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96–698 PDF 2005

S. HRG. 108–777

NOMINATION OF THE HONORABLE

PORTER J. GOSS TO BE DIRECTOR OF

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 14 AND 20, 2004

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence

(

(II)

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

PAT ROBERTS, Kansas, Chairman

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Vice Chairman

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia

CARL LEVIN, Michigan

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California

RON WYDEN, Oregon

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois

EVAN BAYH, Indiana

JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland

BILL FRIST, Tennessee, Ex Officio

THOMAS A. DASCHLE, South Dakota, Ex Officio

BILL DUHNKE, Staff Director

ANDREW W. JOHNSON, Minority Staff Director

KATHLEEN P. MCGHEE, Chief Clerk

(III)

CONTENTS

Page

Hearing held in Washington, DC, Sept. 14, 2004

Statement of:

Durbin, Hon. Richard J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Illinois ............. 45

Goss, Hon. Porter J., Nominee to be Director of Central Intelligence ......... 7

Graham, Hon. Bob, a U.S. Senator from the State of Florida ...................... 5

Nelson, Hon. Bill, a U.S. Senator from the State of Florida ......................... 6

Roberts, Hon. Pat, Chairman .......................................................................... 1

Rockefeller, Hon. John D. IV, Vice Chairman ................................................ 3

Supplemental Material:

Chart presented by Senator John D. Rockefeller IV ..................................... 15

Washington Times Op-Ed by Senator Saxby Chambliss ............................... 53

Letter from Cynthia Thomas, President, TriDimension Strategies ............. 79

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Questionnaire for Completion

by Presidential Nominees ............................................................................. 82

Glynn, Marilyn, Acting Director, Office of Government Ethics, letter to

the Honorable Pat Roberts ........................................................................... 108

Goss, Hon. Porter J., letter to John Rizzo dated September 1, 2004 ........... 109

Financial Disclosure Report of Hon. Porter J. Goss ...................................... 108

Responses to QFRs from Hon. Porter J. Goss to Senator Robert J. Durbin 148

Hearing held in Washington, DC, Sept. 20, 2004

Statement of:

Goss, Hon. Porter J., Nominee to be Director of Central Intelligence ......... 173

(1)

NOMINATION OF THE HONORABLE

PORTER J. GOSS TO BE DIRECTOR OF

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2004

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,

Washington, DC.

The Select Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in

Room SH-219, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Pat

Roberts, (Chairman of the Committee), presiding.

Committee Members Present: Senators Roberts, Hatch, DeWine,

Bond, Lott, Snowe, Hagel, Chambliss, Warner, Rockefeller, Levin,

Feinstein, Wyden, Durbin, Bayh and Mikulski.

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PAT ROBERTS,

CHAIRMAN

Chairman ROBERTS: The Select Committee will come to order.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence meets today to consider the nomination of the Honorable Porter J. Goss to be the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Congressman Goss, on behalf of the Committee, I would like to

congratulate you on your nomination and I thank you for appearing

today.

The Committee would also like to welcome the Senior Senator

from Florida, when he arrives, and the Junior Senator from the

State, my predecessor as Chairman of this Committee, Senator Bob

Graham, and my colleague on the Armed Services Committee, Senator Bill Nelson. So gentlemen, thank you for being here today in

support of Congressman Goss.

The role of Director of Central Intelligence is of paramount importance to the security of this Nation. It is also one of the most

challenging jobs, if not the most challenging job, in the Executive

Branch as of today.

This Nation, as everybody knows, is currently engaged in a war

where intelligence defines the front line. We are not fighting

against nation-states but against a network of desperate terrorist

groups, who operate not only in the shadows, but at times right in

our midst. Whether in Afghanistan, Iraq or here at home, defeating

this enemy depends largely upon the ability of our intelligence

services to locate, to penetrate and to destroy these terrorist cells.

In short, we are involved in a world war which requires timely and

actionable intelligence to assure victory and the safety of the American people.

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The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency is responsible for

producing this intelligence. As we fight the threat posed by Islamic

terror, there remains unabated numerous other worldwide threats

against which our Nation must also guard. Among them are these:

the development of nuclear programs by adversary regimes such as

exist in Iran, also in North Korea; the steady growth of communist

China into an Asiatic power and its greater influence over Taiwan

and the region; and the continued worldwide expansion of WMD

technology.

The Director of Central Intelligence is also responsible for producing intelligence to keep policymakers, both in the Administration and in Congress, informed about many other threats.

If that isn’t daunting enough, Congressman Goss has been nominated for a position which is not likely to exist for much longer.

The President and many in the Congress now support the creation

of a new national intelligence director. There is now a great deal

of discussion among my colleagues on how best to ensure that the

creation of a national intelligence director is something more than

just a name change.

Most of the debate outside this Committee has centered on how

to grant increased authority to the new national intelligence director while leaving undisturbed the structural status quo. Many on

this Committee simply believe you can’t really get there from here.

In other words, it will take significant structural change to effect

real reform.

I believe strongly that we must create a new structure that accommodates the diverse activities of the various intelligence agencies by giving direct responsibility and control of the primary intelligence disciplines—the collection and the analysis and the research and the acquisition and the tactical support—and the corresponding agencies who are in charge of those disciplines to a

truly empowered national intelligence director and his assistants.

True empowerment includes both budget authority and the authority to direct and control the activities of the intelligence agencies—to direct and control. One without the other will once again

leave us, in my opinion, with an intelligence head who can neither

succeed nor be held accountable. This would be an unacceptable

outcome.

We don’t know how or when reform will be enacted. Until then,

we need a strong Director of the Central Intelligence Agency with

the necessary skills to manage a community which is in dire need

of a leader. The unique background of Congressman Goss will serve

him well as he meets these and many other challenges while directing our intelligence community.

For over 40 years, Porter Goss has been serving his Nation, his

State and his local community of Sanibel, Florida. Whether as an

Army intelligence officer, a clandestine CIA case officer, a newspaperman, a county commissioner, U.S. Representative, or Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, he has done his duty

with skill, with honor and with integrity.

His experience, I think, makes him uniquely suited to serve as

the Director of Central Intelligence. The President, in my view, has

selected an outstanding public servant to be his principal adviser

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on intelligence and we look forward to working with him as the

next Director of Central Intelligence.

At this time, I would like to recognize the distinguished Vice

Chairman of the Intelligence Committee for his remarks.

Senator Rockefeller.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,

VICE CHAIRMAN

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Congressman Goss. Good morning, Senator

Graham and Senator Nelson. Welcome all.

You are very well known to this Committee in your role as

Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. Now we have to

deal with you as a Congressman and as a potential future CIA Director and perhaps beyond that.

You have a long and distinguished career as a public servant. I

applaud your willingness to undertake the possibility of this extremely difficult and complicated job of Director of Central Intelligence. And, as you know better than most, the United States intelligence community is at a crossroads.

The documented intelligence failures prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11th and leading up to the war in Iraq have

left the intelligence community’s credibility bruised—not bloodied,

but bruised—and its reputation tarnished. The community’s objectivity, independence and competency have been called into question.

As a result, a bipartisan call for reform has steadily grown to the

point where I believe that the Congress can and should, if allowed

by the Senate and House leadership, pass landmark legislation to

create a stronger and more effectively-managed intelligence community before we adjourn. It can be done. If you give Congress

enough time to do something, we’ll do nothing. If you don’t give us

enough time, we can sometimes get some things done.

The work of the intelligence community, however, of course, does

not stop during this period. We’re at war in Afghanistan. We’re at

war in Iraq. We’re in a global war against terrorists around the

world. The men and women of the Central Intelligence Agency and

other intelligence agencies are a central part of the America’s ability to prevail on the battlefield in various places and to stop terrorists before they carry out their murderous plots either abroad or

here.

The next Director of the Central Intelligence Agency will be the

most important ever confirmed by the United States Senate. Never

before in the 57-year history of the intelligence community has

there been a need for a Director of Central Intelligence with unimpeachable character, proven leadership and management experience, and a strong national security set of credentials.

The new Director will face no fewer than four simultaneous

changes, in my judgment—waging an unrelenting offensive clandestine campaign against al-Qa’ida and other terrorist organizations around the world; supporting the ongoing military operations

in Afghanistan and Iraq; managing an intelligence community in

a state of transition; restoring the intelligence community’s lost or

tarnished credibility. The next Director of Intelligence must be exVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:24 Feb 23, 2005 Jkt 096698 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\DOCS\96698.TXT SCANNER PsN: SCANNER
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traordinarily qualified in order to carry out these and other national security tasks. The stakes are simply enormous.

Perhaps most importantly, in this Senator’s view, the next Director of Central Intelligence must be nonpartisan, independent and

objective. The standard is not mine, although it is; it’s what the

law requires.

The very first responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence under the National Security Act requires the Director to

provide national intelligence to the President, to the Congress, to

the Executive Branch of the military that is ‘‘timely, objective,

independent of political considerations and based upon all sources

available to the intelligence community.’’

Congressman Goss, having reviewed your record closely, I do

have a number of concerns about whether your past partisan actions or statements will allow you to be that type of nonpartisan,

independent and objective national intelligence director that our

country needs. That’s what this discussion will be about—tough,

but fair. And these questions need to be put.

You have made a number of statements relative to intelligence

matters, many in the past year, that are highly, in my judgment,

partisan and display a willingness on your part to use intelligence

issues as a political broad sword against members of the Democratic Party. Now, at the appropriate time, I will ask you to explain

the purpose of some of these statements and to substantiate the

claims that you make in them. As I say, my questions will be

tough, but I hope, pray and believe that they will be fair.

During the course of this hearing, I will also have a number of

questions about your views on reforming the intelligence community, how it is to be done, and the bill that your proposed earlier

this year.

As I noted earlier, I believe intelligence reform should be the top

priority of the Congress. It remains a question whether it will be

allowed to be in these remaining few days or weeks that we have.

And I need to be assured that you appreciate the need for the reform necessary, and that you are prepared to embrace it, if confirmed.

I will want to spend some time discussing your views on a number of recent and ongoing investigations, as well, some of which we

discussed in our very productive meeting yesterday, including both

the joint congressional and the independent 9/11 Commission investigations, this Committee’s inquiry into prewar intelligence into

Iraq, and the criminal investigation in the outing of CIA employee

Valerie Plame.

Your record as a Member and then also Chairman of the House

Intelligence Committee is another area I want to explore with you,

including your involvement with the Cox Commission’s dealing

with the People’s Republic of China and espionage at the Department of Energy’s national laboratories.

In short, we have a lot to talk about. Again I want to say that

I think my questions are going to be thorough and at times tough.

The importance of this position for which you are nominated, in my

judgment, requires no less. And I’m proud that you’re here and I

look forward to hearing what you have to say.

Chairman ROBERTS: Thank you, Senator Rockefeller.

5

I now recognize the distinguished Senior Senator from Florida,

the past Chairman of the Committee, for any remarks he would

like to make in regard to the nominee. And while I have the opportunity, I would like to thank Senator Graham for his years of service in the Senate. He has earned the admiration and respect of all

of our colleagues.

Senator Graham.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BOB GRAHAM,

UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Senator GRAHAM: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for those

very generous remarks.

I am delighted to be here again with colleagues for whom I have

a special affection. I am also here in order to introduce you to a

man that you already know, but hopefully provide some additional

perspective.

Let me state at the beginning that I am not unbiased. I believe

that Porter Goss is an exceptional human being and will be an exceptional head of our Central Intelligence Agency. I want to first,

however, introduce an important part of why Porter Goss is the

man that he is. He is joined today by his wife Mariel and their son

Chauncey. And I would like to ask if they would stand and be recognized.

[Applause.]

Senator GRAHAM: Adele and I, who also joins me, are very fond

of Porter and Mariel, and we recognize the sacrifices which the

family has made in order for Porter to be able to spend so much

of his adult life in public service.

Mr. Chairman, I’ve known Porter Goss for well over two decades,

and I can tell you from personal experience that he is uniquely

qualified to be here today as the President’s nominee to serve as

the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

First, he is a man of great character, unusual intelligence, a tremendous work ethic and an outstanding personal and professional

standard of integrity. As Governor of Florida, I came to know Porter when he served first as Mayor of Sanibel, Florida. In the early

1980s, the county of which Sanibel is a city, Lee County—Fort

Myers is the county seat—decided to undertake the construction of

a new airport. It was probably the largest public works project in

the history of that county.

Unfortunately, shortly into that project, three of the five members of the county commission were indicted for corruption. In that

circumstance, as Governor, I first had the responsibility of suspending them from office, and then the second responsibility of

finding three good people who could step into those vacancies and

complete this important project and restore the integrity of local

government in the eyes and souls of the people of Lee County.

Porter Goss was one of those three people. Not unexpectedly, he

soon rose to be the Chairman of the Lee County Commission. And

over the course of his service, he did both; he completed the airport, which is now a great asset for his community and our State

and Nation, and second, he rebuilt the public confidence in their

local government.

6

Party affiliation did not matter then. What was necessary was

good men and women who could carry out a difficult task. And my

colleagues, I believe party affiliation does not matter today.

The challenge that Porter Goss, on a much magnified scale, will

face as the Director of Central Intelligence is very analogous to the

challenge that he faced 20 years ago in restoring integrity to his

local community and completing a very complex project.

Second, in addition to those personal qualities, when it comes to

the intelligence community, Congressman Goss has, in my judgment, a balanced perspective, a perspective gained both as an insider and then as an outsider. For a decade, early in his career,

Congressman Goss served our Nation in both Army and the CIA.

He knows firsthand the value and the risk of clandestine operations.

Since he’s been in Congress, and especially as a Member of and

Chair of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

he came to know the agencies from an oversight capacity.

Some have said that he’s too close to the intelligence agencies,

that he will be too protective of the status quo. Most of you served

with Porter and myself on the Joint Inquiry into the events of

9/11. I believe you would join me in saying that, from that experience, Porter is a man who will be independent in his judgments

and unflinching in his criticisms where he believes they are necessary.

Mr. Chairman, I have been critical of the intelligence failures

that led to 9/11 and the war in Iraq. I have also been critical of

the Administration for its lack of leadership toward reform in the

three years since September the 11th.

But at this occasion, I want to commend President Bush for the

nomination of Congressman Porter Goss. I am confident that he

will not be part of the problem, but a leader in taking us toward

principled, thoughtful solutions when it comes to reforming the intelligence community.

I strongly recommend your recommendation of confirmation of

Porter Goss.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROBERTS: We thank you, Senator Graham.

It’s my privilege now to recognize the distinguished Junior Senator from Florida for any remarks that he might wish to make.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BILL NELSON,

UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Senator Nelson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman,

Members of the Committee.

I think we need intelligence reform. I think we need it now. And

I think Porter Goss is the man to lead the effort.

This is a uniquely gifted individual and I think the Vice Chairman of the Committee has pointed out very rightfully that this is

a position that all of us have to feel is nonpartisan and is independent and critical in their judgment.

I can tell you this Member of the Senate certainly believes that

by virtue of the lack of information and misinformation that this

Senator received with regard to the intelligence leading up to the

Iraq war, but a most recent example that Porter is going to have

7

to deal with is to get the sufficient assets on the ground that can

penetrate hostile regimes such as North Korea, so that we are not

in this Never-Never Land of not knowing what an adversary will

do, particularly an adversary that may possess the nuclear weapon

and all of that implication to the security interests of the United

States.

So I’m here to echo all the reasons that Senator Graham has

given you, but I’m here to give you my own personal observations

of Congressman Goss as someone whose public life has been illustrative of being nonpartisan, fair and independent. Those characteristics, in this town that is so highly charged partisan, not for the

good of this country, especially at this time, are sorely needed in

a Director of Central Intelligence. And that’s why I wanted to come

to you and tell you why I support Porter Goss.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Graham and Senator Nelson, thank

you very much for your testimony on behalf of your colleague and

for your very strong statements. They certainly show significant bipartisan support.

While my colleagues from Florida are welcome to stay, you may

wish to simply get out of the line of fire while you have the chance.

I thank you very much for your participation and I hope that Ivan

the Terrible turns into Ivan the Meek. You’ve already had enough

of that in Florida and we share your concern.

I now recognize the nominee for his opening statement.

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE PORTER J. GOSS, NOMINEE

TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Mr. GOSS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your

comments.

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, Senators, ladies and gentlemen. I am obviously very honored to be appearing

before this Committee as the President’s nominee to be the next

Director of Central Intelligence. I’m humbled by the confidence the

President has expressed in me and my ability to carry out the obligations of the office to which I have been nominated.

I wish to thank exceedingly Senator Graham and Senator Nelson, my home-state Senators, for their very gracious introductions.

I appreciate their support and their very kind words.

I look forward to today’s hearing and the opportunity it presents

to discuss with you the very important issues facing our Nation,

particularly the intelligence community.

As much as I look forward to this opportunity, I have to say, honestly, that I never expected to be in this seat before you. Of course,

I never planned to be a Congressman or a Lee County Commissioner or the Mayor of Sanibel, for that matter.

As for my representation of my constituents from the 14th District in Florida, I’ve given my best to them for the past 15-plus

years, and at times, perhaps, I’ve engaged in debate with a little

too much vigor or enthusiasm. I’ve tried, however, to the best of my

ability to engage my colleagues on both sides of the aisle fairly and

with the utmost respect for their position and their perspective.

Rest assured, however, that I do understand completely the difference in obligations the position of DCI carries with it and that

8

which the role of Congressman carries. These are two completely

distinct jobs in our form of government. I understand those distinctions and, if confirmed, I commit myself to a nonpartisan approach

to the job of DCI.

As noted, I’ve been a Congressman from Florida. This is my

eighth term in Congress. During the last seven-and-a-half years,

I’ve been privileged to serve as the Chairman of the sister Committee in the House of Representatives, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in the House.

I’ve served with several very distinguished Ranking Democrats

well-known to this Committee—Norm Dicks of Washington, the

late Julian Dixon of California, Nancy Pelosi, who has risen to the

position of House Minority Leader, and most recently with Jane

Harman of California—each of them, able, committed and valuable

Members of Congress.

I’m proud of my record of service to the Nation in that capacity

and the record of cooperation, objectivity and the nonpartisan approach taken together with them on the serious issues facing the

Nation and the intelligence community.

I have served as a Mayor and County Commissioner. I worked

in the Directorate of Operations at the CIA in the 1960s as a clandestine services officer. And while in the Army, I was trained and

worked as a photo interpreter. Each of these opportunities has

challenged me and enabled me to serve my country in unique ways.

If confirmed, I will be given another unique opportunity to serve

my country.

The challenges facing the intelligence community today are varied and extremely complex, as well described in the opening statements of the Chairman and Vice Chairman. Most important among

them is countering the terrorist threat to our Nation.

In addition, the intelligence community cannot lose sight of its

other responsibilities; it must work tirelessly and continuously to

provide our diplomats and our policymakers, both in the Executive

Branch and Congress, with information that informs the development of public policies across a very broad range of topics.

With regard to terrorism, the intelligence community’s task is

most urgent. It must strive to detect, deter and disrupt future terrorist attacks on the United States.

As Americans, we are confronted by a brutal enemy who prefers

to murder innocents, who continues to strike our military men and

women, who bombs our embassies and who is committed to the destruction of not only our economy, but our way of life. In this battle, good intelligence is crucial. We must deliver a solid, reliable

product for our decisionmakers.

When I look back at my time as clandestine services case officer

with the CIA during the Cold War, I can say that the mission of

the intelligence community was very clear—to obtain the plans and

intentions of our enemies, our adversaries and their associates before they could attack the United States. We knew our enemy then.

The mission for the intelligence community has not changed. We

must determine our enemies’ plans and intentions before they attack the United States; that is the core business.

Our human intelligence capability must improve if we are to continue to exercise our responsibilities in this challenging time. Our

9

analytical depth and our scope of coverage must increase if we’re

to provide context and texture to the information that is collected.

Our national technical means must be protected and reinvigorated.

Investment in these areas will be required.

Intelligence needs to be shared with those who need to know.

This includes our State and local law enforcement authorities for

homeland security purposes and our Federal law enforcement officials as well. Information sharing must improve if we are to improve our capabilities against our most imminent threats.

We must also improve our intelligence capabilities in the proliferation arena. We need to develop sufficient language skills and

a depth to be able to accomplish all of our mission objectives in a

timely fashion. I agree wholeheartedly with the 9/11 commissioners

that the intelligence community management must foster and nurture imagination throughout the intelligence community and not

stifle it.

And there are no easy fixes to these complex challenges. If confirmed, I look forward to working together with this Committee to

find ways to improve our capabilities to carry out our mission in

the defense of liberty and freedom.

The job to which I’ve been nominated, the DCI, is a capabilities

job. It is not a policy job, and I know that. The DCI must provide

precise intelligence and it must provide objective intelligence.

In order to do this, the DCI must have the capabilities and resources available to gather that intelligence. Objective and precise

intelligence is only possible if the intelligence community’s leadership is itself objective, independent and clear in its commitment to

these ideals.

I am committed to these principles. If confirmed, I pledge to be

forthright and objective in the presentation of intelligence information to you and to the policymakers of the Executive Branch.

And, finally, I want to say a few words about the dedicated men

and women in the intelligence community. During my years as

Chairman of HPSCI, I’ve come to know the successes that they’ve

achieved and the extraordinary efforts that they have performed in

the service of this Nation. They serve quietly, with integrity and

with the utmost dedication to our Nation, its security, its people.

The people of this great Nation are indebted to their sacrifice, their

commitment and their work.

And most importantly, my role as husband and father defines

me. I have a wife, who has been introduced, who has sacrificed

much to allow me to serve. Mariel and I were looking forward to

a quiet retirement, but we both understand the call of public service and duty to our country. In this time of war, when duty calls,

we find ways to serve. This is my way. I’m eternally grateful to

Mariel for her steadfast support and continued strength.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, Members of the Committee,

again, thank you very much for this opportunity. I’m now prepared

to take your questions.

Chairman ROBERTS: The Committee will now proceed to questions. Each Member will be recognized by the order of their arrival.

Each Member will be granted 10 minutes. And, if necessary, we

will have a second round.

10

Now, Congressman Goss, there’s been considerable concern

raised about the CIA’s alleged involvement in the interrogation of

detainees in Afghanistan and Iraq. Now, I’m not going to ask you

to discuss in an open hearing the specifics of the CIA’s possible involvement in any of the interrogations, but can you commit to us

that as the DCI you will ensure that the CIA’s activities do comply

with all applicable law, and that the CIA will cooperate with the

relevant investigations, including by the Department of Defense,

the Department of Justice and the Congressional Committees?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir, I can strongly commit to both of those in affirmative ‘‘yes’’ answers.

Chairman ROBERTS: Do you agree to appear before the Committee here or in other venues when invited?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.

Chairman ROBERTS: Do you agree to send intelligence community

officials to appear before the Committee and designated staff when

invited?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.

Chairman ROBERTS: Do you agree to provide documents or any

materials requested by the Committee in order to carry out its

oversight and its legislative responsibilities?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.

Chairman ROBERTS: Will you ensure that all intelligence community entities do provide such material to the Committee when requested?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.

Chairman ROBERTS: Do you agree to provide such other information that the Committee may require in order to carry out its oversight and its legislative responsibilities?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.

Chairman ROBERTS: Mr. Goss, will you be a nonpartisan DCI?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir. You have my word on that, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROBERTS: Mr. Goss, your intelligence reform proposal,

H.R. 4584, has been criticized by some as a threat to civil liberties.

That criticism is based on a provision in the bill modifying the prohibition on CIA exercise of any, ‘‘police subpoena or law enforcement powers or internal security functions’’ by opening up the possibility of such activity if ‘‘permitted by law or as directed by the

President.’’

Has your proposal been characterized accurately in this regard?

Mr. GOSS: No, sir, Mr. Chairman. I don’t think that it’s accurately characterized that way.

If you’ll permit, the purpose of that particular piece of legislation

language was to open the door on a debate that must happen. This

was done at a time, of course, when I was a Member of Congress

and Chairman of the Committee and confronting the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report, which call for a blurring of

the line between foreign intelligence and domestic intelligence collection for the first time.

That deserves, in my view, a full, rigorous debate and full attention in the Congress of the United States. It is a very huge departure from what we’ve done in the past and the question is before

us, how do we do domestic intelligence? How do we safeguard libVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:24 Feb 23, 2005 Jkt 096698 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\DOCS\96698.TXT SCANNER PsN: SCANNER
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erties, but how do we protect people? And I think Congress must

be in that debate.

Chairman ROBERTS: Do you support CIA performance of domestic

law enforcement powers?

Mr. GOSS: I do not believe that the foreign intelligence apparatus

should be used domestically. I do believe law enforcement must be

properly prepared with the adequate safeguards to protect us in

this country and to protect our civil liberties.

Chairman ROBERTS: You have already touched on this, but if you

could briefly summarize, what did you hope to accomplish with this

legislative proposal, other than to simply begin the debate?

Mr. GOSS: At the time, it was to begin the debate, because it’s

a debate we had avoided, in my view, in Congress. We’ve raised

this before in the Committee.

At this time, my reason for emphasizing it and being very glad

to receive this question is because I believe the DCI, whoever it

will be—and certainly if I am nominated, I will be coming to you

for guidance and clarity on how we proceed with dealing with that

business with our intelligence and law enforcement capabilities.

Chairman ROBERTS: In Steve Coll’s book ‘‘Ghost Wars,’’ there is

a quote that is attributed to the former DCI, Bob Gates, who said

this: ‘‘Bill Casey had not come to the CIA with the purpose of making it better, managing it more effectively, reforming it or improving the quality of intelligence. Bill Casey came to the CIA primarily

to wage war against the Soviet Union.’’

Mr. Goss, why, primarily, do you want to be the DCI?

Mr. GOSS: Mr. Chairman, the reason is simply because I believe

I can improve our capabilities.

We need better product for our policymakers, we all know that.

I believe the answer to getting that better product is rebuilding our

eyes and ears, our capabilities in HUMINT, and reviewing the way

we do business in our analytical areas. There obviously are some

shortfalls there you yourself have pointed out in a very excellent

product by this Committee, with the group-think issue on the

WMD report. We have fragility in our national technical means

which needs attention.

These are all matters which must not wait. They must happen

now. Intelligence is our first and best defense, especially in a preemptive global war that we are in. And I believe that we have the

obligation to make the investment, which is actually a modest investment compared to some of the other investments our country

makes.

Chairman ROBERTS: This Committee has longstanding concerns

about the National Reconnaissance Office’s inaccurate cost estimates for satellite acquisition. Routinely, the National Reconnaissance Office’s cost group sends Congress cost estimates that are far

below any actual cost to procure intelligence satellites. Cost estimates that are prepared by independent groups outside the National Reconnaissance Office are much more accurate.

To solve this problem, last year, Congress enacted and the President signed a law requiring that independent cost estimates be performed by either the Community Management Staff or the Department of Defense for all intelligence community programs costing

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over $500 million. It also required that the President’s budget not

exceed the projected levels in the independent cost estimate.

Now, the National Reconnaissance Office is evading compliance

with the law by insisting that its cost group estimates meet that

law’s requirements. I believe that the NRO is wrong.

Will you assure the Committee that if confirmed you will budget

to independent cost estimates produced by the Community Management Staff or the Department of Defense in accordance with the

independent cost estimate law reported by this Committee and enacted in 2003?

Mr. GOSS: Mr. Chairman, I shared your frustration with the

problems that the ICE was used to resolve, is intended to resolve.

I supported ICE. It is the law. I intend to comply with the law if

I’m confirmed.

Chairman ROBERTS: Mr. Goss, there’s a saying attributed to John

Paul Jones: ‘‘Men mean more than guns in the raiding of a ship.’’

Let’s talk about the men and women in the intelligence community

workforce, as you did in your opening statement.

During your chairmanship, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has been adamantly opposed to a compensation reform pilot program enacted two years ago for the Central Intelligence Agency. Just as adamantly, the former Director, George

Tenet, supported the pilot program and, in fact, had taken steps to

make the program permanent.

Where do you stand on CIA compensation reform? And I’ll just

leave it at that. And then I have one final question.

Mr. GOSS: I believe that it must happen. My concern with the

package as it was being handled was that we didn’t have an opportunity to review the pilot program. I think the results of the pilot

program on comp reform are extremely important, because it’s such

a unique workforce. You’re absolutely correct, sir. The people are

what intelligence is about.

And they are unique the way they do their work. And I think

we’ve got to get it right. I stand for a comp reform, but I want to

make sure it’s the right comp reform.

Chairman ROBERTS: Let’s talk about OPTEMPO in the remaining time that I have. What will you do to ensure that the men and

women in the CIA’s workforce receive the best training possible

even during this time of very high tempo operations?

Mr. GOSS: Mr. Chairman, thank you.

There’s no question that we have got good training facilities that

are in further need of expansion and modernization. Further, we

have programs—one would be the Roberts scholarship program, as

a matter of fact—that provides in-training capabilities for some of

our good men and women to enhance their capabilities and get

them more focused on the needs we have today.

There are a number of programs out there. We are requiring

now, as a result of the work, I think, of the Oversight Committees,

the NRO Commission, a lot of review that is going on. I found that

in the past few weeks as I’ve introduced myself around the community.

And I believe that we are going to have to invest more in some

training programs. The will is there. The people want the opportunity. They would like to have things like competitive analysis—

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those opportunities. There just aren’t enough resources. There

aren’t enough analysts.

So I think it’s a combination of getting resources on the target

that are the most important priority targets, and then making sure

that we’ve got the right mix of people, the right diversification, to

deal with the threats as they exist today and then providing them

encouragement, career path and training to go do their job. And it’s

certainly a doable program.

Chairman ROBERTS: I apologize to the Members of the Committee for going overtime.

Senator Rockefeller.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Representative Goss, as I noted in my opening statement, I feel

very strongly, as in our discussion last night, that the next Director

of the Central Intelligence Agency has to be a person who has attributes.

Attributes are not always changeable from one year to another.

Attributes are, sort of, part of the make-up of how a person is or

can be—it doesn’t necessarily have to be, but can be. Those attributes have to be nonpartisan, independent and objective.

On March 8th of this year, you co-authored an intelligence oped piece called ‘‘Need Intelligence? Don’t Ask John Kerry.’’ In it,

you made a number of highly charged partisan, in my judgment,

allegations, and here are a few. ‘‘When Democrats controlled the

Congress, the cuts were deep, far-reaching and devastating to the

ability of the CIA to do its job to keep America safe.’’

During the Clinton years, ‘‘the intelligence community was given

a clear message that if they failed in politically risky operations,

which presumably could yield the best information, there would be

no backing from the Clinton White House or the Democratic-controlled Congress.’’

And then you targeted Senator John Kerry, who you claim ‘‘was

leading the way to make deep and devastating cuts in the intelligence community’s budget, and was leading efforts in Congress to

dismantle the intelligence capabilities of the Nation.’’

A few months later, in a June 23, 2004, statement on the floor

of the House, you claimed the Democratic Party did not support the

intelligence community. In the same floor debate, in June, you said,

‘‘My comment is that when there was opposition to intelligence and

year after year efforts to cut the intelligence budget, they did come

from the Democratic side through the period of the 1990s.’’

I have a number of questions about these statements and claims.

As you know, it’s very difficult to talk publicly about budget

issues. They are classified. But I want to present some facts to the

extent that I can do so and ask how these fit into your statements

and whether you stand by these statements.

First, let’s look at whether the Democrats under President Clinton were guilty of not supporting the intelligence community as you

claim. During the first two years of the Clinton Administration, the

intelligence budgets declined. This was a period of deep cuts in almost all areas of government as we tried to grapple with the legacy

of the previous 12 years of, frankly, uncontrolled deficits.

Over the next six years, however, the Clinton Administration

budget requests increased every single year. During that six-year

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period, 1996 fiscal to 2001 fiscal, Republicans controlled both

houses of Congress and the Congress cut the President’s request in

1996, 1997, 1998 and 2001. In 1999, the Republican-controlled Congress initially cut the intelligence budget, but then passed a large

one-time supplemental appropriation.

In fiscal year 2001, the Republican-controlled Congress returned

to its pattern of cutting intelligence funding. After the 9/11 attacks,

the Congress once again passed an emergency supplemental funding bill. By that point, the Democrats had a majority in the Senate.

Now, you voted for every intelligence authorization bill and every

defense appropriations bill during this period. So you must’ve

thought that underfunding President Clinton’s request was at least

within some acceptable range.

Now let’s look at exactly what Senator Kerry proposed in 1994

and contrast that with the bill, H.R. 1923, introduced by Representative Solomon with you listed as the primary co-sponsor. In 1994, Senator Kerry introduced a bill to cut the deficit by $45

billion over five years.

I’m having charts put up. In my 20 years in the Senate, I’ve

never used a chart before. That’s a rather boring chart because

that was all the CIA said I could do. But we can discuss this.

[Laughter.]

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: I’m not gifted artistically.

Chairman ROBERTS: Are you sure it’s not a Mondrian painting?

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: That was a good line, Pat.

[The chart referred to follows:]

15

16

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Now, let’s look at exactly what

Senator Kerry proposed. He introduced a bill to cut the deficit, as

I said, by $45 billion over five years. Again, you will recall the Congress at that time was searching for ways to undo the 12 years of

uncontrolled deficits. Senator Kerry’s proposal would have rescinded $1 billion from the 1994 intelligence appropriations and

then increased intelligence spending over the next four years by

the inflation rate.

Your proposal in 1995 would have cut not less than 4 percent of

the personnel from all intelligence agencies in each of the next five

years.

I have a chart that shows what each of these proposals would

have done to intelligence spending in the aggregate had they been

enacted. The top left line—and I hope this has been distributed to

the Members—is what would have been spent had Senator Kerry’s

legislation been enacted. And I can make it no more complicated

than that, can’t put any numbers, because, again, of the CIA classification, which you understand very well.

The lower line, which is red, is what would have happened to intelligence spending had your proposal become law. I intended to

show how these two proposals compared to the actual spending,

but, again, the CIA told me that I couldn’t do that. And I will attempt to do that if we have a classified session.

Now, after the initial cut in 1994, Senator Kerry’s proposal would

have provided significantly more funding for intelligence than was

appropriated by the Congress, controlled by the Republicans that

Congress, beginning with the fiscal year 1996 budget.

Your proposal, on the other hand, after the initial year where it

would have been higher than the actual spending, but still lower

than Senator Kerry’s suggested level of spending, would have resulted in dramatically lower intelligence funding.

In fact, John Kerry’s proposal would have resulted in $8.8 billion

over that period of time in more spending for intelligence than your

bill. And worse, all of the cuts you proposed in 1995 would have

been achieved by firing 20 percent of America’s intelligence officers.

In fact, had we followed your plan, sir, the intelligence community would have had tens of thousands of fewer intelligence officers

in 2000, fewer intelligence collectors in the CIA, the NSA and elsewhere, fewer intelligence analysts across the community, fewer intelligence officers in the military services, fewer counterterrorism

officers in the FBI.

The Goss plan would have made, using your own words, ‘‘deep

and devastating cuts in the intelligence community budget,’’ I’m

forced to conclude. But this year, an election year, you chose to

level that charge against the Democratic Party as a whole and

John Kerry by name on the floor of the House.

So my questions simply are, how do you reconcile these facts

with your charge that it was the Democrats that did not support

intelligence? Do you stand by your claims? And why did you feel

it necessary, in terms of this question of being nonpartisan and all

the rest of it, did you feel it necessary to do that?

Mr. GOSS: Thank you, Mr. Vice Chairman.

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Your opening question I think was the question of if a person has

attributes, are they so intense that they can’t be changed, or so

much of the foundation?

I think my colleague from Florida, Senator Graham, made it very

clear that I have had times in my life when I have been very nonpartisan. I prefer nonpartisanship. And frankly, what comes more

naturally to me is nonpartisanship. I don’t mean bipartisanship, I

mean nonpartisanship. And certainly in national security that

would be very, very critical. That’s the way I’ve tried to run the

Committee.

My public record is my public record. Today I am before you as

a candidate for a nomination to a job where it would be entirely

inappropriate to make anything that looks like a partisan comment.

So my answer to your question, sir, respectfully, would be the

record is the record. It is true there is a record and anybody is welcome to look at it. I have made a commitment to nonpartisanship

if nominated to the DCI job. Thank you, sir.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. Thank you, sir.

Chairman ROBERTS: With apologies to Senator DeWine, I want

to make a point of clarification to answer a question in my own

mind.

Is this the same 1995 bill that Jerry Solomon, who was a very

unique Member of Congress, born about 10 yards offside in regards

to fiscal discipline, every year would introduce his balanced budget

amendment? And as a Member of the Rules Committee, he was

Chairman and you were on the Rules Committee, and this was not

your bill, but you did co-sponsor it, and that this bill never even

came to a vote because Chairmen like myself, then the Chairman

of the sometimes powerful House Ag Committee, became very disturbed when I learned about this budget.

And so, at least it was proposed, but it never came to a vote. Is

that correct?

Mr. GOSS: Mr. Chairman, the record speaks for the record, as I

said to the Vice Chairman. I think you’ve read it properly.

Chairman ROBERTS: Senator DeWine.

Senator DEWINE: Congressman Goss, thank you very much for

being with us.

You have been, throughout your career, a strong proponent of

human intelligence. You and I have had discussions in the past

about our concern about human intelligence. I wonder if you could

tell us where you think the Agency is and the community is today

in regard to the building back up of human intelligence and where

we are today.

I wonder if you could also comment—the former DCI, Tenet, estimated that it would take at least five years to get where we should

be in regard to HUMINT. I wonder if you could comment about his

perspective on that.

And in doing so, I wonder if you could also talk about the issue

of the use of NOCs. This is something that I’ve been concerned

about. If you’ll recall, when we had our joint investigation into September 11th, I actually filed supplemental comments where I

talked about the use of NOCs and I thought that we should be

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using them more in the community. I wonder if you could talk

about that as well.

Mr. GOSS: Senator, yes, on a scale of 10, we’re about three on

build-back. In terms of years, I don’t believe five is enough, but I

can report some good news, that in my estimation that we have

some that we will be able to bring on before five years is up. But

the great bulk of what we need is more than five years out there,

in terms of global eyes and ears coverage on the core mission,

which is close-in access to the plans and intentions of the enemy,

the mischief-makers, and other things we need to know in this

country for our national security.

It’s a long build-out, a long haul. It’s been started. It needs continuous monitoring, attention, pushing and help. And it’s certainly

going to take the help of this Oversight Committee, as well as all

the management on the Executive side.

On the question of how we do our business overseas, I want to

be very careful what I say in an open session.

Senator DEWINE: I understand that.

Mr. GOSS: But I do agree with your observation that different

types of platforms and different ways of doing business are entirely

not only relevant, but necessary. And I believe that that is now understood in the community. It is certainly my position, very close

to yours, that that’s the type of business we’re going to have to do.

I am looking for innovation. And I believe that the type of the

target and what I call the adjustment of the capability requires

dealing in different ways with the enemy.

Senator DEWINE: One follow-up question in regard to human intelligence. So what you’re telling us is that you believe that it’s

going to take more than five years to get where we need to be in

regard to that.

Mr. GOSS: That’s my estimate, sir. I will admit that I’ve only

been doing homework for a couple of weeks, but in my previous position, combined with that homework, that would be my estimate.

Senator DEWINE: That’s a rather frightening answer, but I appreciate your candor.

Mr. GOSS: Candor’s important, sir, especially with an Oversight

Committee.

Senator DEWINE: Absolutely.

Let me ask another question in regard to a general policy issue.

And I understand this is a policy issue, and I understand the job

that you’re up for. But use of supplementals is something that is

very bothersome to me, and I believe it inhibits us from doing our

job. But in the job that you will be, we hope, heading into, I believe

it will also pose some problems for you in doing your job.

I wonder if you can comment about that in general, understanding that you would be part of a budget team and that you

won’t be making all of those decisions.

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I won’t make a policy comment, but I will

make a manager’s comment. If confirmed, I assure you that my

management style would not be based on supplementals. I like to

do more comprehensive planning. I like to have a better idea of

what the tooth-to-tail ratios are on some of these activities. Very

hard to do that with supplementals.

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Understanding what the OPSTEMPOs are going to be, the kinds

of things we’re going to be engaged in is, obviously, predictive. But

I think that you have a better chance of getting your efficiencies

and your resources in the right place, in the right time, in the right

amount if you have a plan rather than if you’re just ad hocing it

with sups.

Senator DEWINE: I think there’s a general consensus among at

least the Senate Intelligence Committee that we have not historically done as good a job in oversight as we should have. I think

there’s some institutional problems connected with that. I wonder

if you could possibly comment on what as the future CIA Director

you could do to help us do our job in oversight.

Mr. GOSS: Senator, a lot of recommendations about oversight—

I believe this Committee labeled the oversight dysfunctional. I paid

a lot of attention to that in my former position, of course.

I don’t think it’s appropriate for me today to talk about how the

Congress of the United States ought to solve its oversight problem.

Senator DEWINE: That was not my question.

Mr. GOSS: I agree. And I wanted you to understand why I was

not going to go there.

I do think oversight is a critical, complementary part of the arrangement. I think it takes candor with the DCI or whoever is

leading the intelligence community, the elements of the community. It takes understanding.

This is complex business, as you well know. Just learning the

jargon of this business takes a degree of education and getting used

to. And I worry a lot that we always have a supply of knowledgeable Members of Congress on the Oversight Committees who can

participate in the constructive and innovative, creative solutions

we’re needing to have to deal not only with the management, but

with the policy questions of how we apply the capabilities. Because

I don’t ever want to be put in the position, if I’m confirmed, of

building capabilities for the wrong policies.

Senator DEWINE: If I could follow up, you sat where we are sitting and you sat there for quite a while.

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.

Senator DEWINE: And you, I’m sure, have some of the frustration

that at least this Member has felt in trying to get answers from

the Agency, at least from some of the witnesses in the Agency.

What can you do to alleviate some of that problem?

Quite candidly, not all of the witnesses that come before this

Committee are as forthcoming as you are today, Mr. Goss. What

are you going to do as the leader of that team to make sure that

the people who come up here have as their mission to be not only

as open to answer the questions that are specifically narrowly

asked, but trying to be as forthcoming as possible? Sometimes we

get the impression that you’ve got to ask just precisely the right

question, and if you don’t ask it the exact right way, you’re not

going to get the right answer.

You set the culture. You’re going to set the culture for this team.

How are you going to do that?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I share your frustration from my past position. If you confirm me as DCI, you are going to get just as candid

20

presentations from every member of the community that are before

your Committee as you get from me.

Senator DEWINE: And your commitment to us is that that will

be part of your mission, to drive that culture down through your

team and to hold people accountable to do that?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir, that will be the standard. And if there are

complaints about it, there will be ways to deal with it.

Senator DEWINE: We have also been very frustrated, of course,

with the National Intelligence Estimate in regard to Iraq and the

weapons of mass destruction.

A very general question, but I think important question, is you’ve

looked at this, you’ve studied it. What were the lessons that you

learned from this failure and what are you going to do to ensure

that the next major NIE that is produced by the community does

not have that kind of problem? What have we learned?

Mr. GOSS: I think the two major things we learned is we didn’t

have enough collection. Obviously, we all know we didn’t have that

close-in access for plans and intentions. Therefore, we didn’t have

enough for the analysts to work with. And what they did work with

they did not work with in a creative enough way. I believe that the

WMD report that your Committee has put out has basically hit just

about every possible point you could hit on that.

I know that the community, even before your report came out,

on the analytical side has started to go back and talk about why

they have not had the necessary remedies to group-think, as your

Committee expressed it, why they’ve not had more competitive

analysis, why they have abandoned some of the tradecraft, why

they have been not doing some of the things that should have been

done.

So I know that there is a bit of energy and a bit of vision already

being expended. That needs to be reinforced.

I don’t think there’s any question now in hindsight that it wasn’t

our best possible job by any means. I think people did it honorably,

sincerely, but the way I characterized it in my letter to the Committee was they didn’t test conventional—excuse me, to the community, my letter to the community back last September, I think

it was, co-signed with Ms. Harman—was they didn’t test conventional wisdom enough.

There are questions in the caveating, all of those kinds of questions, so that the reader, the consumer of the product, clearly

knows what is known, what is not known and what is predictive.

I think those things help the product consumer very much as well.

So I think those are the areas of understanding there, now it’s

the question of employing it. And we need some more analysts, I’ve

got to tell you that, too.

Senator DEWINE: Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Wyden.

Senator WYDEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Goss, I have always enjoyed working with you. We go back

to our House days, and I always try to be bipartisan in this field.

Senator Lott and Senator Snowe and I are, for example, trying to

overhaul the way government documents are classified.

21

But I will tell you this morning, I am very troubled and have serious reservations about your commitment to intelligence reform.

And I want to be very specific about why that’s the case.

As eight-year Chairman of the Committee, you essentially had a

front-row seat to terrorist attack after terrorist attack—the embassies in Africa, the USS COLE, 9/11. You served on several commissions, the Joint Inquiry into 9/11 during 2001 and 2002, the Brown

Commission. You saw all of these terrorist attacks. You were part

of these various commissions advocating change.

You were in the Congress for 16 years, introduced scores of bills,

but it wasn’t until a few months ago that you introduced any legislation at all to reform the intelligence community. Why wouldn’t

you have acted earlier if you were serious about intelligence reform?

I mean, for example, when we were dealing with the Homeland

Security bill, why wouldn’t you have said, ‘‘We’d better be dealing

with intelligence reform right now too, because the system is broken’’? Why did you wait until just a few months ago to introduce

legislation on intelligence reform?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, as I’ve said, the record is the record and

there is no question that I am in the public record as a Member

of Congress appropriately trying to espouse what I thought were

the right views about intelligence, which indeed include reform.

I don’t think there’s any question about my commitment to reform. I’m totally committed. I wouldn’t be sitting here if I didn’t

think we were going to have reform in the intelligence community

and the opportunity.

The questions that frustrated me the most, honestly, looking

back, are the questions of audience. It was hard to get attention

and, if I failed, it was perhaps in getting attention. And I think

there was a lot of frustration on the Committee that we weren’t

able to get the attention for some of the things we thought needed

to be done.

In fact, I think if you look at Chairman Roberts’ bill that he has

put in and go back to, I think it was, 2002, you would find in the

HPSCI authorization bill, which is where we did put all our legislation, as you know, you would find in that legislation a recommendation that the intelligence community consider a reform

that actually looks sort of similar to the bill that Senator Roberts,

I understand, put out.

Senator WYDEN: I would only say to you, Mr. Goss, you were

Chairman of the Committee. You were in a position to get attention

to this issue, and yet you didn’t do it. And your answer today is,

‘‘Well, I’m committed to reform.’’ And we’re supposed to accept you

at your word, and essentially look at this record of eight years and

literally 16 years in a favorable way.

I’m not there yet. And I’m going to be here through this entire

hearing, but you’re going to have to show me in the course of these

hearings a commitment to reform specific instances, because you

didn’t give me an example, a concrete example, of how you were

committed to intelligence reform just now.

And the second area I’d like to get into deals with this bill in

June. And I want to know specifically whether you favor today

what is in your June 16th bill, which is giving the CIA the power

22

to arrest American citizens in the United States. Do you favor that

provision that was in your bill? And I just would like a yes-or-no

answer.

Mr. GOSS: No.

Senator WYDEN: You do not favor that provision?

Mr. GOSS: No, sir, I’ve already answered that question for Chairman Roberts.

Senator WYDEN: You did not answer that question specifically.

You, in my view, talked generally about it, but I appreciate your

answer, so we’re clear that that 57-year-old ban—that’s what’s on

the books now with respect to the prohibition on the CIA arresting

Americans in the United States—you will not favor changing that

as CIA Director?

Mr. GOSS: The CIA should have no arrest powers in the United

States of America.

Senator WYDEN: A question dealing with the commitment, again,

to take on the tough issues and challenge the Agency is the focus

of this question.

The Senate has cooperated with an ongoing Department of Justice inquiry into the shooting down of an American missionary

plane in Peru. This was a matter, as you’ll recall, that in a program that the CIA was involved in, an American missionary and

a baby were killed. The Senate is cooperating fully in that inquiry.

Has your Committee fully cooperated in that inquiry and shared

documents on the investigation?

Mr. GOSS: To the best of my knowledge.

Senator WYDEN: I think you’d better check again. It is our understanding that the Committee has not cooperated, is not sharing

documents. And the reason that I feel this is important is it goes

to your willingness, looking at the past, to take the Agency on.

The Senate has been willing to do it. The Senate has been willing

to say that we’re going to cooperate with the matter. And my understanding is that the House is not fully sharing documents in

this matter. And I consider it important.

The next area I’d like to ask you about involves political accountability. You have said in the past that the Agency is risk-averse.

And I think that’s an important statement, and one that I largely

share. The reason that I think that may be the case is that when

things go wrong, the Agency takes the hit and political officials,

particularly in the Executive Branch, get off the hook.

I’d like to know what you would do to support political accountability so as to give your agents more confidence in terms of being

willing to take risks.

Mr. GOSS: Risk-aversion is a very important part of this, and rebuilding the morale and giving people the latitude to do the jobs

and standing behind them is just plain good leadership and good

management. And that, surely, is something that I have in mind

and, if confirmed, will practice.

My attitude toward the intelligence community and, I guess, my

alma mater, the CIA, is one of tough love. I very much want to see

our men and women in the intelligence community succeed in their

work for not only their own sake, but for the safety of all Americans. That is our first defense, in my view, of our national security.

23

So I think all the motivation and all the forward lean on this that

could be out there is very, very important.

I will stand up for what is fair and just on behalf of the people

of the intelligence community. And I will hold accountable those

people who are out of bounds. I believe that accountability works

both ways. Those should be celebrated who do good work and those

who don’t need to be corrected.

Senator WYDEN: Why did you vote against the 9/11 Commission,

the creation of it?

Mr. GOSS: Sir, the record will speak for the record. I believe that

I did support the composition of the 9/11 Commission.

Senator WYDEN: But you were opposed to it originally.

Mr. GOSS: Senator, my reason for opposing it was the same as

some of my colleagues in this chamber. I did not believe that a simultaneous investigation would be in the best interest of getting

all the facts out in a very straightforward way and getting an efficient investigation done.

I did very much support the idea of a sequential investigation,

very much understanding that we would never, in our Joint Inquiry, get it all done, and said so many times in the Joint Inquiry.

The record will be clear on that.

But actually I am very proud—I’ll accept some paternity for the

setting up of the 9/11 Commission and the fact of the way we set

it up so that they came up with a bipartisan, good-quality book

which I would recommend to every American, at least the first 338

pages which deal with what happened. I believe that it is a fine

product. And I, frankly, think there will be more of the mosaic in

the future filled in.

Senator WYDEN: I think it’s an excellent product.

I’m concerned that if you had had your way, at least originally,

we wouldn’t have had the product, and that’s what troubles me.

Let me ask you, if I might, about Ahmed Chalabi, because you

led a party-line vote to reject an amendment that would have authorized an inquiry into dealings with Ahmed Chalabi. Now, this

was even after allegations that Chalabi had leaked U.S. military

secrets to Iran. You said, ‘‘I would say that the oversight has

worked well in matters relating to Mr. Chalabi.’’ I find that very

hard to believe.

Do you still feel that oversight has worked well with respect to

Ahmed Chalabi?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir, I do.

Senator WYDEN: As Director of the CIA, would you initiate an investigation into whether an assumed American ally provided intelligence information to an adversary?

Mr. GOSS: Of course, if it were credible.

Senator WYDEN: And why do you believe that the system worked

well with respect to Mr. Chalabi?

Mr. GOSS: I believe the issues about Mr. Chalabi, which are extensive, have been generally well understood. I think that all of the

questions have been raised and I think the appropriate investigations that follow on are taking place. I don’t think oversight gets

much better than that.

Senator WYDEN: Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.

24

I would just say to Mr. Goss that, despite my affection for you,

the answers you’re giving me today suggest that it’s going to be

business as usual at the Agency if you’re confirmed. Now, I intend

to be here throughout the day. I hope we’ll actually have a second

hearing. I hope you can convince me otherwise.

My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me add my welcome to Mr. Goss.

This nomination is being considered in a context, as a number

of colleagues have pointed out, of proposed reforms following failures of intelligence before 9/11 and following massive pre-Iraq failures of intelligence. To my mind, at least as important is the structural reforms which are under consideration and even arguably

more so in terms of importance, is the need to assure the independence and objectivity of intelligence analysis.

A more powerful national intelligence director with greater authority over intelligence budgets and personnel could be appropriate, with a big ‘‘if’’—if that increased power is used to help ensure the independence and the objectivity of intelligence analysis

and if it’s not used—as it must not be used—to promote policy. Intelligence is not supposed to be promoting policy. It’s supposed to

be informing policymakers and I just don’t want a more powerful

national intelligence director to be a more powerful yes man, for

whatever Administration is in power.

I don’t want someone who says that something is a slam dunk

when it isn’t to the President of the United States. I don’t want

someone who says publicly something that is different from what

the classified material says, thereby supporting policy of an Administration with those kind of public statements.

And that’s what I have to become comfortable with relative to

your nomination—not to you personally, but to the nomination that

we’re talking about to this job and whether you are the right person for this job, given the statements which you have made, the positions which you have taken relative to a number of intelligence

matters.

You were quoted yesterday in The Washington Post as saying

that you would not use the term ‘‘failure’’ to describe the intelligence lapses before 9/11. Was that accurate?

Mr. GOSS: I think it’s partially, in context. I think I added some

other words.

Senator DEWINE: Were there significant intelligence failures

prior to 9/11?

Mr. GOSS: In the sense that the intelligence did not prevent the

attack, yes. In that sense that the intelligence was not the full

problem, no.

Senator LEVIN: But would you use the term ‘‘failure’’ relative to

the 9/11 intelligence?

Mr. GOSS: In the contemporary sense that our intelligence failed

us, I would.

Senator LEVIN: As a matter of fact, the report that we all issued,

the two Committees issued, uses the word ‘‘failure’’ over and over

and over again. But you seem to have some reluctance, or you did

25

relative to that interview, to use the term. I’m glad you’re willing

to use the term.

Now, what about prior to Iraq? Would you say that there were

massive intelligence failures prior to the Iraq war?

Mr. GOSS: Are you referring to the WMD, the material that was

given to our——

Senator LEVIN: The 500-page report of this Committee. Would

you say that there were massive intelligence failures prior to Iraq?

Mr. GOSS: I would say there were intelligence failures. The degree question is probably going to be in the eye of the beholder.

They were certainly significant, and they were not up to standard.

Senator LEVIN: In your eye, were there significant failures?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir. In my eye, there were significant failures in

our intelligence, in the product that was delivered, and that’s why

the product has to be better.

Senator LEVIN: All right. The product that the CIA delivered?

Mr. GOSS: The product that the intelligence community delivered, sir.

Senator LEVIN: And would that include the CIA?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir, of course.

Senator LEVIN: And were there significant failures in the public

comments of the Director of the CIA, in terms of his statements

about what the intelligence showed? Would you say there were inaccuracies, omissions, distortions and failures on the part of CIA

Director Tenet in his public statements, many of which were analyzed in that 500-page report, by the way?

Mr. GOSS: I believe that Director Tenet spoke forthrightly with

what he truly believed at the time.

Senator LEVIN: You think that he distorted?

Mr. GOSS: I don’t think he had the full—I don’t think he distorted intentionally, no.

Senator LEVIN: Do you think he omitted?

Mr. GOSS: I don’t know that, sir.

Senator LEVIN: Do you think he exaggerated?

Mr. GOSS: I don’t know that.

Senator LEVIN: And did you read our report?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN: Do you agree with our report?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir. Generally, I’ve read obviously a huge report.

It has a lot of blackout in it, as you very well know, redaction. Too

much probably. And I’ve read all 117 of your conclusions. I’m sorry

there weren’t some recommendations to follow. Perhaps there will

be.

Senator LEVIN: Well, hopefully there will be. That’s phase two,

apparently.

Chairman ROBERTS: It’s the Roberts bill, by the way. I just

thought I’d, you know, toss that in.

Senator LEVIN: This is one of the conclusions in that report, that

most of the major key judgments in the intelligence community’s

October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate called ‘‘Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction’’ either overstated or were not supported by the underlying intelligence reporting.

Mr. GOSS: I think I agree with that.

26

Senator LEVIN: Now, you were also quoted in yesterday’s Post as

saying that—after saying that you would use the word ‘‘failure’’ to

describe the intelligence lapses before 9/11—that’s what The Washington Post said you said—you then are quoted as saying the following: ‘‘I don’t like to see the left wingers splattering mud on an

agency that’s done some very fine work.’’ You allegedly said that

in 2002. Was that an accurate quote?

Mr. GOSS: I have no idea if it’s an accurate quote or not in 2002.

I don’t know what the context was. I do believe that we need a

forthright, nonpartisan look at our intelligence weaknesses, failures

and needs.

Senator LEVIN: Does that reflect your views, however?

Mr. GOSS: Which?

Senator LEVIN: That quote.

Mr. GOSS: That what?

Senator LEVIN: You don’t like to see the ‘‘left wingers splattering

mud on an agency’’?

Mr. GOSS: Let me put it this way, Senator. I don’t believe that

anybody should be unfairly criticizing men and women who are

working in our intelligence community, particularly when we’re at

a time at war, unless there is real justification for it.

Senator LEVIN: And do you think that that 500-page indictment,

in effect, of the failures of the CIA represents splattering mud on

the CIA?

Mr. GOSS: No, sir. And that certainly was not the context of that

quote.

Senator LEVIN: But you don’t remember making that quote?

Mr. GOSS: No.

Senator LEVIN: Your statement to Senator Rockefeller, on the

numbers that he gave to you, is that the record is the record.

That’s an unacceptable answer, because if the record’s inaccurate,

it seems to me you ought to correct it. As a matter of fact, you said

to the Chairman when the Chairman quoted from something in

your record, you said that—and this is just a couple of minutes

ago—‘‘Mr. Chairman, the record is the record. You read the record

properly.’’

Did Senator Rockefeller read the record properly?

Mr. GOSS: I think Senator Rockefeller read the record properly,

and came to the conclusions he came to.

Senator LEVIN: And do you disagree with any of the numbers—

there’s no numbers there, but do you disagree with the statements

that he made? These are very factual statements about what you

supported as a Member of the House, and with intelligence cuts,

comparing the bill that you co-sponsored to the proposal of Senator

Kerry. Is that inaccurate in any way?

Mr. GOSS: The record is accurate to the best of my knowledge,

Senator.

Senator LEVIN: Are his statements accurate?

Mr. GOSS: Senator Rockefeller’s statements?

Senator LEVIN: Yes. Comparing the bill that you co-sponsored

with the proposal of Senator Kerry, is that statement of Senator

Rockefeller accurate?

Mr. GOSS: Senator Rockefeller’s statements are what he believes.

27

Senator LEVIN: I want to know what you believe, not what he believes. I know what he believes, he just stated it very forthrightly.

I need to know what you believe forthrightly.

My question is, do you believe that those statements comparing

Senator——

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I believe——

Senator LEVIN: I want to finish my question.

Mr. GOSS: Sorry.

Senator LEVIN: Do you believe that the statements of Senator

Rockefeller comparing what was in your bill to what Senator Kerry

proposed are accurate? Do you believe it was accurate?

Mr. GOSS: The record is the record, Senator. And I don’t believe

that it is appropriate in any way, shape or form for me to get involved in anything that could be considered a debate about partisan matters.

Senator LEVIN: I couldn’t agree with you more. Let’s talk about

facts and numbers. That’s what the two charts were. They were

comparing numbers, without having the specific numbers, comparing the level of expenditures for intelligence.

It’s a very factual question, it’s a very objective question. We’re

looking for objectivity, we’re looking for independence. It’s not going

to be good enough for you to say, ‘‘The record’s the record,’’ when

you don’t want to deal with the record, but when you do want to

deal with the record, then comment on it. That isn’t going to be

good enough, at least for this one Senator.

And this is not something, again, which is personal between us.

It is something which is very essential to me, that we have confidence that whoever that director is in whatever Administration is

going to be objective and independent and is going to call it as he

sees it.

And now the question that Senator Rockefeller asked, and I’m

going to try to get you to answer, is whether or not that comparison of levels of spending that compared your bill, the bill that you

co-sponsored, with what Senator Kerry proposed was an accurate

representation. That is my question. And it’s essential we get an

answer to that question.

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I believe that Senator Rockefeller believes

what he said, and the record is clear on what my record is. The

facts speak, the record, they’re no different in the record. They

speak for themselves.

Senator LEVIN: They don’t speak. You’re speaking for them is

much more significant at this moment for this Senator than just

simply saying, ‘‘The record speaks for itself.’’ And I don’t understand the reluctance in some cases to say ‘‘Yes, that is an accurate,

factual statement,’’ where in other cases you are perfectly willing

to say, ‘‘No, I did say that,’’ or, ‘‘I didn’t say that.’’

For instance, you gave an answer to Senator Wyden saying you

don’t support something, even though the way the bill reads it

might be interpreted the other way. It’s just a direct question. And

the reluctance troubles me to give a direct answer to a factual

question—what your belief is, whether that is an accurate representation of the facts.

Mr. GOSS: Senator, you’ve asked me what my belief is.

Senator LEVIN: Do you believe it’s an accurate representation?

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Mr. GOSS: I believe that the chart that Senator Rockefeller put

up, as vague as it is, which has no facts on it, is put up there in

good faith by Senator Rockefeller to make a point of the way he

sees it. I believe people can interpret the record in different ways.

That’s why I’m not going to try to interpret the record.

I made a very firm commitment that I would be nonpartisan and

objective and straightforward and candid, and if nominated and if

confirmed that I would take this job and deal with it and step away

totally from my former job and let the record speak for itself.

Senator LEVIN: Thank you.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Mr. Chairman, I just need simply

to interrupt to say that I have all of the figures, and would be

happy to sit down and go over those with you, if that’s appropriate.

But I have all of the figures about those bills. I just could not bring

them before this open forum.

Mr. GOSS: I understand that.

Senator LEVIN: Perhaps we can then get an answer after you’ve

reviewed those figures. We haven’t gotten it now, and I don’t believe that therefore meets the test you’ve just given, which is being

candid and being open and forthright. Your answer does not meet

that test.

Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Congressman Goss, I welcome you and your lovely wife and join

those in commending both of you for the willingness to take on

what appears to be a very arduous and extraordinarily challenging

new post.

I want to be up front with you and tell you exactly where I’m

coming from as we propose here in the Congress the legislative

changes with regard to our intelligence structure. I want to be respectful of our President. I think he’s taken some strong initiatives

through Executive Orders and other ways.

But I come back to my own personal convictions about the Central Intelligence Agency. I was privileged 35 years ago to enter government service as the Under Secretary and Secretary of the Navy,

and I have continuously, except for a brief hiatus when I was running for the Senate, worked with that Agency. I think it is one of

the most extraordinary institutions in our overall government.

It is composed of individuals unlike those found in many other

agencies of government. And you, having been in the ranks there

in your career—distinguished career—I believe you share that and

that’s one of the strongest reasons I want to be a supporter for you

in this post.

I feel that if we go through this legislative change, whatever it

may be at the moment, I personally am going to do everything I

can to strengthen the integrity and the professionalism and the effectiveness of the CIA, and let no one try to crack it and break its

morale, which could cause a disaffection of this extraordinary group

of professionals that are serving all over the world, in many places,

as you well know, taking personal risks equal in every respect to

those of the men and women of our armed forces.

So, having said that, I listened carefully as our distinguished

Chairman and Ranking Member and others talk to you about your

background and your ability to be bipartisan or nonpartisan or

29

however it is—we use those phrases interchangeably rather loosely

up here.

But the fact that you’re an elected official and perhaps the second only in history to take the post to which you’ve been assigned

I think is a great credit, because you bring an extraordinary knowledge of government and the dynamics which make government

work.

And I think if you look back over many of your predecessors, a

number of whom I had the privilege of knowing personally and

working with, while they may not have been elected officials, they

were no fools when it came to politics. And I’m confident that you

can fulfill this post without ever suffering any accusations of being

political.

The Chairman opened the discussion with reference to the ghost

detainee issue. I had extensive briefings on Friday from the Agency

and I participated with the Chairman and other Members of this

Committee yesterday on the subject of the ghost detainees. And

you gave very clear answers.

But I want to clarify something in the record. I want to go back

to an Associated Press story of September 3 this year.

‘‘Washington: Porter Goss, tapped as the next CIA Director, says

the Senate lacked, quote, ‘balance in its public hearings in investigating the Iraq prison scandal and should not have plucked military commanders from the field to question them about the

abuse.’ ’’

Now departing from this momentarily, as Chairman of that Committee, I indicated to the Secretary of Defense in a letter a number

of witnesses who we felt should come before the Committee at

times convenient and in no way to interfere with their military duties.

The Secretary called me personally and said General Abizaid and

Sanchez are in Washington. They’re available and we had them as

witnesses. They were not plucked from their duties. They came at

the direction of the Secretary in connection with their appearances

here in Washington on other matters.

But I continue: ‘‘During one interview in May, the eight-term

House Republican and Floridian said he couldn’t count the number

of ongoing prison abuse investigations, but, ‘We’ve got the circus in

the Senate, which is always the likely place to look for the circus.’

‘‘Even though I say that lightheartedly, I do honestly question

whether or not they have balance over there on this issue.’ ’’ I continue your quote: ‘‘It seems to me pulling the general in charge of

the troops in a hostile combat situation back to explain something

that they don’t need him for and he doesn’t have the answers to,

and he could get the information through subordinates anyway, it

seems to me to be some very stylish interpretation of oversight,’

Goss said, ‘and probably unnecessary, and perhaps not helpful to

the war effort. I am not comfortable with what the Senate is doing,’

he added.’’

I think this is an appropriate time, in light of the questions by

the Chairman with regard to this ghost detainee issue, which I consider a very serious one, along with the whole subject, that I believe that the Senate has treated very conscientiously. And it’s interesting that the House Armed Services Committee was somewhat

30

dismissive of the issue in the beginning, but subsequently that

Committee has conducted just about every single hearing that the

Senate has had on the subject in a very thorough and professional

way.

So I don’t mean to dwell on that, but if you want to say a word.

Mr. GOSS: Senator, thank you for the opportunity.

In the first place, I did not know of your conversation, in your

capacity as Chairman, with the Pentagon. Had I known that, I

probably would not have made that statement. In fact, I certainly

would not have.

My statement was based on dealing with members of the military who were witnesses who had appeared before our House Committee, and they were concerned that we were getting in the way

of their first jobs. That was why the statement was made with regard to do we need our people here or there. And I think that your

clarification of that illuminates it for me, and I think you are right.

With regard to the question of needing to investigate, obviously

we needed to investigate. My issue then was the question of how.

Back then, in May, there was quite a feeding frenzy going on in

the media over the very sensational photographs that were out

there, which, unfortunately, our Committees had the responsibility

of overseeing, and they were—disgusting is not a strong enough

word.

But putting the perversion aside and going to the issue of our

Committee, my worry about balance was the question of the balance between getting it right on interrogation, which is a critically

important tool for intelligence, having professional interrogators

able to do their work—professional interrogators. Torture is never

tolerable, and it’s not anything that a professional interrogator

uses.

Senator WARNER: I think I accept your answer.

Mr. GOSS: Thank you, sir.

Senator WARNER: In terms of the role of the CIA Director in this

coming legislative environment, again, I want to work on a provision along these lines. And that is, I’m a firm believe that competitive analysis and differing views are some of the pillars of strength

in our intelligence system. I want to preserve that, at the same

time supporting the President’s initiative for a NID.

But on the assumption there will be instances where the CIA Director could have a strong, personal, differing view than that held

by the NID, I’d like to have it written in law, if necessary, that

that individual, be it yourself or successors, has the opportunity to

go directly to the President and provide those views.

Let me give you an example. When I and many others worked

on the Goldwater-Nichols Act—and yesterday in that seat sat Colin

Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs—we wrote in that

while the Chairman is the principal military adviser to the President, if one or more of the other uniformed service chiefs have differing views, they can have access to the President to express those

views in the presence of the Chairman or however it was done.

Something along those lines, I think, is needed for your post. And

I wonder if you share that view. I might say Colin Powell said that

he was intrigued with it, and he felt it was worthy of careful examination.

31

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I think it’s a very important observation you

have made. How the reorganization comes out, and how the network is stitched together, and how the intelligence community is

stitched together and what are the positions is unclear to me, and

it will be the job of the Congress. It will not be my job.

But you asked me specifically do I think there should be the opportunity of the person who is in charge of dealing with our clandestine services and our intelligence product that makes up, basically, the most important briefings the President and his national

security people get—do I think that that person should have the

ability to talk to the President of the United States? Yes, sir, I do.

Senator WARNER: Thank you very much. Well, I hope that we

will provide that in a way, if necessary, in law.

Mr. GOSS: Thank you, sir.

Senator WARNER: The President, 24 hours a day, seven days a

week, needs intelligence. You know that full well. The military, certainly in the tactical level, likewise needs it 24 hours a day.

Now, assuming we enact a new law, I’m concerned about how we

implement and transform the present system in such a way, at a

time when this Nation is at war, we don’t lose a single heartbeat

and it is not perceived by any adversary now is the time to strike

America because they’re reshuffling this intelligence system.

What guidance could you give the Congress with regard to how

we may incorporate that in law, or certainly report language, so an

orderly transformation does not leave a single heartbeat, a weakness, in our system?

Mr. GOSS: Sir, that will be your job. And it would be probably

inappropriate for me to tell you how I would like my job description

carved out.

But I will be very candid and say I totally agree that there can

be no slippage, and we must not lose sight of the fact that the

warfighter, to support our military operations when we are at war,

must have every possible priority and consideration. We know

there’s frictions between the national consumer and the military.

Those are an area which I hope that the Senate and the House

would take a very close look at and provide provision when we are

at war, whether it’s a conventional war or a SOLIC-type war, lowintensity conflicts.

I think those are distinctions that need to be looked at in clarity

of how we proceed and deal with our organization so that it is flexible and can get the capabilities on the target to enhance our national security.

Senator WARNER: I thank the witness.

Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Feinstein.

Senator FEINSTEIN: Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Mr. Goss.

I would like to go back to Senator Warner’s question about your

comment that, ‘‘We’ve got the circus in the Senate, which is always

the likely place to look for the circus.’’ And this is still the oversight

body for the intelligence community, and as such I think there

needs to be some mutual respect between this Committee and whoever is DCI. What you’re saying by that comment is certainly a

lack of respect not only for this Committee, but this body.

32

How can there be mutual respect, how can we carry out our oversight responsibility with you as a DCI that believes we are a circus?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I certainly do not believe that the Senate is

a circus or this Oversight Committee is.

The comment that I made to the reporter over the media frenzy

that was going on over the sensationalism of the pictures at the

time was very simple. It was not made as a serious comment. It

was not meant as a serious comment. And it was not reported as

a serious comment. It was light-hearted jesting about our rivalries

that go back and forth on the Hill.

I then amplified that to say, but I am concerned about balance,

because I am so concerned about our interrogation as a weapon we

must have. As you very well know in your position, you have seen

the value of good professional interrogation and what it has meant

to the safety of Americans at home and abroad in recent months

and years.

To lose that because of the extraordinary abuses that were going

on and the failure in the media to understand the distinction between prison guards who may have gotten out of control, or allegedly have gotten out of control and some of who clearly did get out

of control and have been properly convicted and there are investigations ongoing, and our professional interrogators who we need

to do the job was the point I was trying to make.

I was worried that that balance would swing over and that sensationalism would cause a stop in our interrogation, which was my

main problem.

Senator FEINSTEIN: Let me ask you about another light-hearted

comment and this has to do with the outing of a clandestine agent,

namely Valerie Plame. And you said, ‘‘I would never take lightly

a serious allegation backed up by evidence that there was a willful—and I emphasize ‘willful’; inadvertent is something else—willful disclosure and I haven’t seen any evidence. Somebody sends me

a blue dress and some DNA, I’ll have an investigation.’’

Do you believe that’s an appropriate comment as the Chairman

of the House Intelligence Committee?

Mr. GOSS: I don’t think it was my best comment ever, for sure.

I think it was made to a provocative remark to me about the difference between evidence and allegation. It’s not something I’m

proud I said at all. But I think the point I was trying to make is

that evidence is different than allegations.

Senator FEINSTEIN: Okay. The question is what kind of a message that sends to the clandestine community when you’re going to

be their number one authority figure?

Mr. GOSS: If you’re referring to do I take seriously the investigation about the leak, the answer is indeed I do. And when I was the

Chairman of the Committee, I assure you we had numerous of the

right people from the Administration come up and explain to us exactly what was going on.

I did exactly what I have done in every investigation, I think

without exception, as the Chairman and as a Member of the Committee over the 10 years that I’ve been there, which was have a

quiet, closed hearing to get the facts; learn that the proper investigation was being taken by the proper people; demand that a reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:24 Feb 23, 2005 Jkt 096698 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\DOCS\96698.TXT SCANNER PsN: SCANNER
33

port be given back to the Committee for the Committee’s deliberation when the report was concluded.

That was the record. Some of that is closed, obviously, and I cannot go any further in it. But we await that report.

Senator FEINSTEIN: Thank you very much. I’d like to move on.

Mr. GOSS: Yes, ma’am.

Senator FEINSTEIN: This morning every Member of the Committee received a letter from a 22-year veteran of the Agency. He

is a serving CIA officer. He made 10 points. I’d like to read one of

the points and ask you to tell me what you will do about it.

‘‘In the CIA’s core U.S.-based bin-Laden operational unit today,

there are fewer Directorate of Operations officers with substantive

expertise on Al-Qa’ida than there were on 11 September. There’s

been no systematic effort to groom al-Qa’ida expertise among Directorate of Operations officers since 11 September.

‘‘Today the unit is greatly understaffed because of a hiring freeze

and the rotation of large numbers of officers in and out of the unit

every 60 to 90 days, a process in which experienced officers do less

substantive work and become trainers for officers who leave before

they’re qualified to support the mission.

‘‘The excellent management team now running operations

against al-Qa’ida has made repeated, detailed and on-paper pleas

for more officers to work against the al-Qa’ida and have done so for

years, not weeks or months, but have been ignored.’’

What would you do? Because I’m one that believes the capture

of Bin Ladin, the removal of al-Qa’ida from the face of the Earth,

really should be a number one mission of this Agency and this says

that there is the al-Qa’ida unit, which is not really functioning as

it should be.

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I don’t know whether that reference is to the

CTC or to an area division or to some other component.

Senator FEINSTEIN: The CIA.

Mr. GOSS: Yes, ma’am. I’m going to take that to mean it is part

of the CIA Directorate of Operations and answer it that way.

I largely agree with that. I don’t know whether it’s factually accurate, but it is similar to the conclusions that our Committee,

which I’m no longer on, and, obviously, I’m not speaking on behalf

of that Committee.

But that did lead us to write our authorization bill this year with

some very sharp language that went very much to those points

that caused some considerable uproar at the time. Frankly, it was

very similar to language that your Committee reported in your

WMD as well. So I think there is agreement there’s a problem.

One of the reasons that I sit here before you today seeking your

confirmation is so we can continue to rebuild the HUMINT services

properly. They are our best bet for dealing with the war on terrorism. It is very hard to use some of our national technical means

effectively against terrorists. HUMINT is our best capability.

It needs to redesigned. We need to have people who can speak

the language, blend into the culture, spot the people, understand

what motivates people in those cultures. All of those things need

to happen. That takes training, that takes time, it takes resources.

It takes different platforms, different ways of doing business.

34

That is very much why I am looking forward to this job if I am

confirmed. I believe I can make that happen.

Senator FEINSTEIN: Let me follow up on that.

I’m one that believes the NIE was deeply flawed, and virtually

every time there was a difference of view—whether it was on the

aluminum tubes, whether it was on the UAVs, whether it was on

mobile biological weapons labs—the CIA view prevailed and the

CIA view was wrong.

One of the things that bothers me very much is that the Secretary of State was put out before the world at the United Nations

with deeply flawed data. And he used that data, and particularly

on the mobile labs, when our investigation showed that it was a

flawed operation to gather those sources from the beginning and

never should have happened that way.

What will you do to specifically change the collection and analysis methodology in the preparation for an NIE?

Mr. GOSS: Thank you. Part of the answer to that is the management of the integration and the fusion of information. It is a question of co-locating people from different agencies into the different

disciplines to try and make sure that they have people talking to

each other. That’s a big part of it.

The second part of it is the tradecraft, testing the conventional

wisdom, competitive analysis, those kinds of things that are properly pointed out—avoiding group-think if you will. And some of

that is ongoing, and I would submit to you that there is a paper

from the DO which I would like to provide for you if you’re interested on some of the steps that are being taken.

But it goes much further than just dealing with the management. It goes to the question of how many analysts do we actually

have who speak the language, who know the cultures to do the jobs

and these things. And the answer is, frankly, not enough.

I don’t want to give aid and comfort to our enemy today by telling you how bad I think this problem is, but I can tell you right

now we’re borrowing analysts from places we shouldn’t be borrowing analysts from to do jobs. They’re probably not as good at

what they’re being borrowed for, and they’re leaving a gap for what

they’re good at.

That’s not smart. And that worries me. And that’s happening

both at our DO and our analytic divisions, and that’s got to stop.

Senator FEINSTEIN: Do you believe that analysts should have

more of the source data?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, ma’am.

Senator FEINSTEIN: Which is a real problem. And do you also believe that perhaps they should have station experience?

Mr. GOSS: I believe it’s very helpful. The question is that they

haven’t had the time or the people or the slots; there’s a lot of logistics reasons why they haven’t.

In a better world, absolutely they should have that, and certainly

there needs to be better working relationships, understanding, I

will say cross-talking between the DO, the DI.

And, obviously, analysis should drive collection. It shouldn’t be

we have a collector somewhere say this is what we’re interested in.

It should be, we have an analyst who wants this, this is what I

want a collector to get. That’s the right formula.

35

And you’re right. I mean, your Committee’s paper did an excellent job pointing this stuff out.

Senator FEINSTEIN: Thank you, my time is up.

Chairman ROBERTS: Thank you, Senator.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL: Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. Goss, welcome. We are grateful to you and Mariel for offering yourselves once again at an important time in the history of

our country.

I have no questions regarding circuses or any references to circus

or county fairs, but I do want to talk a little bit about some things

that you have discussed here this morning.

Each of us, and certainly you, Mr. Goss, understand that we are

living at a very transformational time in the history of the world.

That is requiring essential United States Government agencies to

be radically transformed. We are in the midst of that today and

have been and will continue to be working on this over the next

few weeks in the intelligence community, reforming our intelligence community, restructuring our intelligence community. This

transformation in the world today has presented new challenges,

new threats, new possibilities.

And with that as the context, I would be very interested in getting your sense of the larger view. And you referenced it a couple

of times in your statement when you said, ‘‘Intelligence needs to be

shared with those who need to know. This includes our State, local

law enforcement authorities for homeland security purposes, and

our Federal law enforcement officials. Information-sharing must

improve if we are to improve our capabilities against our most imminent threats.’’

Within that context, how do you break out information sharing,

as you have noted here, within the domestic structure of our government today? You talk specifically about local law enforcement.

We’re not doing that very well. In fact, I don’t know how much of

it we are doing.

How do we integrate into the overall intelligence community fabric domestic and foreign intelligence? How does that work? We’re

talking about intelligence-sharing this morning, we talked about it

yesterday, you have dealt with it for seven years as Chairman of

the House Intelligence Committee.

Then, in addition to that, how then do we integrate the tacticalstrategic intelligence dynamic into this overall new 21st Century

agency intelligence community that you are going to have an awful

lot to do with, and you will play a very significant role if you’re confirmed, in helping shape and mold that?

Mr. GOSS: That is going to be primarily the most critical task of

the community management aspect of the job of DCI or national

intelligence director or whatever the job finally is.

The question of the horizontal coordination, collaboration and exchange of both tactical and strategic information and the vertical,

down through the State and local, down the working level, is what

this is all about. Blending in, getting over that line that we have

always had, this is different than the wall between intelligence and

law enforcement, but it’s like it.

36

Our whole intelligence apparatus is set up as the National Foreign Intelligence Program. It’s all overseas. Now we have a domestic Homeland Security Department. They do law enforcement and

they stop terrorism from happening. But the information may come

from overseas, or the information may come from local people.

What we have to have is a place to deal with that information.

But we have it. It’s called TTIC. It’s being set up—the Terrorist

Threat Integration Center. It’s a fusion place. It’s a house of exchange of information. It doesn’t have capability to go do something. That’s why we have a national counterterrorism center that

is being considered.

And that’s why we have a very thorny question which is raised

both by the 9/11 Commission—and as some of the Senators asked,

alluding to some of my legislation—how do you join that piece together where you have actual information being used by law enforcement or surveillance people in the United States of America

against Americans? That’s a policy question that you all are going

to have to answer, and I hope that your answer is very clear for

the people in the Executive Branch. It has to be clear. I don’t know

the answer to that.

There are a number of proposals out there to deal with it. The

issue has been raised by virtually everybody, and it has to be dealt

with. I think it’s critical to the success. And everybody has to understand what that is.

Then comes the technical problem, sir. And there is some good

news here. We are beginning to understand ways to share information. We’re using tearsheets. We’re beginning to talk about ways to

get information down to the local level, training people to receive

information at the local level, ways to sanitize or partially sanitize

information so that it can be shared with more people. DIA has

done a good job using taggants on some of the information so people can go back and see what levels of access are available for a

given nugget of information. Those kinds of tools and modernization techniques are beginning to happen. They’re not in place.

We desperately need an enterprise architecture that has an assured, secure mechanism for the intelligence community and its

customers to talk together in a way that you can do all of the business you need to do on behalf of the intelligence community—and

that is classified information, quite often, the exchange between—

and then have a customer be able to reach in there to a safeguarded level where there’s no threat to sources, methods, ongoing

investigations, liaison relationships or things like that.

That is a long way away, but it is so necessary.

And one of the requests, if I am confirmed, that I am going to

be continuously making of the Oversight Committees is continued

support for enterprise architecture. Because we’ve got some agencies now that can’t even do their work inside themselves on a secure basis, as you very well know.

Then they have to be able to find interoperability with other

agencies. Then you have to be able to stitch that network together.

And then you have to be able to deal with your customers, not all

of whom can have access to all of the sources and methods, obviously.

37

You’ve put your finger on probably the toughest management

question we’ve got, and it’s going to take some time and the cooperation of all of us to get that fixed. And we’ve got to do it.

Senator HAGEL: I would hope, Mr. Goss, that you will be very active in this and take significant initiative. Because we play a role—

and you have been through this—but we don’t understand it as

well as you understand it, and your colleagues. And we are, to

some extent, guided, as is your Agency, by the end-user’s needs, by

what you have to say about this.

Mr. GOSS: Thank you, sir.

Senator HAGEL: Let me ask you, in following along the same line

of questions here, you mentioned this, it’s been brought up in some

exchange this morning: human intelligence. You noted the critical

essence of human intelligence.

Can you tell this Committee any specific thoughts you have

about what you would do to address this issue if confirmed? You

mentioned reaching out, obviously, for more linguistics, more new

21st Century dynamics as part of the collection process, the analysis process, but programs—anything specific to this issue that you

are thinking about now?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir. Definitely, some specific things.

I believe there is too much management at headquarters, specifically. It has gotten too patterned. I don’t want to use the word ‘‘too

bureaucratic,’’ but maybe it’s the right word. And I think that has

stifled some of the innovation, some of the creativity and, frankly,

some of the risk-taking in the field. I think some of the exact procedures, which I will not go into in open session, need to be modified

about how people in the field are allowed to go about their business. I think that’s a very easy example.

But there’s a more basic problem than that. That’s a simple fix.

That’s a stroke-of-a-pen fix. Reassurance that people will be supported in the field, building the morale, those are more leadership

issues, that has to happen. The training has to happen.

Training costs money. We need a lot more people and I can’t emphasize enough that if you don’t have case officers that can deal

with the culture and the language, you’re not going to get much.

It really is important to have that. And so one of the very specific

things I’d ask you to look at is the efforts that are being made with

the national flagship language program, the National Security

Education programs to take some of our existing people and bring

them into an area where we need to employ them and give them

the skills, the background, the culture, the language that we also

deal with, the language question more head-on than we have. Because it is a major weakness. We may have the best interrogators

in the world, but if you can’t speak the language, or she can’t speak

the language, it doesn’t do us a whole lot of good.

Senator HAGEL: Do you favor making the aggregate intelligence

community budget public?

Mr. GOSS: Sir, what do you mean by the aggregate, the top line?

Senator HAGEL: Yes, how much we spend.

Mr. GOSS: My preference is no, sir, for a very simple reason. It

served us well not to put that top line out when we were in what

I will call a bipolar stand-off with the Soviet Union. I’m not sure

what the future holds.

38

One of the things that kept the Soviets off balance, we know

now, was they weren’t quite sure how much we were committing,

what we really had, what we were really doing. And my view is

that if I had a preference, I think the day may come when we find

ourselves in another, sort of bipolar situation, maybe it’ll be

tripolar, with other great nations that are emerging.

I don’t think it’s a critical question. To me it’s not a deal-breaking type question, but that would be my preference.

If it is ever revealed—and whatever your decision on that will be,

obviously, I will follow the law if I’m confirmed—but if it is revealed I hope it would be clear what it was that we were talking

about when we say we are revealing the intelligence budget and

how it is managed, how the oversight of that works in Congress,

because I fear, if confirmed as the DCI, that I had to come back

to you with a number that was one number that was public out

there, which wasn’t the real number I was dealing with, that sooner or later there would be stories written about that.

So I think the connection of the decisions you make on how you

do your oversight with regards to the budget and intelligence

amounts is related to what you’re asking me.

Senator HAGEL: Mr. Goss, thank you.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Chairman ROBERTS: Mr. Goss, Senator Bayh is next. We have

come through eight of the Senators who are here for the hearing,

eight of the 16, and he is willing and I would suggest to you that

this would be an opportunity for a five-minute break, if you so

choose. Or if you do not choose to do that, we can press ahead.

Mr. GOSS: Sir, I would be very pleased to have a five-minute

break, maybe a three-minute break if that’s sufficient for you. It’s

sufficient for me, I think.

Chairman ROBERTS: In the Senate, a three-minute break turns

into a five-minute break, that turns into a seven-minute break, as

you well know, so the Committee stands in recess for five minutes.

Mr. GOSS: Thank you, sir.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Chairman ROBERTS: The Committee will come to order.

Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Bayh.

Senator BAYH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Goss. I would like to begin by echoing the sentiments of many of my colleagues here today who have recounted

their positive personal interactions with you. That certainly has

been my experience. And I appreciate your willingness to continue

your service.

I have two lines of inquiry. The first deals with some of the questions and concerns raised by a couple of my colleagues touching

upon the issues of independence and the possibility of undue partisanship.

As I understood your opening statement, you seem to be indicating that there are different standards of conduct for Members of

Congress, the elected branch of government, who by necessity are

involved in the political process, and those in the Executive

Branch, particularly something as sensitive as the Director of Central Intelligence, where a different standard of involvement would

39

apply. And that seems to be a reasonable position to take. Have I

characterized your opening statement correctly?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.

Senator BAYH: With that in mind, I’d like to ask you about something that was referenced I think by Senator Rockefeller. And

that’s this op-ed piece that you authored with Congressman Young

on March the 8th in the Tampa Tribune entitled ‘‘Need Intelligence? Don’t Ask John Kerry.’’

That seems pretty partisan to me, almost—knowing you a little

bit—almost out of character. With that in mind, I’d like to ask you,

were you requested or was it suggested to you that you write this

by someone affiliated with the White House or the President’s reelection efforts?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I don’t remember the exact circumstances of

how that came to pass. I believe I had made some statements on

the question of sufficiency in intelligence that were quoted back to

me, and I don’t remember exactly how all of that blended together,

who were the participants. I’d have to check for the record on that

and get back to you. I just simply don’t recall.

Senator BAYH: I would appreciate it if you would. It raises the

question, if this was just sort of a deep-seated concern about Senator Kerry’s position on these issues and you did that on your own,

that’s one thing. If you did it at the behest of someone else for political reasons—which is not, of course, unheard of—that might

suggest a level of partisanship or lack of independence that the

Committee might find to be relevant to these proceedings.

You would certainly agree that by your own standards an article

like this would be inappropriate for the DCI.

Mr. GOSS: Absolutely. Absolutely, sir. I make that loud and clear.

Senator BAYH: With regard to the reorganization that’s been suggested of the community; there have been different proposals that

have been floated. We find ourselves in an unusual position today

where you’re being nominated to serve in an office that may be

substantially altered in a period of weeks, a handful of months. So

I’d like to ask you about your views on some of the issues that have

been raised here.

And let me back up just momentarily. You had your own proposal. As you know, Brent Scowcroft had been asked to do a study,

had come up with some recommendations. Those recommendations,

as I understand it, are still classified. I find it hard to understand

why they’re still classified. One of our colleagues has suggested

that he’s going to offer an amendment to declassify the Scowcroft

Report.

Would you support declassifying Brent Scowcroft’s recommendations about intelligence reform?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I have not seen the alleged Scowcroft reform.

I don’t know what the report is, whether it was ever concluded or

not. I’ve heard about it, of course, and I don’t know that it would

be a proper——

Senator BAYH: Well, if you haven’t read it, then I can’t ask your

opinion about whether it should be declassified.

But suffice it to say he’s obviously a nonpartisan figure, has some

interesting thoughts about intelligence reform. And as far as I

40

know, there’s nothing in his report that couldn’t be shared with the

American public.

Mr. GOSS: Senator, what I would say is the job I seek, if I am

confirmed, obviously, should be involved with the questions of the

security of our country and the capabilities for the intelligence

product that we get. The questions of how we reorganize the intelligence community, how it is reorganized, is going to be pretty

much up to the legislators in this country to decide what they want

it to look like.

Senator BAYH: Well, let me ask you about a couple of the specifics.

As I understand, the proposal that you had suggested, which was

embraced by many members of the community, as I understand it,

would have tried to flesh out the powers, make real the powers, of

the DCI as they were envisioned in 1947. We sort of made the DCI

the head of the intelligence community, but never really empowered the DCI to exert the kind of leadership that now appears to

be necessary.

And the other approaches that have been suggested by the 9/11

Commission, now by the Administration, by the Chairman of this

Committee, would involve the creation of a national intelligence director, the so-called NID.

What about your approach empowering the current DCI is superior to the recommendations for the creation of a NID?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I think the legislation is pretty clear. The

reason that I proceeded that way with the legislation was to signify

that I understand that one of our very biggest problems in the intelligence community is that we have a loose confederation of agencies rather than an efficient network of agencies that’s delivering

product. I believe there should be sort of a top to the pyramid instead of 15 different tops to it, if you will.

Senator BAYH: But why the DCI model as opposed to the NID

model?

Mr. GOSS: I believe the DCI model came pretty closely right out

of the issue of the DNI recommendation that our Joint Inquiry did.

I thought it was the purest and closest way to do that.

There is obviously a difference between a DNI, a NID and a DCI.

These are very subtle nuances that get into complexities, as you

very well know, sir.

Senator BAYH: Well, can I ask you about a couple of them before

my time expires? The whole issue of budget control, and this does

get into the weeds a little bit, but it’s important if we’re going to

have, as you say, someone coordinating, bringing coherency to all

the different agencies, it’s important we don’t just, as we did in

1947, put that on a piece of paper, but we empower the individual

to actually accomplish that mission.

Let’s talk about budget control. The 9/11 panel would authorize

the NID to actually create the budgets in consultation with the

agencies. The Administration’s proposal would have the agencies

create the budgets and then be approved. And this sounds a little

bit like it’s inside baseball but, as you would well know, the people

who are actually creating the budgets in the first instance are exercising more control and authority than if someone’s just in a position of passing approval on it.

41

Do you have a thought about whether the NID or the empowered

DCI should have the ability to create the budgets for the agencies

as opposed to just approving them?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I have a thought and I had a thought, and

they’re different and I don’t mean in any way to be disrespectful.

The thought I had was that I felt that the national foreign intelligence budget program should be handled by a centralized figure.

I’ve called it the DCI in my bill. That was what I had. What I have

now is basically, I am going to, if I am confirmed, play the cards

that are dealt to me on this subject.

Senator BAYH: What about paramilitary operations? Some have

suggested that those be consolidated in the Pentagon. Others believe that we need to keep a robust capability within the clandestine services of the intelligence community. Do you have an opinion

about that?

Mr. GOSS: I do have an opinion about that. Again, that is subject

to whatever you all decide you wish to do. I think there are pluses

and minuses to virtually all of the recommendations in here, mostly pluses. I think that is one of the area where there is a recommendation that does have some minuses to it that I do have

some concern about.

Senator BAYH: My final question, as I see my time is about to

expire, we had an unfortunate situation where your predecessor,

before I believe—if I’m not mistaken, Mr. Chairman—before 9/11

was in a position—George Tenet called for actually a declaration of

war upon al-Qa’ida and Usama bin Ladin. I think those are words

that he used—‘‘declaration of war.’’ And yet, subsequently, in testimony it came out that the head of the National Security Agency

was unaware of that fact. This was emblematic of the kind of lack

of coordination and communication that existed at that time.

Now, you may have touched upon this in your response to Senator Hagel’s question. How do we prevent that sort of lack of coordination from occurring again? This is not down in the bowels of

the department some place. We have the Director of Central Intelligence declaring war; one of the chief collectors was unaware of

this fact. How do we keep that from happening?

Mr. GOSS: I think that is the principal driving factor for most of

the energies that we see that are now being engaged at all levels

and in all branches of government in Washington to deal with the

network problem.

As I said, instead of having 15 agencies out there doing their

thing, we’ve got to have a different kind of management that has

something at the top that can control that. That’s a solvable problem. It just takes the direction to do it. If I am confirmed, I assure

you that I recognize that the preponderance of what is being asked

of a DCI is to get the network going.

Senator BAYH: Thank you, Mr. Goss.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROBERTS: It is the decision of the Chair and the Vice

Chair to proceed as we go along until we at least come to the conclusion of the first round, and probably the second round. I would

advise Members to inquire of the chair as to where they stand in

order of appearance for questioning so they can get a quick bite to

eat.

42

I would say, Mr. Goss, if you have someone in the audience that

is very favorable to you that can prepare you a bite to eat, we could

take another five or 10 minutes on down the road here.

Mr. GOSS: Thank you, Chairman.

Chairman ROBERTS: With that, let me recognize Senator Mikulski.

Senator MIKULSKI: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Mr. Goss, I want to welcome you and your wife, whom

we’ve known from various trips and travels. We want to welcome

you to this hearing. As you know, we’ve worked together. I have

a great deal of respect for you. We’ve worked together on the Joint

Inquiry Committee and others. We’ve traveled on those NATO

CODELs to see how we could end the Cold War.

So know that when I look at my criteria for this position, it

would be, number one, competence; number two, integrity; number

three, commitment to the mission of the Agency; and number four,

independence.

I know that you are competent from both your work as a CIA

agent, and your work chairing the Committee. There is no doubt

that you’re a man of integrity; your work in Congress and your

record speaks for that. And I believe you’re devoted to the mission

of the Agency. And that’s good news.

But I’m going to ask the questions related to independence.

We’re only 49 days from an election. And my question would be,

will Porter Goss be an independent voice at the CIA, willing to

speak truth to power to whomever is President and also to the Congressional Oversight Committees which we ourselves, hopefully,

will be reforming ourselves?

Let me tell you, everyone’s talked about your attack on John

Kerry and those partisan articles. I’ll come back to that in a

minute. But one of the concerns I had was about investigation in

your tenure as Chair of intelligence leaks.

You’ve stated that you’re absolutely on the side of employees to

make them the best that they can be. Yet there was the outing of

a CIA agent, Valerie Plame. And then when you were asked whether you would be investigating this or whether you felt that this was

a matter of being compromised, you said that before you would do

anything, that you needed to see the blue dress with DNA on it before you would take any action.

Well, that was really a very snotty answer, quite frankly. And I

was surprised about your attitude in that case and also the fact

that this involved a CIA agent, the outing of which is, as you know,

an egregious, and, if proved and prosecuted, a criminal matter.

Could you tell me why you didn’t investigate that, and in fact—

I’m not going to ask you if you said that, if you care to comment

on that—because that’s a cameo of being willing to be independent

because it gave the appearance of being dismissive and really kind

of, if you will, pardon the brusqueness of this, but shilling for the

White House.

Mr. GOSS: The answer to your question that I previously answered on that subject before, it was not a well-chosen remark, and

it’s not one that I’m proud of.

The question about investigation, however, is a very serious matter. And I believe, as I’ve testified already, that the investigation

43

is fully warranted—the best possible investigation. I believe very

strongly in the Intelligence Identity Protection Act. It’s true that

we’ve had, I think, maybe one or maybe no successful prosecutions

in whatever it is, the 25, 30 years that that’s been out there.

That has frustrated me. I assure you, my record will speak as

Chairman of the Committee and I have many comments on that.

I always have practiced the same thing the whole time I was the

Chairman—regardless of whatever Administration; it’s not a factor—that we would have behind closed doors a presentation of the

facts of whatever the problem was and then we would have the

professional people do the investigation, in this case, a professional

investigation by the Department of Justice using the system of referral, which is the right system, was underway.

We were reassured that it would happen. We were then reassured that they had brought in a top-notch prosecutor and this

would be exhausted until the end and that they would report back

to us relevant information to the Committee in our portfolio to deal

with. And that’s where we left it.

Senator MIKULSKI: So you supported a vigorous investigation?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, ma’am.

Senator MIKULSKI: And you regret the remark?

Mr. GOSS: I regret the remark. The remark was not about the

investigation. I was trying to make a distinction between an allegation and evidence, which is somewhat different. I was not trying to

say——

Senator MIKULSKI: But I was trying to get to your state of mind

about these things.

Let’s go to, really, a situation. We’re 49 days from the election.

Either John Kerry or George Bush is going to be President. Let’s

talk about independence with President Bush should he be reelected and then I have a question should John Kerry be elected.

We had a previous CIA Director who said when President Bush

said to him, ‘‘Is there more information about this Iraq?’’—again,

I’m paraphrasing—and he said, ‘‘Oh, Mr. President, this is a slam

dunk.’’

I have here this Select Committee investigation that we did that

showed that it was a dunk. It was not a slam.

Then this is the same CIA Director that sat behind Secretary

Powell at the U.N., one of the most esteemed and trusted men in

the world, who then put forth the reason why we needed to go to

war on what we now know was evidence that was flimsy, dated

and dubious. The CIA Director was sitting behind.

What would you do that was different? How would you be an

independent voice? Because it seems that group-think existed not

only in the analytical department, but enlisted by the very Director

of the CIA as he engaged in conversations with the highest level

of the White House and, in fact, let the President of the United

States down when he asked him that question.

Mr. GOSS: I believe, as I have said, Senator, that getting a better

product to our policymakers is what this is about. That means

using the full network of the intelligence community, the resources

and capabilities, to develop that product and present it in an unvarnished way to the President of the United States. I think that’s

the job. I think I understand that is the job.

44

Senator MIKULSKI: Well, let’s then go to how that job was being

done. The ombudsman at the CIA went to the Director and said,

I’m getting feedback from the employees that they’re being hammered in a way that would predetermine their analysis, the repetitive questioning.

My question to you, when an ombudsman would come to you like

that while they’re doing the national intelligence estimate, preparing information for the President or other policymakers—well,

number one, I presume you support a CIA ombudsman. And, then,

second, what would you have done in that situation?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I would and I did check to find out how much

of this—what is the truth of this. Was there undue, unfair pressure? And just as your Committee investigated that question, our

Committee did as well. Our Committee is not finalized yet. As you

know, I left the Committee—appropriately—when the President

made the nomination. But I have total confidence in the Committee.

I believe that the issues that are involved in fact-checking and

getting everything right are self-evident. You have to do all of that.

Senator MIKULSKI: But here comes the ombudsman—let’s put

this Iraq matter over here. There’s another matter. We don’t know

what the issues are that lie ahead over the next several years.

Say you’re the CIA Director, your ombudsman comes to you, and,

again, regardless of who is President, this issue comes up, that the

analytical or the professional staff feels that they are being hammered in a way to skew the analysis and recommendations they

give. What would you do about that?

Mr. GOSS: I would deal with it very directly. It is inappropriate

to try and shape the intelligence. There’s no question.

And I want to make it very clear that the intelligence product

has to be the best product that the analysts can produce for us

with the best possible collection. Outside interference in that process cannot be tolerated.

Senator MIKULSKI: So you would go to the highest level, even if

you saw that?

Mr. GOSS: If I felt there were interference in the product or tampering of the product, of course I would go to any level to say that’s

not going to happen.

Senator MIKULSKI: I appreciate that answer, and I accept your

word.

Mr. GOSS: Thank you, ma’am.

Senator MIKULSKI: I accept your word. Because, again, as I said,

I believe that you do come to the Committee with integrity.

My last question: Say John Kerry’s elected. Do you feel that you

could serve with John Kerry?

Mr. GOSS: Of course. That would be up to President-elect Kerry’s

decision. But, of course, I believe I can serve, do the job as the DCI

that I’ve been nominated for, for any Administration.

The job is a capabilities job. The question of who is the President

is relevant only in one aspect, and that is whether or not the President would be comfortable with a DCI who happened to be a Porter

Goss, because I do believe that comfort level and that chemistry is

very important to preserve the access. It is the one place where the

intelligence community really plugs into the policymakers.

45

Senator MIKULSKI: I thank you for your answers and I appreciate

the conversation. And again, I need you to know I have a great

deal of respect for you and again, admiration for your wife.

We know that when we are called, you had a whole other life

that you planned two years ago before 9/11. You had another life

planned that you thought you were going back to and so we just

want to pay our respect to her, as well.

Mr. GOSS: Thank you for your kindness.

Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Durbin.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD J. DURBIN,

UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

Mr. Chairman, we meet today to consider the nomination of Congressman Porter

Goss to serve as the next Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). This nomination

comes at a truly historic moment. Three years after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, the Congress is—hopefully—about to legislate into law what may be the most significant and far-reaching intelligence reforms

since the U.S. Intelligence Community was created after World War II. These reforms will likely be based in large part on the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.

Clearly, no position is more important than that of the individual who must lead

the entire Intelligence Community—to date, that has been the Director of Central

Intelligence; but under the current reform proposals, this will become the new position of the National Intelligence Director (NID). Mr. Goss has been nominated to

be the next DCI, but this is a position that may only exist for several more months.

It will be important for us on this Committee to learn the nominee’s views on what

this role should be in this post-9/11 world, and what it should evolve into as part

of the intelligence reform effort.

Given this unique historical moment, l believe that it is more important than ever

that the next DCI be non-partisan and firmly committed to meaningful intelligence

reform. I have known, and worked with Mr. Goss for a number of years in Congress

and consider him a good man and a patriotic public servant. However, there are a

number of concerns I have with his nomination for this important post, and I look

forward to having these concerns addressed in the course of these confirmation

hearings.

In exploring Mr. Goss’ views and record, I am interested in knowing his views

on, and level of commitment to, intelligence reform—and particularly to the reforms

recommended by the 9/11 Commission.

Mr. Goss has also served as the Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee

for almost 8 years—the second longest tenure in that position in the almost 30 years

that the House of Representatives has conducted formal oversight of the Intelligence

Community. The Chairman of a congressional committee has considerable power in

determining what issues the committee will focus its oversight efforts upon, and the

manner in which it will conduct this oversight. I will be interested to know more

about the nominee’s accomplishments in intelligence oversight. I believe that this

oversight record will be a reasonable gauge of his likely effectiveness in managing

the Intelligence Community during this highly challenging transitional period.

I also note that the nominee has made a number of public comments regarding

the Democratic nominee for President—as well as other Democrats—questioning

their commitment to intelligence and national security. I look forward to learning

more about the nominee’s views on these issues, as well as his views on the importance of nonpartisanship as an essential attribute for an effective intelligence professional—particularly for the head of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

Mr. Goss, welcome to the Committee and I look forward to these hearings.

Senator DURBIN: Congressman Goss and Mrs. Goss, thank you

for being with us today.

One of the significant differences between the House and the

Senate, of course, is this nomination process, and I will tell you

that I’ve come to believe since 9/11 and my service on the Intelligence Committee that next to the President’s Cabinet and lifetime

appointments to the Federal courts, this appointment to the CIA

46

is one of the most serious and most important assignments that we

have to consider.

Intelligence is literally our first line of defense in the war against

terrorism, and that’s why this nomination hearing has to be taken

so seriously and your appointment taken more seriously than many

others.

I’ve said publicly that you are a good person. My service with you

convinces me of that. There are a multitude of appointments in this

Administration that you would be excellent to be part of, but I will

tell you today that I come to this nomination with two very fundamental questions.

And that is whether you’re the right person for this job, in light

of what’s happened to America on 9/11 and in the invasion of Iraq.

And I look to two or three specific things.

Number one, are you reform-minded? Do you have it within you

to really undertake what will be titanic battles to reform intelligence in America, which I think is long overdue?

Secondly, will you be nonpartisan. And I think you’ve said from

the outset that that is one of the most important elements in your

service in this position if you are nominated.

Now I will tell you this, Mr. Goss, because I know you and I

know your competence. Whoever briefed you for this hearing and

said that when you get in a tight spot over something you have

said or done, keep repeating ‘‘the record is the record,’’ did you no

great service. That is a dismissive comment that you never should

have included, I think, in your comments before this Committee.

It basically tells us that you’re not prepared to answer or discuss

some important things about you and your background and your

beliefs. And that leaves us, as Senator Wyden has said, at a real

disadvantage, when it comes to answering these fundamental questions.

On the issue of partisanship, I have to tell you, Vice Chairman

Rockefeller’s presentation about the budget figures speak for themselves. You made some allegations about John Kerry and about the

Democrats, which when they’re compared to your own record don’t

stand up. They were entirely partisan and, not that we all aren’t

guilty of it from time to time, but I think you should have given

us a little more in terms of how you got into that fix and why you

were asked to take on this aggressive partisan role when it came

to John Kerry.

But even more important than this election, which will come or

go, is the whole question of your loyalty to the Administration at

times when serious questions were raised about the political misuse of intelligence. This whole question of Ahmed Chalabi, to say

that oversight worked well on Chalabi is to ignore the obvious.

Chalabi was dismissed as a non-credible person by the CIA and

the State Department’s INR while he was being used as the leading witness and expert by the Defense Intelligence Agency. Now to

say that oversight worked well, one of those agencies was wrong.

And history has shown us that the Defense Intelligence Agency

was wrong.

Ahmed Chalabi is now under investigation for perhaps treason

and this man who was posted to sit behind the First Lady at the

47

State of the Union Address is an embarrassment to us. And to say

that oversight worked there, I don’t think is appropriate.

On the Valerie Plame incident, I’m not going to recount your

statement, which you have said you regret. And we all make statements we regret, but you said what you were looking for, the point

you wanted to make was this was about evidence, not about allegations.

The evidence was Robert Novak’s column. That was the evidence.

This woman, this professional, literally had her professional career

and her life in jeopardy, because someone, according to Mr. Novak,

in the White House disclosed her identity. I don’t know what more

evidence you’d like or want to initiate an investigation, but you

didn’t do it.

On the Abu Ghraib scandal, to criticize the Senate for being a

circus, I wish the House would’ve looked at this scandal as aggressively as the Senate did. Again, it was an episode during the Bush

Administration which could have brought embarrassment to the

President during an election cycle. And you chose, as Chairman of

the House Intelligence Committee, not to get involved, raising

questions again about whether or not you could be nonpartisan in

this position.

On your commitment to reform, you were part of the 1996 Commission—Aspin, Brown and Rudman Commission. And, as Senator

Wyden has said, even after the 9/11 Commission vote, there’s no

evidence that you’ve introduced significant reform legislation until

just three months ago.

You voted against the creation of the 9/11 Commission when the

White House opposed it. When you lost that vote on the floor, and

the White House changed its position, you embraced it. That was

what many in your party did. But it doesn’t show the commitment

to reform that many of us are looking for.

Also, I have to really look at your Committee, House Intelligence

and Senate Intelligence, and say that we have been accused of not

being reform-minded. This 9/11 Commission Report—which we

have all praised to high heaven, and should—on page 420 says congressional oversight for intelligence and counterterrorism is now

dysfunctional.

Now that happened on our watch, Congressman, while you were

Chairman and while I served here. What did we do to show a commitment to reform?

Let me be specific in the question that I think may get to the

heart of this, as far as I’m concerned. We now have allegations that

there is at least an alternative, if not a rogue, intelligence operation at work in the Department of Defense under Mr. Douglas

Feith.

Do you feel the Department of Defense under Secretary Rumsfeld

and Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz, specifically DIA and Mr. Douglas Feith, have gone too far in creating an alternative intelligence

effort, specifically in their lionizing Ahmed Chalabi and in the dogged efforts which they made to try to legitimize some meaning in

Prague involving Mohammad Atta?

Mr. GOSS: The issue of Mr. Feith’s position, I believe he’s not actually in the intelligence community. I think he’s in the policy side

of the community. And I’m not sure that as DCI, if I’m confirmed,

48

that my portfolio goes that far into the Secretary of Defense’s territory. That’s a question I’m just going to have to explore further.

I’ve already said very clearly that I do believe that there can be

no policy contamination of the intelligence product. Intelligence informs policymakers, not the other way around. Now, do I believe

any Cabinet Secretary has the right to go out and do his business

or her business the way they see fit, subject to appropriate oversight on the Hill? The answer is, of course, subject to following the

laws of the land.

Do I feel that oversight as it applied to intelligence worked in the

Chalabi case? The answer is yes, for this reason. We found out in

the Oversight Committees that there was a question with the

sourcing. The information that came through that channel was not,

in my view, sufficiently vetted or explained.

Senator DURBIN: But Mr. Goss, we found out after we invaded.

We found out after we had committed 140,000 troops. We found out

after hundreds of Americans lost their lives. To say that oversight

worked is to ignore the obvious. Years ago, the CIA dismissed

Ahmed Chalabi while he was being feted and elevated by this Administration as a reliable person.

Oversight did not work. We ended up in a war that he is frankly

laughing at us over. He told the British press: ‘‘So we didn’t find

weapons of mass destruction. I achieved what I wanted. American

troops are in Iraq, and Saddam Hussein is gone.’’ Oversight didn’t

work.

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I agree with you on your observation, which

I think is what you’re implying, that we did not have enough good

sources in Iraq. I certainly do agree with that. And I would not consider Mr. Chalabi a great source.

Senator DURBIN: So let’s go back to my first question. Here is the

DIA lionizing Mr. Chalabi, trying to create this link between alQa’ida and Saddam Hussein, at war with the CIA in terms of its

sources and its presentations. I want to know this: If you become

the Director of the CIA, what will you do about this rogue intelligence operation in the Department of Defense?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I certainly would not want to characterize

anything as a ‘‘rogue intelligence operation’’ unless I had ample

evidence and much more background information than I do. But if

there were a rogue activity going on that was in any way tarnishing or affecting the product that I am responsible for providing

to the very, very important customers that the community has, if

I’m confirmed, obviously I would deal with it rather directly.

Senator DURBIN: Are you familiar with what I’ve talked about

here, this competition and this friction between the Defense intelligence operation and the CIA? You must be familiar with this.

Mr. GOSS: Senator, of course, I am aware that there are different

views in many of the agencies about the consensus of opinions that

the intelligence community comes up with and delivers. I think

that’s healthy to have competitive analysis going on.

It’s when that competitive analysis is no longer part of the teamwork that that would be a problem.

Senator DURBIN: Do you think it went too far when it came to

Mr. Feith’s efforts and the DIA’s efforts to create the scenario that

led to the invasion of Iraq, that misled not only the Administration,

49

but the American people about the reality on the ground in that

country?

Mr. GOSS: I simply don’t have the answer to that. It would require a judgment on facts that I don’t have and didn’t have as the

Chairman of the Committee.

Senator DURBIN: As Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, you don’t have an opinion as to whether they went too far?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I’m no longer the Chairman of that Committee. And you have stated your concern about my independence

and my nonpartisanship. And I don’t think it’s appropriate for me

to go down that road.

Senator DURBIN: I will just tell you if you were candid with me

in that answer, it would convince me that you will be nonpartisan.

But the fact that you reserve judgment whenever it gets close to

being critical of this Administration continues to trouble me.

I yield, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Hatch.

Senator HATCH: Well, you certainly have a better understanding

of what the Senate is like now than ever before with some of the

questions that you’ve had. And that’s part of the reason why we go

through these confirmation processes, is to test people to see if they

do this job.

Now, I have absolutely no doubt in my mind that you’re qualified

for this job.

Mr. GOSS: Thank you.

Senator HATCH: I know you personally. I know the experiences

that you’ve had. I know the price that you’ve paid. I know the price

your wife has been paying just to have you in Congress. Can you

imagine being head of this Agency?

I saw the same type of criticisms of George Tenet when he served

in a very, very distinguished way, the best he could, day and night,

and did an awful lot of good things that will never be known by

this country. It’s true, isn’t it, that the CIA, people who work for

the CIA never really get the credit for the good things that they

do, right?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.

Senator HATCH: As a matter of fact, many of them risk their

lives for you and me and really everybody else in the world without

people really knowing that they do that, right?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.

Senator HATCH: You were one of those at one time, right?

Mr. GOSS: That was a long time ago, sir. And I don’t think my

life was ever in real danger, but that was the job, yes sir.

Senator HATCH: But you would have been willing to risk your life

as an employee of the CIA, is that correct?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.

Senator HATCH: Just like all the rest of them are willing?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.

Senator HATCH: Now, as a Member of Congress, you’ve been

criticized here for being a little bit critical of the Senate. What a

horrible thing to do. I mean, my gosh, we’re perfect over on this

side of the Hill, as you know. And it is very irritating from time

to time to have Members of the House speak the truth about the

Senate.

50

I’m only joking, but the fact of the matter is, we all make comments about each other, and that’s part of the give-and-take that

we have around here.

The question is: Are you competent for this job? The answer is

yes.

Are you a person who has the background for this job? The answer is yes.

Do you have a lot of experience in the intelligence community?

Of course, the answer is yes. You’ve not only been Chairman of the

House Select Committee on Intelligence, but you’ve had experience

with the CIA. And you know the good things about the CIA, and

you know the bad things about the CIA.

And I’ve seen great CIA Directors, and I’ve seen some that aren’t

so great. And there is at least one popping off right now that you

can’t believe who wasn’t really very good, acting like he’s the authority in the whole world.

Now, I just want you to know that this is a tough job, you know

it’s a tough job, and I know you can do it.

Mr. GOSS: Thank you, sir.

Senator HATCH: Let me just ask you a few questions. You know,

a primary lesson drawn by many investigators of the September

11th terrorist attacks was that law enforcement and foreign intelligence information was not shared at the analyst level. Now, some

statutory barriers to the sharing of information have been removed

by the USA PATRIOT Act and intelligence authorization legislation.

Now, what is your assessment of how effectively information is

being shared today by components of the intelligence community at

the working level? And how would you propose to enhance information sharing among the various agencies so that we don’t have another 9/11, or at least we have the best chance of avoiding another

9/11?

Mr. GOSS: I would say that it is certainly better than it was, but

it is not good enough. More work needs to be done. I’ve seen evidence of that myself in the past few weeks.

As for how we’re doing the fusion, we are trying very definitely

to do co-location, we are trying to get the agencies to interchange

their analytical people, we are trying to make sure that agencies

that are very weak in terms of analysts are being supplied analysts

from other agencies that have those analysts, so that not only do

we have strong agency analytical capabilities within the individual

agencies, but we have those analysts working coherently, coordinated comprehensively with the fusion center, the TTIC, which is

the place where the information basically goes round and around

on the horizontal level and vertically up and down to the local law

people.

I think this is a very doable proposition, Senator. It’s a question

of sticking to it and forcing this down into the ranks. The natural

tendency, as you know, is to cheer for the team, the esprit de corps

of your Agency. You have to overcome that and make people understand it’s the totality of the product that we need for the community that we all put our imprimatur on and that we’re proud of.

We’ve got a ways to go on that yet.

51

Senator HATCH: Can we rely on you being bipartisan in this position, being helpful to both sides of the political equation?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir. Of course.

Senator HATCH: Can we rely on you giving the President the best

solid advice you can, whether he or she wants to hear it or not?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.

Senator HATCH: You’re not afraid to say what the real situation

is?

Mr. GOSS: Not at all, sir.

Senator HATCH: And you commit to doing that?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.

Senator HATCH: You’re a tough enough guy that if you find people that aren’t doing their job, you’re willing to get rid of them or

at least move them to someplace where they can do their jobs?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.

Senator HATCH: You’re willing to travel the world and to take the

time and to put in the effort to be able to do this job?

Mr. GOSS: Yes I am, sir.

Senator HATCH: You know it’s an overwhelming job?

Mr. GOSS: I surely do, and I’m looking forward to guidance from

the Oversight Committee on what all the parameters of the job will

be when you get through with the reorganization.

Senator HATCH: Should the intelligence reform effort underway

now in Congress address the relationship between the DCI and the

FBI Director?

Mr. GOSS: It might have to. It depends on which direction you

go. That would be your decision. I think it’s critically important

that all members of the community work closely together. And I

think Director Mueller is doing a fabulous job of showing some improvements.

Equally, the DCI, whoever he or she may be, or whatever the

title is, the NID, has to be able to work with Homeland Security

people and the Defense people and the State Department people.

These are all critical elements.

Senator HATCH: In your opinion, do you believe that the counterintelligence mission should be taken away from the FBI and placed

in another agency within the intelligence community?

Mr. GOSS: No, sir. I’ve supported CI in the FBI. I think that’s

a function—they have a very competent division down there that

needs to be beefed up a little bit. We’ve also got the executive function, the NCI-Ex function, for the overall community network. I

think it’s a question of building robustness in both places.

Senator HATCH: The 9/11 Commission Report recommends creation of a national counterterrorism center designed to reduce duplication of effort on counterterrorism operations and analysis and

to ‘‘put someone in charge.’’

Of all the disparate counterterrorism functions across the 15 different intelligence agencies and, as the 9/11 Commission Report

says, ‘‘responsibility and accountability were diffuse.’’ Do you believe that arranging the community around core mission areas and

national centers of intelligence is a good way to consolidate, align

and assign responsibilities within the intelligence community?

52

Mr. GOSS: Yes, I do. It’s been tried and proven that it does work,

at least at the agency level. I think it will work at the community

level.

Senator HATCH: What national intelligence centers would you

recommend, besides the NCTC, the National Counterterrorism

Center, to ensure that we’re informing the community, that is truly

able to predict and warn of the threats of tomorrow?

Mr. GOSS: Sir, in addition to the NCTC, which terrorism is the

biggest threat right now, I honestly believe we should be looking

very closely at some work that has already been started and probably should be brought to completion of a WMD national center. I

think the center template does work for those kinds of

transnational threats.

Senator HATCH: Okay.

What would be your top priority issue? How do we ensure that

the intelligence community is prepared to confront it with regard

to terrorism?

Mr. GOSS: Sir, we need to rebuild the eyes and ears and get them

out there. It’s basically more eyes and ears, more good information

coming in, better screens to deal with the all-source information for

our analysts, and making sure that we’ve got an action capability

to disrupt once we’ve got the actionable intelligence. And all of that

is in process, but it’s not in place.

Senator HATCH: Okay. Do you think you can help get that done?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir, I do.

Senator HATCH: You’re going to need a lot of backing to be able

to do that.

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir, I’m going to need the help of this Committee

if I’m confirmed. That’s for sure.

Senator HATCH: Well, you’ll need the help of the current Administration or any future Administration.

Mr. GOSS: Any Administration, yes, sir.

Senator HATCH: Okay.

I, for one, have known you a long time.

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.

Senator HATCH: I’ve watched you on the Intelligence Committee

over there. I’ve seen you lead out in ways—I’ve seen you do all

kinds of investigations. I’ve seen you do all kinds of intelligence

analysis over there. I haven’t seen you shirk your responsibility in

any way. We all wish we could do more. We all wish we could accomplish every investigation in every possible way.

I just want you to know that I’m proud that you’re willing to

take this job. It’s a tough job. No matter what you do, you’re going

to have criticisms. And no matter what you do, you won’t be able

to fully explain it to the public at large. And you’ll have to sit there

and take it time after time. And some of the criticisms are irresponsible criticisms, as you know. And some of them may even

come from the United States Senate. I know that’s hard to believe,

but it could happen.

And so I have every confidence that you’re going to make a great

CIA Director. And I’m going to support you with everything I have,

and I hope everybody else on this Committee will also. I think your

comments have been very candid, very straightforward. And I personally appreciate it.

53

Mr. GOSS: Thank you very much, Senator.

Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Chambliss.

Senator CHAMBLISS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Goss, you and your wife, Mariel, survived Charley and

Frances. You just thought the storms were over until you were

called to testify today.

But let me just say, Mr. Chairman, that as someone who has

known Porter Goss for 10 years, has had the opportunity to work

with him unlike anybody on this Committee, someone who knows

him better, I think, than anybody on this Committee, my support

for him is very well-known publicly as well as privately.

There was an op-ed that appeared in the Washington Times this

morning that was written by me, and I would like to ask unanimous consent that that op-ed be inserted in the record.

Chairman ROBERTS: Without objection, so ordered.

[The information referred to follows:]

[From the Washington Times, September 14, 2004]

FOR SMARTER INTELLIGENCE

(By Senator Saxby Chambliss)

Years before the United States entered World War II, it was General George C.

Marshall’s habit of jotting down names of exceptional officers with whom he came

in contact. One of the names he had collected was Dwight Eisenhower who Marshall

had promoted far ahead of his contemporaries and sent to Europe to lead the Allied

forces to defeat Nazi Germany.

General Marshall knew that individuals matter and that selecting the right person to carry out a plan is at least as important as the plan itself. Whenever there

is a monumental task to be done, we know that critical tasks require exceptional

people.

If we are serious about reforming our intelligence community we will need more

than structural changes; we absolutely must have quality people who have the leadership, vision, and drive to implement and manage change. In short, we need real

reformers in the top positions of our intelligence community to help protect our

country from another devastating terrorist attack.

Porter Goss has been nominated by President Bush to be the Director of Central

Intelligence at the most critical time in the history of the intelligence community.

Intelligence is our first line of defense in our war on terrorism and it is critical for

our national security that the next Director of Central Intelligence be successful in

his job

The President and many members of both houses of Congress have accepted the

9/11 Commission’s recommendation to create a National Intelligence Director who

will be separate from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to oversee our

entire intelligence community. While some think it would be better to wait on Mr.

Goss’ confirmation until the new position of National Intelligence Director is enacted

into law, the reality is that the intelligence community needs to have quality, experienced leadership in place right now to lead and implement the changes we all

know are coming.

The selection of Porter Goss is a brilliant choice, and he should be confirmed without delay. As a colleague, mentor, and friend of mine for ten years, I know his character, professionalism, leadership abilities, and dedication to duty as few others.

Porter Goss was an officer in the Army’s Military Intelligence Corps, a clandestine

case officer in the Central Intelligence Agency, and more recently the Chairman of

the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. As the Chairman for almost

eight years, he had the opportunity to meet with the heads of intelligence of our

major allies. Porter Goss’ personal credibility with these foreign intelligence agencies and their leaders is an important factor as we work with our allies to confront

our shared threats. His unique and important background as a soldier, CIA clandestine officer, and legislator are unmatched.

The country needs Porter Goss’ leadership. He is committed to reforming our intelligence community. I know this first hand from working with him in the intelligence authorization process. He has been the intelligence community’s most

thoughtful and constructive critic, but also its most vocal advocate for greater inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:24 Feb 23, 2005 Jkt 096698 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 E:\DOCS\96698.TXT SCANNER PsN: SCANNER
54

vestment in the parts of the intelligence discipline that were allowed to atrophy and

that everyone else now realizes need our greatest attention. These areas, long

flagged by Porter Goss, include human intelligence (HUMINT), competitive analysis,

unilateral clandestine collection, investment in language training, collapsing intelligence bureaucracies and sharing of intelligence.

As a former clandestine case officer who served overseas, Porter Goss knows

about the hardships, dangers, family separations, and long-hours involved in

HUMINT operations. He has the highest regard for our intelligence professionals

and Porter Goss will work assiduously to improve the morale of the CIA at the same

time he works to fix those problems we have identified in the intelligence community.

Just as General Marshall knew that Dwight Eisenhower was the right person to

bring our allies together to defeat Nazi Germany, I know that Porter Goss is the

right person to implement reforms and fix the problems in the intelligence community. That’s why as the United States Senate should confirm President Bush’s nomination of Porter Goss to be the next director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Under his leadership, our great intelligence professionals will continue to help to

strengthen the security of the United States and its allies.

Senator CHAMBLISS: I think, Mr. Chairman, that I do bring a different perspective to this hearing than anybody else here, both pre9/11 as well as post-9/11. I had the opportunity to work with thenChairman Goss relative to the intelligence community, both the

faults that came out following September 11 as well as the issues

involved in the intelligence community prior to September 11 that

came to the forefront on September 11.

I’ve had the opportunity to see him operate in the public sector

on a day-to-day basis from a hearing standpoint. I’ve had the opportunity to dialogue with him in private, both with and without

other individuals, other Members of the House present, in a bipartisan way. And just let it be said for the record that as someone

who has been there, who has been in the trenches with then-Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, Porter Goss, I have

never seen a partisan bone in his body.

Does he advocate the position that he strongly believes in? You

bet he does. That’s his obligation to do that. Does he point out deficiencies and arguments from folks on the other side of the aisle or

on his side of the aisle? You bet he does. He’s always been that

strong an individual. And I think it’s incumbent on anybody who

serves in the capacity of the DCI to be that type of individual. And

that’s one reason that I so strongly support his nomination by the

President.

There have been some questions here today not just relative to

his partisan attitude, but questions relative to why he didn’t promote legislation in his position as Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee to reform the community. Well, let me just say

that in January of 2001, I went on the Intelligence Committee at

the suggestion of then-Chairman Goss.

The suggestion came from Chairman Goss after the Speaker of

the House created a new Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security within the House Intelligence Committee and asked

that I go on the Committee to chair that. And that was done only

with the concurrence of then-Chairman Goss. And I can’t overemphasize the fact that Chairman Goss, at that time, gave to Jane

Harman, who was my Ranking Member, who is a very loyal and

dedicated public servant who is now his ranking, or before he resigned was his Ranking Member, he virtually gave us a blank

check to go anywhere in the world, do anything that we needed to

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do from a research standpoint to look into the terrorist community

worldwide prior to September 11th.

And we were in the process of trying to raise the elevation of the

issue of the potential for a domestic attack by terrorists in the

United States when along came September 11th and did that for

us.

Following September 11th, he gave us a free hand in doing the

initial congressional investigation of the deficiencies within the intelligence community that allowed September 11 to happen. He

never came to us and said you’re going too far, you’re doing too

much. His leadership and his directive to us was to leave no stone

unturned, do everything you can to find what deficiencies and what

faults exist within the intelligence community.

And when we talk about the fact that he did not propose legislation, that really is not correct. I dare to say that I don’t know

what’s in the Solomon legislation that Mr. Goss co-sponsored several years ago, but I’d venture to say if it involved reduction in the

intelligence budget, it also involved reforming of the intelligence

community. And I’ll be interested to take a further look at that.

But from a personal experience, after we experienced September

11, there was a critical issue that Congresswoman Harman and

myself felt was needed, that we needed to pursue from a legislative

standpoint. And it had to do with information sharing, both within

the intelligence community and from the intelligence community

down to the State and local level.

She and I worked very long and hard with the concurrence and

with the day-to-day dialogue ongoing with then-Chairman Goss, as

well as then-Ranking Member Pelosi in a bipartisan way to craft

this legislation.

And Chairman Goss insisted that it be inserted in the intelligence authorization bill, and it was inserted. The fact of the matter was that in the latter part of 2002 we were working on the

Homeland Security Bill. And at Chairman Goss’ suggestion at that

point in time, we incorporated that information-sharing bill within

the Department of Homeland Security legislation, and that is now

law.

Now, I don’t know how much closer he can be involved in drafting and implementing legislation relative to the reforming of the

intelligence community.

Another issue that I remember very well was the issue of the

hamstringing of the CIA subsequent to 1995 as a result of what’s

referred to as the Deutch Guidelines. Chairman Goss was the leader on the House side in trying to ensure that we remove that handicap from the intelligence community when it came to gathering information by way of human assets. And we did repeal the Deutch

Guidelines in, again, intelligence authorization bills. We did it

twice because it didn’t get implemented.

I again, specifically remember, the leadership of Chairman Goss

and then-Chairman Graham on the Senate side in a bipartisan

way. They went to the CIA and said, now, dadgummit, we have

passed this legislation eliminating these guidelines, and ya’ll need

to implement them.

And in fact, Director Tenet did subsequently remove those guidelines, so I get a little disconcerted when I hear Members on the

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other side really asking questions when they really don’t understand the facts of what this man did in his eight years as Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee.

That being said, I do want to say that I think it’s incumbent

upon the Minority to ask very tough questions, because there’s no

more important position in the United States Government today

than ensuring that we have somebody as head of the intelligence

Agency that can do the job that Mr. Goss is being asked to do. And

I think he’s done a very good job of taking on each and every one

of those difficult questions and providing the right answers for

them.

Let me ask a couple of questions relative to the reform legislation

that we were talking about. And none of us at this point in time

know exactly what direction we’re going to take, but I think it’s

safe to say there will be created the position of National Intelligence Director.

And, Mr. Goss, do you as head of the CIA—or will you as head

of the CIA—be willing to accept that position being created, whether you’re considered for it or not? You’re going to then be in the

position of Director of CIA when certainly some of your power and

authority will be diminished.

But are you willing to work with the Administration to make

sure that, whatever the terms and conditions of the National Intelligence Director legislation might be, that you’d be willing to work

to make sure that it is fully implemented according to the way that

it is passed by Congress?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I, of course, would be pleased to serve at the

pleasure of the President and with the concurrence of the appropriate Committee here for any job that people found me useful in

dealing with the intelligence and national security issues.

We are a country at war. And I feel a very keen sense of duty

and responsibility to that. But very clearly, I don’t know either how

the reorganization is going to come out—and there is uncertainty

of what this DCI nomination, if I am confirmed, will actually lead

to.

I will participate the best I possibly can, as I’m asked on behalf

of our country and the people who lead it.

Senator CHAMBLISS: You know that this issue of information

sharing has really been of concern to me for the last four years.

And you know how diligently particularly Jane Harman and I have

worked on this. And it is an important fundamental issue, which

I first addressed as Chairman of that Subcommittee on the HPSCI.

Now, I was dismayed recently to hear the testimony of General

Kern about the CIA’s refusal to provide information to the Army

in order to complete their investigation on the abuses at Abu

Ghurayb. And I really find this attitude on the part of the CIA totally unacceptable. And I suspect that we’ll have a lot to do, especially in the CIA, to improve our information sharing.

Could you please tell us your views on information sharing and

how you would make sure that information is better shared within

and among all elements of the intelligence community?

Mr. GOSS: Thank you, Senator.

I totally agree with your suggestion about the need for full cooperation—and I have made comment to that—by the CIA with

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any ongoing investigations. They are part of—they need to be cooperative. And I don’t know the details. But if I’m confirmed, certainly I will be dealing with that. And you will see full cooperation.

With regard to information, as I mentioned earlier in response to

another question about information sharing, we have, when I was

still in the position of Chairman of the HPSCI, this year put in our

bill, which I hope you will all consider when you come to that legislative part, of a chief information officer. This is a new deal. It definitely requires some push and attention on that very subject of information sharing.

We need the enterprise architecture. You have been a fabulous

leader on this when you were on the Committee. I urge you to keep

up your leadership efforts on it. It is unfinished business for sure.

It is critical to the proper working of the community.

I am very definitely open for suggestions, ideas and so forth, if

confirmed, about how we make it better, but the whole direction of

where we’re going on the reorganization debate is to set up a community that does have information exchange that works better.

We’ve had the advantage of a very good county sheriff down in

my district who was sort of one of the people who volunteered to

be a guinea pig. And under Senator Graham’s leadership in Florida, we convened a group right after 9/11 to talk about vertical integration of information.

I know it can work. I’ve seen it work.

We had a success case. It turned out the person involved wasn’t

guilty of anything, but it was a roamer that was picked up in Georgia. The person was apprehended in Florida. It was done properly

and it shows that a Federal input, properly handled, put through

the process and put back out can get actionable attention in a timely way in this country. And that’s something we definitely need

with the kind of threat level we’ve got.

Senator CHAMBLISS: Thank you. And thanks to you and Mariel

for your willingness to continue to serve your country.

Mr. GOSS: Thank you, Senator.

Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Snowe.

Senator SNOWE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, want to join our colleagues here today and welcome you,

Mr. Goss and Mariel. And also appreciate the fact that you’ve accepted this nomination. It means you’re taking a detour in your

own personal lives, embarking on this monumental journey.

Your nomination comes at a seminal moment, not only for the

country, but also for the Intelligence Committee, because there’s no

longer any question of whether or not we will be engaged in a comprehensive, critical restructuring of the intelligence community, unlike any reform or change the intelligence community has experienced since its origin.

So I have no doubt about your character, your competence, your

abilities. I can attest to your bipartisanship.

I’ve served with Mr. Goss in the House of Representatives. And

I think that you’re extremely capable. Your experience in the field

as a CIA officer, as well as having chaired the Oversight Committee, certainly I think gives you a breadth and depth of experience these times require.

58

I think the real issue now is, and what is vital, particularly that

comes on the heels of definitive reports, the Joint Inquiry by your

Committee and this Committee in the previous Congress, the 9/11

Commission Report, as well as our study on the investigation of

weapons of mass destruction and the failure of the prewar assessments to reconcile with reality.

So it’s going to be vital to know how your experience and knowledge is going to be synthesized into tangible results and work to

make the gears of the intelligence community totally synchronized

and how it’s going to function, and how we’re going to execute all

of this change, irrespective of what we do.

Because the community is on the cusp and the precipice of major

change. And you’re going to be the first person who’s going to enter

the door of the intelligence community that’s going to have the ability to lay the foundation for the intelligence community of the 21st

Century. So I think your responsibilities, your leadership that has

to be firm, bold and visionary, is going to be absolutely paramount

in order to steer this Ship of State around during these transformational times. I see it that way.

This is my first term on the Intelligence Committee, but I

worked for 10 years in the House on terrorism issues, and I know

it’s hard to get people’s attention when the time comes for change.

The point is, it’s not what we need to do today, it’s what we’re

going to need to do tomorrow, and who’s going to be able to look

down the road.

So you’re entering a community that, you know, understandably

is resistant to change. You know, we have thousands of excellent

men and women who are doing extraordinary jobs and putting

themselves on the line. But now the time has come for some monumental change, and there are diametrically opposed views as to

whether or not that change should occur, how it should occur, it’s

already taken place.

And that’s, you know, some of the issues that I want to explore

with you today.

On the day in which we released our report on the stockpiles of

weapons of mass destruction investigation that was based on a

year-plus effort by the staff and the Committee, one of the highestranking members within the CIA had a press conference and indicated that, ‘‘We recognize the shortcomings in the prewar Iraq intelligence and have taken a number of steps to address them and

to ensure they’re not repeated. It is wrong to exaggerate the flaws

and leap to the judgment that our challenges with the prewar Iraq

weapons intelligence are evidence of sweeping problems across the

broad spectrum of issues with which the intelligence community

must deal.’’

Then on the other hand, on the other side of the spectrum, this

summer in August we had a hearing with Dr. Kay, who, as you

know, was the head of the Iraq Survey Group. And I asked him

about all the proposed organizational changes, which, you know, I

embrace. I mean, I did so during the course of this investigation.

It’s not change for the sake of change or changing boxes around;

it’s changing a whole community in terms of attitude, culture, predisposition, skills and professional management.

59

Dr. Kay said—and I asked him, ‘‘Would it have been a very different product, the National Intelligence Estimate, if we had had

major organizational changes of the types that we were talking

about creating, a National Director of Intelligence?’’

He said, ‘‘It could have been a very different product, in my judgment. It would not just be organizational changes, the failure you

documented’’—referring to some of the issues I raised in our report—‘‘so thoroughly were not just failures of organization. They

were failures of tradecraft, failures of culture, failures of management, conscious mismanagement of the information flow.’’

So, I guess the point is here that it’s making sure that you are

bringing about the spirit of leadership that it’s going to require. It’s

not going to be an easy job; it’s not going to transform overnight,

we know that. But it’s the spirit in leadership in that you’re prepared to make the kinds of changes so that you can help the Agency because they’re going to, first and foremost, face the greatest

change, no matter what reorganization we ultimately enact.

Mr. GOSS: Senator, thank you.

You’ve talked about the blueprints. Reform within the agencies,

getting things fixed within the individual agencies, is relatively

simple. It’s not totally easy, but it’s relatively simple.

Reform among the agencies is going to require blueprints. And

it’s going to require decisions on those. And those will be your decisions and the Administration’s decisions.

I will be, if I’m confirmed, a working stiff taking my direction on

how this happens. Whatever cards are dealt to me I will play to

the best I can to create the remedies for the problems that have

been clearly pointed out in your very excellent WMD report.

I don’t disagree with some of the things Dr. Kay said. Some of

the things he said the first time and some of the things he said the

second time, I’m still rationalizing out. But I think, on balance, we

understand what the problems were and that they’re fixable, and

they need to be fixed right now.

I believe those things can be fixed. I wouldn’t be sitting here otherwise. I am totally committed to reform in concept, because I’ve

seen the problem for too long.

I thoroughly believe the window is open and it will not stay open

forever. I think it is very important for the people who can make

reform happen, our legislators and so forth, to give us those blueprints in the community on the Executive side so we can go out

and get on with the job of redesigning the capabilities to work the

way we want them to get a better product so we don’t have another

Dr. Kay report. I believe that.

Senator SNOWE: And I appreciate that.

And I think the concern that I have for where we are going is

whether or not we’re going to have the ability to foresee the future.

I mean, your predecessor, for example, former Director Tenet, was

trying to get everybody’s attention back in 1998. He didn’t garner

that attention.

I mean, if you look at the emerging threat reports of the Central

Intelligence Agency that were submitted to Congress on an annual

basis from 1997 through 2001, terrorism was not viewed as the

number one issue by the community until 2001 itself, when they

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recognized Usama bin Ladin and his global network would take on

a greater prominence.

But while there even was the realization that there was the potential for attack of some sort, they didn’t, obviously, have the intelligence. Director Tenet obviously felt very strongly about it. He

was trying to get everybody’s attention including Congress, the

President. His own community wasn’t able to do that.

How are we going to avoid just focusing on one single threat and

not be overwhelmed by another threat that we didn’t anticipate?

One, it bothers me he wasn’t able to and I’ll be interested to hear

your views. Did you think it was a failure of leadership, a failure

of organization, a failure of culture? What was it that he was not

able to do to garner people’s attention to focus on an issue, on a

risk and a threat to this country, and he wasn’t able to get anybody’s attention?

And what are we going to do to avoid that scenario in the future?

Because, you know, I believe that you have to look down the road

and beyond. And that’s my greatest concern of all, that we will be

focusing on these charts. And I agree with them totally that we’ve

got to change the flow charts, without a doubt. That’s the beginning.

But at the same time, we can’t just be focusing on a single risk.

Nuclear terrorism, for example. I mean, there’s so many spheres

and dimensions to threats that are going to pose a risk to our country and Americans and our interests abroad.

So what was it that he failed to do that you have identified that

you would do differently? How would you approach it in identifying

emerging threats of the future and making sure it gets everybody’s

attention, irrespective if it’s not on anybody’s radar screen?

Mr. GOSS: I think the manifestation of that is that our analysts

were involved in crisis analysis and there was not enough analytical horsepower to go around to do the predictive type analysis that

you talk about.

The intelligence bill this year that the House put out on the floor

that had some critical language in it was exactly on that point,

that we were not covering the rest of the target. And we used some

very strong language that caused the then-Director, the DCI, to use

some very strong language back, to be very candid.

I believe it takes sometimes very blunt, strong language. I don’t

like doing it. I call it tough love, but I think occasionally you have

to do that. I believe that there are gaps that should not be there

that need to be fixed.

I can tell you that is the drift, that’s the direction and that is

now the mission. And if I’m confirmed, I understand those gaps

have to be filled. We cannot be a one-target team here. We’ve got

to be able to deal with a global world.

Senator SNOWE: I appreciate that. Thank you.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROBERTS: I thank the Senator.

Senator Rockefeller, are you prepared for additional questions? If

so, I will yield to you and then I have just a couple. Well, I wasn’t

ready. I was, sort of, hoping that you would go first, but anyway.

Let me just ask a couple here and then I want to respond to the

comments by Senator Chambliss and indirectly to the concerns

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raised by Senator Levin and so comprehensively pointed out by the

distinguished Vice Chairman.

I want to talk about risk-aversion. And I have, sort of, what I

call a computer speech—and you know what that is; that’s when

somebody in public office is asked the same question about 15

times and, you know, you sort of press the computer and then this

speech rolls out—in regards to risk-aversion. And I used it in a

manner of speaking of connecting the dots.

And I remember during the USS COLE investigation that we finally determined was necessary in the Senate Intelligence Committee, a young man, a DIA agent, quit on the day of that tragedy

thinking that he had provided pertinent information that, if given

to the appropriate policymakers, should have resulted in a threat

warning and that hopefully the captain of the COLE would not

have then gone into the Port of Aden.

Back during that particular time, it seemed to me that if you had

to have 10 dots to connect and you had a great deal of collection

and you’re an analyst, that you had to connect probably seven,

eight, nine of them to make sure that you were not making a mistake or that you were risk-averse until you moved that product.

And after 9/11 came along, the whole world changed and everybody said, ‘‘My goodness, we can’t be risk-averse,’’ so out of 10

dots—and there could be 100 dots or, for that matter, 1,000, to

fully give a picture, sort of a jigsaw puzzle—but then if you had

three or four dots and you connected them, you’d better push the

product, because you don’t want to be risk-averse. But you could

be wrong. And so that’s sort of the nature of the beast. You’re

darned if you do, and darned if you don’t. And the seminal event

of course was 9/11.

Now I can go down all of the ‘‘Oh, my God’’ hearings that we

have had in your former Committee and this Committee—‘‘Oh my

God, how did this happen?’’ Khobar; the embassy bombings; Khartoum chemical plant—whoops, the wrong plant; India nuclear tests;

9/11, of course; the COLE; probably want to put Somalia in there

because it was the same people that were doing these things.

And the big question was how could you connect the dots? And

why couldn’t you have come up with analysis that could be shared

with a policymaker so a threat warning could be issued?

So my question is: do you think there is a risk-averse mindset

in the intelligence community, more especially today? And if so, as

the DCI, what would you do to change the risk-averse mindset

within the intelligence community? And the last part of that, is

Congress part of this problem?

Mr. GOSS: I certainly believe on the analytical side there is more

hesitation about being bold and being innovative because a lot of

people feel that they don’t want to take the risk of being wrong,

of getting outside the box, of doing the daring thing, as it were, because they are worried the sky will fall on them. That is one of the

ripples, I believe, that is out there, Mr. Chairman.

In the DO, I think that the word is getting around slowly. It is

not a done deal, by any means.

Senator Chambliss, very correctly, pointed out that he did some

amazing things on the Committee to get that to happen, along with

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some other people. And I believe we finally got the action we wanted on the day after he made a public announcement about it.

So I think it has taken a combined effort of a lot of people to

send the message. The message is not completely understood.

A lot of people don’t understand that the nature of the intelligence business is if you are going out for win-win situations, you

don’t want to be in the intelligence business. That is what it is not

about. You have got to take the risk.

Now some have said, as you have correctly pointed out, sir, that

we were not sufficiently alert before 9/11 and then, after 9/11, we

were too alert. So the answer is yes, there is an operational climate

that affects everybody.

I believe that the message is out there in the DO right now that

nice spies is not the formula right now, that risk will be rewarded.

But I don’t believe there is a full confidence in those words yet.

What will I do? I will try and put confidence behind those words

for our operators. I will give them the chance to make the mistakes

out there, if I’m confirmed as the DCI.

I will give them more leash, I will be very candid. And frankly,

if I am confirmed as DCI, I will probably be up here explaining to

you, hopefully in closed session, about why something went wrong.

But sometimes the things that only have a 50 percent chance of

success are worth doing. And I think it’s very important that that

risk be taken if it is sufficiently deserved for the information or the

action that may be involved. I think those are judgment calls that

the Oversight Committee certainly should be participating in.

Do I think Congress has a role? Yes, I do, very definitely. I think

Congress is understanding, and dealing with colleagues is very important, because not all colleagues are privileged to sit on these

Committees.

Chairman ROBERTS: I’m not going to get into the instant judgment business that I think that we have, including this Chairman,

in regards to criticism when something goes wrong and then obviously, as has been said, why the intel community can’t really talk

about its successes. I just hope we’re not too harsh on the one side

and ignore the other.

Let me just touch on—and I may run over time, Mr. Vice Chairman. And if so, I would be happy to yield back to you.

But I now have the Balance the Budget Act by Congressman Solomon. This, as I recall in my previous days in the House when I

had the privilege of being a House Member—by the way, I called

the Senate the ‘‘cave of the winds’’ at that time. I was informed by

Senator Kassebaum and Senator Dole that was not appropriate.

But at any rate, here it is. And it’s across the board. And it’s a

call to balance the budget of the United States Government by restructuring government, reducing Federal spending, eliminating

the deficit, limiting bureaucracy and restoring federalism. That’s a

rather ambitious goal.

And Congressman Solomon, bless his heart, a former Marine,

would do this every year. And you know, as a Member of the Rules

Committee, that every year this bill went nowhere, mainly because

we were in the Minority.

And then he got his chance. And this was the number one goal

of the then-Majority party, the Republican Party, and the Congress

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of the United States: to achieve a balanced budget. But it involved

everything from aardvarks to zebras, if I can use that term, as well

as intelligence.

And I have here, I think, that you were shifting things around—

I’m using the editorial ‘‘you’’—much in the same fashion as some

of us are proposing today in order to achieve the savings. Now I’ll

let the statement stand by the distinguished Vice Chairman, who

has that accurately.

But basically—I’m losing my place here; oh, here we go—the Solomon-Goss proposal was an effort to eliminate redundancy within

the intelligence community and to put analysts in consolidated

units so they can more easily share information. That almost

sounds like the Roberts bill.

Dana Milbank’s article admits, in The Washington Post, some of

the legislation sounds much like the current proposals, including a

plan to reduce the redundancy. But as I say again, this was Solomon’s bill, his pet project. And it was across the board. Senator Kerry proposed a $45 billion cut aimed at science, intelligence and defense projects within Committee. Basically, he decided when that became stalled that he would then go to the

floor—if I have this right, and I stand to be corrected—and propose

a $6 billion cut, a targeted cut, at intelligence, as opposed to an

across-the-board cut.

And he indicated that these were clearly pork barrel boondoggles.

And in his view, I will give any Senator credit in terms of intent,

but that was more of a directed cut.

That did come to a vote. And it was defeated, 75 to 20. I think

that’s right; yes, 75 to 20.

And it was aimed at the National Foreign Intelligence Program,

or the NFIP program, the tactical Intelligence or TIARA program.

And there are many comments about how that was not in the best

interest of the Senate by his colleagues.

So I think there is a difference. That might just be my personal

opinion because I can remember my angst as Chairman of the Agriculture Committee in looking over Mr. Solomon’s total package

and indicating to the leadership that it just simply would not work,

as far as I was concerned, on agriculture.

And it never really went anywhere, as opposed to a more specific

attempt in regards to intelligence. And then I think again there is

a difference between trying to move things around.

Now I say that only because it piqued my interest, because I certainly remembered that effort back when I was in the House. I was

not favorable of the activity. I don’t know if that answers the question for Senator Chambliss or if it sheds any light over and above

the comparison that we are trying to make here on who is strong

for intelligence.

I might add that I think both Senator Kerry and Congressman

Goss, at this particular day and age, clearly understand the need

for better investment in intelligence and perhaps this should not be

that much of an issue.

With that, I have exceeded my timeframe. And I will be happy

to recognize the Vice Chairman.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very

much. And I understand the points that you are trying to make.

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But it remains a fact, Mr. Goss, and that’s we have to just go on

this. You say the record is the record.

When you put your name on a bill, your name is on the bill. The

bill usually—we produce 10,000 and pass 100—so there is always

a good chance it’s not going to pass. But you don’t put your name

on a bill if you don’t agree with, for the most part, what is in the

bill.

In your case, you wouldn’t have been as much interested in agriculture as you would have been in the intelligence part of it—or he

might have been.

Chairman ROBERTS: He has an organic farm, sir. I beg to differ.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: And during that six-year period,

1996 to 2001—I emphasize this because frankly, nobody is sort of

taking this up at all. It’s just been left to hang out there—the Republicans controlled both Houses of Congress. And that Republican

Congress cut the President’s request for intelligence in 1996, 1997,

1998 and 2001. And in 1999, the Republican-controlled Congress

initially cut the intelligence budget, but then passed a large, onetime appropriation.

I’m not going to get back into it. I’m just going to say that the

numbers are there. The numbers are there. I can’t present them.

They are there.

And then I’ll leave it at that.

I want to get back to the declassification of Richard Clarke’s testimony.

Mr. GOSS: I’m sorry?

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: The declassification of Richard

Clarke’s testimony. I apologize. You know, of course, of his position.

You know of the fact that when he spoke before the 9/11 Commission he was accused of perjuring himself by Senator Frist.

People—they said what he said before the 9/11 Commission

didn’t agree with what he said before all of us when we were doing

this together. And I just wanted to ask: did you ever suggest that

Mr. Clarke may have lied or perjured himself before the Joint Congressional Inquiry on 9/11?

Mr. GOSS: The answer to the question is I made a statement in

response to a press question about a statement that Mr. Clarke

made, which he subsequently backed down from. And I said that

if he were saying that that were the case, then that would not be

accurate; it would be close to a lie.

It had to do with the question of whether or not there had been

no attention whatsoever to the terrorist threat, which is what his

statement was. I believe in public testimony Mr. Clarke said we all

need to cool off and back down. And perhaps I was a little overzealous in what I said.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: I think the NSC in 2004, they forwarded the declassified testimony of Richard Clarke to you. You

have that.

Mr. GOSS: I requested it, sir.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Yes. And you have it. Did you take

any action to publicly release it?

Mr. GOSS: No, sir.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Would you be willing to publicly

release it?

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Mr. GOSS: I guess the way I answer the question, Senator, is I

am no longer on the Committee. The reason I made the request

was to get the information for the Committee to deliberate over to

see if there was as much of an inconsistency as appeared at first.

That matter has not substantially advanced, as far as I know, in

the Committee. I’m just not in a position to tell you what the Committee is doing.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: I understand that you aren’t the

head of the Committee. But it hasn’t been very long that you

haven’t been. Then maybe I should just say: why didn’t you release

it?

Mr. GOSS: Frankly, I had other higher priorities to deal with as

Chairman of the Committee. That was not something that came

back to be on my plate as a mater of urgency.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: You made a number of statements

about the Clinton Administration and congressional Democrats for

cutting human intelligence collection programs in the 1990s. And

I need to talk about this, Mr. Goss, not because I don’t have a very

high regard for you and respect you very much, but because this

is a confirmation process in which probably the single most important thing, other than qualifications and knowledge about the job—

knowledge about the job and you surely have that—is the question

of independence, of the non-politicalness in an area where everything has become so political that the American people are turning

away in droves.

This is the worst sort of situation I have ever seen in 40 years

in public life. And so that is why this question of independence,

nonpartisanship and all the rest of it is so important.

And you criticize Democrats for limiting the intelligence ability

to carry out its mission. Now I have pointed out already I believe

this claim is not only partisan, but it’s also correct.

On November 6th, you gave a speech entitled, ‘‘A Blueprint for

Intelligence in the 21st Century.’’ And in it, you made the observation: ‘‘I am convinced,’’—your words—‘‘that the U.S. clandestine

service, the CIA’s directorate of operations, was, in the mid-to-late1980s, too large.’’

So in a sense, by your own assessment, you believe our human

intelligence collection, if I’m correct in my quote, needed to be cut

by the time the 1990s began. And I just want to know if that is

a fair statement or if it is not a fair statement.

Mr. GOSS: I believe it’s a fair statement.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Thank you, sir.

Mr. Goss, during the October 2002 House floor debate on whether to authorize the use of military force against Iraq, which obviously was a high point everywhere, you made the following statement: ‘‘Evidence supports Iraq’s involvement in the first and probably the second World Trade Center bombing.’’

Now as you know, the intelligence community, the Joint 9/11

Commission congressional inquiry, which you co-chaired, the KaneHamilton Commission, looked into the al-Qa’ida plot of September

11 and found no Iraq involvement in the attacks at all. I am just

interested what evidence you might have in referring to your claim

that there was involvement. And do you still stand by those claims?

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Mr. GOSS: Senator, that was in 2002. And that was based on the

information that we had at the time. And it was my best judgment.

I, like everybody else, was relying on information that was presented to us. And I thought it was accurate.

It turned out it was not as conclusive evidence as we thought it

was. There was some question, as you know about some things that

happened or may not have happened or the significance of them

happening was not properly interpreted.

I believe it is fair to say that our analysts were giving us worstcase scenarios. And we were accepting worst-case scenarios.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Thank you.

Chairman Roberts and I worked mightily—not always happily at

the beginning, but mightily—about the collection and the analysis

and the production of intelligence. And under our rules, one can go

on and look at the use, misuse, whatever of that by policymakers.

But that was not something that was going to happen. And so

we sat down and we simply worked out our problems and have

worked very, very hard at having a good bipartisan relationship

and produced what you yourself have indicated was a really good

report—and I’m really proud of that report and I know that Chairman Roberts is too—about pre-war intelligence. Now it didn’t cover

everything I wanted. But what it did was very important.

You also had that responsibility. And I don’t know where that report is that you all produced. I know there were press releases. I

don’t know if it’s ever been completed.

Was it conducted on a bipartisan basis with the involvement of

Congresswoman Jane Harman and the Minority staff? I mean,

given the fact that Members of this Committee—our Committee

had to request—Bob Graham in particular had to request, and

Richard Shelby—that the intelligence community produce a National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq in September of 2002, only

three weeks, an unheard of way to put together an NIE, classified,

much less unclassified or unclassified, much less classified. And

that product was extremely hastily put together. Do you still hold

to the opinion that Iraq intelligence assessments were timely?

So number one, what about the report? Has your opinion of a

year ago changed when you said that you had no reason to believe

that intelligence assessments in Iraq were wrong, inaccurate, untimely or biased?

Mr. GOSS: There are a number of questions there. I will try to

get them, Mr. Vice Chairman.

The first one on the Committee, I left the Committee at a time

when the report is in work. The answer is yes. The Committee tries

hard to turn out bipartisan—I would rather say nonpartisan, but

bipartisan is right because there are two side-products.

The planning, as was very clear to all Members of the Committee

and it was no secret to anybody—was that we simply would do four

projects this year in the Committee: the authorization bill; the language provision bill, which is included now in the authorization

bill, which is a task that’s been completed and I hope will be received well by this Committee; the WMD report, our view of it; and

reorganization or reform of the community.

Those were our four tasks, set out in an orderly way, to be done

the way we do business on the HPSCI side, which is more often,

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frankly, in closed session. It’s just the way we have done it over

there. It’s the tradition.

I believe that that report is being prepared. I think there are differences in the goals for the two reports. Our report is focused on

sufficiency of resources to the intelligence community. We did have

one public hearing on that subject. There have been other closed

hearings that are relevant to that.

I believe that you will find that when that report is done that

a lot of what you have already covered so well in your WMD report

will not be necessary in that report. There will be some further attention to sufficiency.

And more than that, we will have the advantage of the extra

time that has gone by. We may have information from Mr. Duelfer,

which is out there. We may have further information from interrogations of detainees and so forth that’s out there.

Originally, I believe your report was scheduled to be released

somewhat earlier in the year. My thinking—and I fully informed

the Committee on this and the staff, there is no question about

that—was that perhaps we could do the best for the people of the

United States if we had two reports during the year so we would

have an ongoing picture, sort of a collage of how things were progressing.

But the idea that you have come out with, as I have said publicly, what you found in your WMD report, I think, is very, very

helpful and pretty much on the mark all over the place.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: So when is it, sir, that we may expect your product?

Mr. GOSS: Sir, this is not in any way——

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Not your product, but the Committee’s product.

Mr. GOSS: It’s not a flip answer.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Yes.

Mr. GOSS: I resigned——

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: I understand that.

Mr. GOSS: I think it was totally appropriate to get out of the

business.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: And I’m caught in that trap. But

the record is the record and decisions were made to do this in a

different way.

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir. That decision was made.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: When might it be that the Committee might come out with this report, since that is what we were

all charged to do?

Mr. GOSS: We were aiming, sir, for after the break, after the

summer break.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Thank you, sir.

Chairman ROBERTS: I think it’s Senator Levin. I apologize.

Senator Wyden.

Senator WYDEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Congressman Goss, I want to come back to this point I made earlier about what I feel has been your slowness to get to the issue

of intelligence reform. I cited earlier your being on the Committee

for eight years. You put in a bill a couple of months ago. You have

been in the House for 16 years.

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And when I asked you about why you had been slow to introduce

legislation, earlier you said, well, it had been hard to get attention

to the topic. Let me tell you, sir, I just think that is a ‘‘hit your

forehead’’ kind of answer.

You are the Chairman of the Committee. Of course you can get

attention if you lay out a bold, aggressive kind of proposal. And

that’s what you get gavels for. I mean, chairmen, in effect, have a

bully pulpit. And so I want to again, because of my affection for

you, see if I can get a sense of why you did some of the things that

you did and how you might change in the future.

And let me start with the 1996 initiative where you were a member of the Brown-Rudman Commission, studied the intelligence

community and it issued a set of recommendations for reform. So

you would have had an opportunity then to lay out a legislative

proposal for reform. My understanding is you did not.

And I would like to know, on the basis of that 1996 initiative

where you were centrally involved, why you did not try to reform

the intelligence community at that time, given your role on the

commission?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I was not the Chairman at that time. The

Chairman at that time was choosing to follow the IC-21 formula.

I did recommend strongly the Aspin-Brown recommendations.

And one of those——

Senator WYDEN: But you introduced no legislation.

Mr. GOSS: No, sir, I did not.

Senator WYDEN: And why was that?

Mr. GOSS: Because I introduced the report to the Chairman of

the Committee and asked him to give it consideration. And he did.

And that was not his decision to go forward with that.

Senator WYDEN: All right. In 2002, you were part of the Joint Inquiry. There was a joint inquiry into 9/11, of course, the Senate

and the House, another report with recommendations, including

creating a strong national intelligence directorate. You were Chairman then. Again, no legislation to implement reforms.

What I am trying to do, you have said, ‘‘The record is the record.’’

And I will tell you it’s the record that I find so troubling. And what

I would like to do is get a sense that your future record would be

different.

And perhaps you could tell me why, after 2002, where you were

the Chairman, a proposal was made for changes in the intelligence

community, why didn’t you introduce legislation then? Why didn’t

you say, here is a chance to really make a difference and I’m going

to use my chairmanship to initiate reform?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I think that what has happened that has

opened the window to allow this engagement to reform is that our

constituency now understands the problem. I think that had not

happened before 9/11. We were focusing on a bite at a time type

reform. A little bit, we could do, up until that time.

After 9/11, it became very apparent that we needed a different

form of protection. The understanding of the value of intelligence

became more widespread. I think there is a very broad constituency.

69

Look at the number of issues right now involving intelligence

that are really on the front burner, on the front pages of the media.

It’s extraordinary. Four years ago, that was not the way it is.

I am very proud that we have been able to move so fast in terms

of the window being open and the engagement I am seeing with a

great number of very thoughtful presentations coming forward on

reform this year from the legislative side, to say nothing of the extraordinarily strong engagement from the Administration on this.

I think we’re going to get this done. I think now is the moment.

Senator WYDEN: I will not try to make a definition of what ‘‘fast’’

is. But I will tell you that your idea of saying that the constituency

wasn’t ready and that that was again the rationale for going slow,

that’s just unacceptable to me. Leaders are supposed to lead.

And I have just cited two examples where someone with your

stature and your prestige could have led in recent years after it

was documented that there were problems. You were a leader in

the intelligence field. And nothing happened.

And that is what I hope—and Mr. Chairman, I have already indicated I hope we will have a second day of hearings. I have a

great deal more I am going to get into and try to use my 10 minutes. I’m anxious to meet with Congressman Goss in my office to

again try to see if we’re going to get a commitment to some reform.

And we’ll just use the rest of my 10 minutes for some additional

questions.

Now one reform that I think is important is the one that Senator

Snowe and Senator Lott and I have in order to shake up the classification system. I think today this system is just wildly abused. It’s

more for political protection really than to protect the national security interests of the country.

I don’t expect you to take a position on the bipartisan bill that

we have. But I would like to ask you about one feature in particular.

We propose—Senator Snowe, Senator Lott and myself—to give

Congress the right to appeal a declassification decision, so that we

strike a balance between the Congress and the Executive Branch.

And then when the Executive Branch in the future essentially tries

to cover themselves—and make no mistake about it, I think it’s

gone on through all kinds of Administrations, Democrats and Republicans—there will be an opportunity for Congress to appeal.

Would you be supportive of the concept of Congress having a

right of appeal for an Executive Branch decision on classification?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I believe there is a system already in place

for both the House and the Senate to deal with matters that they

disagree with.

Senator WYDEN: Do you support reforming that? I think you and

I know that is never used. I mean, you talk about water torture.

I mean, in order to use something like that, that is a huge aroundthe-mulberry-bush kind of exercise.

My question then would be: will you support reforming the process so there can be an expeditious way for the Congress of the

United States to appeal a classification decision?

Mr. GOSS: I believe that there should be working arrangements

that provide for those kinds of matters. We have seen that. I have

participated myself and had some very strong public statements to

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say about how the system is broken on that. I believe it needs a

new system. I certainly agree with that.

Senator WYDEN: I appreciate that answer. I am going to emphasize there that it was a new system that you would be supportive

of, because I take note of the fact if it hadn’t been for Senator Roberts and Senator Rockefeller, even the Senate report would have

been mostly black ink. And that certainly wouldn’t have been in

the public interest. And Senators Roberts and Rockefeller did the

heavy lifting in order to ensure that the public got the facts.

I want to ask you a question about the U.S. relationship with

Israel. And I believe that the close strategic cooperation that our

government has with Israel is very much in the national security

interest of the country, very much in the interest of people in Florida and Oregon and everywhere else.

I think it is to the benefit of our national security. And so I am

concerned this afternoon about the allegations about this Defense

Department analyst—and they are allegations—providing classified

information to Israel and the effect that the case might have on the

close U.S.-Israel relationship that I think is important.

My question to you is, based on what you know, how would you

deal with this situation as CIA Director so as to ensure that our

laws were followed and also the close U.S.-Israel relationship,

which I think is important in fighting terrorism, was maintained?

How would you deal with it?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I am not informed of the details of that. I

have been out of the loop for a while. But in a situation where

there was a leak of concern, there is a system in place for the DCI

for a referral to the Justice Department for appropriate investigation.

That would certainly be the system I would use because it’s the

only system that is there. I believe that the leak problem is a problem that is worthy of oversight attention. That’s the system we

have to use and I would use it.

As for any policy comments on our relationships with any foreign

Nation, I don’t think that it would be appropriate for me. And my

record on that is my record on that as a Member of Congress. And

I will just leave it at that.

Senator WYDEN: Let me ask you about the part of the 9/11 Commission Report dealing with the millennium exception. They, in effect, in the 9/11 Commission Report say that this was an example

where we seem to really have got it right, where the government

acted in concert to deal with terrorism those last weeks of December of 1999.

Information flowed freely, and the Counterterrorism Center and

the Counterterrorism Security Group, that essentially in the summer of 2001, the millennium phenomenon was not repeated. That

was what the Commission found, is that we weren’t doing in 2001

what we were doing in 1999.

Since we know through the Commission’s finding that successful

information-sharing is possible, it just seems to me that somebody’s

feet ought to be held to the fire to make sure that the millennium

exception becomes the rule. Do you believe that somebody should

be held accountable for not sharing information prior to 9/11?

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Mr. GOSS: I know of no specific case where somebody had some

information that was not willfully shared, with the exception of the

matters that are covered. And the justifications are explained. That

would be the wall, as it were. And that, in fact, the Congress has

responded to that and removed the wall.

Senator WYDEN: So you wouldn’t have handled that pre-9/11 situation, as the head of the DCI, any differently than it was handled? You don’t know——

Mr. GOSS: Which situation?

Senator WYDEN: What I’m trying to do is find out what you

would have done pre-9/11. Because we’ve got an example of something that worked. In 1999, the millennium situation, in terms of

dealing with that threat, worked. We shared information alike.

You just told me that you don’t know of anything that you would

do differently, I think. You said you didn’t know of anybody who

should be held accountable.

I want to make sure I understand it. Because it looks to me like

there were a lot of failures in that period before 9/11. In fact, we

have had some testimony to that effect. And I just want to make

sure that you have a chance to tell me, if you were the head of the

DCI at that particular period, whether you would have handled it

any differently.

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I think that the 9/11 Report speaks for itself.

There are various views on how well we were prepared for the millennium, how well we were prepared for 9/11 and where the weaknesses were. There has been a lot written and a lot discussed. And

I don’t think we have the complete mosaic yet.

I will put it this way. It is very clear that there are systems

breakdowns, management breakdowns and problems in the way we

go about dealing with the threat that is in front of us today. I think

we understand what those are.

Now if you are asking me will I assess accountability where I

find omission or where I find negligence, the answer is, of course,

yes. I have to do it in a hypothetical sense, however.

Senator WYDEN: My time is up. I just remain concerned that, if

we are going to see the kinds of changes made, that you have a

chance in the days ahead to say I would do things differently if I

am approved to head the CIA. And that is what I continue to look

for.

And in that vein, Mr. Chairman, I’m going to have to be ducking

out. And I have had a second round. But I do have additional questions. And I feel very strongly that we should have another day’s

worth of public hearings on this nominee.

I intend to meet with him in my office. But if we’re going to use

the litmus test of ‘‘the record is the record,’’ I will say that I find

the record troubling. And because of my personal affection for the

nominee, I want to hear how his record as the head of the CIA will

be different.

And I am not satisfied yet that we will have the urgency behind

the reform push that I think is warranted. So I assume that decisions are going to be made in the next couple of hours as to whether to wrap up the public portion of this hearing today. I just want

it understood that I would like to have another day of public hearings because I have a number of additional questions.

72

And you have been very generous with me. I have already had

a second turn. We have a lot of colleagues who obviously would like

to ask additional ones. And I hope we will have another day at

least of public hearings. And I thank you.

Chairman ROBERTS: I would inform the Senator and those

present that there will be a series of votes at 2:20. And I wish to

recognize Senator Levin and then Senator Chambliss for any further questions that they have.

And I think probably my question could be submitted for the

record. Let me say to the Senator that the Vice Chairman and I

think that any need for further hearings should be Member-driven.

And he has expressed a very strong desire in that regard.

At the same time, I think all of us want to see this expedited,

for the obvious reasons. And so on Monday, perhaps if Members

would like to have another round and then have a business meeting to determine our vote, that would be the thing that I would

suggest.

Senator WYDEN: Would the Chairman yield?

Chairman ROBERTS: Yes, certainly.

Senator WYDEN: I think the Chairman is being very fair in that

regard. And I know you are going to have to discuss this with colleagues and Senators. But that strikes me as very fair.

Chairman ROBERTS: The Wednesday, Thursday, Friday situation,

as we all know, because of Rosh—help me, Carl.

Senator LEVIN: Rosh Hashanah.

Chairman ROBERTS: Rosh Hashanah. We Methodists have problems with that. At any rate, many Senators simply will not be

there. But it is the very strong desire of leadership to have this on

the floor the 21st, which means that we could have a business

meeting on the 20th.

And if Mr. Goss would be available for possible additional questions, perhaps on Monday morning, that might work out. And we

will determine that at that particular time.

Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman asked you about a statement that you made

on the House floor on October 9, 2002 relative to the Use of Force

Resolution, when you said that ‘‘evidence supports Iraq’s involvement in the first and probably the second World Trade Center

bombing.’’

And your answer to Senator Rockefeller was that the evidence

was not as conclusive as you thought it was then. What evidence

are you referring to? Because the President has said that we have

had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with September 11th?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, my view was at the time that there were

some reports that led us to believe that Iraq was part of the war

on terror. I don’t recall specifically what the justification was. But

I do recall I made a statement that I believed.

Senator LEVIN: Do you disagree with President Bush that we

have had no evidence that Saddam Hussein was involved with September 11th?

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Mr. GOSS: I don’t disagree with President Bush. I would point

out that in hindsight our interpretation of the information has

changed.

Senator LEVIN: And there is no evidence that you know of?

Mr. GOSS: Of which, sir?

Senator LEVIN: Of Saddam Hussein’s being involved with September 11th?

Mr. GOSS: Directly involved with the plot of al-Qa’ida? I have no

evidence of that at this time.

Senator LEVIN: Now there was a letter that was sent to Senator

Bob Graham by DCI Tenet on October 7, in which he declassified—

that was in 2002, October 7, 2002—in which they declassified portions of the NIE relative to Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, in

which the Director said that Iraq was unlikely to provide weapons

of mass destruction to terrorists or to al-Qa’ida, called such a move

an extreme step for Saddam Hussein that would be Saddam’s ‘‘last

chance to exact vengeance by taking a large number of victims with

him.’’

If he had been attacked by the United States, it would be in response to an attack that he would take such a step, according to

DCI Tenet’s letter to Senator Graham. Were you aware of that intelligence relative to the lack of connection of Saddam Hussein to

terrorism at the time you made your statement on the floor?

Mr. GOSS: I don’t recall whether I was or not. I remember seeing

that at some point. And I don’t remember the point. I think I will

stick to my statement, sir, that the best judgment I had at the time

was the judgment I spoke. That’s what I believed at the time.

Senator LEVIN: Now you were also asked about these budget

numbers. And I just want to ask, just a statement relative to the

budgets which were adopted, not comparing the bill that you cosponsored to Senator Kerry with this question, but relative to the

votes on intelligence budgets which were made in Congress from

the year 1995 to the year 2004, during those years, 1995 to 2004.

The Republicans took control in 1994, so I’m going to pick it up

from there.

Congress cut funds from the budget requests of Presidents for

the National Foreign Intelligence Program in seven out of 10 years,

from 1995 to 1904, including the two years immediately following

9/11. Did you vote for those budgets that were less than what was

requested by the President?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I will have to go back to my statement. I

don’t recall all my specific hundreds of thousands of votes I made.

The record——

Senator LEVIN: No, I’m talking about the intelligence budget. I’m

just talking about on the intelligence appropriations. Did you vote

for the appropriations bills in those 10 years, seven of 10 of which

had reductions in the requests made for intelligence, in terms of

the National Foreign Intelligence Program?

Mr. GOSS: Most likely I did, sir. But I can’t tell you with certainty that I voted for each and every one of them until I check the

record or until the record is checked.

Senator LEVIN: Do you remember whether you acted to restore

cuts that were made by Congress in those seven budgets from the

presidential requests in those 10 years?

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Mr. GOSS: Senator, what I can tell you, on the basis of what I

recall from my time on HPSCI, the record there is clear and will

show that for seven years in a row—I think it was in my chairmanship from 1997 to 2004—we plussed up every authorization budget

that was given to us. In some years, it was just a tiny amount. But

it was an add-on. We did plus it up. And in other years, it was

very, very significant.

That is a part of the process I control. The part of the process,

once we got into conference and dealing with the appropriators, I

took the best I could get.

Senator LEVIN: Right. I understand that. You’re in a pretty critical position as Chairman of the Intelligence Committee. And I am

representing to you and assume it’s true that there were reductions

in appropriations from the requests of the Presidents in seven out

of 10 years that the Republicans controlled the Congress. And I’m

asking you whether you supported those appropriation bills containing those cuts in the requests. That’s what I’m asking you.

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I would have to go back to the record. And

I apologize that my memory just doesn’t recall each and every vote

that I took on a Defense bill. I seriously doubt I voted directly for

isolated intelligence cuts when I was the Chairman.

Senator LEVIN: And the appropriations bills?

Mr. GOSS: I don’t know how the appropriations bills——

Senator LEVIN: Assuming that that is true, do you think it is fair

to say that the Democratic Party did not support the intelligence

community? Do you think that is a fair comment, given the bipartisan approach to intelligence which has been taken in the Congress, as far as I know, and given the fact that in those years when

Republicans controlled the Senate and the House both, that there

were reductions in the requests of both President Clinton and

President Bush in terms of the requests for intelligence? Is that a

fair kind of a comment, do you think?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, that comment was made in the middle of

floor debate. It is a matter of public record this year on the authorization bill, in a context that appeared appropriate at the time and

in response to a challenge on the bill. I was defending a product

of the bill. And I am happy to report the bill did pass on a bipartisan vote, a strong bipartisan vote.

Senator LEVIN: And to my question, do you think that was a fair

comment?

Mr. GOSS: I think your question was a fair question, sir.

Senator LEVIN: Do you think the comment you made was a fair

comment?

Mr. GOSS: The whole debate?

Senator LEVIN: That the Democratic Party did not support the

intelligence community?

Mr. GOSS: I think in the context of what we were talking about,

it was a reasonable comment. Yes, sir. Maybe it wasn’t my best debating point, but I think it was a reasonable comment.

Senator LEVIN: You will give us the numbers in the budgets for

the last 10 years which are going to support that comment?

Mr. GOSS: Which, sir?

Senator LEVIN: That the Democratic Party doesn’t support intelligence.

75

Mr. GOSS: Sir, what I was just referring to is what I had said.

And I would be very happy to supply any material you would like

to have about our staff justification.

Senator LEVIN: Is that an accurate statement now? Do you believe that the Democratic Party does not support intelligence?

Mr. GOSS: Does not? No. I believe the Democratic Party does support intelligence now, very strongly. We have seen that in good bipartisan votes.

Senator LEVIN: For how long?

Mr. GOSS: We have had good bipartisan work in the Committee

for a number of years. And I am very pleased about that.

Senator LEVIN: You were asked, I believe by Senator Wyden,

about—I think it was by Senator Bayh, I’m not sure—relative to

the Doug Feith operation and the Department of Defense. And

whoever asked you, your answer was that you are not sure that

your portfolio would include going into the Secretary of Defense’s

operations, into the policy operations and that Feith is a policy person. That’s his assignment.

But the facts are that his operation got into intelligence pretty

heavily. Are you familiar with their efforts inside that policy shop

to affect intelligence for Iraq? Are you familiar with that?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I am familiar with the fact that policy is

made from many threads. I don’t know that I would characterize

what Mr. Feith was doing as part of the intelligence community or

an intelligence operation. I’m just not familiar with it to that degree.

He did testify in front of our Committee and I think provided satisfactory testimony. But again, I think there is a very strong line

between policy and capability.

Senator LEVIN: I will just finalize this question and I’ll have to

get back to that issue on Monday. And we are going to get you

some materials on that between now and then so you will be better

in a position to comment on that.

When I asked you earlier this morning about whether you agreed

with the Senate Intelligence Committee report’s summary that

most of the major key judgments in the intelligence community’s

October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate overstated or were not

supported by the underlying intelligence reporting, you indicated

that you thought you agreed with that conclusion. Is that correct?

Mr. GOSS: Generally, I think I do.

Senator LEVIN: But in a letter that you wrote in September 2003,

a letter that you wrote with your Vice Chair, where you had a very

clear disagreement with Jane Harman, you said the following: that

‘‘we have a fundamental disagreement’’—that’s between you and

Congresswoman Harman—‘‘generally on whether the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s WMD programs and the intelligence

on Iraq’s ties to al-Qa’ida were deficient with regard to the analysis

and presentation, especially in the certainty of the IC’s judgments.

The Ranking Member believes it was;’’—in other words, deficient—

‘‘the Chairman’’—you—‘‘believes it was not.’’

And yet, this morning, you told us that you generally agreed

with the conclusion of the Senate Intelligence Committee, which I

just read to you. Have you changed your view on that issue?

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Mr. GOSS: I think that the Senate has provided a very excellent

report that has provided a lot of new information, certainly to me,

that has led me to change my conclusions. One of the points of disagreement I had with Ms. Harman on that was the question of

caveating. And I think that may be in that letter. I’m not sure

which letter you are referring to, but I believe that was the one.

Senator LEVIN: Thank you.

Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Chambliss.

Senator CHAMBLISS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple of

observations, I guess, and maybe in the way of a question.

But we are here to decide whether Mr. Goss is fit for the position

to head the intelligence Agency. And to sit here and ask him what

he would have done differently relative to the situation leading up

to September 11 reaches way beyond the fairness side of this.

Certainly, if he had known that al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi were

in a meeting in Kuala Lumpur in the year 2000 and somehow,

through a glitch in the intelligence system, they got in this country,

we know what his answer is going to be. So I think to try to determine the fitness of this man to move forward in the intelligence

leadership area, based upon what he would have done differently

about pre-2001 is bordering on the ridiculous.

With relevance to the——

Senator WYDEN: Would the gentleman yield?

Senator CHAMBLISS: Yes, I will.

Senator WYDEN: I wasn’t asking him what he personally would

have done differently. I was asking him, on the basis of what was

said in the 9/11 Commission Report, whether he would hold anybody accountable.

I think I read that the 9/11 Commission found that, in the summer of 2001, the millennium phenomenon of cooperation wasn’t repeated. And that was what I was asking the nominee, whether he

would hold anybody accountable, not whether he would have done

something differently.

Senator CHAMBLISS: I agree. You did ask that. But you also went

ahead and you asked him what he would have done differently.

And I think that is a very unfair question and an unfair position

to put him in.

Senator WYDEN: If the gentleman would yield? With respect to

the——

Senator CHAMBLISS: Well, let me go on to what else I am going

to ask and if I have more time, I will be happy to come back to

you.

Mr. Goss, I was, as every Member here, was involved in the

budget issues that have been alluded to. And the fact that we increased the President’s request for both Defense budgets and Intelligence budgets each and every year that the previous Administration submitted Intelligence budgets and Defense budgets and also

that there were movements within those budgets from time to

time, let me ask you if you recall that.

Senator Levin alluded to a particular program where there was

some support and a vote to reduce the funding for that particular

program, the foreign intelligence service program. I’m sure I supported that reduction too. And we took that money and we used it

77

in an area where we thought we would be better served and the

Intelligence Community would be better served.

Am I correct in that? Or do you recall that?

Mr. GOSS: Senator Chambliss, I think you are correct. And as I

said, I appreciate that clarification from you because that was my

recollection.

But I’m not that sure of it that I want to tell a United States

Senator that I remember each and every vote. I believe that there

were a number of tradeoff votes that came. And some of them could

be characterized as cuts to intelligence if the whole story were not

true.

I just don’t have the richness of that panoply of votes in front of

me, nor frankly is my memory of that good of the thousands of

votes that I have made. The question comprehensively though, if

the question you are asking, is have I been a steadfast supporter

of the intelligence community, to give them the resources they

need? You very well know and helped me greatly on the Committee

to provide as much resource as we could for the community that

was justified for their work.

Senator CHAMBLISS: Let me go to one other area that Senator

Wyden was asking about, and that’s our relationship with Israel.

And he brings up a very interesting point. And I think it’s a legitimate question. I don’t disagree this one was unfair, Ron.

I think it is a legitimate point. And I think this is one of the

strongest assets that this man brings to the table, because I have

been there with him when he sat down with the leaders of not just

the Israeli intelligence community, but virtually every other ally

that we have around the world in the intelligence community.

And let me just say, Mr. Goss, if we had an issue with Israel,

do you know and have you had dialogue with the leaders of the

Shin Bet as well as the Mossad over the years? Do you know who

they are? Do they know who you are? Do you have that kind of relationship with them that you could confront them with any intelligence issue, whether it’s positive or whether it’s relative to some

issue, such as what Senator Wyden referred to?

Mr. GOSS: Senator Chambliss, I want to answer that question as

openly as I can, recognizing that this may be a very large audience

and not wishing to put anybody on the spot. I have contacts around

the world in professional business. And I have parliamentarians

around the world that I have met doing this job who have come

here, as you very well know. You have participated in some of

those matters.

Not all of them wish to acknowledge the fact that we have had

conversations and do talk from time to time. So I want to be very

circumspect. But it is well known that there has been a very good

symbiotic working relationship with the professional forces of

Israel. And I think that is of value to both nations.

Senator CHAMBLISS: And that is, Mr. Chairman, an asset that I

don’t know of anybody else in the intelligence community, outside

of those folks who are in leadership positions currently in the CIA,

could bring to the table. And I do think that’s one of the strongest

assets that Mr. Goss has.

Senator Wyden, I don’t know whether there is anything else you

want to ask about, but I’ve got a little time left if you do.

78

Senator WYDEN: No, I think we have cleared it up. And I appreciate your thoughtfulness. I want to see—and I know you do, as

well—what happened in the millennium situation in terms of information sharing. I want to see that become the rule, rather than

what the Commission found as the exception.

I think all of us do. And that was why I was asking the nominee,

with respect to accountability, whether he thought someone should

be held accountable. But I think we have cleared it up. And I look

forward to continuing to work with my colleague and friend from

Georgia on this and a lot of other matters.

Senator CHAMBLISS: I don’t know whether you were here when

I was asking my questions in the first round, but I spent a lot of

time with Mr. Goss relative to the issue of information sharing. I

know how passionate he is because I had the chance to work with

him day to day on the House side about this.

And it is because of his strong leadership and insistence on inclusion of the information sharing package in the Department of

Homeland Security bill that that broad information sharing provision was put in there.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROBERTS: The Chair would inform all Senators that a

vote is taking place now.

Senator Rockefeller, do you have any additional questions at this

time?

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Mr. Chairman, I will not, for the

purposes of this day. I want to reflect and reorganize a few

thoughts. And we discussed whether we would be meeting on——

Senator LEVIN: The Chairman, perhaps when you were gone, indicated that we would have an opportunity to ask questions on

Monday.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Yes, I heard. I will have a couple

of questions for that time.

Chairman ROBERTS: I will search my recollection here. I think it

should be Member-driven. And I know that Mr. Goss will be very

accommodating and there may be an opportunity, as of Monday.

But I do want to expedite this to a business meeting on Monday

afternoon. So we will discuss that with all Members concerned.

And we will notify Mr. Goss that we will proceed accordingly.

Senator WYDEN: Mr. Chairman, would you yield just on that?

Chairman ROBERTS: Yes.

Senator WYDEN: Thank you. And again, I thank you for your

thoughtfulness. Since we may not be able to talk, with Rosh Hashanah and everybody running for planes, your plan now is to try

to go to the business meeting on Monday afternoon with respect to

the Goss nomination. And for those of us that have additional questions and would like to ask them in a public forum, you would work

with Senator Rockefeller to try to provide us that opportunity Monday morning.

Chairman ROBERTS: That is correct.

Senator WYDEN: Okay, I thank you.

Chairman ROBERTS: You may stand at ease, sir.

Mr. GOSS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, Senator.

[Whereupon, at 2:28 p.m., the hearing adjourned.]

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(173)

NOMINATION OF THE HONORABLE

PORTER J. GOSS TO BE DIRECTOR OF

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2004

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,

Washington, DC.

The Select Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in

Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Pat

Roberts, (Chairman of the Committee), presiding.

Committee Members Present: Senators Roberts, Hatch, DeWine,

Hagel, Rockefeller, Levin and Wyden.

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PAT ROBERTS,

CHAIRMAN

Chairman ROBERTS: The Select Committee will come to order.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence meets today to continue considering the nomination of the Honorable Porter J. Goss

to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Congressman,

thank you for returning to make a second appearance before the

Committee after 51⁄2 hours as of last week.

I have one or two additional questions for the nominee, but before I get to them, I would have recognized the distinguished Vice

Chairman for any remarks he might wish to make. We will recognize him just as soon as he attends the session.

Congressman Goss, often we hear concerns about policymakers

and intelligence, and the politics of same. Rarely, however, do we

hear concerns about the flip side of the coin—the intelligence community efforts to shape or influence policy. The latter is a very real

and very unwise phenomenon. The intelligence community should

provide the facts, let the policymaker simply sort them out.

How will you ensure that the intelligence community does not

cross the line into policymaking?

TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE PORTER J. GOSS, NOMINEE

TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Mr. GOSS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As I stated last time, I feel very strongly that it destroys the

credibility of the intelligence if it is thought to be contaminated by

the policymaking process. I believe it is the DCI’s responsibility to

make sure that that does not happen in all the product, that the

product has to be vetted and considered pure by the DCI before it

is given to the policymakers.

174

I think that that process can be worked out very well in a management form, and I would foresee no problems at all conveying

that understanding to the people who are involved in the intelligence community.

And I would have to point out, I think that understanding is

pretty well there. There is a very strong line among the people who

work in the community between those who are in the process of

taking the product and analyzing, and taking information and analyzing it and delivering a finished product and those who are policy

who are not part of that. Intelligence is to inform policy. And I

think that the professionals do understand that, but I think that

they have to be continually monitored and there have to be safeguards put into the system.

If I am confirmed, I will certainly consider that a critical job, because it has been one that has caused the intelligence community

a good deal of consternation in the past couple of years.

Chairman ROBERTS: I appreciate that strong statement.

Should the intelligence community have a voice and a vote at the

interagency table on questions that first and foremost are policy

decisions?

Mr. GOSS: Absolutely not, sir.

Chairman ROBERTS: Congressman, as you know, the President

did direct the CIA and the FBI to co-locate their operational and

their analytical counterterrorism components at the new TTIC facility. The FBI’s Counterterrorism Division just finished moving

into that facility. It’s my understanding that almost all of the CIA’s

Counterterrorism Center is still at Langley.

Do I have your absolute commitment that when you are confirmed you will take immediate steps to ensure that all of the operational and the analytical components of the CIA’s

Counterterrorism Center will be co-located with their FBI counterparts at the new TTIC facility?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.

Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Wyden.

Senator WYDEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Congressman Goss, as you and I talked about in the office, what

I am most troubled about is your willingness to be a change agent

at the CIA.

I think that we discussed over the course of the last week the

matter of being partisan, the question of being objective, those

kinds of issues. And my sense is I can give somebody the benefit

of the doubt on those kinds of issues, but I have scoured your

record and I just don’t see any real evidence of your willingness to

push for intelligence reform and be a true change agent.

And it is heavy lifting; nobody underestimates that. But I think

we saw with Tom Kean that it can be done. I mean, he went into

that 9/11 Commission project. He had to take on the White House.

They were reluctant to cooperate. He handled it in a thoughtful

way and he was able to get a lot of the information that was needed.

What in your record shows that you’re willing to be serious about

pushing for intelligence reform, and particularly doing what Tom

Kean did, which is to stand up to your Administration, stand up

to a President of your party?

175

Mr. GOSS: Senator, as I said last week, I believe it is the intelligence community’s job to provide the best product to any Administration. It’s not a partisan question at all.

And as I explained last week, I well understand that I am leaving one arena and, if confirmed, heading to another arena that operates completely differently where partisan politics are not part of

the job. In fact, I take that so seriously, I have made a down payment on that pledge: You have not heard a word from me publicly

in any partisan possible way since the President nominated me.

So I assure you that I understand that the product of the community is for the Administration that is running the country, whatever the voters choose on that.

Now, with regard to your questions on what have I done, I did

appreciate our conversation very much and I appreciate you taking

the time last week to speak to me, especially on that. And I have

compiled some information, which I hope will be persuasive to you,

that we have not been just idling our time away in the past several

years under my chairmanship. If you wish, I would start back a

few years and give you some examples.

Senator WYDEN: You can certainly do that, but I would like an

answer to the question I asked. Tom Kean showed that he would

stand up to the Administration of his party and that he would take

them on in the name of intelligence reform. I’d like to have even

one or two concrete examples of where you are willing to stand up

to the Administration of your party to try to bring about intelligence reform.

Mr. GOSS: Senator, again, without regard to the question of the

partisanship or the party, which I believe is not appropriate, as I

also said last week, even in the construct of the Oversight Committees that we have on intelligence, so I tried to practice, as I said,

nonpartisanship. I didn’t always succeed, but I tried to practice it,

and I think seven out of the eight bills I pushed through came

through on a bipartisan basis.

I did find it necessary to push very hard on the Administration

on some issues with regard to reform. One of them surely has to

be the area of classification and declassification. We had quite an

arm-wrestling discussion with the Executive Branch about that

system, which I said last week is a broken system. It is a broken

system.

I tried very hard to do some reform with it, actually worked with

Senator Moynihan. We did pass a bill, bicameral, bipartisan—a

first step. It wasn’t as much as either of us wanted, but it was a

good step, and it is the law, and it has made it easier now in the

declassification process.

A second area that I think is critically important to remind ourselves of is that the Joint inquiry did turn out a report and it had

a number of recommendations—19 to be exact—and a good number

of those have been enacted by the Executive Branch at this time.

So we have made some strong progress.

Now, the major one was the question of the Director of National

Intelligence, or the National Intelligence Director. I don’t want to

get mixed up in the alphabet soup, but the kingpin, as it were, the

coordinator, the person with the overall accountability for the

176

whole community, which is a huge issue as we talk about stitching

together a network.

I think we did put out a good report, and I think that the fact

today that the work we did in that Joint Inquiry is out there and

is being so thoroughly addressed on the Hill and downtown now is

a sign of success. I consider it a victory.

We have gotten to a place where we had not gotten to, despite

even the good efforts of the Aspin-Brown and other commissions

like that, which pointed out pretty much the same thing. Maybe we

ought to consider this sort of stuff. So I think we have rolled the

ball pretty well, sir.

Senator WYDEN: The only thing about your answer is that you’re

essentially citing—you said, for example, the Executive Branch

made some changes after 9/11. Of course. No one disputes that.

But after 9/11, and you served on a commission, you could have

introduced a piece of legislation that would have pushed us further

and faster. It would have meant you would have had to take them

on, and you didn’t do it.

But let me move on to the question of Iraq, and obviously on the

basis of the pessimistic NIE that was reported in the press last

week. And you obviously are not up on this and these are just

press reports: You can’t get into all of the details there. But I’d like

to ask you, with respect to Iraq, about your ability to brief the

President objectively on the Iraq issue.

As you know, you voted in support of the President’s decision to

go to war in Iraq. The conflict continues. Obviously, there are a variety of different perspectives on the current situation and, of

course, also what the future portends for that troubled part of the

world.

As part of the CIA Director’s job, you’re going to have to brief the

President and the Cabinet on the situation in Iraq and how well

or how poorly his policies are doing there, and whether the Administration’s goals are going to be achieved or not. Yet as a policymaker, as a Member of the Congress, your decision to invade Iraq

was a policy that you yourself supported and voted for. You voted

for the policy to go into Iraq.

How are you going to handle matters regarding Iraq and other

foreign policy matters that you supported while in the Congress?

It’s pretty hard for a CIA Director to recuse himself, but how can

you tell us, given your past history, that you’re going to give the

President unvarnished truth, despite having a stake in policies you

voted for?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, last week I said, and I will repeat again, I

understand the difference in the jobs. My responsibilities as an

elected Member of Congress on behalf of the people of Southwest

Florida, Florida’s 14th District, require one set of activities. This

job, if I am confirmed, very clearly requires a very different set.

And as I have explained, I totally understand the difference.

What I am going to do is try and improve the product that the

policymakers get, so that the policy is as best-informed as it can

be by an unvarnished, straightforward intelligence product. That’s

my goal if I am confirmed to do that.

Now, in answer to the Chairman’s questions when we started

out, I pointed out that I do believe the DCI, or whatever the equivVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:24 Feb 23, 2005 Jkt 096698 PO 00000 Frm 00180 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\DOCS\96698.TXT SCANNER PsN: SCANNER
177

alent role would be, who is speaking to the President, has that responsibility to be the bearer of all news, not good news or bad

news, that comes legitimately out as a proper, professional job of

creating intelligence product throughout the intelligence community.

Obviously, there will be dissents. Obviously, there will be different views. And I think all of the issues of the formula of what

do we know, what don’t we know, and what would we like to know

need to be clearly presented to the policymakers so that they can

be well informed not only for the policy, but the tasking that inevitably the community will be asked to do.

Senator WYDEN: Well, what is your reaction to these press reports last week with respect to the bleak assessment in Iraq? You

obviously can’t get into all of the details, but I would like to know,

do you think, on the basis of the information that you now have,

which, of course, is not what’s in an NIE, that these bleak reports

are warranted?

Mr. GOSS: Which? I’m sorry?

Senator WYDEN: The reports about the NIE last week and the

situation in Iraq were pretty bleak. I mean, they painted a gloomy

picture.

Mr. GOSS: I’m sorry. I didn’t understand.

Senator WYDEN: You can’t get into all of the details on something

like that, but based on what you know, do you have any reason to

question that NIE?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, obviously I’m not going to comment on a

product I haven’t seen. I don’t know anything about it and, frankly,

I read some of the press reports and have heard some commentary

on it, some opining about it. I would like to reserve judgment on

that until I have a chance to see it myself.

What my interest would be in it is, have we got the information

we need for the policymakers? And if we haven’t got the kind of

information we need, how do we go about getting it for them?

That’s the job of the intelligence community.

Senator WYDEN: My time has expired, but do you know anything

that would indicate that that NIE of last week that painted a

gloomy picture is off base?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, as I said, I don’t know anything about that

NIE. I read in the papers that there was one; I haven’t seen it.

Senator WYDEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROBERTS: I would now like to recognize the distinguished Vice Chairman for any comments he might wish to make.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Congressman Goss.

I want to continue a little bit on Ron Wyden’s theme.

Chairman ROBERTS: It’s 10 minutes, sir. You can have a Rockefeller theme or a Wyden theme, either one.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: There was some of this questioning last week, and there was this question of ‘‘My record is my

record.’’ And I think that you could tell that stirred up a sense of

incompleteness, or unforthcomingness, which was not inaccurate in

the sense of ‘‘My record is my record,’’ but we were looking for

something more.

178

And as I think I also pointed out, independence—which to me is

the most important part of all of this—it’s not how much does Porter Goss know? That’s a lot. What kind of man is Porter Goss? He’s

a good man. Does he have experience with the CIA? Surely he does.

It just comes down to telling truth to power, the independence. You

indicated that you can separate your past life from your present

life.

I think you and I, in private conversations, have indicated neither of us are particularly political, but I’m not sure it’s as easy as

that. I’ve two volumes here that my staff collected, going back over

10 years, of statements. I mean, they’re thick. They’re all political.

They’re not all about intelligence. They go back to some other

things too, but most of them are about intelligence.

And I’m trying to get into your mind a little bit about how it’s

so easy for you, in a position where you have, let’s say, a powerful

Vice President, a powerful Secretary of Defense, a powerful political adviser to the President, powerful people around him who are

accustomed to exercising their power in powerful ways, that you

just suddenly become a different person. And I need to understand

that.

I’ve never been in that position, where I’ve gone from I am who

I am and I can sort of say that because my life has had a kind of

continuum to it, but yours is now potentially probably going to

change quite radically, and so I need to know how you do that.

Now, for example, in the case of Mohammed Atta and the famed

nontrip to Prague, which the Vice President is still referring to and

talking about, ‘‘proving,’’ therefore, relationship between 9/11 and

the Twin Towers, that’s stunning to me, shocking to me. I mean,

I don’t know why he says that, how he says that. It’s not responsible.

Now, you’re the head of the CIA, and he says that, but he says

it publicly, as he does. What do you do about that? You can answer,

‘‘Well, that’s a policymaking question and not a matter for me.’’ On

the other hand, you are the head of the CIA, and he is misusing

intelligence. He is misleading the American people, in my view, in

this Senator’s view, about an incident which didn’t happen, which

the FBI, the intelligence communities can prove, and which I believe you know also.

What do you do with that? Do you go to him? Do you just leave

it lie there?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, you’ve asked a lot of questions, and very good

ones, and they are very hard ones. I will try, if I can answer them

very shortly.

I think very definitely, at any time that anybody with responsibility for delivering product to people in high places is concerned

that that message is fully understood or what that product says,

if there’s doubt in their minds, that it’s incumbent upon that person in the intelligence community—whether it’s the DCI or the

NID or the DNI or whatever it might be—to go to the customer and

say, ‘‘I want to make sure you understand that this is the range

of what we know. This is the range of what we don’t know. This

is the amount of credibility we give this.’’ And put in the caveats,

if there’s any doubt, if there’s a need to go back and do that. I

think that’s appropriate.

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I do not think it’s appropriate for the DCI or the NID or anybody

else in that kind of a position to go and tell a policymaker how to

use product. That would scare me a lot. If you had a very strong

intelligence network with an intelligence person at the top who

controlled the whole community, who was trying to say, ‘‘this is our

product and this is how you must use it,’’ I think that would be

a breach of the faith that we have in how the system is supposed

to work.

There has to be a clear delineation between delivering unvarnished product and allowing policymakers to do their job in the

way they see fit, because, as I have been told many, many times,

policymakers do not make their decisions just based on the input

from the intelligence top person alone, that they get their information from a number of sources and they have a number of reasons

for making judgments that quite often go beyond intelligence. And

I would not want to try and affect that.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: This isn’t a question which would

go beyond intelligence, would it? I mean, if the FBI and the CIA

make their investigations, they look at ticket stubs and where people were, in a sense, it really does come down to you as head of

the CIA as opposed to what the Vice President is saying to the Nation.

Now, you’re not making policy if you go to them and you say,

‘‘Mr. Vice President, I just want you to know, as your Director of

the CIA, that what you are saying is not backed up by intelligence.’’ That’s not making policy. It’s simply saying to him, that

as the person in intelligence and Director of Intelligence, that you

think he’s wrong.

Mr. GOSS: Senator, if I am confirmed and I am the person responsible for the intelligence product of the United States of America, all of those thousands of men and women doing all of that hard

work, all of that investment of the taxpayers’ money, all of the total

machine, which is huge, and you bring that out, and I am the point

of fusion to the decisionmakers, I can assure you I am going to defend that the product is pure and that the understanding is absolutely clear about that.

And if there is a misunderstanding or if there’s a question about

that, I would be very quick to point it out. And if there were no

intelligence——

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: To the Vice President?

Mr. GOSS: To anybody, sir.

If there were no—if I had never myself or caused to have the

community present intelligence to anybody and somebody went out,

no matter who, and said, ‘‘This is what our intelligence community

said,’’ I would certainly find out and advise that person very quickly that that was not this intelligence community.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Would you correct the public

record on the matter?

Mr. GOSS: I would certainly judge the situation at the time. I am

not going to let the credibility of our intelligence community be in

any way affected by the battles that swirl around on the question

of the use of intelligence.

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Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: But then wouldn’t that be the only

way to make sure that that would happen, is by correcting the public record?

Mr. GOSS: It would certainly be one of the ways. I am not sure

public is the only way. Sometimes private words work. Sometimes

other approaches work. I think power of persuasion sometimes is

a good thing. Sometimes there’s just plain misunderstanding.

I don’t believe that something as important and sensitive as intelligence can be, and the machinery we put into it, that the first

thing to do is to go public. I think the first thing to do is to understand, are we damaging in any way our capabilities on how we

handle this. And I always want to pay attention to the capabilities

and how we handle any problem like that.

But I agree, if somebody is abusing the product, I think it is important that the person who is in charge of that product, which

would be the DCI or the subsequent equivalent of that, has a reason to go forward and say, ‘‘That’s not what we said.’’

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Congressman Goss, you indicated

in our last meeting—and there were a number of statements given

that you had made with respect to the Democrats are damaging intelligence. I think you recall my question about John Kerry, what

you said about John Kerry, the article that you wrote about John

Kerry.

Just help me understand how 10 years—this is 10 years of statements, which are partisan—I think this is honest questioning, Porter Goss. I really do. I really do. It gets to the core of what the CIA

has to be.

How does one simply become a different person?

Mr. GOSS: Mr. Vice Chairman, I think I got through my adult life

without giving a partisan speech until about 1988 or 1989. I was

forced to chose a party in order to run under the system we have

in this country, and I was very comfortable with it. Before then, for

the great majority of my life, I don’t believe I had made a single

partisan speech.

Of course, there have been times on partisan issues—I’ve been

on the Rules Committee, as you very well know. We have a lot of

partisan votes, and I had to support those partisan votes in the

Rules Committee.

But on the things that count, the things that are not just the

interplay between the two agendas of the two parties, there’s only

one flag in the room, and it’s that flag back there, and we all know

that.

National security is one of those areas. I am very proud that for

every year I brought my bill in on a bipartisan basis. Even this

year, even though we did not vote it out of committee on a bipartisan basis, we got, I think, five out of eight of the Minority party

voted for it on the floor. So I have worked very hard in that direction.

I have not always succeeded. As you know, in this town, there

tends to be an outside atmosphere that tries to crowd in and affect

these things.

If I didn’t think I could do this and give up public speaking—

which I would be happy to do, frankly, and have enjoyed the past

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few weeks immensely by not doing that—I wouldn’t be sitting before you, because I feel just as strongly as you do about it, Senator.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Thank you, sir. My time is up.

Chairman ROBERTS: I think that I have about 8 minutes remaining, or maybe 7, and then I will be more than happy to recognize

Senator DeWine.

In response to Senator Wyden’s comments, I know that Governor

Kean apparently, in your words, stood up to the President in regards to his efforts, or at least in your opinion, on the 9/11 Commission. But basically the Administration, in considering that, I

think, has taken many forward steps in response to that. I am not

sure that that was the result of Governor Kean.

I would point out that I think the 9/11 Commission took 10 days

to make 41 recommendations. The 41 recommendations were there

encapsulated in a bill introduced by Senator McCain and Senator

Lieberman. It was a marker bill. But basically, it was simply recommendations. It was like the Nike ad: Just do it.

And so, you’d have the recommendations, and if Congressman

Goss would be the National Intelligence Director, it would simply

be, ‘‘Here, Porter, here’s the baby: You rock it,’’ because it isn’t a

comprehensive bill. Right now, the Government Affairs Committee

has that jurisdiction in writing a bill; we have some suggestions for

that bill.

I would say that if there’s an example that Members of this Committee wish to take to stand up to the President, or for that matter

anybody in their party, in terms of leadership, they should get on

the bill that I’ve introduced along with seven other Members. That

is real reform. That is standing up.

Now, that bill has been described as everything from bold and

far-reaching to nutty and radical. So in that regard I’m not sure

that that comparison is really the best one.

Let me just say that in asking staff—I have not asked the witness for this, but in terms of what the Congressman has done, in

September, he and Representative Harman noted that the House

Committee on Intelligence has held no less than 62 hearings on reform just this year alone. Even before 9/11, he was thinking ahead

on the key issues like biological warfare threats, the Department

of Energy, counterintelligence, the NSA, legal authorities.

On Iraq, he has also been an informed and often a very cautious

voice, as I have been, by the way. In September of last year—and

many Members of this Committee—Mr. Goss and Ms. Harman also

laid out their concerns and suggested improvements needed for better intelligence collection.

I know that change comes in various forms, but I would think

a step-by-step process, well thought out, would be the form I would

prefer, at least in regards to change in the intelligence community,

as opposed to 41 recommendations that came out of a 10-day deliberation.

And I am not trying to perjure that effort. I think it’s a great effort and has given us catalyst for reform.

I just happen to have here the Joint Inquiry recommendations.

That was the investigation conducted by this Committee and the

House Committee, and really was the blueprint or the foundation

given to the 9/11 Commission. And there are somewhere in the

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neighborhood here—I have 19 recommendations—one annual report, four one-time reports, three proposed reports, it seemed to me

there was 21 long-range reports.

That was in conjunction with Congresswoman Pelosi and the

Chairman of this Committee at that time, Senator Graham, who is

no shrinking violet in regards to recommending reform.

I suggested at the time that they consider all these—by the way,

these reports, some about, I don’t know, 12 of them, mandatory reports, had to be done by June, and Congressman Goss signed onto

those. We had some discussions about that.

I said, you know, how in the world can anybody at Langley find

any time to do anything if they had to do all of these 19 recommendations and 21 long-term steps and 12 mandatory reports

by June?

And he indicated that something must be done, and so basically,

he is the godfather, if you will, along with three others, Senator

Shelby and Congresswoman Pelosi and also Senator Graham, of

the basic foundations of the 9/11 Report. So to say that he is not

an agent of change or is against reform, I think, is a misnomer.

Let me say that in terms of the use of intelligence, we had hoped

to get to that in terms of phase two, but we find ourselves in the

middle of 9/11 reform and we find ourselves in this nomination,

which we are very pleased to do.

And one of the things that I want to do very badly, along with

the Vice Chairman, is the intelligence on postwar Iraq. Obviously,

we are in the middle of an insurgency. You can call that a war if

you want to. We have not had time to do that, but that would be

the appropriate place to take a look, and we will look, at the National Intelligence Estimate that has been brought up by Senator

Wyden, and we intend to be very aggressive.

I don’t know if raising issues of partisanship subject to opinion

over 10 years is not being partisan as well. I hope to heck nobody

in 10 years takes all the stuff that comes out of my mouth in regards to whether it’s partisan.

I have a reputation around this place of being somewhat obstreperous. I think that Congressional Quarterly, came down and said

I’m pleasantly irascible. Well, I have been 2 hours in traffic this

morning and I am very irascible.

And so, consequently, if they took everything that I have said

over 20 years of service and put it in context and said, Roberts is

this partisan—I remember standing up, shaking a finger at Tip

O’Neill in regards to the Speaker of the House; he told me to take

off my ‘‘Thou shalt not steal’’ button when we thought that the

other side had stolen an election. Was that partisan? You’re darn

right.

If people don’t understand that this is a partisan outfit in the

Congress, they’re either very naive or very disingenuous or have

their head lodged firmly where there is no sun or light.

And so, consequently, I hope to heck that after 10 years somebody could make a statement and then not pick and choose and

say, that’s partisan.

Is that partisan? I think it’s partisan from the other side, and I

think it’s time we quit this.

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The gentleman has indicated he is independent, he will be nonpartisan and he will be aggressive. I think sometimes you have to

take a man at his word. Does this mean that no Member of the

Senate or House in terms of 10 years going back over statements

can serve in any kind of duty in this place?

I’m sorry, my time’s not up.

[Laughter.]

Chairman ROBERTS: But at any rate, I can name you 10 people

in the House, probably 25 people in the House—I had the privilege

of serving there for 16 years with this gentleman—who are very

partisan. I can name you people in the Senate who I think are very

partisan.

This man is not part of that posse. He doesn’t ride with the partisan posse. That’s my considered opinion after knowing him for 16

years and working with him on a weekly basis ever since I have

had the privilege of being on this Committee.

Senator DeWine.

Senator DEWINE: Well, I get to follow up on that. Good.

[Laughter.]

Senator DEWINE: Congressman Goss, good to see you again.

Mr. GOSS: Good morning, Senator.

Senator DEWINE: Good to be back.

For the record, I might add that you and I had the privilege of

working on a bill, which was certainly not a partisan bill at all, and

that was the Ricky Ray bill, where we, I think, did some good for

some folks who had been hurt by the government and certainly had

been hurt, who acquired AIDS because of the blood supply.

And I certainly enjoyed working with you on that, and that certainly was an issue that had nothing to do with politics at all, but

certainly had everything to do about trying to help people. And you

were able to lead the charge on that and I thank you and salute

you for that.

Mr. GOSS: Thank you, sir.

Senator DEWINE: Let me ask this question. Those of us on this

Committee and you on the House Committee really are consumers

of intelligence, as is the Executive Branch.

It strikes me that we are many times in the position of wanting

to have a consensus from the intelligence community, but it seems

to me also that we also have the need to see where the dissent is

coming from in the intelligence community, if there is dissent.

And I bring this up because we have in front of us a number of

proposals that seem to consolidate the power, and I wonder if there

might be a tendency, if these proposals, any of these proposals are

adopted, for the dissent to be stifled or at least for the ultimate

consumer never to see the dissent.

For example, INR, I’ve noticed, a few times has had a different

opinion. At least on one occasion I’ve noticed they were right. Everybody else seemed to be wrong.

Do you want to comment on that, and how we make sure that

as we do these reforms that we make sure that the consumer—the

President, the Congress—at least make sure when we see the consensus that we at least make sure that we still have somebody out

there who is independent and getting an alternative view, and that

we also see that alternative view?

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Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir, I agree with that very much.

I think that there is a system in place now that has not worked

as well as it should have or perhaps as it could have. I don’t know

the answer, whether it’s a should or could, but it has not worked

as well.

I believe that the dissent is a critical part of the process. You

want the differing opinions. You want the competitive analysis.

You want to avoid group-think, things that you’ve pointed out very

well in this Committee study, I think now recognized by the DI, in

a paper that I understand you all are going to get. I mentioned it

last week. It’s a study that’s worth taking a quick look at.

I do believe that it’s very important to have in the reorganization, however it is done, the understanding that the 15 elements

within the intelligence community operate as elements but also as

part of a larger whole, and that they have a responsibility not only

unto themselves, to their own agencies—the FBI, INR, whatever it

may be—but to participate into the network as a whole. That

means we’re going to have to take some mechanical steps like colocation and things like that.

We’ve had some recent disputes. They are continuing to happen.

This process is not going as well as I would like it to go. There is

room for improvement, I will certainly say that. And part of the reorganization that you all decide is going to color very much what

it looks like. But I think we all understand we have to do it.

I think when you have dissent, you have to understand why the

opposing opinions or views were rejected. I think it’s not just simply it was a vote of 3-2. I think it’s, this is because. When we added

the pluses and minuses on the yellow sheet, we got three pluses

and two minuses, and these were the pluses and these were the

minuses, but what we don’t know is this, and if we knew that, that

might tip it.

I think that enrichment process is very important.

Now, not every customer is going to want to know that, but every

customer needs to be able to get to that if they do want to know

it. So I would suggest that it will work two ways.

If you, as a customer on this Committee, want to go behind what

the finished product is that you read, or what the daily SEIB is,

or anything else, and want to get into that, then I suggest you have

the right to do that and should do that, and the community has the

responsibility to come forward and say, look, this is how we weigh

it.

Senator DEWINE: It seems also to me, though, that as a report

is prepared, there is some responsibility in the intelligence community to give us that alternative view, even if we don’t ask for it,

because many times, we don’t know the question to ask sometimes.

You don’t know if there was a minority view unless someone says

it.

Mr. GOSS: That’s absolutely correct, sir.

One of the problems that we have is a system now of trying to

protect our sources and methods in sensitive matters where we use

a system that doesn’t work very well. It’s, you know, how much

credibility can we give this? Do we have high confidence in it?

Well, what does ‘‘high confidence’’ mean? If you say ‘‘high confidence’’ 4 times and it’s only right 3 times, it turns out to be right

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only 3 times, then the next time you hear ‘‘high confidence,’’ it’s not

quite that high.

So I think we do need a different way of telling our consumers—

and I agree that those dissents are important to point out. I mean,

some people say footnotes do it. Actually footnotes don’t do it. Most

people don’t have the time.

Senator DEWINE: Let me ask another question, somewhat related

to this, and that is a problem that we have seen, and that is when

the analysts are so separated from their sources that they do not

have the ability—and we have seen this, in some cases were mistakes were made—they don’t have the full ability to analyze or to

judge how good the sources are. And we’ve seen several specific

cases where they did not really know that, and there was this wall.

Now, I understand sometimes why there is a wall there; you

have to protect your sources. How do you deal with that problem?

How do you protect the source but at the same time make sure the

analyst, who is going to ultimately be giving us the information or

the President of the United States the information, can make a fair

judgment about how good the quality of the source is so he or she

can make that good opinion to us?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, you’ve correctly described a problem which

we obviously need to fix rather quickly. And there’ve been efforts

in the past to try and get the DI and the DO, to use one agency’s

area, working more closely together. There is an esprit de corps in

both of those elements, and it’s a good thing to have, but it’s got

to work more closely.

There are a number of ways that have been suggested. The white

paper that the DI has put out talks about a number of things. If

there were resources, we would like to put some of our analysts out

in the field, working with some of the case officers so that they can

understand better what the problems are out there, and so the case

officer can understand better what it is the analyst absolutely

needs.

But unfortunately, it’s not just—the problem doesn’t just lie

there. It goes beyond that, that we do not have analysts talking to

analysts as opposed to analysts talking to collectors. We find analysts in one agency not talking to analysts in another agency.

Now, hopefully TTIC, in terms of terrorism, is going to deal with

that, but that’s only terrorism. There are other problems out there.

There’s WMD problems, there’s narcotrafficking problems, there’s

racketeering problems, there’s political intelligence, all of those

things that you need to deal with which aren’t covered in the TTIC,

necessarily.

So I think the area you have focused on is the area that is broken in the analytical part, and that it does need attention, and we

have some ideas. And the people involved in that are aware that

we are looking for ideas. So I think we have a will to do a correction, and I believe you will see progress. And if I am confirmed, I

assure you, you have my word on that.

Senator DEWINE: As you’re aware, we passed a few years ago the

Nazi war crimes bill, which called on the CIA to provide additional

new information, to go back in their files, open up the files. That

has worked fairly well. I don’t want to get into great detail about

this today, but there is still information that needs to come out,

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and I would just like your assurance today that—I was the author

of that bill here in the Senate—I would like your assurance today

that you will continue to work with us on that.

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir, of course I will continue to work on that if

I am confirmed.

Senator DEWINE: I appreciate that. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL: Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have no questions

for Mr. Goss. I will just add one comment.

I think the President has chosen wisely in his nomination of Mr.

Goss. But more to the point, I think he has placed a very appropriate amount of confidence and trust in Mr. Goss. I enthusiastically support Mr. Goss’s nomination and look forward to our vote

and getting him to the floor of the Senate and getting him to work.

Mr. Goss, thank you.

Mr. GOSS: Thank you, Senator. I appreciate that very much.

Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Hatch.

Senator HATCH: Mr. Chairman, I echo those sentiments. I feel exactly the same. I’ve watched Congressman Goss for years. I’m

aware of how much he did in a bipartisan way to make the Committee work well over in the House.

And I’ll reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. GOSS: Thank you, Senator.

Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think the most important quality that I’m looking for in a Director of Central Intelligence is somebody who will reliably provide

objective intelligence assessments that are independent of the policy and the political agenda of the White House. Frankly, we

haven’t had that lately in George Tenet. Too often his public statements were exaggerated, shaded, distorted to support policy positions of the White House.

Whether you agree with that or not, there’s a 500-page report of

this Committee that identifies the errors, omissions, exaggerations

of the CIA.

Phase two will get to the question as to what the impact of those

were on policymakers and the policymakers’ statements themselves, but I think even you agree that there were significant failures in the area of intelligence prior to both Iraq and to 9/11. Although you’ve hesitated to use the word ‘‘failure’’ in the past repeatedly, I think that at the last hearing, you were willing to acknowledge that there were significant failures—intelligence failures.

Is that a fair statement?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I said in response to your question—I believe

it was your question—that I agree that there are failures involved

in intelligence and that require fixing, and that is one of the reasons why I seek your confirmation, sir.

Senator LEVIN: And that these significant failures that you are

referring to were failures prior to Iraq and 9/11?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir. There are shortcomings, very definitely, in

both areas. And as I said last week, I believe your report on weapons of mass destruction, your 500-some-page report—much of

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which, sadly, was redacted—was extremely helpful and very informative to me.

Senator LEVIN: Was it troubling to you?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir, in the sense that the depth of some of the analytical problems is as great. I agree with your group-think. And

I would point out, again——

Senator LEVIN: You agree with our group-thinking?

Mr. GOSS: Your group-think. Well, sir, you did have a consensus

product, which I am pleased that the Chairman was able to deliver,

but I don’t suggest that you were the one doing group-think. I suggest that the group-think problem, the failure of competitive analysis—Ms. Harman and I actually wrote a letter in September of

2003, I think—which I’m sure you have; about four pages or so—

which is pretty tough, and it went to some of the same areas.

So I feel that the work that you’ve done and, frankly, the work

that I hope the HPSCI is going to continue to do—and I have every

reason to believe they will deliver a report—will follow up on the

interim letter that Ms. Harman and I wrote with regard to WMD.

Senator LEVIN: One part of that letter said something similar to

what you said this morning, which is that, ‘‘Where public officials

cite intelligence incorrectly, the intelligence community has a responsibility to go back to that policymaker and make clear that the

public statement mischaracterized the available intelligence.’’

In your conversation with Senator Rockefeller, you seemed to

avoid committing yourself to correcting public misstatements by

public officials relative to intelligence in a public way so that the

public misinformation could be corrected. You seemed to avoid saying that public corrections were appropriate. You say you’d like

other approaches first. You want to personally talk to that person

and so forth.

And when there are very public misstatements about what the

intelligence provides, it’s the public that’s been misinformed, and

a private comment to a policymaker doesn’t correct that public misinformation, of which there was a vast amount prior to the Iraq

war.

But let me ask you this specific question: Can you give us some

examples of where, in your judgment, policymakers prior to the

Iraq war mischaracterized the available intelligence? For instance,

were the Atta comments, the meeting in Prague comments, or the

comments relative to uranium, or the comments relative to the use

of aluminum tubes, the vast number of comments characterizing

intelligence that were made by public officials, which went beyond

the intelligence, can you give us an example where you believed

that the public statements of policymakers mischaracterized the

available intelligence prior to the Iraq war?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I don’t believe any public official in a position

of responsibility has deliberately mischaracterized or misled anybody in the United States or anyplace else.

Senator LEVIN: That wasn’t my question.

Mr. GOSS: You asked me if I could give you an example.

Senator LEVIN: I didn’t use the word ‘‘deliberately’’ or ‘‘intentionally’’ or ‘‘purposefully’’ or ‘‘willfully.’’ I just simply said

‘‘mischaracterized the intelligence.’’

Mr. GOSS: I don’t believe——

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Senator LEVIN: I mean, we’re looking for independence here.

Mr. GOSS: Well, I understand.

Senator LEVIN: We’ve got a lot of examples where intelligence

was mischaracterized, not necessarily intentionally—that’s a very

difficult thing to assess—but where it was exaggerated. There’s

many examples which have been out there in the public, and I am

going to go through a few of them with you if you would like.

I just wanted to know whether you’re wiling to acknowledge that

intelligence—can you give us any examples where in your opinion,

this Administration or any of our policymakers mischaracterized,

exaggerated the underlying intelligence?

I’m looking for independence. Can you give us an example to

show that you are willing to challenge the policymakers, that you

are willing to speak truth to power?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I’ve been a policymaker for the past several

years. I don’t know all the intricacies of how the decisions have

been made in the Executive Branch. I have had a perch, from the

Oversight Committee of HPSCI, to look at intelligence.

The intelligence problems that we have looked at lead to questions about, have there been sufficient caveats to warn the users

of the product? That was a question that Ms. Harman and I had

a disagreement on. It’s certainly a question this Committee has

studied very intently and has come up with conclusions about the

difference between the NIE and the white paper and why those caveats were dropped.

It is very clear that there are different needs to present intelligence scenarios, which are admittedly scenarios. They are best estimates. They are not hard fact.

If you are a warfighter, you want a worst-case scenario. You

want to know what is the worst to expect, to protect your troops.

If you are, perhaps, in the diplomatic corps, you do not necessarily

want the worst-case scenario. So if you’re asking me if I know of

anybody who has deliberately mischaracterized or exaggerated intelligence, I don’t believe that’s the case.

Senator LEVIN: That’s not what I asked you. You are, again, responding to a question that wasn’t asked.

Let me give you an example. December 9, 2001, Vice President

Cheney said that, ‘‘It’s been pretty well confirmed that 9/11 alQa’ida hijacker Mohammed Atta did go to Prague and he did meet

with a senior official of the Iraqi intelligence service in Czechoslovakia last April, several months before the attack.’’ Now, that

went significantly beyond what the underlying intelligence said.

Do you agree that went beyond the underlying intelligence? It’s

all been declassified now.

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I don’t believe it all has been declassified

now.

Senator LEVIN: Well, let me read you the declassification, that

‘‘no credible information that the meeting occurred.’’ That’s declassified.

Mr. GOSS: That’s declassified, yes, sir. And I have no reason to

question that summation. What I don’t know is what is behind it.

The classified——

Senator LEVIN: You’ve read—haven’t you read the material on

the Atta meeting as Chairman of the Intelligence Committee?

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Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir, I have.

Senator LEVIN: I’m just asking you a very simple question: Do

you believe the statement that was made on December 9th, 2001,

by Vice President Cheney, that it’s been pretty well confirmed that

that meeting took place, was an accurate reflection of intelligence

that existed at the time, that it’s been pretty well confirmed? I’m

just asking you a direct question.

Mr. GOSS: Is the statement itself that it was pretty well confirmed? If that’s your question, I don’t think it was as well confirmed perhaps as the Vice President thought. But I don’t know

what was in the Vice President’s mind. And I’ve certainly never

talked with him about this. So I don’t know how he came to that

conclusion.

Senator LEVIN: Is that a kind of statement that’s worthy of correction when it’s made publicly?

Mr. GOSS: I would suggest that it probably is something—in that

case, it’s a hypothetical, but if I were confronted with that kind of

a hypothetical, where I felt that a policymaker was getting beyond

what the intelligence said, I think I would advise the person involved. I do believe that would be a case that would put me into

action if I were confirmed. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Rockefeller.

Oh, I’m sorry. Well, I had you first and then Senator Wyden. But

we can reverse that.

Senator Wyden.

Senator WYDEN: Thank you.

Congressman Goss, in your view, what was the most important

recommendation of the Congressional Joint Inquiry on 9/11?

Mr. GOSS: The most important was probably the first one, sir, to

get on with the job of trying to find a way to create a better management of the intelligence community. We suggest it through a

DNI.

Senator WYDEN: Through the DNI?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir.

Senator WYDEN: And did you introduce a piece of legislation to

do that?

Mr. GOSS: Directly, I don’t believe I did, sir.

Senator WYDEN: Well, I guess it makes my point. That would be

an area where somebody could aggressively push for change and

aggressively be a change agent, and you passed on it. I was frankly—if I can finish. I want to give you another chance to answer it.

I was going to be charitable and say, all right, the Congressional

Joint Inquiry is completed in December of 2002. You put in your

bill in 2004. It didn’t really do what the 9/11 Commission talked

about, but at least I think you were moving in that direction. So

it took you a year-and-a-half to really do anything on the subject.

So how does someone like myself, who, A: likes you personally;

B: I’m willing to give you the benefit of the doubt on the question

of partisanship and objectivity—but I’m still looking for somebody

who is aggressively going to be a change agent.

And here’s an example where you had an opportunity to do it,

and you are the Chairman, and it just doesn’t seem to be done. So,

if you could, respond to me on that.

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Mr. GOSS: Senator, you asked me if I had directly put in a piece

of legislation related to the number one recommendation of the

Joint Inquiry. The answer is, I did not put in directly, as I said.

As you did properly point out, I did work to try and find the right

moment, the right way, the right combination to go forward to get

that job done in another bill, which I did, as you properly pointed

out, introduce in our reform bill, which was an announced work

product of the HPSCI for this year.

That statement was made, I believe, probably at the end of 2003,

sir. I am not sure exactly. It would be in the HPSCI records. But

it was an organized way to go after a problem.

And I did this, frankly, after consulting with this Committee, too,

the leadership of this Committee, about how we were going to proceed, and with the former Chairman, Chairman Graham, Senator

Graham. And we did sort of take stock. At one point we had a

meeting to discuss where we were on the 9/11 recommendations.

It was my judgment—and I think it’s been borne out—that having the horsepower and the additional awareness and understanding of the work product of the 9/11 Commission, that we did

set up and there was specific action taken by me and our Committee in the intelligence authorization, of which I am very proud,

to come up with a good Committee, the Hamilton-Kean Committee

and the people who served on it, the commissioners who served on

it, who have done a fabulous job of keeping the issue of reorganization before the public, before the Hill, before the Administration,

before the world, I guess.

And I think that was a pretty good way to proceed. And in the

annals of getting things done around here, speaking as a Congressman, I tend to feel moving in a year-and-a-half to get where we

have gotten is pretty good speed.

I am committed to reorganization. We are going to have it. Once

that reorganization is in place, sir, then it will be a little easier to

do some of the reform you are asking me to commit to. I commit

to improving the product. That is going to take reform.

It’s a little hard for me to be specific about what precisely I am

going to do if I don’t know exactly what the blueprints are of the

network.

So I am asking, if I am confirmed, for a close working cooperation, positive leaning forward, complementary efforts by the oversight committees and the community to make the reform happen

and to make the reorganization happen.

Senator WYDEN: I am going to move on, Congressman, but my

concern remains because I have asked you for example after example. And the very first question at the first hearing you said, ‘‘Well,

gosh, there wasn’t a constituency for the subject. It was hard to get

attention.’’ And I said, ‘‘Well, you are the Chairman. You have the

bully pulpit.’’

And so, in example after example, I will tell you I remain concerned about your willingness to lead, and I am going to ask you

about some other areas where, again, I think you will have an opportunity to lead if you are so inclined.

The President’s proposal to restructure the intelligence community includes a provision that wasn’t recommended by the commission, and I am not sure many people are aware of it. It seeks to

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give the President an exemption from some existing laws on oversight of the intelligence community. And these are the laws requiring that the Congress be kept—and I will quote here—‘‘fully and

currently informed, especially about covert action operations.’’

The President is proposing explicit language that takes the carefully worked out limitations and oversight requirements and only

applies them to the extent consistent with the constitutional authority of the President.

Now, given the very broad interpretation of the President’s authority that we saw in these memos with respect to torture, the

torture memos that finally came to light this summer in which the

Justice Department lawyers argued, in effect, that the President

didn’t really have to comply with the torture laws, what assurance

does this Committee have that language like that advocated by the

President wouldn’t be used to undermine the congressional oversight that the 9/11 Commission says needs to be strengthened?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, is that the amendment to 12333 you are

speaking to?

Senator WYDEN: I am talking about the language that the President has proposed to give the Administration exemptions from the

laws with respect to informing the Congress.

Mr. GOSS: Is that a law that is——

Senator WYDEN: It’s the draft reform bill.

Mr. GOSS: It’s the draft reform bill.

Senator WYDEN: Right.

Mr. GOSS: Senator, that’s going to be your decision on how that

goes, how you want to handle that.

Senator WYDEN: But I want to know if you are for that, because

it seems to me this puts in a huge loophole and a loophole that

goes in the exact opposite direction of what the 9/11 Commission

called for. They want Congress to do a better job of oversight. The

President in his draft bill has now proposed going the other way

and giving Congress fewer tools.

Mr. GOSS: I believe very strongly, Senator, that there should be

strong congressional oversight. I have actually had a hearing at the

point of my transition out of the Committee. I did get instructive

testimony from Governor Kean and from Congressman Hamilton

on that subject, and it’s actually very important.

And I am very glad you asked the question, because their comment went very much to the issue of the dysfunction of oversight

as it is now and the need to fix it, and they both went to some

pains to say they were not picking on your Committee, on this

Committee, or on HPSCI, on our Committee, and they were not

comments about us. They were comments about the system, basically the jurisdictional problem.

And I think that the thing I take away from that, in supporting

the 9/11 recommendations for strong oversight, is that Congressman Hamilton made it very clear, and I think his words to me

were, look, if you don’t get the oversight piece done, if Congress—

this was when I was a congressman—if you don’t get the oversight

piece done, none of the rest of it’s going to work either.

And that’s why I make the strong statement about a forward,

willing, complementary relationship between the Director of National Intelligence and the Oversight Committees. I certainly beVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:24 Feb 23, 2005 Jkt 096698 PO 00000 Frm 00195 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\DOCS\96698.TXT SCANNER PsN: SCANNER
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lieve that we need to have the safeguard for the American people

of strong oversight, and I do not believe it should be nullified by

any shortcuts that have not passed muster with the Congress.

Senator WYDEN: Could you envision any situation that justifies

withholding oversight information from this Committee for an indefinite period of time?

Mr. GOSS: I don’t believe I can think of any right now, but I

would point out that there needs to be work on the statutory requirement when you say this Committee, on the statutory requirement on the gang of eight and which gang of eight are we talking

about.

It turns out there are more than one gang of eight, as I think

you know, which has confounded us a number of times. But there

is one statute, and that would, therefore, preclude some types of information being shared, under the notification process, with all

Members of the Committee. So I don’t want to mislead you in any

way on that.

Senator WYDEN: Just so we are clear—because you mentioned

Governor Kean—Governor Kean did not make any recommendation

at all with respect to congressional oversight along the lines of

what’s in the President’s draft bill, and that’s why I am so troubled

by it.

Let me, if I might, turn to the question of the PATRIOT Act,

with you. As you know, it will be expiring in December of 2005. Do

you support the PATRIOT Act in its current form? Senator Murkowski and I have introduced a bipartisan bill to make changes in

this area. And I would like to know your position generally with

respect to the PATRIOT Act. And then I have a couple of specific

questions about it.

Mr. GOSS: Senator, when I was a Member of Congress, and the

PATRIOT Act was before us, I supported it. And I stated my reasons in the record for doing that. I think it has been useful. I think

we have testimony in this report about the breaking down of the

wall and in other areas.

You asked me about the future legislation or pending legislation.

Obviously I’m going to respectfully demure from that. The job I

seek has no business making comment on legislation that you all

might be considering, in my view, if it comes to policy. And I don’t

think I want to be trying to wear two hats at the same time, sir.

Senator WYDEN: Mr. Chairman, can I ask one additional question on this point? I will be very brief.

Chairman ROBERTS: Certainly.

Senator WYDEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Do you know of instances, Congressman Goss, where the Agency

needed the library lending records provision? This has been very

controversial, as you know, librarians up in arms about this across

the country. Do you know instances where the Agency needed that

provision in its current form?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, we are in open hearing, and I can tell you

that the answer is yes.

Senator WYDEN: Are you open—the Chairman has been very gracious. Are you open to working with myself and Senator Murkowski—as I say we have had a bipartisan bill—on looking at

changes to parts of the PATRIOT Act?

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Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir, of course, if confirmed, in the appropriate role

of the DCI, not as a Member of Congress.

Senator WYDEN: Mr. Chairman, you have been very kind. I

would like the nominee, either when we are in closed session or in

another arrangement that you and Senator Rockefeller could put

together, to have him furnish to us the matter that he felt needed

to be kept secret this morning with respect to the library lending

records.

Chairman ROBERTS: I think we can do that without having a

closed hearing, and I will be more than happy to address the Senator’s request. Has the Senator concluded?

Senator WYDEN: My time has expired. And you have been very

gracious.

Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Rockefeller.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Congressman Goss, you discussed your intelligence community

reform proposal at our last meeting. I didn’t visit that with you.

But there’s one particular provision that troubles me, and perhaps

you can lift me from those troubles. Your June bill, as I understand

it, would amend the current ban against the CIA exercising police

subpoena or law enforcement powers inside the United States by

adding the language ‘‘except as otherwise permitted by law, or as

directed by the President.’’

I don’t have any problem, obviously, with the first part, but the

second phrase, ‘‘or as directed by the President,’’ has been of concern to me and to some others, who believe it would give the President the power to issue secret findings to the CIA, which would

then direct the CIA to conduct covert operations inside the United

States, something which you know is currently prohibited.

Did I get that wrong? Does your legislation place any limitations

on what the President could do to direct the CIA to do intelligence

gathering inside the United States that is traditionally an FBI

thing? Under your proposal, what guidelines would the CIA have

with respect to that matter? Lift that burden from me, if you can,

sir.

Mr. GOSS: Mr. Vice Chairman, you did not get it wrong.

The reason, as I stated last week, that that provision is in that

bill is because we need to address the issue of the PATRIOT Act

and the whole question of the balance between protection and privacy in this country. This report and others, and a lot of the conversation that’s going on now and a lot of the proposals that are

out there for consideration legislatively, tend to blur, some more

than others, the line between the national foreign—and I emphasize ‘‘foreign’’—intelligence program, which is what the 1947 Act,

as you very well know, sets up, and it precludes domestic spying.

Americans don’t spy on Americans; it’s sort of that area.

We are now for the first time blurring that line, and talking

about, because the terrorist beds are thought to be here, nests of

them and so forth, ways to find those people without spying on

Americans or guests in this country. And so we need to craft some

clarity for what is replacing the blurred line.

I put that provision in there in order to encourage that debate.

I gave a number of options that might want to be considered. You

have named them properly. I have never suggested that there

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should be any absence of oversight in that whatsoever. I’m not in

any way suggesting change in oversight, so I’m not saying the

President could do something unilaterally.

What I am saying is we need to understand at what levels we’re

going to allow things to happen in the United States, who’s going

to be in charge, who’s going to be accountable. And I think that’s

very important, not only from the point of view of the efficiency of

getting the terrorists who are here and disrupting them before they

can do dangerous things, but just plain for the whole question of

the protection of our operatives in the field, who are charged to do

this work, so they don’t find themselves with some huge liability

because they violated a civil liberties provision at the same time

they’ve stopped a terrible thing from happening.

I think that’s the responsibility of the Legislative Branch of government to deal with, and that’s why that issue is there. There is

nothing sinister in it.

As I said last week, I totally believe the Central intelligence

Agency should not—repeat ‘‘not’’—have arrest power in the United

States. I have argued that for years. It would ruin the ability of

this country to have a CIA if it did have arrest powers, in my view.

That’s one of the things that distinguishes this democracy from any

other in the world.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: And it’s interesting, because that

does somewhat help me, because the 9/11 Commission does suggest

an approach which I think will cause certain controversies, but

with which I agree—that there needs to be a kind of transnational

approach to a lot of things, including intelligence, on our part.

And so what you are saying is that you just simply did that so

you would get that debate going?

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir. I truly hope that debate is enjoined.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: On October 2, 2003, the House Intelligence Committee received a highly classified briefing from

David Kay, who was the special adviser to the DCI in Iraq on

weapons of mass destruction, as you know, and he updated your

Committee on the progress of the Iraq Survey Group’s search for

evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

Following the briefing, you issued a press statement that stated,

‘‘From the information uncovered to date’’—that’s to be noted—‘‘it

is clear that the threat Saddam presented to the region and to the

world was real, growing, and grave. Further, the brief highlights

the fact that the intelligence regarding Iraq’s WMD was properly

used and is being properly used today. There continues to be no indication that anyone was misled by the intelligence analysis.’’

That’s the end of your quote. The Senate Intelligence Committee

received the same briefing from Dr. Kay as your Committee did.

And I’m puzzled about the basis for your public statements. And

I come back, therefore, to information uncovered to date by the

Iraq Survey Group that made it clear that Saddam Hussein represented a real, grave, growing threat to the United States and the

rest of the world. I do not recall Dr. Kay’s briefing in that highlight, and I would be interested if you could give me your reading

on that.

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Mr. GOSS: Senator, I think it’s pretty simply that Dr. Kay said

this is unfinished business. We don’t know where we’re going. We

do know for sure that we need to keep looking.

I believe Dr. Kay said the right decision was made to go to war.

I believe that Dr. Kay said that Saddam was a very dangerous person. I believe Dr. Kay said we don’t know what happened to the

weapons. And I believe that our concern about the gravity of the

problem is we still don’t know what happened about the weapons.

I think that’s generally the context in which I made those remarks.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: But you’re suggesting that he at

some point suggested that he was on the trail of something?

Mr. GOSS: No, sir. He was doing an investigation. In fact, it got

turned over to Mr. Duelfer. And as I understand, Mr. Duelfer is

going to be making a report soon.

That, frankly, was one of the things we wished to include in our

WMD report on the HPSCI side, which I no longer can speak for,

obviously, but we had hoped to have not only the work of the Commission and your work but the work of Mr. Duelfer to add to try

and give a more accurate and up-to-date snapshot this fall of where

we actually were on the review of the WMD matter.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Just one final question for me, and

I asked you this at our last meeting, and that was about the

HPSCI report, which did not actually come forth. And we discussed

what we called the collection, the analysis, the production, the dissemination of intelligence.

And then I think—and I may be wrong, in which case you need

to correct me—that we also talked about use of, or misuse of, whatever, and in the Senate rules about our Committee, that is a part

of what we studied, and it goes across all of government. There’s

no part of government which is untouched by that.

And for a particular set of reasons we didn’t do that. And as the

Chairman has indicated, we’re going to go ahead and do that, and

I hope we will because I think it’s, kind of, the ball game.

But you indicated that the House rules did not have that flexibility. We looked at them and couldn’t find that. And, therefore, I’m

wondering as to whether or not you discussed that at all, whether

you ever planned to discuss that. We didn’t, because of a particular

reason, but I’m not sure if that applies to you.

Mr. GOSS: Sir, actually we did rewrite the rules of the House a

couple of years ago. What we tried to do was point out where the

jurisdiction of the HPSCI was in the House. And it was basically

anything to do with intelligence, with the intelligence community,

the process of how it works, and those types of things. And it

stopped very abruptly at that point. We have other committees of

jurisdiction who wanted to be clear where that line was, and I

think we came up with a rule in the House that worked pretty

well.

So I was pretty careful about observing that we not get into

other people’s business on that. And it didn’t go entirely smoothly.

There were a lot of people who came to our Committee who felt

that there were things that they needed to know that we claimed

was intelligence and part of the intelligence community product,

but it’s worked pretty well.

196

Now, within the Committee itself you are asking me, did we have

some conversation about this? The answer is, yes, sir. I have got

to be very candid and say that I’m not entitled to talk about what

goes on in a closed session with my other colleagues, who would

rightfully be upset if I did.

I can simply say what I said to you last week in the hearing,

which I think is not violating any confidences of the Committee

work. And that is, as the Chairman, I made the judgment that we

were responsible for the product, not the use of the product. But

I did clarify and say if I felt the product had been misunderstood

or there were needs for the people who delivered the product to

have further conversation for the users of the product, that should

happen.

But we didn’t go that way in our WMD. We went to the question

of sufficiency, because we knew you were going that way here. I

made the point to the Committee—and they seemed to agree with

it, at least some Members did, because this is what we did—that

we would study the sufficiency, that when you asked the question

of why we didn’t know this, and you got the answer there weren’t

enough collectors, and then you ask the next question of why there

weren’t enough collectors, well, because there wasn’t enough

money. Well, why wasn’t there enough money?

When you start asking those why questions and peeling back this

onion, you come to some bedrock sufficiency questions, and those

are the questions which I hope the HPSCI report on WMD will

take up.

Again, I can no longer speak for them, but that would be my

hope, as the former Chairman.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: If the Chairman will indulge me

to just read this particular part of what governs HPSCI: ‘‘the collection, analysis, production, dissemination, or use of information that

relates to a foreign country, a government,’’ et cetera, et cetera, et

cetera, et cetera. So it doesn’t appear, again, to be precluded. It

was just that you were going to wait upon what we did?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, primarily I interpreted the HPSCI role to be

a capabilities committee. It’s a permanent select committee in the

House, as you know. It is a capabilities committee. It is not a policy

committee. International Relations does that over there. I tried to

stay out of there.

Now, obviously, we bridged two other committees to expedite our

jurisdictional problems. I would agree that there’s no prohibition

against it in that language, but I can tell you from the practice and

from my own design, I don’t believe that once we build the car and

deliver it, we should be telling the operator exactly where and how

to drive it, for a very simple reason: I think it’s a little scary if the

person in charge of intelligence is trying to inform policy by telling

the policymakers, this is——

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: This question is not you as CIA

Director, let’s say. This is an oversight function.

Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir. It is an oversight function.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: The use of intelligence would seem

to me to be highly relevant with respect to the build-up of this Iraq

war.

197

Mr. GOSS: I would interpret that to mean having the ability to

provide intelligence for use, for our policymakers. I believe the insufficiency of intelligence has been a big problem, as you have

heard me say a number of times.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Thank you.

My time is up.

Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Hatch.

Senator HATCH: I’ll reserve the balance of my time. Hopefully

this is the last round.

Chairman ROBERTS: I think you have 8 minutes from the previous round, and now 10 minutes, so you have 18 minutes that has

been reserved.

Senator HATCH: I’ll reserve it.

Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Congressman Goss, I sent you some documents over the weekend

relative to the operations of the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Doug Feith. And I don’t know whether you have

had an opportunity to read those documents or not. Did you receive

them and did you have the opportunity to read them?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, thank you. I did receive the documents over

the weekend, with one exception, and I did review them. Some I

read very closely, extremely closely, in fact.

One I did not receive, and it was just because it’s a classified document. I got it over the weekend. I have no storage facilities. And

it was the letter, sir, that was referred to on that footnote. And perhaps we can talk around that.

Senator LEVIN: All right. Relative to that letter, by the way, it’s

an extremely disturbing letter because of the factual inaccuracies,

the factual misrepresentations which were made to this Committee

by Secretary Feith. But since you haven’t had an opportunity to

read it, I’d just simply urge you to read that. And we will lay out

for you in the next 24 hours those misrepresentations for you to

comment on for the record, if you would.

Mr. GOSS: Senator, of course. The letter is a letter from CIA to

Defense, was it?

Senator LEVIN: Yes. And the misrepresentations were what Mr.

Feith represented to the Senate as to what was in that letter, until

we saw it for the first time when it was referred to in that footnote

that is in the 9/11 Report. So what we will provide to you in a classified basis will be what he represented was in that letter to—what

he represented to the Senate was in that letter, comparing it to

what was in that letter, and to ask for your comments for the

record on that.

Mr. GOSS: Senator, you will have those, of course, and I promise

you I will tend to that as quickly as I can get to the place where

I can read a classified memo.

Senator LEVIN: Thank you. I appreciate that.

And relative to the materials you did receive, was there anything

in there that troubled you about the operations of the Feith policy

office?

Mr. GOSS: Obviously there is a lot of material, and it looks like

to me like your Committee did an extraordinary job of going over

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the material. And I am very well aware there were dissenting opinions to the unanimous Committee conclusions on the issues.

There were some things that I, if I am confirmed in this position,

want to be very much on guard about, and that would be the kinds

of concerns about policy sliding into the production of intelligence.

I think you do have to make sure that the watchdogs are watching

on that.

On the other hand, I don’t want to discourage dissent. I do want

to have dissent, and I think that’s extremely important.

And one other area that came to my mind is that I hope that we

will have some guidance. And, frankly, I speak as an American citizen. I hope the Nation will have guidance from the Hill on how

we are going to deal with the relationship between the Secretary

of Defense and the National Intelligence Director, or whatever the

position is. Because it strikes me that the informal program that

we’ve had over the years that’s worked fairly well perhaps does not

provide quite the scope in what I will call informal meetings to get

to some of the issues that are discussed in the packet that you provided me.

I do believe that that’s not just a throw-away comment. Senator

Wyden asked me if I had done anything. One of the things that we

did do a couple of years ago, which I am very pleased with, is we

raised the level of intention to some issues that needed to be adjudicated between the Secretary of Defense and now the DCI, but

whatever the position will be. That is an area that has troubled me

for some time.

Senator LEVIN: Thank you.

To be more specific about some of the matters in those documents, the Senate Intelligence Committee report that you referred

to describes a DOD e-mail that recounts that Deputy Secretary of

Defense Wolfowitz wanted the Department to, quote: ‘‘prepare an

intel briefing on Iraq and links to al-Qa’ida for the SecDef and that

he was not to tell anyone about it.’’

The same e-mail referred—the writer in that e-mail, who was

quoting Wolfowitz—referred to the ‘‘Iraq intelligence cell inside the

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,’’ which is Doug

Feith’s office.

Now, that intel briefing was given to the Secretary of Defense

and then to the DCI. A modified version was given directly to the

staffs of the Office of the Vice President and the National Security

Council with material that the DCI had never seen, including a

chart that was highly critical of the intelligence community for the

fundamental problems with its analysis of the Iraq-al-Qa’ida relationship. It promoted a view of a very close relationship between

Iraq and al-Qa’ida and cooperation in a slide that talked about

‘‘known contacts between Iraq and al-Qa’ida,’’ including a meeting

between Atta and the Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague. That was

called ‘‘a known meeting.’’

I thought it was very different from the CIA view.

Now, that varied significantly with the intelligence community’s

assessment, but was presented to the White House Office of the

Vice President and to the National Security folks.

Now, my first question to you is whether or not—one final point

before my question, which is that DCI Tenet told us in an open

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hearing, in response to my question, that he was not aware of the

briefing to the Office of the Vice President or the NSC staffs until

just a few weeks before when I brought it to his attention and that

he had never had a chance to review the contents before it was provided.

Do you believe it’s appropriate for such rogue intelligence to be

hot-wired directly to the White House without the knowledge of the

DCI and without the opportunity for review by the intelligence

community?

I am not asking you whether the dissenting views are appropriate; we obviously want dissenting views. That’s not the issue.

We want alternative views. The question is, when there is a formal

briefing that is made, an intelligence briefing, an assessment, an

analysis of the kind that you are now familiar with and that was

in this report, when that is being presented to the Office of the

Vice President and to the National Security Council, do you think

it is appropriate that the DCI not even be informed of that so he

could have an opportunity to comment on it?

Mr. GOSS: If appropriate—and this is your question, Senator—I

think it’s appropriate that DCI should always be informed about

anything that is coming from the intelligence community that purports to be intelligence product.

There is a problem here, and it’s one that I hope the reorganization is going to address rather directly. That is, we’ve got 15 agencies. Some of them have Cabinet-level Secretaries that have different discourses with the White House or the National Security

Council on different levels. It is very hard to suggest that everything that everybody has when they go to a meeting is or is not

from the intelligence community. And so I don’t want to try and sit

here and tell you that there’s a hard and fast line somewhere.

I certainly believe that any Administration has the right to go to

its secretaries, the right to go to its agencies in the Executive

Branch, and deal with it as it should. But is it appropriate, if we

are going to have a coordinated intelligence network, to keep the

top man on the intelligence community involved if it’s something

that purports to be intelligence? The answer, sir, is yes.

Senator LEVIN: That’s what George Tenet, when he found out

about it, said was unusual.

Mr. GOSS: I did read the packet, sir.

Senator LEVIN: Do you agree with him?

Mr. GOSS: I agree with him that——

Senator LEVIN: That that was an unusual thing and he was

going to talk to the folks at the——

Mr. GOSS: Sir, I don’t know if it was an unusual point, because

I’ve never been DCI.

Senator LEVIN: All right. All right. Now, there’s another aspect

to this as well, and that is that The Weekly Standard published excerpts from an alleged classified document that was prepared by

Under Secretary Feith.

And the article in The Weekly Standard alleged an operational

relationship between Iraq and al-Qa’ida. In the words of the author, ‘‘The picture that emerges is one of a history of collaboration

between two of America’s most determined enemies.’’ And the artiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 12:24 Feb 23, 2005 Jkt 096698 PO 00000 Frm 00203 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 E:\DOCS\96698.TXT SCANNER PsN: SCANNER
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cle flat out says that Usama and Hussein had an operational relationship.

Now, Tenet said at that hearing I referred to that the CIA did

not clear that document and did not agree with the way the data

was characterized in that document. It was apparently leaked to

The Weekly Standard.

Nonetheless, the Vice President referred to The Weekly Standard

article, saying that it was based on a Defense Department study

that was sent to the Senate Intelligence Committee, and called it

‘‘the best source of information’’ on that issue, being the relationship between al-Qa’ida and Saddam.

Do you believe it is appropriate for a senior Administration official to refer to a leaked classified document, publicly, as the ‘‘best

source of information on the subject’’?

Mr. GOSS: Senator, I have absolutely no way of knowing what

was behind that comment. And I, therefore, can’t shed any light on

it.

Senator LEVIN: You don’t know what was behind it. So that if

there is a highly classified document that is referred to in public,

and it is validated by being called the best source, you are not troubled by that?

Mr. GOSS: If there is a classified document that is released in

public, I am troubled by it.

Senator LEVIN: My time is up. Thank you.

Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Wyden.

Senator WYDEN: Mr. Chairman, I have only one other question.

Let me also say to you, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the

time that you’ve given. I think this is probably going on my fifth

round, and I appreciate it.

Congressman Goss, the last question I had for you is, in your

judgment, what went wrong on the matter of the Iraqi nuclear

threat? As you know, we documented at some length in our Committee the matter of the aluminum tubes. The President of the

United States in his address talked about a mushroom cloud. I

would be interested in your judgment on what went wrong with respect to how the matter of the Iraqi nuclear threat was handled.

Mr. GOSS: There are several threads, Senator. I think that the

first one is the atmosphere that the subject of the nuclear threat

was brought up. I believe that the lesson we learned early in the

1990s when we got into Iraq, discovered that they were much closer to the capability for nuclear weapons than anybody had estimated, that they were perhaps within two years if I’m not mistaken. I want to be careful about what’s classified and what’s not

here.

I think that the pendulum swing from, oh, my gosh, we didn’t get

that one right and that was dangerous led us to look at the worstcase scenario properly, as we did with the other WMD, the chembio, that we were convinced that if our troops went in there, they’d

have to have special protective equipment, which they did, which,

of course, is extremely unpleasant in the circumstances there. So

I think there was an abundance of caution.

Now, there are some other problems, as well, that are very clear.

I think that there was the problem of conventional wisdom, that

when we started getting some of the people who were involved in

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the nuclear program—you’ve asked me to talk—their credibility,

unless they picked up on where we thought the thread had gone,

where the analysts had thought the thread had likely gone given

Saddam’s continued intent and desires and public statements about

rewarding his nuclear people and so forth that were out there, I believe that there was some dismissal of the statements that were

out of line with what we expected to hear in the analysts’ terms.

I think that’s a mistake, and I think it’s been well pointed out

in the problems of conventional wisdom in the work that’s been

done by your Committee and others.

I think that there was some intentional denial and deception by

Saddam. I think that the public statements and the accolades—and

I don’t remember whether he gave ribbons or medals or just words

of encouragement, but it did hint the international media to the

wonderful work being done.

So I think he was trying to at least convince us that he had the

nukes. And we had been convinced before, having been slow before

to get our guard up.

Then there were specific bits of information, which I will not

speak of publicly, but I can tell you, I think this Committee is fully

aware of them, as was ours. There were things that were dug up,

as it were. There were materials that indicated very clearly that

as soon as the watchdogs get out of here, we’re ready to go back

to work in the nuclear area.

I think that, given the threat and given the war on terrorism and

the statements by the fundamentalist leaders that they wanted to

get weapons of mass destruction and deliver them to this country,

seemed to me to be the kind of thing that we should be focusing

attention on. And I think we did. And I think it was an area that

we should have pursued.

Senator WYDEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman ROBERTS: Senator Rockefeller.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will

have just one more question.

The predicate again, Congressman Goss, of all of this is not

about you as a person. It’s not about you as somebody who knows

the business. We haven’t gotten into the business of management

of a large agency, which you haven’t done, but I don’t choose to do

that. It is about the question of independence and I think there’s

sort of two approaches to take to that.

One which has been mentioned here this morning is that we’re

being political. And the other is that it might be that we’re genuinely concerned, because we’re the only ones who can, in a sense,

on behalf of the Senate other than the final vote, is to vet you.

And the questions virtually all have been in the same line—the

independence of you. There has been, as far as I know, one other—

at the very beginning, as you know, I said, and we talked about

it in my office, that nobody who has been in politics, particularly

recently, should do this. And looking back, I think that the President’s father, obviously, for I don’t think quite a year, but he was

head of the CIA

Mr. GOSS: Yes, he was.

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Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: One could argue about Bill Casey

because he wasn’t in the Congress, but he had worked with the

RNC and that kind of thing.

But, for the most part, people have not come from that arena.

And I think that’s a fairly genuine basis from which to ask the

kinds of questions that we’re asking.

And so, let me just ask one final thing. During the kind of hearings which we had some of and need to have more of about pressure on analysts in the Central intelligence Agency, it was quite interesting. There was Richard Kerr, who had been a former Deputy

Director. And he had some things to say.

And then there was, for me more interestingly, the CIA ombudsman who indicated that the pressure on the analyst to come up

with certain kinds of products—this is outside. This is across the

great divide. You know, we don’t want to go one way from analysis

to policy. Well, then, we don’t want to go the other way from policy

to analysis. And that’s a fair trade.

And he said that in his 32 years in his position he had never

seen so much hammering on the part of the Administration on analysts. That’s a severe statement. I don’t happen to know him, so I

can’t judge whether he would make a statement which was offbase, but I don’t think he would have that position.

George Tenet himself indicated that there were people who came

to him with these concerns. So the question I guess I would like

to ask you is, what would you do as CIA Director? How would you

go about the business, to whatever extent you could, of protecting

your analysts from pressure, from whatever kind of Administration

on whatever kind of subject in the business of intelligence, which

is more delicate, more sacred. Because it’s so secret, it’s also so

much more volatile.

Mr. GOSS: The, by analysts, Senator, I’m going to take your question to mean across the community.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Yes.

Mr. GOSS: Because we’re talking generically, I believe. It’s not

just the Agency you’re talking about.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Yes. The Agency is what I’m talking about.

Mr. GOSS: Okay, I’ll answer for both if I can.

What I would try and do, in fact what I would do if confirmed,

is to set up a very clear direct line between the analysts’ management and the top office, which would presumably be whatever the

top office running CIA for them, or the top office of any of the other

agencies that have analytical capability where they fall in line to

the overall Director of National Intelligence or whatever we’re

going to call that person. So there are two stops at least other than

the normal management.

And anybody who feels pressed as an analyst—whether it’s the

pressure of the time, it’s the pressure of the questions, it’s the complexity of the problem, it’s the pressure of not having enough information, whatever it is, those pressures need to be understood in

the product itself and undue outside influence has got to be kept

out of it; there’s no question about it.

I believe we have a system like that that can be used and enforced.

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I’ve read very carefully what Senator Levin sent over. I read the

deliberations of this Committee, which were pretty exhaustive, on

the subject. I read the dissenting views, which raised the concern

which you have echoed. I agree it is an area for watchdogs. It is

an area where you’ll have to have clear access to the top.

And let me tell you how personally I feel about that, if I may,

very briefly. That is, if I am confirmed, I do not want to be the person standing in front of the President of the United States or anybody even close to that rank with information that I do not have

full confidence in. And I am not going to have full confidence in information that has been contaminated by policymaking.

So I think I have a double reason to do it—one, because of the

community; and the other because I don’t want to be put in a position of not delivering the product I say I’ve got.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: And I understand that statement.

I think it’s a very good one.

Mr. GOSS: Thank you.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: My question was: How would you

set about to try to—I mean, obviously, what has worked up to this

point has not quite, at least in recent years, worked sufficiently.

Mr. GOSS: Sir, you can’t isolate the analysts. There has to be

some kind of co-location. There has to be some type of interface

with, as we’ve pointed out, with the collectors. So you run the risk,

at any point, that you start getting product that’s as pure as you

can get it, but getting it as good as you can get it, of drawing that

line.

And all I can suggest is that you put on the door the sign that

says if you think you’re being pressured or somebody’s interfering

with your product unduly, you are invited to call your friendly director.

And I don’t mean that flippantly. I think it’s that kind of level.

It’s a little bit like our whistle-blower law or our 1-800 number we

use. If you’ve got a problem with this, call your Intelligence Committee. That’s our job to oversee this. If there’s an abuse we want

to know it.

I’ve made that work fairly successfully as the Chairman of

HPSCI, actually.

Vice Chairman ROCKEFELLER: Thank you, Congressman Goss.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GOSS: Thank you very much, Vice Chairman.

Chairman ROBERTS: During our two days of open hearings, all

Members have had an ample opportunity to ask questions. The

nominee has been, I think, very forthcoming and very generous

with his time, as have Members. We are about at the 8th hour—

3 hours by the current three Members, plus private meetings. We

have created a thorough record here, it seems to me. And we have

expressed our concerns to Mr. Goss, and he has given us important

commitments.

The intelligence community needs leadership, and the need is

now. It seems to me it’s time to move the nomination. In that regard, we have noticed a business meeting for tomorrow for this

purpose. I look forward to a good turnout.

Will the nominee make himself available today if any Member

would like a private meeting?

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Mr. GOSS: Yes, sir, of course.

Chairman ROBERTS: Mr. Goss, to refer back briefly to a question

from Senator Wyden, I ask you now, would you support any effort

on the part of anybody in the Executive, or for that matter—and

I can’t imagine this, in the intelligence community—of weakening

the congressional oversight of the intelligence community or activity?

Mr. GOSS: No, sir.

Chairman ROBERTS: I have a note here that Senator Levin wants

to ask an additional question. I will recognize him for that purpose.

Senator LEVIN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Congressman Goss, as reported by the Senate Intelligence Committee Report, the intelligence community report or assessment relative to the question of whether or not Saddam Hussein had

trained al-Qa’ida operatives in chemical and biological warfare,

said, in the classified form, that the sources relative to that were

of varying reliability and sometimes contradictory. The National

Security Adviser said that ‘‘we know that there was training of alQa’ida in chemical and perhaps biological warfare.’’

Would you agree that that statement, that we know that there

was training of al-Qa’ida in chemical and perhaps biological warfare, goes beyond the intelligence which said that reports thereof

come from sources of varying reliability and are sometimes contradictory? Would you just agree that that statement of the National Security Adviser did not reflect the underlying intelligence?

Mr. GOSS: Sir, if that were the totality of the issue or the picture,

I would feel obliged, I think, if I were confirmed as DCI, to ask the

National Security Adviser what exactly was the basis for the statement.

Senator LEVIN: If that were the totality?

Mr. GOSS: If that were. I’m not sure that is the totality, because

I will tell you, totally honestly, I’m not sure right now what’s what

with the training, but I honestly believe there was training. Again,

this is getting into classified stuff. And I’ll be happy to talk to you

privately about why I believe that.

Senator LEVIN: I understand that.

My question is, whether or not if that were the totality, that the

underlying intelligence said—if—I’m giving you this question—it

says that the report of training was based on sources of varying reliability, which are sometimes contradictory, if that’s the underlying intelligence, and if the statement made by the policymaker,

as we know there was training, would that be a fair characterization of the underlying intelligence, if that’s the totality?

Mr. GOSS: I would say that the source description of that situation that you’ve outlined, the totality is we’re not sure of our

sources, would not qualify me to say, as the DCI, that we know.

I would qualify it and caveat it.

Senator LEVIN: All right. Now, in your judgment, when the National Security Adviser said, on September 8, 2002, that, ‘‘We do

know that there have been shipments going into Iraq of aluminum

tubes that are really only suited for nuclear weapons programs,

centrifuge programs’’—and that is an exact quote—did that accurately reflect the underlying intelligence?

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Mr. GOSS: Senator, I have no idea what intelligence the National

Security Adviser had received.

Senator LEVIN: You know what the estimates were. I’m asking

you, from what you know of the intelligence relative to that issue,

did that statement, in your judgment, reflect the underlying intelligence accurately? That’s all I’m asking you.

Mr. GOSS: On September 8 of 2002, I don’t honestly remember.

I do know that my assessment of the question of the suitability of

those tubes for anything other than a devilish nuclear purpose has

changed as information has changed. I can’t tell you the exact time

line.

And I do know there were dissenting opinions. What I can’t tell

you is when I knew there were dissenting opinions. So, I’m trying

to answer your question faithfully and say that I just don’t know

when that cognizance came to me. But if I knew that there were

other possibilities for dual-use equipment, I would say so, yes. I

would certainly say so.

Senator LEVIN: And if at the time the intelligence indicated that

there were other uses that were possible, that then to state that

we know that they are really only suited for nuclear purposes

would be an exaggeration in your judgment?

Mr. GOSS: Sir, in a hypothetical sense, that would be an exaggeration if that were the totality. But in a specific case, in the past,

I simply do not know what people knew or what other information

they had.

Senator LEVIN: All right.

You’ve indicated, Congressman Goss, that national security is

one area where bipartisanship is essential. And I think you include

in that intelligence estimates. And I couldn’t agree with you more.

We just unveiled a portrait of Arthur Vandenberg from my home

State of Michigan who surely led the way in that regard.

We’ve seen over the decades too many instances where intelligence has been manipulated or politicized. Secretary of Defense

McNamara used classified communication intercepts to push for

passage of a Gulf of Tonkin resolution, which was then used by

President Johnson as the legislative foundation to expand the war

in Vietnam.

Bill Casey as CIA Director—and here George Shultz’s book just

lays out what really amounts to an indictment but, in any event,

a case that during the Iran-Contra period, the CIA Director, and

here I’m quoting from the Iran-Contra Report in this case, not from

Secretary Shultz’s book, but from the Iran-Contra Report, a bipartisan report, said that that Director Casey ‘‘misrepresented or selectively used available intelligence to support the policy that he

was promoting.’’

We saw much too much shaping and exaggeration of intelligence

prior to the Iraq war. And we’ve got to do everything we can, in

my judgment, to try to prevent that from happening. There’s been

too much of it in the past. It’s not limited to Republican or Democratic Administrations. And I’m just wondering if you would comment on that.

Mr. GOSS: Sir, I agree with you on that. And I’m guilty, too, as

I have said, of slipping into some partisan comments in areas of

national security. And I’m sorry that I have.

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And it’s usually because I’ve had to respond to a question or a

situation which I considered provocative in order to defend what I

think needed to be defended on behalf of national security.

My judgment’s not perfect. I’ve been wrong, and certainly I regret sometimes being sucked into those things. I do understand the

need to get out of the debate. And I do understand the need, if I’m

confirmed, to get into the management business. And I do understand the need to make sure that there’s not only no partisanship,

but that we keep the politics out of it.

Senator LEVIN: Thank you.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much, Congressman.

Chairman ROBERTS: Are there any other questions by the Members?

Not wanting to beat a dead horse, or split the shingle—I’m not

referring to you, sir—did numerous statements by Members of this

Committee, or the House Committee, or any other Member of Congress, just as declarative, just as aggressive, in regards to those

concerns that have been raised here today by Members of Congress, without the benefit of the WMD report that was done by this

Committee, did that represent an exaggeration of the use of intelligence?

Mr. GOSS: Sir, I think that the WMD report done by this Committee, the conclusions you’ve received, were the right conclusions.

I would have supported those conclusions, had I been on this Committee.

Chairman ROBERTS: Well, I think the conclusions represented a

shotgun—no, a flashlight of truth, if you will, that spread a broad

light not only on those in the Executive, but those in the Legislative. And I can cite you statements made by myself and others on

this Committee and the House Committee, and by many Members

of Congress that were very declarative, very assertive, very aggressive, and all pertaining to the concerns that have been raised here.

And we were wrong.

Now, I didn’t exaggerate it. I stated what I thought to be true.

But the intelligence that was provided was not accurate. And so,

consequently, when we get to the use of intelligence, as to whether

it’s exaggerated or not, or whether I felt pressured or whatever—

and I’m not going to get into all that again—I think that’s a consideration.

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I’m not sure that you as the CIA Director or the National Intelligence Director would feel comfortable, however, if somebody made

the statement on the floor of the House or the Senate or in public

or on television that you would immediately feel an obligation to

come to them and say, ‘‘Senator Roberts, I think you’re wrong.’’ You

may feel that way, but you wouldn’t have any time to do anything

if you were trying to correct Members of Congress when perhaps

they exaggerated anything.

With that, this hearing is concluded. I thank all Members for

their participation, and I thank the witness for his patience and

perseverance.

Mr. GOSS: Thank you for your consideration, Mr. Chairman, Mr.

Vice Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., the hearing adjourned.]

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