:STORICAL

BIBLIOGRAPHY No, 5

Deception

Operations

by

Dr. Gary J. Bjorge

January 1986

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'COMBAT

STUDIES

INSTITUTE)

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HISTORICAL

BIBLIOGRAPHY No. 5

Deception

Operations

by

Dr. Gary J. Bjorge

January 1986

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leaven worth, Kansas 66027-6900

Illlllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll

COMBAT

iSTUDIES • INSTITUTE!

Illlllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllf

CONTENTS

PREFACE

I. DECEPTION

A. Books 1

B. Articles 5

C. Government Reports, Manuals,

and Studies 11

II. CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT

A. Books 19

B. Articles 21

C. Government Reports, Manuals,

and Studies 27

III. SUBJECT INDEX 31

86-2537
PREFACE

The focus of this bibliography is on deception at the opera- tional level of war. However, because successful deception at

this level depends on successful tactical-level deception and excellent camouflage and concealment, material on these related

topics is also included.

All of the sources cited in this bibliography can be found

in the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Many of the books and magazine articles that

are cited are available in large public libraries around the

United States. Numerous items, however, exist only in a specialized library such as CARL. To assist readers in locating the

items cited in this bibliography, CARL document numbers (N

numbers) and Defense Technical Information Center numbers

(DTIC numbers) are provided for sources that have them. To

ensure the widest distribution for this bibliography, no classified

sources have been cited.
I. DECEPTION

Part A—Books

1. Beaumont, Roger. Maskirovka: Soviet Camouflage, Concealment and Deception. College Station, TX: Texas A&M

University System, 1982.

In Soviet terminology, concealment, camouflage, and decep- tion are unified under the word maskirovka. This study shows

how systematic and thorough the Soviets are in their approach

to maskirovka at all levels—strategic, operational, and tactical.

Beaumont discusses methods of maskirovka and the relationship

between maskirovka and surprise, presenting historical examples

of successful Soviet maskirovka operations. The military applications of Soviet research into the psychology of awareness, perception, and reaction to surprise are also discussed. The author

expresses his concern about the ability of Americans to cope

with Soviet maskirovka stratagems.

2. Betts, Richard K. Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1982.

Ways in which deception contributes to achieving surprise

are examined in this book. Betts analyzes the nature of deception and the reasons why it succeeds. He describes the successful use of deception by Hitler in World War II, Israel in the

Six-Day War, Egypt in the October War, and the Soviet Army

during its 1945 Manchurian campaign. Possible future Soviet

deception operations along the central NATO front are discussed.

3. Brown, Anthony Cave. Bodyguard of Lies. New York:

Harper & Row, 1975.

The major strategic- and operational-level deception operations carried out by British and American forces during World

War II are described in detail in this excellent, well-documented

book. The evolution of deception planning and operations during

the war comes alive as the author describes Allied deception

efforts and German reactions to them. This is an excellent study

of how to organize and implement deception operations.

4. Cruickshank, Charles. Deception in World War II. New York:

Oxford University Press, 1980.

This book contains descriptions of the most significant deception operations carried out during World War II in the areas of

Europe and North Africa, including some of a diplomatic nature.
Deception techniques and methods, the need for thorough planning and security, and the great benefits that can result from

deception are described. This book shows how the U.S. Army's

attitude changed from skepticism toward deception to one of ad- vocacy as World War II progressed and the value of deception

became clear.

5. Daniel, Donald C., and Katherine L. Herbig, eds. Strategic

Military Deception. New York: Pergamon Press, 1982.

This excellent book consists of sixteen essays almost equally

divided between the theory and the practice of deception. Among

the theoretical articles are analyses of the nature and the process of deception. The deception operations that are examined

include German, American-British, and Soviet operations during

World War II; Chinese deception practices during the Chinese

Civil War; and Egyptian deception in their 1973 war with Israel.

This book is must reading for the student of deception.

6. Eisenhower, John S. D. The Bitter Woods. New York: G. P.

Putnam's Sons, 1969.

The contribution of deception to the success of the German's

Ardennes offensive is discussed. Chapter 9, "Allied Intelligence

is Befuddled," examines the reasons why Allied intelligence

failed to correctly assess German capabilities and intentions. The conclusion is that because German deception encouraged

the Allies to believe what they wanted to believe, indications of

German preparations for an attack were explained away by the

Allies or simply discounted.

7. Garthoff, Raymond L. Soviet Military Doctrine. Glencoe, IL:

Free Press, 1953.

Chapter 16, entitled "Deception, Surprise, and Security,"

describes the place of deception in Soviet military doctrine. Pas- sages on deception in Soviet field regulations and other publications are quoted. Examples of successful Soviet deception operations during World War II are presented.

8. Gooch, John, and Amos Perlmutter, eds. Military Deception

and Strategic Surprise. Totowa, NJ: Frank Cass and

Co., 1982.

The six essays in this book deal primarily with the theory

of deception and strategic-level deception. They present a good

picture of the dynamics of deception and the potential benefits
of deception. Examples of operational-level deception are mentioned in some of the essays to illustrate certain points.

9. Montagu, Ewen. The Man Who Never Was. Philadelphia:

J. P. Lippincott Co., 1954.

This book describes "Operation Mincemeat/' the dumping

of the body of a fictitious British officer into the sea off Spain

as part of the deception plan for the invasion of Sicily. The

author originated the idea and helped carry it out, and his detailed description of these events gives a special insight into

how deception operations are planned and implemented. The

analysis of German reactions to the deception presents useful

lessons in the psychology of deception. This deception operation,

which caused the Germans to redeploy significant forces away

from Sicily, stands as a classic example of a wartime ruse.

10. Owen, David. Battle of Wits: A History of Psychology and

Deception in Modern Warfare. London: Leo Cooper,

1978.

This book discusses deception and psychological warfare as

practiced in the twentieth century. Examples are drawn primarily from World War II, but there are also examples from

World War I, the Korean War, the Arab-Israeli wars, the brushfire wars of the 1950s and 1960s, and the Vietnam War. The

need to outthink the enemy is stressed, and deception is shown

to be an important way to accomplish this goal. A large portion

of this book is devoted to the use of intelligence agents and

strategic deception, but the role of deception in such military

operations as the Battle of El Alamein and the Normandy

landing is also discussed.

11. Perrault, Gilles. The Secret of D-Day. Boston: Little, Brown,

and Co., 1965.

This book contains one of the best accounts of the deception

accompanying the Normandy landings. The detailed description

of German reactions to Operation Fortitude—the Allied deception

effort—shows what it takes for a deception operation to be

successful.

12. The Tangled Web. By the editors of the Army Times.

Washington, DC: Robert B. Luce, 1963.

This book consists of fifteen chapters, each one a description

of a successful deception operation. The greatest number of ex-
amples are from World War II, but there are also examples from

World War I, the Philippine pacification campaign, and the Civil

War.

13. Vigor, P. H. Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory. New York: St.

Martin's Press, 1983.

This book is primarily an examination of how Soviet doctrinal thought on using conventional forces in the nuclear age

has developed. The key to using conventional forces in this new

era is the ability of forces to achieve a rapid and decisive victory. Surprise is one essential element in achieving such a victory, and surprise is, in turn, dependent in large measure upon

successful deception operations. This book discusses the high

value placed upon deception by the Soviet Army. Special attention is given to the use of deception by Soviet forces during the

Manchurian campaign of August 1945.

14. Whaley, Barton. Codeword Barbarossa. Cambridge, MA:

MIT Press, 1973.

This is an excellent, thoroughly documented study of the reasons why Germany had complete strategic surprise when it suddenly attacked the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. Whaley examines the successful German deception effort and develops a new

explanation for understanding why Stalin was fooled by Hitler.

He shows how disinformation reduced ambiguity in Stalin's

mind, making him more certain, yet wronger, about German

intentions.

15. Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1969. CARL N17417.4 A-E.

This exhaustive, major study begins with a general description of deception theory and the practice of deception in warfare.

It then presents analyses of 168 battles from 16 wars during

the years 1914—68 to show how important deception operations

are at both the strategic and the tactical level. The author concludes that at both levels the use of deception is more than ten

times more likely to result in surprise than is reliance on cover

alone.
Part B—Articles

16. Brown, J. Tuck, Col. "Countersurveillance." Field Artillery

48 (May-June 1980):44—47.

This article examines cover and deception from the perspective of Countersurveillance. Particular attention is given to the

use of smoke, decoys, and disguises. The author advocates

greater Army use of large-area smoke screens.

17. Croizat, V. J., Col. "Mislead the Enemy/' Marine Corps

Gazette 43 (October 1959):52—53.

Colonel Croizat, USMC, believes that deception, properly

used, may well be the decisive element for determining victory

or defeat on the battlefield. He advocates that the commanders

of all units, from the largest to the smallest, become deception

conscious and also intelligence conscious, because in his opinion,

accurate intelligence on the enemy is absolutely crucial for con- ducting a successful deception operation.

18. Dashevskiy, Ya, Lt. Gen. "Camouflage, Concealment, Decep- tion: Organization and Execution." USSR Report: Military Affairs no. 1525 (24 July 1980):46—56. Translated by

the Foreign Broadcast Information Service from the Rus- sian article entitled "Organizing and Executing Opera- tional Camouflage, Concealment and Deception" in

Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal [Military history journal], (April 1980):46—52.

This article emphasizes the importance of centralized plan- ning and control in operations that involve operational camou- flage, concealment, and deception. Examples from World War II

show the Soviet Army's use of operational camouflage, concealment, and deception in a variety of situations. The author notes

that successful operational camouflage, concealment, and decep- tion contributed to many victories and states that this type of

operational support is still important in modern-day operations.

19. Deutsch, Harold C. "The Influence of ULTRA on World

War II." Parameters (December 1978):2—15.

This article is primarily a general description of Ultra's tre- mendous contribution to the Allied war effort. However, Profes- sor Deutsch does discuss Ultra's role in deception operations, noting that it crippled most German deception efforts and

allowed the Allies to measure the success of their own deception
operations. The most notable example of Ultra's use in this way

occurred as part of the deception plan implemented for Opera- tion Overlord.

20. Estler, Elizabeth D., Capt. "Tactical Deception in Today's

Army." Military Intelligence 9 (October-December 1983):

24—27.

This is a good overview of the requirements necessary to

implement a successful deception operation. A sample deception

planning chart is included. The author takes the position that

deception should be incorporated into every tactical organization, and that unit training must include deception training.

21. Grodecki, Thomas S., Maj. "Dummy Doctrine." Field Artillery Journal 53 (January-February 1985):39.

This brief article points to the need for a deception program

to protect the artillery. The author advocates greater use of

dummy positions.

22. Hand, Robert P., Lt. Col. "Deception Planning." Military

Review 47 (September 1967):44—48.

This article examines deception planning and deception opera- tions and discusses the responsibilites of G2 and G3 in these

types of activities. Lieutenant Colonel Hand concludes that the

G2 must be the principal staff officer in cover and deception

operations, because intelligence on the enemy is the crucial fac- tor in deciding whether or not to initiate or continue such

operations.

23. Hargreaves, Reginald, Maj. "For to Deceive." Marine Corps

Gazette 43 (January 1959):36—43.

Major Hargreaves presents numerous historical examples of

how camouflage, smoke, "stage armies," and "stage weapons" have been used to deceive an opposing army. The benefits of

using guile in military operations are clearly shown.

24. Heiman, Leo. "War in the Middle East: An Israeli View." Military Review 9 (September 1967):56—66.

This discussion of the 1967 Six-Day War contains a brief

account of the Israeli "fog of battle" deception operation. A

simple, yet effective, part of this operation was the concealment

of the fact that Israel had captured certain towns and strategic
areas. As Arab units entered these areas, they were surprised

and easily captured.

25. Hobar, Basil J., Col. "The Ardennes 1944: Intelligence Fail- ure or Deception Success?" Military Intelligence 10

(October-December 1984):8—16.

Colonel Hobar concludes that there was an intelligence fail- ure on the part of the Allies in the Ardennes, but he gives credit

for the failure to the Germans. Their well-conceived and well- executed deception operation, with its extraordinarily tight security measures, fooled the Allies. German success was helped

by the fact that their deception story fit Allied expectations and

was therefore readily believed.

26. James, Scott. "Maskirovka: Are the Russians Taking Us

Down the Garden Path?" Defense Electronics 12 (August

1980):43—44+.

Soviet use of electronic warfare, camouflage, and decoy techniques is reviewed. The purpose is to indicate that despite an

improvement in battlefield monitoring capabilities, deception can

still be effective and remains an important part of Soviet planning for military operations.

27. Jones, T. T., Lt. Col. "The Genesis of Military River Opera- tions: Alexander the Great at the Hydaspes River." Military Engineer 56 (November-December 1964):424—26.

Lieutenant Colonel Jones describes the important role of de- ception in this successful river crossing, which is held up as a

model for river-crossing operations today. The deception portion

of the operation is compared to the deception planning that was

part of Operation Overlord in 1944.

28. Khan, Muhammad Nagi, Maj. "Surprise and Deception." Military Review 38 (March 1959):100—104. Digested from

The Owl (Pakistan), December 1957.

This article discusses the importance of surprise in war and

the ways in which deception can contribute to achieving surprise. General descriptions of some successful deception opera- tions are presented.

29. Kobrin, N., Col. "Operational Deception." Soviet Military

Review 4 (April 1981):42—44.

Colonel Kobrin emphasizes the important contribution of de- ception operations to the Soviet victory in World War II. The
8

deception plan that was carried out as part of the Lvov-Sandomir

operation in July 1944 is described in some detail. Many Soviet

deception techniques are mentioned.

30. Love, Edmund G. "Deception on the Shuri Line (Okinawa)." Infantry 73 (July-August 1983):14—20.

This article describes a successful deception operation con- ceived by a battalion commander and carried out at the battalion level with the approval of higher authority. The Japanese

defenders were taken completely by surprise and a significant

terrain feature on the Shuri line was captured by U.S. forces.

31. Matoy, George C., Capt. "Breakout." Infantry 72 (March- April 1982):26—29.

The successful use of deception by the German 1st Panzer

Division to break through a Soviet encirclement in December

1941 is described. The need for deception and secrecy in break- out operations is discussed.

32. Meadows, Lee A. "An Overview: Electronic Countermeasure

Technology." Signal 32 (March 1978):34—38+.

This article discusses various weapons that rely upon electro- magnetic radiation for guidance and the electronic counter- measures that can render them ineffective. What emerges is a

picture of deception needs on the electronic battlefield.

33. Mel'nikov, P., Col. Gen. "Wartime Experience in Camouflage, Concealment and Deception." USSR Report: Military Affairs no. 1707 (20 September 1982):22—33. JPRS

no. 81805. Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Informa- tion Service from the Russian article entitled, "Operational Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception (Mas- kirovka)," in Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal [Military history journal], (April 1982):18—26.

Colonel General Mel'nikov, Chief of the M.V. Frunze Military Academy, begins his article by discussing the theoretical

roots of operational camouflage, concealment, and deception, which are all combined in Russian in the term maskirovka. In

the 1920s, military theorists concluded that the most important

means of achieving surprise was the carrying out of maskirovka operations that were based on the principles of activity, naturalness, diversity, and continuity. This article shows how

this theory was put into practice during World War II with ever
greater success. As the war continued, maskirovka methods were

continually improved and the scale and diversity of maskirovka

operations steadily increased. For example, there was greater

use of smoke, security measures were tightened, troop simulation

was expanded, and planning became more comprehensive. Mel'nikov expresses his belief that the Soviet Army's successful

use of maskirovka during World War II is of current signifi- cance under present-day conditions, and he calls for the contin- ued imaginative application of operational camouflage, conceal- ment, and deception.

34. Olsen, Frank H. "Great Hoaxes." Infantry 59 (NovemberDecember 1969):44—47.

This article briefly describes several successful deception

operations that saved some armies from defeat and brought vic- tory to others.

35. Raugh, Harold E., Capt. "The Haversack Ruse." Military

Intelligence 10 (January-March 1984):11—14.

This short article describes a successful ruse used by the

British in the Third Battle of Gaza (October—November 1917). A

haversack containing purported British plans for another frontal

assault on Gaza was "inadvertently" dropped where Turkish sol- diers could retrieve it. Eventually, the plans reached the German

general in command of Turkish forces. Because these plans fit

in so well with his beliefs about British intentions, he accepted

them as true and arranged his defenses accordingly. When the

British carried out a flanking attack, they achieved surprise and

won a major victory.

36. Riccardelli, Richard F., Capt. "Camouflage and Deception—

Soviet Style." Military Review 59 (February 1979):24—32.

Captain Riccardelli notes that current Soviet doctrine calls

for the extensive use of camouflage techniques and deception

ploys in all operations. This article describes Soviet use of

smoke, electronic camouflage and deception, sonic and olfactory

deception, concealment, and dummy positions. The Soviet use

of darkness to cover movement and to create false impressions

is discussed. The conclusion of the article is that great care

must be exercised in making judgments about Soviet intentions

because they are very good at creating false impressions.

37. Sekulich, Miloje. "Deception in War." Military Review 38

(November 1958):92—97. Translated and digested from

Vojno Delo (Yugoslavia), nos. 4—5, 1957.
10

This article is a good general summary of the various ele- ments that are part of deception—including secrecy, security, dem- onstration attacks, and feints. Historical examples of success- ful deception operations are presented.

38. Stevens, Jennie A., and Henry S. Marsh. "Surprise and De- ception in Soviet Military Thought." Part 1: Military

Review 62 (June 1982):2—11; part 2: Military Review

62 (July 1982):24—35.

This two-part article provides a good review of Soviet

thinking on surprise and deception at the tactical, operational,

and strategic levels. Part 1 focuses on surprise, while part 2

concentrates on deception. Soviet use of concealment, imitation,

demonstration maneuvers, and disinformation is examined in

detail. The difficulty of carrying out a deception operation is

also discussed.

39. Szkoda, W. E., Capt. "Camouflage and Deception." Armor

70 (September-October 1961):48—53.

Captain Szkoda discusses deception techniques that are especially relevant to tanks. The successful British deception effort

at the Battle of El Alamein is examined in some detail.

40. Westenberger, Paul H., Maj. "Beware the Russian Ruse." Marine Corps Gazette 48 (January 1964):27—31.

This article describes many acts of deception carried out by

the Soviet Army in World War II, including the use of Russian

units dressed in German uniforms. The importance of deception

within the Soviet Army is illustrated.

41. Ziemke, Earl F. "Operation Kreml: Deception, Strategy, and

the Fortunes of War." Parameters 9 (March 1979):72—83.

This article discusses the possible influence the German deception plan, Kreml, may have had on Eastern Front campaigns

during the summer of 1942. Kreml was intended to make the

Russians believe that the main German thrust during the 1942

campaign season would be directed at Moscow. The great Soviet

strategic retreat on the southern flank during the summer of

1942 is seen as a possible response to this German deception

plan.
Part C—Government Reports, Manuals,

and Studies

42. Chattin, James W., Lt. Col. "Battles for Cities on the East- ern Front During World War II." Student study project.

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort

Leavenworth, KS, 1981. DTIC ADB 064180L.

In this paper, the author discusses the Soviet defense of

the cities of Odessa, Brest-Litovsk, and Sevastopol in 1941. Note- worthy information on the defensive use of smoke for obscura- tion in Odessa and the simulation of three nonexistent divisions

in Sevastopol is included.

43. Dignault, D. W., Maj., et al. "Cover and Deception in the

Six-Day War." Student paper. U.S. Army Command and

General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, March

1974. CARL N8224.1340.

This group research paper was prepared by students in electronic warfare at the USACGSC. Israeli tactical cover and decep- tion activities during the Six-Day War are examined, and the

contribution of these activities to Israeli success on the battlefield is analyzed.

44. Eaton, Harmon L., Maj. "The Soviet Invasion of Manchuria,

1945: An Analysis of the Element of Surprise." MMAS

thesis. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1976. DTIC ADA 030143.

This study shows how the Soviets achieved strategic, opera- tional, and tactical surprise against the Japanese in 1945. The

author discusses the deception measures used at each echelon

and evaluates the influence of surprise on the outcome of the

campaign. This is an interesting study, because the Manchurian

campaign carried out by Soviet forces is one of the finest historical examples of how an integrated, comprehensive deception

plan contributed to success at all three levels of war.

45. Glantz, David L., Lt. Col. August Storm: The Soviet 1945

Strategic Offensive in Manchuria. Leavenworth Papers

no. 7. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute,

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1983.

See annotation presented below.

46. August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, 1945. Leavenworth Papers no. 8. Fort

11
12

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College, 1983.

These two volumes form the definitive English-language

source on the Soviet Manchurian campaign of 1945, one of the

most remarkable operations in World War II. Lieutenant Colonel

Glantz frequently refers to the use of deception by Soviet forces, including false radio nets, camouflaged road nets, underground

assembly areas, dummy defensive positions, and camouflaged

stockpiles. These studies show how deception measures varied

from front to front and from unit to unit, depending to a great

extent on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time.

47. Hacker, Charles L., Maj. "Deception, Countersurveillance,

and the AirLand Battle." MMAS thesis. U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,

KS, 1985.

This study examines the role that deception can play in

gaining and maintaining the initiative in the AirLand Battle.

The fundamentals of deception operations and the deception doctrine of both the U.S. and Soviet Armies are examined. Historical examples of deception are presented. The study concludes

that the U.S. Army needs to reevaluate its deception doctrine

and must place greater emphasis on the use of deception at the

operational level of war.

48. Kronman, Mark. "The Deceptive Practices of the 23rd Head- quarters, Special Troops During World War II." Aber- deen Proving Ground, MD: Tactical Operations Analysis

Office, 1978.

The 23d Headquarters Special Troops (23d HQ) was the only

U.S. Army unit specifically trained and equipped during World

War II to carry out tactical deception. This document describes

and evaluates each of the twenty-one deception operations car- ried out by this unit in the European theater between June 1944

and March 1945. The use of deception in various tactical situa- tions is analyzed and lessons learned are presented. The experience of 23d HQ shows the need for close coordination between

deception specialists and all real troops involved in a deception

operation, the need for thorough planning down to the last de- tail, and the need for a deception operation to appear completely

authentic.

49. Matsulenko, V. A., Maj. Gen. Operational Camouflage of

Troops. Moscow: USSR Ministry of Defense, 1975. Trans-
13

lated into English by SCITRAN, Santa Barbara, CA. DTIC ADB 020935L.

Using documents from the archives of the USSR Ministry

of Defense, General Matsulenko analyzes the use of camouflage

by Soviet forces at the operational level of war during World

War II. His focus, therefore, is on Soviet deception plans by

fronts and armies. Useful maps and diagrams are provided in

each chapter. Several appendices contain detailed data for a number of operations in which smoke, radio deception, mock-ups, decoys, and other means of deception were used. This is an im- portant work for those interested in deception.

50. Shimanskiy, A., Col. "About the Achievement of Strategic

Surprise in the Preparation for the 1944 Summer-Fall

Campaign." Joint Publications Research Service. Soviet

Military Translations, no. 467 (20 August 1968):!—15.

Translated from Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal [Military

history journal] no. 6, 1968.

Colonel Shimanskiy writes about how the Soviet Army was

able to deceive the Germans as to troop deployment prior to

the launching of their 1944 summer-fall campaign. All of the

components of the major deception operation that was carried

51. Shramm, Percy E. The Preparations for the German Offensive in the Ardennes (Sep. to 16 Dec. 1944). [Foreign

Military Studies MS no. A-862. U.S. Army Europe, Historical Division, 1946]. CARL N16253.1.

This lengthy, detailed study of German preparations for the

Ardennes offensive contains a seven-page section (pp. 223—30)

on the role of deception in the operation. The Germans were

extremely security conscious, developed a plausible deception

cover, and practiced good camouflage control. As a result, they

effectively concealed their massive preparations for the offensive

and caught the Allies by surprise.

52. Slepenkov, D. K., et al. Army Operations. Moscow: USSR

Ministry of Defense, 1977. Machine translated by the

Translation Division, Foreign Technology Division, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. DTIC ADB 070776.

This Soviet publication describes over forty different factors

that influence army-level operations. Several of the chapters men- tion deception efforts, such as the use of smoke or concealment

in assembly areas.
14

out, including the simulation of notional forces, the concealment

of actual units, and the implementation of strict security measures, are discussed. The author goes into some detail in de- scribing specific deception techniques used by the Soviets. This

article presents a clear picture of the high value placed on decep- tion by the Soviet Army and the thoroughness with which the

Soviets approach deception operations. Numerous quotes from

German sources show the high degree of success achieved by

the Soviets in this deception effort. The German remarks also

show that they helped fool themselves. They willingly accepted

the Soviet deception story because it fit their own preconceptions

of what was likely to happen.

53. U.S. Army. Combat Development Command. "Tactical

Cover and Deception." Alexandria, VA: Concepts and

Force Design Group, 1972. CARL N19646.Z.

This report presents the results of a study into the status

of tactical cover and deception in the U.S. Army as of 1972. General doctrinal guidelines for cover and deception operations

during the period 1972—77 are presented. Materiel requirements

are examined and an organization for cover and deception

during wartime is proposed.

54. U.S. Army. Combined Arms Combat Developments Activity. Field Circular 90—2, Deception Operations Planning

Guide. Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1985.

This document augments Field Manual 90—2, Tactical Deception, presenting more detailed practical guidance on how to plan

and implement deception operations at the corps level and below. Chapter 1 reviews the fundamentals of deception. Chapter

2 discusses deception planning, with special emphasis on staff

organization and staff responsibilities in each planning phase. There are several appendices, including a deception checklist, a

deception planning work sheet, deception training examples, a

sample deception plan, a list of commonly used acronyms and

their full forms, and a glossary of key terms.

55. U.S. Army. Command and General Staff College. Reference

Book 31—40, Techniques for Deception. Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1976. CARL RB 31—40.

Deception concepts, the role of intelligence in deception, and

deception tools are discussed in this good review of deception

fundamentals. The use of deception in the offense, in the de-
15

fense, and in other tactical operations is examined. In order to

assist deception planners in developing deception schemes, num- erous ideas for deception operations and historical examples of

successful deception are presented. A sample deception plan is

presented in an appendix.

56. U.S. Army. Far Eastern Command. Military Intelligence Sec- tion. "A Brief History of the G-2 Section, GHQ, SWPA

and Affiliated Units." Tokyo, Japan, 1948. CARL

N16262-A.

On pages 25—28 of this item, there is a section entitled "Role

of G-2 in the Hollandia Operations: A Deception Plan." The sec- tion describes the contribution of deception operations to the

successful amphibious assault at Hollandia (now Djajapura), New Guinea. Aerial reconnaissance, feints, and dummy equipment were used to mislead the Japanese into thinking that an

Allied landing at Hollandia was very unlikely.

57. U.S. Army. Office of the Chief Signal Officer. Personnel

and Training Service. "Sonic Warfare: The Sonic Com- pany—Organization, Equipment, Employment/' Pine

Camp, NY: Army Experimental Station, 1944. CARL

N9425.3.

This report describes the purpose and nature of sonic war- fare and the organization of the sonic company. The successful

deception operation of the first sonic unit, which was carried

out on the Brest peninsula during 23—25 August 1944, is men- tioned. This operation caused the Germans to make a major

diversion of antitank defenses to meet a nonexistent armored

threat.

58. U.S. Army. 12th Army Group. "Cover and Deception Report

ETO, Exhibit '8.' Tactical Operations 'A'—<E.' " CARL

N11598.5 (A—E).

This item contains reports of five deception operations under- taken by 23d Headquarters Special Troops in support of 12th

Army Group operations in France during the summer of 1944. Prepared by 23d Headquarters Special Troops for the com- manding general of 12th Army Group and the commanding general of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, these

five reports contain detailed descriptions of deception plan objec- tives, plan implementation, and the results achieved. These origi- nal documents provide an excellent picture of U.S. Army decep- tion operations in the European Theater of Operations.
16

59. U.S. Army Air Force. Camouflage School. Operational De- ception. March Field, CA, 1943. CARL MF N2366A.

This textbook from the Army Air Force Camouflage School

reviews the basic components of deception operations. There are

specific sections on operational planning, staff procedures, the

means of deception, and enemy intelligence. Historical examples

of successful deception operations, mostly from World War II, are presented in an appendix.

60. U.S. Army Ground Forces. Army War College. "German

Methods of Legitimate Deception." Washington, DC, 1944. CARL N4910.

This item is a two-page listing of thirty-two types of tactical

deception used by the German Army in World War II.

61. U.S. Army Security Agency. "Verbatim Extracts from the

Official History of the 23d Headquarters Special

Troops." Arlington, VA, n.d. CARL N17272.62A.

This document summarizes the deception operations carried

out by the 23d Headquarters Special Troops during the period

1 July 1944 through 24 March 1945. Extracts from selected afteraction reports describe the variety of methods (including spoof

radio, dummy equipment, special effects, and sonic workings)

used to deceive the enemy. The contribution of deception opera- tions to U.S. Army operations is shown.

62. U.S. Department of the Army. Army Regulation 525—21, Tactical Deception (TAC-D) Policy (Including Camouflage,

Countersurveillance, and Concealment). Washington, DC, 1982.

This regulation sets forth the Army's TAC-D policy, describes the role of TAC-D in combat operations, and identifies

objectives and assigns responsibilities for TAC-D. The various

Army commands are directed to develop capabilities at corps

echelons and below to use TAC-D during day-to-day operations, mobilization, periods of international tension, and war. This

means having the ability to hide the real through camouflage, Countersurveillance, and concealment and the ability to portray

the false through deception. A glossary is included and it defines TAC-D as: "Actions at Corps level or below which mislead

the enemy and induce him to do something counter to his inter- ests. It includes manipulating, distorting, or falsifying evidence

available to the enemy to ensure security to real plans, operations, or activities."
17

63. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 90—2, Tactical

Deception. Washington, DC, 1978.

This manual divides military deception into two levels, strategic and tactical. Tactical deception is defined as short-term

actions undertaken by a corps or lower-level unit within the battle area to mislead the enemy and induce him to do something

counter to his interests. The five chapters of this manual look

at the nature of deception, the means of deception, deception

planning, ideas for deception, and deception training. Historical

examples of deception are presented throughout the manual and

in one of the appendices. Information on how to apply deception

to field training exercises, ideas and techniques for electronic

deception, and a sample deception plan are contained in other

appendices. This manual is devoted primarily to deception at

battalion level and below. It does not address deception at the

operational level of war.

64. U.S. Department of the Army. Pamphlet no. 20—201, Military Improvisation During the Russian Campaign.

Washington, DC, 1951.

This short pamphlet was prepared for the U.S. Army by a

group of former German generals and general staff officers. It

describes combat methods that the Germans improvised to meet

the special conditions of the Eastern Front. One section in chapter 6 describes deceptive supply movements.

65. U.S. Department of the Army. Pamphlet no. 20—230, Russian

Combat Methods in World War II. Washington, DC,

1950.

The information in this pamphlet was gathered from a group

of former German generals and general staff corps officers who

had extensive experience on the Eastern Front. Chapter 13 discusses camouflage, deception, and propaganda. The Russians are

praised for their skill and effectiveness in carrying out camouflage and deception operations. They are noted for their strict

camouflage discipline and their use of many deception measures

to achieve surprise.

66. U.S. Department of the Army. Office of the Chief of Military History. Deception and Cover Plans. [Foreign Military Studies nos. P-044 a—c]. Washington, DC, 1952.

CARL N17570.

This item is a collection of three manuscripts on deception.

Each one was written by a high-ranking German officer on the
18

basis of his World War II experiences. The theory and practice

of deception are discussed in general terms, and examples of

deception operations are presented. The Russians are praised for

their frequent and clever use of deception, and it is noted that

during 1944 and 1945 many major Russian attacks came as com- plete surprises to the Germans. Two of the essays contain a

section on lessons about deception operations learned during the

war.
II. CAMOUFLAGE AND CONCEALMENT

Part A—Books

67. Barkas, Geoffrey. The Camouflage Story (From Aintree to

Alamein). London: Cassell and Co., 1952.

The author was director of camouflage with Middle East

forces from the time a camouflage organization was established

on 1 January 1941 until he was transferred to a camouflage

post in the War Office after his brilliant success at Alamein.

This book presents the growing role of camouflage and deception in military campaigns in the Middle East during 1941 and

1942. The camouflage techniques used in the deception operation

at El Alamein are described in great detail.

68. Beketov, A. A., A. P. Belekon', and S.G. Chermashentsev.

Ground Troop Concealment, Moscow: Military Publishing House Ministry of Defense, 1976. Translated

from the Russian by SCITRAN, Santa Barbara, CA.

DTIC ADB 020936L.

This book, which is intended for officers of the Soviet

Ground Forces and military school cadets, is an excellent review

of Soviet thinking on the role of camouflage on the modern

battlefield. The difficulties created by more advanced means of

reconnaissance, the growing number of weapons and other equipment that needs to be concealed, and the increased tempo of

battle preparation and combat are discussed. Such developments

are seen as making concealment work more important than

ever. The fundamentals of tactical concealment (cover, simulation, etc.), camouflage techniques (painting, screening, decoys,

smoke, etc.), and camouflage equipment are described. Concealment measures to be used in the advance, the defense, when on

the march, and when deployed in place are examined. There is

even a chapter devoted primarily to discussing U.S. reconnaissance capabilities. Successful concealment operations from World

War II are used as examples.

69. Klose, K., and H. Hartman. The Use of Smoke Agents.

Berlin, East Germany: Deutscher Militarverlag, 1964.

Translated from the German by the U.S. Army Foreign

Science and Technology Center, Washington, DC. DTIC

AD 469769.

This thorough examination of the use of smoke agents begins with a historical review of the use of smoke in military

19
20

operations. Subsequent sections discuss the physical characteris- tics of smoke, smoke-generating substances, equipment and

means for generating smoke, the use of smoke agents by naval

forces, the principles of the use of smoke in ground combat, and calculations for the use of smoke. The material is often

quite detailed and technical. This is a good source on the subject of smoke.

70. Willemer, Wilhelm, Oberst, et al. Camouflage. U.S. Army

Europe, Historical Division, 1953. CARL Nl7500.20.

This thorough study discusses the importance of camouflage

and its use in virtually every type of military situation. An appendix contains a description of how the Panzer Lehr Division

incorporated camouflage into its operations in Normandy during

June and July 1944. In the face of unchallenged Allied air superiority, the German Army used camouflage to survive, but its

mobility and effective firepower were seriously diminished.
Part B—Articles

71. Auten, Chesley, Capt., and Douglas O. Jones, WO1. "The

Mission is Subdued." U.S. Army Aviation Digest 21

(August 1975):6—9.

This article describes how a helicopter unit camouflaged its

positions during a training exercise at Fort Bliss, Texas.

72. Chulanov, A., Lt. Col. "Concealment and Surprise/' Soviet

Military Review (January 1981):29—30.

This brief account of a tactical training exercise presents a

lesson in the use of camouflage to conceal forces and achieve

surprise in the attack.

73. "Communist Camouflage and Deception." Air University

Quarterly 6 (Spring 1953):90—100.

This article discusses the use of camouflage and deception

by communist forces during the Korean War. Many aerial photographs are presented to illustrate a great variety of camouflage

techniques.

74. Deen, Grady, M. Sgt. "Camouflage." Infantry 64 (NovemberDecember 1974):50—51.

Master Sergeant Deen is concerned about the deterioration

of Army training in the use of camouflage. He believes that

camouflage should be recognized as an essential element in all

military operations and be given command emphasis at all

levels of the Army. Camouflage techniques are discussed.

75. DeWitt, B. B., Maj. "Camouflage: A Neglected Art." Marine

Corps Gazette 45 (December 1961):46—50.

Major DeWitt considers good intelligence to be the key to

successful operations, and he wants U.S. forces to do more to

keep the enemy from having good intelligence. In his view, more

attention must be paid to concealment and especially to what

he calls deceptive camouflage, i.e., the use of dummies and de- coys to deceive the enemy. This article is a good review of the

value of camouflage at the tactical level.

76. Ellsen, J., Commander, and J. Jarnekull. "To See, But Not

to Be Seen." Armada International 6 (May-June 1982):

64+.

Camouflage techniques that can counter reconnaissance car- ried out by radar, infrared sensors, television, and lasers are

21
22

described in this article. The authors stress the need to utilize

terrain effectively when camouflaging. They also point out the

value of dummy equipment and the importance of strict camou- flage discipline. Numerous photos illustrate the points being

made by the authors.

77. Emerson, William K., Maj. "More on Camouflage." Armor

87 (May-June 1978):28—29.

Major Emerson describes measures adopted in 1975 to camouflage the M-60A1 tank. These include foliage brackets, fender

nets, and headlight-taillight glare covers.

78. Felter, Jesse E., Lt. Col., and Capt. Leland L. Huber. "Smoke—Who Needs It?" U.S. Army Aviation Digest

21 (September 1975):!, 26—27.

This article briefly reviews the use of smoke in previous

wars and makes the point that smoke is still useful today. The

benefits of having smoke-generating helicopters on the battlefield are described.

79. Forbes, John M., Capt. "Supply Base Camouflage." Army

Logistician 8 (May-June 1976):20—22.

The careful selection of supply areas, the imaginative crea- tion of mock supply dumps, and strict camouflage discipline are

presented as useful ways to counter enemy surveillance efforts.

80. Harvey, David. "Camouflage: Survival Costume." Defense

and Foreign Affairs (October 1979):15—17+.

The author states that camouflage does not receive appropriate attention at the doctrinal level in the U.S. Army. Current

camouflage research and development work in several nations

is examined, and the United States is said to have much to

learn in this area from such countries as Britain, West Ger- many, and Sweden. This article also describes the contribution

that decoys can make to battlefield survival.

81. Hawkins, Dave, Capt. "The Hawk and the Clamshell." Air

Defense Magazine (July-September 1976):18—22.

This article describes methods used to camouflage a Hawk

battery during an exercise at Fort Bliss, Texas. Camouflaging

equipment and procedures are discussed in detail. This is a

follow-on article to an article titled "The Bushmasters" that
23

was written by Captain Henry A. Zimon and published in the

October-December 1975 issue of Air Defense Magazine.

82. Knight, C. G., Maj. "Camouflage: The Gentle Weapon/' Army 25 (February 1975):23—28.

The U.S. Army is criticized for its lack of interest in camou- flage during the quarter century that includes both the Korean

War and the Vietnam War. The author notes that the United

States has successfully developed highly efficient battlefield observation and surveillance devices, and he advocates adopting

a "systems" approach to countersurveillance in general and camouflage in particular. This article contains a general overview

of what is required for effective camouflage and a review of

some recent research developments.

83. Levin, V., Col., and V. Kolchevsky, Col. "Engineer Camou- flage." Soviet Military Review (December 1970):34—35.

Camouflage techniques used to counter visual reconnaissance (ground and air) are reviewed. These techniques include

the use of paint, vertical and lateral screens, flat-top nets, and

camouflage covers. In cases where engineer works cannot be

concealed, it is recommended that efforts be directed toward de- ceiving the enemy as to the number of such works and the

disposition of units within them. The usefulness of decoys, dum- mies, and smoke screens is discussed, and the need for system- atic control over camouflage work is stressed. Commanders are

advised to check camouflage from the air as well as from the

ground.

84. Lewis, L. Kirk, Capt. "Smoke." Field Artillery Journal 43

(September-October 1975):44—45+.

The usefulness of smoke on the battlefield is said to be as

great today as it ever was. The author calls for new doctrine

that will allow the most effective use of field artillery-delivered

smoke.

85. Liebeg, Fritz W., Capt. "Tactics for Employment of Hawk

Decoys." Air Defense Magazine (October-December

1975):5—7.

This article describes how to establish decoy Hawk missile

positions and what can be done to make these positions more

realistic.
24

86. Miller, S. W., 1st Lt. "Camouflage and Deception." Armor

84 (November-December 1975): 15—20.

Lieutenant Miller provides a general discussion of the value

of camouflage and deception and describes developments in four

major areas: camouflage pattern painting, camouflage nets and

disrupters, smoke and aerosol systems, and decoys.

87. Miller, S. W., Capt. "Camouflage and Survival." Infantry

69 (January-February 1979):20—24.

Captain Miller advocates developing camouflage conscious- ness. The use of paint, smoke, shape disrupters, and decoys to

increase the chances for battlefield survivability is discussed.

88. "Modern Camouflage Techniques from Sweden—the Barra- cuda System." International Defense Review 1 (April

1974):198—203.

This article describes the camouflage system (primarily nets)

developed by the Swedish company, Barracudaverken AB. The

operation of modern sensors and the camouflage characteristics

needed to defeat them are discussed. The use of decoy equipment

to confuse modern reconnaissance systems is also mentioned.

This article takes the position that although constant movement

may be used to confuse enemy observers, the skillful use of

camouflage is the only practical way to conceal large formations

or installations.

89. Narayanan, G., Maj. "Camouflage in Battle." Military Re- view 37 (July 1957):97—100. Digested from The Journal

of the Institution of Military Engineers (India), April

1955.

Major Narayanan sees camouflage as having two sides,

namely, concealment and display. He feels that concealment has

long been properly recognized, but that the use of display to

achieve surprise is not well enough known. Most of this article

is devoted to the use of dummies or decoys to mislead the

enemy. Camouflage by smoke is also discussed. Historical examples showing the successful use of camouflage by both the

offense and the defense are presented.

90. Peterson, Gayle D. "Now You See It—Now You Don't." Army 29 (April 1979):36—39.

Camouflage research being carried out at the U.S. Army

Mobility Equipment Research and Development Command, Fort

Belvoir, Virginia, is described in general terms.
25

91. Smith, Philip R. Jr. "Now You See It—Now You Don't." Army Digest 26 (January 1971):57—60.

This article reviews the place of camouflage in war. The

U.S. Army's historical tendency to disregard the use of camou- flage is mentioned, and the hope is expressed that the experi- ences of the Vietnam War will increase interest in camouflage.

92. Spanier, Tom. "Camouflage in the Electronic Battlefield." Defense and Foreign Affairs Digest (October 1977):

38—40.

This article is in the form of an interview with Tom Spanier,

a representative of the Sullivan Company of San Francisco.

This company is one of the oldest makers of camouflage in the

United States and has had U.S. Army contracts to design and

develop camouflage against modern sensors. Mr. Spanier discusses camouflage in general terms and also in terms of his

company's products. He believes that camouflage can be effec- tive on the electronic battlefield and will greatly improve the

survivability of forces that use it.

93. Sylvester, A. T. "Camouflage for Battle Survival." National

Defense 63 (July-August 1978):48—49+.

The importance of camouflage and the difficulty of camou- flaging weapons from a growing number of increasingly sensi- tive sensors are discussed in this article. The U.S. Army's use

of pattern painting and camouflage screens is described.

94. Yelshin, N., Lt. Col. "Camouflage in the Desert." Soviet

Military Review 8 (August 1975):18—19.

In the course of describing how to camouflage forces in a

desert, this article presents a clear picture of the importance

placed on camouflage and deception by the Soviet Army. It is

stated that World War II experiences show that an expenditure

of effort on camouflage will be returned a hundredfold. The

camouflage techniques described by the author show great care

and attention to detail.

95. Zimon, Henry A., Capt. "The Bushmasters." Air Defense

Magazine (October-December 1975):8—11.

An exercise at Ft. Bliss, Texas, in which a Hawk battery

was successfully concealed from visual and electronic surveil- lance is described. Techniques of desert camouflage are discussed.

Part C—Government Reports, Manuals,

and Studies

96. Allied Air Forces, Southwest Pacific Area. Directorate of

Intelligence. Central Interpretation Unit. "Objective

Folder No. 65." Subject: Japanese Camouflage and De- ceptive Methods in the Southwest Pacific Area, 1943. CARL N3386.

The Japanese are recognized as masters at camouflaging

individual soldiers and weapons positions, but their efforts at

camouflaging buildings and ground installations are criticized.

Here the Japanese often showed poor camouflage discipline and

left dummies and decoys in the same location week after week,

thus making them ineffective.

97. U.S. Army. Chemical Corps. Historical Section. Smoke Generator Operations in the Mediterranean and European

Theaters of Operation. [1948]. CARL R16633.1.

This work presents the history of large-area screening activi- ties undertaken by chemical smoke generator companies in sup- port of military operations in the Mediterranean Theater of

Operations and the European Theater of Operations. The development of smoke-generating equipment and the evolution of

smoke screen doctrine is described. The contribution of large

smoke screens to the success of military operations is amply

illustrated,

98. U.S. Army. Far Eastern Command. Military Intelligence

Section. "Chinese Communist Reference Manual for

Field Fortifications/' [Tokyo, Japan], 1951. CARL

R17349.

This document is a translated copy of a Chinese Communist

manual entitled "Reference Manual for Field Fortifications" that

was published by the Manchurian Military Publishing Agency

in January 1948. It is very detailed, with many diagrams, tables, and illustrations. Information contained in this manual provides

an insight into the types of field fortifications used by Chinese

forces and certain methods of camouflage and concealment that

proved effective in the Korean War.

99. U.S. Army. Intelligence Division. "Providing Camouflage in

Assault Operations." Translated from the original Rus- sian by the U.S. Army Intelligence Division. Washington, DC, 1949. CARL N16582.178-C.

27
28

This document describes the successful use of deception by

the Soviet Army during a military operation on the Northwest

Front in July 1942. The actual deception plan is presented. This

gives a clear picture of how the Soviets organized their forces

and allocated resources to conceal the true, display the false, and achieve surprise on the battlefield.

100. U.S. Army. Mobility Equipment Research and Develop- ment Center. "United States Army Camouflage Master

Plan (Coordination Draft)." Fort Belvoir, VA, 1974.

CARL Nl7995.460.

This camouflage master plan was developed to improve U.S.

Army camouflage capabilities and promote the integration of

camouflage into military operations. It establishes guidance, policies, and responsibilities in the area of camouflage and, in doing

so, presents a picture of what needs to be done to camouflage

effectively on the modern battlefield. The U.S. Army's use of

camouflage in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam is briefly

reviewed.

101. U.S. Army. Office of the Chief of Engineers. Engineer Intelligence Division. "Enemy Camouflage Practices in

Korea." Washington, DC. CARL Rl7055.10.

Camouflage is described as "the enemy's most effective wea- pon of defense in Korea." Concealment and deception techniques

used by North Korean and Chinese forces as a means to counter

aerial attacks are presented.

102. U.S. Army Service Forces. "Observation on Camouflage— North Burma." Washington, DC, 1945. CARL N8442.

A camouflage specialist presents his observations on the use

of camouflage by U.S. forces in Burma during the period No- vember 1944—January 1945. The average officer in Burma took

camouflage lightly because of the lack of concentrated Japa- nese air offensive. Some units, however, had excellent camouflage

standards with commanding officers and intelligence officers

conducting frequent aerial checks. The observer recommends

that camouflage receive greater emphasis during unit training.

103. U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. Soviet/Warsaw Pact

Ground Force Camouflage and Concealment Techniques. Washington, DC, 1977. CARL N18911.1505.

This work discusses the strong doctrinal emphasis placed

on camouflage and concealment by Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces.
29

Many camouflage and concealment techniques are described,

with sections on such topics as light and sound masking, camouflage paint and clothing, artificial camouflage sets and field

expedients, smokescreens, and dummy-decoy equipment. The primary focus is on the tactical level.

104. U.S. Department of the Army. Field Manual 5—20, Camouflage. Washington, DC, 1968.

This field manual is a comprehensive guide to camouflage.

The principles involved in concealing or disguising troops, vehicles, weapons, and field installations are discussed. Many

photos and figures are used to illustrate camouflage techniques.

This field manual is almost twenty years old, and for that

reason, many of the camouflage techniques available today are

not described.

105. U.S. Forces, European Theater. General Board. "Smoke

Generator Operations and Organization." N.p., 1946.

CARL R12896.69.

This report examines the use of smoke in the European theater during World War II and makes recommendations for future

smoke generator unit organization and equipment. The General

Board expresses its belief that World War II experiences validate

the value of smoke operations but is concerned that future developments in radar and infrared sensing may render smoke

obsolete.

106. U.S. Navy. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Division of Naval Intelligence. Air Intelligence Group.

Photo Interpretation Center. Japanese Camouflage.

Anacostia, DC, U.S. Naval Air Station, n.d.. CARL

R14200.

This work is a collection of photographs used to instruct

photographic interpreters. The basic methods of camouflage used

by the Japanese are illustrated.

107. U.S. War Department. Military Intelligence Division. The

Punch Below the Belt: Japanese Ruses, Deception Tactics, and Antipersonnel Measures. Washington, DC,

1945. CARL N11077.2.

Japanese use of camouflage and deception is illustrated by

numerous photos showing both camouflage techniques for indi-
30

vidual soldiers, small positions, and fortifications and the con- struction of dummy weapons and decoy positions. Japanese skill

at improvisation using materials available on the spot is

discussed.
III. SUBJECT INDEX

This brief, general index is provided to help readers find

the items cited in this bibliography that are relevant to their

area of interest. Each of the sources in this bibliography is identified by a number that places it in a numerical sequence. Those

numbers have been assigned to the various subject categories

below to indicate which items discuss which topics. Numbers

will sometimes appear under more than one subject heading.

Deception

Historical Examples from World War I and Before: 12, 15, 27,

35.

Nature and Theory: 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 17, 20, 22, 23, 28,

33, 34, 37, 47, 48,; 52,, 54, 55, 62, 63, 66.

Operational and Strategic: 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 19, 24,

29, 33, 44, 47, 48, 49, 51, 66.

Tactical: 15, 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 24, 31, 32, 39, 43, 44, 47, 48, 53,

60, 61, 63.

British Army: 3, 4, 5, 11, 15, 39, 59, 67.

German Army: 2, 5, 6, 14, 15, 25, 31, 41, 51, 59, 64, 66.

Japanese Army: 15.

Soviet Army: 1, 2, 5, 7, 13, 15, 26, 29, 33, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44, 45,

46, 47, 49,150/,

 52» 65» 66-

U.S. Army: 3, 4, 5, 11, 15, 30, 47, 48, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59,

61, 62, 63.

Camouflage and Concealment

Decoys, Dummy Equipment: 16, 21, 34, 67, 76, 79, 80, 83, 88,

89.

Nature and Theory: 59, 67, 68, 70, 73, 82, 83, 86, 87, 89, 91, 92,

93, 100, 104.

Research and Development: 80, 82, 86, 88, 90.

Smoke: 16, 33, 36, 42, 69, 78, 83, 84, 97, 105.

Tactical: 16, 45, 46, 68, 71, 72, 73, 75, 76, 77, 79, 81, 85, 94, 95,

98, 104.

Chinese Army: 73, 98, 101.

German Army: 70.

31
32

Japanese Army: 96, 106, 107.

Soviet Army: 1, 33, 36, 38, 45, 46, 49, 50, 65, 68, 72, 83, 94, 99,

103.

U.S. Army: 59, 74, 82, 91, 97, 100, 102, 105.

86-2537-2500-22 May 86

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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