U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

Bureau of Justice Assistance

October 1998

Onsite Visits, Case Histories, and State 

and Local Innovations From the erspectives Bureau of Justice Assistance

ractitioner Nancy E. Gist, Director

[The program] built on

the wise belief that not

every criminal should go

to prison continues to

prove itself. It is money

well spent. Since 1990,

more than 40,000

offenders, most of them

confronted with their

first-ever prison term,

have been diverted to this

nationally recognized

program. . . . Extensive

counseling explores the

root of the problem,

community work teaches

reliability while restoring

dignity, and reading

programs help develop

valuable skills.

Alternative sanctions clients work alongside

community members to build and maintain

playscapes in Connecticut communities.

Connecticut’s Alternative

Sanctions Program

$619 Million Saved in Estimated Capital

and Operating Costs

The Hartford Courant

October 20, 1997

By Patrick J. Coleman, Jeffrey Felten-Green, and Geroma Oliver, BJA

Any visitor to the Alternative to

Incarceration Center (AIC) in

Bridgeport, Connecticut, will be

impressed by the facility’s structure and organization. The Bridgeport center is one of

Connecticut’s 17 AICs, which serve referrals from the 17 state courts. Just inside the

front door is a control center that tracks the

comings and goings of the several hundred

offenders who are assigned to the center

each year. During our visit on February 22

and 23, 1998, a Connecticut Noreaster was

pounding the outside walls of the AIC, so

many clients were busy at various activities

within the center. For example, down the

hall from the control center, six clients were

folding and stapling newsletters for local

nonprofit organizations to fill part of the

community service requirement of their

sentence. Ordinarily, if it had not been raining so hard, “Most of these clients would be

outside doing much more physical community service work,” according to Jim

Greene, Deputy Director of Field Services

for the Office of Alternative Sanctions

(OAS). More physical work includes activities like cleaning up state parks, removing

trash from inner-city vacant lots, or building

and maintaining giant playscapes (as OAS

community service teams have a reputation

of doing). OAS Field Services organizes and

runs all of the community service opportunities available to OAS clients.

The AIC also contains a classroom and a

computer room where clients are taught

how to read or prepare for their general

equivalency diploma (GED). One part of

Bulletin From the Field

t

t
2

Bulletin From the Field: Practitioner Perspectives

This series is dedicated to the exploration of vital issues in criminal justice program development and management. Case studies highlight the work of progressive, innovative people and programs in state and local criminal

justice systems. Although a case study may include a detailed description of the operational aspects of a program,

it is not a scientific program evaluation. Rather, it is a document designed to explore the interaction of factors

such as collaboration, politics, resources, culture, and others that play a part in successful public management.

this educational program—Project

READ—is funded through the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) Edward Byrne Memorial Formula Grant

funds. Other services available to AIC

clients include substance abuse treatment and a batterer’s education group.

Michael Lawlor, Co-Chair of the Judiciary Committee in the Connecticut House of Representatives, said,

“[Alternatives to incarceration are]

an alternative to prison, not an alternative to punishment.” Alternative

sanctions programs allow the state

courts to ensure that all criminal offenders receive swift, certain, and

meaningful punishment, while repaying the community and preventing the citizens of Connecticut from

having to fund the operations of new

prisons years into the future. Bill

Carbone, the Director of OAS said,

“These programs don’t remove the

need for prison; they reinforce the

severity of prison as a sanction.”

AICs are just one element in a complete continuum of alternative sanctions. Placements are made according

to the amount of risk a client poses to

the community. These alternatives

include:

t Alternative to Incarceration

Centers. AICs provide supervision,

substance abuse treatment, educational/vocational assistance, counseling, and community service

opportunities. All AICs are operated

by private nonprofit agencies.

t Community Service Labor

Program. This program requires that

offenders provide needed services to

the community in lieu of prosecution.

t Electronic Monitoring. Electronic

monitoring technology is used to

verify that an offender remains in his

or her home during specified hours.

t Day Incarceration Centers

(DICs). The most serious offenders

are supervised in DICs 7 days a week

during the day. At night, all DIC

clients are monitored electronically.

t Youth Confinement Centers

(YCCs). Drug-involved offenders,

between ages 16 and 21, are confined

in these centers where they receive

substance abuse treatment services.

t Project Green. This project

combines extensive community

service in state parks with substance

abuse treatment.

t Women and Children Program.

This program permits female offenders to live with their children during

their participation in a treatment

program.

t Traditional Inpatient Drug and

Alcohol Treatment. With this

treatment, clients are admitted to a

residential setting where they receive

detoxification, substance abuse

treatment, and educational/vocational

assistance.

The Connecticut judiciary has established alternative sanction options for

virtually every offender who does

not absolutely have to be in prison.

Alternative sanctions programs are

available to juveniles (up to age 16),

youthful offenders (ages 16 to 18), and

adults (18 and older). Each offender’s

risk of reoffending and his or her living

skills needs (staying sober, learning to

read, maintaining employment) are assessed by judicial branch personnel

and alternative sanctions program staff.

The offender is then placed in the

program(s) most likely to protect the

community and assist the offender in

developing skills that will keep him or

her out of the criminal justice system

in the future. Evaluations have shown

that OAS programs are saving money

and reducing offender recidivism.1

How did Connecticut pull this off

when most of the nation is getting

tough on crime and building more and

more prisons? How have the programs

generated legitimacy and public support for keeping criminals out of

prison? How have they avoided the

traditional problems of overcrowding

and underfunding, which have ruined

the effectiveness of many criminal

justice intervention programs in the

past? How have they escaped the

damaging, negative publicity that

would have rained down if even one

offender had committed a high-profile

violent crime in the 8 years since the

program started? Do alternative sanctions really make a difference in the

safety of the community and the lives

of offenders? Before our visit we had

a lot of questions about the program.

But after much background research

and 2 days in Connecticut conducting

interviews with seven key political
3

Connecticut’s Alternative Sanctions Program

and program players, three groups of

alternative sanctions staff, and two

groups of clients (one juvenile and

one adult) and visiting four day reporting centers in two cities, our

questions were answered.

History

Development of the

Connecticut Alternative

Sanctions Program

Bill Carbone, the Director of OAS and

a career advocate for progress in the

Connecticut criminal justice system,

told us, “In the late 1980s, the criminal justice system in Connecticut had

lost its integrity in the eyes of the

public. Most offenders [including violent offenders] sentenced to prison

were doing 10 percent or less of their

sentence.” This crisis was, in part,

due to 1981 legislation that dismantled the Connecticut Parole

System and established definite sentencing. Definite sentencing led to

longer sentences for offenders and

fewer releases from prison. The immediate result of definite sentencing

was prison overcrowding, which led to

a dramatic increase in the use of supervised home release for offenders.

Bill Carbone told us, “The original

response to this problem, much like

the current response in many other

areas of the country, was to build [facilities to hold] 11,000 prison beds.

Between 1985 and 1990 the state of

Connecticut spent over $1 billion in

this effort.”

By 1990, however, the citizens of

Connecticut were tired of paying for

the construction and upkeep of new

prisons. The original expense of

building the prisons was minor compared with the ongoing expense of operating them year after year. Prison

building, once an economic development plumb sought by Connecticut

communities, was no longer popular.

Even enormous tax incentives offered

by the state were not enough to persuade communities to allow the building of new prisons in their midst. Also,

it became apparent to Connecticut

residents that the prison-building

marathon had not solved the criminal

justice system’s sentencing integrity

problems.

In addition, Connecticut, along with

the rest of the country in 1990, was

experiencing an economic recession.

Mr. Carbone told us, “There was no

Connecticut income tax in 1990, and

the sales tax wasn’t generating sufficient revenue to maintain state institutions, let alone expand them. State

employees were being laid off, and the

construction of any new state institutions became an unpopular option.”

Government leaders and criminal justice officials realized that the prisonbuilding effort had resolved neither

the crowding problems nor their credibility problems. We spoke with Ed

Schmidt, Counsel to the Connecticut

House of Representatives, who told

us, “Despite political differences,

there was no incentive to defend the

status quo.”

Court as a Community

Problem Solver

Director Carbone told us that he and

several others were responsible for

the idea behind the creation of OAS.

He chaired the Connecticut Commission on Prison Overcrowding, which

had recommended alternatives to incarceration as an option for solving

prison crowding and sentencing

legitimacy issues. The Governor at

the time, Democrat William A.

O’Neill, and members of the state legislature had explored the ideas of alternatives to incarceration as well.

Director Carbone, however, gives

credit for the formulation of the idea

and the sheparding of the legislation

to Judge Aaron Ment.

The Honorable Judge Ment, highly

respected Chief Court Administrator

in Connecticut, stepped forward during the prison crisis with ideas that

called for more effective sanctions and

less money. In 1990, Judge Ment proposed two pieces of legislation. The

first created the Office of Alternative

Sanctions and empowered judges to

sentence offenders directly to intermediate sanction programs, including

substance abuse treatment. OAS was

to develop a series of alternatives to

incarceration for low-risk pretrial and

postadjudication offenders. OAS was

to provide judges with a variety of

sanctions that took into account the

seriousness of the offense and the

criminal history of the offender. A gettough side to OAS was to be set up; if

an offender failed the program, he or

she would be sent to prison to complete the full sentence. OAS was to

base its programs on two premises:

1. Every individual convicted of a crime

should be swiftly punished and that

punishment should be strictly

enforced. The sanctions, however,

should be consistent with the severity

of the offense, the offender’s criminal

and personal history, and public

safety needs.

2. A continuum of credible, enforceable

community-based sentencing options,

falling between probation and prison

should be created in every court in

Connecticut. Intermediate sanctions

must punish justly and sensibly and

ensure the availability of prison space

for violent and chronic offenders.2
4

Bulletin From the Field: Practitioner Perspectives

Judge Ment’s second piece of legislation demanded progressive increases

in the percentage of time served by

inmates and ultimately reinstated the

Connecticut parole system. This legislation required that, within a year,

with the diversion of 1,500 inmates to

OAS, minimum prison sentences had

to increase from 10 percent to at least

25 percent of the sentence. In the

second year, with 3,000 offenders diverted to OAS, 40 percent of prison

sentences had to be served. In the

third year, with 4,500 offenders going

to OAS, the parole system was to be

reinstated. According to this legislation, inmates could not see the parole

board until they had served 50 percent of their sentence—with no time

off for good behavior, no exceptions,

and no frills. Judge Ment’s legislation

was intended to restore the severity of

prison sentences and represented a

critical element in the Connecticut

judiciary’s effort to control prison and

jail overcrowding by providing courtbased pretrial and sentencing options

for judges to consider in lieu of long

periods of incarceration.

Judge Ment told us, “I don’t consider

myself a ‘Judicial Activist,’ but I do

believe that the court should play a

role as a problemsolver for the community.” Both pieces of legislation

passed with one condition—a 5-year

sunset clause. This clause was a message to Judge Ment and the supporters of OAS; they had 5 years to

demonstrate that they could safely

and effectively manage low-risk offenders outside prison. At the end of

5 years, the Connecticut legislature

would have to pass new legislation to

fund OAS or the program would end.

When the 5-year period was up, the

legislature unanimously passed a bill

that continued the operation of the

OAS indefinitely with no additional

sunset clauses.

All branches of Connecticut’s government worked together to respond to the

prison and jail overcrowding crisis.

The judicial branch conducted research that led to the development of

OAS and accepted the responsibility

for the administration of the project.

The legislature passed the public acts

described above. The executive branch

has increased funding for these initiatives every year, despite the state’s periodic financial problems.

In addition to the progressive state

financial commitment, the Bureau of

Justice Assistance has also supported

OAS efforts steadily over the years.

Since 1994, OAS has received more

than $11.5 million in BJA Byrne Formula Grant funds, which are administered in Connecticut by the Justice

Planning Unit in the Governor’s Office of Policy and Management. In

addition to Project READ, Byrne

funding has been used to support juvenile justice centers; Latino offender

programs; AIC capacity enhancements; intensive supervision of sex

offenders; the New Haven, Waterbury,

and Hartford drug courts; and many

other OAS programs. OAS has also

received more than $2.5 million in

BJA discretionary funding for corrections options programs for Latino,

female, and youthful offenders.

In the last 2 years, OAS has also received funding from other offices

within the U.S. Department of Justice

(DOJ), Office of Justice Programs

(OJP). A Family Violence Court

Docket has been funded in three Connecticut cities by the Violence Against

Women Grants Office. OJP’s Drug

Courts Program Office has funded a

drug court in Bridgeport. Additionally,

the Corrections Program Office has

funded a drug treatment program for

mothers and their children to fill a

large gap in available treatment services from OAS. This combination of

extensive state resources and significant contributions from BJA and other

OJP agencies has kept OAS well

funded and well managed.

Selling Alternative Sanctions

in a “Tough on Crime”

World

In 1987, the declaration of the War on

Drugs started a trend of criminalizing

what were previously considered to be

minor offenses, such as low-level

drug possession.3

 Most of the nation

seemed to agree that government

should incarcerate more people for

longer periods of time to demonstrate

its intolerance of crime.4

 Three years

later, Judge Ment was successful in

getting legislation passed that would

prevent many of these same low-level

offenders from going to prison. How

did the supporters of alternative sanctions effectively sell this idea?

Judge Ment said that several things

had to be in place for him and his

supporters to be successful. First

of all, there had to be a prison crisis

or they would not have needed

alternative sanctions. Second, they

had to have the support of the state

judiciary. Judge Ment said, “We

avoided telling judges they had to

[use alternatives]—we have no

sentencing guidelines in Connecticut.” Instead, Judge Ment offered

the judges the possibility of having

a “full array of sanctions” and having “complete control” over their

implementation. Another crucial

element was the accompanying legislation, which demanded minimums

for time served. Judge Ment said,
5

Connecticut’s Alternative Sanctions Program

“Credibility is crucial—[alternative

sanctions] have to be an alternative

to higher sanction, such as prison.”

Once the legislation was passed, the

fledgling OAS had 5 years to prove that

its solution worked. Mr. Carbone said,

“We had no time to waste, so we started

evaluating our programs from the beginning.” In fact, the survival of OAS

depended upon several objectives that

had to be accomplished for potential

detractors to be sold on the idea.

Developing Firm Public

Support. To secure public support,

OAS waged an effective marketing

campaign emphasizing the accountability aspects of alternatives to

incarceration. A highly visible

community service component was

developed that showed offenders

doing hard work to pay back the

community and improve neighborhoods. Jim Greene said that “we

had to legitimize community service. We did this by putting offenders along side regular volunteers.

It’s more changing the image of offenders than changing the offenders.” OAS clients assist community

volunteer organizations in building

playgrounds, maintaining state

parks, cleaning inner-city vacant

lots, and building “pocket parks”

on vacant lots. Jim Greene said,

“We try to avoid derision of clients

and use them always as a resource.

. . .We have our supervisors work

right alongside offenders.”

One of the problems with community

service programs has always been

getting the clients to fulfill their

obligations. Jim Greene said, “We

thought, ‘What if offenders actually

wanted to do community service?’.”

To accomplish this, OAS sought

out unusual community service

opportunities for its clients. One example is its work with the Nutmeg

Games, an annual state athletic event.

Ordinarily, community service workers would clean up the trash after the

event. But after OAS had established

the credibility of its community

service program, it began using offenders to collect the gate money at

the Nutmeg Games. Jim Greene said,

“We’ve collected more than $70,000

over each of the last 4 years and the

books have always balanced.”

To make sure that the community

service work was visible to the public,

OAS clients work alongside residents

from the community. People who may

have been unsure about having offenders work on projects in their community “virtually always change their

mind after a day of working alongside

one of our clients,” said Jim Greene.

Having offenders work with community

members not only raises the visibility

and community acceptance of OAS

programs, but also legitimizes the work

of the offenders while integrating them

with the noncriminal population.

OAS has also attracted a good deal of

positive attention from the press,

which has raised the public profile of

its community service work. Director

Carbone has been open and willing to

talk to the press when approached

about OAS programs and evaluation

outcomes. This openness, combined

with the success of the program, has

resulted in an ongoing positive relationship with the press.

OAS creates its own newsletters and

holds its own staff meetings, conferences, and program evaluations for its

network of providers. Providers share

the newsletters with OAS clients and

the public. The staff meetings and

conferences allow ordinarily isolated

providers to create and reinforce a

network that includes other community providers across the state. The

program evaluations update local providers on the impact of the program so

that they can respond to questions

from community members about the

nature and success of OAS programs.

Another effort used to gain public

support for alternative sanctions

was emphasizing how much tax

payer money the program would

save—$25,000 is spent annually to

incarcerate an offender compared

Clients clean up at Yale Bowl after the opening ceremonies at the 1995 World Games of the

Special Olympics.
6

Bulletin From the Field: Practitioner Perspectives

with $7,000 spent (with an average of

four clients per slot per year) to supervise an offender through alternative sanctions. Further, Judge Ment

told us, “The late Raymond Burr

made two movies to promote and inform the public about alternative

sanctions. One included an interview

with a victim.” These movies relayed

the message that even victims saw alternative sanctions as more appropriate for low-risk offenders than prison.

Maintaining Credibility. When

asked how the program has managed

to build and maintain its credibility,

Tom Siconolfi, Director of the Justice

Planning Unit in the Governor’s Office of Policy and Management, said

it was “with no horror stories plus

lots of positive stories.” Jim Greene

explained, “We have managed the

heck out of these programs—the

entire project is dependent upon

proper supervision.” When performing community service OAS maintains a ratio of one staff member to

six offenders. Jack Bailey, the Chief

State’s Attorney in Connecticut told

us, “There is another side to credibility and that is accountability. If

an OAS client doesn’t show up to the

AIC, they are reported and docketed

to be in court the next day.” This

swift response to noncompliance

sends a message to offenders, law

enforcement personnel, and the community that OAS is serious about its

commitment to public safety.

Perhaps the most significant factor in

maintaining credibility is that OAS designed these programs exclusively for

pretrial and low-risk offenders and has

stayed true to its admission criteria.

OAS has carefully followed the design

of its programs and admits only offenders that match the admission criteria.

Many correctional programs that get a

reputation for doing a good job are

suddenly flooded with referrals of all

kinds. Some programs accept inappropriate referrals under this pressure

and end up with horror stories that hit

the press and damage the credibility

of the programs. There may be nothing

wrong with the programs, but admitting the wrong types of clients could

be disastrous.

Maximizing the Benefits of

Privatization. Alternative sanctions

programs are operated through OAS

contracts with private, nonprofit organizations. Privatization helped to sell

this program to Connecticut’s Governor, voters, legislators, press, judges,

and corrections system in several ways.

First, privatization has a reputation for

saving money because, when done correctly, services can be provided without the massive administrative

overhead that comes with operating

under the state government umbrella.

Next, privatization allows “small government” advocates to say that they are

providing more services to the state

with fewer government employees.

Another benefit of privatization is that

it allows OAS to use organizations

that are already providing services

and have already established credibility in the community. Further,

shedding the bureaucracy, according

to Mr. Carbone, “allowed OAS to start

and expand programming almost immediately when it could have taken

years had the programs been state operations.” Finally, and what is most

important—for OAS, its supporters,

and the community—privatization

makes program providers accountable

to OAS. If a contracted service provider is not doing a good job, Jim

Greene said that OAS “can drop them

in 30 days.” Privatization offered cost

savings, accountability, smaller government, and community economic

development—all were appealing to

conservatives who might have opposed a program that they could have

killed by labeling it “soft on crime.”

Creating the Opportunity To Get

Tough on Prison Sentences.

Shortly after the two pieces of legislation that created OAS and minimum

Clients build a lookout tower in a Connecticut state park, which will be used to spot forest fires.
7

Connecticut’s Alternative Sanctions Program

prison time served were passed, offenders sent to prison were required

to spend significantly longer portions

of their sentence behind bars. It became possible for “tough on crime”

lawmakers to consider more stringent

prison sentences for appropriate

crimes. This was largely due to the

prison beds that were made available

by the diversion of low-risk offenders

to OAS. More prison beds and tougher

sentences restored the credibility of a

prison sentence.

Avoiding a Fight With the

Unions. Another common difficulty

with active offender community

services programs involves replacing

union workers with offenders. The

OAS community services programs

operate in state parks and inner-city

sites but generally do not displace

any workers, particularly union workers. Jim Greene told us that the state

workforce had been so depleted by

the recession of the late 1980s and

early 1990s that there were “basically

no union staff left to maintain state

parks.” OAS clients were meeting a

community need but not threatening

the jobs of hard-working, honest citizens; this was key to selling the idea.

Avoiding Becoming a Political

Football. All of the factors discussed

above have, to date, prevented OAS

from becoming a political football.

Judge Ment and Director Carbone

have carefully sheparded the program

through the economic and political

minefields. A “soft on crime” label,

an OAS client committing a violent

crime, an impression of government

expansion draining tax dollars, or

a suspicion that citizens must compete with offenders for jobs can be

portrayed as highly volatile images

that are easily adapted to the needs

of political opportunists. It has taken

patience, tenacity, and reinforced

credibility to sell alternative sanctions to the people of Connecticut. Mr.

Bailey said, “If you have one element

of the criminal justice system against

it, it won’t go.” Mr. Siconolfi added,

“If an area doesn’t have a critical

mass of issues (i.e., prison relief

needs) [and a] demonstrated level of

cooperation among all leaders, you

can have the money or not, [but] it

probably won’t work.”

Unique Political Structure

May Have Helped Establish

OAS

The state of Connecticut has a unique

government structure. State court

judges are nominated by the Governor

and appointed by the general assembly

for 8-year terms and can only be removed with just cause. The Chief Court

Administrator is appointed by the Chief

Justice of the Connecticut Supreme

Court who is appointed by the Governor. The Chief State’s Attorney is appointed by a commission, which is

appointed by the Governor. Local state’s

attorneys are appointed by the Commission on Criminal Justice, which is appointed by the Governor. Jack Bailey

said, “The Attorney General is elected,

but has no jurisdiction over criminal

matters—civil only.” Further, Connecticut has no county governments,

and therefore no county courts. There

are few stakeholders and fewer turf

boundaries to cross in trying to obtain

the necessary consensus of support for

alternative sanctions programs.

In short, none of the players that

would have to defend alternative

sanctions on the political stump have

to run for election. Jack Bailey said,

“It would have been a much harder

sell if they had to run for election. If I

were running on the opposing side, I

would get up and say, ‘We spend $35

million a year on prosecuting and $42

million on keeping [offenders] out

of prison. Don’t you think its time

we restored the credibility of the

criminal justice system?’. ” Because

these players do not have to run for

Alternative sanctions clients work to put out a forest fire in a Connecticut state park.
8

Bulletin From the Field: Practitioner Perspectives

election, the issue is not tested on the

front lines by today’s contentious

partisan politics.

These political dynamics have centralized control and allowed a small

number of individuals to shape policy

without having to pass the test of intense public scrutiny. In this day of

campaign sound bites, misquotes and

quotes taken out of context, and political grandstanding on criminal

justice issues, it is likely that this

consolidation of power has contributed immensely to the acceptance of

alternative sanctions in Connecticut.

This should not take away from the

fact that OAS is supported by a bipartisan, public/private/government coalition, which includes a partnership of

all three branches of government and

a partnership of the state court leadership. OAS staff and supporters

worked extensively to make the

program visible to the public and a

credible offender management tool.

Alternative sanctions programs are

extremely popular in Connecticut

and have demonstrated their

effectiveness in saving money, improving conditions in the community,

and reducing offender recidivism.

Connecticut Alternative

Sanctions in 1998

I think AIC is a very good program. AIC has helped me in many

ways. . . . Since I have been coming here I have gotten my GED.

Now I attend [technical college]

where I am earning an associate’s

degree in business administration.

I am also employed at [a supermarket]. The case managers are

very helpful. If you have a problem

they try to help you out and be

there for you [in] any way they

can. . . . AIC is a good program

for those who want to take advantage of a good thing. If you have

the attitude you are going to

make your time here count, you

can accomplish anything.

—AIC Client

February 24, 1998

Structure

The Connecticut judicial branch has

administrative authority over all criminal courts, the Bail Commission, the

Office of Adult Probation (OAP), and

OAS. OAS has primary responsibility

for coordinating and contracting public and private efforts to expand alternative incarceration programming.

The Bail Commission and OAP are

judicial branch divisions that provide

direct supervision to more than 50,000

accused and sentenced offenders.5

Rapid and efficient statewide replication of proven, alternative sanction

model programs is facilitated by this

unified criminal justice system.

Program Components

In addition to the programs for adult

offenders that were described in the

introduction, there are many other

levels of sanctions that are available

through this system. A statewide

network of more than 50 public and

private providers deliver the following services:

t Community service.

t Day incarceration center.

t Restitution center.

t Family counseling.

t Mediation.

t Drug court.

t Intensive supervision probation.

t Substance abuse treatment.

t Youth confinement centers.

t Sex offender supervision and

treatment.

t Electronic monitoring/house arrest.

t Victim restitution.

t Halfway house placement.

These are cost-effective alternatives

to incarceration that use communitybased punishment, treatment, and

supervision of criminal offenders.

We spoke to several offenders at the

Bridgeport AIC about their experiences with alternative sanctions. All

reported very positive encounters. An

offender involved in the more restrictive Day Incarceration Center programs said, “[Alternative sanctions]

make sense. If you send a man to

prison, that’ll just make him mean.

This way you can deal with your problems and stay out of trouble.” Another

offender said, “I would never have

thought I could get out of the criminal

justice system, but now I’m learning

to read; I’m learning how to work a

computer. You can’t get me out of that

computer room. And I think I really

have a chance to change my life.”

Some of the offenders had suggestions for improvement. One offender

said, “I think AIC should have a job

developer—someone who goes out to

different companies in the area to try

to get jobs for the clients when they

get out of [the program].” We found

that some AICs do offer job development services, but resources are limited. Most of the clients’ criticisms of

alternative sanctions were related to

restrictions on their freedom, which

are required by the program to

ensure public safety.

Each center we visited had a different

“feel” to it. The first AIC we visited

was in New Haven. The physical setup
9

Connecticut’s Alternative Sanctions Program

of this center was very open with

cubicles scattered throughout the

building. Multicultural art adorned the

walls along with many quotes from famous African-American leaders. We

entered the education room where a

group of AIC clients were having a values exploration discussion with their

teacher. They were discussing whether

the United States should bomb Iraq for

noncompliance with U.N. weapons

inspection resolutions. Values exercises such as these force offenders to

think beyond impulsive responses to

events and to consider the direct and

indirect ramifications of such actions

on the lives of others. Each client had

to state an opinion and explain why

he or she felt that way. One young man

said, “I don’t think we should bomb

them because they might have all

those chemical weapons near another

country’s border. And if we bomb them,

the chemicals might hurt the people in

the other country.”

The AIC we visited in Bridgeport (described in the introduction) had almost

no art on the walls, and motivational

quotes had been posted on the walls

in the classroom. The atmosphere in

Bridgeport seemed less culturally focused and more businesslike than that

in New Haven. However, the clients at

both facilities seemed equally engaged

and enthusiastic about the opportunity

to be in an alternative sanctions program instead of prison.

Successes of OAS

In its first year of operation, OAS had

a budget of less than $1 million and

worked with 750 offenders. Eight

years and more than 150,000 offenders later, OAS has an annual budget

of $48 million. At any given time,

there are 4,500 adult and 700 juvenile offenders involved in the

program. Director Carbone said that,

next year, the budget is likely to be

more than $52 million. Program development and fundraising must be

considered a major success of OAS.

But the program has also demonstrated dramatic success in achieving

its primary operational goals.

The first goal of OAS was to manage

offenders for less money. Alternative

sanctions operate at an average cost of

just over $7,000 per year (with an average of four clients per slot per year),

while the average cost for incarcerating

an offender is approximately $25,000

per year. Therefore it is estimated that,

without these alternatives, more than

3,500 additional prison and jail beds

would have been needed at a capital

cost of $525 million and an additional

$94 million per year in operating costs.

Another goal that was imperative to

achieve to survive the 5-year sunset

clause in OAS’s funding legislation was

to prove that the program protected the

public. More than 60 percent of OAS

clients successfully complete the

program. Of the 30 to 35 percent of offenders who are terminated from the

program, less than 10 percent are terminated for a new offense. A 3-year

longitudinal study of the effectiveness

of OAS programs, conducted by the

Justice Education Center, Inc., was

completed in 1996. The study compared offenders who had been sentenced to OAS programs with offenders

who had been incarcerated by the Department of Corrections (DOC), and the

findings were favorable. After 3 years,

there were about two arrests of an OAS

client for every three in the DOC comparison sample, showing a significantly

better track record for OAS clients

than for those released from prison.

Ensuring that offenders give back to

the community where they have offended has been another area of OAS

success. OAS has participated in the

building of seven 15,000-square-foot

playscapes and a 25,000-square-foot,

handicapped-accessible play structure in various communities in

Connecticut. OAS community service

Students prepare to take their GED examinations at a Connecticut Alternatives to Incarceration

Center.
10

Bulletin From the Field: Practitioner Perspectives

crews regularly maintain these playgrounds. OAS Project Green clients

maintain 30 state parks each year.

In 1996 alone, more than 7,000

offenders participated in statewide

community service activities, providing more than 250,000 hours of work,

valued at more than $1.3 million.

More than 100 state, municipal, and

nonprofit agencies received services

at approximately 300 work sites. The

list goes on and on.

And, convincing the Connecticut

legislature that the program works

and subsequently obtaining unanimous passage of a public act to continue OAS funding were major

successes as well.

The Justice Education Center, Inc.,

study also identified some areas of

improvement for OAS. The study

identified the lower rates of success

for Latinos and suggested that increased efforts at culturally sensitive

programming were warranted.6

 In

response to this recommendation,

OAS opened special programs to

provide culturally sensitive services

to Latinos such as the Apoyo

(Caring) Center in New Haven.

Apoyo is a combination of an AIC

and a DIC that serves only Latino

clients. Almost all of the staff are

Latino, and the probation officer

assigned to the center is Latino as

well. The art on the walls at Apoyo

is Latino, and the program is much

more family focused than regular

AIC and DIC programs. This program demonstrated that the success

rate for Latino clients could be improved. Jim Greene said, “Apoyo

gets more Latino referrals than other

centers and has a better success rate

with Latino clients.” AICs in other

locations have attempted to integrate

Latino sensitivity into their programming by hiring Latino staff and

reaching out to the Latino community. At this time, however, Apoyo is

the only free-standing, specifically

Latino program in the state.

Another special need that was identified in the study was services for

adolescent girls and young female

offenders who are pregnant or already

have children. OAS has applied for a

BJA grant to develop a program that

would meet their needs.

The Future of OAS

At some point in the life of a program

like those administered by OAS,

which is designed to divert “certain

offenders” from prison, all of the offenders that fit the admission criteria

are diverted to the program leaving no

room for expansion. This is the case

with the adult alternative sanctions

programs in Connecticut. The state

has realized the maximum adult offender diversion and cost savings that

OAS, as it is currently designed, can

provide. The only way to accommodate more offenders would be to accept offenders that are more likely to

be a danger to the community. OAS

has been trying to ensure that this

risk is not taken.

However, there has been great interest on the part of OAS and elected

officials in creating a parallel network of similar programs for juveniles. Tom Siconolfi commented,

“[OAS programs] haven’t hit any

walls yet, but now they’re looking at

special populations—pricey populations. This is where they’ll start to

hit walls. Any further growth will

come on the juvenile side.”

And so, in the 1995 Juvenile Justice

Reform Bill, with a Republican majority in the state Senate, a Republican Governor, and a Democratic

majority in the House of Representatives, funding was legislated for OAS

to establish a complete continuum of

sanctions for juveniles in communitybased settings. House Counsel Ed

Schmidt said, “None of this would

have been possible without the OAS

longitudinal study.” Project Green workers provide community service through beautification and maintenance of

Connecticut state parks.
11

Connecticut’s Alternative Sanctions Program

Alternatives for Juveniles

OAS has established both residential

and nonresidential alternative sanctions for juveniles. Nonresidential

programs called Juvenile Supervision

and Reporting Centers are highly

structured programs that provide day

and evening programs, 7 days a week,

for nonviolent juveniles who otherwise would be in detention. Services

offered by the programs include:

t Alternative education.

t Afterschool services.

t Volunteer community service

activities.

t Family participation programs.

t Substance abuse education and

intervention.

t Life skills training.

t Recreational activities.

t Meals.

t Case management.

Residential centers are also highly

structured and intensively supervised

but are designed for higher risk juveniles. These staff-secure alternatives to

detention provide 24-hour-a-day supervision for juveniles. These youth could

be supervised in the community but

need an alternative to residing at home.

Youth housed in these centers have

access to the services listed above.

OAS is finishing its 2d year of implementing programs for juveniles. Programs are now available in five cities.

OAS has also developed Juvenile Justice Centers in eight cities. These centers provide less-structured activities

for youth. Juvenile programs started

with a budget of $3 million. The 2d

year the budget was raised to $8 million. The budget for 1999 will be $11

million. Jim Greene said, “We anticipate that the program will continue to

grow like this for 3 more years and

then growth will begin to slow down.”

Therefore, it is planned that by the end

of the next 3-year period, alternative

sanctions programs will be fully implemented in Connecticut.

We met with a group of juvenile clients from nonresidential and residential programs in Bridgeport. At first

the youth were not very talkative, but

eventually a couple offered complaints about their conditions. “Why

can’t we watch rap videos?” asked

one boy. A boy seated next to him

added, “Yeah, we should be able to

watch R-rated movies too instead of

watching kid movies all the time.”

The youth also provided some valuable feedback about the programs.

The rap video fan said, “If I wasn’t

here I’d be at Long Lane [detention

center]. Here, I’m at least close to

home and can work on school. At

Long Lane it’s just like prison. There’s

nothing to do.”

It seemed to be unanimous among the

youth that they would rather be in the

alternative program than housed in

Long Lane. When asked what they

thought might improve the program,

one girl said, “The community service

is a waste. They need to come up with

community service that makes sense

for us. Like, I like to write stories.

Why don’t they let me go read stories

to little kids in elementary school or

go help out with babies at a daycare

center or something like that?” We

passed these suggestions on to Mr.

Greene who thought they were great

ideas and said that he would work on

finding such opportunities. He

repeated one of his first comments to

us: “In order to have any success with

these folks, you have to get them to

come in. So we try to find community

service ideas that will make them

want to come in.”

Midway through their implementation

in Connecticut, juvenile alternative

sanctions seem to have the same level

of support and momentum as adult

programs. Despite major news coverage of the increased violent crime

committed by juveniles, this program

has bipartisan support. Mr. Siconolfi

said, “These programs are providing

leverage for more conservative

Clients provide concessions at the Nutmeg Games.
12

Bulletin From the Field: Practitioner Perspectives

lawmakers to get ‘tough on crime’.

The enacting legislation allowed the

creation of alternatives to detention

but also allowed the transfer of 14-

year-old defendants charged with certain felonies to be automatically

transferred to adult court.” Director

Siconolfi admitted (and Chief State’s

Attorney Bailey backed him up) that

the vast majority of cases that get

transferred to adult court are immediately transferred back to juvenile

court. Jack Bailey said, “That’s really

the most appropriate place to handle

these cases.”

Consideration of

Challenges to OAS’s

Results

Admittedly, it is hard to find much to

criticize about alternative sanctions

programs in Connecticut. However, a

few issues are worth considering. The

first is the question of how much

money OAS really saves the state.

Mr. Siconolfi said, “First of all, [OAS]

used the average cost of incarceration, but low-risk offenders don’t cost

as much to incarcerate as high-risk

offenders.” Therefore, the broad averages used to formulate the figure of

$94 million saved in annual prison

operations costs could be well off the

mark. Tom Siconolfi went on to say

that, as a budget analyst, he has always struggled with such broad averaging and with programs nationwide

that use such averages—not just OAS

or the state of Connecticut.

Director Siconolfi raised a second

issue that potential critics of the program might use to discredit the program, “[OAS is] suggesting that 100

percent of their clients would have

gone to prison. I think that’s the case

for two-thirds of them, but the other

third is arguably marginal; they

might not have been sent to prison.”

If one-third of OAS clients were

managed in traditional community

supervision (i.e., probation), then

they would be in a less expensive

program than the alternative sanctions program. He went on to say,

“Even if that one-third wasn’t prison

bound, the program is still saving

the state an enormous amount of

money.” However, Jim Greene finds

that Connecticut could only have

saved this money if new facilities

with more prison beds had actually

been built: “I don’t think they would

have been. I think we would have

just gone on with really short prison

sentences.” Jim Greene said that,

when he talked to other states about

alternative sanctions, he told them

not to expect to save money that they

are currently spending on prisons

because the prisons that they already

have will probably stay full. Instead

they should look at this kind of a

program as a way to prevent building

more prisons and paying for those

new beds in the future.

The study conducted by the Justice

Education Center, Inc., also addresses the issue of recidivism. The

study showed that prison inmates

reoffended at a rate of 2 to 1 compared with OAS clients. But by

Director Carbone’s own admission,

OAS strives to admit only lower risk

offenders into programs and to send

higher risk offenders to prison. Following this logic, one would expect

the prison cohort to recidivate at a

significantly higher rate. Therefore,

the recidivism data could indicate

that OAS is accurately following the

low-risk guidelines of its admission

criteria but that there is no conclusive evidence that alternative sanctions programs reduce recidivism.

Director Carbone pointed out that the

750 prison inmates in the comparison

group were matched to the OAS clients according to their offense and

criminal history. The criminal behavior of these two groups were very

similar. While this would validate the

results, it also begs the question, Why

were those 750 inmates in prison instead of in OAS programs? There are

many possible explanations for this. It

could be that OAS was in its developmental stages during the study and

did not have the capacity at that time

to divert all the appropriate offenders

in the system. It could also be that

there is room for OAS to increase the

efficiency of its referral and screening

processes to prevent appropriate offenders from ending up in prison.

Another possibility suggested by

Director Carbone is that the screening

process looks at offenders closer than

the matching criteria of the study. Although the two groups may have exhibited similar criminal behavior,

members of the prison group may

have been screened out of the program for other reasons such as negative attitude, lack of family support,

or lack of steady employment.

But are such factors as attitude, employment experience, and family

support really risk factors? Are they

solid reasons for rejecting offenders

who otherwise fit the criteria for diversion from prison? Not just OAS

but offender treatment programs and

interventions all over the country are

struggling with this question. If these

are factors that make or break an

offender’s chance to be diverted, do

they open the program up to accusations of creaming off candidates that

are most likely to succeed and rejecting those likely to be distracting

and noncompliant? Does the
13

Connecticut’s Alternative Sanctions Program

emphasis of such factors open the

program up to allegations of bias in

that some racial/cultural groups may

be less likely to have family support

and some socioeconomic groups are

less likely to have a stable employment situation or history? These issues are still under examination by

OAS. The challenge is to match appropriate offenders to effective programs without creaming or bias.

Connecticut is striving to achieve

the most effective mechanisms for

identifying and screening clients.

Such a high-profile program, with

such a large piece of the judicial financial pie, could not be without opponents. Mr. Greene told us, “The

only people who don’t like this program are the 15,000 people in prison

who aren’t getting the benefit of supervised release any more.”

The Future Looks

Bright for OAS

We were curious about how susceptible OAS would be to one or two key

changes in the political landscape of

Connecticut. Could a sudden economic downturn, a serious spike in

violent crime, or a change of key personnel (such as the Legislative SubCommittee Chair or the Chief Court

Administrator) dramatically change

the level of support for OAS? Judge

Ment was not overly concerned with

such possibilities: “The program is

built on everybody winning. It is not a

political issue.”

Director Siconolfi commented,

“The program has survived Governor

William A. O’Neill, a Democrat;

Governor Lowell P. Weicker, an Independent (actually a progressive

Republican who ran as an Independent); and the current Governor,

John G. Rowland, a Republican.” He

went on to say, “It depends on what

the program is doing for [elected officials] at the time. This program allows [likely detractors] in the state to

be tough on [prison sentencing]. Detractors rising up against the program is very unlikely at this point.”

We were also curious about how OAS

had survived the traditional cause of

death of many good criminal justice

programs. The following is a common

scenario. A program gets a good

reputation and is flooded with too

many referrals, many being inappropriate. Then there is an economic

downturn and program funds and

staff are cut. Finally, an evaluation

is conducted of the overcrowded,

underfunded program, operating

outside the original design, and the

evaluation concludes that the program does not work. OAS has a good

reputation and has had pressure to

open admission to other types of offenders. The state economy has had

several economic slumps since the

formation of OAS and yet evaluations continue to be positive. How

has OAS survived? Representative

Michael Lawlor said that “discipline

on the part of elected officials” prevented any pressure brought to bear

on OAS staff to overuse alternative

sanctions. Jim Greene said, “We

used research to prevent net widening. Contractors can prevent overloading because there are limits

built right into their contract.” Director Carbone and Judge Ment both

said that a commitment to program

design and research showing that the

programs saved money have allowed

OAS to resist the pressure to increase admissions.

In the last 8-years more than 150,000

offenders have gone through the program. We were curious about how the

program has avoided the scenario of a

high-profile crime being committed

by a former client. Mr. Carbone said,

“We have been vigilant to ensure that

only low-risk offenders are admitted

to the program and that we supervise

all of our clients very closely.” Jack

Bailey said, “I think they’ve been

lucky. But they’ve also had real discipline on admissions criteria.”

Public and political support for OAS

appears to be strong and is not likely to

be susceptible to one or two isolated

The crowd takes a moment to recognize some of the 350 community service workers who provided

support each day at the 1995 World Games of the Special Olympics at the Yale Bowl.
14

Bulletin From the Field: Practitioner Perspectives

changes in the political landscape.

However, Mr. Bailey added, “Crime is

down! How long can we sustain funding when the public gets wind of that

fact?” Another factor could undermine

the stability of OAS in the future. All of

Connecticut’s prison beds are now full.

If overcrowding recurs, could the percentage of time served once again drop

below 50 percent of the sentence?

Director Carbone said, “Inmates still

serve an average of 75 percent of their

sentence.” So as it stands, Connecticut

is a long way from returning to the

prison crisis it faced in the late 1980s.

Conclusions

Judge Aaron Ment and the judiciary

branch of the Connecticut state government have done an admirable job

of “engaging the courts as a problem

solver” in response to the prison crisis of the late 1980s. OAS was born

and has developed as a result of patient and meticulous planning, collaboration, evaluation, and marketing.

Judge Ment and the other planners of

OAS found a solution that promised

meaningful benefits for everyone involved, including the communities,

the judiciary, government officials,

and offenders.

OAS created programs that demonstrated to the community that offenders

would be held accountable for their

crimes. OAS closely managed its programs to defend against the possibility

of new offenses being committed by

clients. Further, OAS provided an alternative to the endless expense of

building and operating state prisons,

while restoring the public’s faith in the

efficacy of the criminal justice system.

Many stakeholders who could have

opposed the program were appeased

by design aspects specifically included to obtain their support. The

judiciary was not told it had to use

alternative sanctions; instead, the judiciary was offered a complete array

of sanctions and given total control

over their implementation. Conservatives were not asked to support dramatic increases in government size;

they were shown that OAS would be

an economic development opportunity

for existing nonprofit organizations in

Connecticut communities. Further,

OAS made it possible for prison sentences to return to credible lengths of

stay. This last component allowed

both the opportunity for the state to

appear “tough on crime” and the opportunity for OAS to tell its clients

that prison is a real and severe punishment and it’s what you will face if

you fail in this program. OAS has purposely avoided disputes with unions

by ensuring that its programs never

displace civilian employees.

Finally, Director Carbone, Jim

Greene, and OAS staff have researched and evaluated the cost

savings, public safety, and reduced

recidivism afforded by the program.

OAS is applying what was learned

from the research to improve its effectiveness with current populations and

to reach out to new groups of clients.

Having satisfied the scrutiny of these

groups, OAS provides public safety

daily through the close community

supervision of more than 4,500 adults

and 700 juveniles. The programs are

cleaning up communities and parks,

building playgrounds, and supporting

community development. Clients are

provided with substance abuse treatment and batterers education groups

and are taught how to apply for and

retain a job.

In the political and public management environment of 1998, this program truly stands out as an innovative

community problemsolving collaboration. Could a statewide program such

as this succeed in other places? In a

much larger state? Or in a state where

the stakeholders have to run for election? In closing we asked Judge Ment

and Bill Carbone to make some recommendations for other states interested in developing alternatives to

incarceration.

Judge Ment’s recommendations

included:

1. Make the judicial branch understand

it and embrace it.

2. Sell the judges on the idea of having

complete control of a full array of

sanctions.

3. Start out with offenders who are being

incarcerated but are not marginal—

namely, low-risk offenders.

Director Carbone’s recommendations

included the following:

1. Conduct extensive planning and invite

all of the people to the table who will

have a stake in the program.

2. Start small in one place and expand

slowly. Do not expand so fast that you

deviate from the design of your

program and lose track of admitting

low-risk offenders.

3. Document and evaluate the progress

of your program from the very

beginning.
15

Connecticut’s Alternative Sanctions Program

Notes

1. Lyon, Eleanor, “Longitudinal Study

Alternatives to Incarceration Sentencing Evaluation, Year 3,” Justice

Education Center, Inc., September

1996.

2. “Connecticut’s Judicial System,

New Initiatives,” Briefing Folder,

Judicial Branch of Connecticut,

Hartford, CT, 1996.

3. Weintraub, Bernard, “President

Offers Strategy for United States on

Drug Control,” New York Times,

p. A1, September 6, 1989.

4. Ibid., p. B7.

5. “Connecticut’s Judicial System,

New Initiatives,” Briefing Folder,

Judicial Branch of Connecticut,

Hartford, CT, 1996.

6. Lyon, Eleanor, “Longitudinal Study

Alternatives to Incarceration Sentencing Evaluation, Year 3,” Justice

Education Center, Inc., September

1996, p. 62.

Acknowledgments

The Bureau of Justice Assistance

would like to express its appreciation to the Government of the state

of Connecticut (Governor John G.

Rowland), the state of Connecticut’s

judicial branch, and Chief Court

Administrator Aaron Ment. We

would especially like to thank Bill

Carbone, Jim Greene, and the staff

of the Office of Alternative Sanctions for their assistance and for

agreeing to be interviewed by our

case study team. We would also like

to acknowledge the contributions of

Representative Michael Lawlor,

Co-Chair of the Judiciary Committee

in the Connecticut House of Representatives; Chief State’s Attorney

Jack Bailey; Tom Siconolfi, Director

of the Justice Planning Unit in the

Governor’s Office of Policy and Management; and Ed Schmidt, Counsel

for the Connecticut House of Representatives whose time and input were

highly valued by the case study team.

In addition, special thanks go to the

management and staff of the many

alternative sanctions programs who

took time from their important work

For More Information

For more information regarding the

Connecticut Alternative Sanctions

Program, contact:

Bill Carbone, Director

Office of Alternative Sanctions

1155 Silas Dean Highway

Weathersfield, CT 06109

860–257–1904

For additional reading on the

Connecticut Alternative Sanctions

Program:

Daniels, Jeffrey and Flora Parisky.

1991. Judicial Sanctions: A ThreeYear Strategic Plan. Hartford, Connecticut: Judicial branch.

Grants Management and Justice Planning Unit. May 1997. Federal Drug

Control and System Improvement

Grant Program Abstracts. Hartford,

Connecticut: Office of Policy and

Management.

Papirno, Elissa, Marty Petty, Clifford

Teutsch, and John Zakarian. October

20, 1997. “A Wise Alternative to

Prison.” The Hartford Courant. A10.

Pearsall, Susan. Feburary 25, 1996.

“Hard Work, Earning That Second

Chance.” Connecticut Weekly.

The Bureau of Justice Assistance is

a component of the Office of Justice

Programs, which also includes the

Bureau of Justice Statistics, the

National Institute of Justice, the

Office of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention, and the

Office for Victims of Crime.

to meet with us. Finally, our thanks to

the groups of alternative sanctions

clients who allowed us to invade their

personal worlds to see and hear their

perspectives on the program.

NCJ 172870

Sanctions Update. 1997. Hartford,

Connecticut: Judicial branch. Volume

6, Number 1.

For more information regarding the

Bureau of Justice Assistance Practitioner Perspectives Series, contact:

Patrick J. Coleman

Resident Practitioner

Bureau of Justice Assistance

810 Seventh Street NW.

Washington, DC 20531

202–616–0313

To order publications or to find out

more about BJA programs, contact:

Bureau of Justice Assistance

 Clearinghouse

P.O. Box 6000

Rockville, MD 20849–6000

1–800–688–4252

E-mail: askncjrs@ncjrs.org

World Wide Web: http://www.ncjrs.org

Clearinghouse staff are available

Monday through Friday, 8:30 a.m. to

7:30 p.m. eastern time. Ask to be

placed on the BJA mailing list.
U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

Bureau of Justice Assistance

Washington, DC 20531

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

BULK RATE

U.S. POSTAGE PAID

DOJ/BJA

Permit No. G–91