Rangers: Selected Combat 

Operations in World War N 

by Dr. Michael J. King 

Combat Studies Institute 

US. Army Command and General Staff College 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900 

June 1985 
FOREWORD 

Operation Urgent Fury, conducted in October 1983, focused international attention on the U.S. 

Army Rangers. This tough, highly mobile force performed an airborne-airland assault into Grenada on 

short notice and quickly seized objectives while sustaining only Eimited casualties. The performance of 

the Rangers in Grenada is indicative of the role that skilled forces can play in a nation’s military 

strategy and exempfifies the ideal use of highly trained “elite” forces, 

The U.S. Army Ranger has a proud heritage dating from Rogers’ Rangers to the present, but at 

no time was the Rangers’ legacy more evident than during the heyday of World War Ii. Conceived 

under the guidance of then Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, the Rangers were 

selectively recruited and trained for operations such as raids, infiltrations, and specialized combat. In 

reality, their utilization was somewhat more varied, thus providing one of the themes for this Leavenworth Paper. 

The five Ranger operations recounted in this paper depict the Rangers in a variety of combat 

roles. Each operation provided unique challenges to the Ranger Force, and each produced different 

results. Created for one purpose, often used and misused for others, the Ranger organization fluctuated 

throughout the war. The longer the Ranger Force remained in a theater of operations, the heavier it 

became and the more likely it was to be employed in a conventional role. The Ranger leadership 

constantly struggled with organizational problems in its attempts to balance the need for additional 

firepower and combat power with the need to retain its identity as a right, mobile, flexible strike force. 

The evolutional process depicted in this paper illustrates the difficulties encountered by military 

units that are given inappropriate missions for their force capability. When the Rangers were utilized 

in their designed roles in appropriate missions and within organizational constraints, they achieved 

outstanding successes. When these organizational constraints were ignored and Rangers were used in 

a conventional role, disaster resulted as at Cisterna when the Rangers were unabte to counter the 

German armor threat. 

In Rangers: Selected Combat Operations in World War II, Dr. Michael J. King presents a multifaceted work that blends battle narrative, operational lessons, and doctrinal considerations into a paper 

that provides a useful historical perspective into Ranger operations, The relevance of these historical 

case studies to current and future elite force operations is evident, Force designers, doctrine writers, 

and commanders will greatly profit from the valuable information contained in this Leavenworth Paper. 

One needs only to study these lessons and apply them. 

-5iZk.ZbA 

ROBERT W. RtSCASSl 

Lieutenant General, USA 

Commandant tDirector 

COL LOUIS D. F. Fraschci 

Professor of Combined Arms Warfsre John F Morrison Professor of ,W;f;tary H/story 

Dr Roger J Spiller Dr Bruce W Menmng 

Curriculum Supervisor 

Research Committee LTC Michael T. Chase Teaching Committee 

LTC Gary L Bounds, Chief LTC John A. Hwson. Chiei 

LTC Gary H Wade Dr. Robert H. Berim LTC David R. Durr MAJ Claude A Sass.0 

LTC Charles E. Heller Dr Gary J. Bjorge LTC Kenneth R. Pterce SFC Robert R Cordell 

MAJlPl Robert D. Ramsey III Dr George W. Gawrych LTC Roy R. Stephenson Dr Robert F. Baumann 

MAJ Scott R. McMuchaei Dr. Thomas M Huber LTC George L Tupa Dr Jerold E. Brown 

MAJ Andrew N Morris Dr. Samuel J Lewis MAJ Roger Crrillo Dr Christopher R. Gabel 

CPT Thomas P. Odom Dr. William 6. Robertson MAJ Gary B. Griffin Dr Joseph T. Glatthaar 

Military Hwtory Education Committee Histormd Services Commrttee 

LTC Michael E Hall. Chief Dr Lawrence A Yates, Chef 

MAJ Frederick A Eiserman MAJ Don M. Prewtt. ARNG Eltzabeth A. Snake, Librarian Carolyn M Brendsel, Edwr 

MAJ George J Mordlca II Dr. Jack J Gifford Marilyn A. Edwards, Editor Donald L. Gilmore. EdItor 

Staff 

MSG Danny G. Carlson Carolyn D Conway 

SSG Patrrcla E. Glowers Clara L. Rhoades 

Martha A. Van Sandt Sharon E. Torres 

Leavenworth Papers are published by the Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900. The views expressed in this publication are 

those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element thereof. 

Leavenworth Papers are available from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing 

Office, Washington, DC 20402. 

Leavenworth Papers US tSSN 0195 3451 
Rangers: Selected Combat 

Operations in World War Ii 

by Dr. Michael J. King 

Combat Studies Institute 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900 

June ‘I985 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Ring, Michael J. (Michael Julius) 1941- 

Rangers: selected combat operations in World War II. 

(Leavenworth papers; no. 11) 

“June 1985.” 

Bibliography: p. 

1. World War, 193%1945-Commando operationsUnited States. 2. World War, 193%1945-Regimental 

hiataries-United States. 3. World War, 1939-1945- 

Campaigns. I. Title. II. Series. 

D794.5.K56 1985 948.54’12’73 85-15691 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Ofike, Washingtan D.C. 20402 
Contents 

Illustrations .......................................................... v 

Introduction .......................................................... 1 

Chapter 

1. Origin of the Rangers .......................................... 5 

2. Djebel el Ank .................................................. 13 

3. Port0 Empedacle ............................................... 23 

4. Cisterna ........................................................ 29 

5. Zerf ............................................................ 43 

6. Cabanatuan .................................................... 55 

7. Conclusion 

Notes .......s.l 

Bibliography . . . 

..I 

111 
Illustrations 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

Djebel el Ank Operation, March 1943 . . , . . . . . . , . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 

Port0 Empedocle Operation: Route Followed by 3d Ranger 

Battalion, July 1943 ..,..*..*......I.*..*.*...,..,....,,.., . . . . . . . 25 

Cisterna Operation, January 1944 . . ..*.*..I......*.......*....... 36 

Zerf Operation, February 1945 . , . . . . , , . . . . . . . . . . %. . , . . . . . . . . . . , . . 49 

Cabanatuan Operation: Routes to and from the Objective, 

January 1945 I....,.......................l....................I. 59 

Cabanatuan Operation: Actions at the Objective, 

January 1945 . ..1.....,..,...,......~.....l.l,.,.1......,...,.... 67 

figures 

1, Organrzation of the 1st Ranger Battalion at Carrickfergus, 

June 1942 ~..~,.....,I.,...,..l.........l....,.....~I.I........... 9 

2. Final Organization of Ranger Force, 1943 . . . . . . ‘. , . . . . . . . . . . , . . , . 32 

V 
i~t~~d~ct;~~ 

<de 

This Leavenworth Paper is a critical reconstruction of World War II 

Ranger operations conducted at or near Djebel et Ank, Tunisia; Porto 

Empedocle, Sicily; Cisterna, Italy; Zerf, Germany; and Cabanatuan in the 

Philippines. It is not intended to be a comprehensive account of World War 

II Ranger operations, for such a study would have to include numerous 

minor actions that are too poorly documented to be studied to advantage. 

It is, however, representative for it examines several types of operations 

conducted against the troops of three enemy nations in a v,ariety of physical and tactical environments. As such, it draws a wide range of lessons 

useful to combat leaders who may have to conduct such operations or be 

on guard against them in the future. Some of the most central lessons are 

summarized here to prepare the readers for the narratives that follow. 

Many factors determined the outcomes of the operations featured in this 

Leavenworth Paper, and of these there are four that are important enough 

to merit special emphasis. These are surprise, the quality of opposing forces, 

the success of friendly forces with which the Rangers were cooperating, 

and popular support. 

Of the four factors, surprise was paramount. The Rangers won onesided victories at Djebel el Ank, Porto Empedocle, and Cabanatuan by 

taking unalert enemies by surprise. They failed to surprise their enemy at 

Cisterna and were defeated. 

Whether the Rangers gained surprise or not was strongly influenced by 

the quality of opposing forces. This quality was not so much the sum of 

the abilities of individual Rangers measured against the sum of enemy 

skills as it was the relative cohesion and morale of the forces engaged. 

Individual soldiers in a unit may be of superb quality, but if they lack 

organizational and moral cohesion, they will not fight to the best of their 

abilities. Significantly, the Ranger victories at Djebel el Ank, Porto 

Empedocle, and Cabanatuan were won over enemies who had lost most of 

their tactical integrity. 

When the Rangers lost cohesion, they too became less effective. The 

Rangers’ loss of cohesion was less tactical than moral, however, and came 

about through the assignment of new men as replacements for recent 

1 
2 

casualties. These new men had not been with the Rangers when they were 

first activated, had not gone through training with the original Rangers, 

and were not as thoroughly integrated into the Rangers as those men who 

had been with them from the beginning. It is, therefore, not surprising that 

both the 5th Ranger Battalion’s victory at Zerf, which was the costliest 

successful Ranger operation addressed in this paper, and the 1st and 3d 

Ranger Battalions’ defeat at Cisterna involved Ranger units thathad 

recently suffered heavy losses of seasoned troops. That those losses were 

incurred in conventional infantry operations is a fact of signal importance 

and one to which we shall return. 

No Iess important than the Rangers’ abilities and actions is the fact 

that none of the five operations were conducted in a tactical vacuum, and 

the Rangers’ ultimate success depended upon the success of others. This 

was most clear at Djebel el Ank, Cisterna, and Zerf. In each of these operations, the Rangers infiltrated enemy lines in advance and in support of a 

main attack, and their success depended upon the main attack linking up 

with them. The main attacks succeeded at Djebel el Ank and Zerf, operations in which the Rangers were successful. The main attack failed at 

Cisterna, and the Rangers were surrounded and destroyed as a fighting 

force. 

A final factor, popular support, may be crucial when an operation is 

conducted in a populated area. While the approach of a conventional battlefront may lead local civilians to flee, thus permitting operations to be 

conducted in a popuIation vacuum, such is unlikely to be the case in an 

operation conducted deep behind enemy lines or in a low-intensity conflict 

where front lines do not exist. The action at Cabanatuan, in which Rangers 

liberated American and Allied prisoners from a Japanese POW compound 

in a populated area behind enemy lines, was one such case. Friendly Filipinos conducted reconnaissance, surveillance, and security missions in support of the R”angers; chose the routes to and from the objective; fought the 

Japanese in the objective area; provided transportation to friendly lines for 

the sick and wounded; and provided food and water for all. Had the local 

population been unfriendly toward the Americans, the mission would not 

have been feasible. 

Although this Leavenworth Paper is mainly concerned with Ranger 

combat operations, it also traces the evolution of an elite fighting unit. The 

operations at Djebel el Ank, Port0 Empedocle, and Cisterna were conducted 

by one or more battalions of William 0. Darby’s Ranger Force. Djebel el 

Ank was one of their earliest battles; they took Port0 Empedocle about halfway through their career; and Cisterna was their final battle. 

A complex theme, part of which was beyond Darby’s control and part 

of which was encouraged by him, runs through the history of his Rangers. 

Originally intended to conduct amphibious landings and commando-style 

operations, the Rangers were nonetheless used as conventional infantry 

when the necessity or convenience of higher headquarters so dictated. 

Darby, deciding to give his lightly armed Rangers the firepower needed to 
survive in the conventional combat they seemingly could not avoid, virtually 

transformed them into a light combined arms team. Ironically, it became 

increasingIy IikeIy that, as the Rangers grew to resemble a conventional 

unit, they would be used as such. With that use came the heavier casualties 

that, when replaced, diluted the effectiveness of the remaining Rangers and, 

in turn, weakened the cohesion and effectiveness of Ranger Force. While 

the histories ‘of the 5th and 6th Ranger Battalions are not those of Darby’s 

Rangers, the lessons drawn from their use and misuse are similar. 
Origin of the Rangers 

The Rangers of World War II had their genesis in the spring of 1942 

when Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, sent Colonel Lucian 

K. Truscott, Jr., to London to arrange for American troops to take part in 

British commando raids against German-occupied Europe. The Americans 

selected to participate in the raids were to be drawn from a broad cross 

section of units and then returned to those same units after the raids, thus 

ensuring that, when American forces landed in Europe, they would have 

some combat-experienced men.l 

The commandos had been organized to fit the limitations and characteristics of British landing craft and naval organization. For example, a 

commando platoon was equal to the number of men who could fit aboard 

an assault landing craft (ALC); a commando troop could fit aboard two 

ALCs; and a battalion-size unit called a commando could be carried by a 

flotilla.2 Truscott reasoned that, because the American forces would be under 

British control and using British landing craft, they should be organized 

like the commandos. On 26 May, the day on which Truscott was promoted 

to brigadier general, he proposed to Marshall that an American unit be 

organized along commando lines on a provisional basis pending the War 

Department’s completion of a table of organization and equipment (TOE). 

Authorization from the War Department arrived by cable two days later.3 

Truscott drafted a letter of instructions directing Major General Russell 

P. Hartle, commanding general of United States Army Northern Ireland 

Forces (USANIF) and V Army Corps (Reinforced), to organize the new unit 

as soon as possible. This letter became the basis of a subject letter titled 

‘“Commando Organization,” which was written by Major General James E. 

Chaney, commanding general of United States Army Forces British Isles 

(USAFBI), on 1 June and sent to Hartle. The letter both directed and gave 

guidance for the organization of an American “oommando unit for training 

and demonstration purposes,” which was to be ‘(the first step in a program 

specifically directed by the Chief of Staff for giving actual battle experience 

to the maximum number of personnel of the American Army.” The men 

joining the unit would be trained by the British and take part in combat 

operations under British control. After receiving training and exposure to 

5 
6 

combat, as many men as possible would be returned to their original 

organizations and their places taken by other men.4 The new unit was thus 

intended to be more of a school than a conventional fighting organization, 

It differed from other schools in that combat would be part of its eurriculum. 

Chaney’s letter also established guidelines to be followed in selecting 

personnel. Only fully trained soldiers of the best type were to be sought, 

and officers and NCOs were to have superior leadership qualities with spe 

cial emphasis placed upon initiative, sound judgment, and common sense, 

All men were to have good stamina, have natural athletic ability, and be 

without physica defects. No age limit was established, but it was pointed 

out that British commandos were an average of twenty-five years old. Men 

joining the new American unit were to be capable of the maximum exertion 

and endurance expected from a man of that age. Certain military and eivilian skills, such as self-defense, marksmanship, scouting, mountaineering, 

seamanship, small boat handling, and demalition, were especially desirable. 

Men who were familiar with railway engines, power plants, and radio stations and who knew how to destroy them most effectively on raids were 

also to be sought.5 The unit would be of battalion size and organized in 

Northern Ireland at a site to be chosen by Hartle. While in Northern I’reland, the unit would be attached to the Special Services Brigade (British) 

for training and tactical control, but the United States 34th Infantry Division would be responsible for its administration and supplies. American 

equipment would be kept and American tactical doctrine and methods used 

as much as possible.6 

Choosing an officer to organize the new battalion was one of Hartle’s 

most immediate tasks. On the Sunday morning after he found out about 

the battalion, the general attended church services in Belfast with his aide 

de-camp, Artillery Captain William Orlando Darby, and his chief of staff, 

Major General Edmond H. Leavey. While they were being driven into the 

city, Hartle spoke to Leavey about the importance of finding a good officer 

to put in command of the unit. Darby was an energetic individual who felt 

stifled in his assignment as aide-de-camp and had intimated his dissatisfaction to Leavey on more than one occasion. Leavey saw the Belfast 

conversation as an opportunity to help Darby get transferred to a tactical 

unit and immediately suggested Darby for the job. When Hartle asked 

Darby what he thought of Leavey’s suggestion, Darby responded affirmatively, and the assignment was thus made.7 Promotion to major soon 

followed, and after being a major for ten weeks, Darby was promoted to 

lieutenant colonel. 

A name for the unit remained to be found. While in Washington, 

Truscott had discussed with Major General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who 

was then chief of the Operations Division, War Department General Staff, 

the possibility of organizing American units similar to the commandos. 

Eisenhower told him that, if such units were organized, they should be 

named something other than “commandos” because that name was so 
Colonel William 0. Darbv 11911- 

45). This photograph was‘ taken 

while Darby wag home on leave 

at Ft. Smith, Arkansas, shortly 

befare his death in Italy. He was 

posthumously promoted to brigadier general. 

strongly identified with the British. Truscott chose “Rangers,$’ a name that 

had been carried by a number of American units before, during, and after 

the War of Independence. The new unit was thus designated the 1st Ranger 

Battalion.8 

On 7 June 1942, Hartle sent a letter to major USANIF units, informing 

them of the forthcoming organization of the 1st Ranger Battalion and restating and elaborating on the substance of Chaney’s earlier communication. Among other things, physical and mental standards were defined more 

precisely. Vision had to be twenty-twenty without eyeglasses, hearing normal, and blood pressure within limits normal for a man of twenty-five. 

Men with cardiac defects, slow reaction time, removable dentures, night 

blindness, or evidence of psychological disorders were disqualified.9 

Hartle’s letter stressed the importance of having all WSANIF units gain 

combat-experienced personnel by sending some of their men to serve in the 

battalion. Each major unit or command was required to furnish a specified 

number of men of each rank, private through captain; division and separate 

unit commanders were directed to establish boards of officers to interview 

all volunteers and selected personnel to determine their suitability. Pending 

final acceptance by Darby, those men who were chosen would be attached 

to the 1st Ranger Battalionlo 
8 

The 1st Ranger Battalion began to form almost immediately after issuance of Hartle’s letter, and on 8 June, Darby began to interview his first 

offieer volunteers. These men came from diverse military backgrounds. In 

a group of twenty-nine officers assigned to the battalion on 10 June, for 

example, there were eleven infantrymen, five coastal artillerymen, four field 

artillerymen, three combat engineers, two cavalrymen, and one officer each 

from the Medical Corps, Signal Corps, Quartermaster Corps, and Ordnance. 

The selection of enlisted men began at Carrickfergus, Northern Ireland, 

on 11 June and continued for ten days. These men were interviewed by 

boards composed of Darby’s new officers. The quality of the men accepted 

was extremely high, although the physical standards originally established 

were sometimes relaxed if a board beheved that a man’s shortcomings 

would not interfere with his performance. The rejected men returned to their 

parent organizations. By 15 June, 104 of the 575 volunteers who had come 

to Carrickfergus thus far were sent back to their units as unacceptable, 

and Darby found it necessary to raise additional volunteers by sending six 

boards of officers on recruiting tours.ll 

The 1st Ranger Battalion was officially activated on 19 June, and three 

days later, the 488 enlisted men who had been selected were assigned to 

it.12 These men had backgrounds as diverse as the officers, having come 

from thirty-four units ranging from infantry regiments to quartermaster 

detachments. The training that they would receive from the British would 

be essential for the unit, especially for those men with technical backgrounds who lacked combat skills. 

Training began while recruiting and interviewing were in their final 

stages, but until 28 June, the battalion spent most of its time drawing 

equipment and organizing in accordance with the TOE and instructions 

that had accompanied Chaney’s and Hartle’s letters. The battalion was 

formed into a headquarters and headquarters company and six line companies. Each line company was organized into two platoons, and each platoon was organized into two assault sections and a 60-mm mortar section.13 

(See Figure 1.) 

On 28 June, the battalion began moving from Carrickfergus to the 

Commando Depot at Achnacarry, Scotland, to take part in a commandoadministered training program that would last until 31 July. This training 

strengthened the Rangers physically, conditioned them to think and act 

quickly, and accustomed them to face the possibility of bodily injury. Speed 

marches, cliff climbing, obstacle courses, and tactical problems were emphasized. In the latter, commandos simulated enemy fire by throwing grenades 

and firing smal1 arms near the Rangers. 14 Such rigorous and realistic 

training had its costs. By 17 July, one Ranger had drowned, two had received bullet wounds, and one had been wounded by a grenade fiagment.15 

In mid-July, Colonel Charles A. Vaughan, commandant of the Commando Depot, recommended to Darby that two changes be made in the 

Rangers’ organization to reduce the amount and weight of equipment the 
r-l RANGER 

BATTAllO# 

, . . 

Figure 1. Organization of the 1st Ranger Battalion at Carrickfergus, June 1942 

platoons and sections had to carry. First, he recommended that the mortars 

be taken from the platoons and placed under control of the company commanders in their headquarters. Second, he recommended that the M1919A4 

.30-cahber machine guns, one of which was then in each assault section, 

be placed in a pool at battalion headquarters and that the sections be 

equipped instead with either the lighter Bren guns or Browning automatic 

rifles (BARS). 16 Darby followed Vaughan’s recommendations, and by 17 

July, the mortars had been centralized in the company headquarters, and 

the machine guns. had been replaced with BARs.l7 

Darby and his Rangers continued to train at Achnacarry until 1 August, 

when most of the battalion moved to the vicinity of Argyle for a month of 

training with the Royal Navy. While that training was taking place, same 

Rangers were sent’into combat with the British in fulfillment of the purpose 

for which they had originally been organized. Beginning an 1 August, six 

officers and forty-five enlisted men were attached to Numbers 3 and 4 Commandos and the Canadian 2d Division for the raid an Dieppe. That illfated landing was made on 19 August and cost the Rangers two officers 

and four enlisted men killed and four enlisted men captured.18 

Because of the expanding scope of the war, Dieppe was the only aperation in which the Rangers fought as students of the British. With the 

coming Allied landings in French North Africa, American troops would be 
10 

fighting in large numbers against the Germans, and the British-led operations the Rangers were to take part in for training purposes were no longer 

necessary. Although the original purpose for bringing the Rangers into 

being would soon no longer exist, they were not deactivated. Instead, they 

would serve as an American version of the British commandos. 

On 3 September, the Rangers moved to Dundee where they took part 

in a three-week training program that stressed attacks on coastal defenses, 

pillboxes, and antiaircraft positions with emphasis on planning, control, 

and individual initiative. This program, like the one that had just been 

completed, involved the use of live ammunitipn, and one Ranger was killed 

and one wodnded by the accidental explosion of a land mine.19 

On 24 September, the battalion moved to the vicinity of Glasgow where 

it became assigned to II Corps and attached to the 1st Infantry Division 

in preparation for Torch, the Allied landing in French North Africa. Four days 

later, the 1st Ranger Battalion took the form it would keep throughout the 

fighting in North Africa, except for minor changes, 

The battalion, which was now authorized 26 officers and 452 enlisted 

men, remained composed of a headquarters and headquarters company and 

six line companies. Headquarters and headquarters company was authorized 

eight officers and seventy-four enlisted men. Each line company was authorized three officers and sixty-three enlisted men and was composed of a 

Soldier being trained. Rangers 

underwent strenuous training 

such as depicted in this photo 

of hand-to-hand fighting. 
Preparing to fire a 60-mm 

mortar M-2. The 6Q-mm mortar M-2 was a light, indirectfire weapon frequently used 

by Rangers. 

company headquarters, which included a command section, two mortar sections, and two platoons. The company command section was authorized a 

company commander, a first sergeant, one messenger/orderly armed with 

a submachine gun, and one clerk. Each of the two mortar sections had 

one 60-mm mortar and was authorized one mortar sergeant, one gunner, 

one assistant gunner, and two ammunition bearers. 

Each platoon was authorized one officer and twenty-five enlisted men 

and was composed of a platoon headquarters and two sections. The platoon 

headquarters was authorized a pIatoon leader, a platoon sergeant, one 

messenger armed with a submachine gun, and one sniper/grenadier armed 

with a Springfield 1903 rifle. 

Each section was authorized a section leader, an assistant section 

leader, two scouts, one BAR-man, one assistant BAR-man, and five rifle 

men. All men in a section were armed with M-l rifles except one of the 

scouts, who carried a submachine gun, and the BAR-man. 

Each section had, in addition, one .30-caliber M1919A4 machine gun 

that was held in a pool at battalion headquarters. Protection against armor 

was to be provided by six British .55ealiber antitank rifles that were also 

held in the battalion pool. 2.0 These were soon replaced with bazookas 

While the Rangers’ light armament enhanced their mobility, it greatly 

limited their firepower. Their firepower would be increased before they 

entered combat, however, and it would continue to be increased through 

most of their existence. In the process, the Rangers’ very nature would 

change. 
The 1st Ranger Battalion went into action as a unit for the first time 

on 8 November 1942, when it landed in French North Africa while participating in Operation Torch. The Rangers made a surprise night landing 

in and north of Arzew, Algeria, neutralized its main coastal defenses, and 

captured its docks. Due largely to rigorous training and thorough planning, 

they accomplished their mission with the loss of only one Ranger life.1 

Before and after Arzew, however, the Rangers began to evolve from a 

lightly armed unit organized to conduct special operations into a more 

heavily armed force organized for conventional combat. This was the result 

of two tendencies that reinforced one another throughout the existence of 

Darby’s Rangers. The first tendency was the adoption of heavier weapons 

than were specified in the Rangers’ original TOE because of the occasional 

need for more firepower. The second tendency was the use of the Rangers 

in conventional operations when necessary or expedient. Ironically, the more 

the Rangers were used as conventional infantry, the more firepower they 

needed; and the more firepower they got, the more likely it became that the 

headquarters that controIled them would use them conventionally. Darby 

accommodated this evolution. He had been commissioned into the field artillery when he graduated from West Point in 1933 and had served only with 

artillery units until he became Hartle’s aide-de-camp in January 1942. After 

he took command of the 1st Ranger Battalion, he retained such a strong 

,appreciation of artillery that the battalion executive officer, Major Herman 

Dammer, would later say that Darby had “a fetish for fiiepower.“z 

The transition began during the planning for Torch, when Darby temporarily replaced the battalion’s BO-mm mortars with 81-mm tubes because 

he believed the latter would be more effective against the fortified positions 

that guarded Arzew. It proved to be a wise decision, as the French defenders of Batterie Superieur, one of Arzew’s major forts, resisted, and it was 

necessary for the Rangers to use the mortars against it3 

Although the Rangers accomplished their mission quickly and smoothly, 

troops advancing inland did not have the advantage of surprise and en: 

countered more determined French resistance, Major General Terry de la 

Mesa Allen, commanding general of the 1st Infantry Division, to which the 

13 
14 

Rangers were attached, called upon the battalion to assist in conventional 

operations. During 9 and 10 November, Company E and elements of the 

16th Infantry captured the town of LaMacta, and on 10 November, Company C helped Combat Team (CT) 18 take St. Cloud. Three Rangers were 

killed in the fight for the latter town.4 

The use of the Rangers in conventional infantry operations only fourteen and one-half hours after they had set foot in North Africa bothered 

some of the men. “What was the purpose in organizing and training Rangers for Commando-type operations if they are going to be frittered away 

in mass battles?” thought Ranger James Altieri.5 Dammer, however, sensed 

“no resentment” by Darby over the LaMacta and St. Cloud battles, He 

seemed to believe that there had been a job to do and that the Rangers 

had done it.6 

The Rangers were not used in combat for almost three months following 

Arzew but trained near the city and were then assigned to the Fifth Army 

Invasion Training Center (ITC) as demonstration and experimental troops. 

Many men transferred out of the battalion during this period, believing 

that the war was passing them by, and Darby found it necessary to recruit 

new volunteers. ‘On 31 January 1943, 7 officer and 101 enlisted replacements 

reported for duty and were formed into a seventh company that Darby 

had established for training purposes.7 

No longer attached to the British, the Rangers now had to train themselves. Quite naturally, many of the training techniques introduced by the 

British were kept by Darby, and speed marching, cliff climbing, rappelling, 

and night amphibious landings continued to be integral parts of the 

Rangers’ regimen.8 

Darby strongly emphasized the buddy system, or working in pairs. The 

men chose their own buddies from within their own platoons and then ate, 

performed details, and trained as a team. In what was called the “Bullet 

and Bayonet” course, the men negotiated obstacles and reacted to surprise 

targets in buddy teams. Each team going through the course advanced 

using fire and maneuver and fire and movement. Another course, called 

“Me and My Pal,” was similar in concept but served as a street-fighting 

exercise.g 

As in Northern Ireland and Scotland, realism was achieved through 

the use of live ammunition. Men simulating the enemy used captured German and Italian weapons so the new Rangers would learn to distinguish 

between the sounds of American and enemy guns. Thus, if a training problem required the taking of a machine-gun nest, a captured enemy machine 

gun would be set up to fire live ammunition in a fixed direction.10 

After the new men completed their initial hardening, most training was 

done at night. When tactical problems were conducted during darkness, 

Rangers simulating the enemy added to the realism by using flares. The 

Rangers also experimented with techniques of controlling tactical formations 

at night. Darby favored moving the battalion to an objective in column for 
Firing German weapons. Rangers were required to be familiar with many weapons, to include 

those of the enemy. American soldiers are shown firing a German standard dual-purpose 

machine gun (7.92-mm. M. G. 34). 

ease of control. Once the objective was reached and the companies went 

abreast in preparation for the assault, dim, shielded, colored lights were 

used to maintain formation. Each company used a different colored light. 

When a company reached a predetermined location, it would signal its position to the rear. Company commanders would signal with uninterrupted 

beams, while platoon leaders would signal with dots and dashes. Darby, 

who would temporarily be to the rear where he could see the lights, could 

then be certain that his men were where they were supposed to be when 

beginning an assault.ll 

The lst Ranger Battalion took part in several major actions during 

February and March of 1943. On 11 February, Darby led Companies- A, E, 

F, and a headquarters element on a night raid against Italian frontline 

positions near Station de Sened in central Tunisia. The attacking Rangers, 

carrying out a mission appropriate to their training and organization, killed 

or wounded an estimated seventy-five Italians, destroyed one antitank gun 

and five machine guns, and captured eleven members of the 10th Bersaglieri Regiment at the cost of one of their own men killed and twenty 

wounded.12 

The 1st Ranger Battalion withdrew with II Corps prior to the battle of 

Kasserine Pass (19-22 February) and remained in defensive positions south 

of Bou Chebka until 1 March. From 16 February through 1 March, the 

Rangers were involved in several clashes in which they killed six Italians, 

captured eight Italians and eight Germans, and destroyed three wheeled 

vehicles and captured another three. One Ranger was killed or captured 

while on patrol during this period.l3 

With the end of the Axis’ February offensive, the Allies began to pre 

pare for the next phase of the Tunisian campaign, Montgomery’s Eighth 
16 

Army would attack northward along Tunisia’s east coast, while II Corps 

and the British First Army would threaten the enemy from the west and 

draw his reserves away toward the west. 

By mid-March, Eighth Army had driven the Axis forces westward until 

the latter took up defensive positions along the Mareth Line. The line was 

about twenty-five miles long and extended northeast from the vicinity of 

Cheguimu in the Matmata Hills toward the Wadi Zigzauo, and along the 

wadi to the Gulf of Gabes. Eighth Army was to begin an attack on the 

line during the night of 16 March. The II Corps, over which Patton had 

recently assumed command, would play a supporting role in the attack. 

Operation Wop, as II Corps’ role was named, called for the corps to 

capture and hold Gafsa, which would then serve as a logistical base for 

Eighth Army. After taking Gafsa, II Corps would conduct operations toward 

Maknassy to threaten Axis lines of communication and supply. This plan 

would require the 9th and 34th Infantry Divisions to defend the approaches 

to Rohia, Sbeitla, Kasserine, and Bou Chebka while the 1st Infantry Division took Gafsa. The 1st Armored Division (Reinforced) would then advance 

on Maknassy.14 

On the evening of 13 March, the 1st Ranger Battalion, which had been 

in corps reserve, was attached to the 1st Infantry Division. At 1000 on 17 

March, CTs 16 and 18 attacked Gafsa with the Rangers, found the town 

lightly defended, and quickly captured it. No Rangers were killed or 

wounded in the attack.*5 

Djebel e/ Ank 

The ease with which Gafsa fell revealed that the enemy had almost 

completely withdrawn from the area. Allied intelligence reported that about 

two thousand Axis troops were at El Guettar and that they were also organized in strength at Djebel el Ank. Although Patton did not intend to 

continue the attack toward El Guettar immediately, it was necessary to 

reestablish contact with the enemy and maintain the initiative.16 

On 17 March, Major General Allen of the 1st Infantry Division sent 

Darby a memo ordering him to move the Rangers toward El Guettar after 

dark; reestablish contact with the enemy; determine enemy strength, dispositions, and unit designation; and maintain his unit in the area. Allen 

considered Darby’s mission crucial because the requested information was 

essential to planning an attack on El Guettar. Darby was directed to act 

aggressively but cautioned not to commit the Rangers to any action from 

which they could not disengage.17 

Darby received Allen’s memo at 0200 the following morning and imme 

diately began moving his men through Gafsa toward El Guettar. In spite 

of intelligence reports that there were Italians in the area, the Rangers 

found El Guettar undefended, occupied it, and extended their search for 

the enemy farther to the east. By means of patrols and surveillance, they found 

troops of the Italian Centaur0 Division astride the Gafsa-Gabes road at 
, 

17 

Djebel el Ank Pass. 18 This was about four miles east of El Guettar and 

three miles west of Bou Hamran. It was to be the site of the Rangers’ first 

real battle since the Station de Sened raid. 

With the capture of Gafsa and El Guettar, II Corps’ attack entered a 

second phase. At 1630 on 20 March, the 1st Infantry Division received a 

warning. order from corps to prepare to attack along the Gafsa-Gabes road 

and to take the high ground east of El Guettar about eighteen miles southeast of Gafsa.19 The Gafsa-Gabes road split into two branches less than a 

mile east of El Guettar. The southern branch was a continuation of the 

main road and led into Gabes, The northern branch, dubbed Gumtree Road, 

passed through Djebel el Ank Pass and south of Bou Hamran to Mahares 

on the sea. The plan developed by division required the 18th Infantry to 

attack along the south branch of the Gafsa-Gabes road and for the Rangers 

and the 26th Infantry to attack along the north branch. The 16th Infantry 

would be held in division reserve.20 

Djebel el Ank Pass opened to the west like a funnel with rocky heights 

on both sides, and the Italians had barred its entrance with mines, barbed 

wire, and roadblocks and had covered its approaches with automatic weapons and antitank guns. An unsupported frontal attack on the pass would 

risk heavy casualties and a high likelihood of failure, but a frontal attack 

combined with a surprise Ranger attack from the rear would be more likely 

to succeed with fewer losses. The plan thus developed required the Rangers 

to infiltrate enemy lines and attack the Italians defending the pass from 

behind. With the start of the Ranger attack, the 26th Infantry would make 

a frontal attack into the pass and, after securing it, continue on to Bou 

Hamran. 

The Rangers, as ordered, remained in the Djebel el Ank area after locating the enemy and conducted reconnaissance patrols against the Italian 

positions. Darby made a personal daylight reconnaissance against the north 

wall of the pass, and Lieutenant Walter Wojcik led two night patrols into 

the mountains behind the enemy. The Italians knew that Americans were 

to their front and brought the Rangers under artillery fire on I& and 19 

March but did not realize that the Rangers were operating to their rear. 

During these reconnaissances, the Rangers mapped a tortuous ten-mile-long 

route among fissures, cliffs, and saddles to an unguarded rocky plateau 

that overlooked the Italian positions from behind.22 The Italians, believing 

themselves safe in their naturally strong position, had not established effective local security. (See Map 1.) 

At 1800 on 20 March, the 1st Infantry Division received the order from 

II Corps to attack along the Gafsa-Gabes road and seize the high ground 

east of El Guettar.23 The 26th Infantry held a meeting of unit commanders 

at 2165 to issue the regimental order. The regiment would attack Djebel el 

Ank Pass along the axis of Gumtree Road with the 3d Battalion on the 

left, the 1st Battalion on the right and astride the road, and the 2d Battalion in reserve at El Guettar. The 3d Battalion would attack the north 

19 

wall after the Rangers struck it from behind. Bou Hamran, the first objee 

tive beyond the pass, was to be attacked only on division order.24 

On the night of 20 March, Darby led the 1st Ranger Battalion and an 

attached 4.2-inch mortar company along the previously reconnoitered route 

to the plateau behind the Italians. There, with their faces blackened with 

camouflage, the Rangers awaited the dawn. 25 The mortar company, impeded 

by the weight of its weapons and the ruggedness of the terrain, had fallen 

behind and was still en route to the plateau.26 

Shortly after 0600, as first light brightened the sky to the east, waiting 

troops of the 26th Infantry heard the sound of battle burst forth suddenly 

from the north wall of the pass. 27 The Rangers had taken the unsuspecting 

Italians completely by surprise. 

With machine-gun and rifle fire, a Ranger support element sent the 

Italians on the south side of the pass scurrying for cover, while the rest of 

the Ranger battalion swarmed down on the stunned defenders of the north 

wall. With the sound of a bugle, the assault element jumped from rock to 

rock shouting Indian war cries and formed into skirmish lines to close with 

the Italians. They rushed forward firing their weapons, throwing grenades, 

and bayoneting as Darby repeatedly shouted, “Give them some steel!l’QQ 

The first twenty minutes of the battle all but broke enemy resistance 

on the north wall. Dead Italians sprawled next to their unfired weapons 

while many of the living frantically waved white flags from their dugouts 

and trenches. The Rangers gathered prisoners while their mortars fired on 

those Italians who were still fighting from the other side of the road. By 

0830, the Rangers held the most important positions on the pass, and the 

attached 4.2-inch mortars, which had only recently arrived, were adding 

their fire to the bombardment of the south wall.29 

With the north side of the pass cleared, Darby sent one company to 

silence the several machine guns that could still fire on the entrance of the 

pass from the south wall. The attacking Rangers descended to the floor of 

the pass using a spur for cover and concealment, dashed across an open 

area to the base of the south wall, ‘and slowly fought their way up the 

ridge in a rough skirmish line. The south side of the pass thus fell into 

Ranger hands. Casualties were limited during this final mop-up thanks to 

the Rangers’ Italian-speaking British chaplain, Father Albert E. Basil, who 

talked an Italian officer into surrendering his men.30 

While the Rangers were overrunning the heights, the 26th Infantry 

began moving into the pass. Because of the natural strength of the Italian 

position, the infantry could advance only slowly. A wadi cut across the 

mouth of the pass, and even with Rangers to guide them and with no 

opposition, each company took forty-five minutes to cross it31 

At 1120, the division G3 felt confident enough of the situation to direct 

Darby and the 26th Infantry to clean up what little resistance remained in 

the pass and take the high ground beyond Bou Hamran. Although Darby 
20 

would only claim taking about two hundred Italian prisoners in his afteraction report, the Rangers and infantry together took more than a thousand 

prisoners by 1215. 33 The need for the Rangers passed as American forces 

continued their attack to the east, and the battalion was returned to its 

bivouac and division reserve at El Guettar at 1610.34 

The taking of Djebel el Ank Pass was conducted in the successful tradition of Arzew and the raid at Station de Sened. Ranger losses in the operation amounted to only one officer wounded.35 

Commentary 

At Djebel el Ank Pass, the 1st Ranger Battalion, well-led, well-trained, 

and knowing where the Italians were and how best to attack them, gained 

a one-sided victory over an enemy who chose the battlefield and enjoyed 

the advantages of knowing the terrain. 

There were several factors in addition to Darby”s personal magnetism 

and leadership that contributed to the Rangers’ success in the battle. The 

first of these was their superb state of training. Although a large number 

of men had been transferred out of the battalion while it was assigned to 

Fifth Army ITC, the majority had been with the unit since its inception 

and early training under the British. They not only possessed the knowledge and ability which that training gave them as individuals but also the 

cohesion to use that training effectively as a team. In terms of training, 

the Rangers were at their peak in North Africa. 

The conduct of reconnaissance patrols to the pass was a second factor 

contributing to the Rangers’ success. By means of these patrols, Darby 

and Wojcik mapped out a route to the objective, determined how long it 

would take to travel the route, placed the objective under surveillance, and 

found a secure place from which to launch the attack. Consequently, they 

were able to gain complete surprise and immediate fire superiority over the 

Italians, neutralizing any advantage the Italians may have enjoyed by 

occupying highly defensible terrain. 

The relatively poor quality of the enemy troops, as demonstrated by 

their indifferent attention to security, was a third factor that made Ranger 

success likely. Although the Italians had not yet begun to show the extreme 

symptoms of demoralization they would in Sicily, it was generally true that 

they were a less formidable foe than the Germans. 

Subsequent Developments 

The taking of Djebel el Ank Pass was the last use of the 1st Ranger 

Battalion in an authentic Ranger operation in North Africa. Ironically, the 

gains made in that action were given up within forty-eight hours when the 

Germans launched a counterattack that culminated in the battle of El 

Guettar. The Rangers were once again called upon to fight as conventional 

infantry in an emergency and lost three killed and eighteen wounded in 

defensive actions near Djebel Berda during 23-27 March.36 That was one 

more than had been killed, and almost as many as had been wounded, in 
21 

the Ranger-style operations at Arzew, Station de Sened, and Djebel el Ank 

combined. For the actions at Gafsa, Djebel el Ank, and El Guettar, the 1st 

Ranger Battalion was awarded a Distinguished Unit Citation. 

The Rangers remained in North Africa until early July when they took 

part in the invasion of Sicily. During that time, they underwent two major 

changes in force structure. These changes, which were brought about as a 

result of Darby’s wishes, were their expansion into a force of three battalions and the attachment of a 4.2inch mortar battalion. 

On 14 April, Darby wrote Eisenhower a recommendation that 52 officer 

and 1,000 enlisted volunteers be made available for the formation of two 

additional Ranger battalions in time for the invasion of Sicily.37 Darby’s 

recommendations were approved and forwarded to Marshall, and on 19 

April, Marshall’s authorization to activate the 3d and 4th Ranger Battalions 

arrived at Allied .Force Headquarters (AFHQ). However, the authorization 

contained the suggestion that after the need for the battalions had passed, 

their personnel might be returned to their former organizations. It was, 

therefore, hkely that the Ranger battalions would be provisional rather than 

permanent. This was, in large part, a result of a manpower shortage that 

would remain critical until summer. 38 The three battalions would be called 

Ranger Force. 

On 22 April, Headquarters, North African Theater of Operations, authorized Darby to visit any or akl replacement depots in the theater to recruit 

volunteers for the Rangers. Darby could accept anyone he found suitable 

and have the v,olunteers assigned to the Rangers on the condition that his 

battalions did not exceed their authorized strengths. On 17 May, Headquarters, Atlantic Base Section, announced that qualified enlisted volunteers 

were being sought. The volunteers had to be white, at least five feet six 

inches tall, of normal weight, in excellent physical condition, and not over 

thirty-five years old. They also had to have character ratings of excellent 

and no records of trial by court-martial. Although previous infantry training 

was desirable, volunteers did not have to be infantrymen. Except for technicians, volunteers were not to be higher in grade than private first class.39 

This final stipulation was to ensure that enlisted leadership positions would 

be controlled by seasoned men who had trained with the Rangers in the 

British Isles and served with them in combat. 

Dar-by used the original 1st Ranger Battalion as cadre for Ranger Force. 

He made Major Herman W. Dammer, who had been his executive officer, 

commanding officer of the 3d Ranger Battalion and gave him Companies 

A and B to help build the new unit. Captain Roy A. Murray, Jr., the former 

commander of Company F, became commanding officer of the 4th Ranger 

Battalion and was given Companies E and F. Darby retained command of 

the 1st Ranger Battalion, which kept Companies C and D.4O Darby’s continued command of the 1st Ranger Battalion was necessary because Ranger 

Force had not been authorized a headquarters due to its provisional nature. 

Instead, the 3d and 4th Ranger Battalions were simply attached to the 1st. 

Darby remained a battalion commander, but his duties approximated those 
22 

of a regimental commander, inasmuch as he was responsible for organizing, 

training, and controlling three battalions. He asked the War Department to 

authorize a headquarters for Ranger Force, but on 29 April, he was notified 

without further comment that his request had been disapproved,“1 

The creation of Ranger Force led to a change in organizational structure 

that went far beyond a mere increase in the number of Ranger battalions. 

This was the virtually permanent attachment of the 4.2-inch mortar battalion, which was a direct consequence of Darby’s artillery background. Just 

prior to his assignment as Hartle’s aide, Darby had been a battery eommander with the 99th Field Artillery (Pack) at Fort Hoyle, Maryland. While 

there, he had taken part in a comparison firing of his unit’s 75-mm pack 

howitzers and the 4.2-inch mortar and had been favorably impressed with 

the latter because of its greater range and bursting radius. In mid-May 

1943, Darby accidentally met Lieutenant Colonel Ken Cunin on the streets 

of Oran. Cunin was a 1934 graduate of West Point and had been a friend 

of Darby’s since the two had served together in the 82d Field Artillery at 

Fort Bliss, Texas, in the mid-1930s. He was now commanding officer of the 

83d Chemical Battalion, a 4.2-inch mortar unit. When Cunin told Darby 

that several chemical battalions were scheduled to land in Sicily, Darby 

requested and got Cunin’s battalion attached to Ranger Force.42 This 

arrangement would bind the two units for most of the rest of the Rangers’ 

existence. The evolution, which had begun before Arzew when Darby temporarily replaced his 66-mm mortars with 81-mm tubes continued, gradually 

transforming the Rangers from a light, commando-like strike force into a 

more heavily and conventionally armed unit. 
3 

Porte Empedocle 

9l!? 

From Gela and Licata to Porto Empedocie 

The plan for the invasion of Sicily called for landings on the southeastern corner of the island by two armies. Montgomery’s Eighth Army 

would land along the east coast from the vicinity of Syracuse south to Cap 

Passero, while Patton’s Seventh Army would land along a seventy-mile 

stretch of coast extending from Licata eastward to the right bank of the 

Irminio River. American forces were intended to play a role secondary to 

the British, and Seventh Army’s initial mission was to protect Eighth 

Army’s left while the latter drove northward to Messina, the main objective 

in Sicily. 

The Rangers were among the units tasked to spearhead the American 

landings Seventh Army was divided into two task forces, which, excluding 

reserves, were organized around Major General Omar Bradley’s II Corps 

and Major General Lucian K. Truscott Jr.‘s 3d Infantry Division (Reinforced). Darby’s 1st and 4th Ranger Battalions (Reinforced), which were 

designated Force X and attached to II Corps for the invasion, -made an 

opposed landing at Gela on 10 July 1943. Lieutenant Walter Wojcik, who 

had contributed greatly to the victory at Djebel el Ank Pass, was killed at 

Gela while crossing the beach. Force X captured the town, defended it successfully against an Axis counterattack, and took part in the subsequent 

drive inland under II Corps and Major General Hugh Gaffey’s 2d Armored 

Division. The 3d Ranger Battalion, which was under Dammer’s command 

and attached to the 3d Infantry Division (Reinforced), made an opposed 

landing about fifteen miles to the west at Licata and took part in Truseott’s 

drive inland. 

As the beachheads expanded, Patton decided to capture the 14,0O@inhabitant city of Port0 Empedocle in order to gain a port nearer to the advancing 

front than Licata. He could not, however, openly launch an all-out offensive 

in the direction of Porte Empedocle because of the subordinate role that 

had been assigned to the Americans. He thus decided to seize the city 

through the subterfuge of calling his advance a “reconnaissance in force*’ 

and limiting participation in it to Truscott’s command. 

23 
24 

The Drive on Porto Empedock 

The most direct route from Licata to Porte Empedocle lay along the 

coastal road, Highway 115. Truscott decided against concentrating his 

attack along the highway because considerable enemy artillery had been 

reported in the vicinity of Agrigento. Agrigento, a city of 34,000, sat on 

high ground overlooking Highway 115 and was the most important road 

center on Sicily’s south coast. Port0 Empedocle was three miles to its southwest. 

According to 3d Infantry Division plans, two batt,alions of the 7th Infantry would take Favara while the rest of the regiment advanced along 

the north side of Highway 115 to high ground east of the Naro River. The 

3d Ranger Battalion would then pass through Favara to carry Patton’s 

“reconnaissance in force” behind Agrigento to Port0 Empedocfe.1 The Rangers’ part in the advance would not call for a stealthy penetration of a 

thickly defended enemy front but would require them to go forward of 

friendly lines and accomplish their mission in an area where the enemy 

operated freely. This type of operation would not be unique to the 3d Ranger 

Battalion, but it would be one of the few the Rangers would conduct in 

Sicily that would be appropriate to their original purpose and training. 

By daylight on 15 July, the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, was in Favara 

and the regiment (-) was on high ground overlooking the Naro. Agrigento 

was the next major objective and would have to be isolated against reinforcement before its capture. The 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry, would take 

Hill 333, which commanded the northern approaches to the town. The 3d 

Ranger Battalion, which had become attached to the 7th Infantry at 1730, 

would move westward from Favara to Montaperto, which stood on high 

ground slightly more than a mile northwest of Agrigento. With Agrigento 

thus cut off from the north and west, the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, would 

cross the Naro from the east and capture the city. 

The Rangers passed through friendly front lines at 1900 and advanced 

by foot along the Favara-Agrigento road (Highway 122).2 The first leg of 

the march was relatively uneventful; they were brought under artillery fire 

three miles beyond Favara and were later taken under machine-gun fire, 

but neither was accurate and the battalion continued forward unscathed. 

At about midnight, the Rangers ran into their first opposition, an Italian 

roadblock at the junction of Highways 122 and II&. The Americans attacked at 0030 and, after a sharp skirmish, took the position and some 

emplacements on neighboring high ground by 0130. They also captured 165 

Italians, which were too many for the Rangers to take with them, so the 

prisoners were marched back to Favara and turned over to the 7th Infantry. There were no Ranger casualties in the action. (See Map 2.) 

The battalion got a few hours of sleep on the high ground near the 

road junction before dawn and resumed its march toward Montaperto at 

0600. To advance on the town, the Rangers had to come down from where 

they had spent the night, cross a mile-wide valley through which Highway 
25 
26 

118 passed, and then climb the hill on which Montaperto stood. They were 

briefly taken under ineffective artillery fire during the advance but were 

soon rewarded with an opportunity to win another tactical success. When 

the Rangers were about 200 yards beyond Highway 118, they sighted an 

Italian motorized column of ten motorcycles and two troop-laden trucks 

heading down the road toward them on the way to Agrigento. The Rangers 

were on high ground once they had crossed the road, so they organized a 

hasty ambush where they were and opened fire when the column came 

abreast. The unsuspecting Italians were taken completely by surprise, many 

were killed, and forty were taken prisoner .4 As at the roadblock the night 

before, the skirmish was one-sided, and no Rangers were killed or wounded. 

The battalion continued on its way to Montaperto after the ambush 

and entered the town at about 0800. From their new hilltop position, the 

Rangers could look south into a valley that led to Port0 Empedocle and 

the sea. While so doing, they saw four Italian artillery batteries. Dammer 

seized the opportunity and brought the unsuspecting Italians under fire with 

his 60-mm mortars and automatic weapons. A few of the artillerymen fled 

south toward the sea, but most put their hands up and docilely climbed the 

hill to their captors.5 

The Rangers then moved on Port0 Empedocle via Hill 316, which lay 

midway between Montaperto and the port. They encountered only weak 

resistance, took occasional sniper and machine-gun fire, and captured the 

command element of the Italian artillery in the valley. Lieutenant Raymond 

F. Campbell, the commanding officer of Company F, was killed in an 

assault on a machine-gun position during the advance. He was the only 

Ranger to die in the entire operation and the first man of his battalion to 

be killed in combat.6 

Continuing their advance, the Rangers came to an almond grove slightly 

more than a mile north of Port0 Empedocle and paused to rest and plan 

their attack. The ground north of Port0 Empedocle was broken by a draw 

that ran out of the city along a north-south axis. The plan Dammer developed called for an attack along both sides of the draw. Dammer would 

lead three companies in an attack along the east side of the draw, while 

the remaining three companies attacked along the west side under his executive officer.7 

While Dammer violated the principles of mass and unity of command 

by dividing his force, a two-pronged attack along two parallel avenues of 

approach had the advantage of falling on more than one point along the 

objective. If the enemy was strong where one prong fell, he might be weak 

where the second fell, and that weakness could be exploited. 

The attack began at 1420, and the premise upon which the plan was 

based was proven valid. The three companies west of the draw were stopped 

by determined resistance coming from behind a walled cemetery and by 

Germans manning coastal defenses and antiaircraft positions, but 

Dammer’s men continued to make headway. While one company covered 
27 

their rear and left flank, the other two companies in Dammer’s element 

overcame mild resistance and fought their way into the city and to the 

port area. By 1600, the Rangers had overcome the enemy and had begun 

to establish a perimeter defense around the city.8 

The 7th Infantry continued its advance toward Agrigento while the 

Rangers were operating against Porto Empedocle. Resistance was stiff 

enough to require the infantry to use all three battalions, but by late afternoon, the city was in American hands. 9 Patton’s so-called reconnaissance 

in force thus came to a successful end. 

commentary 

Except for the death in combat of one American officer, the day, which 

began with the early morning attack on the roadblock and ended with the 

taking of Port0 Empedocle, had been little different from an extended training exercise. The march to the final objective had been interrupted by three 

encounters with the enemy that required Dammer to react, and he and the 

Rangers had reacted quickly and well. By the end of the day, the 3d Ranger 

Battalion had captured 675 Italians and 91 Germans, a number almost 

double the battalion’s own authorized strength.10 

The Rangers’ success was largely attributable to the element of surprise. 

This was certainly true in the attacks on the Italian motorized column and 

artillery position, Surprise resulted less from the Rangers’ stealth or slight 

knowledge of the enemy than from enemy weaknesses. The Italians were 

thinly spread and fragmented, and the gaps in their lines invited infiltration. In addition, the Italians were not fighting well. On the day after 

the capture of Port-to Empedocle, the 3d Infantry Division G2 noted that 

the mass surrender of Italians when in combat and their voluntary surrender 

when not engaged indicated a lack of will to fight.11 The Rangers would 

not be so fortunate in their next major operation examined in this paperCisterna di Littoria. 

Subsequent Devek2pments 

The Sicilian campaign not only presented the Rangers with little opportunity to conduct the types of operations at which they excelled, it resulted 

in a permanent change in the Rangers’ force structure. This change, which 

was a response to the Rangers’ recent experience, was the permanent addition of a cannon company to Ranger Force. 

Shortly after Darby and Force X had landed at Gela, the Germans and 

Italians counterattacked, and Italian tanks briefly penetrated the city. 

Darby played an active part in the defense. He personally destroyed one 

Italian tank with a borrowed antitank gun and was seen riding on the top 

of a second tank trying to open its hatch so he could grenade the crew.12 

The major lesson Darby drew from the Gela counterattack was that the 

light weapons of the Rangers made them much too vulnerable to enemy 

armor. He responded as a former artilleryman might, by creating a Ranger 

cannon company armed with four 75mm guns mounted on half-tracks. The 
28 

new company was formed at Corleone at the end of the fighting in Sicily 

and was ready for use in Italy. As with the attachment of the chemical 

mortar battalion, however, the Rangers’ additional firepower made it more 

likely that they would be used as conventional infantry in the future. 

One other change that Darby hoped to make did not come about so 

easily. On 10 August, he wrote to Eisenhower in a second attempt to gain 

a permanent headquarters for the Rangers. Arguing that the Rangers’ value 

and effectiveness had been well proven, he asked that a force headquarters 

be authorized and that the Rangers be assigned to a corps, army, or higher 

level of command. If, on the other hand, the War Department should decide 

that the Rangers were not to be a permanent organization, he requested 

that the three battalions be reformed into a reconnaissance regiment.13 

Patton, who had recently presented Darby with a Distinguished Service 

Cross for the action at Gela, vigorously endorsed Dar-by’s request two days 

later. Furthermore, he valued Darby and the Rangers highly enough to ask 

that the proposed Ranger regiment be permanently assigned to Seventh 

Army. Eisenhower did not share Patton’s enthusiasm, however, and disapproved Darby’s request without comment on 3 September.14 
Cisterna 4 

- “?d.r-r:i r?:), 

Fran7 Saierno to Anxio and Ci+vma 

The Rangers?. experience in Italy fell into two phases. The first phase 

began with an amphibious landing at Maiori, near Salerno, on 9 September 

1943, and included the subsequent seizure and defense of Chiunzi Pass, the 

drive on Naples, and prolonged fighting on the Winter Line. The second 

phase began with the amphibious landing at Anzio on 22 January 1944 

and came to an abrupt end eight days later with a disastrous operation at 

Cisterna di Littoria, or Cisterna. In the latter action, all but 6 men. of a 

767-man Ranger force were killed or captured by the Germans. 

The Rangers’ defeat at Cisterna was due to several causes, but one of 

the factors that contributed to the battle’s outcome preceded it by several 

months and is worth examining in detail at this point. This was the decline 

in the unit’s combat skills resulting from the dilution of a well-trained, extremely cohesive unit by less well-trained replacements for those original 

members who had become casualties. Ironically, the Rangers suffered most 

of these casualties when the force was used as conventional infantry rather 

than as the special strike force that it was. These casualties began to mount 

immediately after Salerno. 

Ranger Force was attached to the British X Corps for Avalanche, Fifth 

Army’s landing near Salerno. The Rangers came ashore at Maiori, about 

twenty miles west of Salerno, before daylight on 9 September with the mission of taking the town, destroying nearby coastal defenses, seizing Chiunzi 

Pass, and preparing to operate against the rear of Germans who might 

attempt to hold up the Allied advance through neighboring Vietri Pass. 

The Rangers gained local surprise and had accomplished their objectives 

by midmorning. 

Had the other Allied units been as successful, they would have quickly 

driven inland and on to the Plain of Naples. Unlike the Rangers, however, 

the main invasion force did not have the advantage of surprise when landing, and nightfall saw it fail to achieve most of its D-day objectives. Furthermore, once the beachhead was established, Fifth Army was slow to 

break out of it, and the Rangers’ mission that had been expected to last no 

more than two days thus lasted more than two weeks. During that time, 

29 
30 

the Rangers were subjected to successive German counterattacks and prolonged artillery fire. The X Corps, which controlled the invasion force landing west of Salerno, did not begin its drive to the Plain of Naples until 23 

September and did not succeed in reaching it until five days later. 

The 1st and 3d Ranger Battalions won Distinguished Unit Citations 

for their successes at Maiori and Chiunzi Pass but paid a very high price. 

In the two weeks preceding the drive on Naples, Ranger Force lost 28 killed, 

9 missing, and about 66 wounded.1 All but a few of these casualties, which 

numbered about 20 percent of the Rangers’ authorized strength, were suffered 

during the conventional fighting that followed the seizure of Chiunzi Passthe type of fighting the Rangers had neither been created nor organized to 

do. 

A relatively uneventful drive on Naples followed and led to about a 

month and a half of conventional infantry combat on the Winter Line. The 

heavy losses that the Rangers had sustained at Chiunzi Pass were repeated 

in the new fighting, and during the week which ended on 27 November, 

Ranger Force suffered more than seventy kiIled and wounded.2 

The regular use of the Rangers for conventional missions disturbed, 

many of Darby’s men. On 28 November, Major Roy A. Murray, commanding 

officer of the 4th Ranger Battalion, wrote to the chief, Army Ground Forces, 

in an effort to resolve certain related problems, Murray pointed out that 

the Rangers did not have a clear-cut directive that defined their purpose 

and were thus hampered in long-range planning. Although a directive 

establishing that the 1st Ranger Battalion was to be for training and demonstration purposes had been issued on 1 June 1942, it had been superseded 

by events, and no consistent written or unwritten policy had ever replaced 

it. 

Murray saw three problems as plaguing the Rangers. The first and most 

pressing was the replacement of casualties. After losing well-trained men 

in combat, the battalions had to remain out of action for a month or more 

to receive replacements and train them to Ranger standards. Murray recommended that the problem be solved by having trained replacements sent to 

Ranger Force from the 2d and 5th Ranger Battalions that had recently 

been activated at Camp Forrest, Tennessee. 

The second problem, which was closely linked to the first, concerned 

the advancement of junior Ranger officers and the retention and use of 

experienced Ranger officers rendered unfit for combat by wounds or other 

physical disabihties. Murray recommended that some of the junior Ranger 

officers be given command of new Ranger battalions and that the disabled 

Ranger officers be sent to the United States to train Ranger replacements. 

His plan would allow younger men to advance and would still make use of 

the older men’s experience. 

The third problem was the absence of a Ranger Force headquarters to 

handle the administration, intelligence, planning, assignment of missions 
31 

to the battalions, and, “most important,” to decide if the missions were 

“proper” for the Rangers. Murray recommended that a headquarters be 

formed and given to Dar-by, “the senior Battalion Commander of Rangers”3 

The fact that Murray described Darby as being only the Rangers’ senior 

battalion commander reflected the tenuousness of Darby’s control over the 

battalions he had organized. No documents are present in the Rangers’ files 

to indicate that Army Ground Forces responded to Murray’s letter. 

On 17 January, Ranger Force made a practice amphibious landing at 

Pozzuoli Bay to the immediate west of Naples. The landing was part of a 

3d Infantry Division exercise and a rehearsal for Anzio. Although the operation was a good opportunity for the Rangers and the Navy to practice 

working together, it revealed a serious deterioration of the Rangers’ fighting 

skills. The chief umpire was favorably impressed with the Rangers’ enthusiasm and spirit but noted numerous violations of doctrinal principles and 

sound combat techniques. For example, the 1st Ranger Battalion became 

congested shortly after landing; several of its companies made excessive 

noise as they practiced stealth; at night, one-third of the men moved while 

flares were being fired-an action that would have made them more visible 

to an enemy; the unit established itself in an indefensible position; and it 

failed to send local security forward after moving inland. The 3d Ranger 

Battalion performed much better and was criticized only for having its 

landing craft too close together and moving in flare light at night. The 4th 

Ranger Battalion combined several potentially fatal errors. In addition to 

moving while in flare light at night and failing to establish communications 

with Force headquarters, it moved up a road in column without sending an 

advance guard forward and went through a seventy-five-yard-long defile 

without first reconnoitering it. 4 In actual combat, either of the latter two 

blunders could have resulted in the battalion walking into an ambush. 

The number and gravity of the Rangers’ errors demonstrated the decline 

in quality which had taken place since their formatian and early training 

in the British Isles. The conventional fighting to which the Rangers had 

too often been committed had resulted in severe attrition among their best 

trained and most experienced men. As their places were taken by replacements who, however brave and highly motivated, had enjoyed nothing equal 

to the time and training that had been lavished on the early Rangers, the 

Rangers’ original quality became diluted and their unit cohesion weakened. 

There was, however, one positive development during the period immediately preceding the landing at Anzio. The Rangers and the units that had 

been attached to them for the landing were designated the 6615th Ranger 

Force (Provisional).5 While there was no assurance that the unit would ever 

be more than temporary, for at least the time being a headquarters element 

was authorized that gave Darby a degree of control over the Rangers he 

had not previously enjoyed. (See Figure 2.) On 11 December, Darby was 

promoted to colonel.6 
32 

Figure 2. Final Organization of Ranger Force, 1943 

Cisterna 

The 6615th Ranger Force (Provisional) was to land at Anzio before 

dawn on 22 January with the mission of seizing the city’s port facilities 

and protecting them against sabotage; destroying nearby gun batteries; 

clearing the beach area between Anzio and Nettuno, a neighboring town; 

establishing and securing a beachhead, and tying in with the British 1st 

Division on the left and the 3d Infantry Division on the right. Upon eontatting the 3d Division, Ranger Force would become attached to it.7 All 

Allied forces landing at Anzio were part of Major General John P. Lucas’ 

VI Corps. 

The landing was the smoothest in which the Rangers had taken part. 

They landed when and where they were supposed to and met only two 

Germans, both of whom they killed. The other sectors of the beachhead 

were established with equal ease, for there were only two undermanned 

German coast-watching battalions to oppose the twenty-seven-battalion Allied force. The Germans, who had come from the Winter Line for rest and 

rehabilitation, were quickly overrun, and by midnight VI Corps had landed 

about 36,000 men and 3,200 vehicles and had taken 227 prisoners at a cost 

of 13 killed, 97 wounded, and 44 missing.8 The landing was an unqualified 

success. 

During the next few days, VI Corps cautiously expanded its beachhead, 

which grew to be seven miles deep and sixteen miles long by 24 January. 

Lucas, however, hesitated to make a decisive thrust inland and thus gave 

the Germans time to gather strength. When Generaloberst Eberhard von 

Mackensen assumed command of the beachhead defenses on 25 January, 

he had elements of eight divisions deployed and elements of five more on 

the way. Furthermore, Mackensen’s mission was not defensive; he was to 

counterattack as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the Rangers aided in VI 

Corps’ slow advance. By the morning of 25 January, they were nine miles 

inland, they would drive forward an additional two and a half miles by 

the morning of the 27th. 

On 28 January, Clark urged Lucas to act more aggressively, and on 

the following day, VI Corps responded by publishing a field order outlining 
33 

a major attack.9 There was a serious need for maintaining the Allied advance at this time. The purpose of the Anzio landing had been to threaten 

the rear of the Germans holding the Winter Line, forcing them to withdraw 

northward. This could be accomplished most effectively by seizing Highways 

6 and 7, which led to Rome from the southeast and passed on either side 

of the 900-meter-high Alban Hills inland from Anzio. By the end of January, 

however, VI Corps had failed to reach the highways. If the Allies failed to 

break the German line, which was then on flat to rolling terrain, the 

Germans might withdraw to the Alban Hills. They would not only be more 

difficult to dislodge there but would still be able to eontrol Highways 6 and 

7 from the heights. The VI Corps attack was intended to shatter the 

Germans before they pulled back to the more defensible and strategic high 

ground. 

The 3d Infantry Division, which was still commanded by General 

Truscott, issued its own field order in anticipation of VI Corps’ order on 28 

January. According to the division order, Ranger Force would cross the 

line of departure at 0100 on 30 January, move rapidly to Cisterna, and 

seize and hold the town until relieved. The 7th Infantry would operate on 

the left of Ranger Force, and the 15th Infantry would operate on the right. 

After seizing Cisterna, the 3d Infantry Division would prepare to continue 

the advance to take high ground near Cori and Velletri.*o 

The mission was acceptable to Darby, who did not believe an attack 

that size could fail.1’ The Rangers were relieved from their positions on 

line by the British during the morning of 29 January, and the battalion 

commanders met with Darby at 1800 that evening to discuss Ranger Force’s 

field order. 

The Force order, which was signed by Dammer and issued at Darby’s 

command, was simple and reasonable. The 1st Ranger Battalion would cross 

the line of departure, which was a road running generally parallel to and 

about three and a half miles south of Highway ‘7, and move to Cisterna 

under coverage of darkness by way of previously reconnoitered routes. The 

terrain between the line of departure and Cisterna was flat farmland with 

little cover other than drainage ditches and scattered farm buildings. Because the Rangers would be vulnerable in the open country, they were to 

use the drainage ditches for concealment when possible and avoid enemy 

contact before reaching their objective. Upon arriving at Cisterna, the battalion was to enter the town, destroy the enemy in it, occupy the ground to 

the immediate northwest, and prepare to repel enemy counterattacks. At 

daylight, the battalion was to send a patrol to the northwest to contact the 

7th Infantry. 

The 3d Ranger Battalion would cross the line of departure fifteen minutes after the 1st Ranger Battalion cleared it and follow the 1st Rangers to 

Cisterna. If the enemy interfered with the 1st Ranger Battalion, the 3d 

Rangers were to engage them, thus freeing the 1st Rangers to continue 

their attack on Cisterna. The 3d Ranger Battalion would assist in the eapture of Cisterna if necessary, occupy the ground immediately northeast of 
34 

town, and prepare to repel enemy counterattacks. At daylight, it was to 

send a patrol to the northeast to contact the 15th Infantry. 

The 4th Ranger Battalion, with an eight-man minesweeping party attached, would cross the line of departure at 0200 and advance on Cisterna 

astride the Conca-Isoia Bella-Cisterna road, clearing the road of mines and 

enemy. At Cisterna, it would become part of Ranger Force’s reserve. The 

Cannon Company and a platoon of the 6Olst Tank Destroyer Battalion 

would be prepared to move on Cisterna by way of the Conca-Isola BellaCisterna road and furnish antitank protection for Ranger Force once in 

Cisterna. The 83d Chemical Battalion would assemble on the Conca-Isola 

Bella-Cisterna road and would be prepared to move forward to positions 

from which it could give fire support to the advanced units.t* 

The 3d Infantry Division 62 was optimistic and suggested that Ranger 

Force would accomplish its mission without undue difficulty. While there 

was still a healthy respect for the ability of the higher German commanders 

and the quality of training and discipline found at battalion and company 

levels, it was noted that the enemy had not recently shown the same tenacity or “elan that he had in the past. This was evident from the frequent 

surrender of small enemy groups and the enemy’s lack of aggressive patrolling and was attributed in part to the integration of Poles and other politically unreliable non-Germans into German units. As early as October 1943, 

a VI Corps G2 report had claimed that the number of Wehrmacht deserters 

appeared to be in proportion to the increasing percentage of non-German 

replacements. The VI Corps records also indicate that, by the end of 

November 1943, a German-Polish buddy system had been put into effect in 

same Wehrmacht units, with Germans and Poles occupying alternate foxholes in defensive positions. 13 The intelligence annex to the division field 

order concluded, “‘It does not now seem probable that the enemy will soon 

deliver a major counterattack involving units of division size; on the other 

hand, the enemy will probably resort to delaying action coupled with smallscale counterattacks in an effort to grind us to a standstill, as on the Cassin0 line.‘“14 

In spite of division’s assurances, Darby’s headquarters believed that 

enemy resistance at Cisterna might be “considerable.“15 The Rangers’ appraisal was the more perceptive of the two. Members of the Hermann 

Goering Panzer Division had recently been taken prisoner in the Cisterna 

area.‘” In the past, the presence of that division in an area had indicated 

that the Germans were reinforcing or preparing to counterattack, but that 

lesson was now lost on higher headquarters 

At 2315 on 30 January, Ranger Force began to move its command post 

forward from a location well behind the lines, and by 0215 the next morning, 

it had reached its new site, an isolated house near the line of departure 

and just to the right of the Conca-Isola Bella-Cisterna road.17 Darby would 

direct the attack from the house and, as the battle progressed, from positions 

forward. 
35 

The 1st and 3d Ranger Battalions passed through the line of departure 

that night as planned and began to move toward Cisterna through a ditch 

that offered cover and concealment. At 0248, however, the first of several 

events took place that did not augur well for the mission. Four radio operators who were to have accompanied the 3d Ranger Battalion reported themselves lost to the Force command post. Darby, always conscious of the need 

for good communications, thought it “the god-damnedest thing” he had 

“ever heard of.“18 A second problem developed when the 3d Ranger Battalion 

lost contact with the 1st Rangers about halfway to the objective. Then, a 

half mile ahead, the 1st Ranger Battalion became split in two, with three 

companies continuing to advance and three remaining in p1ace.l” The dangers of conducting a night infiltration with so many relatively untrained 

and inexperienced men were becoming painfully evident. 

Captain Charles Shunstrom took command of the 1st Ranger Battalion’s 

three rear companies and sent a runner back to find the 3d Ranger Battalion The runner returned with word that Major Alvah Miller, who had 

only recently been made the 3d Ranger Battalion commander, had been 

killed by a round from a German tank and that the battalion was moving 

forward to link up with the 1st Rangers. Although Miller’s death demonstrated that the Germans were probably aware that something was afoot, 

there was no systematic attempt to stop the Rangers and no reason to 

believe that the Germans knew the scope or objective of the operation. On 

the contrary, the 1st Ranger Battalion appeared to be having continued 

success spearheading the operation. Although German patrols crossed in 

front and on both sides of the battalion, they did not appear to be aware 

of the Rangers’ presence, and two groups of German sentries were surprised 

by the point and killed with knives. Lieutenant James G. Fowler, who led 

the point, personally killed two of the enemy. At about 0545, with the first 

light of day, the 1st Rangers passed close enough to an enemy artillery 

battery to hear the gunners’ voices. They did not fire on the Germans but 

tried to radio Darby. They failed to make contact and continued to creep 

forward through some empty trenches until they reached a flat field on the 

southern edge of Cisterna. 

The field was roughly triangular in shape, about a thousand yards long 

on each side, and surrounded and subdivided by roads and drainage ditches. 

The Rangers began running toward Cisterna in the hope of reaching it 

before the sun rose. When about six hundred yards outside the town, they 

passed through what seemed to be a German bivouac area and killed a 

large number of the surprised enemy with bayonets and knives. When they 

had run 400 yards farther and reached the edge of Cisterna, they were 

stopped by violent fire from the town: They returned fire from a position 

astride a road that paralleled an irrigation ditch. It did not provide much 

cover, but it was all the Rangers had. (See Map 3.) 

The 3d Ranger Battalion and the three companies of the 1st Ranger 

Battalion that had been separated were able to get within 300 yards of the 

three lead companies before running into the Germans. After Ranger ba- 
36 

ATTACK /- 

FAILS 

Map 3. Cisterrm Operation, January 1944 
37 

zookamen destroyed two tanks that had been blocking the way, Shunstrom 

went forward with a runner and two other men and made contact with 

Major Jack Dobson, who briefed him on the situation. Dobson, who was 

new to the Rangers, had been given command of the 1st Ranger Battalion 

by Darby shortly before Anzio. 

The 4th Ranger Battalion began its attack up the Conca-Isola BellaCisterna road as scheduled but was stopped short of Isola Bella by fire 

from German tanks, self-propelled guns, automatic weapons, and small 

arms.20 Cisterna was more strongly held than anyone had anticipated, 

Darby, who was gravely concerned about the virtually nonexistent communications he had with the two lead battalions and the difficult time the 4th 

Rangers were having, saw well the urgent need to break through the German roadblock. Indeed, the survival of the 1st and 3d Ranger Battalions 

depended on his doing so. 

Although it was not fully realized at the time, the circumstances in which 

Darby found himself were the results of conscientious planning by the 

Germans and poor intelligence by the Americans. General Field Marshal 

Albert Kesselring, the senior German commander in Italy, had correctly 

judged Lucas to be too cautious to move directly on the Alban Hills and 

had concentrated considerable strength in Cisterna in preparation for a 

counterattack that had been scheduled for 2 February. This counterattack 

continued to be unexpected by American intelligence, which had interpreted 

German intentions in the area to be “‘purely defensive.“21 

Kesselring, however, had correctly judged the probability of an American 

attack on Cisterna and took steps to blunt it. A German officer, who took 

part in the battle and was later captured, stated in his interrogation that 

Cisterna had been reinforced by elements of the Hermann Goering Panzer 

Division on the night of 29 January in anticipation of the attack.22 Ironically, a young Pole named Stempkofski who had been serving in the Wehrmacht made a vain attempt to warn the Americans of the German preparations. He deserted to American troops and tried to tell them what was 

happening, but they evacuated him to the rear and his story was not known 

until after the battle when he was routinely interrogated at Fifth Army 

headquarters.23 Also unknown to Darby was another fact-the Germans had 

detected the 1st and 3d Ranger Battalions as they moved northward about 

a mile south of the triangular field.24 

The appearance of three German tanks to the 1st and 3d Ranger Battalions’ rear while Dobson was briefing Shunstrom indicated to the Rangers 

that they were being surrounded. All three tanks were destroyed by rocket 

gunners, but automatic and small arms fire continued to tear through the 

Rangers, most of whom had gathered in an area about three hundred yards 

in diameter. German attempts to overrun the Rangers, and Ranger attempts 

to break out of the encirclement, were turned back with mutual ferocity. 

After two hours, the Rangers’ ammunition began to run short, and three 

companies that were being held in reserve within the battalions’ perimeter 

gave half their ammunition to the companies on line.25 
38 

Looking northward toward Cisterna from the vicinity of Isola Bella. The shoulder of the ConcaIsola Bella-Cisterna road is to the immediate left, and the Alban Hills are faintly visible on 

the horizon. The 1st and 3d Ranger Battalions infiltrated toward their objective through the 

fields to the front and right and fought their last battle just short of Cisterna”s housea, the 

rooftops af which are visible beyond the trees to the front. The virtual absence of concealment 

is evident in this photograph. 

Meanwhile, the Germans grew in strength as the newly arrived 2d 

Parachute Lehr Battalion, which was regularly used to reinforce threatened 

sectors of the front, and armor, Nebelwerfer, flak wagons, and artillery firing 

at point-blank range brought their power to bear on the Rangers., The be 

sieged Americans repeatedly called for help by radio, but what messages 

got through in spite of the Rangers’ imperfect communications were sent in 

vain, because Darby and the rest of Ranger Force had been fought to a 

standstill south of Isola Bella. 

Shortly after noon, enemy paratroopers supported by armored personnel 

carriers began marching about a dozen captured Rangers toward the center 

of the 1st and 3d Ranger Battalions’ position in an attempt to force an 

American surrender. Ranger marksmen shot two German guards, but the 

Germans retaliated by bayoneting two of the prisoners and continued to 

march the rest forward. The same sequence was repeated a second timetwo Germans were shot and two prisoners were bayoneted. This time, however, more Rangers surrendered, The Germans continued to march their 

captives, now numbering about eighty, toward the center of the Rangers’ 
i 

39 

position shouting that they would shoot the prisoners if the remaining Rangers did not surrender. For a third time, the surrounded Americans opened 

fire, but when several prisoners were accidentally killed along with one or 

two Germans, a few men “who were evidently new to combat got hysterical 

and started to leave their positions and surrender.” They were ordered not 

to give up but continued to do so, and the piecemeal surrender continued. 

Even an attempt by the more determined Rangers “to stop” those who 

wished to surrender “by shooting them” failed.26 

Calmer men disassembled their weapons and buried or scattered key 

parts before the Germans overran the area. Others destroyed radios after 

telling Darby what was happening, Robert ,Ehalt, sergeant major of the 1st 

Ranger Battalion, was the last man to speak to Darby by radio from Cisterna. He told him that the commander of the 1st Ranger Battalion had 

been wounded and the executive officer of the 3d Ranger Battalion killed. 

He himself had only five men left, and German tanks were closing in, ‘So 

long, Colonel,“’ Ehalt concluded, “maybe when it’s all over I’ll see you 

again.” Darby told Ehalt that he would never forget the surrounded men 

and would be with them till the end. Ehalt then destroyed his radio and 

continued to fight on for a while longer with the few men he had left 

before surrendering.27 

Other painful dramas, much like Ehalt’s, were played out in the triangular field as the heavily equipped Germans, using farmers’ access roads 

for their armor, broke the Rangers into ever smaller groups and captured 

them or annihilated them in detail. By the end of the day, the 1st and 3d 

Ranger Battalions had ceased to exist. Only 6 of the 767 men who had 

infiltrated to Cisterna made their way back to friendly lines. All the others 

had been killed or captured.28 

COiWT?f?~ti3~~ 

While Darby was recovering from losing most of his command, his 

superiors were already beginning to avoid or obscure responsibility for the 

debacle. Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, commanding general of Fifth 

Army with overall responsibility for the landing at Anzio, had it entered in 

his diary that he was “distressed to find that the 3d (Infantry) Division 

had led with the Ranger force in its attack on Cisterna. This was a definite 

error in judgement for the Rangers do not have the support weapons to 

overcome the resistance indicated.“29 Out of fairness to Clark, he had not 

been involved in the detailed planning of the attack on Cisterna and did 

not know that the Rangers had been chosen to lead the way.30 Indeed, he 

would have been violating the chain of command had he bypassed VI Corps” 

headquarters to tell a division commander how to plan an attack. 

A report prepared by VI Corps’ 61 professed that, had the attack on 

Cisterna succeeded, “it would have been a brilliant tactical move with, farreaching effects upon the operations in this area. Its faiIure was an incident 

of campaign contributed to by so many factors that it can be ascribed only 

to chance.“3l The Gl would have placed the blame more squarely if he had 
40 

laid it on poor intelligence. Although sufficient information had been collected to correctly determine the enemy’s capabilities and probable course 

of action, they had been sorely misjudged. 

Although poor intelligence was most important in determining the outcome of the battle, the R.angers contributed to their own end, though to an 

indefinite degree. While the Germans expected an attack on Cisterna, they 

had no definite knowledge of precisely when or where it would take place. 

This was learned during the infiltration phase, when the Germans discovered 

the Rangers’ presence. In view of the difficulty the Rangers had practicing 

stealth while training at Pozzuoli Bay, their ability to successfuIly conduct 

an operation such as they attempted at Cisterna is open to question. That 

the Rangers surprised and overran bivouacking enemy just outside the objective was probably due to a breakdown in the Germans’ communications 

and their consequent failure to inform all their troops that the Rangers 

were in the area. 

However much or little it may have contributed to the outcome at Cisterna, the decline in the Rangers’ combat skills was an unfortunate result 

of misusing the Rangers. From North Africa through Italy, the Rangers 

had been too frequently used as conventional infantry, and most of their 

casualties were suffered in those actions. As Ranger casualties were replaced 

with less well-trained men, Ranger Force’s quality became diluted, the level 

of its combat skills declined, and unit cohesion weakened. This deterioration 

was evident throughout the battle. 

Although Ranger Force failed to accomplish its mission at Cisterna, it 

contributed at suicidal cost to the eventual victory. The battle for Cisterna 

was sufficiently jarring to the Germans to force them to delay their plans 

two days. They did not launch their counterattack until 4 February (thus 

giving the Allies forty-eight extra hours to prepare) and then failed only by 

the narrowest of margins, reducing some American units to firing artillery 

over open sights and using clerks and cooks as riflemen. Had the attack 

on Cisterna not taken place and had the Germans been able to counterattack earlier, the outcome might have been different. 

Subsequent Developments 

Cisterna marked the beginning of the end of Ranger Force. The 4th 

Ranger Battalion helped turn back the German counterattack of 4 February, 

and on 19 February, those Rangers still surviving were temporarily attached 

to the Canadian-American 1st Special Service Force. Their experience was 

put to further good use in the spring when they were assigned to conduct 

a scouting and patrolling school for Fifth Army outside Civitavecchia, near 

Naples. Rangers of long standing were sent to Camp Butner, North Carolina, 

on 6 May and remained there until 24 October when the lst, 3d, and 4th 

Ranger Battalions were inactivated. Those men who had joined the Rangers 

more recently and had not spent enough time overseas to justify being re 

turned to the United States were absorbed into the 1st Special Service Force. 
41 

Darby briefly commanded the 179th Infantry during the German 

counterattack at Anzio and was assigned to the Operations Division of the 

War Department General Staff in Washington, D.C., in April 1944. While 

in Washington, Darby had a conversation with William Hutehinson that 

demonstrated, once again, his faith in firepower. He told Hutchinson that 

his experience with the 179th Infantry had impressed him with the might 

that could be brought against an enemy by a unit that was several times 

larger than Ranger Force and had direct access to the firepower of division 

artillery. With such an infantry unit trained in Ranger operations, Darby 

believed that he could do what he had done with the Rangers, but on a 

larger scale. 32 

Events, however, did not afford Darby the opportunity to test his theory. 

After spending a year in Washington, he became assistant division commander of the 10th Mountain Division then fighting in northern Italy. He 

was killed by a round from a German 8&-mm gun in Torbole, Italy, on 30 

April 1945, while visiting the front. 

The timing of Darby’s death was tragically ironic. The day before Darby 

was killed, Mussolini had been slain by Italian partisans in Milan and 

Generaloberst Heinrich Gottfried von Vietinghoff had agreed to surrender 

unconditionally all German forces in Italy effective at noon on 2 May. With 

further irony, on the day of Darby’s death, his name appeared on a list of 

nominees for promotion to brigadier general being submitted to President 

Truman, On 2 May, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson recommended to 

the President that, in view of Darby’s outstanding combat record, his name 

remain on the list and that he be promoted posthumously. Truman agreed 

and on 15 May 1945, slightly more than three months after his thirty-fourth 

birthday, Darby was promoted to brigadier generalz3 He was the only Army 

officer to be posthumously promoted to star rank during the war. 
Zerf 5 

w 

General Background 

The action fought by the 5th Ranger Battalion above Zerf, Germany, 

during 23-27 February 1945 was one of the most successful Ranger operations of World War II. Today, it is hardly remembered. Perhaps the pace of 

fighting at the time was too rapid and the scope of troop movements too 

grand to have permitted one undermanned light battalion to be singled out 

for recognition. Indeed, after-action reports of some American units directly 

involved in the operation ignore even the presence of the 5th Rangers in 

their areas. This fact not only provides an insight into the way in which 

Rangers were perceived by other units but may also explain why the events 

of those five days have all but passed from memory. Documentary references to the action are too meager and too widely spread to draw much 

attention, This has resulted in an unfortunate loss, for the story holds many 

lessons and deserves to be told. 

The 5th Ranger Infantry Battalion was activated at Camp Forrest, Tennessee, on 1 September 1943.1 It landed in Normandy on D-day and fought 

as conventional infantry during the reduction of Brest and elsewhere in 

France and in Germany. Like Darby’s Ranger Force, the 6th Rangers suffered heavy losses of well-trained and experienced men in conventional 

combat, During the first five days of fighting in Normandy, it lost 23 killed, 

89 wounded, and 2 missing. Fighting at Brest in September cost 24 killed, 

111 wounded, and 2 missing, The first eighteen days of December cost an 

additional 18 killed, 106 wounded, and 6 missing.2 In mid-February 1946, 

the badly weakened Rangers found themselves fighting as part of Major 

General Walton H. Walker’s XX Corps, which was advancing on the Saar 

River south of Trier. 

Zerf 

On 22 February, XX Corps’ 94th Infantry Division crossed the Saar in 

the Serrig and Taben areas and, during the following day, expanded its 

bridgeheads against light resistance by infantry, several local counterattacks, and artillery and mortar fire. Elements of the 10th Armored Division, which was also assigned to XX Corps, crossed at Ockfen during 22 

43 

1 

1, i 
44 

and 23 February. In a move calculated to speed the expansion of the bridge 

heads by encouraging a German withdrawal, Walker decided to have the 

5th Ranger Battalion cut the main road leading from the German rear. As 

a result, the 5th Rangers and their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Richard 

P. Sullivan, would conduct one of their most important operations. 

At 1200 on 23 February, the 5th Ranger Battalion was released from 

attachment to the 3d Cavalry Group, for which it had been conducting 

screening and reconnaissance missions, and attached to Major General Harry 

J. Malony’s 94th Infantry Division The Rangers’ new mission required them 

to pass through the division bridgehead near Taben, infiltrate enemy lines, 

follow a generally northeasterly route for about three miles, and establish 

a blocking position across the Irsch-Zerf road.3 

From Saarburg and the Saar, this road ran eastward across flat terrain 

for nearly two miles to Irsch. From Irsch, which lay at the intersection of 

four valleys, the road detoured south for nearly a mile, zigzagging up steep 

heights, and then turned eastward to continue its way to the Rangers’ objective and beyond. This latter section of the road rose gradually for almost 

two and a quarter miles through open fields and was paralleled by slightly 

higher ground to the north and lower ground to the immediate south. After 

rising the nearly two and a quarter miles, the road debauched onto an 

almost treeless plateau and stretched eastward across open fields for slightly 

less than a mile until it disappeared over the horizon through a cleft in a 

wood line. From there, it went downhill for two miles to Serf. The cleft in 

the wood line marked the site of the Rangers’ planned blocking position.* 

Except for the plateau that lay west of their objective, most of the Rangers’ route would take them through the northern reaches of a forest known 

as the Waldgut Hundscheid, The forest, which stretched about nine miles 

from north to south, was marked by sharp hills and deep ravines. While 

the Waldgut Hundscheid offered a well-concealed avenue of approach, its 

apparent safety was illusory. In the manner characteristic of many German 

forests, it was crisscrossed by scores of trails that were seldom more than 

a few hundred yards apart. If enemy patrols were on the trails in any 

number, it would be difficult for the Rangers to reach their objective undetected. 

The route the Rangers were to follow was peculiar in two regards. First, 

it required the battalion to penetrate the German defenses diagonally, rather 

than at a right angle, and then to move parallel to the battlefront once 

behind enemy lines. This resulted in a longer route than might appear neeessary and, presumably, to a greater likelihood of discovery. Second, the 

Rangers were to go forward of friendly lines in the 94th Infantry Division’s 

sector, but because their route would take them to the northeast, they would 

end up in front of Major General William H. H. Morris Jr.‘s 10th Armored 

Division. Elements of that division would be responsible for relieving them. 

In spite of the route’s apparent peculiarities, it had a sound tactical 

basis. The German-held area east of Saarburg and the Saar was generally 

- -~-.____--- 

- 
45 

well forested and was compartmentalized by steep hills and near-cliffs. The 

Saarburg-Zerf road was the best east-west road in the area. It was also a 

logical avenue of approach for an army entering Germany from Luxembourg and had been weIl-fortified with many well-sited pillboxes and bunkers, especially near Irsch. While it would be extremely difficult for the Rangers to penetrate such an obvious and densely fortified avenue of approach, 

they stood a better chance of infiltrating successfully through the less 

strongly defended Waldgut Hundseheid. 

The 5th Ranger Battalion with Company B detached assembled in Weiten 

soon after it received its mission and drew extra machine-gun ammunition, 

antitank mines, and one K- and one D-ration per man. The Rangers then 

marched about two miles to Taben-Rodt, where Company B was located, 

and closed in on the town by 1815. German artillery fire, which had been 

causing the division difficulty throughout the day, was still falling on the 

town, and the Rangers suffered their first losses of the operation when two 

rounds landed on Company A and twenty-four men became casualties. 

The battalion left for the river at 2000 and crossed it by footbridge 

near Taben under harassing artillery fire. No Rangers were hit during the 

crossing, and at 2230, the battalion assembled on the Hockerberg, a hill in 

the Waldgut Hundscheid, about a half mile northeast of the crossing site 

and still within American lines. There, it reformed and prepared to continue 

its march to the forward edge of the bridgehead. Several more men were 

wounded during the march when the Germans resumed their artillery fire. 

The battalion passed through American lines at 2345 and cautiously advanced toward its first checkpoint, an intersection of several trails in the 

forest about a mile. and three quarters southwest of the objective. The leading companies received light rifle and machine-gun fire during the move in 

spite of the concealment provided by the night and the forest, and several 

more Rangers fell wounded. This was but the first of four minor clashes 

that would mark the infiltration phase of the operation. The fighting 

strength of the battalion was still further reduced at about 0145 on 24 February when two of Company B’s platoons became separated. The battalion 

reached the checkpoint at 0630 and halted to wait for the two platoons to 

catch up-5 Although battalion commander Sullivan could not have known 

it, the pause was a waste of valuable time. The two platoons would remain 

separated until the end of the operation and contribute nothing to its outcome. 

A perimeter defense was established for security during the halt, and 

when a German patrol came upon the Rangers, a sharp firefight broke out 

and several enemy were captured. With their presence now definitely known 

to the Germans, the Rangers had to leave the area and sent a reconnaissance patrol to the northeast to find a safe way out. A presumably safe 

route was found by 0815, and the battalion immediately resumed its advance toward the objective, bringing its prisoners with it. 

The Rangers took fire from small groups of Germans in spite of the 

earlier reconnaissance, and by 0930, they came within sight of the jagged 
46 

north edge of the Waldgut Hundscheid about a mile southwest of the objettive. After a short conference, Sullivan ordered the Rangers to continue their 

move to the northeast. They had covered 500 more yards when Company 

D ran into strong resistance. Its commander, Captain George R. Miller, outflanked the Germans with one of his platoons and took several prisoners 

after a brief firefight. Two more Rangers, however, were wounded in the 

action, 

The blocking position the Rangers were to occupy was in a narrow 

strip of woods that extended northward from the Waldgut Hundscheid and 

intersected with the Irsch-Zerf road. The point where the road passed through 

the woods was the previously described “cleft in the wood line” that marked 

the Rangers’ objective. From where Miller’s company had its firefight, it 

was possible to go all the way to the objective along a concealed route by 

marching east through the northern reaches of the Waldgut Hundscheid 

for one mile, and then heading due north for another mile. Sullivan decided 

to avoid the forested route and chose instead to head east under cover of 

darkness by crossing a half-mile-wide open area that lay slightly to the 

north. He had not had much luck avoiding Germans in the woods to this 

point, and the open route was shorter and would save time. It would also 

take him through a cluster of farmhouses and outbuildings that stood 

toward the middle of the open area, allowing him to dear them and better 

secure that part of his rear. 

View along the Irsch-Zerf road from the west, much as it appeared to Germans retreating 

toward Zerf. The cleft in the tree line (arrow), where the road passes through the woods, was 

the Rangers’ objective. 
The Rangers” objective seen from the west. The Rangers established their blocking position in 

the woods to the south (right) of the road. 

At dark, the battalion cautiously began to cross the open ground with 

Company A leading. In spite of the earlier clashes in the forest, the Germans had not yet responded systematically to the Rangers’ presence, and 

many Germans did not know that they were there. Accordingly, a German 

artillery officer, a medical officer, ?and several enlisted men saon drove into 

the area in a medical staff car and were surprised and captured by Campany A. 

Continuing their advance across the open area, the Rangers checked 

the cluster of houses near its center and found them unacceupied. Most of 

the battalion had crossed and the final approach to the objective seemed to 

be going well when Company B, the last company ta crass, came under 

machine-gun and rifle fire from the Kalfertshaus and a nearby pillbax. The 

Kalfertshaus, a medium-size farm dwelling, stood at the edge of the woods 

that led north to the objective and looked out toward the open area that 

the Rangers had crossed. A patrol that was sent to the building last one 

killed. After the patrol rejoined the battalion, the Rangers outposted the 

houses in the open and, with the twenty-three prisoners they had taken 

thus far, prepared to spend the night just south of the objective.6 

At 2340, while the Rangers were settling down for the night, XX Carps 

stepped up its drive eastward. Task Farce (TF) Riley, an element of the 

10th Armored Division’s Combat Command (CC) B, passed through the 94th 
48 

Infantry Division, took Irsch, and began battling its way toward Zerf in 

the face of German infantry, PanzerfZiuste, and antitank fire.7 

At 0600 on 25 February, the Rangers began their final push to clear 

the area of Germans and to take their abjecf2ve. Encountering only light 

resistance, they captured several mare prisoners and took two bunkers near 

the Kalfertshaus and, some buildings several hundred yards farther to the 

north at the Waidmannslust. At 0830, Company E reached the battalion 

objective, and tbe Rangers had only to prepare and await the Germans.8 

Possession of the site where the Rangers were about to establish themselves would prevent the Germans from using the Irsch-Zerf road, but it 

was a poor defensive position. The westward-facing wood line through which 

the road passed was about thirty yards behind the crest of a slight rise 

that paralleled the woods far most of its length, preventing troops using 

the trees as concealment from seeing more than thirty yards to their front. 

Furthermore, if the Germans chose to counterattack, they could use the 

woods immediately north and south of the blocking position as avenues of 

approach. The position could be defended most effectively toward the east. 

There the raad descended toward Zerf through a wide, funnel-like draw that 

had open fields an both sides. If German vehicles came from Zerf, they 

would lack cover and concealment and have limited freedom of maneuver. 

Thus, the position was better suited for defense against Germans who were 

advancing from the east than those retreating from the west. 

Sullivan made the best of the terrain and organized his battalion into 

a perimeter defense. Company E established itself on the north side of the 

perimeter and put antitank mines an -the Irseh-Zerf road, which it then 

covered by fire. Companies D and F occupied the east side of the perimeter 

facing Zerf, and Company C took the west side. Company A set up on the 

south side near the Kalfertshaus to guard against Germans who might come 

out of the Waldgut Hundscheid. Company B, still missing its two lost platoons, guarded the prisoners in a barn near the center. 

Given the crumbling state of their organization, many of the enemy 

were still unaware of the Rangers’ location or intention. Thus, while preparing for German counterattacks, the Rangers had the opportunity to inflict casualties on unsuspecting enemy entering their area. Shortly after noon, 

Company E captured a tank destroyer on the road and destroyed it with 

rocket fire. A half-track was also knocked out when it lumbered onto one 

of Company E”s antitank mines, and German walking-wounded who thought 

the road led to a secure rear were taken prisoner.” (See Map 4.) 

The Germans did not react to the Rangers’ presence in an organized 

way until about 1545, just fifteen minutes before TF Riley entered Zerf from 

the north.lQ They then brought the Rangers’ positian under artillery fire 

and attacked a1ang the two routes that offered the greatest cover and concealment. Company A came under a severe artillery bombardment that was 

followed by an attack of about two hundred infantry wha came through 
BRIDGEHEADS 

JOINED EVENING 

@%IDGEH’EAD ESTABLiSkiEo 

BY 3DlST INF ON : 

MORNING OF 22 tiE& 

SE 

Map 4. Zerf Operation, February 1945 

51 

the woods in the south from the direction of the Waldgut Hundscheid. Simultaneously, an estimated four hundred Germans attacked Company E 

from the northeast. Although the trees to the north and northeast were not 

as dense or extensive as those to the south, there was a slight rise on the 

north side of the road that gave the Germans cover and concealment during their approach to the Rangers” position. Both attacks failed, but the 

German pressure from the north made it necessary for a platoon from Company F to reinforce Company E. The commanding officer of Company B 

and sixteen men were then released from guarding prisoners and sent to 

fill the gap left by the Company F platoon.11 

Eight enemy soldiers captured during the attack and interrogated by 

the Rangers were found to be from the 136th Regiment, 2d Mountain Division The division had served in Poland, Norway, and Finland before being 

sent to the west in January 1945; later that month, it had suffered heavily 

in the Colmar Pocket, from which only 4,000 of its men had escaped. They 

had been ordered to continue attacking the Rangers “to the last man,” but 

as most of them were Austrians and not wholly committed to the cause 

they were serving, many had preferred capture to death. Like many German 

units facing the Americans during the final few months of the war, the 

136th Regiment was worn down and of less than the best quality.12 By the 

end of the day, the Rangers held 135 prisoners.13 

Although the Rangers were thus far successful in their mission, the 

firefights during infiltration and the defense of their position had forced 

them to expend much of their ammunition. An attempt was made to parachute ammunition to the Rangers at 1620, but German fire kept the resupply plane at 1,500 feet, and most of what it dropped fell outside the 

American perimeter.ld’If the operation lasted too long or was too hard fought, 

the Rangers could still lose. 

The larger battle of which the Rangers’ operation was a part was untidy 

and, on the German side, marked by great confusion. The XX Corps did 

not advance along a seamless front but with columns of armor and infantry shouldering their way forward through the Germans, who, singly and 

in groups, were forced to fight, flee, surrender, or die. TF Riley had already 

reached Zerf to the east, yet Germans continued to flee from the west. Sullivan’s battalion added to the confusion and death of a retreating enemy 

by holding ground that controlled his route of withdrawal. 

The Rangers improved their positions during the night while interdicting artillery fire fell on the Irsch-Serf road, denying its use to the enemy. 

Darkness, however, gave no respite. At 0300 on 26 February, a German 

force that the Rangers estimated at four hundred attacked Company E, 

which still held the critical position facing the road. 

The attackers were men of Kampfgruppe Kuppitsch. The Kampfgruppe, 

or provisional task force, was an improvised unit of three ninety-man companies that had recently been formed in Heidelberg under the command of 
52 

a Major Kuppitsch. It had no formal TOE and was composed of miscellaneous march companies, elements of convalescent companies, and new 

recruits. It was armed only with rifles and several machine guns.15 The 

appearance of such ersatz units at the front was symptomatic of Germany’s 

military exhaustion during the latter part of the war. 

What Kampfgruppe Kuppitsch lacked in unit cohesion and training was 

compensated for by spirit and intense artillery and mortar support. Company E soon became hard pressed, and the Company A commander and 

twelve of his men had to rush to its aid. The Germans, accepting heavy 

losses, continued forward and drove the Rangers back 100 yards, retreating 

only when the Americans called artillery fire on their own overrun positions. About twenty-five Germans were taken prisoner during the fight, and 

fourteen Rangers were missing and believed captured. 

Intense artillery fire fell on the Rangers during the rest of the night, 

but the morning of 26 February was quiet, and CCB, which was driving 

on Zerf from the west, reached the Rangers at 1155. Badly needed food, 

water, ammunition, and radio batteries were later brought to the battalion, 

and the wounded and seventy-five prisoners were evacuated. With the Rang 

ers* most immediate needs met, CCB continued on its way to the east, 

leaving Sullivan’s men on their objective. The Rangers remained in their 

blocking position throughout the night while harassing artillery fire fell 

among them. 

The early hours of 27 February arrived with the dense ground fog common to many German mornings. At 0700, a group of about two hundred 

Germans who were apparently lost and could see no better than the Rangers noisily approached the Rangers’ perimeter. The Rangers seized the opportunity to catch an unalert enemy in a hasty ambush and allowed the 

Germans to walk up to the American positions before opening fire. Many 

of the Germans were killed, cut down by sudden machine-gun fire. One 

hundred and forty-five of them, seeing no escape, threw down their weapons and surrendered. 

The ambush in the fog was a rousing climax to a successful mission. 

The Rangers were given further reason to cheer at midday when they were 

joined by the two platoons that had been lost since the 24th. The two platoons had returned to American lines after they became separated, joined 

an armored unit, and fought alongside its tanks as conventional infantry 

during the drive on Zerf. 

Occasional artillery fire fell on the reunited Rangers until midafternoon, 

inflicting the battle’s final few casualties. At 1500, the 94th Infantry Division commander attached the battalion to the 501st Infantry, which was 

continuing the drive to the east. 16 Having successfully conducted the most 

authentic Ranger operation it would perform in the war, the 5th Ranger 

Battalion was sent to fight as conventional infantry. The pattern that had 

so often characterized the use of Darby’s Rangers was holding true for Sullivan’s Rangers as well. 
Commentary 

The 5th Ranger Battalion’s mission above Zerf was appropriate to the 

Rangers’ original purpose and was well conceived and successfully executed. 

However, the infiltration phase of the operation was less than perfect, as it 

was marked by the separation of two platoons and four skirmishes with 

the enemy. There are at least two reasons why these premature enemy contacts occurred. 

First, the 5th Ranger Battalion, like Ranger Force prior to Cisterna, 

had suffered heavy losses earlier in conventional fighting. If the battalion’s 

replacements were less well trained than its original members, as is likely, 

the average level of the battalion’s combat skills would have declined as 

had that of Ranger Force at Pozzuoli Bay. Such a decline would have made 

it more difficult to conduct an infiltration without being detected and may 

explain the enemy’s detection of the Rangers. The inevitable loss of unit 

cohesion that would result from the integration of replacements may explain 

the separation of two of Company B’s platoons. During the Cisterna operation, the 1st and 3d Ranger Battalions, which had recently absorbed a large 

number of replacements, also temporarily lost contact with each other. 

Second, the Rangers moved a long distance through an area where they 

had no detailed knowledge of enemy dispositions, and enemy patrols were 

active, Given this fact and the size of the American unit, the odds may 

have been against the Rangers being undetected no matter what the level 

of their combat skills. 

Fortunately for the Rangers, the Germans near Zerf, like the Italians 

along the route to Porto Empedocle, were under American pressure and 

losing organizational cohesion. Consequently, contact with the Germans in 

one area of the front did not necessarily result in Germans elsewhere along 

the front being alerted to the Rangers’ presence or mounting a coordinated 

effort against them. Furthermore, when the Germans did counterattack, they 

did not have the numbers or equipment that the Hermann Goering Division 

and 2d Parachute Lehr Battalion were able to mass against Ranger Force 

at Cisterna. 

On the objective, the Rangers fought with diligence and stamina and 

skillfully used artillery fire to interdict German movement on the Irsch-Zerf 

road and to turn back German counterattacks. Although official records do 

not reveal the Rangers’ plans for artillery support at Zerf, their unit files 

from defensive operations elsewhere contain an abundance of detailed overlays and fire plans that give evidence of a unit in which thorough tactical 

planning was routine. The timely and effective use of artillery support at 

Zerf was characteristic of the 5th Rangers. 

At a cost of 90 Ranger casualties, the battalion had killed an estimated 

299 enemy and taken 328 prisoners during the five days of the operation 

and contributed to the collapse of the enemy front west of Zerf.17 
54 

Subsequent Developments 

The 5th Ranger Battalion performed conventional missions during the 

final two months of the war, seeing additional combat, guarding prisoners, 

and imposing military government in and near Bamberg, Erfurt, Jena, Gotha, 

and Weimar. The battalion was in Ried, Austria, when the Germans 

surrendered. 

In eleven months of combat, the 5th Ranger Battalion had fought its 

way from Normandy to Austria, killed an estimated 1,572 enemy, and taken 

4,541 prisoners. In doing so, it lost 115 killed, 552 wounded, 25 missing, 

and 2 known captured.18 
General Backgmund 

The rescue of 511 American and Allied prisoners from a Japanese POW 

compound near Cabanatuan in the Philippines by elements of the 6th Ranger 

Battalion, reinforced by Alamo Scouts and Filipino guerrillas, was the most 

complex operation that Rangers conducted during World War II. It was 

also one of the most successful. 

The 6th Ranger Battalion had its roots in the 98th Field Artillery Battalion. The 98th was activated at Ft. Lewis, Washington, in January 1941, 

and subsequently served in New Guinea. In April 1944, it was at Port 

Moresby as part of Sixth Army. Unknown to the 98th’s men, events had 

already transpired that would lead to the unit’s redesignation and reorganization, 

In late 1943, Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, who had recently be 

come commanding general of Sixth Army, created an elite force that he 

named the Alamo Scouts. The scouts were loosely patterned after the Navy’s 

frogmen and conducted reconnaissance and other special missions behind 

enemy lines in teams usually composed of one officer and six enlisted men. 

They were extremely successful and within nine months won nineteen Silver 

Stars, eighteen Bronze Stars, and four Soldier’s Medals without suffering 

any losses. Krueger was so favorably impressed with the scouts’ effectiveness that he decided to create a bigger force to do on a large scale what 

the scouts had done on a small one. The new unit would be created from 

the 98th Field Artillery Battalion.’ 

Krueger selected Lieutenant Colonel Henry A. Mucci, an aggressive 1936 

West Point graduate, to lead the soon-to-beformed battalion. Mueci arrived 

in Port Moresby to assume command of the 58th in April 1944, and on 25 

September, the unit was redesignated the 6th Ranger Infantry Battalion.2 

In the interim, Mucci put the men through a strenuous training program 

very similar to that which Darby’s Rangers had undergone. He also encouraged all men who did not want to be Rangers to transfer to other 

units so the battalion would be manned excIusively by volunteers.” 

The 6th Ranger Battalion was introduced to combat in the Philippines, 

where it successfully conducted several important operations. It landed on 

55 
56 

the islands of Dinagat, Guiuan, and Homonhan on 17 October 1944, three 

days before the main American invasion, and destroyed radio facilities and 

other Japanese positions guarding the entrance to Leyte Gulf. Some minor 

security missions followed and on 10 January 1945, the day after Sixth 

Army landed on Luzon, the Rangers also landed, but only to spend most 

of the next two weeks as Krueger’s headquarters guard. 

Initial Japanese resistance on Luzon was relatively weak, and Sixth 

Army made very good headway during its drive eastward from Lingayen 

Gulf. Major General Oscar W. Griswold’s XXV Corps, which included the 

37th and 40th Infantry Divisions and formed Sixth Army’s right, drove 

toward Tarlac, Clark Field, and San Fernando. Major General Innis Pm 

Swift’s I Corps, which included the 6th and 43d Infantry Divisions and 

formed Sixth Army’s left, pushed northward into the mountains toward 

Baguio. After being reinforced by the 25th Infantry Division, I Corps continued to drive eastward through the Cabaruan Hills toward San Jose. 

At about daybreak on 26 January, advance reconnaissance units of the 

6th Infantry Division occupied Guimba and, within hours, established outposts nine miles farther to the east along the Licab River. They also took 

La Paz, farther to the south, thus establishing a solid front that was more 

than eighteen miles wide and had Licab at its center. 

Cabanatuan 

As Sixth Army entered central Luzon, Krueger began planning the liberation of American and Allied prisoners held in a compound at Pangatian, 

five miles east of Cabanatuan. Krueger had first learned of the existence of 

the camp when he landed on Lingayen Gulf and was met by a number of 

American officers who had remained in the Philippines sinee 1942 leading 

Filipino guerrillas against the Japanese. Army Major Robert Lapham, who 

had been conducting guerrilla operations in the northern part of Nueva 

Ecija province where the compound was located, was one of these officers. 

As Sixth Army entered Nueva Ecija province, Filipino runners constantly 

kept him informed of the situation at the camp.4 

The compound would present an extremely difficult challenge to any 

prospective liberator. In addition to being behind enemy lines, it was in 

the mainstream of Japanese troop movements. Because of the rapid advance 

of American forces from the southwest, the Japanese were withdrawing 

toward the north and east along the Cabanatuan City-Baloc-San Jose and 

Cabanatuan City-Cabu-Rizal highways. They moved at night to avoid being 

seen by American aircraft and rested during the day in concealed areas 

and transit camps. The POW compound at Pangatian did double duty as a 

transit camp. Furthermore, Japanese tanks used the roads in the Pangatian 

area regularly, and there had been reports of dense Japanese troop concentrations in nearby Cabana&an City and Cabu.5 

The Japanese had already evacuated many of the prisoners, and Sixth 

Army headquarters feared that they might move the remainder to the northeast or kill them to prevent their liberation. If these possibilities were to be 
57 

averted, the Americans would first have to take the compound by surprise 

before their own main forces arrived in the area and then evacuate the 

prisoners to friendly lines before the Japanese could react. Krueger assigned 

this difficult mission to the 6th Ranger Battalion on the recommendation 

of his G2, Colonel Horton White.6 

The force Mucci assembled for the operation consisted of himself; Company C, commanded by Captain Robert W. Prince; 2d Platoon, Company F, 

commanded by First Lieutenant John F. Murphy; two teams of Alamo 

Scauts; and four combat photographers from the 83211 Signal Service Battalion. The Alamo Scouts would be an especially valuable asset, for both 

teams had worked together in freeing thirty-two Javanese civilians held by 

the Japanese at Moari, New Guinea, in October 1944. The mission had 

been a complete success; the prisoners were freed, the Japanese guards were 

annihilated, and no Scouts were lost. The total strength of Mucci’s force 

was 8 officers and 120 enlisted men.’ 

Map and ground reconnaissance would be important during both the 

planning and execution phases of the operation. Mucci’s men used aerial 

photographs in their planning, and every officer and enlisted man familiarized himself with the routes, rendezvous points, and the location of the 

objective. The Air Corps would provide air cover and send information 

gained during reconnaissance to Sixth Army. Army would then send the 

intelligence it developed to a forward base at Guimba, from which it would 

be relayed to the Rangers, who would carry an SCR 694 radio for the primary purpose of receiving it8 

The Alamo Scouts would also play a key role in the surveillance of the 

objective. Both scout teams would leave the Rangers’ base camp at Calasiao 

on the afternoon of 27 January, march to a guerrilla headquarters at Guimba 

where they would be joined by native guides, and then go to Plater0 three 

miles north of the objective. They would contact local guerrillas there and 

keep the compound under surveillance to determine the number of Japanese troops, who the guards were, and what the guards’ routines were. The 

scouts would then furnish that information to the Rangers when the latter 

arrived in the area. 

The Rangers would move to Guimba, about seventy-five miles east of 

base camp, on 28 January and pick up an eighty-man guerrilla force and 

native guides at a nearby guerrilla camp. They would then march on a 

route chosen by local civilians and rendezvous with the Alamo Scouts and 

a second eighty-man guerrilla force at Balincarin, about five miles northeast of the objective, on 29 January. They would complete their plans there 

and, unless the situation had changed, conduct the operation that night.9 

Following Mucci’s instructions, the Rangers wore soft caps and fatigue 

uniforms with no insignias or badges of rank. Riflemen carried their choice 

of M-l rifle or M-l carbine; the weapons sections carried Browning automatic rifles, and most noncommissioned officers carried a Thompson sub 

machine gun and a .43caliber pistol. Mucci was armed with only a .45- 

caliber pistol, but most officers carried rifles in addition to their pistols. 
58 

Each medic was armed with a pistol and either a rifle or a carbine. Each 

man carried a trench knife and at least two bandoliers of ammunition and 

two hand or rifle grenades.lO 

With its preliminary planning complete, Mucci’s force left base camp 

by truck convoy at 0500 on 28 January, halted at Guimba, and left with 

native guides at 1400 to march to a guerrilla camp near Lobong about five 

miles to the southeast. Guerrilla Captain Eduardo Joson, who had worked 

with Major Lapham before the American return to the Philippines, joined 

the Rangers there with eighty men. Although the civilian population was 

overwhelmingly friendly toward Americans, Joson feared the possibility of 

a clash with Communist Huk guerrillas operating in the area and took 

necessary precautions. He left twenty armed men to guard the camp at 

Lobong and sent most of his guerrillas far out to Mucci’s flanks to prevent 

the column from being ambushed.11 The force then marched east. 

Except for the area east of Lobong, which was heavily forested, much 

of the march was through open grasslands and rice paddies. The force 

crossed into enemy territory about a mile south of Baloc after dark, forded 

the Talavera River at midnight, crossed the Rizal highway at 0400 the following morning, and arrived at Balincarin at 0600.12 The Rangers’ detailed 

planning, thorough map reconnaissance, and guerrilla support proved effee 

tive; in spite of the frequent lack of concealment and the sighting of Japanese tanks on major roads, the force completed the fourteen-mile march 

from Lobong without incidentI 

At Balincarin, the Rangers met Lieutenants Thomas Rounsaville and 

William Nellist of the Alamo Scouts and learned that the scouts were still 

gathering information the Rangers would need for their final plans. They 

were soon joined by guerrilla Captain Juan Pajota, who had worked with 

Major Lapham and was the guerrilla area commander at Cabu, and his 

force of approximately 90 armed and 160 unarmed men.l* (See Map 5.) 

Rounsaville, Nellist, and Pajota all told of large numbers of Japanese 

troops in the area. The highway in front of the camp had been heavily 

traveled by withdrawing Japanese during the previous twenty-four hours 

and two to three hundred enemy were bivouacked on Cabu Creek, a mile 

north of the compound. Pajota”s men also reported that at least one Japanese division was at Cabanatuan City less than four miles to the south.‘5 

The number of Japanese in the area convinced Mucci that a delay in the 

operation would be prudent, and he decided to postpone the raid for twentyfour hours.‘” 

Although the available information did not permit Mucci to complete 

his plan, the Rangers and guerrillas did what they could with the information they had to assure the success of the mission. Prince and Pajota arranged to have the guerrillas provide all-around security, assemble a 

carabao-cart train large enough to carry 200 liberated POWs, and prepare 

food for 650 men along the return route. The guerrillas instructed the eivilians north of the Cabanatuan City-Cabu highway to remain in the area 
,” ._. 

‘,“I .i _,_ 

^ ,. 

. . ;_ 

Map 5. Cabanatuan Operation: Routes to and from the Objective, Janum 1945 
---. 
61 

etain ~~~~i~~r~ whs n-3 enter it until after the prisoners were 

rillas also told t to pen all chick s and tie and muzz 

ain silent whike ucei's column 

through the area. Civilian5 in the vicinity of t objective were 

leave for the sake of their safety but to ds so adudly in order not to 

alert the Japsmese.17 

but added that a new 

e were in the area 

Alamo SCQULS 

and was enclosed 

in estrange was barred by an 

entered t$e compo 

e that had been at 

nearby h~gbway was light. The est outside threat to the 

e miseiion was a force of about e hundred Japanese with 

tanks and trucks at Cabu. The ~~so~e~s were sed in b~i~d~~gs in the 

E-LOrma1.l~ 

With the ~eco~~~i~sa~ce conditiotms favorable, Nucci confirmed his decision e men were thoroughly briefed, 

and each man was on his responsibilities. Mucei csnsider men to make every 
62 

effort to gain it. The pIan was logical and provided for the metb~di~a~ 

accomplishment of the mission. 

Captain Joson’s guerrillas were to establish a roadblock on the main 

highway and 800 yards southwest of the compound to stop any Japanese 

who might come out of Cabanatuan City. A six-man bazooka team under 

Staff Sergeant James 0. White of 2d Platoon, Company F, would give the 

guerrillas antitank protection. Captain Pajota’s guerrillas were to establish 

a roadblock at the highway bridge over Cabu Creek 300 yards northeast of 

the compound and stop any Japanese wha might come out of Cabu. T 

guerrillas were also to cut the phone lines linking the camp to the outside 

just prior to the attack. 

On Pajota’s recommendation, an American airplane would buzz the 

compound just prior to the attack. The guerrillas had noted that the camp 

guards kept their eyes skyward when American aircraft were in the area, 

and Pajota believed that a well-timed overflight would distract Japanese 

from the Rangers as they crept forward. 

The 2d Platoon, Company F, was to eliminate the guards at the rear 

entrance of the st,ockade and prevent Japanese from moving into the area 

of the compound occupied by the prisoners. Six men from the platoon were 

also detailed to destroy the pillbox at the northeast corner of the stockade. 

The 1st Platoon, Company C, led by First Lieutenant William J, @Connell, was to force the front gate of the compound open and kill Japanese 

in several known locations. In particular, 1st Section, led by Staff Sergeant 

Preston N. Jensen, was to attack acroaa the highway, kill the guards at” 

the gate and in nearby guardhouses, and gain entrance to the compound. 

The 2d Section, led by Sergeant Homer E. Britzius, was to cross the highway to the right of 1st Section and support 1st Section’s action by firing at 

enemy positions through the fence. Weapons Section, led by Staff Sergeant 

Manton P. Stewart, was to follow 1st Section through the gate and then 

move to the right of 1st Section and advance t.o destroy with bazooka fire 

the building housing the tanks and trucks. The 2d Section was to lift its 

fire as Weapons Section went in, and them pass through the gate and move 

to the right edge of the stockade to prevent Japanese from escaping” 

The 2d Platoon, Company C, led by First Lieutenant Melville H. 

Schmidt, was to follow 1st Platoon into the compound, open the prisoners’ 

section of the camp, and begin evacuating them while providing its own 

close fire support. In particular, 1st Section, led by Staff Sergeant Clifton 

Harris, was to enter the compound after 1st Platoon, force the entrance to 

the prisoners’ enclosure, and fire on the pillbox under attack by 2d Platoon, Company F. The 2d Section, led by Staff Sergeant William R. Butler, 

was to follow 1st Section in and then go to the right flank of the prisoners’ enclosure to prevent Japanese from entering it. Weapons Section, led 

by Staff Sergeant August T. Stern, Jr., was to remain in reserve at the 

beginning of the attack and then direct the prisoners through the main 

gate and start them on the march north. 
63 

When all prisoners were dear of the compound and on their way to 

friendly lines, Captain Prince was to signal the Rangers to withdraw by 

firing a red flare from the rear of the column. When the column was at 

least a mile from the camp, Prince would signal the guerrillas manning 

the roadblocks to withdraw by firing a second flare. After withdrawing, the 

guerrillas would provide rear and flank security for the column.20 

The Alamo Scouts kept the stockade under continuous surveillance immediately prior to the attack. Civilian runners maintained communication 

between the scouts and t.he main body at Plater0 and carried periodic intelligence reports to Mucci, who was thus kept informed of the situation at 

the objective. 

Mueci, his Rangers, and their Filipino and American attachments left 

Platero for the objective at 1700 on 30 January. The entire force under 

Mucci’s command numbered nearly 375. Only a radio crew, which was to 

maintain communication between the Rangers and higher headquarters, had 

been left behind in Plater0 where several armed villagers provided security, 

Unknown to Mu&, Pajota had already sent an additional 400 guerrillas 

ahead. Pajota had not told the Americans about these men or about their 

four water-cooled .3@caliber machine guns because he wanted to use them 

as he thought best without having to discuss the matter with Mucci. Half 

the men, Squadrons 200 and 202, were to form a reserve near Joson’s roadblock. The other half, Squadrons 201A and 204, were to position themselves 

near Manacnac on the enemy side of Cabu Creek. This latter group was to 

attack the Japanese from behind if they threatened to cross the Cabu be 

fore the Rangers had completed their missionzl 

On the first leg of its march to the objective, the column advanced 

along a well-concealed, narrow dirt trail that cut through tall grass and 

bamboo. After marching a half mile, the force reached the Pampanga River 

and split into three elements. Pajota and Joson led their men across the 

river and headed toward their blocking positions, while Mueci led the main 

body across the river and toward the compound. Although Mucci’s aerial 

photograph showed only short grass, rice paddies, and shallow ponds eovering the two miles between the river and the objective, high grass covered 

almost half the distance and gave the Rangers concealment to within about 

a mile of the compound. It was 1800 and twilight when Mucei’s force 

reached the far side of the grassy area. Stretching before them to the south 

for more t‘han a mile lay a treeless, shrubless plain of rice paddies and 

ponds. Only a single nipa hut a mile ahead broke the flatness of the horizon” 

The 2d Platoon, Company F, which was to kill the guards at the rear 

of the stockade, split off from the main body and headed east under its 

platoon leader, First Lieutenant John F. Murphy. After marching about a 

half mile, it dropped down into a streambed that it would follow to the 

east fence of the compound. 

The 1st and 2d Platoons of Company C, led by Company Commander 

Prince, continued forward another 500 yards before they saw the stockade’s 

- 
64 

guard towers on the horizon. Assuming that if they could see the Japanese, the Japanese could see them, the Rangers dropped to the ound an 

began crawling toward the compound. It was a mile away, and the Rangers would have to crawl for seventy-five minutes to reach it. 

While the Rangers were closing on the objective, the guerrillas were 

preparing their roadblocks. Pajota’s farce, strengthened by the men and machine guns he had not told Mu& about, covered the highway, the bridge 

over Cabu Creek, and other likely river-crossing sites. The extra men proved 

useful for it was the dry season, the creek was low, and the Japanese would 

probably be able ta cross the Cabu in many places. Happily for Pajota, the 

Japanese had not posted guards at the Cabu, and the Filipinos were able 

to prepare their positions in relative security. Some of the guerrillas crossed 

to the far side of the creek to lie in ambush while others planted a time 

bomb under the far end of the bridge. The time bomb, which was one of 

several delivered by an American submarine, was set to detonate between 

1940 and 1950 hours. Mucci had scheduled the attack on the compound to 

begin shortly after 1930, and Pajota set the bomb with the hope of destroying Japanese who might try to cross the bridge to aid the compound’s garrison. 

At 1840, three-quarters of an hour before the attack was to begin, a 

single P61 Black Widow from the 547th Night Fighter Squadron approached 

the objective area as planned. It flew over the bridge and prisan compound 

twice at an altitude of 200 feet, scaring and distracting the Japanese before 

it left to search for enemy troops who might be on the roads leading to the 

compound. 

Twenty-five minutes after the 3’62 left, Prince, the 1st and 2d Platoons 

of Company C, the combat photographers, medics, several’ guerrillas, and 

Alamo Scouts completed their mile-l-ong crawl and arrived at a drainage 

ditch across the highway from the main gate of the stockade. There, they 

were in positian to attack. 

While Prince’s element waited in its assault positions, First Lieutenant 

John F. Murphy and 2d Platoon, Company F, crept under the highway 

through a large culvert and advanced toward the back of the compound 

through a fivefoot-deep ditch that ran parallel to and fifty yards outside 

the compound’s east fence. As the Rangers passed the guard tower at the 

northeast corner of the compound, a sentry in the tower raised his rifle 

and looked toward the ditch as though alerted to the Americans” presence 

but soon lowered his weapon, apparently convinced that nothing was there. 

The Rangers then continued forward undetected, positioning men opposite 

the guard towers and pillboxes they were to bring under Ere. Murphy and 

the last Rangers to go into position arrived near the rear gate at 1925. 

Because Murphy’s element had the greatest distance to go to reach its 

assault positions and would arrive there after the rest of the farce was in 

place, Mucci chose him to give the signal to begin the attack. Murphy’s 

Rangers were in position and ready to attack at 1930, but Murphy wanted 

to be certain that they were completely prepared and their positions were 
65 

secure. He thus sent several men to retrace the route the platoon had followed while getting in place, inspect the squad positions, and check nearby 

buildings to ensure that they were not occupied. These precautions delayed 

the attack fifteen minutes, but Murphy would be sure that his men were 

ready. 

The moonlight was bright, and the Rangers were able to select their 

targets while waiting for Murphy’s signal. Some aimed at the red glow of 

cigarettes they saw in the shadows, while others aimed at men relaxing in 

their underwear inside still-lit barracks. The 150 enemy who were passing 

the night in the compound and were supposed to leave the following morning were a headquarters unit. The seventy-three guards were a polyglot assortment of Japanese, Koreans, and Formosans. They were not a match for 

the well-trained and highly motivated Rangers. 

At 1945, Murphy aimed his M-l rifle at an open window in the nearest 

barrack and fired. His shot was the signal to begin the attack. Superior 

leadership, training, combat intelligence, and planning prevailed in the brief 

encounter that followed. (See Map 6.) 

When Murphy gave the signal to start the attack, Company F began 

throwing hand grenades and f&g carbines, rifles, autamsrtic weapons, and 

rifle grenades into the compound from outside the east fence. The Rangers 

concentrated their fire on pillboxes, guard towers, and Japanese who were 

unfartunate enough ta be exposed. 

Company C, which had been in position opposite the front of the eompound, also began firing on Murphy’s signal. The men gave special attention to a waist-high concrete shelter and guard tower at the main entrance 

and to a nearby guard shack. A lone enemy soldier who was sta 

guard in the shelter when the attack began became the initial. target of 

much of the company, and Staff Sergeant James V. Melliean saw the upper 

half of the man disintegrate in the Rangers’ concentrated fire. All guard 

towers, guard shacks, and pillboxes were neutralized within thirty seconds 

after Murphy fired the first shot. 

The Rangers then stormed the compound. Staff Sergeant Theodore R. 

Richardson of Company C charged across the highway to the compound’s 

main gat,e and shattered the lock with a shot from his .45-caliber pistol. 

Two Japanese who tried to prevent the Americans from entering were killed 

by Richardson and Private First Class Leland A. Proveneher, 

With the gate open,. Staff Sergeant Preston N. Jensen and 1st Section, 

1st Platoon, rushed into the camp. To Jensen’s right, Sergeant Homer E. 

Britzius and 2d Section dashed across the highway and gave 1st Section 

covering fire through the fence. Staff Sergeant Manton P. Stewart’s Weapons Section followed 1st Section through the gate and ran 300 yards to the 

central. part of the camp where it destroyed two trucks and a corrugatedmetal tank shed with bazooka fire. The assault was proceeding as planned 

and no American casualties had yet been suffered. 
66 

While the Rangers were attacking the compound, Pajota was fighting 

his own battle at the bridge. When the Filipinos heard Company F’s opening shots, they began firing on a Japanese battalion in bivouac less than 

300 yards beyond Cabu Creek. The stunned Japanese counterattacked the 

Filipinos repeatedly in piecemeal fashion, suffering heavy casualties, but 

were unable to gain ground. Pajota’s time bomb blew a gap in the bridge, 

and his four machine guns killed many Japanese who tried to jump to the 

Filipino’s side of the bridge or cross the creek where it was shallow. Bazookamen with Pajota also put two Japanese tanks and one truck out of action. 

Several minutes after the raid began, Private First Class Leland A. 

Provencher of 1st Platoon, Company C, liberated the first POW. He was an 

American generator operator who was temporarily away from his fellow 

captives. The rest of the prisoners would be freed by 2d Platoon, Company 

C, led by First Lieutenant Melville Schmidt. 

The 2d Platoon, Company C, performed its mission smoothly and as 

planned. The platoon’s 2d Section, led by Staff Sergeant William Butler, 

charged up the compound’s central road and joined 1st Platoon in firing to 

the right and rear into the Japanese-occupied southwest area of the stockade. The 1st Section, Ied by Staff Sergeant Clifton Harris, stopped short of 

2d Section and turned left to the prisoners’ area of the compound, which it 

entered after shouting the gate’s lock off. 

What little enemy resistance still remained twelve minutes after the attack began dwindled to a few scattered shots, and the Rangers began leading the first POWs from the compound. Unfortunately, during this phase 

of the operation, the Rangers suffered their first casualties when a Japanese light mortar fired three rounds toward the front gate and wounded six 

men. Alamo Scout Rounsavilfe and battalion surgeon Captain James C. 

Fisher were among the casualties. Fisher would die before he reached 

friendly lines. 

The Japanese continued to attack Pajota’s positions during the evacuation of the compound but remained unable to gain ground or inflict casualties on the Filipinos. Joson’s roadblock, in contrast, was not attacked. Any 

likelihood that it would be attacked ended shortly after 2000 when one of 

the P61s assigned to provide air cover for the operation strafed and de 

stroyed a Japanese convoy that was heading from San Jose toward Cabanatuan City and the roadblock. 

At 2615, a half hour into the raid, Prince completed his second search 

of the POW’s area of the compound to ensure that no prisoners were being 

left behind. When he was satisfied that the area was cleared, he fired one 

red flare into the sky to begin the withdrawal. Unknown to Prince or anyone else, however, one dysentery-weakened British civilian prisoner had hidden in the latrine at the sound of the first shots and never came out. He 

would be discovered near the camp after midnight by Filipino guerrillas 

and rescued. Tragically, one POW had died of an apparent heart attack 

while being helped out of the compound. 
ASSAULT ELEMENT 

,NO. 7 

SCALE 1:3,000 

LEGEND 

NO. 1 . . . TANK SHED. 

NQ. 2. . . REAR GUARD 

QUARTERS. 

NQ. 3 I . . PILL 60x. 

NO. 4 . . s ENEMY 

TRANSIENT 

QUARTERS. 

NO. 5. I. ENEMY 

OFFICERS 

QUARTERS. 

NO. 6. . . ENEMY 

ENLISTED MEN’S 

QUARTERS. 

NO. 7 . . . MAIN GATE & 

GUARD 

HWSE. 

NQ. a. . . GUARD TOWER. 

m PM BOXES. 

SUPPORT ELEMENTS, 

Map 6. Cabanatuan Operation: Actions at the Objective, January 1945 
ALL ALLIED PRISONE 

\i \ 

&RE CONCENTRATED 

if, T&S ENCLOSURE. 
69 

Six men from Company F were the last Americans to withdraw from 

the objective, and as they did so, the Japanese brought them under fire. 

The six were trotting along the outside of the compound fence toward the 

highway when they began receiving scattered rifle shots. Some of the 

Rangers fired back, while others dashed through the moonlight toward the 

drainage ditch they had come through during their approach, When Corporal Roy Sweeey turned to fire his M-l at the Japanese, he was shot through 

the chest with an automatic weapon and died several minutes later. He 

and the fatally wounded Captain Fisher were the only Rangers to die in 

the operation. 

Most of the Rangers and liberated POWs were at or approaching the 

Pampanga River by 2030, forty-five minutes after the raid began. All men 

except those who were at the roadblocks or on other security missions were 

across the river by 2045, and Prince fired the flare to signal Joson and 

Pajota to withdraw. Joson withdrew immediately, sending half his men to 

provide security around Platero, the first barrio Mucci’s column would pass 

through on its march to friendly lines. The other half of Joson’s men would 

provide flank security for the column when it left Platero. Pajota was unable to withdraw when Prince gave the signal because his men were still 

battling the Japanese on Cabu Creek. Pajota’s fight continued until shortly 

after 2200 when the exhausted Japanese ended their attack. His guerrillas 

had virtually destroyed a Japanese battalion without suffering any fatalities or serious wounds. They then withdrew by marching around the battlefield in a southeasterly direction and established themselves as a rear guard 

on the Pampanga to protect Mucci’n column from pursuit. 

As successful as the infiltration and raid had been, the Rangers’ mission would not be fully accomplished until they safely brought the liberated POWs to friendly lines. All means were taken to assure their safe 

deliverance. Carabao carts that had been requisitioned from local civilians 

were awaiting the POWs on the south bank of the Pampanga River. The 

column’s first stop was in Platero, where it reorganized and ate. There, 

guerrilla doctor Carlos Layug treated the sick and wounded. Food and water 

were provided by local people, and the hospitality and concern the Filipinos displayed in Plater0 would be shown again by other civilians in other 

barrios during the remainder of the return march. Those ex-POWs who were 

able to walk went under Ranger escort to Balincarin as soon as they could 

be assembled. The first of them left Plater0 at 2100. 

When the column reached Bahncarin, it received more food and water 

from local people, as well as fifteen carabao carts to add to the twenty-five 

it already had.22 Captain Fisher was left in Balincarin with thirteen Alamo 

Scouts and Rangers and some guerrillas, and a light aircraft was requested 

to evacuate them. The aircraft would never arrive, and Fisher would die 

about the time the main column reached friendly lines.23 

The column left for the next barrio, Matoas Na Kahey, at midnight 

and arrived there at 0200 the following morning, 31 January. The civilians 

at Matoas Na Kahey gave additional food and water to the column and 
70 

provided it with eleven more carabao carts. When the column left ‘at 0230, 

it had fifty-one carts and was a mile and a half long. 

The most dangerous leg of the return march lay slightly beyond Matoas 

Na Kahey where the column would cross the Rizal highway. The risk of 

crossing an insecure highway in enemy territory with a long, slow’ column 

of weakened ex-POWs was compounded by the fact that difficult terrain on 

the opposite side of the highway would not permit the column to cross 

directly over. Instead, it would have to enter the highway and march one 

mile south before crossing. Because of the length of the column, as much 

as two-thirds of it would be on the highway during the movement. 

Discovery by the Japanese would be disastrous. Et could not be avoided 

if the column was on the road at an inopportune time, but discovery could 

be prevented through proper security. This was provided by First Lieutenant William J. O’Connell’s 1st Platoon, Company C. One section of the 

platoon, armed with a bazooka and antitank grenades, established a roadblock 400 yards northeast of where the column was to enter the road. A 

second section established another roadblock 3,000 yards to the south. Luckily, no Japanese used the road during the crossing. The column took an 

hour to clear the highway and did so by 9430 without being discovered. 

The men halted in a small barrio at 0530 and resumed their march toward 

friendly lines after a short rest. 

The Rangers had been unable to make radio contact with the forward 

base at Guimba since before the raid began and had not yet informed Sixth 

Army of their success. They made several more attempts to contact Guimba 

at about dawn but failed, and at 0800, they arrived at the small town of 

Sibul. Local people once again provided the column with food and water 

and with an additional twenty carabao carts. While the column was resting, the e at Guimba succeeded in establishing radio contact. Mu& requested trucks and ambulances be prepared to meet the column, which 

resumed its march shortly after Q900.24 

At about 1100, Technician 5 Patrick Marquis, who was on the point 

and several hundred yards in advance of the column, was halted by a Sixth 

Army reconnaissance patrol. The trucks and ambulances Mucci had asked 

for were only a short distance to the patrol’s rear, and an hour later, the 

former POWs were at the 92d Evacuation Hospital in Guimba.25 With that, 

the Rangers’ mission was accomplished. 

Commentary 

The Cabanatuan prison camp raid was an overwhelming tactical success. At a cost of two Rangers killed, the 6th Ranger Battalion (-), reinforced by Alamo Scouts and Filipino guerrillas, liberated 511 American and 

Allied POWs and killed or wounded an estimated 523 Japanese.26 Their 

success was both recognized and rewarded. General Douglas A. MacArthur, 

who said that the raid was “magnificent and reflectted] extraordinary credit 

to all concerned,” awarded the Distinguished Service Cross to Mucci, the 
71 

Silver Star to all American officers, and the Bronze Star to all American 

enlisted men who participated in the operation.27 All Filipino officers and 

enlisted men were awarded the Bronze Star.28 

The operation was immediately singled out for special comment in the 

Sixth Army weekly G2 report, which described it as “an almost perfect 

example of prior reconnaissance and planning . . , .“29 It was further held 

up as demonstrating “what patrols can accomplish in enemy territory by 

following the basic principles of scouting and patrolling, ‘sneaking and 

peeping,’ [the] use of concealment, reconnaissance of routes from photographs and maps prior to the actual operation, . . . and the coordination of 

all arms in the accomplishment of a mission”30 

All of the principles and techniques that the weekly G2 report pointed 

out were important because they contributed to the Rangers’ undetected approach to the objective, their gaining complete surprise over the Japanese, 

their smooth assault on the compound, and their successful liberation of 

the prisoners. Of equal, if not greater, importance was the one indispensable element that the report did not mention-an aggressively friendly civilian population. The Filipinos conducted reconnaissance, surveillance, and 

security missions in support of the operation, chose the routes to and from 

the objective, fought Japanese in the objective area, provided transportation 

to friendly lines for the sick and wounded, and provided food and water 

for all. The success of the mission would have been unlikely without Filipino friendship and support, and impossible had the Filipinos sympathized 

with the Japanese. 

Subsequent Developments 

The 6th Ranger Battalion did not take part in major combat operations 

after Cabanatuan. Their activities in the Philippines were limited to providing security for Sixth Army headquarters, conducting reconnaissance patrols, searching for Japanese stragglers, and eliminating small pockets of 

enemy resistance. In one such encounter, the Rangers annihilated seventeen saber-bearing Japanese officers who had taken shelter in a bunker to 

avoid Filipino guerrillas, The battalion’s records show only one Ranger killed 

in action, one dead of wounds, and three wounded in all of the operations 

that followed Cabanatuan. None of these losses were suffered in the incident involving the Japanese officers. 
Conclusion 

Most of Rogers’ Rangers’ nineteen standing orders, which appear in 

FM 21-75, Combat Skills of the Soldier, deal directly or indirectly with two 

principles of war-security and surprise. The more than two centuries that 

have passed since Major Robert Rogers first wrote his standing orders during 

the French and Indian War have not diminished the importance of these 

principles. On the contrary, modern lessons based upon security and surprise 

are present in the five operations that have been examined in this paper. 

Because the United States and its Allies do not have a monopoly on Ranger 

operations, and their forces may come under Ranger-style attacks as well 

as conduct them, these lessons are best seen from the perspectives of both 

the attacker and the attacked. 

From the attacker’s perspective: 

0 It is essential that troops conducting Ranger operations have surprise 

in their favor because they are usually lightly armed and frequently isolated 

from friendly forces. 

e Surprise is much more easily gained over an enemy who has lost his 

tactical cohesion than over one who is well organized. This is especially 

true if he is in retreat. Gaps in the enemy front are easier to find and 

exploit, and even if local surprise is lost, an enemy unit that is in disarray 

might not have the ability to warn others of the attacker’s presence. 

l In populated areas, the ease or difficulty with which surprise is gained 

will be greatly dependent upon the sympathy and support of the local population, 

From the defender’s perspective: 

e Troops who have lost their cohesion or otherwise have gaps in their 

front are especially vulnerable to and will probably invite enemy Rangerstyle attacks. 

l In areas populated by civilians who are friendly to the enemy, the 

enemy can be expected to conduct Ranger-style operations, and he will be 

more likely to gain surprise. 

In spite of the importance of security and surprise in the operations 

studied, the greatest lessons are to be drawn from another principle of war73 
74 

unity of command. The Rangers suffered from an absence of unity of eommand throughout World War II. The Ist, 3d, and 4th Ranger Battalions 

did not come under the effective command of a single headquarters until 

shortly before Anzio; and the Zd, 5th, and 6th Ranger Battalions remained, 

for all practical purposes, separate entities throughout their existence. This 

had unfortunate effects on the Rangers’ mission assignments, training of 

replacements, and unit cohesion. 

The six Ranger battalions were formed in response to separate require 

ments in the Mediterranean, northern Europe, and the Philippines; their 

formation did not reflect a centralized plan to put the Ranger concept into 

action. The lst, 3d, and 4th Ranger Battalions came closest to being expressions of a unifying concept, but even under Darby”s forceful leadership, the 

goal of a true regimental headquarters remained elusive almost until the 

end. 

Because of the lack of a separate Ranger command, the missions assigned to Ranger Force and the individual Ranger battalions were determined by the various headquarters to which they were assigned or attached. 

Some major commanders, such as Terry de la Mesa Allen and Walter 

Krueger, tended to use their Rangers in accordance with their special skills. 

Others, such as Mark Clark, did not. 

Even when employed by perceptive commanders, however, the Rangers’ 

missions were mixed. The 1st Ranger Battalion, which was in North Africa 

from 8 November 1942 through 10 July 1943 and was used more properly 

than Ranger Force’s other two battalions, spent only eight days of those 

eight months conducting true Ranger operations. During the same period, 

however, they spent 30 days in conventional infantry combat and 212 days 

training themselves and others and in reserve. They thus spent almost four 

times as many days in conventional combat than they did in Ranger operations and spent most of their time on noncombat duties. This latter fact 

was not necessarily bad, as it was partly the result of the Rangers being 

held back for appropriate missions and was preferable to their being wasted 

in prolonged conventional combat. 

The replacement of the heavy losses that frequently occurred when they 

were in prolonged conventional combat, and sometimes occurred when they 

conducted true Ranger operations, posed special difficulties for the Rangers. 

Because of the absence of a headquarters responsible for all Ranger battalions, there was no single center where replacements would be trained by 

Rangers, to Ranger standards, for the Ranger battalions. The 1st Ranger 

Battalion and Ranger Force made a valiant effort to train their replaeements as thoroughly as time allowed, but the number of men they could 

detach as instructors and the amount of time that these could spend with 

their trainees was determined by the needs of the headquarters- to which 

they were assigned or attached. The commanders and headquarters that 

controlled the Rangers were usually too busy fighting their own conventional 

battles to exert themselves developing special missions for the Rangers. The 

losses that the Rangers suffered conducting conventional operations, com- 
75 

bined with the lack of a dependable source of Ranger-trained replacements, 

inevitably led to a dilution of the Ranger battalions with less well-trained 

men and to a decline in their unit cohesion. 

Some critics have maintained that the Rangers are superfluous because 

there is nothing the Rangers do that cannot be done by good conventional 

infantry. This contention contradicts the lessons of war. Conventional units 

suffer casualties and are subject to the same consequences of attrition as 

the Rangers. They, too, suffer the loss of trained men and cohesion that 

are necessary for success. If troops such as the Rangers are not held in 

reserve for special missions, there is no assurance that, when such missions 

are necessary, there will be any unit capable of accomplishing them. 

The need for highly trained units for special missions is supported by 

the fact that, except for the Rangers’ amphibious landings in which there 

was time to plan and occasionally rehearse, most of the Rangers’ missions 

were conducted on short notice. This is important. In spite of the Rangers’ 

traditional emphasis on detailed planning and thorough preparation, most 

World War II Ranger operations were conducted without these advantages. 

Under such circumstances, only exceptionally well-trained and cohesive units 

such as the Rangers are likely to succeed. The survival of World War II 

Ranger battalions as highly trained and cohesive units would have been 

more complete had there been a Ranger headquarters to control them. 

In 1981, I concluded my biography of William 0. Darby with these 

words: 

While the modern Ranger tradition begun by Darby continues, the struggle 

which he waged has yet to be won. The First and Second Battalions, Seventy 

fifth Infantry (Ranger), like the Ranger battalions and companies which 

came before them, are without their own Ranger headquarters.’ 

Happily, this condition no longer exists. In 1984, Headquarters and Headquarters Company and the 3d Battalion, 75th Infantry (Ranger), were activated, increasing Ranger strength and placing all three battalions under a 

single regimental commander. Unity of command has been achieved, and 

the evils which came from its absence in the past are less likely to occur 

in the future. 
Notes I I 

Most of the documents cited below are found in the journals and files 

of the lst, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th Ranger Battalions and the journals and 

files of units and headquarters with which the Rangers served. These 

documents are in the Washington National Records Center in Suitland, 

Maryland, and are available in both their original form and on microfilm. 

A note referring to an original document contains the letters “SF,” representing Suitland Files, followed by the file number of the folder in which 

the cited document is stored. A note referring to a microfilm copy of a 

document contains the code SF-INBN 72-37 followed by the number of the 

microfilm roll and the numbers of the frames on which the cited document 

appears. The letters SF represent Suitland Files, as above, and the code 

INBN 72-37 appears on each roll of microfilm containing the Ranger battalions’ journals and files. Documents that are found elsewhere than the 

SuitIand Files are appropriately identified. 

Chapter I 

1. Subject letter, “Commando Organization,” from Major General James W. Chaney to CG 

USANIF, 1 June 1942, SF-INBN 72-37, roll 1, frames 4-6. 

2. Technically, the word commando denotes a battalion-equivalent unit of appropriately 

trained soldiers but is commonly used in referring to the individual soldier who is a 

member of a commando. 

3. Lucian King Truscott, Command Missions: A Personal Story (New York E. P. Dutton 

and Co., 1954), 37-38. 

4. Subject letter, ‘Commando Organization,” from Major General Russell P. Hartle to Distribution, 7 August 1942, SF-INBN 72-37, roll 1, frames 7-10. 

5. Subject letter, c‘Commando Organization,” 1 June 1942. 

6. Ibid. 

7. Major General Edmond H. Leavey (U.S.A., Ret.) to James J. Altieri, 3 August 1965, copy 

in author’s collection. 

8. Truscott, Command Missions, 40. 

9. Subject letter, “Commando Organization,” 7 August 1942. 

10. Ibid. 

77 
78 

11. 1st Ranger Battalion, Diary, SF-INBN 72-37, roll 1, frames 93-101. 

12. USANIF and V Army Corps (Reinforced), General Order no. 7, 19 June 1942, SF-INBN 

72-37, roll 8, frame 83. The TOE authorized the battalion 441 enlisted men. The figure 

488 includes a lo-percent overstrength in each grade to offset attrition anticipated during 

training. 

13. Subject letter, “Commando Organization,” 7 August 1942. 

14. 1st Ranger Battalion, Diary. 

15. Subject letter, “Progress Report,” from Darby to Brigadier General Lucian King Truscott, 

Jr., 17 July 1942, SF-INBN 72-37, roil 8, frames 89-91. 

16. Progress Report on U.S.A. Rangers, from Colonel Charles A. Vaughan to HQ, Special 

Service Brigade, undated, SF-INBN 72-37, roll 8, frames 84-85. 

17. Subject letter, “Progress Report,” 17 July 1942. 

18. R. W. Thompson, “Massacre at Dieppe,” in History of the Second World War, vol. 37, 

edited by Barrie Pitt (Hicksville, NY: Marshall Cavendish, 1973), 1017. 

19. 1st Ranger Battalion, Diary; James J. Altieri, The Spearheaders (New York: Popular Library, 196Q), 64-75. 

20. 1st Ranger Battalion, Memorandum, SF-INBN 72-37, roll 1, frames 141-44. 

Chapter 2 

1. 1st Ranger Battalion, After Action Report, 1 January 1943, SF-INBN 72-37, roll 1, frames 

212-15. 

2. Colonel Herman A. Dammer (U.S.A., Ret.) and Elizabeth Dammer, interview with author, 

McLean, VA, 15 July 1972. 

3. “U.S. Rangers,” lecture presented by Darby with Dammer’s assistance at the Army and 

Navy Staff College, 27 October 1944, copy in author’s collection (hereafter cited as Darby 

lecture). 

4. 1st Ranger Battalion, After Action Report, 1 January 1943. 

5. Altieri, The Spearheaders, 115. 

6. Dammer interview, 15 July 1972. 

7. 1st Ranger Battalion, Training Guides, SF-INBN-1-3.13; Lieutenant Colonel Peer Buck 

(U.S.A., Ret.), interview with author, Plover, WI, 18 November 1972. 

8. Darby lecture, 27 October 1944. 

9. Ibid. 

LO. Ibid. 

11. Notes on interview with Colonel William 0. Darby, 18 May 1944, Infantry Hall Library, 

HQ, Army Ground Forces, Fort Benning, GA, SF. 

12. 1st Ranger Battalion, After Action Report (11-12 February 1943), 5 March 1943, SFINBN 72-37, roll 1, frame 220. 

13. 1st Ranger Battalion, After Action Report (14-28 February 1943), 5 March 1943, SFINBN 72-37, roll 1, frame 219. 

14. II Corps, Operation Plan WOP, Operation WOP Outline Plan, 9 March 1943, SF-301-0.13. 

15. II Corps, G-3 Journal and File, G-3 Periodic Report of 17 March 1943, 1st Infantry Division, 2300 17 March 1943, SF-202-3.2; 1st Ranger Battalion, After Action Report, 9 April 

1943, SF-INBN 72-37, roll 1, frame 221. 
19 

16. 1st Infantry Division, G-3 Journal and File, Memo from Major General Terry de la Mesa 

Allen to Darby, 17 March 1943, SF-301-3.2. 

17. Ibid. 

18. 1st Ranger Battalion, After Action Report, 9 April 1943. 

19. 1st Infantry Division, G-3 Operations Report (15 January-8 April 1943), SF-31X-3, 

20. 26th Infantry Regiment, Dextrous 1 Unit Journal, Report of Operations (8 November 194% 

8 May 1943), SF-301-Inf(26)-0.3 (hereafter cited as Dextrous 1 Unit Journal). 

21. Ibid. 

22. Altieri, The Spearheaders, 198-99; 1st Ranger Battalion, After Action Report, 9 April 

1943. 

23. 1st Infantry Division, G-3 Journal and File, SF-301-3.2. 

24. Dextrous 1 Unit Journal. 

25. Altieri, The Spearheaders, 199. 

26. James J. Altieri, Da&y’s Rangers: An Illustrated Portrayal of the Original Rangers 

(Durham, NC: The Seeman Printery, 1945), 44. 

27. Dextrous 1 Unit Journal. 

28. Altieri, The Spearheaders, 199. 

29. Altieri, Da&y’s Rangers, 44. 

30. 1st Ranger Battalion, After Action Report, 9 April 1943. 

31. Dextrous I Unit Journal. 

32. Ibid. 

33. II Corps, G-3 Journal and File, Telephone conversation, Captain Lord to Major Chase, 

1215 21 March 1943, SF-202-3.2. 

34. 1st Infantry Division, G-3 Operations Report (15 January-8 April 1943); 1st Ranger 

Battalion, After Action Report, 9 April 1943. 

35. 1st Ranger Battalion, After Action Report, 9 April 1943. 

36. Ibid. 

37. Subject letter, “Procurement of Personnel Necessary for Activation of Additional Ranger 

Battalions,” from Darby to Ci@ AFHQ, 14 April 1943, SF-INBN 72-37, roll 1, frame 285. 

38. AFHQ incoming message no. 6300, from General George C. Marshall to General Dwight 

D. Eisenhower, 2355 19 April 1943, SF-INBN 72-37, roll 1, frame 287. 

39. Letter, HQ, North African Theater of Operations to Darby, SF-INBN 72-37, roll 1, frame 

286; Subject letter, “Volunteers for Ranger Battalions,” from HQ, Atlantic Base Section to 

Darby, 17 May 1943, SF-INBN 72-37, roll 1, frame 228. 

40. Altieri, Darby’s Rangers, 46. 

41. Memorandum, Fifth Army G-l to Darby, 29 April 1943, SF-INBN 72-37, roll 1, frame 294. 

42. Colonel William S. Hutchinson (U.S.A., Ret.), interview with author, Jacksonville, FL, 14 

June 1973. 
80 

Chapter 3 

1. Albert N. Garland and Howard McGaw Smyth, Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, U.S. 

Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief af Military History, U.S. 

Amy, 1965), 226-27. 

2. 3d Ranger Battalion, After Action Report (lo-18 July 19431, 31 July 1943, SF-INBN 72. 

37, roll 4, frames 2-4. 

3. Ibid. 

4. Ibid.; Altieri, Darby’s Rangers, 53. 

5. 3d Ranger Battalion, After Action Report (lo-18 July 1943), 31 July 1943. 

6. Ibid. 

7. Ibid. 

8. Ibid. 

9. Ibid. 

10. 3d Infantry Division, G-2 Journal (10 July-17 August 1943), G-2 Periodic Report no. 8, 

17 July 1943, SF-303-2.2. 

11. Ibid. 

12. Former Ranger Stan Zaslaw, interview with author, Deerfield, IL, 19 Jane 197’2. 

13. Subject letter, “Status of RANGER Battalions,” from Darby to CiC AFHQ, 10 August 

1943, SF-INBN 72-37, roll 1, frames 290-91. 

14. 1st and 2d Indorsements to letter from Darby to CiC AFHQ, 12 August 1943, SF-INBN 

72-37, roll 1, frame 297. 

Chapter 4 

1. 1st Ranger Battalion, After Action Report (9-29 September 1943), 15 November 1943, SFINBN 72-37, roll 1, frame 396; 3d Ranger Battalion, After Action Report (9-30 September 

1943), 25 November 1943, SF-INBN 72-37, roll 4, frames 29-30; 4th Ranger Battalion, 

After Action Report (9-29 September 1943), 5 October 1943, SF-INBN 72-37, roll 4, frames 

124-26. 

2. Michael J. King, “William Orlando Darby: A Military Biography” (Ph.D. dissertation, 

Northern Illinois University, 19771, 219. 

3. Subject letter, “Ranger Infantry Battalions,” from Major Roy Murray to CiC AGF, 28 

I November 1943, copy in author’s collection. 

4. VI Corps, Journal and File (1 November 1943-20 February 1944), Subject letter, “Umpire 

Notes on Operation of 1st Ranger Group,” from 45th Infantry Division Artillery to Office 

of Problem Director, VI Corps Planning Group, 20 Janwary 1944, SF-206-3.2. 

5. Martin Blwmenson, Salerno to Cassino, U.S. Army in WorId War II (Washington, DC: 

Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1969), 353; VI Corps, Journal and File 

(1 November 1943-20 February 1944), Subject letter, “Attachment of Troops,” from VI 

Corps to units concerned, 16 Janwa-ry 1944, SF-206-3.2. 

6. William 0. Darby, 201 File, HQ, NATOUSA Promotion Letter, 11 December 1943, National 

Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, MO. 

7. VI Corps, Outline Plan, Operation SHINGLE, Field Order no. 19, VI Corps, 15 January 

1944, SF-2060.13. 

8. Blumenson, SaEerno to Cassino, 358-59. 

9. Ibid., 388-90. 

10. VI Corps, After Action Report (January 1944), VI Corps Historical Record-The Mounting 

and Initial Phase of Operation SHINGLE (January 1944), SF-2060.3. 
81 

11. Hutchinson interview, 14 June 1973. 

12. Field Order no. 2, Ranger Force, 29 January 1944, SF-IN&N 72-37, roI1 1, frame 525. 

13. 3d Infantry Division, G-2 Estimate, 29 January 1944, SF-INBN 72-37, roll 1, frames 521-22. 

14. 3d Infantry Division, Field Order, Operation SHINGLE, SF-303-3.9. 

15. Ranger Force Journal entry, 291835 January 1944, SF-INBN 72-37, roll 1, frame 528. 

16. Fifth Army, G-2 Report no. 142, 26 January 1944, SF-105-3.2. 

17. Ranger Force Journal entries, 292300, 292315, 300125, and 300140 January 1944, SF-INBN 

72-37, roll 1, frame 528. 

18. Ranger Force Journal entries, 300248 and 300249 January 1944, SF-INBN 72-37, roll 1, 

frame 528. 

19. Captain Charles M. Shunstrom, “Capture of the First and Third Ranger Battalions,” SFINBN 72-37, roll 1, frame 752. 

20, Major Jack Dobson, “With the Rangers at Cisterna,” in Altieri, Darby’s Rangers, 83-84. 

21. 3d Infantry Division, G-2 Estimate, 29 January 1944. 

22. VI Corps Historical Record-The Mounting and Initial Phase of Operation SHINGLE 

(January 1944). 

23. Fifth Army, G-2, Special Report, 9 March 1944, SF-INBN 72-37, roll 1, frame 751. 

24. After Action Report (22 January-5 February 1944) Ranger Force, SF-INBN 72.37, roll 2, 

frames 676-82. 

25. Ibid.; Shunstrom, “Capture of the First and Third Ranger Battalions.” 

26. Shunstrom, “Capture of the First and Third Ranger Battalions”; Altieri, The Spearheaders, 

266. 

27. Former Ranger Robert Ehalt to the author, undated (lQ78), copy in author’s collection. 

26. VI Corps, Subject letter, “Battle Casualties, 6615 Ranger Force in the Action of 29-30 

January 1944,” 16 February 1944, SF-INBN 72-37, roll 1, frames 683-88. 

29, Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, 391. 

30. General Mark W. Clark (U.S.A., Ret.), interview with author, Leland, MI, 8 September 

1973. 

31. VI Corps Historical Record-The Mounting and Initial Phase of Operation SHINGLE (January 1944). 

32. Hutchinson interview, 14 June 1973. 

33. Henry L. Stimson, “Memorandum for the President.” 2 May 1945, in William 0. Darby$ 

201 File. Stimaon’s memorandum disproves an account of Darby’s promotion that had 

once been generally accepted. That account cited only the fact that Darby’s promotion 

had been posthumous and implied that, because it was posthumous, it was honorary. 

General Mark W. Clark gave credence to that account in his book, CalcuEated Risk (New 

York: Harper and Brothers, 19501, writing that he had “asked General Marshall to pro. 

mote (Darby) to Brigadier General posthumously, and he did . . . .” When I showed a 

copy of Stimson’s memorandum to Clark during an interview on 8 September 1973, he 

appeared to be genuinely surprised and said that he had always thought Darby’s promotion was the result of his (Clark’s) own recommendation. 

Chapter 5 

1. John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh, Infantry, pt. 1, Regular Army, Army Lineage Series 

(Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1972), 889. 

2. 5th Ranger Battalion, After Action Report (6-10 June 1944), 22 July 1944, SF-INBN 72- 

37, roll 5, frames 2-5; 5th Ranger Battalion, After Action Report (l-18 September 19441, 
82 

10 October 1944, SF-INBN 72-37, roll 5, frames 102-11; 5th Ranger Battalion, After Action 

Report (l-31 December 1944), 10 January 1945, SF-INBN 72-37, roll 5, frames 179-96. 

3. 5th Ranger Battalion, After Action Report (l-28 February 1945), 10 March 1945, SFINBN 72-37, roll 5, frames 365-73. 

4. The description of the objective presented in the brief Ranger history that appears in the 

1962 edition of FM 22-50, Ranger Training and Ranger Operations, is misleading. Although it tells of the Rangers seizing “the high ground commanding the main German 

military supply route west of Zerf,” the objective was on high ground only when approached from the east. The Rangers’ blocking position was at the eastern rim of a 

plateau, and when approached from the west, as it would have been by retreating 

Germans, it was level. It was also level when approached from the north and south, as it 

was by counterattacking Germans. Thus, any description of the Rangers’ objective as 

being on “high ground” is only onequarter correct. This error is traceable to the Rangers’ 

own after-action report that describes the objective as being on “high ground” without 

elaboration, A too caeuat examination of a topographical map of the objective area also 

suggests height. A physical inspection of the site, such as I made in 1984, reveals a 

position that is far less defensible than FM 21-50 implies. These facts make the 5th Ranger 

Battalion’s victory at Zerf all the more worthy of note. 

5. 5th Ranger Battalion, After Action Report, 10 March 1945. 

6. Ibid. 

7. Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division, S-3 Periodic Report (252400-262400 February 1945), 26 February 1945, SF-61~CC&3.1. 

8. 5th Ranger Battalion, After Action Report, 10 March 1945. 

9. Ibid. 

10. Ibid.; CCB, 10th Armored Division, S-3 Periodic Report, 26 February 1945. 

11. 5th Ranger Battalion, After Action Report, 10 March 1945. 

12. 94th Infantry Division, G-2 Journal and File. 

13. 5th Ranger Battalion, After Action Report, 10 March 1945. 

14. Ibid. 

15. 94th Infantry Division, G-Z Journal and File. 

16. 5th Ranger Battalion, After Action Report, 10 March 1945. 

17. Ibid. 

18. Ibid. 

1. 6th Ranger Battalion, History of King IL Operation, SF-INBN 72-37, roll 6, frames 3-9. 

2. Subject letter, “Historical Data,” from Captain Arthur D. Simons, CO, B Company, 6th 

Ranger Battalion, to the Adjutant General, 7 February 1945, SF-INBN 72-37, roll 6, frames 

24-28. 

3. Ibid. 

4. Forrest Bryant Johnson, Hour of Redemption: The Ranger Raid on Cabanatuan (New 

York Manor Books, 1978), 180. 

5. Ibid. 

6. Ibid., 181--84. 

7. Ibid., 182; Subject letter, “Ranger Mission at the Pangatian Prison Camp,” from HQ, 6th 

Ranger Battalion, to Sixth Army G-3, SF-INBN 72-37, roll 6, frames 236-40. The prison 
83 

eamp in question was near both Cabanatuan and Pangatian and is known by both 

names. I have chosen to identify the camp with Cabanatuan, which is the larger of the 

two towns. 

8. Narrative of the Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion from January 2, 1945, to July 1, 1945, 

SF-INBN 72-37, roll 6, frames 65-81. 

9. Sixth Army, G-2 Weekly Report no. 74 (31 January-7 February 1945), SF-166-2.1. 

10. Johnson, Hour of Redemption, 208-g. 

11. Ibid., 210. The Huks, or Hukbalahapa, were the People’s Anti-Japanese Army. They were 

largely Communist led and operated mainly on the fringes of the central Luzon plain, 

After World War II, they would style themselves the People’s Liberation Army and fight 

an unsuccessful guerrilla war against the government of the newly independent Philip 

pines. 

12. Subject letter, f”Ranger Mission at the Pangatian Prison Camp.” 

13. Ibid. 

14. Ibid. 

15. Johnson, Hour of Redemptian, 220. 

16. Subject letter, “Ranger Mission at the Fangatian Prison Camp.” 

17. Ibid.; Johnson, Hour of Redemption, 229. 

18. Ibid. 

19. Subject letter, “Ranger Mission at the Pangatian Prison Camp.” 

20. Ibid.; Narrative of the Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion from January 2, 1945, to July 1, 

1945. 

21. Johnson, Hour of Redemption, 223, 260-62. 

22. Subject letter, “Ranger Mission at the Pangatian Prison Camp”; Johnson, Hour of Redemption, 286-316; Narrative of the Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion from January 2, 1945, to 

July 1, 1945. 

23. Johnson, Hour of Redemption, 339. 

24. Subject letter, “Ranger Mission at the Pangatian Prison Camp”; Johnson, How of Redemp 

tion, 317-43. 

25. Subject letter, ‘“Ranger Mission at the Pangatian Prison Camp.” 

26. Sixth Army, G-2 Weekly Report no. 74 (31 January-7 February 1945); Message, from 

Colonel White to Colonel Hutchinson, 31 January 1945, SF-1662.2. 

27. Narrative of the Sixth Ranger Infantry Battalion from January 2, 1945, to July 1, 1945. 

28. Johnson, Hour of Redemption, 347. 

29. Sixth Army, G-2 Weekly Report no. 74 (31 January-7 February 1945). 

30. Ibid. 

Chapter 7 

1. Michael J. King, William Orlando Da&y: A Military Biography (Hamden, CT: Archon 

Books, 19811, 187. 
Bibliography , 

-5e I 

Official documents, personal letters, interviews, and books were drawn 

upon in the preparation of this Leavenworth Paper. Of these, the official 

documents were the most important for it would have been impossible to 

do this study without them. Except where otherwise noted, the official documents are found in the Washington National Records Center in Suitland, 

Maryland, and are available in both their original and microfilm forms. 

An entry referring to an original document contains the document’s title 

followed by the letters SF, representing Suitland Files, and the number under 

which the document is cataloged. An entry referring to a microfilm roll 

contains the roll’s title, microcopy number, and roll number, 

Official Documents 

Unit Journak and Fiies 

1st Ranger Battalion. Journals and Files. INBN-l-6.1, Historieal Information, 

1942-1944, through INBN-l-0.7, Unit Journal, November-December 

1943. Microcopy no. 72-37, roll 1. 

1st Ranger Battalion. JournaIs and Files. INBN-1.0.12, Messages, FebruaryDecember 1943, t.hrough INBN-l-3.13, Training Guides, 8 July 1943. 

Microcopy no. 72-37, roll 2, 

3d Ranger Battalion. Journals and Files. INBN-3-0.3, Report of Action, 

lo-18 July 1943, through INBN-4-1.14, Special Orders, June 1943- 

January 1944. Microcopy no. 72-37, roll 4. 

5th Ranger Battalion. Journals and Files. INBN-5-0.3, After Action Report, 

6-10 June 1944, through INBN-5-1.13, General Orders, 1944-1945. 

Microcopy no. 72-37, roll 5. 

6th Ranger Batt,alion. Journals and Files. INBN-6-0.3, History of King II 

Operation, August-December 1944, through INBN-6-30.0, Report of 

Mess Inspection, May 1945. Microcopy no. 72-37, roll 6. 

Ranger Battalions. Historical Background Information on Ranger Battalions 

and Tables of Organization and Equipment. Microcopy no. 72-37, roll 

8. 

85 
86 

26th Infantry Regiment. Dextrous 1 Unit Journal. Report of Operations (8 

November 1942-8 May 1943). SF-301-Inf(26)-0.3. 

Combat Command B. 10th Armored Division. S-3 Journal and File. SF-610- 

CCB-3.1. 

1st Infantry Division. G-3 Journal and File. SF-301-3.2. 

1st Infantry Division. G-3 Operations Report (15 January-8 April 1943). 

SF-301-3. 

3d Infantry Division. G-2 Journal (10 July-17 August 1943). SF-303-2.2. 

3d Infantry Division. Journal and File. SF-303-3.9. 

94th Infantry Division, G-2 Journal and File. SF. 

II Corps. G-3 Journal and File. SF-202-3.2. 

II Corps. Operation Plan WOP, 9 March 1943. SF-301-0.13. 

VI Corps. After Action Report (January 1944). SF-206-0.3. 

VI Corps. Journal and File (1 November 1943-20 February 1944). SF-206- 

3.2. 

VI Corps. Outline Plan, Operation SHINGLE. SF-206-0.13. 

Fifth Army. G-2 Journal and File. SF-105-3.2. 

Sixth Army. G-2 Weekly Report no. 74 (31 January-? February 1945). SF106-2.1. 

Nonunit Lhxments 

Darby, William 0. 201 File. National Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, 

MO. 

Notes on interview with Colonel William 0. Darby, 18 May 1944. Infantry 

Hall Library, HQ, Army Ground Forces, Fort Benning, GA. SF. 

“‘U.S. Rangers.‘” Lecture presented by Darby with Dammer’s assistance at 

the Army and Navy Staff College, 27 October 1944. Copy in author’s 

collection. 

Ehalt, Robert. Letter to author, (undated) 1978. 

Leavey, Edmond H., Major General (U.S.A., Ret.). Letters to James Altieri, 

3 August and 14 October 1965. James Altieri’s files. 

fntervie ws with A u fhor 

Buck, Peer, Lieutenant Colonel (U.S.A., Ret.). PIover, WI, 18 November 1972. 

Clark, Mark W., General (U.S.A., Ret.). Leland, MI, 8 September 1973. 

Dammer, Herman W., Colonel (U.S.A., Ret.), and Elizabeth Dammer. McLean, 

VA, 15 JuIy 1972. 

Hutchinson, William, Colonel (U.S.A., Ret.). Jacksonville, FL, 14 June 1973. 

Zaslaw, Stan. Deerfield, IL, 19 June 1972. 
1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

LEAVENWORTH PAPERS 

The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76, by Major Robert 

A. Doughty 

Namonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939, by Dr. Edward J. Drea 

“Nat War But Like War’*: The American Intervention in Lebanon, by Dr. 

Roger J. Spiller 

The Dynamics of Dcrctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine 

During the First World War, by Captain Timothy T. Lupfer 

Fighting the Russians in Winter: Three Case Studies, by Dr. Allen F. 

Chew 

Soviet Night Operations, by Major Claude R. Sasso 

August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Stretegic Offensive in Manchuria, by 

Lieutenant Colonel David M. Glantz 

August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, 

1945, by Lieutenant Colonel David M. Glantz 

Defending the Driniumor: Covering Force Operations in New Guinea, 1944, 

by Dr. Edward J. Drea 

Chemical Warfare in World War I: The American Experience, 19 I 7- I9 f 8, 

by Major Charles E. Heller, USAR 

Rangers: Selected Combat Operations in World War if, by Dr. Michael J. 

King 

RESEARCH SURVEYS 

1. Amicicide: The Prablem of Friendly Fire in Modern War, by Lieutenant 

Colonel Charles R. Shrader 

2. Toward Combined Arms Warfare: A Survey of 20th~Century Tactics, Doctrine, 

and Organization, by Captain Jonathan M. House 

3. Rapid Deployment Logistics: Lebanon, 1958, by Lieutenant Colonel Gary H. 

Wade 

4. The Soviet Airborne Experience, by Lieutenant Colonel David M. Glantz 
87 

Altieri, James J. Darby’s Rangers: An Illustrated Portrayal of the Original 

Rangers. Durham, NC: The Seeman Printery, 1945. 

-. The Spearheaders. New York: Popular Library, 1960. 

Blumenson, Martin. Salerno to Cassino. U.S. Army in World War II. 

Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 

1969. 

Clark, Mark Wayne. Calculated Risk. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950. 

Garland, Albert N., and Howard McGaw Smyth. Sicily and the Surrender 

of Italy. U.S. Army in World War II. Washington, DC: Office of the 

Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1965. 

Johnson, Forrest Bryant. Hour of Redemption: The Ranger Raid on Cabanatuan. New York: Manor Books, 1978. 

King, Michael J. William Orlando Darby: A Military Biography. Hamden, 

CT: Archon Books, 1981. 

-. “William Orlando Darby: A Military Biography.” Ph.D. dissertation, 

Northern Illinois University, 1977. 

Mahon, John K., and Romana Danysh. Infantry. Pt. 1. Regular Army. Army 

Lineage Series, Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military 

History, U.S. Army, 1972. 

Nichols, Lester M. Impact: The Battle Story of the Tenth Armored Division. 

New York: Bradbury, Sayles, @Neil1 Co., n.d. 

Thompson, R. W. “Massacre at Dieppe.” In History of the Second World 

War, edited by Barrie Pitt, vol. 37. Hicksville, NY: Marshall Cavendish, 1973. 

Truscott, Lucian King. Command Missions: A Personal Story. New York: 

E. P. Dutton and Co., 1954. 

U.S. Department of the Army. FM 21-50. Ranger Training and Ranger Operations. Washington, DC, 1962. 

- __.-- 
89 

STUDIES IN PROGRESS 

Counterattack on the Naktong: Light fnfantry Operations in Korea, 1950 

0 

Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine 

on the Russian Front During World War II 

a 

Tactics and Doctrine in imperial Russia 

l 

U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965 

a 

Seek, Strike, and Destroy: 

U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War N 

e 

Evolution of the Corps 

e 

World War N Eastern Front Atlas 

9 

Peacekeeping Operations 

0 

Mobilization-Related Correlates of Success En 

American World War II Infantry Divisions 

+U.S. GOVERNMENTPRINTINGOFFICE: 1988-554-001182063 
- Dr. Michael J. King - 

Michael J. King is a graduate of De Paul 

University and holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in 

history from Northern Illinois University. He is also 

a graduate of the US. Army Airborne and Ranger 

Schools and served as a platoon leader and rifle 

company executive officer in the 1st Battalion, 

30th Infantry, in Germany. While in the U.S. Army 

Reserve, he served as S2 of the 12th Special 

Forces Group (Airborne). He is the author of 

William Orlando Da&y: A Military Biography. Dr. 

King completed the research for this Leavenworth 

Paper while a Teaching Fellow at the Combat 

Studies Institute. 

COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE 

Missions 

The Combat Studies institute was established on 18 June 1979 as a department-level activity 

within the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. CSI has the 

following missions: 

1, Conduct research on historical topics pertinent to doctrinal concerns of the Army and publish 

the results in a variety of formats for the Active Army and Reserve Components. 

2. Prepare and present instruction in military history at USACGSC and assist other USACGSC 

departments in integrating military history into their instruction. 

3. Serve as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s executive agent for the development 

and coordination of an integrated, progressive program of military history instruction in the 

TRADOC service school system.