*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court

generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order

and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Filed 7/29/96

TENTH CIRCUIT

___________________________________

ARNULFO CHAPA,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Defendants-Appellees.

No. 96-1071

(D.C. No. 95-M-1533)

(D. Colorado)

___________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

___________________________________

Before BRORBY, EBEL and HENRY, Circuit Judges.

___________________________________

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument.
-2-

Arnulfo Chapa, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal

of his civil action to recover property administratively forfeited to the Federal

Bureau of Investigation. We grant the parties' motions to supplement the record

on appeal and affirm.

In his complaint, Mr. Chapa alleged he did not receive sufficient notice of

the forfeiture proceeding, as required under 19 U.S.C. § 1607 (notice must be

published for three consecutive weeks) and the due process clause of the Fifth

Amendment. The government moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the ground Mr. Chapa was collaterally estopped from asserting

he received inadequate notice in light of a prior judgment entered against him in

the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The district

court agreed and dismissed Mr. Chapa's claim with prejudice. The district court

also denied Mr. Chapa's motion to file an amended complaint.

Mr. Chapa now contends the district court erred in concluding his action

was barred by collateral estoppel. We disagree. On or about July 18, 1994, Mr.

Chapa filed a motion for return of seized property pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.

41(e). United States v. Chapa, No. A-91-CR-159(2) JN (W.D. Tex.). In his

memorandum in support of the motion, Mr. Chapa contended he received
-3-

inadequate notice of the forfeiture proceedings. After receiving a response from

the government, Judge James R. Nowlin of the United States District Court for

the Western District of Texas denied the motion and concluded "the currency was

properly forfeited in accordance with the applicable administrative forfeiture

proceedings." The claim Mr. Chapa raised in the instant action is identical to the

claim he raised in his earlier action in Texas. We therefore agree that Mr. Chapa

is barred by collateral estoppel from relitigating that issue.

Mr. Chapa also contends the district court abused its discretion when it

denied his motion for leave to file an amended complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 15(a). Again, we disagree. Mr. Chapa sought to include a claim that the

administrative forfeiture violated his rights under the double jeopardy clause of

the Fifth Amendment. Even if we assume for the sake of discussion the district

court abused its discretion, it would be futile to remand the case to allow Mr.

Chapa to proceed on the merits of his double jeopardy claim. The United States

Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Ursery, ___ S. Ct. ___, 1996 
-4-

WL 340815 (June 24, 1996), makes it clear his double jeopardy claim lacks merit.

AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court:

WADE BRORBY

United States Circuit Judge