Fighting the Russl’ans in Winter. 

Three Case Studies 

by Dr. Allen F. Chew 

Combat Studies institute 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027 

DECEMBER 1981 
FORE WORD 

This Leavenworth Paper contains three case studies about winter warfare drawn from twentieth century experience. It provides several valuable 

perspectives about this well known, but sometimes little understood subject. 

Our attention is directed to the distinctive aspects of warfare in subarctic climes, the characteristics of this harsh environment and the climatic 

impact upon a broad range of military operations. These case studies also 

provide examples of how several armies adapted-or failed to adapt-to 

the demands of winter warfare. FinalEy, they demonstrate that even military forces indigenous to subarctic regions, with experienced soldiers, can 

have difficulty in conducting winter operations. 

These case studies show clearly the importance of thorough preparation of soldiers and their equipment, the necessity for special training, and 

the understanding of expertly developed doctrine. Only when these requisites are fulfilled, can even the most skillful commander hope to master 

the conditions imposed by winter in s 

Lieutenant General, USA 

Commandant 

John F Morrison Professor of Military tf~tory 

Dr. David Svrett 

Combned Arms Center HIS~OIIIR 

Dr Roger J Spiller 

Chef. Research Comrrvrree 

L,e,,tenanr Colonel. Kenneth A. Steadman 

Research FeNows 

Major Charles E Heller 

Dr. Edward J Drea 

Dr. W,ll,am G Robertson 

Chiei Teachmg Commirtee 

Lteurenant Colonel David M Glantz 

Teaching FeNows 

L,eurenant Colonel Thomas W’. Sweeney 

L,eutenant Colonel Ph~ll~p W Chlldress 

Captm Pamma B Genung 

Captam Jonathan M House 

0’ Robert H BerIm 

Or, Robert M Epstea 

Sergeant Frrsr Class Robert R Cord.4 

Chief. Hisioncal Services CommIttee 

Or Lawrence A Yates 

Research Librarian 

Elizabelh R. Snake 

Ed/ror 

Al,ce M McCvt 

.srai/ 

Mapr &chard H Barnes 

Sergeant First Class Nelson C Rogers 

Mrs. Peggy K. Barrett 

M,s Debra M. Henderson 

Nl,ss Tracy Searles 

The Leavenworth Papers are issued by the 

Combat Studies Institute, an element of the 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027. The 

views expressed in this publication are those 

of the author and not necessarily those of the 

Department of Defense or any element thereof. Requests for additional copies or for permission to reprint Leavenworth Papers in 

whole or in part should be addressed to the 

Director, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027. 

Leavenworth Papers US lSSN 0 f 95 345 1 
Contents 

Maps ..................................................................... v 

Introduction ............................................................... vii 

Chapter 1. Selected Examples and Lessons from the Undeclared 

Allied-Soviet War in Northern Russia During the 

Winter of 1918----19 *. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...*.... s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 

Chapter 2. The Destruction af the Saviet 44th Motorized Rifle Division . . ~. . . ~. 17 

Chapter 3. Pertinent Aspects of Nazi-Soviet Warfare During the Winter 

sf1941-42 .‘.‘...I..............~‘.............,~............ 31 

Chapter 4. Conclusion .................................................... 43 

Notes ..................................................................... 45 

. . . 

III 

1 E 

1. Locale of Aftied expedition to North Russia, 1918-19 *~.I..~.~.I..~.“.~ 3’ 

2. Battle of Bolshie Ozerki, 31 March-2 April 1919 I.. . . I,. . . _. . ~. . . . I 1 ~. ~ 7 

. e . ,. I -.-.* *I.-,. -..-..- m-..- #pL t--..-.... en.%n “1 
1. Locale sf AlCied expedition to Narth Russia, 1918--2 9 . , l,. . . . . I.. . . . ~. . 3 

2. Battle of Bolshie Ozerki, 31 March-2 April 197 9 . . , . . . . . . “. . . . . . %. . *. . . 7 

3. Soviet attack against Nizhnyaya Gora, 79 January 1919 . . . . . . . . I *. -.. . .I 1 

4. Ninth Army objectives .*....~..........~.*1‘~1....~.*..~..~....D....... 19 

5. General ioeale af Suomussalmi-Raate Campaign . . . . I.. . . ~. . ~. . , . . . , . . 22 

6. Destruction of the 44th Division . c. *.. . . . . . . . . . *. . . . . . . . *. . . . . . a *. . . . . 27 

7. The Soviet Winter Offensiwe, 1941-42 . . . . -. . , . . . . -. . . . . . . . . . . . . . III (j 32 
The Russian winter defeated Napoleon, as every Frenchman knows. It 

also defeated Hitler, as most Germans know. Many Americans share that 

“knowledge”-which is false in both cases! Those popular myths illustrate 

the uncritical acceptance and perpetuation of rationalizations designed to 

obscure the fact that those “invincible” Western military paragons were 

humbled by the “‘inferior” Russians. 

This paper wiI1 not discuss either of those ill-fated campaigns in detail. 

However, in regard to the claims of “General Winter,‘” it should be noted 

that the main body of Napoleon’s Grande Arm&e, initially at least 378,000 

strong,’ diminished by half during the first eight weeks of his invasion”- 

befare the major battle of the campaign. This decrease was partly due to 

garrisoning supply centers, but disease, desertions, and casualties sustained 

in various minor actions caused thousands of losses.3 At Borodino on 7 

September 1812-the only major engagement fought in Russia-Napoleon 

eouId muster no more than 135,000 troops3 and he lost at least 30,000” of 

them to gain a narrow and Pyrrhic victory almost 600 miles deep in hostile 

territory. The sequels were his uncontested and self-defeating occupation of 

Moscow and his humiliating retreat, which began on LQ October, before the 

first severe frosts later that month” and the first snow on 5 November.7 

Hitler”s plans also miscarried before the onset of severe winter weather; 

he was so confident of a lightning victory that he did not prepare for 

even the possibility of winter warfare in Russia. Yet his eastern army suffered more than 734,000 casualties (about 23 percent of its average strength 

of 3,200,OOO troaps)B during the first five months of the invasion, and on 27 

November 1941, General Eduard Wagner, the Quartermaster General of the 

German Army, reported that “We are at the end of our resources in both 

personnel and materiel. We are about to be confronted with the dangers of 

deep winter.“‘9 [My italics.] 

> Although the plans of both of those would-be conquerors of Russia failed 

before the arrival af winter, there is no denying that snow and severe frost 

contributed greatly to the magnitude of their subsequent problems and 

casualties. This study addresses those aspects of warfare in the vicinity of 

. 

vii 
European Russia. The harsh climate of that region can be an indiscriminate 

killer, and the successful army must adapt to winter conditions. In the following examples, all illustrating combat in northern and subarctic European Russia, both Russians and their opponents paid the ultimate price 

when they overlooked this reality. 

Before turning to specific operations, it may be useful to list some of the 

pertinent environmental factors and their military ramifications. The obvious special conditions encountered in the northern latitudes are: extreme 

cold, deep snow, short days, and-in most subarctic locales-dense coniferous forests, sparse population (and consequently few ready-made shelters), 

and poor and widely separated roads. Their military corollaries are also 

readily apparent: 

* Mobility and logistical support are restricted. Roads and runways can 

only be kept open by plowing or compacting the snow. Cross-country 

transport-if possible at all-requires wide-tracked vehicles or sleds. 

a Infantrymen moving through deep snow rapidly become exhausted. 

* Extended marches require skis or at least snowshoes. 

@ Without special lubricants firearms and motors may freeze up and become inoperative at subzero temperatures. 

l Human efficiency and survival require adequate shelter. If not available locally, portable shelter must be provided. 

* Frostbite* casualties may exceed battle losses unless troops wear praper clothing, including warm gloves and footgear. 

* Speedy removal of the wounded from the battrefield to shelter is essential 

to prevent even minor wounds from resulting in death from exposure.1° 

In the following three case studies, examples drawn from recent history 

illustrate these and other distinctive aspects of winter warfare in the Russian environment. 

ALLEN F. CHEW 

Combat Studies Institute 

U.S. Army Command and General 

Staff College 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

*Frostbite is damage resulting from low temperatures. Severe cases involve not only the skin 

and subcutaneous tissue but also deeper tissues, sometimes leading to gangrene and loss of 

affected parts. Persistent ischemia, secondary thrombosis, and livid cyanosis mark severe frostbite 

cases. 

. . . 

VIII 
Selected Examples and Lessons 

From the Undeclared Allied-Soviet 

War in Northern Russia 

During the Winter of 1918~19T ’ 4 

w 

In 1918-19, thousands of Allied troops occupied the ports of Murmansk 

and Arkhangelsk and penetrated deep into the hinterland of northern Russia. This military operation was but one of a series of events that convulsed the Russian nation as a result of its involvement in World War I. 

In March 1917 the centuries-old czarist autocracy collapsed under the pressure of war, corruption, and social and economic dislocation. The inept Provisional Government that replaced the monarchy, plagued by internal strife 

and lacking popular support for its efforts to continue the disastrous war, 

fell easy prey to a Bolshevik military coup in November 1917. Four months 

later the Bolsheviks made good their well-publicized promise to remove Russia from the war by concluding a separate peace treaty with Germany. 

This “betrayal” caused considerable consternation among Russia’s former 

allies. They feared that Germany might transfer hundreds of thousands of 

troops from Russia to the western front, where the war was still raging. 

Also cause for alarm was the possibility that Allied war materiel in Russia 

might fall into German hands or be used by the Bolsheviks-who espoused 

the violent eradication of the existing international order-to consolidate 

their hold on the country. Faced with these and other grim prospects, the 

Allied Supreme War Council decided in 1918 to send military units into 

northern Russia and eastern Siberia. 

The misadventure in northern Russia, with which this chapter is concerned, began when about 150 British marines landed at Murmansk in early 

March 1918. At the beginning of August about 1,200 French troops, British 

marines, and American sailors debarked at Arkhangelsk. The astensible reason for the Allied landings was to prevent German seizure of the vast stores 

of war materiel accumulated at those ports, but after the Armistice between 

the Allies and the Central Powers on 11 November 1918 that pretext lost 

all validity. At that time there were more then 13,000 Allied troops stationed along the Murmansk Railroad and about 11,000 scattered in. an irregular semicircle radiating from Arkhangelsk. Attempts to expel the Bolsheviks from Arkhangelsk province had stalled in the fall af 1918, and 

with the onset of winter, Allied commanders were concerned primarily with 

holding defensive positions while awaiting the outcome of the political debate over the future course of the intervention. That debate ended in the 

1 
2 

spring of 1919. Unable to agree among themselves on the ultimate purpose 

of the intervention, and faced with vocal opposition from their constituents 

and declining morale among their troops, Western leaders decided to withdraw their forces from northern Russia. The withdrawal began in June and 

July when the Americans left Arkhangelsk, and ended in October when 

the last British troops departed from Murmansk.l 

The diplomatic complexities of this poorly conceived and ill-fated intervention are beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that Allied 

motives concerning the North Russian Expedition were varied, confused, 

and sometimes contradictory. What is important for the purpose of this 

study is that Allied troops, including about five thousand Americans,2 were 

involved in combat with the nascent Red Army. 

The Allied forces based at Murmansk and at Arkhangelsk comprised 

separate fronts, commanded by the British Major Generals C. M. Maynard 

and William Edmund Iran&de. Because the Arkhangelsk district witnessed 

more fighting than the Murmansk hinterland during the winter of 1918-19, 

the following examples are from the Arkhangelsk region. General Ironside 

assumed command of the Allied fQrces on the Arkhangelsk front in the fall 

of 1918. Within his small command, the order of battle was extremely complex. In addition to the U.S. 339th Infantry Regiment (with supporting engineer and medical units), there were about 6,000 British trsops, 500 Canadian field artillerymen, 900--1,700 French soldiers, plus small numbers (only 

about 500 in the aggregate) of Poles, Italians, Estonians, Lithuanians, 

Czechs, Serbs, Finns, and Chinese. Not included in the figure of 11,000 cited 

above were various Russian contingents which fluctuated widely in both 

numbers and reliability-including a small unit of the French Foreign Legion and a larger Slavo-Bkitish Legion.3 

Opposing Ironside’s polyglot forces were the Bolshevik troops of Comdr. 

Ateksandr A. Samoilo’s Sixth Independent Army, which probably had no 

more than 14,000 combat effectives during that winter’s fighting. Although 

they were a more hQmQgeneQUS force than the Allies, they included a Chinese company and a Finnish regiment.4 

In the campaigns fought during the winter of 19X4-19, each side at times 

displayed sound adaptation to climatic challenges and at other times made 

fatal mistakes. The Red Army suffered far heavier casualties than the 

Americans (and other Allied units) partly because of the different postures 

of the two forces: U.S. troops were generally on the defensive during the 

winter, whereas the Soviets mounted nearly continuous raids5 and several 

determined offensives. A well-sheltered defender enjoyed a marked advantage over his exposed attacker advancing through deep snow in subzero 

cold. Ironside reccrgnized this fundamental fact. After a few limited and 

abortive attacks designed to secure more advantageous winter outposts, he 

concentrated on the defense of his far-flung positions.6 Stressing the impor- 
p,esehaya\ Kodis;% 

L Shegovari 

I~IENKURSR 

ht’ Padenga 

Map 1. Locale of Allied expedition to North Russia, 1918-19. 
4 

tance of shelter in those conditions ,* Ironside noted that any attack had to 

be short in duration and, as its ultimate objective, had to secure cover.7 

American outpost, Northern Russia, 1918-19 

The most costly battles of the North Russian campaign, fought near 

Bolshie Ozerki from 31 March to 2 April 1913,& clearly illustrate the advantages of the defense. 

The tiny village of Bolshie Ozerki lay between the port of Onega and 

the important Allied position at Obozerskaya Station on the ArkhangelskVologda railroad. Because the port, at the main Allied base of Arkhangelsk 

was frozen fast during the winter, any reinforcements for the railroad front 

had to travel overland from the distant ice-free port at Murmansk via the 

minor road through Bolshie Ozerki. When the 6th Yorkshire Regiment was 

dispatched over this arduous route towards the end of winter, the Red command decided to seize Bolshie Ozerki to prevent those troops from linking 

up with the Allied forces at Obozerskaya.g 

*Shelter not only provided warmth, which benefited both men and weapons, but also concealed the defenders. The attackers, silhouetted against the snow and leaving revealing tracks, 

were easily spotted. Even when they wore white capes, their faces and weapons were visible. 

The attackers atso suffered exhaustion from moving through the heavy snow. 
5 

The preliminaries to the major engagements at the end of the month 

began on 17 March, when a ski detachment of Red partisans led by G&p 

Palkin reconnoitered the village’s defenses undetected, quietly captured two 

sentries, and learned the precise locations sf the Allied positions. With this 

intelligence, Comdr, Petr A. Solodukhin’s brigade of 600 to 800 men surprised and averwhelmed the garrison of 80 to 160 French and White Russian troopsI and captured the outpost at Bolshie Ozerki intaet.1’ 

A small-scale Allied counterattack from Obozerskaya the next day proved 

abortive,‘” but it probably contributed to the Soviet decision to suspend temporarily all offensive operations. The Sixth Army commander, former czarist Maj. Gen. A. A. Samoilo, issued that order to his entire field staff on 

18 March. He cited these factors in the decision: shortages of warm footgear and other provisions; the perilous situation of Solodukhin’s column 

(which, according to Samoilo’s information, had not succeeded in capturing 

all of the buildings of the village); and Comdr. Ieronim P. Uborevich’s report that on another Sixth Army sector half of the troops of his attacking 

battalions had either frozen to death or been disabled by frostbite when 

the temperature dropped below -30°C (-22OFr.l” 

When Samoilo issued an order on 19 March to resume operations on 25 

March-with Obozerskaya now the main objective-the commander in chief 

of the Red Army, the former czarist Col. Ioakim I. Vatsetis, countermanded 

it ‘“because of the severe frost.“l” 

On 23 March about 320 men of the 6th Yorkshire Regiment and 70 

Americans from Company H, 339th Infantry Regiment, launched eoordinated attacks on Bolshie Ozerki from positions west of the village. They 

soon became exhausted, however, from wading through waist-deep snow, 

which also ruled out a charge. Under heavy machine gun fire, they had to 

abandon the attack.‘” 

A simultaneous assault on the eastern approaches to the village fared 

no better. About 300 White Russian and 40 to 80 British troops were halted 

along the roadway by effective enemy fire. At that point, Company E, 339th 

Infantry, tried to flank the Red defenses by skirting through the woods 

north of the road. Already tired from a ten-mile march in their awkward 

Shackleton boots,” the soldiers of Company E required about four hours to 

cover less than three miles, whereupon they were recalEed to their starting 

point. The Allies lost about seventy-five men in those two futile attaeks.16 

After that failure, Ironside, who had recently taken personal command in 

that sector, decided to destroy the village by artillery fire, which was Eargely accomplished on 25 l%arch, just before he returned to Arkhangelsk.17 

*That canvas-and-leather footgear had been designed by the famous Antarctic explorer, Sir 

Ernest Shackleton. Although warm and adequate for sedentary use or with skis, their smooth 

solies and low heels made them extremely slippery on ice or packed snow; lronside considered 

the natives’ felt boot superior. (Kalliday, p. 148; Ironside, p. 63) 
6 

Despite the weather, both sides continued to bring up reinforcements for 

the impending showdown. The Allies constructed strong wooden blockhouses, log barricades, and troop shelters about four miles east of the village, on the road to Oboz,erskaya some twelve miles farther east. By the 

end of the month they had pulled up from their railroad positions all available artillery, mainly ‘75mm guns manned by White Russians. They also 

concentrated all the troops they could spare from Arkhangelsk and other 

sectors, including Companies E, I, and M of the U.S. 339th Infantry, three 

infantry companies and one machine gun company of White Russians, two 

Yorkshire platoons, and an invaluable section of the U.S. 310th Engineers.18 

Those Allied forces, totaling less than 2,OOcE men,‘9 were opposed by an 

estimated 7,000 Red troops2Q including (among other units not positively 

identified) the 2d Moscow Regiment,21 the 97th Saratov Regimentz2 and a 

brigade from Kamyshin (possibly part of Commander Kuznetsov’s Kamyshinsk Division).23 The Soviet artillery included a battery of 4.2-inch guns 

that had been hauled about thirty-seven miles over a minor road at the 

cost of uncounted dead horses.24 

About 8830 on 31 March the Reds cut the phone lines between Obozerskaya and the road positions, and later in the morning three battalions of 

the 2d Moscow Regiment flanked the Allies on the north and attempted to 

capture two 75”mm guns from the rear. Lieutenant Lukovsky, the White 

Russian in charge of those pieces, reversed them in time to get off four 

rounds of shrapnel at point-blank range. His action, coupled with the effective fire of Corporal Pratt”s Lewis gun* team (Company M, 339th Infantry}, halted the attack with heavy losses to the Muscovites. Thereafter the 

fighting shifted to the frontal positions, where the Reds launched repeated 

attacks from the direction of Bolshie Ozerki throughout the day. All failed 

under the devastating fire from the forward blockhouse and the frontline 

posts, and Allied artillery took an added toll of the enemy until darkness 

brought a lull in the battle. 

The main Soviet effort began on 1 April about 0330 (shortly after daybreak) with determined frontal attacks and a weaker demonstration in the 

rear. Inflicting heavy losses, the defenders drove back these and all subsequent attacks with the same effective machine gun, rifle, and artillery fire.25 

At times they even used rifle grenades when the attackers came within 

their ,X&yard range.Z6 

Several deserters who crossed the lines intermittently on that April Fool’s 

Day revealed demoralization within the Red units; they reported that an 

entire company of the 97th Saratov Regiment had refused to advance.2” 

*The Lewis gun was a gas-operated, air-cooled light machine gun with a horizontal drum 

magazine which held 47 rounds of .30-inch caliber ammunition; its rate of fire was about 500 

rounds per minute. 
Soviet Attacks, 

Soviet Reinfor

Allied 

Allie

Q 1 

I 

Map 2. Battle of B&tie Oaerki, 31 March- 2April 1919. 
8 

Nevertheless, because the Allies were still outnumbered and because the 

fighting was so protracted and intense, the Allied command ordered a diversionary attack on Bolshie Ozerki from the west to relieve the pressure 

on the units so heavily engaged east of that village. 

As envisioned in the operations order for the diversionary blow, Company C of the 6th Yorkshire Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Marsh, 

would move along a trail through the woods to flank the village from the 

north. A White Russian officer had recently reconnoitered the trail, and 

Lieutenant Marsh had Russian guides. Captain Bailey’s Company A (Yorkshires) would advance along another trail made about a week earlier; a 

detachment moving along the main road leading into the village from the 

northwest would protect its right flank. Bailey would be assisted by an 

American trench mortar detachment and a machine gun team from Company H, 339th Infantry, which would also provide two infantry platoons 

for the reserve. Part of a White Russian machine gun company would also 

support the two Yorkshire companies. A campany of Polish troops was to 

advance along the main road and to deploy south of the roadway upon 

enemy cantact. 

This counterblow, however, was no more successful than the Soviet offensive that continued at the same time. The Allies had fixed zero hour for 

0300 on 2 April, but at 0200 Lieutenant Marsh reported that his company 

was lost in the woods, that his horses were belly-deep in the snow, and 

that he could not proceed. Thus one of the main elements in the attack 

was neutralized until it returned to the main road, far from its objective, 

about 0510. By then the Poles had suffered heavily and had retired from 

the battle temporarily. By 0610 Company A was partially surrounded and 

forced to yield ground. Captain Bailey was killed about this time, and his 

successor, Lieutenant Goodloss, ordered a withdrawal. Lt. Clifford Phillips’s 

platoon (Company H, 339th Infantry) rushed up from the reserves to cover 

the British pullback. 29 In the subsequent delaying action, that American 

officer was also mortally wounded.30 

The remainder of the day witnessed mostly artillery and mortar exchanges, until Red pressure on both flanks provoked a successful Allied 

counterattack about 1730. The Reds disengaged around 1960, and about an 

hour later the Allies began withdrawing under the cover of darkness to 

their quarters at settlements in the rear. By then they were suffering from 

exhaustion, and there were many cases of severe frostbite.jl 

Soviet operations at the road position east of Bolshie Ozerki had resumed 

on 2 April with an exceptionally heavy artillery and mortar barrage, answered by an effective counterbarrage. Only weak infantry attacks were 

attempted, however, and even they petered out by noon. The costs of the 

previous attacks apparently decided the issue: there were no more attacks 

after 2 April,“2 and by the fifth the Reds were withdrawing from the area. 
9 

Further delay would have risked the loss, or at least prolonged immobifization, of their guns and sleighs in the spring mud.33 Those fierce engagements at the turn of the month were the last major battles of the campaign 

in northern Russia. The Soviet forces had been temporarily checked, and 

the Allies began to evacuate as soon as ArkhangeLsk was reopened to navigation. 

In the battles around Bolshie Ozerki, the defense won both of the main 

rounds: the Allies defended their road positions, and the Reds defended 

BoIshie Ozerki. Both attacking forces suffered heavy casualties from exposure to the weather, although the days were sunny and the nighttime temperatures by then were no worse than a relatively mild -20°C (-4”F).34 By 

day the sunshine melted the snow, which soaked through the canvas tops 

of the Shackleton boots and caused more cases of frostbite among the Allied 

troops than they had experienced during the coldest days of winter35 when 

temperatures sometimes dropped below -4P.” Their enemies suffered even 

heavier losses; a Soviet source acknowledges more than 500 frostbite casualties in the brigade from Kamyshin alone.36 In view of that, Allied estimates of 2,000 Red casualties from all sources may have erred on the conservative side.37 

One reason for those excessive Soviet losses was that the Red command 

recklessly committed the brigade that arrived from the milder climate of 

the southern Volga before it could receive proper clothing; it had neither 

the felt boats (vale&i) nor the sheepskin coats issued to other Sixth Army 

units3* Nevertheless, the mere fact that thousands of Soviet troops were 

deployed in the open for days on end doomed many to freeze to death or to 

suffer frostbite. 

The operations near Shenkursk in January 1919 provided examples of 

other pertinent problems. Having occupied that imposing district center of 

several thousand inhabitants in September,39 the Allies had had time to 

fortify it strongly. When the crisis described below developed in January, 

the Allies had sufficient provisions to last two months, and the garrisoncounting the outposts in nearby villages-totaled about 1,700 American, 

British, Canadian, and White Russian troop~.“~ They undoubtedly could 

have taken a terrible toll of any force attacking them in winter. The town, 

however, was situated an the frozen Vaga River more than 200 miles southeast of Arkhangelsk, far in advance of any Allied positions on eit,her 

flank,41 and tberefore highly vulnerable to encirclement. General Ironside 

ordered the local commander, Colonel Graham, to evacuate at once if the 

enemy attempted an enveloping movement.42 

+-4@3C = -40°F 
10 

Commander Samoilo had in mind just such an operation, one intended not 

only to destroy the Shenkursk garrison, but also to seize the mouth of the Vaga 

north of the town.43 He made elaborate preparations for the offensive, deploying 

at least 3,100 infantry@ for coordinated attacks from three directions. The 

supporting artiIlery included several 4.2-inch howitzers”5 and one G-inch gun.“” 

A detachment of about 150 local partisans was detailed to strike at Shegovari, 

a village some twenty-five road miles to the rear (north) of Shenkursk, held by 

about ninety Americans.47 Two other partisan units of similar size were to 

reconnoiter, harass the enemy flanks, select populated points along the march 

rout.es, and stock them in advance with provisions, fodder, and medicine.4” 

Although white camouflage coveralls were not available, some of the units 

prepared for surprise attacks by removing their sheepskin coats and substituting 

quilted trousers and jackets, over which they wore long white peasant shirts 

and white pants, Thus blending into the snowy landscape, they could not be 

detected beyond 50-125 feet.@ 

The largest of the three main detachments, led by future Soviet Lieutenant 

General Filippovsky, consisted of more than 1,300 infantrymen,50 six heavy 

guns,5* and twenty-one machine guns .52 Assigned the task of a frontal assault, 

it bore the brunt of the actual fighting,53 which took place primarily at the 

outpost,s south of Shenkursk. Nizhnyaya Gora, farthest from the town-about 

fifteen miles-was hit first and hardest. The only troops there when Samoilo’s 

massive blow fell were the forty-seven men of the 4th Platoon of Company A, 

339th Regiment, and even that small unit was divided: Lt. Harry Mead had 

twenty-two men at the exposed southern point, and a sergeant was in charge 

of twenty-three others at the other end of the village. To the left rear, a 

company of Cossacks held the neighboring village of Ust’Padenga. About a 

mile farther to the rear, at Vysokaya Gora, the remainder of Captain Odjard’s 

Company A manned five sturdy blockhouses on a commanding bluff, supported 

by two light guns which were serviced alternateIy by Canadian and White 

Russian gunners. In all three villages Captain Odjard had a total of 450 

riflemen, eighteen machine guns, and two artillery pieces.5* 

Early on the morning of 19 January, when the mercury hit -36°C 

(-33°F),5j Filippovsky’s powerful guns shook Nizhnyaya Gora from positions 

beyond the range of the smaller Allied pieces.“6 From their tiny outpost 

Lieutenant Mead’s half platoon saw far across the frozen Vaga River hundreds of dark figures advancing slowiy through powder snow, which varied 

in depth from three to more than four feet.57 Just before they came within 

small-arms range, the barrage lifted, and the Americans were stunned by 

the sudden appearance of about 100 to 1X ghostly white-clad figure@ who 

rushed them on three sides fram nearby snowdrifts into which they had crept 

undetected before dawn. Within seconds a bitter fight was underway, and the 

Allied machine guns tore into the attackers with great effect. 

But Mead’s hopelessly outnumbered men were also taking losses, and he 

ordered a hasty retreat. When the survivors joined the remainder of the 
L nnroaimate .Scale _--.-_ in --- Yards -.--- 

Soviet Attacks Illmem ‘* 

‘Ust t o”lr 

‘Padenga ,o, 

; Nizhnyaya 11 

Map 3. Soviet attack against Nizhnyaya Gora, 19 January 1919. 
12 

platoon at the rear of the village, they faced a terrible prospect: t,heir only 

route to the security of Vysokaya Gora lay down a hill, across a valley 800 

yards wide, and up another hill to the friendly blockhouses-the entire distance through deep snow with no protective cover. As they struggled 

through the snow drifts, they made perfect targets, and only seven of the 

platoon’s original forty-seven members made it unscathed to friendly shelter.5g The Reds had list an estimated 150 men,“” and the hundreds who 

swarmed into Nizhnyaya Gara were na doubt exhausted from their own 

long march through the snow; consequently, there was no determined pursuit 

on that day. Fihppovsky seemed content for the moment to wear down the 

defenders with his artillery, which fired about 1,000 rounds on the nineteenth 

and 800 the next day.61 The Cossack company at Ust’Padenga departed 

under the cover of darkness and reached Vysokaya Gora undetected on the 

night of the nineteenth.62 

From 20 to 22 January it was the Reds’ turn to face the ordeal of crossing the open valley below Vysokaya Gora. Canadian gunners, firing shrapnel from their commanding positions on the hilltop, slaughtered the Soviet 

infantry struggling through the snow below them. A Soviet source acknowledges that one of the Red battalions lost half its men in those unsuccessful 

attacks”3 The Allied defenses stood firm, but on the evening of 22 January 

Colonel Graham ordered Captain Qdjard to retire on Shenkursk, because it 

had become obvious that the town was the main Red objective.6” 

Odjard’s weary troops had scarcely reached Shenkursk, late in the afternoon of 24 January, when Colonel Graham decided to evacuate that. town 

without a fight, in compliance with General Ironside’s standing order. The 

day before, the partisan raid had been carried out at Shegovari, and reconnaissance had revealed that Soviet forces held nearly all of the roads from 

Shenkursk. Enemy artillery was shelling the town from the northwest, the 

northeast, and the south,65 and communications to the rear were severed in 

the afternoon.66 A successful withdrawal was already problematical; ta remain 

longer meant slow but nearly certain annihilation. In fact, by midnight all 

three of Samoilo’s main columns were in their designated positions in nearby 

villages, ready to begin a coordinated attack on the morning of the twentyfifth.6’ 

The escape of the entire Allied force, approximately 1,500 troops accompanied 

by about 600 civilians, was due to a combination of intelligent leadership, strict 

march discipline, and sheer luck. In silent but determined flight during the 

night of 24-B January, the evacuating column followed a little-used winter 

trail that the Reds had overlooked.69 

Lt. Hugh McPhail of Company A ingeniously ordered his platoon to cut 

off their cumbersome overcoats at knee length, a precaution for which they 

were thankful on the long and difficult march that covered thirty-five to 

forty miles in two days. 69 The awkward Shackleton boots, however, caused 
13 

more trouble. After struggling along precariously on the icy trail that night, 

many soldiers discarded those boots and continued in stocking feet-which 

led to disabling frostbite.70 

Shenkursk was an important psychological and tactical victory for the 

Sixth Army, but Commander Samoilo acknowledged that it failed in two of 

its main objectives: it did not destroy the Allied garrison or capture the 

mouth of the Vaga River.?’ Among the ‘causes for those disappointments 

enumerated by his military eommissar, Nikolai N. Kuzmin, was the fact 

that the attackers did not pursue aggressively because, after twelve days of 

slim rations and exposure to severe frost, the comforts and vast stores of 

provisions at Shenkursk proved irresistible. 72 Samoilo also noted that this 

operation served as a school for his troops, especially by demonstrating the 

need for ski training.7” 

Although a detailed description of all the Allied positions and local engagements is impractical, certain additional aspects of the campaign in 

northern Russia warrant attention for their technical lessons. At, Obozerskaya Allied troops lived in 257 converted railroad boxcars. (The same improvised shelters were used at Murmansk.} Remodeled, insulated, and heated with 

small sheet-iron stoves, they were warm and comfortable,“” although one 

veteran of the expeditionary force remarked that they were “most unhygienie.“75 

Both sides recognized the value of skis, but neither had enough troops 

trained to use them. For example, a Soviet ski battalion from Vyatka 

(modern Kirov), destined for and needed by the Sixth Army, had to be 

assigned instead to the Third Army. 76 The British employed a Finnish officer to train Company D of the 6th Yorkshire Regiment as a mobile ski 

column; however, in its first three weeks of combat, it suffered 160 cases of 

frostbite (compared to only eighteen battle casualties).77 

Snowshoes were also used on occasion, but a major Allied experiment 

with them proved a disappointment. Captain Barbateau, an experienced 

French Canadian woodsman, ordered several thousand pairs of appropriate 

snowshoes from Canada, but they were shipped to Murmansk instead of 

Arkhangelsk. He therefore had to use the ‘“bear paw” type issued by British 

Ordnance. Oval hoops about eighteen inches long, they were too small to 

support a man’s weight in the dry and powdery snow of the northern Russian winter. He nevertheless trained several platoons of White Russians to 

use them and proudly dubbed his detachment “Les Coureurs de Bois.” Their 

first combat mission was a flank attack on Emtsa in December, as part of 

a larger operation designed to capture Plesetskaya. Floundering in the deep 

snow in the woods, his men covered only a kilometer or so an hour. During 

the first day they progressed only about six miles-less than halfway to 

their objective. Even then they were so exhausted that Barbateau requested 

a two-day rest before proceeding, and the whole operation was called off 

before his detachment could engage the enemy.75 
The extreme cold caused many weapons to become inoperative. Lt. John 

Baker (of the 339th Infantry) reported an engagement on 30 December during which all of his Lewis guns were either frozen or broken79 In an operation on ES December, a strong Allied detachment, was preparing to attack 

a superior Red force northeast of Shenkursk. The Allies narrowly escaped 

disaster when, just before the scheduled assault, they learned that neither 

the automatic cannon nor the Vickers” machine guns were working because 

their oil had frozen. This discovery occurred barely in time to permit a 

successful retreat.8’2 

The Ford trucks used by the Allied expedition in northern Russia proved 

unreliable in the severe cold and deep snow, for even packed trails required the 

continuous use of low gear. General Ironside wisely chose to travel by the 

common native sleigh. Those simple but practical conveyances, pulled by 

small but rugged ponies that could survive in the open when necessary, were 

the backbone of the logistics of both sides.81 

American supply column, Arkhangelsk region, January 1919 

*The Vickers was a water-cooled, recoil-operated, tripod-mounted medium machine gun fed 

by a fabric belt holding 250 rounds of .303-inch caliber ammunition; its rate of fire was about 

5OU rounds per minute. 
15 

The special aspects of winter warfare illustrated by this chapter may be 

summarized briefly: 

0 The defensive was normally superior to the offensive because the attacker 

had to contend with debilitating exposure to frost and wind chill, exhaustion 

from moving through deep snow, relative lack of concealment, longer exposure 

to enemy fire because rushing was not feasible, and aggravated supply problems. Any offensive had to be limited in both time and distance-and had to 

have prospects of securing shelter. 

* Troops not acclimated to the harsh environment had less chance for 

survival. Appropriate clothes and boots were essential, and their use required 

supervision: long overcoats were not practical for long marches; camouflage 

required white outer garments. 

0 The wrong snowshoes were virtually useless. 

@ The value of trained ski troops was underscored by their scarcity on 

both sides. 

* The lack of special lubricants caused weapons to freeze at critica 

moments. Motor vehicles also proved unreliable, and native horse sleighs 

provided the most dependable transport. 

e The climate compounded distances, for all deployments and maneuvers, 

especially cross-country movements, required extra t,ime. 

6 Deep snow and ice complicated both retreat and pursuit. Where they 

had to cover open terrain in those operations, both sides found themselves 

in highly vulnerable positions. 

Both contestants knew-or rapidly learned-those principles of winter 

combat, and under ideal conditions both practiced them. That they violated 

those sound concepts so frequently in practice-with generally fatal eonsequences-was most often because both sides were operating on a shoestring. 

The Allies could not substantially reinforce or re-equip their small forces 

because their main base was icebound, and the Soviet eommand-simuhaneously faced with much greater perils on other fronts--could not spare 

more resources for its Sixth Army.82 
The Destruction of the Soviet 

44th Motorized Rifle Division7 + 

2 

+aP 

On 30 November 1939 the Red Army invaded Finland without a declaration of war and’achieved tactical surprise at numerous points along the 

900-mile common border. Despite their overwhelming odds in men and firepower and their virtual monopoly of armor, Soviet forces suffered severe 

and humiliating reverses during the first several weeks of that 105-day eonGet. A partial explanation is that about a third of Finland is north of the 

Arctic Circle, where one of the coldest winters on record had already begun. 

The Finns were prepared for combat in snow at subzero temperatures; the 

invaders were not. It was almost that simple. 

Not all Red Army commanders, however, were indifferent to environmental factors or ignorant of Finnish capabilities. An eighty-seven-page pamphlet, Finlandiya i ee Armiya [Finland and its army], published by the 

Soviet Commissariat of Defense in 1937, noted that all Finnish troops were 

experienced skiers trained for winter warfare, and that their field exercises 

emphasized Finland’s many natural defenses: rivers, swamps, thousands of 

lakes, and vast forests. The future marshal of the Soviet Union, Kirill 

Meretskov, then commander of the Leningrad Military District, which was 

initially responsible for the entire Soviet operation, cautioned on the eve of 

the invasion that serious resistance could be expected. Comdr. Boris Shaposhnikov, Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, also anticipated a 

lengthy struggle against stubborn defenders. 

Cn the mistaken assumption that Finnish workers would welcome the 

Red Army as Iiberators, Stalin ignored his military advisers and rushed 

into the invasion without adequate preparation. In 1939-as in June of 

1941-the Soviet military services paid an enormous price for Stalin’s political 

miscalculations. 

The most dramatic illustration of the price the Finns extracted was their 

annihilation of the 44th Motorized Rifle Division in January 1940. That 

battle is a classic example of what well-trained and appropriately equipped 

troops can accomplish against an enemy who has superiority in numbers 

and firepower but is not prepared for the special conditions of a subarctic 

environment. Such a region typically has dense coniferous forests, few and 

17 
18 

widely separated roads, and a very cold climate-not a favorable setting 

for the deployment of standard motorized or armored units in winter. It is 

a realm where specially trained and equipped light infantry may prove its 

worth. 

Among the four Soviet armies initially involved in the invasion, the Ninth 

Army was to bisect Finland at its narrow waist by driving for the northern 

end of the Gulf of Bothnia. On 30 November the Ninth Army commander 

hurled three divisions across the border, but they could not cooperate with one 

another because they were separated by sixty to one hundred miles of roadless 

woods. Thus it is possible to examine the central prong of the Ninth Army’s 

offensive in isolation from other operations. 

The main units of the 163d Rifle Division brushed aside a fifty-man 

covering detachment on the minor road that ran from the border near 

Juntusranta to Suomussalmi village, while the division’s reconnaissance battalion and one rifle regiment pushed back two Finnish infantry battalions 

along the better road to Suomussalmi from Raate, about thirty miles south of 

Juntusranta. On 7 December the two columns joined forces to capture 

Suomussalmi, some twenty-five miles from the Soviet border. There a brigade 

of less than 5,000 men held the 163d Division in check until more reinforcements 

could reach that remote district. 

By Christmas the Finnish forces totaled 11,500 men, reorganized as the 

9th Division. This division had been formed in haste from various reserve 

units that happened to be available; only one of its three infantry regiments, JR”27, commanded by Lt. Col. Johan Mgkiniemi, had been a part 

of that division before the war (the other peacetime regiments had previously 

been deployed to distant regions). Lt. Col. Karl Mandelin’s newly’ formed 

JR65 was rushed to Suomussalmi from Oulu. Lt. Col. Frans FagernSis’s 

JR64 arrived from the southwest and included the only regular army troops 

in the division. These reserve units had never before served together, but 

coordination was good because all of the regimental commanders and the 

division commander, Cal. Hjalmar Siilasvuo, were veterans of the 27th 

JZiger Battalion. That unit of some 1,800 Finnish volunteers had fought in 

the Kaiser’s army against the Russians in the First World War. After Finland gained its independence from Russia in December 1917, those JSiger 

veterans received additional battle experience in the Finnish civil war of 

1918. They aslo became the nucleus of the Finnish officer corps. 

On 27 December Colonel Siilasvuo launched a major counterattack 

against his opponent, who outnumbered him by several thousand men and 

also enjoyed a vast superiority in firepower. In two days of fierce fighting 

the Finns shattered the 163d Division; before the month ended its survivors 

“JR: infantry regiment. 
FINLAND 

mi 

Map 4. Ninth Army objectives. 
were fleeing in disorder northeast towards the frontier. By then the snow 

was at least three feet deep and the mercury dipped to -30” to -40”. Daylight lasted only about five hours. 

While the battle with the 163d Division was still developing, the Ninth 

Army had dispatched along the Raate road a strong reinforcement, Commander Vinogradov’s elite 44th Motorized Rifle Division. This regular army 

unit was originally from the Kiev Military District, and most of its troops 

were Ukrainians who were not familiar with northern woods. (In contrast, 

many of Siilasvuo’s men were lumberjacks in peacetime.) The crew of the 

Finns’ lone airplane* spotted advance elements of the 44th Motorized Infantry Division as early as 13 December, and they estimated that the main 

components were on the Raate road by the twenty-fourth. Had they succeeded in linking up with the 163d Division in time, the defense of central 

Finland would have been seriously jeopardized. 

However, Colonel SiiIasvuo had countered this potential threat before it 

became a reality. On II December he established a roadblock at a ridge 

between Lakes Kuivasjgrvi and Kuomasjgrvi, about six miles southeast of 

Suomussalmi. There Capt. Simo Makinen’s two infantry companies, reinforced by additional mortars and guns, held up the advance of the entire 

44th Division. Their success was due both to their own initiative and mobility and to the fact that the road-bound Russians were vulnerably ignorant 

about the strength and dispositions of the Finns. 

The 44th Division had large amounts of motorized equipment, including 

about fifty tanks, all of which were confined to a single narrow dirt road 

through a pine forest. Under those circumstances the division could not 

bring more than a fraction of its abundant firepower to bear on the Finns 

at the roadblock. Although they had several hundred pairs of skis, none of 

the Russians had been trained to use them; therefore, even the infantry 

was confined to a radius of a few hundred yards on either side of the 

roadway. 

In contrast, all of the Finns were experienced skiers and thus able to 

keep the 44th Division under constant surveillance. They also harassed it 

night and day with hit-and-run attacks on both of its vulnerable flanks, 

which stretched nearly twenty miles from the roadblock to the border. Approaching silently on skis and camouflaged in their white snowsuits, the 

*Colonel Siilasvuo bad but one obsolete plane at his disposal. Although it could be flown 

only at dawn or dusk, it was effective for reconnaissance because the Russians were clearly 

visible on the roads. The Soviets employed very few aircraft here, although the Finns saw 

many bombers overhead enroute to Oulu and other rear areas. Because of short days and the 

cover provided by the dense forests, air power played a very minor role in the early campaigns 

in central Finland in general. The Soviets then directed their bombing efforts mainly against 

Finnish towns and the defenses on the Rarelian Isthmus far to the south. 
21 

Finnish raiders often achieved complete surprise. When they opened fire 

from the woods at close range, their Suomi submachine guns (firing seventy 

rounds per magazine} were especially effective.* 

Misled by the frequency and effectiveness of those attacks, Commander 

Vinogradov believed that a much larger force opposed him. Consequently, 

he made no major effort to rescue the 163d Division while it was being 

destroyed just six to eight miles beyond the roadblock. The minor attacks 

he launched on 24 and 25 December failed to dislodge Captain Makinen’s 

small force. On the twenty-seventh, Vinogradov scheduled a new attempt 

to smash the roadblock for 1030 the next morning, but raids by two Finnish 

companies early on 28 December led him to revoke that order and to direct 

his division to dig in for defense on the road. 

While still preoccupied with the numerically superior 163d Division, 

Siilasvuo had the foresight to order the preparation of an improvised winter 

road for future operations against the 44th Division. A truck equipped with 

a snow plow was driven over a series of frozen lakes that paralleled the 

Raate road about four to six miles to the south to form the winter road. 

The Finns also began clearing a snow trail about fifteen miles long from 

Moisiovaara, at the end of an existing road, to the winter road (the socalled ice road). This road system enabled them to supply their forces on 

the enemy’s southern flank from a railhead twenty miles beyond Moisiovaara. 

The Finns plowed another improvised road along the Haukipera watercourse to a point just west of Lake Kuivasjgrvi. From there the road went 

overland (out of sight of the Russians across that lake near the roadblock}, 

skirted the lake on the south, and then turned east. Where these winter 

roads branched cross-country from watercourses, the Finns used their usual 

method of compacting snow in areas where truck plows were impractical: a 

skier led a horse through the snow (in deep snow the horse proceeded by a 

series of jumps, which necessitated the rotation of lead animals), followed 

by a horse pulling an empty sled, followed in turn by a series of horsedrawn sleds with progressively heavier loads. 

Previous Finnish experience in bitter fighting just north of Lake Ladoga 

had indicated that three miles was the extreme limit for effective flanking 

attacks in wooded wilderness. More ambitious attempts had failed because 

of the problems of communications, supply, and artillery control in such a 

heavily forested environment. Thanks to Siilasvuo’s winter roads, however, 

which alleviated those problems, large-scale flanking attacks were successful 

fifteen miles beyond the roadblock. 

*Each Finnish division was authorized 250 of these weapons, ideal for forest fighting which 

is necessarily at close range. The Russian forces in Finland had nothing similar until February 

1940. 
I 3YRY 

/r Moisiovaara 

I 

25 

-I 

Map 5. General locale of Suomussalmi-Raate Campaign. 
23 

The initial moves to destroy the 44th Division began while mopping-up 

operations against the 163d were still in progress. On New Year’s Eve a 

reinforced battalion of light infantry made a probing attack to the vicinity 

of the Haukila farm (see map 6). Skirting Lake Kuivasj&rvi on the south, 

they encountered a Russian battalion east of the lake. They confirmed that 

the area was heavily defended. In fact, the largest concentration of the 

44th Division-a reinforced regiment and most of the division’s tanks and 

artillery-was strongly entrenched in a two-mile sector just east of the roadblock. 

On 1 January a small reconnaissance unit reported that the enemy had 

occupied the Eskola area, about one and a half miles south of the Raate 

road on another road branching off from it and crossing the border to the 

southeast. To deny the Russians further use of that road, Siilasvuo immediately dispatched Capt. Ahti Paavola’s light battalion to the Sanginlampi 

area, about three miles south of Eskola. 

Now the winter road over the frozen lakes began to prove its worth. 

Paavola’s troops easily skied along it for fifteen miles on New Year”s Day, 

camping for the night near the M&kel& farmhouse. Two larger strike 

groups, Task Forces Kari and Fagerngs, also skied along that ice road during the first two days of January. They deployed from Suomussalmi to 

positions as far as twenty miles to the southeast from which they would 

later launch coordinated flank attacks. Maj. Kaarle Kari’s three battalions 

bivouacked in the M%kel& area, while most of Lieutenant Colonel FagernWs 

two battalions camped near Heikkils. One reinforced company went as far 

as V&k%, just south of Raate. 

All of those units enjoyed the comfort of Finnish Army tents, each of 

which was easily transported on one skifflike sled called an alzhio, which 

was harnessed to three skiers, with a fourth behind it to steady the load. 

The units also used that simple carrier to haul mortars, heavy machine 

guns, and supplies and to evacuate the wounded. Each tent, heated by a 

wood-burning stove, kept twenty men comfortably warm on even the coldest 

nights. Lying on soft pine branches and sleeping in their uniforms, the 

Finns did not need blankets. 

In marked contrast, the Russians huddled around open campfires or dug 

holes in the snow for shelter. At best, they had an improvised lean-to, a 

shallow hole covered with branches, or a branch hut fashioned at the roadside or in a ditch, The fortunate ones had a fire in a half barrel. Many 

literally froze to death in their sleep. Lack of proper footgear aggravated 

their misery; the summer leather boots which most wore contributed to 

many frostbite cases. Finnish estimates put Russian losses from the cold 

as high as their battle casualties. Once the Finns had begun major and 

sustained counterattacks, the enemy’s problems of survival worsened: it 

became too dangerous to use open fires at night. 
24 

Numbering about a thousand men, Capt. Eino Lassila’s battalion 

(L’JR27) began the first sustained effort to cut up the 44th Division during 

the night of I January. Using the winter road previously cleared around 

the southern end of Lake Kuivasjgrvi and extending to the east, a rifle 

company moved ahead as a trail security party during the afternoon of 1 

January. The remainder of the battalion follawed about an hour later. By 

1700 the entire battalion had reached the end of the horse trail (the winter 

road), where they ate a hot meal before proceeding to their objective some 

three miles to the north. Pulling machine guns and ammunition along on 

akhios, they traversed those last miles through dark woods in deep snow 

and bitter cold silently on skis. 

About 2300 the advance guard reached a ridge about four hundred yards 

from the Raate road, where they could see the enemy grouped around 

numerous campfires. Captain Lassila positioned six heavy machine guns 

on each side of the assault force on the ridge. He ordered two rifle companies to advance abreast and very close to one another, while the third remained 

in reserve near the command post behind the ridge. Upon reaching the road, 

one company would push east, the other west, to seize about five hundred 

yards of the roadway. Then the attached engineer platoon would throw up 

roadblocks in both directions by felling trees and mining them. 

A half hour after midnight the assault companies advanced, overran the 

sentries posted about sixty yards from the roadway, and reached the road 

with little opposition. By a fortunate accident they had emerged from the 

woods some five hundred yards east of their assigned objective, the Haukila 

farm. Instead of the strong infantry defenses they had expected, the Finns 

fell upon an artillery battalion, which they easily captured. When they 

struck the road all of the field guns were facing west; although the Russians 

managed to turn two pieces towards the south, their crews were shot down 

before they could fire a single round. The Soviet four-barreled antiaircraft 

machine guns were also ineffective because they were mounted so high on 

trucks that they fired over the Finns’ heads. The Finnish assault companies 

completed their task in about two hours with only light casualties; they did 

not even need the reserve company. 

Using the horse and sled method described above, the battalion supply 

troops worked all night long to extend the winter road from the end of the 

horse trail to the battle area. About 0700 the first priority shipment arrived 

via this route-two antitank guns. They saw a&ion almost immediately 

when the Russians launched their first counterattack from the east. Within 

fifteen minutes they destroyed seven tanks on or near the road, making 

the roadblock even more effective. The Finns also beat off an infantry 

attack. 

Later that morning hot meals were sent forward from the support area, and 

tents were erected behind the ridge. The troops then rotated so they could warm 
25 

up and have hot tea inside those shelters. Except when under immediate 

attack, they were routinely relieved after two hours of exposure to the cold. 

In contrast, the Russians were both cold and hungry. Finnish patrols deliberately sought out field kitchens as targets and eventually destroyed or 

captured all fifty-five of them. Each day the roadblock held, the Russians 

grew weaker and more demoralized.* 

During the afternoon of 2 January about two companies of Russian infantry waddled through deep snow to hit Lassila’s roadblock from the west, 

but the Finnish reserve company caught them from the flank and forced 

them to withdraw. Then, as later, the 44th Division failed to coordinate its 

counterattacks and thus permitted the Finns to deal with them one at a 

time. 

That same day Capt. Aarne Airimos’s battalion (III/JRZ7) assaulted the 

road on Lassila’s left flank and encountered the strong defenses near the 

Naukila farm. Although he secured positions close to the roadway, he could 

not sever it. That evening Colonel Siilasvuo ordered Capt. Sulo Hgkkinen 

to position his light battalion ‘(Sissi Pl**) closer to Haukila, where it could 

support the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 27th Infantry Regiment. Hgkkinen 

also sent reconnaissance patrols east of Lassila’s roadblock. 

Further to the southeast, on 2 January, Captain Paavola’s light battalion 

advanced towards the Sanginlampi farmstead from MZkel& Because the 

Russians had deployed considerable forces there via the road past Eskola, 

Siilasvuo had to send Major Kari’s units to assist Paavola. On 3 January 

Kari sent the 4th Replacement Battalion into the attack, and the next day 

it captured the Sanginlampi area in heavy fighting. Meanwhile, on 3 

January one company of Sissi Pl cut the road north of Eskola, which enabled another of Kari’s battalions (ER *** P15) to take Eskola from the south 

the next morning. Kari’s third battalion (I/JR64) also reached Eskola that 

day. Thus, by 4 January Task Force Kari had secured an excellent attack 

position within two miles of the Kokkojgrvi road fork. 

The Finnish term for such an entrapped enemy force is a motti, which is their word for a 

stack of firewood piled up to be chopped. Motti warfare became a common feature of the 

battles in the forested wilds north of Lake Ladoga. When the Finns iacked sufficient firepower 

to reduce strong mods-same of which contained scares of tanks-they relied upon cold and 

hunger to destroy their enemies. 

**Sissi literally means guerrilla, but it should not be equated to partisans; it was essentially 

light infantry employed in a manner similar to the U.S. Army Rangers, but Sissi units did not 

receive special training like the Rangers. 

I?: Battalion 

***ER: Indedpendent (Detached) 
26 

At the same time Task Force Fagernk’s battalions (II and IWJR64) 

had been improving communications from the base camps towards the 

Raate road, but not close enough to alert the enemy. The company at V&kg 

constructed a winter road as far as Linnalampi, while the main units at 

Heikkilz opened a poor road part way to HonkajBrvi. By 4 January both 

forces had relatively easy access to points within four miles of the Raate 

road. 

On 4 January Colonel Siilasvuo issued orders for a general attack designed to destroy the 44th Division the next day. Two new task forces were 

assembled; Lieutenant Colonel Mgkiniemi’s included all three battalions of 

his own regiment (JR27) plus the 1st Sissi Battalion (Sissi Pl). Siilasvuo 

allocated six of his eight field guns to MBkiniemi, because he had to attack 

the strongest known enemy concentration- in the Haukila area. Lieutenant 

Colonel Mandelin’s Task Force, two battalions of JR65 and three separate 

units of company size or smaller, was to strike Haukifa from the north in 

coordination with Mtikiniemi’s blow from the south. 

Just east of Mzkiniemi’s sector, Task Force Kari-with three battalions 

and the remaining two field guns-was to destroy the strong units in the 

Kokkoj&vi-Tyynelz region by flank attacks. With part of his force he was 

also to push east to link up with Task Force Fagends. Comprising two 

battalions of JR64, Task Force Fagerr& was supposed to cut the road about 

a mile from the border and at the Purasjoki River to prevent the 44th 

Division from receiving reinforcements from the east. 

On the fifth, Soviet resistance was still so strong that none of those 

attacks succeeded completely. The Soviets checked three of Task Force 

Mgkiniemi’s battalions as they closed on the Raate road east of the original 

roadblock. The fourth, Captain Lassila’s battalion, which had been holding 

its stretch of the road since 2 January, lost ninety-six men that day as the 

Russians desperately attempted to break through to the east. 

Attacking from the north, Task Force Mandelin also made little progress, 

although it did secure-too lightly, as it later developed-a minor road leading northeast to the border near Puras in order to block any Russian retreat 

in that direction. Task Force Kari’s attacks in the Kokkoj&vi and Tyynefg 

areas were likewise thrown back on the fifth; the Finns sustained heavy 

losses at Kokkoj&rvi. 

Task Force Fagerr& achieved the day’s best results, although it accomplished only half of its mission, its attacks in the Raate area and at 

Likoharju having been repelled. Near M&tyl& however, one of its platoons 

did ambush and destroy several truckloads of reinforcements that were part 

of the 3d NKVD* Regiment, which had been sent to assist the 44th Division 

*NKVD: People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs, which included both secret police and 

barder guard formations. 
27 

TASK FORCE 

MANDELIN 

l-ASK FDRCE’“E ’ 

MBkelH 

LEGEND 

Soviet Defense Pa&ions 

Finnish Roadblocks 

Finnish Counterattacks 

Winter Roads 

Map 6. Destructian af the 44th Division. 
28 

at the beginning of January. In a renewed assault that night, Fagem& 

finally took a stretch of the Raate road just north of Likoharju and held it 

against a strong counterattack from the east. Around 2200, his engineers 

blew up the Purasjoki River bridge, thus preventing further enemy truck traffic 

beyond that point (the river banks were too steep for motor vehicles). 

The decisive battles occurred on 6 January. Task Force Mgkiniemi overcame stubborn resistance to widen its hold on the Raate road east of the 

original roadblock. By evening all four of its battalions had reached the 

road, and the 3d Battalion had established a roadblock west of the one the 

1st Battalion was still defending against repeated attacks. About 0200 the 

next day the Finns resumed the offensive, and after an hour’s battle the 

enemy troops facing the 2d and 3d Battalions (JR27) abandoned their heavy 

equipment on the road and fled towards Haukila hill. 

On the opposite side of the road, Task Force Mandelin spent most of 6 

January hunting down enemy stragglers who were retreating through the 

woods to the northeast. Trudging through the snow on foot, the demoralized 

Russians were easy prey for the Finnish skiers 

About 0300 on 6 January, a reinforced company of Task Force Kari cut 

the Raate road about a mile east of Kokkojgrvi and established another roadblock, which it held against two strong counterattacks. Desperately trying to 

fight its way out to the east, the 44th Division was being cut into smaller 

and smaller fragments. Battalion ERP15 seized a segment of the road east 

of Tyynel& about 1100, after a three-hour battle. The main forces of the 

battalion then turned west towards Tyynel8. By afternoon the Russians 

were abandoning this sector and fleeing along the Puras road, where only 

two Finnish companies were screening a broad sector. Colonel Siilasvuo 

therefore sent Captain Paavola’s detachment to block that escape route at 

Matero, which Paavola reached that evening, 

The freshest Russian troops, including the NMVD unit, counterattacked 

Task Force Fagern&s in such strength during the morning of 6 January 

that it had to withdraw a short distance into the woods to escape the fire 

of five Russian tanks. After their reserve company arrived, the Finns resumed the offensive near the Purasjoki bridge, where they estabhshed defensive positions west of the river. Nevertheless, Russian counterattacks 

continued near Likoharju late into the evening. 

To relieve the pressure on Fager&, Siilasvuo ordered Kari to send a 

battalion (I/JR64) against the enemy who were operating between those 

two task forces. That understrength battalion advanced along a forest path 

from Eskola to Saukko. Overcoming stiff resistance there, it pushed on by 

evening to Mbntyl&, which it book after several hours of fighting. By then 

so many Russian stragglers had bypassed the roadblock east of KokkojQrvi 

through the woods that they threatened the battalion’s rear. Therefore, late 
29 

in the evening the battalion commander turned his front from east to west 

and destroyed those harassing groups. The company near Raate also resumed its attacks on 6 January to prevent Russian movement on the road 

near the border. 

Late in the evening of the sixth, Commander Vinogradov belatedly authorized the retreat that had been underway in many sectors for hours. He 

advised his subordinate commanders that the situation was desperate and 

that those who could escape should. 

Although only mappingup was, necessary in most sectors on 7 January, 

the Russians were still trying to fight their way through to the east near 

Likoharju, About 0400, with the help of tanks, they threw a Finnish company back from the Purasjoki River. However, a Finnish counterattack at 

1030 that morning dispersed the Russians in disorder. The Finns then continued westward to capture Likoharju, where they took many prisoners and 

five tanks. 

The final attempt to rescue the 44th Division came during the early morning darkness when infantry, supported by artihery positioned behind the 

border, assadted the company at Raate. After repelling that attack, the 

Finns sent a reconnaissance patrol two miles inside Soviet territory, where 

it encountered only support elements. 

There was also minor fighting near Lake KokkojBrvi and Tyynelg early 

on 7 January, but the Russians knew they were doomed. At daylight, troops 

of Task Force Mgkiniemi crossed the Raate road near Haukila and pushed 

north PzntiI they linked up with Task Force Mandehn. 

The Russians in bunkers along the shore of Lake Kuivas&vi resisted 

stubbornly, but the Finns cleared that area during the day and opened the 

road to Suomussalmi. The last organized resistance came from bunkers near 

Lake Kuomasj&vi, A Finnish platoon dispatched late in the evening returned from those positions at 6400 on the eighth with seventy prisoners. 

Mopping-up continued for several days, as the Finns hunted down halffrozen stragglers in the woods along the entire length of the Raate road 

and to the north. By the standards of that small war, the booty was enormous: the Finns captured 43 tanks, 70 field guns, 278 trucks, ears, and 

tractors, some 300 machine guns, 6,060 rifles, 1,170 live horses, and modern 

communication equipment which was especially prized. The enemy dead 

could not even be counted because of the snow drifts that covered the fallen 

and the wounded who had frozen to death. A conservative Finnish estimate 

put the combined Russian losses (the 163d and 44th Divisions, plus the 3d 

NKVD Regiment) at 22,500 men. Counting killed, wounded, and missing, 

Finnish losses were approximately 2,700 (only about 12 percent of these 

casualties were frostbite cases). 
Debris of the 44th Division along the Raate mad 

Additional features of winter combat demonstrated in this classic battIe 

include: 

6 The great utility of skis: The relative immobility of troops not trained 

to use skis affected intelligence as well as deployment. Finnish ski 

patrols kept their road-bound enemy under continuous surveillance, 

whereas the Russians remained ignorant of the Finnish strength and 

dispositions. 

* The effectiveness of improvised roads: In terrain where trucks fitted 

with snowplows could not get through, the simple method of compacting snow with a series of harse-drawn sleds was quite effective. 

* The advantages of specialized training and equipment: Sleeping on 

pine boughs in heated tents kept the Finns comfortable while their 

opponents were literally freezing to death a few hundred yards away. 

* Unusual targeting: The Finns accelerated their enemy’s debilitation by 

firing on his campfires and destroying his field kitchens. 

The Russians had reason to regret the folly of launching their invasion 

without thorough preparations to cope wit,h the environment, but they were 

not the last to make that costly mistake. 
Pertinent Aspects of Nazi-Soviet 

Warfare During the Winter of 

ir941--42 

3 

1 

tip 

During the fifteen-month interval between the Winter War and Hitler’s 

invasion of Russia, the Red Army profited from its experience in Finland. In 

addition to making genera1 organizational and tactical changes, the 

Soviets paid more attention to winter clothing, equipment, and trainingincluding that of ski troops-in marked contrast to their future opponents. 

Many of the combat problems the German Army encountered in European Russia during the winter of 1941-42 resemble a greatly amplified playback of the Arkhangelsk campaign of 1918-19. The Germans paid an exorbitant price for ignoring the lessons of those, and other, earlier winter campaigns. General Dr. Waldemar Erfurth noted that before 1941 the German 

General Staff had never been interested in the history of wars in northern 

and eastern Europe. No accounts of the wars of Russia against the Swedes, 

Finns, and Poles had been published in German. “The older generation 

which had been brought up in the tradition of von Moltke f , . considered 

it sufficient to study the countries immediately surrounding Germany. . . . 

the northern regions of Europe remained practically unknown to the German soldier.“1 

The devastating results of the decision to expose German troops to combat in the latitude of Moscow-the same as that of Hudson Bay in Canada-without appropriate clothing and provisions were so widespread that it 

is impossible to single out one particular battle as the best example. Accordingly, the observations that follow are generalizations applicable to a 

very wide front. 

Weather 

In 1941 winter weather arrived in Russia earlier* than usual.2 Initially, 

that was not entirely detrimental to German operations, because it cut short 

the autumn rasputitsa, the period of heavy rains which twice a year turns 

the unpaved roads of central and northern Russia into an impassable 

*In normal years, snows begin in central European Russia about mid-November and severe 

cold sets in during the latter half of December. 

31 
32 

: 

. 

Limit of German 

- - - (and Finnish) 

Advance, 1941 

(i I 

- Ground Regained, 

Russian Advance, 

Winter 1941-42 

1 100 0 I.00 200 300Miler 

r-Q 100 ' 3QQKSometers 

FINLAND 

yitebsk s 

h&k 

iPOLAND 

Tikhvin 

HUNGARY 

- Rostov 

Map 7. The Soviet Winter Offensive, 1941-42. 
33 

morass of mud. The temperature dropped sharply at the beginning of 

November, causing the rolads ta freeze, thus allowing the movement of 

trucks and tanks.3 

Although there is general agreement concerning weather conditions on 

the Russian front through October 1941, there are many conflicting versions 

of the severity of temperatures during the weeks and months that followed. 

For example, Field Marshal von Back, commander of Army Group Center, 

recorded in his war diary on 5 November 1941 that the mercury dipped to 

-29°C (-20aF),i and Albert Seaton reported that around 24 November it was 

a steady -30°C (-22OFj.s In contrast, Marshal Zhukov, then responsible for 

defending the approaches to Moscow, stated that during the November general offensive the temperature on the Moscow front remained stable at -7” 

to -10°C (+19’ ta +14OF).” In a work specifically refuting German accounts, 

another Soviet spokesman cites the Meteorological Service records of the 

minimum temperatures for the Moscow area in late 1941: October, -82°C 

(about +17”F); November, -17.3“C (+l”F); December, -28.8”C (-20°F).7 There 

were also many reports of temperatures as law as -40” during that exceptionally cold winter,8 and at least one report af -53°C f-63’F).$ 

In terms of casualties, the precise temperatures are virtually meaningless, because a poorly clothed soldier exposed to the elements is susceptible 

to frostbite even at temperatures warmer than -18°C (WF). As previausly 

nsted, the Allies suffered more frostbite casualties during the fighting 

around Bolshie Qzerki from late March through early April 1919-when the 

lowest temperature was only -20°C (-4°F) and daytime thawing caused wet 

boots--than they experienced during the coldest periods of that winter. 

There had been some snowfall as early as Oetaber 1941,“” and heavy, 

eumulat,ive WOWS began about 7 December. Strong winds and blizzards followed, creating massive drifts.‘” The exceptional cold caused the srmw to 

remain unusually powdery and deep long after it had fa1len.l” h/larshal 

Emerenko estimated the winter’s lasting snow cover in the region between 

Mascow and Leningrad at, .7 to 1.5 meters (28-59 inches&l” This snow cover 

greatly restricted German mobility ,I4 but it also hampered the Red Army. Gne 

German source frankly states that the fate of the overextended Army Graup 

Center would have been even wcn-se had there been less snow, ecmcluding that 

cccomplete collapse [af the German units] was prevented . o . especially by the 

deep snow, which constituted a major obstacle [to the Soviet eounteroffensive]*‘“15 Discussing the plight of about seven divisions that were cut off in 

January 1942, a German commander observed that “the deep snows protected 

the encircled German troops around Demyansk from annihilatian. Even the 

Russian infantry was unable to launch an attack through thase snows.“*6 

Weather-Related Casualties 

Hitler’s overconfidence immeasurably compounded the inevitable hardships 

of a winter campaign in Russia. Expecting victory by autumn, he had intended 
34 

to withdraw two-thirds of his divisions from Russia and to leave the remainder 

as an occupation army. Winter clothing, procured on the basis of the occupation 

force, arrived very late because of the breakdown in transportation.” On 30 

November von Bock informed Field Marshal von Brauehitsch, the Chief of 

Staff of the German Army, that his men still had not received winter coats, 

although the temperature was -45’C (-49’F).I” Nearly three weeks later the 

angry General Heinz Guderian, commander of the Second Panzer Army, eonfronted Hitler with the stark facts that none of’the winter clothing had yet 

arrived in the forward areas and that he had lost twice as many men from 

frost as from enemy action. That conversation led to the Nazi Party’s Christmas drive among German civilians to collect winter clothes and skis,19 few 

of which reached the front before February 1942. The freezing German 

troops were reduced to removing clothes from enemy corpses,20 improvising 

straw boots, and taking other emergency measures.21 

It is no wonder that thousands of Germans froze to death that winter.2Z 

By the turn of the year they had suffered about 100,0QC1 cases of frostbite, 

more than 14,000 of which required amputations.Z3 By the end of that terrible winter the number of frostbite victims exceeded a quarter of a million, 

and more than 90 percent were second- and third-degree cases.24 To these 

must be added thousands of cases of pneumonia, influenza, and trenchfoot.25 

The impact of those non-battle casualties was tremendous. Although the 

Red Army had lost millions in dead, wounded, and eaptured by December 

1941, Russia was able to muster replacements from its vast manpower 

resources. In contrast, by 26 November German losses of about 375,000 

dead, missing, and permanently disabled were virtually irreplaceable. By 

April 1942 the German deficiency on the Russian front had reached 625,000 

men.26 In the words of a German officer who survived that grueling winter, 

those casualties meant that ‘“the actual loss of the war in the East merely 

had been postponed.“27 

The Red Army was far better prepared for winter warfare than were its 

opponents. For example, Siberian troops who attacked the shivering 

Germans of the 35th Infantry Division near Moscow on 5 December 1941 

wore padded jackets and trousers, fur caps, and felt boots.28 Nevertheless, 

the unseasonable cold of early November caught many Russian units by 

surprise. On 9 November Marshal Kirill Meretskov, then commanding both 

the Fourth and Seventh Armies, personally checked the condition of the 

troops who had lost the town of Tikhvin the previous day. He found the 

troops still in summer uniforms. 29 A week later a German attack on a hill 

northeast of Rzhev succeeded because the Soviet sentries, who had not yet 

received winter clothes, were too cold to be alert.“@ However, winter uniforms 

were available at Russian supply points, and distribution was soon accomplished.“l 
Camouflaged Soviet troaps in attack, winter 1941-42 

Nevertheless, Soviet troops alsa suffered weather-related casualties. The 

diary of a Red Army field surgeon contains the 27 January 1942 notation 

that ‘“the first frostbite cases have made their appearance. We amputated 

two feet and will probably amputate many more.1J32 The main cause of such 

losses was the Soviet counteroffensive that began early in December and 

continued throughout the coldest months of the winter. General Ironside’s 

observations in 1919 about the superiority of the defense over the offense 

in such weather remained valid. A German officer who witnessed persistent 

Soviet attacks near Shuvaevo in mid-January 1942, when the temperature 

reached -4O”, reported that “the Russians suffered even more [than the 

Germans] from the cold despite their winter clothing, since they were out 

in the open.“33 

Logistics and Mobility 

The ubiquitous, shaggy, hardy Russian ponies once more proved indispensable for transport in bad weather. Many of the larger horses that the 

Germans had brought from western Europe died fram the cold, but the 

native breed could survive in the open at almost any temperature if merely 

sheltered from the wind.34 The Germans called those small, patient animals 

panje horses, a term they also applied to the native carts and sleighs3” 

German accceunts were full of praise for those seemingly anachronistic 

vehicles and horses. Genera1 Rendulie wrote: 
36 

The light native carts (sleighs), and the small, strong, and undemanding 

native horses are absolutely indispensable for the trains of infantry units. 

They are equally indispensable for the supply of motorized troops during the muddy season and in the winter, whenever military operations grind to a halt. Before 

long, even the German motorized and armored divisions had such trains of 

horse-drawn vehicles at their disposal. I cannot imagine haw the German 

Army could have fought and lived through four years of war against Russia 

if it had not made use of these carts, sleighs, and horses.“6 

German supply column returning from the front, January 1942 

In the opinion of another German officer, panje sleighs were not only 

the best means of transport in winter, but in the open fields and on the 

miserable secondary roads they were the only vehicles that afforded complete oversnow mobility. w By early 1942 some panzer divisions employed 

as many as two thousand panje horses, while hardly any of their motor 

vehicles remained serviceable. Those panzer units were given the ironic nickname panje divisions. Even the Luftwaffe had to resort to panje transport 

in Russia.38 
37 

Naturally, the Russians relied upon the same horsedrawn transport, but 

they also employed cavalry in combat. A German source even reported a 

quixotic mounted cavalry attack against a German tank company in 

January 1942.3” For security and reconnaissance missions, the Soviets used 

cavalry units extensively. At times these troops fought dismounted, They 

also cooperated with armor in major offensive operations.40 

Russian tanks, especially the T34, KVl, and KVZ, were effective even in 

deep snow because of their wide tracks and good ground clearance. These 

features gave them a marked advantage over the tanks that the Germans 

employed during the first winter, tanks which became stuck because of their 

narrow tracks and limited ground clearance. The Soviets frequently used 

T34s to break paths through the snow for the infantry.41 

Another advantage the Russians enjoyed was the number of ski troops. 

Profiting from the lessons of the Winter War against the Finns, both Soviet 

military and civilian authorities emphasized skiing during the peacetime 

winter of 1940-41. Special ski units, trained in Siberia and committed on 

the Finnish front during the new war, proved almost as skillful as the 

Finns.42 

The Soviets employed ski troops in units up to brigade size.*3 In January 

1942 a force of three ski battalions was operating behind the German 

Fourth Army.44 On the night of 23 November 1941 about three hundred 

skiers, including female Komsomol students and Party workers, executed a 

daring raid on 12th Corps headquarters, killing nineteen Germans and 

wounding twenty-nine. Although their casualties were heavy, 80 percent of 

the skiers made their way back through the woods.45 

Other ski units were not always that lucky. A ski brigade of the 39th 

Guards Army that made a dawn attack on the rear of the 114th Panzer 

Grenadier Regiment in late March 1942 was virtually annihilated. It failed 

to surprise the Germans partly because they clearly heard its approach over 

the snow, for sound travels a great distance in cold weather.46 (Powdery 

snow tends to reduce the sound of movement, but that is not true of the 

heavy crusted snow common by early spring.) 

Russian ski units were more successful in combination with other arms. 

When the Third Panzer Army was retreating west of Moscow in December 

1941, a Russian force of ski troops, cavalry, and sleigh-mounted infantry 

cut off the 6th Panzer Division, which was the rear guard of the LVI 

Panzer Corps.47 

Although the mobility of well-trained ski units was a significant asset, 

not all of the Russian ski troops employed in that first wartime winter 

were sufficiently experienced to exploit that advantage. General Meretskov 
38 

noted that he often saw men of the hastily formed Second and Fifty-ninth 

Shock Armies proceeding on foot, dragging their skis behind them.48 

The Germans found it even more difficult to muster effective ski troops, 

which they did not employ in units larger than battalions.49 Within Army 

Group Center, accounts of one regiment reveal that it had only ten sets of 

ski equipment per company in January 194Z50 Another regiment could 

equip only one platoon per unit, barely enough for patrol, messenger, and 

similar duties.sl When a corps was finally able to organize one ski battalion 

in March 1942, the men had to be selected on the basis of their skiing 

ability. Because many were from support units-with no combat experience-their effectiveness was limited.52 

Weather-Related Failures of Arms and Machines 

It could only have been in total ignorance of the Arkhangelsk campaign 

more than twenty-two years earlier that the German Army in 1941 could 

be “surprised” (as General Rendulie expressed it) that because of the extreme 

cold the mechanisms of rifles and machine guns, and even the breech 

blocks of artillery, became absolutely rigid .53 The recoil liquid in artillery 

pieces also froze stiff, j4 and tempered steel parts cracked.55 Strikers and striker 

springs broke like glass.s6 

One can only conjecture the number of tactical defeats such surprises 

caused. Even General Halder took notice of an encounter near Tikhvin 

when the temperature was -35°C (-31“F) and only one of the five German 

tanks could fire.j7 Sentries in the German 196th Infantry Regiment discovered at the inopportune moment of a Soviet night attack in January 1942 

that their machine guns were too frozen to function.58 

Soviet weapons were designed for winter, and they used appropriate lubricants. The Germans preferred the Soviet submachine gun to the model originally issued to them. 5g During the first winter the Germans had to improvise 

by lighting fires under their artillery, and by either wiping off all the lubricants from weapons or experimenting with substitutes. Kerosene worked, 

but it was not durable and thus had to be renewed frequently.60 Sunflower 

oil proved quite effective, but it was available only in southern Russia.sl 

(By the second winter of the war the Germans had suitable lubricants on 

hand.621 

Deep snow greatly reduced the effectiveness af mortar shells, and even 

of artillery smaller than 150-mm caliber. The best antitank weapon was 

the gun of a heavy tank, for regular antitank artillery could not be used in 

deep snow.63 Mines proved unreliable under heavy snow or ice, especially 

when there was some thawing, because their pressure fuses would not 

function when cushioned by deep snow or covered with an ice crust.64 
39 

As noted, the oversnow capabilities of Soviet tanks were superior to those 

af the German models employed in 1941. The Germans also encountered 

constant problems with most of their motor vehicles. At first they tried to 

start frozen machines by towing, which badly damaged motors and ripped 

differentials to pieces. It proved necessary to apply heat for up to two hours 

before moving.65 During alerts motors were frequently kept running for 

haurs.66 (Only thepanje horse started without a warming up period?} 

German vehicles abandoned during the retreat from Moscow, December 1941 

Weather”s Impact on Local Operatisns and Tactics 

B.ecause shelter was essential to survival, villages became the focal 

points of Iocal battles during the winter of 1941-42, just as they had been 

in 1918-19.67 During the Soviet counteroffensive General Rendulic, eommander of the 52d Infantry Division, initially tried to conduct an orthodox defense which included holding open terrain That, however, led to so many 

frostbite casualties that he had to restrict his lines to populated points and 

their immediate environs, When the Russians penetrated the gaps between 

the German-held villages and fanned out laterally to threaten the roads 

leading to the rear of those villages, the Germans were forced to retreat 

again. Where the Soviet forces had sufficient ammunition and passable 

roads, they also attacked the villages. 6e Whenever they failed to capture 

them during the day, they usually withdrew to the nearest friendly village 

for the night.6” 
40 

Whenever the Germans were able to take the initiative, they faced the 

same problem, though aggravated because of their inferior clothing. On 28 

December 1941 the 4th Armored Infantry Regiment of the 6th Panzer 

Division successfully counterattacked Russian units that had broken 

through the German positions on the Lama River. By evening they closed 

the gap in their line by making contact with the 23d Infantry Division, 

and they sheltered that night in nearby villages and farmhouses. The plan 

for the next day was to surround the enemy and regain the Lama River 

positions. Again the 4th Infantry, in an attack coordinated with the division’s motorcycle battalion, attained its objectives: by noon the Soviet breakthrough force was encircled. The nearby villages had been destroyed, however, and the former positions were buried deep in show. Without shelter, 

and faced with freezing to death in the nighttime temperature of -36” to 

-40°, the Germans had to abandon the encirclement and withdraw to a 

distant village. The Russians then broke through again and eventually 

forced the entire German front in that area to withdraw. Etattlefield success 

had turned to failure because the Germans were not equipped for the 

weather and could not find local shelter.70 

Occasionally even a destrayed village offered protection from the cold. 

The Russians generally tried to surround a German-held village before the 

garrison could escape and set it on fire. When they failed and the village 

burned, they usually arrived before the fires had died down, and they could 

begin at once to dig shelters in the ground thawed by the heatSY1 

Sometimes there was an alternative to shelter in villages, even when the 

ground was too hard for digging. Conducting defensive operations in open 

country around the turn of the year, the 6th Panzer Division was sustaining 

abo’ut 800 frostbite casualties a day. It had some five tons of explosives on 

hand, however, and on 3 January 1942 its engineers blasted enough craters to 

accommodate all of the combat elements Covered with lumber and heated 

with open fires, each crater sheltered three to five men. New frostbite eases 

immediately fell from eight hundred to four a day. With minefields, antitank 

obstacles, and paths trampled between and behind the craters, the position 

held out for ten days and was only abandoned when outflanked.72 Eventually, 

in order to free them from dependence on the engineers, the Germans trained 

both combat and service units to use IO&gram cartridges for blasting shelters.7:S 

The Germans soon learned how to prevent wood smoke fram revealing 

their field positions. In contrast to fresh firewood, charcoal burns with little 

smoke and its manufacture was improvised widely.74 

Deep snow hampered movement on foot. In one instance a unit of the 

52d Infantry Division required nine hours to advance two and one-half 

miles-unopposed-through five feet of snow. Consequently, trampling lateral and rearward paths assumed tactical significance, For example, the 

German commander of Company 6, 464th Infantry, realized on 15 January 

1942 that his positions would soon become untenable. He therefore detailed 
41 

a few men with minor wounds to trample a path from the village held by 

the company towards a nearby forest. During the ensuing Soviet offensive, 

that path prevented his unit from being trapped by the enemy.75 

Distinctive lessons which may be drawn from this chapter include: 

* Sound travels farther in very cold weather. On the Russian front in World 

War II the noise of troops advancing aver heavy, crusted snow deprived 

them of the advantage of surprise. 

0 Horses provided the most reliable transport on the Russian front in 

winter. The small but acclimatized native horses proved superior to larger 

breeds accustomed to the milder climate of Western Europe. 

o Mines often failed in winter. This was true when the snow was sufficiently 

deep to cushion the fuse and when alternating melting and freezing 

created an ice bridge over the detonat,ar. 

0 Charcoal was bett,er than wood for heating because it ereated less 

smoke to reveal troop positions. 

o Soviet wide-tracked tanks had better aver-snow mobility than the early 

German models because of their lighter ground pressure. 

a Explosives were useful for constructing foxholes and larger shelters in 

frozen ground. 

e Finally, perhaps the most important lesson is simply the folly of 

ignoring the pertinent lessons. A former Luftwaffe officer, Lt. Gen. H. 

J. Rieckhoff, concluded a discussion of the problems encountered by 

the grcmnd components of the German Air Force in winter with the 

abservation that the highest German commanders were slow to profit 

from Russian examples because of their feeling of superiority, and 

some refused to learn until they went down in defeat.76 There may be 

a message for others in that conceit. 

German troops in retreat, December 1941 
These cases illustrate common lessons, even though they span almost a 

quarter of a century, cover a broad geographic area, and concern arms 

ranging from bayonets to modern tanks. Foremost among these lessons is 

that troops fighting in severe winter weather must have appropriate clothing, weapons, and transport for that harsh environment. Acclimatization 

and pertinent training are also essential. 

Two of the three campaigns clearly demonstrated the superiority of the 

defense over the offense in such weather conditions. The exception, the destruction of the 44th Division, does not invalidate that generalization: the 

attacking Finns enjoyed concealment and warm shelter in the woods, whereas the Russians were defending a hopeless position, an exposed roadway 

witholut sheltering villages. Lost of the weather-related casualties of 1941- 

42 need not have occurred had the commanders fully appreciated the experiences of 1918-19. Most of those lessons will probably be valid as long 

as Russian winters remain frigid. Surely “General Winter” will always be 

a formidable foe to an unwary army fighting in Russia. 

43 
Notes 

-w 

Introduction I 1 

‘Eugene Tar& n;apoleon’s Invasion of Russia---1812 (London: George Allen and Unwin 

Ltd., 1942), p. 40; Sovetskaya Voennaya Entsiklopediya [Soviet military encyclopedia]: 6 (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel’stvo, 1978):153 (hereafter cited as SovVoenEnts). 

?Eugene Tarl& Bonaparte (New York: Knight Publications, 1937), p. 271. 

“Theodore Dodge, Napoleon (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1907), 3:479, 507. 

1SovVoenEnts, 1(1976):567. Count Philippe DeSQgur, L~apoleon’s Russian Campaign, trans. 

J. David Townsend (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1958), gives French strength at 

Borodino as only 120,000. 

“Andrei Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe 1789-1825 (Durham: Duke University 

Press 1947), p 223. DeS&ur, p. 98, puts Napoleon’s losses at 40,000. Soviet estimates of French 

iosses range from 50,000 to 58,578. See SovVoenEnts, 1569; L. G: Beskrovnyi, Otechestvennaya 

Voina l&12 Goda [The fatherland war of 18121 (Mascow: SOTSEKGIZ, 1$62), p. 397. 

@Tarl& Bonaparte, p. 296. 

?DeSggur, p. 167; Dodge, p. 646. 

“Franz Halder, The HaEder Diaries: The Private U’ar STournals of Cal. Gen. Franz Halder 

(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977), 2187 (71321 of original). 

gEbid., p. 183 (p. 1317). 

*%ol. Frances King discusses many of these constant factors in their modern context in 

“Cold Weather Warfare: What Would Happen?” &Zilitary Review 57 (November 1977):86-95. 

Chapter 1 

Chapter 1 contains many citations from National Archives Record Group 120, Records of 

the American Expeditionary Forces (World War I), 1917-1923, which includes a collection 

known as the Historical File of the AEF, North Russia (hereafter cited as Archives). The following abbreviations pertain to these records: 

“Extracts’‘-“Extracts from Correspondence Files of Allied G.H.Q. Archangel” (file 23-11.5). 

“Records”-“Records of Events, ‘M’ Co., 339th Infantry Regiment” (file 23-33.2, item 17-F). 

“Operation Report”-“Operation Report, ‘H’ Co, 339th Infantry Regiment, Apr 7, 1919” (file 

23-33.2, item 17-J). 

“Summary’‘-“Summary of principal military events . . , Aug 4th, 1918 to and including March 

24, 1919,” forwarded to War Department by Colonel Ruggles, military attach; (file 23-33.6). 

“Turner Report”-“Report of Major H. C. Turner, 0. C. Bolshieozerka Det., dated April 9th, 

1919, covering March 31st to April 1st” (file 23-33.2, item 17-E). 

“War Diary”-“War Diary, G.H.Q., Notes-Shenkursk Evacuation” (file 23.33.2? item 15-A). 

45 
46 

‘Leonid A. Strakhovsky, Intervention at Archangel (New York: Howard Fertig, P971), pp. 

167--77,194, ‘280-84; Richard H. Ullman, ArzgEo-Sovied Relations, 1917-21: Interventicn and the 

War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 1:109, 252, 2:1$8-g% 

zUllman, 1:243. 

:Strakhovsky, pp. 44-45, 283-84; Ullman, 1:252; A. A. Samoilo and M. I. Sboichakov, 

.Pouchitel’nyi Urok (Moscow, 1962j, p, 116; Archives, “Report of Expedition to the Murman 

‘Coast,“” compiled by Lt. Col. E. Lewis, 339th Infantry (file 23-33.2), strength return for 3 June 

1919; Leonid Strakhovsky, “The Canadian Artillery Brigade in North Russia,” The Canadian 

HistoricaE Review, June 1958, p. 127. 

%Samoilo and Sboichakov, pp. 8, L77; Ddrektivy Kamandouaniya Frontau Krasncai Armii 

/f91T---I922~ [Directives of the command of the Red Army fronts (19l’i---1$X22)], ed. V. V. Dushen’kin 

et al., 4 ~01s. (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel’stvo, 1971--78), extrapolated from 4:33, 51 (hereafter 

cited as Dir&ivy). 

j\i. V. Tarasov, Bor’ba s Interuenteni ne Severe Rossii [Combat with the interventionists 

in the north of Russia] (Moscow: GOSPOL6TfZDAT, 1958), p. 157. Brig. Gen. Wilds I?. Richardson, ‘“Expedition in North Russia,” Thomas Files, Historical Division Files, U.S. Army War 

College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. (microfilm no. 51315), p, 33. 

eE. M. Halliday, The Ignorant Armies (New York: Award Books, 19&Q, pp. 100, 101, 1X3- 

17. 223. 

“William Edmund Iranside, Archangel I918--1919 (London: Constable and Co Ltd., 1953), 

pp. 54, 55, 65. 

“Lt. Cal. Joel R. Moore, “The North Russian Expedition,” Infantry Journal, July 1926, p. 

19. 

SHalliday, pp. 245-47. 

10”‘Summary,” 17 March entry; A. A. Veresov, ed., Nezabyvaemye Irnena [Unforgettable 

names] (Arkhangelsk: Severo-Zapadnoe Knizhnoe Izdat., 1967), pp. 187-90. 

“‘Ironside, p. 121. 

12L‘Summary,” I& March entry. 

-DiFektiuy, 2%. 

‘4Ibid., p. 22. 

“sHalliday, pp. 247-48; Archives, Captain Ballensinger’s “Report of engagement,” 24 March 

1919 (file 2333.2, item 17-H). 

lB”‘Summary,‘y 23 March entry; Archives, Lieutenant Pellegrom’s “Situation Report,” 26 

March 1919 (file 23-33.2, item 1-T.Gj; Capt. Joel R. Moore et al., eds., The History of the American ExpecQion Fighting the Bofsheuiki (Detroit: Polar Bear Pub. Co., 19X), pp. 189-90. 

“Ironside, pp~ 121-22. 

isLieutenant Colonel Moore, Infantry Jcmrnal, p. 29; “Turner Report,” p 5. 

1sCompiled from Archives, “‘Weekly Order of Battle, Allied Forces, Archangel District, Northern Russia,” dated 18 April 1919 (file 2310.6). 

*“Lieutenant Colonel Maore, Infantry Journal, p. 19. 

“LTarasov, p. 197. 

zpairektivy, 2:22; “Turner Report,” p. 4. 

““Direkfivy, 2:22; A. S. Bubnov et al., Grazhdanskaya Vaina 19I8---1921 [Civil war 1918- 

19211 (Moscow: Izd. ‘“Voennyi Vestnik,” 1928’), 1:227. 

9;Bubnov, 1:227; Captain Moore, p. 190. 

Lj‘CTurner Report,” pp. l-3; “Records,” 31 March entry. 

““Captain Moore, pp. 170, 191. 

25’“Turner Report,” p. 4. 

““Archives, Lieutenant Colonel Morrison’s Operations Order No. P, 1 April 1919 (file 23 

33.2); Lieutenant C~olonel Morrison’s ““Report . . . on the Opertions West of Bolshieozerki on 

the 2d April, 1919” {file 2333.2, item 17-D). 

“‘j’“Operation Report,“’ pp. 1-3. 

‘OCaptain Moore, pp. 171, 301. 

,““Operation Report,” p. 5; Lieutenant, Colonel Morrison, “Report . . ” 

:*%aptain Moore, p. 192; “Records,” pp. 3-4. 

i”Halliday, p, 251. 

:‘iBubnov, 1227. 
47 

35Ironside, p. 123. 

36Bubnov, 1:227. 

%aptain Moore, p. 192; Halliday, p, 151. 

“SBubnov, 1227. 

39Halliday, pp. 87-88. 

4Q“War Diary,” p. 5. 

*lHalliday, p. 134. 

42Ironside, pp. 99-100. 

43A. Samoilo, Due Zhizny [Two lives] (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatel’stvo, 1958), p. 240. 

%Sovemkaya Istoricheskaya Erztstklopecliya [Soviet historical encyclopedia], vol. 16 (Moscow, 

1976), co1. 253. 

45”War Diary,” p. 3; Direktiuy, 1507. 

“Samoilo, p. 239. 

d?Archives, Lieutenant Steele’s report, “Attack on Shegovari,” 2 May 1919 (file 23-33.2, item 15-B). 

%ubnov, 1:222. 

+aIbid., p. 224. 

SSamoilo and Sboichakov, p. 87. 

5*&e Soviet source (Bubnov, p. 225) shows Filippovsky with six heavy and eight light 

guns. 

52Direktiuy, 1507, 778; Samoilo, p. 239. 

=Direktiuy, 1:508. 

SdHalliday, pp. 170-71; “Extracts,” pp. 22-23; Archives, “Report of Expedition to the 

Murman Coast,” p. 36. Nizhnyaya Gora is designated Nizhni Gora in many English-language 

sources, but the latter form is grammatically unlikely. Vysokaya Gora appears as V&or& 

Gora in many English works. 

jjBubnov, 1:224. 

SeHailiday, pp. 170-71. 

j”Ibid., p. 170; Samoilo, p. 239. 

s”Ironside, p. 100; Halliday, p. 171. 

jgHalliday, pp. 171-75. 

GO“War DiaryI” p. 1. 

6j”Extracts,” pp. 22-23. 

GzHalliday, p. 177. 

%amoilo and Sboiehakov, p. 89. 

61Ibid., pp. 177-79. 

GjIbid., p. 185. 

r%ronside, p. 102. 

“*Samoilo, p. 240-his dating is in error here. 

6*Ironside, p. 102; Halliday, pp. 185 ff. 

@sHalliday, pp. 187, 190-92; Samoilo, p. 240; Tarasov, p. 195. 

“fiHalliday, pp. 148, 190; Ironside, p. 63. 

“Samoilo, p. 240. 

‘ZBubnov, 1~226. 

%amoilo and Sboichakov, p. 93. 

‘“Captain Moore, p. 201; Capt. Donald ,A. Stroh, “A Critical Analysis of the North Russian 

Expedition ,” Individual Research Study No. 12, Command and General Staff School, 

Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1933, pp. 26-27. 

TjLt. W. K. M. Leader, “With the Murmansk Expeditionary Force,” Journal of the Royal 

Urztted Seruice Institution, February-November 1921, p. 666. 

7”Direktivy, 1516-18. 

‘:Maj. Frederic Evans, “Campaigning in Arctic Russia,” Journal of the Royal United Service 

Institution, May 1941, p- 295. 

‘aArchives, Captain Price’s report, “Allied Offensive on Vologda Force Front,” (inclosure to 

Colonel Ruggles’s letter of 14 January 19191, (file 23-27.8), p. 7; Archives, Major Nichols’s 

letter of 16 May 1919, ‘“Operations of Railway Detachment December 30th and 31st, 1918” 

(file 23-33.2); Halliday, pp. 135-36, 142. 
48 

“‘Archives, Lt. John J. Baker’s “Report of Engagement,” 5 March 1919 (file 23-33.2, item 

14-G), p, 3. 

X°Captain Moore, p. 68. 

SIIbid., p. 190; Halliday, pp. 207-8, 251. 

X2This section was not intended to be an operational history of the North Russian campaign, 

but SimPlY an examination of some of the most, serious problems created by the environment. 

The less dramatic operations of the Allied force based on the ice-free port of Murmansk are 

briefly described by Lt. W. Leader in ‘“With the Murmansk Expeditionary Force,‘” pp. 662-91. 

Chapter 2 

‘This section was adapted almost entirely from Chapter IV of the author’s book, The %%&e 

De&h: The Epic of the Soviet-Finnish %?liinter Iwar (East Lansing: Michigan State University 

Press, 1971), pp. 97-125. Because most of the sources cited therein are in the Finnish language they are not listed here. The additions to the above consist of a few technical details 

obtained in more recent correspondence between the author and Colonel Eino Lass&, USA 

(Ret.), who-as a captain in the Finnish Army-participated in the battles on the Raate Road. 

Chapter 3 

This section uses numerous unpublished or limited-dist.ribution monographs from the Foreign 

Military Studies series. Written in the years immediately following World War II by former German officers who had fought on the Russian front, the monographs were produced under the auspices of t,he Office of the Chief Historian, Historical Division, Headquarters, United States Army, 

Europe. Also used are Department of the Army pamphlets, at least partially based on the same 

sources. In the footnotes these sources are cited by the following alphanumeric designations: 

Department of the Army pamphlets: 

DA PAM 20-201 Military Improuisations During the Russian Campaign, Washington, 

D.C., August 1951. 

DA PAM 20-269 Small Unit Actions During the German Campaign in Russia, Washington, DC., July 1953. 

DA PAM 20-291 Effects of Climate on Combat in European Russia, Washington, 

D.C., February 1952. 

DA PAM 20-292 Warfare in the Far North. Washington, DC, October 1951. 

Foreign Military Studies, Historical Division, Headquarters, United States Army, Eurape: 

MS B-266 “Combat in the East: Experiences of German Tactical and Logistical 

Units in Russia,” mimeographed, Foreign Mikitnry Studies, vol. 1, no. 

10, April 1952. 

MS C-034 General der Infanterie Gustav Hoehne, “‘In Snow and Mud: 31 Days 

of Attack Under Seydlitz During Early Spring of 1942,“” 20 October 

1948. 

MS D-420 Generaloberst Dr. Lothar Rendulic, “Field Expedients,” 23 February 

1947. 

MS D-035 -. “Effect of Extreme Cold on Weapons, Wheeled Vehicles, and 

Track Vehicles,” 24 February 1947. 
49 

MS D-078 General der Infanterie Otto Schellert, “Winter Fighting of the 25&d 

Infantry Division in the Rzhev Area in 1941-42,” draft translation 

reproduced by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department 

of the Army, Washingtan, D.C., 1952. 

MS D-106 Generaloberst Dr. Lothar Rendulic, “Combat in Deep Snow,” 19 

April 1947. 

MS D-164 Generalleutnant Walter Friedrich Poppe, “Wint.er Campaign 1$41- 

42; Campaign of the 265th Infantry Division East and South of 

Temkino, Mid-December 1941 to April 1942 (Area of Army Group 

Centerj,” draft translation reproduced by the Office of the Chief of 

Military History, Department of the Army, Washington, DC., 1953. 

MS D-277 Generalmajor Karl Rein, “Regiment in the Attack Through SnowCovered Primeval Forests January 1942,” draft translation reproduced 

by the Office of t,he Chief of Military History, Department of the 

Army, Washington, D.C., 1952. 

MS D-283 General der Artillerie Rudolf von Roman, “The 35th Infantry Division Between Moscow and Gzhatsk,” draft translation reproduced 

by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the 

Army, Washington, DC., 1961 [assigned 1 April 19471. 

MS P-562 Generalmajor Alfred Toppe. “Erfrierungsprobleme im deutschen Heer 

wghrend des II. Weltkrieges” [Frostbite problems in the German 

Army during World War II], 22 February 1951. 

‘D-4 PAM 20-292, pp. l-2. 

*KiriIl Meretskov, Serving the People (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971), p. 160. 

Marshal Georgii Zhukov, “The Battle of Moscow,” in &foscow I941:“1942 Stalingrad, cornpiled by VIadimir Sevruk (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974): p, 53; Alfred W. Turney, Disaster 

at Moscoc~~: van Bock’s Campaigns (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1976), p. 

133. 

4Turney, p. 133. 

SAlbert Seaton, Tke Battle Far &foscorc? 1941-1942 (New York: Stein and Day, 1971), p. 

159. 

6Zhukov in Sevruk, p. 53. 

7Col. P. Zhilin, cited in John Erickson, Tke Soviet Higk Command (New York: St. Martin’s 

Press: 1962), p. 641. 

SFor example, DA PAM 20-291, p. 5. 

“Ibid., p. 4. 

:3Alexander [Aleksandr Alfredovich] Bek, Vo’o(okoLam.sk Highway, 2d rev. ed. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969), p. 149. 

:*Seaton, pp. 214-17. 

““MS c-034, p. 4. 

::+A. Emerenko, Tlte Arduous Beginning (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966), p. 275. 

LaGerman General Lothar Rendulic noted that., because of a hiatus in heavy snowfall for 

several weeks before the end of January 1942, the snow on most of the roads used for operations had already been so well packed t.hat movement was possible. He also observed, however, 

that the narrow confines of such packed areas enabled the enemy to concentrate firepower 

effectively. MS D-106, pp. 3. 10. 

:5MS D-184, p. 19. Soviet, sources support that conclusion: for example, Marshal Rokossovsky, “Forward,” S&et Milifary Review, no. 12, December 1971, p. 37. 

:“Ms c-034, p. 5. 

-Seaton, pp. 38, 133, 134. 

_. ----__ ----____ 
50 

‘&Turney, p. 147. 

LsSeaton, pV 213. 

SaDA PAM 20-291, p. 1%. 

21Zhukov in Sevruk, p. 53. 

2Turney, p. 139. 

%t. R. J. H. Haynes, “Soviet Techniques in Winter Warfare,” Journal of tize Rayal United 

Services Institute for Defense +&es 119, no. 2 (June 1974):59. 

Z4Dr. Berthold Mikat, “Die Erfrierungen bei den Soldaten der deutschen Wehrmacht im 

let&en Weltkrieg” [Frostbite among the German armed forces in the last warEd war] in MS 

P-062, Anlage [appendix] 8, pp. 2, 4. 

“5Tarney, p 128. 

2%eaton, p. 288. 

27MS D-184, p. 20. 

“*MS D-285, p. 4. 

LSMeretskov, pp. 157, 160. 

“j”DA PAM B-269, pp. 15-18. 

:‘LMeretskov, pp. 160-61. 

:‘ZNikoIai Amosoff, PPC--2.266: A Surgeon’s, War, translated and adapted by George St. 

George (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1975), p. 102. 

~“~“MS D-678, $2. 17. 

““DA PAM 20-291, pp. 21-22. 

:‘“MS D-277, p. 4. 

:““MS D-020, pp. 4-5. 

~“WS D-277, p” 4. 

:FXDA PAM 20-201, pp. 52-53. It is essential to adopt the latest scientific improvements in 

winter ctothing, shelter, transport, and weaponry, but in the stark reahty of the battlefield the 

most sophisticated equipment is apt to break down in unforeseen circumstances. When that 

happens, it is often wise to imitate the simple customs of the local natives whose ancestors 

have adapted their ways to their environment for centuries. Western society has become so dependent on modern technology that one may well wonder how many of today’s generation 

would know which end of a panje horse to harness. 

:‘“MS D-285, p. 18. 

4% H. Liddell Hart, ed., The Red Army (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1956), pp. 

337-42. 

4’DA PAM 20-291, pi 11. 

‘ZDA PAM 20-292, pq 16. 

4WA PAM 20-291, p. 12. 

‘%eaton, p. 255. 

“‘Ibid., p. 163. 

4fiDA PAM 20-291, pp. 16-17. 

4’Ibid., p. 17. 

4*Meretskov, p. 190. 

““DA PAM 20-291, p. 12. 

“‘“MS D-184, p. 5. 

~‘MS D-277, p. 9. 

5”MS D-184, p. 15. 

-MS D-035. 

“4DA PAM 20-291, p. 4. 

“=MS D-285, p. 3. 

““DA PAM 20-291, pp. 5, 19. 

“?E%akder Diaries, 6 December L941 entry. 

=DA PAM 20-269, pp. 27-28. 

=DA PAM 20-291, p. 69. 

““1MS D-035. 

“‘DA PAM 20-291, p. 19. 

“‘JMS D-635. 

“,tMS C-634, pp. 12, 19-20. 
“4MS B---266, p. 44. 

“SMS D--036. 

=DA PAM 20-291, p. 19. 

“%fS D---1&4, p. 6; MS D---28& p. 5. 

6”MS D-106, pp~ 12-14. 

fi9DA PAM 20-201, p. 24. 

‘ODA PAM 20-291, p. 5. 

“Lieutenant General Sir Mason-MacFarlane, “Russian Artillery 1941-45,” The Jourrzul of 

the RoyaE Arti&lery 74, no. 4 (October 1947):326. 

7Q.A PAM 20-201, pp. 23-24. 

=MS D-277, p. 8. The Soviet Army has since perfected systematic blasting patterns for 

individual foxholes, bunkers, trenches, and gun and tank emplacements. See Haynes, pp. 6Q-- 

62. 

=MS D-020, p. 6. 

7”DA PAM 20-269, pp. 22-23. 

‘6“Winter Experiences of the German Air Force Ground Units,” translated and digested in 

Military Review 29, no. 7 (October 1949):85. 

fi Lt. S. Government Printing Office: 1989 - B4-001 [X1781 
STUDIES IN PROGRESS 

Chemical Warfare: The Integrated Battlefield, 1917-l 8 

0 

The Problem of Friendly Fire in Modern War 

e 

Selected Ranger Operations in World War II 

Arracourt: Armored Wtrfare in France, 1944 

e 

Light infantry Operations in Korea, 1950 

The Evolution of Air-Groutd Doctrine, 1939 to 1980 

Soviet Operations ?n Manchuria, 1945 

Allen F. Chew was a research fellow from July 

1979 to June 1981 at the Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. He received his doctorate 

at Georgetown University in Russian history, and 

he has taught in that field for the University of 

Maryland, the U.S. Air Force Academy, and the 

University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh, where he also 

served as chairman of the history department. 

Among his publications are An Atlas of Russian 

History (Yale University Press) and The White 

Death: The Epic of the Soviet-Finnish Winter War 

(Michigan State University Press). He is also a 

regular contributor to Military Review and other 

professional journals. 

Dr. Allen F. Chew 

COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE 

Mission 

The Combat Studies Institute was established on ‘I8 June 1979 as a separate, department-level 

activity within the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for the 

purpose of accomplishing the following missions: 

1. Conduct original, interpretrve research on historical topics pertinent to the current doctrinal concerns of the U.S. Army m accordance with priorities established by the Commander, U.S. Army 

Training and Doctrine Command, and to publish the results of such research in a variety of useful 

formats. 

2. Prepare and present instruction in military history at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff 

College and to assist other College departments in integrating applicable military history materials 

into therr instruction. 

3. Act as the proponent agency for development and coordination of an integrated, progressive program of military history instruction in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command service school 

system.