Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 106 / Thursday, June 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 31803 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(g)(1) The Manager, Fort Worth Special 

Certification Office, FAA, has the authority to 

approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested 

using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your 

request to your principal inspector or local 

Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 

attention of the person identified in the 

Related Information section of this AD. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/ 

certificate holding district office. 

Related Information 

(h) For more information about this AD, 

contact Peter W. Hakala, Aerospace Engineer, 

FAA Rotorcraft Directorate, Fort Worth 

Special Certification Office, ASW–190, FAA, 

2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 

76137; phone: (817) 222–5145; fax: (817) 

222–5785; e-mail: peter.w.hakala@faa.gov. 

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on May 

25, 2011. 

Earl Lawrence, 

Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2011–13532 Filed 6–1–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2010–0857; Directorate 

Identifier 2010–NM–156–AD; Amendment 

39–16708; AD 2011–12–01] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Koito 

Industries, Ltd., Seats and Seating 

Systems Approved Under Technical 

Standard Order (TSO) TSO–C39b, 

TSO–C39c, or TSO–C127a 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This AD requires 

determining if affected seats and seating 

systems and their components are 

compliant with certain FAA regulations, 

and removing those seats, seating 

systems, and their components that are 

shown to be unsafe from the affected 

fleet. This AD was prompted by a 

determination that the affected seats and 

seating systems may not meet certain 

flammability, static strength, and 

dynamic strength criteria. Failure to 

meet static and dynamic strength 

criteria could result in injuries to the 

flightcrew and passengers during 

emergency landing conditions. In the 

event of an in-flight or post-emergency 

landing fire, failure to meet 

flammability criteria could result in an 

accelerated fire. We are issuing this AD 

to prevent accelerated fires and injuries 

to the flightcrew and passengers. 

DATES: This AD is effective August 1, 

2011. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 

9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is 

Document Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Patrick Farina, Aerospace Engineer, 

Cabin Safety Branch, ANM–150L, FAA, 

Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office 

(ACO), 3960 Paramount Boulevard, 

Lakewood, California 90712–4137; 

phone: 562–627–5344; fax: 562–627– 

5210; e-mail: Patrick.Farina@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an airworthiness 

directive (AD) that would apply to the 

specified products. That NPRM 

published in the Federal Register on 

September 24, 2010 (75 FR 58340). That 

NPRM proposed to require determining 

if affected seats and seating systems and 

their components are compliant with 

certain FAA regulations, and removing 

those seats, seating systems, and their 

components that are shown to be unsafe 

from the affected fleet. 

Ex Parte Contact 

On October 14, 2010, during two 

separate meetings, we met to discuss the 

NPRM with the European Aviation 

Safety Association (EASA), Japanese 

Civil Airworthiness Bureau (JCAB), 

Airbus, and Boeing, as well as with 

other national airworthiness authorities 

and operators. On October 20, 2010, we 

had a similar meeting with additional 

authorities and operators. We 

emphasized that the meetings were not 

a substitute for the formal comment 

process and would consider comments 

made through the comment process 

identified in the NPRM. Summaries of 

these meetings are posted in the AD 

docket on the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. The 

following presents the comments 

received on the proposal and the FAA’s 

response to each comment. 

Request To Withdraw the NPRM 

Several commenters either inferred or 

specifically requested that we withdraw 

the NPRM. 

The Association of European Airlines 

(AEA) stated that the combined safety 

analysis carried out by EASA/FAA for 

the NPRM is fundamentally flawed 

because it assumes ‘‘a catastrophic 

failure.’’ The AEA also stated that new 

test data are available to the FAA. AEA 

added that Koito (witnessed by the 

JCAB) has carried out extensive 

retesting of the seats to prove they are 

safe and meet all of the certification 

criteria. AEA concluded that these data 

have not been evaluated by the FAA, 

which could negate the issuance of an 

FAA AD. 

The Association for Asia Pacific 

Airlines (AAPA), China Airlines, and 

Japan Transocean Airlines (JTA) stated 

that the evaluation and use of JCAB data 

could negate the justification for the 

NPRM. 

Koito Industries (Koito) respectfully 

questioned the basis for the NPRM 

moving forward, absent FAA 

verification and support that an unsafe 

condition exists. Koito stated it deeply 

regrets the circumstances surrounding 

this AD. Koito submitted that no actual 

unsafe condition has been verified even 

for production seats where 

discrepancies existed between drawings 

and materials used to show compliance. 

Koito added that the NPRM states only 

that a potential unsafe condition could 

exist. Koito submitted that noncompliance with regulations does not 

necessarily equate to an unsafe 

condition. Koito stated that the testing 

results will provide much-needed data 

for the FAA to make the required 

determination under section 39.5 of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

39.5), and then the FAA will be able to 

determine whether a safety-of-flight 

issue exists that is sufficient to warrant 

an AD in accordance with the 

requirements of section 39 of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

39). Koito concluded that issuing an AD 

prior to reviewing forthcoming testing 

data to determine whether an unsafe 


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31804 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 106 / Thursday, June 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 

condition exists could result in 

unnecessary burdens on aircraft 

manufacturers and affected airlines. 

Nippon Cargo Airlines (NCA) stated it 

could not accept the issuance of an AD 

prior to completion of all appropriate 

actions (including re-testing, conformity 

assessment, and establishment of the 

refurbishment plan) that should be 

performed by Koito. NCA stated that we 

should establish a feasible compliance 

period based on service bulletin 

recommendations and status of parts 

availability. We infer NCA is requesting 

we withdraw the NPRM. 

EVA Airways stated that it preferred 

an alert service bulletin be issued 

instead of an AD because a service 

bulletin would minimize the impact on 

daily operation and minimize the cost 

impact on operators. 

We do not agree to withdraw the 

NPRM. It is a fact that some seats have 

failed during testing. Failure of the seat, 

in combination with an emergency 

landing, is considered catastrophic. The 

purpose of the required initial 

determination (testing) is to determine 

which seats might fail. The purpose of 

an AD is to restore the affected fleet to 

an acceptable level of safety. Only those 

seats that fail the testing will be 

required to be removed from service. 

EASA and the FAA have reviewed the 

data generated by Koito, under the 

oversight of JCAB, and we have 

determined that this AD is necessary to 

address the identified unsafe condition. 

In addition, certification of these seats 

was obtained through false pretenses, 

and thus, until the seats are re-certified 

in whole, they need to be appropriately 

marked and actions must be done in 

accordance with this AD. We have not 

revised the AD in this regard. 

Request for Extension of Comment 

Period 

Multiple commenters requested an 

extension of the comment period, and 

most wanted the extension in order to 

allow review of the Koito/JCAB data. 

AAPA, All Nippon Airways (ANA), The 

Boeing Company, China Airlines, 

Continental Airlines, Copa Airlines, 

EVA Air, Japan Airlines International 

(JAL), JTA, Jett8 Airlines, Kuwait 

Airways, NCA, Thai Airways, and 

Virgin Blue International Airlines (V 

Australia) requested that the comment 

period be extended by 90 days in order 

to provide time for the parties 

concerned to better understand the 

Koito/JCAB test data. The AAPA and 

AEA stated that because the JCAB is the 

primary certification and design 

authority for the Koito seats, and has 

been able to confirm that production 

drawings were retained by Koito and 

checked for conformity, the new JCAB 

data should be given credit. The AAPA 

and China Airlines stated that the 

failure to do so would ignore the huge 

potential burden the NPRM would 

impose on national airworthiness 

authorities providing oversight and air 

carriers. Continental requested that the 

FAA work with the JCAB to determine 

the validity of the data and accept data 

that demonstrate compliance on specific 

seat models to reduce the potential 

burden on the operators. 

AEA requested an extension of the 

comment period for six months. AEA 

commented that the NPRM calls for inservice seats to be used for testing, but 

that the same goal can be achieved by 

carrying out a conformity evaluation of 

in-service seats against those tested by 

Koito, under JCAB supervision. 

Koito requested an extension of the 

comment period for three months. Koito 

stated that it is confident that its 

comprehensive safety testing, conducted 

under strict JCAB supervision and in 

cooperation with Airbus, Boeing, and 

JCAB-regulated airlines, will assist the 

FAA and EASA in preparing a more 

targeted and effective AD, without 

compromising in any way the level of 

safety that the AD seeks to ensure. Koito 

added that once the FAA and EASA 

have thoroughly evaluated Koito’s 

testing methodology, procedures, and 

results, and are satisfied that Koito’s 

testing can be a reliable basis for 

determining the safety of in-service 

seats, the testing results could be widely 

shared among all the parties affected by 

the AD. Koito noted that this would 

allow the affected parties to provide the 

FAA with more precise and targeted 

comments before the AD is adopted. 

Koito also stated that the FAA itself 

could gain important insights from 

reviewing Koito’s testing methodology 

and testing results before issuing a final 

AD. 

Airbus commented that the comment 

period should be extended (but did not 

specify the length of the requested 

extension) to allow review of the Koito/ 

JCAB tests results. 

Singapore Airlines did not request an 

extension of the comment period; 

however, Singapore Airlines requested 

that JCAB data be evaluated by the FAA. 

Singapore Airlines stated that JCAB 

showed that all design changes made to 

in-service seat models have been 

identified and analyzed, with no 

problem identified relating to metallic 

parts, and no significant differences 

between seats manufactured and 

production drawings. 

We disagree with extending the 

comment period. As stated previously, 

we have discussed the data in briefings 

with EASA and the operators. EASA 

and the FAA have since reviewed the 

data generated by Koito, under the 

oversight of JCAB, and concluded that 

test data from new-build test articles can 

be used to demonstrate compliance to 

the static strength requirements of the 

AD; we have added Notes 3 through 10 

to this AD to provide clarification on 

testing. Test data from new-build test 

articles can also be used for the 

flammability requirements in 

combination with conformity of inservice seat cushions. The purpose of 

this AD is to restore the affected fleet to 

an acceptable level of safety. To delay 

this action would be inappropriate, 

since we have determined that an 

unsafe condition exists and that the 

actions required by this AD must be 

conducted to ensure continued safety. 

Failure of the seat in combination with 

an emergency landing is considered 

catastrophic. The required initial 

determination (testing) will determine if 

seats do not meet FAA regulations and 

those that do not could fail. Only those 

seats that fail the testing will be 

required to be removed from service. We 

have not changed this AD in this regard. 

Request for Follow-Up Briefing Session 

AAPA, China Airlines, EVA Airways, 

JAL, Jett8 Airlines, NCA, and Thai 

Airways requested a follow-up briefing 

session be made to carriers similar to 

the follow-up session agreed on in 

Cologne for carriers in the Asian-Pacific 

(ASPAC) region. Kuwait Airways 

requested a follow-up briefing session 

be made to carriers similar to the followup session agreed on in Cologne for 

concerned carriers. ANA requested a 

follow-up briefing session be made to 

carriers similar to the follow-up session 

agreed on in Singapore. 

We agree it is beneficial for affected 

parties to meet again. We plan on 

organizing a meeting with affected 

parties shortly after the AD is published. 

No change to the AD is necessary 

regarding this issue. 

Request for Consistency Between the 

Applicability of the FAA NPRM and the 

EASA Proposed AD (PAD) 

JAL and JCAB requested consistency 

between the applicability of the FAA 

NPRM and the EASA PAD because the 

NPRM applies to the component and the 

PAD applies to airplanes having the 

component. JAL stated that in the FAA 

NPRM, the proposed AD is to be applied 

to passenger seats manufactured by 

Koito; however, the EASA PAD is 

applied to airplanes equipped with 

passenger seats manufactured by Koito. 

JAL requested a unified applicability to 

avoid unexpected burdens on the 


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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 106 / Thursday, June 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 31805 

airlines/operators. JCAB stated the 

applicability between the FAA NPRM 

and EASA PAD should be further 

harmonized so as to avoid confusion 

among authorities and operators of 

countries outside the U.S. and Europe. 

We acknowledge the importance of 

harmonizing with EASA. The FAA has 

granted an approval for the seats 

themselves, and so the seats are the 

basis of the applicability of the FAA AD. 

This is different in the EASA system, 

where the approval is based on airplane 

installation. Although the description of 

the applicability is different, the overall 

effect of the two ADs should be 

essentially the same. Nonetheless, while 

it is thought that all the seat models 

have been identified, there may be 

models not identified. Commenters have 

also noted that the NPRM did not 

address several older types of seats, 

approved under technical standard 

order (TSO) TSO–C39, TSO–C39a, and 

TSO–C127, as well as non-TSO models. 

We intend to supersede this AD to 

address any affected seats that are 

determined to not be covered by this 

AD. However, we have not revised this 

AD in this regard. 

Request To Match the Affected Seats in 

the Applicability of the FAA NPRM 

With Those in the EASA PAD 

Several commenters requested that 

the affected seats in our applicability 

match those in the EASA PAD. JCAB 

identified 74 models listed in the NPRM 

that are not produced under TSO–C39b, 

TSO–C39c, or TSO–C127a: 15 models 

that are approved under TSO–C127, 22 

models that are approved under TSO– 

C39a, and 37 models that do not have 

TSO approvals. JCAB noted that seats 

models approved under TSO–C39a and 

TSO–C127 and those without TSO 

approval are not covered by the 

proposed AD by its current text. JCAB 

requested that we harmonize our 

applicability with EASA’s applicability. 

JCAB also stated that there are seat 

models listed in table 1 of the NPRM 

that are not approved under TSO–C39b, 

TSO–C39c, or TSO–C127a, as specified 

in paragraph (c) of the NPRM. JCAB 

requested that we revise table 1 and 

paragraph (c) of the NPRM to clarify the 

intent of the NPRM for these seat 

models. 

Koito stated that the NPRM contains 

32 seat model numbers that were not 

produced under TSO–C39b, TSO–C39c, 

or TSO–C127a and should be removed. 

Boeing requested that TSO–C127 be 

added to the applicability of the NPRM 

if the intent of the AD is to be applicable 

to all Koito seats. Boeing stated that 

some Koito seats were certified to TSO– 

C127 prior to the release of TSO–C127a. 

We agree that certain seat models that 

should be covered by the FAA AD were 

not explicitly covered by the 

applicability of the NPRM. However, we 

do not agree to revise the applicability 

of this AD. Adding seats models to the 

applicability would require issuance of 

a supplemental NPRM instead of a final 

rule. To delay this action would be 

inappropriate, since we have 

determined that an unsafe condition 

exists and that the actions required by 

this AD must be done to ensure 

continued safety. We might issue further 

rulemaking to address other seat 

models, including models approved 

under other TSOs and those without 

TSO approval. The future rulemaking 

might revise the applicability of the AD 

to include all seat models produced by 

Koito, installed on any aircraft by any 

means. We have not revised this AD in 

this regard. 

Request To Revise Applicability by 

Removing Certain Seats Models From 

Table 1 

JCAB stated that 11 models of Koito 

seats have seat cushions provided by 

another TSO holder (TSO–C72c). We 

infer JCAB is requesting that seat 

cushions made by another manufacturer 

be removed from table 1 of the NPRM. 

We do not agree. The JCAB did not 

identify which seat models were issued 

with TSO–C72c seat cushions provided 

by an outside source (non-Koito 

produced). Seats for which the cushion 

approval is independent of the Koito 

TSO authorization can show 

compliance with the cushion 

flammability requirements using the 

third-party approval basis under TSO– 

C72c. As it is possible for the seat to be 

modified by a third party to procure seat 

cushions by Koito, we have not revised 

this AD in this regard. The TSO–C72c 

seat cushion is a requirement of TSO– 

C127a. 

Request To Remove Seat Models 

Installed on Certain Airplanes From the 

Applicability 

JCAB requested that seat models for 

Mitsubishi YS–11 and Fokker F–27 

airplanes, which were designed and 

manufactured well before the mid1980s, be removed from table 1 of the 

NPRM. JCAB stated that according to 

the conclusions of the investigation 

conducted by Koito Manufacturing, a 

parent company of Koito Industries, the 

fraudulent activities by Koito Industries 

started in the mid-1980s. JCAB stated its 

investigation revealed the same results, 

and therefore, it is believed that those 

seats designed and manufactured before 

the mid-1980s were properly certified 

and need not be the subject of ADs. 

We acknowledge the commenter’s 

request. However, we have not received 

data to identify seats certified without 

falsified data. In addition, as discussed 

previously, certain seats might not be 

part of the applicability of this AD 

because this AD only applies to seats 

and seating systems having certain 

models numbers that are approved 

under TSO–C39b, TSO–C39c, or TSO– 

C127a. However, under the provisions 

of paragraph (l) of this AD, we will 

consider requests for approval of an 

alternative method of compliance 

(AMOC) if sufficient data are submitted 

to substantiate that the new AMOC 

would provide an acceptable level of 

safety. We have not revised this AD in 

this regard. 

Request To List Both the Seat Model 

and Part Number in the Applicability 

Airbus requested the NPRM list both 

the seat model and generic part number 

in the AD applicability. 

We disagree. The commenter did not 

justify its request. We have determined 

that, to capture all Koito seats, including 

third-party modified seats and secondhand seats, reference to the model alone 

is appropriate for the applicability of the 

AD. The affected model numbers are 

identified in table 1 of this AD. We have 

not revised this AD in this regard. 

Request To Delete Fokker Services B.V. 

From Table 2 in the Applicability 

Fokker Services B.V. requested we 

remove ‘‘Fokker Services B.V.’’ from 

table 2 of the NPRM. Fokker Services 

B.V. indicated that it did not certificate 

the installation of seats or seating 

systems by Koito, nor was it aware of 

any Koito seats installed on aircraft 

types on which Fokker Services B.V. is 

the type certificate holder. 

We disagree. All operators must 

confirm whether the affected seats and 

seating systems are installed. Table 2 of 

this AD is a non-inclusive list of 

manufacturers on which the seats and 

seating systems may be installed. JCAB 

has identified seat model AFS–105 

installed at one time on Fokker aircraft 

(type certificate data sheet A–817). 

Although it is probable that this model 

has been removed and destroyed, it has 

not been verified. We have not revised 

this AD in this regard. 

Request To Explain Effect of NPRM on 

Imported Airplanes 

An anonymous commenter requested 

that we clarify the effect of the NPRM 

on imported airplanes. The commenter 

questioned whether an operator of a 

non-U.S. registered airplane can obtain 

a certificate of airworthiness from the 

FAA after the AD is released without reVerDate Mar<15>2010 16:10 Jun 01, 2011 Jkt 223001 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\02JNR1.SGM 02JNR1

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31806 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 106 / Thursday, June 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 

testing Koito seats. The commenter 

stated that for a newly imported 

airplane, the seats would be affected by 

the ‘‘Parts Installation’’ requirement 

specified in paragraph (h) of the NPRM, 

which does not allow installation of a 

non-retested Koito seat after the 

effective date of the AD. 

We agree to clarify the effect of this 

AD on imported airplanes. When an 

operator imports an airplane onto the 

U.S. Register, the airplane is subject to 

all applicable FAA ADs. Moving an 

airplane from one register to another 

would not be classified as a new 

installation if there is no physical 

design change to the subject airplane. 

An imported airplane is subject to the 

compliance times in this AD. We have 

not revised this AD in this regard. 

Request for Compliance Time Extension 

Multiple commenters requested that 

we extend the compliance times 

specified in the NPRM. 

ANA requested that we extend the 

compliance times to do the testing and 

to remove non-compliant seats, seating 

systems, and components. ANA stated 

that a longer compliance time is needed 

to do the required tests because it will 

not be able to accomplish them within 

two years. AAPA, ANA, and China 

Airlines commented that the NPRM 

would require operators to take actions 

that are normally beyond their 

responsibility and competence. China 

Airlines added that the NPRM ignores 

the economic and operational burden 

that will be faced by air carriers. ANA 

argued that air carriers are not experts 

in seat design and indicated that any 

seat testing would have to be performed 

by a seat vendor or public test facility. 

AAPA, China Airlines, JTA, and Thai 

Airways requested that the compliance 

time of 2 years specified in paragraph 

(g) of the NPRM for determining 

compliance with FAA regulations 

(testing) be extended to 5 years. The 

commenters stated that it is the 

responsibility of the primary design and 

certificating authority (the JCAB) with 

the support of Koito, in collaboration 

with EASA and FAA, to develop a plan 

of action to ensure compliance of inservice Koito seats. The commenters 

added that agencies capable of 

performing the testing of in-service 

seating are limited and may not have 

sufficient resources to support the 

affected air carriers. The commenters 

also stated that seat providers do not 

necessarily have the resources or spare 

capacity to support requests from air 

carriers required to change their seats, 

especially within the 2-year compliance 

period operators have for seats that have 

failed the testing. JTA pointed out that, 

as a consequence of the problems with 

Koito seats, airplanes have been and are 

grounded. JTA stated that airlines have 

no suitable pragmatic solution available 

due to the lack of certified spares and 

the long lead-time of sourcing 

replacement seats. 

AAPA, China Airlines, and JTA also 

requested that we extend the 6-year 

compliance time for removing noncompliant seating systems (specified in 

paragraph (g)(3) of the NPRM) to 15 

years. AAPA, China Airlines, and JTA 

questioned the safety analysis used by 

the FAA to establish the NPRM 

compliance time. JTA requested we 

consider that, based on a new finding of 

the JCAB and 16g test results stored in 

Koito computers, it can be concluded 

that even non-compliant seats still offer 

a high level of protection. JTA also 

asked that we consider there is no 

justification to assume this potential 

non-compliance will result in an 

increase of fatalities and noted there 

have been no reported seat failures that 

resulted in fatalities. JTA also stated that 

there are no historical data to support 

that the safety analysis takes into 

account the potential of seat failures 

resulting from high-level turbulence 

events. 

AAPA, AEA, China Airlines, and JTA 

requested that we reconsider the 

compliance times based on a revised 

catastrophe rate and stated that using an 

accident rate of 0.15·10¥7 is a more 

realistic base for the safety analysis. 

AEA added that the affected seats would 

have a reduction in performance of 10% 

compared to the certification 

requirement. 

AEA and Thai Airways commented 

that the lack of certified spares and the 

long lead time of sourcing seats make 

the replacement of seats difficult and 

asked for a longer compliance time to 

perform seat testing and seat 

replacement. AEA noted that a 2-year 

compliance time would ground 

airplanes. Thai Airways requested that 

the compliance time of 2 years specified 

in the NPRM be extended to 5 years. 

Thai Airways noted that there are a 

large number of seats in-service, and 

FAA and EASA test facilities do not 

currently exist. Thai Airways stated that 

replacement seats are not 

interchangeable because they are 

customized for items such as in-flight 

entertainment. 

Boeing requested that the 2-year 

compliance time be extended to 5 years. 

Boeing stated that retrofit programs take 

at least 2 years to certify. Boeing also 

stated that all the falsified tests showed 

that the forward dynamic test pulses 

were greater than 14g. Boeing noted that 

although not 16g, the test results 

indicate a level of safety higher than 

that of 9g-only seats. 

Cathay Pacific Airways and V 

Australia requested that the 2-year 

compliance time be extended to 4 years. 

Cathay Pacific stated the extended 

compliance time would allow sufficient 

time to carry out seat replacement 

during its scheduled heavy maintenance 

checks. Cathay Pacific also noted it 

takes 18 to 24 months for a typical seat 

development. V Australia noted that 

seat acquisition programs typically take 

18 to 21 months. Cathay Pacific also 

stated that seat suppliers might not have 

sufficient capacity to cope with the high 

demand from all the affected operators. 

Copa Airlines stated it is concerned 

about the compliance times of the 

NPRM. EVA Airways, JAL, Singapore 

Airlines, and V Australia stated the 

compliance times are not feasible. Copa 

Airlines, EVA Airways, and JAL stated 

there are no step-by-step service bulletin 

or original equipment manufacturer 

(OEM) instructions and that the NPRM 

should include clear guidance on means 

of compliance, work instructions, and/ 

or requirements for facilities to conduct 

the tests. Copa Airlines, EVA Airways, 

and Singapore Airlines stated that the 

high demand for replacement parts 

might exceed the capacity of suppliers. 

Copa Airlines and JAL added there is 

insufficient time to replace the seats if 

they fail the testing since a new seat 

program takes 18 to 24 months. V 

Australia also stated there is insufficient 

time to replace seats. Singapore Airlines 

added that for airlines with a large fleet 

having affected seats, the 2-year 

compliance time is not pragmatic 

because vendors need time to design, 

manufacture, and install new seats. EVA 

Airways and JAL also questioned the 

availability of test facilities. Singapore 

Airlines stated that the 2-year time limit 

to replace seats that fail the 16g and 9g 

tests would pose a hardship for 

operators. 

Koito suggested that we add explicit 

wording to paragraph (g) of the NPRM 

that would allow airlines to start their 

testing plan with a static performance 

test according to ‘‘14 CFR 25.562(b)(3)(ii) 

and (iii)’’ within 2 years (to get approval 

for seats to remain in service for 6 years) 

and continue it later with a dynamic 

testing according to sections 

25.562(b)(2) and (c)(7) of the Federal 

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

25.562(b)(2) and (c)(7)) within 6 years. 

Koito stated it understands that the FAA 

considers this phased testing structure 

as an acceptable testing plan, but also 

understands that this flexibility is 

important to Koito’s customers. 

We acknowledge that the compliance 

times specified in the NPRM could be 


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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 106 / Thursday, June 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 31807 

misinterpreted. We also acknowledge 

that air carriers are not experts in seat 

design and that testing most likely 

would be done by the seat manufacturer 

or at a test facility. 

We have revised paragraphs (g), (g)(1), 

(g)(2), (g)(3), and (g)(4) of this AD to 

clarify the compliance times by 

removing the 2-year compliance time 

that was specified in paragraph (g) of 

the NPRM and including the applicable 

compliance times for the determination 

and removal in paragraphs (g)(1), (g)(2), 

(g)(3), and (g)(4) of this AD. Paragraph 

(g)(3) of this AD allows 6 years for the 

determination for certain seating 

systems specified in that paragraph. 

Paragraph (g)(4) of this AD allows three 

years for the determination for 

components specified in that paragraph. 

It was not our intent to require the 

determinations specified in paragraphs 

(g)(3) and (g)(4) of this AD within the 2- 

year compliance time. 

We have also revised paragraph (g)(2) 

of this AD and added paragraph (h) of 

this AD to clarify the actions and 

compliance times for seating systems 

approved under TSO–C127a that are 

shown to be compliant with sections 

25.562(b)(2) and 25.562(c)(7) of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

25.562(b)(2) and 14 CFR 25.562(c)(7)), 

but are shown to exhibit sharp or 

injurious surfaces. Instead of removing 

non-compliant seating systems, 

operators may determine if the seating 

systems are compliant with sections 

25.561(b)(3)(ii) and 25.561(b)(3)(iii) of 

the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 

CFR 25.561(b)(3)(ii) and 14 CFR 

25.561(b)(3)(iii)) and do not exhibit 

sharp or injurious surfaces. The removal 

of seating systems within the initial 2- 

year compliance time will only be 

required in the event that the seat model 

is not capable of withstanding the 

minimum static forward and side loads. 

We have not extended any other 

compliance times specified in this AD. 

However, under the provisions of 

paragraph (l) of this AD, we will 

consider requests for approval of an 

extension of the compliance time if 

sufficient data are submitted to 

substantiate that the new compliance 

time would provide an acceptable level 

of safety. 

In regard to one commenter’s 

justification for extending the 

compliance time, we do not agree with 

the suggestion that there is evidence the 

level of safety offered by Koito seats is 

only 10% below the applicable 

certification requirements. The FAA risk 

assessment does not assume 100% 

failure in the event of a survivable 

emergency landing and post-emergency 

landing fire, and includes both 

worldwide and U.S. fleet accident rates. 

Seats that do not pass the static 

requirements pose a significant 

airworthiness risk in the event of an 

accident and also in the event of highturbulence loads. Seats, seating systems, 

and components that fail to meet the 

requirements specified in this AD must 

be removed; this AD does not require 

replacement of seats, seating systems, 

and components. 

In regard to the Koito data, we have 

reviewed the data available to us and 

have determined this AD is necessary to 

address the identified unsafe condition. 

As previously stated in the NPRM 

section ‘‘The Role of the Airframe 

Manufacturers (Airbus and Boeing) in 

Helping Airlines Establish the Status of 

Their Seats,’’ it will take cooperation 

among the airlines, the seat 

manufacturer, and the authorities to 

minimize the effects of this AD. 

Request To Revise Compliance Times 

for Removal of Seats and Seating 

Systems With Sharp or Injurious 

Surfaces 

Several commenters requested that we 

revise the compliance times for removal 

of seats and seating systems that have 

sharp or injurious surfaces (specified in 

paragraph (g)(4) of the NPRM). ANA 

requested clarification of the sharp edge 

issue or limitation for use (TSO–C127 & 

TSO–C127a). ANA stated that in the 

case where the static test is performed 

without the sharp edge as the first 

confirmation test, it will be able to use 

the seat for 6 years. However, ANA 

stated that in case it performs the 16g 

test as the first confirmation test and 

finds sharp edges, the seat must be 

removed within 2 years. Based on the 

above, ANA considered that the current 

AD description has an inconsistency. 

JAL stated that the NPRM requires 

that determination of compliance or 

removal of the non-compliant seats 

against the sharp or injurious surfaces 

criteria be accomplished within 2 years 

after the effective date of the AD for the 

seats approved under TSO–C127a. 

However, JAL suggested that since the 

compliance time for the dynamic testing 

requirements in section 25.562 of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

25.562) would be 6 years once the seats 

have passed the static testing 

requirements in section 25.561 of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

25.561), the compliance time to 

determine if there are sharp or injurious 

surfaces in dynamic testing should be 6 

years for consistency with the dynamic 

testing. 

JAL also stated the NPRM does not 

specify the requirements and method of 

compliance for the sharp or injurious 

surfaces. Accordingly, JAL requested 

that the FAA clarify those requirements 

and methods by specifying the 

applicable section(s) of the regulation(s) 

and/or providing clear guidance 

information. 

We agree that the compliance time for 

removing seats and seating systems that 

have sharp or injurious surfaces should 

be revised. We have removed paragraph 

(g)(4) of the NPRM and added the 

determination of sharp or injurious 

surfaces to the actions specified in 

paragraphs (g)(1), (g)(2), (g)(3), and (h)(2) 

of this AD, as discussed previously. The 

compliance times in this AD are based 

on the relative risk to safety resulting 

from non-compliance with the different 

standards; it is acceptable that the sharp 

edge determination be correlated with 

the particular type of test (static or 

dynamic) being performed. Thus, we 

agree that both assessments should have 

the same compliance time. 

As noted in the NPRM, the sharp edge 

determination can be made from 

photographic evidence of the original 

Koito tests. In addition, as noted above, 

the FAA will accept the determination 

of an FAA designee who witnessed the 

test(s). 

Request To Revise Compliance Times 

for Removing Non-Compliant Seats, 

Seating Systems, and Components 

Two commenters requested that we 

revise the compliance times for 

removing seats, seating systems, and 

components that are not compliant. 

ANA requested that if structural failure 

is found, then the compliance time for 

the required removal should be counted 

from the test confirmation date. JAL 

requested that the FAA consider 

revising the commencement date of the 

compliance time for removing seats, 

seating systems, and components that 

are not compliant from ‘‘the effective 

date of the AD’’ to ‘‘the date when the 

non-compliance is determined.’’ 

We disagree. The commenters provide 

no technical justification for revising the 

compliance time for removal. Operators 

must comply with the actions in this AD 

within the compliance times specified 

in this AD in order to address the 

identified unsafe condition. However, 

under the provisions of paragraph (l) of 

this AD, we will consider requests for 

approval of an extension of the 

compliance time if sufficient data are 

submitted to substantiate that the new 

compliance time would provide an 

acceptable level of safety. We have not 

revised this AD in this regard. 


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Request To Be Excluded From the 

Requirements of the NPRM 

ANA also asked to be excluded from 

the requirements of the NPRM by 

providing a plan to replace the seats 

within 10 years or sell the airplanes 

within 4 to 5 years. 

We disagree. The commenter did not 

provide justification for its request. As 

stated previously, operators must 

comply with the actions in this AD 

within the compliance times specified 

in this AD in order to address the 

identified unsafe condition. However, 

under the provisions of paragraph (l) of 

this AD, we will consider requests for 

approval of an alternative method of 

compliance if sufficient data are 

submitted to substantiate that the new 

AMOC would provide an acceptable 

level of safety. We have not revised this 

AD in this regard. 

Request To Clarify the 2-, 3-, and 6- 

Year Compliance Times 

Sami Kazi requested that we clarify 

whether the 2-, 3-, and 6- year 

compliance time requirements start after 

the 2-year compliance time specified in 

paragraph (g) of the NPRM. Sami Kazi 

stated that ‘‘For example if the AD is 

released on January 1, 2011 then the 

compliance findings must be completed 

by Dec. 31, 2012. Then 2, 3 or 6 years 

time periods of ‘Table—Summary of 

Proposed Actions and Requirements’ 

start after Dec. 31, 2012.’’ 

We agree to provide the following 

clarification of the compliance times. 

The compliance times in this AD for 

removing non-compliant seats, seating 

systems, and components do not start 

on the date of the compliance findings. 

All compliance times in this AD are 

measured from the effective date of the 

AD. For example, if an AD has a 

compliance time of ‘‘within 2 years after 

the effective date of this AD’’ and the AD 

has an effective date of July 1, 2011, the 

deadline for compliance for actions 

required within 2 years is July 1, 2013. 

Request To Change Paragraphs (g)(1) 

and (g)(2) of the NPRM 

Boeing requested that paragraphs 

(g)(1) and (g)(2) of the NPRM be revised 

to ensure that TSO–C39b and TSO–C39c 

seats installed on airplanes having 14 

CFR 25.562 as their certification basis 

are tested to the 14 CFR 25.562 

regulations. 

We disagree. We acknowledge that 

TSO–C39b and TSO–C39c seats that are 

installed on airplanes having 14 CFR 

25.562 as their certification basis should 

be tested to the 14 CFR 25.562 

regulations. However, we have not 

revised this AD in this regard at this 

time. Revising these actions would 

require the issuance of a supplemental 

NPRM instead of a final rule. To delay 

this action would be inappropriate, 

since we have determined that an 

unsafe condition exists and that the 

actions required by this AD must be 

conducted to ensure continued safety. 

We might consider further rulemaking 

to address this issue. 

Request for Harmonization of 

Remaining In-Service Time Between 

FAA NPRM and EASA PAD 

AAPA, China Airlines, EVA Airways, 

JTA, Singapore Airlines, and Thai 

Airways requested that we harmonize 

with EASA on the remaining time inservice for Koito seats. AAPA and China 

Airlines stated that EASA and FAA are 

widely recognized by national 

airworthiness authorities as leading 

regulatory authorities, especially in the 

areas of safety, type certification, and 

design. AAPA and China Airlines added 

that it is also well understood that the 

FAA’s and EASA’s jurisdiction covers 

only those air carriers operating aircraft 

on the U.S. Register and in the 27 

countries in the European Union, 

respectively. AAPA, China Airlines, and 

JTA explained that it is common 

practice for airworthiness authorities to 

adopt either the EASA or FAA 

airworthiness directive; however, on 

implementing an AD, some regulators 

elect to apply an FAA AD to the Boeing 

fleet and the corresponding EASA AD to 

the Airbus fleet. AAPA, China Airlines, 

and JTA concluded that consequently, 

since there is a lack of harmonization 

between the FAA and the EASA 

proposed ADs, the end result will be a 

mixed standard fleet. 

AAPA, China Airlines, JTA, and Thai 

Airways noted that, unlike the FAA’s 

NPRM, the equivalent EASA PAD 10– 

101 will include a 10-year maximum 

limit on continued service of in-service 

seats, even after air carriers have 

successfully passed all test 

requirements. EVA Airlines stated that 

in the FAA NPRM, the seats may remain 

in service if they meet amendment level 

25–64 of sections 25.562(b)(2) and (c)(7) 

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 

CFR 25.562(b)(2) and (c)(7)). AAPA, 

China Airlines, and JTA argued that this 

difference is not driven by safety and is 

an unjustified cost burden. AAPA and 

China Airlines, and EVA Airways and 

JTA urged the FAA to ask EASA to 

remove this 10-year requirement to 

ensure harmonization. 

Singapore Airlines requested that we 

recommend to EASA to allow seats to 

continue operation without limitation if 

they pass the confidence tests—similar 

to the FAA. 

JCAB noted that harmonization efforts 

may be made to avoid possible 

confusion among authorities and 

operators of the countries and regions 

outside the U.S. and Europe. JCAB 

previously stated that it does not have 

any plan to issue its own AD because 

the FAA and EASA are in a better 

position to make fleet-wide risk analysis 

and to come up with possible fleet-wide 

actions. 

We acknowledge the importance of 

harmonizing with EASA, and we have 

coordinated with EASA on our 

respective ADs. However, EASA’s 10- 

year limiting requirement is a result of 

its regulatory requirements, and the 

FAA is not in a position to recommend 

changes to this. We have determined 

that seats, seating systems, and 

components that meet the FAA 

regulations specified in this AD do not 

need to be removed and, therefore, this 

AD does not have a 10-year limiting 

requirement. While harmonization is a 

goal, EASA is obligated to follow its 

own regulatory guidance. Given the age 

of many of the seats in service, it is 

arguable whether the EASA 10-year 

requirement will have a significant 

effect on airplanes affected by EASA’s 

PAD. We have not changed this AD in 

this regard. 

Request for Time Extension for Spare 

Parts Eligibility for Installation 

Several commenters requested that we 

extend the time for spare parts 

eligibility for installation specified in 

paragraph (h) of the NPRM. 

AAPA, China Airlines, and JTA stated 

that since the announcement by the 

JCAB of the problems associated with 

Koito seats, all spare parts have been 

deemed not approved until Koito has 

finalized a recertification process. 

Furthermore, AAPA, China Airlines, 

and JTA stated that Koito is not 

permitted to make spares available even 

if it has them in stock. AAPA, China 

Airlines, and JTA stated that, as a 

consequence, air carriers are under 

significant pressure as they are unable 

to adequately support in-service seats, 

and sourcing of parts manufacturer 

approval (PMA) parts is a possibility, 

but not widely accepted. AAPA, China 

Airlines, and JTA pointed out that in 

order to support the requirements of the 

AD, spare parts are essential. AAPA, 

China Airlines, and JTA urged the FAA, 

EASA, and JCAB to determine the best 

way forward by agreeing on an approach 

that offers flexibility for air carriers to 

source spare parts. 

Continental Airlines requested that 

the current inventory of spare parts be 

allowed to remain eligible for 

installation without additional testing 


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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 106 / Thursday, June 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 31809 

for two years from the effective date of 

the AD since the requirement for 

replacement components places an 

unreasonable burden on the operators to 

recertify or purge current inventory of 

spare parts within the timeframe 

specified. 

We disagree with extending the time 

for spare parts eligibility for installation 

specified in paragraph (i) of this AD 

(referred to as paragraph (h) in the 

NPRM). However, we did intend to 

allow Koito seats and seating systems as 

‘‘direct’’ spares for the same part number 

seats or seating systems based on 

guidance in the component 

maintenance manual (a ‘‘direct’’ spare 

has the same part number of the part it 

replaces). Therefore, we have revised 

paragraph (i) of this AD and a new Note 

11 to add this exception and definition. 

We have also added new paragraph (j) 

to this AD to allow re-arrangement of 

the existing installed seats if the rearrangement follows the same 

installation instructions and limitations 

as the original certification. In addition, 

we have added new paragraph (k) to this 

AD to clarify the parts installation 

requirements for components of seats 

and seating systems (we had included 

components in paragraph (h) of the 

NPRM). 

Under the provisions of paragraph (l) 

of the final rule, we will consider 

requests for approval of an extension of 

the compliance time if sufficient data 

are submitted to substantiate that the 

change would provide an acceptable 

level of safety. 

Request To Remove Requirement to 

Determine if Seats and Seating Systems 

Have Sharp or Injurious Surfaces 

Boeing stated many of the tests of the 

suspect seats were witnessed by FAA 

‘‘delegates’’ (designated engineering 

representatives (DERs) or authorized 

representatives (ARs)); thus, the seats 

were already reviewed for sharp edges. 

Boeing also stated that even after DERs 

discontinued witnessing TSO tests, the 

photos from the tests were provided in 

the test report, which was provided to 

the installer. Boeing concluded that had 

any of the photos exhibited sharp edges, 

the AR would have questioned this and 

required additional data or tests in order 

to make the compliance finding on the 

installation. We infer that Boeing is 

requesting that we remove the 

requirement to determine if seats and 

seating systems have sharp or injurious 

surfaces, as specified in paragraphs (g) 

and (g)(4) of the NPRM. 

We disagree with the request because 

determining if there are sharp or 

injurious surfaces is necessary to 

address the identified unsafe condition. 

Photographic evidence is not sufficient 

since often times it is not close enough 

and the angle can readily hide defects 

that are not a blatant failure. In addition, 

if testing was done at a lower pulse than 

required, the low pulse may not show 

a hidden defect that would have been 

evident at the required pulse. We have 

not changed this AD in this regard. 

Request To Revise Costs of Compliance 

AEA, EVA Airways, and Koito 

requested that we revise the Costs of 

Compliance section of the NPRM. AEA 

stated that there are significant impacts 

and costs involved: hundreds of million 

of dollars in retrofitting seats including 

months—possibly years—of ground 

time if seats cannot be sourced. Koito 

stated that the NPRM not only 

underestimates the cost of the proposed 

AD, but in some cases acknowledges 

that the cost cannot be determined. 

Koito noted that the FAA did not appear 

to consider the replacement costs for 

seats, seating systems, and their 

components that are found to be noncompliant. Koito stated that the FAA 

should not ignore the costs of replacing 

seats, seating systems, and their 

components that are found to be noncompliant. EVA Airways stated the 

NPRM specifies a cost estimate of 

approximately $875,000 for 40,365 

passenger seats installed on airplanes in 

the U.S. fleet. EVA Airways added that 

since there is no way to know how 

many tests will be done and how many 

seats will be modified or replaced, it is 

very difficult to estimate the exact cost 

of this NPRM; however, because the cost 

for one dynamic test is about $20,000 to 

$50,000, the NPRM estimate of $875,000 

is low. 

We do not agree to revise the Cost of 

Compliance section of this AD. We have 

included the estimated cost of the 

actions required by this AD, which is 

applicable to the U.S. fleet. The AD 

requires a determination and removal of 

non-compliant parts, and we have 

included those costs. While this AD 

does not require replacement we 

recognize that operators could choose to 

replace non-compliant seating systems. 

However, we are unable to make an 

assessment of how many seats would be 

required to be replaced based on the 

findings of the AD. We did provide an 

estimated cost of replacement seats in 

the table ‘‘Seat Replacement Cost 

Estimates’’ in the preamble of the NPRM 

and this final rule in the Costs of 

Compliance section. 

We also do not consider it appropriate 

to attribute the costs associated with 

aircraft ‘‘down time’’ to the AD. 

Normally, compliance with the AD will 

not necessitate any additional down 

time beyond that of a regularly 

scheduled maintenance hold. Even if 

additional down time is necessary for 

some airplanes in some cases, we do not 

have sufficient information to evaluate 

the number of airplanes that may be so 

affected or the amount of additional 

down time that may be required. 

Therefore, attempting to estimate such 

costs would be futile. We have not 

revised this AD in this regard. 

Request for Department of 

Transportation (DOT) and Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB) Review 

Koito requested that the NPRM be 

reviewed by the DOT and OMB, as 

required by Executive Order 12866 

(‘‘E.O. 12866’’) (58 FR 51735, October 4, 

1993) and Department of Transportation 

(‘‘DOT’’) Order 2100.5 (44 FR 11034, 

February 26, 1979). Koito stated that 

under DOT Order 2100.5, where a 

rulemaking ‘‘concerns a matter on which 

there is substantial public interest or 

controversy,’’ it should be classified as 

a ‘‘significant’’ rulemaking and receive 

DOT Office of the Secretary (‘‘OST’’) and 

Office of Management and Budget, 

Office of Information and Regulatory 

Affairs (‘‘OMB–OIRA’’) review, 

consistent with E.O. 12866. Koito stated 

that under DOT Order 2100.5, the FAA 

may only avoid cost-benefit analysis if 

it determines that the cost impact of the 

proposal is so minimal as to not require 

full review. 

Koito stated that the FAA did not 

address the possibility that the NPRM 

may adversely affect in a material way 

a sector of the economy, which would 

have a significant impact and require 

further review. Koito added that this is 

true especially where, as in this case, 

the number of aircraft and airlines are 

potentially large, and where the direct 

and indirect effects, including any 

inadvertent effect on competition due to 

differences in approach in the AD 

requirements of EASA and the FAA, are 

unknown or not taken fully into 

account. 

Koito noted that the FAA has 

witnessed very substantial public 

interest and controversy, not only in the 

comments filed to date, but in two 

widely attended public meetings in 

Cologne, Germany, and Singapore. Koito 

concluded that under these 

circumstances, it would appear 

appropriate to categorize this 

rulemaking as significant and in need of 

DOT OST and OMB–OIRA review. 

China Airlines urged the FAA to 

recognize that the problem is not 

limited to U.S.-registered carriers and 

any AD will have global ramifications. 

We do not agree that this AD requires 

a review by the DOT OST and OMB– 


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31810 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 106 / Thursday, June 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 

OIRA because we have determined that 

this AD is not a ‘significant’ rulemaking. 

ADs in general do not require an OMB 

review. However, when the cost of an 

AD exceeds $100 million and, therefore, 

is economically significant, we do 

coordinate the AD in accordance with 

all applicable DOT and OMB 

requirements. For the purposes of these 

requirements, the costs of an AD are 

based on the U.S. domestic fleet. For the 

purposes of the requirements, this AD 

has a total cost for the U.S. fleet of 

$875,000 and thus is not economically 

significant. In addition, ADs correct 

identified unsafe conditions, rather than 

raise the level of safety and cannot be 

assessed in terms of benefits balancing 

costs, as would be the case for 

amendments to the airworthiness 

standards. This AD does not have an 

annual effect on the U.S. economy of 

$100 million or more nor does it 

adversely affect in a material way the 

economy, a sector of the economy, 

productivity, competition, jobs, the 

environment, public health or safety, or 

state, local, or Tribal governments or 

communities; it does not create a 

serious inconsistency or otherwise 

interfere with an action taken or 

planned by another agency; it does not 

materially alter the budgetary impact of 

entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan 

programs or the rights and obligations of 

recipients thereof; and it does not raise 

novel legal or policy issues arising out 

of legal mandates, the President’s 

priorities, or principals set forth in E.O. 

12866. 

We do recognize this AD could affect 

the non-U.S.-registered fleet if mandated 

by airworthiness authorities of other 

countries. However, this AD does not 

directly impact non-U.S. operators and, 

therefore, the cost review is not required 

for the non-U.S.-registered fleet. We 

have not changed this AD in this regard. 

Request To Provide Guidance on 

Testing in General and Seat Cushion 

Testing, Including Allowing the Use of 

New-Build Test Articles 

Airbus, AEA, ANA, Continental, JAL, 

JCAB, and Singapore Airlines requested 

that we provide guidance on testing seat 

cushions. Airbus requested that the 

NPRM define test pass/fail criteria and 

provide guidance on how the seat 

cushion could be tested per section 

25.853(c) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 25.853(c)). Airbus 

stated its concern that it is impossible 

to prepare a test article per Appendix F 

of part 25 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR part 25) without 

gluing parts of the cushion. Airbus 

concluded that an in-service test 

cushion is likely to have degraded 

flammability characteristics and, thus, is 

not able to pass requirement criteria. 

AEA and ANA stated that the 

flammability test of cushions cannot be 

accomplished by using a cushion 

removed from an in-service seat and 

added that there are no test criteria for 

the use of used cushions. AEA 

requested that we provide a practical 

means to allow operators and type 

certificate holders to conform and 

procure foam test samples. AEA added 

that an operator should be allowed to 

deviate from the test criteria. ANA also 

added that testing is not feasible 

because it cannot obtain the correct 

results due to effects of the material 

aging and could result in new cushions 

(made per Koito drawings) being used 

for the test. 

Continental requested that we work 

with the JCAB and Koito to determine 

the specific part numbers or foam 

compositions in question that led to this 

requirement being applied across all 

seat models. Continental stated that the 

NPRM should identify the flammability 

concerns by seat model and only those 

models with questionable oil burn data 

should be included in the NPRM. 

JAL stated that the used cushions 

(cushions returned from service) should 

not be used for the testing campaign and 

newly fabricated seat cushions that 

conform to their original TSO design 

should be used instead for the following 

reasons: 

• Used cushions do not represent the 

new ones due to contamination and/or 

deterioration and/or compression while 

in service; 

• Cushions vary in condition; 

• Due to its complexities of 

constructions and natures of used 

materials, it may be impossible to 

fabricate the required quantity of 

consistent test samples by using an 

actual cushion (by ‘‘cut and bond’’ 

method); and 

• Since the condition of each used 

cushion could be different and no clear 

criterion for representative samples has 

been specified, conformity 

determination of each cushion for 

testing cannot be accomplished. 

JCAB stated that the burden on 

affected operators should be minimized 

because operators are not expected to 

have in-depth technical knowledge 

about certification of seats or seating 

systems. JCAB noted that it is extremely 

important to have technical support 

from the airplane manufacturer. JCAB 

also stated that one of its efforts is to 

advise and supervise Koito in 

conducting re-testing of in-service 

models. JCAB expressed its firm belief 

that the result of the re-testing of inservice seat models by Koito is 

technically acceptable and should be 

fully utilized by the affected operators 

in showing compliance with the 

requirements of the NPRM. 

NCA stated that the results of the tests 

currently underway by Koito should be 

considered valid because the test is 

being done under JCAB supervision and 

is in accordance with FAA 

requirements. 

JCAB said that without data derived 

from re-testing, operators would have 

difficulty certifying seats or seating 

systems and completing all necessary 

re-testing within the 2-year compliance 

time, which could result in operators 

needing to ground airplanes from which 

seats are removed for re-testing. JCAB 

also stated that the use of in-service 

seats for re-testing is not technically fair, 

since the requirements cited in the 

NPRM are for newly produced test 

articles. JCAB added that the 

performance of used seats is degraded 

and cannot be at the same level as 

newly produced test articles. JCAB also 

stated that even if the test results are 

good, there may be no seats to re-install 

on the aircraft from which the tested 

seats were removed because after the 

testing, the seats may be deformed. 

JCAB stated the proposed test for 

flammability is too stringent and needs 

improvements, including adding 

background information. JCAB 

requested that we provide more 

clarification on how the requirements of 

the NPRM can be met so as to make the 

process more efficient and effective. 

JCAB stated that it is necessary to have 

guidance on how the number of tests 

can be minimized. JCAB also questioned 

if, for seats with TSO–C39a approvals, 

it would not be necessary to do the 

flammability test that was introduced in 

TSO–C39b. 

Singapore Airlines stated that we 

need to provide better clarity of test 

instructions, such as approval of test 

planes, if there is a need for authorities 

to be present during testing and to 

accept test results. Singapore Airlines 

recommended that the FAA and EASA 

set up a mechanism for airlines to work 

with EASA or the FAA through the 

operators’ local civil aviation authorities 

for approving a test plan, witnessing, 

and reviewing test results to testify 

compliance to the FAA NPRM and 

EASA PAD. 

Singapore Airlines stated that inservice seat cushions could be 

contaminated and are therefore not 

representative of initial flammability 

certification conditions. The commenter 

recommended that new test cushion 

coupons that are built according to the 

approved drawings for testing be used. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 106 / Thursday, June 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 31811 

AEA, AAPA, China Airlines, 

Continental, JCAB, Singapore Airlines, 

and Thai Airways requested that we 

allow data from new-build test articles 

to be used. 

AEA and Continental stated that the 

JCAB determined that metallic parts 

were not affected by the discrepancies 

with Koito seats, and therefore the 

dynamic/static tests performed on new 

seats that were produced in accordance 

with the production drawing should 

also be accepted. AAPA, China Airlines, 

JCAB, Singapore Airlines, and Thai 

Airways stated that no problems have 

been identified related to the metallic 

parts provided by suppliers and used in 

the construction of Koito seats. Several 

commenters also noted that the results 

of tear-down inspections have 

demonstrated that there were no 

significant differences. Thai Airways 

also stated that the JCAB has been able 

to confirm all production drawings were 

retained by Koito and checked for 

conformity and all design changes made 

to each in-service seat model have been 

identified, checked, and analyzed. 

Thai Airways stated that the FAA, 

EASA, and JCAB should update all data 

for seat testing results together in order 

to initiate clear and concise instructions 

and to support operators in decreasing 

the number of applicable seat part 

number testing to ensure the seat 

integrity of in-service seats. 

Koito respectfully requested that its 

testing efforts and results be effectively 

reflected in the AD. Koito stated this 

would facilitate and expedite 

compliance by airline operators with the 

AD requirements, without 

compromising safety. 

We agree to provide guidance on seat 

cushion testing. Evaluation of the Koito 

oil burner test has determined that the 

facility did not comply with the 

requirements of Appendix F, part II, of 

part 25 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR part 25). Although 

other civil airworthiness authorities are 

not required to follow U.S. regulations, 

the flammability rule affects U.S. 

operators and was developed based on 

survivable accidents in which there was 

loss of life. The retrofit for all transport 

category airplanes operating under parts 

121 and 135 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 121 and 14 CFR 

135) required fire-blocked seat cushions 

in accordance with this flammability 

rule. When TSO–C39b was issued, seats 

and berths approved prior to the 

issuance of the TSO were allowed to be 

manufactured under the provisions of 

their original approval. However, a 

specific exception was identified. This 

exception was that the seat cushions 

must comply with section 25.853 of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

25.853), including the requirements of 

section 25.853(c) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 25.853(c)), and 

Appendix F, part II, of part 25 of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

part 25). The retrofit of the entire U.S. 

fleet was accomplished in 3 years. 

We have added Notes 3 through 10 to 

this AD to provide some guidance on 

testing. The guidance includes allowing 

for new-build test articles (with inservice article conformity), test plans, 

and test reports, which must be 

presented to the FAA for approval. Test 

data from new-build test articles can be 

used to demonstrate compliance to the 

static requirements of the AD. Test data 

from new-build test articles can also be 

used for the flammability requirements 

in combination with conformity of inservice seat cushions. Any difficulties 

encountered with test articles and 

resultant interpretations can be 

discussed with the FAA. Consideration 

will be given to aging effects on test 

results. 

Request To Allow Newly Manufactured 

Seats Be Used as Representative InService Seat 

AEA, ANA, Continental, EVA 

Airways, JAL, Koito, and V Australia 

requested that newly manufactured 

seats produced in accordance with 

Koito drawings be used as a 

representative case of in-service seats. 

JAL stated that use of newly produced 

seats should be accepted for testing. JAL 

stated that, in its presentation in the 

Singapore meeting, JCAB confirmed the 

results of the tear-down inspection; the 

results indicated that using seats that 

conformed to the production drawings 

would have no significant differences 

that could impact the testing. 

Furthermore, JAL stated that conformity 

determination of each seat for testing 

cannot be accomplished since the 

condition of each seat in service could 

be different. 

We partially agree with the 

commenters. We have added Note 4 and 

Note 8 to this AD to clarify we will 

allow the test of new-build test articles 

in lieu of in-service seats for the static 

requirements in section 25.561 of the 

Federal Aviation Regulation (14 CFR 

25.561). However, for the dynamic 

requirements in section 25.562 of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

25.562), the in-service seats will still be 

required to be tested, as nonconformities in production cannot be 

adequately represented. 

Also, we cannot accept all Koito data 

obtained under JCAB oversight because 

of several factors including the fact that 

the maximum weight of all the seats in 

a group was not tested. In addition, the 

results of the re-testing of seat cushions 

for flammability at the Koito laboratory 

are invalid due to non-compliance of 

the test facility. 

Request for Service Information 

Copa Airlines, EVA Airways, and JAL 

stated there are no step-by-step service 

bulletin or OEM instructions and that 

the NPRM should include clear 

guidance on means of compliance, work 

instructions, and/or requirements for 

facilities to conduct the tests. 

NCA requested that a service bulletin 

be issued, and that the AD should refer 

to the service bulletin. NCA stated that 

operators are not in a position to take 

responsibility for the manufacturer and 

that Koito should issue a service 

bulletin. China Airlines stated that for 

‘‘regional airworthiness authorities’’ to 

provide effective oversight, 

comprehensive accomplishment 

instructions should be provided instead 

of the high-level requirements in the 

NPRM. 

We do not agree that waiting for a 

service bulletin to be issued is 

appropriate. There are many entities in 

industry that are able to determine if the 

seats comply with the AD. An operator 

may outsource this determination. We 

do not consider that delaying this action 

until after the release of a 

manufacturer’s service bulletin is 

warranted. To delay this action would 

be inappropriate, since we have 

determined that an unsafe condition 

exists and the actions required by this 

AD must be performed to ensure 

continued safety. We have not revised 

this AD in this regard. 

Request To Consider Data Found in 

Koito Computers 

JCAB requested that we consider the 

data found in Koito computers. JCAB 

added that raw data, mainly dynamic 

tests, are stored in computers of Koito 

and because those data are not believed 

to be falsified, with technical analysis 

those data may be used to show 

compliance with the proposed 

requirements of the NPRM, if certain 

conditions are met. 

We do not agree that the data found 

in Koito computers should be used to 

show compliance with this AD because 

we cannot confirm the validity of the 

data at this time. However, if additional 

data are provided that confirms the 

validity of the data, we will consider the 

data. We have not revised this AD in 

this regard. 


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31812 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 106 / Thursday, June 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 

Request To Identify Seats by Grouping 

or Family 

AAPA, ANA, China Airlines, Eva 

Airways, JAL, JTA, NCA, and Singapore 

Airlines requested that we allow 

identifying seats by grouping or family. 

Several commenters questioned who 

will do the identification. EVA Airways 

indicated that operators are not capable 

of identifying seat models by groups to 

enable testing by similarity to reduce 

cost, and requested that EASA and the 

FAA work with Airbus and Boeing to 

group seats. Thai Airways stated that 

the number of sampling seats in each 

applicable part number to be selected 

for testing has not been defined. 

AAPA, China Airlines, and JTA 

requested that we modify the NPRM to 

clearly indicate that a collective 

approach by airlines is an acceptable 

approach to responding to the 

requirements of the AD. AAPA stated 

that such an approach would allow air 

carriers in coordination with airframe 

manufacturers to carry out a sampling of 

seat family/models and the resultant 

data would then be considered as 

acceptable justification to demonstrate 

compliance to the NPRM. 

JAL stated that since the airlines/ 

operators cannot accomplish their tasks 

without technical support from the 

airplane manufacturers, especially in 

cases where a seat family extends 

between operators and between the 

manufacturers, it requests that the FAA 

clearly define the airplane 

manufacturers’ roles. Furthermore, JAL 

stated that if the FAA expects Koito to 

take any roles, those roles should also 

be specified in the NPRM. JCAB noted 

that it is in a position to assist operators 

in complying with the NPRM. 

We agree with the commenters and 

confirm that seat grouping will be 

allowed to show compliance with the 

AD; work is ongoing by the type 

certificate holders to define seat groups. 

However, we have not revised this AD 

to specify how and who should do the 

work. It is expected that the type 

certificate holders or suitable qualified 

organizations can assist in the clustering 

of seat models. Seat model grouping is 

not essential for compliance with the 

AD, but is recognized by FAA as a 

means to reduce the economic burden. 

Request To Explain Conformity 

Inspection 

AEA, Airbus, ANA, and EVA Air 

requested we provide guidance on how 

to perform a conformity inspection of 

the seats. 

We disagree with revising this AD to 

include instructions on conformity 

inspections because there are numerous 

ways to accomplish this, and we want 

to provide flexibility for operators. This 

AD requires the determination for 

compliance with certain FAA 

regulations of seats, seating systems, 

and components in accordance with a 

method approved by the FAA. We will 

provide guidance during the FAA 

review and approval of the test plans 

submitted. Changes to the design might 

have occurred between when the 

product was accepted for a TSO and 

when production started. A simple 

instruction to establish conformity 

through comparison to the component 

maintenance manual is not a sufficient 

way for operators to determine 

airworthiness. We have not revised this 

AD in this regard. 

Request That the TSO Certification 

Level be Commensurate With the 

Testing Requirement at the Time of the 

Original Aircraft Type Certification 

AAPA, AEA, ANA, China Airlines, 

Continental Airlines, JAL, JTA, JCAB, 

Koito, and Boeing requested that the 

TSO certification level be 

commensurate with the testing 

requirement at the time of the original 

aircraft type certification. 

AEA stated that operators should only 

be obliged to comply with the original 

type certification basis of the aircraft. 

AEA also stated that testing the seats to 

the latest or later requirements cannot 

be justified and would increase the risk 

of failures dramatically as the original 

seat design would not allow for this. 

JAL stated that the NPRM requires the 

airlines/operators to determine 

compliance with the latest static 

structural requirements under section 

25.561(b) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 25.561(b)) at 

Amendment 25–64. However, JAL and 

AEA stated that the side load factor 

defined in section 25.561(b)(3)(iii) of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

25.561(b)(3)(iii)) should be consistent 

with the airplane certification basis 

because ‘‘new’’ seats were tested to 4g 

requirements at Amendment 25–64 of 

that regulation, whereas the ‘‘old’’ seats 

were tested to 1.5g requirements at 

Amendment 25–23 or 25–0 of that 

regulation in the course of original TSO 

design approvals. 

JCAB questioned whether it correctly 

understands that re-tests can be 

conducted in accordance with the 

certification basis of airplanes/seats. 

JCAB noted that for older airplanes/ 

seats, the side load requirement in static 

seats is 1.5g, while the newer 

requirement is 3g/4g. JCAB also noted 

there is a -2g pulse shape introduced in 

TSO–C127a. 

Koito stated that a more appropriate 

level of compliance for the requirements 

of the NPRM would be to the 

certification basis of the aircraft or a 

higher amendment level, whichever an 

affected operator chooses. Koito noted 

that it took the FAA 17 years to finalize 

the regulations at Amendment 25–64 (to 

address retrofitting), in large part 

because of technical difficulties in 

certifying seats to the 16g standard, 

which were more sophisticated and 

complex than 9g seats. Koito pointed 

out that when the regulations at 

Amendment 121–315 were adopted, it 

required full compliance only for new 

production airplane models. Therefore, 

Koito submits that requiring compliance 

to the most recent amendment levels is 

not supported and is inconsistent with 

the FAA’s approach to addressing 

retrofitting aircraft to the higher 

standards at Amendment 25–64 of the 

regulations. Alternatively, Koito stated 

that an airplane may have a certification 

basis that does not include section 

25.562 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 25.562) and 

requested that the FAA relieve the 

requirements of sections 25.562(b)(2) 

and (c)(7) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 25.562(b)(2) and 

(c)(7)). 

We partially agree with the 

commenters. We agree that certain TSO 

seats can be tested at the level that the 

TSO was issued. We have revised 

paragraph (g)(1) of this AD to clarify the 

certification basis. For TSO–C39b and 

TSO–C39c seats, the certification basis 

when determining (testing) if the seats 

meet section 25.561 of the Federal 

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 25.561) is 

the certification basis of the TSO; 

however, for TSO–C127a seating 

systems, the testing remains the same. 

Boeing also requested that a note be 

added regarding pulse shape to allow 

the use of the pulse shape that was 

acceptable at the time of TSO approval 

or type certification or supplemental 

type certification. 

We disagree with Boeing’s request 

that a note be added regarding pulse 

shape to allow the use of the pulse 

shape that was acceptable at the time of 

TSO approval or type certification or 

supplemental type certification. The 

current criteria for the pulse shape 

meets the original intent of section 

25.562(b)(2) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 25.562(b)(2)). 

Request To Accept the Use of Koito 

Interface Loads Reports for the 

Analysis To Determine Which Seat(s) 

Testing is Required 

AEA requested that we accept the use 

of Koito interface loads reports for the 


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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 106 / Thursday, June 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 31813 

analysis to determine which seats are 

tested. AEA stated that if structure 

testing is to be conducted for showing 

compliance with the applicable portions 

of the NPRM, one method to determine 

the ‘‘critical’’ seat(s) for testing is 

mentioned in Appendix 3 of FAA 

Advisory Circular 25.562–1B, dated 

January 10, 2006. AEA stated that one 

element in this determination is taking 

into account the highest loaded seat leg 

of a seat within a ‘‘family of seats,’’ 

which can be concluded from the 

calculated interface loads for those 

seats. AEA noted that since falsification 

involved ‘‘static, dynamic and 

flammability testing, as well as 

uncontrolled changes to production data 

(material and dimensional),’’ we accept 

the use of Koito Interface Loads Reports 

for the analysis to determine for which 

seat(s) testing is required. 

We agree that the use of Koito 

interface loads reports may be 

acceptable for the determination of 

compliance to FAA regulations required 

by this AD. We note that the use of 

advisory circular material may be 

allowed, thus Koito analysis of interface 

loads may be allowed. We have added 

this information to Note 6 of this AD. 

Request To Use Only Lower Testing 

Requirement 

Several commenters requested we 

allow testing to be done at lower testing 

requirements. AEA requested that all 

seats that pass the 9g requirement can 

remain in service. AEA stated that 

according to the NPRM, seats with a 16g 

certification basis that fail the 16g test 

are required to carry out a 9g test, and 

receive a 6-year grace period if the test 

is passed. AEA stated that during the 

16g rulemaking it was determined that 

the 16g rule was not made retroactive to 

seats that met the earlier 9g certification 

basis. Therefore, AEA stated that all 

seats that pass the 9g test have shown 

compliance to the minimum standard 

and can therefore remain in service. 

ANA stated that 16g seats (TSO– 

C127a) may be installed on an airplane 

that itself does not have a 16g 

requirement. ANA asked that the 9g 

confirmation test be considered 

sufficient. 

We disagree. This AD requires 

compliance with certain provisions of 

the TSO. If a seat is TSO–C127a then the 

requirements of that TSO apply. In 

addition the FAA’s operational and 

airworthiness regulations do not allow a 

downgrade of the certification basis of 

airplanes to an older standard. We have 

not changed this AD in this regard. 

Also, Boeing stated that the 

certification basis of various models of 

airplanes is different regarding the static 

side load case. Boeing stated that 

airplanes (such as Boeing Model 747– 

400 and 767–300 airplanes) have a 

certification basis lower than the 

standards at Amendment 25–64 of the 

regulations, and as such, a 1.5g side 

load would be appropriate. 

We disagree. A seating system that is 

approved under TSO–C127a must also 

meet section 25.562 of the Federal 

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 25.562), 

even if the airplane has a lower 

certification basis. We have not changed 

this AD in this regard. 

Request To Waive Bunsen Burner Test 

AEA requested that we waive the 

Bunsen burner requirement when 

operators elect to perform a complete requalification program, as mentioned 

under Note 1 of the NPRM. AEA stated 

that during the question and answer 

session in Cologne, it was stated that 

relevance of Bunsen burner test results 

is negligible and that absence of such 

test data does not lead to an unsafe 

condition. 

We disagree. The comments made by 

EASA and FAA during the meeting in 

Cologne might need further 

clarification. It was not stated that 

compliance with section 25.853(a) of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

25.853(a)), commonly referred to as the 

Bunsen burner test, has no influence on 

the determination of the unsafe 

condition. It was stated that Bunsen 

burner testing is not a required element 

of the flammability tests to show 

compliance to this AD. If requalification 

is chosen, showing compliance with all 

aspects of the applicable TSO is 

required in accordance with part 21 of 

the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 

CFR 21). We have not changed this AD 

in this regard. 

Request To Clarify When Re-Installing 

Seats Is Allowed 

Airbus, AEA, APA, Boeing, China 

Airlines, JAL, JTA, Koito, and Thai 

Airways requested that we clarify when 

re-installing seats after removal or 

reconfiguration is allowed. Airbus 

requested that we allow provisions for 

filling the gap in the cabin following 

removal of seats for confidence tests (by 

allowing production and installation of 

complete seats of the same design) or 

allow reconfiguration of the cabin 

without full requalification of the seats. 

Koito agreed with Airbus that we should 

allow provisions for filling the gap. Thai 

Airways stated that after removing seats 

for testing, there are no instructions to 

address deviations from the aircraft 

configuration type certificate. 

Boeing requested that we clarify the 

text in the ‘‘Limitations on Seats Found 

Not to Be Fully Compliant, but Are Safe 

to Remain in Service’’ section of the 

preamble of the NPRM because a couple 

of sentences conflict with each other. 

Boeing stated that one sentence would 

allow the use of direct spares (i.e., same 

part number) to be re-installed in an 

airplane, but a different sentence 

specifies that any removed seat is to be 

destroyed. Boeing stated this would 

mean that no spare seat would exist, as 

indicated by the earlier sentence. Boeing 

suggested the section include ‘‘unless 

retained as a direct spare as noted 

above. The direct spares can be reinstalled in any previously certified 

layout using that seat part number.’’ 

Boeing recommended the paragraph 

read as follows: 

That is, unless they are shown to fully 

comply with the regulatory requirements, 

this proposed AD would restrict the 

installation of such seats and would require 

specific marking. These seats can be used as 

a direct spare for the same part number seat. 

However, any other use of such seats would 

be considered a new installation approval 

and would be required to comply with all 

regulations. Thus, seats not meeting all 

regulations could not be installed except as 

noted above, and if removed from an 

approved arrangement, would have to be 

destroyed or rendered unusable in some 

other manner acceptable to the FAA, unless 

retained as a direct spare as noted above. The 

direct spares can be re-installed in any 

previously certified layout using that seat 

part number. 

Boeing stated that the additional text 

clarifies that the airlines can continue to 

re-configure their airplanes from, for 

example, their previously certified 

summer layout (with lots of economy 

class) to their previously certified 

winter layout (with less economy class) 

and vice-versa. 

Boeing also recommended we clarify 

that re-configuration is acceptable and 

suggested adding the following text: 

As an exception, when a seat(s) is removed 

from an airplane for the direct purpose of 

testing under the context of this AD, the 

remaining seats can be re-pitched to fill the 

vacant spot. This one-time re-pitch following 

a test-seat removal is to follow the same 

installation instructions and limitations as 

the original certification (e.g., if the original 

limitations allowed 32′′ to 34′′ pitch, the new 

layout shall be pitched within that range). 

Boeing stated that although repitching is not a simple solution, 

removing a seat for testing without 

allowing for a solution produces a 

‘‘hole’’ or unused space in the airplane. 

Boeing noted that the re-pitch will be 

equally as safe as the seats were before 

the removal of the test seat and, in 

addition, leaving a ‘‘hole’’ or unused 

space in the airplane leaves passengers 

without tray tables (which were seatVerDate Mar<15>2010 16:10 Jun 01, 2011 Jkt 223001 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\02JNR1.SGM 02JNR1

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31814 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 106 / Thursday, June 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 

back-mounted on the removed seat). 

Boeing further stated that the ‘‘hole’’ also 

leaves the electrical daisy-chain 

interrupted, which eliminates reading 

lights, attendant call, and in-flight 

entertainment (IFE) to the seat 

assemblies beyond the missing one. 

AEA and Koito stated that the 

preamble of the NPRM states the seats 

that pass the test and remain on the 

airplane are ‘‘limited on how they can be 

used.’’ AEA also stated that the FAA has 

clarified this means that seats have to 

remain in the currently approved 

configuration and cannot be changed, 

moved, or re-pitched. AEA noted that in 

order to remain competitive in today’s 

changing market, it is essential for 

operators to have the ability to amend 

the configuration of their aircraft to suit 

the market needs. AEA, AAPA, and 

China Airlines requested that the FAA 

clarify the wording so that operators 

would be allowed to reconfigure 

airplanes containing Koito seats. Koito 

stated that it echoed the concerns raised 

by AEA. AEA provided the following 

justification: 

• Seats that have passed the 

confidence test will have been shown to 

be safe. 

• Certain reconfigurations may 

actually improve safety. 

• Reconfigurations are usually 

supplemental type certificates (STCs); in 

addition, all changes (including minor) 

related to Koito seats are FAA-approved. 

• FAA has previously stated that 

Koito data are approved. 

• In order to provide test specimens, 

some operators will need to remove 

seats from in-service airplanes, and this 

will leave a large gap in these aircraft 

unless the remaining seats can be repitched. 

Koito stated that preventing operators 

from reconfiguring seats that are part of 

a supplemental type certificate would 

be unnecessarily restrictive and would 

provide no safety benefit—nor would it 

be necessary to correct a potential 

unsafe condition. 

JAL requested that the FAA accept the 

use of newly produced seats to fill in 

gaps left by seats removed for testing in 

case newly produced seats are not 

allowed for testing. 

We agree to clarify when seats and 

seating systems can be installed and 

rearranged. We have added a new Parts 

Installation paragraph (paragraph (j) of 

this AD) to allow certain 

reconfigurations. We will consider 

allowing reconfiguration within the 

same installation instructions and 

limitations as the original certification. 

Operators may request approval of an 

AMOC in accordance with the 

procedures specified in paragraph (l) of 

this AD. We have not revised the 

‘‘Limitations on Seats Found Not to Be 

Fully Compliant, but Are Safe to 

Remain in Service’’ section because that 

section of the NPRM is not restated in 

this final rule. 

Request To Allow Entire Seat 

Assemblies To Be Produced and 

Installed To Replace Seats That Have 

Been Removed for Testing 

JAL requested the FAA accept the use 

of newly produced seats to fill gaps left 

by seats removed for testing in case 

newly produced seats are not allowed 

for testing. 

Boeing requested that the following be 

added to the ‘‘Replacement 

Components’’ paragraph in the preamble 

of the NPRM: 

‘‘* * * Entire seat assemblies may 

also be produced and installed to 

explicitly replace any seat removed 

from the fleet for testing under this AD.’’ 

Boeing stated that removing a seat for 

testing without allowing for a new 

replacement seat assembly to be 

produced leaves a ‘‘hole’’ or unused 

space in the airplane. Boeing stated the 

replacement seat will be identical, or at 

least representative of the one removed 

for testing, which achieves an identical 

or representative level of safety between 

the newly installed seat and others on 

the airplane. 

Additionally, Boeing reported that 

leaving a ‘‘hole’’ or unused space in the 

airplane leaves passengers without tray 

tables (which were seat-back-mounted 

on the removed seat). Boeing noted the 

‘‘hole’’ also leaves the electrical daisychain interrupted, which eliminates 

reading lights, attendant call, and IFE to 

the seat assemblies beyond the missing 

one. 

We agree. The FAA’s intent is to 

allow new Koito seats with the same 

part number to be installed to replace 

in-service seats used as test articles. We 

have revised paragraph (i) of this AD to 

clarify this issue by specifying that seats 

and seating systems may be removed 

from service and re-installed and that 

new seats and seating systems may be 

installed as direct spares for the same 

part number seats or seating systems. 

The new Koito seats and seating systems 

are subject to this AD. 

Request To Consider Minor Failure 

AEA requested that we consider what 

to do if there is a minor failure of the 

seats. AEA stated an example is a seat 

experiencing a ‘minor’ failure of a 

structural test. AEA stated in the case 

where a 9g seat is tested the NPRM 

implies that if it fails in any way it 

would require replacement in 2 years. 

AEA requested that a logical, safetybased approach be applied to tests and 

a maximum allowed grace period be 

granted should a failure be deemed as 

minor. 

We disagree that there is such a thing 

as a ‘minor’ failure. Existing pass/fail 

criteria already include consideration of 

the amount of damage that is considered 

a failure and these criteria continue to 

be valid. This AD requires that a 

determination be made to ensure that 

seats, seating systems, and components 

are compliant with certain regulations 

and removed if necessary. The 

compliance time for removal is 

dependent on the failure criteria as 

identified in the AD. AEA stated that 

replacement is required; however, this 

AD only requires removal of seats, 

seating systems, and components that 

are non-compliant. We have not revised 

this AD in this regard. 

Request To Allow Alternative Actions 

Two commenters requested that we 

allow alternative action for 

‘‘replacement.’’ Thai Airways stated that 

remedial action does not exist if seats 

fail the test and the only 

recommendation is replacement. ANA 

requested that we allow modification to 

comply with the NPRM. 

We do not agree. Seats, seating 

systems, and components that are noncompliant must be removed, as required 

by the AD. However, under the 

provisions of paragraph (l) of this AD, 

we will consider requests for approval 

of an AMOC if sufficient data are 

submitted to substantiate that the new 

methods would provide an acceptable 

level of safety. We have not revised this 

AD in this regard. 

Request To Clarify 100% Conformity Is 

Not Required 

AEA requested that we confirm and 

clarify that a 100% conformity 

inspection of all seats installed is not 

required and that based on analysis the 

recertification of a representative test 

article is acceptable. AEA stated that 

according to Note 1 of the NPRM, it 

must be determined if the seats and 

seating systems and their components 

are compliant with FAA regulations. 

Note 1 refers to recertification, i.e., requalify to the TSO. 

We agree to clarify this issue. We 

confirm that 100% conformity of the inservice fleet is not required to comply 

with the AD in most cases because a 

sampling approved by the FAA will be 

allowed. The AD does not require requalification of the seats and seating 

systems, which would involve showing 

compliance with all aspects of the 

applicable TSOs, such as measurement 

and reporting of permanent 


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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 106 / Thursday, June 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 31815 

deformations and lumbar load 

requirements. The AD requires a 

determination if the seats are compliant 

to the specific requirements set forth in 

the AD. 

Request To Clarify Guidance on 

Replacement Cushions 

Several commenters requested 

guidance on replacement cushions. AEA 

requested that we allow similar bottom 

cushions to be accepted instead of 

tested. AEA stated that according to 

paragraph (g)(2) of the NPRM, for 

seating systems approved under TSO– 

C127a, dynamic testing is limited to a 

16g forward load condition; however, 

strict adherence to the referenced 

guidance of FAA Advisory Circular 

25.562–1B, Appendix 3, paragraph 9 

(reference paragraph (g)(5) of the NPRM) 

would require conducting a 14g down 

lumbar load test, if the original bottom 

cushion material (i.e., foam) is not 

available for the manufacturing of 

replacement cushions. AEA stated that 

since it is accepted that in-service seats 

might not meet the 14g down lumbar 

load requirement, it would be 

unreasonable to require the showing of 

full compliance with this part of the 

regulations in case an operator is forced 

to replace bottom cushions because of 

non-compliance with the oil burner test 

or because spare cushions cannot be 

obtained. 

Therefore, AEA requested that we 

accept similar bottom cushions with 

respect to stiffness and density 

(measured according to accepted 

industry standards) to show that the 

performance of a replacement bottom 

cushion is not worse than that of the inservice cushion. 

ANA noted that in paragraph (g)(5) of 

the NPRM, the reference for the 

replacement is AC 25.562–1B; however, 

this is for a TSO–C127a seat only, and 

not for TSO–C39b and TSO–C39c seats. 

ANA requested that we revise this 

reference. 

We agree that the requirement for 

replacement cushions is too restrictive 

for certain seating systems. We revised 

paragraph (g)(4) of this AD (referred to 

as paragraph (g)(5) in the NPRM) to 

clarify that the requirement is only for 

seat cushions affected by FAA Advisory 

Circular 25.562–1B, dated January 10, 

2006 (i.e., seat cushions replaced on 

airplanes required to meet section 

25.562 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 25.562) either by 

their original certification basis or posttype certificate modifications). We have 

also clarified that compliance with 

section 25.562(c)(2) of the Federal 

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

25.562(c)(2)), i.e. lumbar load, does not 

need to be shown. 

Request To Add Guidance on Pass/Fail 

Criteria 

Boeing requested that we add Note 4 

after paragraph (g) of the NPRM to 

provide information that pass/fail 

criteria for cracks may be acceptable on 

a case-by-case basis, i.e., front fitting 

acceptable, rear fitting not acceptable. 

We disagree. This information is not 

necessary to comply with this AD. 

Guidance on acceptable damage is 

contained in Advisory Circular 25.562– 

1B. We have not changed this AD in this 

regard. 

Request To Add Guidance on 

Conformity 

Boeing requested that a note be added 

as follows: ‘‘If the test article consists of 

a seat from the fleet (or from spares), 

conformity should consist of matching 

the seat part number to that noted in the 

test plan, of noting the general condition 

of the seat, of noting revisions/ 

modifications that have been made to 

the seat (typically noted on modification 

placards), and of verifying the date of 

manufacture.’’ 

We agree with the intent of the 

suggestion. We have added Notes 5, 6, 

9, and 10 to this AD to provide 

guidance. 

Request To Specify Specific Cushions 

AEA requested that we specify 

specific cushions in paragraph (g)(5) of 

the NPRM. AEA requested that although 

not explicitly mentioned in paragraph 

(g)(5) of the NPRM, the FAA should 

limit the applicability of this paragraph 

to seat bottom and seat back cushions 

only, as these represent the majority of 

foams on the seats. AEA stated that 

legrest cushions and headrest cushions 

are significantly smaller when 

compared to bottom and back cushions. 

AEA added that it is nearly impossible 

to manufacture representative test 

sample sets of these small-sized 

cushions on in-service seats. 

We agree to specify cushion types. 

Headrest and legrest cushions typically 

have much less mass than bottom and 

back cushions. While the requirements 

of section 25.853(c) of the Federal 

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 25.853(c)) 

also apply to headrest and legrest 

cushions, non-compliance of these types 

of cushions would not have as much 

effect on safety as would noncompliance of the bottom and back 

cushions. We have determined that 

addressing only bottom and back 

cushions provides an adequate level of 

safety. We have revised paragraph (g)(4) 

of this AD to specify that seat bottom 

and seat back cushion assemblies must 

be shown to be compliant as specified 

in the AD. 

Requests for Harmonization of Parts 

Replacement 

Singapore Airlines requested that we 

work with EASA and the JCAB to 

harmonize parts replacement to 

facilitate Koito’s production and 

shipment of spares to airlines. 

Singapore stated this is especially 

important to airlines that expect to 

continue operations with Koito seats if 

their seats pass the confidence tests 

stipulated by EASA and the FAA. 

Singapore stated that without JCAB’s 

approval for Koito to produce spare 

seats for replacement of in-service seats 

for the confidence testing, airlines might 

end up with a ‘‘hole’’ in the airplane 

(impacting IFE systems and wiring), 

having to approve a new configuration, 

having seats destroyed during testing 

that cannot be re-installed, and having 

a commercial impact that may affect 

route performance and viability. 

Thai Airways stated that Koito could 

manufacture seats and seat accessories 

according to FAA TSO and deliver them 

to the operators as spare parts. Thai 

Airways requested we coordinate with 

the JCAB to clarify and reconsider 

authorizing export of those seats as 

spare parts. 

As previously stated it is the FAA’s 

intent to allow new Koito seats with the 

same part number to be installed to 

replace in-service seats used as test 

articles. However, we do not have 

authority over the production approval 

of Koito spare parts. JCAB is the 

authority and they are aware of this 

issue. We have not revised this AD in 

this regard. 

Request To Allow Replacement of NonConforming Seats 

The JCAB requested that we allow the 

replacement of non-conforming seats. 

The JCAB stated that if operators chose 

to correct non-compliance found during 

the determination (testing) specified in 

the NPRM, the seats in question have to 

be modified so they fully meet all 

applicable requirements. The JCAB 

stated that there would be Koito seats 

that comply with the requirements of 

the NPRM while not meeting the full 

requirements under Part 25 of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

25); and there would also be seats that 

failed to comply with the NPRM 

requirements and would require 

modifications to achieve compliance 

with the NPRM requirements. The JCAB 

noted that after the modifications, the 

latter seats are at the same level of safety 

as the former seats and, therefore, 


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should be allowed to continue operation 

without further actions. The JCAB 

argued that requiring the full 

compliance for the latter seats is not 

fair, and it may be more reasonable if 

operators are allowed to continue to use 

seats that are modified. 

We disagree. This AD requires 

determining if the seats and seating 

systems and their components are 

unsafe, based on the failure to comply 

with certain key performance standards 

in the TSO. As clarified in Note 1 of this 

AD, this determination may be made by 

independent re-qualification of the 

affected TSO article that has thorough 

control of the design and production 

process. Seats and seating systems that 

fail the determination (tests) required in 

the AD will be subject to the associated 

limitations. Any future design change to 

the seats or seating systems requires full 

re-certification of the seats or seating 

systems. We have not revised this AD in 

this regard. 

Request To Add Guidance on Use of 

Redesigned Part 

Boeing requested that we add a note 

allowing the use of re-designed parts to 

be installed after test failure. Boeing 

stated that retrofitting an entire family 

of seats with a new design is perceived 

as a quicker path to safety and is nonpunitive to airlines. 

We disagree that such a note in the 

AD is necessary. Seats and seating 

systems that fail the determination 

(tests) required in the AD will be subject 

to the associated limitations. Any future 

design change to the seats or seating 

systems requires full re-certification of 

the seats or seating systems. We have 

not revised this AD in this regard. 

Request for FAA and EASA 

Harmonization of Replacement Parts 

ANA and JAL requested that we 

harmonize with EASA on replacement 

parts. JAL commented that the FAA 

NPRM requires that replacement parts 

meet applicable airworthiness 

requirements, whereas the EASA PAD 

requires replacement parts to be 

compliant with the requirements of the 

AD. JAL requested that the NPRM 

reflect compliance similar to the EASA 

PAD since operators might have to 

conduct further testing to show 

compliance with requirements other 

than flammability and injury prevention 

provisions. Accordingly, JAL requested 

that the FAA consider revising the 

requirements for the replacement parts 

so they are consistent with the ones in 

the EASA PAD. JAL noted that airlines/ 

operators might have to conduct further 

testing to show compliance to 

regulations other than the flammability 

and injury prevention provisions. ANA 

stated there are differences regarding 

parts replacement between the FAA and 

EASA, and ANA requested the use of 

the EASA description. 

We disagree. We cannot harmonize on 

this issue because EASA has a proposed 

10-year removal date whereas the FAA 

does not. Since our AD allows seats, 

seating systems, and components that 

are compliant to remain on the airplane, 

our AD refers to the applicable 

airworthiness requirements for 

replacement parts. We have not revised 

this AD in this regard. 

Request To Allow Replacement of 

Actuators, Hydrolocks, and Other 

Structural Parts 

Several commenters requested that we 

allow the replacement of actuators, 

hydrolocks, and other structural parts. 

ANA stated that after the AD is 

effective, the AD requires that 

replacement parts comply with the 

requirements of the AD. ANA added 

that for the structural member, basically 

the new part is obviously much 

healthier than the existing one (installed 

on seat). ANA concluded that it is not 

necessary to include requirements for 

the spare (replacement) parts, including 

an actuator, a hydrolock, and so on, 

which are the standardized 

manufacturing parts. 

JAL stated that it is currently 

proposed that only wear-out 

components and non-structural 

members may be manufactured and 

installed on the seats affected by the 

NPRM. JAL requested that we consider 

exempting the mechanical reclining 

control actuators even though they may 

be part of structural members. JAL 

stated the actuators are a type of wearout component replaced often during 

maintenance. JAL added that the ones 

used on the Koito seats have many 

suppliers, their quality and performance 

were unlikely to be adversely affected 

by falsification, and the replacement of 

actuators improves, not degrades, the 

performance of existing seats. 

Koito stated that the NPRM provides 

only for the replacement of wear-out 

component parts, such as food trays, 

arm rest covers, and non-structural 

members. Koito stated that this strict 

limitation may be disproportional as the 

replacement of certain parts of inservice seats can ensure appropriate 

safety levels while allowing the airlines 

to extend the use of these seats without 

having to replace them. Thus, Koito 

suggested including an explicit section 

in the NPRM describing possible 

avenues for airlines to upgrade seat 

performance (e.g., through service 

bulletins and kits developed by Koito) 

to ensure they meet the safety 

requirements foreseen in the NPRM. 

Koito considered this would adequately 

ensure safety performance, while 

minimizing the burden on airlines. 

We partially agree. We disagree with 

the ANA request to allow other 

structural parts ‘‘and so on’’ because 

ANA did not list specific parts. We 

agree that certain parts may be allowed. 

The intent of this AD is to allow Koito 

spares based on guidance in the 

component maintenance manual. Seat 

cushions would need to be in 

compliance with the AD. A seat, seating 

system, or component that fails the 

determination (tests) required in the AD 

is subject to the associated limitations. 

Any future design change (such as 

upgrade kit and associated Koito service 

bulletin) would require full recertification of the seat. 

Request To Clarify Limitation on Seats, 

Seating Systems, and Components 

Remaining in Service 

EVA Airways commented that the 

NPRM contains inconsistent statements. 

EVA Airways stated that the NPRM 

reads that as of the effective date of this 

AD, a seat, seating system, or 

component may be re-installed on the 

airplane from which it was originally 

removed, provided it is removed from 

service within the applicable 

compliance time specified in this AD. 

EVA Airways also stated that the NPRM 

specifies these seats can be used as 

direct spares for the same part number 

seats. We infer that the commenter is 

requesting clarification of the 

limitations on seats, seating systems, 

and components remaining in service. 

We agree to provide clarification. As 

specified in paragraphs (i) and (k) of this 

AD, a seat, seating system, or 

component that is removed to conduct 

testing can be replaced with a newly 

built part of the same part number or a 

used part of the same part number. All 

seats, seating systems, and components, 

whether new or used, must be in 

compliance with the AD within the 

appropriate compliance times of the AD. 

Request To Revise Paragraph (h) of the 

NPRM 

AEA requested that we revise 

paragraph (h) of the NPRM. AEA 

commented that paragraph (h) of the 

NPRM is very restrictive to operators 

who cannot obtain spare parts. ANA 

stated that it did not have spare seats 

based on the fact that there are many 

seat part numbers. Koito agreed with 

AEA that this provision is very 

restrictive and stated that such a 

significant limitation would prevent 

reconfiguration of airplanes containing 


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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 106 / Thursday, June 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 31817 

Koito seats. AEA requested that the 

wording of paragraph (h) of the NPRM 

be amended to allow non-compliant 

seats and their components to be used 

as direct spares for the same part 

number seat or component as follows: 

Seats and components that successfully 

complete the relevant requirements of 

paragraph (g) of this AD and are permitted to 

remain in service for the defined length of 

time, are limited in how they can be used, 

unless they are shown to fully comply with 

the applicable airworthiness requirements. 

Non-compliant seats and their components 

that are removed from service are not eligible 

for installation on another aeroplane or by 

another operator except as a direct spare for 

the same part number seat or component. 

We do not agree to allow installation 

of seats, seating systems, and 

components as direct spares between 

other airlines and authorities. The intent 

of paragraphs (i) and (k) of this AD 

(referred to as paragraph (h) in the 

NPRM) is to limit the introduction of 

known bad parts into the worldwide 

fleet. Non-compliant seats, seating 

systems, and components are subject to 

the limitations of the AD. However, we 

have revised paragraphs (i) and (k) of 

this AD to allow installation of parts as 

direct spares on another airplane for a 

given operator, provided the operator 

complies with the requirements of the 

AD. 

Request To Revise ‘‘Data the FAA Will 

Accept * * *’’ Section of the NPRM 

Boeing requested that we revise the 

‘‘Data the FAA Will Accept to 

Demonstrate Compliance with the 

Proposed AD’’ section of the preamble of 

the NPRM. Boeing suggested that we 

replace the wording ‘‘* * * As noted 

above, tests conducted as part of the 

JCAB investigation may be acceptable if 

the conformity of the seats in service 

can be verified’’ with the wording 

‘‘* * * Tests conducted as part of the 

JCAB investigation are acceptable if the 

seat model in question is part of the 

family of the tested seat and if the tested 

seat included the highest loaded leg 

***’’ Boeing stated that the JCAB 

reported that falsification of data did not 

relate to the structural components of 

the seat and, as such, testing of test 

articles that are manufactured to the 

level of drawings at the time of 

production can establish a level of 

safety for the fleet. 

We disagree with revising the 

wording because all tests might not be 

acceptable. Tests conducted as part of 

the JCAB investigation may be 

acceptable if the conformity of the seats 

in service can be verified. Operators 

may include not only the highest loaded 

leg but also such things as the rationale 

for why the seat model is the critical 

seat in the determined group/cluster in 

any proposed test plan. That section of 

the NPRM is not restated in the final 

rule. We have not revised this AD in 

this regard. 

Request To Clarify Status and Validity 

of TSO and Tagging 

JAL, Continental, and Koito requested 

clarification on the validity of TSO 

design approvals and tagging. JAL 

requested the status and validity of TSO 

design approvals of Koito seats and 

PMAs as replacement parts be 

unchanged by the AD. 

JAL requested that the FAA define the 

disposition of TSOs/PMAs when 

operators decide to acquire new seat 

cushions. 

Continental stated the NPRM should 

include a provision to allow the TSO to 

remain intact for any seats which are 

shown to meet the original TSO 

requirements or for any seats that are 

brought into full compliance. 

Koito indicated the NPRM proposes to 

require modification of existing TSO 

tags prior to reinstallation to indicate 

non-compliance with the TSO, the AD 

number, and applicable removal date; 

however, the FAA has not proposed to 

revoke or suspend the TSOs. Koito 

requested the NPRM only require that a 

tag be added to the TSO marking that 

specifies the number of the AD, 

identifies the AD paragraphs it is in 

compliance with, and a removal date, if 

applicable. Koito concluded that only 

seats that do not comply with any 

requirements of the NPRM should have 

all TSO markings obliterated. 

We agree to provide clarification. This 

AD does not address action against the 

manufacturer and we have not revoked 

the letter of design authorization for the 

TSO. However, none of the TSO 

markings on existing articles produced 

under TSO authorizations specified in 

this AD are considered valid because 

they were obtained in violation of the 

TSO process. This includes falsified 

Bunsen burner tests, oil burner tests, 

static tests, dynamic tests, and material 

certificates. If a seat model is fully requalified by the TSO holder, a seat may 

be entitled to a new TSO marking, with 

a new date, but the existing marking 

cannot be validated after the fact. The 

JCAB stated that the models identified 

in the AD have data that was either 

falsified or is suspected to have been 

falsified. The obliteration of the TSO 

identification (‘TSO–XXX’) is therefore 

required for all seats and seating 

systems affected by this AD. 

The operator/owner may elect to 

show full compliance to the TSO as 

indicated by Note 1 of this AD (Note 1 

indicates that it is possible for operators 

to redesign if they have a failure 

provided they re-qualify the affected 

TSO article through a thorough control 

of the design and production process). 

This permits the seat to remain in 

service in compliance with the AD but 

does not negate the fact that the TSO 

authorization was obtained 

fraudulently. 

Acquisition or use of new seat 

cushions that comply with section 

25.853 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 25.853) is one way 

to replace affected seat cushions. Also, 

use of third-party PMA seat cushions 

that are obtained through test and 

computation is a way to do this. PMA 

holders with compliance data may wish 

to request approval for an alternative 

method of compliance with this AD. 

PMA seat cushions that are obtained 

through ‘‘identicality’’ might not comply 

with the AD as the Koito data to which 

the PMA is identical might have been 

falsified. This AD does not address 

third-party PMA parts, except as 

replacement parts, which are subject to 

the requirements specified in ‘‘Parts 

Installation—Components of Seats and 

Seating Systems’’ in paragraph (k) of this 

AD. We might consider further 

rulemaking to address PMA parts 

obtained through identicality. 

Request To Add Guidance on Dynamic 

Testing 

Boeing requested that we add a note 

for paragraphs (g)(1), (g)(2), and (g)(3) of 

the NPRM to provide guidance on 

dynamic testing, including details on 

maximum seat weight for family, 

ballast, surrogate parts in a non-load 

path, and the use of the highest loaded 

leg. 

We acknowledge that this sort of 

information needs to be addressed; 

however, it is appropriate for a test plan. 

There are current FAA guidelines that 

address these items that are found in 

FAA AC 25.562–1B. This level of detail 

is not necessary for this AD. The AD 

requires that operators determine 

compliance in accordance with a 

method approved by the FAA and each 

test plan may vary. We have not revised 

this AD in this regard. 

Request for Compliance With FAA 

Statement of Compliance With 

Airworthiness Standards Form 8100–9 

Aeroflot submitted an e-mail in which 

the operator requested Koito fill out an 

FAA Statement of Compliance with 

Airworthiness Standards Form 8100–9. 

Koito responded to Aeroflot that Koito 

was not able to issue the form and has 

never issued this form to date. Aeroflot 

stated it needed approval of repairs and 


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31818 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 106 / Thursday, June 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 

spare parts. We infer Aeroflot is 

requesting how to show compliance 

with the requirements of the AD for a 

specific repair for Model ARS–417 and 

ARS–418 seats. 

We disagree with providing specific 

repair information. U.S. operators must 

do the actions in this AD in accordance 

with a method approved by the FAA. 

Non-U.S. operators are not subject to 

this AD unless it is mandated by their 

respective airworthiness authorities. We 

have not revised this AD in this regard. 

Clarification of Terminology 

In paragraph (h) of the NPRM we 

specified that parts are not eligible for 

installation ‘‘by another airline or any 

other aviation entity.’’ We have removed 

the sentence containing that phrase in 

paragraphs (i) and (k) of this AD (which 

correspond with paragraph (h) of the 

NPRM). Instead, we have added the 

phrase ‘‘on airplanes operated by the 

same operator’’ to the sentences in 

paragraphs (i)(1) and (k)(1) of this AD. 

We also revised the description of the 

unsafe condition in the Summary of this 

AD to match the description of the 

unsafe condition in paragraph (e) of this 

AD. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

with the changes described previously. 

We also determined that these changes 

will not increase the economic burden 

on any operator or increase the scope of 

the AD. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD affects 

40,365 passenger seats installed on 

airplanes in the U.S. fleet. There are 278 

airplanes of U.S. registry. The average 

labor rate is $85 per work-hour. 

The estimated cost to determine if the 

affected seats and seating systems and 

their components are in compliance 

(i.e., estimate the cost of static, dynamic 

and flammability testing, labor) is 

approximately $100,000 for the U.S. 

fleet. The estimated cost of the 

consumed article such as the seat row 

and materials consumed for 

flammability testing is approximately 

$490,000 for the U.S. fleet. The 

estimated cost to remove affected seats 

and seating systems and their 

components is approximately $285,000 

for the U.S. fleet (this estimate assumes 

that the removal of all seats and seating 

systems in the fleet). The total estimated 

cost of this AD for the U.S. fleet is 

$875,000. 

Operators might need to replace only 

certain components. It is not feasible to 

include the cost of individual 

components in this AD because we have 

no way of determining which 

components might need replacement. 

Operators might need to replace the 

affected seat with a new seat. The 

following table provides the estimated 

costs for U.S. operators to replace the 

different types of seats. We have no way 

of determining how many seats might 

need to be replaced after testing is done 

to determine if the seats are in 

compliance. Certain operators might 

need to replace any type of seat that are 

generalized by description and 

estimated per-seat cost in the following 

table. 

TABLE—SEAT REPLACEMENT COST ESTIMATES

Seat style/class Aircraft style, foot rest, and recline mechanism Cost per passenger seat 

Economy .................... Narrow/Wide Body; Mechanical .................................................................................................. $2,300. 

First, Business ........... Narrow Body; Mechanical ........................................................................................................... $7,500. 

Business .................... Wide Body; Mechanical .............................................................................................................. $10,000. 

Business .................... Wide Body; Electrical .................................................................................................................. $25,000 to $35,000. 

First ............................ Wide Body; Lay flat single place, Electrical ............................................................................... $75,000 to $150,000. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in subtitle VII, 

part A, subpart III, section 44701: 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2011–12–01 Koito Industries, Ltd: 

Amendment 39–16708; Docket No. 

FAA–2010–0857; Directorate Identifier 

2010–NM–156–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This AD is effective August 1, 2011. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 


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Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to Koito Industries, 

Ltd., seats and seating systems having a 

model number identified in table 1 of this AD 

that are approved under technical standard 

order (TSO) TSO–C39b, TSO–C39c, or TSO– 

C127a, and installed on, but not limited to, 

airplanes of the manufacturers identified in 

table 2 of this AD, all type certificated 

models in any category. 

TABLE 1—SEAT MODELS

Model Nos. 

AFS–105, AFS–136, 

AFS–235, AFS–315, 

ARS–183, ARS–189, ARS–190, 

ARS–200, ARS–242, ARS–242–TA, ARS–254, ARS–255, ARS–263, ARS–276, ARS–277, ARS–281, ARS–289, 

ARS–29, ARS–29–03, 

ARS–304, ARS–308, ARS–311, ARS–311–A, ARS–311–B, ARS–336, ARS-339, ARS–341, ARS–347, ARS–352, ARS–354, ARS–357, ARS– 

360, ARS–384, ARS–385, ARS–392, ARS-397, ARS–398, 

ARS–415, ARS–417, ARS–418, ARS–419, ARS–423, ARS–424, ARS–425, ARS-427, ARS-431, ARS–437, ARS–446, ARS–447, ARS–448, 

ARS–451, ARS–452, ARS–465, ARS-478, ARS–480, ARS–482, ARS–483, ARS–493, ARS-494, 

ARS–507, ARS–510, ARS–511, ARS–514, ARS–516, ARS–518, ARS–527, ARS–542, ARS-543, ARS–550, ARS–552, ARS–553, ARS–554, 

ARS–571, ARS–574, ARS–577, ARS-588, ARS–589, ARS–591, ARS–592, ARS–593, ARS–594, ARS–595, ARS–596, ARS-597, ARS–598, 

ARS–599, 

ARS–600, ARS–601, ARS–604, ARS–605, ARS–607, ARS–610, ARS–611, ARS–613, ARS-615, ARS–616, ARS–617, ARS–620, ARS–626, 

ARS–627, ARS–629, ARS–636, ARS-641, ARS–642, ARS–643, ARS–644, ARS–646, ARS–647, ARS–649, ARS–651, ARS–652, ARS–657, 

ARS–658, ARS–659, ARS–667, ARS–668, ARS–669, ARS–670, ARS-671, ARS–672, ARS–673, ARS–674, ARS–694, ARS–697, 

ARS–704, ARS–707, ARS–709, ARS–710, 

ARS–813, ARS–814, ARS–815, ARS–823, ARS–831, ARS–832, ARS–833, ARS–835, ARS-836, ARS–837, ARS–838, ARS–840, ARS–841, 

ARS–843, ARS–844, ARS–846, ARS-847, ARS–849, ARS–851, ARS–852, ARS–853, ARS–857, ARS–858, ARS–859, ARS-861, ARS–862, 

ARS–869, 

ASS–197D, 

ASS–215, 

ASS–30, ASS–30–1, 

B–317, 

F11M11, 

F44A33, 

P11B31, P11B33, P11M93, 

P21B33, P21B35, P21B73, 

P22A23, 

P32B73, 

P52B41, 

P56B63, 

PB7–2001, 

T–316, 

Y11B31, Y11B33, Y11B73, Y15B73, 

Y21A23, Y21B73, 

Y27B73, 

YE1B35, 

YG7B35, 

YH1B73, 

YK2B73 

TABLE 2—AFFECTED AIRPLANES

Manufacturer Product subtype 

Airbus .............................................................................................................................................................................. Transport Airplane. 

The Boeing Company ..................................................................................................................................................... Transport Airplane. 

McDonnell Douglas Corporation ..................................................................................................................................... Transport Airplane. 

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. .................................................................................................................................... Transport Airplane. 

Fokker Services B.V ....................................................................................................................................................... Transport Airplane. 

Subject 

(d) Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 25: Equipment/Furnishings. 

Unsafe Condition 

(e) This AD results from a determination 

that the affected seats and seating systems 

may not meet certain flammability, static 

strength, and dynamic strength criteria. 

Failure to meet static and dynamic strength 

criteria could result in injuries to the 

flightcrew and passengers during emergency 

landing conditions. In the event of an inflight or post-emergency landing fire, failure 

to meet flammability criteria could result in 

an accelerated fire. The Federal Aviation 

Administration is issuing this AD to prevent 

accelerated fires and injuries to the 

flightcrew and passengers. 

Compliance 

(f) You are responsible for having the 

actions required by this AD performed within 

the compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

Determination of Compliance and Removal 

(g) At the applicable times specified in 

paragraphs (g)(1), (g)(2), (g)(3), and (g)(4) of 

this AD, determine if the seats and seating 

systems and their components are compliant 

with FAA regulations specified in paragraphs 

(g)(1), (g)(2), (g)(3), and (g)(4) of this AD, in 

accordance with a method approved by the 

Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification 

Office (ACO), FAA. For a method to be 

approved, the approval must specifically 

refer to this AD. Before re-installing any seat 

or seating system, modify the existing TSO 


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31820 Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 106 / Thursday, June 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 

tag by defacing the TSO number and letter of 

designation, e.g., overstrike the TSO 

identification with an ‘‘X’’ (such as ‘‘TSO– 

C127a’’ is defaced to look like 

) , and add a tag that specifies noncompliance to the TSO number and letter 

designation, this AD number, and removal 

date if applicable. 

Note 1: Determining if the seats and seating 

systems and their components are compliant 

may be done by independent re-qualification 

of the affected TSO article that has thorough 

control of the design and production process. 

Note 2: Components of seats and seating 

systems include any non-metallic exposed 

part, assembly, or item. A component can 

include a seat cushion, recline cable, hook 

and loop (hook and loop is a generic term for 

Velcro), and a leather cover that is glued to 

a seat, headrest, or arm cap. 

(1) For Koito Industries, Ltd., seats 

approved under TSO–C39b or TSO–C39c: 

Within 2 years after the effective date of this 

AD, determine if the seats are compliant with 

14 CFR 25.561(b)(3)(ii) and 14 CFR 

25.561(b)(3)(iii) at the level that the TSO was 

issued and determine if seats exhibit sharp or 

injurious surfaces. If any seats are not shown 

to be compliant with 14 CFR 25.561(b)(3)(ii) 

and 14 CFR 25.561(b)(3)(iii), or if any seats 

are shown to exhibit sharp or injurious 

surfaces in testing conducted to satisfy the 

original TSO authorization program or 

subsequent verification tests required by this 

paragraph, within 2 years after the effective 

date of this AD, remove the non-compliant 

seats. 

(2) For Koito Industries, Ltd., seating 

systems approved under TSO–C127a: Within 

2 years after the effective date of this AD, 

determine if the seating systems are 

compliant with either of the regulations 

specified in paragraphs (g)(2)(i) and (g)(2)(ii) 

of this AD and determine if seating systems 

exhibit sharp or injurious surfaces. If any 

seating systems are not shown to be 

compliant with either of the regulations 

specified in paragraphs (g)(2)(i) and (g)(2)(ii) 

of this AD, or if any seating systems are 

shown to exhibit sharp or injurious surfaces 

in testing conducted to satisfy the original 

TSO authorization program or subsequent 

verification tests required by this paragraph, 

within 2 years after the effective date of this 

AD, remove the non-compliant seating 

systems, except as provided by paragraph (h) 

of this AD. 

(i) 14 CFR 25.561(b)(3)(ii) and 14 CFR 

25.561(b)(3)(iii). 

(ii) 14 CFR 25.562(b)(2), and 14 CFR 

25.562(c)(7). 

(3) For Koito Industries, Ltd., seating 

systems approved under TSO–C127a that are 

shown to be compliant with 14 CFR 

25.561(b)(3)(ii) and 14 CFR 25.561(b)(3)(iii) 

and that are shown to not exhibit sharp or 

injurious surfaces during the actions required 

by paragraph (g)(2) or (h)(2) of this AD: 

Within 6 years after the effective date of this 

AD, determine if the seating systems are 

compliant with 14 CFR 25.562(b)(2), and 14 

CFR 25.562(c)(7) and determine if seating 

systems exhibit sharp or injurious surfaces. If 

any seating systems are not shown to be 

compliant with 14 CFR 25.562(b)(2), and 14 

CFR 25.562(c)(7), or if any seating systems 

are shown to exhibit sharp or injurious 

surfaces in testing conducted to satisfy the 

original TSO authorization program or 

subsequent verification tests required by this 

paragraph, within 6 years after the effective 

date of this AD, remove the non-compliant 

seating systems. 

(4) For components of Koito Industries, 

Ltd., seats approved under TSO–C39b or 

TSO–C39c and components of seating 

systems approved under TSO–C127a: Within 

3 years after the effective date of this AD, 

determine if the seat bottom cushion 

assembly and seat back cushion assembly are 

shown to be compliant with 14 CFR 

25.853(c). If any seat bottom or seat back 

cushion assembly is not shown to be 

compliant with 14 CFR 25.853(c), within 3 

years after the effective date of this AD, 

remove the non-compliant seat bottom and or 

seat back cushion assembly. If a seat cushion 

is replaced on airplanes required to meet 14 

CFR 25.562 requirements (either by their 

original certification basis or post-type 

certificate modifications), the replacement 

seat cushion must have consistent seat 

bottom stiffness and seat reference point 

locations using the guidance found in 

paragraph 9 of Appendix 3 of FAA Advisory 

Circular 25.562–1B, dated January 10, 2006 

(http://rgl.faa.gov/ 

Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/ 

rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/0/ 

808324bf7790fda3862571010075bcbf/$FILE/ 

AC25.562-1b.pdf); however, compliance with 

14 CFR 25.562(c)(2), i.e. lumbar load, does 

not need to be shown. 

(h) For seating systems that are shown to 

be compliant with the regulations specified 

in paragraph (g)(2)(ii) of this AD, but are 

shown to exhibit sharp or injurious surfaces 

during the tests required to show compliance 

with paragraph (g)(2)(ii) of this AD: Do the 

actions specified in paragraph (h)(1) or (h)(2) 

of this AD using a method approved in 

accordance with the procedures specified in 

paragraph (l) of this AD. 

(1) Within 2 years after the effective date 

of this AD: Remove the non-compliant 

seating systems. 

(2) Within 2 years after the effective date 

of this AD: Determine if the seating systems 

are compliant with the regulations specified 

in paragraph (g)(2)(i) of this AD, and 

determine if the seating systems exhibit 

sharp or injurious surfaces during the tests 

required to show compliance with paragraph 

(g)(2)(i) of this AD. If any seating systems are 

not shown to be compliant with the 

regulations specified in paragraph (g)(2)(i) of 

this AD, or if any seating systems are shown 

to exhibit sharp or injurious surfaces in 

testing conducted to satisfy the original TSO 

authorization program or subsequent 

verification tests required by this paragraph, 

within 2 years after the effective date of this 

AD, remove the non-compliant seating 

systems. 

Note 3: For airplanes not required to 

comply with any 14 CFR 25.562 

requirements in either original certification 

basis or post-type certificate modifications, 

the use of an FAA Part 21 Production 

Approval Holder to develop and conduct the 

test program (in accordance with their 

procedures, including the control and 

oversight of the test facility) will facilitate the 

FAA approval process. 

Note 4: For airplanes not required to 

comply with any 14 CFR 25.562 

requirements in either original certification 

basis or post-type certificate modifications, 

the use of a new-build test article is 

acceptable for static testing. 

Note 5: For airplanes not required to 

comply with any 14 CFR 25.562 

requirements in either original certification 

basis or post-type certificate modifications, 

conformity inspections of test articles 

consisting of a seat from the fleet (or from 

spares), should confirm aspects such as 

matching the seat part number to that noted 

in the test plan, noting the general condition 

of the seat, noting revisions/modifications 

that have been made to the seat (typically 

noted on modification placards), and 

verifying the date of manufacture. 

Note 6: For all airplanes, it is not required 

to test all in-service seat part numbers. The 

use of similarity is acceptable to show that 

the results obtained from a chosen test article 

are valid for other seat part numbers. Koito 

Interface Loads Reports/drawings may be 

used as a source of guidance for input data 

for the similarity analysis. The similarity 

methodology must be agreed on using the 

procedures specified in paragraph (l) of this 

AD. For airplanes required to comply with 

any 14 CFR 25.562 requirements in either 

original certification basis or post-type 

certificate modifications, the similarity 

methodology does not necessarily need to 

follow all guidelines as given in FAA AC 

25.562–1B (http://rgl.faa.gov/ 

Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/ 

rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/0/ 

808324bf7790fda3862571010075bcbf/$FILE/ 

AC25.562-1b.pdf). However, it must be 

agreed on using the procedures specified in 

paragraph (l) of this AD. 

Note 7: For airplanes required to comply 

with any 14 CFR 25.562 requirements in 

either original certification basis or post-type 

certificate modifications, the use of an FAA 

Part 21 Production Approval Holder to 

develop and conduct the test program (in 

accordance with their procedures, including 

the control and oversight of the test facility) 

will facilitate the FAA approval process. 

Note 8: For airplanes required to comply 

with any 14 CFR 25.562 requirements in 

either original certification basis or post-type 

certificate modifications, the use of a newbuild test article is acceptable for static 

testing. However, in order to account for 

unknown production non-conformities, test 

articles for dynamic testing must be seats 

removed from service or spare seats delivered 

at the same time as the aircraft, unless newly 

produced test articles are shown to conform 

with in-service seats. 

Note 9: For airplanes required to comply 

with any 14 CFR 25.562 requirements in 

either original certification basis or post-type 

certificate modifications, conformity checks 

of test articles consisting of a seat from the 

fleet (or from spares) should confirm aspects 

such as matching the seat part number to that 


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Federal Register / Vol. 76, No. 106 / Thursday, June 2, 2011 / Rules and Regulations 31821 

noted in the test plan, noting the general 

condition of the seat, noting revisions/ 

modifications that have been made to the seat 

(typically noted on modification placards), 

and verifying the date of manufacture. 

Note 10: Regarding 14 CFR 25.853(c), in 

order to account for unknown production 

non-conformities, test articles should be 

constructed from in-service cushions. The 

guidance in FAA AC 25.853–1 (http:// 

rgl.faa.gov/ 

Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/ 

rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/0/ 

7f0b93c640a3ae48862569d100732cfe/$FILE/ 

ATT9758X/AC25.853-1.pdf) is applicable. 

However, it may also be acceptable to test 

brand new test specimens, provided that it is 

shown that the in-service cushions consist of 

foams/covers which were supplied to Koito 

and marked by a different production 

organization approved in the FAA and/or 

EASA system. Test reports issued by any 

qualified design organization acceptable to 

the FAA will be acceptable; after May 23, 

2011, any tests performed in the Koito seat 

cushion oil burner test facility, under JCAB 

supervision, will be acceptable. An 

independent approval of the seat cushion, 

such as a TSO–C72 (individual floatation 

device) may be sufficient to show 

compliance. 

Parts Installation: Seats and Seating Systems 

(i) As of the effective date of this AD, no 

person may install on any airplane any Koito 

Industries, Ltd., seat and seating system 

having any model number identified in table 

1 of this AD that are approved under TSO– 

C39b, TSO–C39c, or TSO–C127a; unless it is 

shown to meet applicable airworthiness 

requirements, except as specified in 

paragraphs (i)(1), (i)(2), and (i)(3) of this AD. 

(1) Seats and seating systems may be 

removed from service and re-installed on 

airplanes operated by the same operator. 

(2) New seats and seating systems may be 

installed as direct spares for the same part 

number seats or seating systems. 

Note 11: A ‘‘direct’’ spare has the same part 

number of the part it replaces. 

(3) Seats and seating systems installed as 

direct spares are subject to the applicable 

requirements and compliance times specified 

in this AD. 

Parts Installation: Installation and Rearrangement 

(j) Installation of seats and seating systems 

other than those installed as direct spares, as 

specified in paragraph (i) of this AD, is 

considered a new installation that needs 

approval and must comply with all 

regulations, except that re-arrangement of the 

existing installed seats on an airplane is 

acceptable following the same installation 

instructions and limitations as the original 

certification (e.g., if the original limitations 

allowed 32′′ to 34′′ pitch, the new layout 

must be pitched within that range). 

Parts Installation: Components of Seats and 

Seating Systems 

(k) As of the effective date of this AD, no 

person may install on any airplane any 

component of any seat or seating system 

having any model number identified in table 

1 of this AD that is approved under TSO– 

C39b, TSO–C39c, or TSO–C127a, unless the 

component is shown to meet the applicable 

airworthiness requirements; except as 

specified in paragraphs (k)(1), (k)(2), and 

(k)(3) of this AD. 

(1) Components specified in paragraph 

(g)(4) of this AD may be removed from 

service and re-installed on airplanes operated 

by the same operator. 

(2) New components may be installed as 

direct spares for the same part number 

components. 

(3) Components specified in paragraph 

(g)(4) of this AD that are installed as direct 

spares are subject to the applicable 

requirements and compliance times specified 

in paragraph (g)(4) of this AD. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(l)(1) The Manager, Los Angeles ACO, 

FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs 

for this AD, if requested using the procedures 

found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 

14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your 

principal inspector or local Flight Standards 

District Office, as appropriate. If sending 

information directly to the manager of the 

ACO, send it to the attention of the person 

identified in the Related Information section 

of this AD. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/ 

certificate holding district office. 

Related Information 

(m) For more information about this AD, 

contact Patrick Farina, Aerospace Engineer, 

Cabin Safety Branch, ANM–150L, FAA, Los 

Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 

3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, 

California 90712–4137; phone: 562–627– 

5344; fax: 562–627–5210; e-mail: 

Patrick.Farina@faa.gov. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(n) None. 

Issued in Renton, Washington on May 23, 

2011. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2011–13340 Filed 6–1–11; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 71 

[Docket No. FAA–2010–1171; Airspace 

Docket No. 10–ASW–16] 

Amendment of Class D Airspace; 

Corpus Christi, TX 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule, technical 

amendment. 

SUMMARY: This action amends Class D 

airspace within the Corpus Christi, TX, 

area by updating the geographic 

coordinates for Cabaniss Navy Outlying 

Field (NOLF). This action does not 

change the boundaries or operating 

requirements of the airspace. 

DATES: Effective date: 0901 UTC, August 

25th, 2011. The Director of the Federal 

Register approves this incorporation by 

reference action under 1 CFR part 51, 

subject to the annual revision of FAA 

Order 7400.9 and publication of 

conforming amendments. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Scott Enander, Central Service Center, 

Operations Support Group, Federal 

Aviation Administration, Southwest 

Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort 

Worth, TX 76137; telephone (817) 321– 

7716. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

The Rule 

This action amends Title 14 Code of 

Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Part 71 by 

adjusting the geographic coordinates, 

within Class D airspace, of the Cabaniss 

NOLF, Corpus Christi, TX, to coincide 

with the FAAs aeronautical database. 

This is an administrative change and 

does not affect the boundaries, altitudes, 

or operating requirements of the 

airspace, therefore, notice and public 

procedures under 5 U.S.C. 553(b) are 

unnecessary. 

The FAA has determined that this 

regulation only involves an established 

body of technical regulations for which 

frequent and routine amendments are 

necessary to keep them operationally 

current. Therefore, this regulation: (1) Is 

not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’ 

under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not 

a ‘‘significant rule’’ under DOT 

Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 

FR 11034; February 26, 1979); and (3) 

does not warrant preparation of a 

regulatory evaluation as the anticipated 

impact is so minimal. Since this is a 

routine matter that will only affect air 

traffic procedures and air navigation, it 

is certified that this rule, when 

promulgated, will not have a significant 

economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities under the 

criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. 

The FAA’s authority to issue rules 

regarding aviation safety is found in 

Title 49 of the U.S. Code. Subtitle 1, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the agency’s 

authority. This rulemaking is 


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