to 

defend North Atlantic shipping routes. The base served a 

similar role during the Cold War and now supports maritime patrol and air-defense activities as well as aircraft 

traveling between North America and Europe.

The Air Force in East Asia 

and the Pacific 

The Air Force has three fighter wings and two additional 

fighter squadrons stationed in East Asia, accounting for 

approximately 14,000 of the 23,000 airmen based in the 

region (the rest are assigned to administrative or support 

units). The 8th Fighter Wing and the 51st Fighter Wing 

are based in South Korea, along with the 7th Air Force 

and supporting units. The 35th Fighter Wing and two 

F-15 squadrons of the 18th Composite Wing are based in 

Japan, as well as the 5th Air Force, the 374th Airlift 

Wing, and various supporting units. Overall, most of the 

Air Force personnel stationed in South Korea are associated with combat units, whereas about half of the Air 

Force personnel based in Japan are assigned to support 

and administrative units (see Table A-2).

To support and house its forces in Asia, the Air Force 

maintains a total of 67 installations. Of those, 44 are in 

Japan and 19 are in South Korea.4

 The largest are the 

Kadena Air Base and the nearby Kadena Ammunition 

Storage Annex in Japan (more than 11,000 acres and a 

value in excess of $5 billion) and the Misawa Air Base in 

Japan (almost 4,000 acres and a value of $4 billion). Facilities in Japan also include five housing annexes for personnel and their families, several communications stations, and two air ranges.

Air Force installations in South Korea are not as extensive 

as those in Japan, but they do include two large air bases. 

One is at Kunsan, on the southwestern coast more than 

100 miles south of the border, and is home to the 8th 

Fighter Wing. The other is at Osan, less than 50 miles 

south of the border, making it the closest major U.S. air 

base to North Korea. The 7th Air Force and the 51st 

Fighter Wing are based at Osan along with other units. 

Those two bases occupy 2,600 and 1,800 acres, respectively, and together are valued at a total of $3.2 billion.

The Navy in East Asia and the Pacific

All told, the Navy has about 6,000 personnel stationed 

ashore in Japan and a total of 12 installations to support 

them. The base at Yokosuka—which encompasses six 

separate installations—is the Navy’s largest and most strategically important overseas base in the world. It houses 

the Seventh Fleet and is home port for the aircraft carrier 

Kitty Hawk. Yokosuka’s features include a ship repair facility and the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (the 

largest naval facilities of their type in the Western Pacific), 

a hospital, a communications station, and various facilities to support fleet activities and personnel. All told, the 

base has a value of $5.7 billion. 

The Navy also operates a base in Japan at Sasebo, where 

elements and the commander of the Amphibious Squadron Eleven are based. That base includes much less exten4. The Air Force also has three installations in Australia and one in 

Singapore.
54 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Table A-2.

U.S. Bases and Forces Stationed in East Asia and the Pacific, by Service

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Installations and Environment, Department of Defense Base Structure Report, Fiscal Year 2003 Baseline (June 2003), available at 

www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2003/basestructure2003.pdf; Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate of Information Operations and Reports, Department of Defense Active-Duty Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by 

Country (309A) (September 30, 2002); and other Defense Department data.

Notes: * = less than 500; ** = less than $500 million.

Excludes forces based in Hawaii or U.S. territories, such as Guam.

a. Includes the replacement value of excess facilities that the United Sates still owns.

b. Onshore personnel only.

sive facilities than Yokosuka, with an estimated replacement value of $1.2 billion. 

The other Navy installation of note in Japan is Atsugi 

Naval Air Facility, which is home to Carrier Air Wing 

Five (CVW-5), the Navy’s only forward-stationed air 

wing. CVW-5 comprises eight squadrons, including four 

equipped with F-18s, and about 2,000 personnel.5

 It is 

permanently attached to the Kitty Hawk, which means 

when that carrier is under way, CVW-5 deploys on board 

it. When the Kitty Hawk is in port, however, the air wing 

returns to its home base at Atsugi. The Atsugi facility 

covers 2,600 acres and has an estimated replacement 

value of $1.9 billion. 

Navy forces and installations in South Korea are much 

smaller than those in Japan. The main role of U.S. naval 

Forward-Based Personnel

(Thousands) Installations

Combat

Support and 

Administration Total

Total 

Number

Number with 

Replacement

Value of More 

Than $1 Billion

Total

Replacement

Valuea

(Billions of dollars)

Army 13 17 30 95 2 11

Air Force

Japan 7 7 14 44 3 14

South Korea 7 3 10 19 2 4

Other 0 * * 4 0 **

Subtotal 14 10 23 67 5 18

Navyb

Japan 0 6 6 12 6 9

South Korea 0 0 0 2 0 **

Other 0 * * 2 0 **

Subtotal 0 6 6 16 6 9

Marine Corpsb

Japan 10 10 20 2 2 6

Total 37 43 79 180 15 44

5. Those personnel are not included in the tallies of Navy personnel 

based on shore.
APPENDIX A CURRENT BASING OF AIR FORCE, NAVY, AND MARINE CORPS FORCES OVERSEAS 55

personnel in South Korea is to provide leadership and expertise in naval matters to area military commanders. 

Consequently, no naval personnel are permanently assigned to that country, and naval facilities share a base 

(Yongsan Garrison in downtown Seoul) with the Army. 

Elsewhere in East Asia and the Pacific, the Navy maintains small facilities in Australia, where it operates a communications station, and in Singapore, Hong Kong, and 

Indonesia.

The Marine Corps in East Asia 

and the Pacific

The Marine Corps’s only significant Asian presence is in 

Japan, where it has about 20,000 active-duty personnel 

stationed. Most of those troops are located on the island 

of Okinawa, at installations that occupy a significant portion of the island and represent a major U.S. investment. 

Those forces include the Marines’ only division-sized unit 

stationed overseas: the III Marine Expeditionary Force 

(MEF), whose mission is to support contingency plans 

and operations in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean 

regions. The III MEF, with a total of 17,000 personnel, 

has been based on Okinawa since 1971. Its subordinate 

units include the First Marine Air Wing and the Third 

Marine Division. 

To support those units, the Marines maintain two large 

installations in Japan. Camp Butler, on Okinawa, is made 

up of several facilities that cover a total of 78,500 acres 

and have a replacement value of $4.8 billion. The Iwakuni Air Station on the island of Honshu, which is home 

to around half of the 1st Marine Air Wing, covers about 

6,600 acres and has a replacement value of about $1.7 

billion. (Other units assigned to that air wing, including 

its headquarters, are based on Okinawa.)

B

How CBO Estimated the Costs

of the Alternatives in This Report

The cost estimates for the alternative basing structures described in this study have two major components: 

one-time costs or savings that would arise during a 10-

year phase-in period, when new facilities would be constructed and units relocated to their new bases, and annual costs or savings that would occur once the phase-in 

period was over. This appendix describes the methods 

that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) used to estimate those costs for a variety of factors, such as construction, relocation of personnel, equipment purchases, base 

operations, housing, and so on. Those estimates represent 

incremental costs—the costs or savings that would occur 

relative to the total cost of maintaining the current overseas basing structure. They are not relative to the cost of 

the Army’s plans because specific details about those plans 

were not available to CBO. 

The estimates of both up-front costs and subsequent recurring costs or savings are presented in 2004 dollars. A 

net-present-value analysis—which would put the two 

types of costs in comparable terms by considering the effects of inflation and the opportunity cost of money—

could not be done for these alternatives. Such an analysis 

requires a more complete understanding of the time pattern of costs and savings than now exists.

The actual costs or savings of rebasing U.S. troops depend on specifics about the size, type (combat or support), and location of units that would be relocated. Because all of those factors are unknown at this time, the 

cost estimates in this report are necessarily uncertain. To 

produce those estimates, CBO developed generalized cost 

factors and methodologies that could be applied to all of 

the alternatives. Those factors and estimates are discussed 

in detail below and summarized in Table B-1.

CBO collected data from a wide range of sources to construct cost factors and estimates for the alternatives in this 

study. Data on construction costs came from the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) Base Structure Report.1 Preliminary cost estimates for the Efficient Basing Germany initiative in Europe and the South Korean Land Partnership 

Plan were based on briefings and data from the Army. 

Factors for estimating the costs of constructing and 

operating forward bases were based on costs presented in 

recent budget-justification materials for operations in Kosovo and for the Army’s operation and maintenance budget accounts. Cost estimates for construction and operation of military housing were based on the Army’s 

recently published master plans for family housing and 

barracks. Data for estimating the costs of building and 

operating DoD schools came from annual reports and 

budget-justification materials for the DoD dependents’ 

education system and from Impact Aid reports by the 

Department of Education.

2

 Cost-of-living allowances for 

overseas stationing were calculated from Army pay tables,

APPENDIX

1. Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of 

Defense for Installations and Environment, Department of Defense 

Base Structure Report: Fiscal Year 2003 Baseline (June 2003), available at www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2003/basestructure2003. 

pdf.

2. When service members’ children attend public schools rather than 

DoD schools, public school districts receive Impact Aid payments 

from the Department of Education to make up for the fact that 

many active-duty military personnel do not pay property taxes, 

the traditional source of school funding. 
58 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Table B-1.

Summary of Cost Factors Used in the Estimates

(2004 dollars)

CONUS Europe South Korea Unit of Measurement

One-Time, Nonrecurring Costs or Savings

Construction of Permanent Basesa

Headquarters, operations

facilities, infrastructure

82,000 126,000 110,000 Cost per person

MWR facilities 7,600 9,300 8,100 Cost per person

Barracks 26 million/

400 personnel

21 million/

350 personnel

18 million/

350 personnel

Cost/number of personnel per barrack

Schools for dependents 12 million 14 million 13 million Average cost of school with 450 spaces

Cancelled Overseas Constructiona n.a. 61,000 31,000 Savings per person

Construction of Forward bases n.a. 250 million 225 million Cost per base

New Prepositioned Equipment n.a. 1.6 billion 1.6 billion Cost per brigade set

Relocation of Units n.a. 15,000/7,000 17,000/5,000 Cost per person for movement to 

CONUS/intratheater movement

Annual Recurring Costs or Savings (After 10-Year Transition)

Operation of Permanent Bases 27,000 36,000 28,000 Cost per person

Operation of Forward Bases n.a. 50 million 40 million Cost per base

Troop Rotations to Forward Bases n.a. 26 million/

17 million

26 million/n.a. Six-month rotation of a brigade from 

CONUS/intratheater rotation

Cancelled Overseas Construction n.a. 2,400 200 Savings per person

Housing

Barracksb 5,000/

30 percent

5,000/

45 percent

5,000/

90 percent

Cost per person/percentage of troops in 

barracks

DoD-owned family housingb,c n.a. 12,700/

40 percent

25,000/

5 percent

Cost per family/percentage of troops in 

DoD-owned family housing

DoD-leased family housing n.a. 14,000/

10 percent

29,300/

5 percent

Cost per family/percentage of troops in 

DoD-leased family housing

Housing allowancesd 11,400/

70 percent

12,600/

5 percent

n.a. Average cost per person/percentage of 

troops receiving a housing allowance

Education of Dependents

DoD dependent schools 11,400/

15 percent

12,600 12,600 Cost per student/percentage of children

in DoD schools

Public school districts (Impact Aid) 6,000/

85 percent

n.a. n.a. Cost per student/percentage of children

in public schools

Continued
APPENDIX B HOW CBO ESTIMATED THE COSTS OF THE ALTERNATIVES IN THIS REPORT 59

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: CONUS = continental United States; MWR = morale, welfare, and recreation; n.a. = not applicable; DoD = Department of Defense.

a. The cost factors displayed for construction in South Korea assume that the United States would pay 100 percent of the costs. The final 

estimates (shown in Table B-3) assume that the South Korean government would pay between zero and 85 percent of the costs. European 

construction costs for headquarters and infrastructure reflect costs in Eastern Europe. Construction in Western Europe, as in Alternative 

1B, would cost about 20 percent less.

b. Cost factors for DoD-owned barracks and family housing do not include construction. Construction costs or savings from the elimination 

of family housing are included in the factor for canceled overseas construction.

c. Currently, about 20 percent of troops based in CONUS live in DoD family housing. However, CBO assumes that families relocated to 

CONUS from overseas bases would instead receive a housing allowance to buy or rent their own units or would use privatized housing. In 

alternatives in which families would be relocated from current overseas bases to new overseas bases, CBO assumes that all new family 

housing would be leased.

d. In addition to the percentage shown, troops on overseas unaccompanied tours receive housing allowances for their families in CONUS.

and estimates for the relocation of troops, base operations, and permanent-change-of-station moves were 

based on top-level data extracted from Army military 

personnel and operations and maintenance budget data 

and from cost models. 

Methodologies for Estimating 

One-Time Costs or Savings

The one-time, or nonrecurring, costs of construction and 

relocation for each alternative depend on the location, 

size, and number of new bases required. Building new 

bases would be more expensive overseas than in the 

United States because of higher construction costs and 

the need for additional infrastructure improvements. 

Forces relocated to the United States could in some cases 

use existing buildings and infrastructure, which would 

help decrease construction costs. Construction costs also 

could be offset to some degree by canceling construction 

projects in Europe or South Korea that would no longer 

be necessary. 

CBO assumed that the phase-in period for completing all 

of the alternatives is 10 years, during which new facilities 

would be built or renovated to accommodate the relocated units. In reality, some or all of the units could be relocated sooner than 10 years, at which time some annual 

recurring costs or savings would begin to accrue. However, because of the number of troops involved and the 

long lead times necessary for construction, the full cost 

and benefits of the transition would not be realized until 

long after the troops were physically relocated.

Construction of Permanent Bases

The largest one-time cost of rebasing Army troops would 

be for the construction and renovation of facilities—inTable B-1.

Continued

(2004 dollars)

CONUS Europe South Korea Unit of Measurement

Annual Recurring Costs (Continued)

Special Pay and Allowances

Overseas cost-of-living allowance n.a./n.a. 5,100/9,000 1,000/4,200 Average cost per person/average for 

accompanied personnel

Family-separation allowance 1,200 1,200 1,200 Cost per family (unaccompained)

Permanent-Change-of Station Moves

To or from CONUS 5,600/9,400 6,900/11,500 6,900/11,500 Cost per unmarried soldier/family (every 

three years)

Overseas one-year 

unaccompanied tour

n.a. 2,000 2,000 Cost per person
60 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

cluding unit headquarters, maintenance and other operations-related facilities, base infrastructure (such as sidewalks and utilities), and barracks and cafeterias to house 

and feed the troops. The Army would also need to build 

new commissaries and exchanges and, in some locations, 

schools for soldiers’ children. CBO estimated costs for 

four categories of construction:

B Headquarters, operations-related facilities, and base 

infrastructure;

B Morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) facilities;

B Barracks and family housing; and

B Schools for dependent children.

In the absence of specific Army plans, CBO assumed that 

requirements for the first two categories would generally 

be the same no matter where troops were based, whereas 

requirements for housing and schools would most likely 

vary by location. (The exception would be construction 

of forward operating bases, which was estimated separately in this analysis.)

Ideally, the first step in estimating the construction costs 

for each alternative would be to quantify the amount of 

excess facilities available in the United States, Europe, and 

South Korea. The next step would be to analyze the facility needs of each unit designated for relocation. The 

Army has a model called the Real Property Planning and 

Analysis System (RPLANS) that is designed to perform 

those analyses. The Army denied CBO’s request for access to the RPLANS model, so instead, CBO examined 

costs for recent analogous construction projects and used 

that information to develop generalized construction-cost 

factors. Those factors take into account project location 

(continental United States, Europe, or South Korea) and 

whether the Army can use existing facilities in those locations.

For the most part, CBO’s cost estimates for construction 

represent the total cost of building new facilities or renovating existing ones. For construction in Europe, CBO 

assumed that the United States would pay 100 percent of 

that cost. For construction in South Korea, CBO used 

various assumptions about contributions from the host 

nation, with the U.S. share of construction costs ranging 

from about 35 percent to 100 percent in Alternatives 1C, 

2A, and 2B. For Alternative 1B, CBO assumed that the 

U.S. share would range from about 15 percent to 100 

percent, on the basis of preliminary discussions and data 

related to the Land Partnership Plan.

Headquarters, Operations Facilities, and Base Infrastructure. CBO collected costs and technical descriptions 

of recent brigade-sized construction projects to estimate 

the costs of building headquarters, maintenance and 

other operations-related facilities, and base infrastructure. 

The most analogous project for estimating purposes is the 

ongoing construction at Grafenwoehr, Germany—a 

project in which various components of a brigade combat 

team (about 3,400 soldiers in all) are being consolidated 

at one facility. Grafenwoehr is a useful example because it 

involves both the construction of new facilities and the 

renovation of existing buildings. CBO expects that both 

new construction and renovation would also occur if 

troops were relocated to the continental United States. 

According to briefings from the Army’s 5th Signal Command, recent cost estimates for the Grafenwoehr project 

total almost $400 million (excluding the costs of barracks 

and family housing). That $400 million figure covers a 

wide assortment of buildings and infrastructure needed 

for a brigade-sized unit, including headquarters facilities, 

maintenance shops, storage facilities, and improvements 

to utilities and other infrastructure.

CBO used the Grafenwoehr costs to create per-person 

cost factors, which could be applied to the force levels 

and locations discussed in each alternative.3

 CBO then 

applied location-adjustment factors from the Army Corps 

of Engineers to the per-person costs to account for the 

differences in construction costs between Europe, South 

Korea, and the United States. For alternatives requiring 

construction in Eastern Europe and South Korea, CBO 

added another 25 percent to costs to account for the fact 

that those locations might not have as many existing facilities as Europe or the United States and thus could 

require more new facilities and infrastructure. Those calculations produced per-person construction costs for 

headquarters, operations facilities, and infrastructure of 

3. Measuring construction costs on a per-person basis suggests a linear relationship between cost and number of people. In reality, 

there would be a substantial amount of overhead and other fixed 

costs that would depend on the overall size and number of facilities that would be constructed and occupied—numbers that are 

unknown at this time. The construction estimates in this study 

assume that relocated Army units would occupy facilities sufficient in size to house one brigade each. 
APPENDIX B HOW CBO ESTIMATED THE COSTS OF THE ALTERNATIVES IN THIS REPORT 61

$82,000 for soldiers relocated to the continental United 

States (CONUS), $110,000 for troops relocated within 

South Korea, and $126,000 for troops moved from Germany to Eastern Europe (see Table B-1).

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Facilities. U.S. military 

bases typically include such MWR facilities as commissaries, exchanges, recreation centers, movie theaters, and 

bowling alleys. Using planning cost factors from the 

Army Corps of Engineers, CBO estimated that building 

enough of those facilities in the United States to serve 

about 5,000 troops would cost approximately $38 million, which translates into a per-person cost of $7,600. 

CBO estimated that building those same facilities in 

South Korea and Europe would cost about $8,100 and 

$9,300 per person, respectively, with location-adjustment 

factors included.

Barracks and Housing. Troop barracks and family housing constitute much of the value of U.S. military facilities. Unlike the construction categories discussed above, 

troop housing does not easily lend itself to using one perperson cost factor because housing for soldiers can take 

several forms, each of which has a different cost. Possible 

housing options include living in barracks, militaryowned family housing, or government-leased housing or 

receiving a monthly allowance to rent or buy housing in 

the private sector. In addition, the manner in which soldiers are housed often varies by location. For instance, a 

higher percentage of troops live in barracks at overseas 

bases than in the United States because they are not as 

likely to be accompanied by their dependents.

In estimating the cost of housing construction, CBO included only costs associated with building new barracks 

for unmarried or unaccompanied personnel. CBO assumed that any change in requirements for family housing that resulted from the alternatives in this study would 

be addressed through housing allowances in CONUS or 

leased housing in overseas locations. (Costs or savings for 

those requirements would be of a recurring nature and 

are discussed in the section on recurring costs.)

Using information about recent construction projects 

contained in the Army’s budget-justification materials, 

CBO estimated that a typical barrack in an overseas location would hold about 350 personnel and cost about $20 

million. CBO also estimated that a typical barrack in 

CONUS would house about 400 personnel and cost 

about $26 million. (Apart from housing more personnel, 

barracks in CONUS are typically larger in terms of 

square footage per person, which is why they are more expensive. The size of overseas barracks, especially in South 

Korea, is often limited by land constraints.) Because 

many troops assigned overseas are unaccompanied, relocating them to or within overseas locations would require 

building more barracks spaces than if they were relocated 

to CONUS.

For Alternative 1A, which would make all tours in Europe unaccompanied, CBO assumed that space for about 

28,000 unaccompanied personnel would need to be constructed. However, it is possible that vacated family housing could be converted for that purpose, which would 

lower the overall one-time cost of the alternative.

Schools for Dependent Children. About 21,000 children 

of Army personnel are educated in schools operated by 

DoD in Europe. Another 1,600 Army children are enrolled in DoD schools in South Korea. Any relocation of 

Army personnel to new overseas bases would most likely 

require the construction of DoD schools.

For the options in which troops would be restationed to 

CONUS, CBO assumed that DoD would need to construct school spaces for only about 15 percent of the children who would return to the United States—about the 

same percentage as the share of military children in CONUS who now attend DoD schools. CBO assumed that 

the other 85 percent of returning children (as many as 

18,000) would enroll in local school districts, although 

the percentage could be higher near large cities and lower 

in more remote areas. DoD would not incur construction 

costs for students who attended local district schools, but 

the federal government would incur annual costs for additional Department of Education Impact Aid (discussed 

below in the section on recurring costs).

On the basis of data in recent budget-justification materials provided by DoD, CBO estimated that each new 

DoD school built in CONUS would have spaces for 

about 450 children and would cost about $12 million. 

Constructing a DoD school overseas would be slightly 

more expensive: $13 million in South Korea and $14 

million in Europe, CBO estimated.

Cancelled Overseas Construction

A review of recent plans cited by the General Accounting 

Office and the Future Years Defense Program suggests 

that the Army will need to make a significant investment 
62 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

to renew facilities in Europe and South Korea if troops remain at their current locations.4

 Moving units to CONUS or to new bases overseas would eliminate the need 

to fund construction projects to maintain those older facilities, producing savings that would partly offset the 

construction costs described above. Because DoD has not 

made public any decisions about the future size of the 

permanent Army presence overseas, CBO cannot estimate with any accuracy the annual funding level needed 

to maintain the facilities associated with that overseas 

presence.

Instead, CBO developed a 10-year estimate of funding 

requirements for Europe and South Korea on the basis of 

DoD’s 2003 Base Structure Report. That report includes 

measures of plant replacement value (PRV)—DoD’s estimate of the cost to replace all of the facilities on U.S. military bases in a region using current construction standards. The estimated PRV for Army bases in Germany 

totals about $30 billion; the PRV for South Korea is almost $8 billion. Not all of the facilities in those areas require replacement, however. About 25 percent of the $30 

billion and $8 billion figures represents excess facilities or 

those operated by foreign governments, which would 

probably not need to be replaced. CBO adjusted the 

PRVs downward by 25 percent and then divided them by 

67—DoD’s target average replacement age for its facilities—to estimate the annual construction budgets needed 

to keep Army facilities in Europe and South Korea at acceptable standards. 

By CBO’s calculation, those budgets would total about 

$340 million a year for Germany and $90 million a year 

for South Korea (assuming that the United States paid 

the entire cost). Assuming that the alternatives in this 

study would be phased in over 10 years, CBO estimated 

that potential savings from forgoing all construction and 

maintenance of Army facilities in Germany over that period would total $3.4 billion. Similar savings from forgoing all construction and maintenance of Army facilities in 

South Korea would total almost $900 million. CBO then 

estimated construction savings for each alternative on the 

basis of the number of troops that would be restationed 

to CONUS or other locations.

Construction of Forward Operating Bases

In several of the alternatives in this study, permanent U.S. 

presence overseas would be replaced with equipment 

prepositioned in a region and periodic rotations of units 

to forward bases. In those alternatives, each of the forward bases would be sized to accommodate brigade-sized 

units and have facilities and functions similar to that of 

Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo. On the basis of data reported 

for the construction of Camp Bondsteel, CBO estimated 

that each forward operating base would cost about $250 

million to build—including about $100 million for storage, maintenance, and operations-related facilities and 

$150 million for barracks and other troop-support facilities and infrastructure.

Purchases of Prepositioned Equipment

Additional military equipment would need to be prepositioned overseas under several of the alternatives. Because 

of the ongoing unit transformations in which some of the 

Army’s heavy brigades are being converted to the lighter 

Stryker brigade configuration, CBO believes that enough 

excess military equipment could be available to provide 

the additional brigade sets needed for those alternatives. 

The exception is Alternative 2A, which would maintain 

current U.S. troop levels in Europe and South Korea by 

using continuous six-month rotations. The demands of 

that rotation schedule would probably require rotating almost every type of combat unit to those locations, including the new Stryker brigades. Thus, for Alternative 2A, 

CBO assumed that the Army would need to purchase 

Stryker brigade sets to preposition in both South Korea 

and Europe. Buying equipment to outfit an additional 

Stryker brigade would cost about $1.6 billion, CBO estimated from data in Army budget-justification materials.

Relocation of Units to New Bases 

Relocating U.S. forces to new bases would require transporting substantial amounts of equipment and moving 

thousands of soldiers and their families. Using data from 

Army budget-justification materials and operation and 

maintenance cost models, CBO estimated that moving a 

division from an overseas base back to the United States 

would result in a one-time cost of about $200 million, or 

$15,000 per person.5

 Relocating a unit up to 500 miles

4. See General Accounting Office, Defense Infrastructure: Basing 

Uncertainties Necessitate Reevaluation of U.S. Construction Plans 

in South Korea, GAO-03-643 (July 2003).

5. The cost of relocating units to new bases would depend on the 

type of units being moved. For instance, a heavy armor unit would 

have much more expensive transportation requirements than a 

finance unit. In estimating relocation costs for this study, CBO 

calculated a per-person cost factor based on a division-sized unit, 

which allows various unit types to be factored in and properly 

weighted. 
APPENDIX B HOW CBO ESTIMATED THE COSTS OF THE ALTERNATIVES IN THIS REPORT 63

(such as from positions near the Korean demilitarized 

zone to areas south of Seoul) would cost about $5,000 

per person, in CBO’s estimate. Relocating a unit up to 

1,000 miles (such as from Germany to new bases in Eastern Europe) would cost $7,000 per person. (Costs do not 

change proportionately with distance because of the fixed 

costs of preparing and packing equipment and other 

items.) 

Those costs include relocating civilian employees of the 

Army who are U.S. citizens. CBO estimated that as many 

as 10,000 such civilians in Europe and 2,000 in South 

Korea could be affected by the alternatives in this study.

Methodologies for Estimating 

Recurring Costs or Savings

Once the relocation of troops and their families was complete, annual costs or savings would occur. CBO’s estimates of those recurring costs or savings are driven by two 

main factors—the number of personnel and dependents 

that would be relocated to the continental United States 

from overseas bases, and the number of unit rotations 

that would be made to and from overseas bases, including 

any new forward operating bases. Because it costs more to 

house and operate forces overseas, relocating troops and 

their families to CONUS would save money on base operations, family housing, dependent schools, overseas 

cost-of-living allowances, and permanent-change-ofstation (PCS) moves. Savings would also result from not 

having to invest in existing infrastructure overseas, which 

is typically more expensive to rebuild and maintain than 

in the United States.

Operation of Permanent Bases

The category of base operations refers to the service contracts and logistics required to run military bases. It includes delivery of supplies, such as food and spare parts, 

as well as contract support to operate base facilities and 

provide technical assistance. The cost of transporting 

supplies and contracting for support can vary significantly by location. CBO used data from operation and 

support cost models to calculate region-specific average 

operations costs for bases located in CONUS, South Korea, and Europe. It then converted those average costs 

into per-person factors that could be applied to the force 

levels associated with the alternatives in this study.

The average cost for base operations is higher overseas 

than in CONUS. Europe has the highest average cost 

(about $36,000 per person), followed by South Korea 

(about $28,000 per person after host-nation contributions), and the United States (about $27,000 per person). 

Those estimates exclude compensation for military personnel and the cost of operating barracks and family 

housing, which are treated separately in CBO’s analysis.

Operation of Forward Bases

For the alternatives that would replace permanent overseas presence with periodic troop rotations to forward 

bases, CBO used data from operation and support cost 

models to estimate average operations costs for a brigadesized base in Europe and South Korea. Adjusted to account for the reduced infrastructure and amenity requirements of a less permanent facility, the annual fixed cost of 

operating a forward base would total about $50 million 

in Europe and $40 million in South Korea, CBO estimated.

Troop Rotations

Besides the fixed cost of operating forward bases, the 

Army would incur expenses to rotate units to those bases 

on a periodic basis—including transportation costs for 

personnel, family-separation pay, and some additional 

support costs. Those costs would not include the cost of 

moving heavy equipment, since equipment would be 

prepositioned at those bases. Using data from operation 

and support models, CBO estimated that rotating troops 

from CONUS to forward bases in South Korea and Europe for six months at a time would cost about $26 million per brigade-sized unit. Conducting six-month rotations of troops between Germany and forward operating 

bases in Eastern Europe would cost about $17 million per 

brigade.

Cancelled Overseas Construction

As mentioned above, relocating units to CONUS would 

allow the Army to cancel planned construction projects 

overseas. Such restationing would also produce recurring 

construction savings over the long term, because all facilities, no matter where they are located, will eventually require replacement or modification. Savings would occur 

because the costs to replace or modify facilities would be 

less in the United States than in Europe or South Korea. 

To estimate those long-term annual savings, CBO began 

with the annual plant replacement values it used to calculate one-time construction savings: $340 million for 

Germany and $90 million for South Korea. It applied 

location-adjustment factors from the Army Corps of En-
64 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

gineers to calculate a comparable PRV for base facilities 

in CONUS to examine the difference between replacing 

those facilities overseas and replacing them in the United 

States. 

CBO treated the PRV related to family housing separately, because it assumed that no new family housing 

would be built as a result of relocating units to new bases 

(for reasons discussed in the housing section below). As a 

result, the entire annual replacement value of affected 

family housing would be counted as savings. That is especially important for alternatives that involve bases in Europe, where the annual PRV for family housing is about 

$90 million, CBO estimated.

According to that method, relocating troops from Europe 

to CONUS would save about $2,400 per person on construction each year, and relocating troops from South Korea would save $200 per person.6 The savings for South 

Korea should theoretically be a range because some of the 

facilities there would probably otherwise have been replaced by the South Korean government. However, even 

if the United States realized the full $200 savings per person, total annual construction savings from relocating 

troops from South Korea would not be significant.

Housing

As with the estimates of one-time costs to construct military housing, estimates of annual costs or savings for operating soldiers’ and dependents’ housing also depend on 

the location and type of housing used.

Barracks. As discussed above, the percentage of troops 

housed in barracks tends to be higher overseas than in the 

United States. Consistent with housing reports published 

in the Army’s master plans for barracks and family housing, CBO assumed that about 90 percent of the troops 

assigned to South Korea under the alternatives would be 

housed in barracks, compared with about 45 percent for 

Germany and 30 percent for CONUS.7 The Army does 

not publish information about the cost of operating individual barracks, so CBO used operation and support 

budget data and cost factors to calculate an annual cost 

for operating barracks—about $5,000 per person.

Family Housing. The most expensive form of military 

housing is family housing owned or leased by DoD. Using data from DoD housing reports, CBO estimated that 

the annual cost to operate a unit of family housing averages about $25,000 in South Korea, $12,700 in Europe, 

and $8,000 in CONUS. (Those amounts exclude costs 

for long-term major construction, which are estimated 

separately.) The demand for and availability of DoD family housing varies by location. Analysis of the Army Family Housing Master Plan suggests that about 10 percent 

of soldiers stationed in South Korea use family housing, 

compared with 50 percent in Europe and about 20 percent in CONUS. (That 20 percent figure excludes families who receive housing allowances.)

In producing the estimates for this study, CBO assumed 

that the military would not build new governmentowned housing under any of the alternatives. Instead, 

CBO assumed that soldiers with families who relocated 

to CONUS would receive housing allowances to live in 

privatized housing or privately owned units. Likewise, 

CBO assumed that military families who were relocated 

to new overseas bases would occupy local housing leased 

by DoD. (However, if soldiers were relocated to remote 

areas with limited options for family housing, the Army 

might need to build such housing, which would increase 

the one-time costs of some of the alternatives.)

Housing Allowances. Currently, about half of all troops in 

the United States receive an allowance to live in privately 

owned housing or housing provided under the military 

housing privatization initiative. On the basis of Army 

budget-justification data, CBO estimated that the allowance averages about $11,400 per soldier, although the actual amount depends on a soldier’s rank, number of dependents, and location. 

In estimating the costs of the alternatives, CBO assumed 

that about 70 percent of troops relocated to CONUS 

would receive a housing allowance. That figure is larger 

than the current percentage because CBO assumed that 

troops with dependents who were relocated to CONUS 

would receive an allowance to live in privatized or private-sector family housing rather than live in newly built 

Army-owned housing. CBO also accounted for the fact 

that many soldiers stationed in South Korea receive hous6. That large difference in construction savings between Germany 

and South Korea is attributable to the larger proportion of family 

housing and other infrastructure in Germany as well as to the 

higher overall construction costs there.

7. Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for 

Installation Management, Army Barracks Master Plan, Fiscal Year 

2002 (June 2002) and Army Family Housing Master Plan, FY03-

09 (President’s budget version, February 2003).
APPENDIX B HOW CBO ESTIMATED THE COSTS OF THE ALTERNATIVES IN THIS REPORT 65

ing allowances to support their families back in the 

United States. CBO assumed that in Alternatives 1A and 

1C, which would reduce the number of accompanied 

tours to Europe, soldiers who left their families in CONUS would also draw housing allowances while living in 

barracks.

Schools for Dependent Children

The annual cost of operating DoD schools overseas is 

about $12,600 per student, CBO estimates, 10 percent 

higher than the cost of operating DoD schools in CONUS. Thus, relocating dependents from overseas bases to 

the United States would save money. In estimating the 

cost of providing dependent education, CBO assumed 

that DoD would create spaces for about 15 percent of the 

children relocated to CONUS and that the other 85 percent would attend public schools—consistent with current percentages. (For dependents attending public 

schools, Impact Aid averages about $6,000 per student, 

according to data from the Department of Education.) 

The actual number of additional spaces that DoD would 

need to create in CONUS would depend on where units 

were ultimately relocated. If they were based near large 

cities and population areas, local school districts should 

have sufficient facilities to absorb the additional students. 

But if units were relocated to more-remote areas, DoD 

would probably need to provide additional school spaces.

Special Pay and Allowances

Troops stationed overseas currently receive a cost-ofliving allowance to offset the greater expense of personal 

goods and services in those locations. DoD’s cost-ofliving-adjustment pay tables suggest that the annual cost 

of furnishing those allowances averages about $1,000 per 

person in South Korea and about $5,100 per person in 

Europe. (The actual amount of the allowance depends on 

location and whether the service member is accompanied 

by dependents.)

Alternatives that returned personnel to the United States 

would save money because fewer soldiers would be eligible for the cost-of-living allowance. Conversely, options 

that increased the number of accompanied tours in South 

Korea would raise the costs associated with cost-of-living 

allowances. 

Alternatives that altered the number of accompanied 

overseas tours would also affect the number of soldiers eligible for another type of special pay: family-separation 

allowances. Under current law, soldiers collect $250 a 

month when on assignments that separate them from 

their families. The authority to provide that allowance 

will expire at the end of fiscal year 2004 unless the authorization is extended. If not, family-separation allowances 

will drop back to $100 per month—the level paid before 

April 2003. The estimates in this study assume payments 

at the $100 per month level.

Permanent-Change-of-Station Moves

One drawback of stationing troops overseas is the cost of 

transporting personnel and their belongings to new duty 

stations. Costs can be especially high if the soldiers are accompanied by their families, requiring the transportation 

of household goods. Using operation and maintenance 

budget data provided by the Army, CBO estimated that 

the average cost of a PCS move to or from an overseas 

location is about $9,200. (Actual costs are higher for families and lower for single service members.) By comparison, the average cost of a typical move within the continental United States is about $7,500. That difference 

suggests that relocating troops to CONUS would result 

in lower overall PCS costs. Those savings would be magnified by the fact that each rotation involves two PCS 

moves: one for the soldier leaving a duty station and another for the new arrival.

Several of the alternatives (1A and 1C) would produce 

higher annual PCS costs because they would implement 

one-year unaccompanied tours in Europe. A typical PCS 

move for a one-year unaccompanied overseas tour costs 

only about $2,000, CBO estimated.8 However, those 

moves would happen every year instead of the more typical three-year tours, eliminating any savings that would 

result from not having to move families overseas. Additional costs would also occur because of increased movement of families between locations in the United States. 

Most soldiers’ families would either remain in place until 

the soldiers returned from the unaccompanied tours or 

move to their next CONUS duty station (if known). 

However, a small number—10 percent, CBO assumed—

would make an additional PCS move within the United 

States once when their soldiers departed for overseas duty 

and another when those soldiers returned.

8. Troops assigned to such tours are limited in the amount of personal belongings they may bring with them, which is why those 

moves cost significantly less than a regular three-year move.
66 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Results of the Cost Analysis

CBO produced cost estimates for each of the proposed alternatives using the cost factors described above. Not all 

of those factors apply to every option (see Table B-2). For 

instance, unlike the other alternatives, 1A would not involve relocating any units, and 2A would require the 

Army to purchase additional equipment. Alternatives 1A 

and 1C would increase some PCS costs, whereas the 

other options would create savings in that category.

Alternatives That Would Maintain 

Current Force Levels Overseas 

As detailed in Chapter 3, the first set of options for 

changing the Army’s overseas basing would retain the current level of U.S. forward presence. Alternative 1A, which 

would eliminate accompanied tours in Europe, would entail one-time costs of about $825 million, CBO estimates—comprising about $1.6 billion to build new 

housing for unaccompanied personnel in Europe, partly 

offset by eliminating the need to maintain and upgrade 

family housing units there (see Table B-3). Once Alternative 1A was fully implemented, it would produce net annual costs of about $75 million (see Table B-4). Although 

savings would result from the reduced need for DoD dependents’ schools in Europe and for overseas cost-ofliving allowances, those savings would be more than offset by the cost of rotating the entire force in Europe on an 

annual basis and paying housing allowances for families 

in CONUS.

Alternatives 1B and 1C would relocate units based in 

South Korea and Europe to new bases in those theaters. 

In Alternative 1B, troops in South Korea would be 

moved to locations north of Seoul; in Alternative 1C, 

they would be moved to two locations south of the capital. Both options would also relocate troops in Germany 

to positions farther east. The total one-time costs of implementing Alternative 1B would range from $1.4 billion 

to $2.9 billion, CBO estimates, reflecting modest troop 

movements similar to the plans discussed as part of the 

Efficient Basing Germany initiative in Europe and the 

Land Partnership Plan in South Korea. Alternative 1C 

would require higher one-time costs, between $2.9 billion and $5.0 billion, because of the larger number of 

troops that would be relocated. (In both cases, the range 

of costs reflects varying assumptions about what portion 

of new construction might be paid for by the South Korean government.)9

 Conversely, Alternative 1C would 

not result in any significant annual costs or savings once 

it was implemented, CBO estimates, whereas Alternative 

1B would cost about $225 million per year because of the 

requirement to rotate units to new forward operating 

bases in Eastern Europe.

Alternatives That Would Halve 

Army Forces Overseas

Alternatives 2A and 2B would reduce the level of Army 

forces based in Germany and South Korea by about onehalf. In Alternative 2A, however, the U.S. military would 

maintain its current level of combat presence in Europe 

and South Korea by rotating troops there from CONUS. 

That option would have the highest one-time costs of any 

alternative in this study—$8.4 billion to $9.4 billion—

because of the need to build and operate forward bases 

and buy equipment for prepositioning. After that, however, the total recurring costs of Alternative 2A would be 

insignificant, CBO estimates.

Alternative 2B would have far lower one-time costs—

$4.8 billion to $5.8 billion—because it would involve the 

construction of fewer forward operating bases and would 

not require the purchase of two prepositioned sets of 

equipment for Stryker brigade combat teams. The need 

to operate fewer forward bases and conduct fewer rotations from CONUS would also reduce recurring costs, so 

on net, Alternative 2B would save about $500 million per 

year. 

Alternatives That Would Remove Almost All Army 

Forces from Germany and South Korea

The last two options, Alternatives 3A and 3B, would return almost all Army troops in South Korea and Germany to the continental United States. Although those 

alternatives would require significant up-front spending 

for construction in CONUS, they would offer the greatest potential for annual savings thereafter. CBO estimates 

that building new bases in CONUS to house and support 

the relocated soldiers and their dependents would cost a 

total of $8.6 billion for Alternative 3A and $9.0 billion

9. In calculating total net costs or savings, the relationship between 

construction costs and savings is treated as complementary. For 

instance, if CBO assumes that the South Korean government will 

pay for 65 percent of the cost of new bases, it also assumes that the 

government would have paid for 65 percent of the construction 

required to maintain the existing base structure—in which case, 

the savings that would accrue to the United States from cancelled 

construction projects at current bases would be only about 35 percent of the total cost of those projects. 
APPENDIX B HOW CBO ESTIMATED THE COSTS OF THE ALTERNATIVES IN THIS REPORT 67

Table B-2.

Categories of Potential Costs or Savings for Each Alternative

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Note: MWR = morale, welfare, and recreation; DoD = Department of Defense.

a. Included in the category “Troop Rotations to Forward Bases.”

for Alternative 3B. However, between 40 percent and 50 

percent of those construction costs could be offset by canceling planned overseas construction. Thus, on net, the 

one-time cost of implementing either Alternative 3A or 

3B would range from $6.8 billion to $7.4 billion (taking 

into account moving and other types of costs besides construction).

After a 10-year phase-in period, Alternative 3B would 

yield annual savings of $1.2 billion, mainly from the 

lower costs associated with operating bases in the United 

States and from not having to pay overseas cost-of-living 

allowances. Annual savings from Alternative 3A would be 

lower, about $925 million, because of the cost of periodic 

rotations to forward bases in Europe and South Korea.

Alt. 1A

Europe

Alt. 1B Alt. 1C Alt. 2A Alt. 2B Alt. 3A Alt. 3B

Europe

South 

Korea Europe

South 

Korea Europe

South 

Korea Europe

South 

Korea Europe

South 

Korea Europe

South 

Korea

One-Time, Nonrecurring Costs (+) or Savings (–)

Construction of Permanent Bases

Headquarters, operations

facilities, infrastructure

++ ++ ++ ++ ++ ++

MWR facilities + + + + + + + + + + + +

Barracks + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Schools for dependents + + + + + + + + + + + + +

Cancelled Overseas Construction – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Construction of Forward Bases + + + + + + + +

New Prepositioned Equipment + +

Relocation of Units + + + + + + + + + + + +

Annual Recurring Costs (+) or Savings (–)

Operation of Permanent Bases – – – – – – – –

Operation of Forward Bases + + + + + + + +

Troop Rotations to Forward Bases + + + + + +

Cancelled Overseas Construction – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Housing

Barracks + + – – – – – – – – –

DoD-owned family housing – – – – – – – – – – – – –

DoD-leased family housing – + + – + – – – – – – – –

Housing allowances + + – + + + + + + + +

Education of Dependents

DoD dependent schools – – + – – – – – – – –

Public school districts 

(Impact Aid)

+ + – ++ ++ ++ ++

Special Pay and Allowances

Overseas cost-of-living 

allowances

– –+ – – – – – – – –

Family-separation allowances + + – a – a – a – –

Permanent-Change-of-Station 

Moves

+ +– – – – – – – – –
68 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

Table B-3.

One-Time Costs or Savings of the Alternatives

(Millions of 2004 dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Notes: These numbers represent incremental costs or savings (those that would occur relative to the cost of maintaining the current basing 

structure).

CONUS = continental United States.

a. The ranges for construction costs and savings for South Korea reflect differing assumptions about the share of construction costs that 

would be paid by the South Korean government. For almost all alternatives that share ranges between zero and 65 percent of the total 

cost. The exception is Alternative 1B, which assumes that between zero and 85 percent of the cost would be paid by the South Korean 

government. In calculating total net costs or savings the relationship between construction costs and savings are treated as complementary. For instance, if CBO assumes that the South Korean government pays for 65 percent of the cost of new bases, it also assumes that 

the government would have paid for 65 percent of the construction required to maintain the existing base structure. In that case, the savings that would accrue to the United States from cancelled construction projects at current bases would only be about 35 percent of the 

total cost of those projects.

Alternative and Theater

Construction of

Permanent Bases

Cancelled

Overseas

Constructiona

Construction

of Forward

Bases

New PrePositioned 

Equipment

Relocation

of Units

Total Net

Nonrecurring

CONUS Overseas Costs a

1A: Make European Tours

Unaccompanied

Europe 75 1,625 -875 0 0 0 825

1B: Make Minor Changes in Basing

Europe 0 525 -200 750 0 25 1,100

South Korea 0 350 to 2,175 -125 to -400 0 0 50 275 to 1,825

1C: Make Extensive Changes in Basing

Europe 25 2,275 -725 0 0 75 1,650

South Korea 0 1,375 to 3,950 -250 to -750 0 0 100 1,225 to 3,300

2A: Maintain Current Combat 

Presence Overseas with Unit 

Rotations from CONUS

Europe 2,750 0 -1,525 1,000 1,550 375 4,150

South Korea 1,425 825 to 2,350 -300 to -850 450 1,550 275 4,225 to 5,200

2B: Halve Overseas Combat Presence

Europe 3,200 0 -1,775 750 0 425 2,600

South Korea 1,425 825 to 2,350 -300 to -850 0 0 275 2,225 to 3,200

3A: Maintain Reduced Combat 

Presence Overseas with Unit 

Rotations from CONUS

Europe 5,650 0 -3,125 750 0 750 4,025

South Korea 2,950 0 -300 to -850 225 0 450 2,775 to 3,325

3B: Return Virtually All Overseas 

Forces to CONUS

Europe 6,075 0 -3,350 500 0 800 4,025

South Korea 2,950 0 -300 to -850 225 0 450 2,775 to 3,325
APPENDIX B HOW CBO ESTIMATED THE COSTS OF THE ALTERNATIVES IN THIS REPORT 69

Table B-4.

Annual Costs or Savings of the Alternatives

(Millions of 2004 dollars)

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

Notes: These numbers represent incremental costs or savings (those that would occur relative to the cost of maintaining the current basing 

structure).

* = between -$13 million and $13 million; PCS = permanent change of station; CONUS = continental United States.

a. Does not include costs or savings related to long-term construction of family housing or barracks, which are included under canceled 

overseas construction.

b. In these alternatives, Camp Humphreys would be converted into a forward satellite base. Because that camp is an existing facility, CBO 

does not assign a significant marginal cost for operating it.

Alternative and Theater

Operation of 

Permanent 

Bases

Operation

of Forward

Bases

Troop

Rotations

to Forward

Bases

Cancelled 

Overseas 

Construction Housinga

Education

of Dependents

Special

Pay and 

Allowances

PCS

 Moves

Total Net 

Recurring 

Costs or 

Savings

1A: Make European Tours 

Unaccompanied

Europe 0 0 0 -50 100 -125 -75 225 75

1B: Make Minor Changes

in Basing

Europe 0 150 75 * * 0 0 0 225

South Korea 0 0 0 0 * 0 0 0 *

1C: Make Extensive

Changes in Basing

Europe 0 0 0 -25 25 -25 -25 50 *

South Korea 0 0 0 0 50 * * -25 25

2A: Maintain Current

Combat Presence Overseas 

with Unit Rotations from 

CONUS

Europe -225 200 200 -50 * -50 -125 -25 -75

South Korea * 75 100 * -25 * -25 -50 75

2B: Halve Overseas

Combat Presence

Europe -275 150 25 -75 * -50 -150 -25 -400

South Korea * 0 0 * -25 * -25 -50 -100

3A: Maintain Reduced

Combat Presence Overseas 

with Unit Rotations from 

CONUS

Europe -475 150 100 -125 25 -125 -250 -50 -750

South Korea -25 b 50 * -50 * -50 -100 -175

3B: Return Virtually All

Overseas Forces to CONUS

Europe -500 100 0 -125 25 -125 -275 -50 -950

South Korea -25 b 0 * -50 * -50 -100 -225

C

Deployment Tempo and Rotation Ratios 

for Active Army Forces

To analyze how many active-duty troops the Army 

would have available for other long-term commitments if 

it rotated brigades overseas from the United States on 

temporary deployments, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) had to make assumptions about rotation ratios—the number of units necessary to support one unit 

on a rotational deployment. This appendix examines the 

factors underlying the rotation ratios that CBO used in 

its analysis.

Unlike the Marine Corps, which has routinely maintained about 25 percent of its infantry battalions at sea or 

on Okinawa, Army units and personnel were not subject 

to long deployments on a continuing basis until the mid1990s. At that time, the Army began keeping 5 percent of 

its deployable force in operations overseas—a practice 

that some defense analysts and Army officials feared 

would harm readiness and troop morale.

The level of forces that the Army can sustain overseas depends on how much of the service is deployable and how 

much time, on average, those soldiers can spend away 

from home and still maintain sufficient levels of training 

and an acceptable quality of life. If deployment duty to 

overseas operations is shared equally among all personnel 

in the Army’s active component who can be deployed, 

the average amount of time in a given year that a soldier 

assigned to a deployable unit spends deployed will be 

roughly proportional to the amount of the force deployed. In the late 1990s, the 5 percent of deployable 

forces that the Army maintained overseas meant that the 

average soldier in a deployable unit spent about 20 days 

per year in overseas operations. (That soldier also spent 

more than 60 days away from home each year for training 

and joint exercises.) 

Under current practices, not all of the Army’s 480,000 

active-component personnel are immediately available for 

deployment. About 110,000 soldiers are assigned to duties—such as recruiting—that are not associated with 

units available to deploy.1 At any one time, another 

68,000 or so personnel are not available to deploy because they are in training, in school, in transit between assignments, or are sick. That leaves about 300,000 activecomponent Army personnel who are assigned to units—

such as armor battalions or military police companies—

that can be sent to operations overseas. It is from that 

pool of 300,000 that active-component Army forces for 

operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq are 

drawn.

The level of overseas operations that the Army can sustain 

with a given force will be determined by the deployment 

tempo (or time away from the home station) that is 

deemed acceptable and not too taxing on military personnel. As mentioned above, the levels of deployment that 

the Army experienced in the late 1990s, which resulted in 

an average of 20 days per year deployed to operations, 

were considered by some observers to be too taxing.2

 The 

appropriate deployment tempo—and therefore the required rotation ratio—is a matter of policy judgment. 

One benchmark, however, was set by the Congress in the 

APPENDIX

1. An enlisted soldier may typically spend two or three years in a 

nondeployable assignment (such as recruiting) and then move to 

an assignment in a deployable unit.

2. That level of deployment represents an average for the entire 

300,000-person deployable force. Some types of soldiers, and soldiers in some types of deployable units, experienced much higher 

levels of deployment during that period, and others experienced 

lower levels.
72 OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE ARMY’S OVERSEAS BASING

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, 

which established a program that would pay military personnel from any service a bonus of $100 for each day of 

deployment above a certain threshold. Originally set at 

250 days in a 365-day period, the threshold was later 

amended to 400 days in a 730-day period.3

 That level of 

deployment translates to an average deployment rate of 

200 days per year, or 55 percent of the time.4

The Congress defined deployment days to include not 

only days spent overseas for operations such as Iraqi Freedom but also days spent away from home at training 

ranges and on joint exercises. A study by RAND found 

that soldiers in deployable units spent an average of 63 

days per year away from home for training and at joint 

exercises in 2000.5 That pace would leave a maximum of 

about 140 days per year, on average, below the Congressional threshold that military personnel could be deployed to operations.6

Assuming that all deployable units were equally likely to 

be sent to operations overseas, limiting deployed time to 

140 days per year—or 38 percent of the time—would 

yield a cap of 38 percent on the share of deployable active-duty Army forces that could be deployed overseas for 

an extended period. Put another way, the ratio of total 

deployable forces to those that could be sustained overseas (referred to as the rotation base) would be approximately 3:1.

If higher or lower deployment levels were deemed acceptable, then lower or higher rotation ratios, respectively, 

would be required. For example, deployment levels that 

required soldiers to be away from home for all but 30

Table C-1.

Effect of Various Deployment Tempos 

on Rotation Ratios for 

Active-Component Units

Source: Congressional Budget Office.

days of leave per year (335 days, or 92 percent of the 

time) would require a small rotation base: only slightly 

more than 1. However, such a high level of deployment 

—roughly equal to three-quarters of the deployable force, 

and much higher than the current level of active Army 

forces deployed worldwide—would be hard to sustain for 

a long period. Conversely, if the need for both individual 

and collective training, as well as preparation and recovery, limited the average amount of time spent deployed to 

operations to 90 days per year (or 42 percent of the time, 

including training and exercises), a total of four soldiers 

in deployable units would be needed to support each service member deployed overseas.7

That requirement could be further increased—to a ratio 

of 5:1—if 20 percent of the Army’s deployable units were 

not available or not suitable to be used in overseas operations, or if other factors (such as transit time and time 

when incoming and outgoing units overlap) reduced the 

efficiency of the unit rotation scheme to 80 percent 

rather than the 100 percent that CBO assumed in deriving the lower ratios (see Table C-1 and Figure C-1). In3. That change was enacted in the Floyd D. Spence National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.

4. The Department of Defense has been operating under a temporary waiver from that restriction since September 11, 2001.

5. Ronald E. Sortor and J. Michael Polich, Deployments and Army 

Personnel Tempo, MR-1417-A (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 

2001).

6. The deployment rates and ratios discussed in this analysis apply 

only to the 300,000 soldiers who are in deployable units. By definition, soldiers in other assignments do not deploy. If the total 

number of days deployed was averaged across the entire activecomponent Army of 480,000 personnel, the average deployment 

rate would be lower.

Rotation Ratio

Deployment Tempo

At 80 Percent 

Efficiency

At 100 Percent 

Efficiency

335 Days per Year 

(For all activities) 1.7:1 1.3:1

Congressional Threshold 

(200 days per year for all 

activities) 3.2:1 2.7:1

90 Days per Year 

Deployed to Operations 5.1:1 4.0:1

7. The authors of a recent RAND publication argue that reducing 

the time between six-month deployments below 18 months—or 

increasing the fraction of time spent deployed to more than 25 

percent—would place considerable stress on units. See W. 

Michael Hix, J. Michael Polich, and Thomas P. Lippiatt, Army 

Stationing and Rotation Policy, DB-421-A (Santa Monica, Calif.: 

RAND, 2003), pp. 30-31.
APPENDIX C DEPLOYMENT TEMPO AND ROTATION RATIOS FOR ACTIVE ARMY FORCES 73

Figure C-1.

Average Share of Time That a Soldier in an Average Unit Would Spend Deployed 

Under Various Deployment Tempos

(Percentage of time deployed)

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Ronald E. Sortor and J. Michael Polich, Deployments and Army Personnel Tempo, 

MR-1417-A (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001) and on data from the Department of Defense.

Note: The ratios shown in this figure are the rotation ratios implied by the various deployment tempos and efficiency levels.

deed, the rates at which the levels of deployed soldiers 

were supported in the late 1990s suggest that 80 percent 

is more representative of the efficiency that the Army has 

demonstrated in the past—when 5 percent of the Army 

was deployed 6 percent of the time.8

 Further justification 

for higher rotation ratios comes from Army analysts, who 

argue that a ratio of 5:1 is necessary to give units enough 

time to prepare, recover, and train for combat-related 

tasks without placing them and their personnel under undue stress.9

In summary, this analysis suggests that the Army would 

need a deployable rotation base of active-component 

forces that ranged from slightly more than one to five 

times the size of the forces maintained overseas. Intermediate values of three and four, however, seem to fall 

within the range of rotation bases that can be expected to 

be feasible over the long run.

0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Tempo of 335 days/year deployed for all activities

Congressional Threshold (Tempo of

200 days/year deployed for all activities)

Tempo of 90 days/year

deployed to operations

Pre-Sept. 11

Tempo

20.0:1 5.1:1 4.0:1

3.2:1 2.7:1

1.7:1 1.3:1

80 Percent Efficiency 100 Percent Efficiency

Thousands of Troops Deployed Worldwide Under a Given Deployment Tempo

8. See Sortor and Polich, Deployments and Army Personnel Tempo.

9. Briefing by the Army’s Rotation, Manning, and Mobilization 

Task Force, October 18, 2002.

Seoul

Camp Bonifas

Camp Casey

Camp Hovey

Camp Castle

Camp Greaves

Camp Garry Owen

Camp Giant

Camp Stanton

Camp Edwards

Camp Howze

Camp Market

Camp Colbern 

Yongsan Garrison

K-16 Airfi eld

Camp Yongin

Camp Red Cloud

Camp Jackson

Camp Stanley

Camp Sears

Camp Essayons

Camp LaGuardia

Camp Kyle

Camp Eagle

Camp Long

Suwon

Air Base

Osan Air Base

Camp Humphreys

Chongju Air Base

Kunsan Air Base

Kwangju Air Base

Pohang

Camp Mu Juk

Camp Carroll

Camp Walker

Camp Henry

Taegu Air Base

Kimhae

Air Base

Noksan

Camp Chinhae

Camp Hialeah

Camp Nimble

H-220 Heliport

Selected U.S. Military Facilities in South Korea

Camp Page