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93–171 PDF 2004

S. HRG. 107–1099

AVIATION SECURITY UNDER THE

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION:

AN UPDATE ON SCREENING PASSENGERS,

CHECKING BAGGAGE, TICKET COUNTER

SECURITY, AND NEW TECHNOLOGY

FIELD HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

AUGUST 8, 2002

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

(

(II)

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, Chairman 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

MAX CLELAND, Georgia 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina 

JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

CONRAD BURNS, Montana 

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

GORDON SMITH, Oregon 

PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia 

KEVIN D. KAYES, Democratic Staff Director 

MOSES BOYD, Democratic Chief Counsel 

JEANNE BUMPUS, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on August 8, 2002 ............................................................................. 1

Statement of Senator Boxer .................................................................................... 1

WITNESSES

Acree, Hardy, Director of Airports, Sacramento County Airport System ........... 10

Bowens, Thella, Director, San Diego International Airport ................................. 7

Green, Paul, Chief Operating Officer, Los Angeles World Airports .................... 4

Martin, John L., Director, San Francisco International Airport ......................... 6

Stone, Admiral David, (Retired), Federal Security Director, Lax International 

Airport, Los Angeles, Transportation Security Administration; Accompanied 

by Ed Gomez, Federal Security Director, San Francisco Airport; and General Mike Aguilar, Federal Security Director, San Diego Airport ................... 12

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 15

(1)

AVIATION SECURITY UNDER THE

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION: AN UPDATE ON

SCREENING PASSENGERS, CHECKING

BAGGAGE, TICKET COUNTER SECURITY,

AND NEW TECHNOLOGY 

THURSDAY, AUGUST 8, 2002

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in the Commission Hearing Room, Administration Building, LAX International Airport, Los Angeles, Hon. Barbara Boxer, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,

U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA 

Senator BOXER. Good morning. I would like to welcome everyone 

to this hearing of the Senate Commerce Committee in order to get 

an update on California airport security under the Transportation 

Security Administration. 

We are almost a month away from the 1-year anniversary of September 11th. As we all painfully know, that day the terrorists hijacked four commercial jets, all of which were headed to California, 

including three to this very airport. Included among the thousands 

killed in the attacks, 39 Californians. 

Ever since September 11th, I have been working with other 

Members of the Commerce Committee to make air travel more secure. Last fall Congress passed and the President signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. I wrote the provision of that 

law that required air marshals to be on board all high-risk flights 

with priority given to nonstop, long distance flights. Those were the 

flights that were hijacked. They had a full fuel load and a light 

passenger load and they were large, and therefore they were targeted. 

Because it is classified information, I cannot give you the numbers of air marshals that we now have on planes, but I can say 

that we are making good progress. But in my view, we have a lot 

more to go in that area, and behind the scenes, I am working to 

make sure that the TSA lives up to what our bill said to do, which 

gives priority to these long distance flights. 

I have been working hard again with Members of this Committee—we have wonderful Members of this Committee, with SenVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:09 Dec 22, 2004 Jkt 093171 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\93171.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
2

ator Hollings being the Chair and Senator McCain being the Ranking Member, and the staff of the Committee, and we have several 

of them behind me—because to me, it is our absolute obligation to 

make air travel as safe as it can be. 

I would say today that air travel is more secure than it has ever 

been. I can say that and feel good about that. But I have to say 

I still do not believe it is as secure as it could be or it should be. 

So if I have a message here in this opening statement, it is to say 

that now is not the time to slow down or delay our efforts to increase and improve aviation security. The job is not done, and we 

just have to keep working. We cannot go backward. 

Today, I want to examine the status of California airports under 

the direction of the new Federal Transportation Security Administration. We will hear updates on passenger and checkpoint screening, baggage bomb detection, and ticket counter security. I want to 

briefly discuss why these issues are so important. 

First, passenger and checkpoint screening: At the beginning of 

July, just a month ago, I was shocked to read that checkpoint 

screeners at airports in Los Angeles and Sacramento were ranked 

in the bottom 5 airports for high failure rates. Los Angeles and 

Sacramento airports have failure rates of 41 percent and 40 percent respectively. The examiners who were doing these tests did 

not even attempt to hide weapons and the screeners still did not 

find them. 

Two weeks ago, Transportation Secretary Mineta said at a Commerce Committee hearing that oh, well, those are the old screeners, 

pre–September 11. Well, that cannot be an excuse. Whether they 

are the old screeners or the new screeners, our screeners must be 

trained yesterday, and whether they are old or new does not make 

any difference. And I think that that type of excuse is just not 

going to wash with the public. 

When I read about the failure rates, I called those two airports 

and learned that they still had acting Federal security chiefs. And 

I am glad to say that since that call, Los Angeles has a full-fledged 

director. I am so happy to say that, and we’re very happy with the 

choice. And I also learned this week that Sacramento also now has 

a new head, and I hope that I had something to do with it because 

on that day that I phoned over to Los Angeles, I felt the acting 

head at that time, had an understanding of what occurred and 

there was movement to change things. When I called to Sacramento, the individual that I spoke to was very unaware of the 

fact that the tests even had happened. In other words, TSA had 

never even informed the acting head of that airport that there was 

a 41 percent failure rate. So I was very distressed about that, and 

this individual just had not a clue as to what went wrong or what 

should be done. So I am really glad we now have a permanent person there. So that is the first area. 

Second, bomb detection in checked baggage: I am extremely concerned that the installation of baggage detection machines may not 

be completed by the congressionally mandated deadline, which is 

the end of the year. While DOT has met the deadline to screen all 

checked baggage, either by bag match, hand search or bomb sniffing dogs, we all know that bag match for example alone will do 

nothing to prevent a suicide bomber. 

3

It really amazes me. After we were attacked, we sent our troops 

halfway around the world, and we used such sophisticated weapons 

that they were able to go into caves and burrow into bunkers. So 

no one can convince me, no one—and if you are going to try, try, 

but I am being honest with you—no one can convince me, knowing 

American ingenuity and our can-do attitude as a people, that by 

the end of the year we will not be able to detect a bomb in a suitcase that is standing right in front of our feet when we have gone 

halfway around the world into an area nobody even knew and had 

bombs that burrowed into caves and bunkers. So think of it that 

way. There cannot be an excuse. 

Now, I know these machines are large and airports are developing plans to create space for them. That is an issue. We have to 

make it work. And today, I hope to hear from the airport officials 

about how the administration is working with the airports to develop and approve of these plans for these machines. We need 

these machines, and the administration needs to ensure that these 

baggage detection machines are in place by the deadline, period. 

Now, the House of Representatives passed a homeland security 

bill that slips the deadline. I do not understand how that could be 

part of a homeland security bill; turns it into homeland insecurity 

bill as far as I am concerned. So speaking for myself as one Senator, when we take up homeland security, I am going to fight 

against such a move. 

Third, the ticket counter security: There are still vulnerable 

spots at our airports. The breach of security at a ticket counter 

here in LA on July Fourth is an example. If all our airlines did not 

have two security guards at the site of the incident, the death toll 

would have been far more devastating. Put another way, there 

could have been a massacre. So what does that tell us? It tells us 

we need security at the ticket counters. As my children would have 

said when they were a lot younger, now they are grown up, ‘‘duh.’’ 

We need security at the ticket counters; very important. 

And I know and I compliment LAX for increasing the police presence in those areas. And I just want to make sure that you are reimbursed for that because you are supposed to be, and I want to 

talk to you about that. And I also want to know about what other 

airports are doing at their ticket counters. 

I am concerned about the mixed message I am getting from TSA 

about their involvement in this issue of ticket counter security. 

First when this incident happened they announced they were all 

over the problem. Then they backed away. And in a private meeting I had with our new head of TSA—and I wish him every good 

wish; I am going to work with him—he indicated this was an issue 

he was going to resolve. So I need to know what the status is there. 

We have a lot to get done if we are going to fulfill our responsibilities to Californians and the entire traveling public. So with that, 

we will get started. 

I will give you what the plan is. Our panel is Mr. Paul Green, 

COO of Los Angeles World Airports and Mr. John Martin from San 

Francisco International Airport, we welcome you. Ms. Thella 

Bowens, director of San Diego International Airport, we welcome 

you. Mr. Hardy—do I say it right?—‘‘Acree.’’

Mr. ACREE. Correct. 

4

Senator BOXER.—Director of Airport, Sacramento Airport System. And we also have Mr. David Stone of the Los Angeles International Airport accompanied by Mr. Ed Gomez of the San Francisco International Airport, Mr. Aguilar of the San Diego International Airport. They are all from the Transportation Security Administration. As I understand it, there is going to be one statement; is that correct? 

Admiral STONE. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. And who is going to deliver that? 

Admiral STONE. I will. 

Senator BOXER. Mr. Stone. And then I will ask questions. This 

is going to be a fast-moving type of a hearing because there are so 

many things to cover that I hope to do so. And I want to thank you 

all for being willing to be here today because to us, we cannot 

make progress without your help and your candor. So with that, let 

me hear from Mr. Paul Green, COO of Los Angeles World Airports. 

STATEMENT OF PAUL GREEN, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, 

LOS ANGELES WORLD AIRPORTS 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you. Good morning, Senator Boxer, and welcome back to Los Angeles International Airport. I am Paul Green, 

Chief Operating Officer for Los Angeles World Airports. For the 

record, Los Angeles World Airports is the city of Los Angeles department that owns and operates a system of airports comprising 

LAX, Ontario International, Palmdale Regional, and Van Nuys. 

LAX is the world’s busiest origination and destination airport, 

meaning that more travelers and more luggage enter the worldwide 

aviation system at LAX than any other airport. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak to you today 

regarding the vital public issue of aviation security and Los Angeles World Airports’ commitment to compliance with the Aviation 

and Transportation Security Act. 

We have been working closely with the Transportation Security 

Administration and the air carriers to ensure we are doing our part 

to meet the key deadlines set forth in the new law. Communication 

and cooperation among all parties has been excellent. We are working together to achieve the goals of effective aviation security and 

efficient customer service. 

Working with a team of consultants, we defined existing conditions, monitored and evaluated new security requirements, developed recommended improvements required to implement the newly 

mandated security measures, and developed a prioritized program 

of implementation for both near term and long term. 

I am confident that we have sound plans in place to meet the November 19th passenger-screening deadline and the December 31 

deadline to screen 100 percent of checked baggage. The crucial caveat is that TSA’s contractors take timely delivery at LAX of the 

necessary equipment and the requisite number of Federal employees are available to operate this equipment. 

I would like to turn briefly to our response to the July Fourth 

tragic shooting at LAX’s Bradley terminal. The immediate law enforcement response was very effective. The investigation into the 

shooting is continuing. Within 1 week of the shooting, Mayor Hahn 

announced plans to expedite his security enhancement program at 

5

LAX to allow us to hire off-duty Los Angeles police officers to increase security in the terminal areas, which Senator Boxer alluded 

to. This action allows the daily deployment of armed police officers 

in each terminal area near ticket counters and waiting areas. 

Currently, 60 additional officers are being processed for training 

and are scheduled to graduate from the Airport Police Academy in 

January 2003. The off-duty LAPD officers will be assisting in the 

terminal areas for 6 months, until this training class of LAX officers graduates. 

Another recent aviation security initiative announced by Mayor 

Hahn involves a $15 million upgrade to LAX’s perimeter. The perimeter security improvements will consist of approximately 8 

miles of upgraded fencing surrounding the airport. The new fencing 

along large portions of the airport perimeter will include a 2–1/2-

foot tall concrete rail with 8 feet of heavy duty chain-link fence and 

six strands of barbed wire, intrusion detection devices, increased 

lighting, and closed-circuit television monitoring. The new security 

cameras will be controlled by security personnel who will be able 

to view the perimeter area through closed-circuit television monitors and be able to automatically zero in on any intruders. 

The perimeter security improvements also includes the expansion 

of ‘‘sally port’’ gate systems at all airfield entry points, which are 

used by tenant airlines, airport workers, and other authorized personnel whose jobs require access to high-security areas that are off 

limits to the public. The devices consist of two-sided gates, which 

surround vehicles until they are cleared for entry. 

Finally, just last week, Mayor Hahn announced that more than 

1,200 video cameras will be installed throughout the airport complex through another $15 million initiative. We will be adding cameras to all domestic terminals and all areas of the Tom Bradley 

International Terminal. The system will be integrated with existing 

video resources at LAX and will be administered by the Los Angeles Airport Police at a new, centralized monitoring station. In addition, video will be recorded and maintained for future use by law 

enforcement officials. 

We believe LAX will be the first airport in the United States to 

have such a comprehensive surveillance system. Airports in the 

United Kingdom and Hong Kong have had similar systems installed with excellent results. 

Thank you very much for the opportunity to provide you with 

this security status report. I will be pleased to answer any questions that you might have. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. I am going to hold those until we 

hear from everyone. 

I also forgot to say that when we are done with this panel, we 

are all going to go look at some of the new technologies that are 

available to help us meet our security needs. I thought that might 

be interesting because in California we are really the home of a lot 

of those inventions and we have some of them. So we will all take 

a walk through after. Wonderful. 

Mr. Martin, welcome. Please proceed. 

6

STATEMENT OF JOHN L. MARTIN, DIRECTOR, SAN FRANCISCO 

INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 

Mr. MARTIN. Good morning, Senator Boxer. I am John Martin. 

I am the director of the San Francisco International Airport. I am 

honored to appear before you this morning to testify on the challenges of aviation security under the Transportation Security Administration and provide the Committee with an update on screening passengers, checking baggage, ticket counter security, and new 

technology. 

I am pleased to provide any information necessary for this hearing or at any other point in order that we can work with Congress, 

the Department of Transportation, and the Homeland Security Administration to meet the challenge of ensuring passenger safety, 

while meeting customer service demands. 

SFO does strongly support those provisions passed by the U.S. 

House of Representatives in the Homeland Security Bill that allow 

for airport security modifications to provide a more measured approach. This flexibility will allow the TSA the opportunity to deploy 

100 percent-automated checked baggage screening in all terminals. 

It is my sincere hope that the U.S. Senate will adopt a similar provision so that the TSA will be allowed the time necessary to implement safe and efficient screening equipment. 

SFO was one of the first airports in the country to deploy a fully 

integrated checked baggage inspection system that screens all baggage for international departing flights in our international terminal. We are currently in the process of upgrading this system to 

become the first airport to provide 100 percent TSA-certified in-line 

Explosive Detection System (EDS) for all departing passenger baggage in the International Terminal, and this will be in place by the 

end of the year. We do appreciate the leadership of the TSA and 

especially Ed Gomez, who is the FFD in San Francisco, in helping 

to make this happen. 

As one of the 5 opt-out airports chosen to keep TSA-certified security contractors in place for screening responsibilities, I am confident that TSA will be able to provide SFO with a skilled work 

force at adequate staffing levels. At the ticket counters, SFO has 

added police staffing that ensures that police are in place at all 

times in front of the ticket counters. 

As a model U.S. airport for safety and security, SFO believes 

that any alternative interim solution to 100 percent automated 

checked baggage screening for checked baggage screening would be 

ineffective and may result in less than optimal security and unacceptable delays to the traveling public. 

The TSA, the airports, and the airlines need the flexibility to provide a measured and responsible approach which will allow us the 

opportunity to deploy 100 percent automated checked baggage 

screening at all terminals. While security considerations are our 

first priority, in the view of our security staff and consultants’ 

views, the TSA’s deployment of trace detection equipment at ticket 

counters using the suggested methodology would do little to enhance explosive detection. Testing of the ETD equipment indicates 

that they have low detection rates, much lower than the in-line 

EDS equipment, and that they also have high false alarm rates. 

7

* The information referred to has been retained in Committee files. 

A comprehensive analysis of various alternatives conducted by 

SFO concludes that the conservative cost of the ticket counter ETD 

option would be at least three times as expensive as a permanent 

solution using the best technology, and this is due to the extraordinarily high recurring labor costs for the use of the trace detection 

equipment. I have submitted a detailed comprehensive analysis for 

the Committee for your review. * 

Mr. MARTIN. The lobbies at SFO and at many airports across the 

country are not capable of supporting large volumes of passengers 

that will result from baggage screening operations at the ticket 

counter. These infrastructure constraints will result in the implementation of a project that exposes the traveling public to an environment that is highly congested and in itself could expose passengers to potential increased security threats at the front of the 

terminal building and adjacent airport roadways. 

Passenger processing times would also increase to levels that 

may well be unacceptable to the traveling public and result in severe economic implications for the airlines. From a security and 

customer service point of view, airports need to move passengers 

and their luggage with the best available equipment, the best 

available technology and a full level of staffing. Passenger processing times must decrease, not increase, while the industry and 

governmental agencies continue to identify and deploy security that 

meets the highest standards. We must develop innovative ways of 

handling the flying public that allows for continuous movement of 

passengers from the time the passengers enter the front door of the 

terminal building through the ticket counter line, through the 

checking of the baggage, and through the security screening process. 

The compromise approach passed by the House in the Homeland 

Security Bill will allow airports and the TSA the opportunity to 

build and install an automated checked baggage screening system 

that provides effective and long term security to the traveling public, and I believe that that installation could be completed by December 31, 2003. 

Senator Boxer, I once again thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. This is clearly the most important issue facing U.S. airports and the aviation industry. And if I, or anyone on 

my staff, can be of any help as we look to Congress for help to meet 

the challenges, please do not hesitate to call me. This concludes my 

remarks, and I would be happy to answer any questions. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, Mr. Martin. Since we have some 

basic disagreements, it will be interesting. We’ll have a little 

chance to debate those. 

Ms. Thella Bowens from San Diego, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF THELLA BOWENS, DIRECTOR, SAN DIEGO 

INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT 

Ms. BOWENS. Good morning. I Thank you, Senator Boxer, for the 

opportunity to add my comments to this very important conversation on airport security. 

8

The tragic events of last year have caused all airports to recommence to the absolute need for expanding and improving aviation 

security programs, particularly ones that protect travelers from the 

kinds of threats experienced on September 11th. 

Since the passage of the Aviation Transportation Security Act 

and the creation of the Transportation Security Administration, we 

at San Diego International Airport have remained committed to assisting the TSA in implementing federally mandated security measures. Theirs is an enormous and difficult mission, made more so by 

the stringent time lines established by Congress, and TSA should 

be commended for those efforts. 

Our challenge at San Diego International has been how best to 

handle the installation of new security equipment and processes in 

a highly constrained facility while ensuring the airport continues 

to deliver the highest quality level of customer service and thereby 

support the good health of the industry. 

Security checkpoint lines are longer now than before 9–11, certainly, but they are managed carefully and moving efficiently. To 

date, passenger wait times have continued to decrease—we are at 

less than 20 minutes average in our facility—as travelers become 

familiar with new requirements and plan accordingly. In September/October of this year, we will experience the installation of 

additional checkpoint equipment, improved personnel training, and 

new streamlined procedures. We will know then if our joint efforts 

are truly successful in achieving improved security checkpoint operations and continued convenient access to air travel services. 

We are in line to meet the November deadline for checkpoint 

screening. The challenge for providing for travelers’ safety by 

screening 100 percent of checked baggage for explosive material by 

December 31st is another matter altogether. 

The requirement to install Explosive Detection Systems in the 

magnitude necessary to meet congressional screening requirements 

at an airport with the physical constraints of SDIA is truly overwhelming. Adding significantly to the difficulty and expense of 

such an enterprise is the ever-approaching December 31st deadline. 

Given the lack of availability of Explosive Detection Systems, 

EDS’s, and the complexity of installing the equipment in existing 

baggage handling systems, which is the better approach to this installation, we do not expect to be able to accomplish this task in 

the near term. 

We are moving ahead to install the less effective and radically 

more disruptive Explosive Trace Detectors, ETD’s, together with 

the EDS’s that do become available, in the public areas of our terminals. This is the approach that has been adopted by the TSA as 

an interim measure to meet the requirements of the law as it is 

now written. 

The process that is currently underway at SDIA, again, with the 

total cooperation of TSA personnel, led by an exceptional Federal 

Security Director, Mike Aguilar, is to assess the numbers of explosive trace detection devices required and their appropriate locations. Working together, we have come to a very preliminary understanding of the number of ETD’s required and, if they are installed in the manner recommended, their presence will seriously 

9

disrupt passenger circulation in already congested lobbies and concourses. 

Additionally, screening and property search processes using 

ETD’s will generate long passenger waiting lines that will serve to 

further discourage air travel, not only at SDIA, but throughout an 

already troubled industry. More importantly, this approach will not 

provide the optimal level of increased safety and security for the 

traveler. Instead of the ‘‘quick fix’’ approach using ETD’s, we at 

San Diego International join with other large hub airports in suggesting an alternative solution. 

It is our firm belief that an integrated and automated Explosive 

Detection System is the most optimal and only workable approach 

at SDIA. Rather than forcing airports into an interim solution to 

meet the statutory deadline, we recommend incrementally expanding baggage screening capabilities as facilities, staff, and machines 

become available. This will not result in a diminished level of protection,as we will be using the same means as today—canine detection, positive bag matching, hand searches, and other methods that 

are in place. 

This measured approach would provide the TSA more time to implement an optimal solution on an airport-by-airport basis. Such an 

approach avoids a large waste of investment in both equipment and 

manpower that would inevitably be replaced by a more integrated, 

efficient, and cost-effective system. 

As a separate but equally critical issue, I would like to touch on 

an area of airport security that has gone largely unaddressed. The 

need to protect cargo shipments, both cargo in the belly of passenger aircraft and cargo carried by air freighters, is one that we 

as an industry and the TSA should move forward with as a priority. Because of the nature of integrated cargo operations conducted at remote sites on the airport or off-airport ‘‘through the 

fence,’’ to use an industry term, this is an area of vulnerability directly linked to perimeter security, as well. I submit that improvements in this critical area can be made a priority while we phase 

in 100 hundred percent bag screening. 

Finally, I would like to invite the Committee’s attention to the 

role of local law enforcement in providing the uniformed security 

presence at checkpoints and, eventually, throughout the airport. I 

believe the use of local police officers who are knowledgeable and 

trained in matters of aviation security, local law enforcement, and 

public safety is superior to having a Federal force at the airport. 

Experience shows me that there is no substitute for locally trained 

and certified police officers who know the airport and the region 

and are responsive to its people and its diverse cultures. We are 

using local police to increase law enforcement now, as is present at 

the ticket counter. 

I do urge you to support amending the current legislation to provide additional time for a more comprehensive approach to solving 

the passenger screening responsibility. As stated in the letter forwarded to the Senator and Secretary Mineta earlier this year, we 

are truly concerned that the proposed interim response to baggage 

screening designed to meet the December 31st deadline will result 

in a less than optimal approach to security, will create unacceptVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:09 Dec 22, 2004 Jkt 093171 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\93171.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
10

ably long wait times to the traveling public, and will result in an 

unnecessary expensive solution. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak, and I am pleased to answer any questions. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. We will get into those in a bit. 

Mr. Acree, welcome. 

STATEMENT OF HARDY ACREE, DIRECTOR OF AIRPORTS, 

SACRAMENTO COUNTY AIRPORT SYSTEM 

Mr. ACREE. Good morning, Senator Boxer. My name is Hardy 

Acree, Director of Airports for the Sacramento County Airport System. 

First, I would like to take this opportunity to thank you, Senator 

Boxer, for the invitation to be here today to speak on the very important issues of airport security. I applaud the Senator for your 

efforts with helping to get answers to some very important questions. 

My comments today are intended to be constructive and not overly critical of TSA. Heaven knows they have been given a huge task. 

I am here to share with you our concerns and, yes, a sense of frustration with how the process is working and in some cases not 

working. 

First, at the risk of sounding trite, on the subject of improved 

airport security, it is safe to say that while some progress has been 

made, it would be more accurate to say that much remains to be 

done. And as we approach the first anniversary of the tragic events 

of September 11th, the deadline for meeting certain security mandates looms ever closer. 

In Sacramento we have two concerns regarding security checkpoints: First, from a customer service perspective, we have seen our 

screening checkpoint queueing lines increase dramatically over the 

last 2 months. During peak times, the lines frequently stretch all 

the way to bag claim, causing excessive delays, with some passengers missing their flights. 

To compound the problem, our June passenger counts were the 

second highest on record with over 817,000 passengers traveling 

through the airport. We are one of only a handful of airports nationwide where passenger activity is exceeding last year’s record 

levels. This is a trend we hope continues but which will only add 

to the challenges at the screening checkpoints. 

Second, from an operational perspective, as you said, it came as 

a shock for us to hear that Sacramento International ranked in the 

bottom 5 for airports with the worst test failure rate at the screening checkpoints. What happened that caused Sacramento International to go from an airport with one of the best screening compliance records to one of the worst since TSA took over? Or as Gordon Bethune might say, what happened that we went from first to 

worst? 

In an attempt to get answers, we recently met with representatives from TSA to discuss the issue. We were told that TSA is in 

the process of hiring and training the personnel needed to staff the 

screening checkpoints with Federal employees. From our perspective, the problems appear to be attributed to an absence of adequate supervision oversight and the lack of a customer service 

11

focus. Now that the Federal security director for Sacramento International is onsite, we trust these issues will get resolved in the 

near term. 

With regards to the checked bag screening requirements, TSA 

was given the monumental task of reinventing the entire U.S. 

transportation security system. For airport security, many in the 

industry consider the time given TSA to make the necessary 

changes to be adequate for some airports but inadequate for others. 

What we are discovering as we go through this very complex and 

people-intensive process is that one size does not fit all. What 

works in Sacramento may not work at LAX and vice versa. As I 

sit here today, I cannot tell you whether or not TSA will be successful in Sacramento and meet the December 31st deadline for 

100 percent checked bag screening. What I can say, however, is 

that Sacramento is committed to doing everything in its power to 

make it happen. But until we see a definitive plan for how TSA intends to meet the requirement, it is impossible for me to say 

whether or not it can be done by December 31st. 

Needless to say, I am concerned. It is August the 8th, and I have 

yet to see such a plan. I am concerned because if their plan calls 

for the airport to make significant facility modifications to accommodate the installation of EDS and ETD machines, there is no way 

the airport can respond with any substantive construction contracts 

in 4 and 1/2 months. Both the airport and TSA may well need the 

flexibility of additional time, but I will not know until I see their 

plan. 

If, on the other hand, TSA comes in with a plan that calls for 

a similar ‘‘plop and plug’’ approach—that is technical terms—installing X number of EDS and ETD machines in our terminal 

lobby, then where are the passengers going to go? Our terminal 

lobby space is in limited supply to begin with and that concerns 

me. 

In that regard, customer service considerations must play a 

meaningful role in any implementation plan, regardless of which 

technology, solution, or combination thereof is proposed. The airport system cannot approve a plan that does not give adequate consideration to the customer. Lest we forget, it is the customer who 

is the source of all our revenues, and it is imperative that we not 

lose sight of that. 

I hope you can see my concerns. Time is growing short, and TSA 

lacks the sheer number of personnel who are properly trained to 

operate the screening checkpoints. And we have yet to see a plan 

for meeting the December 31st deadline. 

In closing, we all share the same goal; that of having an airport 

security system that instills confidence in the traveling public and 

restores credibility in a security system that for too long has been 

neglected. 

Again, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to speak before 

you today. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you, sir, for your candor. 

And now it is my pleasure to call on Mr. David Stone of the Los 

Angeles International Airport. And he is the head, the Federal 

head, of that airport. In other words, since we have decided that 

the Federal Government will be responsible for security, we have 

12

called in his good people, and this is his challenge. He is going to 

be speaking on behalf of the TSA folks that are here. 

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL DAVID M. STONE (RETIRED),

FEDERAL SECURITY DIRECTOR, LAX INTERNATIONAL

AIRPORT, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION;

ACCOMPANIED BY ED GOMEZ, FEDERAL SECURITY

DIRECTOR, SAN FRANCISCO AIRPORT; AND GENERAL MIKE

AGUILAR, FEDERAL SECURITY DIRECTOR,

SAN DIEGO AIRPORT 

Admiral STONE. Good morning, Madam Chairwoman. 

It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss airport security at Los Angeles International Airport, San Francisco International Airport, and San Diego International Airport. I am David 

Stone, the Federal Security Director here at LAX. With me this 

morning are Ed Gomez, the Federal Security Director at San Francisco, and Mike Aguilar, the Federal Security Director at San 

Diego. 

We are all pleased to represent Admiral James Loy, the Acting 

Under Secretary of Transportation for Security. I thank you for the 

opportunity to speak to you today about the challenges we face in 

California in ensuring the highest standard of aviation security. I 

have a short opening statement to give, and then we will be available to answer your questions. I have submitted a statement for 

the record. 

By way of introduction, Ed Gomez is a retired chief of the California Highway Patrol, Mike Aguilar recently retired as a Brigadier 

General in the United States Marine Corps, and I recently retired 

as a Rear Admiral in the United States Navy. Ed Gomez took up 

his post in San Francisco at the end of May, Mike Aguilar arrived 

in San Diego on April 1st, and I arrived here at LAX on July 15th. 

I would also like to mention that TSA has selected Federal security directors for several other airports in California. We now have 

FSDs in place at 9 of the 12 California airports that will have 

FSDs. The FSDs at the other three sites are in various stages of 

the selection process. As Federal security directors, we will fill a 

crucial role in aviation security by providing a clear line of authority for security at our Nation’s airports. 

We report to Michael Robinson, the Associate Under Secretary 

for Aviation Operations. We provide day-to-day operational leadership for the Federal security responsibilities at our assigned airports. The FSD is the ranking TSA authority responsible for the 

leadership and the coordination of TSA security activities within 

the airport, including planning, execution, and management of coordinated security services. 

The FSD has three primary responsibilities: First, screening operations for passengers and their carry-on property, as well as all 

checked baggage and cargo that will be carried on passenger 

flights. Law enforcement: We serve as the aviation security liaison 

to local intelligence and law enforcement communities. We receive, 

assess, distribute, and ensure that we effectively use intelligence 

and law enforcement information. We also coordinate and implement security countermeasures with appropriate departments and 

law enforcement agencies, airports, and air carriers. And third, regVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:09 Dec 22, 2004 Jkt 093171 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\93171.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
13

ulatory: We are responsible for ensuring compliance with TSA aviation security regulations. 

The FSD is responsible for securing airports and air carriers. If 

a particular security threat to a gate, concourse, terminal, airport, 

or related facility cannot be addressed in a way adequate to ensure 

the safety of passengers, crew, or other individuals, the FSD may 

clear, close, or otherwise secure the affected facilities. 

Similarly, if a security threat to a flight or series of flights cannot be addressed in a way adequate to ensure the safety of passengers and crew, the FSD will have the authority to cancel a 

flight or series of flights, delay a flight or series of flights, or return 

flights to an airport after departure, divert such flights, or otherwise appropriately handle these critical situations. These are important responsibilities that we take seriously. 

In consultation with TSA managers, the FSD provides for training, supervision, and equipment for the screener work force and 

Federal TSA law enforcement officers. Furthermore, the FSD will 

ensure that screeners meet and maintain eligibility for employment 

and that law enforcement officers are properly deployed at screening locations. ‘This will result in our supervision of large numbers 

of new Federal employees at Los Angeles International and San 

Diego Airport. The exact numbers are now under assessment. 

Ed Gomez will have the responsibilities that Mike Aguilar and 

I have without direct screener oversight. As provided for under the 

Aviation and Transportation Security Act, San Francisco is one of 

5 airports in the country selected for a contract screening pilot program. San Francisco is the only California airport that is participating in this program. Instead of screeners who are Federal employees of TSA, at San Francisco the screeners will operate under 

a contract awarded by TSA. The contract screeners must have the 

same qualifications as TSA screeners and must follow the same 

training requirements. They are entitled to receive the same pay 

and benefits as TSA screeners. This contracting process has just 

begun. TSA expects to award a contract in early October. 

We expect to have a strong law enforcement presence. TSA is responsible for enforcing Federal laws and regulations with respect 

to aviation security at security screening checkpoints, in the secure 

areas of the airport, and at perimeter areas. In some airports, we 

will provide TSA law enforcement officers; at other airports, we are 

contracting with State or local law enforcement agencies to assist 

in the passenger checkpoint enforcement work. Additionally, our 

Federal air marshals will provide on-board security on high-risk 

flights. 

Madam Chairwoman, we are all well aware of the tragedy that 

occurred at this airport on July 4th. The fact that the gunman does 

not appear to have been part of an organized terrorist plot is of little solace to the innocent victims. In the wake of this incident, we 

understand the call for additional support from TSA to provide security in the public concourse areas of the airport terminals. TSA 

has a five-pronged approach to this issue. 

First, TSA’s own law enforcement officers or State and local 

LEOs working under contract to TSA will chiefly staff the secure 

areas of airports, and our Federal air marshals will serve on board 

commercial aircraft. 

14

Second, TSA does have an important, broader responsibility: to 

coordinate and approve the overall security plan for all commercial 

airports. To do so, the FSD at each airport will work closely with 

State, local, and airport law enforcement officers and the airport 

management team and other Federal agencies operating at commercial airports. All of us here today are pledged to do this. 

Third, law enforcement—local law enforcement will continue to 

have responsibility for enforcement in the public areas of the airport and will coordinate with TSA on the overall security plan. 

Fourth, our limited use of TSA’s law enforcement officers outside 

of the immediate areas associated with screening will be primarily 

to assess and make recommendations for security improvements. 

This is consistent with the ATSA, the authorizing legislation that 

Congress passed. Of course, if there is an incident where it is appropriate to assist local law enforcement officers, we certainly will 

do so to the extent possible. 

Finally, we are already partnering successfully with State, local 

and airport law enforcement authorities nationwide. These officers 

are assisting TSA in meeting our statutory responsibilities at the 

passenger screening checkpoints. TSA is seeking to clarify its authority to extend these partnerships beyond November 19th of this 

year. 

I would like to briefly discuss the plans to Federalize our three 

airports to meet the two critical statutory deadlines. The first is to 

require the screening of all passengers with Federal screeners, with 

the exception of the contracting screening pilot program in San 

Francisco, by November 19th, 2002. 

The second is to ensure that all checked baggage is screened for 

explosives by December 31st, 2002. As you can imagine, this is an 

extraordinary challenge to meet at 429 airports throughout the 

country. Our headquarters is working closely with our major contractors that are assisting us in this effort. Contractors are onsite, 

and airport assessments have begun in order to meet the statutory 

deadlines. However, as you recently heard from Secretary Mineta, 

the amount of money available to TSA this year has necessitated 

a reassessment of its rollout strategy. Naturally, our headquarters 

in Washington, DC will keep the Committee informed of the results 

of this reassessment. 

In keeping with our mandate from Admiral Loy, all FSDs pledge 

to have open lines of communication with airport operators, air carriers, and other airport stakeholders, Members of Congress, local 

officials, State and local law enforcement officials and their agencies, and the many Federal, State, and local agencies with whom 

we must work cooperatively. Mike Aguilar, Ed Gomez, all of the 

other FSDs in California, and I will continue to work hard on this 

in the coming weeks and months. The three of us have already 

begun this effort, and we appreciate the support and cooperation 

from our airport partners. 

Madam Chairwoman, all of us on this panel, and indeed, all TSA 

employees throughout the country, are keenly aware of the tragic 

link between California and the terrorist attack on our Nation on 

September 11. We know that all four planes that were hijacked by 

the terrorists were bound for California—three of those flights were 

destined for LAX; the fourth was bound for San Francisco. Many 

15

California residents perished on that day. Our goal is to ensure a 

level of security at our airports here in California, and everywhere 

in our great Nation, so that a tragedy like September 11 never 

happens again. 

We all welcome your support and that of all Californians. Mike 

Aguilar, Ed Gomez, and I will be pleased to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Stone follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL DAVID M. STONE (RETIRED), FEDERAL SECURITY

DIRECTOR, LAX INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION; ACCOMPANIED BY ED GOMEZ, FEDERAL SECURITY DIRECTOR, SAN FRANCISCO AIRPORT; AND GENERAL MIKE AGUILAR, FEDERAL SECURITY

DIRECTOR, SAN DIEGO AIRPORT

Good morning Madame Chairwoman. It is a pleasure to appear before you today 

to discuss airport security at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) San Francisco 

International Airport (SFO) and San Diego International Airport (SAN). I am David 

Stone and I am the newly arrived Federal Security Director here at LAX. With me 

this morning are Ed Gomez the Federal Security Director at SFO and Mike Aguilar 

the Federal Security Director (FSD) at SAN. Mike is the senior member of our 

group having arrived at SAN at the end of March of this year. We are all pleased 

to represent ADM James Loy the Acting Under Secretary of Transportation for Security. I thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today about the challenges 

we face in California in ensuring the highest standard of aviation security. 

I would like to take a few moments to briefly introduce us to you. Ed Gomez is 

a retired Chief of the California Highway Patrol (CHP) with over 13 years experience as a member of their top management executive team. He headed a division 

with over 1,400 CHP employees. As part of his 33-year long career in law enforcement Ed has coordinated law enforcement resources during numerous special events 

and disasters such as the 1992 Los Angeles riots and the devastating Northridge 

Earthquake. Ed is a member of the F.B.I. National Executive Institute and has attend the United States Secret Service Dignitary Protection Course. Ed has a Master’s degree in Public Administration. 

Mike Aguilar recently retired as a Brigadier General in the United States Marine 

Corps. During a distinguished 30-year career in the Marines Mike served in a number of key assignments including the Commanding General Fleet Marine Forces 

South and the Deputy Commander U.S. Marine Forces South. Mike served in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and has flown helicopters for many 

years logging thousands of hours of accident free flights. Mike holds a Master’s Degree in Strategic Studies and National Security Affairs. 

I retired as a Rear Admiral in the United States Navy. My last assignment was 

as Director Environmental Protection Occupational Health and Safety in the Office 

of the Chief of Naval Operations. I previously served as the Commander of the Nimitz Battle Group where I was responsible for organizing training and deploying over 

5,000 sailors. I also commanded the United States Middle East Force in Manama 

Bahrain and served as the first United States Flag Officer to command NATO’s 

Maritime Immediate Reaction Force ‘‘The Standing Naval Force Mediterranean.’’ I 

graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy and hold a Masters’ degree in National Security Affairs from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and in National Security 

and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College. I also earned a Masters Degree in Management from Salve Regina College. 

I would also like to mention that TSA has selected FSDs for several other airports 

in California. We now have FSDs in place at 9 of the 12 California airports that 

will have FSDs. The FSDs at the other three sites are in various stages of the selection process. 

I believe that we bring a wealth of experience talent and commitment to this important position. As Federal Security Directors we will fill a crucial role in aviation 

security by providing a clear line of authority for security at our nation’s airports. 

We report to Michael Robinson the Associate Under Secretary for Aviation Operations. We provide day-to-day operational leadership for the federal security responsibilities at our assigned airports. The FSD is the ranking TSA authority responsible for the leadership and coordination of TSA security activities within the airport 

including the planning execution and management of coordinated security services. 

The FSD has three primary responsibilities: (1) screening operations for passengers and their carry-on property all checked baggage and cargo that will be carried on passenger flights; (2) law enforcement: serving as the aviation security liaiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:09 Dec 22, 2004 Jkt 093171 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\WPSHR\GPO\DOCS\93171.TXT JACK PsN: JACKF
16

son to local intelligence and law enforcement communities. The FSD receives assesses distributes and ensures the utilization of intelligence and law enforcement information as appropriate. We also coordinate and implement security countermeasures with appropriate departments and law enforcement agencies airports and 

air carriers; and (3) regulatory: responsible for ensuring compliance with TSA aviation security regulations. 

The FSD is responsible for securing airports and air carriers. If a particular security threat to a gate concourse terminal airport or related facility cannot be addressed in a way adequate to ensure the safety of passengers crew or other individuals the FSD may clear close or otherwise secure the affected facilities. Similarly 

if a security threat to a flight or series of flights cannot be addressed in a way adequate to ensure the safety of passengers and crew the FSD will have the authority 

to cancel a flight or series of flights delay a flight or series of flights or return flights 

to an airport after departure divert such flights or otherwise appropriately handle 

these critical situations. 

In consultation with appropriate TSA managers the FSD provides for appropriate 

training supervision and equipment for the screener workforce and Federal TSA 

Law Enforcement Officers (LEOs). Furthermore the FSD will ensure that screeners 

meet and maintain eligibility for employment and that LEO’s are deployed at 

screening locations in accordance with applicable statutory standards. This will result in my supervision of approximately 1,850 passenger and baggage screeners at 

LAX. Mike Aguilar will oversee over 650 screeners at SAN. 

Ed Gomez will have the responsibilities that Mike Aguilar and I have without direct screener oversight. This is because San Francisco will operate in a different setting. As provided for under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act San Francisco was one of five airports in the country selected for a contract screening pilot 

program. San Francisco is the only California airport that is participating in this 

program. Instead of screeners who are federal employees of TSA the estimated 1,000 

contract screeners at San Francisco will operate under a contract awarded by TSA. 

The contract screeners must have the same qualifications as TSA screeners and 

must adhere to the same training requirements and they will be entitled to receive 

the same pay and benefits as TSA screeners. This contracting process has just 

begun and TSA has issued a Synopsis of the procurement. TSA expects to award 

a contract in early October. The contract may be awarded to individual contractors 

or in one bundle depending on how the offers are evaluated to determine how the 

best interests of the Government may be met. 

We expect to have a strong law enforcement presence in place. TSA will be responsible for enforcing Federal laws and regulations with respect to aviation security at security screening checkpoints in the secure areas of the airport and at perimeter areas. In some airports we will provide TSA employees as Law Enforcement 

Officers; at other airports we are contracting with state or local law enforcement 

agencies to assist in the passenger checkpoint enforcement work. Additionally our 

Federal Air Marshals will provide on-board security on high-risk flights. 

Madame Chairwoman we are all well aware of the tragedy that occurred at this 

airport on July 4. The fact that the gunman does not appear to have been part of 

an organized terrorist plot is of little solace to the innocent victims. In the wake 

of this incident we understand the call for additional support from TSA to provide 

screening in the public concourse areas of the airport terminals. TSA has a fivepronged approach to this issue.

• First TSA’s own Law Enforcement Officers or LEOs working under contract to 

TSA will chiefly staff the secure areas of airports and our Federal Air Marshals 

will serve on board commercial aircraft.

• Second TSA does have an important broader responsibility: to coordinate and 

approve the overall security plan for all commercial airports. To do so the Federal Security Director at each airport will work closely with State local and airport law enforcement officers and the airport management team and other federal agencies operating at commercial airports. All of us here today are pledged 

to do this.

• Third local law enforcement will continue to have responsibility for enforcement 

in the public areas of the airport and will coordinate with TSA on the overall 

security plan.

• Fourth our limited use of TSA’s law enforcement officers outside of the immediate areas associated with screening will be primarily to assess and make recommendations for security improvements. This is consistent with ATSA the authorizing legislation that Congress passed. Of course if there is an incident 

where it is appropriate to assist local law enforcement officers we certainly will 

do so to the extent possible.

17

• Finally we are already partnering successfully with State local and airport law 

enforcement authorities nationwide. These officers are assisting TSA in meeting 

our statutory responsibilities at the passenger-screening checkpoints. TSA is 

seeking to clarify its authority to extend these partnerships beyond November 

19 of this year.

I would like to briefly discuss the plans to federalize our three airports to meet 

the two critical statutory deadlines. The first is to require the screening of all passengers with Federal screeners (with the exception of the contracting screening pilot 

program at San Francisco and four other airports) by November 19, 2002. The second is to ensure that all checked baggage is screened for explosives by December 

31, 2002. As you can imagine this is an extraordinary challenge to meet at 429 airports throughout the country. Our Headquarters is working closely with our major 

contractors that are assisting us in this effort. Contractors are on site and airport 

assessments have begun in order to meet the statutory deadlines. However as you 

recently heard from Secretary Mineta the amount of money available to TSA this 

year has necessitated a reassessment of its rollout strategy. Naturally our Headquarters in Washington DC will keep the Committee informed of the results of this 

reassessment. 

In keeping with our mandate from ADM Loy all FSDs pledge to have open lines 

of communication with airport operators air carriers and other airport stakeholders 

Members of Congress local officials state and local law enforcement officials and 

their agencies and the many federal state and local agencies with whom we must 

work cooperatively. Mike Aguilar Ed Gomez all of the other FSDs in California and 

I will work hard on this in the coming weeks and months. 

Madame Chairwoman all of us on this panel and indeed all TSA employees 

throughout the country are keenly aware of the tragic link between California and 

the terrorist attack on our Nation on September 11. We know that all four planes 

that were hijacked by the terrorists were bound for California—three of those flights 

were destined for LAX the fourth was bound for San Francisco. Many California 

residents perished on that day. Our goal is to ensure a level of security at our airports here in California and everywhere in our great Nation so that a tragedy like 

September 11 never happens again. 

We all welcome your support and that of all Californians. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you and share the challenges that 

the Federal Security Directors in California face today and for your continuing support of the Transportation Security Administration. Mike Aguilar Ed Gomez and I 

will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much. 

I am going to skip around here because there are a few issues 

I want to dig a little bit deeper into. I guess, Mr. Martin, your comments that if you put these other machines in as an interim solution, you will have a lot of lines, you are going to expose the public 

to more security problems, I have a problem with that. I think it 

is an excuse. Let me say why: If we have adequate security in the 

lobbies, in the ticket counters, that is going to be a prevention, 

number one. 

Number two—and this goes to Ms. Bowens’ and Mr. Martin’s remarks, I think, more than the others—you keep stressing ‘‘customer friendly.’’ This is important, and to some degree, Mr. Acree 

said that we have got to make sure people move through and so 

on and so forth. I just want you to respond to this, and maybe it 

is just a disagreement we have. But I fly. I am flying more than 

I am standing still. And I have talked to people, and I have talked 

to employees and passengers and so on and so forth. 

My concentration on this safety issue, which has been, I have to 

admit, exceedingly focused and making people uncomfortable, 

which I am going to do today to you, which I apologize for, but it 

is just the only way I can get to the bottom of things, is because 

I believe in my heart if there is just one more incident like the 

one—the several we had on September 11th, that the blow to the 

18

airline industry, the blow to airport travel, will be so extraordinary 

that it will make your comments, in retrospect, just seem completely out of touch with reality. 

Oh, my God, people are waiting an extra 15 minutes. People 

aren’t thrilled to do this, but aren’t there other ways to deal with 

it other than slipping a deadline? And it is like ‘‘The dog ate my 

homework.’’ We had a year and a half knowing this was coming. 

LAX is going to meet the deadline in terms of the bomb detection. 

I appreciate that very much. But, you know, who is to say in another year, ‘‘Oh, my goodness, we can’t, we won’t, we can’t.’’ There 

are other ways to address the issue of customer satisfaction, and 

one might be a trusted traveler program. 

Now, I, myself, have been patted down and pulled aside at least 

15 to 20 times because I travel so much. In fact, on the one hand, 

it is a great signal to everybody that no one is getting a free ride 

here, but on the other hand, it is a bit of a waste of time to have 

three people on a United States Senator who is five feet tall and 

a grandma, and is not such a threatening profile. 

So if people are willing to give up some of their privacy, like if 

I agree, OK, I will give up some of my privacy, I will do some genetic—let some machine test my iris in my eye or my fingerprint 

or whatever, and I am willing to go into such a program, and let 

us just say a third of the traveling public is willing to go into such 

a program and maybe even more—granted, it is a voluntary thing. 

They give up their privacy. If they do not want to do it, fine. Now 

you have got a third of the people you can treat a little differently, 

relieving this issue that you all talk about at the airports—which 

I understand your angst when you see long lines—but wouldn’t 

that be a better way to go other than saying, well, we cannot put 

a trace machine in the lobby because it will be crowded in the 

lobby? I am just trying to get your sense of it. 

Mr. Stone, I do not know where TSA comes down on the trusted 

traveler program. Can you give me a little insight into what you 

know about the thinking, if you know where Admiral Loy is coming 

from? 

Admiral STONE. Yes. It is my understanding that Admiral Loy is 

open to that idea. 

Senator BOXER. Good. 

Admiral STONE. Recently, TSA sent a credentials program representative to see me yesterday to talk about how we might use 

these type technologies in the Department of Transportation Identification Card. So there is a lot of creative thinking about how we 

might use new technologies along those lines, and we are also open 

to new ideas such as moving the gate screening cord and combining 

it with the checkpoint. And so we have a test program here that 

TSA is sponsoring to change, to look at new ideas, to look at new 

technologies. 

Senator BOXER. Well, I am very happy to hear that, Mr. Stone, 

because the prior folks were fairly close, but I think Admiral Loy—

and I met with him, and I am very impressed. And if you could 

take a message back to him, and of course I will call him myself, 

that this is something I think would be important. 

So perhaps the airport folks could respond to how they feel about 

this trusted traveler type of program, and if you would view that 

19

as a possible way to go to relieve the kind of congestion that you 

are concerned about. We will not get into the machines right now, 

just go to the trusted traveler. 

Mr. ACREE. I would agree with the Senator’s comments. I think 

the airport industry is on record as supporting a trusted traveler 

concept. If we are looking for a needle in a haystack, the first thing 

we should be doing is decreasing the size of the haystack, and I 

think the trusted traveler program does that. 

Senator BOXER. Ms. Bowens, do you have feelings on that? 

Ms. BOWENS. I would agree that the trusted traveler program as 

well as any other innovations that we could bring on board would 

help. At this point, none of that has been discussed with us. We 

have not even been—long before the TSA came in, we investigated 

the availability of this explosive detection equipment just to purchase on our own. It was not available for us in terms of the numbers of the pieces of the equipment that we would have to have. 

So we are in favor of any kind of technology that the FAA or the 

TSA would approve that would help expedite these lines, but right 

now, that is not available to us. We have to deal with what’s handed to us today. 

Senator BOXER. I understand. I understand. But that is the purpose of this hearing, to make it better, to keep the focus on. Because what you are basically saying is, you are being told you need 

to install these machines, and you do not see any relief at the ticket counter. And you are concerned that that is going to make a 

very crowded, unpleasant experience for folks, and you want to put 

off doing the interim measures. I understand that. 

Mr. Martin? 

Mr. MARTIN. San Francisco very much favors further exploration 

of trusted traveler programs. We think that they can benefit the 

aviation industry greatly, both in customer service but also in aviation safety. Great benefits potentially are there. Only 10 percent of 

our passengers, who are frequent fliers account for over 50 percent 

of our trips. So you can well imagine the benefits from a trusted 

traveler program. 

Senator BOXER. Absolutely. It is huge. 

Mr. Green, would you also favor a trusted traveler type of program? 

Mr. GREEN. I do favor that. I think concepts like trusted traveler 

and I think increased use of technology going forward is really 

going to be the solution, long term, to resolving these service issues 

for the industry, particularly when it gets back into a growth mode. 

Projecting what you are doing today without technology and concepts like this in the future is a little worrisome, so I really would 

endorse it. 

Senator BOXER. Mr. Gomez or Mr. Aguilar, do you have any comments on this idea of pursuing this at the TSA, developing some—

perhaps one or two or three systems that you have faith in, or perhaps one system that could be a centralized system? 

So again, we understand, some of them, in fact, may want to be 

in the program, they are giving up certain privacy, and that is 

something an individual has to determine. But I know most of the 

folks I know who are traveling constantly would really welcome 

that. Do you think it is a good thing to pursue? 

20

Mr. GOMEZ. Good morning, Senator. Ed Gomez from San Francisco. I am pleased to be here and address these serious issues. 

I think one of the points that I want to make is that we all want 

the same thing. We want people to be able to travel and have a 

sense of security and confidence in the airports and other modes 

of transportation. And I think that some of the ideas that are being 

put forth today, whether we’re talking about training people and/

or baggage, I think that it is still a process of evolution. 

As we speak, there are teams of consultants in all of our airports 

and hundreds of airports across the country looking at the individual uniqueness of each airport in terms of processing people and 

bags. So I like your ideas about, let us look at things in different 

ways to try to get people through but not sacrifice the quality of 

security. And I do believe that identification of people and trying 

to say that you, as Senator, should not be searched six times 

versus a frequent flier that would have a record of travel and a stability, that TSA would be able to perhaps look at having them be 

processed in a different way. 

So we are open to different suggestions without, again, trying to 

diminish in any way the level of security at the airport. 

Senator BOXER. Mr. Aguilar? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Madam Chairwoman, again, thank you for the invitation and opportunity to speak. 

I agree with you 100 percent in that there is a threat, there is 

a sense of urgency, and we have to take the technology that we 

have now to address that threat. I am pleased to say that TSA is 

very open to looking at new technology, emerging technology. We 

are familiar with the legislation which you have introduced, and I 

know Admiral Loy is very receptive to that. I would just add probably that with this emerging technology, I believe TSA would like 

to have the latitude to be able to assess that technology before 

making a final decision, but we are in complete support of contributing to the customer service without compromising our security 

requirements. 

Senator BOXER. I think it goes to what Mr. Acree mentioned 

when he said that you are looking for a needle in a haystack, the 

bad one. And if you have a smaller universe, you are going to clearly have a better chance. So I guess now I have two messages from 

me to you which I will deliver to Admiral Loy myself, one of course, 

is not to let these deadlines slip, and of course, we have disagreement here. 

I thought the House bill was completely a step back for us in 

terms of delaying the date because, again, the same reasons you 

are giving now, excuses, problems, explanations as to why it is difficult, are not going to really change. I want to go to the issue of 

the interim check for bombs, bomb detection. 

Mr. Green, if you were to say one reason why you are successful 

in getting these machines installed, what would it be? Were you 

just ahead of it? Were you just earlier than——

Mr. GREEN. Well, I think probably the short answer is we got a 

jump start on it. After September 11, we had the same concerns 

that all airports have and have been expressed here this morning. 

But absent a mandate that says we are going to do something later 

than December the 31st, our view was, earlier this year, that we 

21

really need to get focused on meeting that. So we brought a team, 

actually brought four consultants in, to look at, not only passenger 

processing, but perimeter cargo and all the other issues that we 

talked about. And we did that early, and we did a lot of comprehensive analysis and modeling, analyzing the equipment. 

Senator BOXER. You mean right after September 11? 

Mr. GREEN. This was, like, spring of this year. It was not last 

year but this year. But for several months, we have been engaged 

in that. And I think when the TSA came in and got serious about 

establishing some protocol and some procedures for our airport, we 

were fortunate enough to have done a lot of work that has sort of 

come together at the right time. And I think that put us in a position of not being delayed, and that is why I think—given the work 

that our consultants did, and I think it is shared by Admiral 

Stone—we are optimistic that, if we have the equipment and the 

people in place, then we can comply. But I guess the short answer 

really was we got started early. 

Senator BOXER. Right. I think that is an important point, and I 

think there is a lesson here. I mean, we cannot wait. Anyone who 

wants to get us is thinking every minute, is planning every minute, 

is getting ready every minute. And we are sitting back and saying, 

gee, this is hard; gee, we cannot do it. I just do not accept it, and 

I just want to push a little harder on the point. 

In terms of the interim solution that none of you—well, Mr. 

Acree, you have a different issue. Your problem is you just now got 

somebody in place from the TSA who is a permanent person. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. ACREE. Just this week, he was onsite. 

Senator BOXER. At this point, you have no plan in place even? 

Mr. ACREE. Correct. 

Senator BOXER. So I hope, Mr. Stone, that you can take that 

back because you are here representing TSA. They’ve been disadvantaged because they are so late in getting someone on board, 

and they are a growing passenger airport. They need to have some 

attention paid over there. That’s why I have different airports here 

because I think sometimes we get lost in the shuffle when we do 

not have the huge international airports. Is yours called an international airport? 

Mr. ACREE. We are an international airport. 

Senator BOXER. Smaller international airports, they do not get 

the attention. So we need immediate attention. They had a 41 percent failure rate——

Mr. ACREE. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator BOXER.—at the screening. I mean, that is outrageous. 

The acting Federal person, the acting head, did not know anything 

about it. They need attention. So that is a message. Sacramento 

needs attention. They have good people. He is a very good man, 

and they just need some direction of what they are going to do. 

But in terms of this interim—what do you call the machines that 

would be the interim? The trace detection machines, right? Here’s 

a question that I have for you, Mr. Martin: You are concerned that 

they are going to be put in the middle of the lobby and be a mess. 

Why is it that we have to have the passenger there with the 

bag——

22

Mr. MARTIN. Why is it that we have to have a passenger with 

the bag? 

Senator BOXER.—that’s going to be checked? 

Mr. MARTIN. Because there is a particularly high rate of false 

alarms with the trace detecting equipment, and the passenger 

needs to be there with the bag when the screening agent opens the 

bag. 

Senator BOXER. When it is done with the trace detection as opposed to the others? 

Mr. MARTIN. Right. The EDS equipment did not result in nearly 

as high of a false alarm rate. 

Senator BOXER. What is the false alarm rate? 

Mr. MARTIN. When there is a positive read, the bag and its contents need to be investigated further. The EDS also has——

Senator BOXER. I said, what is the rate? What is the percentage 

failure? Out of the 10 that—if they find 10 traces, how many would 

be wrong? 

Mr. MARTIN. More than 30 percent of the total bags produce false 

reads. Overall, the EDT equipment——

Senator BOXER. Wait. Then I am still confused. If you are doing 

bomb sniffing, where is that done? 

Mr. MARTIN. It is done throughout the terminal building. 

Senator BOXER. So the passenger is not there with the bomb 

sniffing, right? 

Mr. MARTIN. Sometimes there are passengers; sometimes there 

aren’t. 

Senator BOXER. If the problem is—and let me just take this to 

Mr. Stone—if the problem is, in terms of the movement, that there 

are all these passengers around, I just want to ask you this question. If you had a false positive with a dog sniffing situation, you 

would do a hand search. The passenger does not necessarily have 

to be there, right? 

I mean, my question is, why does the passenger have to be there 

when you do the trace, even with a third of the problems? 

Admiral STONE. I would like to ask Mike Aguilar to describe 

that. 

Senator BOXER. OK. Mike? 

Mr. AGUILAR. Yes, ma’am. 

The passenger is not required to be there. However, I think most 

airports, just out of respect for privacy for the passenger, just does 

allow them to accompany their baggage. But as far as an absolute 

requirement for the individual to be there, that is really, again, in 

respect for their privacy, if they wanted to accompany their bag. As 

far as the false alarm rate only, you are absolutely right——

Senator BOXER. Wait a minute. When you check your bag in and 

it goes through a different check, you are not there with the bag. 

What’s the privacy problem? I mean, in other words, when you are 

packing a bag, you know it is going to be checked. So already you 

are making a decision. If you do not want to pack that special 

thing, do not pack that special thing, whatever it may be. But the 

point is, we all know we have to check bags. 

I mean, what I hear, if that is the reason—is that the reason is 

privacy concerns? 

23

Mr. MARTIN. Privacy concerns and specifically I do not know of 

a single U.S. airline or foreign airline that allows a bag to be 

opened without the passenger being present. So in our international terminal where we have an in-line bag system, four or five 

passengers a day are called down to the bag screening room for the 

bag to be opened. 

Senator BOXER. So in other words, when you do the hand 

searches, the passenger is always there? 

Mr. MARTIN. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. So if the dog sniffs something and there has to 

be a hand search, you go find the passenger? 

Mr. MARTIN. That’s right. 

Senator BOXER. How do you do that? Page them? What do you 

do? 

Mr. MARTIN. We page them or we contact the airline. We primarily work through the airlines in contacting passengers. 

Senator BOXER. And if it is an EDS? 

Mr. MARTIN. The EDS does not produce the high false alarm 

rate. They are also more than twice as effective in identifying if 

there is an explosive device. 

Senator BOXER. Now, what happens if the machines that we all 

want, the big machines, find something that is questionable? Do 

you then call the passenger before you open that bag too? 

Mr. MARTIN. We contact the airline, the airline brings the passenger down to the screening room. 

Senator BOXER. All right. So you bring the passenger down. So 

why do not you bring the passenger down with the other, with the 

trace——

Mr. MARTIN. We’d have to bring 30 percent of the passengers 

down with the trace detection equipment given the false reads, and 

there is no way that the industry could handle that. 

Senator BOXER. Do you agree that there is a 30 percent failure 

rate? 

Admiral STONE. No, I do not. That’s not the figures that I would 

be——

Senator BOXER. What are your rates? 

Admiral STONE. I can only brief qualitatively that the error rate 

is such that it will not cause the significant backups that were 

mentioned here. 

Senator BOXER. So we have a disagreement on the failure rates. 

How do you base your numbers, Mr. Martin? Where do you get 

your figures? 

Mr. MARTIN. My figures are from a Reason Foundation report. 

Senator BOXER. A what? I am sorry. 

Mr. MARTIN. A Reason Foundation——

Senator BOXER. ‘‘Reason.’’

Mr. MARTIN. ‘‘Reason.’’

Senator BOXER. Who are they? 

Mr. MARTIN. It is a foundation based in Southern California. 

Senator BOXER. What do they do? 

Mr. MARTIN. They are very active on a number of issues, commenting on privatization and, commenting on a number of issues 

related to aviation——

Senator BOXER. Are they scientists or are they——

24

Mr. MARTIN. I am sorry. I cannot tell you further background. 

[Committee discussion off the record.] 

Senator BOXER. Well, from what I understand, it is a group that 

is trying to privatize airport security. They have another agenda. 

So I would just say——

Ms. Bowens, you want to support Mr. Martin there, what he’s 

saying? 

Ms. BOWENS. I have the same information that he has. 

Senator BOXER. From the Reason Foundation? 

Ms. BOWENS. We actually had the Reason Foundation work. And 

just reading in general industry information on the ETD, that is 

the number that just continues to pop up, is 30 percent. 

Senator BOXER. But TSA does not agree. 

Ms. BOWENS. They do not have a number. They did not give a 

number. 

Senator BOXER. Mr. Stone, would you repeat what your information is. 

Admiral STONE. I said I had qualitative assessments that that 

rate that was mentioned by that study is too high and that, in fact, 

will not cause the type of backlog that was mentioned. 

Senator BOXER. Mr. Gomez? 

Mr. GOMEZ. Senator, I think we all acknowledge that EDS has 

a higher reliability rate than the trace detection machines, but I 

totally agree with your point that time is an issue here. And I 

think that in-line systems really are certainly faster, will inconvenience the passengers less, but more expensive. It is going to take 

a lot more time. And all of us—certainly Congress has given us a 

deadline to meet, by the end of the year. 

So I think that with the help of the consultants that are on board 

right now, they are going to work with each airport. And as you 

know, flying around the country, each airport is very unique, very 

different given the circumstances of where it is and the environment that—these machines will still allow us to find a lot of material that could be very hazardous to the people and the airplanes 

and that. 

We are going to use these hybrid systems again, even though 

they are not going to be on-line, and the other machines that would 

be better, will be forthcoming. But we cannot delay, and I think 

these machines still—we must move forward with that to meet the 

mandate of Congress. 

Senator BOXER. You oversee San Francisco? 

Mr. GOMEZ. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator BOXER. So you and Mr. Martin have a little disagreement here. 

Mr. GOMEZ. We have talked about this a lot, and let me tell you 

this: San Francisco has done a marvelous job of being proactive, 

much like Los Angeles is, that because of their proactive nature 

they immediately started to change the conveyer systems and that. 

We are very proud to say, by the end of the year at international 

terminals, all bags going out of the country will be screened for explosives on an in-line system. But we do not have the time, we do 

not have the money, we do not always have the wherewithal to do 

that with domestic. But I suggest we cannot delay, and John and 

I have discussed this a lot. And like you said already, Senator, that 

25

time is an issue, and I think the citizens trust us to get this in line 

and in place as soon as possible. 

Senator BOXER. Well, I would suggest that—I am going to do a 

little research on this foundation. I think they have another agenda. And I would like to have, Mr. Stone, if you could take a message back to TSA, what I consider to be more science-based study 

of the failure rate. But be that as it may, the bottom line is if you 

do not do this, you are going to have some bags that are going to 

get through. Because the bag match, we all know that does not protect us against a bomb. 

So I would say to TSA—and again, I have my friends whom I 

love who do not agree with me here who are going to push for 

change in the law. I am going to fight against changing the law. 

So I would move as if the law would not be changed. Because you’ll 

be back here next year and you’ll ask me the same thing. Because 

the problems you are describing are not going to get away that easily. 

So you might as well just face it, just like we had to face that 

we had to send our troops to Afghanistan. No one wanted to go. 

It was a horror. It was a nightmare. We did not know what we 

were going to face. We did it and we did it well and we did it right, 

and we continue to have to be there and make sure we finish the 

job right and make sure there is stability there. Think about that 

challenge compared to your challenge of testing a bag that is lying 

in front of your feet. 

Now, there may be people who will give you permission. If you 

asked me when I am checking in, me—here’s my bag, I am checking it in, and if the person at the counter says to me, we want to 

check your bag for bombs, but we do not have an EDS yet; as an 

interim we have got this trace detection machine. Here’s an option: 

You can go to the gate, relax, get on your plane, or you can stand 

by your bag. Give people a choice. 

Perhaps half of them or more will say, fine, as long as it makes 

it onto my plane. Some of them will not want to leave their bag, 

they will go. I think there is some innovative ways you can deal 

with the public. The public is more forgiving than you seem to 

think in your testimony. You are going to have a few people who 

are annoyed that they are slowed up, but most people want to get 

there safely. I mean, 99.9 percent, is my feeling. And if they know 

there is a little bit of an inconvenience, so be it. 

Mr. Green, you did not mention in your opening the failure rate 

at the screening that was discovered by the Federal Government 

when they tested. 

Mr. GREEN. The 41 percent? 

Senator BOXER. Yes. The 40 or whatever, 40 or 41 percent failure 

rate. Could you discuss what’s been done at your airport to improve 

that situation? 

Mr. GREEN. Well, we were certainly concerned to get those numbers. And the thing we needed quickly was to get an FSD in here, 

and, of course, Admiral Stone is here. I think the combination of 

supervisory attention at these checkpoints, when they begin to get 

better trained people in here, raise the standards, manage the operation a little more effectively than perhaps it has been over the 

past few years. I think we are very confident we will not have a 

26

problem here in LA, but that was a little disconcerting. It was a 

small sample size, but once was too many and it was bothersome. 

Senator BOXER. Mr. Stone, having come on board with that problem, you came right after that, what did you do? Without giving 

away any secrets, did you take that as one of your first responsibilities, to get that down to zero? 

Admiral STONE. Exactly. That caused me significant concern 

when I saw that, and I think the first thing as a leader is to bring 

the urgency for change. We cannot live with that type of performance. Even though we are Federalizing in an October timeframe, 

between now and October is a long time in terms of the current 

threat. So an urgency for change, which I conveyed when I got to 

the airport to the screening managers, was the first step. 

Senator BOXER. And the screening managers are Federal employees at LAX? 

Admiral STONE. These are contractors that gathered at the airport. When I arrived, I asked to meet with them and talk with 

them. 

Senator BOXER. They are contractors. Will they become Federal 

employees? Will that all be changing? 

Admiral STONE. That will be part of the Federalization process 

as we assess through NCS Pearson. And that process is starting at 

the assessment center to see which of our current employees meet 

the standards, and then we are very keen to retain all those that 

do. 

Senator BOXER. But now, have you tested again, in your way, 

some spot checks? Do you spot check? 

Admiral STONE. The TSA does. 

Senator BOXER. That is what I mean. 

Admiral STONE. I have not since I have been here. After the promulgation of the standard operating procedures by TSA and provided to the contractors as the standard to which to measure, 

both—the contractor does their own self-assessment, and TSA has 

sent out people to test and provide feedback to the contractors on 

corrective actions that need to be taken. 

The contractors were then required to provide a plan of action to 

correct any mid- to long-term deficiencies, but to do on the spot corrections at the time of the test. So that program is in place, and 

we will do continuous improvement up to the day we Federalize. 

Senator BOXER. Well, I think it is very important because when 

Secretary Mineta said, well, those are the old folks—old folks, new 

folks, some people do not care. They want them trained. They are 

out there. They are working for us, and they are working for the 

people to protect the people. So I hope that—and this is a message 

to the TSA folks—that you will conduct some of your own little 

tests just quietly, randomly, just to see that things are improving. 

Now, Mr. Acree, I am very concerned about Sacramento. I think 

Sacramento has been neglected. I feel that way in my heart, and 

I am upset about it. I am very delighted to hear you have a new 

person. Have you met with that person? 

Mr. ACREE. Yes. We met this week. 

Senator BOXER. What is his name? 

Mr. ACREE. William Wade. 

27

Senator BOXER. William Wade. And you expressed to him your 

concerns that you do not have any plan about the high failure rate 

and so on. Do you feel good that he’s wrapping his arms around 

these issues? 

Mr. ACREE. I met with him, it was his second day on the job, so 

I do not think he’s got his arms around that issue yet. But we are 

optimistic that—as SFO, LAX, and San Diego have experienced, we 

expect to have a positive working relationship. And we think now 

that he’s on board, we’ll get some results. 

Senator BOXER. Good. Well, I am going to talk to him personally 

because I am very worried that you have—of all the airports here, 

my sense is you have the longest way to go in terms of having the 

master plan, and you’ve been very candid about that. So I want you 

to know that I am going to help get a little special attention over 

there because it worries me. San Diego and San Francisco are complaining about, you know, decisions that have been made to put 

certain machinery in their lobbies, and you do not even know what 

plan there is for Sacramento to complain about or not complain 

about. 

Mr. ACREE. We like to say that we aim to please, please give us 

some place to aim. That is where we are at. 

Mr. AGUILAR. Senator, if I could interject, not to become defensive, but as of February when the TSA took over all the airports, 

we did not neglect any of the airports. In fact, we placed at every 

airport, pending the appointment of an FSD, an interim Federal security representative. I have not been to Sacramento. I have to believe that they have an interim secretary. 

Senator BOXER. I talked to her——

Mr. AGUILAR. Yes, ma’am, and——

Senator BOXER.—and she did not even know the results of the 

TSA tests on screeners. She said she was not even told, and she 

was the acting person. I am just saying, look, it is a new agency; 

we are finding our way. And it is not about blame. It is just that 

if I talk to an acting head—I mean, if you were sitting there—you 

are the head of security and at a very important airport, as all of 

these airports are, and you did not know that your own boss’s 

agency conducted a test and you failed it by 40 percent, you would 

have to read it in the paper—she read it in the paper—I mean, this 

is bad. 

Now, the acting head of LAX was much more informed. He knew, 

he was told, he was informed, he was making changes and improvements, and he was excited that you were coming. This was a 

different story. There was no word that anyone was coming. And 

I believe that I might have helped stir the pot in that regard just 

to move it a little quicker because when I talked to TSA, they said, 

oh, Sacramento. I am afraid that is a long way down the list. So 

I do not think it is a question of being defensive. It is a fact that 

the acting head did not know that there was this failure rate. It 

is just a fact. I mean, we are all human and things happen, but—

I cannot say what the bumper strip says, but things happen. But 

things do happen that are not good. 

Just trying to recap where we are: do we all agree that a trusted 

traveler program is very worth pursuing in order to lessen our 

hunt for the bad folks? I think there is an agreement there. That 

28

is very good. And I think if TSA—and in the beginning, TSA was 

not open to it, but clearly with the new leadership, they are open 

to this. So that is one very important thing that I am going to work 

on to try and develop and talk to Senator Hollings and Senator 

McCain and really start to move on this because we will do much 

better if we lessen the problem. And as far as what Mr. Martin 

said, that—if let us just say half of the people signed up who are 

the frequent fliers, that would diminish the universe by how much 

do you think, in your airport? 

Mr. MARTIN. Like 25 percent. 

Senator BOXER. So if half the frequent fliers did this, you’ve got 

a 25 percent easier job. Now, that is, of course, knowing that, as 

Mr. Gomez stresses, it has got to be really good technology and 

cannot be counterfeited and the rest of it. And that is, when we get 

to our technology show—there are a few things there. I do not 

know if it will deal with that, but certainly here in California we 

can figure out a way to make that work. So that is number one. 

Number two, there is a disagreement between the Federal folks 

and a couple of local airports on the error rate on the trace detection systems. 

Admiral STONE. Senator, I have a comment on that. 

Senator BOXER. Yes. 

Admiral STONE. Since we have these trace detection systems 

here at the airport now, here at LAX, we have a protocol in effect 

that if one machine you get a hit on, you go to another one. And 

if that does not, then you can clear, you have supervisors come. So 

the point made that that will take time in December when we have 

our baggage checked in that way is true. But I am not getting 30 

phone calls an hour telling me, over here at the terminal, that we 

have a problem. 

This is being resolved through time and testing and quantitative 

assessment by people. So as I look at December, I realize, as you 

stated, there is going to be some churn, some delay, but the costs 

far, I think in terms of security, outweigh the extra time that is 

going to be spent to resolve the error rate on ETDs. 

Senator BOXER. So the trace detection system, that is a bit of a 

conflict here. And my job, I want to get some more data, some more 

data on the accuracy or inaccuracy of those tests and the ways that 

you can get around it, which is to have a double check, and also 

the issue of passengers getting a choice to whether they want to 

stay with the bag or just go right to the plane. So we have an issue 

there. 

There is a disagreement between me and a couple of our local 

airport people in terms of slipping the date. I view that as a terrible way to go. And as I said, you know, it is like when you are 

a kid and you are doing your homework, it is really, give me another deadline, can’t I do the test next week? You are still working 

up to the last minute. It does not work. We have a problem. We 

have to deal with it. We have people working overtime trying to 

hurt us, and we have got to act. And it is my view that one more 

horrible disaster is going to destroy what you are trying to build. 

That is what I want to put in your head. One miss, one horrible 

miss because somebody said, oh, well bag match will work. Well, 

bag match does not take the place of these tests. 

29

Let us see, I want to get back to these failure rates that we experienced at Sacramento and LAX, Mr. Stone, because I am not clear. 

What is the deadline for the new hires? 

Admiral STONE. Our intent is in October to Federalize LAX. So 

this week NCS Pearson & Company was contracted by TSA down 

here in Los Angeles, and we’ve opened up an assessment center. 

And they are currently in the position of recruiting folks that we 

are going to need to Federalize our force in October. 

Senator BOXER. Mr. Stone—and again, you are just so nice to 

take on this job of answering for people who are not here—why is 

there no plan for Sacramento? Why are we getting this news that 

there is not even a plan there that they can argue about? Ms. 

Bowens, Mr. Martin, they at least have a plan they can argue 

about, or they think they do. You do not have a plan? 

Mr. MARTIN. We do not have a definite plan. We were told that 

it will be several weeks before we receive the plan and then another approximately 6 weeks, I believe, for the architectural and 

engineering and design work to be done, and then a couple months 

remaining for any construction work to be completed. And that’s 

our great concern. 

We want to do all we can to be ahead of the curve on security. 

We recognize it is the TSA’s responsibility, and I am purely providing my assessment of the lack of effectiveness of the trace detection machines that are not effective as compared to explosive detection devices on an in-line operating basis. 

Senator BOXER. We know. That is why they are interim and not 

permanent. 

Ms. Bowens, you do not have a plan either? 

Ms. BOWENS. We are about at the same spot as San Francisco, 

maybe just a week or two ahead of them. 

Senator BOXER. So could you respond to that, Mr. Gomez? 

Mr. GOMEZ. Yes, Senator. I told you that there were several consulting contracts out; Boeing is doing the baggage screening, and 

Lockheed Martin is going to be doing the checkpoint screening; and 

that the airport management met with these people already and 

preliminary kind of input was established in terms of what they 

would like to see. Obviously, they want the least amount of interruption to the passenger screening; and that they do not want a 

lot of modifications, although TSA is going to pay for that. 

So keeping all those things in mind, we feel that within two to 

3 weeks at the most, we are going to have some finalized plans 

that will take into account all of the input, and then based on that, 

then we’re going to be able to do the reconfigurations to allow us 

to meet the mandate by November 19th. 

All three of our airports will have the new standards for all the 

screeners. They’re going to be applied. They’re going to be—the 

people are going to be operating at higher level with their equipment, with better configurations. So I think that we’re going to be 

able to meet that. So the plan will evolve from that. 

Senator BOXER. Mr. Aguilar, is that——

Mr. AGUILAR. Yes. In fact, TSA has contracted, as you know, 

Lockheed Martin to conduct the passenger surveys at all the airports and Boeing for the checked baggage. And it is my understanding, in addition to LAX, San Francisco, and San Diego, that 

30

we currently have both Boeing and Lockheed Martin at Sacramento doing their assessments. 

I would hope that those assessment teams are working with the 

interim Federal security representative in Sacramento, as I know 

all of us have shared with our airport managers the status of that 

assessment. And from that assessment, we will develop our plan—

but we are at the beginning, merely at the beginning; that is what 

the assessment does—as to the best resolution for the introduction 

of the explosive detection systems and the reconfiguration of the 

checkpoints. 

But all the airports and my understanding, again, for Sacramento, that is currently being done, and certainly at San Diego. 

And I know I share all that information with Thella through my 

process action team. So again, that information——

Senator BOXER. So no plan yet written down, but you are discussing what the options will probably look like. And you are responding to that by saying you are worried about the interim solution. 

Let me just ask, Mr. Martin, Ms. Bowens, Mr. Acree, and Mr. 

Green, have these consultants talked to you, the Lockheed people 

and so on? 

Ms. BOWENS. We’ve had meetings. 

Senator BOXER. And you’ve expressed your concerns, the movement and so on. And you, Mr. Acree? 

Mr. ACREE. The TSA’s contractor, we met with them, the first 

time, 1 month ago today on July 8th. 

Senator BOXER. Who was that contractor? 

Mr. ACREE. That’s Jim Harris. 

Admiral STONE. Senator, I have a comment concerning LAX on 

that. 

Every week we are meeting with Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Los 

Angeles rural airports. There is an urgency here that this is not 

a measured approach. We’re at war with terrorism. Folks at the 

table know that. So I think that is the key here, at least for LAX, 

is that sort of mind-set about moving on——

Senator BOXER. Good. Well, I think I would encourage you, as 

the TSA people, to bring in your airport folks into these conversations, these roundtables, as often as possible so that they can make 

sure that their voices are being heard. Because there may be ways 

to—if the problem is congestion in the lobby, there may be answers 

to that. I tried to put through a few suggestions of my own, but 

they might not be the right ones. But there may be ways to handle 

it in a way that it works. 

I have been at foreign airports where this is done. And, yeah, it 

is a little chaotic, but you sure feel good that somebody is checking 

bags for bombs. That is the bottom line. You want to make sure 

there is no bomb on that plane, and that is the thing. And if it is, 

you hope it is in a kevlar container, which we are going to show 

later. Because if it is in a kevlar container in a cargo hold, then 

apparently it will not go up. It will blow up, but it will not cause 

a fire. It will be contained in a bin. 

Mr. Stone, does the TSA plan to reimburse local police departments and so on for the security that is being provided in the lobbies? 

31

Admiral STONE. The arrangement for that is one of the issues 

that I am currently working with TSA to find out, that financial 

pipeline and how that is going to work. So when Mayor Hahn 

called me after the Fourth of July and told me of his plans, we 

have been discussing that issue. So I do not have any answers, but 

I can get back you. 

Senator BOXER. That is a very big issue because I think that we 

put a price, a security tag on the ticket prices, and you know, security is security. And if you are standing at the counter, you should 

be protected. It seems to me if the Federal Government’s taking 

over security at airports, then it needs to—I agree with Ms. 

Bowens—utilize the local people to do it, but reimburse. It is an 

important thing. 

Mr. GREEN. If I might, Senator. I think any help you can give 

us in that regard would be appreciated because, obviously, the 

price you spoke to is going up considerably. The costs we are incurring going forward for security are staggering. 

Senator BOXER. I would like to hear from all of you on the added 

costs. Are you doing more security at the check-in counters? 

Mr. ACREE. Yes, ma’am. We have deployed additional uniformed 

and nonuniformed law enforcement officers as well as additional 

canine teams. 

Senator BOXER. Good. And you as well, Ms. Bowens? 

Ms. BOWENS. We have increased our police presence. We are on 

the list to receive additional canine teams. Our cost overall for increased police security at the airport has gone up about $3 million. 

Senator BOXER. Well, when I spoke to Admiral Loy, I was very 

pleased with his attitude on the point, and that was different from 

the prior individual. And so I am hopeful that we can resolve that. 

But do let me know; detail some of these costs. 

So let me sum up here. This has been very helpful to me. You 

know how I know that? Because I have a headache. And if I get 

a headache, it means that I have been concentrating and trying to 

figure this all out. That is how I know. 

We are going to work with the local people to make sure that you 

are reimbursed for your expenses that deal with the added security 

at the check-in. So please let me know. I think we have a sympathetic ear at the TSA. We just have to figure this out. 

Second, I hope that you will, instead of fighting the deadline, 

which is easy to do, work with us, please. You know, I will say this: 

if the Senate does vote to agree with Dick Armey and the House 

people and you get another year, you are not going to get any other 

years. It is only going to work once. So the bottom line is, you are 

going to have to do what you have to do. No one is going to come 

and arrest you, you know, if every little ‘‘i’’ is not dotted, but let 

us do what we need to do. 

I want to assure you, as a member of the traveling public, that 

a little inconvenience is not going to worry me. I want to get off 

the plane and see my grandchild at the other end or make my 

meeting at the other end, call my husband when I get to the other 

end, not from the airplane saying, ‘‘I love you.’’ That is not what 

I want to do, and I do not think I am very different from most. 

You are going to have a couple of people who are impossible to 

deal with, but that is our life. And you will always have people who 

32

are difficult, whether there is a long line or a short line, and we 

will deal with that as we have to. But I am very sympathetic to 

the challenge. I also think there are ways to get around false 

positives. You heard some of them from Mr. Stone, some backup 

tests, et cetera, that can work. 

Why do not we try to meet the deadline, please, I say to my 

friends out in there in the field. I compliment LA. I hope, I say to 

my TSA people, that you will stay on top of those screeners because 

we cannot handle a 40 percent failure rate. It is unacceptable. That 

is a giant hole in the dike that is not good. So let us work. 

Let us go and see some of the innovations. One of the things that 

I am working on is to try and get a better way, when someone 

gives an ID to a check-in person, to know if it is a false ID. And 

we have some demonstrations on that. 

So I want to thank all of you for being here. I know these are 

hard things to deal with, but we are all on the same team. The bad 

guys are on the other team. So let us stick together, unified, and 

defeat their attempts to harm us. 

I thank you very much, and we stand adjourned until we meet 

in the other room. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, the field hearing was adjourned.]

Æ