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1

 For the underlying arbitration proceeding, however, Petitioners were

denied attorney fees. See doc. 41.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

RODERICK J. MOELLER, et al.,

Petitioners,

vs. CASE NO.: 4:03mc7-SPM

MARSHALL R. CASSEDY, JR., et al.,

Respondents.

________________________________/

ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES

Petitioners Roderick J. Moeller and Donald E. Darden, individually and on

behalf of the Donald E. Darden SEP IRA, were prevailing parties at arbitration on

a claim for violation of the Florida Securities Act, § 517.301, Fla. Stat. The

arbitration award has been confirmed by this Court. Pursuant to section

517.211(6), Florida Statutes, Petitioners are entitled to attorney’s fees for the

confirmation of the award.1

The parties have been unable to agree upon the appropriate amount of

the fee award. Petitioners seek an award in the amount of $111,802.07. The

amount reflects 148.2 hours at an hourly rate of $301.76, yielding a lodestar of

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$44,720.83 that is then multiplied by 2.5. Respondent contends that the amount

should be reduced on various grounds, which are discussed below. 

I. DISCUSSION

 Florida utilizes a lodestar method for determining an appropriate attorney

fee award. Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145,

1150 (Fla. 1985). Under the method, a lodestar figure is computed by multiplying

the number of hours reasonably expended in the litigation by a reasonable hourly

rate. Id. The lodestar figure can then be reduced or enlarged based on the

results obtained or the application of a contingency fee risk multiplier. Id. at

1151.

A. Comparative Excess and Litigating Attorney Fees

In arguing for a reduction of Petitioners’ claimed fees, Respondent

complains that the hours expended were excessive compared to the hours

expended by his own attorneys. He also complains that no fees should be

awarded for the time spent litigating attorney fees. Respondent argues

alternatively that if some fees are awarded for this time, a reduction should be

made for time spent on Petitioners’ unsuccessful claim for attorney fees incurred

during the arbitration proceeding.

With regard to comparative excess, Respondent identifies some tasks,

such as preparing the motion to confirm and responding to the motion to vacate,

as taking too much time given the routine nature of the tasks and the expertise of

Petitioners’ counsel. The time expended, however, was not beyond the bounds

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of reasonableness, especially given the high quality of the work product

submitted. Accordingly, no reduction will be made on this ground.

With regard to the hours litigating attorney fees, fees are properly awarded

for time spent by Petitioners’ attorney in establishing Petitioners’ entitlement to

fees. Barron Chase Sec. Inc. v. Moser, 794 So. 2d 649, 650 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.

App. 2001) (fees may be awarded for time spent establishing entitlement to

attorney fee, but not for time spent establishing the amount of the attorney fee). 

A reduction should be made, however, to account for Petitioners’ unsuccessful

claim for attorney fees incurred during the arbitration proceeding. Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983) (hours spent on discrete, unsuccessful

claims should be excluded).

Determining the proper reduction is difficult because the successful issue

of entitlement to fees for confirmation and the unsuccessful issue of fees for

arbitration were presented together in Petitioners’ motion for attorney fees and

reply, and they involved some overlapping tasks. It is not possible, therefore, to

distinguish with precision the time spent on each issue. 

According to Respondent, Petitioners devoted a total of 76.7 hours of time

litigating the attorney fee issues. The Court finds that a reduction of 38.4 hours,

which is approximately half of the time, is appropriate. This reduction gives

Respondent the benefit in doubtful areas. In particular, the reduction

encompasses some time that would be fully compensable to Petitioners if the

time entry for the tasks had been more specific. For example, the tasks in the

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2

 Similar instances can be found for the billing entries of May 18, 2004 for

7 hours; June 10, 2004 for .8 hours; and June 17, 2004 for 7.5 hours.

entry on May, 17, 2004 for 5.6 hours include the calculation of non-controversial

costs. This task is distinct from the issue of entitlement to fees, but is included in

the reduction because it was not listed as a separate billing entry.2 

The reduction, furthermore, favors Respondent because it does not take

into account overlapping matters that both entitlement issues had in common,

such as the statutory basis for the award. If these overlapping matters are taken

into account, the incremental time spent by Petitioners in addressing the

unsuccessful issue of entitlement to fees for arbitration is probably less than half

of the total time Petitioners spent litigating the attorney fee issue. Thus, the

reduction reflects more time than what is actually attributable to the unsuccessful

issue of entitlement to fees for arbitration.

B. Block-billing

Respondent argues that an additional reduction is appropriate because

Petitioners’ billing statements inappropriately groups multiple activities under a

single billing item. The Eleventh Circuit has said that “the general subject matter

of the time expenditures ought to be set out with sufficient particularity so that the

district court can assess the time claimed for each activity.” Norman v. Housing

Auth., 836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988).

While the billing statements in this case could have been more specific,

they are sufficient to show that the time claimed by Petitioners is not

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3

 148.2 total hours minus 38.4 hours attributed to unsuccessful claim

unreasonable. Accordingly, no additional reduction will be made.

C. Multiplier

Florida law provides for the application of a multiplier on claims for

violation of the Florida Securities Act. Olde Discount Corp. v. Amsel, 800 So. 2d

667, 668 (Pleus, J., concurring and concurring specially). The Court finds that a

2.5 multiplier is appropriate.

Petitioners in this case were represented on a contingency fee basis for

the arbitration proceeding. The representation continued through this proceeding

for confirmation of the arbitration award. As a whole, the case has been difficult

to prosecute and Petitioners’ were unlikely to succeed at the outset. Without an

adjustment for risk, it would have been extremely difficult for Petitioners to find

counsel to represent them. Many undesirable aspects about these types of

cases have been noted, and they are present in this case. Among these are: (1)

difficulty in proving fraud, (2) relatively small damage awards, (3) rigorous

defense, (4) need to proceed to arbitration first, (5) time-consuming process of

arbitration, (6) dearth of qualified attorneys, and (7) need for large outlays of

costs. Id. Based on the foregoing, application of a 2.5 multiplier is warranted.

II. CONCLUSION

Petitioners are entitled to an award of attorney fees for 109.8 hours3

 at a

rate of $301.76 per hour. The hourly rate is reasonable and does not exceed the

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prevailing market rate. 

The number of hours reflects a reasonable amount of time for Petitioners’

attorney to litigate the arbitration award confirmation proceeding. The attorney

time records are sufficiently detailed and there are no time entries that are

excessive. An appropriate reduction has been made for Petitioners’

unsuccessful claim. 

Petitioners are entitled to a 2.5 contingency fee risk multiplier. Applying

the 2.5 contingency fee risk multiplier to the lodestar, $33,133.25 (109.8 x

$301.76), yields a result of $82,833.13. Based on the forgoing, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. The clerk shall enter judgment directing Respondent Cassedy to

pay to Petitioners the amount of $82,833.13 as the Petitioners’ prevailing parties’

attorneys’ fees pursuant to Florida Statutes, Section 517.211(6). 

2. Interest on the judgment shall run from March 15, 2005, which is 

the date of the order (doc. 41) declaring Petitioners’ entitlement to an award of

attorneys’ fees.

DONE AND ORDERED this 8th day of May, 2005.

FOR ALL WHICH LET EXECUTION ISSUE.

 s/ Stephan P. Mickle 

Stephan P. Mickle

United States District Judge

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