NO. 90-106 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1990 

STEER, INC., 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF 

THE STATE OF MONTANA, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Lewis and Clark, 

The Honorable Dorothy McCarter, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Eric J. Fehlig, Esq., Department of Revenue, Helena, 

Montana 

For Respondent: 

Bryan L. Asay, Esq., Kelley & Asay, Helena, Montana 

Submitted: October 25, 1990 

Filed: 

Decided: December 11, 1990 0 

Clerk 
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

The Department of Revenue (DOR) appeals an order of the First 

Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, which grantedtaxexempt status to cattle owned by Steer, Inc. (Steer), on the basis 

that the cattle were property owned by an "institution of purely 

public charityn under §§ 15-6-201 (1) (e) , and -201 (2) (a) , MCA. This 

holding reversed a prior decision of the State Tax Appeal Board 

(STAB). We reverse the ~istrict Court's order. 

DOR raises the following issues: 

1. Did the District Court err in finding STAB'S Findings of 

Fact IX and XI clearly erroneous? 

2. Did the District Court err by failing to remand the case 

to STAB for suitable findings when it found STAB'S Findings of 

Facts IX and XI clearly erroneous? 

3. Did the ~istrict Court err when it held that tax-exempt 

property of an institution of purely public charity need only be 

owned, and not used, by the institution? 

4. Did the District Court err when it found that the 

requirements of a purely public charity did not preclude uses that 

are significantly non-charitable in nature? 

5. Did the ~istrict Court hold that the dissemination of 

religious teachings is a charitable purpose qualifying the 

institution for a property tax exemption, and if so, was this an 

error? 
6. Did the District Court err when it found that the 

production of revenue from property is a charitable purpose 

qualifying the institution for a property tax exemption? 

7. Did the District Court err when it found that the 

beneficiaries of an institution of purely public charity do not 

have to be persons who would otherwise be the recipients of aid 

from local or state Montana governments? 

FACTS 

Steer, a non-profit North Dakota corporation, conducts a 

stewardship program that raises funds, and in turn, donates these 

funds to member evangelical organizations. This unique stewardship 

program, which originated in 1956 and is currently operating in 

twenty-eight states, creates a three-way partnership between a 

donor, a farmer, and a member evangelical organization. 

A donor contributes $600.00 increments to Steer, and receives 

a one-time tax deduction for the charitable contribution. Steer 

then purchases a livestock unit with each $600.00 contribution. 

Steer places the livestock unit with a farmer. The farmer 

agrees to provide free feed and care to the livestock unit, as well 

as its offspring. The farmer sells the livestock's offspring in 

Steer's name, and forwards all of the profits from the sale to 

Steer. The farmer's costs associated with the care of the 

livestock unit are tax deductible. 
Steer then donates all profits, less twenty-seven percent for 

administrative and insurance costs, to a member evangelical 

organization, which can be designated by the donor or farmer. To 

be a member, an evangelical organization must complete an application and be approved by Steer's Board of Directors. Once selected, 

the member evangelical organization must pay Steer an annual 

membership fee . 

The livestock unit is reinvested in this stewardship program 

and continues to yield profit which is donated to member evangelical organizations until it is too old to produce. The old 

livestock is then culled and sold, whereby, again, all sale profits 

go to Steer for distribution to member evangelical organizations. 

Steer currently has approximately 100 head of cattle in Garfield 

County, Montana. 

From 1982 to 1987, Garfield County's Assessor classified 

Steer's then approximate seventeen cattle as taxable property under 

5 15-6-136, MCA, and assessed Steer $485.92 in taxes. Steer 

appealed to the Garfield County Tax Appeal Board for a refund on 

April 22, 1987--this appeal was denied. On June 29, 1987, Steer 

further appealed to STAB. 

On January 30, 1989, STAB denied Steer's appeal on the basis 

that Steer did !'not advance a charitable purpose. The evidence 

establishes that the cattle are raised and sold for a profit. The 

profit is used to advance and further evangelical gospel and 

doctrine. 

4 
Steer petitioned for judicial review on March 24, 1989. On 

December 18, 1989, the District Court reversed and remanded STAB'S 

decision, and held that ind dings of Fact IX and XI were clearly 

erroneous: 

Steer, Inc. objects to STAB'S Finding of Fact 

IX which states that I1[e]ach missionary recipient has as its principal purpose the dissemination of evangelical gospel and principles." Because this finding ignores its 

commitment to providing services and goods to 

the needy, Steer, Inc. argues, it shows that 

STAB failed to look beyond the religious 

aspect of Steer Inc.'s organization. STAB 

also found in Finding of Fact XI that I1[t]he 

evidence in the case establishes that the 

cattle and the property owned by Steer, Inc. 

are not used for any purpose other than the 

purposes set forth in the Findings of Fact 

above." These findings are clearly erroneous 

based upon the evidence on the record. 

The District Court further stated that STAB ignored testimony that 

stated that Steer's funds were used in projects "that were 

charitable rather than strictly evangel is ti^^^ such as a hospital 

construction and educational contributions. From this decision, 

DOR appeals. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

We recognize that in the past this Court has interpreted 5 2- 

4-704, MCA, the standards for judicial review of an administrative 

ruling, to mean that an agency's findings of fact are subject to 

a ''clearly erroneous1' standard and agency's conclusions of law are 

subject to a broader ''abuse of discretion1I standard. City of 
Billings v. Billings Firefighters (1982), 200 Mont. 421, 430, 651 

P.2d 627, 632; P.W. Berry Co., Inc. v. Freese (1989), 239 Mont. 

183, 188, 779 P.2d 521, 524 (citations omitted). "[A] finding is 

'clearly erroneous1 when, although there is evidence to support it, 

a review of the record leaves the court with the definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been committed." Wage Appeal of 

Montana State Highway Patrol Officers v. Board of Personnel Appeals 

(1984), 208 Mont. 33, 40, 676 P.2d 194, 198 (citations omitted). 

"Appellants carry the burden of showing prejudice from a clearly 

erroneous decision.'' Terry v. Board of Regents of Higher Education 

(1986), 220 Mont. 214, 217, 714 P.2d 151, 153 (citations omitted). 

An agency's conclusions of law will be reversed for abuse of 

discretion I1[w]here it appears that the legislative intent is 

clearly contrary to agency interpretation." Billinqs Fireficrhters, 

200 Mont. at 431, 651 P.2d at 632. 

In the future, we will continue to use the "clearly erroneous1' 

standard for reviewing findings of fact. However, in reviewing 

conclusions of law, our standard of review will be merely to 

determine if the agency's interpretation of the law is correct, 

instead of applying the inappropriate abuse of discretion standard. 

In the past, we have applied this standard when reviewing 

conclusions of law of the Workers1 Compensation Court. See Sharp 

v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp. (1978), 178 Mont. 419, 423, 584 P.2d 1298, 

1301; Wassberg v. Anaconda Copper Company (1985), 215 Mont. 309, 

315, 697 P.2d 909, 912; Schaub v. Vita Rich Dairy (1989), 236 Mont. 

6 
389, 391, 770 P.2d 522, 523. The reasoning for simply determining 

if the court's conclusions are correct is that no discretion is 

involved when a tribunal arrives at a conclusion of law--the 

tribunal either correctly or incorrectly applies the law. For that 

reason, this Court concludes that our standard of review relating 

to conclusions of law, whether the conclusions are made by an 

agency, workers' compensation court, or trial court, is whether the 

tribunal's interpretation of the law is correct. 

Our standard of review relating to conclusions of law is not 

to be confused with our review of discretionary trial court 

rulings. This has been defined as "encompassing the power of 

choice among several courses of action, each of which is considered 

permissible." See ~ldisert, The Judicial Process, 1976, page 759. 

Such rulings are usually trial administration issues, scope 

of cross-examination, post-trial motions, and similar rulings. The 

standard of abuse of discretion will be applied to these rulings. 

ANALYSIS 

Because we find reversible error involving two of the seven 

issues presented on appeal, we will limit our discussion to 1) 

whether the District Court erred in finding STAB'S Findings of Fact 

IX and XI clearly erroneous, and, 2) whether the District Court 

erred when it held that tax-exempt property of an institution of 

purely public charity need only be owned, and not used, by the 

institution. 

7 
1. Did the District Court err in finding STAB'S Findings of 

Fact IX and XI clearly erroneous? 

STAB'S Findings of Fact IX and XI read as follows: 

IX 

Each missionary recipient has as its principal 

purpose the dissemination of evangelical 

gospel and principles. 

XI 

The evidence in the case establishes that the 

cattle and the property owned by Steer, Inc. 

are not used for any purpose other than the 

purposes set forth in the Findings of Fact 

above. 

DOR asserts that the District Court incorrectly found Findings 

of Fact IX and XI clearly erroneous because contrary to the 

District Court's holding, STAB did not ignore the fact that Steer, 

in part, supports charitable projects. Rather, DOR argues that 

STAB correctly found that Steer's member evangelical organizations1 

principal purpose is to disseminate evangelical gospel and 

principles. "Principal, here, does not mean llexclusivell--STAB 

used the word "principal" to put into perspective Steer's religious 

activities compared to its charitable activities. 

Additionally, DOR argues that STAB'S Finding of Fact XI 

properly distinguishes that when considering whether personal 

property is tax-exempt under Mont. Const. art. VIII, 5 5 (1) , and 

§ 15-6-201(1) (e) and -201 (2) (a), MCA, it is the use of the 

personal property and not the ownership that is determinative. 

Here, DOR argues that Steer used its cattle exclusively as a 

capital investment for the production of revenue, which in turn, 
was donated to member evangelical organizations--Steer was not 

directly using the cattle as a source of food for the needy. 

Finally, DOR argues that the record is void of evidence that 

Steer was prejudiced by STAB'S decision or that STAB made a 

mistake. Accordingly, DOR argues that the District Court had no 

basis to find Findings of Fact IX and XI clearly erroneous in light 

of Terry and Waqe, supra. 

We agree with DOR1s arguments. The record indeed contains 

substantial evidence to support STAB'S finding that Steer's member 

evangelical organizations1 principal purpose was the dissemination 

of evangelical gospel and principles. This finding does not ignore 

the fact that Steer conducts charitable activities; it does, 

however, properly balance its charitable activities in relation to 

its primary, religious activities. Furthermore, we agree with DOR 

that when considering tax-exempt status, it is the use of the 

property that is determinative rather than the ownership of the 

property. See Flathead Lake Methodist Church Camp v. Webb (1965), 

144 Mont. 565, 570, 399 P.2d 90, 93. Steer exclusively used the 

cattle as a capital investment to produce funds, which in turn, 

were donated to member evangelical organizations that provide 

beneficial services to the needy; Steer did not directly use the 

cattle to feed needy people. Finally, we hold that STAB'S decision 

did not prejudice Steer and the record does not reveal that STAB 

made a clearly erroneous mistake. Theref ore, based on the 

standards of review under Terry and Waqe, the District Court 

9 
incorrectly found STAB'S Findings of Fact IX and XI clearly 

erroneous. 

2. Did the District Court err when it held that tax-exempt 

property of an institution of purely public charity need only be 

owned, and not used, by the institution? 

Steer, through its innovative stewardship program, provides 

a valuable service by raising funds which, in turn, are donated to 

needy people world-wide. However, the fact that Steer's unique 

fund-raising method produces worthwhile results through its member 

evangelical organizations does not negate its tax obligations under 

Montana constitutional and statutory mandate. We have already 

held that Steer's use of its cattle as a capital investment was 

determinative in deciding that it did not qualify for a taxexemption based on being an "institution of purely public charity.'' 

We feel, however, that this case requires us to further clarify 

"institutions for purely public charity." 

In order to receive tax-exempt status, Steer's cattle must 

qualify as "institutions of purely public charity1' under Mont. 

Const. art. VIII, 5 5(1), and 55 15-6-201(1) (e) and -201(2) (a) MCA, 

The primary focus is whether "institutionI1 means entity or 

property. 

Mont. Const. art. VIII, 5 5(1) provides: 

(1) The legislature may exempt from taxation: 
(a) Property of the United States, the state, 

counties, cities, towns, school districts, 

municipal corporations, and public libraries, 

but any private interest in such property may 

be taxed separately. 

(b) Institutions of purely public charity, 

hospitals and places of burial not used or 

held for private or corporate profit, places 

for actual religious worship, and property 

used exclusively for educational purposes. 

(c) Any other classes of property. [Emphasis 

added. ] 

Section 15-6-201(1)(e), MCA, provides: 

(1) The following categories of property are 

exempt from taxation: 

(e) institutions of purely public charity 

[Emphasis added]. 

Section 15-6-201(2)(a), MCA, provides: 

(2) (a) The term llinstitutions of purely 

public charity1' includes organizations owning 

and operating facilities for the care of the 

retired or aged or chronically ill, which are 

not operated for gain or profit. 

Exemptions from property taxation are to be strictly construed. Cruse v. Fischl (1918), 55 Mont. 258, 265-66, 175 Pac. 

878, 881; Town of Cascade v. Cascade County (1926), 75 Mont. 304, 

308, 243 Pac. 806, 807; Flathead Lake Methodist Camp v. Webb 

(1965), 114 Mont. 565, 573, 399 P.2d 90, 94-95; Old Fashion Baptist 

Church v. Montana Deplt of Revenue (1983), 206 Mont. 451, 455, 671 

P.2d 625, 627. Taken together, the Montana Constitution and the 

Montana legislative acts intend llinstitutionsll tomean property or 
place employed for purely public charitable purposes or activities 

rather than an entity. The cattle are property and tax is imposed 

on property. If it is charitable property in its purpose and 

employment and not for profit or gain of income, taxes are not 

imposed. Here, the cattle1 s employment was for the gain of income, 

and therefore, the cattle are taxable. 

Mont. Const. art. VIII, § 5(1) provides that the legislature 

mav exempt property from taxation. The exemptions of property from 

taxation is clearly left to the discretion of the legislature and 

as noted, are to be strictly construed. The history and provisions 

of 3 15-6-201, MCA, reflect the many times when this section of the 

code has been amended to add property to the list of exempted 

items, which includes such items as residences of the clergy to a 

bicycle used for personal transportation of the owner. The 

judiciary may not add livestock to the list of exemptions. 

Accordingly, we reverse the District Court and hold that Steer's 

cattle do not qualify as "institutions of purely public charity," 

and therefore, are not tax-exempt. 

Reversed. 
We concur: 

Justices 
Justice John C. Sheehy, dissenting: 

The majority take a very narrow view of the charitable 

exemption from taxation provided by our State Constitution and our 

statutes. The majority interpretation of that exemption gives it 

a twist that will certainly be a troublemaker in the future. 

First, we must recognize that the constitutional and 

legislative language is imprecise. Montana Constitution, Art. 

VIII, 5 5 (1) (b) , provides: 

(1) The legislature may exempt from taxation: 

. . . (b) Institutions of purely public charity, 

hospitals and places of burial not used or held for 

private or corporate profit, places for actual religious 

worship, and property used exclusively for educational 

purposes. 

With regard to the meaning of the constitutional exemption for 

purely public charity institutions, the intent is open to argument. 

While other clauses of the constitutional permission for tax 

exemptions refer to property of the entities, with respect to 

charity organizations it merely exempts llinstitutions.ll It could 

be argued and some members of this Court think that the exemption 

is only to the "institutionw as an entity, and not to the property 

of the institution. That position is akin to arguing that the 

taxation exemption is applicableto an abstraction, the entity, and 

not to its property, which has a physical existence. 

The majority Opinion rejects that argument, holding that the 

Constitution and the legislature intended llinstitutionsll tomean 

property or place and not the entity itself. That position, of 

course, is correct. Having reached the proper interpretation of 
the imprecise language, however, the majority then reverse their 

logic, holding that the entity's property is taxable. On the one 

hand, the majority hold that the property of an institution is what 

is intended to be exempted though held by a purely public charity; 

on the other hand, they take away that exemption by holding the 

property of such an institution is taxable. 

What that position means for other property held by purely 

public charities is threatening. One can think of examples. If 

a donor gives shares of corporate stock to a purely public charity, 

and the charity holds the stock for income to accomplish its 

purposes, under the logic of the majority the stock itself is 

taxable as property, unless other statutory provisions intervene. 

The donor of a bed to a purely public charity, to be used by the 

charity to acquire income for the charity's purposes would find the 

bed also taxable, although in Bozeman Deaconess Foundation v. 

Gallatin County (1968), 151 Mont. 143, 439 P.2d 915, this Court 

held that such property was not taxable. (Of course, a bed in a 

charity organized for the care of the retired, the aged or the 

chronically ill is specifically exempted under S 15-6-201 (2) (a) , 

MCA, but what of a bed used by a charity to gain funds for the 

homeless or needy transients?) 

Judge McCarter, sitting in the District Court in this case, 

saw the issue quite clearly. She said: "The question is whether 

Steer, Inc. is a purely charitable organization pursuant to 5 15- 

6-201(l) (e) , MCA. Necessarily, the definition of a purely 

charitable organization is crucial to answering this question." 

Such a simple and direct statement of the issue, if followed by the 
majority, would have led to a correct conclusion. If <he 

institution is truly a purely charitable organization, it and its 

property are entitled to exemption from taxation as intended, I 

submit, by the constitutional framers and the legislature. 

The fact that the charity holds its property to gain income 

which in turn is used for charitable purposes should not destroy 

the exemption. This Court indicated that solution in Bozeman 

Deaconess Foundation v. Gallatin County, supra, 151 Mont. at 148. 

This Court said: 

To qualify as a charity does not require that it have an 

exclusive relationship to the poor, and its charitable 

status is not destroyed by the charging of fees for 

admission and maintenance. The case of Frederica Home 

for the Aged v. San Diego County, 35 Cal.2d 789, 221 P.2d 

68, summarizes the modern view of these points: 

"The concept of charity is not confined to the relief of 

the needy and destitute, for 'aged people require care 

and attention apart from financial assistance, and the 

supply of this care and attention is as much a charitable 

and benevolent a purpose as the relief of their financial 

wants.' (Citing case.) So the charge of fees by such an 

institution as a home for the aged will not necessarily 

prevent its classification as charitable if such sums 'go 

to pay the expenses of operation and not to the profit 

of the founders or shareholders, for all persons may 

'under certain conditions be proper objects of charity. 

(Citing cases.)'' 

These same authorities demonstrate that neither its 

public nature nor its standing as a charity is destroyed 

by the admission requirements imposed. Such requirements 

apply to all of a particular class and are consistent 

with charitable methods, motives and purposes. 

No one can demonstrate for me a substantial difference between 

charging fees by an institution in its home for the aged (which 

fees go to pay the expenses of operation and not to the profit of 

the founders or the shareholders) and the holding of property by 
I 

such a charitable organization to gain income, which in turn 

llgo[es] to pay the expenses of operation and not to the profit of 

the founders and shareholders. Indeed, there is no difference. 

Bozeman Deaconess, supra. 

The proper rule in this case should be that once an 

institution is shown to be one of purely public charity, without 

dispute, then its property, of whatever kind, is not subject to 

taxation under the exemption granted by the Constitution and our 

legislature. 

On another point, the Department of Revenue has argued 

strenuously that the purpose of Steer, Inc. in the use of its 

property in this case was to disseminate its religion, and that 

therefore the plan violated the First Amendment if a tax exemption 

were granted. The majority opinion is silent on this subject, and 

I hope by implication, quite properly, rejects that contention. 

The Department argued that dissemination of religion was the 

llprinci~algl objective of Steer, Inc. in its plan. STAB, in its 

Finding of Fact No. IX stated that: "each missionary recipient 

has as its principal purpose the dissemination of evangelical 

gospel and principles.It On that basis, the Department claimed that 

the First Amendment was violated. The District Court disagreed 

with the Department's contention, pointing out that there was 

substantial testimony from Steer, Inc. about how its funds were 

used by its member organizations and that charitable purposes other 

than the dissemination of religion were involved. There is no 

reason to deny the exemption even though the "charity may be 

devoted to bringing people into religious influencetfl as long as 
d 

the funds are truly used for what all recognize as charitable 

purposes not necessarily bound by religion, the aid of the poor, 

the homeless, the aged, the ill, and the misfortunate. Flathead 

Lake Methodist Camp v. Webb (1965), 144 Mont. 565, 399 P.2d 90. 

Another argument of DOR of no merit is its contention that 

the tax exemption should not be allowed if the charitable 

activities take place out of Montana. DOR is in the farcical 

position of claiming a parochial reason for its anti-parochial 

stance. 

It is my view that the District Court should be affirmed. 

+L 4 &bb/ 

Justice 
Justice Fred J. Weber dissents as follows: 

I join in all aspects of the dissent of Justice Sheehy. In 

addition to the elements of his dissent, I desire to comment on a 

fundamental aspect of the majority opinion. 

The majority opinion in Issue 1 concludes that STAB1s Findings 

of Fact IX and XI are correct, and therefore overrules the 

conclusion of the District Court. In substance Finding of Fact IX 

found that each missionary recipient to whom Steer, Inc. 

contributed had as its principal purpose the "dissemination of 

evangelical gospel and principles." In substance Finding of Fact 

XI concluded that the cattle and property owned by Steer, Inc. were 

not used for any other purpose than set forth above in the Findings 

of Fact. The conclusion of fact to be drawn from these two 

Findings is that STAB found that the cattle owned by Steer, Inc. 

were used for the principal purpose of the dissemination of 

evangelical gospel and principles. The substance of the majority 

opinion comment on this aspect is as follows: 

. . . Rather, DOR argues that STAB correctly found that 

Steer's member of evangelical organizations1 principal 

purpose is to disseminate evangelical gospel and 

principles. "Principalw here does not mean Hexclusivell- 

-STAB used the word nprincipalll to put into perspective 

Steer's relisious activities compared to its charitable 

activities. 

We agree with DORIS arguments. The record indeed 

contains substantial evidence to support STAB1s finding 

that Steer's member evangelical organizations' principal 

purpose was the dissemination of evangelical gospel and 

principles. This finding does not ignore the fact that 

Steer conducts charitable activities; it does, however, 

properly balance its charitable activities in relation 
. to its ~rimar~, relisious activities. . . . (Emphasis 

supplied.) 

STAB bases its entire analysis on an invalid assumption that 

religious activities cannot be charitable. The majority opinion 

has fallen into the same error when it concludes that the Finding 

properly balances the charitable activities of STAB in relation to 

its primary, religious activities. To state the conclusion in a 

different way, the assumption is that charitable activities cannot 

include religious activities. The assumption that charitable 

principles or purposes somehow exclude religious principles or 

purposes is incorrect. 

In order to demonstrate that the assumed contradiction is not 

correct, I will review some basic Christian religious principles. 

The gospel according to Matthew, Chapter 25 starting at verse 31 

(Revised Standard Version of the Bible) describes the last judgment 

when Jesus Christ returns: 

When the Son of man [Jesus Christ] comes in his glory, 

and all the angels with him, then he will sit on his 

glorious throne. Before him will be gathered all the 

nations, and he will separate them one from another as 

a shepherd separates the sheep from the goats, and he 

will place the sheep at his right hand, but the goats at 

the left. Then the King [Jesus Christ] will say to those 

at his right hand, ffCome 0 blessed of my Father, inherit 

the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the 

world; for I was hungry and you gave me food, I was 

thirsty and you gave me drink, I was a stranger and you 

welcomed me, I was naked and you clothed me, I was sick 

and you visited me, I was in prison and you came to me." 

Then the righteous will answer him, "Lord, when did we 

see thee hungry and feed thee, or thirsty and give thee 

drink? And when did we see thee a stranger and welcome 

thee, or naked and clothe thee? And when did we see thee 

sick or in prison and visit thee?" And the King will 

answer them, "Truly, I say to you, as you did it to one 

of the least of these my brethren, you did it to me." 
" 

From the foregoing, we may conclude that a principle of 

Christianity is that Jesus Christ will judge Christians upon the 

manner in which they treat the least of people. More 

specifically, the gospel establishes the religious principle that 

Christians are to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, 

to clothe the naked, to visit the sick and those in prison. We may 

therefore conclude that the feeding of the hungry, the clothing of 

those without clothes, and the caring for the sick are essential 

principles of the Christian religion. Note that these also 

constitute charitable activities. 

The evidence in this case with regard to the religious basis 

for the activities of Steer, Inc. and the missionary recipients was 

all presented by Steer, Inc. No contrary information was presented 

by any opposing parties. It is true the evidence did establish 

that Steer, Inc. as well as the missionary recipients have a 

strong set of Christian principles which motivate and guide them. 

As I trust appears from the foregoing gospel quotation, the 

obligation felt by believers in Christianity that they are to feed 

the hungry, clothe the naked, and care for the sick and visit those 

in prison does not convert those activities into some form of 

religious activity which thereby becomes a =-charitable activity. 

This is recognized in the holdings of the District Court which 

are now reversed by the majority opinion. The ~istrict Court 

pointed out that Finding of Fact IX ignored the commitment to 

provide services and goods to the needy by STAB'S failure to look 

beyond the religious aspect of the organization. The District 
a 

Court correctly saw that religious activities can also properly be 

charitable activities, and that charitable activities can of course 

include religious activities, such as providing for the needy. 

In accord with the above described Christian religious 

principles, Mother Theresa and a number of women working with her 

provide food, clothing and shelter for the poorest of the poor in 

cities throughout the world. They do so based upon the above 

quoted gospel principle that when they do this for the least of 

human beings, they are doing it for Jesus ~hrist. Would those 

religious principles disqualify their charitable activities from 

tax exemption? 

In his dissent, Justice Sheehy has clearly set forth the error 

on the part of the majority in assuming that the property of an 

institution of public charity is subject to tax. I conclude that 

the majority also makes a foundational error when it assumes that 

religious principles of Steer, Inc. and its missionary recipients 

disqualifies their activities from being classed as charitable. 

I too would affirm the District Court. 

Justice John C. Sheehy joins in the foregoing dissent.