Docket No. 109581.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. RICKY

 KING, Appellee. 

Opinion filed January 21, 2011.

JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with

opinion.

Chief Justice Kilbride and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman,

Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

I. BACKGROUND

In 2002, defendant, Ricky King, was charged with five counts of

first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9–1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2000)), in

connection with the August 8, 2002, beating death of Robert Nash.

Defendant was 15 years of age at the time of the incident. On June 19,

2003, the State filed an additional count of attempted first degree

murder (720 ILCS 5/8–4(a), 9–1(a) (West 2000)) arising out of the

same incident. That same day, defendant entered a negotiated plea to

the attempted murder charge in exchange for dismissal of the murder

charges and a 15-year sentence in the Department of Corrections. The

circuit court of Champaign County immediately entered judgment
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pursuant to the plea agreement, sentenced defendant to the agreedupon 15-year prison term, and dismissed the murder charges. 

On October 10, 2008, defendant filed a pro se postconviction

petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS

5/122–1 et seq. (West 2006)), arguing that he was not properly

admonished about mandatory supervised release. The circuit court

dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently without merit.

On appeal, defendant argued for the first time that his sentence

was void because the State failed to request a hearing under section

5–130(1)(c)(ii) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act) (705 ILCS

405/5–130(1)(c)(ii) (West 2000)) to determine whether he should be

sentenced as an adult. The appellate court agreed. 395 Ill. App. 3d

985, 992. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the judgment of

the circuit court and remanded with directions to vacate defendant’s

criminal conviction, enter an adjudication of delinquency, and enter an

order sentencing him under the Act to time served as of his twentyfirst birthday. Id. at 994-95.

The State sought review in this court, arguing that (1) defendant

should be estopped from arguing that the sentencing provision of the

fully negotiated plea agreement is void because he enjoyed the benefits

of the plea agreement, including the dismissal of first degree murder

charges; and (2) if the sentencing provision of the fully negotiated plea

agreement is void, the plea should be vacated in its entirety, the

murder charges reinstated, and the parties returned to the status quo

ante for further plea proceedings or trial. 

On this court’s own motion, the parties were given leave to file

supplemental briefs addressing the following two issues of statutory

interpretation involving sections 5–130(1)(a) through (1)(c) of the Act

(705 ILCS 405/5–130(1)(a) through (1)(c) (West 2000)): (1) whether

an offense “covered by” section 5–130(1)(a) includes only those

charges “specified in” that section or both charges “specified in” that

section and “all other charges arising out of the same incident”; and

(2) if an offense “covered by” section 5–130(1)(a) includes both

charges “specified in” that section and “all other charges arising out

of the same incident,” whether section 5–130(1)(c)(ii) required the

State to request a hearing to determine whether defendant should be

sentenced as an adult or whether he was properly sentenced as an

adult without a hearing pursuant to section 5–130(1)(c)(i). Both
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parties have filed supplemental briefs. 

For the following reasons, we conclude that an offense “covered

by” section 5–130(1)(a) includes both charges “specified in” that

section and “all other charges arising out of the same incident,” that

section 5–130(1)(c)(ii) did not require the State to request a hearing

to determine whether defendant should be sentenced as an adult, and

that he was properly sentenced as an adult without a hearing pursuant

to section 5–130(1)(c)(i). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the

appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 

II. ANALYSIS

The dispositive issues on appeal are issues of statutory

construction, which are questions of law subject to de novo review.

Solon v. Midwest Medical Records Ass’n, Inc., 236 Ill. 2d 433, 439

(2010).

Our primary objective in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and

give effect to the intent of the legislature. Id. at 440. The best

indicator of such intent is the language of the statute, which is to be

given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. In determining the plain

meaning of the statute, we consider the statute in its entirety, the

subject it addresses, and the apparent intent of the legislature in

enacting it. Id.

With these principles in mind, we turn to the applicable statutory

provision, section 5–130 of the Act, which provides, in pertinent part,

as follows:

“(1)(a) The definition of delinquent minor under Section

5–120 of this Article shall not apply to any minor who at the

time of an offense was at least 15 years of age and who is

charged with first degree murder, aggravated criminal sexual

assault, aggravated battery with a firearm committed in a

school, on the real property comprising a school, within 1,000

feet of the real property comprising a school, at a school

related activity, or on, boarding, or departing from any

conveyance owned, leased, or contracted by a school or

school district to transport students to or from school or a

school related activity regardless of the time of day or time of

year that the offense was committed, armed robbery when the
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armed robbery was committed with a firearm, or aggravated

vehicular hijacking when the hijacking was committed with a

firearm.

These charges and all other charges arising out of the

same incident shall be prosecuted under the criminal laws of

this State.

* * *

(b)(i) If before trial or plea an information or

indictment is filed that does not charge an offense

specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) the State’s

Attorney may proceed on any lesser charge or charges, but

only in Juvenile Court under the provisions of this Article.

The State’s Attorney may proceed under the Criminal

Code of 1961 on a lesser charge if before trial the minor

defendant knowingly and with advice of counsel waives,

in writing, his or her right to have the matter proceed in

Juvenile Court.

(ii) If before trial or plea an information or indictment

is filed that includes one or more charges specified in

paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) and additional charges

that are not specified in that paragraph, all of the charges

arising out of the same incident shall be prosecuted under

the Criminal Code of 1961.

(c)(i) If after trial or plea the minor is convicted of any

offense covered by paragraph (a) of this subsection (1),

then, in sentencing the minor, the court shall have

available any or all dispositions prescribed for that offense

under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.

(ii) If after trial or plea the court finds that the minor

committed an offense not covered by paragraph (a) of this

subsection (1), that finding shall not invalidate the verdict

or the prosecution of the minor under the criminal laws of

the State; however, unless the State requests a hearing for

the purpose of sentencing the minor under Chapter V of

the Unified Code of Corrections, the Court must proceed

under Sections 5–705 and 5–710 of this Article. To

request a hearing, the State must file a written motion
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within 10 days following the entry of a finding or the

return of a verdict. Reasonable notice of the motion shall

be given to the minor or his or her counsel. If the motion

is made by the State, the court shall conduct a hearing to

determine if the minor should be sentenced under Chapter

V of the Unified Code of Corrections. *** If after the

hearing the court finds that the minor should be sentenced

under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections, then

the court shall sentence the minor accordingly having

available to it any or all dispositions so prescribed.”

(Emphases added.) 705 ILCS 405/5–130(1)(a) through

(c)(ii) (West 2000).

In the present case, defendant was originally charged with five

counts of first degree murder, an offense “specified in” section

5–130(1)(a). Exclusive jurisdiction for first degree murder when the

accused is at least 15 years of age lies in criminal court, not juvenile

court. 705 ILCS 405/5–130(1)(a) (West 2000). In addition, if “other

charges arising out of the same incident” are alleged in an indictment,

together with charges “specified in” section 5–130(1)(a), the entire

prosecution takes place in criminal court. 705 ILCS

405/5–130(1)(b)(ii) (West 2000). Here, the State added to the

indictment an attempted first degree murder charge, which had to be

prosecuted in criminal court with the first degree murder charges

because it arose out of the same incident. 

Ultimately, defendant pleaded guilty to attempted first degree

murder in exchange for dismissal of the first degree murder charges

and a 15-year sentence. Therefore, he pleaded guilty only to the

offense “arising out of the same incident” as the offense “specified in”

section 5–130(1)(a), which was first degree murder. 

Section 5–130(1)(c)(i) of the Act governs sentencing of a minor

convicted of any offense “covered by” section 5–130(1)(a), while

section 5–130(1)(c)(ii) governs sentencing of a minor convicted of an

offense “not covered by” section 5–130(1)(a). Section 5–130(1)(a)

specifically lists several offenses, including first degree murder, and

states that “[t]hese charges and all other charges arising out of the

same incident shall be prosecuted under the criminal laws of this

State.” 705 ILCS 405/5–130(1)(a) (West 2000). 

Both parties and the appellate court in this case assumed, without
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discussion or analysis, that an offense “covered by” section

5–130(1)(a), as used in sections 5–130(1)(c)(i) and (1)(c)(ii), was

synonymous with an offense “specified in” section 5–130(1)(a), as

used in section 5–130(1)(b). See 395 Ill. App. 3d at 989 (“However,

the statute provides if a defendant either pleads or is found guilty of

only the non-section 5–130(1)(a) charges, then a court is required to

proceed under sections 5–705 and 5–710 of the Act, unless the State

requests, within 10 days of the plea or trial, a hearing at which the

court would determine whether to sentence the defendant as an adult.”

(Emphasis in original.)). In making this assumption, the appellate

court cited prior appellate court opinions in which the parties and

court had made the same assumption. See, e.g., People v. Jardon, 393

Ill. App. 3d 725 (2009); People v. Mathis, 357 Ill. App. 3d 45 (2005);

People v. Champ, 329 Ill. App. 3d 127 (2002); People v. Brazee, 333

Ill. App. 3d 43 (2002); People v. Brazee, 316 Ill. App. 3d 1230

(2000).

On this court’s own motion, the parties were given leave to file

supplemental briefs addressing the following two issues of statutory

interpretation involving sections 5–130(1)(a) through (1)(c) of the

Act: (1) whether an offense “covered by” section 5–130(1)(a) includes

only those charges “specified in” that section or both charges

“specified in” that section and “all other charges arising out of the

same incident”; and (2) if an offense “covered by” section 5–130(1)(a)

includes both charges “specified in” that section and “all other charges

arising out of the same incident,” whether section 5–130(1)(c)(ii)

required the State to request a hearing to determine whether

defendant should be sentenced as an adult or whether he was properly

sentenced as an adult without a hearing pursuant to section

5–130(1)(c)(i).

In their supplemental briefs, the parties agreed that an offense

“covered by” section 5–130(1)(a) includes both charges “specified in”

that section and “all other charges arising out of the same incident.”

The parties disagreed, however, as to whether section 5–130(1)(c)(ii)

required the State to request a hearing to determine whether

defendant should be sentenced as an adult or whether he was properly

sentenced as an adult without a hearing pursuant to section

5–130(1)(c)(i).

Pursuant to sections 5–130(1)(c)(i) and (1)(c)(ii), whether
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defendant could be sentenced as an adult without a hearing depends

on whether the offense to which he pleaded guilty (attempted first

degree murder) is “covered by” section 5–130(1)(a). The dictionary

definition of “cover” is “to treat or deal with,” as in “material covered

in the first chapter.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

524 (1976). Accordingly, when section 5–130(1)(c)(i) discusses an

offense “covered by” section 5–130(1)(a), it means an offense treated

or dealt with in that section, which includes the offenses “specified in”

that section as well as “all other charges arising out of the same

incident.” See 705 ILCS 405/5–130(1)(a) (West 2000).

That interpretation is confirmed by the use of other terms in

section 5–130(1). For instance, section 5–130(1)(b) addresses

whether the prosecution should occur in juvenile or criminal court,

and the answer hinges on whether the charging instrument includes

any charge of an offense “specified in” section 5–130(1)(a). The plain

meaning of “specify” is “to mention or name in a specific or explicit

manner.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2187 (1976).

Thus, when section 5–130(1)(b) discusses an offense “specified in”

section 5–130(1)(a), it means the offenses explicitly named therein.

Moreover, the Act itself demonstrates that offenses “specified in”

section 5–130(1)(a) does not mean offenses explicitly named in that

section plus other charges arising out of the same incident. Section

5–130(1)(b)(ii) mandates that when an information or indictment

includes charges “specified in” section 5–130(1)(a) “and additional

charges that are not specified in that paragraph, all of the charges

arising out of the same incident shall be prosecuted under the Criminal

Code of 1961.” In other words, the offenses “specified in” section

5–130(1)(a) do not include “other charges arising out of the same

incident.” 

The legislature’s decision to use “specified in” in section

5–130(1)(b) and “covered by” in section 5–130(1)(c) demonstrates

that it intended different meanings for these terms. See People v.

Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d 181, 193 (2008) (“When the legislature uses

certain language in one part of a statute and different language in

another, we may assume different meanings were intended.”). Section

5–130(1)(b) discusses those offenses “specified in” section

5–130(1)(a), i.e., those offenses explicitly named in that section,

whereas section 5–130(1)(c) discusses those offenses “covered by”
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section 5–130(1)(a), i.e., those offenses dealt with in that section,

which includes those explicitly named in that section and those arising

out of the same incident. The legislature repeated the paired use of

both “covered by” and “specified in” throughout the Act–the

distinction appears again in sections 5–130(2)(b) and (2)(c) (705

ILCS 405/5–130(2)(b), (2)(c) (West 2000)), sections 5–130(3)(b) and

(3)(c) (705 ILCS 405/5–130(3)(b), (3)(c) (West 2000)), and sections

5–130(5)(b) and (5)(c) (705 ILCS 405/5–130(5)(b), (5)(c) (West

2000))–confirming that the use of the two distinct terms was

intentional.

Moreover, the Act as a whole, including its use of the term

“prosecute,” confirms that the legislature intended “covered by”

section 5–130(1)(a) to include all charges arising out of the same

incident. Section 5–130(1)(a) states that “[t]hese charges and all other

charges arising out of the same incident shall be prosecuted under the

criminal laws of this State.” The Act does not define the term

“prosecute.” However, section 2–16 of the Criminal Code of 1961

defines “[p]rosecution” as “all legal proceedings by which a person’s

liability for an offense is determined, commencing with the return of

the indictment or the issuance of the information, and including the

final disposition of the case upon appeal.” 720 ILCS 5/2–16 (West

2000). Thus, section 5–130(1)(a) mandates that charges of the

“specified offenses” as well as all other charges arising out of the same

incident proceed as a criminal prosecution until final disposition on

appeal. 

The legislature’s use of “prosecute” elsewhere in section

5–130(1)(b) further demonstrates that offenses “covered by” section

5–130(1)(a) include all charges arising out of the same incident as the

specifically enumerated offenses. Section 5–130(1)(b) addresses

where trial and plea proceedings should occur. Section 5–130(1)(b)(i)

states that if the charges do not include an offense “specified in”

section 5–130(1)(a), the State’s Attorney should “proceed” on the

lesser charge or charges in juvenile court but “may proceed under the

Criminal Code of 1961” on a lesser charge not “specified in” section

5–130(1)(a) if the minor waives in writing the right to proceed in

juvenile court. See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

1807 (1976) (defining proceed as “to carry on a legal action or

process”). On the other hand, section 5–130(1)(b)(ii) states that if a
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minor is charged with an offense “specified in” section 5–130(1)(a)

“and additional charges that are not specified in that paragraph, all of

the charges arising out of the same incident shall be prosecuted under

the Criminal Code of 1961.” The legislature’s decision to use

“proceed” in the waiver context and “prosecution” in the context of

other charges arising out of the same incident demonstrates its

differing intent. See Hudson, 228 Ill. 2d at 194. 

That distinction is further reflected in section 5–130(1)(c). Section

5–130(1)(c)(i) states that if the minor is convicted of any offense

“covered by” section 5–130(1)(a), “the court shall have available any

or all dispositions prescribed for that offense under Chapter V of the

Unified Code of Corrections.” As discussed above, offenses “covered

by” section 5–130(1)(a) include the offenses “specified in” that section

as well as all charges arising out of the same incident. This is

consistent with section 5–130(1)(b)(ii)’s mandate that the offenses

“specified in” section 5–130(1)(a) and “all of the charges arising out

of the same incident shall be prosecuted under the Criminal Code of

1961” and with section 5–130(1)(a)’s directive that the charges

specified therein and “all other charges arising out of the same incident

shall be prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State.” 

On the other hand, because a minor charged with only a lesser

offense (of an offense “specified in” section 5–130(1)(a)) who waived

the right to proceed in juvenile court would not be convicted of an

offense “covered by” section 5–130(1)(a), the minor would not be

subject to sentencing under the Unified Code of Corrections unless the

State requested a hearing under section 5–130(1)(c)(ii). This is

consistent with section 5–130(1)(b)(i), which allows the State to

proceed under the Criminal Code of 1961 only upon the minor’s

written waiver. Thus, if defendant had been charged only with

attempted murder, both his written waiver and a hearing would have

been required to proceed in criminal court and sentence him as an

adult. 

This construction is also consistent with the framework of the Act,

which turns on the offenses in the charging instrument. This court has

long recognized that the classification at issue in the Act is based on

the minor’s age and the type of offense charged. People v. J.S., 103

Ill. 2d 395, 403 (1984). Thus, it is the charging instrument that

determines whether the minor has the right to have the proceedings in
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juvenile court.

As discussed above, section 5–130(1)(c)(i) states that if after trial

or plea, a minor is convicted of an offense “covered by” section

5–130(1)(a), in sentencing the minor, the circuit court has available

“any or all dispositions prescribed for that offense under Chapter V of

the Unified Code of Corrections.” Offenses “covered by” section

5–130(1)(a) include those “specified in” that section as well as those

arising out of the same incident.

In the present case, defendant was initially charged with first

degree murder. The State subsequently filed an additional information,

which added an additional count for attempted first degree murder

arising out of the same incident. Thus, the attempted first degree

murder charge was “covered by” section 5–130(1)(a) (“These charges

and all other charges arising out of the same incident shall be

prosecuted under the criminal laws of this State.”). Defendant pleaded

guilty to the attempted first degree murder charge that same day. 

Defendant argues that the attempted first degree murder charge

was not “covered by” section 5–130(1)(a) because the first degree

murder charges were subsequently dismissed. We disagree. 

The first degree murder charges were still pending when the

circuit court accepted defendant’s plea and sentenced him to the

agreed-upon 15-year sentence. The circuit court thereafter dismissed

the first degree murder charges pursuant to the plea agreement. 

Therefore, we find that defendant pleaded guilty to an offense

(attempted first degree murder) “covered by” section 5–130(1)(a)

because it arose out of the same incident as the charges pending

against him for an offense “specified in” section 5–130(1)(a) (first

degree murder). Accordingly, we conclude that defendant was

properly sentenced without a hearing pursuant to section

5–130(1)(c)(i) and that his sentence is therefore not void as prohibited

by statute. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the

appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
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Appellate court judgment reversed; 

circuit court judgment affirmed.