alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

SMART COAT PAINTING, LLC
, Appellant,

v.

RICHARD MURRAY and AP CONSTRUCTION SOLUTIONS, LLC
,

Appellee s

.

No. 4D2023

- 1237

[ January 2 5 , 2024 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Daniel Arthur Casey, Judge; L.T. Case No. CACE

- 22

- 018264.

Michael Garcia of Michael Garcia, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant

.

Aldo G. Bartolone, Jr. and Jared Blake Namm of the Berman Law Group, Boca Rato n, for appellees

.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed

.

W ARNER
, D AMOORGIAN and F ORST
, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
(January 24, 1980)

#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Jesse Reaves, Also Known as Pernell Williams, Appellant.

— -Judgment unanimously reversed, on the law, motion to suppress granted, and indictment dismissed. Memorandum: In seeking the issuance of a search warrant based upon information supplied by an informant it was necessary that the issuing court be informed of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that there were illegal drugs where he claimed they were and *also*of the circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant was reliable *(United States v Harris,*403 US 573; *Spinelli v United States,*393 US 410; *Aguilar v Texas,*378 US 108; *People v Brown,*40 NY2d 183). The application for the search warrant was plainly insufficient without such and the motion to suppress should have been granted. (Appeal from judgment of Onondaga Supreme Court Appellant. criminal possession controlled substance, sixth degree.) Present — Cardamone, J. P., Simons, Schnepp, Doerr and Witmer, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-4158

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus JUAN GARCIA-AVALINO, Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham. Frank W. Bullock, Jr., District Judge. (CR-03-370) Submitted: June 18, 2004 Decided: July 8, 2004 Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Arnold L. Husser, Angela Hewlett Miller, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Juan Garcia-Avalino appeals his conviction and sentence for illegally reentering the United States without the permission of the United States Attorney General after having previously been deported subsequent to a felony conviction, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(1) (2000). Garcia-Avalino’s attorney has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), raising one issue but stating that, in his view, there are no meritorious grounds for appeal. Although notified of his right to do so, Garcia-Avalino has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. In the Anders brief, counsel questions whether the district court erred in sentencing Garcia-Avalino to thirty months of imprisonment. We find that we have no authority to review the district court’s decision to sentence Garcia-Avalino to thirty months because this sentence is within the guideline range and is below the statutory maximum sentence of ten years. See8 U.S.C.§ 1326(b)(1) (setting forth statutory maximum). Because GarciaAvalino’s sentence does not exceed the maximum allowed by the Sentencing Guidelines or statute, we will not review it on appeal. See United States v. Porter , 909 F.2d 789, 794 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding challenge to court’s exercise of discretion in setting a sentence within a properly calculated guideline range not addressable on appeal).- 3 - In accordance with Anders , we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm Garcia-Avalino’s conviction and sentence. This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
###### Editorial Note on Subchapter C of Chapter II

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to subchapter C appear by Amdt. 381, 65 FR 64586, Oct. 30, 2000.

###### Editorial Note on Part 272

#### Editorial Note:

OMB control numbers relating to this part 272 are contained in § 271.8.

#### § 272.9 Approval of homeless meal providers.

The State SNAP agency, or another appropriate State or local governmental agency identified by the State SNAP agency, shall approve establishments serving the homeless upon sufficient evidence, as determined by the agency, that the establishment does in fact serve meals to homeless persons. Where the State SNAP agency identifies another appropriate State or local agency for the purpose of approving establishments serving the homeless, the State SNAP agency will remain responsible for insuring that the provisions of the preceding sentence are effectively carried out. The State SNAP agency, or another appropriate State or local governmental agency identified by the State SNAP agency or private nonprofit organization under contract with the State SNAP agency shall execute contracts with restaurants wishing to sell meals in exchange for SNAP benefits to homeless SNAP households. Such contracts shall specify that such meals are to be sold at “concessional” (low or reduced) prices and shall also specify the approximate prices which will be charged, or the amount and type of price reduction.

[56 FR 54777, Oct. 23, 1991, as amended at 61 FR 53600, Oct. 15, 1996]
#### McILVAINE v. STEINSON.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

December, 1905.)

Action by Tompkins BIc-Ilvaine against George Steinson.

No opinion. Blotion granted.
EXHIBIT 31.1


CERTIFICATION


I, Carl E. Worboys, certify that:


1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Dolce Ventures Inc.;


2. Based on my  knowledge,  this  quarterly  report  does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact  necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the  circumstances  under which such statements
were made, not  misleading  with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report;


3.  Based  on my  knowledge,  the  financial  statements,  and  other  financial
information  included in this quarterly  report,  fairly present in all material
respects the financial  condition,  results of operations  and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;


4.  The  registrant's  other  certifying  officers  and  I are  responsible  for
establishing and maintaining  disclosure  controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the registrant and have:


a) designed  such  disclosure  controls and  procedures  to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries,
is made known to us by others  within those  entities,  particularly  during the
period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;


b) evaluated  the  effectiveness  of the  registrant's  disclosure  controls and
procedures  as of a date  within  90  days  prior  to the  filing  date  of this
quarterly report (the "Evaluation Date"); and


c) presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the effectiveness of
the  disclosure  controls  and  procedures  based  on our  evaluation  as of the
Evaluation Date;


5. The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation,  to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of
registrant's   board  of  directors  (or  persons   performing   the  equivalent
functions):


a) all significant  deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls
which  could  adversely  affect the  registrant's  ability  to record,  process,
summarize and report  financial data and have  identified  for the  registrant's
auditors any material weaknesses in internal controls; and


b) any  fraud,  whether  or not  material,  that  involves  management  or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal controls; and


6. The  registrant's  other  certifying  officer  and I have  indicated  in this
quarterly  report  whether or not there  were  significant  changes in  internal
controls or in other factors that could  significantly  affect internal controls
subsequent to the date of our most recent  evaluation,  including any corrective
actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.


Date: July 26, 2005

                                                 _/s/ Carl E. Worboys_____
                                                      Carl E. Worboys, President
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>  This schedule contains summary financial information
extracted from Balance Sheets and Statement of Operations for
the year ended December 31, 1995 Form 10K of ML Delphi Premier
Partners, L.P. and is qualified in its entirety by reference
to such financial statements.
       
<S>                                          <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                          12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                      DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-END>                           DEC-31-1995
<CASH>                                      714,000
<SECURITIES>                                588,000
<RECEIVABLES>                          37,411,000
<ALLOWANCES>                              0
<INVENTORY>                               0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                          0
<PP&E>                                    0
<DEPRECIATION>                            0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                         41,311,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                         0
<BONDS>                                   0
<COMMON>                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                     0
<PREFERRED>                               0
<OTHER-SE>                             41,258,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>           41,311,000
<SALES>                                   0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            289,000
<CGS>                                     0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                             0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                       657,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                          0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                        0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                        788,000
<INCOME-TAX>                              0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        0
<DISCONTINUED>                            0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                           0
<CHANGES>                                 0
<NET-INCOME>                           788,000
<EPS-PRIMARY>                             62.00
<EPS-DILUTED>                             0
        

</TABLE>
Page 1 of 2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs. CASE NO. 4:02-CR-045-SPM

KENO THOMPSON,

Defendant.

_____________________________/

ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTIONS AND READOPTING

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon the “Response to Magistrate’s

Report and Recommendation Doc #:272" (doc. 277) filed July 17, 2006. This

Court previously adopted the report and recommendation and denied

Defendant’s § 2255 motion (see doc. 273). Defendant then filed a motion for

extension of time in which to file objections, stating that he never received a copy

of the report and recommendation. With leave of court, Defendant now files his

objections, which I have reviewed de novo.

Calculation of jail time credit lies within the province of the Bureau of

Prisons and is not computed by the Court. If Defendant takes issue with the

manner in which BOP has structured his sentence, he may file a petition for writ

Case 4:02-cr-00045-SPM-AK Document 278 Filed 07/19/06 Page 1 of 2
Page 2 of 2

of mandamus, but such complaints are not properly heard in objections to the

report and recommendation.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Defendant’s objections (doc. 277) are overruled.

2. The magistrate judge's report and recommendation (doc. 272) is

readopted and incorporated by reference in this order.

DONE AND ORDERED this nineteenth day of July, 2006.

 s/ Stephan P. Mickle 

Stephan P. Mickle

United States District Judge

Case 4:02-cr-00045-SPM-AK Document 278 Filed 07/19/06 Page 2 of 2
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2041 Introduced in House (IH)]

113th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2041

  To modify the definition of fiduciary under the Employee Retirement 
  Income Security Act of 1974 to exclude appraisers of employee stock 
                            ownership plans.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 17, 2013

Mr. Guthrie (for himself, Mr. Loebsack, and Ms. Jenkins) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Education and 
                             the Workforce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To modify the definition of fiduciary under the Employee Retirement 
  Income Security Act of 1974 to exclude appraisers of employee stock 
                            ownership plans.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. FIDUCIARY EXCLUSION.

    Section 3(21)(A) of the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act 
of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1002(21)(A)) is amended by inserting ``and except to 
the extent a person is providing an appraisal or fairness opinion with 
respect to qualifying employer securities (as defined in section 
407(d)(5)) included in an employee stock ownership plan (as defined in 
section 407(d)(6)),'' after ``subparagraph (B),''.
                                 <all>
```
#### In the Matter of William S. Miller, an Attorney, Respondent. Co-ordinating Committee on Discipline of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the New York County Lawyers’ Association and the Bronx County Bar Association, Petitioner.

First Department,

April 17, 1969.

*Angelo T. Cometa (Edward C. Walsh*with him on the brief), for petitioner.

*Carl J. Rubino*for respondent.

*Per Curiam.*

Respondent was admitted to practice in the Second Judicial Department in November, 1927. The charges involve three specifications. The Referee to whom the matter was sent for hearing sustained two of the three charges.

We find that the record sustains Charge No. 1. We are of the -opinion that the Referee was correct in not sustaining Charge 3, and it is our opinion that Charge 2 has not been sustained.

Charge 1 alleges respondent submitted an application for an allowance in a death action which alleged that he had disbursed $200 for services rendered by a chemist and an electrical engineer. It appears that respondent in that connection paid out only $35.

In the same matter, in Charge No. 2, respondent is charged with filing a closing statement which failed to set forth any payment to a forwarding attorney. In fact, .subsequent to the filing of the closing statement, respondent did pay the -sum -of *24$750, representing 25% of his fee, to the attorney who had referred the matter to him. From the proof it would appear that sufficient 'services were rendered by the referring attorney to warrant the payment.

The third specification, based on the receipt of the sum of $50 from a client in order to expedite a matter, was not sustained.

The report of the Referee is confirmed to the extent indicated above and disaffirmed as to Charge 2.

Respondent has been extremely active in various communal and charitable activities, and his professional character and community involvement have been certified by eminent and outstanding members of the community. Since 1962, by reason of surgery, respondent suffers serious physical disability.

Respondent in 1934 was suspended for a period of one year for professional misconduct at a time when he had been in practice for .seven years’ (241 App. Div. 414). It appears that respondent has since then conducted himself beyond reproach except for the matters under consideration.

Respondent’s actions herein constitute professional misconduct which cannot be condoned and discipline is indicated. We take cognizance of respondent’s communal services and in the light of the circumstances consider suspension for a period of six months to be appropriate. *(Matter of*Bouquet, 28 A D 2d 11; *Matter of*Thomson, 23 A D 2d 441.)

Eager, J. P., MoG-ivern, Markewich, McNally and Steuer, JJ., concur.

Respondent suspended for a period of six months effective May 19, 1969.
§ 3201.42 Wood and concrete sealers. ( a ) *Definition.* ( 1 ) Products that are penetrating liquids formulated to protect wood and/or concrete, including masonry and fiber cement siding, from damage caused by insects, moisture, and decaying fungi and to make surfaces water resistant.
( 2 ) Wood and concrete sealers for which preferred procurement applies are: ( i ) *Penetrating liquids.* Wood and concrete sealers that are formulated to penetrate the outer surface of the substrate.
( ii ) *Membrane concrete sealers.* Concrete sealers that are formulated to form a protective layer on the surface of the substrate.
( b ) *Minimum biobased content.* The minimum biobased content shall be based on the amount of qualifying biobased carbon in the product as a percent of the weight (mass) of the total organic carbon in the finished product. The applicable minimum biobased contents for the preferred procurement product are: ( 1 ) Penetrating liquids—79 percent.
( 2 ) Membrane concrete sealers—11 percent.
( c ) *Preference compliance date.* No later than May 14, 2009, procuring agencies, in accordance with this part, will give a procurement preference for qualifying biobased wood and concrete sealers. By that date, Federal agencies that have the responsibility for drafting or reviewing specifications for items to be procured shall ensure that the relevant specifications require the use of biobased wood and concrete sealers.
[73 FR 27994, May 14, 2008]
#### In the Matter of Sol Pinsley, as Agent for Cardinal Ranch, Petitioner, v New York State Racing and Wagering Board, Respondent.

Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this court by order of the Supreme Court at Special Term, entered in Saratoga County) to review a determination of the New York State Racing and Wagering Board which refused to award petitioner the first place purse money in a harness race. By decision of December 20, 1979, determination of this proceeding was withheld and the matter remitted for further proceedings *(Matter of Pinsley v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd.,*73 AD2d 756). The pertinent facts are adequately set forth therein and need not be repeated here. On remand the board determined that petitioner adopted the incorrect procedure in that he resorted to an appeal rather than protest the result of the race pursuant to 9 NYCRR 4121.1. It is well established that the interpretation given to a regulation by an administrative agency responsible for the regulation’s implementation is given a great deal of weight and should be upheld if not irrational or unreasonable *(Matter of Howard r Wyman,*28 NY2d 434, 438). A protest must be made before the winnings are paid (9 NYCRR 4121.1). Due to time factors, the future placement of horses, and the payment of the purse, it would be reasonable and rational to require a protest for race result related grievances and leave the avenue of appeal for disciplinary measures and unsatisfactorily disposed protests. We note, however, that the language of the regulations leaves much to be desired. For instance, the exact reach of the protest procedure is unclear. Furthermore, it is possible that in a different factual situation a seriously injured driver might be unable to lodge the necessary protest and thereby be deprived of the benefits of the regulation. Consequently, on this record, we are constrained to confirm the board’s determination. In view of this determination, it is unnecessary to pass on the merits of petitioner’s appeal to the board. Determination confirmed, and petition dismissed, without costs. Sweeney, J. P., Kane, Staley, Jr., Main and Herlihy, JJ., concur. [91 Misc 2d 266.]
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. James Johnson, Appellant.

Order, entered December 19, 1967, unanimously reversed and vacated, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, without costs and disbursements, and matter remanded for a rehearing. In the interests of justice, the *524defendant, sentenced as a second felony offender, should be afforded a further opportunity to develop the proofs as to whether or not he was deprived of his constitutional rights in connection with the predicate felony conviction in South Carolina. It is suggested that the District Attorney and Legal Aid fully investigate the facts relative to the alleged representation of defendant by an attorney (Irving Steinberg, Esq.) in the South Carolina criminal proceeding and be prepared with relevant proofs prior to the setting down of the matter for a hearing. Concur—■ Eager, J. P., MeGivem, Markewich, Nunez and Steuer, JJ.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Louis Alicea, Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered May 17, 1968, convicting defendant of grand larceny in the first degree, after a nonjury trial, and imposing sentence. Judgment affirmed. No opinion. Beldock, P. J., Brennan and Hopkins, JJ., concur; Christ and Rabin, JJ., dissent and vote to reverse the judgment and order a new trial, with the following memorandum: In our opinion, the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the retail value of the stolen car was more than $500 (cf. *People*v. *Harold,*22 N Y 2d 443, 445). The owner’s rather vague testimony as to the amount his insurance company paid him after the theft is not probative. No other evidence as to .the value of the stolen car appears in the record. The majority, however, sustain this conviction by taking judicial notice of the 1967 National Market Reports, which listed the wholesale values of used automobiles. We think that those reports are not a proper subject of judicial notice. Even if they were, however, they would not be probative as to the value of the *specific*automobile involved in this case, since these reports reflect only the *average*value of a given class of automobiles (Richardson, Evidence [9th ed.], § 41). A new .trial is required.