[Cite as State v. Nelson, 2022-Ohio-3520.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

HARDIN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 6-22-07

 v.

TREVER DYLAN NELSON, O P I N I O N

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Hardin County Common Pleas Court

Trial Court No. CRI-2021-2097

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: October 3, 2022

APPEARANCES:

Howard A. Elliott for Appellant

Andrew R. Tudor for Appellee
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SHAW, J.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Trever D. Nelson (“Nelson”), appeals his 

conviction and sentence from the Hardin County Court of Common Pleas.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶2} On July 15, 2021, Nelson was charged in a four-count indictment with 

the offenses of aggravated possession of drugs, a fifth-degree felony (Count 1), 

failure to verify address, a first-degree felony (Count 2), failure to provide notice of 

change of address, a first-degree felony (Count 3), and failure to register, a firstdegree felony (Count 4). Nelson entered into a negotiated plea agreement and pled 

guilty to Counts 1 and 2. The trial court accepted Nelson’s plea and entered a 

finding of guilty. The trial court ordered a presentence investigation and set the 

matter for a sentencing hearing on March 31, 2022.

{¶3} After the sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Nelson to ten 

months in prison on Count 1 and four years on Count 2, to be served consecutively, 

for an aggregated prison term of four years and ten months. As to both counts, the 

trial court ordered Nelson to pay court-appointed-counsel fees. The trial court also 

dismissed the remaining counts of the indictment as part of the plea agreement. 

Nelson filed a notice of appeal, raising two assignments of error for our review.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1

The trial court, having imposed a term of incarceration, properly

[sic] imposed a financial sanction directing that the 
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Defendant/Appellant pay court appointed counsel fees without 

having determined as a prerequisite, the ability of the Defendant 

to pay same.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2

The charge of failure to verify address may not be sustained 

without the State first demonstrating that the appropriate notice 

under Ohio Revised Code § 2950.06(G) was generated and 

transmitted pursuant to statute and where the record does not 

reflect that was done, conviction for violation of Ohio Revised 

Code § 2950.06(F), failure to verify address of sex offender, 

cannot be sustained.

First Assignment of Error

{¶4} In his first assignment of error, Nelson argues that the trial court erred 

when it failed to determine his ability to pay court-appointed-counsel fees as a 

prerequisite to imposing such a financial sanction.

{¶5} We begin our analysis by noting that, in State v. Rodriguez, 3d Dist. 

Seneca No. 13-20-07, 2021-Ohio-2295, we concluded, “to the extent that 

[appellant] argues that court-appointed-counsel fees are financial sanctions under 

R.C. 2929.18 his argument is without merit.” Rodriguez at ¶ 8. It is stated in 

Rodriguez that the Ohio Supreme Court has held that “ ‘there is no statutory 

authority allowing a trial court to “sentence” a defendant to pay court-appointedcounsel fees, [and that] such an order cannot be included as part of the defendant’s 

sentence.’ ” Id., quoting State v. Taylor, 163 Ohio St.3d 508, 2020-Ohio-6786, ¶ 
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35. Accordingly, to the extent Nelson presents an assignment of error directing us 

to R.C. 2929.18 discussing financial sanctions, his argument is without merit. 

{¶6} As relevant here, R.C. 2941.51(D) states in pertinent part:

The [appointed-counsel] fees and expenses approved by the court 

under this section shall not be taxed as part of the costs and shall 

be paid by the county. However, if the person represented has, or 

reasonably may be expected to have, the means to meet some part 

of the cost of the services rendered to the person, the person shall 

pay the county an amount that the person reasonably can be 

expected to pay.

{¶7} In this case, as part of the plea agreement, the parties agreed to a joint

recommendation as it pertained to Nelson paying his court-appointed-counsel fees. 

(Mar. 3, 2022 Tr. at 4). At the time of sentencing, the trial court made the following 

finding: “Defendant has, or reasonably may be expected to have, the means to pay” 

“court-appointed-counsel fees.” (Doc. No. 44 at p. 5). The trial court then ordered 

Nelson to pay court-appointed-counsel fees.

{¶8} Moreover, since the record indicates Nelson agreed to the trial court 

ordering the payment of court-appointed-counsel fees, any error in the trial court’s 

order was invited by Nelson, and therefore, he cannot take advantage of this alleged 

error upon appeal. Pursuant to the “invited error” doctrine, a party may not “ ‘take 

advantage of an error which [that party] invited or induced.’ ˮ State v. Campbell, 

90 Ohio St.3d 320, 324, 2000-Ohio-183, quoting Hal Artz Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. v. 

Ford Motor Co., 28 Ohio St.3d 20 (1986), paragraph one of the syllabus. 
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Furthermore, having failed to object to the court-appointed-counsel fee order at the 

sentencing hearing, no manifest miscarriage of justice occurs by concluding that we 

are precluded from reviewing this because the State and Nelson had a joint

recommendation that the trial court implicitly adopted and that was “authorized by 

law.” See Rodriguez at ¶ 9; see also State v. Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365, 2010-

Ohio-1, ¶ 16, citing R.C. 2953.08(D)(1); State v. Sergent, 148 Ohio St.3d 94, 2016-

Ohio-2696, ¶ 15. Nelson’s first assignment of error is overruled.

Second Assignment of Error

{¶9} In his second assignment of error, Nelson claims that his conviction of 

failure to verify a current address cannot be sustained because the State failed to 

prove that the Hardin County Sheriff’s Office complied with the seven-day notice 

requirement of R.C. 2950.06(G)(1) prior to commencing prosecution. Nelson 

contends, for the first time on appeal, that there was no mention in his indictment or 

the essential facts constituting the offense charged that the statutorily required

notification was met.

{¶10} The following additional facts are necessary for us to evaluate this 

assigned error. Nelson is a convicted sex offender who is required to periodically 

verify his current address pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2950. On January 30, 2020, 

Nelson went to the Hardin County Sheriff’s Office for his annual verification 

obligation. Reference was made to a form provided Nelson setting forth his 
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registration duties and informing him that his next verification was to be completed 

by January 30, 2021.

{¶11} Nelson failed to verify his address on the next scheduled date of 

January 30, 2021, and in July 2021, was indicted and then pled guilty as stated above 

to failing to provide verification of his current address, a violation of R.C. 

2950.06(F). That section states that no person who is required to verify a current 

residence “shall fail to verify a current residence * * * by the date required for the 

verification as set forth in division (B) of this section,” but that “no person shall be 

prosecuted * * * for a violation of this division * * * prior to the expiration of the 

period of time specified in division (G) of this section.” R.C. 2950.06(B)(1) 

provides that an offender, like Nelson, comply with the registration verification 

requirement on the anniversary of the offender’s initial registration date. 

{¶12} Both R.C. 2950.06(G)(1) and (2), in turn, link a seven-day period to 

the mailing of a written warning to a sex offender. State v. Williams, 114 Ohio St.3d 

103, 2007-Ohio-3268, ¶ 11. “In addition, R.C. 2950.06(G)(2) prohibits a 

prosecution for a violation of R.C. 2950.06(F) ‘unless the seven-day 

period subsequent to that date that the offender * * * is provided under division 

(G)(1) of this section to verify the current address has expired.’ ” (Emphasis 

deleted.) Id.
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{¶13} Criminal Rule 12(C)(2) mandates that “ ‘[d]efenses and objections 

based on defects in the indictment’ ” must generally be raised before trial, and “

‘failure to timely object to the allegedly defective indictment constitutes a waiver of 

the issues involved.’ ” State v. Barton, 108 Ohio St.3d 402, 2006-Ohio-1324, ¶ 73. 

See also State v. Horner, 126 Ohio St.3d 466, 2010-Ohio-3830, at paragraph three 

of the syllabus (“By failing to timely object to a defect in an indictment, a defendant 

waives all but plain error on appeal.”).

{¶14} In any event, Nelson entered into a written plea agreement with the 

State in which he agreed to plead guilty to the offense of failure to verify an address. 

At the plea hearing, the trial court asked the prosecutor what the facts were and the 

prosecutor recited the facts surrounding the failure to verify as a sex offender. 

Nelson admitted that he failed to verify his current residence and that the State has 

evidence to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (Mar. 3, 2022 Tr. at 26). 

Additionally, the trial court specifically advised Nelson that he was waiving any 

“technical defenses” he might have had. (Id. at 19-20). When the discussion 

returned to the matter of the registering later in the hearing, the trial court added: 

“That’s why the prosecutor has to give your attorney all of the evidence. And that’s 

what—I trust that’s all done. That certainly is what this prosecutor’s office regularly 

does, in my experience, so I would feel—and Mr. Kelley’s done criminal work for 

years and years and years. You understand that?” (Id. at 39). Nelson responded: 
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“Yes, yes, I do.” (Id.). The trial court also asked, “So, you know, he does a lot of 

this kind of thing so I trust that you are satisfied with his services, am I correct?”

and Nelson replied, Yes, I am. (Id. at 40). Accordingly, the Court finds that 

Nelson’s actions in voluntarily pleading guilty to failure to verify current address 

pursuant to negotiation and agreement while represented by counsel constitutes a 

waiver of his alleged error on appeal.

{¶15} The second assignment of error is overruled.

{¶16} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

 Judgment Affirmed

ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.

/jlr