Lieutenant Colanef Richard N. Armstro 
_ .-. 

, 

The U.S. Army believes that deception is a vital part of 

military operations. Field Manual 100-5, Qperattons, acknowiedges that the Soviet Army mastered operational deception in 

World War IL. WImiEe its ~ueeess is widely recognized, there are 

few published Western assessments of Soviet operational deception. 

Sauiet Qperatio~zal Deception: The Bed Clsak, by Lieutenant 

Colonel Richard N. Armstrong, examines the role of operational 

deception in the Red Army’s World War II victories. This 

Combat Studies Institute special study focuses on operationallevel deception planning, allocation of resources, and deception 

measures used derring battle in the Lvov-Sandomierz operation 

erf July 1944. Lieutenant Colonel Armstrong’s insightful study 

demonstrates the clear connection between the wise use of deception and Soviet battlefield success. 

December 1988 RICHARD M. SWAIN 

Colonel, Field Artillery 

Director, Combat Studies Institute 

CSI Special Studies cover a variety of military histary topics. The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Army 

or the Department of Defense. I 
oviet Operational 

Deception: 

The Red Cloak 

bY 

Lieutenant Colonel Richard N. Armstrong 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Armstrong, Richard N, (Richard Nolan), 1946 

Soviet operational deception: the red cloak / by Richard N. 

AlTllS~Olig. 

p. cm. 

Bibliography: p. 

1. World War, 193%1945-Campaigns-Eastern. 2. World War, 1939- 

1945 - Mikuy intelligence-Soviet Union. 3. Derxption (Military 

science)-History-20th century. 4. Strategy-History-20th century. I. 

Title. 

D764.A77 1989 

940.54’21- dc 19 88-39114 

CIP 

-\ 

. . I 
contents 

Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . e . . ..v 

Tables .............................. .vii 

Abbreviations ........................... ix 

Text ................................. 1 

Notes .............................. 

..4 5 

Bibliography ........................... .53 

.a. 

111 
Abbreviations 

A 

CMG 

GA 

GCC 

GMC 

GTA 

GTB 

GTC 

ID 

PZ 

TA 

TC 

-Y 

cavalry mechanized group 

guards army 

guards cavalry corps 

guards mechanized corps 

guards tank army 

guards tank brigade 

guards tank corps 

infantry division 

panzer 

tank army 

tank corps 
1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

Maw 

The 3d Guards Tank Army regrouping, 

October 1943 . . , , . S . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 

Eighth Army location of 3d Guards Tank Army, 

30 October 1943 , , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 

Eighth Army location of 3d Guards Tank Army, 

31 October-6 November 1943 . . . . . . . . . . .12 

Plan and situation, 1st Ukrainian Front, 12 July 1944 . .21 

Regrouping of 1st Ukrainian Front . . . m . . . . .31 

German estimate of 1st Ukrainian Front armies . . . S 32 

The 1st Guards Tank Army commitment in the Rava 

Russkaya direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40 

V 
Tables 

1, The 1st Guards Amy Deception Plan Extract . . . . .24 

vii 
I n order to perform illusions greater than a sleight of hand, 

the magician often uses a cloak. The creation of illusions is 

not magical, or mystical, but is a hint of suggestion, an 

understanding of human nature, relatively simple technical 

manipulations, and the fulfillment of carefully planted 

expectations. Despite this fundamental awareness, one is 

awed by the magician’s illusions of objects disappearing and 

appearing. Similarly, on the battlefield, the application of 

deception depends on the same nonmystical elements but is 

potentially fatal for the one awed and surprised. The Red 

Army learned and practiced the art of deception at all levels 

of warfare during World War II. By cloaking various force 

groupings and activities, Soviet military leadership, 

particularly in the latter stages of the war, created 

operational-level deceptions that surprised German 

intelligence and commanders. This aspect of combat on the 

Eastern Front remains relatively unexplored in Western 

writings.’ The Soviets, on the other hand, have published 

significant studies that remain largely unexploited by Western 

military analysts and historians.2 Through their empirically 

structured military science, Soviet researchers and doctrine 

writers have applied deception to the tactical, operational, 

and strategic levels of war. 

Deception at the tactical level is conducted by corps and 

below and has the goal of hiding activities associated with 

battle preparation.3 Exploiting time of day or night, terrain, 

weather, and specific camouflage and mock-up devices, 

tactical units seek to conceal their activities and formations by 

using feints, ruses, demonstrations, or other tactical actions. 

Operational-level deception is conducted at the Front 

(equivalent to a U.S. army group) and army levels of 

command so battle preparations can be conducted secretly. 

1 
2 

At this level, deception is achieved by maintaining radio 

silence; concealing command and control and troop 

regroupings; disseminating false information to the enemy; 

camouflaging the assembly areas of supporting units; and 

creating dummy troop concentrations, command posts, and 

defensive installations. Operational-level deception is 

‘achieved only by strictly observing the tactical deception 

measures.4 

Strategic-level deception is carried out by commands 

higher than Front and includes measures for maintaining 

secrecy in. the preparation of strategic-level operations and 

campaigns. These actions disorient enemy estimates and 

conceal the true intentions and operations of the armed 

forces5 

Soviet military writers use the term maskirovka, which 

partially aligns with the Western concept of deception. 

However, the definition of maskirovka in its full sense 

encompasses camouflage, concealment, cover, misinformation, and operations security, as well as deception. For clarity, 

this study uses the Western term “deception” and specifically 

states the other aspects of madirovka when appropriate. 

While operational-level deception promotes the 

achievement of operational surprise, its practice provides a 

number of collateral effects, such as masking force ratios, 

delaying enemy decisions, and misdirecting the enemy’s 

attention and commitment of forces. In 1343-45, Soviet 

operations were consistently successful and offer historical 

lessons concerning operational-level deception. A review of 

these lessons and a close look at the Red Army’s improved 

capability to produce battlefield illusions during an operation 
3 

in the summer of 1944 is instructive and may prove useful to 

current U.S. Army initiatives exploring battlefield deception. 

Senior Red Army commanders understood the 

fundamentals of the art of deception, and their efforts are 

chronicled in their memoirs. “The mission of operational 

deception,‘” wrote Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov, “is to disguise 

operations preparatians and mislead the enemy about the 

intentions and character of impending actions. s . .Y’6 Further, 

in offensive operations, operational-level deception protected 

forces and their assets from direct influence by enemy ground 

and air forces and resulted in the premature use of all forms 

of enemy reserves.’ Marshal Ivan S. Konev observed that this 

was very important ‘“because precisely such a disruption of the 

integrity of the enemy’s forces and of the system of their 

control is a sine qua non for successfully developing an 

operation to a great depth.“8 

Antecedents for successful Soviet deception existed before 

World War II. As the Soviets sought to codify their 

theoretical developments of the 1920s and 1930s, the Red 

Army Field Service Regulations of 1936 reveal a reiterated 

belief that “surprise actions depend on concealment . . . 

achieved by . e . secret concentration of forces, concealed 

preparation of artillery concentrations . . . and the use of 

night, smoke screens and radio silence.“’ The 1939 draft 

regulation “obliged superiors of all grades without awaiting 

specia1 instructions to undertake all measures of deception. . . .“l* 

On the eve of World War II, the Red Army at Khalkhin 

Gol, commanded by General Zhukov, developed an elaborate 

deception plan against the Japanese forces in a major 

Manchurian border battle in August 1939. After a significant 
4 

border incursion and clash, Zhukov’s deception measures 

“were aimed at creating the impression thatIye were making 

no preparations for an offensive operation. Consequently, 

troop concentrations and redeployments were done at night, 

radios and telephones were used to pass false information, 

and attack groups were moved to their jumping-off positions 

shortly before the attack. Deception efforts and diversionary 

attacks served to cloud the Japanese estimate of Soviet 

activities and keep the Japanese assessment off-balance. The 

Soviets therefore achieved operational surprise when Red 

Army forces swiftly surrounded the awed Japanese forces and 

completely destroyed their units. According to the Kwantung 

Army command, “We had no prior clue from intelligence at 

any level, from the front to army headquarters, to lead us to 

expect there would be an offensive on such a scale at this 

time.“12 

Despite the Red Army’s impressive example of deception 

against the Japanese in late 1939, Soviet forces were surprised 

by the German invasion in the summer of 1941. The 

ramifications of Joseph Staltlin’s purging the top military 

leadership who had drafted the progressive regulations of the 

193Os, combined with confusing military experiences in 

Manchuria, Poland, and Finland, placed in question the 

general competency of the Red Army in modern warfare. 

Consequently, in the early fighting on the Eastern Front, a 

disparity between the Soviets’ theoretical concepts and their 

practical applications existed. 

During the initial period of the war, Red Army forces 

rarely resorted to operational-level deception, which was 

limited to launching a series of diversionary attacks across a 

wide front, complemented by intensified reconnaissance 

activity. At the tactical level, division and lower units used 

--1___-- 

--- 
only camouflage as a passive means of keeping manpower and 

equipment hidden from German aerial reconnaissance, and 

they did not concentrate on planning and executing other 

deception techniques.13 

On 29 September 1941, the Stavka (Supreme High 

Command) issued a directive cautioning commanders to 

conceal their personal reconnaissances and to hide their 

forces’ attack preparations.14 The Soviets learned quickly 

that success in counterattacks depended on surprise and thus 

were rediscovering the links between surprise and deception. 

Red Army commanders learned, too, that passive deception 

measures had to be supplemented by active measures to 

deceive the Germans successfully. Nonetheless, from June 

1941 to November 1942, during the first period of the war, 

Soviet unit commanders learned little more than the 

necessities about camouflaging equipment, troops, and 

weapons at the tactical level and conducting some 

diversionary actions.15 Red Army planners had much to learn 

about balancing techniques between defensive and offensive 

battles and coordinating the numerous combat and combat 

support functions at the operational level of war. 

During the second period of the war, November 1942 to 

December 1943, the role of operational-level deception 

increased significantly as the Red Army changed to a strategic 

offensive. The concealment of counteroffensive preparations 

received considerable attention early in the war. Clever 

regrouping of forces became an instrumental method of 

executing operational-level deception. 

The Soviets regrouped forces in order to reinforce existing 

forces or to create new groupings for repelling enemy 

offensives, developing successful attacks, and transferring 
6 

forces to new directions.16 These forces gathered and moved 

only at night and under strictly observed and enforced 

camouflage discipline. The Department of Research Into and 

Application of Wartime Experience, General Staff of the Red 

Army, which had the responsibility of determining lessons 

learned and producing studies of war experience, emphasized 

the value of regroupings. During the preparations of the 

Southwest Front offensive in December 1942, one such study 

noted that “the secrecy of regrouping is one of the factors 

deciding the success of an offensive operation.“17 

In another study on the war experience from the Battle of 

Stalingrad, the following points were noted on the regrouping 

of the 5th Tank Army: 

For purposes of masking, the areas of concentration of the 

5th Tank Army were 30-60 km from the front line. The movements of the troops were carried out exclusively at night. The 

masking of the areas of concentration was obligatory. All radio 

traffic was forbidden. In spite of the fact that in taking up the 

jump-off positions for the offensive the troops had to cross to 

the south banks of the Don River, the deployment of the main 

forces of the army was in the main a surprise for the enemy, 

even though enemy air reconnaissance noticed the presence of 

new units (especially cavalry units) on the south banks of the 

Don. From 10 November enemy aviation subjected the inhabited localities, the areas of concentration of the units and the 

crossings to regular aerial bombardment; however, the scale of 

concentration was not revealed to the enemy. 

For the purposes of masking the regrouping of the forces we 

carried out the following measures: Before the front deployment of the 47th Guards and 119th RiIIe Divisions, taking over 

sectors from the 14th Guards Division, previously on the defensive, we left combat security from this division. 

In carrying out all the preparations and planning of the operation we observed the strictest secrecy. The commanding personnel was informed of the plan of operations onIy within the limits 
of their missions and fimctidns. Thus, the preiiminary decision 

of the commander of the 26th Tank Corps was known only to 

the commanders of the brigades, their assistants for the political 

units and the chiefs of staffs; in the staff of the corps the only 

ones knowing about the decision were the deputy commander of 

the corps, the chief of staff, his deputy for the political unit, and 

the chief of the operations and training section. The mission of 

the tank corps was not made known to all the personnel until 

the eve of the attack, on the evening of 18 November. 

As a result of ail these measures one succeeded in effecting 

complete strategic surprise. From the statements of “control 

prisoners” we found out the amount of information the enemy 

had concerning preparations for the offensive; but the grouping 

of our forces, the direction of the main blow and the time of the 

attack were not known to the enemy. In addition to this, the 

enemy apparently was too late in obtaining information pertaining to the preparation of the offensive, and hence, he did not 

have the time for regrouping his forces and taking countermeasures.r8 

7 

While regrouping actions allowed the concealment of additional forces for offensives at Stalingrad and repelling German offensives at Kursk, regroupings that transferred forces 

to new directions or sectors dramatically affected Soviet 

operations from the middle of 1943 to the end of the war. 

The regrouping of the 3d Guards Tank Army (GTA) in the 

battles for the Dnieper River in October 1943 is a secondperiod example that foreshadows the operational dexterity 

and manipulation of forces by the Red Army battlefield 

magicians. 

Toward the end of September 1943, forces of the 

Voronezh Front (redesignated the 1st krainian Front on 2 

October 1943) seized a number of bridgeheads across the 

Dnieper River. The Front initially achieved a bridgehead in 

the area of the Great Bukrin Bend south of Kiev (see map 1). 

Twice in October, unsuccessful attempts by 1st Ukrainian 

Front forces -40th Army and 3d GTA- to generate 
c 

22 sep--25 Ott 

Miles 

Map 1. The 3d Guards Tank Army regrouping, October 1943 
9 

a successful offensive from the bridgehead toward the old 

Russian capital, Kiev, frustrated the Soviet leadership. 

In late September and early October, troops of the 38th 

Army, 1st Ukrainian Front, operating north of Kiev, secured a 

bridgehead in the area of Lyutezh. This second major 

bridgehead offered the opportunity to concentrate a major 

force for a different offensive approach to Kiev. On 24 

October, the S&I&CZ ordered the Front forces, to include the 

3d GTA, to regroup so they could conduct an offensive from 

the Lyutezh bridgehead. 

By 1830 on 25 October, the Front commander assigned 

the 3d GTA the three-stage mission of withdrawing from the 

Bukrin bridgehead, marching north, and occupying jump-off 

positions for an offensive north of Kiev. While the tank army 

was only 50 percent of its authorized strength, it had a 

significant number of combat vehicles and equipment to 

move. Among its major combat vehicles, the 3d GTA had 

over 300 tanks and self-propelled assault guns, hundreds of 

guns and mortars, and armored personnel and wheeled 

vehicles. The routes of march were 200 kilometers along the 

front with crossings over the Desna and Dnieper Rivers. 

The 3d GTA used deception to conceal its withdrawal 

from the bridgehead. Inoperable and destroyed tanks, along 

with dummy tanks and self-propelled assault guns, were left in 

vacated positions. Army and corps command posts continued 

routine radio transmissions. 

The 3d GTA cleared the bridgehead by 28 October; 

moved to assembly areas north of Kiev by 30 and 31 October, 

a day or two behind the planned movement scheme depicted 

on map 1; and qtickly restored itself to about 70 percent of 

its authorized strength. 
10 

On 30 October, the Front commander assembled the 

army, corps, and brigade commanders for a short meeting and 

announced: 

In the morning the day after tomorrow an offensive in the 

Bulk bridgehead will begin with forces of the 27th and 40th armies, as far as the enemy believes, your 3d [Guards] Tank Army. 

According to our information the enemy does not know that you 

tankers are already here. And when the enemy throws all of his 

reserves against the troops attackin in Bukrin, we will make the 

main strike here north of Kiev. . . . 

18 

The German Eighth Army intelligence situation maps for 

30 October located the 3d GTA in the Bukrin bridgehead 

(see map 2).20 On the 31 October to 6 November situation 

maps, the 3d GTA was depicted outside the B&in Bend on 

the east side of the Dnieper River southwest of Borispol.21 

The German Fourth Panzer Army situation map for 3 

November showed the 3d GTA on the east side of the 

Dnieper opposite the Lyutezh bridgehead, but German 

intelligence was four days behind in accurately tracking the 3d 

GTA (see map 3).22 The 1st Ukrainian Front commander 

could almost count on the German commanders not knowing 

that the 3d GTA was in the Lyutezh bridgehead. The 3d 

GTA’s attack was a complete surprise to the defending 

German forces, and they were quickly overwhelmed. 

In his memoirs, &xt VWx-iq Field Marshal Erich von 

Manstein, commander of Army Group South, where the 

Bukrin and Lyutezh bridgeheads were located, describes the 

battles for the Dnieper River. His account on the holding 

battles in October 1943 against the Bukrin bridgehead notes, 

“By the end of the month it had more than five armies (one 

of which was entirely armoured) in there. . . .“23 After some 

description of the fighting farther south, he describes the 
11 

Map 2. Eighth Army location of 3d Guards Tank Army, 30 October 1943 
12 

Map 3. Eighth Army location of 3d Guards Tank Army, 31 October-6 November 1943 
13 

Lyutezh bridgehead fight: “At the beginning of November 

the enemy again attacked the northern wing of the Army 

Group, Fourth Panzer Army’s Dnieper front, with strong 

forces. . . . It soon becomes evident that the formations of the 

Fourth Panzer Army would be unable to hold the Dnieper 

against the far stronger Russians. . . . “24 Manstein Leaves the 

impression that the Red Army maintained strong forces all 

along the Dnieper, particularly in the bridgehead areas. And, 

for whatever reason, he fails to identify or acknowledge the 

1st Ukrainian Front’s major regrouping of the 3d GTA and 

other forces that made the breakout from the Lyutezh 

bridgehead possible. 

The Soviets were still learning about deception during the 

second period of the war. As the scope and scale of 

deception efforts increased, the Red Army experienced 

inconsistent results because not all branches of service, 

particularly the engineers, participated in the planning and 

execution of deception operations. Also, poor radio security 

repeatedly compromised deception efforts. 

Nonetheless, through the use of reconnaissance-in-force 

operations, the Red Army began to understand how a 

suggestion could be pfanted in the Germans’ minds. When 

the Soviets coordinated all their deception measures, the 

battlefield became a stage for producing illusions for the 

Germans, who were closely monitoring all Soviet actions. 

The most important measures for operational-level 

deception were to be included in the general Front or army 

operations plan. Under the guidance of the Front or army 

chief of staff, representatives from alI branches of troops and 

services developed the deception plan. Based on the 

commander’s decisions for his impending operation and his 
14 

consideration of neighboring unit actions, the operational 

deception plan indicated the general intention of deception 

measures, forces and resources for their implementation, and 

execution times. In addition, the deception pIan specifically 

indicated who would control the operation, when it would 

take place, and how it would be executed.= This plan was 

essential to the commander’s decision-making process and the 

operations plan. 

For example, in the smoke support portion of the 

deception plan for an assault crossing on the Dnieper in 

October 1943, smoke generation for the 65th Army was 

carefully planned and successfully executed simultaneously in 

thirteen sectors across thirty kilometers of the army front.% 

The plan specified the purpose and location of the smoke 

screens, the expenditures of smoke resources, their readiness, 

and those responsible for executing the smoke operation. 

These smoke screens were used to blind German observation 

points, cover crossing sectors, and act as feigned points of 

attack. Previous Red Army combat experience in crossing 

water obstacles revealed the necessity for creating smoke 

screens at dummy crossing sites. But in order to successfully 

attract German attention, it was also necessary to increase 

troop activity and antiaircraft artillery fire at the dummy 

crossings. In the 65th Army’s operation, a German rifle 

division attacked in the false smoke screen areas. 

Total smoke support for the 65th Army included using 

5,5(EO smoke pots, 2,000 smoke hand grenades, 2 tons of 

smoke-producing compound, and improvised smoke means 

(coniferous branches, damp brushwood, hay, and straw).” 

The chiefs of chemical services for the rifle corps assumed 

responsibility for the execution of the smoke plan. The corps 

commanders indicated the placement of the smoke screens 
15 

and their ignition times. As noted by General Pave1 

Ivanovich Batov, commander of the 65th Army, ‘“This 

experience became a fine base for successfully overcoming 

many subsequent rivers, especially those like the Narev, 

Vistula and Oder.“28 

An important aspect in the operational deception plan was 

deception maneuver-a set of actual and false combat actions 

conducted by specified Front and army forces and resources 

intended to compel German commanders to transfer their 

basic forces to an advantageous position for Red Army 

forces.29 Deception maneuver had to be simple, executed 

quickly, and, most important, a surprise to the enemy. 

Regrouping and maneuvering combat power often became 

the crux of the deception plan. 

The deception plan outlined each step of the operation, 

including measures for the preparation period. Usually, the 

plan consisted of one copy of the plan in table form and a 

special map marked with Fro&t force deception maneuver for 

all stages of the operation. Interestingly, Soviet officers 

outlined their plans and decisions by drawing directly on their 

maps with colored pencils. Commanders, demonstrating their 

involvement and responsibility for the plan, marked 

“approved” in the upper margin of the map and signed their 

names. 

In planning the deception activities that were to be seen 

by or hidden from German reconnaissance, the Soviets 

understood well what actions German intelligence had to 

notice and that these actions had to be executed convincingly 

and smoothly if the false operations were to be believed by 

the Germans. Correspondingly, in conjunction with deception 

maneuver, the Soviets practiced what today is called 
16 

operations security, which they applied in preparing the actual 

operation. To enhance surprise, a cloak of deception had ts 

hide key indicators of the operation. 

Red Army operational-level deception during the second 

period of World War II improved from issuing isolated 

instructions and measures to developing serious deception 

plans and creating ad hoc planning staffs. Even though the 

Red Army conducted some ‘unsuccessful deception 

operations, it was learning and learning well. Cike the 

magician on stage, Soviet commanders and their units on the 

battlefield had to be well practiced in the smallest details of 

the illusion. 

By the summer of 1944, in the third period of the war, the 

Red Army had become more sophisticated in its application 

of deception. Simultaneous deception actions of sever 

Fronts dramatically increased the scope and employment of 

coordinated deception measures at the operational level. 

Soviet lessons learned continued to reinforce the idea that 

careful preparation and active execution strictly and centrally 

controlled by Front and army staffs produced the best results. 

Necessary resource allocations generally involved 10 perce 

of the equipment and weaponry for each 

tion of rigorous pla 

successful deception operations. 

rces ~e~essa~ 

a rifle or ta division, the Soviets required I rifle 

or tank company, 100 mock-up tanks and self-~ro~elled 

assault guns, 1 battery and 28 to 30 mock-up guns, 10 vehicles, 

60 to 80 mock-up vehicles, and IO to 12 mock-up field 

kitehens?2 
17 

At the operational level, to display corps- and army-level 

units and the resources for tactical units and operational-level 

support, corps and army radio stations and communication 

centers had to transmit radio signals that were well known to 

the enemy.33 Imitating sounds with loudspeakers also 

enhanced Soviet efforts. Coordination between the engineers 

and the signal units was very important. 

A revealing example of Soviet operational-level deception 

in the third period of the war occurred in the 

Lvov-Sandomierz operation in July 1944. This one Front 

operation offers a useful look at the Soviets’ depth of 

planning, allocation of resources, and measures practiced in 

conducting deception during the battle. 

The Soviets” main objective in the summer of 1944 was to 

destroy the German groupings in the Belorussian and 

Northern Ukrainian areas. Major Red Army offensives on 

the Eastern Front would also preclude significant transfers of 

German forces to the Western Front to counter the AHied 

Normandy invasion. 

April and May, the Eastern Front was relatively 

quiet as it had been during the previous muddy, thawing 

The disposition of opposing forces created the 

‘“Belorussian balcony,” which was occupied by the German 

Army Group Center, with Army Group Northern Ukraine in 

the south. En concerned anticipation, German intelligence 

began estimating the contours of possible Soviet summer 

offensives. While the German rces High Command 

ando der wehm and the Army High 

~~~~d ~~~er~~~~~~ C&S Heereg [cz1KH]) disagreed on 

the Red Army’s objectives (the .BaIkans versus the Baltic), 

they were convinced that the Soviets’ main effort would be 
18 

against Army Group Northern Ukraine. 34 By early May, the 

Germans expected a large offensive in the direction of 

Lvov-Lublin, with a possible swing to the north to cut off the 

Belorussian balcony. This estimate reflected how the 

Germans would have attacked the problem themselves.35 

In preparing for the main effort, the Belorussian 

operation, the Soviet High Connnand wanted to create a 

posture that suggested to the Germans that the Red Army’s 

main attacks would indeed be launched in the south as well as 

in the Baltic areas in the north. To implement these major 

diversions, the Red Army’s strategic deception plan tasked 

the 3d Ukrainian and 3d Baltic Fronts to deceive the enemy 

by creating large concentrations of troops, tanks, artillery, 

antiaircraft, and other units. These efforts, particularly in the 

south, attracted German air reconnaissance. Invaluable to the 

strategic deception was the decision to leave a large 

concentration of three tank armies in the 1st Ukrainian Front 

sector as “a kind of bluff.“36 Correspondingly, commanders 

of the 1st Baltic and the lst, Zd, and Belorussian Fronts took 

the strictest measures to protect the actual preparations of the 

Belorussian operation. 

Late in May, the Germans began to detect some activity 

opposite Army Group Center in Belorussia; however, these 

Red Army activities did not meet German expectations. Earl 

F. Ziemke, a military historian, concluded from his review of 

OKN; Army Group Center, and Ninth Army operations and 

intelligence records, ‘To a Soviet deception, the German 

command added an almost hypnotic self-induced delusiom 

the main offensive would come against Army Group Northern 

Ukraine because that was where they were ready to meet 

it ,;37 

. Strategically, hints, German predispositions, and 
19 

expectations were coming together to conceal the Soviets’ 

main summer offensive. 

Unfortunately for Marshal Ivan S. Konev, the 1st 

Ukrainian Front commander, the strategic deception focused 

German attention and expectations on his sector. The Soviet 

High Command directed the 1st Ukrainian Front to liberate 

the western regions of the Ukraine and southeastern Poland. 

Because of increased scrutiny and preparations by German 

forces in the Front’s area of operation, an operational 

deception effort was critical to Konev’s successful 

accomplishment of his assigned objectives. 

In anticipation of the impending Red Army offensive, the 

German Army Group Northern Ukraine command created a 

well-prepared and in-depth defense in the Lvov sector. As 

noted in a postwar study: 

The main battle position was mined in depth up to 15 miles 

to the rear. Prior to the major offensive the area east of Lvov 

during the summer of 1944, the sector where the main attack 

thrust was expected, was mined with 160,000 antipersonnel and 

200,ax) antitank mines within the zone defense. This was the 

first time that the Germans applied zone defense tactics of this 

type described in this study.% 

In addition to the mines, the Germans prepared successive 

trench lines. Moreover, the sector that had been the sight of 

major fighting during World War I and early fighting in 1941 

was swampy terrain that severely channelized maneuver. 

Faced with these difficulties, Konev and his staff devised 

an aggressive plan to establish two powerful striking forces 

that would penetrate the German defense from two separate 

directions. The first strike group, consisting of two rifle and 

two tank armies, would launch its attack from the Ternopol 
20 

area in the general direction of Lvov. Simultaneously, sixty to 

seventy kilometers to the north, a second group, consisting of 

one tank and two rifle armies and a cavalry mechanized group 

(CMG), would attack from the area west of Lutsk in the 

direction of Sokal and Rava Russkaya (see map 4). After 

some serious disagreements with the General Staff and Stalin, 

the supreme high commander (who favored attack on a single 

main axis), Konev’s plan was accepted. However, Konev 

remembered what Stalin had said: “You are really very 

stubborn. Fi~zd pursue your plan and carry it out on your 

responsibility. Konev heeded Stalin’s warning and realized 

the added pressure he had for succeeding in his operation. 

Konev”s most important preliminary task was to regroup 

his forces significantly, since the main Front forces were on 

the left flank too far south. Three tank armies with nearly 

1,300 tanks and self-propelled assault guns, 1,900 guns and 

mortars, and more than 700 vehicles, plus a rifle army and 

other corps, divisions, and reinforcing arms had to be shifted 

north to the center and right flank. 

Konev’s actions illustrated the scope and scale that Red 

Army operational-level deception routinely encompassed by 

1944. His deception maneuver resulted from an ambitious 

plan to hide the preparations of main strike groups on the 

right flank and center of the Front while demonstrating 

armored concentrations on the left flank. In magicians 

jargon, Konev’s Front was to perform a misdirection: it 

would direct the Germans’ attention, or even their thought 

process, away from the main efforts. The intended result of 

the misdirection was misperception. Illusionists have long 

known that, if a person sees something that was not there 

before, it is human nature for that person to automatically 

look at it. 
21 

4th Panzer 

Army 

1 st Belorussian Front 

1st Ukrainian Front 

6aranov’s CMG 

okolov’s CMG 

Army Group 

Northern 

Wkraine 

Scale 

Map 4. Plan and situation, 1st Ukrainian Front, 12 July 1944 
22 

Consequently, Konev’s Front appeared to have a major 

strike group on its left flank in the direction of Stan&lava 

rather than in the direction of Lvov and Rava Russkaya. 

Opposite Stan&lava, the 1st Ukrainian Front simulated the 

concentration of a tank army and a tank corps behind the 1st 

Guards Army (GA) and a tank army behind the 18th Army. 

Simultaneously, behind a cloak of stringently enforced 

security measures, other forces regrouped and moved to the 

-Ternopol and Lutsk areas. In a conditioned response learned 

from previous experiences, such as those of the 3d GTA at 

the Dnieper River, the shifting forces regrouped for the 

offensive, adhering to strict radio silence and a definite 

schedule of using other communications means. Movements 

were predominately conducted at night, which was the most 

effective chxk n-r the days before infrared and thermal 

detection warfare. 

As understood by General A A. Greehko, commander, 

1st GA, 1st Ukranian Front, and later the minister of defens’e, 

the German command had correctly surmised the direction of 

the Front% intended attack. The objective of the deception 

was to confuse the Germans about the probable directions of 

the Front attacks, to conceal the time of the offensive, and to 

hide the forces in the main strike group~.~ 

General Grechko’s part of the deception plan was to 

portray false concentrations of a tank army and a tank corps, 

which he decided to place in the Chertov and Kopachynites 

areas respectively. Then, his staff planned to construct a false 

unloading area for the fictitious tank army from 3 to 10 July, 

to create the appearance of the movement of a tank column 

from the unloading area ta the assembly area, and to simulate 
23 

the placement of a tank armI and corps into final jumping-off 

positions from 17 to 20 July. 2 

To implement these deception measures, 1st GA allocated 

a significant force that included 4 combat engineer battalions, 

2 rifle regiments, 2 artillery battalions, 1 antiaircraft company, 

150 disassembled T-34 tank mock-ups, 2 powerful 

loudspeaker units, 3 radio battalion stations, and 8 vehicles.42 

The combat engineers set up false materiel, the rifle and 

artillery units provided movement in the simulated troop 

concentrations and false positions, and the tanks and tractors 

made tracks in the areas where mock-ups were set up and 

made motor noises near the German front lines. In isolated 

cases, the tanks fired on the Germans. Antiaircraft weapons 

covered the unloading points and assembly areas. False radio 

traffic to simulate the unloading and movement forward of 

the units was conducted according to a special program 

devised by the Front. 

The personnel from the deception platoons, detached 

from the Front’s deception company (see table l), provided 

the technical expertise for the illusions, were used as technical 

instructors for work with the collapsible tank mock-ups, and 

accompanied the units with mock-ups. Teams of camouflage 

specialists dressed as tankers provided a technically qualified 

cadre to advise and assist other troops. 

At this point in the war, the Soviets had formed 

operational groups composed of representatives of the various 

branches of troops and services in the armies to organize and 

control the activities and resources dedicated to the deception 

effort. General Grechko’s operational group was headed by 

an engineer colonel who directed 1st GA’s deception 

planning and execution. Interestingly, a major from the Front 
m 

26 

staff was also included in the 1st GA’s and 18th Army’s 

operational groups to provide advice on the operation and to 

ensure close conformance with the Front’s plan43 The 

ahocation of this Front staff officer indicated the Red Army’s 

emphasis on planning and coordinating every detail in 

executing the deception. 

An officer was appointed to each simulated assembly area 

and point of deception activity where he was responsible for 

conducting specific deception measures. The operational 

group coordinated the actions of ah the various branches of 

troops and in all the regions where simulations were being 

conducted. Communications were maintained only via 

messengers and liaison officers. Table 1 shows the 1st GA’s 

scheduled events from 4 to 20 July that were to be monitored 

by the operational groupeM 

The dummy equipment, which was assembled by 26 Julyp 

included 154 prefabricated tanks, 299 mock-up tanks, and 568 

mock-up guns hammered together from improvised materials, 

along with 68 other dummy vehicles. Thir !? field kitchens and 

six fuel resupply points were also laid out4 

Trains carrying mock-up tanks arrived at the designated 

unloading points and were driven onto a siding or a roadway 

excavation far from the station. These unloading points were 

carefully guarded. Unloading the trains, which was 

accompanied by the noise of tractors, tanks, or loudspeakers, 

was completed in one and one-haIf hours. When German 

aircraft appeared in the skies, the chemical protection 

companies covered the area with smoke screens. Simultaneously, simulations of infantry and motorized infantry 

motor columns were created near the assembly areas. At 

night, the vehicles moved with flashing headfights, and in the 

__ -- 
27 

daytime, they moved with crowns of trees fastened to their 

sides to create great dust clouds.46 

In addition to the normal 25kilometer exclusion zone for 

the local populace behind the front line, the Soviets took 

extra measures to deceive German agents or reconnaissance 

patrols. Groups of Red Army officers in tankers uniforms 

simulated the work of billeting party members by 

systematically visiting populated areas in the troops’ path. 

The army intelligence staff planned and conducted 

reconnaissance in force at thirteen points to simulate the 

preparation of breaches in the area where German defensive 

positions were located. Since the September 1941 Stmka 

directive, the Soviets had been perfecting reconnaissanceoperations in concert with deception and operations 

security practices. Additionally, army and corps combat 

engineers made gaps in the forward minefields. 

German reconnaissance efforts were drawn to the left 

flank. Soviet forces at this point in the war knew very well 

the signs by which German intelligence “‘discovered” 

preparations for operations. The Germans watched for major 

indicators, such as regrouping activities, movement in 

assembly areas, evacuation of patients and materiel to the 

rear, reinforcing aviation, increased reconnaissance and 

intelligence collection, and many other signs of increased 

activity.47 Thus, since the Soviets had anticipated German 

actions, they manipulated their forces accordingly. 

As a result of the deception measures, the Soviets claimed 

that sixty-eight flights of German reconnaissance aircraft flew 

over the false assembly areas. The number of German aerial 

reconnaissance assets by 1944 was inadequate for covering the 

Eastern Front4 At a given time, their air reconnaissance 
28 

could cover only relatively small sectors of suspected 

importance, and any diversion of these limited assets caused a 

loss in observation and important intelligence. 

The Germans repeatedly dispatched scouts and dropped 

agents at night into the 1st GA% zone of operation. 

Nonetheless, the Soviets estimated that German artillery 

expended some 2,900 shells against bogus targets. Prior to 16 

July, the Germans had not changed their forces’ groupings 

opposite the 1st GA sector, although by 9 July, a considerable 

portion of the forces from the 1st Ukrainian Front forces had 

moved laterally from the left to the center and right flanks,49 

From 4 through 20 JulyY the 18th Army contributed to 

operational deception by simulating the concentration of a 

tank army in its rear area in the vicinity of Ostrowiee, 

Zabolotov, and Gankovtsy. Under the army’s chief of staff 

and operational group of eight staff officers, headed by the 

deputy chief of operations, the 18th ‘Army conducted its 

deception operations similar to the 1st GAS. 

The 18th Army timed its daytime activities for when 

German reconnaissance aircraft flew over in the mornings. 

At night, a column of specially designated vehicles with 

headlights on moved toward the assembly areas. The 

following describes a ploy that deceived German night aerial 

reconnaissance: 

To intensify the light effect, two teams of 15 men each were 

allocated, equipped with flashlights. The soldiers, dispersed at 

30-50 meter intervals, moved along the route to assembly areas, 

turning on the flashlights from time to time. With the appearance of a German aircraft, all lights were lit. After the 

aircraft passed, the team boarded its vehicle and moved forward 

5-10 kilometers, where it continued its work?O 
29 

In addition, collapsible tank mock-ups were set up on the 

march routes at night so the Germans could detect the 

movement of combat vehicles in case they used illumination 

flares. For sound effects, the Soviets used loudspeaker 

systems or moved self-propelled guns. 

During deception preparations, Soviet troop units 

maintained radio silence, and any broadcasting of 

misinformation was conducted cautiously. Radio stations 

established communications for the first time on 8 July and 

conducted a daily communications check from 9 July through 

11 July; they did not broadcast. Only after 13 July, following 

the beginning of the attack on the Rava Russkaya sector, did 

they begin to transmit. 

Even though the 1st Ukrainian Front offensive began on 

13-14 July, the 18th Army’s deception efforts continued. On 

18 July, after the troops had been concentrated in assembly 

areas and moved into the jump-off positions, the corps radio 

stations sent common-coded texts with typical Soviet five-digit 

groups, compiled at random by the officer operators. Cipher 

clerks provided the beginning of the text address and the end 

registration number in accordance with the Red Army’s 

existing code. The number of groups in each text was always 

different. The wireless sets were operated in normal 

sequencer changes in call signs, communications checks, and 

password rotations were conducted every twenty-four hours, 

and the frequency was changed twice during the radio 

demonstrations?” 

At the same time that operational deception was being 

conducted in the 18th Army rear area, an offensive with a 

limited objective was undertaken on 13 July that coincided 

with the attack in the Rava Russkaya sector. The limited 
30 

tactical objective and timing attempted to deceive the 

Germans as to the true intent and scale of the Front’s 

operational plan. The Soviets wanted the Germans to 

hesitate. The 11th Rifle Corps, 18th Army, 18th Guards Rifle 

Corps, and 1st GA attacked in the direction of Stanislava.52 

While the 1st GA and 18th Army produced false troop 

assembly areas and tank concentrations, the regrouped forces 

moved to take their starting attack positions. In early duly, 

the Front had a significant ‘amount of lateral motion from 

south to north (see map 5). 

After the preparation phase, the combatants did not 

believe they had been very effective in deception. In his 

memoirs, Marshal Konev wrote that everything we did “with 

regret was not fully successful in deceiving the enemy, in spite 

of the deception measures taken. However, the regrouping of 

the 1st Guards Tank Army in the area of Lutsk and 4th Tank 

Army in the area of Ternopol all regained hidden, which was 

very important for the operation. However, Konev was 

more successful than he thought. 

The Om situation maps showed the German’s perception 

of the situation (see map 6). While German intelligence 

personnel did not fall for the false assembly areas behind the 

1st GA and 18th Army, they failed to detect the regrouping of 

some army-size units from the left flank. Major General F. W. 

von Mellenthin, chief of staff for the XXXXVIII Panzer 

Corps that sat astride the Lvov sector, noted, “Wireless 

intercept and interrogation of prisoners produced most 

contradictory reports. . * . Only second,,;ite Russian formations were identified in the front line. . . . 

The XXXXVIII Panzer Corps did not detect the 38th 

Army’s shift north opposite its sector in front of Lvov as the 
31 

6 6cx 

12 Jtrl 

\ 

* 3 Gl 

1 15 J 

rA 

Gic 

Map 5. Regrouping of IS Ukrainian Front 
-- 

0 1 GTA 

Map 6. German estimate of 1st Ukrainian Front armies 
JJ 

1st Ukrainian Front’s first echelon until two days before the 

attackas The panzer corps had captured 38th Army engineers’ 

making preparations for the attack. The 38th Army did not 

appear on the 8KH situation map in the vicinity of Ternopol 

until 17 July, and even then, the map was marked with a 

qestion markss6 

Concerning the armored forces of the Front mobile 

groups for attacking into the operational depth of the German 

defense, the 0m situation maps for 12 and 13 July showed 

the correct location for the tank and cavalry corps of General 

Baranov’s CMG that would operate in the northern attack 

sector. Of General Sokolov’s CMG that would fight in the 

center sector opposite Lvov, the Germans located its tank 

corps but depicted its cavalry corps with a question mark in 

the wrong loeation.57 In the case of both CMGs, there is no 

indication that the Germans understood at any time during 

the operation that the combinations of these tank and cavalry 

corps created CMGs. 

On the German situation maps, the 3d GTA and 4th Tank 

Army were located too far south prior to the operation. The 

XXXXVIII Panzer Corps intelligence records reflect no 

forewarning of the tank armies by specific unit designation.5g 

However, as a sector of main attack, the panzer corps 

command watched the developing battle for the commitment 

of Russian tanks. At 0555, 14 July, after the attack had begun 

in the Lvov direction, General von Mellenthin remarked to 

the corps operations officer: ‘“I think it’s a main attack. The 

barrage fire was less than expected. The enemy tanks ,,$ll 

probably first appear when the infantry breaks some holes. 

At 0900, 15 July, General Hermann Balck, commander of 

the XXXXWII Panzer Corps, in a telephone conversation 
34 

with the First Panzer Army commander, Colonel General 

Erhaud Raus, summarized the situation, indicating his belief 

that a Soviet tank corps was in the fighting.@) With the 

initiation of the attack on 14 July, elements of the 3d GTA 

began to move forward from their assembly areas to attack 

positions on the east bank of the Seret River by evening. To 

strengthen the first-echelon rifle army strike for a quick 

breakthrough of the Germans’ tactical defense zone, two 

brigades -one mechanized and one tank -from the 3d GTA 

were committed as forward detachments to the battle early on 

15 July. General Balck’s enemy “tank corps” was actually the 

forward detachments of the 3d GTA. 

During the operation, German intelligence concerning the 

4th Tank Army lagged behind in revealing its movement and 

commitment. The tank army was forced to redirect its line of 

commitment because a XXXXVIII Panzer Corps counterattack with two panzer divisions stopped and pushed back the 

38th Army? attack in the 4th Tank Army’s original area of 

commitment. The 4th was not correctly located on OKH 

situation maps until 19 Jul~.~l Swiftly altering its direction 

and following the 3d GTA through a narrow, four- to sixkilometer-wide gap, the Germans did not recognize the 4th 

Tank Army until it was operating in their operational rear and 

threatening Lvov from the south side. 

German intelligence did not identify units in the vicinities 

of the 1st GA’s and 18th Army’s false tank concentrations. 

The scale and amount of activity may have been enough to 

plant enough doubt in the German analysis to hoId the two 

tank armies too far south. 

The Germans did not detect the 5th GA that formed the 

1st Ukrainian Front reserve, but this was understandable 
35 

considering the distance the army trailed behind the front 

line. However, the 5th GA previously had shifted from 

Romania where German intelligence tracked it until late July. 

This reserve army was a key unit in seizing crucial Vistula 

River crossings later in August. 

The regrouping of the 1st GTA was absolute battlefield 

magic. Its units moved at a distance of 100 kilometers behind 

the front line to assembly areas 80 to 120 kilometers from the 

front line during hours of darkness. The Germans completely 

failed to discover this regrou$;g and m&located it in the 

south on their situation maps. This omission had serious 

consequences for the German defensive fight in the north. 

Evidence from German maps and captured unit records 

indicates that German commanders did not know enough 

about the disposition of the Red Army forces opposite the 

Rava Russkaya sector to correctly assess the63situation and 

adequately conduct their defensive operation. The Fourth 

Panzer Army and XXXXII Army Corps were totally surprised 

when the 1st GTA appeared. 

Prom 24 June to 7 July, the 1st GTA moved from the 

Front’s left flank opposite Stan&lava to the right flank south 

of Lutsk, a distance of some 225 kilometers. The tank army 

consisted of the 11th Guards Tank Corps and 8th Guards 

Mechanized Corps (GMC), with approximately 346 tanks and 

self-propelled assault guns. The armored vehicles moved at 

night along carefully concealed march routes according to a 

strict time schedule. The routes were used for night marches 

so that, during the day, everything could be covered and 

camouflaged. Throughout the march, staff officers 

continuous1 & moved along the cohun.ns to ensure swift 

movement. 
36 

Despite having closed south of Lutsk between 5-7 July,, 

the 1st GTA appeared on the late 

When the 1st Ukraini Front offensiv 

the 1st GTA and the Front commander to 

revealing 1st GTA’s location to the Germans. During the 

course of its operation, the 1st GTA continued its deception 

operations. This stage of the operation provides not only 

insight into the impact of the Front’s operational deception 

and sueeess with the 1st GTA but also a rare glimpse at how 

the Soviets conducted deception. 

The main objective of deception operations is to force 

enemy to use his reserves prematurely and to force him into a 

sector that is adv~tag~~us to friendly forces. Even though 

little consideration has been given to deception operations 

and direc~~n; creating 

t of false colum.ns 
A close look at 1st GTA’s commitment reveals some of 

these deception measures used after the preparatory phase. 

rough a series of ~sd~r~~t~o~s, the 1st GTA a~ro~t~~ 

maneuvered itself beyond the Germans’ tactical defense and 

then we11 into their operational depths. Through this artful 

illusion, the defending Germans faced the harsh reality of 

battle. 

In the early morning hours of 13 July, specially detailed 

detachments of the forward rifle units of the 3d GA and 13th 

Army on the Rava Russkaya sector conducted a recormaissance in force. The onty resistance they met was from the 

German 29lst Infantry Division, which was to have been 

withdrawn on 14 July. Apparently, the rest of the XXXXZI 

Army Corps had been withdrawn to a second line of defense 

in anticipation of a preattack artillery preparation. Within a 

few hours, the reconnaissance-in-force units reached a depth 

of seven to eight kilometers, prompting the Red 

command to commit the additional forces of the .3d 

13th Army, which then advanced to a depth of twelve to 

fifteen kilometers. 

With Red Army dispositions showing no o 

th, the German co and committed the 16th 

ivisions to the heavy fighting e 

site the 3d GA in the vici 

reed the 291st fnfantry 

position at Gorokhov. 

night of M-15 July, the 1st Guards Tar& B 

GMC, as the forward detachment of the 1st 

battle and was eorn.r&ted in the directian of 

Yet this was not the direction the 1st GTA 

followed. 
38 

While German intelligence sources did not identify the 

forward detachment of the 1st GTA immediately, they located 

and overestimated the size of the commitment. The OH7 

situation maps showed 100 tanks for a unit normally half that 

strengthsa While this erroneous estimate remained an the 

OKH situation map until 16 July, the XXXXII Army Corps 

took prisoners in the fighting on the 15th. By 2000, 15 July, 

the chief of staff of XXXXIf Army Corps reported to Fourth 

Panzer Army “that the enemy committed elements of the 8th 

GMC against the front of the corps.“‘@ At that time, the 

German corps expected the 8th GMC to commit more 

elements, estimating its strength at ninety-two tanks. The 

panzer army’s daily war journal indicated that the presence of 

the 8th GMC raised the potential for the Soviets to commit a 

tank army: “We must expect the rapid commitment of enemy 

operational reserves. Their rn,Fment to commitment has 

not been detected yet, however. 

On 15 July, the 3d GA and 13th Army committed their 

second-echelon corps, The German Fourth Panzer Arm 

believed that the sector on 15 July “is now under control.” x 

But, in the next twenty-four to thirty-six hours of fighting, the 

Soviets created a ten- to twelve-kiIometer gap south of 

Gorokhov in the 13th Army sector, well south of the 1st 

GTB’s commitment in the 3d GA fight. 

General V. K. Baranov’s CMG, consisting of the 1st 

Guards Cavalry Corps and 25th Tank Corps (TC), began 

moving through the breach made by 13th Army on 16 July. 

These corps, while identified as separate entities early on 

OKH situation maps, were never depicted as moving until 

19 July.” The Germans failed to identify the formation of 

cavalry mechanized groups in this operation. As Baranov’s 

CMG moved into the gap, the Germans were confused by 
39 

reports of the 25th Tank Corps, mingled with identification of 

other armored forces. 

During the afternoon of 16 July, after the CMG had 

moved, the 1st GTA began moving toward the gap. The 1st 

GTE, with reinforcements, continued to fight actively in the 

3d GA sector toward Porytsk (see map 7A). Based on the 

level of activity and the firm evidence of the presence of the 

8th GMC, the deputy commander of Army Group Northern 

Ukraine shared his opinion with Fourth Panzer Army “‘that 

indicators for the commitment of the 1st Soviet Tank Army 

are on hand.‘“73 

By 17 July, the German estimate of the situation in the 

area of the 1st GTE3 was reduced to a more realistic forty 

t s 74 and erman ~~te~~~~e~c~ identifie 

brigade-size forces moving into the widening breach, now 

southeast of Sokal. However, the Germans, after five days of 

combat with the 1st Ukrainian Front in the northern sector, 

had not identified Baranov’s CMG or moved its corps on 

their maps. 33177 1st GTA remained unidentified on OKIi’s 

situation maps. The Fourth Panzer Army identified the 

25th Tank Corps in contact but had not linked it to a CMG 

configuration. Also, the Fourth Panzer Army had not 

positively identified 1st GTA in its sector. 

On 17 July, following the movement of Baranov’s CMG 

southeast toward Lvov to assist in the encirclement of 

German forces at Brady, 1st GTA began moving through the 

breach. The 11th Guards Tank Corps, with two reinforced 

tank brigades in the first echelon, met no resistance and was 

followed quickly by the 8th GMC, minus the 1st GTB. The 

8th GMC, which was screening the 1st GTA’s right flank, 

repelled counterattacks by the 17th Panzer Division and 291st 
4th Pz Army 

1st Pz Army 

Scale 

O’B 

Miles 

4th Pr Army 

1st Pz Army 

Scale 

O:p 

M,b 

4th Pr Army 

1 st Belorussian Front 

1st Ukrainian Front 

1st Pz Army 

LEGEND 

Map 7. The 1st Guards Tank Army commitment in the Rava Russkaya direction 
41 

Infantry Division. By 1200, the 1st GTA advanced into the 

operational depth of the German defense. The German 

command failed to identify and prevent the commitment of 

two Soviet mobile groups through the breach. 

On 18 July, the 1st GTA finally appeared on the German 

Om situation maps and had been placed correctly in the 

breach.76 However, by the end of the day, the 1st GTA 

forced the Western Bug River against relatively unprepared 

opposition- the tank army was on the loose in the German 

rear. The 1st Ukrainian Front’s operation in the Rava 

Russkaya sector progressed better than the strike toward 

Lvov. Konev’s creation of two major Front efforts paid off. 

The widening fracture in the north, combined with the solid 

thrust in the Front’s center sector, crumbled the German 

defense. 

In the Lvov sector, despite great difficulties from hard 

fighting and constrained maneuver, the 3d GTA and 4th Tank 

Army advanced through the four- to six-kilometer-wide 

‘“Koltov Corridor.” In the area southwest of Brody, units of 

the 3d GTA began to encircle a large German grouping of 

seven to eight divisions. Baranov’s CMG eventually closed 

the northern half of the encirclement. 

The command of the Army Group Northern Ukraine 

concluded that Lvov was the Front’s objective. They believed 

that the 1st GTA would strike south across Zhofkov and, in 

conjunction with the two tank armies attacking directly from 

the east, conduct a three-prong attack on Lvov (see map 7B). 

In its assessment of the situation on 18 July, the Fourth 

Panzer Army concluded that “it is to be expected that the 

enemy will concentrate the mass of his armored forces (11th 

GTC and 25th TC) under concealment oriented to the west 
42 

so that he may thrust through Zholkov and Lvov.“‘~ The 

assessment also illustrates the Germans’ inability to separate 

Baranov’s tank corps from the 1st GTA. The German 

defenders simply could not read through the riddle of 

battlefield confusion and realize that two operational entities 

were moving through the breach in two different directions. 

On 19 July, the Fourth Panzer Army committed the 16th 

Panzer Division and the 20th Motorized and 168th Infantry 

Divisions in the vi&i of Zholkov to block the 1st GTA’s 

advance toward LVOV.~ 2 But the 1st GTA, meeting no serious 

resistance, continued west and did not turn south where the 

Germans were waiting. By the end of the day, the t 

army’s forward detachment had advanced to a depth of 

th~r~-f~v~ to forty kilometers d was ap~roachi 

~usskaya~ 

At the same time, the 1st elorussian Front forces 

participating in the Belorussian operation to the north 

provided additianal alternatives for the Germans to consider. 

The Germans could see a potential for the 3d GA and 1st 

CTA to move northwest and complement the 1st Belorussian 

Front’s drive for Lublin and Brest that had begun on 18 July. 

Such a course of action conformed with the Germans’ original 

assessment of how the Soviets would deal with the 

Belorussian balcony (see map 7C). 

Still confused by the Soviet order of battle, the Fourth 

Panzer Army assessed the situation on 19 July: ‘“Employing 

elements of the 1st Tank Army (11th TC, apparently also the 

mass of 8th GMC, and probably one additional tank corps) 

supported by 5-6 rifle divisions, the enemy succeeded in 

crossing the Bug between Krystynopol and Ulvovsk and 

gaining ground to the west and northwest in our army right 
fl ank.““7a 

43 

Even on 19 July, the divergent paths of Baranov”s 

CMG and the 1st GTA were not evident to the Germans. 

Instead of moving as the Germans predicted, the 1st GTA 

advanced southwest to Yaroslava and forced the San River. 

Continuously moving on a westward path, the 1st GTA, by 30 

July, secured important crossings over the Vistula River in the 

vicinity of Sandomierz, a sustained deep operation of nearly 

400 kilometers. 

The 1st Ukrainian Front succeeded in clearing German 

forces from the Ukraine and gained an invaluable foothold in 

southeastern Poland across the Vistula River. The success af 

this startingly swift operation owed much to operational-level 

deception. Despite an unwanted strategic focus and an 

initially poorly disposed force, Konev veiled the scope of his 

intentions and the scale of his operation. Putting into practice 

three years of war experience against the German Army, the 

Red Army forces, as exemplified by the 1944 operations, and 

in particular the Lvov-Sandomierz operation, ushered in an 

instrumental dimension to warfare at the operational level, 

Their capabilities and practice in deception set the stage for 

the final year of the war. 

In 1945, Red Army operational deception was marked by 

plausibility, greater scope, diversity of methods and forms, 

and the participation of the staffs of the various branches of 

troops at all levels. Deception culminated in the European 

theater for Red Army operations such as the Vistula-Oder 

and the Eerlin offensives. In August 1945, in their Far 

Eastern theater, the Soviets achieved a lightning success 

against the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria through a 

massive and intensive strategic and operational deception 

effort. 
44 

World War II left the Soviet military with a vast reservoir 

of experience. From their analysis of lessons learned, Soviet 

researchers in deception have identified the following 

important requirements for effective deception: 

*Evaluate enemy intelligence collection and devise 

counteractions. 

o Develop deception expectations for operations, ensuring 

that operational deception measures conform to the 

friendly forces’ ability to conduct them. 

aPlan all deception measures in detail and centralize 

their execution. 

@Systematize deception activities and maintain their 

credibility, continuity, and diversity. 

@Use initiative and creativity in organizing and executing 

deception measures.N 

While Red Army deception never totally eliminated all 

indicators of impending offensive operations, by cloaking its 

forces behind stringent concealment measures and deceptive 

maneuvers, it seriously skewed German intelligence 

estimates. The Soviets” depiction of false forces in false 

directions and activities, combined with concealed 

regroupings, confused the situation. This confusion often 

suspended or misdirected German actions. The Red Army’s 

artful illusions surprised German commanders as to the 

intent, scale, and location of the operational battlefields. By 

the final stage of the war, the Red Army had achieved not 

only the physical but also the psychological initiative, which 

resulted in self-defeating German actions and reactions, 

smashed defensive lines, and catastrophic encirclements of 

major German forces -forces held spellbound by the red 

cloak of deception. 
Notes 

1. Charles Cruickshank, Deceptian in World War II (New York: Oxford 

University Press, 1979), covers very generally only strategic deception 

in support of Aliied Western Front requirements for the Soviets. Earle 

F. Zen&e, “Stalingrad and Belorussia: Soviet Deception in World 

War II,“’ in Strategic Military Deception, edited by Donald G. Daniel and 

Katherine L. Herbig (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), 243-76, 

examines Red Army operational deception but only for the Stalingrad 

and Belorussian operations. The most comprehensive review has been 

Colonel David M. GIantz’ “The Red Mask: The Nature and Legacy of 

Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War,” Inteiiigence and 

National Security 2 (July 1987):175-259. 

2. See V. A. Matsulenko, Operativnaya maskimvka voisk [Operational 

deception of force] (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975), hereafter cited as 

Matsulenko, OMV; M. M. Kir’yan, Vnezapnost’ v nartupatel’nykh 

operatsiy&h veiikoi otechestvennoi veiny [Surprise in offensive 

operations of the Great Patriotic War] (Moscow: Nat&a, 1986); V. A. 

Matsulenko, “Operativnaya maskirovka sovetskikh v&k v pervom i 

vtorom periodakh veiny” [Operational deception of Soviet forces in the 

first and second periods of the war], Voyenno istoricheskii zhurnal 

[Military history journal], January 1972~11-20; this journal is hereafter 

cited as Hz&. Also see V. A. Matsulenko, ‘“Operativnaya maskirovka 

voisk v tret”em periode veiny” [Operational deception of forces in the 

third period of the war], I&h, June 1972:29-4@ Georgii 

Konstantinovich Zhukov, “Organizatsiya operativnoi maskirovka” 

[Organizing operational deception], Hz&, May 1977~48-56, Ya. 

Dashevskii, “Organizatsiya i provedenie operativnoi maskirovki” 

[Organizing and conducting operational deception], k$& April 

198(9:46-52; P. Mel’nikov, ‘“Qperativnaya maskirovka” [Qxrational 

deception], k’iti, April 1982:X3--26. Vizh has a number of other articles 

on specific operations and services regarding operational deception. 

3. V. A. Efmov and S. G. Chermashentsev, “maskirovka” [Deception], 

Sovetskaya VOennqa Entsiklopediya [Soviet mihtary encyclopedia] 

(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1978), 5:175. 

4. Ibid. 

45 
46 

5, Ibid. 

6. Zhukov, “Organizatsiya,” 48. 

7. Dashevskii, “Orgapizatsiya,” 47. 

8. I. S. Konev, Sm&pyu@ [Forty-Five] (Moscow Vocnizdat, 1%6), 106. 

9. Soviet Union (19X3-- U.S.S.R.), Peoples CommzSsariat of Defense, 

Field Service Regulations, Soviet Army, 1936 (Tentative) (Moscow: 

Soviet Military Publications Division, Commissariat of Defense, 1937), 

translated by Staff Sergeant Charles Berman, TransIation Section, U.S. 

Army War College, Washington, DC, September-October 1937. 

10. Matsulenko, Ow, 2. 

11. Georgii Konstantinovich Zhukov, Reminiscences and Reflecticrras 

(Moscow: Progress, 1985), 1~1%‘. 

12. Japan, Kantogun [The Kwantung Army], Sanbobu [Headquarters], 

Dai-1 Ka ]lst Operations Section], c‘Nonmnhan jiken kimitsu sakusen 

nisshi” [Nomonhan incident secret operations diary], vol. 1, prepared 

by Hattori Takushiro after the Nomonhan incident, quoted in Alvin D. 

Coax, Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939 (Stanford, CA: Stanford 

University Press, 1986), vol. 1. 

13. Matsuienko, O&T, 8. 

14. Matsulenko, “Operativnaya maskirovka sovetskikh,“’ 12. 

15. Soviet historiography of the Great Patriotic War divides the war into 

three periodsz frost, June 1941 to November 1942; second, November 

1942 to December 1943; and third, January 1944 to May 1945 for 

Europe and August 1945 for Manchuria. 

16. “Peregruppirovka v&k” [Regrouping forces], Voennyi Entsikbopedicheskii Slovar’ [Military encyclopedic dictionary] (Moscow: Voeuizdat, 

1986), 546-47. 

17. Sbomik Materiaiov po lnrcheniyu Opyta Veiny No. S: &gust-Oktyabr” 

1943 [Collection of mater& for the study of war experience, no. 8, 

August-October 19431 (Moscow: Voeuizdat, 1943), 64, translation by 
47 

Directorate of Military Intelligence, Army I-Ieadquarters, Ottawa, 

Canada. 

18. Sbomik Materialov po Izucheniyu Opyta Veiny, No. 6, ApreP-h&i 1943 

[Collection of materials for the study of war experience, no. 6, 

April-May 19431 (Moscow: Voenizdat, 19431, 96-97, translated by the 

U.S. Department of fhe Army. 

19. A. M. Zvartsev, 3-yu gvardeiskaya tankovaya [3d Guards Tank] 

(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1982), 116. 

20. Germany, Army, Eighth Army, Intelligence records, Situation maps, 

microfilna series T-312, roll 58, frame 7573794, National Archives and 

Records Administration, Washington, DC. 

21. Ibid., frames 7573801-4. 

22. Lieutenant Colonel David M. Glantz, “The Kiev Operation, an 

Overview,” 19, in 1985 Art of War Symposium -From the Dnepr to the 

I&t&a: Soviet Oflensive Operations, November I943-August 1944, 

Transcript of Proceedings [Held] 29 Aprio-3 h&y 1985, edited by Colonel 

David M. Glantz (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Center for Land Warfare, 

U.S. Army War College, August 19SS). The symposium proceedings 

are cited hereafter as 1985AWS. 

23. Erich von Mansteiu, Lost I&Conies (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982), 

481. 

24. Ibid., 486. 

2$. Matsulenko, ONC: 60. 

26. Mel’nikov, “Gperativnaya maskirovka,” 21. 

27. V. E. Yakubov, “Primenenie dymovykh sredstv v nastupatel’nykh 

operatsiyakh Veliioi Otechestvennoi veiny [The application of smoke 

means in offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War], I&& May 

1987:31, 

28. P. I. Batov, Forsirovaniye rek 1942-1945 gg. [Forcing rivers 1942-19453, 

(Moscow: Voenizdat, 19S6), 60. 

29. Dashevskii, “Organizatsiya,” 48, 
48 

30. Zhukov, “Orgauizatsiya,” 54. 

31. MatsuIenko, O&.W, US. 

32. Zhukov, “Organizatsiya,” 54. 

33. Ibid. 

34. Colouel H. van Nes, “‘BAGRATION’: Study of the Destruction of 

Army Group Centre During the Summer of 1944 as Seen From the 

Point of View of Military InteIIigence,‘” 248, in 1985AB’,,. 

35. Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The &nnan &@ar in the East, 

Army Historical Series (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of 

Military History, IJnited States Army, 19#3), 313. 

36. S. M. Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff at War, 1941-1945 (Moscow: 

Progress, 1975), 228. 

37. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, 316. 

38. US. Department of the Army, Pamphlet no. 20-201, Military 

Improvisations Dwing the Russian Campaign (Washington, DC, August 

1951), 32. 

39. I. S. Konev, Zapiski Komanduyushchego frontona writings of a From 

commarrder] (Moscow: Voeuizdat, 1981), 224. 

40. A. Grechko, “Nekotorye voprosy voermogo iskusstva v L’vovskoSaudomirskoi operatsii” [A few less&us of military art in the 

Lvov-Sandomierz operation], I&h, February 196029. 

41. Matsuleuko, OMV, 109. 

42. Ibid. 

43. Ibid,, 110. 

44. Ibid., 189. 

45. Ibid., 110. 

46. Ibid. 
47. 

48. 

49. 

50. 

51. 

52. 

53. 

54. 

55. 

56. 

57. 

58. 

59. 

60. 

61. 

49 

Zhukov, “Organizatsiya,” 49, and Richard Armstrong, “The Enemy 

WiII TeII Us When,” Military Intelligence 7 (April-June 1981):47-48. 

D. PauI.Deichmann, Gertrwn Air Force Operations in Suppoti of the 

Army, USAF Historical Study 101-163 (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL 

Research Studies Institute, U.S. Air Force Historical Division, Air 

University, 1984), 161. 

MatsuIenko, OMV; 112. 

Ibid., 116. 

Ibid., 117. 

Vosemnadtsataya v smheniyawr za Rodiny [Eighteenth in the fight for 

the Motherland] (Moscow Voenizdat, 1982), 390. 

Konev, Zapiski, 223. 

Friedrich WiIhehn van Mellenthin, Panzer Battles (New York: 

BaIIantine, 1980), 338. 

Germany, Army, XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, Intelligence records, 

microfilm series T-314, roll 1187, frames 309 and 322, National 

Archives; the corps is hereafter cited as XXXXVIII Panzer Corps. 

Germany, Army, Oberkommando des Heeres [Headquarters, German 

Army High Command], Situation maps, microfti series T-78, roll 136, 

frames 6065297-303, National Archives; the headquarters is hereafter 

cited as OKH. 

Ibid., frame 6065300. 

X.XXXVIII Panzer Corps, Intelligence records, microfilm series T-314, 

roII 1187, frames 370-93. 

XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, Operations records, Telephone log, 

m&of&n series T-314, roII 1186, frame 159. 

Ibid., frame 175. 

OKH, Situation maps, microfilm series T-78, roll 136, frames 

6065295-304. 
50 

62. Ibid., frames 6065300-301. 

63. Ibid.; and B. Pakov and S. Anov, “K voprosu o proryve na 

rava-russkom napravlenii” [On the question of the breakthrough on the 

Rava Russkaya direction], Imth, February 1970:94+X 

64. A. L. Getman, Tat&i iduf na Berlin [Tanks going on Berlin] (Moscow, 

Nauka, 1973), 206. 

65, OKH, Situation maps, microfrlrn series T-78, roll 136, frame 6065303. 

The maps after 10 July had the portion cut off that showed 1st GTA’s 

location. While 1st GTA was never shown in the north until 18 July, its 

exact location according to O&X maps from 10 to 13 July is 

undeveloped. 

66. Zhukov, ““Organizatsiya,” 56. 

67. S. Petrov, ‘cDostizhenie vnezapnosti v L’vovsko-Sandomirskoi operatsii’” 

[Achieving surprise in the Lvov-Sandomierz operation], Vszh, Truly 

197433. 

68. OKH, Situation maps, microfilm series T-78, roll 136, frame 6065298. 

69. Germany, Army, Fourth Panzer Army, Kriegstagebucher [Daily war 

journal], Operations records, microfilm series T-313, r~li 403, frame 

8701771, National Archives, hereafter cited as Fourth Panzer Army 

War Journal. 

70. Ibid., frame 8701773. 

71. Ibid. 

72. OKH, Situation maps, microfilm series T-78, roll 136, frames 

6%5295-301. 

73. Fourth Panzer Army War Journal, microfilm series T-313, roll 409, 

frame 8701778. 

74. OKH, Situation maps, microfilm series T-78, roll 136, frame 6065297. 

75. Ibid., frame 60652%; on the 21 July situation map, elements of 

Baranov’s CMG are depicted behind Brady, northeast of Lvov, already 

linked with 311 GTA. 
51 

76. 

77. 

78. 

79. 

80. 

Ibid. 

Fourth Panzer Army War Journal, microfilm series T-313, roll 409, 

frame 8701800. 

OKH, Situation maps, microfilm series T-78, roll 136, frame 6065295; 

and Petrov, “Dostizhenic vnezapnosti,” 36. 

Fourth Panzer Army War Journal, microfilm series T-313, roll 409, 

frame 8701809. 

Mel’nikov, “Operativnaya maskirovka,” 26. 
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56 

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DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1968. 
Lieutenant C&me1 Richard IV. Armstrong is 

currently AssistarPt Chief erf Staff for Intelligence, 1st Cavalry Division, Fork Had, Texas. 

He received a B.A. in history from West Virginia 

University, am P&A. fram Bastion University, aad 

is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and 

General Staff Grallege. A military intelligence 

offices, be has served in Vietnam, West Germany, 

and Korea, and has hekd staff positions at 

variaus command leveEs, including service with 

the &p&y Chief af Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, Department of the Army. Awarded the 

Additional Skill Identifier Historian $ti’Februaq 

198&, his research and studies have f~eztsed on 

Swiet military history and affairs, and he has 

authored articles in such journals as M%kuy 

Beuielo, Parameters, and Military Affairs. 

CQMBAT STTJDIES ENSTITUTE 

The Combat Studies Institute was established on 18 June 1919 as a 

department-ievel activity within the U.S. Army Command and General Staff 

Galiege, Fort Leavenwc&h, Kansas. ~31 has the f&xvtng missians: 

1. Canduet re5earch on histadeal topics pertinent to the doctrinal concerns elf 

the Army and publish the resukts in a variety of formats of the Active Army 

and Reserve Campanents. 

2. Prepare and present instr.ruccicm in military history at USACGSC and assist 

crtber UELWGSC departments in: integrating military histery inta their instru&ion. 

3. Serve as the U.S. Army Training and Da&rime Command’s executive agent 

for the deveIopment and eoordinatian of an integrated, progressive prergram 

of military history instrudion in the TEADOG service s&ad system. 
,