Colonel Charles A. Endress, MAR 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900 
CONTENTS 

Preface ...................................................... v 

Bibliographies ................................................ 1 

General ..................................................... I 

Pre-World War I ............................................. 3 

World War I Era ............................................ 4 

World War II and Aftermath ................................ 5 

Korean War ................................................. 6 

The Berlin Crisis and the 1960s ............................. ‘7 

The Vietnam War Era ...................................... -9 

The Post-Vietnam War Era ................................. 10 

a.. 

111 
PREFACE 

This bibliography provides those with access to the Combined Arms Research Library a starting point in the search for 

information relating to the mobilization and integration of reserve forces during national emergencies in the twentieth century. 

Reserve components played a significant, and in some cases 

paramount, role in the national defense during this period. 

Nonetheless, the process of reserve mobilization that formed the 

massive military establishments of World Wars I and II are 

little understood today by those responsible for utilizing reservists in future emergencies requiring the total force. 

With few exceptions, the historical examples cited in this 

bibliography concern the Army National Guard and the U.S. 

Army Reserve. Titles relating to the role of the reserves in the 

scheme of national defense, however, relate to all the services. 

Most of the items included in this bibliography relate only to 

premobilization structures and plans, call-ups, and the integration of soldiers into standing forces. Combat actions of 

reserve units are included only as parts of general works. 

An examination of the sources in this bibliography will reveal recurring themes in the attitudes and relationships between 

civilian authorities, the Regular Army, the Army National 

Guard, and the Army Reserve. One striking constant that runs 

throughout these accounts is that the lessons of mobilization 

have not always been learned. Failures that have surfaced include the inadequate provisioning and training of reserves in 

noncrisis periods, the violation of unit integrity during mobilization, and the mobilization of reserves without the concomitant 

mobilization of national will. The latter condition has often 

embittered citizen soldiers, created political antagonism, and 

confused the nation. 

Attempts to reform the system on the basis of military efficiency have often run headlong into the realities of a pluralistic 

society and a democratic system for which the reserve establishment is more than simply a military asset. Today, the total 

force concept that seems finally to have placed the reserve forces 

in a meaningful context within the defense structure has yet to 

be fully tested. Many of the bibliographic entries in this text 

relate to sensitive current issues including single-parent reservists, the deployment of female reservists into hostile environments, and the political and social implications of the total force 

V 
structure for mobilization. These and other issues are extensively 

covered in the post-Vietnam section. 

This bibliography adheres to the following specifications: 

1. All entries are located in the Combined Arms Research 

Library and are accompanied by a library call number or a 

Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) number. 

2. Each entry is annotated with the exception of a few 

classified items for which only an unclassified title is provided. 

3. Only substantial studies are included. Trivial references 

that would provide superficial information are excluded. 

4. Emphasis is on the mobilization of Reserve Components 

in the twentieth century and planning for the total force. 

5. The entries are grouped in chronological sections. 

vi 
Bibliographies 

The Army Library [Pentagon Library]. Mobilization: Preparedness, Manpower, Industrial; a Selective Bibliography. 

Washington, DC, July 1980. Supplement, April 1982. CARL 

second floor vertical files. 

A useful general bibliography. 

National Defense University Library. Mobilization. Washington, 

DC, August 1983. CARL second floor vertical files. 

A good, up-to-date, all-service bibliography covering both 

manpower and industrial aspects. 

General 

Crossland, Richard B., and James T. Currie. Troiee the C%izen: 

A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908-1983. 

Washington, DC: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984. 

CARL 355,370 C951t. 

This new general history of the Army Reserve contains valuable sections on the mobilization for the Korean War and the 

Berlin crisis and also the lack of a general mobilization for the 

Vietnam War. The study contains specific references to units 

called up in Vietnam and a section on total force implications. 

The book also has a helpful general bibliography and statistics 

relating to reserve status in the appendixes. 

Galloway, Eilene. History of United States Military Policy of 

Reserve Forces, 1775-1957. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957. CARL 355.37 U51h. 

A 56-page overview of the Reserve Components, this study, 

prepared for members of the Committee on Armed Services sf 

the HOUW of Representatives, contains a good, short, but dated, 

review of the history of reserves, focusing on the development 

of public laws dealing with reserve officers. 

Heymont, Irving. Analysis of the Army Reserve Systems of 

Israel, Canada, United ‘Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands. McLean, VA: General Research 

Corporation, 1977. DTIC ADA 052654. 

This study provides an overview of each reserve system mentioned in the title and identifies characteristics of each system 

that might benefit the U.S. Army Reserve posture if adopted 

and those that should be avoided. 

1 
2 

Heymont, Irving, and E. W. McGregor. Review/ and Analysis of 

Recent Mobilizations and Deployments of U.S. Army Reserve 

Components. McLean, VA: Research Analysis Corporation, 

1972. For official use only. DTIC AD 904077L. 

Irving and McGregor compare and contrast the World War 

II, Korean War, Berlin crisis (1961), and Vietnam War (1968) 

Reserve Component mobilizations to determine what features 

should be considered in future mobilizations. The historical study 

identifies recurring deficiencies relating to national manpower 

and recruitment policies and inadequate reserve training, equipment, facilities, and organization. 

Hill, Jim Dan. The Minute Man in Peace and War: A History 

of the National Guard. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Co., 1964. 

CARL 355.351 H4646m. 

Hill’s work is a solid overview of the history of the National 

Guard from its colonial origins through the early 1960s. His 

tone is often defensive in response to what he considers slights 

and condescension from the Regular Army toward the Army 

National Guard. 

Kreidberg, Marvin A., and Merton G. Henry. History of Military 

Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945. DA 

Pam 20-212. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 

Office, 1955. CARL 355.2 K92h. 

The most comprehensive study of American mobilization, this 

single volume contains detailed explanations of peacetime and 

wartime Army structures as well as describing the process of 

mobilization in all U.S. wars through World War II. The narrative is supported by extensive statistics and diagrams. 

Lacy, James L. “The Case for Conscription.” In Military Service 

in the United States, edited by Brent Scowcroft. Englewood 

Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1982. CARL 355.2236 M644. 

This analysis focuses on the failure of the all-volunteer force 

to maintain the quantity and quality of forces needed and 

tangentially on the Reserve Component forces’ same incapability. 

Lacy doubts that the political will exists to call up reserves as 

needed-particularly without a draft-and cites the Korean War 

as an example of this infirmity of will. 

Mahon, John K. History of the Militia and the National Guard. 

New York: Macmillan, 1983. CARL 355.370973 M216h. 

As the title suggests, this is a general history of the militia 

and Army National Guard, but it does not provide a detailed 
3 

analysis of mobilization problems. It does contain a good 

bibliography that includes a section listing other bibliographies. 

Woods, Clyde W. “The Role of the Army National Guard in the 

Cold War Era.” Master’s thesis, U.S. Army War College, 

Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1966. DTIC ADE 750505. 

Woods examines the structure and mission of the Army 

National Guard from 1945 to 1966. As part of his thesis, he 

argues for the greatly enhanced status of reserve readiness by 

the incorporation of all reserve units under Army National 

Guard control and for increased funding for equipment and 

training. 

Pre-World War I 

Burdett, Thomas F. “Mobilizations of 1911 and 1913: Their Role 

in the Development of the Modern Army.” Military Reuiew 

54 (July 1974):65-74, 

Burdett provides a short historical overview of the period of 

transition between the Spanish-American War and World War 

I. The mobilizations of 1911 and 1913 call attention to the 

organizational, manpower, and equipment problems of the old 

Army and set the stage for military organization in World War I. 

Carey, Spencer C. ‘“Mobilization of the United States Army for 

the Spanish-American War.” Student paper, U.S. Army 

Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 

1975, CARL N-8224.1227. 

Mobilization, as well as other Regular Army, National Guard, 

and volunteer Army problems, are described in this paper. 

US. National Guard Bureau. Report on Mobilization and the 

Organized Militia and National Guard of the United States, 

1916. Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Office, 

1916. CARL 355.351 U5764r. 

This after-action report deals with the mobilization of the 

Organized Militia and National Guard for the Mexican border 

emergency. It is a short but detailed study that candidly 

examines the legal and technical problems of mobilizing an 

essentially civilian force for real military action. The study 

reveals that many of the problems concerning reluctance to 

serve that are often associated with the Vietnam era are not in 

fact new. 
4 

World War I Era 

Bullard, Arthur. Mobilizing America. New York: Macmillan Co., 

1917. CARL 940.373 B935m. 

Bullard’s interesting and insightful essay addresses pm-world 

War I America and deals with broad issues rather than technical problems. He makes interesting points concerning propaganda, censorship, and the industrial labor aspects of modern 

war. This is a thoughtful prewar book that avoids the nationalistic and romantic emotionalism that typifies this genre. 

Longino, James C., et al. “A Study of World War Procurement 

and Industrial Mobilization.” Washington, DC: Army Industrial College, 1939. Mimeographed. CARL 940.373 L8553, 

The stated purpose of this article is to “review the World 

War [I] experiences of the United States in the procurement of 

munitions and in industrial mobilization.” The authors present 

a historical overview of the structure and operation of the War 

Department bureaucracy and a detailed examination of procurement during the war. The study is good in its examination of 

each component of the mobilization machinery. However, it contains little on manpower mobilization. 

U.S. War Department. General Policies and Regulations for the 

Organized Reserves, 1921. Washington, DC: U.S. Government 

Printing Office, 1921. CARL 335.37 U586. 

The complete regulations for the Army Reserve forces are 

found in this document. 

White, Lonnie J. “Forming the 36th Division in World War I.” 

Military History of Texas and the Southwest 17 (1982):1-53. 

This is the first of four numbers devoted to the service of 

the 36th Division (Texas and Oklahoma National Guards) in 

WorId War I. The numbers are listed and annotated here in the 

chronological order in which they were published. 

“‘Training the 36th Division in World War I.” Military 

His&y of Texas and the Southwest 17 (1982):55-122. 

The second of four numbers devoted to the service of the 

36th Division (Texas and Oklahoma National Guards) in World 

War I, this article stresses the lack of equipment and camp 

facilities that was typical of mobilization in both World Wars I 

and II. The article also discusses the wartime replacement of 

National Guard officers by regular officers in key command 
5 

positions and the removal of a naturalized German officer 

thought unsuitable for service in France. 

“The Combat History of the 36th Division in World 

War ‘I.” iMiLitary History of Texas and the Southwest 17 

(1982):123-79. 

The third of four numbers on the 36th Division, this article 

highlights the division’s combat experience in October 1918 at 

St. Etienne and along the Aisne. 

“The Homecoming of the 36th Division in World War 

I.” kiEitary History of Texas and the Southwest 18 

(1983):181-228. 

The last of four numbers on the service of the 36th Division 

in World War I, this article contains some interesting personal 

information on participants in the war but has little information 

of real value on demobilization as a process. 

World War IL and Aftermath 

Brown, John S. “Winning Teams: Mobilization-Related Correlates 

of Success in American World War II Infantry Divisions.” 

MMAS thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff 

College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1985. DTIC ADA 164741. 

An examination of World War II divisional experiences, this 

study concludes that personnel turbulence and training unrelated 

to first-battle experiences were the major causes of failure among 

unsuccessful divisions. 

Crowell, Harold G. “Wind Down to Wind Up, 1945-1950.” 

Special report, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 

PA, 1972. DTIC AD 764435. 

Crowell chronicles post-World War II demobilization and the 

unreadiness of the Army to face the initial Korean threat in 

1950. ft carries the message: “To maintain peace, prepare for 

War.” 

Johnston, Edward S. Building an Army: MobiCization of Manpower in the Army of the United States. Harrisburg, PA: 

Military Service Publishing Co., 1941. CARL 355.22 J72b. 

Written in rough prose, this World War II era document 

explains the process of mobilization to laymen. While covering 

the field, it provides little detailed or technical information. 
6 

Nanney, James S., and Terrence J. Gough. U.S. Manpower 

Mobilization for World War II. Washington, DC: Histories 

Division, US. Army Center of Mihtary History, 1982. CARL 

355.220973 N183u. 

A general overview of the mobilization effort in World War 

II, this book also provides a detailed examination of specific 

mobilization problems, demonstrating the complexities arising 

from competing armed forces and economic, political, and individual interests. 

Palmer, John McAuley. “General Marshall Wants a Citizen 

Army.” Saturday Euening Post, 23 December 1944. CARL 

Ml03 G. 

,Brigadier General Palmer presents Marshall’s case for a 

reserve system that can be used as a mobilization base in the 

future, He places the argument in the context of the failure to 

adopt workable plans (including George Washington’s) in the 

past. 

U.S. Department of Defense. Committee on Civilian Components 

[Gray Board]. Reserve Forces for National Security. 

Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1948. 

CARL 344.37 U565r. 

This committee, chaired by Assistant Secretary of the Army 

Gordon Gray, was constituted to determine the appropriate 

mission, size, and configuration of the Reserve Components. It 

recommends consolidation of the Army Reserve and National 

Guard and their management through the Department of 

Defense staff. The report stresses the total force concept. 

U.S. Department of the Army. Office of the Chief of Army Field 

Forces. “Lessons Learned During the Mobilization Phase of 

World War II.” Fort Monroe, VA, 1954. Mimeographed. 

CARL N-13423.227. 

This short but interesting summary of complaints most often 

voiced by military inductees indicates that many serious problems could be corrected with a little thought and virtually no 

cost. 

Korean War 

Giusti, Ernest H. Mobitization of the Marine Corps Reserve in 

the Korean Conflict, 1950-1951. Washington, DC: Historical 

Branch, G-3 Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1951. CARL 

951.9042 G538m. 
7 

Giusti’s account stresses the key role played by the Marine 

Corps Reserve in the early days of the Korean War, particularly 

in the Inchon landing, and contains many charts and graphs 

to back up its contentions. Although it deals with some standard 

mobilization problems such as individual delay requests and 

demobilization planning, it tends to play down the disorganization and lack of preparedness on the part of planners and 

reservists. 

Kendall, John Michael. “An Inflexible Response: United States 

Army Manpower Mobilization Policies, 1945-1957.” Ph.D. 

dissertation, Duke University, 1982. CARL 355.2236 K33i. 

Kendall has written a detailed and well-thought-out study 

of mobilization problems that focuses on the Korean War. 

Kendall indicates that the process of call-up in the war was 

poorly planned and executed and was saved only by a large 

pool of World War II veterans who functioned adequately despite 

the system. The dissertation contains an excellent bibliography 

on the period. 

U.S. Army. 44th Infantry Division. “G-l After Action Report, 

Call to Active Duty, 12 September 1951.” N.p., n.d. Type 

script. CARL N-18945.1. 

This rather roughly accomplished report contains some interesting insights into the call-up of the Illinois Army National 

Guard during the Korean War. The report deals with such issues 

as racial tension, VD problems, and the use of the division for 

levies. 

Walker, Robert A., ed. America’s Manpower Crisis: The Report 

of the Institute of Manpower Utilization and Government 

Personnel, Stanford University, August 22, 23, and 24, 1951. 

Chicago: Publication Administration Services, 1952. CARL 

331.11 159a. 

Without particular reference to armed forces mobilization 

requirements, this study group treats the overall issue of U.S. 

manpower in all areas of society. 

The Berlin Crisis and the 1960s 

Coakley, Robert W., et al. “U.S. Army Expansion, 1961-1962.” 

Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 

1963. CARL N-16436.99. 

Limited to 143 copies, this now declassified monograph deals 

with the Army buildup during the 1961 Berlin crisis and 
8 

examines the call-up of Army Reserve and Army National Guard 

units within the context of the whole crisis. The Berlin crisis 

situation clearly demonstrates the problems of partial mobilization when it is unaccompanied by the mobilization of the 

national will. 

Eliot, George Fielding. Reserve Forces and the Kennedy Strategy, 

Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Press, 1962. CARL 355.37 E4Zr. 

Written after the 1961 Berlin crisis, Eliot’s study argues for 

increased readiness of the Army National Guard and Army 

Reserve, particularly in light of the growing threat in Southeast 

Asia. Eliot makes the point that the Berlin crisis was resolved 

successfully because of the U.S. decision to call up ground force 

reserves, which bad a psychological impact on the Russians. 

Freeman Board. Report of the USCONARC Board for Review 

of Mobilization Procedures. Fort Monroe, VA: United States 

Continental Army Command, 1962. CARL N-13084.6-A. 

This is the report of the board constituted to study the limited 

mobilization of Reserve Component units and individuals in 

1961. The board was to identify problems and to recommend 

corrective action. The fundamental conclusion is that the 

mobilization was generally well done. 

Levantrosser, William F. Congress and the Citizen Soldier: 

Legislative Policy-making for the Federal Armed Forces 

Reserve. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1967. 

CARL 355.37 L655c. 

Levantrosser provides a detailed study of Congressional oversight and policy issues regarding the Reserve Components from 

the end of World War II to the middle of the 1960s. He deals 

most speeifitially with the legal status of the reserves and little 

with aspects of mobilization. 

Stukey, John D., and Joseph H. Pistorius. MobiEization of the 

Army National Guard and Army Reserve: A HistoricaE 

Perspective and the Vietnam War. Carlisle Barracks, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1984. 

DTIC ADB 086430. 

Presented in this work is a short overview of the role of 

Reserve Components during mobilization after the Berlin crisis. 

Also examined is the nonmobilization of the Vietnam era. The 

authors point out that throughout our history, it has always 

been assumed that Reserve Components would form the bulk of 

our armed forces during conflicts but that the planning and 
9 

execution of Reserve Component mobilization has always been 

poorly done. The authors deplore the failure of the Johnson 

administration to gain the political, psychological, and military 

advantages mobilization would have brought. They feel the 

small mobilization was a disgrace. 

U.S. Army. 49th Armored Division. “49th Armored Division 

Mobilization Report, 1961-62.” Fort Polk, LA, 1962? CARL 

N-18935.1. 

This fairly sanitized after-action report of the 49th Armored 

Division (Texas National Guard) during the Berlin crisis should 

be compared with draft reports (N-18935.1-B) from subordinate 

units. 

. 32d Infantry Division. “After Action Report: Mobilization.” Fort Lewis, WA, 1963. CARL N-18933.3. Mimeographed. 

A standard after-action report of a National Guard division 

(Wisconsin} called to active duty during the Berlin crisis, this 

report reviews the activities and problems of activating a 

National Guard division. 

27th Armored Division. “Exercise PRE-PLAN.“’ N.p., 

1962: Mimeographed. CARL N- 18934.1. 

This document is useful only as a type exercise plan for an 

Army National Guard unit in the 1960s. 

US. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Armed 

Services. &I%itary Reserve Posture Hearings. Washington, 

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962. CARL 335.37 

U541m. 

This l,lOO-page report documents the extensive examination 

of the Reserve Components made in the spring of 1962 in the 

aftermath of the Berlin crisis call-up. The official positions of 

all interested government agencies and private-interest groups 

are documented. AR the traditional issues of Reserve Component 

mobilization are examined in detail. Although not always easy 

to use, this document contains an enormous amount of information, including the valuable appendixes. 

The Vietnam War Era 

Currie, James T. “The Army Reserve and Vietnam.” Parameters 

14 (Autumn 1984):75--83. 

Currie argues that President Johnson’s decision not to call 

up the reserves in 1965 was a political one made to conceal 
10 

escalation. The limited reserve call-up in 1968 exposed a lack of 

training and equipment in most reserve units that was compensated for in Vietnam by individual maturity and esprit de corps. 

Scott, Joseph W. “ROTC Retreat.” In The American Military, 

edited by Martin Oppenheimer. N-p.: Transaction, 1971. 

CARL 355.0213 062a. 

Scott examines the importance of the ROTC as a source of 

junior officers and ‘its transformation in the face of academic 

hostility. 

U.S. Army Pacific. The 29th Infantry Brigade [Separate], 1 

January 1968 Through 30 June 1970. Honolulu, HI(?): 

Military History Office, ODCSOPS, USARPAC, 1971. CARL 

N-16082.117. 

Detailed in this report is the mobilization of the 29th Infantry 

Brigade [Separate]-the Hawaii Army National Guard-during 

the Vietnam War. Since no general mobilization of Reserve 

Components took place during the war, the history of those 

units called up is of great importance. Points of interest with 

broad implications include the impact on morale caused by 

partial mobilization and the threat to unit integrity that resulted 

from using units for individual levies. 

U.S. Department of the Army. After Action Report, Mobilization 

of Reserve Forces 1968. Washington, DC, n.d. CARL 

N-17665.1. 

A declassified study, this report describes the 1968 reserve 

call-up of 76 units and 20,000 men. Chapter 4 deals with lessons 

learned, and chapter 5 compares and contrasts 1961 with 1968, 

pinpointing mistakes made in 1961 that were repeated in 1968. 

The Post-Vietnam War Era 

Anderson, Thurman E., Arthur C. Dister, and Arthur D. Wells. 

“Mobilization: Can the Nation Afford a National Emergency.” Research report, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle 

Barracks, PA, 1973. DTIC AD 525626L. 

This study addresses the issue of personnel costs in the event 

of a large mobilization. It posits a limited war of 48 months’ 

duration, beginning in 1973, and develops a methodology to 

examine costs arising from such a hypothetical mobilization. 

Binkin, Martin. U.S. Reserve Forces: The Problem of the 

Weekend Warrior. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 

1974. CARL 355.370973 B613u. 
11 

Binkin argues that the Reserve Components are too large, 

inefficiently organized, poorly integrated into plans for mobilization, and overcompensated. He provides fairly detailed recommendations for a more streamlined, cost-effective force. 

Bowman, Joseph M. “A Total Force Model for Training the 

Army’s Reserve Components.” MMAS thesis, US. Army 

Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 

1980. DTIC ADA 091582. 

Bowman argues that the present organization and management of the Army is not effective in light of its mobilization 

policy and mission, He calls for full integration of reserves in 

total Army plans through continuous and staggered involuntary 

call-ups of reservists and units. 

Brayton, Abbott A. “American Mobilization Policies for the 

1980’s.” Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for 

Defence Studies 126 (March 1981):26-33. 

A concise and precise examination of the integration of the 

Army Reserve and National Guard forces into the Regular Army 

since 1974, Brayton’s article includes general definitions, describes the process of integration, and provides a valuable short 

overview. 

Canby, Steven L. “European Mobilization: U.S. and NATO 

Reserves.” Armed Forces and Society 4 (Winter 1978):227-44. 

Canby argues that a large, organized reserve force is indispensable for an effective defense in Europe. The problem of 

western European defense does not lie in greater expenditures 

but is rather an organizational and conceptual problem. Canby 

places the role of reserves in the framework of an organization 

and tactics that thwart Soviet blitzkrieg plans. 

Coffey, Kenneth J. “Defending Europe Against a Conventional 

Attack: The Increasing Gap Between the Army’s Capabilities 

and NATO Commitments.“’ In Changing U.S. Military 

Manpower Realities, edited by Franklin D. Margiotta, et al. 

Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983. CARL 355.220973 C456. 

Coffey argues that a NATO versus Warsaw Pact war in 

Central Europe is likely to last less than sixty days and that 

Reserve Component assets could neither be mobilized nor delivered in that time. In that context, the total force concept has 

decreased the Army’s ability to fight a short-warning, highintensity war in Europe or deter it through negotiations during 

the crisis. Given the current era of the volunteer Army and 
12 

steady funding levels, Coffey suggests planning for a short war 

with fully equipped and manned on-site combat power. 

Fialka, John J. ‘“The Pentagon’s Exercise ‘Proud Spirit’: Little 

Cause for Pride.‘” Parameters 11 (March 1981):38-41. 

Exercise Proud Spirit, a national command post exercise (CPX), 

demonstrated our inability to make timely midcrisis decisions, 

to a great extent because of computer breakdown. A second 

cause of the exercise’s deficiencies was the lack of basic supplies, 

including food, fuel, and ammunition. The deficiencies reflected 

the same problems identified in CPX Nifty Nugget. 

Foster, Gregory D., and Karen A. McPherson. “‘Mobilization for 

Low Intensity Conflict.” Naval War College Review 38 

(May-June 1985):49-64. 

Foster and McPherson propose that Iimited mobilization can 

be an effective means to mobilize popular support, realistically 

test systems, show national resolve, and prepare for future crises. 

Foster, R. B., and F. B. Hoeber. “Limited Mobilization: A 

Strategy for Preparedness and Deterrence in the Eighties.” 

Orbis 24 (Fall 1980):435-57. 

Foster and Hoeber argue for the Reagan defense buildup, 

which they characterize as a mobilization of both will and 

resources to match the Soviet buildup of the 1970s. The article 

does not deal with the concept of short-term mobilization in the 

conventional sense. 

Gessert, Robert A., et al. Evaluation of Reserve Component 

Improvement Concepts. 3 ~01s. McLean, VA: General 

Research Corporation, 1975. CARL N-19117.56 A,B,C. 

This three-volume contract study consists of an executive 

summary, main report, and appendixes. It is a detailed study 

of a number of concept tests designed to discover the best 

possible methods to employ Reserve Components to increase the 

Army’s capability to meet NATO’s mobilization deployment 

goals. 

Gould, James T. “The Guard and Reserve: Towards a Fuller 

Realization of the Total Force Potential.” In Mobilization 

and the National Defense, edited by Hardy L. Merritt and 

Luther F. Carter. Washington, DC: National Defense 

University Press, 1985. CARL 355.28 M687. 

Gould focuses on the development of the total force concept 

after 1973. This chapter is a general overview of the role the 

reserves play and their limitations. 

_--- 
13 

Hefner, Hal L,, Charles D. Brown, and Car&e L. Jarvis. ‘“Women 

in the Reserve: What Are the Real Limits.” Research project, 

U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1975. DTIC 

ADA 030434. 

Using a random mail survey of enlisted women and field 

studies of selected reserve units, this study examines the impact 

of women on the operational readiness of Reserve Components. 

The study should be used carefully, since both the validity and 

reliability of the poll may be open to question. The report concludes that 64.4 percent of women reservists do not meet legal 

requirements for deployment outside of CQNUS, and 42 percent 

have dependent children. 

Merritt, Hardy L., and Luther F. Carter, eds., MobilizaGuz and 

The Nutional Defense. Washington, DC: National Defense 

University Press, 1985. CARL 355.28 M687. 

This up-to-date anthology contains chapters dealing with 

economic and manpower mobilization. Chapter 7 deals specifically with Reserve Component mobilization. The work also 

contains an excellent annotated bibliography. 

Miksche, Ferdinand 0. “Strategic Basis: Mobilization or 

Standing Force ?*’ MiEitary Review 54 (October 1974):47-51. 

In this short article, the author argues for using a larger 

proportion of defense funds by the Federal Republic of Germany 

for combat-ready reserves rather than for a smaller, full-strength 

standing force, 

Moxon, Arthur L. “U.S. Reserve Forces: The Achilles’ Heel of 

the All-Volunteer Force?” In Changing U.S. Military Manpower Realities, edited by Franklin D. Margiotta, et al. 

Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983. CARL 355.220973 C456. 

By 1982,. after ten years of the All Volunteer Force (AVF), 

Reserve Components constituted 45 percent of all general-purpose 

forces, including 33 percent of combat divisions, 50 percent of 

artillery battalions, and 67 percent of tactical support forces 

under the total force concept. According to Moxon, the reserves 

have declined in strength, and projections based on demographics are for the decline to continue. Moxon argues that the 

reserves will not be able to provide more than augmentation 

for mobilization and stresses the need for an operationa Selective Service System, but no current draft. He doubts if the total 

force concept can survive in the AVF environment. Moxon 

stresses that there are no “active force” or “reserve force” 

problems, only “total force” problems. 

- 
14 

Pate, Robert I. “U.S. Army Reserve Components-Peacetime 

Assessment and Management to Meet Mobilization Requirements.” Research project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle 

Barracks, PA, 1975. DTIC ADA 014181 (hard copy). 

Pate argues that the current unit-readiness reporting system 

inaccurately assesses Reserve Component unit combat capabilities. He proposes a new system that would weigh readiness in 

terms of postmobilization capability. 

Pew, Frank W. The Role of FORSCOM in the Reception and 

Care of Refugees from Cuba in the Continental United 

States. Fort McPherson, GA: Military History Office, Office 

of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army Forces Command, 1984. 

DTIC ADA 156353. 

This report includes the role played by Reserve Components 

called to duty during the Cuban refugee crisis of 1979. 

Starry, Donn A. “Mobilization’s Challenge to Army’s Training 

Base.” Army 31 (October 1981):36-43. 

General Starry reviews the difficulties raised by full or 

partial mobilization in a situation where the luxury of available 

time, as in World War II, does not exist. Facility and equipment 

shortages identified in MOBEX-80 must be overcome as well as 

the inadequacy of automatic data processing systems. Starry’s 

article presents a concise outline of Army mobilization problems. 

Stuckey, John D. “Status of Planning for Mobilization and 

Deployment.” Individual study project, U.S. Army War 

College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1980. For official use only. 

DTIC ADB 051107. 

Stuckey focuses on mobilization and deployment plans and 

capabilities and concludes that they are inadequate, as they 

could not be completed as planned or required. He reviews personnel, command and control, and training and movement 

planning for both the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army 

Reserve. 

Tech, Larry C., et al. “Mobilization of the National Guard and 

Reserves: Use of State Facilities.‘” Study project, U.S. Army 

War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1984. DTIC ADA 149517. 

Examined in this study is the utilization of nonfederal facilities in Colorado in the event of mobilization, focusing particularly on movement and housekeeping logistics. 
15 

U.S. Army. Forces Command. After Action Report Exercise 

‘Proud Saber”“/5 MOBEX 83 (U). Fort McPherson, GA, 1983. 

CONFIDENTIAL. CARL C-19787.58. 

Final Evaluation Report> Mobilization Command Post 

Exe&se, MOBEX-76. Fort McPherson, GA, 1977. CARL 

N-19787.19. 

A declassified after-action report, this study details serious 

mobilization problems as they existed in 1976, including ‘&a 

serious disconnect between European war plans and CONUS 

mobilization plans.” In this instance, the logistics, personnel, 

and automatic data processing system were designed for peacetime rather than wartime mobilization. 

FORSCOM Reserve Component Mobilization Plan. 

Fort McPherson, GA, 1979. CARL N-19787.28. 

This is the 1979 version of the basic plan for mobilization 

of Reserve Components, which is continually updated by 

FORSCOM. It provides guidance for both unit and installation 

mobilization. 

U.S. Department of Defense. Annual Report of the Secretary of 

Defense on Reserve Forces Fiscal Year 1975. Washington, 

DC, 1976. CARL 355.37 U56a. 

This is one of a series of annual reports detailing mission, 

strength, readiness, and changes for the year. 

U.S. Department of the Army. Army Mobilization Plan (U), 

Vol. 1. Headquarters Department of Army Mobilization Plan. 

Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 

1981. CARL N-189741.67.A. 

The CARL library has only volume 1 of the Army Mobilization Plan for 1981. It is revised and updated yearly. Volume 

1 is the mobilization plan for Headquarters, Department of the 

Army, and details mobilization procedures and organization. 

Annex D contains reserve mobilization procedures. 

. National Guard Bureau. Recommendations for Improvement of Army National Guard Readiness. Washington, 

DC, 1972. CARL N-17665.9.A. 

A study-group analysis of Army National Guard problems, 

this report cites major problem areas, including poor instruction 

and training and inaccurate readiness reporting. An executive 

summary accompanies the report. 
16 

Reserue Cfomponents Roop Basis of t?.xe Army. Annex 

I. Army National Guard Unit Program. Washington, DC, 

1981. CARL N-17665.11. 

This is a good reference source for reserve units of the 

National Guard down to company level and includes location, 

strength, and parent units. 

Reserve Forces Policy Baard. Proud Spirit 80: Report 

one dbservations During Mobilization Exercise MN3EX-80/ 

REX-80 BBAVO (U) CONFIDENTIAL. CARL C-20433.1. 

U.S. Departments of the Army and the Air Force. National 

Guard Bureau. 1982 knnual Review. Washington, DC, 1982. 

CARL 355.37093 U356a 1982. 

The annual reports of the National Guard articulate information concerning organization and activities throughout the 

system. 

U.S. General Accounting Office. Problems in Alerting and 

Preparing Army Reservists for 1MobiEization. Washington, 

DC, 1984. DTIC ADA 138764. 

This report concludes that the Army’s alert procedures are 

inadequate. Spot checks and surveys indicated failure of reserve 

units to adequately brief members or maintain accurate personnel rosters. 

Williamson, Robert G. “Army Resource Management-the Army 

Reserves as a Peacetime Asset of the Active Army.” 

Research paper, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 

PA, 1972. DTIC AD 766487. 

Williamson examines the Army in the post-Vietnam environment of reduced manpower and less money. He concludes that 

greater utilization of Reserve Components will enhance the 

cost-effectiveness of readiness. 

Wilson, Bennie J., ed. The Guard and Reserve in the Total 

Force: The First Decade, 1978 to 1983. Washington, DC: 

National Defense University Press, 1985. CARL 355.37 G914. 

Part five of f2-h antbolclgy deals with various aspects of 

mobilization. Articles raise such issues as reservists’ use of due 

process to avoid service, the organization of the mobilization 

process, and theoretical issues concerning the reserves and war 

in Europe. The anthology contains a useful appendix showing 

the structure of the reserve forces. 

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