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96–359PDF 2004

EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD DECLARE ITS SUPPORT

FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF KOSOVA; AND RESOLUTION

OF THE ETHIOPIA–ERITREA BORDER DISPUTE ACT OF 2003

MARKUP

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

H. Res. 28 and H.R. 2760

OCTOBER 7, 2004

Serial No. 108–142

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international—relations 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, Chairman 

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Vice Chairman 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

PETER T. KING, New York 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

AMO HOUGHTON, New York 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado 

RON PAUL, Texas 

NICK SMITH, Michigan 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 

JERRY WELLER, Illinois 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

THADDEUS G. MCCOTTER, Michigan 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

VACANCY 

TOM LANTOS, California 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

BARBARA LEE, California 

JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York 

JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada 

GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

DIANE E. WATSON, California 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., Staff Director/General Counsel 

ROBERT R. KING, Democratic Staff Director 

DANIEL FREEMAN, Counsel/Parliamentarian 

MARILYN C. OWEN, Senior Staff Associate 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

MARKUP OF 

H. Res. 28, Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the 

United States should declare its support for the independence of Kosova ..... 2

Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H. Res. 28 offered by the 

Honorable Dan Burton, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Indiana .......................................................................................................... 21

H.R. 2760, To limit United States assistance for Ethiopia and Eritrea if 

those countries are not in compliance with the terms and conditions of 

agreements entered into by the two countries to end hostilities and provide 

for a demarcation of the border between the two countries, and for other 

purposes ................................................................................................................ 26

Committee Print showing the text of H.R. 2760 as adopted by the Subcommittee on Africa on October 10, 2003 ....................................................... 36

Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 2760 offered by the 

Honorable Tom Lantos, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California ...................................................................................................... 47

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Illinois, and Chairman, Committee on International Relations: Prepared 

statement on H. Res. 28 ...................................................................................... 8

APPENDIX 

The Honorable Henry J. Hyde: Prepared statement on H.R. 2760 ..................... 63

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa: Prepared statement ...................................................................................................................... 64

(1)

EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD DECLARE ITS 

SUPPORT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF KOSOVA; AND RESOLUTION OF THE ETHIOPIA–ERITREA BORDER DISPUTE 

ACT OF 2003

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 7, 2004

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:13 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Henry J. Hyde (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Chairman HYDE. The meeting will come to order. Pursuant to notice, I now call up the resolution H. Res. 28, expressing the sense 

of the House that the United States should declare its support of 

the independence of Kosova, for purposes of markup, and move its 

favorable recommendation to the House. Without objection, the resolution will be considered as read and open for amendment at any 

point. 

[H. Res. 28 follows:]

2

1

IV

108TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. RES. 28

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the United States

should declare its support for the independence of Kosova.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 27, 2003

Mr. LANTOS (for himself and Mr. HYDE) submitted the following resolution;

which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that

the United States should declare its support for the

independence of Kosova.

Whereas the United States and the international community

recognize that a right to self-determination exists as a

fundamental right of all people;

Whereas Kosova was constitutionally defined as a sovereign

territory in the First National Liberation Conference for

Kosova on January 2, 1944, and this status was confirmed in the Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia adopted in 1946, and the amended

Yugoslav constitution adopted in 1974 preserved the autonomous status of Kosova as a de facto republic;

Whereas prior to the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia,

Kosova was a separate political and legal entity with sepVerDate Mar 21 2002 12:03 Nov 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\M100704\96359.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL

96359a.AAB
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2

•HRES 28 IH

arate and distinct financial institutions, police force, municipal and national government, school system, judicial

and legal system, hospitals and other independent organizations;

Whereas Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic rose to power in

1987 on a platform of ultranationalism and anti-Albanian

racism, advocating violence and hatred against all nonSlavs and specifically targeting the Albanians of Kosova;

Whereas Slobodan Milosevic subsequently stripped Kosova of

its self-rule, without the consent of the people of Kosova;

Whereas the elected Assembly of Kosova, faced with these intolerable acts, adopted a Declaration of Independence on

July 2, 1990, proclaimed the Republic of Kosova, and

adopted a constitution on September 7, 1990, based on

the international legal principles of self-determination,

equality, and sovereignty;

Whereas in recognition of the de facto dissolution of the

Yugoslav federation, the European community established principles for the recognition of the independence

and sovereignty of the republics of the former Socialist

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Kosova fully satisfied

those principles as a de facto republic within the federation;

Whereas a popular referendum was held in Kosova from September 26–30, 1991, in which 87 percent of all eligible

voters cast ballots and 99.87 percent voted in favor of declaring Kosova independent of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;

Whereas, from the occupation of Kosova in 1989 until the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military action against the Milosevic regime in 1999, the Albanians


96359a.AAC
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3

•HRES 28 IH

of Kosova were subjected to the most brutal treatment in

the heart of Europe since the Nazi era, forcing approximately 400,000 Albanians to flee to Western Europe and

the United States;

Whereas in the spring of 1999 almost 1,000,000 Kosovar Albanians were driven out of Kosova and at least 10,000

were murdered by the Serbian paramilitary and military;

Whereas Slobodan Milosevic was indicted by the International

War Crimes Tribunal and extradited to The Hague in

June 2001 to stand trial for war crimes, crimes against

humanity, and genocide in Kosova, Bosnia, and Croatia;

Whereas the United Nations established Kosova as a protectorate under Resolution 1244, ending the decade long

Serbian occupation of Kosova and Milosevic’s genocidal

war in Kosova;

Whereas Kosovar Albanians, together with representatives of

the Serb, Turkish, Roma, Bosniak, and Ashkali minorities in Kosova, have held free and fair municipal and

general elections in 2000 and 2001 and successfully established a parliament in 2002, which in turn elected a

president and prime minister;

Whereas 50 percent of the population in Kosova is under the

age of 25 and the unemployment rate is currently between 60 and 70 percent, increasing the likelihood of

young people entering criminal networks, the source of

which lies outside of Kosova, or working abroad in order

to survive unless massive job creation is facilitated by

guaranteeing the security of foreign investments through

an orderly transition to the independence of Kosova;

Whereas the Kosova parliament is committed to developing a

western-style democracy in which all citizens, regardless


96359a.AAD
5

4

•HRES 28 IH

of ethnicity, are granted full human and civil rights and

are committed to the return of all noncriminal Serbs who

fled Kosova during and after the war; and

Whereas there is every reason to believe that independence

from Serbia is the only viable option for Kosova, after

autonomy has failed time and time again: Now, therefore,

be it

1 Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Rep2 resentatives that the United States should—

3 (1) publicly support the independence of Kosova

4 and the establishment of Kosova as a sovereign and

5 democratic state in which human rights are re6 spected, including the rights of ethnic and religious

7 minorities, as the only way to lasting peace and sta8 bility in the Balkans;

9 (2) recognize the danger that delay in the reso10 lution of Kosova’s final status poses for the political

11 and economic viability of Kosova and the future of

12 Southeast Europe;

13 (3) work in conjunction with the United Na14 tions, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and

15 other multilateral organizations to facilitate an or16 derly transition to the independence of Kosova; and

17 (4) provide its share of assistance, trade, and

18 other programs to support the government of an

19 independent Kosova and to encourage the further


96359a.AAE
6

5

•HRES 28 IH

1 development of democracy and a free market eco2 nomic system.

Æ


96359a.AAF
7

Chairman HYDE. The Chair yields himself 5 minutes for purposes of presenting a statement. 

International attention to the Balkans region has been diverted 

since September 11, 2001, and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan 

and Iraq. Sadly and regrettably, the region exploded into a new 

round of violence in March of this year. 

Since I have been Chairman, this Committee has attempted to 

address through a number of hearings the continuing and underlying inadequacies of international policies in the Balkans, policies 

which were to a large extent imposed on the region. 

In 1999, NATO intervened militarily in Serbia in what was the 

first NATO military operation in the history of the alliance. It is 

easy to understand why the final status of Kosovo was left undetermined at the time. 

The current status of Kosovo is governed by U.N. Security Council 1244, passed in June 1999 at the end of the Kosovo conflict. The 

resolution authorizes an international military and civilian presence in Kosovo, the duration of which is at the direction of the U.N. 

Security Council. The NATO-led peacekeeping force, KFOR (Kosovo 

Force), is charged with maintaining a secure environment while 

the U.N. mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is given the chief role in administering Kosovo on a provisional basis. 

The resolution provides for an interim period of autonomy for 

Kosovo of undefined length until negotiations on the future status 

of the province takes place. UNMIK is tasked with gradually transferring its administrative responsibilities to elected, interim, autonomous government institutions while retaining an oversight role. 

In a future stage, UNMIK will oversee the transfer of authority 

from the interim autonomous institutions to permanent ones after 

Kosovo’s future status is determined. 

UNSC Resolution 1244 provides little insight into how the status 

issue should be resolved, saying only that it should be determined 

by an unspecified ‘‘political process.’’

In the aftermath of the violence in March of this year, confidence 

in the ability of the U.N. to administer Kosovo reached a new low. 

Through the leadership of the U.S. Administration, in close cooperation with our European allies, the aforementioned ‘‘political 

process’’ resolving the status issue has been reenergized and reinvigorated over the past 6 months. The goal of this process is to 

achieve the true goal of nation-building: To return power to competent, responsible, and representative local government. 

In the meantime, political developments within Serbia have improved considerably. President Boris Tadic was elected President of 

Serbia in June of this year by a majority of Serbian voters, who 

chose his path of reform and opportunity over radicalism, isolation, 

and conflict. And just this past weekend, Serbia completed democratic, free and fair municipal elections. 

President Tadic visited Washington in July of this year and met 

with the Committee Members. He recently wrote me a letter expressing his concern about how sensitive the political situation is 

within Serbia and how the wrong signal could potentially upset the 

delicate political process in the region, and perhaps even the participation of all groups in the upcoming October 23rd Kosovo elections. 

8

Today, Committee consideration of this resolution does not condone the violence of this past March in the region. I condemn the 

violence. This resolution conveys that the status quo of the past 5 

years is unacceptable. All sides must participate to engage in this 

most difficult political process to ensure that all Kosovars can create a future where they can live in security, prosperity and freedom. That is why the Committee is considering this resolution 

today, and that is why I support the resolution. 

I yield to my friend, the Ranking Democratic Member, Tom Lantos, for such remarks as he chooses to make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hyde follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY J. HYDE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INTER- NATIONAL RELATIONS

H. RES. 28

International attention to the Balkans region has been diverted since September 

11, 2001, and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Sadly and regrettably, the 

region exploded into a new round of violence in March of this year. 

Since I have been Chairman, this Committee has attempted to address through 

a number of hearings the continuing and underlying inadequacies of international 

policies in the Balkans, policies which were, to a large extent, imposed on the region. 

In 1999, NATO intervened militarily in Serbia, in what was the first NATO military operation in the history of the alliance. It is easy to understand why the final 

status of Kosovo was left undetermined at that time. 

The current status of Kosovo is governed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 

(UNSC) 1244, passed in June 1999 at the end of the Kosovo conflict. The resolution 

authorizes an international military and civilian presence in Kosovo, the duration 

of which is at the discretion of the U.N. Security Council. The NATO-led peacekeeping force, KFOR (Kosovo Force), is charged with maintaining a secure environment, while the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is given the chief role in administering Kosovo on a provisional basis. The resolution provides for an interim period 

of autonomy for 

Kosovo of undefined length, until negotiations on the future status of the province 

take place. UNMIK is tasked with gradually transferring its administrative responsibilities to elected, interim, autonomous government institutions, while retaining 

an oversight role. In a future stage, UNMIK will oversee the transfer of authority 

from the interim autonomous institutions to permanent ones, after Kosovo’s future 

status is determined. UNSC Resolution 1244 provides little insight into how the status issue should be resolved, saying only that it should be determined by an unspecified ‘‘political process.’’

In the aftermath of the violence in March of this year, confidence in the ability 

of the U.N. to administer Kosovo reached a new low. Through the leadership of the 

U.S. administration, in close cooperation with our European allies, the aforementioned ‘‘political process’’ resolving the status issue has been reenergized and reinvigorated over the past six months. The goal of this process is to achieve the true 

goal of ‘‘nation-building:’’ to return power to competent, responsible and representative local government. 

In the meantime, political developments within Serbia have improved considerably. President Boris Tadic was elected President of Serbia in June of this year, by 

a majority of Serbian voters who chose his path of reform and opportunity over radicalism, isolation and conflict. And just this past weekend, Serbia completed democratic, free and fair municipal elections. 

President Tadic visited Washington in July of this year, and met with Committee 

members. He recently wrote me a letter, expressing his concern about how sensitive 

the political situation is within Serbia, and how the wrong signal could potentially 

upset the delicate political processes in the region, and perhaps even the participation of all groups in the upcoming October 23rd Kosovo elections. 

Today, Committee consideration of this resolution does not condone the violence 

of this past March in the region. I condemn the violence. This resolution conveys 

that the status quo of the past five years is unacceptable. All sides must participate 

to engage in this most difficult political process to ensure that all Kosovars can create a future where they can live in security, prosperity and freedom. 

9

That is why the Committee is considering this resolution today. That is why I 

support this resolution.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I would 

like to ask for my colleagues’ undivided attention, and I would like 

to ask my colleagues to listen to this discussion with a truly open 

mind. 

There are few issues I have been personally as deeply engaged 

in during the last 24 years of my service in this body than the 

issue of Kosova. And today we are at an historic juncture as we 

vote on this resolution. And I would like to discuss the background 

of this resolution in some depth. 

Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that the only way to address the 

problem of the political, economic and social instability that continues to plague the Balkans, and the only way to prevent renewed 

violence in the region, is to grapple with the issue of Kosova’s final 

status. It is my belief that the sooner we deal with that problem, 

the better it will be for the peace and stability of the region. 

Since our successful military action against the Federal Republic 

of Yugoslavia in 1999, the international community has joined 

Kosovars in rebuilding their country, revitalizing their economy, establishing democratic institutions of self-government, and healing 

the scars of war. However, progress in Kosova, which currently is 

a United Nations protectorate, is being held up by uncertainty 

about its political status. 

Under former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, the Yugoslav Government dismantled Kosova’s political structure. Before 

the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, Kosova was an autonomous 

province under Milosevic. Kosovars were subjected to systemic persecution and discrimination. Ethnic Albanians were replaced by 

Serbs in most jobs. Serb-owned firms took over Albanian-owned 

companies. And Albanians were prohibited from purchasing or improving property. 

I traveled to Kosova beginning in the 1980s on numerous occasions and I personally witnessed this tragedy time and time again. 

I talked to a large group of Kosovars at the capital city of Pristina 

on the main square. These men, women and children greeted my 

wife and me with joy, which was not aimed at us, it was aimed at 

the United States and the freedom we represented. Serbian policemen were beating the crowd at the edges all around the square 

while Kosovars were chanting, ‘‘USA, USA.’’ I will never forget that 

scene. 

All of us watched in horror the mass devastation of ethnic Albanians by Serbian paramilitary forces with the enthusiastic support 

of the Milosevic Government. Kosovars were killed, their homes 

were burned and pillaged, and hundreds of thousands of them were 

made homeless. All of us remember the scenes as they were pushed 

out of their homeland where they had lived for centuries, old ladies 

carrying their grandchildren in their arms, pregnant women being 

pushed across the border. It was one of the most horrific sights of 

Europe since the Holocaust. 

The United States, with the assistance of many of our European 

allies, was able to halt the tragedy and helped to stabilize the situation. Today, as we meet here, Kosova is under United Nations 

protection, but, of course, the problems that remain are extremely 

10

serious. Unemployment is over 60 percent. The economic crisis increases the likelihood that Kosovars—half of them are under the 

age of 25—will either enter criminal networks or will leave to find 

work abroad in order to survive. The perpetuation of these economic difficulties heightens the potential for continued instability 

in the Balkans and it undermines our national security interests 

in this important region. 

Achieving genuine long-term political and economic stability requires reconstruction assistance, but just as importantly, it demands a resolution of the political status of Kosova. International 

private investments, loans from the World Bank are delayed or not 

even considered because of questions about the long-term status of 

Kosova. 

Mr. Chairman, you expressed the link with special eloquence in 

a speech in 2002 when you said, and I quote Chairman Hyde:

‘‘There will be no jobs without peace and stability in Kosovo, 

but there will be no peace and stability without independence.’’

Under the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974, Kosova was equivalent 

in most ways to the other constituent republics of Yugoslavia—Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia. As an autonomous province, 

Kosova exercised the same powers as the other republics. It had its 

own Parliament, it had its own high court, it had its central bank, 

it had its own police service, and it had its local defense force. 

Through constitutional change, Kosova was recognized as a constituent element of the Yugoslav Federal System. 

Now, when Slovenia and Croatia demanded independence in 

1991, Western European governments, including our own Department of State, opposed recognizing the right of those republics to 

self-determination. 

I want to repeat this, Mr. Chairman, because we are hearing 

from the same State Department the dilatory, meaningless statements issued with respect to Kosova that they issued with respect 

to Slovenia, Croatia and all the others. 

I remember marching with a large group of my Croatian friends 

on Union Square in San Francisco demanding that the State Department allow Croatia to become independent. Croatia is an independent country; it will become a member of NATO, it will become 

a member of the European Union. Slovenia already is. What we are 

talking about is an interim solution, because at the end of the rainbow in Europe, there is the European Union. And just as Slovenia 

is a member of the European Union, I hope, Mr. Chairman, and I 

know, Mr. Chairman, that the other former constituent republics 

of Yugoslavia will all become members of the European Union. 

We simply cannot go on with the status quo of continued subservience and subjugation of the Albanian people of Kosova. 

The State Department sent another letter this time, as it did 12 

years ago, saying this is not the time. Well, let me tell the State 

Department and its representatives in the room that no couple is 

ever ready for parenthood and no nation is ever ready for nationhood; yet couples have had children and groups of people have 

formed nations since time immemorial. So these boilerplate 

phrases that this is not the time, we have heard this ad nauseam 

and ad infinitum. 

11

Eventually, Mr. Chairman, our Government and the rest of the 

world acknowledged the independence of Slovenia and Croatia and 

the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. Let 

me mention parenthetically that Kosova has a larger population 

than either Slovenia or Macedonia, 21⁄2 million people, fully capable 

of moving toward independence. 

We have found, Mr. Chairman, that self-determination for those 

nations has involved not so much a change of borders as a change 

in the status of existing borders. The lines on the map remain the 

same but their status is upgraded from a constituent republic within a federation that no longer exists to an independent nation. This 

has contributed to the stability and progress of these countries. 

Kosova is entitled to the same treatment. There must be no double 

standard. 

Let me now touch upon a highly sensitive issue. The United 

States is accused by its opponents in the media and elsewhere, like 

Al-Jazeera, that we discriminate against Muslim entities. Kosova is 

an overwhelmingly Muslim entity. It has a significant Christian 

population but the bulk of the people are Muslims. Yesterday, the 

European Union took an historic step opening the door to Turkey’s 

eventual admission as a full member of the European Union. It 

would be a disgrace if the International Relations Committee of the 

United States House of Representatives—using whatever obfuscation we might choose—would now deny an overwhelmingly Muslim 

European entity the right to move toward independence. This 

would be a great victory for all of our enemies everywhere. It would 

be a great victory for Al-Jazeera. It would be described as a new 

crusade against Islam. That is the last thing we are engaged in. 

We want to integrate the people of Kosova into Europe. They are 

valuable and useful citizens, just as they are when they come to 

New York or Los Angeles or anywhere else in this country. 

Persistent tensions in the Balkans cannot be resolved if we continue to delay a determination of Kosova’s final status. To achieve 

a just and lasting peace in the Balkans, we must move toward giving Kosova its independence today. The people of Kosova must understand that the human rights of the Serbian minority must be 

protected without a moment’s lapse. The Serbian citizens living in 

Kosova are entitled to precisely the same protection that the 

Kosovar citizens are. But we have received this assurance from the 

Kosovar leadership. I urge all of my colleagues to join our distinguished Chairman, Chairman Hyde, and me in supporting this resolution. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Mr. Lantos. 

The Chair will entertain motions to strike the last word. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. And the Chair recognizes Mr. Burton. 

Mr. BURTON. Well, first of all, Mr. Chairman, I have the highest 

regard for you and Mr. Lantos, and I think Mr. Lantos knows that. 

He and I have become very good friends over the years. 

I don’t believe and I hope that no one will consider my vote, 

which is going to be against the resolution, to be one that is antiMuslim. I have spoken at probably 50 mosques around the country, 

have a lot of friends who are Muslims, and I believe that problems 

12

that we have worldwide with Muslims and Muslim leaders need to 

be discussed and worked out in an equitable way. So I want to say 

that at the outset. 

Now, Milosevic is no longer the Dictator of Serbia. We had a 

meeting here with Boris Tadic about, what, 3, 4, or 5 weeks ago. 

I chaired that meeting and he committed to me, along with the 

members of his Administration, his desire to reach out to every 

governmental entity surrounding Serbia to try to work out their 

differences so that everything would be resolved in a peaceful way. 

And the problems would be solved without more conflict. 

I am aware of the ethnic cleansing that has taken place on both 

sides, on all sides. We are all aware of that, and it has been a real 

tragedy. It is not confined to one ethnic group or another. It has 

been going on all over. Serbian churches have been burned, and 

Serbian people have been killed, and Muslim people have been 

killed in Kosovo. I mean, I understand all that. 

But our State Department—and I want to read a little bit of this 

letter. And then, if I might, Mr. Chairman, I would like to have a 

representative of the State Department—if they want to—illuminate a little bit on this issue. I believe Kathleen Stephens is here 

with us representing the State Department. Maybe she could make 

a comment or two. But let me just read a little bit of this. The letter—and I don’t know if all my colleagues have seen it, but here 

is what it says:

‘‘I am writing to express our concern over H. Res. 28, which 

would declare the House in favor of independence for Kosovo. 

Such a resolution at this pivotal moment will undermine the 

important progress toward peace and freedom we and our allies are making in the region. The next few months will be key 

to moving toward our envisioned mid-2005 discussion of 

Kosovo’s future status. Since the terrible violence in March, we 

have worked with our partners in the Contact Group to reenergize the U.N. and support the reconstruction of damaged 

homes and schools. We are strongly engaged to ensure progress 

on minority rights and security while promoting transfer of significant responsibilities to Pristina’s elected leaders after the 

October 23rd Assembly elections.’’

And listen to this:

‘‘When I met with Kosovo’s leaders last week in Pristina, they 

welcomed this approach.’’

I mean, just last week he met with these leaders, and they concurred. 

In a courageous step, Serbian President Boris Tadic, on October 

5th, called for Kosovo’s Serbs to participate in the October elections 

despite serious opposition, and there have been calls for his impeachment because of that. So he is keeping his commitment to do 

everything he can to reach out and make sure that every party in 

that area is participating and working together. 

And then they say:

‘‘I respectfully request that your Committee not act on this resolution at this time. With your support, the United States can 

and will continue to play a key role in moving toward a future 

13

for Kosovo and for the broader region that is in the interest of 

all, a regional family on the path to Euro-Atlantic integration 

and to realization of a Europe, whole, free, and at peace.’’

I think that says it all. We all want a resolution of the problem. 

The question is the timing and how we do it. I am afraid right now 

the State Department—it is not just the State Department, it is 

the National Security Council and the European Subcommittee—

Mrs. Davis is opposed to it. The Embassy of Serbia and Montenegro is opposed to it. There is just a whole host of opposition. And 

while I have the highest regard for my good colleague, Mr. Lantos, 

I think this is the wrong resolution at the wrong time. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I would respectfully request that 

we ask the State Department to add any additional information 

they would like to give to us. 

Chairman HYDE. The Chair would tell the gentleman that we are 

in a markup and we don’t hear witnesses, absent some technical 

interpretation that only a witness can provide. This would open up 

this meeting to a hearing, and I am disinclined to do that. 

Mr. BURTON. Okay, Mr. Chairman. I will accede to your wishes. 

I just thought it might be illuminating. With that, I yield back the 

balance of my time. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you. 

Mr. Engel. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I very strongly support the resolution. Whenever someone wants 

to throw cold water on a resolution, they always declare that it is 

not the right time, or that the intent is good, but you are going 

about it the wrong way. The people of Kosovo are entitled to the 

same thing that the rest of the people in the former Yugoslavia are 

entitled to. 

One may take the position that it was a mistake to break up the 

former Yugoslavia. But the genie is out of the bottle and there are 

countries like Slovenia and other countries that are now independent—some of them even becoming members of NATO. 

The people of Kosovo have suffered a long time. Everyone remembers the ethnic cleansing back in 1999 when Milosevic tried to 

make Kosovo free of Albanians. I chaired the Albanian Issues Caucus here in the Congress, so I know the issue very well, and I have 

been to Kosovo many, many, many times. 

The people of Kosovo are entitled to have self-determination. 

They don’t want to be part of Serbia anymore and they shouldn’t 

be forced to be part of Serbia. They should be able to be free to determine their own destiny the way, again, other parts of the former 

Yugoslavia are free and were free to determine their own destiny. 

Now, if one looks at the status of Kosovo, there is really only 

three statuses that could happen in the future, two of which are 

totally unacceptable and unworkable. One would be for the international community to continue to occupy or to stay in Kosovo and 

essentially run Kosovo as an international protectorate. That is not 

something long range that is possible or sustainable or workable. 

The second would be even more preposterous, and that would be 

to pretend that somehow the Serbs or the Belgrade Government 

could continue to govern Kosovo the way it did prior to 1999. After 

1999, the majority of Kosovo’s population, Albanians, would never 

14

allow themselves again, ever again, to be governed by Belgrade. 

You know, if there had been more enlightened leadership in Belgrade through the years, perhaps Kosovo—which was supposedly 

an autonomous region of the former Yugoslavia—could have continued in that status or maybe become a third republic. But it cannot 

happen anymore because of what happened with ethnic cleansing 

in 1999. 

So, therefore, the only thing that is left, and the most righteous 

thing that is left, is self-determination. And, you know, we had better do it sooner rather than later because things are festering over 

there. Unemployment is high. People are becoming more and more 

despondent. And the nonsense with UNMIK and the United Nations just kind of pushing everything to the back burner and back 

burner and back burner—right now things are resolvable. The Albanians and the Kosovars love the United States and they want to 

be part of everything American. And we have an obligation and the 

ability to push things along. If we wait and continue, people are 

going to become more restive, radical elements are going to fan the 

fires, and we may not be able to put things back in order. 

The standards before status is a joke. To me, it is just a matter 

of trying to prevent the people of Kosovo from getting a final status. It is a ruse. Every time they try to achieve final status, the 

ante is up, there are more roadblocks, there are things put in front 

of them. 

And so I think this is a very, very sensible resolution. Again, why 

should the people of Kosovo be treated any differently than any of 

the people in the former Yugoslavia? Now, there has to be safeguards for minority rights. Nobody is saying that there shouldn’t 

be, and I have said that many, many times before. However, selfdetermination and independence are very, very important. 

You know, UNMIK has really messed things up. But even the 

United Nations report that was put forward has said that this cannot continue indefinitely, and that self-determination really is the 

only thing that is important and that can work. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for 

your leadership, and I also want to thank Mr. Lantos. Oftentimes 

listening to him, it is like listening to a seminar by somebody who 

clearly has the utmost intelligence; and the way he can articulate 

issues, and even though he is a Democrat and I am a Republican, 

more often than not I find myself agreeing with his point of view. 

However, in this one instance I do not, and I would associate myself with the remarks that the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton, previously made. 

I am very troubled by this resolution and I have to oppose it in 

its present form. I am concerned that we might be sending the 

wrong message to those reform-minded leaders in Serbia and Montenegro that are seeking to promote stronger relationships with 

both the United States and the European-Atlantic institutions. And 

I fear a further Balkanization in that region if the ongoing efforts 

of those pro-Western leaders in Serbia are undermined by the passage of this very resolution. 

15

It has only been a very few short months since the outbreak of 

the ethnic violence in Kosovo where a number of minority communities were victimized. Extremists murdered a number of innocents, hundreds of homes were burned, and centuries-old holy sites 

were destroyed. We had a priest in our office who showed us photographs of church after church—these are historic, irreplaceable 

churches—that were essentially reduced to rubble. 

And I have to say it is also of concern the scant coverage that 

this got in the world press. Oftentimes they will cover things which 

one has to scratch his head and wonder why they are covering to 

the extremes that they do. But this received virtually no coverage 

in the world press at all. 

At this point, I believe adoption of this particular resolution 

would not be productive. We all hope for the same thing: A lasting 

peace in the Balkans with peace and democracy and equal rights 

for all the parties that are involved. I do not, however, believe that 

adoption of this resolution will be helpful in that regard, and therefore I must respectfully oppose it. And I yield back. 

Chairman HYDE. Mrs. Napolitano. 

Mrs. NAPOLITANO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have listened 

with great intent to your presentation and to Mr. Lantos, our great 

leader, our Ranking Member. I have been to the Balkans. I have 

talked to them, not recently of course. But, again, I associate with 

some of the remarks that I have heard from my Democratic Members. 

Nobody knows how to birth a baby until you have had a baby 

and what you are going to go through. For us to say that we should 

wait because it is in the best interest of the United States, what 

about the best interest of the Kosovans? I believe that we are dragging our feet in an area where we say one thing, but we mean another. And I trust that my colleagues will join me and support this 

great resolution. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I will have to note that Mr. Lantos’s observation that, you know, there is never a time when you can become 

a parent and be absolutely certain that you are prepared for it—

that really struck home here. 

Mr. LANTOS. I wasn’t looking at you, Dana. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But I would like to compliment Elliot Engel 

and you, Mr. Lantos, and the Chairman, for the hard work that 

you have put into this over a decade. I remember, a decade ago, 

going to meetings with Steny here and Elliot and the gang. There 

was a horrible story going on there. And we were meeting people 

in various parts of the Capitol who were telling us about these horrible murders and repression that were going on in Kosovo. I think 

that it is time for us to end this conflict. It is time for us to bring 

some peace to that area. And the way we do it is by making a decision and not putting off a decision. 

I support this resolution strongly for practical and philosophical 

reasons. In the practical arena, we still have troops in this area 

and we will continue to have troops in this area until a decision 

is made. And no one here can deny that. If we simply put this off, 

5 years from now we will continue to have our troops stationed 

there. And this is not a time when we should be using the energies 

16

and resources of our own military in a place where they could be 

operating independently and have a democratic government and be 

able to function without us. The status quo with our troops there 

and the continuing status quo—not making a decision—is a cesspool of stagnation which is going to bring all the wrong elements 

to the fore; you know, what floats to the top when you have a situation like this where you don’t permit people to have a strong economy because you have uncertainty. And so people will live in poverty, and when they live in poverty, they will turn to extremists. 

We don’t need that. We can now move forward and try to have 

reconciliation and try to find harmony just like they found in Croatia. The Serbs didn’t want the Croatians to be independent, either. And, no, it is time that we make a decision. It is time the 

Western world makes a decision that the people of Kosovo have a 

right to determine their own destiny. And when we make that decision, freedom will work, liberty will work. It will bring harmony, 

it will not bring disharmony. And until that decision is made, until 

people are able to get out of this quagmire, there will continue to 

be disharmony and there will continue to be factionalism. There 

will continue to be hatred and there will always be a threat hanging over us. 

So let us get moving. Let us work on a practical way, and the 

practical way is to let the people there make their own decision 

about what their status is. And that is what leads to the philosophical reason that I am in favor of this, and that is, we Americans believe that all people have a right to determine their own 

destiny through the ballot box. From the time we started down this 

path, we were told, well, that will cause all kinds of disruption in 

society and there are all kinds of potential downsides to letting 

people control their own destiny through the ballot box. 

Well, no, freedom brings stability. We will not have stability 

until there is freedom. And the people of that part of the world—

the Muslims of Kosovo, the Kosovars—have a right to determine 

their own destiny just like the American people have a right and 

just like the people everywhere have a right. 

And, finally, let us look at the message that we are sending. By 

supporting this resolution, we are being consistent with our view 

that democracy is not just for Christian Europeans and Americans. 

It is for the Muslim world as well. And where people are dying in 

Iraq now to set that principle, to make sure that we can institute 

a democratic government there, well, how can we be against a 

democratic government in Kosovo while we are fighting for democracy in Iraq? 

So let us send a message to the Muslim world. We believe in the 

right to determine your destiny through the ballot box. We believe 

in democracy. We believe that freedom will bring harmony in a society and permit people to live together. And we believe in respecting their rights. Once we respect the rights of the majority of the 

people there—the Kosovars—they then will respect the rights of 

their minority—the Serbian minority. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Schiff. 

Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to speak 

on the bill. And I find myself in a point of rare disagreement with 

17

the Chair and the Ranking Member. I don’t quarrel with many of 

the points that have been made about the desirability of Kosovar 

independence. But I do have concerns about the alacrity with 

which this bill has been brought before the Committee and the failure of the Full Committee to even have an oversight hearing on a 

matter as significant as declaring our support for the independence 

of Kosovo. 

I, for one, would like to hear what the Secretary of State’s office 

has to say about this in more detail than a single-sided letter that 

was drafted yesterday. And now I know Mr. Burton requested that 

we allow the State Department representative here today to speak, 

and the Chairman correctly pointed out this is not an oversight 

hearing, it is a markup. But that begs the question of why isn’t 

this an oversight hearing on a matter of this importance? 

I would like to know, in more detail, what effect this declaration 

would have on the ongoing discussions in the region. Are we going 

to undermine some of the reform-minded leadership there? And I 

don’t have full answers to those questions. And, in fact, the Committee analysis, which is usually lengthy and sophisticated, in this 

case is a one-sided summary sheet. I just think an issue of this 

level of importance deserves more thought and more attention than 

we are giving it here today. 

Mr. LANTOS. Will my friend yield for a moment? 

Mr. SCHIFF. Yes, I would be glad to yield. 

Mr. LANTOS. Long before you joined the Congress, Mr. Schiff, we 

have had countless hearings on this issue and the record of all of 

these hearings is available. This is not a snap judgment of Chairman Hyde and myself. We have been working on the issue of 

Kosova independence for two decades, and the documents are all 

there. The issues have not changed. 

May I also say that this is not a new issue in Central and Eastern Europe. When you go down, just 150 yards from here, there is 

a statute of Louis Kossuth, who, in 1848, told the Austro-Hungarian monarchy that the Hungarians did not want to live under 

Austrian tutelage. That was over 150 years ago. These people are 

no less entitled to their own independence than the Slovenians, the 

Croatians, and every one of the other ethnic entities. They happen 

to be Muslim. That is the only difference. And in today’s climate, 

that should be all the more reason that we support their right. 

I thank my friend for yielding. 

Mr. SCHIFF. And I thank the gentleman. And believe me, I would 

never compare my experience to my colleague from northern California, whom I respect and admire. 

The problem, I think, is that not only has the gentleman from 

California been working on this long before I came to Congress; indeed, the gentleman has been working on it long before a majority 

of the Members of this Committee have been in Congress. And we 

are being asked to vote on it today. It is not for the edification of 

the Chair or the Ranking Member that I suggest that we have an 

oversight hearing, but rather for the rest of us who have not been 

working on this for decades and would benefit from hearing what 

our State Department has to say, what the witnesses in favor of 

a declaration of support for independence have to say. 

18

I don’t at all take issue with the fact that this has been a persistent issue for a very long time, but this Committee has not done 

the oversight it should do on this bill. And given that the State Department has come out in opposition, I think we should spend more 

time finding out why and make an informed judgment. It may be 

after that that I would speak in support of the measure. But I am 

concerned that we might undercut the very cause that is being advanced, and I would urge the Chairman and my colleagues to 

schedule an oversight hearing and put the bill back on calendar so 

that we all might give it the due diligence that it really deserves. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman HYDE. The Chair accepts the reproach of the gentleman but informs him we did have a hearing on this issue last 

fall, about a year ago. This has been on the table for a long, long 

time. If the gentleman wants to know how the State Department 

feels, there is a letter at your chair from Mr. Grossman that explains that rather fully. 

Mr. Nick Smith—and I would point out this is Mr. Smith’s last 

hearing with this Committee; he is retiring, and he will be missed. 

Mr. SMITH OF MICHIGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just briefly. 

You know, under U.N. control, the autonomous region, Kosovo, 

has made some state-like decisions including negotiating a free 

trade agreement with Albania. Ultimately, I think it is unlikely 

that Kosovo will return to Serbia even as an autonomous region, 

and I think it would be good for the Committee to review what the 

resolution says. This resolution reflects, I think, common sense and 

the opinion of many analysts—and, I suspect, most of the Members 

of this Committee—about the final form of a settlement. I think 

most would agree that finally, eventually, sometime, Kosovo should 

be an autonomous state. 

Let me just review for the Committee what the resolving clauses 

of this resolution call for, and that is that it is the sense of the 

House to publicly support the independence of Kosovo and the establishment of Kosovo as a sovereign and democratic state in which 

human rights are respected, including the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, as the only way to lasting peace and stability in 

the Balkans. 

And so the question is when? And I think that is the question 

of the State Department. When is it most appropriate? 

And the other resolving clause says: Work in conjunction with 

the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and 

other multilateral organizations to facilitate an orderly transition 

to the independence of Kosovo. 

Orderly, in my mind, means also a reasonable, timely transition 

of that state. And so the resolution clause doesn’t say do it tomorrow or even next month or next year, but it says eventually it 

should be there as an independent state and there should be an orderly transition. I think it is hard to disagree with that philosophy 

of what should eventually happen to Kosovo. And so I support the 

resolution. 

Chairman HYDE. The Ambassador, Ms. Watson. 

Ms. WATSON. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

With the deepest respect for the Chair and Representative Lantos, the Ranking Member, I would like to hold my position until I 

19

hear from Congresswoman Davis, who I thought sent a very compelling letter along with the letters that came from the State Department and others. At this time, to cast a vote would be premature for me until I can investigate the problems that are inherent in the letters that have been sent to me. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the rest of my 

time. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you, Ms. Watson. 

Mrs. Jo Ann Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, since my name has been invoked by several of my 

colleagues, I felt I have to say something. And let me just say, I 

have the greatest admiration both for you, Mr. Chairman, and for 

Mr. Lantos, the Ranking Member. I just want to say that as Chair 

of the Europe Subcommittee, I have looked at the situation in 

Kosovo, and my opposition is simply this: The timing of the resolution. I know I have heard the disagreements and the arguments on 

that statement, but I just don’t think that we should be making 

this kind of statement at this time. 

With all due respect to my colleague from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, I wish it were that simple, that by passing this resolution 

we could bring our troops home. I would like nothing better than 

that. But my concern in passing this resolution at this time is that 

it could have the opposite effect and I just think it is bad timing. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. The gentleman from California. 

Mr. LANTOS. I have a parliamentary inquiry. My understanding 

is that we will have a series of votes beginning in 5 minutes. We 

have heard powerful and eloquent statements against this resolution. We have heard some comments in favor of the resolution. I 

wonder if it may not be possible to get to a vote before this meeting 

disintegrates. Because today, as we all know, we have a very heavy 

schedule. Very few people will return. After the votes we will lose 

our quorum. So I would respectfully suggest to all of my colleagues 

that we move toward a vote. Thank you. 

Chairman HYDE. There are no more Members who are seeking 

to——

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. All right. Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. I would move to strike the last word. 

I also have some reservations. I was very, very involved with 

Kosovo-Americans in my district—not living in my district—but 

who came to me there. And during the situation, I visited refugee 

camps. It was cold and it was damp. They had tents. It was a terrible situation. So I have a very strong personal feeling for the people of Kosovo and the way they were treated. 

However—as the bell rings, and that will shorten my speech—

I do, too, believe that this may be premature. I think we should 

come back for a more thorough discussion. I certainly support Mr. 

Lantos in what he is attempting to do, but it seems to me that it 

may be better to postpone it at this time. We may send the wrong 

message. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

20

Chairman HYDE. Well, ladies and gentlemen, there are votes 

being called. I would entreat the Committee to come back after the 

vote. We have one amendment, at least, and this is a very important issue to an awful lot of people. So if you don’t mind, make the 

effort. 

Mr. Burton, you have an amendment? 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, I do have an amendment at the 

desk. 

Chairman HYDE. The clerk will report the amendment. 

The CLERK. Amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by 

Mr. Burton of Indiana:

‘‘Strike the preamble, and insert the following: . . .’’

Chairman HYDE. I ask unanimous consent that further reading 

of the amendment be dispensed with. 

[The amendment in the nature of a substitute referred to follows:]

21

1

H.L.C.

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE

TO H. RES. 28

OFFERED BY MR. BURTON OF INDIANA

Strike the preamble and insert the following:

Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

(June 10, 1999) authorized the United Nations Mission

in Kosovo (UNMIK) to administer Kosovo and to facilitate a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s

future status and, in the final stage, oversee the transfer

of authority from Kosovo’s provisional institutions to institutions established under a political settlement;

Whereas in 2002, UNMIK outlined a series of standards of

international expectations for Kosovo’s institutions and

society which should be achieved before the issue of

Kosovo’s future status is determined;

Whereas the people of Kosovo held free and fair municipal

elections in 2000 and 2002 and a general election in

2001 to elect a Parliament, which in turn selected a

President and Prime Minister in 2002;

Whereas on October 23, 2004, Kosovo will conduct another

round of province-wide elections for the Provisional Assembly which will play a critical role in the next phase

of Kosovo’s efforts to implement the standards outlined

by UNMIK and to enter into a process to determine

Kosovo’s future status;

Whereas in 2003 United States Undersecretary of State

Marc Grossman announced, with the support of other


96359e.AAB
22

2

H.L.C.

members of the International Contact Group, a formal

review in mid-2005 by UNMIK of Kosovo’s progress toward meeting the standards and if sufficient progress

had been made to determine a process by which discussions on the province’s status may begin;

Whereas the international community’s efforts to bring stability to Kosovo suffered a serious blow in March 2004

when rioting and violence by Kosovo Albanians against

Serb minority enclaves, resulting in the deaths of 19 civilians, over 4,000 displaced persons and wholesale damage and loss of Serb property, including several religious

and cultural institutions, called into question just how

strong Kosovo’s government institutions are and how far

Kosovo has progressed toward meeting expected standards, including whether all persons, regardless of ethnic

background, race or religion, are free to live, work and

travel in Kosovo without fear, hostility or danger;

Whereas most ethnic Albanian elected authorities in Kosovo

recognize that substantial efforts toward reconciliation

with ethnic minorities are needed for the long-term security and participation in government institutions of all

citizens of Kosovo;

Whereas leaders of the Kosovo Parliament have publicly committed to developing a western-style democracy in which

all citizens, regardless of ethnicity, are granted full

human and civil rights and are committed to the return

of all refugees, whatever their ethnicity, who fled Kosovo

during and after the conflict; and

Whereas the initiative of the Special Representative of the

United Nations Secretary General in Kosovo to begin a

dialogue between the authorities in Belgrade and in


96359e.AAC
23

3

H.L.C.

Pristina on issues of practical concern must be renewed

and strengthened: Now, therefore, be it

Strike all after the resolved clause and insert the following:

1 That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that

2 the United States should—

3 (1) recognize that any resolution of Kosovo’s

4 final status before the achievement by Kosovo of the

5 standards outlined by the United Nations Mission in

6 Kosovo (UNMIK) in 2002 could pose serious con7 sequences for the political and economic viability of

8 Kosovo and the stability of Southeast Europe;

9 (2) publicly support the goal of a democratic

10 government in Kosovo in which human rights, in11 cluding the rights of ethnic and religious minorities,

12 are respected;

13 (3) continue to support the United Nations, the

14 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European

15 Union, the Organization for Security and Coopera16 tion in Europe, and other international organizations

17 to assist Kosovo to meet the United Nations bench18 marks that are the necessary conditions for holding

19 discussions on the future status of Kosovo, including

20 the option of independence;


96359e.AAD
24

4

H.L.C.

1 (4) insist that UNMIK conduct it’s comprehen2 sive review of Kosovo’s progress in developing insti3 tutions of democratic self-government, establishing

4 the rule of law, facilitating the return and reintegra5 tion of refugees into local communities, and pro6 tecting ethnic minorities, in accordance with the

7 benchmarks established by the United Nations not

8 later than June 2005, and move to a formal process

9 regarding the future status of Kosovo as soon as

10 practical thereafter; and

11 (5) continue to provide assistance, trade, and

12 other programs to encourage the further develop13 ment of democracy and a free market economic sys14 tem in Kosovo.

Amend the title so as to read: ‘‘Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the

United States should support the development of self-government in Kosovo once Kosovo has made sufficient

progress, as defined by United Nations benchmarks, in

developing democratic institutions and human rights protections.’’.


96359e.AAE
25

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman, I will not ask the amendment be 

read. I will go into the details of it when we return. 

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will stand in recess. Please return so we may dispose of this issue. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman HYDE. The Committee will come to order. 

The Chair understands that there has been some further discussion of this matter between Members of the Committee during the 

votes on the Floor. In order to give the Committee an opportunity 

to look at this matter carefully, we will postpone further consideration of the matter, and I yield to Mr. Lantos. 

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, I think you are making, as usual, a 

wise decision; and I fully support it. 

Chairman HYDE. Thank you very much. 

I want to assure the Committee and other interested parties that 

this issue is very much alive and will be gone into, certainly, in the 

next Congress in detail and in depth. So this postponement is by 

request of the Members who want to study this a little more deeply, and I think that procedure is acceptable. 

Mr. BURTON. Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman HYDE. Mr Burton. 

Mr. BURTON. Your wisdom is only exceeded by your good looks. 

I want to thank you very much. 

Chairman HYDE. Does the gentleman require additional time? 

[Head shaken indicating ‘‘no.’’] 

Chairman HYDE. All right. Without objection the Chairman is 

authorized to seek consideration of the bill H.R. 2760, as amended, 

regarding Ethiopia and Eritrea under suspension of the rules. Is 

there any objection? 

If not, the Committee stands adjourned. 

[H.R. 2760, the Committee Print showing the text of H.R. 2760 

as adopted by the Subcommittee on Africa, and the amendment in 

the nature of a substitute follow:]

26

1

I

108TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 2760

To limit United States assistance for Ethiopia and Eritrea if those countries

are not in compliance with the terms and conditions of agreements

entered into by the two countries to end hostilities and provide for

a demarcation of the border between the two countries, and for other

purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 16, 2003

Mr. LANTOS (for himself and Mr. PAYNE) introduced the following bill; which

was referred to the Committee on International Relations

A BILL

To limit United States assistance for Ethiopia and Eritrea

if those countries are not in compliance with the terms

and conditions of agreements entered into by the two

countries to end hostilities and provide for a demarcation

of the border between the two countries, and for other

purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Resolution of the

5 Ethiopa–Eritrea Border Dispute Act of 2003’’.


96359b.AAB
27

2

•HR 2760 IH

1 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

2 In this Act:

3 (1) ALGIERS AGREEMENTS.—The term ‘‘Algiers

4 Agreements’’ means the Cessation of Hostilities

5 Agreement and the Comprehensive Peace Agree6 ment.

7 (2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT8 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com9 mittees’’ means the Committee on International Re10 lations of the House of Representatives and the

11 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

12 (3) CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AGREEMENT.—

13 The term ‘‘Cessation of Hostilities Agreement’’

14 means the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities

15 signed on June 18, 2000, in Algiers, Algeria, by the

16 Government of Ethiopia and the Government of Eri17 trea that established a temporary demilitarized secu18 rity zone within Eritrea to be enforced by the United

19 Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Ethiopia and Eri20 trea (UNMEE).

21 (4) COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT.—The

22 term ‘‘Comprehensive Peace Agreement’’ means the

23 agreement signed on December 12, 2000, in Algiers,

24 Algeria, by the Government of Ethiopia and the

25 Government of Eritrea, under the auspices of the

26 Organization of African Unity (OAU), that provided


96359b.AAC
28

3

•HR 2760 IH

1 for an end to military hostilities between the two

2 countries, assurances by the countries to refrain

3 from the threat or use of force against each other,

4 and established a neutral Boundary Commission to

5 delimit and demarcate the border between the two

6 countries.

7 (5) ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.—The term ‘‘eco8 nomic assistance’’ means—

9 (A) assistance under chapter 1 of part I of

10 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to

11 development assistance); and

12 (B) assistance under chapter 4 of part II

13 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating

14 to economic support fund assistance).

15 (6) MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS TRANS16 FERS.—The term ‘‘military assistance and arms

17 transfers’’ means—

18 (A) assistance under chapter 2 of part II

19 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating

20 to military assistance), including the transfer of

21 excess defense articles under section 516 of that

22 Act;

23 (B) assistance under chapter 5 of part II

24 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating

25 to international military education and training


96359b.AAD
29

4

•HR 2760 IH

1 or ‘‘IMET’’), including military education and

2 training for civilian personnel under section 541

3 of that Act (commonly referred to as ‘‘Ex4 panded IMET’’); and

5 (C) assistance under the ‘‘Foreign Military

6 Financing’’ Program under section 23 of the

7 Arms Export Control Act and the transfer of

8 defense articles, defense services, design and

9 construction services, or any other defense-re10 lated training under that Act.

11 SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

12 Congress makes the following findings:

13 (1) On May 6, 1998, a conflict erupted between

14 Ethiopia and Eritrea, two of the world’s poorest

15 countries.

16 (2) The two-year war claimed 100,000 lives,

17 displaced more than 1,000,000 people, cost Ethiopia

18 more than $2,900,000,000, and caused a 62 percent

19 decline in food production in Eritrea.

20 (3) Millions of dollars were diverted from much

21 needed development projects into military activities

22 and weapons procurements at a time when severe

23 drought threatened a famine in both Ethiopia and

24 Eritrea, as bad as the famine in 1984 in those coun25 tries, putting more than 13,000,000 lives at risk.


96359b.AAE
30

5

•HR 2760 IH

1 (4) On June 18, 2000, Prime Minister Meles

2 Zenawi of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethi3 opia and President Issaias Afewerki of the State of

4 Eritrea signed the Cessation of Hostilities Agree5 ment in Algiers, Algeria. On December 12, 2000,

6 the two countries also signed the Comprehensive

7 Peace Agreement in Algiers under the auspices of

8 the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and in the

9 presence of United Nations Secretary General Kofi

10 Annan and President Abdel-Aziz Boutheflika of Al11 geria.

12 (5) Article 4.2 of the Comprehensive Peace

13 Agreement states the following: ‘‘The parties agree

14 that a neutral Boundary Commission composed of

15 five members shall be established with a mandate to

16 delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border [be17 tween the two countries] based on pertinent colonial

18 treaties (1900, 1902 and 1908) and applicable inter19 national law.’’.

20 (6) Article 4.15 of the Comprehensive Peace

21 Agreement states the following: ‘‘The parties agree

22 that the delimitation and demarcation determina23 tions of the Commission shall be final and binding.

24 Each party shall respect the border so determined,


96359b.AAF
31

6

•HR 2760 IH

1 as well as territorial integrity and sovereignty of the

2 other party.’’.

3 (7)(A) The President of the United Nations Se4 curity Council, on behalf of the Security Council,

5 confirmed the Security Council’s endorsement of the

6 terms and conditions of the Algiers Agreements,

7 with special reference to the neutral Boundary Com8 mission described in Article 4.2 of the Comprehen9 sive Peace Agreement and its mandate.

10 (B) In addition, the Security Council reaffirmed

11 its support for the Algiers Agreements in United

12 Nations Security Council Resolution 1308 (July 17,

13 2000), 1312 (July 31, 2000), 1320 (September 15,

14 2000), 1344 (March 15, 2001), 1369 (September

15 14, 2001), 1398 (March 15, 2002), 1430 (August

16 14, 2002), 1434 (September 6, 2002), and 1466

17 (March 14, 2003).

18 (8) On April 13, 2002, the neutral Boundary

19 Commission announced its ‘‘Delimitation Decision’’,

20 reiterating that both parties had agreed that it

21 would be ‘‘final and binding’’.

22 (9) Following the decision of the Boundary

23 Commission that the heavily disputed town of

24 Badme would be zoned to the Eritrean side of the

25 new border, Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin of


96359b.AAG
32

7

•HR 2760 IH

1 Ethiopia announced on April 15, 2003, that ‘‘[n]o2 one expects the [G]overnment of Ethiopia to accept

3 these mistakes committed by the Commission’’. Fur4 ther, the Ethiopian Ministry of Information released

5 a statement accusing the Boundary Commission of

6 an ‘‘unfair tendency’’ in implementing the border

7 ruling and ‘‘misinterpreting’’ the Algiers Agree8 ments.

9 (10) In his March 6, 2003, ‘‘Progress Report’’

10 to the United Nations Security Council, Secretary

11 General Kofi Annan reported that Prime Minister

12 Zenawi of Ethiopia had expressed to his Special

13 Representative, Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, that ‘‘if

14 its concerns were not adequately addressed Ethiopia

15 might eventually reject the demarcation-related deci16 sions of the Commission’’.

17 (11) The independent Boundary Commission

18 has investigated, reviewed, and rejected Ethiopia’s

19 claims with respect to the village of Badme, and in

20 a report issued on March 21, 2003, stated that,

21 based on the boundary line from the 1902 treaty be22 tween the two countries that was used as the ref23 erence under the terms of the Algiers Agreements,

24 the evidence submitted by the Government of Ethi25 opia to support its claim was ‘‘inadequate and inconVerDate Mar 21 2002 12:03 Nov 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\M100704\96359.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL

96359b.AAH
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8

•HR 2760 IH

1 sistent’’ and the Commission ‘‘cannot allow one

2 party to claim a territorial right, to insist on adjust3 ments of parts of the boundary which that party

4 finds disadvantageous’’.

5 SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

6 It is the sense of Congress that both Ethiopia and

7 Eritrea should take all appropriate actions to implement

8 the Algiers Agreements, including by accepting the ‘‘De9 limitation Decision’’ issued by the neutral Boundary Com10 mission on April 13, 2002, with respect to the boundary

11 between the two countries.

12 SEC. 5. DECLARATIONS OF POLICY.

13 Congress makes the following declarations:

14 (1) Congress expresses its support for the

15 Boundary Commission established by the Com16 prehensive Peace Agreement and calls on the inter17 national community to continue to support the

18 United Nations trust fund established to facilitate

19 the process of demarcation between Ethiopia and

20 Eritrea and the economic and social transition of af21 fected communities to new borders determined by

22 the Commission.

23 (2) Congress further declares that it shall be

24 the policy of the United States to limit United

25 States assistance for Ethiopia or Eritrea if either


96359b.AAI
34

9

•HR 2760 IH

1 such country is not in compliance with, or is not

2 taking significant steps to comply with, the terms

3 and conditions of the Algiers Agreements.

4 (3) Congress strongly condemns recent state5 ments by senior Ethiopian officials criticizing the

6 Boundary Commission’s decision and calls on the

7 Government of Ethiopia to immediately end its in8 transigence and fully cooperate with the Commis9 sion.

10 SEC. 6. LIMITATIONS ON UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE.

11 (a) LIMITATION ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.—Eco12 nomic assistance may only be provided for Ethiopia or Eri13 trea for any period of time for which the President deter14 mines that Ethiopia or Eritrea (as the case may be) is

15 in compliance with, or is taking significant steps to comply

16 with, the terms and conditions of the Algiers Agreements.

17 (b) LIMITATION ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND

18 ARMS TRANSFERS.—Military assistance and arms trans19 fers may only be provided for Ethiopia or Eritrea for any

20 period of time for which the President determines that

21 Ethiopia or Eritrea (as the case may be) is in compliance

22 with, or is taking significant steps to comply with, the

23 terms and conditions of the Algiers Agreements.

24 (c) EXCEPTIONS.—The limitation on assistance

25 under subsections (a) and (b) shall not apply with respect


96359b.AAJ
35

10

•HR 2760 IH

1 to humanitarian assistance (such as food or medical as2 sistance), peacekeeping assistance, counterterrorism ini3 tiatives, assistance to protect or promote human rights,

4 and assistance to prevent, treat, and control HIV/AIDS.

5 (d) WAIVER.—The President may waive the applica6 tion of subsection (a) or (b) with respect to Ethiopia or

7 Eritrea if the President determines that it is in the na8 tional security interests of the United States to do so.

9 SEC. 7. REPORT.

10 Until the date on which the border demarcation be11 tween Ethiopia and Eritrea is finalized, the President

12 shall prepare and transmit on a regular basis to the appro13 priate congressional committees a report that contains a

14 description of progress being made toward such demarca15 tion, including the extent to which Ethiopia and Eritrea

16 are in compliance with, or are taking significant steps to

17 comply with, the terms and conditions of the Algiers

18 Agreements.

Æ


96359b.AAK
36

1

[COMMITTEE PRINT]

(Showing the text of H.R. 2760, as Adopted by the

Subcommittee on Africa on October 10, 2003)

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Resolution of the

3 Ethiopa–Eritrea Border Dispute Act of 2004’’.

4 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

5 In this Act:

6 (1) ALGIERS AGREEMENTS.—The term ‘‘Algiers

7 Agreements’’ means the Cessation of Hostilities

8 Agreement and the Comprehensive Peace Agree9 ment.

10 (2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT11 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com12 mittees’’ means the Committee on International Re13 lations of the House of Representatives and the

14 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

15 (3) CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AGREEMENT.—

16 The term ‘‘Cessation of Hostilities Agreement’’

17 means the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities

18 signed on June 18, 2000, in Algiers, Algeria, by the

19 Government of Ethiopia and the Government of EriVerDate Mar 21 2002 12:03 Nov 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\M100704\96359.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL

96359c.AAB
37

2

1 trea that established a temporary demilitarized secu2 rity zone within Eritrea to be enforced by the United

3 Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Ethiopia and Eri4 trea (UNMEE).

5 (4) COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT.—The

6 term ‘‘Comprehensive Peace Agreement’’ means the

7 agreement signed on December 12, 2000, in Algiers,

8 Algeria, by the Government of Ethiopia and the

9 Government of Eritrea, under the auspices of the

10 Organization of African Unity (OAU), that provided

11 for an end to military hostilities between the two

12 countries, assurances by the countries to refrain

13 from the threat or use of force against each other,

14 and established a neutral Boundary Commission to

15 delimit and demarcate the border between the two

16 countries.

17 (5) ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.—The term ‘‘eco18 nomic assistance’’ means—

19 (A) assistance under chapter 1 of part I of

20 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to

21 development assistance); and

22 (B) assistance under chapter 4 of part II

23 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating

24 to economic support fund assistance).


96359c.AAC
38

3

1 (6) MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS TRANS2 FERS.—The term ‘‘military assistance and arms

3 transfers’’ means—

4 (A) assistance under chapter 2 of part II

5 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating

6 to military assistance), including the transfer of

7 excess defense articles under section 516 of that

8 Act;

9 (B) assistance under chapter 5 of part II

10 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating

11 to international military education and training

12 or ‘‘IMET’’), including military education and

13 training for civilian personnel under section 541

14 of that Act (commonly referred to as ‘‘Ex15 panded IMET’’); and

16 (C) assistance under the ‘‘Foreign Military

17 Financing’’ Program under section 23 of the

18 Arms Export Control Act and the transfer of

19 defense articles, defense services, design and

20 construction services, or any other defense-re21 lated training under that Act.

22 SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

23 Congress makes the following findings:


96359c.AAD
39

4

1 (1) On May 6, 1998, a conflict erupted between

2 Ethiopia and Eritrea, two of the world’s poorest

3 countries.

4 (2) The two-year war claimed 100,000 lives,

5 displaced more than 1,000,000 people, cost Ethiopia

6 more than $2,900,000,000, and caused a 62 percent

7 decline in food production in Eritrea.

8 (3) Millions of dollars were diverted from much

9 needed development projects into military activities

10 and weapons procurements at a time when severe

11 drought threatened a famine in both Ethiopia and

12 Eritrea, as bad as the famine in 1984 in those coun13 tries, putting more than 13,000,000 lives at risk.

14 (4) On June 18, 2000, Prime Minister Meles

15 Zenawi of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethi16 opia and President Issaias Afewerki of the State of

17 Eritrea signed the Cessation of Hostilities Agree18 ment in Algiers, Algeria. On December 12, 2000,

19 the two countries also signed the Comprehensive

20 Peace Agreement in Algiers under the auspices of

21 the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and in the

22 presence of United Nations Secretary General Kofi

23 Annan and President Abdel-Aziz Boutheflika of Al24 geria.


96359c.AAE
40

5

1 (5) Article 4.2 of the Comprehensive Peace

2 Agreement states the following: ‘‘The parties agree

3 that a neutral Boundary Commission composed of

4 five members shall be established with a mandate to

5 delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border [be6 tween the two countries] based on pertinent colonial

7 treaties (1900, 1902 and 1908) and applicable inter8 national law.’’.

9 (6) Article 4.15 of the Comprehensive Peace

10 Agreement states the following: ‘‘The parties agree

11 that the delimitation and demarcation determina12 tions of the Commission shall be final and binding.

13 Each party shall respect the border so determined,

14 as well as territorial integrity and sovereignty of the

15 other party.’’.

16 (7)(A) The President of the United Nations Se17 curity Council, on behalf of the Security Council,

18 confirmed the Security Council’s endorsement of the

19 terms and conditions of the Algiers Agreements,

20 with special reference to the neutral Boundary Com21 mission described in Article 4.2 of the Comprehen22 sive Peace Agreement and its mandate.

23 (B) In addition, the Security Council reaffirmed

24 its support for the Algiers Agreements in United

25 Nations Security Council Resolution 1312 (July 31,


96359c.AAF
41

6

1 2000), 1320 (September 15, 2000), 1344 (March

2 15, 2001), 1369 (September 14, 2001), 1398

3 (March 15, 2002), 1430 (August 14, 2002), 1434

4 (September 6, 2002), and 1466 (March 14, 2003).

5 (8) On April 13, 2002, the neutral Boundary

6 Commission announced its ‘‘Delimitation Decision’’,

7 reiterating that both parties had agreed that it

8 would be ‘‘final and binding’’.

9 (9) Following the decision of the Boundary

10 Commission that the heavily disputed town of

11 Badme would be zoned to the Eritrean side of the

12 new border, Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin of

13 Ethiopia announced on April 15, 2003, that ‘‘[n]o14 one expects the [G]overnment of Ethiopia to accept

15 these mistakes committed by the Commission’’. Fur16 ther, the Ethiopian Ministry of Information released

17 a statement accusing the Boundary Commission of

18 an ‘‘unfair tendency’’ in implementing the border

19 ruling and ‘‘misinterpreting’’ the Algiers Agree20 ments.

21 (10) In his March 6, 2003, ‘‘Progress Report’’

22 to the United Nations Security Council, Secretary

23 General Kofi Annan reported that Prime Minister

24 Zenawi of Ethiopia had expressed to his Special

25 Representative, Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, that ‘‘if


96359c.AAG
42

7

1 its concerns were not properly addressed Ethiopia

2 might eventually reject the demarcation-related deci3 sions of the Commission’’.

4 (11) On September 19, 2003, Prime Minister

5 Zenawi wrote to United Nations Secretary General

6 Kofi Annan and stated: ‘‘As the Commission’s deci7 sions could inevitably lead the two countries into an8 other round of fratricidal war, the Security Council

9 has an obligation, arising out of the UN Charter, to

10 avert such a threat to regional peace and stability.’’.

11 (12) On October 3, 2003, the United Nations

12 Security Council wrote to Prime Minister Zenawi

13 and stated: ‘‘The members of the Security Council

14 therefore wish to convey to you their deep regret at

15 the intention of the government of Ethiopia not to

16 accept the entirety of the delimitation and demarca17 tion decision as decided by the boundary commis18 sion. They note in particular, that Ethiopia has com19 mitted itself under the Algiers Agreements to accept

20 the boundary decision as final and binding.’’.

21 SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

22 It is the sense of Congress that both Ethiopia and

23 Eritrea should take all appropriate actions to implement

24 the Algiers Agreements, including by accepting the ‘‘De25 limitation Decision’’ issued by the neutral Boundary ComVerDate Mar 21 2002 12:03 Nov 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\M100704\96359.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL

96359c.AAH
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8

1 mission on April 13, 2002, with respect to the boundary

2 between the two countries.

3 SEC. 5. DECLARATIONS OF POLICY.

4 Congress makes the following declarations:

5 (1) Congress expresses its support for the

6 Boundary Commission established by the Com7 prehensive Peace Agreement and calls on the inter8 national community to continue to support the

9 United Nations trust fund established to facilitate

10 the process of demarcation between Ethiopia and

11 Eritrea and the economic and social transition of af12 fected communities to new borders determined by

13 the Commission.

14 (2) Congress further declares that it shall be

15 the policy of the United States to limit United

16 States assistance for Ethiopia or Eritrea if either

17 such country is not in compliance with, or is not

18 taking significant steps to comply with, the terms

19 and conditions of the Algiers Agreements.

20 (3) Congress strongly condemns recent state21 ments by senior Ethiopian officials criticizing the

22 Boundary Commission’s decision and calls on the

23 Government of Ethiopia to immediately end its in24 transigence and fully cooperate with the Commis25 sion.


96359c.AAI
44

9

1 SEC. 6. LIMITATIONS ON UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE.

2 (a) LIMITATION ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.—Eco3 nomic assistance may only be provided for Ethiopia or Eri4 trea for any period of time for which the President deter5 mines that Ethiopia or Eritrea (as the case may be) is

6 in compliance with, or is taking significant steps to comply

7 with, the terms and conditions of the Algiers Agreements.

8 (b) LIMITATION ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND

9 ARMS TRANSFERS.—Military assistance and arms trans10 fers may only be provided for Ethiopia or Eritrea for any

11 period of time for which the President determines that

12 Ethiopia or Eritrea (as the case may be) is in compliance

13 with, or is taking significant steps to comply with, the

14 terms and conditions of the Algiers Agreements.

15 (c) EXCEPTIONS.—The limitation on assistance

16 under subsections (a) and (b) shall not apply with respect

17 to humanitarian assistance (such as food or medical as18 sistance), peacekeeping assistance, counterterrorism ini19 tiatives, assistance to protect or promote human rights,

20 and assistance to prevent, treat, and control HIV/AIDS.

21 (d) WAIVER.—The President may waive the applica22 tion of subsection (a) or (b) with respect to Ethiopia or

23 Eritrea if the President determines that it is in the na24 tional security interests of the United States to do so.


96359c.AAJ
45

10

1 SEC. 7. INTEGRATION AND BORDER DEVELOPMENT INITIA2 TIVE.

3 (a) ASSISTANCE.—After the date on which the border

4 demarcation between Ethiopia and Eritrea is finalized

5 (consistent with the decision of the Eritrea–Ethiopia

6 Boundary Commission), the President shall establish and

7 carry out an initiative in conjunction with the Govern8 ments of Ethiopia and Eritrea under which assistance is

9 provided to reduce the adverse humanitarian impacts on

10 the populations of the border region, prevent conflict

11 which might result from the demarcation process, and fur12 ther social and economic development projects that are

13 identified and evaluated by local authorities to establish

14 sustainable integration, development, and trade at the bor15 der region.

16 (b) PROJECT EXAMPLES.—Examples of development

17 projects referred to in subsection (a) are—

18 (1) startup initiatives, including farming

19 projects, to promote community economic develop20 ment and the free flow of trade across the border be21 tween the two countries;

22 (2) generous compensation packages for fami23 lies displaced by the border demarcation and support

24 for relocation;


96359c.AAK
46

11

1 (3) effective mechanisms for managing move2 ment of persons across the border between the two

3 countries;

4 (4) an increase in the supply of basic services

5 in the border region, including water, sanitation,

6 housing, health care, and education; and

7 (5) support for local efforts to reinforce peace

8 and reconciliation in the border region.

9 SEC. 8. REPORT.

10 Until the date on which the border demarcation be11 tween Ethiopia and Eritrea is finalized, the President

12 shall prepare and transmit on a regular basis to the appro13 priate congressional committees a report that contains a

14 description of progress being made toward such demarca15 tion, including the extent to which Ethiopia and Eritrea

16 are in compliance with, or are taking significant steps to

17 comply with, the terms and conditions of the Algiers

18 Agreements.


96359c.AAL
47

1

H.L.C.

AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE

TO H.R. 2760

OFFERED BY MR. LANTOS

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the

following:

1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Resolution of the

3 Ethiopa–Eritrea Border Dispute Act of 2004’’.

4 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

5 In this Act:

6 (1) ALGIERS AGREEMENTS.—The term ‘‘Algiers

7 Agreements’’ means the Cessation of Hostilities

8 Agreement and the Comprehensive Peace Agree9 ment.

10 (2) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT11 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com12 mittees’’ means the Committee on International Re13 lations of the House of Representatives and the

14 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

15 (3) CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AGREEMENT.—

16 The term ‘‘Cessation of Hostilities Agreement’’

17 means the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities

18 signed on June 18, 2000, in Algiers, Algeria, by the

19 Government of Ethiopia and the Government of EriVerDate Mar 21 2002 12:03 Nov 04, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 F:\WORK\FULL\M100704\96359.000 HINTREL1 PsN: SHIRL

96359d.AAB
48

2

H.L.C.

1 trea that established a temporary demilitarized secu2 rity zone within Eritrea to be enforced by the United

3 Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Ethiopia and Eri4 trea (UNMEE).

5 (4) COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT.—The

6 term ‘‘Comprehensive Peace Agreement’’ means the

7 agreement signed on December 12, 2000, in Algiers,

8 Algeria, by the Government of Ethiopia and the

9 Government of Eritrea, under the auspices of the

10 Organization of African Unity (OAU), that provided

11 for an end to military hostilities between the two

12 countries, assurances by the countries to refrain

13 from the threat or use of force against each other,

14 and established a neutral Boundary Commission to

15 delimit and demarcate the border between the two

16 countries.

17 (5) ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.—The term ‘‘eco18 nomic assistance’’ means—

19 (A) assistance under chapter 1 of part I of

20 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating to

21 development assistance); and

22 (B) assistance under chapter 4 of part II

23 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating

24 to economic support fund assistance).


96359d.AAC
49

3

H.L.C.

1 (6) MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS TRANS2 FERS.—The term ‘‘military assistance and arms

3 transfers’’ means—

4 (A) assistance under chapter 2 of part II

5 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating

6 to military assistance), including the transfer of

7 excess defense articles under section 516 of that

8 Act;

9 (B) assistance under chapter 5 of part II

10 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (relating

11 to international military education and training

12 or ‘‘IMET’’), including military education and

13 training for civilian personnel under section 541

14 of that Act (commonly referred to as ‘‘Ex15 panded IMET’’); and

16 (C) assistance under the ‘‘Foreign Military

17 Financing’’ Program under section 23 of the

18 Arms Export Control Act and the transfer of

19 defense articles, defense services, design and

20 construction services, or any other defense-re21 lated training under that Act.

22 SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

23 Congress makes the following findings:


96359d.AAD
50

4

H.L.C.

1 (1) On May 6, 1998, a conflict erupted between

2 Ethiopia and Eritrea, two of the world’s poorest

3 countries.

4 (2) The two-year war claimed 100,000 lives,

5 displaced more than 1,000,000 people, cost Ethiopia

6 more than $2,900,000,000, and caused a 62 percent

7 decline in food production in Eritrea.

8 (3) Millions of dollars were diverted from much

9 needed development projects into military activities

10 and weapons procurements at a time when severe

11 drought threatened a famine in both Ethiopia and

12 Eritrea, as bad as the famine in 1984 in those coun13 tries, putting more than 13,000,000 lives at risk.

14 (4) On June 18, 2000, Prime Minister Meles

15 Zenawi of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethi16 opia and President Issaias Afewerki of the State of

17 Eritrea signed the Cessation of Hostilities Agree18 ment in Algiers, Algeria. On December 12, 2000,

19 the two countries also signed the Comprehensive

20 Peace Agreement in Algiers under the auspices of

21 the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and in the

22 presence of United Nations Secretary General Kofi

23 Annan and President Abdel-Aziz Boutheflika of Al24 geria.


96359d.AAE
51

5

H.L.C.

1 (5) Article 4.2 of the Comprehensive Peace

2 Agreement states the following: ‘‘The parties agree

3 that a neutral Boundary Commission composed of

4 five members shall be established with a mandate to

5 delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border [be6 tween the two countries] based on pertinent colonial

7 treaties (1900, 1902 and 1908) and applicable inter8 national law.’’.

9 (6) Article 4.15 of the Comprehensive Peace

10 Agreement states the following: ‘‘The parties agree

11 that the delimitation and demarcation determina12 tions of the Commission shall be final and binding.

13 Each party shall respect the border so determined,

14 as well as territorial integrity and sovereignty of the

15 other party.’’.

16 (7)(A) The President of the United Nations Se17 curity Council, on behalf of the Security Council,

18 confirmed the Security Council’s endorsement of the

19 terms and conditions of the Algiers Agreements,

20 with special reference to the neutral Boundary Com21 mission described in Article 4.2 of the Comprehen22 sive Peace Agreement and its mandate.

23 (B) In addition, the Security Council reaffirmed

24 its support for the Algiers Agreements in United

25 Nations Security Council Resolution 1312 (July 31,


96359d.AAF
52

6

H.L.C.

1 2000), 1320 (September 15, 2000), 1344 (March

2 15, 2001), 1369 (September 14, 2001), 1398

3 (March 15, 2002), 1430 (August 14, 2002), 1434

4 (September 6, 2002), 1466 (March 14, 2003), 1507

5 (September 12, 2003), 1531 (March 12, 2004), and

6 1560 (September 14, 2004).

7 (8) On April 13, 2002, the neutral Boundary

8 Commission announced its ‘‘Delimitation Decision’’,

9 reiterating that both parties had agreed that it

10 would be ‘‘final and binding’’.

11 (9) Following the decision of the Boundary

12 Commission that the heavily disputed town of

13 Badme would be zoned to the Eritrean side of the

14 new border, Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin of

15 Ethiopia announced on April 15, 2003, that ‘‘[n]o16 one expects the [G]overnment of Ethiopia to accept

17 these mistakes committed by the Commission’’. Fur18 ther, the Ethiopian Ministry of Information released

19 a statement accusing the Boundary Commission of

20 an ‘‘unfair tendency’’ in implementing the border

21 ruling and ‘‘misinterpreting’’ the Algiers Agree22 ments.

23 (10) In his March 6, 2003, ‘‘Progress Report’’

24 to the United Nations Security Council, Secretary

25 General Kofi Annan reported that Prime Minister


96359d.AAG
53

7

H.L.C.

1 Zenawi of Ethiopia had expressed to his Special

2 Representative, Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, that ‘‘if

3 its concerns were not properly addressed Ethiopia

4 might eventually reject the demarcation-related deci5 sions of the Commission’’.

6 (11) On September 19, 2003, Prime Minister

7 Zenawi wrote to United Nations Secretary General

8 Kofi Annan and stated: ‘‘As the Commission’s deci9 sions could inevitably lead the two countries into an10 other round of fratricidal war, the Security Council

11 has an obligation, arising out of the UN Charter, to

12 avert such a threat to regional peace and stability.’’.

13 (12) On October 3, 2003, the United Nations

14 Security Council wrote to Prime Minister Zenawi

15 and stated: ‘‘The members of the Security Council

16 therefore wish to convey to you their deep regret at

17 the intention of the government of Ethiopia not to

18 accept the entirety of the delimitation and demarca19 tion decision as decided by the boundary commis20 sion. They note in particular, that Ethiopia has com21 mitted itself under the Algiers Agreements to accept

22 the boundary decision as final and binding.’’.

23 (13)(A) In an attempt to resolve the continued

24 impasse, United Nations Secretary General Kofi

25 Annan offered his good offices to the two parties


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1 and appointed Mr. Lloyd Axworthy, former Minister

2 for Foreign Affairs of Canada, to serve as his Spe3 cial Envoy for Ethiopia and Eritrea on January 29,

4 2004.

5 (B) Despite the assurances of the United Na6 tions Secretary General, including in his Progress

7 Reports of March 6, 2004, and July 7, 2004, that

8 the appointment of the Special Envoy was ‘‘not in9 tended to establish an alternative mechanism to the

10 Boundary Commission or to renegotiate its final and

11 binding decision’’, President Isaias of Eritrea has re12 fused to meet with the Special Envoy or otherwise

13 engage in political dialogue aimed at resolving the

14 current impasse.

15 (14) In his July 7, 2004, ‘‘Progress Report’’ to

16 the United Nations Security Council, Secretary Gen17 eral Kofi Annan reported that the Ethiopian Min18 istry of Foreign Affairs continues to reiterate its po19 sition that ‘‘the current demarcation line would dis20 rupt the lives of border communities and lead to fu21 ture conflict’’.

22 (15) In that same report, Secretary General

23 Annan reminded both governments that they them24 selves ‘‘entrusted the Boundary Commission with

25 the entire demarcation process, drew up its mandate


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1 and selected its Commissioners’’ and called upon the

2 Government of Ethiopia to ‘‘unequivocally restate its

3 acceptance of the Boundary Commission’s decision,

4 appoint field liaison officers, and pay its dues to and

5 otherwise cooperate fully and expeditiously with the

6 Commission’’.

7 SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

8 It is the sense of Congress that Ethiopia and

9 Eritrea—

10 (1) should take all appropriate actions to imple11 ment the Algiers Agreements, including by accepting

12 the ‘‘Delimitation Decision’’ issued by the neutral

13 Boundary Commission on April 13, 2002, with re14 spect to the boundary between the two countries;

15 and

16 (2) should fully cooperate with the United Na17 tions Special Envoy for Ethiopia-Eritrea, Lloyd

18 Axworthy, whose mandate is the implementation of

19 the Algiers Agreement, the Delimitation Decision of

20 the Boundary Commission, and the relevant resolu21 tions and decisions of the United Nations Security

22 Council.

23 SEC. 5. DECLARATIONS OF POLICY.

24 Congress makes the following declarations:


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1 (1) Congress expresses its support for the

2 Boundary Commission established by the Com3 prehensive Peace Agreement and calls on the inter4 national community to continue to support the

5 United Nations trust fund established to facilitate

6 the process of demarcation between Ethiopia and

7 Eritrea and the economic and social transition of af8 fected communities to new borders determined by

9 the Commission.

10 (2) Congress further declares that it shall be

11 the policy of the United States to limit United

12 States assistance for Ethiopia or Eritrea if either

13 such country is not in compliance with, or is not

14 taking significant steps to comply with, the terms

15 and conditions of the Algiers Agreements.

16 (3) Congress strongly condemns statements by

17 senior Ethiopian officials criticizing the Boundary

18 Commission’s decision and calls on the Government

19 of Ethiopia to immediately and unconditionally fulfill

20 its commitments under the Algiers Agreements, pub21 licly accept the Boundary Commission’s decision,

22 and fully cooperate with the implementation of such

23 decision.

24 (4) Congress recognizes the acceptance by the

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1 sion’s decision as final and binding, but condemns

2 the Government of Eritrea’s continued refusal to

3 take advantage of the good offices offered by the

4 United Nations Secretary General, to work with

5 Special Envoy Lloyd Axworthy, or to otherwise en6 gage in dialogue aimed at resolving the current im7 passe, and calls on the President of Eritrea to do so

8 without further delay.

9 SEC. 6. LIMITATIONS ON UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE.

10 (a) LIMITATION ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.—Eco11 nomic assistance may only be provided for Ethiopia or Eri12 trea for any period of time for which the President deter13 mines that Ethiopia or Eritrea (as the case may be) is

14 in compliance with, or is taking significant steps to comply

15 with, the terms and conditions of the Algiers Agreements.

16 (b) LIMITATION ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND

17 ARMS TRANSFERS.—Military assistance and arms trans18 fers may only be provided for Ethiopia or Eritrea for any

19 period of time for which the President determines that

20 Ethiopia or Eritrea (as the case may be) is in compliance

21 with, or is taking significant steps to comply with, the

22 terms and conditions of the Algiers Agreements.

23 (c) EXCEPTIONS.—The limitation on assistance

24 under subsections (a) and (b) shall not apply with respect

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1 sistance), assistance to protect or promote human rights,

2 and assistance to prevent, treat, and control HIV/AIDS.

3 (d) WAIVER.—The President may waive the applica4 tion of subsection (a) or (b) with respect to Ethiopia or

5 Eritrea, particularly for the provision of peacekeeping as6 sistance or counterterrorism assistance, if the President

7 determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional

8 committees that it is in the national interests of the

9 United States to do so.

10 SEC. 7. INTEGRATION AND BORDER DEVELOPMENT INITIA11 TIVE.

12 (a) ASSISTANCE.—After the date on which the border

13 demarcation between Ethiopia and Eritrea is finalized

14 (consistent with the decision of the Boundary Commission

15 established by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement), the

16 President shall establish and carry out an initiative in con17 junction with the Governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea

18 under which assistance is provided to reduce the adverse

19 humanitarian impacts on the populations of the border re20 gion, prevent conflict which might result from the demar21 cation process, and further social and economic develop22 ment projects that are identified and evaluated by local

23 authorities to establish sustainable integration, develop24 ment, and trade at the border region.


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1 (b) PROJECT EXAMPLES.—Examples of development

2 projects referred to in subsection (a) are—

3 (1) startup initiatives, including farming

4 projects, to promote community economic develop5 ment and the free flow of trade across the border be6 tween the two countries;

7 (2) generous compensation packages for fami8 lies displaced by the border demarcation and support

9 for relocation;

10 (3) effective mechanisms for managing move11 ment of persons across the border between the two

12 countries;

13 (4) an increase in the supply of basic services

14 in the border region, including water, sanitation,

15 housing, health care, and education; and

16 (5) support for local efforts to reinforce peace

17 and reconciliation in the border region.

18 SEC. 8. REPORT.

19 Until the date on which the border demarcation be20 tween Ethiopia and Eritrea is finalized, the President

21 shall prepare and transmit on a regular basis to the appro22 priate congressional committees a report that contains a

23 description of progress being made toward such demarca24 tion, including the extent to which Ethiopia and Eritrea

25 are in compliance with, or are taking significant steps to


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1 comply with, the terms and conditions of the Algiers

2 Agreements, and are otherwise cooperating with inter3 nationally-sanctioned efforts to resolve the current im4 passe.


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[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(63)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY J. HYDE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

H.R. 2760, THE RESOLUTION OF THE ETHIOPIA-ERITREA BORDER DISPUTE ACT OF 2004

Beginning on May 6, 1998, a border dispute between the east African countries 

of Ethiopia and Eritrea erupted into a full-scale war, which ultimately resulted in 

the death of over 100,000 people and displacement over one million others. Unfortunately, the effects of this tragic war still haunt us today. 

After two years of brutal warfare and countless mediation efforts, the Prime Minster of Ethiopia and the President of Eritrea finally signed a Comprehensive Peace 

Agreement in Algiers, Algeria. With an eye toward avoiding future border disputes, 

the Algiers Agreement established a neutral Boundary Commission charged with 

the delimitation and demarcation of a permanent boundary between Ethiopia and 

Eritrea. The parties themselves—Ethiopia and Eritrea—drew up the Commission’s 

mandate, selected the commissioners, and agreed to accept its determinations as 

‘‘final and binding.’’

The Commission met, studied the relevant maps and treaties, and finally announced its decision on April 13, 2002. Now, two-and-a-half years later, that border 

has yet to be demarcated. 

Why is it that the Boundary Commission’s decision, which both Ethiopia and Eritrea agreed to accept as final and binding, has yet to be implemented, and the border has yet to be demarcated? 

While Eritrea continually reaffirms its acceptance of the Commission’s decision as 

‘‘final and binding,’’ senior officials in the Ethiopian Government repeatedly denounce the Commission and refuse to allow demarcation to move forward. Ethiopia’s 

decision to flout its international obligations and refusal to publicly accept the Commission’s decision is unacceptable, and must not be allowed to continue. 

To help move the demarcation process forward, United Nations Secretary-General 

Kofi Annan appointed the former Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd 

Axworthy, to serve as his Special Envoy to Ethiopia and Eritrea. Although the Secretary-General repeatedly has made it clear that Mr. Axworthy has been tasked 

only with facilitating dialogue between the parties so that the Commission’s decision 

can be implemented, Eritrea has refused to recognize or meet with him. The Eritreans will not even entertain political dialogue with the Ethiopians until the entire 

border has been physically demarcated. Eritrea’s continued stubbornness also contributes to the impasse we currently face. 

So, while Ethiopia rejects the decision of the Boundary Commission, and Eritrea 

refuses to engage in any dialogue which might actually facilitate implementation of 

that decision, the conflict drags on. 

Meanwhile, the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) has 

been deployed to the region for the past four years, at a cost of $850 million (of 

which the U.S. share has been $237 million). Though UNMEE’s presence has contributed to stability in the border region, it was never intended to be a permanent 

fixture. UNMEE has been specifically tasked with facilitating demarcation of the 

border. That mandate cannot be fulfilled under the current conditions. Given that 

reality, it makes it very difficult to justify diverting precious peacekeeping resources 

toward a mission with no job to do. 

H.R. 2760 is intended to give to the parties involved in this conflict a much-needed and well-deserved push forward so that the border can be demarcated and Ethiopia and Eritrea can move toward normalization. As introduced, the bill would limit 

64

United States assistance to any country which is not in compliance with the Algiers 

Agreement. There is an exception made for humanitarian assistance and assistance 

to treat and prevent HIV/AIDS, as well as a national interest waiver. An exception 

may also be made for peacekeeping assistance, but only if Congress is notified. 

H.R. 2760, including amendments which I expect will be offered by the esteemed 

Ranking Democratic Member and sponsor of this legislation, was painstakingly 

drafted such that it would be neither ‘‘pro-Ethiopian’’ nor ‘‘pro-Eritrean.’’ The bill 

is simply ‘‘pro-demarcation.’’ The approach is reasonable and just, and I urge your 

support. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

AFRICA

The Subcommittee on Africa marked this bill—and I want to commend its author, 

Mr. Lantos—a year ago. Unfortunately, there has been little to no progress resolving the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The effort to resolve the border dispute between the two countries follows a bloody two-year war that has taken 

some 100,000 lives. This international effort to demarcate their common border, the 

Boundary Commission, whose ruling the two parties agreed would be binding, has 

bogged down, rejected by Ethiopia. 

This legislation creates incentives for both countries to abide by the Commission’s 

decision. It is not anti-Ethiopia, and it is not pro-Eritrea. This legislation is crafted 

to be pro-Boundary Commission, pro-rule of law, and ultimately, pro-peace. I don’t 

expect either government to understand this, though, as both are so deeply mired 

in a zero-sum game mentality. Nothing in the minds of these leaderships—who I 

would add, so poorly serve their people—can be mutually beneficial. We must do 

what we can, though, and this legislation uses our development aid leverage to back 

the Boundary Commission. It deserves our strong support.

Æ