COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Coleman and Bray 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

DEBORAH WILLIAMS 

v. Record No. 2133-95-1 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

 CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA JUNE 25, 1996 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 

Randolph T. West, Judge 

 Bryan L. Saunders for appellant. 

 Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Deborah Williams appeals her convictions, after a bench 

trial, for grand larceny and felony destruction of private 

property. She argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove 

her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm the convictions. 

 In July of 1994, Michelle Carlsen was living in Newport News 

with her husband and four-year-old daughter. The family resided 

in a new home that was in good condition. Ms. Carlsen, a 

sergeant in the U.S. Army, received a duty assignment in Texas, 

and her husband was also away on military assignment. She 

arranged for Deborah Williams, who worked at her daughter's day 

care center, to care for the home and forward the mail. Ms. 

Williams also agreed to care for Carlsen's puppy. Carlsen had 

disconnected the battery to her truck, but told Williams where 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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the key was in case of an emergency. Carlsen gave a house key to 

Williams and no one else. 

 By September, Carlsen was concerned because she had received 

only one package of mail from Williams. She left Williams 

numerous messages, and finally reached her on October 13, 1994. 

Williams told her that she had been busy working in a hotel at 

night, but that everything was fine at the house. Still 

concerned, Carlsen sent a key to a friend, Petty Officer Dauth, 

and asked him to check the house. 

 On October 15, Dauth arrived at the house and found it 

unlocked. He entered the house and noticed a rancid smell. 

Dauth discovered the remains of the dog, decomposing and covered 

with maggots, on the floor in the den. The dog had a hole in its 

head, and blood had soaked through the pad under the carpet. 

There were large black stains on the carpet and the tile floor, 

and black handprints on the walls. Tables were turned over, and 

there were piles of dirty dishes in the kitchen, as well as moldy 

food. Upstairs, there were dried urine and dog feces in the 

guest bathroom, and the bedrooms were in disarray. The master 

bedroom had apparently been ransacked, and snack food was piled 

on the bed in the guest room. Dauth became covered with fleas. 

 Dauth removed the dog and buried it in the backyard. He 

purchased multiple insecticide foggers to kill the fleas. He 

activated the foggers and left the premises, locking the door 

behind him. 
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 Dauth and his wife returned the next day in order to 

continue their efforts to clean up the house. They found a flea 

fogger and a can of bug repellent that had not been there the day 

before. The washing machine had apparently just stopped and 

there was still a ladies' pantsuit inside it. 

 Cheryle Harris, Carlsen's neighbor, had observed Williams at 

the house on several occasions while Carlsen was in Texas. She 

saw Williams loading her car with clothes in clothes baskets and 

with other property concealed in large green garbage bags. She 

saw people other than Williams going in and out of the house, and 

saw Williams and others driving Carlsen's truck. She saw 

Williams for the last time in mid-September, but observed others 

at the house until shortly before Carlsen returned. 

 Carlsen returned to the house on October 30, 1994. She 

observed that in addition to the property damage, items of 

personal property including clothing, jewelry, and tools were 

missing. She estimated that the value of the missing items was 

over $2,000, and paid over $1,000 for clean-up and repair of the 

home. She confronted Williams at work, and testified that 

Williams told her that someone else had been taking care of the 

house. She tried to contact this individual at the number 

Williams gave her, but no one at that location had heard of the 

individual. 

 Ms. Williams gave a statement to the police, which was 

introduced at trial, and also testified in her own behalf. She 
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stated that she had moved to Gloucester over Labor Day weekend, 

cleaning the house before she left, and after that did not go to 

the Carlsen house every day. After moving to Gloucester she 

returned to the house to do her laundry and feed the dog. 

Williams stated that about a week prior to the call she received 

from Carlsen, she had discovered the dog dead in the house. She 

claimed that the dog had been alive and healthy during her last 

visit. She covered the dog with a sheet and left it there, and 

did not return to the house after that. Williams testified that 

she did not give a house key to anyone else, and claimed to have 

no idea how the house came to be in such terrible condition. 

 The Commonwealth argues that Williams failed to preserve her 

objection to the sufficiency of the evidence pursuant to Rule 

5A:18. Williams moved to strike the Commonwealth's evidence, but 

failed to renew her motion to strike after she presented her own 

evidence. However, before the court rendered a final order, she 

made a motion to set aside the verdict that challenged the 

sufficiency of the evidence. This motion preserved her 

sufficiency objection after the bench trial. See McGee v. 

Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 317, 321, 357 S.E.2d 738, 739-40 (1987). 

 On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Higginbotham v. 

Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). In a 

case based on circumstantial evidence, the Commonwealth must 
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exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Lafon v. 

Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 411, 425, 438 S.E.2d 279, 288 (1993) 

(citations omitted). The Commonwealth is not required to 

disprove every remote possibility of innocence, but is instead 

required to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Id. The Commonwealth is only required to exclude 

reasonable hypotheses of innocence which arise from the evidence. 

Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 269, 289-90, 373 S.E.2d 

328, 338-39 (1988) (citations omitted). 

 Both Carlsen and Williams testified that Williams was the 

only person with a house key. There were no signs of forced 

entry. Williams was seen going in and out of the home, and was 

also observed removing items from the home in garbage bags. 

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, these 

facts support the inference that Williams was responsible for the 

damage to the home and for the theft of Carlsen's property. 

 Williams' improbable account of her actions provides further 

evidence of her guilt. She acknowledged visiting the home about 

a week before Dauth did, but claimed to have no knowledge of the 

home's condition. Her claim that she left the home in good 

condition and her account of the dog's death were contradicted by 

other evidence in the record. Her testimony was inherently 

improbable and inconsistent with circumstances in evidence, and 

the judge was therefore entitled to reject it. Servis v. 

Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 525, 371 S.E.2d 156, 165 (1988). 
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Moreover, the trial court could properly consider her false 

testimony as affirmative evidence of her guilt. See Wright v. 

West, 505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992); Black v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 

838, 842, 284 S.E.2d 608, 610 (1981) (citations omitted). The 

trial court could reasonably conclude that Williams, and not 

other individuals whom she may have invited into the home, did at 

least some of the damage and stole Carlsen's property. For these 

reasons, we affirm the convictions. 

 Affirmed.