icicide: 

The Problem of Friendly Fire 

in Modern War 

by Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Shader, U.S. Army 

! December 1982 
COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE 

Mission 

The Combat Studies Institute was established on 18 June 1979 as a department-level 

activity within the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas. CSI has the following missions: 

1. Conduct research on historical topics pertinent to doctrinal concerns of the Army 

and publish the results in a variety of formats for the Active Army and Reserve 

components. 

2. Prepare and present instruction in military history at USACGSC and assist other 

USACGSC departments in integrating military history into their instruction. 

3. Serve as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s executive agent for the 

development and coordination of an integrated, progressive program of military history 

instruction in the TRADOC service school system. 

CSI Research Surveys are doctrinal research manuscripts, thematic in nature, that investigate the evolution of specific doctrinal areas of interest to the U.S. Army. Research 

Surveys are based on primary and secondary sources and provide the foundation for 

further study of a given subject. The views expressed in this publication are those of the 

author and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element thereof. 

Cover: This Department of Defense photograph shows a wrecked Spitfire that was shot down 

by Allied antiaircraft fire over Paestum beach in Italy. 
Amicicide: 

The Problem of Friendly Fire 

in Modern War 

by Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Shrader, U.S. Army 

December E 982 

U.S. Army 

Command and General 

Staff College 

Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900 
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data 

Shrader, Charles R. 

Amicieide: the problem of friendly fire in modern 

war. 

(Research survey/Combat Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army Command and General Staff College; no. 1 

Bibliography: p. 

“December 1982.” 

1. Amicicide (Military science) I. Title. 

II. Series: Research survey (U.S. Army Command and 

General Staff College. Combat Studies Institute); 

no. 1. 

U167.S47 1985 355.4’2 85-7905 

For sale by the Superinteneient of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Off%, Washington, D.C. 20402 
CONTENTS 

Foreword ......................... v 

Introduction ....................... vii 

Chapter 1. Artillery Amicicide ............. 1 

Chapter 2. Air Amicicide ................ 29 

Chapter 3. Antiaircraft Amicicide ............ 65 

Chapter 4. Ground Amicicide ............... 75 

Chapter 5. Conclusions ................. LO5 

Notes ........................ ..lll 

Glossary ......................... 137 

Bibliography ....................... 139 

iii 
PoREwoRD 

War is aften depicted in the textbooks as a wellorchestrated, albeit violent, exercise in which opposing 

units strive to achieve tactical and strategic objectives. 

That each side will suffer casualties in the process is 

taken for granted; they are the inevitable, if regretable, 

consequence of such a deadly undertaking. That each side is 

almost certain to suffer casualties inflicted by its own 

forces is not generally taken for granted, Yet, in each of 

America's wars, especially those of the twentieth century, a 

significant number of soldiers have been killed or wounded 

as the result of friendly fire. The fact that the 

percentage of casualties resulting from friendly fire from 

World War I through Vietnam has been extremely low does not 

make the accidental killing or wounding of one's own troops 

any less tragic or unpalatable. Nor does it offer much 

consolation to the commander responsible for the lives of 

his troops or to the soldier who runs the risk of falling 

victim to the fire of his own forces. It may well be that 

in the "fog of war" friendly fire casualties are inevitable, 

but this solemn observation does not absolve the armed 

forces from doing everything in their power to eliminate the 

problem. 

To be sure, each branch of the Army and each of the 

Armed Services employ measures calculated to prevent 

incidents of friendly fire. But such measures offer only 

partial solutions, especially on the modern battlefield 

where joint and combined forces operate under often obscure 

conditions. A more comprehensive study of the causes and 

consequences of friendly fire is needed. That one has not 

yet appeared is attributable to several factors, foremost 

among them being the nature of the evidence on which such a 

study must rely. The required raw data are scattered 

throughout a variety of primary and secondary, official and 

unofficial sources. Before one can undertake a serious and 

comprehensive analysis of friendly fire, these data must be 

found and brought together in one place. 

In Amicicide: The Problem of Friendly Fire in Modern 

&, LTC Charles R. Shrader has taken a major step toward 

the compilation of these data. From his survey of much of 

the existing literature on World War I, World War II, the 

Korean War, and the Vietnam War, he has extracted examples 

of friendly fire involving U.S. ground forces and has 

categorized them according to types of incidents. In his 

well-informed narrative, he draws tentative conclusions 

about the causes and effects of friendly fire and offers 

recommendations for those who expect to study the subject 

v 
further. He has, in short, produced a superb reference book 

and a springboard for a deeper and more comprehensive 

analysis of this grim and complex problem. The Combat 

Studies Institute is pleased to present this work as the 

first in its series of Research Surveys. 

Colonel, Armor 

Director, Combat Studies Institute 

Vi 
INTRODUCTION 

The “fog of war” is an oft-mentioned, if imperfectly 

understood, factor in combat. Noise, smoke, faulty communications, tension, hyperactivity, and fear all conspire to 

mask from the soldier and his leaders the true situation on 

the battlefield. When accurate information regarding the 

location and activity of both friendly and enemy forces is 

lacking, one result is often the unintentional placement of 

fire on one’s own troops, A less serious problem in the days 

of small armies, circumscribed battlefields, and 

line-of-sight weaponry, the engagement of friendly forces by 

friendly fire has become important in the present era of 

large and highly mobile field armies, enormous battle areas, 

and weapons of great ky increased range % lethality, and 

complexity employed in the indirect fire role. 

While there is reason to believe that the casualties 

attributable to friendly fire in modern war constitute a 

statistically insignificant portion of total casualties 

(perhaps less than 2 percent) and have generally only a 

transient effect on the progress of major operations, numerous specific instances can readily be cited in which friendly 

fire has inflicted serious casualties on friendly units and 

has significantly disrupted ar otherwise caused the failure 

of specific, local operations. Beyond the immediate loss of 

life and materiel, with its direct degradation of combat 

power, such incidents often have a devastating effect on 

troop morale and the confidence of ground combat forces in 

their supporting air, artillery, and armored forces. 

Friendly fire incidents often disrupt the close and 

continuous combined arms cooperation so essential to success 

in modern combat, especially when that combat is conducted 

against a well-armed, well-trained, and numerically superior 

opponent. 

This study, by presenting selected examples in their 

historical settings, is intended only to explain a few of the 

most obvious types of friendly fire incidents and some of the 

causative factors associated with them. By directing the 

attention of commanders and staff. officers responsible for 

the development, training, and employment of combat forces to 

the hitherto little explored problem of friendly fire 

incidents, I hope this study will generate interest in and 

solutions for the problems outlined. 

The methodology of this study is primarily historical, 

narrative , and highly selective. In the analysis of the 

available data, time and resource constraints precluded the 

Use of proven mathematical techniques and forward-looking 

war-gaming methods, both of which may be legitimately and 

vii 
fruitfully applied to this prob2em.l Time and resources 

have also limited the scope of this study to incidents 

involving US forces in World War II and Vietnam, although 

some evidence available from other conflicts in the twentieth 

century has also been considered. In sum, this study can 

claim to be no more than a narrative exposition of selected 

examples. Although its conclusions must be considered highly 

speculative and tentative in nature, this study can be of 

substantial value to an understanding of the problem of 

friendly fire in modern war. 

The first problem in a study af this sort is to define in 

clear and concise terms the topic under consideration. The 

phrase "friendly casualties due to friendly fire," although 

accurately describing the type of events we wish to investigate, is both clumsy and subject to misinterpretation. 

Another term, commonly used to describe the type of incidents 

with which we are concerned, is fratricide. Although common 

and handy, the word fratricide has a well-known technical 

usage with respect to artillery projectiles and has 

connotations of intent and civil. conflict inappropriate for 

the types of incidents we shall undertake to investigate. In 

the interest of clarity, brevity, and convenience of usage, 

the resort to a neologism seems desirable. The noun amicitide, derived by the legitimate combination of the Latin noun" 

amicus, -us (friend) with the common latinate suffix for 

killing (Gide), provides a single word that adequately 

describes wxut distracting connotation the incidence of 

human casualties (both dead and wounded) incurred by military 

forces in active combat operations as a result of being fired 

upon unintentionally by the weapons of their own or allied 

forces. 

Instances of amicicide may be conveniently divided for 

the purpose of our study into several descriptive categories, 

each of which may be further subdivided. One category, 

artillery amicicide, includes all incidents in which friendly 

ground forces are subjected to the fire of friendly artillery 

weapons, mortars, and rockets, as well as guns and howitzers, 

employed in either direct or indirect fire. Also included in 

this category are instances in which friendly ground forces 

are struck by spent projectiles or fragments from friendly 

weapons directed at aircraft. A second category, air 

amicicide, includes all incidents in which friendly ground 

forces are bombed, strafed, or rocketed by friendly aircraft, 

either fixed or rotary-wing, of whatever service. A third 

category, antiaircraft amicicide, incorporates those 

incidents in which friendly aircraft are taken under fire by 

friendly surface forces (bath ground and naval) employing 

either small arms, automatic weapons9 missiles, or antiviii 
aircraft artillery. The final category that we shall consider here is ground amicicide, incidents in which friendly 

ground troops and variously armed armored vehicles fire upon 

other friendly ground forces or armored vehicles. Such incidents may be further divided into those involving infantry 

against infantry, infantry against tanks and vice versa, 

antitank weapons against tanks and vice versa, and tanks 

against tanks. 

There are, of course, several other obvious categories of 

amicicide that are excluded from this study. These involve 

air-to-air engagements, air-to-naval vessel incidents, and 

incidents involving the engagement of one friendly naval 

vessel by another. In a few cases we shall discuss incidents 

invalving friendly air and ground fire attacks on friendly 

boats (as opposed to ships). Naval gun fire incidents are 

included here under the category of artillery amicicide. A 

few bizarre instances involving aircraft will also be 

considered. 

There are also a number of other types of incidents in 

which friendly casualties may be inflicted by friendly 

weapons. Most of these are excluded from our definition of 

amicicide. Cases of homicide (both intentional and 

unintentional), suicide, and self-inflicted wounds (whether 

intentional or not) are excluded, as are what may be termed 

pure accidents, for example, the explosion af a gun due to 

faulty ammunition or unintentionally walking in front of a 

gun being fired. We shall also exclude from our definition 

of amicicide sa-called disciplinary actions and the 

intentional calling-in of fire on one's own position in 

extremis. The former category includes legally prescribz 

executions, the shooting of recalcitrant troops in battle by 

their officers, and the rare, but not unknown, practice of 

firing upon friendly troops as punishment for failure to 

advance or for some other infraction of military discipline 

such as mutiny or riot. 

There appear to be no thorough, systematic studies of the 

general problem of amicicide either in official or unofficial 

literature. A few limited studies of certain types of amicitide incidents, such as those involving Allied air strikes on 

friendly positions during Operation COBRA (the St. L6 

breakout, 1944) and the Allied bombing of Switzerland in 

World War II, are available.2 The literature of ground 

combat, however, is devoid of even such limited studies. 

Despite a reasonably thorough bibliographical search using a 

variety of appropriate key words, only two works dealing 

specifically with the problem of amicicide come to hand. A 

post-World War 1 polemic by the French General Alexandre 

ix 
Perein, Le Massacre de nstre Infanterie, 19l.b1918, is 

directed against the French high command and' the doctrine of 

heavy artillery employment followed in World War I.3 

General Percin alleges that same 75,000 French soldiers lost 

their lives to friendly artillery fire in World War 1.4 

Although Percin cites numerous specific cases of artillery 

amicicide, his book and his conclusions are somewhat suspect 

because of their obviously polemical purpose, 

The other work takes the form of historical reportage in 

which a single case of artillery amicicide during the Vietnam 

conflict provides the occasion for a study of the reaction of 

one American family to the lass af their son in Vietnam. 

Although based on fact and cantaining a detailed recanstructian of an amicicide incident involving members of Company 6, 

1st Battalion, 6th Infantry, 198th Light Infantry. Brigade 

(AmericaP Division), on 18 February 1970, C. D. B. Bryan's 

Friendly Fire focuses on the subsequent radicalization of 

Cpl. Michael E. Mullen's family, their involvement in the 

antiwar mavement, and their inability to accept the fact: of 

their son"s death due to a friendly artillery round.5 

Useful as an indication of the effect of amicicide on a 

victim's family, Bryan's book offers little in the way of 

general analysis of the problem of amicicide. 

GiVCSl the dearth of literature on the topic, the 

researcher must collect and analyze the scattered, often 

cryptic, references to amicicide found in general operational 

military histories or in the available official documents of 

combat units. Such a search is fraught with misleading, 

usually incomplete, and of ten erroneous data, already 

preselected by another historian or by accident of 

preservation, and scattered across the full range of 

multitudinous operational histories, both official and 

private, and thousands of linear feet of official records. 

The disarray of source materials far the study of amicitide is understandable. The conditions of active cambat in 

which cases of amicicide occur are scarcely conducive to 

thorough, accurate reporting of what at the time may seem 

relatively minar incidents. Furthermore, cammanders at 

various levels may be reluctant to report instances of 

casualties due to friendly fire either because they are 

afraid of damaging unit or personal reputations, because they 

have a misplaced concern for the morale of surviving troops 

or the benefits and honors due the dead and wounded, or 

simply because of a desire to avoid unprofitable conflicts 

with the personnel of supporting or adjacent units. In many 

cases, of course, the victim's commander may never know that 

a particular casualty was due to friendly fire. Moreover, 

X 
the commanders and soldiers of units responsible for 

inflicting friendly casualties are seldom in a position to 

evaluate their handiwork, even if they wished to do so. 

In most cases recognizable incidents of amicicide do 

require some sort of formal investigation and report if the 

circumstances permit. In the past, special investigations 

and reports were common only when the incident resulted in a 

high number of casualties or was remarkable in some way. The 

surviving reports of SUCh investigations provide fertile 

ground for the historian's plow. Official casualty reports, 

on the other hand, while seemingly comprehensive in their 

identification of all casualties, are singularly sterile for 

use in the study of amicicide. In most cases it is all but 

impossible to decipher official casualty statistics without 

the direct assistance of the person responsible for categorizing the data in the first place.. No casualty reporting 

system used by the US Army has made adequate provision for 

the clear, separate identification of casualties due to 

friendly fire. The current Army casualty reporting regulation, AR 600-10 with change 1, does provide for identification of the inflicting force as enemy, US forces, allied, or 

other on line 47 of the standard casualty reporting format, 

but does not highlight such information or provide any 

guidance regarding special reporting procedures applicable to 

instances of amicicide.6 

While it is possible to discern cases of amicicide in 

individual casualty reports, the composite statistics for 

World War II, Korea, and Vietnam are of little use for the 

study of the problem of amicicide without a knowledge of how 

cases of amicicide were categorized in each conflict.-/ 

Even then it is likely that the criteria varied from statistician to statistician at the various reporting levels. This 

brief study has not produced a magic key. A major investigation of casualty reporting methods would be required to do 

so. 

An extremely detailed historical study of the casualty 

reporting system in use during the Korean War, for exam le, 

does not allude to casualties caused by friendly fire. A f 

statistical study of Korean War casualties, which presents 

detailed breakouts of both KIA and WIA by causative agent and 

type of ground operation, offers only the cryptic entry, 

"Accidents in the Use of Own Weapons," to tantalize the 

historian. What types of accidents were or were not 

included?9 Casualties due to accidents in the,use of own 

weapons --a category which may include cases of amieicide--in 

the Korean War included 112 killed and 1,377 wounded out of a 

total of 18,498 KIA and 72,343 WIA C,61 percent and 1.9 perxi 
cent respectively).10 Whether these in fact represent the 

Korean War figures for amicicide remains for the moment a 

matter of pure conjecture. 

The official casualty statistics for US forces in Southeast Asia between January 

slightly less mysterious.ll 

1961 and March 1975 are only 

Causative agent rather than 

identification of the inflicting force (despite separation of 

hostile and nonhostile casualties) appears to be the primary 

basis of categories. Accidental self-destruction, suicide, 

homicide, and accidental homicide, however, are listed 

separately. The great tantalizer in these reports is the 

category "Misadventure" under the heading "'Hostile.'" Of a 

total of 46,397 hostile deaths in Southeast Asia during the 

reporting period, 

misadventure.12 

1,326 (2.85 percent) are attributed to 

Curiously, two vagrant clues are available. Genera 1 

Percin alleged that 75,000 of the 4,9451,:70 French casualties 

in World War, I were due to amicicide. If his figures are 

correct, amicicide thus accounted for about 1.5 percent of 

total French casualties in the war. Secondly, a survey of 

the first one hundred men wounded in the Korean War reports 

TWO casualties (2 percent) due to friendly fire.14 The 

percentage is (coincidentally?) close to that just mentioned 

for casualties in the Korean War "Accidents in the Use of Own 

Weapans" category (1.6 percent) and the Southeast Asian 

"'Hostile-Misadventure" category (2.85 percent). Inasmuch as 

speculation on such slim and slippery data is likely to be 

misleading, it is perhaps better to turn our attention to the 

less finite, but more satisfying, narrative description af 

specific instances of amicicide. The study of specific cases 

can provide some definite information as to the causes of 

amicicide incidents and thus suggest to today's commanders 

and staff officers ways in which such occurrences may be prevented in the future. 

CHARLES R. SHRADER 

Lieutenant Colonel, US Army 

xii 
1 

ARTILLERY AMICZCIDE 

Introduction 

The development in the late nineteenth century of 

long-range, rapid-fire artillery capable of delivering a high 

volume of extremely lethal explosive shells on targets out of 

sight of the gun positions greatly increased the probability 

that friendly troops might be subject to the fire of their 

own supporting artillery. The concurrent development of 

tactical doctrines designed to capitalize on the technokogical advances in artillery served <only to add to the 

problem. Tremendous artillery preparations, the rolling 

barrage and close defensive concentrations utilizing guns and 

shells of frequently unpredictable performance in indirect 

fire techniques of still primitive efficiency, and the 

absence of dependable, instantaneous battlefield ccmmunications posed significant hazards to friendly troops in both 

the attack and the defense. 

In time both weapons and ammunition have become much more 

dependable, and techniques for controlling indirect artillery 

fire have been improved in both sophistication and 

reliability. Communications on the battlefield have also 

improved dramatically. Nevertheless, friendly artillery fire 

continues to fall on friendly troops in combat. While artillery amicicide may be attributed to a wide range of discrete 

causes, the incidence of such events seems to respond, for 

good or ill, to technological improvements in guns, ammunitian, communications, and position determination devices; to 

changes in tactical doctrine; and, above all, to changing 

levels of competence on the part of the people responsible 

for manipulating the devices. Changing levels of competence 

are, of course, a reflection of native intelligence, training, and discipline. The key factor in artillery amicicide, 

as in other types, is that ever-present element in war, human 

error. 

It must again be emphasized that the available information is far too sparse and uncertain to permit a definitive 

appreciation of the problem of artillery amicicide. AR 

understanding of the causes and effects of artillery amicitide, however, even in broad outline, is an important first 

step toward preventing such occurrences. The narrative 

depiction of selected examples may thus provide better 

1 
insight into the overall problem of artillery amicicide than 

does the manipulation of the uncertain statistical data. 

World War I 

By 1914 artillery weapons had reached their technological 

adolescence but were still far from consistent in accuracy 

and reliability. Communication, an essential element of 

indirect fire control, was also of limited perfection. 

Tactical doctrine for the employment of indirect fire artillery weapons, however, had evolved more rapidly and threatened to outstrip the available technology. Incidents of 

artillery amicicide due to inadequate communications, poor 

survey and fire control, and the sheer volume of artillery 

fire called for by the prevailing tactical doctrine became so 

common in World War I as to be an almost unremarkable aspect 

of the war on the western front. Postwar memoirs of participants on both sides attest to the frequency with which troops 

were fired upon by their own artillery. Indeed, when 

estimating the probable human cost of an offensive operation, 

the thorough staff planner usually included an allowance for 

casualties due to a friendly barrage.1 

The result, according to one French general, was nothing 

less than the outright massacre of friendly infantry by its 

OWl artillery.* Although the true number of such incidents, the actual number of casualties incurred thereby, and 

the practical effect of artillery amicicide in World War I 

are perhaps unknowable, General Percin's calculations of 

75,000 French casualties, 

. . :as a result of a misunderstanding of the 

principle of the offensive, as a result of a lack of 

coordination of the artillery and the infantry, as a 

result of an irrational use of the heavy 

artillery. . .3 

are perhaps not totally unreasonable. The 75,000 casualties 

attributed by Percin to artillery amicicide constitute only 

about 1.5 percent of the total 4,945,470 casualties suffered 

by the French army in World War I.4 

It may be supposed that the other armies engaged on the 

western front fared little better. The Germans certainly 

experienced similar problems, and one particularly guilty 

German field artillery regiment, the 49th, was wryly known as 

the '"48Qth" because of its persistently short shooting.5 

2 
The direct effect on cambat power of so many casualties 

due to friendly artillery fire was probably exceeded -by the 

deleterious effect of such incidents on morale and on the 

willingness of soldiers to leave the comparative safety of 

the trenches. Artillery amicicide was also probably one 

contributor to the well-known distaste of the frontline 

soldier for the denizens of the staff and rear area, among 

whom the artillerists were Gin view af their exposure to 

counterbattery fire) perhaps unjustly included . In a*y 

event, shelling by friendly artillery, although routine, w.as 

seldom accepted, and the World War I infantryman was always 

“prepared to damn the gunners without reflecting on the 

difficulty of their task.‘“6 

World War II: Europe 

By 1939 artillery weapons and ammunition as well as 

communications and fire control procedures were somewhat 

improved, and tactical doctrine had changed significantly for 

the better with respect to amic ic ide . But artillery 

amic ic ide cant inued to be a problem. Technalogical and 

tactical advances appear to have been offset by continued 

heavy use of artillery and the lack of signif icant 

improvements in the means for accurate location of friendly 

troops on the ground. The enormous scale and scope of the 

Second World War also had its effect by requiring the 

frequent employment Of inadequately trained personnel in 

combat operations conducted in a variety of climates and 

terrain. In every case the results were similar: dead and 

wounded comrades, delayed or stifled offensive actions, 

confusion, and a general degradation of combat effectiveness. 

Surprisingly few artillery incidents have survived into 

the published official histories of combat in North Africa. 

Considering the greenness of American troops in the North 

African campaign and the relatively high mobility of combat 

forces, one would expect the record to be replete with 

instances of artillery amicicide. The apparent lack of such 

incidents is no doubt due to the disarray of the sources 

rather than to any real lack of casualties due to friendly 

artillery or mortar fire, although the comparatively better 

visibility afforded by the flat, open desert terrain may have 

been a factor.7 

The conquest of the Italian peninsula, however, was not 

WF thout its -share of friendly casualties due to friendly 

artillery fire. The rugged terrain and stubborn German 

defense from prepared positions made the employment of 

3 
supporting indirect artillery and mortar fire both heavy and 

at times inaccurate. The mountainous terrain of central 

Italy also made the positive location of friendly troops 

somewhat uncertain. 

The assault of elements of the US 85th Infantry Division 

on the Gothic Line at Monte Altuzzo in the Northern &ermines 

between 10 and 18 September 1944 illustrates in detail the 

problems encountered by the small unit leader in maintaining 

cohesion following the shelling of friendly troops by their 

supporting artillery. It also illustrates the difficulties 

faced by battalion commanders and their attached artillery 

liaison personnel in identifying the culpable unit and 

controlling their fires satisfactorily.8 

In the short period of three days (14-17 September 1944) 

the 1st Battalion, 338th Infantry (85th Infantry Division), 

suffered six killed and three wounded in four separate incidents of artillery amicicide on the steep slopes and peaks of 

Monte Altuzzo. Misplaced fire from supporting mortars and 

artillery served on several occasions to delay or halt the 

assault, disrupt the defense against German counterattacks, 

and adversely affect the battalion"s morale and fighting 

spirit. In addition, the fear of striking friendly troops 

hampered the full employment of available firepower. 

Forced by violent and repeated German counterattacks to 

withdraw from advanced positions on Monte Altuzzo on the 

evening of 14 September, Company B, 1/338th Infantry, 

commanded by Capt. Maurice E. Peabody, Jr., was ordered to 

withdraw to the battalion CP at Paretaio. Under cover of 

darkness Captain Peabody began to move his men off the 

mountain, but before they had reached the safety of Paretaio 

they were subjected to fire from American artillery being 

used to Stop a counterattack against the 2d Battalion's 

Company E. Fortunately, Company B suffered RO casualties as 

a result of this shelling, nor ,was the withdrawal 

significantly affected thereby. 

The following day, 15 September, fire from friendly 

artillery or direct fire weapons (tanks or tank destroyers) 

landed on the southwest slopes of Knob 2, then occupied by 

the 1st Platoon, Company C, 1/338th Infantry. The first 

shell struck a few yards below the platoon's position, but a 

few minutes later a second shell landed squarely in the 

middle of the 2d Squad. The second shell killed six men, 

including the squad leader, and wounded two others. The 

survivors were badly shaken by concussion and withdrew 

precipitately to the platoon CF. The platoon leader, 1st Lt. 

William S. Corey, was sure the fire was American and 

4 
attempted to have it lifted, but the shells had cut his 

telephone lines to the Company C CP. After some difficulty 

the supporting artillery units were notified. Al though 

Lieutenant Corey’s riflemen were certain the rounds were from 

a friendly 105mm or 24@-mm howitzer or g-inch gun, the 

liaison officer of the supporting 329th Field Artillery 

Battalion conjectured that they came from either a tank or 

tank destroyer. The actual source was apparently never 

determined. 

Although only one round actually struck the platoon, the 

resulting confusion and the belief that it was from friendly 

artillery had a demoralizing effect on the survivors. The 

dazed and angry men had quickly scattered down the hillside 

and Lieutenant Corey had an extremely difficult time reorganizing his position to face the expected German counterattacks. The shaky men were scarcely capable of maintaining 

a stubborn. defense. Fortunately, the platoon was not 

immediately tested; it later withdrew spontaneously and 

apparently without authorization. 

The memory of 1st Platoon’s misfortune served to restrict 

the use of available firepower in subsequent attempts to take 

the mountain. Further assaults Later in the day by both, 

Companies A and C went unsupported by the companies’ GO-mm 

mortars for fear their fire would hit the attacking elements. 

Two days Later, on 17 September, the 3d Platoon of Company C 

moved out in the assault again. The platoon had proceeded 

about fifty yards aLong the main trail just below and west of 

the main Altuzzo ridge, when friendly supporting fire fell 

fifty yards to its front. The platoon halted and quickly 

called for the fire to be lifted. The platoon leader, 2d Lt. 

Albert J. Krasman, held his platoon for more than an hour to 

insure that the shellfire had stopped. During that time, one 

man was 

shells. lfj 

slightly wounded by fragments from the friendly 

As soon as he was notified of the incident, 1st Lt. 

Dawson L. Farber, Jr., the 329th Field Artillery Battalion 

liaison officer, queried the supporting division and corps 

artillery units to determine the source of the shells falling 

on 3d Platoon. Unable to determine the offending unit (or 

even whether the fire was from artillery, tanks, or tank 

destroyers) all II Corps artillery units were ordered to 

cease firing for half an hour in the Altuzzo area and 1,000 

yards either side of the main ridge. The fire continued, 

however, and ceased only after the artillery no-fire line was 

pushed 1,000 yards north of the crest of Monte Altuzzo. 

Company C resumed its advance at 0200, 17 September, after a 

delay of about three hours. 

5 
Subsequently, on 18 September 1944, the 11338th Infantry 

took Monte Altuzzo and continued its advance up the rugged 

Italian peninsula. The memory of the destruction, confusion, 

and delay occasioned by friendly fire on Monte Altuzzo 

receded as replacements joined and new leaders took command. 

The Long-range effect of this incident of artillery amicicide 

is problematical, but its negative effects on combat power 

probably outweighed the positive ones if on each future 

occasion the use of available firepower was a Little more 

hesitant and the confidence of the infantrymen in their 

supporting artiL.lery a LittLe weaker. 

Operation OVERLORD and the subsequent advance of the 

Allied armies across France and Belgium into Germany brought 

IlO noticeable improvement in the problem of artillery 

amicicide. The progress of offensive action continued to be 

disrupted from time to time by friendly artillery fires, and 

occasionally friendly artillery caused the temporary withdrawaL of friendly forces, as it had on Monte Altuzzo. In 

some respects the conditions of combat in the European 

theater complicated the accurate delivery of indirect fires. 

The greater number of traops and units in the line, extensive 

and irregular frontages, the dense hedgerows of Normandy, and 

heavy forestation of parts of Belgium and Germany, coupled 

with frequent fog conditions and heavy rain and snow, served 

to intensify the difficulties in correctLy locating friendPy 

troops and coordinating supporting fires. The great confusion accompanying the German Ardennes offensive in December 

L944 abso contributed to several incidents of amicicide, by 

both indirect and direct fire weapons. The German forces, 

too, were subject to the same conditions and also experienced 

instances of artillery amicicide. 

On 5 July 1944 Maj. Gen, Robert C. Macon's 83d Infantry 

Division was ordered to attack in the Carentan Peninsula to 

seize the town of Santeny. The attack by the division, which 

had been badly handled by the enemy the previous day, began 

inauspiciously when several rounds from the ten-minute artillery preparation landed on friendly troops, causing a regimentaf executive officer to report frantically that the 

artillery was '"slaughtering our 3d Batta1ion."g The 

incident did not precipitate disaster, but less than two 

weeks Later, shorthy before the St. La breakout, the CP of 

one of the 83d Infantry Division's infantry battalions was 

nearly obliterated by 155~mm howitzer rounds fired by the 

957th Field Artillery Battalion. The incident occurred when 

one of the computers" in the 957th's Fire Direction Center 

*a soldier, not a machine 
(FDC) relayed the wrong charge (he said, “‘Charge 4,"' when the 

mission was computed “‘Charge 5”) to the firing battery. 

Corrective action was subsequently taken to avoid such human 

errors : computers were to repeat aloud to the battalion S-3 

the instructions given to the batteries by telephone.10 

The lines of the opposing forces in Hormandy were 

frequently so close that the use of artillery was limited so 

as not to strike friendly forces.11 Nevertheless, several 

units experienced cases ‘of artillery amic ic ide during the 

early weeks of the fighting on the Continent. A nighttime 

raid by a platoon of the 117th Infantry (30th Infantry 

Division) in late June 1944 into the town of Font-du-St. 

Fromond near Airel on the Vire River was disrupted by 

friendly artillery fire, demonstrating the difficulty of 

coordinating fires at night in the hedgerow country.12 

Similarly, the attack of a battalion of the 8th Infantry (4th 

Infantry Division) on the town of La Chapelle-en-Juger 

following the Operation COBRA bombing of 25 July 1944 was 

brought to a halt by friendly artillery fire.13 

Misplaced American artillery fire also played a role in 

the ill-fated battle of Schmidt in early November 1944 e 

Beginning in the early morning haurs of 6 November 1944 

elements of the 28th Infantry Division’s 2d Battalion, 112th 

Infantry, began to withdraw individually and without orders 

from their defensive 

Vossenack. l4 

positions in the village of 

With great difficulty the battalion officers 

had managed by 1030 to reestablish in the vicinity of the 

battalion command past a defensive line of about seventy 

men. All American infantrymen capable of leaving the eastern 

port ion of Vossenaek had done so, although some American 

tanks remained behind. Despite their presence a call for 

artillery support was made, but the first four volleys fell 

short among the defenders at the newly established battalion 

CP line. One round hit a barn in which men from the 1st 

Platoon of Company E had taken shelter. One man was killed 

and three others seriously wounded, The platoan sergeant, T. 

Sgt. Donald Nelson, and another surviving member of the 

platoon immediately withdrew to the battalion”s rear aid 

station in Germeter. 

The Company E commander, 1st Lt. Melvin Barrilleaux, and 

several of his men were also fully exposed to the friendly 

artillery fire. Barrilleaux rushed into the battalion CP to 

try to stop the firing, and just as he left the CP another 

round exploded nearby, killing his first sergeant and wounding the lieutenant himself in the face and leg. He, too, 

moved back to the aid station in Germeter, as did one of his 

lieutenants, 1st Lt e Clifton W. Beggs, who had been only 
slightly wounded in the shelling. Beggs later discounted the 

seriousness of his wounds and returned to his platoon in 

Vossenack. 

Galls to the supporting artillery lifted the friendly 

fire after only four volleys, but the surviving officers 

found that, by virtue of casualties, their position was 

weaker than ever. The retreat was stopped, and at noon 

American infantry still held half the town of Vossenack. But 

the tenuous defense had been little helped by the friendly 

artillery fire on the American positions. 

The difficulties posed by terrain, weather, and many 

units operating in close proximity to each other contributed 

to many of the cases of artillery amicicide in the European 

theater. Qn 14 December 1944 troops of the 9th Infantry in 

the vicinity of Wahlerschied were fired on by friendly artillery during the attack of the 2d Infantry Division toward the 

Roer River dams. The problems in registration due to dense 

forest, clinging fog, and a lack of specific information QR 

enemy positions were cited as contributing factors.15 The 

WahEerscbied incident reinforced an earlier comment of &aj. 

Gen. Raymond 0. Barton, commanding general of the 4th Infantry Division, tha,t I "'Positive measures must be taken to 

insure the supporting artillery knows where you are.""16 

The problem of coordinating the fires of different units 

operating in the same area is well illustrated by an incident 

involving the assault of the 2d Battalion, 11th Infantry, on 

Fort St. Blaise from the 5th Infantry Division's bridgehead 

across the Moselle River at Dornot on 8 September 1944. In 

order to permit the supporting artillery to shell Fort St. 

Blaise before the final assault, Companies I? and G were 

pulled back 400 yards. They were struck by three rounds of 

friendly artillery that fell short, killing three men and 

wounding several others.l7 The regimental commander, 

Colonel Lemmon, later related that checks made by his liaison 

officers from both the 5th Infantry Division and 7th Armored 

Division artilleries revealed that the short rounds had been 

fired by a 7th Armored Division artillery unit on call from 

his Tth Armored Division artillery liaison officer, who had 

the fires lifted immediately.18 

The confusion engendered in defending American forces 

during the great German offensive in the Ardennes in December 

1944 also led to several instances of artillery amicicide. 

Representative of those incidents is the case of the confused 

withdrawal of the 2d EEattalion, 394th Infantry, and 1st 

Battalion, 393d Infantry, of the 99th Infantry Division from 

the vicinity of Murringen on the night of 18 December 1944. 
Lost, badly mauhed, and greatly confused, the two battalions 

were withdrawing toward Wirtzfeld when they were fired on by 

the artillery of the 2d Infantry Division and suffered 

several casualties.lg The tired and hungry men nearly 

panicked, but the officers and T\1COs managed to restore order 

while a squad leader ran ahead to an American observation 

post and managed to stop the artillery. Most of the 2/394th 

and 1/393d reached Elsenborn in the early hours of 19 

December, somewhat the worse for their handling by the 

Germans and the 2d Division artillery. 

Not all cases of artillery amicicide in the ET0 can be 

blamed on American forces aLone. Some cases reported as 

amicicide may have been due to German fire. In April L945 an 

Amy ground forces observer reported two cases in which 

deceptions by the enemy gave the appearance of friendly fire 

incidents-20 In the first case an attack by the 3d 

Infantry Division in the vicinity of Osheim on 23 January 

1945 was preceded by a twelve-minute artillery preparation. 

The fires were suspended when the commander of the leading 

infantry battalion reported that friendLy fire was faLling on 

his troops. After a quick check the preparation was resumed 

with increased range but again was reported to be falling 

short. An order to cease firing was issued, and about a 

third of the preparation's value was lost. An investigation 

disclosed that the fire was coming from German tanks on the 

east flank. The 3d Infantry Division subsequently developed 

the SOP to continue scheduLed preparations until completed, 

regardless of reports from the front lines, a procedure which 

probably contributed to future cases of genuine artillery 

amicicide. 

In another case, a patrol from the LLth Armored Division 

came under intense German small arms fire and radioed for 

artillery support. The enemy monitored the radio transmission, and when the American artillery reported "on the 

way'" the German artillery promptly opened fire on the 

patrol. Mistaking the enemy fire for friendly artillery 

falling short, the patrol called for "cease fire," thus 

saving the Germans from a heavy artillery barrage.2l 

The Germans did not, however, escape occasional incidents 

of artillery amicicide among rhekr own troops. During the 

attack of the US 30th Infantry and 2d Armored Divisions 

against the West Wall at Uebach on 4 October L944, the 

attacking German forces of the 49. Infantry Di.vi.sian were 

fired upon by their own artikler! and forced to break off 

their assault.22 And again in the so-called Sad Sack 

Affair on 28 December 1944 near Sadzot, Belgium, the attacking 25. - 

Panzer Grenadier Regiment (2. Ss Panzer Division) 

9 
became confused and put mortar fire on its own positions during the course of a night engagement with elements of the US 

3d Armored and 82d Airborne Divisions.23 Neither side in 

the war in Europe had an exclusive claim on human fallibility. 

World War II: The Pacific 

With respect to artillery amicicide, the war in the 

Pacific did not differ substantially from that in Europe. 

Difficult terrain, heavy vegetation, weather, and hard 

fighting against a competent and determined enemy conspired 

to mask the location of friendly troops and to complicate 

coordination. Nor were the effects af artillery amicicide 

any different: the reduction of friendly combat power 

through the loss of friendly troops dead and wounded, 

confusion, and the inevitable degradation of morale, all of 

which contributed to slowed or broken offensive operations 

and to the weakening of defensive positions, Almost every 

major operation in the Pacific Islands was punctuated by 

instances of misplaced friendly artillery fire, the usual 

problems of weather, terrain, and troop location being 

further complicated by the presence of both Army and Marine 

Corps units and the frequent use of naval gunfire, which 

demanded increased coordination. 

The Buna Campaign has been called '"A Leavenworth Nightmarerg; it certainly was with respect to the coordination of 

artillery fires.24 On 25 Navember 1942, an 81-mm mortar 

shell fell short on the command post of Company L, Sd 

Battalion, 126th Infantry (32d Infantry Division), during the 

advance along the Sanananda Road toward Buna in Papua. The 

nephew of an Australian general, Cpt. Jack M. Blarney, a company commander of the 2d/2d Australian Infantry Battalion, 

and one of his men were killed, and six other Australians and 

Americans, includin 

2!? 

the Company L commander, Capt. Bevin D. 

Lee, were wounded. 

On Carlson Island (Kwajalein) in the Marshalls, the late 

advance of the 2d Battalion, 32d Infantry (7th Infantry 

Division), on 1 February 1944 delayed until twilight the 

registration of the 49th Field Artillery Battalion, and the 

first shells of the preparatory fires fell on the 2/32d 

Infantry's positions.z6 On 1.5 June of the same year the 

1st Battalion, 162d Infantry (Slst. Infantry Division), found 

itself pinned down most of the afternoon by friendly artillery and mortar fire, thereby slowing the progress of its 

attack to capture Mokmer Drome on the island of Biak.27 The 

same problem faced the 43d Infantry Division's 172d Infantry, 

attacking toward Hill 351 on Luzon on 11 January 1%5,28 

10 
S'uch incidents were frequently very costly in terms of 

human suffering. On 7 August 1944 the elements of the k24th 

Infantry composing TED Force (Cal. Ted Starr) of PERSECUTION 

Task Force Lost one KIA and three WIA to Japanese forces in 

the battle of the Driniumor River in New Guinea-29 On the 

same day, however, eight men were killed and fourteen wounded 

as a result of faulty mortar ammunition, and the following 

day, 8 August, misplaced artillery fire from the 120th Field 

Artillery Battalion killed four men and waunded twenty-two 

others in the Lst Battalion, 124th Infantry.30 

Naval gunfire could and did prove especially damaging to 

friendby forces when poorly placed. Smoke and dust from the 

preEiminary air and naval bombardment of Parry Island 

(Eniewetok), which began at dawn on 22 February 1944, soon 

masked the target for some of the supporting ships. The 

landing craft started ashore at 0845 and three of the LCI(G)s 

that went in with the first wave to fire rockets were hit by 

5-inch shells from the destroyer Bailey, killing thirteen and 

wounding forty-seven.31 Later the same day the 1st 

Battalion, 226 Marines, called for naval gunfire to suppress 

Japanese artillery. Five salvos from 5-inch naval guns 

eliminated the Japanese artillery and broke enemy resistance, 

but proved damaging to friendly troops and tanks as weLL.32 

The campaign of the 77th Infantry Division on Guam in 

August 1944 also saw several cases of artilkery amicicide. 

Ordered to withdraw from their exposed position 200 yards 

narth of Barrigada at 1430, 2 August 1944, the men of 2d 

PlatOOn, Company B, Lst Battalion, 307th Infantry, had to 

make their dash for safety through an unintentional barrage 

of American artillery fire.33 The fallowing day, 3 August, 

the advance of the 2d Battalion, 307th Infantry, was slowed 

by short artillery rounds that disrupted communications and 

killed some men in the CP area and wounded others, including 

the battalion commander, who had to be replaced.34 On 7-8 

August the 2d Battalion, 306th Infantry, was fired on by 

Marine pack artillery of the 3d Marine Division near Mount 

Santa Rosa.45 

Dense jungle, inadequate maps, and frequent overcast 

conditions made the location of friendly units on Guam 

extremely difficult, and unit commanders rarely knew their 

exact position, with one result being American artillery fire 

on friendly positions. Even when the fire was Japanese, the 

men of the 77th Division were inclined to believe it was 

friendly, and the division commander, Haj. Gen. Andrew D. 

Bruce, had to remind his troops that the Japanese, too, had 

artillery and that they frequently masked its sound by firing 

at the same time as the friendly guns" He finally had to warn 

11 
the infantrymen to "stop accusing our own artillery of firing 

on [our] own troops until the 'facts are known."'34 

The discovery of additional cases of artillery amicicide 

during the World War II campaigns in the Pacific is probably 

limited only by the researcher's time and perseverance in 

reviewing the available records. One additional instance, 

however, is both interesting and instructive in that it 

clearly outlines the problems of coordinating artillery fires 

between units of different services engaged in hard fighting 

on difficult terrain and also sheds some further light on one 

of the most famaus general officer reliefs of the Second 

World War. 

Operation FORAGER, the invasion of Saipan, began with the 

amphibious assault of the 2d and 4th Marine Divisions on 15 

June 1944. By 25 June Lt. Gen. (USMC> Holland M. Smith's V 

Amphibious Corps, including the US Army's 27th Infantry 

Division under the command of Maj. Gen. Ralph Smith, were 

pressing against the Japanese forces in the mountainous terrain in the central portion of the island. The 27th Division 

occupied the center of the corps zone in the area that came 

to be known as Death Valley. The 2d Marine Division was on 

its left, on and around Mount Topatchau, and the 4th Marine 

Division was OR its right. The terrain was extremely steep 

and heavily wooded with numerous cliffs, which made the maintenance of contact with flanking units especially difficult. 

The Japanese defenders were particularly tenacious and frequently mounted violent counterattacks, which pushed back 

friendly forces and further added to the problem of accurately finding friendly lines. 

Dissatisfied with the late and 

the 27th Division on 23 June, which 

the entire operation, Holland Smith 

his command on the afternoon of 24 

his regimental commanders on attack 

day, Major General Smith outlined 

uncoordinated attack of 

he felt had jeopardized 

relieved Ralph Smith of 

June.35 After briefing 

plans for the following 

the situation for his 

successor, Maj. Gen. Sanderford Jar-man, and subsequently 

departed Saipan for Hawaii by seaplane at 0530 on 25 June. 

General Smith's relief subsequently became a cause celebre 

and "Smith vs. Smith" remains one of the more debated reliefs 

of a general officer in World War II.36 

The attack planned by Major General Smith got underway at 

1630 on 25 June, as Companies E and 6, 2d Battalion, 106th 

Infantry, supported by Company B, 762d Tank Battalion, moved 

out up the right side of Death VaLley.37 The supporting 

artillery preparation by Battery A, 106th Field Artillery 

(15%mm), and Battery B, 249th Field Artillery (105-mm), 

12 
which had been in position and firing on the cliffs since 

about 1530, was halted about 1715, because friendly shrapnel 

was landing on the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines (2d Marine 

Division), an Mount Topatchau.38 Both the attack and the 

inadvertent shelling of the Marines continued on the foklowing two days with the 218th Marines continually requesting, 

and often demanding, better control of the artillery and 

mortar fires supporting the 106th Infantry.39 

Qn 29 June the regiments of the 27th Division experienced 

their own problems with their uncoordinated artillery 

fires.bO Maj. Gen. George W. Griner, the new division 

commander, ordered the 3d Battalion, 105th Infantry, to take 

up position on the right, completing the cordon around the 

enemy forces in Death Valley. Meanwhile the 2d Battalion, 

165th Infantry, was to finish the conquest of Purple Heart 

Ridge by taking Hill Able. In order to accomplish its 

mission the 2/165th would first have to recapture Hill King, 

which had been retaken by the Japanese. 

The day's events began inauspiciously when friendly 

artillery fire struck the 3/105th before it could jump off. 

Capt. Alexander C. Bouchard's Company K finally left the 

battalion assembly area at 0700 and proceeded to skirt the 

west slope of Purple Heart Ridge en route to the line of 

departure. Informed by a guide from the 106th Infantry that 

Hill King was clear (it was not) and offered an easy route, 

Captain Bouchard's men had climbed halfway to the crest when 

they came under intense Japanese rifle fire. In The 27th 

Division, Love relates what happened next: 

The company commander then assumed that the fire was 

coming from a small party of stragglers and dispatched 

a squad under Staff Sgt. Carl A. Neidt to circle the 

hill and clean them out . . . . As Neidt started out 

on his patrol the [friendly] artillery preparation 

[for Company E, 2/165th' Infantry, attacking from the 

other side] began landing on Hill King. The first 

fifteen shells landed squarely in the midst of K 

Company, wounding nineteen men. Captain Bouchard 

looked around, saw the crest of the hill, and figured 

that if he could get his men on the reverse slope of 

it he would be safe from the artillery. Without any 

further ado he ordered his men to get over the top of 

the hill, rifle fire or no rifle fire. They were just 

in the act of following out the order when the full 

force of the concentration struck and the dispersal 

which the scramble up the hill had effected acted to 

cut down the casualties.4l13 
As it was, Company K found itself in the middle of a 

sizable Japanese force, but hard fighting by Company K, 

assisted by the assaulting Company E, finally cLeared the 

hill 5f Japanese. Company K had TV stop to reorganize, and' 

it was not until 1300 that it was finally able to take its 

position closing the line around the enemy forces in Death 

Valley. Despite the delay, by 1530 the 27th Division had 

restored contact with the 2d Marine Division on its left 

flank, successfully completing at least an important part of 

the day's mission.42 

During the remaining days until Saipan was declared 

secure on 9 July 1944, reports continued to flow into the 

106th Infantry CP (and presumably into the other regiments) 

requesting cease-fires of friendly artillery falling on 

American troops.43 Even the planes dropping surrender 

leaflets to the Japanese proved inaccurate. On 30 June the 

leaflet aircraft managed to drop two batches of leaflets 

behind and two batches of leaflets in front of friendly 

lines.44 The Marines continued to experience serious cases 

of artillery amicicide as well. Advancing on Garapan on 2 

July I the 8th Marines were tempararily disorganized when 

friendly artillery fire fell into their lines, causing 

forty-five casualties.45 

The relief of Army Naj, Gen. Ralph Smith by USMC Lt. Gen, 

Holland Smith on 24 June and the constantly erratic artillery 

fire af the 27th Infantry Division into the Marine units on 

its flanks during the campaign aroused animosities between 

the Army and Marines that soured their relations in the 

subsequent months.46 Although Ralph Smith's relief was 

ostensibly based on the slow and uncoardinated advance of his 

division on 23 June, there can be little doubt that Holland 

Smith's decision was influenced by the unwarranted shelling 

of his marines by the 27th Division% artillery. 

The Korean War 

The Korean War was fought with the weapons of World War 

II using similar fire direction techniques and troop location 

aids. Tactically it was somewhat different in its greater 

emphasis on small unit defensive positions, numerous small 

patrol actions, and a greater reliance on artillery firepower 

to break large enemy assault formations. The rough terrain 

of the Korean peninsula also made the accurate delivery of 

artillery fires more difficult. In the frequent night 

battles for platoon-size positions perched on steep ridges 

and isolated from the main lines, a position could and did 

L4 
change hands several times in the course of a single night, 

and cases of artillery amicicide were almost inevitable. The 

confusion created by tenuous communications and by defending 

isolated positions at night meant that friendly troops would 

frequently retake a defensive position from the enemy using 

StlK%ll arms, automatic weapons, and band grenades before “’ 

requested artillery support could be called off. The result 

was that eoncentratio'ns fired by friendly artillery units 

frequently struck the very troops they were intended to 

support. 

The records of the Korean War have not been reviewed 

systematically in this study for incidents of artillery 

amicicide, and a single case must serve as an example. On 

the night of 16-17 April 1953 various elements of the 31st 

Infantry Regiment (7th Infantry Division) participated in the 

defense of Fork Chop Hill.47 The battle in the darkness 

was extremely confused, with first one side, then the other, 

and sametimes both at the same time occupying the trenches, 

bunkers, and slopes of the hiL1. At 2307 the position (or 

parts of it> was in the possession of elements of the 1st and 

3d Platoons of Company E, 3Lst Infantry, when "Flash" fires 

were called for. One battery fired the protective barrage 

using VT fuzes. Pfe. Richard Long of the Company E CP group 

failed to see or heed the flare signaling the imminent 

“Flash” fire and was hit by the friendly protective shelling, 

Shortly before dawn (about 0530) on 17 April the 1st 

Platoon of Company L, attempting to regain possession of the 

hill, had just fired accidentally on elements of Company El 

when they themselves were struck by friendly artillery fire. 

One salvo wounded the platoon sergeant (Sgt. Horace Ford) in 

the arm and sent a sliver of shrapnel through the helmet of 

one private, wha was miraculously unharmed. Another salvo 

landed in a communications trench occupied by fourteen members of Company L, getting them all. For many of these men 

it was their second or third wound of the night. One man of 

this group, Private Williams, was sent to the rear of the 

hill to attempt to stop the artillery. There he found three 

medium tanks parked, and as Williams was trying to communicate with the tankers, two more friendly rounds landed among 

the tanks. Williams ducked under the hull of a tank and 

escaped further injury. The sergeant of the tanks apparently 

then radioed and got the fire lifted, 

About 0600, 17 April, shortly after 1st Lt. Joseph G. 

Clemons, Jr., commander of Company K, reached the CP bunker 

on Pork Chop Hill, three rounds of what were apparently 

shorts from friendly artillery exploded in the CF area. One, 

landing directly in the doorway of the bunker, rewounded 

15 
Lieutenant Attridge of Company E, and the other two, exploding about twenty-five yards away, wounded three KATUSAs of 

Company K. 

A thorough examination of Korean War records would probably reveal many similar instances. The rather unique terrain 

and tactical situations encountered by the contending forces 

in Korea made artillery amicicide almost unavoidable. 

Vietnam 

By the 1960s artillery and ammunition technology, FIX and 

troop location procedures and aids, and battlefield communications had all been significantly improved over what was 

available in World War I, World War IL, and the Korean War. 

Improvements in technology were complemented in the Vietnam 

War by an increased awareness at all levels of the need to 

protect friendly soldiers and noncombatants from unintentional exposure to friendly fire. US Forces in Vietnam were 

directed by the commander of the United States Military 

Assistance Command Vietnam to observe scrupulously an elaborate set of rules and 

firepower.4S 

procedures for the employment of 

The MACV Rules of Engagement were intended 

specifically to prevent amicieide and were so specific and 

complex that some officers and men claimed the rules unduly 

limited the successful application of superior American 

firepower. American artillery units in the field also 

adopted numerous procedures designed to insure accuracy and 

to preclude friendly casualties.49 Among the safety 

measures employed generally were: 

1. Firing a smoke shell set far a 20Q--meter height of 

burst as the first round for most observed missions. 

2. Double- or even triple-checking all firing data at 

each echelon from the forward observer to the gun. 

3. Conducting periodic gunner (firing) inspections and 

drills, 

4. Separating and segregating, by lot, projectiles and 

powder for separate-loading ammunition. 

5. Boresighting guns at least twice daily. 

6. Registering guns at least twice weekly. 

7. Conducting frequent staff inspections to insure compliance with safety policies.5O 

16 
Despite both improved weaponry and greater attention to 

safety procedures, Free World Military Farces in the Vietnam 

conflict continued to suffer frequent and destructive incidents of artillery amicicide. A few incidents can be 

attributed to mechanical malfunction of guns or ammunition, 

and only ane of the incidents identified for this study seems 

to have been caused by misidentification of friendly for 

enemy troops or by a lack of technological aids. The available data do suggest, however, that the weapons and procedures of modern indirect fire artillery have become so complex as to exaggerate and compound the most persistent cause 

of artillery amicicide: human error. Errors attributable to 

forward observer mistakes, FDC miscalculations and failures 

to follow established procedures, and gun crew errors accaunt 

for the gr;;t majority of all artillery amicicide incidents 

in Vietnam. 

Lt should be noted that the data on artillery amicicide 

incidents in the Vietnam War used in this study are much more 

detailed than those available for other conflicts. Whether 

this occurs by chance or simply because of a difference in 

reporting and collection techniques is uncertain, but it does 

permit a somewhat more finite classification of incidents 

according to causative factors and pushes forward the element 

of human error as an explanation of artillery amicicide in 

Vietnam.52 

The tactical aspects of the Vietnam War as well as the 

often densely jungled or mountainous terrain contributed to 

incidents af artillery amicicide, The frequent very close 

support of night defensive positions by heavy artillery 

concentrations fired from distant fire bases, and the night 

and day operation of small units on rough terrain, made some 

cases of misplaced artillery fire inevitable. As in earlier 

conflicts commanders and operations officers were not unprepared to accept some casualties from friendly artillery fire 

as the price for the close and continuous fire support needed 

to overcome enemy resistance in the assault or to break up 

heavy enemy attacks on defensive positians, and fires on QWR 

position, not included in this study, were not uncommon.53 

This rather pragmatic approach to the problem was--and 

Is--neither unusual nor unwarranted and was certainly recognized in earlier conflicts. The commander of the 2d 

Battalion, 9th Infantry, for example, told an Army Ground 

Forces observer in Normandy on 1 July 1944, "We must teach 

our soldiers to remember that when they follow the artillery 

barrages and air strikes closely, they eventually suffer 

fewer casualties even though an occasional short may falL on 

them."54 That the ordinary soldier understood and accepted 

this principle is perhaps revealed in the comment of one 
SOldiel- ta his commander on 

hard-fought battle of Prek Klok 

asked, "What did you think of 

strike--were they coming in a 

replied with a big grin, "'Sir, 

over* But God it felt good!"'55 

the morning following the 

I on 28 February 1967. When 

the artillery and the air * 

Little close?" the saldier 

1 was getting sprayed all 

The incidents of Vietnam-era artillery amicicide range 

from the deeply tragic to the almost comicah, Because of a 

lack of central fire control and coordination compounded by 

enemy deception, the Lst and 3d Battalions, 15th Infantry 

Regiment, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), lost more 

than 150 men killed and wounded (to both enemy and friendly 

fire, including smaL1 arms, artillery, and aircraft) in an 

engagement in Cao Lanh Province in May 1965. At the other 

end of the scale, friendly artillery fire blasted the tail 

off a CV-7A Caribou aircraft on short final approach to the 

1st Cavalry Division airfield at An Khe around 1966-67. Not 

considered in this study are training incidents, not al.1 of 

which were restricted in the 1960s to US units. For example, 

on 9 April 1965 at the Bergen-Hohne NATO training area in 

Germany, five 81-mm mortar rounds fired in a demonstration by 

5. Company, Armored Infantry Battalion 92, hit the observer 

zoup of the 6th German General Staff Course, killing ten men 

and wounding twenty others. 

As a result of C. D. B, Bryan's popular book, Friendly 

Fire, and the television drama based upon it, perhaps the 

best known incident of artillery amicicide in the Vietnam War 

is that which Bryan meticulously reconstructs and which 

serves as the initiating event for his story focusing on the 

tragic aftereffects of such an incident on one American 

family.56 On 17 February 1970, Company C, 1st Battalion, 

6th Infantry, of the America1 Division"s 198th Light Infantry 

Brigade, established a night defensive position on a wooded 

hilltop in the vicinity of Tu Chanh, South Vietnam. Because 

of priority missions the supporting artillery, consisting of 

four 105~mm howitzers located on another hilltop some distance away, did not begin registering Company C"s defensive 

fires until the early morning hours of 18 February. The 

defensive targets (or DTs) were correctly planned and plotted 

400 meters from the company perimeter, or about L,30O feet 

from the nearest soldier. The first registration round 

CWP--Airburst-- meters) was right on target, but the second 

round (NE) exploded directly over the 1st Platoon area after 

striking a tree. Two men were killed (including Acting Sgt. 

Michael Mullens, one of the principals of Bryan's story) and 

six were wounded. Later investigation disclosed that the FDC 

Of the supporting artillery unit had failed to calculate 

correctly for the height of the trees on the target hill. 

28 
The first registration round (airburst) had cleared the 

trees, but the second (HE--Impact) had not. It hit a tree, 

exploded, and caused the friendly casualties.57 

Two similar incidents of treetop explosions of friendly 

artillery rounds, perhaps due to the same cause, occurred in 

1968. In April of that year a combined US Special Forces and 

Free Cambodian task foree on an operation west of Song Be 

lost'three to four men killed and more than fifteen wounded 

when a friendly &-inch projectile exploded in the treetops 

over their position. The following month on Mother's Day, LO 

May 1968, Company A, 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry (LOlst 

Airborne Division), suffered two to four men killed and eight 

wounded when one of six rounds with delay fuzes, fired in 

support by the 1st BattaLion, 320th Field Artillery, struck a 

tree, and defLected downward inta the company CJ? near Due 

Pho " 

Artillery fire direction centers were frequently capable 

of other errors as well. In September 1970, incorrect computation of adjustment data by the FDC of a 105~mm battery 

supporting Troop A, 1/7th Cavalry, resulted in a Battery Qne 

Round falling on the troop's position. Fortunately, the 

resultant explosions were loud and frightening but not very 

effective; only one man was lightly wounded. Earlier, probably in 2967 or 1968, one friendly infantryman was kilLed 

when struck by friendly artillery fired on the wrong coordinates. This was the resuLt of a transposition of the target 

grid coordinates during telephonic transmission of the fire 

mission between the tactical operations center CTOC) of the 

infantry division artillery and the operations center of the 

firing artillery battalion and a subsequent failure to 

double-check the elements.of the fire request.5a 

Less obvious but equally fatal errors were also made. 

Three men of Company B, -4th -Battalion, 31st Infantry, of the 

America1 Division's 196th Light Infantry Brigade, received 

minar wounds when their position was struck by six short 

rounds of 105-mm artillery on 8 January 1968 in the Que Son 

Valley. The combat situation required the delivery of 

close-in artillery fire to cover the withdrawal of a platoon 

to align an assault formation. The supporting artillery was 

requested to "'Drop 50" and the resulting rounds fell 200 

yards short of the target and in the center of the supported 

unit. Investigation revealed a calculation error in that the 

"Drop 50" request should have caused the firing unit to go 

from Charge 3 to Charge 2, minimum quadrant at Charge 3 

having been reached. The rounds were fired with Charge 3, 

however, and friendly casualties resulted. A number of 

friendly casualties were caused in another incident when an 

19 
unknown number of 105~mm rounds hit a friendLy position. The 

incident occurred when a ground forward observer (FO) started 

the fire mission but, unabLe to observe the rounds, passed 

the mission to an aerial FO, who made shifts aLong the 

gun-target (GT) line, while the FDC continued to plot using 

the observer-target (OT) Line.59 

Artillery FDCs were also responsible for cases of artillery amicicihe when they failed "to folkow established procedures for obtaining clearance to fire on certain areas. Such 

incidents of incomplete or inadequate coordination frequently 

resulted in friendly civilian as well as friendly military 

casualties. In January 1967 a platoon from the 1st 

BattaliQn, 27th Infantry (25th Infantry Division), in Wau 

Ngia Province lost about twenty men wounded when hit by 

eighteen rounds fired by 173d Airborne Brigade artillery. An 

aerial observer from the Lst Infantry Division had reported 

an enemy platoon in the open and the L73d's artillery, OPCON 

to the 1st Division, received the fire mission. The 1st 

Division Fire Support Element (FSE), however, failed to 

coordinate with the 25th Infantry Division, in whose sector 

the target lay, and consequently the firing unit was unaware 

of the presence of friendly troops in the area. 

Again, the failure of an America1 Division L55-mm artillery battaLion to ckear its fires properly with units responsible for the area of operations resulted in one killed and 

five wounded in Company C, 4th Battalion, 21st Infantry, when 

the artillery unit fired an uncleared interdiction mission at 

night along the road between Landing Zone (LZ) Ross and LZ 

Ealdy near Chu Lai in August 1968, A similar incident 

occurred, also in 1968, when a 10%mm artiLLery battery fired 

an unobserved traiL runner mission resulting in the injury of 

one ARVN soldier and three Vietnamese civilians. The mission 

had been passed from one artillery battalion to another 

because of a boundary change in two brigade areas of operations (AO). When questioned, the fire direction officer 

(FDC} of the original firing battalion declared the area to 

be cleared. The FDO of the receiving artillery battery 

assumed that all required area clearances had been obtained, 

but in realitytargets had been cleared only within the A0 of 

the old firing battalion. 

Gun crew errors also proved to be the cause of many 

incidents of artillery amicicide in Vietnam. Two US soldiers 

were wounded in 1968 as a result of a LOO-mil deflection 

error by a howitzer section of a firing battery. In the same 

year t a 200-mil deflection error by the gunner of a 4.2-inch 

mortar resulted in one registration round falling within a 

friendly battalion defense perimeter, killing four soldiers 

and wounding ten. 

20 
Earlier, in September 1967, Battery B, Jd Battalion, 82d 

Field Artillery, decided to secure a helicopter pickup zone 

(PZ} for Company C, 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, 196th Light 

Infantry Brigade, by continuous fire around the PZ and 

l,OOO-2,000 meters from it. The infantry company commander 

declined the artillery support but was overridden. Battery B 

fired the mission with a l,OOO-mil error, dropping a "Battery 

Six" on the friendly PZ. Fortunately, the rounds landed in 

an open rice paddy, which absorbed most of their force, and 

no friendly casualties resulted. company a, 2d Battalion, 

502d Airbarne Infantry (10lst Airborne Division), was not so 

fortunate south of Phu Bai in March 1969, when a lS5-mm 

howitzer firing at 12,000 meters with a lOO-mil deflection 

error dropped two rounds on the company, killing two men and 

wounding seven. 

Incorrect handling and counting of powder charges by gun 

crews also caused several amicieide incidents. In June 1968 

near Quang Tri, the 1st Cavalry Division's 2d Battalion, 19th 

Field Artillery, wounded one friendly soldier while firing an 

8-inch howitzer with an incorrect charge. Also in 1968 a 

newly assigned member of a 175-mm gun crew selected different 

lots of powder during the course of a fire mission. One 

round landed on a friendly position causing several casualties. In April 1970 a 155~mm howitzer battery at Fire 

Support Base (FSB) Birmingham near Hue failed to count 

charges properly while firing harassment and interdiction (H 

and I> fires at night, As a consequence one round landed in 

a fire base occupied by Company A, 2d Battalion, 501st 

Infantry (10lst Airborne Division), and one man was killed 

and five were wounded. 

One of the most serious incidents of artillery amicicide 

in Vietnam occurred in late 1967 as the result of just such a 

gun crew error in handling powder charges. A US artillery 

unit firing H and I fires at night applied Charge 7 rather 

than the computed Charge 4. The rounds landed in a US base 

camp, killing one man and wounding thirty-seven. The 

victims' unit initiated counterbattery fire that proved 

unfortunately accurate and killed twelve men and wounded 

forty on the offending fire base. The entire incident lasted 

twenty-three minutes and resulted in a total of ninety 

casualties among, and entirely caused by, friendly troopse60 

Infrequently, artillery amicicide incidents in Vietnam 

could be attributed to mechanical failure or defect in guns 

or ammunition. A few days before the main incident described 

in Bryan's Friendly Fire, the same artillery battalion had 

wounded several men in Company B, 1/6th Infantry (198th Light 

Infantry Brigade, America1 Division) when using a howitzer 

21 
with missing teeth in the elevating gear mechanism, the 

mechanism thus indicating a higher elevation than WElS 

actually on the tube.61 

The 81-mm mortar proved exceptionaLly prone to ammunition 

malfunctions, three incidents involving faulty &l-mm mortar 

ammunition being reported in 1968 alone. In January 1968 the 

1st Battalion, 27th Infantry (25th Lnfantry Division) was 

under attack by a North Vietnamese Army (WA) regiment in a 

defensive position thirty kilometers southwest of Cu Chi. 

The battalion commander ordered his 81-m mortars to shift 

their fire to blunt an enemy penetration, and one 81-mm round 

hit the battalion CP, killing one man and wounding eight 

others, including the battalion commander and the supporting 

artillery liaison officer/fire support coordinator. The 

LNO/FSCOClRD personally verified the cause of the short round 

as a Wet powder increment before being evacuated. In 

addition to the one man killed and eight wounded, seven M-16 

rifles and three PRC-25 radios were destroyed. 

Later the same year a US infantry company in a night 

defensive position was registering its planned defensive 

fires when the first 81-mm mortar round fell short, 

thirty-five meters from the tube. Three soldiers were 

wounded, one of whom later died from his injuries. The man 

who died of wounds, on being warned "Short round!'" by the 

platoon sergeant, ran rather than taking cover. The incident 

was attributed to faulty ammunition.62 An almost identical 

incident occurred near Dong Xoai in December 1968. Company 

B, 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry, and Companies A and B, 2d 

Battalion, 5th Cavalry (all of the Is& Cavalry Division), 

occupied a night defensive position with A and B, 2/5th, on 

the perimeter and B, 1/5th, in linear formation across the 

position's diameter. Company A, 215th Cavalry, initiated 

81-mm H and I fire to the west of the night defensive position (NDP). The first round did not clear the perimeter and 

detonated in some cut and stacked brush about ten feet forward of the B, 115th, Cavalry, position. The round burst 

about one meter above the ground and proved exceptionally 

lethal, killing six men and wounding at least fourteen 

others. Again, the probable cause was defective ammunition. 

Only a few incidents in Vietnam involved properly cleared 

artillery fire falling on friendly troops not known to be in 

an area, but lack of coordination and the failure to follow 

established procedures often had tragic consequences. In 

late July or early August of 1964 in Len Than Province the 

headquarters element of the 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry, was 

hit by friendly N and 1 or registration rounds while on a 

search and destroy mission. The rounds hit a rock outcrop22 
ping and killed one man and wounded five others. In August 

1968, Troop A, 3/5th Cavalry (9th Infantry Division), OPCON 

to the 3d Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division as part of a 

"pile on" operation in Quang Tri Province, was [establishing a 

cordon when struck by an 8-inch round. Troap A lost two men 

killed and two men wounded, and an attached infantry squad 

from 119th Cavalry also lost two killed and two wounded. The 

g-inch battery was apparently unregistered and had fired its 

first round '"HE on the deck" using aerial adjustment, which 

failed to locate the friendly troops. At L,Z Ike in Tay Ninh 

Province in September 1969 the 2/8th Infantry (1st Cavalry 

Division) lost one man killed and one wounded by the direct 

fire of Battery A, 2/19th Field Artillery. The 2/8th had 

established listening posts (LPs> on the perimeter of the 

fire base and reported their location to Battery A. The 

actual location of the LP hit, however, was 600 mils from the 

position given to the artillery, 

The errors of forward observers in correctly plotting 

their own position and correctly shifting supporting artillery fires added significantly to the number of artillery 

amicicide incidents experienced in Vietnam. Forward observer 

error has been perhaps the most persistent cause of artillery 

amicicide in every conflict, being, as it usually is, a function of human performance under conditions of severe stress. 

A proportional number of amicicide incidents due to this 

cause have no doubt occurred in every conflict, and the problem is hardly amenable to corrective or preventive action 

other than adequate training, experience, and the inculcation 

of individual coolness under fire, 

In several cases of artillery amicicide in Vietnam the 

proximate cause appears to have been an error by the forward 

observer in correctly locating iiis own position or that of 

the target when calling in supporting fires. On 12 April 

1969 five men of the Aero RifLe Platoon, Troop R, 2,/17th 

Cavalry (10lst Airborne Division), were killed and four 

wounded on a hilltop night defensive position near Hue when a 

radio-telephone operator made a 4,000-meter error when 

calling for fire support. In another incident in Darlac 

Pro vi!t::* in Xb,vember 1970 two Regional Force soldiers were 

wounded when a misoriented FQ called for fire behind his 

position. A US advisor CMCO> to a Vietnamese Regional 

Force/Popular Force (RF/PF) platoon in the vicinity of FSB 

Black Horse in December 1969 was adjusting the fires of 

Battery B, 2140th Field Artillery. The observer-target 

azimuth given by the advisor to the FDC was 1,600 rails (90"2 

off, and the correction he gave brought the friendly 

artillery rounds down on his hilltop position. Ten soldiers 

were wounded, including the advisor. A more unusual incident 

23 
occurred in Rach Gia Province in January 1965 involving the 

3d Battalion, 15th Infantry Regiment (ARVN). The forward 

units of the battalion identified their positions along a 

major canal by using the canal name on a 1964 US map. The FO 

requested fire on the grid coordinates of the position taken 

from a pre-1954 French map. A one-kilometer difference in 

the placement of the canal on the twa maps resulted in the 

strike of the artillery on the forward unit, killing two men 

and wounding four. 

The confusion of FOs under fire has also led to friendly 

casualties. In one 1968 ease a squad leader of a US patrol 

became disoriented during the conduct of a "Danger Close" 

fire mission. He unconsciously faced his second marking (I#> 

round as it struck, estimated 150 meters to the target, and 

gave a correction of "Left 1501' instead of "Add 150."' The 

FIX, having no way of knowing the FO had unconsciously 

changed his observer-target COT) azimuth by 1,600 mils, 

accepted the "Left 150,'" and the firing battery fired the 

correction with "'HE, Fuze Quick.'" The round landed near the 

squad, wounding three men. In another case a battery of US 

artillery fired fifteen 105-mm rounds that detonated near a 

bridge guarded by US and Vietnamese Popular Force (PF) 

soldiers, wounding one US and one PF soldier. A PF soldier 

called in the fire mission through the ARVN district chief, 

who misplotted the target by 1,000 meters and incorrectly 

gave the observer-target direction as 3,200 mils rather than 

320 degrees. An incompetent observer and language difficulties contributed to the incident. 

In several other cases, failure of the FO to follow 

established procedures or the dictates of common sense contributed to the death and injury of friendly troops. In one 

case an FQ with an infantry company requested a 100~meter 

shift away from a defensive concentration, which had been 

previ0usl.y fired in thick growth during darkness, and which 

was apparently much closer to the friendly position than 

estimated. The FYI's target description misrepresented the 

criticalness of the situation, and the FDC ordered the defensive concentration to be fired as a contact mission not 

requiring safe fire adjustment of the battery. As a result, 

three US soldiers were killed and nineteen were wounded. In 

one final instance, one round af 155-11~s artillery fire hit 

friendly troops during a contact mission when the airborne 

artillery liaison officer in a command and control helicopter 

foolishly attempted to adjust the fires of four batteries at 

one .time, became confused, and gave a correction that caused 

the round to fall left and short of the intended target. 

24 
Conclusion 

The evidence of modern cases of artillery amicicide 

remains too incomplete and uncertain. Our examination of 

ninety-eight separate cases of artillery amicicide (see table 

1) does, however, suggest several tentative and partial conclusions as well as directions for future investigation. 

Certain factors, such as visibility and type of tactical 

operation, seem to have little importance.63 Direct human 

error (see table Z), particularly that of forward observers, 

fire direction center personnel, and gun crews under the 

stresses of combat, seems to be the most significant causative factor in artillery amicicide.64 It is also the least 

amenable to preventive measures or dramatic improvement, not 

to say elimination. There is little that can be done to 

avoid incidents of artillery amicicide due to human error 

other than thorough training, careful selection of personnel, 

and experience. 

Modern technology offers some expectation of reduction of 

this type of error, as for example the use of lasers to mark 

targets and digital read-out devices for indicating position. Improvements in the accuracy and mechanical dependability of artillery weapons and production of explosive 

charges consistently free of erratic ballistics have greatly 

reduced the proportion of artillery amicicide incidents due 

to mechanical failures. We have at least reached a point 

where the round goes to its intended point on the earth's 

surface contingent upon proper pointing by the humans in 

charge. 

The use of high technology electronic or laser-based 

position locators down to squad or even individual level, fed 

directly to fire direction computers equipped to block fires 

on positions displaying a distinctive signature, is state of 

the art. The deployment of such aids is limited only by 

time, money, and human perception of their need. But we must 

be alert to the fallacy of relying too heavily on advanced 

technology and complex procedures that outstrip the ability 

of the average human to comprehend or master. 

The influence of tactical doctrine on the incidence of 

artillery amicicide remains too complex to be properly understood at this time, Clearly, the lavish employment of artillery and other indirect fires will continue to be a major 

factor in future war, and to obtain their full value, maneuver forces will continue to be required to operate close to 

their supporting fires. Some friendly casualties, perhaps 

25 
the prevalent 5 percent, thus will continue to be accepted 

and acceptable as the price of close fire support. To avaid 

completely the engagement of friendly troops by friendly 

artillery firing indirectly over great distances with extremely lethal munitions is probably impossible. Nevertheless, in view of the potentially drastic negative effects 

of artillery amicicide on friendly combat power, it should 

remain a goal actively sought. 

26 
TABLE 1 

Artillery Amicicide Incidents by Conditions of Visibility, 

Type af Operation, and Type of Error 

Conflict 

A. Conditions of Visibility 

Visibility Visibility Visibility Total 

Normal Reduced Unknown Incidents 

WW II CEur) 9 7 4 20 

WW II (Pat> 18 4 6 28 

Korean War 3 3 

Vietnam War 2 11 34 47 

B. TvDe of heration 

Retro- Type Total 

Conflict Defensive Offensive Patrol grade Unknown Incidents 

WW II (Eur) 3 13 1 2 1 20 

WW II (Pat> 5 21 1 1 28 

Korean War 3 3 

Vietnam War 16 5 3 23 47 

c. Type of Error 

Misident- MechanTotal 

Type Inciification ical Coord FDC Crew FO Unknown dents 

-- --- 

WW II fEur) 10 1 9 20 

WW II bPac) 2 1 13 12 28 

Kordan War 2 1 3 

Vietnam War 1 4 7 4 9 9 13 47 

3 5 32 5 9 9 35 98 

27 

(i%) (5%) (33%) (5%) (9%) (9%) (36%) (100%) 
TABLE 2 

1969 USARV Study* 

Section I 

Incident/Accident Profile 

Occurrence--Time of Dav 

Morning 

Afternoon 

Night (before midnight) 

Night (after midnight) 

Clearance Causes 

Materiel Causes 

Fire Direction Center Causes 

Firing Battery (Mortar Platoon) Causes 

Forward Observer Causes 

Location Errors 

Indefinite Target Location 

Fire Too Close to Friendly Locations 

Improper Employment by Ground Element 

Artillery 

20% 

23% 

31% 

26% 

15% 

15% 

26% 

21% 

11% 

11% 

Mortar 

13% 

20% 

47% 

20% 

15% 

25% 

18% 

19% 

11% 

11% 

Aviation 

27% 

40% 

21% 

12%" 

7% 

8% 

21% 

18% 

13% 

*David Ewing Ott, Field Artillery, 1954-1973 (Washington, DC, 1975), pa 178. 
AIR AMICICIDE 

Introduction 

The armed military airplane made its formal debut on the 

battlefield in World War I and has subsequently proved a weapon of enormous significance, as increasing aviation technology has extended its range, speed, ordnance load, and general 

sophistication. These very characteristics that make the 

airplane such a potentially useful and destructive weapon 

have also made it a significant threat to friendly troops. 

As the speed and range of miI.itary aircraft have increased, 

the difficulties of control and coordination have increased 

accordingly. Indeed, the present technological sophistication of military aircraft, both fixed and rotary wing, like 

that of modern artillery weapons, threatens to outstrip the 

capabilities of its human operators to control its employment 

adequately. 

Among the 269 cases of amicicide identified in this 

study, incidents of air amicicide exceeded artillery 

incidents in frequency. Ninety-nine of 269 cases (37 

percent) involved the engagement of friendly troops by their 

own aircraft. More significant, in terms of the number of 

friendly casualties caused, air incidents clearly 

predominate, both as to total casualties and casualties per 

incident. In one World War II incident alone, 111 friendly 

troops lost their lives and 490 were w0unded.l 

The effects of air amicicide on friendly combat power and 

the conduct of operations are the same as those of artillery 

incidents, but they are magnified by the greater destructive 

power of air-delivered ordnance. Death and wounds, as well 

as confusion, result from the bombing and strafing of 

friendly troops by their own air forces, and such incidents 

can and do have adverse effects on combat power, the progress 

of offensive operations, the viability of defensive 

positions, and the morale and confidence of troops. Indeed 

it appears that morale and confidence in supporting arms are 

more seriously affected by incidents of air amicicide than by 

artillery incidents. While ground troops may grudgingly 

acknowledge that an artillery strike might have been 

perpetrated by the enemy rather than by friendly guns, or 

even that the friendly artillery could not, for whatever 

reason, know their location, they are far less able to under29 
stand why friendly aircraft, which they could see perfectly 

well, could not see and recognize them.2 

Although as a result of previous study and analysis, the 

available data on air incidents are somewhat more complete 

and detailed than that for artillery amicicide, they too 

remain sketchy and generally unreliable. They do suggest, 

however, that the incidence of both types of amicicide 

respond to the same three general factors. 

Technological advances in aircraft design have increased 

speed, range, and ordnance load. These improvements have 

complicated the problem of adequately controlling the placement of aerial fires, speed alone serving to make enormously 

mare difficult the correct identification of ground troops. 

Concurrent improvements in communications and electronic 

methods for locating both friendly troops and friendly aircraft have offset somewhat the problems of control brought on 

by advancing aviation technology. 

The development of close air support doctrine in World 

War IT ,and the subsequent heavy and frequent use of armed 

aircraft in support of ground combat forces made the 

occurrence of air amicicide inevitable, given the available 

identification and location technology. The addition of very 

close support by armed rotary wing aircraft in Vietnam and 

the use of extremely fast, high performance jet aircraft in 

the close air support role only served to increase the 

hazard. Continued use of tactical doctrines calling for 

close support of ground farces by air forces will, of course, 

do nothing to reduce the possibility that friendly troops 

will fall victim to the fires of their supporting aircraft,. 

just as they may be subject 

fires. 

to their own close artillery 

Just as in the case of artillery incidents, air amicicide 

in the final analysis is usually the result of some human 

error. The rapid advance of aviation technology, even with a 

corresponding increase in communications and position location technology, threatens ta overwhelm the capability of 

even the most competent and best trained human beings to 

cope. It is too much to hope that a pilot, diving at 600 mph 

through smoke while taking evasive action and attempting to 

deliver area-type ordnance accurately, could instantaneously 

and correctly identify camouflaged friendly ground troops 

making maximum use of available cover and concealment. As 

was noted in the "Lessons Learned"' section of HQ, Advanced 

Allied Expeditionary Air Force, letter of 20 July 1944: 

30 
In all air support operations conducted extremely 

close to the friendly troops, there will be the danger 

of bombing and strafing behind the friendly front 

lines. In case of air preparation close to friendly 

traops, this hazard must be recognized and accepted by 

the requesting agency.3 

World War I 

Although the armed military airplane became a significant 

weapon of war in the course of World War I, its slow speed 

and light armament, as well as the existence of clearly 

defined front lines and the absence of a true close air 

support doctrine, rendered incidents of air amicicide few and 

relatively insignificant. Friendly troops on both sides in 

Warld War I were bombed and strafed by their own aircraft, 

but rarely did such incidents have any major impact on the 

course of combat operations. Amid the tremendous easualties incurred by ground weapons, the deaths and wounds attributable to friendly air strikes went almost unnoticed. 

Qne curious World War I incident of air amicicide, 

however, did have some influence in stifling the development 

of a particularly frightful method of aerial bombardment. At 

the very beginning of the First World War, in August 1914, 

the French invented a device consisting of a large metal can 

filled with minuscule steel flechettes and designed to be 

dispersed from aircraft. The use of this weapon was 

discontinued by the French (although the Germans copied and 

used it) when an aviator dropped some of them in errar on a 

detachment of Zouaves.4 It was found that the flechettes 

were poisonous because their fall through the air was not 

rapid enough to clear them of the oil in which they were 

packed, and the resultant wounds became infected. 

Warld War II: Narth Africa and Europe 

The development of a doctrine of close air support and 

the frequent employment of large numbers of friendly aircraft 

in the battle area in World War II caused the problem of air 

amieicide to grow to significant proportions. The danger 

posed to friendly ground troops by. supporting aircraft was 

recognized early in the war, and various procedures, at first 

visual and later increasingly electronic, were developed to 

reduce the occurrence of such incidents. The slow but steady 

31 
progress achieved through better c( mmunications and improved 

air-ground coordination procedures up to June 1944 was 

temporarily undone by the greater intensity of tactical air 

operations in northern Europe and the repeated, and mostly 

unsuccessful, attempts to employ he svy bombers for close air 

support in the months immediatel) following the Normandy 

invasion. Eventually, technology and technique once more 

began to overcome the problem, but despite such improvements 

in all theaters, air amicicide inc ldents throughout the war 

continued to exact a heavy toll on friendly ground forces as 

well as friendly, or at least neutl al, civilian populations. 

The primary factors involved in WOI Id War IL air amicicide, 

other than the adolescent state ( f the art of close air 

support and its technological handmz idens, were clearly human 

ones not amenable to technologic al solutions. Lack of 

coordination, the failure to ide ntify ground troops as 

friendly, and direct pilot or navig: tor errors predominate as 

the causes of most World War II inci lents. 

American air operations in sup 

forces faced their first real test 

North Africa in 1942-43 and in 

adequate systems of air-ground coor 

US Army forces had to endure sev 

aircraft due to poor coordination or 

result of inadequate marking systems 

Although the British, for th 

problems in communications and in i 

ground troops, by 1942 Air Vice Xa 

Desert Air Force (RAF) had deve 

methods for avoiding air amicicide. 

the battle of El Alamein on 30 Cc 

point. Despite a restricted (nine-n 

the bomb line constantly shifted, 

tons of bombs delivered by more t 

friendly forces.5 The results of 

by the RAF could not be immediat 

forces, however, and many hard lesso 

the Americans on their own. 

On 9 November 1942, the 1st E attalion, 60th Infantry, 

commanded by Maj. Percy Dew. McCar‘ .,ey, Jr= 2 failed to mark 

its position with the prescribed identification panels during 

a pause before the final advance one French positions around 

the airfield at Mehdia-Port Lyautey, Morocco. A US Navy 

plane dropped two bombs among the t;roops, and the resultant 

disorganization delayed preparation~s for the attack until 

approaching darkness made it necessary to postpone the 

advance until the following day.6 ~ 

Tort of advancing ground 

during the campaign in 

Sicily in 1943. Until 

lination were worked out, 

?ral attacks by friendly 

misidentification as the 

zir part, faced severe 

dentification of friendly 

:shal Coningham's Western 

loped usually effective 

Tactical air support at 

tober 1942 is a case in 

ile square) area in which 

none of the ninety-five 

nan 300 sorties fell an 

three years@ experience 

ely absorbed by US air 

1s had to be relearned by 

32 
The 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, allocated to the US 

1st Armored Division, was among those units repeatedly hit by 

friendly air strikes during the North African campaign. One 

company of the 701st TD Battalion was attached to the British 

11th Brigade in the vicinity of Medjez-el-Bab, 22-30 November 

1942, The company operated successfully against German Mark 

IV tanks on 23 November 1942, but the following day was 

attacked by US P-38s and "practically all its vehicles were 

temporarily put out of action."7 The disabled vehicles 

were cannibalized, and three tank destroyers were SOOR 

returned to service with another three subsequently repaired. 

Less than two weeks later on 2 December 1942, during the 

battle of the Zaid Pass, the 1st and Reconnaissance Platoons 

of Company B, 701st TD Battalion, were strafed at 1020 by one 

of a flight of four P-38s that flew vver their position. 

Three men were killed and two were severely wounded. The 

author of the unit"s North African campaign diary commented: 

This case of mistaken identity was inexcusable and 

highly demoralizing to us. The explanation was that 

our vehicles were too far out, that is, outside the 

bomb line. As a matter of fact, our vehicles had been 

drawing enemy artillery fire from the vicinity of the 

pass; had they been any closer in the pass they could 

nat have performed their assigned mission.8 

Portions of the 70fst TD Battalion were also among the 1st 

Armored Division units bombed by US B-258 near Station de 

Sened, Algeria, on the late afternoon of 3 February 1943,9 

On a few occasions it was absolutely impossible from the 

air to identify a target as friendly. A German ship was 

loaded with Allied POWs in Tunis on 4 May 1943 and lay 

anchored off Gape Bon for three days before the Germans abandoned it. During that time at Least forty Allied fighters 

strafed the ship and aimed 100 bombs at it. Fortunately, the 

fighter pilots proved somewhat unskilled, only one of the 

bombs, a dud, hit the ship, 

was killed.lo 

and only one of the Allied PWs 

Procedures for the positive identification of friendly 

ground forces from the air had not noticeably improved by the 

time of the Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943. The 

movement of a company of tanks from CCA, 2d Armored Divison, 

toward Canicatti was briefly delayed on 11 July 1943 when its 

march column was attacked by a P-38.11 The incident 

resulted in no casualties or equipment loss, but it was only 

the first of several such attacks during the week of 11 July 

that cost CCA fourteen vehicles and seventy-five men, as 

friendly pilots, alert for the 15. Panzer Grenadier Division, - 

33 
repeatedly mistook the armored vehicles of CCA for enemy 

ones. The prominent display by CCA of yellow smoke, the 

agreed identification signal for friendly troops, did little 

to alleviate the problem. In fact, one pilot, 1st Et. R. F. 

Hood of the 86th Fighter-Bomber Group, who was shot dawn by 

CCA's antiaircraft fire, admitted he had seen the yellow 

smoke ) but did not know its meaning, The 15th Army Group 

subsequently changed from smoke to pennants as the means of 

identification, and thereby reduced the problem. 

Unfortunately, timely improvements in recognition 

procedures did not entirely close the gap in air-ground 

coordination. On 12 August 1943, Lt. Cal. Lyle A. Bernard, 

commanding the 3d Infantry Division's 2d Battalion, 30th 

Infantry, ordered his Company F down from Monte CipolLa to 

relieve Company E in defense of the Brolo River 1ine.l2 

Relayed by German fire, Company F did not reach the flats and 

move toward the river until almost 1600. Lts arrival 

coincided with a prescheduled air strike. Seven A-36s 

arrived over Monte Cipolla about 1600 and, probably as a 

result of pilot misorientation to the ground, dropped two 

bombs on the battalion CP, causing nineteen casualties. They 

dropped the remainder of the bombs on the supporting howitzer 

positions of Battery A, 58th Armored Field Artillery 

Battalion, destroying the remaining fsur howitzers. Although 

Company F was unharmed, Lieutenant Colonel Bernard, deprived 

of his remaining support for the two companies along the 

river, was forced to withdraw his troops onto Monte Cipolla 

in anticipation of a final stand against the opposing 

elements of the 71. - Panzer Grenadier Regiment. 

Interviews conducted by Army Ground Forces observers in 

Sicily during and after the campaign testify to frequent 

bombing and strafing of friendly troops by Allied aircraft 

despite the supposedly agreed upon use of panel markers and 

yellow smoke as recognition signals. Although yellow smoke 

was probably difficult for the pilots to distinguish from 

dust and smoke from fires on the ground, the opinion of 

ground troops was clearly that the pilots were unfamiliar 

with the meaning of yellow smoke despite the understanding of 

the ground forces that it was to be the primary recognition 

signal.13 Same improvements in air-ground coordination 

were made during the Sicilian campaign, however. Noticeable 

advances in the use of radio communication and mobile air 

control parties would prove of tremendous value as the war 

moved onto the continentelk 

The destruction of one of the oldest centers of Western 

Christian monasticism, the venerable Abbey of Monte Cassino, 

by Allied aerial bombardment in March 1944 is still viewed by 
many as not only a clear-cut case of amieicide but a crime 

against civilization itself. Whether the abbey was occupied 

by the Germans has little bearing on the fact that the 15 

March bombardment of Cassino resulted in the first major air 

amicicide incident of World War XI. between 0830 and 1200 on 

15 March 1944 some 435 Allied heavy and medium bombers 

dropped more than 1,100 tons of L,OOO-pound HE bombs in the 

Cassino area.15 Some of the bombs from the heavies fell on 

Italian civilians and Allied troops in the area, demolished 

the HQ trailer of the British Eighth Army commander three 

miles away, and among the Allied soldiers caused casualties 

of 28 killed and 114 wounded.16 At the same time Allied 

aircraft bombed friendly troops (including a French corps 

headquarters) in the town of Venafro, ten miles from Cassino, 

killing 57 Allied soldiers and friendly civilians and 

wounding 179.17 

The mistaken bombings at Cassino and Venafra were due to 

several causes. General Mark Clark attributed the tragic 

errors to "poor training and inadequate briefing of personnel," and the commander of the 6th New Zealand Brigade later 

stated: 

Heavy bombers operating from 14,000 feet are not 

accurate enoug,h for this class of close support. 

Medium and light bombers are excellent. If the air 

farce could have used more medium bombers and still 

kept up the weight of the attack, the results would 

have been better.18 

The malfunction of a bomb rack on one lead aircraft had 

resulted in the dropping of forty bombs on friendly 

positions, and investigation revealed that poor air 

discipline, obscuration of the target by smoke and dust, and 

the lack of specific aiming points also had contributed to 

the fiasco.19 Regardless of the causes, the effects were 

noticeable. Confusion reigned, friendly troops and civilians 

were killed and injured, and the planned ground attack 

proceeded slawly and unsuccessfully. 

The greater scale and intensity of both air and ground 

operations in Western Europe after the Normandy invasion in 

June 1944 increased both the number and seriousness of air 

amicicide incidents. And to the hazards of being strafed by 

fighter aircraft or bombed by attack planes was added the 

even greater hazard of serious heavy bombing by medium and 

heavy bombardment aircraft employed in the close support 

role, as at Monte Cassino. 

35 
As a result of detailed wartime and postwar analyses of 

air operations in the European theater, the occurrence of air 

amicieide, its causes and effects, and the measures taken to 

prevent it are much better documented than are events in 

other theaters.20 Thanks to the efforts of both official 

agencies and civilian historians, only a brief review af the 

most significant incidents need be made in this study. 

It should be pointed out that during the course of the 

campaign in Europe, constant attention was given to the 

problem of properly coordinating air-ground operations. 

Procedures for marking friendly positions, ground-to-air 

radio communications, and radio/radar position location aids 

were all improved. They reduced, but did not eliminate, the 

number of amicicide incidents. Until the very end of the war 

in Europe, pilot and navigator/bombardier errors continued to 

result in friendly casualties, broken attacks, and the 

degradation of friendly combat power. 

Allied ground forces on the Continent were not the only 

victims of Allied air power. Friendly civilians as well as 

neutral populations were occasionally the unintended targets 

of massive air operations, Before proceeding to describe 

incidents of purely military significance, a brief, separate 

account of representative incidents involving the bombing of 

friendly or neutral territory may be instructive. 

The US Army Air Forces bombed neutral Switzerland several 

times between 1943 and the end of the war in 1945, causing 

severe diplomatic repercussions, as well as death, suffering, 

and heavy property loss among the presumably unintended 

victims. Helmreich has attributed these incidents to a 

number of causes including bad weather, faulty equipment, and 

incompetence or excess zeal on the part of air crews; but he 

also suggests that the bombings may have been other than 

accidental.21 

On 1 April 1944, fifty American planes bombed the Swiss 

city of Schaffhausen, causing serious fires and property 

damage and killing or wounding more than 100 civilians. On 

22 February 1945, even as presidential aide Laughlin Currie 

was laying a wreath on the graves of the Swiss victims of the 

Schaffhausen bombing, US planes took part in thirteen 

separate attacks on Swiss territory, the most serious of 

which was at Stein-am-Rhein, only twelve miles from 

Schaffhausen. The 22 February incidents killed or wounded 

more than thirty Swiss citizens. 22 

On 4 March 1945, six B-24Hs dropped 12.5 tons of high 

explosives and 12 tons of incendiaries on Zurich, and nine 

36 
others dropped 16.5 tons of high explosives and 5 tons of 

incendiaries on Basel. 23 The incidents, attributed to 

faulty equipment, bad weather over France and haze over 

Switzerland, navigational errors, and misplaced zeal, resulted in heavy damage to the main Base1 railway freight station, seven civilians injured in Basel, and five civilians 

killed, twelve hospitalized, and twenty-two families left 

homeless in Zurich. 24 The pilot and the navigator of the 

lead plane in the Zurich raid were subsequently tried and 

acquitted of violating the 96th Article of War. Their courtmartial was held at HQ, 2d Air Division, 8th Air Force, at 

Horsham St. Faith, England, on 1 June 1945, and was presided 

over by Col. James M. (Jimmy) Stewart.25 

Friendly civilians in towns closer to the battlefront 

also suffered severely from Allied air bombardment. As a 

result of a “gross error--due to poor navigation, poor headwork and misidentification of target” one group of medium 

bombers of the 9th Bombardment Division hit the Belgian town 

of Genck, twenty-eight miles west of the assigned target, on 

the morning of 2 October 1944, 

and wounding forty-five.26 

killing thirty-four civilians 

Two of the best documented incidents of this type 

occurred at Malmedy , Belgium, on 23 and 25 December 

1944.2’ At 1526 on 23 December 1944, six 13-26s of the 322d 

Bomb Group (9th Bombardment Division, Ninth Tactical Air 

Force), flying in support of the 30th Infantry Division, then 

heavily engaged with Kampf gruppe 

Division) near La Gleize, %htyy-$x q50-==& dropped 

General Purpose bombs on Malmedy. At least thirty-seven 

American soldiers from the 120th Infantry Regiment of the 

30th Infantry Division and a considerable number of civilians 

lost their lives, the town was set on fire, and a mass panic 

of the civilian population was averted only with great 

difficulty.28 The assigned primary target for the bombers 

had been Zulpich, the railhead for the German Seventh Army, 

thirty-three miles away, which, unlike the hilly and forested 

terrain around Malmedy, lay in the open. Both ceiling and 

visibility during the mission were unlimited, and enemy 

counterair activity was minimal. The pilots realized they 

had not hit Zulpich, but believed they had bombed Hammersum, 

a town six miles northeast of Zulpich, and reported excellent 

results. Flight cameras had operated 100 percent during the 

mission, and a photo-interpreter later identified the bombed 

town as Malmedy. The reason given for the mistake was 

personnel error. 

Two days later, about 1600 on 25 December, four B-26s of 

the 387th Bomb Group dropped sixty-four 250-pound General 

37 
Purpase bombs on Malmedy. Again, the pilots realized they 

had made an error and believed they had bombed the town of 

Born rather than the assigned target of St. Vith, and again 

the photo-interpreter disclosed the actual site of the 

bombing. Plane-to-ground visibility in this case was three 

to four miles, and again the apparent cause of the incident 

was listed as personnel error. In both cases poor navigation 

and inability to properly identify the target resulted in 

significant friendly military and civilian casualties. 

From the beginning of close air support operations on the 

Continent, the Allied air forces received mixed reviews. 

Although grateful for the assistance provided by Allied 

fighter-bomber aircraft in the hard fighting against the 

German defenders, many ground soldiers subscribed to the 

opinion of the 1st Infantry Division staff officer who made 

the following entry in the division E-3 journal for 7 July 

1944:. 

Wish you would tell the Air Corps we don't want them 

over here. Have them get out in front [and] let them 

take pictures [but] no strafing or bombing.29 

The attitude changed somewhat as air-ground coordination 

improved, amicicide incidents declined, and close air support 

proved its value in the battles across Prance and Belgium and 

into Germany. 

During the attack on Cherbourg on 22 June 1944, ground 

forces (primarily the US 9th and 79th Infantry Divisions) 

undertook to mark the front lines by yellow smoke and the 

bomb line, 1,500 yards in advance, by white smoke fired from 

mortars. 30 The results were uniformly poor. No yellow 

smoke was visible, and every few minutes a mortar would fire 

two or three shells, the smoke from which quickly dissipated 

in the wind and dust af battle.31 The result of poor 

marking was inevitable. Some planes of the British 2d TAP 

(EtAFl and the American Ninth Air Force attacked the wrang 

area and caused friendly casualties. The proportion of the 

aircraft so doing was relatively small (perhaps only ten out 

of 700 fighter-bombers involved) but the small proportion did 

little to alleviate the pain and destruction in the units 

hit. Ironically, Generals Schlatter and Nugent from HQ AA&Q? 

were strafed by the RAF en route to Lt. Gen. J, Lawton 

Collin"s VII Corps HQ to witness the air attack.32 

An Army Ground Forces observer, Cal. Charles H. Coates, 

was present on 22 June in the CP of the 314th Infantry 

Regiment C79th Infantry Division), which was strafed by P-47s 

and which reparted casualties in the regiment's front lines 

as well. Colonel Coates commented: 

38 
The artillery was called upon to mark the bombline 

with WP but the WP shells were lost in the smoke of 

bombing. There may be a need for air burst smoke for 

marking bomblines or bombing observation so that the 

marking can be seen above the smoke of previous 

bombing.33 

The executive officer of the 2d Battalion, 314th Infantry, 

Haj. D. D. Woggsdon, also commented to Colonel Coates: 

We have got to have a better way to identify our front 

lines to the air, Before we jumped off on the high 

ground before Cherbourg, the smoke of bombing drifted 

on us and even though we were firing WP from artillery 

the air people could not see it and dropped some bombs 

on my battalion.34 

Although in general the ground forces commanders in the 

Cherbourg operation were satisfied that the use of smake as a 

marker was "moderately effective and should be continued in 

air support operations," the air forces were not so well 

satisfied, and they remarked: 

Smoke should be continued to mark targets, friendly 

boundaries, and the bombline in air support operatians 

until a better marking method is devised, It is 

believed, however, that yellow and white smoke are the 

least desirable of all calors for the purpose. Both 

tend to blend with the smoke and dust of battle. The 

British are using brilliant colored smokes (red, blue, 

purple) which can be distinguished both from smoke and 

dust and from the natural ground colors. Smoke is not 

entirely satisfactory, but it is the most practicable 

solution to the problem of marking found to date.35 

The other major alternative available at the time, using 

display panels, was not much more effective. Six weeks after 

the Cherbourg operation the C-3 af the 4th Infantry Division 

noted: 

Once our own planes started strafing our CPs and 

everybody started putting out panels, then the air 

never did know where the front lines were.36 

HQ AAEAF concluded that the great majority of gross 

bombing errors (those causing heavy losses to friendly 

troops) in the Cherbourg operations resulted from misidentification of the target by the bombardier due to a lack of 

obvious reference points and noted that the OBOE bombing 

method (using radio beacons and radar positioning) would pre39 
elude such errors.37 Eventually, electronic marking SYSterns would indeed alleviate the problem of air amicicide, but 

before such aids could be fully developed, Allied ground 

forces would suffer the most severe friendly air attack of 

all time. 

The St. LS breakthrough of 24-25 July 1944, code-named 

Operation COBRA, has been characterized as "a well-planned 

and successfully executed attack by combined air and ground 

forces," as indeed it was when viewed in general perspective. 

COBRA was the most massive close air support effort ever 

attempted and was properly exploited by ground forces that 

subsequently destroyed German resistance, caused their 

withdrawal behind the Seine, and paved the way for the rapid 

advance of Allied forces to the German border.38 COBRA 

also resulted in the most devastating incident of amicicide 

ever to occur. 

The detailed story of the planning and execution of 

Operation COBRA and the accompanying close air support operations is set forth by Martin Blumenson in Breakout and 

Pursuit (chapters 11 and 12). The details of the supporting 

air operations are also recounted in part 1-C of The 

Effectiveness of Third Phase Tactical Air Operations in x 

a The essence of the 

breakthrough plan was a massive, short, and violent attack by 

medium and heavy bombers on a rectangular target 7,000 yards 

wide and 2,500 yards deep immediately to the south of the 

Pkriers-St, Li3 highway, This was the prelude for the main 

attack on a narrow front between P&riers and St. La by the US 

VII Corps, supported by the US VIII Corps on its right and 

the US V Corps on the left, with the US XIX Corps prepared to 

exploit the breakthrough. The operation was carefully 

planned, and presumably adequate provisions were made to 

avoid bombing friendly troops in the course of the 

preparatory air bombardment. To that end, friendly troops 

were to be withdrawn 1,200 yards from the target area, while 

the heavy bombers would bomb no closer to the friendly troops 

than 1,450 yards, the 250-yard gap to be covered by more 

accurate fighter-bombers. The relatively straight and well 

defined Pgriers-St. I.3 highway was to form the no-bomb line; 

in the absence of direct ground-to-air communications, 

artillery was to mark the northern Limit of the heavy bomber 

target with red smoke at two-minute intervals; the ground 

troops were to mark their positions after withdrawal with 

identification panels; and the Allied white star insignia on 

all. vehicles of participating units were to be repainted-39 

were to be divided into three main 

of heavy bombers (1,500 aircraft 

40 
from the US Eighth Air Force) were to bamb the target for one 

hour from H minus 60 minutes. Ten groups of medium bombers 

(396 aircraft from the 9th Bombardment Division) would then 

attack specified targets within the box from H-Hour to H plus 

30 minutes. Finally, fifteen groups (700 planes from the IX 

and XIX Tactical Air Commands) of fighter-bombers would 

attack the 250-yard strip north of the heavy bombing area in 

two twenty-minute phases, one immediately before and one 

immediately after the heavy bomber attacks. Although General 

Cmar Bradley, the First Army commander, desired that the bomb 

runs be made parallel to the front lines, the Eighth Air 

Force insisted that the approach be at right angles to the 

target (and consequently the run-in would be over friendly 

positions) to minimize German counterair and to speed passage 

of the aircraft over the target area.41 

Operation COBRA was scheduled to begin on 18 July, but 

poor weather caused several postponements, The attack was 

subsequently rescheduled for 1300 on 24 July, and many of the 

planes were already in the air when poor visibility over the 

target again caused the cancellation of the mission. Many of 

the aircraft could not be recalled in time, however, and 484 

of the heavy bombers and 378 of the medium bombers, as well 

as the first increment of fighter-bombers, in fact attacked 

the target.42 Not only did the abortive air attack alert 

the Germans to the coming ground attack, but the results of 

the partial aerial bombardment were generally poor. Only 15 

percent of the bombs from the heavies landed in the target 

area, and only twenty-one of the thirty attacking medium 

bomber units placed their bombs in their target areas.43 

Results achieved by the fighter-bombers were somewhat better. 

More significant, however, the confused bombing in poor 

visibility resulted in several instances in which friendly 

troops and equipment were destroyed. One of these incidents 

proved extremely costly. One fighter-bomber pilot made a 

mistake in landmark identification and inadvertently bombed 

an American ammunition dump.44 When one of the heavy 

bombers was hit by a packet of chaff, the bombardier in a 

reflex action hit the bomb release toggles and dropped his 

bombs on the American airfield at Chippelle, destroying two 

manned planes on the ground and damaging others.45 The 

lead bombardier of another heavy bomber had mechanical 

difficulty with his bomb release mechanism and prematurely 

released his bombs on 30th Infantry Division positions 2,000 

yards north of the Periers-St, L6 highway, the other fifteen 

planes in his group also dropping on his lead.46 Five 

medium bombers of the 9th Bombardment Division released their 

bombs seven miles north of the target, also on troops of the 

30th Infantry Division.47 

41 
The effect of the abortive air attack and short bombings 

Was disastrous, The 30th Infantry Division suffered 

tWMtty-fiVe men killed and 131 wounded.48 Most of the 

casualties were from the 2d Battalion, 120th Infantry 

Regiment, 

attack.49 

which had been in the open waiting to lead the 

Even men in foxholes were buried by near misses 

or obliterated by direct hits. Confusion reigned as 

commanders at various echelans attempted to determine whether 

the ground operation was to continue as planned, It did 

not. Both the full aerial bambardment and the ground attack 

were rescheduled for the next day. 

Improved weather on 25 July permitted the preparatory 

bombing and ground breakthrough to take place as planned, but 

short bombing took an even heavier toll and nearly wrecked 

the offensive. In three instances on 25 July heavy bombers 

dropped their Loads on friendly positions.50 In the first 

case a lead bombardier made a visual release after failing to 

synchronize his bomb sight, and twelve B-24s thus dropped 470 

100-pound I-EE bombs behind friendly lines. Eleven B-24s 

dropped 352 26Q-pound fragmentation bombs on friendly troops 

when another lead bombardier failed to identify the target 

properly and dropped at the point where the bambs af a 

previous strike, made in error, were seen to explode. In the 

final instance, a command pilot ordered bombs away while his 

bombardier was still sighting for range, in the belief that 

the bombing was to be by wing rather than by group. Fortytwo medium bombers of the IX Bomber Command also failed to 

identify their targets properly through the thick smoke and 

dropped their bombs on friendly positions. 

Again, the results of these bombing errors were 

disastrous. The leading battalion of the 47th Infantry (9th 

Infantry Division) and the 30th Infantry Division's 120th 

Infantry Regiment and 743d Tank Battalion were particularly 

hard hit, and the 92d Chemical Battalion, attached to the 

30th Ii-tfantry Division, was completely knocked out of 

action. The quick substitution of less damaged combat 

units and the grim determination on the part of ground force 

commanders and the troops permitted the planned assault to 

take place with only a minimum delay. The hard hit L20th 

Infantry jumped off only thirty minutes behind schedule.52 

The 957th Field Artillery Battalion, which had nearly thirty 

casualties and lost its entire Fire Direction Center when a 

B-17 dropped a string of bombs through the CP area, transferred its fire direction functions to one of its batteries 

and still fired all its planned fire missions for the day.53 

The 30th Division alone suffered 662 casualties from 

friendly bombing on 25 July: 64 killed, 374 wounded, 60 

42 
missing, and 164 cases of combat fatigue induced by the 

stunning effects of the heavy bombardment (for a twa-day 

total of 814 casualties). Unknown to most of the participants, air or ground, was the death of Lt. Gen. Lesley J. 

McNair, former commanding general of Army Ground Forces, who 

was killed instantly in the bombing while observing with the 

assault elements of the 2/120th Infantry.54 

The total friendly casualties from the second day of 

erroneous bombing were 111 killed and 490 wounded.55 Aside 

from the human errors already mentioned, contributory factors 

to this frightful toll included improper briefing on the 

bombline and poor visibility due to dust and smoke that 

obscured reference points and the Pgriers-St. L6 road, 

causing a parallel road three miles to the northeast to be 

mistaken for the bomb line. 

Despite the devastation of friendly forces, Operation 

CQBRA proved a resounding success. Although perhaps as few 

as 3 percent of the enemy troaps were killed by the bombing, 

the massive air attack stunned and demoralized the German 

survivars and severely disrupted their defense, making 

possible the successful breakthrough of Allied forces and 

precipitating what eventually develo ed into a general withdrawal of German forces to the Rhine. 5 6 

The mistaken bombing in Operation COBRA did have some 

positive effects. The demonstrated inadequacies of smcake and 

panels as aids for target identification in close air support 

operations caused great attention to be focused on the 

development of good technical methods, a highly effective 

marker system was 

csmmunications 

improx$.s;~uently developed, and a.ir-g;;;: 

As a result of Operation 

the concept of close air support by heavy and medium bombardment aircraft was nearly abandoned altogether by ground force 

personnel. General Eisenhower in fact swore never to use 

heavy bombers in close support operations again, but later 

relented.58 Until better procedures were developed for 

controlling the heavies, however, ground force commanders 

generally preferred to have their close air support provided 

by fighter-bombers, which were not only more accurate, but 

boosted ground force morale by visibly delivering their ordnance on enemy positions.5g 

The Lessons learned at so high a price in Operation COBRA 

did not, however, bring about even a temporary cessation of 

the use of heavy and medium bombers in the close air support 

role. Several additional serious amicicide incidents 

unfortunately occurred before substantial improvements in 

remote bombing, troop marking, and air-ground communications 

43 
technology were forthcoming. The use of bombers in Operation 

TOTALTZE (Caen IT> on 7-% August 1944 resulted in Canadian 

and Polish casualties of twenty-five killed and 131 wounded, 

including a division commander, when they were mistakenly 

bombed by two groups of bombers. Most of the casualties were 

in the 1st Polish Armored Division.60 The errors were 

attributed to: heavy enemy antiaircraft fire during runs 

parallel to the front lines when only light antiaircraft 

fires were anticipated; inability to see the colored smoke 

markers from the air and the obscuration of landmarks by 

smoke and dust from bombing; inexperienced crews; and the 

continued lack of adequate procedures and equipment for certain identification of safety lines in the target area.61 

During the main effort of Canadian and Polish ground 

units against Falaise on 14 August 1944, more than 800 RAF 

and RCAF heavy and medium bombers supported the attack by 

dropping 3,700 tons of bombs in the target area. Canadian 

and Polish units suffered almost 400 casualties when several 

bomb loads fell short of target, but the attack nevertheless 

advanced to within three miles of Falaise on the first 

day.62 

The reduction of Fortress Brest between 25 August and 18 

September 1944 proceeded much more satisfactorily in terms of 

air amicicide losses. No Allied casualties were attributed 

to friendly aircraft, but the Ninth Tactical Air Force Operational Research Section nevertheless recommended on 2% 

September that medium bombers be used only on specialized 

targets and not in direct support of ground troops and that 

Petro-gel1 (napalm) be used sparingly in close support 

missions by fighter-bambers because of its unpredictable 

trajectory characteristics.63 

After the disastrous COBRA, TOTALIZE, and Falaise bombings of friendly troops, great emphasis was placed OR development of an effective system of close cooperation between 

ground forces, particularly tanks, and the presumably more 

accurate fighter-bombers. The system that evolved relied on 

the exchange of liaison officers and more efficient 

air-ground communication equipment and proved a vital 

ingredient in the rapid advance of the US Third Army across 

France.64 But the utilization of fighter-bombers, 

primarily the P-47 Thunderbolt, did not eliminate attacks on 

friendly troops by their own supporting aircraft. Human 

errors continued to result in significant damage to the 

bodies, equipment, and morale of Allied ground forces, 

Indeed, in its early versions tank-fighter coordination 

left much to be desired. At sunset on 9 July 1944 six medium 

44 
tanks of CCB, 3d Armored Division, fresh from a serious 

encounter with an American tank destroyer outfit, were 

strafed by US aircraft at Hill 91 near Hauts-Vents 

(Normandy). The air strike, which had been requested earlier 

in the day and was dela ed by bad weather, fortunately caused 

no friendly casualties. z 5 

About 1900 on 26 July 1944, Company A, 1st Battalion, 

66th Armor CCCA, 2d Armored Division), attached to the regiment's 2d Battalian, was moving through the town of Canisy in 

an attack toward St. Martin de Bon Fosse (Normandy) when it 

was dive-bombed by an Allied P-47 and lost one tank. The 

incident occurred despite the use of identification panels on 

the American tanks and, presumably, the use of the standard 

yellow smoke signals.46 The veteran tankers of CCA no 

doubt recalled the "bad old days" in Sicily for their newly 

joined comrades. 

Fighter-bombers also inadvertently bombed and strafed 

several units of the 

Division near 

alr--adi9 bj;;;T67use;ur;igth t;;fa;;;; 

Troisgots on 

division's desperate defensive battle at Mortain in early 

August, supporting US P-47s and rocket-firing RAF Typhoons 

often hit friendly positions, one regiment (the 120th 

Infantry) being hit by friendly aircraft ten times on 7 

August alone. On the same day CCB, 3d Armored Division, 

operating in support of Company I, 3d Battalion, 119th 

Infantry, in the same battle, lost two tanks to Allied 

dive-bombing.68 

Even the Army Air Forces' own advanced headquarters were 

not immune from air attack by Allied planes. On 15 August 

American fighters strafed the headquarters of the US Third 

Army and XIX Tactical Air Command' near Laval, as well as 

friendly troops southwest of Carrouges. Friendly antiaircraft gunners around Lava1 proved resentful and downed one 

fighter from the VIII Fighter Command.69 

The concept of close air support by heavy and medium 

bombers was revived in the fall of 1944 as Allied units 

approached the borders of Germany. The 2d Armored and 30th 

Infantry Divisions found themselves preparing to cooperate in 

the breaching of the West Wall north of Aachen in late 

September and early October 1944. The 30th Infantry Division 

was to cross the Wurm River three miles above Aachen and 

penetrate the German defensive line. The 2d Armored Division 

was then to exploit the penetration. The operation, codenamed CISCO, was originally to be supported by "the greatest 

concentration of planes in close support of American ground 

troops since the 'carpet' bombing along the P&riers-St. L6 

45 
road in Normandy."?Q To the great consternation of the 

30th Division planners, the air support was to involve more 

than 3,300 planes, including more than 1,000 heavy bombers. 

Fortunately, the heavies did not become available, and the 

entire air operation was greatly reduced in scale. 

Eventually only 360 A-20 and B-26 medium bombers of the 9th 

Bombardment Division and 72 P-38 and P-47 fighter-bombers of 

the IX Tactical Air Command were scheduled to take part. 

The concern of the 30th Division planners for troop 

safety, greatly heightened by their memories of the COBRA 

fiasc5, was further increased after a flight of P-38s dropped 

four napalm bombs within the division lines, destroying an 

ammunition dump and six vehicles and killing two men and 

wounding four during an abortive attack on the West Wall on 

22 September. The division commander, Maj. Gen, Leland S. 

Hobbs, and his staff insisted that the Operation CISCO bomb 

runs be made over enemy territory parallel to the Wurm River 

and that the target areas be marked with the traditional 

smoke. The air planners for their part insisted on a perpendicular approach to avoid enemy flak and refused the use of 

smoke far fear it might obscure the target and/or friendly 

lines as had occurred in Normandy. 

Although no friendly troops were hit, the air strikes 

that began at 0900 on 2 October under a scattered overcast 

proved a failure, in part perhaps because of excessive 

caution in planning and execution. The bomb runs were made 

perpendicular to the front lines. Many of the bombers 

overshot the target, but none released their bombs over 

friendly positions. The fighter-bombers were more accurate 

but had little effect. Even the napalm dropped in the woods 

east of Runburg was not particularly effective because the 

woods were wet and failed to ignite. The attack went 

practically unnoticed by the Germans; when interrogated 

later, one German prisoner even went so far as to inquire, 

"What bombing?" 

Yet another attempt to employ heavy and medium bombardment aircraft in close support of ground troops was made in 

conjunction with efforts of the US First Army to breach the 

Roer River line on 16 November 1944. Operation QUEEN, as the 

breakthrough attempt was called, was carefully planned and 

demonstrated the recent advances made in marking devices and 

other safety and technical aids.71 The plan called for the 

employment of more than 4,500 aircraft, making Operation 

QUEEN the largest air attack in direct support of ground 

troops in World War II. More than 1,200 heavy bombers of the 

US Eighth Air Force, a like number of RAF heavies, 600 medium 

bombers from the US Ninth Air Force, 750 fighter-bombers of 
the IX and XXIX Tactical Air Commands, and 800 escort 

fighters for the heavy bombers were scheduled to participate 

in opening the way for the main breakthrough attempt by the 

US VII Corps in the Eschweiler area, 

The earlier catastrophic bombing errors in Normandy were 8 

clearly in the minds of the Operation QUEEN planners, and 

elaborate, detailed precautions were taken to avoid a repetition of the previous disasters. Among the aids used to 

designate the target areas and the position of friendly 

troops were giant panel markers (one of which was located 

nineteen miles to the rear of the front line), captive 

balloons flown parallel to the front line, bright-colored 

panels in the immediate vicinity of frontline troops, and 

marking fire by 90-mm antiaircraft guns. The Eighth Ai* 

Force also employed a system of radio beacons close to the 

front lines and a radio fan marker transmitting a thin vertical signal over the row of balloons in addition to prescribing that bomb bay doors would be opened and locked over 

the English Channel to prevent any damage should bombs be 

released accidentally in the process, 

The multiple safety precautions indeed prevented any 

major tragedy. The new marking systems proved satisfactory, 

and pilots had no trouble in identifying the locations of 

friendly troops. The new safety aids demanstrated that 

visual bombing by heavy and medium bombers was possible with 

a 2,00@-yard safety zone without damage to friendly troops. 

And yet Operation QUEEN was not completely flawless. A 

faulty bomb release mechanism caused an Eighth Air Force 

heavy bomber to drop four bombs on the 39lst Armored Field 

Artillery Battalion of the 3d Armored Division, killing one 

man and wounding two. The same unit was later dive-bombed by 

a P-38, but RO casualties resulted. The 1st Infantry 

Division reported five incidents of stray bombs falling near 

its troops, but only one human casualty resulted, although 

one bomb exploded within 150 yards of the division artillery 

cp, and another knocked the wings off a liaison plane and 

destroyed the division artillery airfield. Such minor events 

were clearly no repetition of the St. LS-P&riers Road, Caen, 

or Falaise disasters. 

In any event, the safety precautions proved perhaps too 

restrictive. The excessive withdrawal of ground troops 

before the air strike delayed the subsequent ground attack, 

over-bombing caused few of the enemy frontline troops to be 

affected, and the wide extent of the target area somewhat 

dissipated the psychological shock of the heavy bombardment. 

Operation QUEEN clearly demonstrated that the effectiveness 

of close air support was contingent upon the confidence of 

47 
ground troops in their air SUppQ?A and a willingness of 

commanders to accept the necessary risk of short bombing in 

order to capitalize on the effects of aerial bombardment of 

the enemy front lines. 

Although the new and more effective procedures and 

technical aids were sufficient to reduce the number of catastrophic incidents of air amicieide by bombers, they could not 

totally prevent the degradation of friendly combat power as 

the result of air strikes on friendly units. Two air amicitide incidents during the ill-fated attack of the 28th Infantry Division on Schmidt in early November 1944 demonstrated 

that the supposedly mare accurate fighter-bombers were also 

capable of gross errors with tragic consequences for friendly 

ground forces. Five fighter-bomber groups of the IX Tactical 

Air Command were scheduled to isolate the battlefield from 

counterattacking enemy armor.72 On the first day of the 

battle, 2 Novembter, only one group actually participated 

directly in the operation and one of its squadrons mistakenly 

bombed an American artillery position near Roetgen, killing 

seven men and wounding another seventeen.73 

On 7 November just as elements of Company B, 707th Tank 

Battalion, had successfully penetrated to the far edge of the 

village of Vossenack, they came under direct fire from enemy 

positions on the nearby Brandenberg-Bergstein ridge, and the 

tank company commander requested an air strike against the 

enemy positions. Most of the twelve P-47s of the 365th 

Fighter-Bomber Group assigned to conduct the strike bombed 

and strafed the enemy position, but two planes mistakenly 

bombed and strafed the town of Vossenaek, then occupied by 

friendly troops. One plane dropped two bombs and 

machine-gunned the town; the other also strafed and dropped 

its two bombs, one of which hit a house sheltering an 

American tank crew and some of the accompanying engineers, 

killing one man, seriously wounding another, and inflicting 

slight wounds on three others.74 The maneuverability and 

low-level attack characteristics of the P-47 were not proof 

against the human error of its pilot, who all too often was 

improperly briefed on the target and location of friendly 

troops and who was more likely than not to become disoriented 

during the conduct of a mission. 

Brigadier General Boudi.not"s CCB, 3d Armored Division, 

also continued to have problems with its friendly air 

support. 0% began its attack in the Kuertgen forest in 

mid-December with sixty-four medium tanks and, in less than 

three days of heavy fighting (16-18 December 19441, took its 

four objectives (Werth, Koettenich, Hastenrath, and 

Scherpenseel). The effort, however, cost CCB 42 of its 
medium tanks plus 7 light tanks: German antitank guns destroyed 24; Panzerfausts, 6; mines, 12; artillery fire, 6; 

and one ta cent) was destroyed by American 

bombing.75 

The following week, during the battle between the Salm 

and Ourthe rivers, the same unit suffered even more heavily 

at the hands of friendly fighter pilots. Task Force 

McGeorge, consisting of a company of armored infantry and a 

company of medium tanks from CCB, arrived west of Grandmenil 

in the early afternoon of 25 December 1944 with the mission 

of restoring blocking positions in Grandmeni1.76 Just as 

the task force was beginning its attack, eleven P-38s from 

the 430th Fighter Squadron, being contrahled by the 7th 

Armared Division, mistook the Americans for Germans and 

bombed their wooded assembly area, killing three officers and 

thirty-six men (and presumably wounding a proportionate 

number of others). The attack had to be rescheduled for 2000 

that same day, and a reconstituted TF McGeorge entered 

Grandmenil only to be successfully counterattacked by the 

Germans. The incident was due as much to failure in 

coordination between the 3d and 7th Armored Divisions as to 

confusion among the pilots. The TF McGearge assembly area 

was located almost exactly on the no-bomb line established by 

the 7th Armored Division, and the display of orange panel 

markers on TF McGearge vehicles did nothing to deter the 

attacking P-38s. The result, as always, was death and 

disruption of the operation. 

The role played by Allied air power in the desperate 

Battle of the Bulge is well known. The confusion caused by 

the German drive in the Ardennes and consequent American 

efforts to hold their pasitioas and restore the integrity of 

the lines involved amicicide incidents of all types, including air strikes an friendly positions. One of the few good 

flying days of the period, 24 December 1944, saw several 

incidents. One erican officer was killed and another was 

wounded when a squadron of P-38s attacked the village of 

Buisonville, which had just been taken by CCA, 2d Armored 

Division, as part of VII Corps's effort to blunt the German 

salient. At embattled Bastagne, P-479 of the XIX Tactical 

Air Command's 512th, 513th, and 514th Fighter Squadrons made 

good use of the fair weather on 24 December to work around 

the Bastogne perimeter. The disputed village of Marvie was 

hit by P-47s during the afternoon, and the fighters bombed so 

close to American lines in the Noville sector that the 1Olst 

Airbarne Division frantically signaled VIII Corps to call aff 

the mission. 

49 
The difficulties of controlling close air support by 

heavy and medium bombers were continually reduced in the 

European Theater of Operations by better planning and the 

development of technical aids for blind bombing and marking 

Of friendly positions, Experience, better training, and 

improved air-ground communications and coordination procedures also greatly improved the amicicide record of 

fighter-bombers during the course of the campaign. DWpite 

the tragic incidents in Normandy and the numerous occasions 

on which American units were bombed or strafed by their own 

fighter-bombers during the campaign in Europe, ground 

commanders and soldiers alike acknowledged the high value of 

close air support and, as better procedures and technical 

aids were developed and experience gained, were increasingly 

willing to place confidence in their air support and follow 

it cl0sel.y. Units that seldom asked for air strikes closer 

than 1,000 yards from the front Lines in the early days of 

the campaign later requested air strikes on targets as close 

as 300 yards from their positions.77 it. Gen. J. L,awton 

Collins, commander of the US VII Corps, acknowledged, '"We 

could not possibly have gotten as far as we did, as fast as 

we did, with as few casualties, without the wonderful air 

support that we have consistently had."78 

World War II: The Pacific 

As was the case with the employment of artillery, the war 

in the Pacific posed different, and, in some ways, more 

difficult challenges to the coordination and control of close 

air support operations. Distant airfields, more difficult 

terrain that reduced both visibility and communications, and 

the requirement to coordinate Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, 

as well as Army Air Corps planes, complicated and intensified 

the problem of avoiding friendly air strikes on friendly 

troops e Although the combat operations in the Pacific did 

not witness any major disaster such as occurred in Operation 

eCrmA, serious incidents involving both medium bombers and 

fighter-bomber aircraft were not uncommon and served, as in 

Europe, to cause suffering, loss of combat power, delay or 

halting of offensive operations, and lowered morale on the 

part of ground troops. 

The frequent use by both Allied and Japanese forces of 

small boats and coastal vessels in the island campaigns of 

the Pacific war posed special problems of identificatian for 

Allied pilots, in that SUCh craft cauld be extremely 

difficult to identify properly from the air. Jn mid-October 

1942 during the Papua Campaign on New Guinea a ferry-shuttle 
service for men and supplies was established by Allied forces 

between Manigela and Pongani. On its second day of 

operation, 18 October 1942, two newly arrived luggers were 

mistaken for enemy boats and bombed by a Fifth Air Force B-25 

off Pongani.7g Lt. A. B. Fahnestock, a well-known explorer 

and yachtsman in charge of the small boat operations for the 

Combined Operational Service Command, and Byron Darnton, a 

New York Times correspondent, were killed, six men were 

WOURd@d) and one of the boats was so severely damaged that it 

had to be withdrawn from the shuttle service.80 Later 

investigation revealed that the Army had failed to notify the 

Air Corps about the ferry service, and the pilot of the B-25 

had not bothered to insure that his target was Japanese 

before attacking.Sl Under similar circumstances three 

months later, on 5 January 1943, four American P-4Ts strafed 

two American LCMs off Saidor, New Guinea, but fortunately 

caused RQ casualties. 82 

The dense vegetation and uncertain location of friendly 

troops in the Papuan jungle during the Buna campaign posed 

other problems. On at least six occasions during the 

campaign, Fifth Air Force responsible 

friendly casualties.g3 The ~~~~~st Woefrethe 32d Infan::; 

Division"s Task Force URBANA OR the Buna Mission on the 

morning of I.9 December 1942 received close support by B-25 

and A-20 aircraft. Their accuracy left something to be 

desired, however, and four bombs landed within fifty yards of 

the bivouac area of the 127th Infantry. A chaplain visiting 

troops in Buna Village was also wounded by machine gun fire 

intended for the Japanese at Giropa Point.g4 Two days 

later a B-25 dropped a bomb on friendly positions in the 

area, killing several Allied soldiers.85 

The inherent confusions and uncertainties of amphibious 

assault landings also contributed to a number of air amicitide incidents. During the landing on Attu in the Aleutians 

on 24 May 1943, an Eleventh Air Force B-24 inadvertently 

bombed elements of the 32d Infantry Regiment (7th Infantry 

Division). No casualties were caused, and the Eleventh Air 

Force remarkably had no other incidents to mar its 

record.86 The experience of the Marines on Tarawa was more 

typical. On the morning of 20 November 1943 the 3d 

Battalion, 2d Marines (2d Marine Division), commanded by Maj. 

John F. Schoettel, landed on RED Beach 1 on Betio,. During 

the morning several requests for air strikes against the main 

Japanese beach positions were made, and about 1120 one air 

strike was delivered but was cancelled almost immediately 

when Company K, 3/2d Marines, complained of being strafed.87 

51 
As friendly troops moved off the assault beaches and 

inland into the often dense jungle and mountainous terrain of 

the Pacific islands the difficulties of correctly locating 

their positions and providing accurate close air support were 

increased, Accurate close air support of ground troops was 

often impossible in the dense jungle which masked the positions of friend and foe alike. For example, on New Georgia 

in the Central Solomons aerial observers were unable to 

report a single case of enemy movement during the enti.re 

operation, and chose air support of grclund troops proved 

impractical because of the dense jungle and close proximity 

of the opposing forces.aa 

Even vehicles and tanks were hard to identify correctry. 

In the coconut grove along the eastern edge of the West Tank 

Barrier on Butaritari (Makin) four tanks supported the attack 

of the 2d Battalion, 165th Infantry (27th Infantry Division), 

on 21 November 1943. The tank officer in charge, 1st Lt. 

Edward J. Gallagher, and two enlisted men were killed and 

several others were wounded when a Navy bomber made a 

low-level pass and dropped a 2,000~pound fragmentation bomb 

about twenty-five feet from one of the tanks.89 

Even close control by air liaison parties on the ground 

could not prevent all incidents af poor communications and 

pilot confusion. The 12th Air Liaison Party (GANGWAU)I, 

headed by Cpt. George F. Frederick, attempted to control 

bombing by four squadrons of B-25s on both sides of 

Porharmenemen Creek, southwest of Momote on Los Negros in the 

Admiralties, on the afternoon of 2 March 1944. Two squadrons 

(the 498th and 5OPstr hit their assigned targets, but two 

others (the 499th and 500th) dropped their bombs into a~ area 

recently occupied by friendly troops. Two men were killed 

and three were wounded before GANGWAY could call off the 

attack.9o 

On Saipan a total of 115 close support air missions were 

requested, but fifteen missions requested were disapproved 

because friendly troops were too close. Of the seventy 

missions actually flown, several. resulted in casualties to 

friendly troops. At 1444 on 26 June 1944, for example, a 

bombing and strafing misslion flown in support of the 165th 

Infantry Regiment (27th Infantry Division) missed the target 

and endangered friendly troops.91 The only casualties 

suffered by the Marines in the area south of Garapan in 

Central Saipan on 28 June 1944 were from an American air 

strike on Earapan in which three misdirected rockets fell in 

the lines of the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, 

twenty-seven casualties.92 

causing 

52 
The campaign on Guam in July and August 1944 was plagued 

from beginning to end by friendly air strikes on American 

ground troops. On the first day of the invasion of Guam (21 

July 1944) the 22d Marine Regiment had captured Agat and were 

just moving out when hit by a misplaced American air strike, 

which caused some casualties. On the morning of 24 July 1944 

two battalions of the 21st Marines attempted to attack out of 

the beachhead up a ravine on Bondshu Ridge. The Marines 

encountered heavy Japanese machine gun fire and called for 

air support from US Navy planes, The attacking Navy pilots 

had to drop their bombs so close to the Marine lines that 

seventeen marines were killed or wounded. On 4 August the 

command post of the 3d Battalion, 21st I‘4arine Regiment, was 

hit by two B-25s, which then strafed other marines along the 

Finegayan-Earrigada road. 

The Army, too) fell victim to friendly air power on 

Guam. By 0815 on 28 July 1944, Company A, 1st Battalion, 

305th Infantry (77th Infantry Division), had successfully 

reached the summit of Mount Tenjo on southern Guam and waited 

to be relieved, During the wait Company A was bombed and 

strafed by American planes, disaster being averted only by 

the quick action of Pfe. Eenno Levi who braved the fire of 

the attacking planes and spread out the appropriate identification panels. American planes hitting Mount Santa Rosa on 

7 August 1944 mistakenly dropped a bomb on Company F, 2/305th 

Infantry, about 1500, causing some casualties. About the 

same time the same planes strafed the 31307th Infantry in the 

vicinity of Yigo. 

As Allied forces advanced through the islands of the 

Pacific, they continued to be plagued by their own air 

support. On 28 January 1945 the 37th Infantry Division's 

129th Infantry Regiment attacked from the vicinity of Culayo 

to take Clark Field on Luzon, Elements of the 129th had 

reached the outskirts of barrio Tacondo on the southeast 

earner of Fort Stotsenburg by about 1000, when they were 

halted by Japanese fire and a misplaced strike by Fifth Air 

Force planes.93 The next day, 29 January, P-51s strafed 

friendly troops along the Pampanga River.94 Two days later 

General Krueger, the US Sixth Army commander, complained to 

General Kenney, commander of the Allied Air Farces, of the 

attacks by Fifth Air Farce planes on troops of the US 1 and 

XIV Corps and noted that the ground 

losing confidence in their air support.95 

farces were rapidly 

On 4 February 1945 six Fifth Air Force B-25s made an 

unscheduled strafing run across the front of the 1st Infantry 

Regiment (6th Infantry Division), which at I-330 had just 

secured its objectives in the attack on San Jose (Luzon), 

53 
The friendly strafing attack killed one man and wounded seven 

others; the regiment had lost only one KIA and eighteen WIA 

to Japanese fire in the attack.96 The San Jose incident 

prompted a more direct and forceful radio message from 

General Krueger to General Kenney: 

I must insist that you take effective measures to stop 

the bombing and strafing of our ground forces by 

friendly planes. . . . These repeated occurrences are 

causing ground troops to lose confidence in air 

support and are adversely affecting morale.97 

As was the case in the European theater, the experience 

of three years of close air support operations and the 

development of better air-ground coordination and control 

procedures did bring some improvement and reduction in the 

number of air amicicide incidents in the Pacific theater. 

Until the end of the war, however, such incidents, attributable for the most part to pilot errors in target identification, continued to plague air commanders and to incense 

ground leaders.98 As in Europe the benefits of close air 

support came to be widely acknowledged by ground troops and 

their commanders, despite the numerous air amicicide 

incidents. Despite his heated messages to General Kenney, 

General Krueger judged the overall support provided by the 

Fifth Air Force "superb," as did most of his subordinate 

ground commanders.99 Maj. Gen, J. N. Swing, commander of 

the 11th Airborne Division, wrote to the commander of the 8th 

Fighter Group on 4 May 1945, "We of the division are proud 

that our confidence in Air Support has reached the point 

where we are willing to remain within 400 yards of 1000 pound 

bombs."100 Major General Nudge of the 1st Cavalry Division 

expressed the usual opinion after a strafing incident on 11 

February 1945, when he said, "'We understand that accidents 

will happen. We have short rounds in our artillery. Investigation was necessary to prevent repetition of error. We 

bear no grudge or ill feeling."'lOl 

The Korean War 

This study did not undertake an examination of air amicitide incidents in the Korean War. That such incidents 

occurred, with the predictable results in casualties, lowered 

morale, reduced combat power, and disrupted operations may be 

taken as certain. The Korean War also saw the introduction 

of two types of aircraft that were to play an important role 

in close air support operations in Vietnam: the high perfor54 
mance jet fighter-bomber and the helicopter, both of which 

were to be the agents of numerous air amicicide incidents in 

Southeast Asia. 

Vietnam 

The traditional causes of air amicicide incidents 

(mechanical malfunction, misidentification -of target, pilot 

disorientation, and problems associated with the location and 

marking of friendly troops on the ground) continued to play a 

role in the inadvertent engagement of friendly troops by 

their own supporting aircraft in the Vietnam War.102 As in 

the case of the island campaigns in the Pacific in World War 

11, the dense jungle and otherwise difficult terrain of parts 

of South Vietnam contributed to difficulties in correctZy 

locating friendly troop positions. The employment of high 

performance jet aircraft and helicopters added to the peculiar problems of air-ground coordination, and the volume of 

close air support used in Vietnam, as well as the nature of 

tactical operations, which involved requests for air strikes 

very close to friendly troops, made a certain number of air 

amicicide incidents unavoidable. Technological advances made 

since 1945 in air-ground communications, technical location 

aids, and accuracy of ordnance were offset in part by the 

higher speed of attacking jet aircraft, which demanded of the 

pilot extremely quick reactions susceptible to error. Helicopters, while providing a presumably more stable weapons 

platform and a hovering capability that gave the pilot sufficient time to properly identify his target, also possessed 

certain unique flight characteristics that contributed to 

amicicide incidents. 

Mechanical malfunctions continued to play only a minor 

role in air amicicide incidents. While turning to attack a 

target, an F-4& flying in support of friendly troops in 

contact with the enemy near Ban Me Thuot in 1968 accidentally 

dropped an unfinned napalm canister on a nearby church, 

killing thirteen civilians and wounding six.103 The cause 

of the incident was later determined to have been a mechanical malfunction of the bomb rack. The technical characteristics of helicopters and peculiarities of their tactical 

employment as practiced in Vietnam also resulted in an amicitide incident near Go Vap, five to ten kilometers north of 

Saigon on 3 March 1968. Company C, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry (25th Infantry Division), was caught in an NVA ambush on 

one side of a canal. Soldiers of the 3d Platoon, Company D, 

419th Infantry, attempted to cross the canal to aid the 

embattled Company C. A UH-1 helicopter attempting to support 

55 
the friendly ground units inadvertently placed two 2.75-inch 

aerial rockets in the 3d Platoon area, wounding three men. 

The flight path of the helicopter was perpendicular to the 

line of the canal (and of friendly troops), and the accident 

apparently occurred when the helicopter hit an air pocket, 

causing the nose of the aircraft to dip just as the rockets 

were fired. 

The difficulties of properly marking friendly positions 

by visible means were greatly increased by the often thick 

vegetation and the usual very close proximity of friendly and 

enemy troops. In 1968 two B-57s were diverted in the KLAMATH 

FALLS area of operations to support a Vietnamese Civilian 

Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) company in contact with the 

enemy. Because dense jungle vegetation prevented visual 

sighting of friendly troop locations from the air, the 

friendly ground troops marked their position with green 

smoke. Before the attack, the ground commander, the airborne 

forward air controller (FAC) controlling the strike, and the 

attacking B-57s made several changes in the target and in the 

attack headings. One B-57 strafed the suspected target area 

with 20-mm cannon fire and some of the rounds hit the 

friendly positions. Four CIDG soldiers were killed and 

twenty-eight were wounded, as were two US advisors. Heavy 

vegetation, the close proximity of friendly troops to the 

target Cl00 meters), and too many changes given to the pilot 

of the attacking aircraft were cited as contributory causes 

in the incident. 

Airborne FACs frequently marked targets for high performance aircraft with white phosphorous (WP> rockets. Any 

inaccuracy on the part of the FACs' marking rocket placement 

could result in firing on nearby friendly troops. In 1968 an 

FAC controlling an F-4D aircraft armed with an M-117 Low Drag 

bomb attempted to mark a target 225 meters west of a US Army 

brigade in close, heavy contact with the enemy. The friendly 

position was not marked by smoke and the FAG's target-marking 

rocket landed seventy-five meters west of its intended 

point, The pilot of the F-4D was thus required to drop his 

bomb on the target, which lay between the marking rocket 

(seventy-five meters west) and the friendly troops (225 

meters east). He apparently misinterpreted the FAC's verbal 

description of the friendly troop position and incorrectly 

estimated the distance of the target from bath the marking 

rocket and the friendly troops. The bomb struck the friendly 

forces, wounding twelve men and apparently killing three 

others who were subsequently listed as missing in action. In 

another 1968 incident the pilots of two F-100s supporting a 

US division were improperly briefed on the location of 

friendly forces by the FAG, and one F-150 consequently 

strafed the friendly position, wounding five men. 

56 
Even when the FAC properly marked the target and briefed 

the attacking aircraft, errors could still occur. One of a , 

flight of three Vietnamese F-5$ dropped two BLU-1B napalm 

bombs on an element of a US infantry division in contact with 

Vietcong forces in Binh Dinh Province in 1968. Two US soldiers were killed and eighteen were seriously wounded. An 

investigation of the incident revealed that, while the US FAC 

and the VNAF flight leader understood each other, the Vietnamese pilot of the offending aircraft did not understand the 

FAG's instructions, consequently did not know the exact location of friendly ground troops, and could not visually 

identify them from the air because of smoke and haze in the 

target area. 

On another occasion two F-100s were flying an immediate 

air strike in support of two companies of a US infantry division in close and heavy contact with the enemy. The strike 

was controlled by a USAF FAC, and each F-100 successfully 

delivered four bombs on target, 250 meters northeast of a 

reference point, in this case burning napalm from a previous 

strike. As the ground battle became more intense the ground 

commander requested strafing runs along the western edge of 

the burning napalm. The two F-100s made two strafing passes 

each about sixty-five meters from friendly positions. 

Darkness was approaching and one pilot became disoriented on 

his last strafing pass, fired short, and hit the friendly 

pasition, killing two men and wounding seven. In a similar 

incident the pilot of an F-100 dropped a Cluster Bomb Unit 

(CBU) about 1,000 meters southeast of the target correctly 

marked by the FAC. Two US soldiers were wounded. It was 

later determined that the pilot momentarily lost sight of the 

target while reversing his direction of flight after the 

first pass and lined up for his second run on smoke laid down 

by a helicopter rather than on the FAC's marker. 

Because of their explosive characteristics Cluster Bomb 

Units (CBUs) were especially hazardous when used near 

friendly troops. When their use was coupled with faulty 

coordination the results were disastrous. Twenty-three 

friendly troops were wounded in 1968 when an airborne FAC 

failed to clear a target area properly and permitted an 

F-100 pilot to dump two CBU-2As in what the FAC presumed to 

be the authorized jettison area. 

Aerial rockets could be equally dangerous to friendly 

troops. In August 1968 a Navy A-7D fired two S-inch aerial 

rockets into the HQ CP of Company D, 2d Battalion, 327th 

Infantry (10lst Airborne Division), during an operation in 

the A Shau Valley. Fifty-five casualties resulted. The 

entire operation was plagued with amicicide incidents of 

57 
various types, and one participant estimates that the US brigade involved lost far more men to friendly fire than to 

enemy action in this operation. 

On a few occasions, close proximity of friendly and enemy 

troops, lack of adequate marking of friendly positions, and 

pilot inexperience combined to cause incidents of amicicide. 

Two F-100s armed with MK-82 High Drag General Purpose bombs 

conducted a preplanned strike on a North Vietnamese Army 

(EVA) headquarters in support of a US infantry division in 

1968. The main friendly element marked its position with 

smoke, but the forward elements closest to the target did 

not, for fear of disclosing their location to the enemy. The 

FAC gave the fighters a verbal description of the friendly 

positions, and the Lead attack pilot successfully hit the 

target with al.1 four of his bombs in three passes. The 

second pilot accurately dropped two bombs, but on his third 

pass one bomb fell 1,200 to 1,300 meters short, killing one 

US soldier and wounding four others of the forward friendly 

element. The primary cause of the incident was determined to 

have been the accidental thumbing of the bomb release button 

on the stick grip by the pilot while he was trying to trim 

the aircraft with the stick trimmer button. 

Occasionally the tactical. situation in Vietnam demanded 

the air-delivery of ordnance so close to friendly positions 

that some friendly casualties could not be avoided. Four US 

Marines were killed and two were wounded in a 1968 operation 

south of Hue when fragments from a properly placed bomb 

scattered into friendly lines. Two companies of Marines were 

in very heavy contact with NVA forces and were provided air 

support by two Marine A-4$ under the control of a USAF FAC. 

The FAC correctly determined that the ground tactical situation warranted hazardously close support. The aircraft in 

fact made three such passes with all weapons on target. The 

bombs dropped on the fourth pass were also on target, but 

fragments hit friendly troops. 

The armed helicopter, used extensively for the first time 

during the Vietnam conflict, offered significant advantages 

in mobility and accurate firepower, but it also had several 

peculiar characteristics that contributed to incidents of air 

amicicide. Many amicicide incidents involving helicopters 

resulted from the causative factors commonly associated with 

fixed wing aircraft. Helicopter piLots as well as fixed wing 

fighter and bomber pilots were capable of mistaking friendly 

ground troops for the enemy. In early 1968 helicopter gunships of the 187th Assault Helicopter Company, operating in 

War Zone C, engaged a company-size force west-northwest of Go 

Da Hau. The personnel on the ground were unidentified, and a 

58 
check with the base at Cu Chi revealed that no friendly 

forces were reported in the area. The UH-1Cs took the ground 

formation under fire and wounded several men before the 

ground force was able to identify itself as a unit of the 

25th ARW Infantry Division. 

Sometimes the errors of the pilot were even more blatant. 

Two US soldiers were killed and three were wounded near 

Pleiku in August 1969 when fired upon by the crew of a UH-1H 

helicopter from Company A, 4th Aviation Battalion (4th 

Infantry Divisian). The Company A commander was providing a 

new crew an orientation flight when smoke was spotted coming 

through some trees. The crew chief and gunner were directed 

to fire on the unidentified smake and did so, hitting an 

American unit with the usual results of such ill-considered 

firing. 

Faulty communications, poor coordination, and lack of 

accurate information regarding the whereabouts of friendly 

ground troops also contributed to several incidents. One US 

soldier was killed and nine others were wounded when their 

infantry platoon was fired on by helicopter gunships in 

1968. The US infantry platoon, conducting a mounted combat 

patrol, had established an ambush position near a district 

headquarters compound and during the night became engaged 

with an enemy force. A light fire team (LFT) was requested 

and upon arrival on station was directed by the subsector 

advisor to fire on the wood line north and west of the district headquarters compound. The LFT fired on the friendly 

patrol as a result of a misunderstanding between the subsector advisor and the LFT as to the exact location of 

friendly troops. Clearance to fire had not been given by the 

commander of the victimized ground troops. Another incident 

occurred in August 1968 when helicopter gunships from Troop 

D, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (1st Infantry Division), operating in the III Corps Tactical Zone fired rockets that hit a 

friendly armored personnel carrier, killing two men and 

wounding three. The gunships had found an enemy unit at 

night and the friendly ground forces were attempting to 

adjust the fire of the helicopters onto the target but caused 

the rocket fire of the helicopters to fall on their own 

position. 

The haste and confusion of combat air assaults, a characteristic feature of the Vietnam War, also contributed to a 

number of amicicide incidents. Several soldiers from Company 

A, 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry (199th Light Infantry Brigade), 

were wounded during an airmobile assault in Long An Province 

in July 1968. After dismounting from their helicopters,- the 

ground troops moved rapidly to establish a perimeter around 

59 
the landing zone (LZ). The door gunners of the troopcarrying helicopters attempted to place machine gun fire 

beyond the perimeter as the helicopters left the LZ, but were 

unable to change the direction of their fires as the helicopters changed attitude, altitude, and heading. Thus, friendly 

machine gun fire bit several of the infantrymen on the 

ground. Similarly, in 1970 near Chu Lai one man was killed 

when soldiers from an infantry unit inserted in an LZ ran 

into the suppressive fires of the accompanying 21st Assault 

Helicopter Company. 

In the spring of 1970 helicopters of the 158th Aviation 

Battalion ClOLst Airborne Division) were called upon to conduct an emergency extraction of a platoon of the 1st ARVN 

Infantry Division near Dong La Ruong Mountain, fifteen kilometers north of Khe Sanh in northern I CTZ. During the 

course of the extraction, the pilot of a supporting Cobra 

gunship became confused and, believing the pickup zone (PZ> 

to be clear, made a firing run on it, wounding five of the 

six ARVN soldiers remaining on the PZ. The wounded saldiers 

were immediately picked up and evacuated to a hospital ship. 

Several unusuaL incidents invalving helicopters were also 

reported. OR 27 August 1967 one man of the 2d Battalion, 

12th Infantry (25th Infantry Division), was killed when he 

was hit by machine gun fire from a CH-47 helicopter. The 

doorgunner of the CH-47 had been hit and killed by enemy 

ground fire. His death grip on the trigger of the M-60 

machine gun caused it to strafe the defensive position of a 

company of the 2/12th Infantry, resulting in the casualty. 

An even more bizarre incident occurred in 1966 or 1967 when 

the extension rod (which limits traverse of the gun) on an 

M-60 door gun broke, and the doorgunner, tracking a target, 

inadvertently fired into the cockpit, wounding the aircraft 

commander.104 

Conclusion 

Although much better studied, the evidence for a&tacks by 

friendly aircraft on friendly ground troops, like that for 

artillery amicicide, is still incomplete and vague, but does 

permit some tentative conclusions as to its meaning and the 

ways in which such incidents might effectively be prevented. 

As in the case of artillery incidents, cases of air 

amicicide are influenced by a wide range of causative or 

contributory factors (see table 3). Unlike indirect artillery fires, the cases of air amicicide reviewed in this study 

60 
were influenced by visibility conditions. In thirty-two of 

the ninety-nine cases, the visibility conditions could not be 

determined. Of the remaining sixty-seven incidents, thirtysix occurred under conditions that may be characterized as 

normal and thirty-one under conditions of reduced visibility 

[night, fog, smoke, haze, etc.). This statistical division 

is somewhat misleading, because with few exceptions, the 

incidents occurring in normal visibility in fact involved 

transient smoke and dust from previous air strikes and the 

ongoing ground battle. In the case of the seven identifiable 

Vietnam incidents, six occurred in conditions of reduced 

visibility. 

With respect to the type of ground tactical operation in 

progress when air amicicide occurred, the available information leads to the same conclusions as in the case of artillery incidents: the type of ground tactical operation is not 

significant and simply reflects the dominant type of combat 

in each conflict. Thus sixty-two incidents occurred during 

offensive operations, seven during defensive operations, one 

during retrograde operations, and one during patrolling 

actions. In twenty-eight cases, the type of ground combat 

operation could not be determined. 

It is also interesting to note the type of air operation, 

or rather the weapon employed by the aircraft pilot, that 

caused friendly casualties. In only six of the ninety-nine 

cases could this not be determined clearly. In fifty-two 

incidents, the friendly troops were bombed, and in thirty 

they were strafed. In seven cases friendly troops were both 

bombed and strafed. Four incidents involved air-to-ground 

rockets. 

With regard to the type of error leading to the incidents 

examined, eleven cases involved friendly ground troops being 

mistaken for enemy soldiers. Six incidents clearly involved 

mechanical malfunctions, but twenty-three could be attributed 

to a lack of adequate coordination. The remaining 

twenty-three classifiable incidents could be attributed 

directly to pilot, crew, or FAC (human) error. These can be 

further subdivided into incidents attributable to navigation 

errors (five>, disorientation (six), physical manipulation 

problems (five>, and failure to see, recognize, or otherwise 

observe ground recognition markings (seven>. In thirty-six 

incidents, the type of error could nat be determined. 

The striking factor with regard to air amicicide is the 

degree to which human error has been the chief cause of most 

incidents. The failure of a ground commander to mark or to 
report his position, the failure of a staff officer to coordinate with supporting air forces, the inaccuracy of a FAC's 

marking of the target, and the confusion and disorientation 

of a pilot have caused far more incidents of air amicicide 

than have purely mechanical failures or the lack of any technical aid. For almost forty years intensive efforts to solve 

the problem of air amicicide through the development of 

sophisticated technical devices have been undertaken but have 

failed to eliminate the problem. Electronic means of locating ground troops, positioning and directing aircraft, and 

improving air-ground communication have alleviated but not 

eliminated air amieicide. The human factor remains impervious to technological remedies. 

Technological advances in safety devices have been offset 

in large measure by the increasing complexity of the aircraft 

themselves. The high speed and heavy instrumentation of the 

modern high performance jet fighter-bomber demands almost too 

much of its human operator. The late stages of the Second 

World War saw what was probably to be the best mix of man 

with machine. Since 1945 the capabilities of aircraft have 

seemingly outstripped the ability of their pilots to control 

them accurately enough to avoid the occasional destruction of 

friendly ground troops, even when operations are carefully 

planned and coordinated. The evidence of air amicicide 

forcefully suggests the value of slower, propeller-driven 

aircraft for close air support missions. 

The serious effect of air amicicide on friendly ground 

combat certainly warrants a continued search in every direction for adequate preventive measures. Whether these lie in 

sophisticated electronic devices or in simpler and less 

expensive improvements in human training and procedures 

remains to be seen. The destructive power of modern 

air-delivered ordnance demands that the attempt be made. 

62 

- -. --.. -.. - 
TABLE 3 

Air Amicicide Incidents by Conditions of Visibility, Type of 

Ground Operation, Type of Air Operation, and Type of Error 

Conflict 

WW II (Eur) 

WW II (Pat) 

A. Conditions of Visibility 

Visibility Visibility Visibility Total 

Normal Reduced Unknown Incidents 

18 25 10 53 

17 7 24 

Vietnam War 1 4 15 22 

36 31 32 99 

(37%) (31%) (32%) (100%) 

Conflict 

B. Type of Ground Operation 

Type Total 

Defensive Offensive Patrol Retrograde Unknown Incidents 

WW II (Eur) 5 '39 9 53 

WW II (Pac1 18 6 24 

Vietnam War 2 r 

61 

1 1 13 22 

7 1 1 28 99 

(7%) (63%) (1%) (1%) (28%) ClOO%> 

c. Type of Air Operation 

Bomb & Type Total 

Conflict Bomb Strafe Rocket Strafe Unknown Incidents 

WW II (Eur) 32 12 5 4 53 

WW II (Pat> 11 8 1 2 2 24 

Vietnam War 9 10 3 22 

D. Type of Error 

Conflict 

Misident- Mechan- Pilot- Type Total 

ification ical Coordination Crew-FAC Unknown Incidents 

WW II (Eur) a 4 10 13 18 53 

WW II (Pat> 1 3 3 17 24 

Vietnam War 2 2 10 7 1 22 

11 6 23 23 36 99 

(11%) (6%) (23%) 

63 

(23%) 
Introduction 

The number of antiaircraft amicicide incidents uncovered 

in the course of this study was unexpectedly small. Only 

fifteen specific incidents were identified, althaugh it would 

appear that the engagement of friendly aircraft by friendly 

antiaircraft weapons was probably much more common in past 

conflicts than the surviving data seem to suggest. Nevertheless, antiaircraft amicieide appears to be a relatively 

insignificant problem when compared to the other types in 

terms of frequency and human casualties. 

With one exception all of the antiaircraft amicicide 

incidents examined in this study occurred in the Second World 

War. It should be noted that both aircraft and antiaircraft 

weapons and their associated identification and safety systems were much more primitive than are those in use today. 

The comparatively short range of World War 11 antiaircraft 

artillery, for example, usually required a visual sighting of 

the target before engagement. The slower speed of airplanes 

and the shorter range and lesser destructive power of antiaircraft weapons no doubt served to reduce the number of 

incidents due to misidentification and to attenuate the 

effects when they did occur. Then, too, in Korea and Vietnam 

our forces enjoyed near total air superiority and friendly 

antiaircraft artillery activity was reduced accordingly. 

Such may not be the case in future war where the almost 

instantaneous acquisition, identification, and engagement of 

high-speed targets at long range will be the rule rather than 

the exception. Visual sightings will probably be rare if not 

absent altogether, and the burden will be placed on electronic systems. Such systems proved of great value in World 

War 11, and present and future systems may thus serve to 

reduce in part the effects of that most common cause of antiaircraft amicicide, human error. Although in this area teehnology may be of great value, it cannot bear the burden 

alone. Training and experience will also be key components 

of any solution. 

65 
World War II: North Africa and Sicily 

In view of the greenness of both American ground troops 

and aircrews it is truly surprising that so few incidents of 

antiaircraft amicicide during the Worth African campaign in 

1942-43 have been recorded in the published record. The 

official US Army and US Air Force histories of the North 

African campaign, for example, mention only two incidents 

worthy of note. 

On 20 February 1943 German forces broke through the 

American positions at the Kasserine Pass and precipitated a 

confused and desperate fighting withdrawal of the defeated 

American forces. Despite rain and fog on 21 February, 

fighter-bombers of the XII Air Support Command, based at 

Youk-les-Bains, attempted to assist friendly ground troops in 

blocking the enemy advance toward Thala and Tebessa, The 

cooperation of Allied aircraft with WB , 1st Armored 

Division, OR 21 February was marred by American antiaircraft 

fire that damaged five American planes beyond repair and 

turned back two friendly air missions.l The next day 

friendly antiaircraft guns shot up five American P-38s 

despite their distinctive double fuselage and specific 

instructions to ground troops to be alert for Low-flying 

friendly aircraft over friendly positions. The American 

planes were also instructed to rack their wings as they flew 

over friendly positions, and the attention of graund troops 

was called to the dark noses of American planes in contrast 

to the yellow or white ones of the enemy. 

In view of the distinctive shape and marking of the 

American planes and specific instructions ta ground farces to 

expect them, the boss of aircraft to friendly antiaircraft 

fire on 21-22 February cannot be attributed to mistaken identification. Lack of training and fire discipline on the part 

of American ground troops coupled with the confusion and 

nervousness caused by the German breakthrough and subsequent 

withdrawal are mare likely causes of these incidents. To 

preclude such incidents the commander of the XII Air Support 

Command issued an order that prohibited ground troops from 

firing on any aircraft until after it had attacked+ 

The number of incidents in North Africa in which ground 

troops fired on their own planes was apparently much larger 

than the few noted incidents WCKlld suggest, General 

references to the problem of antiaircraft amicicide OCCULelsewhere in the records of the North African campaign, and 

at least one observer noted that such incidents could be 

attributed to the lack of uniform policy for both ground and 

66 
air units regarding 

fire. 2 

the engagement of aircraft by ground 

Such policy eventually evolved but did not become 

effective before the most tragic antiaircraft amicicide incident of the war occurred. 

On the morning of 11 July 1943 Maj. Gen. George S. 

Patton, Jr., ordered the reinforcement of the Allied beachhead at Gela, Sicily, by more than 2,000 men of the 1st and 

2d Battalions, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment; the 376th 

Parachute Field Artillery Battalion; and Company 6, 307th 

Airborne Engineer Battalion.3 The paratroopers were 

scheduled to be dropped by 144 aircraft of the US 52d Troop 

Carrier Wing on a drop zone in the Gela-Fare110 area at 2245 

on 11 July. Because the weather was good and the approach 

was over friendly territory, an easy operation was expected. 

Ground commanders on Sicily were notified to expect the drop, 

and naval vessels of the invasion fleet off the coast of 

Sicily were alerted. 

The airborne force departed from Tunisian airfields at 

1900, and its flight was uneventful except for some light 

antiaircraft fire from Allied ships north of Malta, which 

caused no damage. Hitting the Sicilian coast the troop 

carriers turned to the northwest, flying along a two-mile 

wide corridor at an altitude of 1,000 feet over friendly 

lines. The lead elements jumped five minutes ahead of 

schedule, but as the second flight neared the final checkpoint a lone machine gun began firing. Suddenly every Allied 

antiaircraft gun on shore and on the naval vessels offshore 

began firing at the slow, vulnerable troop carrier aircraft. 

Control over both Army and Navy antiaircraft gunners 

vanished. Even the crews of tanks took the hapless troop 

carriers under fire with their .50-caliber machine guns. The 

commander of the 504th's Headquarters Company, Capt. Adam A. 

Komosa, later recalled: 

It was the most uncomfortable feeling knowing that our 

own troops were throwing everything they had at us. 

Planes dropped out of formation and crashed into the 

sea. Others, like clumsy whales, wheeled and 

attempted to get beyond the flak which rose in. 

fountains of fire, lighting the stricken faces of men 

as they stared through the windows.4 

Several planes were hit before they could drop their 

paratroopers and others attempted to escape by turning out to 

sea. The paratroopers managed to jump from some planes 

before they were hit, but they were widely scattered, and 

some were shot at in their chutes and even on the ground. 

The planes attempting to escape the maelstrom suffered 

67 

- 
heavily from the antiaircraft fire of the naval vessels off 

the coast. The destroyer Beatty fired on a ditched airplane 

for several seconds with 20-mm guns before recognizing it as 

American and dispatching a boat to pick up survivors. One 

pilot who survived stated with justifiable irony, "Evidently 

the safest place for us tonight while over Sicily would have 

been over enemy territory."5 

In short, the operation was a total disaster. B'y the 

afternoon of I.2 July Col. Reuben H. Tucker, the commander of 

the 504th Regimental. Combat Team, couLd count as effective 

only 37 afficers and 518 men of his 2,000-man force. In alL, 

the paratroopers suffered casualties of 81 dead, 132 wounded, 

and L& missing, and the 52d Troop Carrier Wing reported 7 

dead, 30 wounded, and 53 missing and a 16 percent loss of 

aircraft (23 destroyed and 57 badly damaged). FriendLy fire 

had caused 319 casuaLties and totaLLy disrupted the operation. 

A thorough investigation of the incident was quickly 

ordered by General Eisenhower, but the board of officers 

appointed to investigate the tragedy was unable to reach any 

definite conclusions as to its causes. In the end, a lack of 

training and discipline on the part of both ground and naval 

antiaircraft crews was probabky the primary factor. SCRlle 

ground and naval units professed never to have received the 

warning regarding the drop, and thus a portion of the catastrophe must be attributed ta a faiLure in coordination. In a 

2 August 1943 Letter, Maj. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, the 

commander of the 82d Airborne Division, elegantly concluded: 

The responsibility for the loss of Life and 

material resulting from this operation is so divided, 

so difficult to fix with impartial justice, and so 

questionable of ultimate value to the service because 

of the acrimonious debates which would foLlow efforts 

to hold responsibLe persons or services to account, 

that disciplinary action is of doubtful wisdom. 

Deplorable as is the loss of life which occurred, 

I believe that the Lessons naw learned could have been 

driven home in no other way, and that these Lessons 

provided a sound basis far the belief that recurrences 

can be avoided. 

The losses are part of the inevitable price af 

war in human Lifea 

The furor caused by the tragic amicicide incident at Gela 

did not preclude the occurrence of an almost identical. incident in the British zone on the east coast of Sicily only two 
nights later. A British airborne assault to seize the 

Primosale Eridge over the Simeto River and the establishment 

af a bridgehead an the river's north bank as a prelude to .a 

breakthrough to Catania seven miles to the north was mounted 

on the night of L3 JuLy L943. Operation FUSTIAN was successful in the end but was nearly aborted by friendly antiaircraft fire. The American and British troop carrier aircraft 

Loaded with 1,900 men of the British 1st Parachute Brigade 

encountered heavy antiaircraft fire from Allied ships off the 

southeastern coast of SiciLy.7 The fire intensified as the 

air column neared the Sicilian coast. More than half the 

planes reported receiving fire from friendly naval vessels 

off Cape Passaro, and additional damage was caused by both 

friendly and enemy antiaircraft batteries once 

over Sicily.8 

the planes 

were Only thirty-nine out of the eightyseven planes that got through the fire managed to drop their 

paratroopers within a mile of the four designated drop zones, 

and four planes dropped their parachutists twenty miles away 

on the slopes of Haunt Etna.9 

The margin of victory in Operation FUSTIAN was extremely 

narrow, in part because of the uncoordinated and illcontrolled friendly antiaircraft fire, Of the 124 pLanes on 

the mission, 11 were destroyed, 50 were damag,ed by friendly 

fire, and another 27 were forced to return to base with full 

or partial loads.L* In all, only about 300 men and three 

antitank guns reached the Primosole Bridge, which 

captured intact nevertheless.LL 

they 

The disastrous airborne operations on Sicily nearly 

spelled an end for Allied airborne operations in the European 

theater. Only three of the four major airborne drops in 

Sicily could be rated as tacticaL successes, and none was 

satisfactory from a technical or operational viewpoint.L2 

Of 666 troop carrier, sorties flown, 42 aircraft were destroyed, at least 34 (or 5 percent) of them by friendly naval 

and ground antiaircraft fire, and only 40 percent of the 

5,000 paratroopers dropped had Landed near their assigned 

drop zones.13 Investigations and analyses concluded, however, that airborne assaults were a viable tactical tool, 

provided there were centralized early planning and continued 

close coordination of air, naval, and ground forces; adequate 

safeguards to keep aircraft away from friendly naval vessels; 

and better training for aP1 units in navigation, recognition, 

and fire discipline.14 The improvements generated by the 

unsuccessfuE drops an Sicily paved the way far Larger and 

more successful. airbarne operations in Italy, Normandy, and 

southern France. 

69 
The troop carriers and paratroopers were not the only 

victims of friendly antiaircraft fire on Sicily. Still green 

American ground troops continued throughout the Sicilian 

campaign to engage their own airplanes. As one corporal of 

an armored field artillery battalion put it, "Every plane 

that comes over us was fired upon because we could not identify it."15 Some such incidents might be ascribed more to 

righteaus indignation than to misidentification, 1st Lt. R. 

F. Hood of the 86th Fighter-Bomber Group, for instance, was 

shot down by antiaircraft fire of CCA, 2d Armored Division, 

after failing to observe the tankers' yellow smoke recognition signals.16 The basic problems of training and 

experience would be resolved in time, but Allied pilots and 

aircrews paid in the meantime. 

World War II: The Pacific 

Reports of antiaircraft amicicide incidents from the 

Pacific Theater of Operations in World War II are somewhat 

more plentiful than those from the European and Mediterranean 

theaters. Fortunately, however, there were no major incidents of the type experienced over Sicily. Nevertheless, 

fighter and bomber pilots in the Pacific also took a beating 

from friendly antiaircraft fire, both naval and ground-based. 

Amphibious landings, frequently opposed by heavy concentrations of Japanese aircraft, were the setting for most of 

the incidents reported from the Pacific. The amphibious 

assault accompanied by heavy naval and ground-based air 

support was the characteristic tactical operation of the 

Pacific war and was also the scene of great confusion and 

activity. The Arawe-Cape Gloucester (New Britain) invasion 

of late 1943 was typical. The secondary attack, against 

Arawe, began on 15 December 1943. In the next twenty-three 

days the two Army 40-mm antiaircraft artillery batteries on 

Arawe were credited with shooting down eight Japanese planes 

and one American P-47.17 

The main landing on Cape Gloucester took place on 26 

December 1943. Between 1430 and 1510 on D-Day the expected 

Japanese air attack on the beachhead took place, involving 

twenty-five Japanese Navy Val dive bombers escorted by thirty 

to sixty fighters. There were eighty-one Allied fighters in 

the area, and in the ensuing fifteen-minute aerial combat the 

Japanese lost twenty-two dive bombers and probably more than 

twenty-four fighters.18 Antiaircraft fire from the Allied 

naval vessels and deck-loaded Marine 40-mm, 20-mm, and 

.50-caliber machine guns accounted for one Japanese dive 

70 
bomber but also brought down two American B-25s and seriously 

damaged two others, killing at least one mans19 The confusion of the Japanese attack and the great number of aircraft (more than L50> in the confined air space over the 

beachhead account for the mistaken hits. The Vals made their 

attack just as the B-25s were going in to strafe Hill 250 and 

in fact the Vals flew through the B-25 formation.20 A few 

minutes after the B-25 engagement, a P-39 was ineffectively 

engaged by one Z&-mm gun, In both cases the commander of the 

air task force stated 

airmen.21 

the fault was clearly that of his 

In any case the Allied antiaircraft gunners eannot be condemned too severely in view of the obvious confusion and fear in which the incidents took place. 

At 1715 the same day fifteen Japanese Betty torpedo 

bombers attempted to attack an LST convoy but were intercepted by twenty-six P-47s from the 341st and 342d Fighter 

Squadrons, which downed all of the Bettys and two Japanese 

fighters. One P-47 of the 342d Fighter Squadron, however, 

was Shot down by antiaircraft fire from the 

ships.z2 

friendly 

Later in the operation, during the hours of 

darkness, an Allied B-24 not showing identification 

friend/foe (IFF) approached the beachhead area about an hour 

after a Japanese attack and was promptly illuminated and 

engaged. Fortunately, the pilot started evasive action as 

soon as he was illuminated, and his plane and crew escaped 

injury. A night fighter in the area was also driven from its 

base friendly 

el.sewheZ. 23 

antiaircraft fire and crash-landed 

Although the coordination of air, naval, and ground 

forces in the Cape Gloucester operation was found in retrospect to be quite satisfactory, the incidents of antiaircraft 

amicicide revealed the need far additional recognition and 

fire discipline training for both naval and ground antiaircraft gunners and aircrews. The Navy antiaircraft gun 

crews in particular were found to fire on "anything that was 

not a P-38."25 Army antiaircraft artillery commanders also 

admitted that "after two years of war we frequently fail to 

distinguish between friend and foe" and noted that reliance 

on visual reeognition alone would not solve the probI.em.26 

Fortunately, additional training and experience proued 

successful in reducing, but not in eliminating, such incidents in future operations.27 

On the day (27 May 1944) of the landings at Bosnek (Biak, 

New Guinea), friendly antiaircraft gunners, trigger happy 

from Japanese attacks, made direct air support by light and 

medium bombers from the 17th Reconnaissance Squadron (B-25s) 

and 3d Bombardment Group (A-20s) hazardous. On 28 May a 17th 

71 
Reconnaissance Squadron B-25, cleared to drop its photographs 

on the beachhead, was shot down by friendly fire. Similar 

instances probably continued to occur until the end of the 

campaign in the Pacific but have gone unrecorded. Additional 

training and experience of both aircrews and antiaircraft 

gunners as well as the development of better technical aids 

and coordination procedures did, however, reduce the frequency of such incidents and prevent any repetition of the 

disastrous Sicilian turkey shoot. 

Vietnam 

Near total Allied air superiority over South Vietnam and 

the consequent absence of heavy concentrations of friendly 

antiaircraft weapons precluded significant incidents of antiaircraft amicicide during the Vietnam War. Unlike their 

fathers in North Africa, Sicily, and the Pacific in World War 

11, American ground combat troops in Vietnam came to assume 

that any aircraft overhead, either fixed or rotary wing, was 

friendly. 

Only one instance of friendly fire on a friendly aircraft 

was noted in the survey of Vietnam amicicide conducted at the 

US Army Command and General Staff College in January 1980. 

In 1971, an American UH-1H helicopter from the 21st Assault 

Helicopter Company was shot down at night by American infantry at Fire Support Base Nary Ann near Chu Lai. The troops 

at FSB Mary Ann engaged the helicopter (probably on a lark 

resulting from indiscipline), which returned fire before 

being destroyed in a crash landing. Fortunately, the helicopter crew escaped injury. 

Conclusion 

The number of recorded incidents of antiaircraft amicitide has been small and, with the exception of the tragic 

airborne operations in Sicily, the loss of life, injury, and 

degradation of combat power resulting from such incidents 

have been minuscule (see table 4). Here, more than in the 

case of artillery, air, or ground amicicide, technological 

aids for the positive identification of friendly forces have 

worked to keep the number of incidents and casualties low. 

The most common cause of incidents of antiaircraft amicicide 

seems to have been the lack of training and fire discipline 

combined with the usual confusion of active combat 

operations. Seven of the fifteen incidents discussed can be 

72 
attributed to that cause. Five other incidents had as their 

primary cause a lack of adequate coordination and foresight 

between air and ground planners. In only three incidents 

could the cause be identified as misidentification of 

friendly for enemy aircraft. There were na cases noted 

involving mechanical malfunctions. Thus, just as in the case 

of artillery and air amicicide, the basic cause is intimately 

connected with the human element rather than with mechanical 

malfunction or the presence or absence of technological 

identification systems. Visibility and the type af 

operation, air or ground, do not appear to be significant 

factors. Training, experience, and the development of better 

planning and coordination procedures thus appear to be the 

most efficaciaus solutions, 

Although the almost complete absence of an enemy air 

threat in Korea and Vietnam served to arbitrarily reduce the 

number of incidents to almost nil, some credit for the favorable record in those conflicts must also be given to the 

development in and after World War II. of adequate air-groundnaval coordination procedures and improved technological 

aids. The experience of Korea and Vietnam, however, should 

not deceive us with regard to the future probability of 

serious incidents of antiaircraft amicicide. Any future 

conflict in which US forces are involved, especially one in 

Central Europe, will involve an enemy active in the air and 

hitherto unseen numbers of very destructive antiaircraft 

missiles and guns. In such a conflict a lack of training, 

experience, or coordination will likely produce the same 

unwanted results as they did in World War II: friendly aircrews and planes destroyed by friendly antiaircraft fire. 

73 
TABLE 4 

Antiaircraft Amicicide Incidents by Conditians of Visibility, 

Type of Ground Operation, Type of Air Operation, and Type of Error 

A. Conditions of Visibility 

Conflict 

Visibility 

Normal 

Visibility Visibility Total. 

Reduced Unknawn Incidents 

WW II (Eur) 4 2 6 

ww II (Pat> 4 2 2 8 

Vietnam War 1 1 

Cmflic t 

F,. Type of Ground Operation 

Type TCltal 

Defensive Offensive Retrograde Unknown Incidents 

WW LI (Eur) P 3 2 6 

WW II CPac> 7 1 8 

Vietnam War 1 1 

0 LO 2 1 15 

c. 

Conflict 

Close Air 

Support 

WV? II (Eurl 4 

WW II (Pat> 5 

Type of Air Operation 

Airborne Type Tatal 

Assault Other Unknown Incidents 

2 

2 k 8 

D. Type of Error 

Conflict 

Training & Total 

Misidentification Coordination Discipline Incidents 

ww II CEur) 

ww II fPac> 

Vietnam War 

74 
4 

GROUND AMICICIDE 

Introduction 

While amicicide incidents arising from the engagement of 

one friendly ground unit by another have not involved the 

same destructive force as either artillery or air incidents, 

they have nevertheless canstituted a serious threat to the 

continuity of ground operations and have resulted in death, 

wounds, and loss of friendly equipment. Active combat 

operations involving large numbers of infantry troops and 

armor units are particularly difficult to coordinate. The 

lack of proper coordination, the inability to distinguish 

friend from foe, and the usual stresses of combat on nervous 

or ill-disciplined troops have on occasion led to friendly 

soldiers or tanks firing on one another with predictable 

consequences. None of the fifty-eight incidents identified 

in this study were related to any mechanical problem. The 

incidents were all due to some human failure. 

It should be pointed out that the weapons involved in the 

noted incidents of ground amicicide were direct-fire weapans 

of limited range and required visual acquisition and identification of the target. In World War II and in Vietnam 

there were no technical, electronic aids to assist in the 

identification process, and the pressures of combat usually 

demanded, or seemed to demand, a "shoot first and sort 'em 

out later" policy. Most of the fifty-eight incidents 

examined involved small arms and automatic weapons fire of 

one infantry force against another. Sixteen af the fiftyeight incidents involved tanks, but most were cases in which 

tanks fired with both machine guns and main armament on 

infantry forces. Only two major incidents involved friendly 

tanks engaging other friendly tanks, and one additional incident involved a protracted engagement of tanks with friendly 

tank destroyer forces. All three incidents occurred in the 

European theater during World War II. Two of the incidents 

are described in detail in this study. 

World War I 

The well-fixed defensive lines and planned, coordinated 

attacks characteristic of warfare on the western front in 

75 
World War 1 were not proof a ainst frequent incidents of 

ground as well as artillery amlcicide. The great confusion 

of offensive operations and the serious disruption of ~a~~~- 

ications that accompanied such attacks sometimes resulted in 

one group of friendly troops battling another. The limited 

visibility and confusion of a disputed trench was often the 

scene of such incidents. Typical of these was the experience 

of the Australian 50th Infantry Battalion on 24 April 1918 

during the second battle of VilLers-Bretonneux 1 

heavy enemy fires, the Australians advanced stea 

the German trenches under cover of the darkness. As they 

neared the German position, several shots were fired at them 

from close in front, someone yelled "Bomb the bastards," 

grenades were thrown, and a rush of the trench was made.2 

The trench proved to be occupied, not by the Germans, but by 

remnants of the 2d Devon and 1st Worcester Battalions, wha 

had not been informed of the Australian counterattack and 

thought the Germans were attacking them from the rear. 

The mare fluid conditions of combat in World War II, both 

in Europe and the Pacific, only intensified the problems of 

locating and coordinating friendly units in order to preclude 

incidents of amicicide. Although communications were reatly 

improved, the greater area of dispersion, higher mobility, 

and ) particularly in the Pacific, more difficult terrain 

offset any gain in ease of communication. Surprisingly, 

there appear ta have been no incidents of ground amicicide 

during the North African campaign of 1942-43 worthy of being 

recorded in the more obvious sources. The inexperience of US 

forces was amply revealed in several incidents of artillery, 

air, and antiaircraft amicieide, but cases of misplaced 

ground fires that may have occurred do not appear in the 

published histories of the campaign. 

The ill-fated airborne reinforcement of the Gela beachhead by the 504th Regimental Combat Team on the night of 11 

July 1943 has been described above. Friendly antiaircraft 

fires were not the only hazard for the paratroopers of Qperation HUSKY 2. Several. of the American paratroopers were hit 

by friendly small arms and automatic fire whil.e still in 

their parachutes, and a few were shot after they landed. For 

example, Chaplain Delbert A. Kuehl (HHC f 504th Parachute 

Infantry) and several other men landed in the 45th Infantry 

Division area, well to the southeast of Gela, and i~ed~a~ely 

began to receive fire from American troop~.~ Shouting the 

password only caused the fire to increase, so while the other 

76 
x 

mew fired their weapons into the air, Chaplain Kuehl crawled 

around to the rear of the American position and succeeded in 

stopping the fire. 

Both the 271st and 158th Field Artillery Battalions of 

the 45th Infantry Division reported engagements with erican 

paratroopers on the night of 11 July, the L7lst's report 

stating that: 

Since no news of the Amerisan paratroopers had reached 

this headquarters, they were assumed to be hostile and 

the Battalion was deployed for all around defensee4 

The nervous artillerymen even managed to kill one of their 

own men who was mistaken for a German parachutist.5 The 

entire Gela-Farello fiasco prompted an investigation which, 

however, came to no firm conclusions,~ Both the antiaircraft and ground amicicide incidents connected with Operation 

HUSKY 2 did bring improvements in coordination that went far 

toward avoiding SUSR incidents during later airborne 

operations. 

Both the pace and scale of combat operations on the 

Continent after 6 June 1944 made the avoidance of ground 

amicicide difficult if not impossible. The fire and maneuver 

of many large units, often in a confined area, against a 

determined and skillful enemy frequently resulted in the 

engagement of one friendly unit by another. Such incidents 

were particularly somnmn during the periads of active 

offensive operations (the Normandy breakout; the breaking of 

the West Wall) and during the confused retrograde and holding 

actions in the Ardennes in December 1944. 

Amiciside began to occur almost as soon as the first 

Allied troops crossed the Normandy beaches in June 1944. 

Within the first four or five days after the invasion, the 

green troops of the 25th Cavalry Regiment (4th Armored 

Division) shot up another American unit while attempting to 

straighten their lines in a defensive position near the 

Normandy beachhead.7 

The data on amisicide incidents of all types is par 

larly good for at least one unit that fought in the European 

theater. The US 30th Infantry Division took part in some of 

the hardest fighting on the Continent and appears to have 

carefully recorded its share of both the receipt and delivery 

of misplaced fires. The experiences of the 30th Bivision 

were by no means unique and thus may serve as examples of the 

problems faced by all Allied units during the advance inta 

Germany. 

77 
Between 1 and 6 July 1944 the 30th Infantry Division, 

commanded by Maj, Gen. Leland S. Hobbs, as part of Lt. Gen. 

Charles H. Corlett's XIX Corps, held defensive positions 

north of the Vire-et-Taute Canal and east of the Vire River 

and prepared to continue the attack to the south with an 

assault crossing of the canal-river line in the vicinity of 

Airel. Active patrolling was conducted as the division prepared for the coming river crossing operation. Although the 

re lat. ively quiet course of static defensive operations 

brought no major amicicide incidents, some liaison officers 

and messengers reported that they were "more afraid of 

nervous sentries in the rear areas than of Germans."S 

At 0430 on 7 July 1944 XIX Corps attacked with the 29th 

and 30th Infantry Divisions and the 113th Cavalry Group 

(Mechanized) to secure the high ground north of St. LB. The 

30th Division successfully assaulted westward across the Vire 

River in the vicinity of Airel and southward across the 

Vire-et-Taute Canal to seize the high ground in the vicinity 

of Font Hebert with the main effort in the direction of St. 

Jean de Daye, St. Giles, and St. L8. By nightfall on 7 July 

the division had secured its bridgeheads and was preparing to 

resist German counterattacks and continue the attack to the 

south on 8 July.9 Late on 7 July the corps commander, 

Lieutenant General Corlett, sought to exploit a possible 

breakthrough situation by committing elements of the 3d 

Armored Division through the small and still developing 30th 

Infantry Division bridgehead over the Vire River. Combat 

Command B of the 3d Armored Division was ordered to cross the 

Vire River at Airel and attack southward on the morning of 8 

July with the 30th Infantry Division. The commitment of CCB 

through the confined 30th Division bridgehead served to 

increase enormously the confusion and turmoil already present 

in the still tenuous position and was to result in several 

serious incidents of ground amicicide before the units broke 

free to the south toward St. L6. 

Problems began as soon as CC3 attempted to cross the 

crowded Vire River bridge at Airel and move into assembly I 

areas in the bridgehead on the night of 7-8 July. Chaos 

prevailed as both tankers and infantrymen competed to cross 

the bridge and find space for assembly areas. In the confusion men from both units fired indiscriminately with small 

arms and machine guns, partially from fear and confusion and 

partially out of frustration and anger over the actions of 

their supposed comrades-in-arms.1G The following day Major 

General Hobbs complained to corps headquarters that his division had suffered sixteen casualties as a result of uncontrolled shooting by the CC3 tankers.ll Casualties among 

the tankers were apparently not reported. 

78 
The attempt to advance on 8 July saw no substantial 

improvement. Most of the day was spent trying to sort out 

the jumble of tanks and infantrymen now faced by counterattacks and strong resistance from the recently arrived 2. SS 

Panzer Division (Das Reich).12 

-- 

General Hobbs subsequently 

complained bitterlyof znactivity and lack of movement by 

CGB which prevented his own regiments from moving forward and 

which hampered efforts to support the 30th Division units 

with close artillery fires for fear of hitting the friendly 

a7Xl0r elements q I3 On the afternaon of the eighth the 

artillery commanders of the 3d Armored Division and the 30th 

Infantry Division met in an effort to coordinate their fires 

and to prevent the artillery of one unit from firing on the 

troops of the other.14 At 2U45 Major General Hobbs and 

Maj. Cert. Leroy H. Watson (commanding general of the 3d 

Armored Division) discussed both the problem of CCBs not 

moving out and the problem of possible additional amicicide 

incidents: 

Watson: Do you mean I am holding you up? 

Wobbs: Yes. 

Watson: I don't see how I am. 

Hobbs: If you don‘t move those people will shoot into 

each other. We have had 16 casualties from the 

situation as it is now. 15 

h few minutes later General Hobbs told his artillery chief 

that 

* * * as far as fires are concerned tonight [f want] 

it clearly understood that first of aPI it should be 

prepared to protect our troops as they are now, 

wherever they are, irrespective of armcxr or anything 

else, and if they call for it, they get ite16 

Fortunately, there were no major incidents of misplaced 

artillery fire, but the resumption of the attack on 9 July 

was to see a significant incident of ground amicicide 

involving the two commands, 

In an effort to relieve the congestion and confusion in 

the Airel bridgehead caused by the presence there of two 

major units under separate command, on the evening of 8 July 

CGB was attached by Lieutenant General Gorlett to the 30th 

Infantry Division, despite the protests of Major General 

Hobbs, who was convinced his division could proceed in the 

advance without further '"assistance" from the pesky armor 

79 
unit,l7 Nevertheless, Hobbs received attachment of CCB and 

plans were made for the tankers to continue the attack to the 

southwest on 9 July to seize the dominant terrain of Hill 91 

at Hauts-Vents, slightly more than three miles ahead. 

On the morning of 9 July Brigadier General Bohn, the CGB 

commander, attempted to pass his trailing task force in 

column through his leading elements. The always difficult 

maneuver was further complicated by the heavy hedgerow 

terrain and extremely muddy conditions caused by several days 

of heavy rain, The advance of the armored forces was soon 

bogged down and also stymied the attempts of 30th Division 

units to move forward. Dissatisfied with CCB' s slow 

progress, General Hobbs pressed General Bohn, telling him to 

take his objective by 1700 or surrender command of his 

uait .18 In an effort to give his impatient superior some 

sign of progress, Bohn ordered one of his tank companies to 

strike ahead without pause, cross the St. Jean de Daye-Pont 

Hebert highway, and move southwestward to Hill 91. The 

company of eight Sherman tanks soon moved Off toward 

Hauts-Vents spraying the ditches and hedgerows with machine 

gun fire. 

Meanwhile Bohn attempted to get the remainder of his 

mired combat command underway and the various elements of the 

30th Infantry Division braced themselves against expected 

counterattacks by the 2. SS Panzer Division from the west and 

the panzer Lehr DivisrG fnrom the east, As the dav wore on 

the 30th Dixon's infantry and attached armor (?43d Tank 

Battalion) came under increasing German pressure. AL though 

the division generally stood firm in the face of the German 

counterattack, isolated units withdrew precipitately after 

learning of the virtual destruction of the 743d Tank 

Battalion in a German ambush on the division right flank. 

The 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion (Towed) was attached ta 

the 30th Infantry Division in April 1944 and landed at OMAHA 

Beach on 24 June 1944. Equipped with thirty-six 3-inch or 

76-mm towed antitank guns P the 823d was considered a 

well-trained unit with high morale even though on 9 July it 

was still in its shakedown period. Later the battalion would 

hold the US Army record for tanks destroyed by a tank destroyer battalion for the period 6 June 1944--g Eay 1945 on 

the Continent, ha;lging knocked out 111 enemy tanks and other 

armored vehicles. 

Company C, 823d Tank Destroyer Eattalion, had crossed the 

Vire River on 7 July and had supported the 30th Infantry 

Division's abortive attempts to continue the attack out of 

the bridgehead on 8 July. Its main role, however, had been 
to counter the German counterattacks that mounted in intensity on 9 July, By late afternoon on the ninth the company 

was in defensive direct-fire positions south of the St. Jean 

de Daye crossroads astride and east af the main highway to 

St. L8.20 Shortly after 1635 1st Lt. Ellis W. McInnis's 

1st Platoon shifted positions slightly in anticipation of an 

expected German armored counterattack north up the St. IA 

highway.21 By about 1715 1st Platoon's guns were in position covered by the bazookas and small arms of the 1st Reconnaissance Platoon, 823d TD Battalion, led by 1st Lt. Thompson 

L. Raney. 

While Lieutenant McInnis's platoon moved into position, 

stragglers from the 117th Infantry Regiment streamed northward along the St. L8 highway reporting that the German armor 

was not far behind. Air bursts from unidentified artillery 

over the tank destroyer positions lent credence to the 

imminence of a German assault. About 1800 Lieutenant McInnis 

spotted a tank about 1,000 yards to his front which maved 

back and forth several times to look over the hilltop in hull 

defilade. He immediately radioed the Company C commander to 

ascertain whether there were any friendly tanks in the area 

and received the reply that "what you are looking for is in 

front of you.'122 

Almost immediately the tank moved north along the highway 

spraying the hedgerows, ditches, and 1st Platoon positions 

with .30-caliber machine gun fire. It was sown joined by 

several other tanks which also fired their machine guns and 

75-m tank guns. Unable to visually identify the advancing 

tanks because of the drizzle and fog which had restricted 

visibility al1 day, Lieutenant McInnis could only conclude 

that the tanks firing on his position constituted the 

long-awaited German counterattack and gave the order to his 

platoon to open fire.23 

Sergeant Malery Nunn, who had already received a graze on 

the face from one of the tank machine gun bullets, issued the 

fire commands for his gun to engage the lead tank at an estimated range of 500-600 yards. The gunner, Corporal Clement, 

scored a dead center hit with the first round, and the lead 

tank stopped as smoke poured from it. Two additional rounds 

were fired, but their effect could not be observed because of 

smoke. The other tanks continued to advance firing, and 

Sergeant Nunn's gun was hit, and Corporal Clement was wounded 

in the leg. Sergeant nunn assumed the gunner's position and 

Lieutenant McInnis loaded. Three more rounds were fired, but 

no hits were observed, and the remaining tanks continued to 

roll forward.24 

81 
As the tanks cl.osed, the tank destroyer personnel were 

forced to take cover in the ditches where they were pinned 

down by the machine gun fire from the tanks. When the tanks 

were about 400 yards away, Sergeant Nunn recognized them as 

friendly mediums 2 called for a cease-fire, and stood up 

waving at the tanks in an attempt to halt their firing. His 

brave attempt had no effect, and the 1st Platoon hugged the 

ground as several tanks, only three of which were not firing, 

passed through the position and continued out of sight to the 

north, all attempts by the tank destroyer personnel to identify themselves having failed.25 

Sgt. Carl Hanna, Private First Class Hardin, and 

Pfc. Ernie Jacobs of Lieutenant Raney"s recon platoon were in 

the process of establishing a bazooka position in a ditch 

when the tanks appeared. They were pinned down by fire from 

the tanks, and when it became unbearably heavy, Sergeant 

Hanna ordered his men to take cover in the ditch on the other 

side of the hedgerow. As they attempted to do so, Private 

First Class Jacobs was hit in the head by a 75mm tank round, 

which killed him instantly and knocke out Sergeant Ranna, 

who was hit in the back of the head by fragments of Jacob's 

~1~11.26 

Company C's 2d Platoon, led by Ist Et. Francis .I, 

connor s , also fell victim to the tankers' fire. A tank 

rolled up to within fifteen yards of Connors's uncamouflaged 

halftrack, which could scarcely have been mistaken for anything other than a US vehicle, and fired paint-blank, 

severely wounding the halftrack's assistant driver in the 

chest.27 Lieutenant Cannors identified the tank as a 3d 

Armored Division tank (~IIo. 25) and Sgt. Joseph A. Chustz, the 

2d Platoon Security Sergeant, identified another by the name 

on its hull, BE-BACK.2g 

During the course of the fray Lieutenants McGinnis and 

Raney and several of their men took cover on the north side 

of a stone building. One of the tanks fired an BE round into 

the building from twenty feet away and five feet from where 

the party was standing. The next tank in column turned its 

turret toward the group but did not fire when Lieutenant 

Mc Innis waved his arms and shouted. Shortly after the 

o'ffending tanks had rolled northward out of the Company C 

area, 1st. Lt. Neil P. Curry of the 30th Reconnaissance Troap 

arrived from the north and reported that the tanks had also 

fired on his M-8 halftrack and showed the hole in the turret 

ring mount.23 

The results of the twenty-five-minute engagement were 

serious but not catastro Two US medium tanks were 
destroyed, and one 3-inch antitank gun was damaged by machine 

gun fire striking the recoil mechanism but was returned to 

service within twenty-four hours.30 The 823d TD Battalion 

suffered casualties of one man killed and three wounded (two 

seriously); the tankers lost SiX men.31 In his daily 

report for 9 July the 823d TD Battalion S-3, Maj. Ashby I. 

Lohse, reported the unit"s combat efficiency as "satisfactory 

but mad as hell" and added that the unit 

took two prisoners which were its first, suffered its 

first fatal casualties, was shot up by <its own 

Infantry and Armored Force and in turn shot up our own 

Infantry and Armored Force but under all circumstances 

came through their first critical engagement in fairly 

good shape and without too serious losses,32 

On 10 July Major Lohse was appointed a board of 

officer to investigate the incident. He identified 

offending tanks as belonging to the 3d "Armored Division 

concluded that the US tanks were fired upon because: 

(1) enemy tanks were reported both by Higher 

Headquarters and withdrawing Infantry to be in the 

immediate front of the 3" guns, 

(2) poor visibility prevented recognition of type and 

nationality of tank, 

(31 no friendly tanks were known to be in that area, 

(4) because tanks were firing upon gun positions and 

friendly positions generally and, 

(5) because tanks were moving north while the 

direction of attack was south.33 

Despite the poor visibility and obvious stress of being 

under heavy fire, the tank destroyer personnel did recognize 

the tanks as friendly and ceased firing when the tanks were 

about 4OQ yards away. They then attempted, often at very 

personal risk, to identify themselves. Under the circumstances the continued firing by the tankers is difficult to 

excuse. Every effort was made by the tank destroyer personnel to identify themselves, but whether out of confusion, 

fear, or simply lack of discipline, the tanks moved through 

the friendly position and well to the rear, firing 

continuously. 

As the reader has probably already surmised, the 

offending tanks were the company from CCB, 3d Armored 

83 
Division Cprobably a company of the 332 Armored Regiment), 

earlier dispatched by Brigadier CeneraZ Bohn to proceed 

expeditiously to Hauts-Vents. Apparently the tank company 

commander either misunderstood his instructions or became 

confused. In any event, upon reaching the north-south St.. L8 

highway he turned right (north) rather than left (south) and 

blundered into the 823d TD Battalion position. The commander 

personally suffered the consequences of his error. His tank 

was the one knocked out at the beginning of the engagement by 

Sergeant Paunn's gun. Just at the moment the Lead tank was 

hit, General Bohn was attempting to contact his wayward unit 

by radia and over the open radio channel heard the tank 

company commander"s cry of pain and anguished statement, "1 

am in dreadful agony."34 

After their pass through the 823d's position, the 

remaining six tanks reversed direction and proceeded to the 

objective, Hill 91 at Hauts-Vents, which they somehow managed 

to reach shortly before dark. Ironically, the six tanks 

reached the objective just in time to be hit by an American 

strafing attack requested earlier but delayed by bad 

weather. Fortunately, there were no casualties and the 

remnants of the tank company spent the night on Hill 91 only 

to be withdrawn the following morning (I.0 July) when it 

proved impossible to reinforce them. The Hauts-Vents 

objective was finally seeured by CC& on the afternoon of I1 

JuPy .35 

Despite the tragic amicicide incident, Lieutenant General 

Corlett, the XIX Corps commander, congratulated Major General 

Hobbs on the 30th Infantry Division's performance on 9 July, 

and Hobbs replied that he, too, thought that the division had 

done a good job and that 

. . . there were a few upsets but things like that 

will happen. In one case our own tanks turned the 

wrong way and went up the wrong road, but all in all 

it was a good show.36 

The unfortunate engagement of CCB, 3d Armored Division, 

and the 30th Infantry Division's 823d Tank Destroyer 

Battalion south of the St. Jean de Daye crossraads on 9 July 

1944 was representative of the problems of identification and 

control faced by ground forces commanders in the difficult 

hedgerow terrain of Normandy as Allied forces plagued by 

often foul weather attempted to break out of the Normandy 

enclave against strong German opposition, Given the difficult terrain, poor visibility, and confusion generated by 

crowded Allied units and skillful German resistance, the 

occurrence of incidents of amicicide of all types is not 

84 
surprising. On 10 July, the very morning fullawing the St, 

Jean de Daye crossroads incident, 30th Infantry Division 

units were again reporting friendly tank fire falling OR 

their troops.37 But the 30th Infantry Division was not the 

only American unit to experience ground amicicide incidents 

in the Normandy fighting. The attack of the 29th Infantry 

Division to seize St. L8 1.5 July 1944 got off to a dismal 

start when lack of proper coordination with the adjacent 35th 

Infantry Division resulted in a misunderstanding and exchange 

of fire among US troops. A panicky withdrawal by an infantry 

company of the 115th Infantry Regiment (29th Infantry 

Division) was averted only by the prampt action of an 

artillery liaison officer who took charge and restored order 

and discipline.38 Such incidents would continue to occur 

as the Allies pressed forward on the Continent. 

In late July as Allied forces broke out of the Normandy 

lodgement and raced toward Avranches, mission-type orders 

were eommort and operations often took place in great 

confusion. On one occasion two tank battalions of the 4th 

Armored Division engaged in a shooting match while trying to 

occupy the same night assembly area. A short time later the 

two US battalions were joined by a German tank battalion also 

attempting to use what must have been a really choice 

assembly area. The German tanks parked unchallenged and it 

was some time before all parties realized what WEiS 

happening. The upshot was a frantic melee in which the 

German and American tanks 

eight to twenty-five feet,39 

engaged each other at ranges of 

Some American tanks posed a hazard to friendly troops 

merely by virtue of their construction. In September 1944 

the 1st Infantry Division cautioned its units that extreme 

care should be exercised in firing the bow machine gun with 

which some US tanks were equipped because the gun was mounted 

in a low position and was impossible to aim accurately, 

thereby creating a serious hazard for infantry in front of 

the tank.4Q 

BY late November 1944 American units were pressing 

against the prepared German West Wall positions in the 

Saar-Moselle triangle. In foul weather on 23 November 1944 

the 90th Infantry Division's 2d and 3d Battalions, 358th 

Infantry Regiment, were ordered to attack Pluenzingen and 

Sins, 3,000 and 4,000 yards respectively behind the Orscholz 

Switch Line, in hopes of opening the way for CGA of the 10th 

Armored Divisian (to which the 358th Infantry was then 

attached) to drive through and secure a crossing over the 

Saar River at Saarburg. Planning and coordination of the 

attack proved faulty, however. As the 2/358th Infantry 

85 
crossed the line of departure and moved into the attack it 

was taken under heavy short-range 75-mm fire by the tanks of 

CCA's TF CHAMBERLAIN, bogged down in the mud on the flank. 

Almost simultaneously the supporting 344th Field Artillery 

Battalion, mistaking the location of the friendly infantry, 

showered the unfortunate infantrymen with a hail of shells. 

Caught unaware by friendly fire from flank and rear, many of 

the infantrymen were killed or wounded, control was lost, and 

the attack stalled. The 3J358th Infantry suffered less 

damage than its sister 2d Battalion and quickly reorganized 

and continued the attack, clearing Campholz Woods of the 

enemy. The 2/358th Infantry, however, was seriously disorganized and was unable to reform and resume the attack 

until late in the afternoon and then with only meager 

success .41 

The infantrymen of the 358th were justly enraged by the 

careless firing of the CGA tankers. 111 will between the two 

units persisted for some time. Fights broke out in the hospitals where casualties of the two units were confined, and 

there were numerous altercations between the infantrymen and 

tankers later in the rest area behind the lines.42 

Friendly troops paid a heavy toll for the failure of commanders and staff afficers to adequately coordinate the operations in progress. 

The unexpected and violent German attack in the Ardennes 

in December 1944 scattered American units and seriously disrupted the coordination and cooperation of the hard-pressed 

American soldiers. Struggling to reorganize and hold the 

powerful German offensive thrust, several units found that in 

the confusion and uncertainty of the moment their fires found 

friendly rather than enemy troo~s.4~ 

On 16 December 1944 the 4th Infantry Division attempted 

to jam the southern shoulder of the German penetration. That 

morning Company B, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry, and ten 

tanks from the 70th Tank Battalion mounted a limited attack 

to relieve the 2d Battalion's Company I?, then encircled at 

the north end of the village of Berdorf. The tanks, with 

infantrymen on their decks, reached the northeastern edge of 

the town just before noon and began shelling the Pare Hotel, 

which proved to be occupied by men of Company F, who quickly 

found in the hotel an American flag, which they displayed on 

the roof. Having relieved the battered infantrymen of 

Company F, the attacking force attempted to clear the town 

but German resistance proved strong, and the attempt was 

abandoned at night fall. 

86 
The same day (16 December) found the 28th Infantry 

Division resisting the attack of the 2. Panzer Division in 

the vicinity of Weiler and Wahlhausen.Small elements of US 

armor and infantry were committed piecemeal in the area, and 

coordination was difficult, In the early afternoon a platoon 

of medium tanks from Company A (or B), 707th Tank Battalion, 

attempted to drive the Germans off the road linking the 

villages of Holzthum and Consthum. The tankers were informed 

that there were no friendly troops on the road, but just outside Holzthum the tanks engaged and knocked out an antitank 

gun placed there by Company I, 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry. 

After a short delay while the infantry and tankers identified 

themselves, the tanks rolled on to the south to complete 

their mission. 

At several times American units were forced to withdraw 

and in the resulting confusion were fired upon by their own 

troops. On the night of 17-18 December elements of the 2d 

Battalion, 38th Infantry (2d Infantry Division), and the 

395th Infantry Regiment (99th Infantry Division) were forced 

to withdraw from the village of Rocherath. The 395th 

Infantry elements took up new defense positians on the 2d 

Infantry Division left flank northeast of Rocherath and 

waited far the expected enemy advance. In the withdrawal 

from Rocherath the 324th Engineer Combat Battalion (99th 

Infantry Division) had been left behind on Rath Hill, On the 

morning of the eighteenth, the engineers moved west to rejoin 

their fellows, but before reaching safety they came under 

fire from both the enemy and the 395th Infantry and suffered 

some casualties. 

Also on the morning of 18 December Major General Barton, 

the 4th Infantry Division commander, dispatched the 2d 

Battalian, 22d Infantry, to strengthen the right flank af the 

12th Infantry near the village of Qsweiler. As the battalion 

approached the village, the American tanks there, mistaking 

them for Germans, opened fire. After two hours and several 

casualties, a patrol under a white flag managed to make contact with the tankers in Osweiler and establish identification, and the tank company in Osweiler was augmented by the 

somewhat worn 2/22d Infantry. 

The following day (19 December) the 423d Infantry Regiment (106th Infantry Division) attempted to mount a counterattack against the German forces in the vicinity of 

Schoenberg in the Schnee Eifel. The 3/423d jumped off at 

1000, but one company was soon cut off and captured. The 

other two rifle companies nearly reached Schoenberg, but were 

forced to withdraw. The 1/423d managed to get one company in 

the advance, but it was eliminated by mid-afternoon. The 

87 
fate of the 2/423d was even less inspiring. Attempting to 

advance to the northwest on the regiment"s right flank, the 

2/423d became separated and was taken under fire by the left 

flank elements of the neighboring 422d Infantry, 400 yards to 

the north. The 422d~ men mistook the 2/423d's advance for a 

German flanking attack and fired into the draw up which the 

423d men were moving. A brief fire fight ensued, and both 

units became considerably disorganized. At 1630, with control gone, ammunition spent, and many wounded men untended, 

the commander of the 423d Infantry surrendered his regiment 

to the Germans. Eventually, all but 150 men of the 422d 

Infantry were forced to surrender as well. 

The attacking Germans in the Ardennes were not immune 

from ground amicicide incidents either. On the morning of 23 

December 293. Regiment (18. Volks-Grenadier Division) worked 

its way through the Fiihrer Begleit Brigade around Rodt (near 

st. Vith) and proceeded along the road to Poteau, intending 

to outflank CCA, 7th Armored Division, to the east. The 

German situation was as confused as the American, however, 

and the 293. Regiment ran into the infantry and assault gun 

screen of>e 9. SS Panzer Division, which mistook them for a 

withdrawing ArnEiGn column and delivered a heavy flanking 

fire. Several hours later, after the Americans had escaped 

from the trap, the 293. entered Poteau. 

The American forces in the Bulge weathered the Ardennes 

storm and soon resumed their steady advance toward Germany. 

That advance continued to be accompanied by occasional amicitide incidents that caused casualties and disrupted the continuity and pace of offensive operations. In the 6th Armored 

Division attack toward Wardin on 2 January 1945, the 9th 

Armored Infantry Battalion attempted to replace the 44th 

Armored Infantry Battalion, but was caught in an artillery 

barrage during the passage of lines and was seriously disorganized. The 9th was unable to resume the advance until noon 

and soon thereafter was subjected to the misplaced fire of 

the 134th Infantry (35th Infantry Division) which further 

retarded its progress. 

One final incident will conclude our survey of ground 

amicicide in the European theater. It merits detailed 

description because it is one of the very few incidents in 

which friendly tanks 

tanks.44 

were fired upon by other friendly 

At the end of February 1945, the 30th Infantry 

Division was advancing, steadily opposed by elements of the 

2. and 11. Panzer Divisions, along the Roer River. The flat, 

open teGain dotted with villages afforded little cover and 

concealment for a conventional daylight attack, and so most 

of the bounds forward from town to town were made by 
coordinated night attacks lit by moonlight. 45 The incident 

with which we-are concerned involved elements of the 30th 

Infantry Division in a night attack north of Oberembt, 

Germany, on 26-27 February 1945. 

On the night of 25-26 February the 117th Infantry 

attacked successfully and seized the towns of Lich and 

Oberembt. On the twenty-sixth, the 117th consolidated its 

position and planned the next phase of the operation: a 

coordinated night attack to seize the villages of 

Kleintroisdorf and Kirchtroisdorf and the town of Put2 

farther on. The day was spent in reconnaissance and detailed 

planning and coordination, and at 1800 the regimental. plan 

was issued. The plan called for the 3/117th to move up from 

Steinstrass, pass between the 2d and 1st Battalions, and 

attack on the left at 2230 to seize Kleintroisdorf. The 1st 

Battalion would attack simultaneously on the right to seize 

Kirchtroisdorf. Then the 2d Battalion would be committed 

through the 3d Battalion to seize Futz.46 The attack would 

be supported by tanks from Companies B and C, 743d Tank 

Battalion, and a company of British flail tanks (Troop A, 1st 

Lothian and Border Yeomanry) to be used for breaching 

minefields. 

Despite the obvious problems of a night passage of lines 

(by the 3d Battalion), the attack jumped off smoothly at 

2230. By midnight the 1st and 3d Battalions had taken 

Kirchtroisdorf and Kleintroisdorf respectively, and three 

hours later the 2d Battalion passed through and took Putz 

before daylight in a short but stubborn fight.48 Only one 

incident marred the generally well coordinated and successful 

moonlit attack. The platoon of British flail tanks (four 

tanks) detailed to follow the 1/117th in the attack on the 

right toward Kirchtraisdorf strayed left into the 31117th 

zone. After proceeding several hundred yards the platoon 

leader realized his mistake and turned his platoon around. 

As his tanks again approached the 3d Battalion axis of 

advance, they were spotted by elements of the 3d Battalion, 

which had jumped off ten minutes late. The 3/117th and its 

accompanying armor (B-743d Tank En and Troop A, 1st Lothian 

and Border Yeomanry (->> and tank destroyer elements (one 

platoon of C-823d TD Bn) assumed that the tanks were German 

and took the hapless flail tanks under fire, destroying the 

entire platoon.49 In an otherwise well planned, well coordinated and well executed attack, chance, an error, and 

reduced visibility making identification difficult resulted 

in a serious case of ground amicicide, as it had so many 

times before in the European battle area. 
World War II: The Pacific 

Numerous incidents of ground amicicide occurred in the 

Pacific theater and for the same reasons prevalent in 

Europe: green troops, confusion, lack of coordination, and 

misidentification due to poor visibility, dense jungle, and 

the excitement of battle. If anything, small-scale incidents 

of indiscriminate firing at night were an even greater problem in view of the reputation of the Japanese enemy as a wily 

night fighter. 

An attack by Company K, 127th Infantry (32.d Infantry 

Division), on the Buna Mission on 28 December 1942 was 

stifled by spontaneous and uncontrolled firing by American 

troops) and the attack had to be halted while a reorganization took place.50 Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, the 

commanding general of the Buna Force, also reported: 

Excitedly firing at noises during the night was a 

common fault and seriously restricted the use of 

patrols and other important movements after dark.51 

The problem of indiscriminate firing at night was a 

serious one everywhere in the Pacific. It was addressed in 

some detail in a report worth quoting in its entirety: 

PART 2. 

Killing or wounding our own troops. 

During recent operations a number of officers and 

enlisted men have been killed or wounded at night by 

our own troops who fired with the belief, or from the 

fear, that the Japs were infiltrating into their 

areas. The majority of cases reported occurred among 

traops bivouaced well to the rear of the front line 

infantry battalians. Some of the men and officers 

were sleeping in their jungle hammocks when shot. The 

majority of this 'trigger happy' firing, although not 

restricted to troops which had not been previously in 

action, was among newly arrived units. 

Officers with battle experience in this theater 

are of the opinion that this condition is contributed 

to by the overemphasis placed on the ability of the 

Jap to infiltrate into our rear areas and by the 

oftenheard statement "stay in your slit trenches after 

dark, assume that everything that moves is a Jap'". 

90 
That attitude is, of course, essential for patrols 

and observations QOStS remaining outside the 

'perimeter' at night and for the small units forming 

that 'perimeter'. In the rear of this line, even in 

the areas of the battalions in contact, commanders, 

staff officers, messengers and wire communications 

personnel must move around at night. Further to the 

rear) back of the artillery areas for instance, such 

personnel should be able to move with more freedom. 

Those officers also believe that, while there will 

continue to be incidents of this nature in the forward 

area, training prior to arrival in the theater in the 

withholding of fire until it is established that the 

.target is an enemy will obviate these losses in the 

rear areas. They feel that such training, together 

with a judicious use of passwords or recognition 

signals, will reduce these casualties in the forward 

areas.5* 

The danger of uncontrolled firing by ill-disciplined 

green troops was clearly demonstrated in the events on the 

Aleutian island af Kiska on 15-16 August 1943. Expecting 

fanatical Japanese resistance, 35,000 US and Canadian troops, 

most of whom had,not seen combat before, invaded Kiska on 15 

August 1943. By nightfall on 16 August, twenty-eight men 

were dead and fifty were wounded despite the fact that there 

was not a single live Japanese soldier on the island.53 

Although a few (four killed and several wounded) fell victim 

to booby traps and mines left by the Japanese, most were shot 

by mistake by their own comrades in the heavy Kiska fog. 

Immediately upon landing on 15 August, the inexperienced 

troops fanned out through the fog. The columns frequently 

engaged each other in the reduced visibility, and the night 

of 15-16 August brought even more firing by the nervous 

soldiers. One participant, US Army Lt. Brian Murphy, later 

recalled that, 

moved.'"54 

"the troops were shooting at anything that 

One infantryman attacked what he believed to be 

an enemy patrol. The patrol members shouted for him to stop, 

but he began to throw hand grenades and was promptly shot 

down. 

The Kiska landing was an embarrassing and costly mistake 

in several respects, not the least of which was the uncontrolled gunfire of the inexperienced troops. The invasion 

commander, Vice Adm. Thomas C. Kincaid (commander, North 

'Pacific Force), proved somewhat disingenuous when he later 

stated that '"of course we had no way af anticipating our men 

would shoot each other in the fog.'"55 

91 
Inadequate coordination between units was another cause 

of ground amicicide incidents in the Pacific. In May 1943, 

three manths before the ill-fated Kiska landings, US troops 

on Attu, another of the Aleutian Islands, experienced delays 

and casualties from their own fires. As one platoon leader 

on Attu later commented, 

'"Staff work must equal small unit work in quality if 

there is to be success. Lack of coordination will 

cause units to fire into the area held by friendly 

units, and, as I actually saw, attack friendly units. 

I cannot stress this too much, as I saw the Lack of it 

too much.'r56 

A major obstacle to the quick capture of Butaritari 

Island (Hakin) on 20 November I.943 was the West Tank Barrier, 

a trench six feet deep and more than fourteen feet wide, 

which extended narth and south across the island about 3,400 

yards east of the RED landing beaches.57 The planners of 

the 27th Infantry Division decided that the best method of 

eliminating the obstacle would be to envelop it, and because 

this would involve two units moving toward each other, great 

care was taken to avoid the danger af a fire fight between 

friendly units. The measures proposed to coordinate the two 

assaulting units involved colored smoke signals and constant 

radio contact between the two units. 

In the event, the coordination measures proved 

inadequate. OR D-Day (2Q November) the 1st Battalion, 165th 

Infantry, landed and advanced eastward toward the West Tank 

Barrier, while the 2/165th Infantry moved westward toward 

it. No direct radio communication between the two units was 

established, and the frantic attempts of the l/ 165th 

commander, Lt. co1 * Gerard W. Kelley, to determine the 

whereabouts of the 2/165th were futile. About 1400 the 

L,fhGSth was pinned down by friendly fire from the front, but 

Kelley was ordered by 27th Infantry Division Headquarters to 

press on to a junction with Lt. Cal. John F. McDonough's 2d 

Battalion. The men of the P/165th pressed on, but not 

without some anxious moments due to the continuing fire of 

the 21165th Infantry. 

Japanese sniper fire and ruses on the night of 20-22. 

November provoked uncontrolled firing by the jumpy American 

troops, who blasted away all night, wasting ammunition and 

drawing Japanese counterfire. Daylight on the twenty-first 

brought a resumption of incidents attributable to poor 

coordination and lack of strong fire discipline. Two hulks 

on the reef near On Chang's Wharf (YELLOW Beach), which had 

been heavily attacked by air and naval gun fire, were again 

92 
thought to harbor the enemy. Landing craft coming in to 

YELLOW Beach machine-gunned the hulks, many of their rounds 

landing amidst the American troops on shore. Between 0818 

and 1630 several. air strikes were directed against the hulks, 

and at 0920 several medium tanks were brought up to the beach 

and shelled the hulks with their 75-mm guns. Many of their 

"over s" fell into the boat lanes in the lagaon, making the 

approach to YELLOW Beach a very uncomfortable one indeed. 

The 27th Infantry Division"s problems with illcoordinated and downright indiscriminate ground fire on 

Butaritari were neither unique nor particularly costly. They 

did, however, interrupt operations and adversely affect the 

discipline and morale of the men ashore. Given other 

conditions, they may have proved costly indeed. 

Amphibious assaults, the dominant tactical form in the 

Pacific war, were very difficult to coordinate and control., 

and amicicide incidents were frequent for both the Army and 

the Marines. During Operation FLINTLOCK, the assault on 

Rwajalein Atoll on 1 February 1944, the 2d and 3d Battalions, 

24th Marines, landed on Namur Island beginning at 114.5. 

Enemy fire was light, but the Marines were greatly annayed 

and suffered several casualties as a result of fires by 

friendly armored amphibians offshore that raked the Marines 

moving inland from the beach. The Army forces on Kwajalein 

had problems of their own. The greatest danger to the 32d 

Infantry Regiment (7th Infantry Division) advancing on the 

east side of the island on 3 February 1944 was friendly small 

arms fire from the 184th Infantry to the west. 

Green troops and confusion were not exclusive characteristics of American forces. In the attack on Myitkyina, 

Burma, an the night of 20 May X944, unseasoned infantrymen of 

the Chinese 150th Regiment (Chinese 50th Infantry Division) 

assisting Merrill's Marauders became confused, fired on their 

own men, and ran away in panic.58 

Some incidents of ground amicicide in the Pacific were 

almost bizarre, During the campaign on Saipan the 27th 

Infantry Division had great difficulty controlling its artillery fires.59 The tanks of the 27th Division were also 

occasionally guilty of firing on the adjacent Marines, but 

proved equally dangerous for the 27th's infant rgmen,60 

During an attack on Hill Able on the morning of 27 June 1944 

two platoons from the 762d Tank Battalion supported the 

assault. Soon after the attack began it started to rain, and 

the tanks became covered with mud, which obscured the vision 

Of the drivers and caused them to lose their sense of 

direction. As a consequence, the tanks fired in the direc93 
tion of the Jd Battalion, 106th Infantry, disrupting the 

coordination of the attack and halting it. The 3/1Q6th was 

forced to regroup and effect further coordination. They 

finally jumped off at 1250 and accomplished their mission by 

1342.61 

The stiff Japanese resistance and difficult terrain on 

the island of Guam made the caordination of all arms difficult during the campaign in Suly and August 1944.62 

Typical of the problems caused by the dense Guamanian jungle 

was that faced by the 22d Marines attempting to take Orate on 

28 July. The Marines swept through the barracks grounds and 

moved on to the outskirts of the village of Sumay, where they 

were held up by Japanese fortified in coconut-log pillboxes. 

Marine tanks were called up to eliminate the pilkboxes abut 

made little progress because the. dense brush restricted 

observation and frequently made it impossible to fire withaut 

danger to friendly traops. Fortunately, no friendly troops 

were injured, but the Japanese had to be winkled out by the 

infantry in a slow and dangerous operation. 

The Army and Marines on Guam, as on so many other islands 

Of the Pacific, found it extremely difficult to maintain 

contact with adjacent units and to keep their operations 

adequately coordinated. The attack of the 77th Infantry 

Divisian to secure Mount Barrigada resumed on the morning of 

4 August 1944. In order to reduce Japanese roadblocks and 

reestablish contact with the 3d Marine Division on the 

division's flank, a platoon from the 1st BattaLion, 307th 

Infantry, and one tank from Company A, 706th Tank Battalion, 

set out along the Finegayan Road about 0645. Three hours 

later the small task force had broken two strongly held 

Japanese roadblocks, and shortly before 1100 it came to a 

third. The American tankers opened fire at once on what they 

assumed to be another Japanese position. This roadblock, 

however, turned out to be manned by Company G, 9th Marines, 

who had been warned by the 3d Marine Division to expect the 

Army patrol. The Marines did not fire and were apparently 

unaware that the Army troops expected friendly pasitions to 

be signaled by red smoke grenades. Capt. Francis L. Fagan, 

the Marine company commander, was able to stop the Army 

firing only by running down the road toward the Army troops 

waving his helmet. Before he was able to stop the firing, 

seven of his Marines were wounded. Contact between the Army 

and Marines was reestablished, but at some cost to the 

Marines. 

Several days later it was the Army's turn to come under 

fire from the Marines. Troops of the 2d Battalion, 306th 

Infantry, moving along the Salisbury Road in the attack on 

94 
Mount Santa Rosa, began receiving rifle and machine gun fire 

about 1215.. They suspected the fire was coming from the 3d 

Marine Division elements in the area. About 1245 the 

trailing company, Company F, 21306th Infantry, was engaged in 

a short fire fight at the junction of the Chaguian Trail and 

Salisbury Road by what they were convinced was a force af US 

Marines. Complaints were lodged with the 3d Marine Division, 

which denied that its troops were in the area. Shortly 

thereafter the 306th Infantry Regimental CP came under artillery fire that was conclusively shown to be from Marine pack 

howitzers, and a short time after the mistaken shelling an 

Army motor column on the Salisbury Road was machine-gunned by 

what again was believed to be the Marines. 

The canfused situation along the Salisbury Road and the 

attendant incidents of amicicide resulted from a lack of 

adequate coordination between Army and Marine units in the 

area. Once ad hoc action had been taken to stop the mistaken -- 

firing, the 306th was able to complete its mission with 

relative ease, and by 1715 the regiment had dug in across the 

northern face of Mount Santa Rosa.63 The eighth of August 

ended for the troops of the 77th Infantry Division in a grand 

finale of amicicidal firing. ht sunset the 1/306th Infantry, 

west of Lulog, and the 3/307th Infantry, to the south on 

Mount Santa Rosa, engaged in a prolonged and costly fire 

fight. About 1830 each battalion began receiving mortar fire 

coming from the general direction of the other. Although it 

might have been Japanese fire, it was more likely from 

American weapons being registered for night defensive fires. 

Both battalions reported a Japanese counterattack and opened 

up with small arms fire in the direction of the presumed 

attack. This fire only increased' the illusion in each unit 

that they were under attack, and the tanks with the 306th 

Infantry began firing toward the 307th's position. Both 

battalions called for artillery fire, and the 902d Field 

Artillery Battalion fired a brief barrage. Fortunately, it 

soon became apparent that friendly troops were firing on one 

another and the firing was stopped. The costs of the mistake 

were high: the 31307th Infantry had at least ten casualties, 

and the 1/306th and the 306th Regimental CP suffered a 

smaller number. 

The Korean War 

Two of the first one hundred men wounded in the Korean 

War received their wounds as a result of friendly fire. Both 

incidents, however, more resembled a true accident than they 

did a correctly designated case of ground amicicide. They 

95 
are included, however, because they both meet our definition 

of amicicide and presaged an all too common event of the next 

conflict (Vietnam): one green and nervous soldier shooting 

another. 

Pvt. Robert J. McCoy, 21st Infantry (24th Infantry 

Division), suffered a severe shrapnel wound of the left arm 

at 0900 on 10 July 1950, when he was mistaken for an enemy 

soldier by his buddy, who threw a hand grenade at him.64 

At 2220 on 2 August 1950, Pfc. Norman A. Yoder, Battery B, 

15th Field Artillery Battalion (2d Infantry Division), was 

shot in the right arm by a .3+caliber carbine fired by a 

sergeant guarding the battery CP north of Pusan.65 The 

sergeant mistook Private First Class Yoder for a North Korean 

infiltrator. Yoder spent the next thirty hours in pain at 

the battalion aid station 

put in the ambulance."66 

"waiting for another casualty to be 

Such "accidents" involving individual soldiers were probably not uncommon in Korea. More serious results followed 

ground amicicide incidents of greater scale. The tactical 

situation of US forces in the Korean War frequently involved 

the loss and subsequent recapture of defensive positions at 

night. Sometimes the same position changed hands several 

times in the course of a single night. Ad hoc attacks and -- 

counterattacks mounted in darkness and great confusion bred 

ground amicicide incidents arising from a lack of coordination. Two examples can suffice. 

One of the most gallant episodes of the Korean War was 

the stubborn, defense of the British 29th Brigade along the 

Imjin River north of Seoul in April 1951.67 Faced by a 

massive Chinese Communist attack beginning on 22 April 1951, 

the 29th Brigade held its positions until the early morning 

of 25 April when it was ordered to withdraw. The battered 

remnants of the 1st Battalion, Royal Northumberland 

Fusiliers, an attached battalion of Belgians, and the 1st 

Battalion, Royal Ulster Rifles, were able to retire in good 

order. The 1st Battalion, The Gloucester Regiment, was not 

so fortunate. Surrounded, exhausted, and with ammunition and 

rations nearly expended, the Glosters left their dead and 

wounded in the care of their battalion commander, 

sergeant-major, surgeon, and chaplain and attempted to break 

out after sixty hours of continuous fighting. 

The only element of the Glosters to escape death or 

capture was Company D, under the command of Capt. Michael 

Harvey, and Company D paid a heavy price to both enemy and 

friendly fire for its ultimate survival. Pursued closely by 

the Chinese, Harvey and his men had almost reached the safety 
of American lines by running and crawling the length of a 

narrow valley when they encountered a line of American tanks 

drawn up across the valley 500 yards ahead and firing at the 

Chinese pursuers. As the surviving Glosters rushed forward, 

the American tanks mistook them for the enemy and produced a 

devastating fire from main guns and machine guns. Six of the 

hapless Glosters were killed. After several agonizing 

minutes, during which the Chinese continued to bayonet the 

stragglers, Captain Harvey succeeded in identifying his force 

to the American tankers. The surviving Glosters were brought 

under the meager protection of the US tanks, and the combined 

force conducted a three-mile fighting retreat out of the 

valley to safety. Captain Harvey and thirty-eight men of the 

GLosters made it to safety; they were the only men of the 

regiment to do so. 

Two years later American troops found themselves the 

victim of their own fires. Pork Chop Hill was occupied by a 

succession of Red Chinese and American troops on the night of 

16-17 April 1953.68 Shortly before dawn on 17 April, 

Companies K and L, 31st Infantry (7th Infantry Division), 

attacked from opposite sides of the hill to retake it. 

Neither company knew that the other was to attack from the 

other side. Company K, commanded by 1st Lt, J. G. Clemons, 

had just reached the top of the hill near the CP bunker when 

they came under intense machine gun fire. They immediately 

returned fire. The fire on Company K was coming from the 

right-hand finger of the hill where Sgt. Horace Ford of 1st 

Platoon, Company L, had found a machine gun and two boxes of 

ammunition and had ordered Pvt. Columbus Jackson to fire on 

the crest of Pork Chop Hill, believing it to be held by the 

Chinese. As S. L. A. Marshall expressed it, "King's men 

tried to signal Love to shut it off, but the fire was too 

intense to stand against. 

bled into silence."69 

It died only after Love had been 

The Dominican Republic 

Even the brief intervention by US forces in the Dominican 

Republic in 1965 produced at least one incident of ground 

amicicide. Two companies of the 82d Airborne Division were 

assigned to secure a bridge, one company at either end. 

Neither company could be said to have been seasoned, and when 

someone fired a shot, a fire fight between the two units 

broke out. The firing halted only after both company 

commanders called to the same field artillery battalion for 

support. Two men were wounded.70 

97 
Vietnam 

Ground amicicide incidents of various types occurred 

among US troops with disconcerting frequency during the ten 

years of US involvement in Vietnam. Most were precipitated 

by nervousness and lack of fire discipline or by inadequate 

coordination.71 

As in other conflicts, green troops in Vietnam took their 

toll of their fellow soldiers by firing nervously befare 

properly identifying their target, One man was killed in 

October 1966 near Bong San during a five-man patrol sent out 

by Troop D, 2d Squadron, 12th Cavalry (1st Cavalry Division, 

Airmobile). The patrol stopped for a break and one man left 

the trail to relieve himself. When he attempted to rejoin 

the patrol he was "mistaken for the enemy" and shot to death 

by his best friend. A similar incident occurred in the 1st 

Battalion, 46th Infantry. A soldier from Company B, 1/46th, 

was killed by a comrade in the summer of 1971. The victim 

.left the company's night defensive perimeter and became 

disoriented. Returning to the perimeter at the wrong location, he scared another man from Company B, who shot and 

killed him. 

Aside from possible enemy action, night defensive positions often proved to be dangerous places. In 506 Valley, 

south of Bang Son, on 16 December 1966, Company A, 1112th 

Cavalry (1st Cavalry Division, Airmobile) had established a 

defensive position at night, when the battalion commander 

ordered another company (probably Company B, 118th Cavalry, 

OPCOW at the time to the 1/12th Cavalry) to pass through 

A-1/12th and take up a position on the other side. During 

the passage of lines a soldier from B-1/8th shot one af the 

platoon leaders from A-l/lath, wounding him severely. In 

November 1971 an infantry rifle platoon of Company C, 1/5i16th 

Infantry ClOlst Airborne Division), found itself in a night 

defensive position in I CTZ. A new member of the platoon was 

pulling night perimeter guard for the first time. He was 

Spanish-speaking and could barely understand English. As the 

relief guard approached to relieve him, the Spanish-speaking 

soldier turned in fright and killed the relief with a shot 

from his M-16 rifle. 

The limited quantities of armor employed in Vietnam 

served to make amicicide incidents involving tanks rare, No 

incidents involving tank against tank or infantry against 

tanks were recorded, On one occasion, however, an armored 

vehicle fired on friendly troops with devastating effect. In 
September 1969 soldiers of the 758th Supply and Service 

Company and the 546th Ordnance Company (both of the 610th 

Maintenance Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division, Airmobile), 

manning the perimeter at Quan Loi base camp, were fired upon 

by a 1st Cavalry Division M-551 Sheridan using a beehive 

round. Seven of the soldiers were killed in and on their 

bunker. 

Although tanks were relatively rare in Vietnam, armored 

personnel carriers equipped with .50-caliber machine guns 

were Ilot, and the mechanized infantry forces were fond of 

reconning by fire. On 25 February 1967 just before the 

battle of Prek Klok the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry (Lst 

Infantry Division), commanded by Lt. Cal. Rufus C. Lazzell, 

was fired upon in the early hours of darkness by a friendly 

mechanized unit conducting reconnaissance by fire with &heir 

.X&caliber machine guns, Fortunately, the only damage was 

to an 81-mm mortar.72 In I CTZ in 1971 Company C, 11506th 

Infantry (1Olst Airborne Division), also narrowly escaped 

injuries when fired upon at night by .50-caliber machine guns 

mounted on friendly armored personnel carriers. The APCs 

were "returning fire" ,after having received "sniper fire." 

The confusion and disorientation that affect even 

seasoned troops in active combat often produced amicicide 

incidents, especially when previous coordination was less 

than adequate. In September 1968 Company A, 3/7th Infantry, 

199th Light Infantry Brigade, established a night ambush 

position along the edge of a village in Long An Province. 

The perimeter of the ambush was irregular, with village huts 

separating the various platoon positions. As the expected 

Vietcong squad approached the ambush site, one pLatoon opened 

fire as planned. During the ensuing fire fight another 

platoon to the right af the first began firing on the first 

platoon's position, hitting several of the friendly soldiers 

with rifle and machine gun fire. 

A similar incident involving a single platoon, 3d 

Platoon, Company D, 4112th Infantry (199th Light Infantry 

Brigade), occurred near Dinh Quan (Long Kanh Province) in 

October 1969. The platoon established a perimeter defense 

for the night in dense jungle. During the night the platoon 

received a few rounds of enemy fire at close range and 

returned fire. One of the platoon machine guns was observed 

firing across a portion of the friendly perimeter, and 

following the enemy attack one man was discovered in the area 

fired across by the friendly machine gun with a mortal wound 

in the back of his head. Presumably he had been killed by 

the friendly machine gun. 

99 
Incidents involving confusion and inadequate coordination 

also happened to units on the move. In August 1969, Company 

A, 1/22d Infantry C4kh Infantry Division) was on the move 

across a sparsely wooded plain with high brush soukh of 

Pkeiku. First Platoon led, followed by the 2d and 3d 

Platoons. Three enemy mortar rounds fell to the left of the 

company, and enemy sniper fire was received from the left 

front. The 2d Platoon returned fire on the suspected sniper 

location, forgetting in the heat of battle that the 1st 

Platoon was ahead. A Kit Carson Scout with the point squad 

of the 1st Platoon received a wound in the groin from a 

friendly W-79 grenade launcher HE round. 

The difficult terrain of Vietnam often made even well 

planned operations the scene of amicicide incidents when 

units were unable to maintain contact and coordination. In 

Pleiku Province in June 1966 the commander of Company C, 

ll35kh Infantry, prescribed specific routes far each of his 

three platoons on a search and destroy mission. The unit had 

had recent contact in the area, and the men were quick to 

fire. During the course of the operation one platoon became 

disoriented and strayed into the path of another platoon. 

The two platoons engaged in a fire fight that resulted in two 

men wounded in each platoon before the firing was stopped. 

On 2 September 1969 Company A, 1150th Infantry (Mech), 

made a combat assault ten kilometers north of LZ Sandy. On 

landing, the troops dispersed on the rice paddy dikes and 

almast at once received fire from the brush nearby and 

observed what they believed ko be the enemy on the horizon to 

the east. Company A returned fire and then received fire 

from the wood line to the southeast in the general direction 

in which the "enemy" had been observed. The troops on the 

horizon to the east: turned out to be friendly; fortunately, 

no casualties were caused in either unit. 

In August 1970 the 1st and 2d Platoons of Company A, 

l/?kh Cavalry (1st Cavalry Division, Airmobile), conducted 

clearing operations. The two platoons inadvertently crossed 

paths and engaged in a five-minute fire fight, which 

resulted, surprisingly, in no casualties. One platoon's M-60 

machine guns laid down a heavy and effective suppressive 

fire, which, although it fortunately did not hit anyone, did 

force the other platoon to the ground and limit their fire. 

Such "coordinated"" operations were even more hazardous 

when conducted at night: and when the plan involved close 

cooperation between US and ARVN forces. Company A, 317th 

Infantry (199th Light Infantry Brigade), was on a nighk 

operation near a Vietnamese village in Long An Province in 
August 1968 when fired upon by an ARVN security force. One 

US soldier was killed and several were wounded. The ARVN 

element was located on the edge of the village with the 

mission of security and ambush. The US company was moving to 

a pickup zone. The leading platoon leader of the US company 

was told by his company commander that the ARVN security 

force had been informed of the company's movement and that a 

strobe light displayed at a certain trail intersection would 

bring an ARW soldier to the passage point and that he would 

guide the unit through the village. Fifteen meters from the 

passage point, the US platoon leader could hear the ARVN' 

security force and see the guide. Suddenly the ARVN soldiers 

fired a flare and took Company A under fire. After some 

time, the leading platoon leader was able to establish direct 

voice communication with the ARVN security force and to have 

the firing stopped. The incident was the product of incomplete coordination on the part of the ARVN security force. 

Their US advisor had indeed informed the ARVN platoon leader 

of the US company's movement, but the latter had not passed 

the iniormation on to the security squad that did the firing. 

Neither the US nor the ARVH forces were immune from mistaken engagements during night operations. In early 1949 two 

US patrols, one of which was from Company 8, 5th Transportation Battalion (1Olst Airborne Division), met and engaged in 

a fire fight at night outside the perimeter of Camp Eagle 

(Phu Bai). Qne American soldier was wounded. In the spring 

Of the same year (1969) two Regional Force/Popular Force 

platoons were conducting a night operation in a contested 

area in Binh Tranh District, Dinh Tuong Province. The plan 

called for the two units to operate on opposite sides of a 

canal during the patrol, but mistakes were made, and the two 

platoons engaged each other in the dark. As was so often the 

case, one man was killed and one was wounded. 

Conclusion 

There is nothing at ail mysterious about either the 

causes of ground amicicide or the measures necessary to 

prevent it. Incidents of friendly ground troops firing on 

one another are natural products of the fog of battle. In 

every war, inexperienced and nervous saldiers, poorly planned 

or inadequately coordinated operations, and occasionally poor 

fire discipline or true mistaken identification result in 

friendly forces inadvertently engaging each other with 

weapons ranging from rifles and hand grenades to tanks and 

antitank guns. 
As was the case with air amicicide incidents, visibility 

seems to have been a significant factor in most incidents of 

ground amicicide (see table 5). Nearly half (twenty-seven) 

of the fifty-eight incidents examined in this study took 

place under conditions of reduced visibility, mostly during 

the hours of darkness. The natural increase of fear, misorientation, and nervousness during reduced visibility 

perhaps played as great a role as the inability to see and 

distinguish clearly other ground forces in the vicinity. 

The type of tactical operation in progress at the time of 

an incident seems to have followed the dominant tactical 

employment in each conflict. In World War II most incidents 

(twenty-six out of thirty-four) took place during offensive 

operations in which the necessary fire and maneuver of forces 

against often strong, enemy opposition made coordination and 

identification much more difficult. In Vietnam, on the other 

hand, most of the incidents identifiable as to type of operation (sixteen) occurred in defensive situations at night 

(seven> or during patrols (eight). 

By far the most significant causative factor in all 

ground amicicide incidents appears to have been some lack of 

adequate coordination between units. In twenty-six of the 

fifty-eight incidents studied, lack of coordination was the 

primary cause. This was especially true of incidents that 

occurred in the Pacific during World War II (twelve out of 

sixteen) and in Vietnam (ten out of twenty), where the 

natural difficulties of coordination and accurate location of 

friendly forces were further complicated by difficult 

terrain. The misidentification of friendly for enemy troops 

was also a frequent cause. In fifteen of the fifty-eight 

incidents misidentification was the major factor, and it was 

an element in many of the incidents attributable mainly to 

faulty coordination as well. Proportionately, misidentification seems to have been a greater problem in Europe during 

World War II (twelve out of eighteen incidents) than in 

either the Pacific theater in World War II (none out of 

fifteen incidents) or in Vietnam (only two out of twenty 

incidents). The employment of green troops and lack of fire 

discipline and proper control of firing by leaders were also 

an important factor (eleven incidents). 

The results of such incidents have always been killed and 

wounded soldiers, disrupted operations, and a general 

degradation of cohesion, morale, and combat power. The 

measures required to prevent them are also simple in concept 

if not so easy in achievement. Adequate training and battle 

indoctrination accompanied by tight fire discipline imposed 

by calm and capable leaders are essential. Operations must 
be planned and thoroughly coordinated with detailed attention 

given to the possible occurrence of amicicidal engagement. 

Even the best planned operations conducted with well-seasoned 

troops will probably continue to result in occasional 

amicicide incidents, given the frightening and confusing 

atmosphere of the battlefield. While human error cannot be 

eliminated from war, its incidence and effects can be 

attenuated somewhat if due attention is given it by those 

charged with the lives of men and the fate of their nation. 
TABLE 5 

Ground Amicicide Incidents by Conditions of Visibility, 

Type of Operation, and Type of Error 

A. Conditions of Visibility 

Conflict 

Visibility Visibility 

Normal Reduced 

Visibility 

Unknown 

Total 

Incidents 

WW II (Eur) 7 8 3 18 

WW II CPac> 8 5 3 16 

Korean War 1 2 1 4 

Vietnam War 2 12 6 20 

B. Type of Qperation 

Conflict 

Type Total 

Defensive Offensive Patrol Retrograde Unknown Incidents 

WW II (Eur) 6 11 1 18 

WW II CPac> E l-5 16 

Korean War 1 2 1 4 

Vietnam War 7 1 8 4 20 

C. Type of Error 

Misident- Green Troops/ Type Total 

Conflict ification Discipline Coordination Unknown Incidents 

WW II CEur) 12 1 3 2 18 

WW II (Pat> 4 12 16 

Korean War 1 2 1 4 

Vietnam War 2 4 10 4 20 
5 

Even the most cursory examination of the problem of 

amicicide in modern warfare is sufficient to suggest some 

conclusions regarding the causes, effects, and prevention of 

incidents in war involving the engagement of one friendly 

military force by another. We have examined in greater ar 

lesser detail some 269 amicickde incidents of all types. 

Host were drawn from the record of the US Army in World War 

11, the last full-scale, global, high technology war to be 3 

fought. A few incidents of more recent occurrence have been - 

identified and described from the personal recollections of 

participants in the Vietnam conflict. This study, limited 

though it has been by the time available for its preparation 

and the inadequacies of the available evidence, nevertheless 

permits some tentative conclusions ta be drawn, and each 

incident, standing by itself, provides some insight into the 

problem of amicicide. 

The incidents examined in this study suggest that in the 

past, incidents involving friendly aircraft mistakenly 

engaging friendly ground forces were, by a small margin, the 

most frequent type (99 out of 269 incidents, or roughly 37 

percent). Attacks by friendly artillery on friendly ground 

forces were almost as commun (98 out of 269 incidents, or 

roughly 36 percent). The engagement of friendly aircraft by 

friendly antiaircraft weapons proved to be a relatively minor 

problem (only 15 out of 269 incidents, or about 5 percent}. 

A fair number of incidents involved the direct engagement of 

friendly ground troops by other friendly ground troops (58 

out of 269, or 22 percent). Of the latter category, only 

three incidents were seen to invalve the mistaken engagement 

of friendly tanks by other friendly tanks or antitank 

weapons. Given the obvious weaknesses of the sample, these 

proportions cannot be viewed as anything more than a rough 

approximation of the order of magnitude, They can, however, 

perhaps suggest the priority of efforts to reduce amicicide 

incidents. 

The number of casualties in past wars attributable to 

friendly fire is impossible to determine with any accuracy 

from the available data. Our sample of 269 incidents 

involved a total af nearly 4,000 friendly casualties, with 

most incidents (81) involving fewer than 5 casualties per 

incident. It appears that amicicide incidents account for 

something less than 2 percent of all casualties in battle. 

American casualties in the Second World War were about 

774,000. If 2 percent is a reasonably accurate estimate of 

the total casualties attributable to amicicide, then about 

15,480 Americans, or the equivalent of one full infantry 

LO5 
division, fell victim to friendly fires in World War IL. 

Similarly, out of 57,000 US casualties in Vietnam more than 

1,100 could thus be counted as victims of amicicide. 

Whether the loss, permanent or temporary, of 2 percent of 

the nation's military manpower in a given conflict is significant and thus demands an extraordinary application of 

resources to avoid is a question that must be answered at the 

higbest policy levels. It should be noted, however, that the 

impact af amicicide on combat power is geometric, naf 

linear. Each amicicide incident that results in friendly 

troops killed or wounded has an adverse effect on morale and 

confidence in supporting arms $ disrupts the continuity of 

friendly operations, and represents one bomb, shell, or 

bullet that should have fallen on the enemy to reduce his 

combat power rather than our own. 

In terms of the number of casualties produced, air amicitide incidents clearly predominate as the most destructive, 

both in total and per incident.h Artillery incidents are 

nearly as destructive in the aggregate but usually invokve 

only small numbers of casualties per incident.2 Although 

frequent, ground incidents are not often heavy casualty producers, eves though they can significantly disrupt the fLow 

of combat operations.3 Antiaircraft amicicide is perhaps 

the least significant type, resulting only in rare incidents 

in more than a. few casualties per incident.4 Again, the 

relative priority for investigation and application of 

resources for prevention is suggested; that is, we would do 

well to concentrate our efforts on understanding and trying 

to prevent air and artillery amicicide first, 

Some contributory factors were found in this brief study 

to be relatively insignificant. For example, the type of 

combat operation in progress when an amicicide incident 

occurred had little or no bearing on the occurrence, While 

it may be seen fram the narrative that amicicide incidents 

were slightly more frequent during withdrawals and patrol 

actions, the pattern generally conforms to the dominant type 

of tactical operation in each conflict. 

Visibility plays a role in some types of amicicide incidents and not in others, In cases of air and ground amicitide there appears to be a relatively high correlation 

between reduced visibility (night, fog, smoke) and the 

occurrence of incidents. On the other hand, visibility was 

apparently not a significant factor in cases of artillery ar 

antiaircraft amicicide. 

The evidence examined in this study points clearly to ane 

factor as the primary cause of most amieicide incidents: 
direct human error. Only rarely were such incidents due to 

mechanical failure, but in innumerable cases the incident 

resulted from some identifiable human failure. The nervousness of green troops, a lack of control or of fire discipline 

imposed by calm and decisive leaders, the lack of adequate 

coordination of operations by commanders and staff officers, 

and disorientation, confusion, and carelessness of pilots, 

gunners, or crewmen were the predominant causes of most incidents. Fear and the fog of battle have conspired to produce 

the amicicide incidents described in this study. Surprisingly few incidents can be traced to a genuine misidentification of friendly for enemy troops. Almost always a lack of 

coordination or some more direct human error was responsible 

for the engagement of friendly forces by their supporting 

air, ground, or artillery weapons. 

Sometimes incidents resulted from human failures as 

simple as the inadvertent pushing of a button at the wrong 

time, the transposition of a series of numbers, or a mistake 

in arithmetic. On other occasions, the human failure was 

more complex in its origins, and commonly the fear and confusion so prevalent on the battlefield played a major role. 

As the author of a report on friendly fire casualties in 

Vietnam noted, 

They [amicicide incidents] also serve as a reminder 

that the battlefield is and always has been a strict 

and harsh disciplinarian. Those who have deviated 

from proven techniques, used "short cuts" because it 

was the "easy way out" or failed to follow directives 

and established 

P 

rocedures, have done so with 

disastrous results. 

Although the causes of amicicide incidents may be uncertain and hidden in the complex functioning of the human mind, 

the effects of such incidents are much more certain and 

patent. The first and most obvious effect is the unnecessary 

death and suffering of soldiers due to the actions of those 

dedicated to their support. Standing alone, the avoidance of 

such occurrences is a worthy goal. But amicicide also has a 

more subtle but very important impact on the overall conduct 

of military operations. 

In general, the occurrence of even the most serious 

amicicide ineidents seems to have had only a local and transient effect on the outcome of combat operations. Certainly, 

such incidents have delayed or even completely halted offen107 
sive operations, disrupted and weakened defensive operations, 

and, on occasion, precipitated withdrawal and local defeats. 

The negative impact of amicicide on friendly combat power is, 

however, often more complex and subtle. Each incident contributes in some measure to the subtle degradation of combat 

power by lowering morale and confidence in supporting arms so 

necessary to the successful pursuance of modern combined arms 

operations, This effect is, as has been mentioned, g%ometric 

rather than linear. As expressed in the MAW study of 

Vietnam amicicide, 

The statistics and examples of incidents, although 

important, cannot and do not of themselves reveal the 

complete picture of the deplorable loss of life by 

fire from friendly sources. All service components 

are acutely aware of the seriousness of these 

incidents in terms of Lowered effectiveness of the 

fighting forces, lessened rapport between US forces 

themselves and Vietnamese Nationals, and the 

unquestionable adverse effect on the overall military 

effort.6 

The solutions and preventive measures required to reduce 

or eliminate incidents of amicicide on future battlefields 

are problematic. Given the clear preponderance of direct 

human error as the source of most amicicide incidents, it is 

manifest that preventive measures must be directed toward the 

correction or improvement of human frailties, and these, as 

always, are the factors least amenable to correction. The 

fear and confusion of the battlefield cannot be eliminated, 

Indeed they are likely to be even more prevalent on the 

battlefield of the future than they were on the battlefields 

of the past. The combat experience and steadiness born of 

the soldier&s confidence in his cause, his weapons, his 

comrades, and himself can be gained in the end nowhere but on 

the field of battle itself. A vigorous study of past 

experience and the careful selectian and rigorous training of 

soldiers under conditions closely approximating those of 

actual combat may prove of some value in reducing the incidence of amicicide, but in the last analysis the only truly 

effective solution is experience coupled with an unremitting 

attention to detail, ~bvious~~~ we cannot hope to eliminate 

amicicide as a problem in modern war, but direct and forceful 

attention to its human causes may bring some reduction of its 

incidence and effect. 

Modern people, and especially Americans, have increasingly sought to overcome their most difficult problems, 

108 
particularly military problems, by the application of science 

and technology. While advanced technological devices may 

certainly be of significant value in reducing amicicide by 

better location and identification of friendly troops and 

equipment and by improved communication and coordination, 

they cannot pravide a total solution to what is essentially a 

problem of human frailty. 

Indeed, there is every reason to suspect that the advance 

of military technology has increased rather than reduced the 

problem of amicicide. As the use of technologicaLby sophisticated weapons systems has increased, the limits of human 

ability to control SUCh destructive forces have been 

approached. With respect to the problem of amicicide it may 

be suggested that the optimum point of matching the capabifities of men and machines may already have been passed and 

that the gap between the capabilities of machines and the 

human ability to control them adequately is increasing. The 

implications of this gap for amicicide in future war are 

clear: amicicide may be a greater problem on the future 

battlefield than ever before, both in terms of frequency and 

the number of casualties produced thereby. 

The effective applicatian of better selection and training or of modern technology to solve the problem of amicicide 

is dependent upon the degree to which amicicide is viewed as 

a problem of significant seriousness warranting the expenditures of resources to reduce its occurrence and the proper 

selection of areas in which such resources may be fruitfully 

employed. The conclusions suggested by this study are that 

the human factors responsible for the occurrence of amisicide 

incidents of all types should receive priority. ; 

Regardless of the resources applied, the problem of 

amicicide cannot be eliminated by any means in the foreseeable future. Today, as in earlier times, the best intentions 

and efforts are insufficient to prevent the occurrence of 

amicicide, which remains a problem for all military forces 

right up to the present, as suggested by an article that 

appeared in the Kansas City Times on Wednesday, 2 January 

1980: 

Confusion, fear and gunfire in the pre-dawn darkness 

of an ambush site produced Northern Ireland's first 

casualties of the decade Tuesday--a British squad 

leader and a private, killed by their own meneT 
TABLE 6 

@umber of Casualties per Incident (All Types) 

Number of Number of Incidents 

Casualties Air Artillery Ground Antiaircraft Total 

0 12 2 4 4 22 i-5 

6-10 

11-15 

16-20 

21-25 

26-30 

31-35 

36-40 

41-45 

46-50 

51-55 

56-60 

61-65 

66-70 

7L-75 

76-80 

19 

8 

1 

4 

2 

1 

1 

2 

1 

25 

12 

5 

5 

2 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

1 

14 1 59 

5 25 

6 

1 10 

4 

2 

1 

3 

1 

2 

1 

1 

1 

141-145 1 1 

146-150 1 1 

15L-155 

156-170 2 2 

236-240 1 1 

316-320 1 1 

396-400 1 I 

601-605 1 1 

TOTAL 58 57 25 6 146 
CITES 

introduction 

1. For example, the FASTVAL tests conducted at Fort Hunter 

Liggett, Califarnia, between April and July 1979 pitted a 

reinforced tank company sup ted by A-LO aircraft and attack 

helicapters against an OPF tank battalion. AEL players 

were equipped with lasers and laser sensors, and artillery 

was played with all the inherent problems of accurate target 

location. Engagements of friendly forces as well as enemy 

forces were recorded and analyzed. 

2, Operation COB is discussed in several studies. See 

Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit CWashington, DC, 

19612, inter alia. For the Allied bombing of Switzerland see 

Jonathan s_l_ E, ?G?Gmreich, "The Diplomacy of Apology: U.S. 

Bombings of Switzerland during World War II,'" 

Review 28 (May-June 1977):19-37. 

3, Translated from Alexandre Percin, Le Massacre de notre 

Infanterie, 1914-1918 (Paris, k92P)+ 

4. Ibid,, p. 10. 

5. Courtlandt Dixon Barnes Bryan, 

1976). 

(New York, 

6. us Amy, Army Regulation 600-10, 

System, 15 January 1976, with change I, dated 15 September 

1978. 

7. The general problems of dealing with military medical 

statistics are well outlined in the preface and introduction 

to Gilbert Wheeler Beebe and Michael E. De Bakey, Battle 

De Bakey characterize such data as '"inevitably crude and 

inexact," 

8. 1st Lt. David W. Hart, "'Casualty Reporting, July 

1951-July 1953,'" typescript, Seoul, Korea, 6 April L954, U.S. 

ArTf Center of Military His t03Ty files, Washington, DC 

(hereafter cited as CMH). 

9. Frank A. Reister, "'Effects of Type of Operation and 

Tactical Action on ajor unit Casualty and Morbidity 

Experience--Korean War (Numbers and Rates of Killed, Wounded, 
Disease and Non-Battle Injury for U.S. Army Divisions and 

Separate Regimental Combat Teams), 1950-1953'" (Washington, 

DC, May 1369)) table 18 (pp* 52-531, table 19 (pp. 54-551, 

CMH. 

10. Ibid.. 

Il. '"Casualties-Number Incurred by U.S. Military Personnel --Hostile-Not Hostile, 196Lq1975," typescript (n.p. f 

n.d.1, tables CAS 8,0, 9.0, 10.0, CMH. 

12. Ibid., table CAS 9.0. 

13. Percin, Le Massacre, pp* 10, 13-14. 

14. Letter, Maj. Cen, Paul K. Streit (Commander, Walter Reed 

Army Hospital) to Maj, Gen. Raymond M. Bliss (The Surgeon 

General, Department of the Army> , subject: Casualty 

Questionnaires, 23 August 1950, CMH. 

Chapter 1. Artillery Amicicide 

1. In the excellent World War I film, Paths of Glory, 

directed by Stanley Kubrick and starring Kirk Douglas, 

Adolphe Menjou, and Ralph Meeker, the commander of a French 

division scheduled for a particularly difficult assault 

matter-of-factly list5 "5 percent to our own barrage" when 

enumerating the probable costs of the operation for the 

commander of the leading assault regiment. The angry reaction of the regimental commander in the film must be considered necessary to the dramatic progress of the story rather 

than as representative of actual reactions in a war in which 

such losses were all too common. 

2. Percin, Le Massacre, passim. 

3. Ibid., p* 10. 

4. Ibid., pp* 13-14. The estimates of total casualties in 

the war vary. For consistency, I have used Percin's figure. 

Percin cites about 236 specific incidents of artillery amicitide among French forces. While an average of about 318 

casualties per incident t 75,000 G 236) seems unreasonable, 

his estimation of the total number of casualties due to 

amicicide seems in accordance with what we know of the 

general conditions of artillery employment and is remarkably 

consistent with the evidence for other conflicts as explained 

above (ibid., p. 10). 

112 

--- 
5. John Ellis, Eye-Deep in Hell: Trench Warfare in World 

War I (New York, 19761, pp. 61-62. 

6. Ibid., p. 61, quoting Sidney Rogerson of the 2d 

Battalion, West Yorkshire Regiment. 

7. A summary review of the published official history of the 

North African campaign reveals only one incident. During the 

attack of the US 34th Infantry Division on Fandouk-el-Aouareb 

on 27 March 1943, American artillery struck two squads of the 

Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon of the 135th Infantry 

Regiment. The incident is described in George Frederick 

Howe, Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West 

(1957; reprint ed., Washington, DC, 19701, pa 581. 

8. The following account of the Monte Altuzzo incident is 

based entirely on the story of the battle contained in 

Charles Brown MacDonald and Sidney T. Mathews, Three 

Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt (1952; reprint ed., 

Washington, DC, 19741, pp. 169-216. 

9. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 84. 

10. Interview with Brig. Gen. James L. Collins, Jr., a 

former US Army Chief of Military History, who then commanded 

the 957th FA Battalion, 10 April 1980 at Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

Il. Robert L. Hewitt, The Workhorse of the Western Front: 

The Story of the 30th Infantry Division (Washington, DC, 

19461, p. 32. 

12. Ibid., p. 24. Before arriving on the Continent, the 

30th Infantry Division artillerymen had sharpened their 

skills on the small and tricky ranges available in England 

with mixed success. On one occasion a stray round destroyed 

a wooden leg, leaving its Owner otherwise untouched. Another 

(correctly placed) round hit a bull that had strayed into the 

impact area (ibid., p. 7). 

13. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 243. 

14. The detailed story of the battle of Schmidt and the 

amieicide incident as described here is contained in 

MacDonald and Mathews, Three Battles. I have followed 

closely MacDonald's account of the defense of Vossenack (pp. 

352-54). 

15. Charles Brown MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign 

(1963; reprint ed., Washington, DC, 19701, p. 609. 

113 
16. Comment of Major General Barton on 8 August 1944, in US 

AmY Ground Forces Observer Board (European Theater of 

Operations) (hereafter cited as AGFOB(ETO)), report no. 191, 

"Notes on Interviews with Various Commanders in Normandy 

during the period August 5th to 10th 1944," by Cal. Charles 

H. Coa tes, 20 August 1944, p. 5, US Army Military History 

Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA (hereafter cited as MHI). 

17. MacDonald and Mathews, Three Battles, p. 25. 

18. Ibid., pp. 25, 33. 

19. Hugh Marshall Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge 

(1965; reprint ed., Washington, DC, 19721, p* 106. 

20. AGFOB(ETO), report no. 803, "Miscellaneous," by Gal. 

James D. O'Brien, 7 April 1945, p. 1, MHI. 

21. Ibid. 

22. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, pp- 270-71. 

23. Cole, The Ardennes, p. 602. 

24. "Report of the Commanding General, Buna Forces, on the 

Buna Campaign, December 1, 1942-January 25, 1943," (n.p., 

19431, p. 54, Combined Arms Research Library, US Army Command 

and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS (hereafter 

cited as CARL). 

25. Samuel Milner, Victory in Papua 

Washington, DC, 19711, p* 159. 

(1957; reprint ed., 

26. Philip Axtell Crow1 and Edmund GI Love, Seizure of the 

Gilberts and Marshalls (1955; reprint ed., Washington, DC, 

19701, p. 251. 

27. Robert Ross Smith, The Approach to the Philippines 

(1953; reprint ed., Washington, DC, 19711, pp+ 339-40. 

28. Robert Ross Smith, Triumph in the Philippines (1963; 

reprint ed., Washington, DC, 19731, p. 84. 

29. Smith, The Approach to the Philippines, p. 199. 

30. Ibid. It was later found that Maj. Ralph D. Burns's 1st 

Battalian, 124th Infantry, had not called for any artillery 

support and that the fire was apparently called for by 

artillery observers in towers along the coast who spotted the 

smoke from fires used by Burns's men to cook their breakfasts. 

114 
31. Crawl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, 

ps 363. 

32. Ibid., p* 364. 

33. The following accounts of Guam incidents are from Philip 

A. Crawl, Campaign in the Marianas (1960; reprint ed., 

Washington, DC, 1970), pp. 392-406. 

34. Ibid., p. 406. 

35. Edmund G. Love, The 27th Infantry Division in World War 

II (Washington, DC, 19491, p* 662. - 

36. Ibid., pp. 662-63. 

37. Growl, Campaign in the Marianas, p. 209. 

38. US Army, 106th Infantry Regiment (27th Infantry 

Division), "Regimental Journal," 2 June 1944, entry 394, in 

"FORAGER Operations Report" dn.p., 19441, CARL. See also 

Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas, p. 209, and Love, The 27th 

Infantry Division, p. 662. 

39” 106th Infantry Regiment, "Regimental Journal,"" 26 June 

1944, entries 423, 428, 429, 430, 437, 451, 461, 463, 469; 27 

June 1944, entries 510, 522, 567, CARL. 

40. The story of the division's activity and the Company K 

mishap on Hill King on 29 June is told in Love, The 27th 

Infantry Division, pp. 332-33, and in Crowk, Campaign in the 

Marianas, pm 228. Not surprisingly, the 27th Infantry 

Division G-3 Periodic Report for the period 281600 June to 

291600 June 1944 (in US Army, 27th Infantry Division, "Operational Report, 27th Infantry Division, Battle for Saipan, 17 

June to 6 August 1944," CARL) is somewhat vague on this part 

of the day's events, consequently I have followed the account 

given in Love and in Crowl. 

41. Love, The 27th Infantry Division, pp. 332-33. 

42. Total 27th Infantry Division casualties for the period 

from 281300 June to 301300 June were 28 killed and 279 

wounded, presumably including the men of Company K wounded by 

friendly artillery on Hill King. See 27th Infantry Division 

G-3 Periodic Reports for 281600-291600 June 1944 and 

291600-301600 June 1944 in the division's "Operational 

Report,'" CARL. 
43. 106th Infantry Regiment, "Regimental Journal," 3 July, 

entries at 1010 (no serial) and 0946; 4 July, entry at 0915 

(no serial or time-in); 7 July, entry 1092, CARL. 

44. Ibid., 30 June 1944, entry 739. 

45. Growl, Campaign in the Marianas, p. 238. 

46. Love, The 27th Infantry Division, p* 289. 

47. The following account was taken from the detailed story 

of the battle for Pork Chop Hill told by Samuel Lyman Atwood 

Marshall in his 

48. The are reproduced in David 

Ewing Ott, Field Artillery, 1954-1973 (Washington, DC, 19751, 

pp. 133-75. 

49. Ibid., pp. 175-76. 

51. Of 47 incidents identified, the type of error could be 

established in 34 cases. Of these, one was due to misi 

fixation of friendly for enemy troops and four to mechanical 

problems of one type or another, The remaining 29 cases were 

all due to FIX/gun crew error (131, FO error (91, or lack of 

adequate coordination (7). See table 1. The results of a 

'1969 USARV study of artillery and mortar incidents and accidents (cited by Ott, Field Artillery* pp. 178-791 are given 

in table 2. 

52. It should be noted that amicieide incidents of all types 

were perhaps mare thoroughly reported and investigated in 

Vietnam than ever before (see Ott, Field Artillery pp* 

176-77). Aside from the now-famous incident that forms the 

background of 6. D. B. Bryan's journalistic Friendl.y Fire and 

ten incidents described in official documents, the majority 

of the artillery amicicide cases noted in this study were 

identified through responses to a questionnaire circulated to 

the staff, faculty, and students of the US Army Command and 

General Staff College in January 1980. More than 100 

responses were received, some detailing more than cme 

incident. These incidents are not cited separately in the 

notes, thus all incidents in the text not identified as to 

source can be assumed to have been reported in the survey, 

The time available for verifying all the incidents reported 

in the survey has been short, therefore all incidents must be 

considered tentative as to unit involved, date, actual 

116 
casualties, and cause pending verification from official 

records. It might also be noted that although details are 

lacking, there were 29 artillery amicicide incidents reported 

in the XXIV Corps area between 1 February and 30 April 1970. 

These resulted in 40 killed and 112 wounded, both military 

and civilian. See US AmY t XXIV Corps, "Operational 

Keport--Lessons Learned, Headquarters, XXIV Corps, Period 

Ending 30 April 1970 (RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)),"' 23 May 1970, p* 

34, Defense Technical Information Center, Defense Logistics 

Agency, Cameron Station, VA (DTIC). 

53. An experienced infantry officer who served as a battalion S-3 in Vietnam related to the author that it was his common practice (and that of others) to accept up to 5 percent 

friendly casualties from friendly artillery in the assault 

before lifting or shifting fires. The rationale, of course, 

is that it is preferable to suffer 5 percent casualties from 

one's own fire plus 5 percent from the enemy than to permit 

the enemy, through lack‘ of adequate suppression, to inflict 

15 percent casualties on the attacking force. 

54. AGPOBCETO), report no. 157, '"Notes on Interviews with 

Various Infantry Commanders in Normandy, France, 6 June8 July 1944," by Cal. Charles H. Coates, 5 August 1944, 

p. 7, MHI. 

55. Bernard William Rogers, Cedar Falls-Junction City: A 

Turning Point (Washington, DC, 19741, pa 116. 

56. Bryan, Friendly Fire, passim. 

57. Ibid., pp- 337-38. 

58. The following Vietnam accounts were taken from US Military Assistance Command, Viet Nam (MACJ3431, Viet Warn Lessons 

Learned No. 70: Friendly Casualties from Friendly Fires, 17 

October 1968, pp* 9-12 (hereafter cited as VNLL#70). 

59. This incident reported in VNLL#70 was confirmed to me 

independently by a friend who served in the 25th Infantry 

Division artillery at the time of the incident. 

60. Letter, US Department of the Army, the Adjutant General 

(AGAM-F(M)), Subject: Special Operational Report-Lessons 

Learned, Casualties from Own Fires, 8 January 1968, CMH. 

61, Bryan, Friendly Fire, pp. 372-73. 

62. This and the following accounts were taken from VNLLt70, 

pp. 5-13. 

117 

-. --.__ I_- .- 
63. Visibility does not appear to have been a significant 

factor. In nearly one half of the total incidents the 

visibility was unknown or uncertain. Of the remaining 54 

cases, the difference between incidents occurring during 

conditions of reduced (night, smoke, fog) visibility (25) and 

normal (daylight) visibility (29) cannot be considered 

significant. Such incidents did appear to occur more 

frequently during periods of reduced visibility in Vietnam 

(1l:Z) but one must consider that the tactical conditions of 

the Vietnam conflict generally resulted in increased 

artillery activity at night, specifically the firing of close 

defensive fires. With respect to the type of tactical 

operation (defense, attack, retrograde, or patrol) the data 

appear equally insignificant. Of the 98 incidents, the type 

of tactical operation could not be determined from the 

available data in 24 cases. Of the remaining 74 incidents 

more than half (39) occurred during offensive operations by 

friendly troops, 27 occurred during defensive operations, 3 

during withdrawals, and 5 during patroling actions. When the 

World War II and Korea/Vietnam cases are considered 

separately, however, a pattern emerges. In World War II, 34 

incidents took place during offensive operations as against 

only 8 during defensive combat. The situation is reversed in 

the case of Korea/Vietnam: 19 incidents during defensive 

operations and 5 during offensive operations. What is 

reflected here is the predominant tactical mode in each 

conflict rather than any decisive influence of type of 

operation on the occurrence of artillery amicicide. 

64. The type of error to which an incident of artillery 

amicicide could be attributed was extremely uncertain. In 35 

cases the cause was unknown. In only three cases (two in 

World War II and one in Vietnam) could the cause be identified as misidentification of friendly for enemy troops. 

Incidents due to mechanical problems were few (5). Errors 

due to direct human error predominated. The largest number 

of incidents (32) was due to lack of adequate coordination. 

Fire direction center (51, FO (9), and gun crew errors (9) 

were also important. All of the latter incidents occurred in 

Vietnam. Many such errors, however, are probably concealed 

under the general heading of lack of coordination in the 

World War II figures. 

Chapter 2. Air Amicicide 

1. Operation COBRA in Normandy, 25 July 1944. See the 

detailed discussion below. 

118 
2. "Saipan Operational Report, 295th Joint Assault Signal 

Company," in "Operational Report, 27th Infantry Division, 

Battle for Saipan," p. 21, CARL. 

3. Letter, Advanced Allied Expeditionary Air Force (Adv. 

AEAF/24241), Headquarters, Subject: Air Support of the 

Attack on the Cherbourg Peninsula, June 22, 1944, 20 July 

1944, p. 4, CARL (hereafter cited as Letter, AAEAFl24241). 

4. Sir Edward Louis Spears, Liaison 1914: A Narrative of 

the Great Retreat (London, 19301, pp* 299-300. 

5. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Gate, eds., The Amy 

Air Forces in World War II, vol. IL, Europe: TORCH to POINT 

BLANK, August 1942 to December 1943 (Chicago, 1949), pp. 29, 

38. 

6. Howe, Northwest Africa, p. 162. 

7. US Army Ground Forces, "Observer's Report," by Col. 

Thomas J. Heavey, 19 February 1943, p$ 23, CARL (hereafter 

cited as USAGF, “‘Observer’s Report"). 

8. US Army, 7Olst Tank Destroyer Battalion, "North African 

Campaign Diary: "Btf co. , 701st TD Bn and 2nd Pit., Recon 

co., 70lst TD BR,“’ typescript (n.p., 19431, p, 8, MKT. 

9. Howe, Northwest Africa, p. 398. 

10. Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, 11:193. 

11. The following account was taken from Albert N. Garland 

and Howard McGaw Smyth, assisted by Martin Blumenson, Sicily 

and the Surrender of Italy (1965; reprint ed,, Washington, 

DC, 19701, pp. 194-95. 

12. The following account was taken from that provided in 

Garland and Smyth, Sicily, p. 403. 

13‘ AGFOB(ETO), report no. 51, "Visit to 2d Armored Division 

(Major General E. H. Brooks, Commanding) at Tidworth 

Barracks, Wiltshire, England, LO-12 April 1944," by Col. 

Robert 0. Montgomery, 18 April 1944, pp. 4-5, MHI. 

14. Craven and Gate, Army Air Forces, II:486. 

15. Martin Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino (Washington, DC, 

1969), p. 441; James W. Walters, "Artillery and Air Support 

of Ground Attack, Cassino--1944," Military Review 26 (January 

1947):54. 

119 
16. Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, p. 441; James A. Huston, 

"Tactical Use of Air Pawer in World War II: The Army 

Experience,"' Military Review 32 (July 1952):41. 

17. Blumenson, Salerno to Cassina, p. 441; Huston, "Tactical 

Use of Air Power," p. 40. 

1%. For General Clark's remarks see Blumenson, Salerno to 

Cassino, p. 441. The report of the commander of the 4th New 

Zealand Brigade is quoted by Walters in "Artillery and Air 

Support,"' p. 58. 

19. Ibid.; Craven and Gate, Army Air Forces, vol. III, 

Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 1945 

(Chicago, 19511, p. 367 and n. 124, p. 849. 

20. Of particular interest is the US Army Air Forces 

Evaluation Board in the European Theater of Operations, The 

Effectiveness of Third Phase Tactical Air Operations in the 

European Theater, 5 May 1944-S May 1945 (Orlando Army Air 

Base, FL, 20 August 19451, CARL (hereafter cited as Third 

Phase Tactical Air Operations), which contains more than 400 

pages of detailed information on all tactical (close air 

support) operations in the ETO. This very important study 

can be supplemented for various specific operations by more 

general histories: Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit 

(particularly on Operation COBRA), and Helmreich, "The 

Diplomacy af Apology," pp. 19-37. 

21. Helmreich, "The Diplomacy of Apology," p. 20. 

22. Ibid., pp. 20-29. 

23. Ibid., p. 31; Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, 

III:735-36. 

24. Helmreich, "The Diplamacy of Apology," p. 31 and n. 47, 

p. 34. 

25. Ibid., pp. 34-35. 

26. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p. 260 and 

n. 20; Craven and Gate, Army Air Forces, III:415. 

27. Both incidents are examined in detail using the pertinent official records by Royce L. Thompson in "'Malmedy, 

Belgium Mistaken Bombing, 23 and 25 December 1944,'F typescript, 5 June 1952, CMH. T. have followed Thompson's excellent reconstruction of the events. 

120 
28. Cole, The Ardennes, p. 377. 

29. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 208. 

30. Letter, AAEAF/24241, p. 1, CARL. 

31. Ibid., p* 2. The Germans also complicated matters by 

firing smoke shells over Allied positions to confuse Allied 

pilots. See Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, III:200. 

32. Ibid. 

33. AGFOB(ETO), report no. 157, p8 11, MHI. 

34. Ibid., p. 8. 

35. Letter, AAEAF/24241, p. 3, CARL. 

36. ACFOBCETO), report no. 191, p. 5, MHI. 

37. Letter, AAEAF/24241, pm 5, CARL. For additional information on OBOE and other radio/radar marking systems see 

Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, III:17. 

38. Third Phase Tactical Air Operations, 

39. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, pp. 

40. Third Phase Tactical Air Operations, 

p. 85. 

220-22. 

pp. 85-86. 

41. Ibid., p. 86. See also Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 

pp* 220-21. 

42. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, pp. 228-29; Third Phase 

Tactical Air Operations, p. 86. 

43. Third Phase Tactical Air Operations, p. 91. 

44. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, pa 229 and n. 11. 

45. Ibid.; Third Phase Tactical Air Operations, p. 91; 

Craven and Gate, Army Air Forces, III:230. The bomber was 

from the 2d Bombardment Division, The airfield was being 

used by the US Ninth Air Force. 

46. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 229; Third Phase 

Tactical Air Operations, p. 91. Blumenson states that 

sixteen heavy bombers were involved, and Third Phase Tactical 

Air Operations mentions only twelve and does not indicate 

that the strike hit the 30th Infantry Division. In general I 

121 
have followed Blumenson's account throughout inasmuch as his 

work was conducted later with the benefit of better materials. 

47. , p. 91. 

48. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 229; Hewitt 

Workhorse of the Western Front, p. 36, gives 24 killed 

128 wounded. Craven and Cate (Army Air Forces, III:2301 

the 30th Infantry Division casualties at 16 killed and 

in 

and 

Put 

64 

wounded. The US Army, 30th Infantry Division, "After Battle 

Report," July 1944, pp. 18-19, CARL (hereafter cited as 30th 

Infantry Division ABR), lists the following casualties from 

friendly air attacks on 24 July: 

120th Infantry and 31117th Infantry Cat 1145; vicinity :;1679): 18 killed, 76 wounded; 

b. 117th Infantry (->: 8 wounded; 

4556;1 

119th Infantry (at 1146; vicinity 3d Battalion, 

; from 3 bombs dropped by 2 P-47s): 4 killed, 33 

wounded; 

d. 743d Tank Bn: 1 wounded; 

e. 823d Tank Destroyer Bn (bombed): no casualties; 

f. 197th FA Bn: 1 killed, 3 wounded; 

is* 105th Engineer Bn (by P-47s, vicinity 460680): 7 

wounded; 

h, Total Casualties: 24 killed, 128 wounded. 

49. Hewitt, Workhorse of the Western Front, p. 36. 

50. The following accounts of these incidents were taken 

from Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, pp. 235-36; Third Phase 

p pe 91; and Craven and Cate, Army Air 

Forces, III:234. 

51. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, pp. 236-37; Third Phase 

, PP* 91-92; Hewitt, Workhorse of the 

Western Front, p* 36. 

52. Hewitt, Workhorse of the Western Front, p. 37. 

53. Interview with Brig. Gen. James L. Collins, Jr. The 

957th was hit by air strikes thirteen times in Europe. Seven 

of those attacks were by friendly aircraft. 

54. Hewitt, Workhorse of the Western Front, p. 37. Hewitt's 

figures are the same as those in 30th Infantry Division ABR, 

Juiy 1944, pp. 19-20, CARL. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, 

p. 236 and n. 32, gives the number of men killed in the 30th 

Infantry Division as sixty-one. 

122 
55. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 236 and n. 32. The 

total casualties for the two days would thus be about 757 men 

killed and wounded. The figures vary. For instance, the 

most commonly mentioned figure is 101 killed and 463 wounded 

for both days (Third Phase Tactical Air Operations, p. 91>, 

computed by Eighth Air Force in May 1945. Craven and Cate 

(Army Air Forces, 11X:234) give the losses on 25 July as 102 

killed and 380 wounded for a two-day total of 562 

casualties. Bhumenson is more likely to be correct. 

57 e 

5%. 

59. 

60. 

61. 

62. 

63. 

64. 

65. 

Third Phase Tactical Air Operations, p* 85. 

Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 236. 

Third Phase Tactical Air Operations, p. 32. 

Ibid., p. 96; Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 480. 

Third Phase Tactical Air Operations, pp. 96, 99. 

Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 510. 

Third Phase Tactical Air Operations, p. 118. 

Craven and Gate, Army Air Forces, III:xix. 

Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 115; Craven and 

Gate, Army Air Forces, III:206. The engagement with the 823d 

Tank Destroyer Battalion is described in chap. 4. 

56. Third Phase Tactical Air Operations, p. 92; Blumenson, 

Breakout and Pursuit, pp. 238-41. 

66, "Employment of 2d Armored Division in Operation COBRA, 

25 July-l August 1944," by Committee 3 (Student research 

report, The Armored School, Fort Knox, KY, May 19501, p. 21, 

CARL. 

67. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 299. 

6%. Hewitt, Workhorse of the Western Front, pp* 59, 61. 

69. Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, III:255. 

70. The following account of the air support for Operation 

CISCO is taken in its entirety from MacDonald, The Siegfried 

Line Campaign, pp. 252-60. 

71. The details of the following account of the Operation 

QUEEN breakthrough attempt were taken from Third Phase 

123 
Tactical Air Operations, pp. 28, 173, 413; MacDonald, The 

Siegfried Line Campaign, pp- 403-6, 412-13, and n. 12. - 

72. MacDonald and Mathews, Three Battles, pp. 272, 274. 

73. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p. 348; and 

MacDonald and Mathews, Three Battles, pp. 272, 274. 

74. MacDonald and Mathews, Three Battles, pp. 385, 386. 

75. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p. 424. 

76. The following accounts of the Grandmenil and Battle of 

the Bulge incidents were taken from Cole, The Ardennes, pp. 

592, 441, 474, and n. 8. 

77. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p. 382. In some 

areas close coordination proved almost impossible. One such 

area was the Balkans, where the US Fifteenth Air Force faced 

severe problems in getting the suspicious Russians to 

cooperate. Some minor improvements were made after a flight 

of P-3& strafed a Red Army march column near NiS, 

Yugoslavia, in November 1944, destroying twenty vehicles and 

killing six men, including a Russian lieutenant general. See 

Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, III:749. 

78. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p. 381. 

79. Milner, Victory in Papua, p. 108. 

80. Ibid.; Craven and Gate, Army Air Forces, vol. IV, The 

Pacific: Guadabeanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944 

(Chicago, 19501, p. 13; Robert L. Eichelberger, Our Jungle 

Road to Tokyo (New York, 19501, p* 67. I 

81. Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, IV:13. 

82. Ibid., IV:348. 

83. Ibid., IV:126. 

84. Milner, Victory in Papua, pp* 284-85. General 

Eichelberger noted in Our Jungle Road to Tokyo cp. 401 that 

more than a dozen casualties were caused by a stick af 

American bombs which fell on one company of the 127th 

Infantry on its first day in the line at Buna. 

85. Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, IV:123. Even the 

generals were nat immune. General Eichelberger and the 

Australian General Blarney were strafed twice within minutes 

124 
near Buna by two different American aircraft. Three men were 

wounded in the last attack. Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to 

Tokyo, p. 40. 

86. Craven.and Cate, Army Air Forces, IVz385. 

,87. Crow1 and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, 

p. 135. 

88. Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, IV:231-32; Robert Lee 

Sherrod, History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II 

(1952; reprint ed., San Rafael, CA, 19801, p. 151. It was 

during the Hew Georgia Campaign that the Marine Corps began 

to develop more effective methods for controlling close air 

support. Ibid., p. 150. 

89. Growl and Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, 

p* 111. 

90. Craven and Gate, Army Air Forces, IV:566. 

91. US Army, 27th Infantry Division, "'Saipan Operational 

Report, 295th Joint Assault Signal Company," in "Operational 

Report,F' 24 Qctober 1944, p. 20, CARL. 

92. This account of Garapan and the following accounts of 

Guam were taken from Growl, Campaign in the Marianas, pp. 

227, 345, 357, 407, 374, 427, 425. 

93. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 183. 

94. Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, vol. V, The Pacific: 

MATTERHORN to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945 (Chicago, 

19531, p. 442. 

95. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 236 and n. 56. 

96. Ibid., p. 198; Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, V:442. 

97. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, p. 236. The official 

Air Forces history (Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, V:442 

and nn. 76-81, ppe 8C5-61 admits only five air amieicide 

incidents during the Luzan Campaign: two involving Fifth Air 

-Force planes strafing Sixth Army troops; one caused by the 

accidental jettisoning of a bomb on a Navy LSM by a Marine 

Corps SBD off Damortis; a bombing by twenty-three B-24s west 

of Fort Stotsenburg on 22 February 1945, which caused no 

casualties; and a strafing by Navy SBDs on positions held by 

the 1st Cavalry Division on 11 February. 

125 
98. Smith, Triumph in the Philippines, pp. 235-36. In April 

1945 the 24th Infantry Division suffered 32 casualties on 

Mindanao when their positions were mistakenly bombed by 

Marine aircraft. Sherrod, Marine Corps Aviation, p* 321. On 

Okinawa Marine aircraft flew more than 10,000 sorties ,with 

only 10 reported incidents of amicicide involving 66 

casualties. General Geiger himself was forced into a ditch 

on the Motobu peninsula in April 1945 

an American plane. Ibid., pp. 409-10. 

when he was strafed by 

99. Craven and Gate, Army Air Forces, v:442. 

100. Ibid., V:438-39. 

101. Ibid., V:442 and n. 77, p. 806. 

102. Of twenty-two incidents of air amicicide in Vietnam 

considered in this study only one could not be identified as 

to primary cause. Seven of the incidents involved a direct 

pilot error, either in navigation, orientation to the ground 

and target, physical manipulation, or observance of marking 

aids. Ten incidents involved problems of coordination or 

accurate location of the positions of friendly ground troops 

known to be in the target area. Only two incidents resulted 

from purely mechanical problems and there were only two 

incidents attributable to mistaking friendly for enemy 

troops. Qf seven incidents in which it was possible to 

determine unambiguously the existing visibility conditions, 

six occurred in conditions of reduced visibility. Twenty of 

the incidents produced 327 casualties, or 16.35 casualties 

per incident. Unless otherwise noted all incidents described 

in this section were identified in the survey conducted at 

Fort Leavenworth in January 1980. 

103. The details of this incident and most of the following 

accounts of other Vietnam incidents were taken from VNLL870, 

PP. 14-22, except for the personal account of the A Shau 

Valley incident provided to the author by Lt. Co1 L. D. F. 

Fraschg at Carlisle Barracks, PA, February 1980. 

104. Anthony A. Bezreh, '"Interim Report on Injuries 

Resulting From Hostile Actions Against Army Aircrew Members 

in Flight (July 1966-June 19671," typescript, n.d., CHIH. 

Chapter 3. Antiaircraft Amicicide 

P. The following account was taken from Howe, Northwest 

Africa, pp. 467-68. 

126 
2. USAGF, "Observer's Report," p. 28, CARL, 

3. Garland and Smyth, Sicily, p. 175. Garland and Smyth 

give a detailed account of the ill-fated HUSKY 2 airborne 

opeqjjtion, pp. 175-85. The following description is based 

entirely on their material except insofar as is noted. 

4. Ibid., p. 180. 

5. Ibid., p. 184. 

6. Ibid., p. 184. 

7. Ibid., p. 21%. 

8. Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, II:454. 

9. Garland and Smyth, Sicily, p* 218. 

10. Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, II:454. 

11. Garland and Smyth, Sicily, p* 218. 

12. Craven and Gate, Army Air Forces, II:455; Garland and 

Smyth, Sicily, pp. 423-25. 

13. Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, IL:455. 

14.. Ibid., pp. 455-56; Garland and Smyth, $ pp* 423-25. 

15. AGFOB(ETO), report no. 51, p. 3, MHI. 

16. Garland and Smyth, Sicily, p. 195. A similar: case 

occurred on 15 August 1944 over Laval, France, when a fighter 

from the VIII Fighter Command was shot down while attempting 

to strafe the headquarters of the US Third Army and XIX 

Tactical Air Command. See Craven and Gate, Army Air Forces, 

III:255. 

17. US Army Ground Forces Observer Board (Southwest Pacific 

Area), report no. 27, 19 January 1944, IncLosure 2, 

"Memorandum for G-3 HQ ALAMO Force from AA Section," 

15 January 1944, pp* 2, 7, MHI (hereafter cited as 

AGFOB(SWPA), report no. 27). The cause stated for the 

erroneous downing of the P-47 was "too Little training."' 

18, Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, EV:34Q-41. 

19. Ibid.; AGFO&(SWPA~, report no. 27, p. 7, MHE. 

127 
20. Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, IV:341. 

21. AGFOBCSWPA), report no. 27, p* 7. 

22. Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, IV:341. @ 

23. AGFOB(SWPA), report no. 27, p. 7, MHI. The B-24 later 

showed IFF. 

24. Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, IV:344. 

25. Ibid. 

26. AGFOB(SWPA), report no. 27, p. 7, MHI. 

27. Craven and Cate, Army Air Forces, IV:345. The following 

accounts of 27 and 28 Nay 1944 were taken from IV:635-37. 

Chapter 4. Ground Amicicide 

1. This incident is not included in the tabulation of ground 

amicicide incidents found in table 4. 

2. Charles Edwin Woodrow Bean, The Australian Imperial Force 

in France During the Main German Offensive, 1918 (Sydney, 

19371, p" 585. 

3. Garland and Smyth, Sicily, pp. 179, 181. 

4. Ibid., p. 181, n. 15. 

5. Ibid. 

6. See above, pp. 67-68.. 

7. Information provided by Lt. Gen. Dewitt C. Smith, 

USA-Retired, former Commandant, US Army War College, who 

served in the 4th Armored Division at the time. 

8. Hewitt, Workhorse of the Western Front, p. 22. The 

following account of the operations of the 30th Division in 

the Vire River crossing is based on Hewitt; chaps. V and VI 

of Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit; and the journals, 

reports, and other documents of the 30th Infantry Division 

and its subordinate units in "AGO, World War II Operations 

Reports, 1940-1948," boxes 8732, 8792, 23847,' 23849, 23911, 

Record Group 407, Hational Archives, Washington, DC 

(hereafter cited as AGOWWIIORs). 

128 
9. HQ, US Army Ground Forces, lvlemorandum for the Commanding 

General, Army Ground Forces, Subject: "Report on operations 

of XIX Corps in Normandy and Comments based upon Interviews 

and Personal Observations," by Lt. Cal. H. W. Johnson and Lt. 

Cal. W. S. Renshaw, 2 August 1944, p. 7, CARL. 

TO* Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 109; Hewitt, 

Workhorse of the Western Front, p. 28. 

Summary of telephone conversation between Major General 

ii;bs (Commanding General, 30th Infantry Division) and 

Colonel Maguire (XIX Corps Headquarters), 2100 hours, 8 July 

1944, entry 53A, 9 July 1944, in US Army, 30th Infantry 

Division, "63 Journal Files," Box 8792, AGQWWIIORs. 

12. Hewitt, Workhorse of the Western Front, p. 28. 

13. In a telephone conversation with Calonel Maguire (XIX 

Corps Headquarters) Major General Hobbs accused Brig. Gen. 

John J. Bohn, the CCB commander, of having "not turned a 

track in 95% of his vehicles all day long"' and of "sitting on 

his fanny all day, doing nothing," and attempted to resolve 

the confused artillery situation. Summary of telephone 

conversation between 30th Infantry Division, "'G3 Journal 

Files," AGOWWIIBRs. 

14. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 109. 

15. Summary of telephone conversation between Major General 

Hobbs and Major General Watson, 2045 hours, 8 July 1944, 

entry on 9 July 1944, 30th Infantry Division, "G3 Journal 

Files," AGOWWIIQRs. 

16. Summary of telephone conversation between Major General 

Hobbs and Colonel Ellis (CRACKER 51, 2112 hours, 8 July 1944, 

entry 53A, 9 July 1944, 30th Infantry Division, "G3 Journal 

Files,@" AGOWWIIORs. 

17. The details of the following account of the Airel 

bridgehead incidents were taken from Blumenson, Breakout and 

Pursuit, pp. 110-14, 116; and Hewitt, Workhorse of the 

Western Front, pp. 28, 29, 274. 

18, Despite the fact that elements of CCB did reach 

Hauts-Vents by 1700 on 9 July, Major General Hobbs did 

relieve Brigadier General Bohn five hours later (Blumenson, 

p. 1161. 

19. Hewitt, Workhorse of the Western Front, p. 274. 

129 
20. US Army, 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion, TD Weekly 

Operational Report no. 3 (090800 July 44-160800 July 441, 16 

July 1944, entry no. 12, 16 July 1944, "Journal Files," Box 

23847, ACOWWILORs. 

21. The following account of the amicicide incident at the 

St. Jean de Daye crossroads is based primarily OR the sworn 

depositions of 823d TD Battalion personnel present. These 

statements are included in the report of the officer 

appointed to investigate the incident, Maj. Ashby I. Lohse, 

S-3, 823d TD Bn. Major Lohse's report, dated 10 July 1944, 

is included as entry no. 14, 10 July 1944, 823d TD Bn, 

"Journal Files," Box 23849, AGOMeJIIORs (hereafter cited as 

"Lohse Investigation"). Blumenson briefly describes the 

incident in Breakout and Pursuit (PP. 114-15), using the 

Lohse investigation materials and the CCB, 3d Armored 

Division, journal files, which I have not seen. Hewitt 

(Workhorse of the Western Front, p. 29) completely confuses 

the incident, making it a fight between a column of tanks 

from CCA, 3d Armored Division, and friendly antiaircraft guns. 

22. Sworn statement of Lieutenant McInnis, 10 July 1944, 

"Lohse Investigation." 

23. Ibid. 

24. Sworn statements of Lieutenant McXnnis and Sergeant 

Nunn, 10 July 1944, "Lohse Investigation." 

25. Ibid. 

26. Sworn statement of Sergeant Hanna, 10 July 1944, "Lohse 

Investigation." 

27. Sworn statement of Lieutenant Connors, 10 July 1944, 

"Lohse Investigation." 

2%. Sworn statements of Lieutenant Connors and Sergeant 

Chustz, 10 July 1944, "Lohse Investigation."' 

29. Sworn statement of Lieutenant Raney, 10 July 1944, 

"Lohse Investigation." Lieutenant Raney played a key role in 

later actions of the 823d TD Bn, particularly in the 

hard-fought defense of Mortain in early August. 

30. 823d TD Bn Weekly Operational Report no. 3, AGOWWIIORs. 

31. Statement of Investigating Officer, 10 July 1944, '"Lohse 

Investigation"; Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 115; 8236 

TD Bn Weekly Qperational Report no. 3, AGQWWIIQRs. The 

__-_-___ .-.-- -. -- 
'"Daily Estimated Loss Report as of 2400, 9 July 1944,"" entry 

no. 2, 10 July 1944, 30th Infantry Division, "GL Journal 

Files," AGOWWIIORs, shows Y July casualties for the 823d TD 

En as 1 killed, 11 wounded, and 12 missing; for CCB, 3d 

Armored Division (attached) as 5 killed and 28 wounded. The 

exact personnel losses for the two units in this amicicide 

incident are difficult to determine. Blumenson (Breakout and 

Pursuit, p. 115) states that the two units together had LO 

casualties. A review of the Lohse Investigation statements 

puts 823d TD Bn casualties at 1 killed (Pfc. Jacobs) and 3 

wounded (counting Sgt. Nunn but not Sgt. Hannah, That would 

leave six casualties (or two tank crews> for the CCB company, 

not all of 'whom were killed, if the G-l loss report for 9 

July is correct. 

32. Unit Report no. 15 (082200 July 44-0922110 July 441, 

092230 July 1944, entry no. 4, 9 July 1944, 823d TD Bn, 

“‘Journal Files ,'I Box 23849, AGOWWIIORs. 

33. Statement of Investigating Officer, LO July 1944, "'Lohse 

Investigation."" 

34. Blumenson, p. 115. 

35. Ibid., pp. 115, 117. 

36. Summary of telephone conversation between Lieutenant 

General. Corlett and Major Generali Hobbs, 2100 hours, 9 July 

1944, entry on 9 July 1944, 30th Infantry Division, '"G3 

Journal Files," AGGWWIIORs. 

37. Entries 29 (at 0710 hours) and 59 (at 1300 hours), 10 

July 1944, 30th Infantry Division, "'G3 Journal Files,"" 

AGQWWIIORs. 

38. Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 164. 

39. Notice of this incident was provided to the author 

indirectly by Lt. Gen. Dewitt C. Smith, USA-Retired, former 

Commandant, US Army War College, who was assigned to the 4th 

Armored Division at the time. The commander of the US XII 

Corps, Haj. Gen. Manton Eddy, noted a similar incident in his 

diary for 8 November 1944. The members of a tank battalion 

attached to the US 26th Infantry Division near Arracourt got 

into a shooting match among themselves and knocked out five 

of their own tanks and wounded the battalion commander 

(Manton S. Eddy, "Activities of General Eddy," entry for 8 

November 1944). 

131 
40. AGFOBCETO), report no. 120, "Employment of Tanks with 

Infantry," 2 September 1944, p* 7, MHI. 

41. "The 10th US Armored Division in the Saar-Moselle 

Triangle," by Committee 15, (Student research report, The 

Armored School, Fort Knox, KY, May 1949), pp* 35-36 

(hereafter cited as "Saar-Moselle Triangle"); Hugh M. Cole, 

The Lorraine Campaign (1950; reprint ed., Washington, DC, 

1978)' p* 493. 

42. "Saar-Moselle Triangle," pV 36. 

43. The following incidents are described in, CoLe, The 

Ardennes: Berdorf, p* 247; Holzthum, p. 185; Rocherath,T 

112; Osweiler, pa 251, Schoenberg, pp. 1'68, 170; the German 

293. Regiment, p. 418; 9th Armored Infantry Battalion, p. 633. 

44. The only other recorded incident is that involving the 

two tank battalions of the 4th Armored Division in the night 

assembly area near Avranches in July 1944. See above, p. 159. 

45. "'Armor in the Night Attack," by Committee 21 (Student 

research report, The Armored School, Fort Knox, KY, June 

19501, p* 4; Hewitt, Workhorse of the Western Front, p. 228. 

46. The plan as given in "Armor in the Night Attack," (p. 

12) is certainly incorrect, substituting the 2d for the 1st 

Battalion and vice versa. 

more misleading. 

The plan ThThcryfe; lfnigures l-3) are even 

' "Armor in the Night 

Attack" would have required the 2d and 3d Battalions to 

attack simultaneously across each other's paths. Hewitt 

(Workhorse of the Western Front, p. 228) apparently gives the 

correct (or at any rate, more reasonable) dispositions, the 

principle of difficilior lectio potior not withstanding. 

47. "Armor in the Night Attack," pp. 11-12. 

48. Hewitt, Workhorse of the Western Front, p. 228; "Armor 

in the Night Attack," p. 14. 

49. "Armor in the Right Attack," pp. 14-15 (based on the 

"After Action Report" of the 743d Tank Battalion for February 

1945, p. 191. 

50. '"Report of the Commanding General, Buna Forces, on the 

Buna Campaign, December 1, 1942-January 25, 1943," pa 70, 

ChRLe 

51. Ibid. General Eichelberger himself nearly became the 

victim of such uncontrolled nighttime firing during the 

132 
infamous "'Battle of Brinkman's Plantation"' at Hollandia. A 

platoon from the 24th Infantry Division was detailed to guard 

Eichelberger's CP, and from about 2200 until the following 

morning the trigger-happy platoon "carried on a terrific 

war, 'I resulting in several friendly casualties. At dawn 

General Eichelberger dismissed the errant platoon, stating he 

would feel safer if guarded by the Japanese army. Coincidentally, the same platoon was again assigned to guard 

Eichelberger's CP on Biak several weeks later and despite a 

real Japanese presence did not fire at all that night. 

Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road to Tokyo, pp. 115-16. 

52. AGFOB(SWPAj, report no. 32, by Col. Horace 0. Cushman, 

25 February 1944, p. 6, MHI. 

53. The story of the Kiska invasion is told by Brian Wynne 

Garfield in The Thousand Mile War: World War II in Alaska 

and the Aleutians (New York, 19691, pp. 334-35. Four of the 

dead and four of the wounded 

Canadian Infantry Brigade. US 

87th Mountain Infantry Regiment, 

and elements of the 17th and 53d 

54. Ibid., p. 334. 

55. Ibid., p. 335. 

were Canadians of the 13th 

units involved included the 

the 184th Infantry Regiment, 

Infantry Regiments. 

56. US War Department, Infantry Combat: Part One, 

Eddekhila, and Part Two, Attu Cn.d.; reprint ed., Fort 

Benning, GA: US Army Infantry School, ca. 19441, pp. 14-15. 

57. The details of the following accounts of the incidents 

of November 1943 and February 1944 were taken from Crow1 and 

Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, pp. 42, 42-43, 

96, 108, 109-10, 316, 265. 

58. Craven and Gate, Army Air Forces, V:517. 

59. See above, pp. 12-14. 

60. 106th Infantry Regiment, "Regimental Journal," 3 July 

1944, entry 946, CARL. 

61. 106th Infantry Regiment, "FORAGER Operations Report," p. 

PO, CARL. 

62. The following Pacific incidents are described in Crowl, 

Campaign in the Marianas: 22d Marines, p. 369; roadblock on 

the Finegayan Road, pp. 402-3; Salisbury Road, pp. 433-34; 

77th Infantry Division, p. 434. 

133 
63. Ibid., p. 434. The 306th ,Infantry reported casualties 

of eleven killed and twenty-four wounded on 8 August, many of 

which were due to friendly fire from both the Marines and the 

307th Infantry. Earlier in the day the 3/306th had been 

fired on accidentally by tanks with the 307th Infantry 

(ibid., p. 432). 

64. Streit to Bliss, p. 6, and questionnaire form on McCoy, 

CMH. The letter transmits to The Surgeon General a questionnaire filled out on (and by) each of the first 100 men evacuated from Korea. Private McCoy was awarded the Purple Heart 

Medal. 

65. Ibid., pp. 2, 6, and questionnaire on Yoder. Pfc. Yoder 

was also awarded the Purple Heart Medal. 

66. Ibid., p. 2. 

67. The story of the 29th Brigade's defense of the Imjin 

River line is in T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (New 

York, 19631, pp. 449-57. I have followed closely 

Fehrenbach's account of the encounter between the Gloster 

survivors and the US armor unit (pp. 456-57). 

68. The whole story of the battle for Pork Chop Hill is told 

by S. L. A. Marshall in Pork Chop Hill. The amicicide incident involving Companies K and L is on pp. 151, 177. 

69. Ibid., p. 151. 

70. Information provided by a respondent to the friendly 

fire incidents survey conducted at the US Army Command and 

General Staff College in January 1980. 

71. All information on ground amicicide incidents in 

Vietnam, unless otherwise identified, is derived from the 

friendly fire incidents survey conducted at the US Army 

Command and General Staff College. 

72. Rogers, Cedar Falls-Junction City: A Turning Point, 

p. 112. 

Chapter 5. Conclusions 

actual number of 

incidents resulted 

1. In 58 of the 99 air incidents the 

casualties could be determined. These 58 

in a total of 2,616 casualties (killed or wounded). Most 

incidents (31) resulted in fewer than 5 casualties per 

134 
incident, but. in 5 incidents the total was mare than 140, 

including the‘ st. La bambings of 24-25 July 1944, in which 

the total casualty count was more than 757. See table 6, Air 

column. 

2. In 57 of the 98 artillery incidents the actual number af 

casualties could be determined. These 57 incidents- resulted 

in a total of 722 casualties. Again, almost half of the 

incidents (27) involved fewer than 5 casualties per incident 

and only one resulted in mare than 60 casualties (this incident involved 150 casualties). See table 6, Artillery column. 

3. In 25 of the 58 ground incidents the actual number of 

casua1ties.coul.d be determined. These 25 incidents resulted 

in a total of 147 casualties. Once again most incidents (I.81 

involved fewer than 5 casualties per incident, and only one 

resulted in more than 20 casualties (this incident involved 

74 casualties). See table 6, Ground column. 

4. In 6 of the 15 antiaircraft incidents the actual number 

of casualties could be determined. These 6 incidents 

resulted in a total of 320 casualties, but in two-thirds (4) 

of the incidents no casualties resulted, and in one other 

incident there was one casualty. The figures for antiaircraft incidents are thus greatly skewed by the 319 casualties 

of the Sicilian airborne operation (HUSKY 2). See table 6, 

Antiaircraft column. 

5. vNLL#70, p. 4. 

6.. Ibid., p. 3. 

7. The Kansas City Times, Wednesday, 2 January 1980, p. A9. 

The Washington Post, Sunday, 4 July 1982, p. A17, also 

carried renorts from British war correspondents in the 

I 

Falkland Islands of two amicicide incidents durin the short 

war between Britain and Argentina. On 21 May 1982 at least 

four British Royal Marine commandos were injured when one 

Royal Marine commando patrol called in mortar fire on another 

patrol in the mistaken belief that it was Argentinian. In 

the second incident two men were killed by friendly small 

arms fire when a Special Boat Squadron patrol and a Special 

Air Service patrol attacked each other at night. The same 

article reported a total of 256 British fatalities from 

fighting in the Falklands. 
AAEAF : Advanced Allied Expeditionary 

Air Force 

AQ: area of operations 

APC: armored personnel carrier 

ARVN: Army Republic of Vietnam 

CBU: cluster bomb unit 

CCA: Combat Command A 

CCB: Combat Command B 

CIDE: Civilian Irregular Defense 

Group 

CP: command post 

GTZ: corps tactical zone 

RT: defensive target 

ETO: European Theater of Operations 

FAC: forward area controller 

FDC: fire direction center 

FRO: fire direction officer 

FQ: forward observer 

FSB: fire support base 

FSE : fire support element 

H and I: harassment and interdiction 

HE: high explosive 

RHC: headquarters and headquarters 

company 

I CTZ: I Corps Tactical Zone 

IFF : identification, friend/foe 

(radar) 

KATUSA: Korean augmentation to United 

States Army 

KIA : killed in action 

LCI: landing craft, infantry 

LCM: landing craft, medium 

LFT: light fire team 

L~O~FS~~ORR: liaison officer/fire 

support coordinator 

LP: listening post 

LST: landing ship, tank 

LZ: landing zone 

mcv : Military Assistance Command 

Vietnam 

NC0 : noncommissioned officer 

NDP: night defensive position 

NVA: North Vietnamese Army 

OBOE: a radar bombing system 

OPCCYM : operational control 

OPFOR :opposing force 

OT: observer-target (line> 

FE: Popular Force 

PZ: pickup zone 

RAF: Royal Air Force 

RCAF : Royal Canadian Air Force 

RF/PF: Regional Force/Popular Force 

SOP : standing operating procedure 

TAC: tactical air command 

TAF : tactical air force 

TR : tank destroyer 

TF: task force 

TOG: tactical operations center 

tJSMC: United States Flarine Corps 

VNAF : Vietnamese Air Farce 

VT: variable time fuze 

WIA: wounded in action 

WI?: white phosphorous 

137 
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bu. S GOVERNMENT PRINTiNG OFFICE : 1987-754-001 i’62061 

146 
ABOUTTHE AUTHOR 

A Phi Beta Kappa, Lieutenant Colonel Charles R. Shrader earned a bachelor’s degree 

at Vanderbilt University and a doctorate in history at Columbia University. He also completed courses of study at the Airborne School, the Transportation Officer Advanced Course, 

the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) and the U.S. Army War 

ColFege (USAWC). 

He has taught European history at the U.S. Military Academy, military history at 

USACGSC, and military history and strategy at USAWC. He also served in the Republic of 

Vietnam with the 11th Transportation Battalion and the 48th Transportation Group and in 

Germany with the 4th Transportation Brigade and the 53d Transportation Battalion. Formerly 

Chief of the Research Committee, Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC, he is now Chief of 

the Oral History Branch, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 

I 

His published works include several articles in various scholarly and military journals. 
85.CSI-6742 

Fort