RECORD IMPOUNDED 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3884-22 

S.G., 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

D.R.M., 

 Defendant-Respondent. 

__________________________

Argued March 20, 2024 – Decided September 20, 2024 

Before Judges Gummer and Walcott-Henderson. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Gloucester County, 

Docket No. FV-08-1277-23.

Robert M. Bernardo argued the cause for appellant 

(South Jersey Legal Services, Inc., attorneys; Robert 

M. Bernardo, Cheryl Turk Waraas and Kenneth M. 

Goldman, on the brief). 

Respondent has not filed a brief. 

The opinion of the court was delivered by 

WALCOTT-HENDERSON, J.S.C. (temporarily assigned). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3884-22

 Plaintiff S.G.1 appeals from an April 24, 2023 order dismissing her 

application for a final restraining order (FRO) against her former paramour, 

pro se defendant D.R.M., finding that although plaintiff established defendant 

had committed predicate acts of domestic violence, plaintiff had failed to 

demonstrate an FRO was required because she was in immediate danger or the 

FRO was necessary to prevent further abuse. See generally Silver v. Silver, 

387 N.J. Super. 112, 128 (2006) (providing standard for issuance of an FRO 

under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to 

-35). Plaintiff also appeals from a July 28, 2023 order denying her motion for 

reconsideration. Defendant did not submit a brief on appeal. We reverse. 

 Plaintiff and defendant dated for approximately seven months. They did 

not reside together and had no children or property in common. Intending to 

celebrate her admission to a graduate school, plaintiff picked up defendant 

from the motel room where he had been living at the time. Plaintiff brought 

defendant to her home where they celebrated by consuming alcohol and 

listening to music in the living room. Defendant later assaulted plaintiff, 

causing her physical injuries. 

1

 We use initials to protect the confidentiality of the parties pursuant to Rule 

1:38-3(d)(3). 
3 A-3884-22

The day after the hours-long brutal assault, plaintiff applied for a 

temporary restraining order (TRO) against defendant, alleging, among other 

things, defendant had grabbed her by the neck several times and had covered 

her nose and mouth. Plaintiff also alleged that defendant had threatened to kill 

her multiple times, had pulled her off the bed onto the floor and then thrown 

her back on the bed, ripped her wig off, and pulled at her hair. Plaintiff 

alleged that she was naked for the entire time and that after about four hours, 

defendant demanded that she take him home to the motel. Plaintiff alleged 

that the assault continued while defendant was in her car. Plaintiff further 

alleged defendant excessively and obsessively called her. The TRO was 

granted on March 9, 2023. 

On March 22, 2023, plaintiff amended her complaint seeking the 

restraining order. Plaintiff's amended complaint contained additional details 

about the assault, including that defendant had: whipped plaintiff with a string 

of lights; strangled her; lifted and thrown her by the neck onto the bed, causing 

her neck to crack; pinned her to the bed, gripping her hair and hitting her head 

up and down from the bed; licked all over her face; and pried her eyes open 

and blew aggressively into them. Plaintiff also alleged that she had lost 
4 A-3884-22

consciousness several times as a result of the strangling. Plaintiff certified that 

the information she included in the original and amended complaints was true. 

 On April 24, 2023, plaintiff and defendant testified before the Family 

Part judge during their FRO hearing. Plaintiff testified that when they arrived 

at her home, they "sat at the table for a little bit . . . opened up [their] drinks, 

and [] were just talking," hanging out and drinking. At some point, however, 

defendant began to question plaintiff about her male friends, asking when she 

had last contacted one of them. Plaintiff testified that when she told defendant 

she had wished the unidentified male friend "happy birthday" one month prior, 

defendant "got really mad . . . . [a]nd [] tried to snatch [her] phone," before 

taking the phone and searching through it. Defendant called one of the male 

contacts from plaintiff's phone, but plaintiff disconnected the call. The parties 

then consumed additional alcohol. 

Plaintiff further testified that she went to the bedroom, changed into an 

"intimate outfit," and invited defendant into the bedroom where they began "to 

engage in sexual contact," but then defendant stopped and instead began an 

hours-long attack, physically assaulting her while she was naked. 

Plaintiff explained that defendant had struck her about the face and 

body, pinned her to the floor and strangled her, covering her mouth, and 
5 A-3884-22

holding and squeezing her neck. Defendant threatened plaintiff that he was 

going to kill her. When she was able to get up and retreat into the bathroom, 

defendant followed her and sprayed water in her face. He ripped her hair piece 

from her head, causing hair loss, and asked her "why do you have this on?" 

Plaintiff further testified that when she eventually got out of the bathroom, 

defendant barricaded her in the bedroom with him, where he tossed plaintiff 

from the floor to the bed and banged her head against the bed, whipped her 

with decorative string lights while she was on the floor, and pried open her 

eyes and blew into them aggressively. Plaintiff identified photographs she had 

taken the morning after the brutal assault, depicting red marks on her neck, 

swelling to her face, bruises and rug burns on her arms, and marks on her torso 

that had been caused by the string lights defendant had used to whip her. 

Plaintiff also identified a photograph depicting the broken sink in her 

bathroom, which she alleged defendant had damaged during the assault which 

took place in the bathroom. The photographs were admitted into evidence. 

On cross-examination, plaintiff recalled that the only thing she 

remembered defendant saying was that he was going to kill her and that she 

needed to answer his questions about the phone—and her contact with another 
6 A-3884-22

man—and that she believed she had answered those questions, "but he [had] 

said [she] didn't." 

The ongoing and varied assaults in the bedroom and bathroom lasted for 

close to five hours until defendant asked plaintiff to take him home. Plaintiff 

believes she lost consciousness—maybe more than once—during the lengthy 

time defendant had barricaded her in the bedroom with him. 

 Hours after the assault began, defendant asked plaintiff to take him back 

to the motel, and she agreed. Plaintiff testified that as she was getting into the 

driver's seat of her vehicle to drive defendant to the motel, defendant pulled 

her out and climbed over the driver's seat before sitting in the passenger seat 

Plaintiff drove defendant back to the motel. When they arrived, defendant 

refused to get out of the car. For about another hour in the car, defendant 

shouted at her and grabbed her. Defendant took plaintiff's glasses from her, 

squeezing them until a lens popped out, and punched the car ceiling and 

dashboard, ripping the skin on his knuckles and leaving blood marks on the 

ceiling. Defendant eventually exited the car. 

 Plaintiff testified that she went to the hospital the next day. Plaintiff had 

taken photographs of her injuries which were admitted in evidence at the FRO 

hearing. Plaintiff testified that she was "fearful of the future and [her] life, if 
7 A-3884-22

[defendant] would have contact with [her]." She noted "the threat that he 

made" to kill her, claiming she felt "that his actions [we]re unpredictable." 

She also expressed concern for her "small children." 

 Defendant testified that plaintiff had picked him up and taken him back 

to her house after stopping at a liquor store. At the house, they both consumed 

alcohol and talked, eventually discussing her contact with a male friend. 

According to defendant, earlier that day, he was "just stressed out from [his] 

job, because [he] was being racially profiled, [and] racially harassed at work." 

Defendant further explained that at the time he was staying with a coworker 

and "there [were] a lot of things . . . said to [him] that upset [him]," and other 

people living in the motel had a lot of "like weapons and everything on the 

table" that made him feel unsafe. Defendant admitted that he called out of 

work on March 8, 2023—the day of the assault—and made plans to meet up 

with plaintiff. Defendant admitted that he had smoked marijuana and was high 

prior to consuming alcohol with plaintiff. He testified that plaintiff had 

initially allowed him to look at her phone and that he became angry when she 

tried to hide the phone. Defendant admitted that he had snatched the phone 

from plaintiff and called a number via Facebook, and that a "guy [] answered 
8 A-3884-22

the phone. . . . [a]nd before [he] could even get a word in, [plaintiff] snatched 

the phone, so quickly and hung up the phone." 

Defendant also testified that plaintiff had gone to the bathroom to 

change and came back out wearing "panties and a black like tank top, halter 

top, or something . . . [a]nd that's when she started to come onto [him]." 

Defendant testified that he had not had sexual intercourse with plaintiff, but 

"that's pretty much like all [he] remember[ed] about . . . the situation." 

Defendant testified that on the car ride back to the motel from plaintiff's 

home, he was frustrated because he was talking to plaintiff, telling her that he 

did not want their relationship to end and that he wanted to work it out. He 

admitted that during the car ride, plaintiff's glasses "had kind of fell towards 

[his] left foot" and when he picked them up to give them to plaintiff, she had 

tried to take them from him and that's when "she said the lens or something 

popped out." Defendant admitted that he had punched the top of the roof of 

the car out of frustration, injuring his hands and drawing blood, which dripped 

down from his hand. 

 In an oral decision, the court found plaintiff's testimony regarding the 

assault credible and concluded plaintiff had established that defendant had 

committed the following predicate acts of domestic violence enumerated in the 
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PDVA: assault, terroristic threats, false imprisonment, criminal mischief, and 

harassment. See N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(3)(a)(2), (3), (6), (10), and (13). The 

court did not find the predicate act of sexual assault because plaintiff did not 

"testify that there was sexual contact against her will." 

The court denied the FRO, finding plaintiff had not established 

defendant would continue to have contact with her and, consequently, had not 

established a need for protection going forward. The court found significant 

that 

at no time during her testimony did . . . [plaintiff] 

testif[y] that there was any history of [d]omestic 

[v]iolence. And she said it very calmly as she 

testified. There is no evidence in her demeanor or her 

body language that indicated that she had any fear 

whatsoever of the defendant. She was not upset at any 

time during her testimony, or didn't even appear 

nervous. 

The court addressed the applicable statutory factors under N.J.S.A. 

2C:25-29 for determining the necessity of the FRO, stating: 

I've considered that this is a serious [a]ct of [d]omestic 

[v]iolence that occurred and committed by the 

defendant. But Silver v[.] Silver requires that the 

plaintiff also prove[] a need for protection going 

forward. The only evidence for the need for 

protection going forward is the plaintiff's testimony 

that she's afraid of the defendant. Of course, she's 

afraid of the defendant after what occurred. 
10 A-3884-22

The court concluded: 

[T]here is a lack of evidence that the defendant will 

continue to try [to] have contact with the plaintiff in 

the future . . . . The parties were in a seven-month 

relationship. They do not have any children in 

common. They don't own property in common. 

There's no history of [d]omestic [v]iolence in this case 

. . . . There's no evidence of a history of the defendant 

having contact with the plaintiff after being told not 

to. 

In considering the statutory factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(13)(a), the 

court addressed factor one, finding that there was no previous history of 

domestic violence. Of the six factors, the court determined that factors two 

and four were relevant: "the existence of immediate danger to person or 

property," and the best interest of the victim. As to factor two, the court 

stated, "I see no evidence of immediate danger, at this time." The court further 

stated "that the act of [d]omestic [v]iolence occurred on March 8th, 202[3]. 

The [r]estraining [o]rder was obtained on March 22nd, where there's no 

testimony about any attempt by the defendant to contact the plaintiff after the 

incident that occurred on March 8th." In considering the fourth factor—the 

best interest of the victim—the court concluded that it "saw no reasons why 

[plaintiff] would need to continue to have any contact with the defendant." In 
11 A-3884-22

an April 24, 2023 order, the court denied the FRO and dismissed the complaint 

and the TRO. 

Plaintiff moved under Rule 4:49-2 for reconsideration of the denial of 

her application for the FRO, arguing that "any one of the acts of domestic 

violence – of egregious domestic violence that were committed against [her] 

would have been sufficient enough for the FRO in and of themselves." 

Plaintiff asserts that she was scared and currently fears the defendant because 

of the brutal assault and the fact that he knows where she lives. Defendant, 

although served with the motion for reconsideration, did not file a responsive 

brief or appear for the hearing. 

In a July 28, 2023 order, the court denied plaintiff's motion for 

reconsideration, finding no error in its decision denying the FRO essentially 

for the same reasons stated in its oral opinion. The court found the parties did 

not have any need for future contact with each other, they had no children or 

property in common and no dependency on one another, and there was a lack 

of any evidence of a history of domestic violence between the parties. 

Plaintiff moved for a stay of the court's denial of the FRO, which was also 

denied. The court stated, 

[t]here's nothing in the papers about any contact by the 

defendant, to the plaintiff, since the entry -- since the 
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hearing back in April. Which might be relevant to 

whether a stay should be granted. And -- so without 

sufficient evidence . . . . I find that it would be 

inappropriate to reinstate a temporary order that had 

already been adjudicated. 

Plaintiff appealed from the orders denying the FRO and the motion for 

reconsideration. Plaintiff then moved for a stay of the court's order denying 

the FRO. On October 12, 2023, we granted plaintiff's motion for a stay. 

Plaintiff argues the court erred as a matter of law in finding that the 

commission of multiple predicate acts of domestic violence did not establish 

the need for a FRO. Additionally, plaintiff maintains that the court also 

"erroneously read the amended TRO date as the initial TRO date and reasoned 

that because the defendant had not been in contact with [plaintiff] between 

March 9, 2023 and March 22, 2023, [plaintiff] did not need protection." 

Our review of an FRO is generally limited. C.C. v. J.A.H., 463 N.J. 

Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 2020). In matters involving domestic violence, our

Supreme Court has held the findings of a trial court "are binding on appeal 

when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. 

Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998) (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs. 

Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). "Appellate courts accord particular 

deference to the Family Part because of its 'special jurisdiction and expertise' 
13 A-3884-22

in family matters." Harte v. Hand, 433 N.J. Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) 

(quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412-13). Deference is further justified because 

"the trial judge 'hears the case, sees and observes the witnesses, and hears them 

testify,' affording it 'a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating 

the veracity of a witness.'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (quoting 

Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412). However, "a judge's purely legal decisions are 

subject to . . . de novo review." C.C., 463 N.J. Super. at 429; see also H.E.S. 

v. J.C.S., 175 N.J. 309, 329-31 (2003). 

 The entry of an FRO under the PDVA requires the trial court to make 

certain findings, pursuant to a two-prong analysis. See Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 

at 125-27. Initially, the court "must determine whether the plaintiff has 

proven, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that one or more of the 

predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a) has occurred." Id. at 125. 

Once a court finds a predicate act under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-19(a) occurred, 

"the judge must determine whether a restraining order is necessary to protect 

the plaintiff from future danger or threats of violence." D.M.R., 467 N.J. 

Super. at 322. This determination must be made based on a totality-of-thecircumstances analysis. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 126-27; see also N.J.S.A. 

2C:25-29(b) (stating "the court shall grant any relief necessary to prevent 
14 A-3884-22

further abuse"). The inquiry is necessarily fact specific, Silver, 387 N.J. 

Super. at 127-28, requiring consideration of the following factors under 

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a): 

(1) The previous history of domestic violence between 

the plaintiff and defendant, including threats, 

harassment and physical abuse; 

(2) The existence of immediate danger to person or 

property; 

(3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and 

defendant; 

(4) The best interests of the victim and any child;

(5) In determining custody and parenting time the 

protection of the victim's safety; and 

(6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection 

from another jurisdiction. 

[N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1)-(6).] 

Because the judge found defendant had committed predicate acts against 

plaintiff, defendant has not offered any challenge to that finding, and we are 

satisfied the finding is supported by substantial credible evidence, the primary 

issue presented on appeal is whether the court erred in denying the FRO based 

on its determination that plaintiff had not established the second prong of 

Silver – the FRO was necessary to protect her from "immediate danger or 
15 A-3884-22

further acts of domestic violence," 387 N.J. Super. at 128 – because she had 

not demonstrated "a need for protection going forward." 

In addressing this issue, we consider that "[a]lthough this second 

determination . . . is most often perfunctory and self-evident, the guiding 

standard is whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the 

factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25–29[(a)(1)-(6)], to protect the victim from an 

immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." N.T.B. v. D.D.B., 442 N.J. 

Super. 205, 223 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 127). 

In A.M.C. v. P.B., we held: 

[w]hen the predicate act is an offense that inherently 

involves the use of physical force and violence, the 

decision to issue an FRO "is most often perfunctory

and self-evident." But even when the predicate act 

does not involve physical violence, the trial court must 

still evaluate the factors in N.J.S.A. 2C:25–29 a-(1) to 

-(6) to determine whether an FRO is warranted to 

protect the victim from an immediate danger or to 

prevent further abuse. 

[447 N.J. Super. 402, 417 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting

Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 127).] 

We also considered whether a court may "properly refuse to issue 

restraints" despite "finding that a defendant committed one of the predicate 

acts listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)." Id. at 414. Citing A.M.C., plaintiff 

argues that "when the predicate act is an offense that inherently involves the 
16 A-3884-22

use of physical force and violence, the decision to issue an FRO is 'most often 

perfunctory and self-evident.'" Id. at 417 (quoting Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 

127). 

In A.M.C., a Family Part judge denied the plaintiff-wife an FRO even 

though the judge found that her "husband . . . physically assaulted her on two 

separate occasions over a three-week period." Id. at 405. The judge 

determined an FRO was not necessary because plaintiff had "'failed to 

establish even a mere likelihood that the parties would continue to interact in 

the future' or that [the] defendant posed a threat to her." Id. The judge noted 

the relatively short duration of the marriage, the fact that the parties had no 

children and would not be "interacting as parents," and that plaintiff failed to 

prove all but two incidents of domestic violence, despite alleging many, 

mitigated against the need for an FRO. Id. at 411-12. We rejected the judge's 

finding that the absence of children or the duration of marriage were reliable 

indicators of defendant's future conduct, id. at 416, and held that courts may 

consider two key factors: "(1) a lack of evidence demonstrating a history of 

domestic violence or abuse; and (2) the commission of a predicate act that 

does not involve physical violence against the victim." Id. at 414. 
17 A-3884-22

We examined a similar issue in two other cases. In McGowan v. 

O'Rourke, we concluded that a single act, without domestic-violence history 

between the parties, warranted issuance of an FRO because the defendant had 

"mail[ed] graphic pornographic pictures [of plaintiff] to [her sister] and 

impl[ied] that they may be sent to [plaintiff]'s workplace and her son." 391 

N.J. Super. 502, 506 (App. Div. 2007). And, in C.C. v. J.A.H., we rejected the 

defendant's argument that an FRO was not necessary to protect plaintiff 

because there was no history of domestic violence. 463 N.J. Super. at 435-36. 

In that case, the parties had engaged in mostly a texting relationship after 

meeting at a gym. When the plaintiff rebuffed the defendant's attempts to meet 

up in-person outside of the gym, the defendant sent the plaintiff "a barrage" of 

"vulgar, insulting, and threatening" text messages over approximately twelve 

hours and the plaintiff sought a restraining order after receiving a text message 

from the defendant showing her address. Id. at 426. Although in that case we

primarily considered whether the parties had a "dating relationship"—given 

that the parties had never gone on a date in-person—we also addressed 

whether the absence of any prior history of domestic violence precluded the 

plaintiff from obtaining a FRO. Id. at 430. 
18 A-3884-22

We concluded that the parties' relationship was a "dating relationship" 

under the PDVA and further that the plaintiff's fear that the defendant had 

found out where she lived combined with his offensive text messages was 

sufficient to support the Family Part judge's decision that the defendant's 

conduct had placed the plaintiff in fear and that the FRO was thus "necessary 

to protect plaintiff from immediate danger or future abuse." Id. at 435-36; see

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b); Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 127. 

Our review of this record convinces us that plaintiff demonstrated the 

need for a FRO to protect her from immediate danger or to prevent further 

abuse. We reach this determination based on the evidence in the record 

demonstrating, first and foremost, the brutal and violent assault defendant 

perpetrated on plaintiff. See Cesare, 154 N.J. at 402 ("[O]ne sufficiently 

egregious action [can] constitute domestic violence under the Act, even with 

no history of abuse between the parties . . . ."). "The need for an order of 

protection upon the commission of a predicate act of 'domestic violence' . . . 

may arise even in the absence of a pattern where there is 'one sufficiently 

egregious action.'" Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 128. 

Here, after plaintiff brought defendant to her home and while they were 

drinking and talking, defendant became enraged because plaintiff admitted that 
19 A-3884-22

she had texted another man. That disclosure by plaintiff provided the impetus 

for defendant's hours-long brutal physical assault of plaintiff during which 

defendant threw plaintiff on the bed and onto the floor, pinned her down, 

strangled her, caused her to lose consciousness, ripped off her hairpiece, pulled 

her hair, and whipped her. Defendant also barricaded plaintiff in her bedroom 

for hours and damaged the sink in her bathroom. And, even after plaintiff 

agreed to take defendant back to his motel, the abusive conduct continued in 

her car where defendant berated plaintiff, broke her glasses, and damaged the 

interior of her car by striking the roof of her car with his fist, leaving blood. 

Even though this assault on plaintiff was a one-time occurrence, the 

violence exhibited by defendant is demonstrative of defendant's efforts to 

threaten, intimidate, scare, physically and emotionally harm, and demean 

plaintiff. This conduct constitutes the classic efforts at control that the PDVA 

was designed to address and prevent. See N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19; Cesare, 154 N.J. 

at 397. 

Moreover, in considering the statutory factors under the second prong of 

Silver, we are persuaded the court erred in its conclusion that plaintiff did not 

establish a need for protection. In addressing factor one—the prior history of 

domestic violence—the court merely stated, "there is none," which was
20 A-3884-22

undisputed, but a prior history of domestic violence is but one factor to be 

considered under N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1)-(6) and, as we have previously 

stated, a single act can constitute domestic violence for the purpose of the 

issuance of an FRO. See McGowan, 391 N.J. Super. at 506. 

The court then briefly considered factor two—the existence of 

immediate danger to plaintiff—and found "no evidence of immediate danger, 

at this time." We are persuaded that in assessing whether plaintiff was in 

immediate danger, the court failed to appreciate the depravity of defendant's 

conduct on the day of the assault, the brutality he exhibited and the length of 

the assault—approximately five hours—his threats to kill her, and that he 

perpetrated this assault upon plaintiff in her home, thus, knowing where she 

lived. 

We are similarly persuaded that the court failed to properly consider 

factor four—the best interest of the victim. In addressing the best interest 

factor, the court simply stated, "I see no reason why [plaintiff] would need to 

continue to have any contact with defendant." The court, however, did not 

specifically address whether the grant of an FRO would be in plaintiff's best 

interest despite having found her testimony credible and the assault perpetrated 

by defendant egregious acts of domestic violence. Thus, the court erred in 
21 A-3884-22

failing to consider the best interest of plaintiff and to properly apply the 

relevant statutory factors. 

Applying our reasoning in A.M.C., McGowan, and C.C. concerning the 

need for an FRO in cases with no or a limited history of domestic violence and 

the seriousness of a single act of domestic violence, we conclude plaintiff has 

demonstrated a need for protection based on the brutality of the assault she 

endured, defendant's threats to kill her, defendant's knowledge of where 

plaintiff lived with her minor children, and his admitted use of marijuana and 

alcohol to get high. In view of these facts, the denial of the FRO constitutes 

reversible error because of the egregious nature of this single act and because 

plaintiff had established the need for a FRO to protect her from immediate 

danger or to prevent further abuse. 

In sum, given our standard of review and having considered the court's 

factual findings and legal conclusions in its April 24, 2023 order denying the 

FRO and July 28, 2023 order denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, 

we are persuaded that reversal is warranted. And, we instruct the judge to 

expeditiously enter a FRO in plaintiff's favor against defendant. Our stay of 

the April 24, 2023 order shall be vacated upon the remand court's entry of the 

FRO. 
22 A-3884-22

Because we have concluded reversal is warranted under Silver, we need 

not reach any of plaintiff's remaining arguments. 

Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion. We 

do not retain jurisdiction.