Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed June 11, 2019.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-18-00041-CV

IN THE MATTER OF J.K. 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4 

Fort Bend County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 17-CJV-021351 

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N 

Appellant J.K., a juvenile, appeals from the trial court’s adjudication order 

finding that he engaged in delinquent conduct by committing aggravated robbery.1

 

Appellant argues (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, and 

(2) the trial court’s findings are not supported by legally sufficient evidence. For 

the reasons below, we affirm. 

 

1 Appellant was fifteen years old at the time of the offense. To protect the identity of 

minors involved in this case, the minors, the minors’ parents, and other family members of the 

minors are identified by aliases. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(c)(1)(A)-(B), 9.9(a)(3). 
2

BACKGROUND

Appellant was arrested for aggravated robbery in connection with a stolen 

Xbox. Appellant pleaded “not true” to the allegations and proceeded to a bench 

trial. 

Complainant E.T., a seven-year-old girl, testified at Appellant’s trial.2 E.T. 

was home alone at her family’s apartment the afternoon of August 19, 2017, when 

an intruder “knocked a lot of times” on the apartment door before breaking in. 

E.T. testified the intruder was carrying a long black gun with “a little red on the top 

of the gun.” E.T. said the intruder told her something in a “mean voice” before 

walking into her seventeen-year-old brother’s bedroom and stealing her brother’s 

Xbox. The intruder left the apartment shortly afterwards. 

Describing the intruder, E.T. testified he was wearing black, blue, and red 

clothing, carrying a blue bag, and covering part of his face with a bandana. E.T. 

stated the intruder’s skin was “kind of dark, but . . . a little light,” and said his skin 

color was “peach, but darker.” 

When the intruder broke into the apartment, E.T. was on the phone with her 

mother, Tina, who was at work. Testifying at Appellant’s trial, Tina stated she 

could hear someone knocking on the door while she was on the phone with E.T. 

Tina then heard a “loud noise” and “a louder voice like someone broke in.” E.T. 

ended the phone call and Tina called the apartment office, letting them know 

someone had broken into the apartment. Tina left her job and drove to the 

apartment. 

 Joshua Grice, an employee at the apartment complex, answered Tina’s 

phone call and ran to the family’s apartment. When Grice got to the apartment, the 

 

2 E.T. was six years old at the time of the offense. 
3

front door was cracked open and the door’s locking mechanism was broken. Grice 

called out but no one responded. Grice walked away from the apartment building 

towards the complex’s fence line and observed a “younger black man” with a black 

and blue backpack walking away from the complex. Grice testified the individual 

was wearing a black shirt and black shorts and that a “bat or stick” was protruding 

out of the backpack. 

Grice walked back to the family’s apartment and found E.T. hiding 

underneath a blanket in the master bedroom. E.T. told Grice that a man entered the 

apartment carrying a gun and repeatedly asked E.T., “Where is my weed?” E.T. 

told Grice the man was wearing all black and covering his face. Grice called 911 

and two police officers, Deputy Christopher Arias and Detective Jessip Murphy, 

arrived at the family’s apartment. 

Before the officers’ arrival, Tina picked up E.T. from the apartment and left 

to get her son, V.T., from his friend’s house. Tina, E.T., and V.T. returned to the 

apartment approximately ten minutes after the officers’ arrival. Tina and V.T. 

spoke to the officers and, at Appellant’s trial, acknowledged they initially lied to 

the officers because they did not want to admit E.T. was home alone. Tina and 

V.T. testified that they eventually told the officers the “true version” of where they 

were when the apartment was broken into: Tina was at work and V.T. was staying 

at a friend’s house. 

Testifying at Appellant’s trial, Deputy Arias stated that E.T. told him “a bad 

man had entered or came into the resident’s apartment.” Deputy Arias asked E.T. 

whether the intruder was carrying a weapon and E.T. indicated the intruder was 

carrying a gun “like the duty weapon [Deputy Arias] had on [his] hip at the time.” 

Describing E.T.’s demeanor, Deputy Arias stated she “appeared as if a traumatic 

event had just occurred.” 
4

The officers also spoke to V.T. and asked him if he knew who may have 

been responsible for breaking into the apartment and taking the Xbox. V.T. told 

the officers about an incident several weeks before during which he and a friend 

were smoking marijuana in the apartment complex parking lot when they were 

approached by a young, African-American man. The young man identified 

himself as Appellant and the boys exchanged information about the high schools 

they attended. V.T. testified that he and Appellant attended the same school. V.T. 

said Appellant was acting “suspicious” that evening and was “just walking around 

in circles” at the apartment complex. 

After speaking with the family, Detective Murphy contacted the Fort Bend 

school district to get Appellant’s information and address. At 9:45 p.m. that 

evening, Detective Murphy and another detective arrived at Appellant’s address. 

The detectives knocked at Appellant’s front door for about 5-10 minutes before 

Appellant answered. Appellant said he was home alone and the detectives called 

Appellant’s mother and “gave her a rundown of what was happening.” Appellant’s 

mother came home and gave the detectives consent to search the house. In an 

upstairs room, the detectives found marijuana and an Xbox with a serial number 

matching the system stolen from V.T.’s room. The detectives questioned 

Appellant about the Xbox and, according to Detective Murphy, Appellant gave 

different accounts for how he came to possess the Xbox before eventually 

admitting that he took it. 

Appellant was the last witness to testify at his trial and stated that, the day 

before the robbery, V.T. had messaged him about buying marijuana. Appellant 

arrived at V.T.’s apartment on August 17, 2019, and knocked for 5-10 minutes. 

After nobody answered, Appellant testified that he kicked in the door and entered 

the apartment. Appellant said he carried a baseball bat in his bag but left the bat 
5

outside of the apartment when he entered. 

Appellant saw E.T. on the phone when he entered the apartment and said he 

did not speak to her. Appellant walked into V.T.’s bedroom and took marijuana 

and an Xbox. Appellant left the apartment and walked away from the apartment 

complex. Appellant testified that he “probably” was the person Grice saw walking 

away from the complex. 

During his testimony, Appellant did not deny that he entered the apartment. 

He stated his intent was to steal marijuana. Appellant said he did not carry a gun 

when he entered the apartment. Appellant stated he did not talk to E.T. or make 

any threats toward her. Appellant said he was wearing dark clothing and a 

bandana over his face when he entered the apartment. 

After closing statements, the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt the 

following allegation of aggravated robbery: 

That [Appellant], on or about August 9, 2017, in Fort Bend County, 

Texas, did then and there while in the course of committing theft of 

property owned by [E.T.] and with intent to obtain and maintain 

control of the property, intentionally and knowingly threaten or place 

[E.T.] in fear of imminent bodily injury or death, and the [Appellant] 

did then and there use and exhibit a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm; 

and that this act is a violation of section 29.03 of the Penal Code. 

The trial court made the following finding in response to a special issue submitted 

as to the use or exhibition of a deadly weapon: 

That [Appellant], while in the course of committing the delinquent 

conduct of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, did then and there 

personally use or exhibit a deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm, in the 

commission of the Aggravated Robbery. 

Appellant timely appealed. 
6

ANALYSIS

In two issues, Appellant asserts (1) the trial court erred in denying his 

motion to suppress a confession made during a custodial interrogation, and (2) the 

evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court’s aggravated robbery 

findings. 

I. Motion to Suppress

Appellant asserts the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the

confession he made after the detectives discovered the marijuana and Xbox during 

their search of his home. Appellant argues this confession was inadmissible 

because it was made during a “custodial interrogation” and no procedural 

safeguards were used to secure Appellant’s privilege against self-incrimination. 

Appellant’s motion to suppress was filed pre-trial and re-urged by 

Appellant’s counsel during Detective Murphy’s trial testimony. Both parties took 

Detective Murphy on voir dire and Detective Murphy recounted in detail the 

events that took place at Appellant’s house. 

According to Detective Murphy, he and the other detective were at 

Appellant’s house for approximately 1.5 hours. Detective Murphy and his 

colleague were both wearing their “relaxed uniform” of a black polo shirt with tan 

pants and both detectives carried their service weapons. After Appellant’s mother 

arrived at the house, the detectives entered the house and Detective Murphy 

interviewed Appellant in the kitchen. Appellant denied any involvement in the 

robbery and said he had been at his house all day. Appellant’s mother signed a 

written form consenting to a search of her home and Detective Murphy asked 

Appellant if there was anything in his room the detectives needed to know about. 

Appellant told the detectives there was a pipe in his room. 
7

The detectives found marijuana and the missing Xbox upstairs; Detective 

Murphy acknowledged that the investigation “focused” on Appellant after this 

point. Detective Murphy again questioned Appellant and Appellant told Detective 

Murphy a friend “had brought [the Xbox] to his house” but he “couldn’t explain 

who the friend was or anything like that.” Detective Murphy raised his voice and 

told Appellant that he and his mother “could go to jail for this.” Detective Murphy 

described the scene as “kind of a fiasco” with both Detective Murphy and 

Appellant’s mother “yelling” at Appellant. Appellant kept “hem hawing around” 

and Detective Murphy “finally just raised [his] voice and yelled at [Appellant], 

‘Tell me. Tell me where you got it from.’” Appellant responded: “Because I took 

it, sir.” 

Detective Murphy testified that Appellant was not read his Miranda 

warnings or any warnings under the Texas Family Code. Appellant was not told 

that he “was free to leave, or that he didn’t have to answer any of the[] questions.” 

Appellant also was not handcuffed during the questioning. According to Detective 

Murphy, Appellant did not indicate that he wanted to stop talking to the detectives. 

We assume without deciding the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s 

motion to suppress the confession he made during Detective Murphy’s 

questioning. Because the improper admission of a juvenile’s statement made 

during a custodial interrogation implicates the constitutional right against selfincrimination, it is constitutional error to admit the statement into evidence. Marsh 

v. State, 140 S.W.3d 901, 908 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d); 

see also Jeffley v. State, 38 S.W.3d 847, 858 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2001, pet. ref’d). Accordingly, we reverse unless the record establishes beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the admission of Appellant’s confession in response to 

Detective Murphy’s questioning did not contribute to Appellant’s conviction. See 
8

Jeffley, 38 S.W.3d at 858 (citing Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(a)). 

In our application of this standard, we do not focus on the propriety of the 

outcome of Appellant’s trial. See Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 119 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2000); see also Marsh, 140 S.W.3d at 908. We focus instead on the 

error and its possible impact in light of the existence of other evidence. Marsh, 

140 S.W.3d at 908. We consider the following factors: (1) the source of the error; 

(2) the nature of the error; (3) whether the error was emphasized and its probable 

collateral implications; (4) the weight a factfinder would probably place on the 

error; and (5) whether declaring the error harmless encourages the State to repeat it 

with impunity. Id. at 908-09 (citing Wilson v. State, 938 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1996)). “Though no one factor is dispositive, the existence and 

severity of these factors are indicative of the harm caused by the admission of the 

oral statements.” Jeffley, 38 S.W.3d at 859. Having identified the source and 

nature of the error, we turn to the remaining factors. 

Here, the substance of Appellant’s confession to Detective Murphy was 

established by other testimony and evidence, including (1) E.T.’s and Grice’s 

description of the intruder; (2) V.T.’s identification of Appellant as a “suspicious” 

person; and (most importantly) (3) the detectives’ discovery of marijuana and the 

missing Xbox during their consensual search of Appellant’s house. Given this 

testimony and evidence, it is improbable the factfinder placed much weight on 

Detective Murphy’s testimony regarding Appellant’s confession. See Marsh, 140 

S.W.3d at 909-10 (erroneous admission of juvenile’s statement harmless error 

where other testimony and evidence “established the same facts as his unrecorded 

statement”); see also Jeffley, 38 S.W.3d at 858-60 (erroneous admission of 

juvenile’s statement harmless error where the defendant’s “written statement and 

other testimony” supported conviction). 
9

Moreover, the State did not place significant emphasis on Appellant’s 

confession to Detective Murphy. Referencing Appellant’s testimony at trial, the 

prosecutor asserted there “really wasn’t much issue” regarding Appellant’s 

commission of the theft. The prosecutor’s closing argument instead focused on 

E.T.’s testimony and her recollection regarding the intruder’s gun. In light of the 

other evidence supporting the conviction as well as Appellant’s testimony, the 

collateral implications of the erroneous admission of Appellant’s confession were 

limited. See Marsh, 140 S.W.3d at 908. 

Finally, “[g]iven the strict requirements upon law enforcement officers in the 

family code regarding interrogation of juveniles, it is unlikely that declaring the 

admission of the oral statements harmless would encourage the State to repeat the 

error with impunity.” Jeffley, 38 S.W.3d at 860. Accordingly, we find the record 

establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the admission of Appellant’s confession 

to Detective Murphy did not contribute to his conviction. See Tex. R. App. P. 

44.2(a). We overrule Appellant’s first issue. 

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

In his legal sufficiency challenge, Appellant argues (1) the State failed to 

prove Appellant stole property owned by E.T. as alleged in the indictment; (2) no 

evidence supports the trial court’s aggravated robbery findings; and (3) the State 

failed to prove identification. We review the applicable legal standard before 

analyzing Appellant’s evidentiary challenges. 

A. Standard of Review 

For a legal sufficiency challenge, we review all of the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a rational factfinder could have 

found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks v. 
10

State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see also Criff v. State, 438 

S.W.3d 134, 137 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d). The 

factfinder is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and is free to believe or 

disbelieve all or part of a witness’s testimony. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902. We 

give “deference to ‘the responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts 

in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic 

facts to ultimate facts.’” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2007) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)). Circumstantial 

evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 

45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). 

B. Property Owned by E.T. 

In its “Judgment and Order of Adjudication,” the trial court found Appellant 

“commit[ed] theft of property owned by [E.T.] . . . with intent to obtain and 

maintain control of the property.” Pointing out that the Xbox belong to V.T. and 

was not used by six-year-old E.T., Appellant argues the State “failed to prove 

Appellant stole property owned by [E.T.].” 

The name of the appropriated-property’s owner is not a substantive element 

of the theft offense. Byrd v. State, 336 S.W.3d 242, 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). 

But the Code of Criminal Procedure requires the State to allege the name of the 

owner of property in its charging instrument. Id.; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 

Ann. art. 21.08 (Vernon 2009). 

Under Texas pleading rules, ownership may be alleged in either the actual 

owner or a special owner. Byrd, 336 S.W.3d at 251-52. “A special owner is a 

person who has actual custody or control of property that belongs to another.” Id. 

at 252. To eliminate the distinction between actual and special ownership, the 

legislature expansively defined “owner” and included in the definition a person 
11

who has title to the property, possession of the property, or a greater right to 

possession of the property than the defendant. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. 

§ 1.07(a)(35)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2018); see also Garza v. State, 344 S.W.3d 409, 

413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). 

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the challenged finding, 

supports the trial court’s conclusion that E.T. had a greater right to possession of 

the Xbox than Appellant. V.T. testified that he owned the missing Xbox that was 

recovered at Appellant’s house. V.T. and E.T. testified that they lived together at 

the apartment with their mother. E.T.’s status as a resident at the apartment with 

her brother gives her “a greater right to possession” of the Xbox than Appellant, 

who admittedly broke into the apartment and stole it. The evidence is sufficient to 

support the trial court’s finding regarding ownership of the stolen property. 

C. Aggravated Robbery 

A person commits the offense of aggravated robbery if he commits robbery 

and uses or exhibits a deadly weapon. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 29.03(a)(2) 

(Vernon 2019). A person commits robbery if, “in the course of committing theft 

. . . and with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, he: 

(1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or 

(2) intentionally or knowingly threatens or places another in fear of imminent 

bodily injury or death.” Id. § 29.02(a) (Vernon 2019). “Theft” is defined as 

“unlawfully appropriat[ing] property with intent to deprive the owner of property.” 

Id. § 31.03(a) (Vernon 2019). Appellant argues the evidence is legally insufficient 

to support the trial court’s findings that (1) under section 29.02(a)(2) Appellant 

“intentionally and knowingly threaten[ed] or place[d] [E.T.] in fear of imminent 

bodily injury or death;” and (2) under section 29.03(a)(2) Appellant “personally 

use[d] or exhibit[ed] a deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm, in the commission of the 
12

Aggravated Robbery.” 

1. Section 29.02(a)(2) 

We examine first the trial court’s finding under section 29.02(a)(2) that 

Appellant “intentionally and knowingly threaten[ed] or place[d] [E.T.] in fear of 

imminent bodily injury or death.” Appellant argues there was no evidence to 

support this finding. 

Because the trial court could have found Appellant guilty for either of these 

culpable mental states, we need only address the less culpable mental state of 

knowingly. See, e.g., Howard v. State, 333 S.W.3d 137, 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2011). Under the Penal Code, a defendant acts “knowingly” with respect to “a 

result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to 

cause the result.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(b) (Vernon 2011). “Knowingly” 

does not refer to the defendant’s knowledge of the actual results of his actions, but 

instead the knowledge of what results his actions are reasonably certain to cause. 

Howard, 333 S.W.3d at 140. 

Proving robbery by showing the defendant placed another person in fear 

does not require an actual threat. Burton v. State, 230 S.W.3d 846, 852 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.). Instead, “[t]he crucial inquiry in 

determining whether a threat has been made is whether the assailant acted in such a 

manner as would, under the circumstances, portend an immediate threat of danger 

to a person of reasonable sensibility.” Sifuentes v. State, 494 S.W.3d 806, 811 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (internal quotation omitted). 

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s section 

29.02(a)(2) finding, legally sufficient evidence supports the finding that Appellant 

“knowingly threaten[ed] or place[d] [E.T.] in fear of imminent bodily injury or 
13

death.” 

 Appellant testified that, after he “kicked through the apartment door,” 

he saw E.T. under a blanket in the master bedroom. After seeing E.T., 

Appellant went into V.T.’s bedroom and took marijuana and an Xbox 

before exiting the apartment. 

 According to E.T., Appellant was wearing a bandana over his face and 

carrying a long black gun when he walked into the apartment and told 

her something in a “mean voice” before walking into V.T.’s bedroom. 

E.T. said she “got [her] blanket and [she] hide under it” because she 

“was very scared.” 

 Tina testified that, while she was on the phone with E.T., she heard 

someone speak in “a louder voice like someone broke in.” 

 Grice testified that, after the incident, E.T. told him a man entered the 

apartment carrying a gun and repeatedly asked E.T., “Where is my 

weed?” 

 According to Deputy Arias, after the incident E.T. had “appeared as if 

a traumatic event had just occurred.” 

This evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Appellant acted in such a 

manner that would, under these circumstances, portend an immediate threat of 

danger to a person of reasonable sensibility. See id.; Burton, 230 S.W.3d at 852. 

We overrule Appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s section 29.02(a)(2) 

finding. 

2. 29.03(a)(2) 

We turn now to the trial court’s finding under section 29.03(a)(2) that 

Appellant “personally use[d] or exhibit[ed] a deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm, in 

the commission of the Aggravated Robbery.” Challenging this finding, Appellant 

argues that “he maintained at all times that he was never in possession of a 

firearm” and “[t]he only evidence that he even had a firearm” came from six-yearold E.T. 
14

A deadly weapon is “used” when it is employed or utilized to achieve its 

purpose and is “exhibited” if it is consciously shown or displayed during the 

commission of an offense. Patterson v. State, 769 S.W.2d 938, 941 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1989). A victim’s testimony concerning the presence of a gun generally is 

sufficient to support a finding on the presence of a deadly weapon. See Bradley v. 

State, 359 S.W.3d 912, 917 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d); see 

also Alexander v. State, No. 14-09-00574-CR, 2010 WL 1992829, at *2 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 20, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated 

for publication). 

Here, legally sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding that 

Appellant “personally use[d] or exhibit[ed] a deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm, in 

the commission of the Aggravated Robbery.” E.T. testified that an intruder entered 

the apartment carrying a long black gun with “a little red on the top of the gun.” 

On cross-examination, E.T. acknowledged that she had not “seen lots of guns” but 

stated that her mom owns “a small gun.” Recounting his conversation with E.T. 

after the incident, Grice testified that E.T. told him an intruder had entered the 

apartment and was carrying a gun. Deputy Arias also testified about his 

conversation with E.T. after the incident and stated that she indicated the intruder 

was carrying a gun “like the duty weapon [Deputy Arias] had on [his] hip at the 

time.” E.T.’s testimony, combined with Grice’s and Deputy Arias’s descriptions 

of their conversations with E.T. after the incident, are sufficient to support the trial 

court’s section 29.03(a)(2) finding. See Bradley, 359 S.W.3d at 917; Alexander, 

2010 WL 1992829, at *2. 

Appellant argues E.T. “only saw a glimpse of him when she was not hiding 

under her blanket” and points out inconsistencies in her other testimony, such as 

E.T.’s description of the intruder’s skin color as “peach, but darker.” But the trial 
15

court, as the factfinder, was the exclusive judge of the witnesses’ credibility and 

was charged with resolving any inconsistencies or contradictions in the evidence. 

See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. We defer to the trial 

court’s resolution of evidentiary conflicts and its weighing of witnesses’ credibility 

and testimonies. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. All 

of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the challenged finding, 

supports the trial court’s section 29.03(a)(2) deadly-weapon finding. 

Appellant also asserts the detectives did not find a gun when they searched 

his house after the incident. But the failure to recover a weapon does not nullify 

other evidence supporting the trial court’s deadly-weapon finding. See, e.g., 

Johnson v. State, No. 14-02-00901-CR, 2003 WL 22012693, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 26, 2003, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication); 

Wysner v. State, No. 05-00-02014-CR, 2001 WL 1329315, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Oct. 30, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication). 

We overrule Appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s section 29.03(a)(2) 

finding. 

D. Identification 

Arguing the State failed to prove Appellant was the person who committed 

the robbery, Appellant argues “[t]he only eyewitness testified that the armed 

robber was white in that he had peach-colored skin.” 

E.T. testified that the intruder’s skin color was “peach, but darker.” 

Appellant is an African-American boy. Other evidence in the record supports the 

trial court’s finding that Appellant committed the charged offense: 

 Grice testified that he observed a “younger black man” walking away 

from the apartment complex shortly after he received the call from 

Tina reporting the robbery. Grice said the young man was wearing a 
16

black and blue backpack with a “bat or stick” sticking out of the top. 

 Responding to Deputy Arias’s inquiry about who could have been 

responsible for the robbery, V.T. recounted his previous encounter 

with Appellant in the apartment complex’s parking lot. V.T. said 

Appellant was acting “suspicious” that evening because he was “just 

walking around in circles” at the complex. 

 In their search of Appellant’s home, the detectives found an Xbox 

with a serial number matching the system stolen from V.T.’s 

bedroom. 

 Detective Murphy testified that, after detectives found the missing 

Xbox, Appellant admitted taking the Xbox. 

 Appellant testified that he kicked in the door to V.T.’s apartment and 

took marijuana and an Xbox from V.T.’s bedroom before leaving. 

Appellant testified that he “probably” was the person Grice saw 

walking away from the complex. 

We defer to the factfinder’s responsibility to fairly resolve conflicts in the 

evidence. Considering all evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, 

legally sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Appellant was the 

person who committed the charged offense. 

We overrule Appellant’s final issue. 

CONCLUSION 

We overrule Appellant’s issues on appeal and affirm the trial court’s 

judgment. 

 /s/ Meagan Hassan

 Justice 

Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Hassan, and Poissant.