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16-4068-cv 

Dollinger v. N.Y. State Ins. Fund et al. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed 

on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a 

document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an 

electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order 

must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at 

the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 

on the 13th day of February, two thousand eighteen. 

PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, 

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 

Circuit Judges. 

 

ROBERT A. DOLLINGER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 16-4068-cv 

v. 

NEW YORK STATE INSURANCE FUND, NYSIF BOARD 

OF COMMISSIONERS, WILLIAM O’BRIEN, PETER 

CUSICK, JAMES FEHRER, CHARLES BROWNING, SCOTT 

ENGLEHART, MARK KENYON, HEATHER 

WOOLFOLK, JOSEPH MULLEN, ALYCE SIEGEL, SUSAN 

LEFKOWITZ, JOHN MASSETTI, JOE NOLTE, THOMAS 
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RACKO, TINA CHRISTIANO, ROBERT VERHAYDEN,

MARK GALLO, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

 

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Robert A. Dollinger, pro se, Kirkwood, 

NY. 

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES New York 

State Insurance Fund, NYSIF Board of 

Commissioners, William O’Brien, Peter Cusick, 

James Fehrer, Scott Englehart, Mark Kenyon, 

Heather Woolfolk, Joseph Mullen, Alyce Siegel, 

John Massetti, Joe Nolte, Thomas Racko, Tina 

Christiano, Robert Verhayden, Mark Gallo: Barbara D. Underwood, Solicitor General 

(Andrea Oser, Deputy Solicitor General, 

and Laura Etlinger, Assistant Solicitor 

General, on the brief), for Eric T. 

Schneiderman, Attorney General of the 

State of New York, Albany, NY. 

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE Charles 

Browning: Charles C. Spagnoli, The Law Firm of 

Frank W. Miller, East Syracuse, NY. 

Appeal from a judgment of November 18, 2016 of the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of New York (Mae A. D’Agostino, Judge). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court be, and it hereby is, 

AFFIRMED IN PART AND REMANDED IN PART. 

Plaintiff-Appellant Robert A. Dollinger (“Dollinger”), proceeding pro se, appeals the District 

Court’s judgment of November 18, 2016. The judgment dismissed, pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 

12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Dollinger’s claims of sex-based discrimination, hostile 

work environment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title 

VII”) and disability-based discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation in violation of 
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the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.1 We 

assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case. 

1. Pending Motions 

We deny Dollinger’s motion to exclude documents from the record on appeal. The record 

on appeal comprises among other things “the original papers and exhibits filed in the district court.” 

Fed. R. App. P. 10(a)(1). In this case, Dollinger requests exclusion of Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2 to the 

answer to Dollinger’s second amended complaint. Several Defendants-Appellees filed these papers 

in the District Court and included them in their appendix on appeal. [See Appellant’s Mot. for 

Opportunity to Fairly Present the Full Facts Relating to Issues Raised, ECF No. 76; 

Appellees’ App. 79–277; Exhibit 1 to Answer to Amended Complaint, Dollinger (N.D.N.Y. 

Mar. 25, 2016), ECF No. 46-1; Exhibit 2 to Answer to Amended Complaint, id.] The 

documents are therefore properly part of the record on appeal.2

We also deny Dollinger’s motion “to fairly present the full facts relating to the issues raised.” 

Appellant’s Mot. 2, ECF No. 76. We will consider evidence from outside the district court record 

only in “extraordinary circumstances.” Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 

1975). We see no such circumstances in this appeal. 

 

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 We understand Dollinger to be appealing the District Court’s judgment of November 18, 2016 

as well as the District Court’s earlier orders of March 30, 2015; December 10, 2015; and November 

18, 2016. Dollinger does not specifically mention either the judgment or any of the earlier orders in 

the letter to the District Court that that court construed as his notice of appeal. His letter refers only 

in general terms to the merits of his complaint, alluding to “discriminatory and retaliatory actions,” 

“retaliatory actions,” and “my disability.” Appellees’ App. 303. Dollinger’s principal and reply briefs 

also omit any mention of specific orders. We conclude that this general language nonetheless gave 

the Defendants-Appellees sufficient notice that Dollinger meant to appeal the District Court’s 

judgment of November 18, 2016. Cf. Conway v. Village of Mount Kisco, 750 F.2d 205, 211–12 (2d Cir. 

1984). All earlier orders in the proceeding are ordinarily deemed to merge with the judgment for the 

purpose of permitting appellate review. See Shannon v. Gen. Elec. Co., 186 F.3d 186, 192 (2d Cir. 

1999). We therefore understand Dollinger’s appeal to encompass the three orders mentioned above. 

2

 Dollinger also objects to the inclusion of “references” to these exhibits “in Appellee’s Brief 

(Docket 65).” Appellant’s Mot. 2, ECF No. 76. For the reasons given in this paragraph, we also deny 

Dollinger’s motion insofar as it requests redaction of the principal brief submitted by all of the the 

Defendants-Appellees other than Defendant-Appellee Charles Browning. 
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2. Merits 

We construe Dollinger’s principal brief as appealing several issues decided in the District 

Court. 

(a) Title VII Claims 

We understand Dollinger to be appealing the District Court’s dismissal, pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6), of his claims of sex-based discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under 

Title VII. We note, for example, his mention of “unlawful discrimination and retaliation on the basis 

of disability and sex in violation of ADA and other law.” Appellant’s Br. 2. We also understand 

Dollinger to be alluding to his Title VII claims when he repeats allegations from his complaint about 

workplace mistreatment having to do with his sexual orientation: “hate emails and graphics 

appearing on appellant’s work computer screen and left in his work area displaying figures in a 

sexual position and stating ‘NO AIDS’ ” and “[t]hreatening material received at . . . home includ[ing] 

graphics similar to other reported ‘NO AIDS’ graphics.” Id. at 4. 

“We review a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo, accepting all of the plaintiff’s allegations as true 

and drawing all inferences in a manner favorable to the plaintiff.” United States v. City of New York, 

359 F.3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2004) (italicization added and citation omitted). 

We remand the cause to the District Court for further consideration of the Title VII claims 

of sex-based discrimination that Dollinger raised in his original complaint. Cf. Zarda v. Altitude 

Express, 855 F.3d 76 (2017), reh’g en banc granted, No. 15-3775 (2d Cir. May 25, 2017), ECF No. 271. 

(b) ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims 

We also understand Dollinger to be appealing the District Court’s dismissal under Rule 12(c) 

of his claims of disability-based discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation in violation 

of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. 

“We review de novo the dismissal of claims pursuant to a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on 

the pleadings, ‘accepting the allegations in the amended complaint as true and drawing all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the [plaintiff].’” Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 2003) (alteration in 

original) (quoting Patel v. Searles, 305 F.3d 130, 134–35 (2d Cir.2002)). 

We conclude that the District Court correctly dismissed Dollinger’s claims of discrimination 

and retaliation under the ADA and discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under 

the Rehabilitation Act. We draw this conclusion substantially for the reasons given by the District 

Court in its orders of December 10, 2015 and November 18, 2016. See Memorandum-Decision and 

Order, Dollinger v. N.Y. State Ins. Fund, No. 3:14-CV-908 (MAD/DEP), 2016 WL 6833993, at *5–9 

(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2016) (ADA discrimination and retaliation claims against individual 
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Defendants-Appellees and Rehabilitation Act discrimination, hostile-work-environment, and 

retaliation claims); Memorandum-Decision and Order, id., 2015 WL 8491013, at *2–4 (Dec. 10, 

2015) (sovereign immunity of Defendant-Appellee New York State Insurance Fund from ADA 

claims). 

The District Court also correctly dismissed Dollinger’s ADA hostile-work-environment 

claim. We have not yet decided whether hostile-work-environment claims are cognizable under the 

ADA. Even if such claims are cognizable, Dollinger would need to have alleged facts showing that 

the discriminatory treatment at issue was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of 

[his] employment and create an abusive working environment” and that the hostility occurred 

because of the protected characteristic of disability. Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427, 439 (2d Cir. 2015). 

In this case, however, most of the alleged conduct related to Dollinger’s sexual orientation, whereas 

only one harassing communication referred to a disability (HIV/AIDS). Dollinger has thus failed to 

allege sufficiently severe or pervasive conditions. 

(c) Denial of Motion for Leave to Amend 

We understand Dollinger to appeal the District Court’s denial of his motion for leave to 

amend his second amended complaint. The District Court denied leave on the ground that further 

amendment would be futile. See Memorandum-Decision and Order, Dollinger, 2016 WL 6833993, at 

*9. 

We review a district court’s decision to permit or deny leave to amend for abuse of 

discretion, but we review the denial of leave to amend based on futility de novo. Balintulo v. Ford Motor 

Co., 796 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 2015). In general, a district court should not dismiss a pro se

complaint without permitting at least one opportunity to amend, but leave to amend can be denied if 

amendment would be futile. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). 

We remand the cause for further consideration of Dollinger’s motion in conjunction with his 

allegations of sex-based discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under Title VII. 

CONCLUSION 

We AFFIRM the District Court’s judgment of November 18, 2016 IN PART. We 

REMAND the cause IN PART for further consideration of Dollinger’s Title VII claims and his 

motion for leave to amend his second amended complaint. We DENY Dollinger’s pending 

motions. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk