AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed June 4, 2019.

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-18-00894-CV

IN RE THE COMMITMENT OF JOSE CAVAZOS

On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CV1770006

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Schenck, Osborne, and Reichek

Opinion by Justice Schenck

On our own motion, we withdraw our opinion and vacate our judgment of May 8, 2019, 

and substitute this opinion in its place. This appeal involves a civil commitment pursuant to the 

Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators Act. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.

§§ 841.001–.153. A jury found Jose Cavazos to be a sexually violent predator as defined in section 

841.003 of the Texas Health and Safety Code. The trial court ordered Cavazos committed until 

his behavioral abnormality changes to the extent he is no longer likely to engage in a predatory act 

of sexual violence. See id. § 841.081. In a single issue, Cavazos contends the trial court erred in 

admitting certain evidence. We overrule appellant’s issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Because all issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

BACKGROUND

In August 2017, the State filed a petition seeking to commit Cavazos for treatment and 

supervision, alleging that Cavazos is a sexually violent predator. The State alleged that Cavazos 
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had previously been convicted of two sexually violent offenses, triggering statutory eligibility for 

civil commitment. These offenses occurred in Dallas and Hidalgo Counties. The State further 

alleged that an expert had performed a clinical assessment of Cavazos and found he suffers from 

a behavioral abnormality that makes him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. At 

the time the petition was filed, Cavazos was in his mid-60s, in poor health, and had been 

incarcerated for more than 24 years. Cavazos was scheduled to be released from prison by August 

30, 2019. 

At trial, the State called two witnesses, Dr. Randall Price and Cavazos himself. The State 

also introduced into evidence Cavazos’ penitentiary packets. Dr. Price is the forensic psychologist 

the State hired to evaluate Cavazos. After describing his background, training, and how forensic 

evaluations are conducted, Dr. Price briefly described the process that leads to a civil commitment 

proceeding.1 He testified that close to the time that an inmate will be released from incarceration, 

prison employees will examine the inmate’s records to determine whether he has two or more

convictions for sexual offenses. If so, he is considered for an initial evaluation. Thereafter, he 

may be referred to a “Multi-Disciplinary Team” that will further examine his file and decide 

whether to seek a forensic psychological evaluation. From there, the inmate may be referred to 

the Special Prosecution Unit in Huntsville or to the county in which the person was most recently 

convicted of a sexually violent offense. The Special Prosecution Unit or the county may in turn 

obtain a psychological evaluation before deciding whether to proceed with a request for civil 

commitment. In those instances, a forensic psychologist like Dr. Price will typically review all of 

the inmate’s criminal and medical records, including the previous evaluations, and conducts a faceto-face interview to assess whether the inmate has a behavioral abnormality. 

 

1 Dr. Price’s testimony concerning the screening process comprises 5 pages out of approximately 200 pages of trial testimony. 
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Dr. Price went on to describe his involvement in Cavazos’ case and his opinions concerning 

whether Cavazos is a sexually violent predator. Before interviewing Cavazos, Dr. Price reviewed

Cavazos’ offense reports, police reports, court documents, prison file, and psychological and

psychiatric evaluations. 

Dr. Price described Cavazos’ criminal history in great detail and explained that his history 

is relevant to determining whether he has a behavioral abnormality. Cavazos’ record showed a 

pattern of nearly four decades of serious sexual offenses, most of which involved pre-pubescent 

boys. Cavazos record further showed he had been sent to juvenile facilities for punishment and 

treatment, had received sex offender treatment in a California state hospital, had received shock 

probation, and served time in prison, and that despite his numerous pronouncements that he would 

not offend again, he did repeatedly so. 

Dr. Price enumerated that Cavazos began committing sexual offenses against children at 

the age of 15. He explained that age 15 is a very early age to start committing offenses against 

other children and is very significant because the sexual deviancy is more ingrained and more 

significant when it begins at an early age. He expounded that “early starters” tend to commit more 

sexual offenses, even after being caught and sanctioned. 

Dr. Price testified that Cavazos’ first victims were 8 and 11 years old. These children were 

strangers to Cavazos, meaning he had known them for less than 24 hours when the assaults 

occurred. Dr. Price testified about additional offenses Cavazos committed in the early 1970s, 

1978, 1980, 1981, 1984, and 1994. Cavazos committed the offenses in multiple jurisdictions,

including California, Louisiana, and Texas. 

Dr. Price stated that Cavazos admitted to him that he had victimized approximately 30 

children, some of whom he sexually assault on more than one occasion. Dr. Price indicated that 

in his experience offenders like Cavazos tend to under report the number of their victims. Cavazos
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further admitted to Dr. Price that he used his position as a volunteer baseball coach and his job as 

an ice-cream truck-driver to attain access to some of the children he molested. He also molested

children he picked up at shopping malls, fairs, and parks. He also shared his typical modus 

operandi. He would give them money or pay for arcade games and cokes before convincing them 

to go into a restroom with him where the molestation then would occur. During the interview, 

which took place approximately 3 months before trial, Cavazos admitted to Dr. Price that he is still 

interested in boys, and that when he gets out of prison he plans on going to malls. 

 Dr. Price testified that he used the information he gathered from his review of the records 

and his interview to complete several actuarial instruments to assist in assessing whether Cavazos 

risks reoffending. The first actuarial instrument Dr. Price completed is the STATIC-99R, an 

instrument that measures certain risk factors for reoffending. Cavazos received a score of “6,” 

which means he has a “well above average” risk of reoffending. Dr. Price also completed a PCLR 

examination, which is the Psychopathy Checklist Revised examination. That instrument looks at 

20 personality traits of a psychopathic personality. Results can range from 0 to 40. A score of 30 

or more indicates a psychopath. Cavazos scored 27 on this examination. Dr. Price testified, that 

in light of additional records he received after calculating Cavazos’ score, Cavazos’ score might 

be higher. 

Dr. Price diagnosed appellant with pedophilic disorder, anti-social personality disorder,2

and major depressive disorder.3 Pedophilic disorder means the individual is sexually attracted to 

pre-pubescent children and has acted on those urges. He explained that pedophilia is a very 

difficult disorder to cure. Treatment is typically aimed at management against reoffending. Dr. 

 

2 Anti-social personality disorder means the person’s behavior and attitudes have consistently gone against the rules of society, and the person

fails to conform his behavior to the norms of society with respect to lawful behaviors.

3 Cavazos’ records indicate that since he was an adolescent, he has been diagnosed as being a pedophile. Records after Cavazos turned 18 

include an anti-social personality disorder diagnosis. 
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Price testified that Cavazos admitted to having sex with other offenders while in prison despite 

rules prohibiting such behavior, which further demonstrates Cavazos lacks volitional control and 

does not obey rules. Dr. Price concluded that Cavazos met the criteria for behavioral abnormality 

as set forth in the Texas Health & Safety Code. 

At trial, Cavazos admitted to having committed the offenses Dr. Price described. He 

indicated that he always acted impulsively and had trouble controlling his anger. He claimed that 

upon release from prison he has no plan to commit another offense against a child and that he plans 

on seeking a sexual relationship with an adult. He claimed that Mr. Garrett, who is associated with 

a group called the Felony Foundation, will assist him with various things when he is released, but 

then admitted he does not know what, if any, assistance Mr. Garrett would provide. 

The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Cavazos is a sexually violent predator. The 

court entered an order civilly committing him for treatment and supervision. Cavazos filed a 

motion for new trial, which was overruled by operation of law. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

In 1999, the Texas Legislature enacted the Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent 

Predators Act to protect the public from “a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent 

predators” who “have a behavioral abnormality that is not amenable to traditional mental illness 

treatment modalities and that makes the predators likely to engage in repeated predatory acts of 

sexual violence.” HEALTH & SAFETY § 841.001. The Act provides for the involuntary civil 

commitment, by means of outpatient treatment and supervision, of a repeat sexual offender who 

is found to be a sexually violent predator. Id. §§ 841.003(a), 841.081(a).

For a person to be civilly committed as a sexually violent predator, the State must prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the person (1) is a repeat sexually violent offender, and (2) suffers 

from behavioral abnormality that makes the person likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual 
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violence. Id. § 841.003(a). A person is a repeat sexually violent offender if he has been convicted 

of more than one sexually violent offense and a sentence was imposed for at least one of the 

offenses. Id. §§ 841.002(6), 841.003(b). A “behavioral abnormality” is “a congenital or acquired 

condition that, by affecting a person’s emotional or volitional capacity, predisposes the person to 

commit a sexually violent offense, to the extent that the person becomes a menace to the health 

and safety of another person.” Id. § 841.002(2). A “predatory act” is one that is “directed toward 

individuals, including family members, for the primary purpose of victimization.” Id.

§ 841.002(5).

Cavazos does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s verdict

and concedes that he is a repeat sexually violent offender. His challenge focuses on the behavioral 

abnormality requirement for civil commitment. He claims the trial court erred in admitting Dr. 

Price’s testimony concerning the screening process for civil commitment cases and urges that the 

testimony was harmful because it conveyed to the jury the hearsay conclusions of other mental 

health professionals who had already determined that he has a behavioral abnormality at the outset 

of the case. 

If a trial court errs by improperly admitting evidence, reversal is warranted only if the error 

probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. Bay Area Healthcare Grp., Ltd. v.

McShane, 239 S.W.3d 231, 234 (Tex. 2007). An erroneous evidentiary ruling is likely harmless 

if the rest of the evidence was so one-sided that the error likely made no difference. Reliance Steel 

& Aluminum Co. v. Sevcik, 267 S.W.3d 867, 873 (Tex. 2008). 

No court in Texas has considered whether it is error to permit the State to introduce 

evidence or comment on the statutory administrative screening process over a timely objection.

4

 

 

4 Cavazos cites two decisions in sister states in support of his argument that conveying information concerning the screening process stacks 

the deck against the defendant and is reversible error. See In re Det. of Stenzel, 827 N.W.2d 690 (Iowa 2013); In re Foster, 127 P.3d 277 (Kan. 

2006). While out-of-state cases may on occasion be persuasive authority, we are obviously not bound by them. Tharp v. State, 935 S.W.2d 157, 
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In this case, we need not make that determination because Cavazos has failed to demonstrate that,

if the trial court erred in allowing testimony about the process, that testimony probably led to the 

rendition of an improper verdict. See McShane, 239 S.W.3d at 234.

Dr. Price testified at length about Cavazos’ decades-long history of sexual assault of minor 

males and his admissions concerning the dozens of children he victimized and his method and 

means of securing them. Dr. Price also testified about the actuarial tests he used to assess Cavazos’ 

likelihood of reoffending and the results of the tests. Cavazos did not controvert Dr. Price’s 

diagnoses or his conclusion that Cavazos met the criteria for behavioral abnormality. Records 

dating back decades corroborated Dr. Price’s diagnoses of pedophilia and anti-social personality 

disorder. Moreover, the evidence presented established that, despite Cavazos’ assertion that he 

will not commit offenses against children if he is released, Cavazos continued to abuse children 

over four decades, notwithstanding having received treatment and having served time in 

correctional facilities. Dr. Price’s testimony concerning the screening process was limited in 

duration and the State’s attorney did not mention the screening process during her opening 

statement and did not inappropriately mention the process during closing argument. Given the 

one-sided evidence of Cavazos’ behavioral abnormality and the minimal reference to the screening 

 

161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). In this case, Foster and Stenzel fail to persuade, and they are readily distinguishable from this case. Foster was a 

prosecutorial misconduct case, and, unlike the screening process in Texas, the process in Kansas included a probable cause hearing whereby the 

district judge determines whether there is sufficient evidence to proceed with the commitment case. The jury was apprised of that step in the 

process during opening statements, and the Kansas Supreme Court found the State’s reference to the district court’s prior probable cause 

determination was damaging because it expressed judicial approval of the State’s case. Foster, 127 P.3d at 280, 286. Further, the decision in Foster

was limited to error and harm by statements made by the State’s attorney during opening arguments. See id. at 286. In this case, the State’s attorney 

did not mention the screening process during her opening statement. See Brown v. State, 519 S.W.3d 848, 859 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017) (finding no 

error in permitting comment and testimony regarding the screening process required under the sexually violent predators act where the assistant 

attorney general did not discuss the screening process in elaborate detail during opening statement and only mentioned it briefly to introduce the 

psychologist that performed the statutorily required end-of-confinement report). In Stenzel, the State’s expert testified about the screening process 

and, during closing argument, the State’s attorney argued there is “a screening process that goes into this and it’s pretty sensitive and not many 

people meet the criteria as a sexually violent predator.” Stenzel, 827 N.W.2d at 704. The State then reviewed the hoops that Stenzel’s case had to 

go through. Id. Finally, the State recapped “[i]n this case, at every step of the way, Mr. Stenzel has been considered to meet the criteria for [sexually 

violent predator], but what’s really—what’s important is what you think?” Id. The court concluded, “[t]his aspect of the trial strikes us as lacking 

in probative value and unfairly prejudicial to the respondent.” Id. at 706. Cavazos complains about the State’s attorney’s statements “if there was 

a doctor that said he didn’t have a behavioral abnormality or a person or a prison guard we could have heard from them. Where is that person?

You heard he went through the whole process and now we’re here today.” However, those statements do not rise to the level of those made by the 

State’s attorney in Stenzel. Moreover, unlike the comments made in Foster and Stenzel, Dr. Price’s comments were not tied specifically to appellant

and Dr. Price never indicated any reliance on the screening process in forming his opinion. 
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process, we conclude Dr. Price’s testimony concerning the screening process likely made no 

difference to the jury on the issue of whether Cavazos suffers a behavioral abnormality that makes 

him likely to engage in a predatory act of sexual violence. Sevcik, 267 S.W.3d at 873. 

We overrule Cavazos sole issue.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

180894F.P05

/David J. Schenck/

DAVID J. SCHENCK

JUSTICE
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Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT

IN RE: THE COMMITMENT OF JOSE 

CAVAZOS, 

No. 05-18-00894-CV 

On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District 

Court, Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CV1770006.

Opinion delivered by Justice Schenck. 

Justices Osborne and Reichek participating.

In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is 

AFFIRMED.

It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal.

Judgment entered this 4th day of June 2019.