IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

RONELLE WILLIAMS,

Appellant.

No. 84617-5-I

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

FELDMAN, J. — Williams appeals the trial court’s judgment and sentence for 

assault in the second degree, felony harassment, unlawful possession of a firearm 

in the first degree, assault in the fourth degree, and witness tampering. He claims 

that the judgment and sentence violates double jeopardy principles, the trial court 

should have given him credit for time served on prior convictions, and the trial court 

improperly ordered him to pay Victim Penalty Assessment (VPA) and community 

custody supervision fees. We remand to the trial court to strike the VPA and 

community custody supervision fees, but in all other respects we affirm.

I

The State charged Williams with second-degree assault, unlawful 

possession of a firearm, fourth-degree assault, and tampering with a witness 
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following a violent altercation with his girlfriend at the time, Sametra Beck. A jury 

found him guilty on all charges.1

In his first appeal from the judgment and sentence, Williams argued that his 

arrest was not supported by probable cause, he was deprived of a fair trial, he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel, and his offender score was 

miscalculated. State v. Williams, 15 Wn. App. 2d 1030 (2020) (unpublished). After 

this court affirmed in an unpublished opinion, the Supreme Court granted 

discretionary review and remanded the case solely for recalculation of Williams’

offender score and sentence in light of State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 481 P.3d

521 (2021), which struck down Washington’s statute prohibiting simple drug 

possession. State v. Williams, 197 Wn.2d 1007, 484 P.3d 1260 (2021). 

In accordance with the Supreme Court’s mandate, the trial court entered an 

order amending Williams’ sentence based on his recalculated offender score after 

excising the prior convictions subject to Blake. Williams again appeals. 

II

A. Double Jeopardy 

Williams asserts that the conviction for assault in the fourth degree must be 

vacated because it violates double jeopardy principles. In response, the State

contends that Williams is prohibited from raising the double jeopardy issue in this 

appeal because he could have raised it, but did not raise it, in his first appeal from 

 1 Because the facts of this case are known to the parties and set forth in detail in our prior 

opinion in this matter (State v. Williams, 15 Wn. App. 2d 1030 (2020) (unpublished), review granted 

in part, cause remanded, 197 Wn.2d 1007, 484 P.3d 1260 (2021)), we do not repeat them here 

except as relevant to the arguments below.
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the trial court’s judgment and sentence. The fatal flaw in the State’s argument is 

that the trial court addressed the merits of Williams’ double jeopardy argument on 

resentencing, ruling that “it is of a constitutional magnitude, and I need to address 

it.” Consequently, our review is governed by RAP 2.5(c)(1), which states:

Prior Trial Court Action. If a trial court decision is otherwise properly 

before the appellate court, the appellate court may at the instance of 

a party review and determine the propriety of a decision of the trial 

court even though a similar decision was not disputed in an earlier 

review of the same case.

Because the double jeopardy issue is of constitutional magnitude and the trial court 

squarely addressed it below, we exercise our discretion under RAP 2.5(c)(1) to 

review and determine the propriety of the trial court’s decision.

While we agree with Williams that he can properly raise his double jeopardy 

argument in this appeal, we reject his argument on the merits. As Williams notes, 

assault can be a course of conduct crime, and multiple assault convictions that 

constitute one course of conduct implicate double jeopardy concerns. State v. 

Villanueva-Gonzalez, 180 Wn.2d 975, 984-85, 329 P.3d 78 (2014). But the record 

here does not indicate that his assaultive acts were part of a single course of 

conduct. To determine whether the acts constitute a single course of conduct, we

examine five factors: (1) the length of time over which the acts took place, 

(2) whether the acts took place in the same location, (3) the defendant’s intent or 

motivation for the different acts, (4) whether the acts were interrupted or there was

an intervening act or event, and (5) whether there was an opportunity for the 

defendant to reconsider their actions. Id. at 985. These factors are not individually

dispositive, and “the ultimate determination should depend on the totality of the 
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circumstances, not a mechanical balancing of the various factors.” Id. We review 

the trial court’s double jeopardy ruling de novo. Id. at 979-80.

Applying these factors, the trial court correctly concluded that Williams’

fourth-degree assault conviction does not violate double jeopardy. As to factors 

(1) and (2), both assaultive acts took place in the same location, and the trial court 

estimated that both events occurred within a period of “around fifteen minutes of 

time thereabouts.” Regarding factor (3), there were two separate assaultive acts, 

and the trial court reasonably found that Williams’ intent was different for each. 

The fourth-degree assault was directed solely at Beck: Williams punched her

several times in the face in rage, and the trial court found his intent in doing so was 

to assert domination and control over her. The second-degree assault, in contrast,

was directed at both Beck and her unborn child: Williams pointed a loaded firearm 

at Beck’s abdomen while threatening to kill her unborn child when she was eight 

months pregnant, and the trial court found his intent in doing so was “a different 

type of power and control by . . . lashing out at the child as well as Ms. Beck.” As 

to factors (4) and (5), which are especially significant here, Williams left Beck’s 

apartment between the two assaultive acts. During that time, Williams confronted 

Beck’s ex-partner and armed himself with a firearm before returning to threaten 

Beck and her unborn child. Thus, there was at least one intervening event and 

sufficient opportunity for Williams to reconsider his actions. On this record, the trial 

court did not err in rejecting Williams’ argument that the assaultive acts were part 

of a single course of conduct. 

It is equally clear, considering the totality of the circumstances and the 
No. 84617-5-I

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Villanueva-Gonzalez factors, that Williams’ reliance on In re Pers. Restraint of 

White, 1 Wn. App. 2d 788, 407 P.3d 1173 (2017), is misplaced. The defendant in

White was convicted of two separate counts of second-degree assault for pointing 

a gun at his girlfriend (Raina Stevens) and strangling her. Id. at 794. The court 

found a double jeopardy violation in White because (1) “White’s intent and 

motivation did not change” throughout the altercation with Stevens; (2) there was 

“one continuous struggle from the time White pointed a gun at Stevens to throwing 

her on the floor and beating her to the time he began to strangle her”; and (3) “the 

State points to no interruption or moment of calm that provided an opportunity to 

reconsider.” Id. at 795-96. Because the facts and circumstances here are 

markedly different, as the above discussion shows, White is inapposite.

2 

B. Credit for time served

Williams next argues that he “is entitled to credit for time served for 

unconstitutional convictions.” According to Williams, he “previously served 32 

months’ incarceration for multiple convictions” under the statute prohibiting simple 

drug possession that was declared unconstitutional in Blake and the trial court 

should have given him credit for the time he served on those unrelated convictions 

against the subsequent convictions at issue in this appeal. We disagree.

Preliminarily, Williams does not dispute the State’s argument that the 

Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) does not authorize the relief he is seeking here. 

 2 Williams’ reliance on State v. Robinson, No. 36504-2-III, (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2019) 

(unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/365042_unp.pdf, is misplaced for similar 

reasons. Like White and unlike this case, Robinson involved an “uninterrupted” series of assaultive 

acts. Id. at 6.
No. 84617-5-I

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Williams would be hard-pressed to argue otherwise, having conceded below that 

the SRA “does not provide for crediting time to one sentence for time served on 

another sentence.” But even ignoring this concession, RCW 9.94A.505(6) 

authoritatively addresses this issue and requires trial courts to “give the offender 

credit for all confinement time served before the sentencing if that confinement 

was solely in regard to the offense for which the offender is being sentenced." 

(Emphasis added). The prior drug convictions here do not satisfy this requirement:

they are not “solely in regard to the offense for which [Williams] is being 

sentenced,” and are instead wholly unrelated to the convictions at issue in this 

appeal. Thus, the relief Williams seeks cannot properly be granted under the SRA.

Williams seeks to circumvent the plain language of the SRA by relying 

instead on principles of equity, fairness, and due process as described and applied 

by our Supreme Court in In re Pers. Restraint of Roach, 150 Wn.2d 29, 74 P.3d 

134 (2003). The Court in Roach adopted “the doctrine of credit for time at liberty”

and held, as a matter of fairness and equity, “that a convicted person is entitled to 

credit against his sentence for time spent erroneously at liberty due to the State’s 

negligence, provided that the convicted person has not contributed to his release, 

has not absconded legal obligations while at liberty, and has had no further criminal 

convictions.” Id. at 34-37. 

Williams’ reliance on Roach is misplaced, as this case does not raise any 

of the fairness and equity issues that animated the court’s holding in Roach. 

Perhaps most important, unlike the circumstances in Roach, the government here 

did not lead Williams to believe that he had completed his sentence or parole and 
No. 84617-5-I

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was completely at liberty—which is the sine qua non of the doctrine of credit for 

time at liberty as described and applied in Roach. 150 Wn.2d at 35-36 (quoting 

Green v. Christiansen, 732 F.2d 1397, 1399 (9th Cir.1984)). Additionally, unlike 

the relief sought in Roach, the relief that Williams seeks contradicts the controlling 

statute. For these reasons, we decline to apply (or extend) the doctrine of credit 

for time at liberty to the facts at issue here.

C. Legal Financial Obligations

Lastly, Williams argues that remand to the trial court is necessary to strike 

the $500 VPA and community custody supervision fees from his judgment and 

sentence. Williams contends that recent amendments to RCW 7.68.035 provide 

that the VPA shall not be imposed against a defendant who is indigent at the time 

of sentencing. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449, § 1. The State does not dispute that 

Williams is indigent and does not object to a remand for purposes of striking the 

VPA from his judgment and sentence. The State similarly concedes that, pursuant 

to the amended RCW 9.94A.703 and State v. Wemhoff, 24 Wn. App. 2d 198, 519 

P.3d 297 (2022), the trial court should have struck the community custody 

supervision fees from Williams’ judgment and sentence. We accept the State’s 

concessions and, accordingly, remand to the trial court to strike the VPA and 

community custody supervision fees.3

 3 While the State claims that Williams relies on inapposite authority, the court squarely held 

in State v. Ellis, 27 Wn. App. 2d 1, 16-17, 530 P.3d 1048 (2023), that the recent amendments to 

RCW 7.68.035 and RCW 9.94A.703 apply to cases, like this one, that are on direct appeal.
No. 84617-5-I

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III

We remand to the trial court to strike the VPA and community custody 

supervision fees. In all other respects, we affirm.

WE CONCUR: