Slip Op. 16-81
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Before: Timothy C. Stanceu, Chief Judge
Court No. 14-00199

OPINION [Affirming a decision ma de in response to cour t order in an action contesting a ruling on the scope of antidumping and count ervailing duty orders on alumin um extrusions from China] Dated: Donald Harrison , Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, of Washington, DC, for plaintiff.
Aimee Lee , Senior Trial Counsel, Civ il Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of New York, NY, for defendant. With her on the brief were Benjamin C. Mizer , Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson , Director, and Reginald T. Blades, Jr. , Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief was David P. Lyons , Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement & Compliance, U.S. Depart ment of Commerce, of Washington, DC. Alan H. Price and Robert E. DeFrancesco, III , Wiley Rein LLP, of Washington, DC, for defendant-intervenor. Stanceu, Chief Judge: Plainti ff Whirlpool Corporation (“Wh irlpool”) challenged a 2014 decision of the International Trade Administration, United States De partment of Commerce (“Commerce” or the “Department”) interpreting the scope of antidumping and countervailing duty orders on aluminum extrusions from China to include two types of kitchen appliance door WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION, Plaintiff,

v. UNITED STATES , Defendant, and
ALUMINUM EXTRUSIONS FAIR TRADE COMMITTEE, Defendant-Intervenor.

August 26, 2016Court No. 14-00199 Page 2 handles imported by Whirlpool. In an opinion an d order, the Court denied plaintiff’s motion as to one type of appliance door handles, each of which consisted of a single piece that was fabricated from an aluminum extrusion, and grante d it as to a second type of handles, which were assemblies. In response, Comm erce has decided, under protest, that the assembled handles are outside the scope of the anti dumping and countervailing duty orders on aluminum extrusions from China (the “Orders”). Whirlpool supports this decision. Opposing the determination Commerce reached on remand is the Aluminum Extrusions Fair Trade Committee (“AEFTC”), an association of domestic aluminum extrusi on producers that was a pe titioner in the underlying antidumping and countervailing duty investigatio ns and is a defendant-intervenor in this proceeding. The court affirms the Department’s decision in the Remand Redetermination that the assembled handles are outsi de the scope of the Orders.
I. B ACKGROUND Presented below is background to suppleme nt the background provided in the court’s earlier opinion and order, Whirlpool Corp. v. United States , 40 CIT __, 144 F. Supp. 3d 1296, 1298-99 (2016) (“ Whirlpool I ”). A. Decisions Reviewed by the Court in this Litigation Commerce issued the decision originally contes ted in this litigation (the “Final Scope Ruling”) on August 4, 2014. Final Scope Ruling on Kitche n Appliance Door Handles , A-570-967, C-570-968 (Aug. 4, 2014) (Fir st Admin.R.Doc. No. 11), available at http://enforcement.trade.gov/download/prc-ae/s cope/46-kitchen-door-han dles-4aug14.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2016) (“ Final Scope Ruling ”). 1

1 Citations to “First Admin.R.Doc.” refe r to documents placed on the record by Commerce in Parts A.1 and A.3 of the administ rative record, which refer to the assembled handles. Citations to “Second Admin.R.Doc.” refer to documents placed on the record by (continued...)Court No. 14-00199 Page 3

The contested determination nowbefore the court (the “Remand Redetermination”) is the decision Commerce issued in res ponse to the court’s order in Whirlpool I

. Results of Redetermination Pursuant To Court Remand (Apr. 15, 2016) (Remand Admin.R.Doc. No. 3) (“ Remand Redetermination ”). B. Administrative Proceedings Conducted by Commerce Commerce issued the antidumping and c ountervailing duty orders on aluminum extrusions from China (the “Orders”) on May 26, 2011. Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s Republic of China: Antidumping Duty Order , 76 Fed. Reg. 30,650 (Int’l Trade Admin. May 26, 2011) (“ AD Order ”); Aluminum Extrusions from th e People’s Republic of China: Countervailing Duty Order , 76 Fed. Reg. 30,653 (Int’l Trade Admin. May 26, 2011) (“ CVD Order ”). On December 20, 2013, Whirlpool filed a reque st for a scope ruling on the appliance door handles that remain at issue in th is case, i.e., the assembled handles. Letter Requesting a Scope Inquiry Regarding Kitchen App liance Door Handles With End Caps 7 (First Admin.R.Doc. No. 1) (“First Scope Ruling Request ”). On March 19, 2014, Whirlpool responded to a Department questionnair e regarding its submission. Resp. of Whirlpool Corp. to the Dep’t’s Supp. Questionnaire on Scope Inquiry Regarding K itchen Appliance Door Handles With End Caps (First Admin.R.Doc. No. 7) (“ Supp. Questionnaire Resp. ”). Whirlpool filed a second scope ruling request, on January 8, 2014, for one-piece appliance door handles, each of which was fabricated from an aluminum extrusion. Letter

(continued...) Commerce in Parts B.1 and B.3 of the administ rative record, which pe rtain to the one-piece handles. Citations to “Remand Admin.R.Doc.” refer to documents placed on the record of this remand proceeding.Court No. 14-00199 Page 4 Requesting a Scope Inquiry Regarding Kitchen Appliance Door Handles Without End Caps 4 (Second Admin.R.Doc. No. 1). On March 19, 2014, Whirlpool file d a response to the Department’s questionnaire on this type of handles. Resp. of Whirlpool Corp. to the Dep’t’s Supp. Questionnaire on Scope Inquiry Regarding Kitc hen Appliance Door Handles Without End Caps (Second Admin.R.Doc. No. 7). On August 4, 2014, Commerce issued the Final Scope Ruling, in which it determined that both types of Whirlpool’s appl iance door handles are within the scope of the Orders. Final Scope Ruling

. C. Proceedings before the Court of International Trade Whirlpool commenced this action on August 26, 2014. Summons, EC F No. 1; Compl., ECF No. 6. On February 23, 2015, Whirlpool file d a motion for judgment on the agency record, arguing that Commerce impermissibl y placed both handle types within the scope of the Orders. Pl.’s Mot. J. Agency R., ECF No. 26 (“Pl.’s Br.”). Defendant a nd defendant-intervenor responded on June 2, 2015. Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. J. Agency R., ECF No. 36 (“Def.’s Opp’n”); Def.-Int.’s Resp. Pl.’s Mot. J. Agen cy R., ECF No. 35 (“Def.-Int.’s Opp’n”). On July 13, 2015, Whirlpool filed a reply. Pl.’s Re ply Br. to Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. J. Agency R., ECF No. 42. The court held an oral argument on October 8, 2015. ECF No. 47. On February 1, 2016, the court issued Whirlpool I , affirming the Department’s determination that the one-piece handles were w ithin the scope of the Orders but remanding the Final Scope Ruling to Commerce fo r reconsideration of the decisi on that the assembled handles were within the scope. Whirlpool I , 40 CIT at __, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1307. Following the court’s ruling in Whirlpool I , Commerce issued a draft redetermination (“Draft Remand Redetermination”) on March 18, 2016 and invited the parties to comment.Court No. 14-00199 Page 5 Draft Results Of Redetermination Pursuant To Court Remand (Mar. 18, 2016) (Remand Admin.R.Doc. No. 1). Defendant-interve nor filed comments on the Draft Remand Redetermination on March 24, 2016. Petitioner’s Comments on Department’s Draft Remand Results (Remand Admin.R .Doc. No. 2). Commerce issued the Remand Redetermina tion on April 15, 2016, on which Whirlpool submitted comments on May 13, 2016, Pl. Whirlpool Corp.’s Comments on Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand, ECF No. 53, and on which AEFTC submitted comments on May 16, 2016, Def.-Int. Aluminum Extr usions Fair Trade Committee’s Comments on Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand, ECF No. 55 (“Def.-Int’s Comments”). Defendant responded to these comments on June 3, 2016. Def.’s Resp. to Remand Comments, ECF No. 59.
II. D ISCUSSION A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review The court exercises subject matter jurisdicti on under section 201 of the Customs Courts Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c), which grants ju risdiction over civil actions brought under section 516A of the Tariff Act of 19 30 (“Tariff Act”), 19 U.S.C. § 1516a. 2 Among the decisions that may be contested in this Court under S ection 516A is a determination of “whether a particular type of merchandise is within the cl ass or kind of merchandise described in an . . . antidumping or countervailing duty order.” Id . at § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(vi). In reviewing the contested scope ruling, the court must set asid e “any determination, finding, or conclusion found . . . to be unsupported by substantial evidence on th e record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id . § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i).

2 All citations to the United Stat es Code are to the 2012 edition.Court No. 14-00199 Page 6 B. Description of the Merchandise in Whirlpool’s First Scope Ruling Request The merchandise remaining at issue, which was the subject of Whirlpool’s first scope ruling request, consisted of 38 models of handl es for a variety of kitchen appliances. Whirlpool I , 40 CIT at __, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1299 (citing First Scope Ruling Request Attach. 1). Thirty-two of these handles were made for specifi c models of refrigerators, four were made for specific models of ranges, one was made for a si ngle dishwasher model, and one was made for a single electric oven model. Id. (citing First Scope Ruling Request Attach. 1). As the court stated
in Whirlpool I , “[t]he record indicates some variation in the assemblies, but a fact common to all models is that each handle has within the assembly a single component that is fabricated from an aluminum extrusion and then surface coated (by, for example, brushing, a nodizing, or painting).” Id. “Also common to each handle in Whirlpool’s first scope ruling request is the presence of plastic end caps that are attached to the aluminum component by screws.” Id. (citing First Scope Ruling Request 7, 16-17). The court added that “[a] s imported into the United States, all assembled handles covered by this request ‘are fully manufactured, assembled and completed, with no further processing of the handle required.’” Id. , 40 CIT at __, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1300 (quoting First Scope Ruling Request 7). C. The Scope Language in the Orders The scope language of the antidumping duty order and the scope language of the countervailing duty order are essent ially equivalent. The orders apply to “aluminum extrusions which are shapes and forms, produced by an extr usion process, made from aluminum alloys having metallic elements corresponding to the alloy series designations published by The Aluminum Association commencing with the numb ers 1, 3, and 6 (or proprietary equivalents or other certifying body equivalents).” AD Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650; CVD Order , 76 Fed.Court No. 14-00199 Page 7 Reg. at 30,653. Such extrusions may be “produced and imported in a wide variety of shapes and forms,” and, after extrusion, may be subjected to drawing and to further fabrication and finishing. AD Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650; CVD Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654

. The scope of the Orders includes aluminum extr usions that are “described at the time of importation as parts for final finished products that are assembled after importation” or “identified with referen ce to their end use.” AD Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650-51; CVD Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654. To be subject to the Orders, however, such merchandise must “otherwise meet the definition of aluminum extrusions.” AD Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651; CVD Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654. The Orders exclude from the scope certain finished merchandise “containing aluminum extrusions as parts that are fully and permanen tly assembled and completed at the time of entry, such as finished windows with gl ass, doors with glass or vinyl, picture frames with glass pane and backing material, and solar panels.” AD Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651; CVD Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654.

D. The Court Affirms the Department’s Decisi on that the Assembled Handles Are Outside the Scope of the Orders 1. The Court’s Decision in Whirlpool I
In Whirlpool I , the court began its analysis with the general scope language, i.e., the language of the Orders absent sp ecific exclusions. Under the general scope language, the court reasoned, “aluminum extrusions” subject to the Orders are “shapes and forms, produced by an extrusion process . . .” from specified aluminum alloys. Whirlpool I , 40 CIT at __, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1300 (quoting AD Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650; CVD Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,653). The court stated, furthe r, that “[t]he scope of the Or ders includes goods made of the specified aluminum alloys that resulted from an extrusion process but al so were subjected toCourt No. 14-00199 Page 8 certain specified types of industr ial processes after extrusion.” Id. The court added that “[t]hese post-extrusion processes are draw ing, fabricating, and finishin g; the scope language provides non-exhaustive lists of types of fabr icating and finishing operations.” Id. Observing that “[n]otably absent from the identified post-extrus ion processes are assembly processes,” the court reasoned that “the term ‘extrusion’ is not defined in the general sc ope language so as to include a good simply because an extruded aluminum compone nt is present within a good consisting of an assembly.” Id. , 40 CIT at __, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1302. Addressing scope language providing that subject aluminum extrusions may be “describ ed at the time of importation as parts for final finished products that are assembled after importa tion” or “identified with reference to their end use,” the court, citing th e express language of the scope, conc luded that this language is limited by the qualification that goods so described or identified are within the scope only if they “otherwise meet the defin ition of aluminum extrusions.” Id. (quoting AD Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650-51; CVD Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654 (emphasis added)). The court next addressed the “subassemblies provision,” id. , which places within the scope of the Orders “aluminum extrusion comp onents that are attached (e.g., by welding or fasteners) to form subassemblies, i.e., partially assembled merchandise unless imported as part of the finished goods ‘kit’ defined further below.” AD Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651; CVD Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654. 3 The court concluded that “[t]his is the only gene ral scope language that

3 The referenced “finished goods ‘kit’” defi nition is part of the “finished goods kit exclusion,” in defining which the Orders state as follows: The scope also excludes finished goods c ontaining aluminum extrusions that are entered unassembled in a “finished goods kit.” A finished goods kit is understood to mean a packaged combination of parts th at contains, at the time of importation, all of the necessary parts to fully asse mble a final finished good and requires no further finishing or fabri cation, such as cutting or punching, and is assembled “as (continued...)Court No. 14-00199 Page 9 reasonably can be interpreted to expand the scope beyond goods consisting solely of a single extrusion, but this sentence, notably, refers to ‘partially assembled merchandise.’” Whirlpool I , 40 CIT at __, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1302. The cour t noted that Commerce, in the Final Scope Ruling, had not relied upon the subassemblies pr ovision in placing Whirlpool’s assembled handles within the scope of the Orders; this was “understandable,” ac cording to the court, because the subassemblies provision applies only to partially assembled merchandise whereas the handles were “imported in a form in which they require no further assembly or processing prior to the intended use.” Id ., 40 CIT at __, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1303 (citing Final Scope Ruling 5).

The court reasoned that the Final Scope Ruli ng was flawed because it failed “to address in any meaningful way the question of whet her the general scope language describes the assembled handles” and because, after mentioning the definition of “extrusion” in the general scope language, it proceeded “directly to a discu ssion of whether these go ods satisfy either the finished merchandise exclusion or th e finished goods kit exclusion.” Id. , 40 CIT at __, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1302-03 (citing Final Scope Ruling 17). The court opined in Whirlpool I that “[a]fter a discussion of the two exclusions , the Final Scope Ruling states, in conclusory fashion, that ‘we find that the handles at issue fall inside the language of the scope that includes “aluminum

(continued...) is” into a finished product. An imported product will not be cons idered a “finished goods kit” and therefore excluded from th e scope of the investigation merely by including fasteners such as screws, bolts, etc. in the packaging with an aluminum extrusion product. Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s Re public of China: Antidumping Duty Order , 76 Fed. Reg. 30,650, 30,651 (Int’l Trade Admin. May 26, 2011); Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s Republic of China: Countervailing Duty Order , 76 Fed. Reg. 30,653, 30,654 (Int’l Trade Admin. May 26, 2011).Court No. 14-00199 Page 10 extrusions which are shapes and forms, produced by an extrusion process.”’” Id. (quoting Final Scope Ruling 18). The court did not cons ider the assembled handles to conform to this definition and pointed out the distinction between “extrus ions” as defined in the scope language and “assemblies, each of which contains an extrusion, machined and surface-treated, as the principal component.” Id. , 40 CIT at __, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1302. Viewing as unreasonable an interpretation of the general scope language to in clude the assembled handles, the court held that the Final Scope Ruling was “contrary to law and must be set aside.” Id. , 40 CIT at __, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1303. The court also analyzed the a pplicability of the finished merchandise exclusion to the assembled handles, even though this analysis wa s unnecessary to the decision to order a remand of the Final Scope Ruling. Id. , 40 CIT at __, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1303-04. The court stated that Commerce had failed to demonstrate that the asse mbled handles, if presumed to fall within the general scope language, would not qualify under the plain language of that exclusion. Id. (“Commerce presents no convincing reason why the plain language of this exclusion, which appears to describe the assembled handles, w ould not be dispositive were the general scope language presumed to describe these goods.”). Id. , 40 CIT at __, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1304. The court considered Commerce to have decided that the presence of what Commerce considered “fasteners” within an assembly is to be disreg arded when the finished merchandise exclusion is applied and, in so doing, to have relied unjustifi ably on a reference to “f asteners” in a different exclusion, the finished goods kit exclusion. Id. The court further concluded that “Commerce also employed flawed logic and ignored record ev idence in concluding that the plastic end caps in the assembled handles are ‘fasteners.’” Id. , 40 CIT at __, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1304-05. As the court stated, “[r]elying on a dictionary definition of ‘washer’ as a ‘flat th in ring or a perforatedCourt No. 14-00199 Page 11 plate used in joints or assemblies to ensure tightness, prevent leakage, or relieve friction,’ . . . Commerce found that the plastic en d caps ‘are analogous to a washer’ because they ‘allow[ ] the handle to fit tightly to the re frigerator door’; Commer ce further found, without evidentiary support in the recor d, that the plastic end caps ‘rel ieve[ ] friction between the door and the handle.’” Id. , 40 CIT at __, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1305 (citing Final Scope Ruling 17) (internal citation omitted). As to the lack of substantial evidence to support the Department’s finding, the court stated that “[t]he record evidence is that the end caps are made of plastic, are designed for their specific appl ication, and are attached to th e aluminum extrusion component ‘by means of screws.’” Id. (citing First Scope Ruling Request 7, 16-17). Whirlpool I directed Commerce to r econsider its decision plac ing the assembled handles within the scope of the Orders and to “reach a new determinati on as to whether the assembled handles are covered by the scope, bearing in mind that it must interpret reasonably the scope language it chose upon promulgating the Orders.” Id. (citing Duferco Steel, Inc. v. United States , 296 F.3d 1087, 1097-98 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 2. The Department’s Remand Redetermination In the Remand Redetermination, Commerce deci ded “under respectful protest[ ] that handles with end caps are outside the scope of the Orders because, consistent with the Court’s interpretation of the scope language, there is no general scope language which covers such products.” Remand Redetermination 8 (footnote omitted). Commerce further decided that, as a result, it was unnecessary to address whether th e assembled handles meet the conditions for the exclusions to the Orders. See id. at 8, 14. The court affirms the Department’s decision th at the assembled handles are not within the scope of the Orders. However, the court doe s not affirm all of the statements CommerceCourt No. 14-00199 Page 12

included in the Remand Redetermination. Mo st notably, when responding to defendantintervenor’s comments in the Remand Redeterm ination, Commerce included statements that appear to misinterpret certain aspects of the c ourt’s opinion and order in Whirlpool I , as discussed below. Nevertheless, the Remand Redete rmination is sufficient to allow the court to affirm, on the reasoning the Department presents , the decision that the assembled handles are outside the scope of the Orders . The Remand Redetermination adopts, albeit under protest, the same analysis that the court applied in Whirlpool I to conclude that the general scope language does not include the assembled handles. In addressing AEFTC’s position that the asse mbled handles are covered by the Orders on the premise that the plastic end caps are “faste ners,” Commerce stated that it agrees with defendant-intervenor that “both the scope langua ge and the record evidence support a finding that the plastic end caps in question should be tr eated as fasteners, and, therefore, Whirlpool’s handles with end caps consis t solely of aluminum extr usions and fasteners.” Id. at 10. Commerce added that it coul d not rule in this way consistent with the court’s opinion and order
in Whirlpool I because “the Court has made a specific finding that, based on the scope language and this same record evidence, the plastic end caps are not fasteners.” Id. (footnote omitted). However, the court did not make a “finding” that the plastic end caps are not fasteners. It is not the court’s role to make findings but instead to determine whether the Department’s findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record and whether the Department’s conclusions are otherwise in accordance with law. As discussed previously in this Opinion, the finding that the end caps are “fasteners” was flawed based on the r ecord evidence, and it was inconsistent with the definition of the term “w asher” upon which Commerce itself relied. The conclusion that treating the end caps as fasteners results in the inclusion of the assemb led handles within theCourt No. 14-00199 Page 13 scope of the Orders was also flawed, as it was based on a misinterpretation of the scope language. The Remand Redetermination also appears to misinterpret the court’s discussion in Whirlpool I of the subassemblies and parts provisions in the scope language. In addressing AEFTC’s opposition to the Department ’s position that it need not an alyze the applicability of the scope exclusions to Whirlpool’s assembled handles because they are not within the ambit of the general scope language, Commerce st ated that “although the Court id entified additional general scope provisions, i.e., the ‘parts’ language and ‘subassemblies’ language, which also could be considered relevant, the Court ultimately found that, based on the record evidence, these provisions would not support a finding that Whirlpool’s handles with ends caps are covered by the Orders.” Remand Redetermination 12-13 (emphasis added). However, the court never held that the subassemblies language would not support a finding that the assembled handles were within the scope. Because Commerce itself base d the reasoning of the Final Scope Ruling on scope language other than the subassemblies provision, the court was not in a position to reach a holding on whether the subassemblies provision c ould support a finding that the assembled handles are subject merchandise. 4 Instead, the court, as it was required to do, reached its holding
in Whirlpool I based on the reasoning Commerce put forth, and the court’s observations as to the subassemblies provision are, therefore, dicta . As to the “parts” provi sion in the scope language,

4 In the Remand Redetermination, Commer ce again refrained from applying the subassemblies provision. Even had it applie d the subassemblies provision, and even had it somehow concluded that the assembled handles are only “partially assembled,” it could not plausibly have decided, as it did in the Final Scope Ruling, that th e assembled handles are within the scope. By its express terms, the subasse mblies provision is limited to “the aluminum extrusion components” and “does not include the non-aluminum extrusion components of subassemblies.” AD Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651; CVD Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654. As it did in the Final Scope Ruling, Commerce based its decision in the Remand Redetermination on each assembled handle, considered as an entirety.Court No. 14-00199 Page 14 the question in Whirlpool I was not whether the assembled handles are “described at the time of importation as parts for final fini shed products that are assemble d after importation” within the meaning of the scope language, AD Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650, CVD Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654. The point the court made in Whirlpool I was that goods that are within the meaning of this language do not necessarily fall within the scope. See Whirlpool I , 40 CIT at __, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1302. Instead, by the express limitation in the scope language, such goods are within the scope only if they “otherwise meet the definition of aluminum extrusions,” AD Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651, CVD Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654. 3. Defendant-Intervenor’s Commen ts on the Remand Redetermination In opposing the Remand Redetermination, de fendant-intervenor AEFTC puts forth several arguments that the court reje cts for the reasons discussed below. AEFTC argues that the Department’s findi ng in the Remand Redetermination that the general scope language does not apply to the assembled handles is unreasonable and “inconsistent with evidence on the record that shows that the handles match the physical description of subject mercha ndise and are comprised entire ly of extruded aluminum and fasteners.” Def.-Int’s Remand Comments 2. Acco rding to AEFTC, “the ‘fasteners’ term is properly understood as covering a much broader category of co mponents than described by the Court in its decision,” id. at 5 (citation omitted), and should be construed to cover the plastic end caps because these components se rve an attachment function, id. at 5-6. This argument is unavailing. The court’s discus sion of the “fasteners” questio n occurred in the hypothetical context of the court’s presuming, arguendo , that the scope language could be construed, as a general matter, to encompass assembled goods su ch that the finished merchandise exclusion would need to be considered. See Whirlpool I , 40 CIT at __, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1303-04. EvenCourt No. 14-00199 Page 15 if the plastic end caps plausibly could be described as “fasteners ,” so describing them would not have cured the fundamental flaw in the Fina l Scope Ruling. While the subassemblies provision (which Commerce did not invoke) can be interpreted as enlarging the scope to encompass an “extrusion” (as defined in the scope language) that is imported as a component of a partially assembled good, the general scope language, apar t from the subassemblies provision, does not include assembled goods. Rather, the general scope language defines extrusions as “shapes and forms, produced by an extrusion process.” AD Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650; CVD Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,653. The post-extr usion processes that do not remove an extrusion from the scope are specified in the scope language as drawing, fabricating and finishing. AD Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650; CVD Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,654. An assembly process using an extrusion as a component in the production of an other good is not included among those postextrusion processes, and only the subassemblie s provision refers to assembled goods. The assembled handles, considered as a whole (which is how Commerce analyzed them in the Final Scope Ruling and the Remand Redetermination) ca nnot truthfully be described as shapes or forms produced by an extrusion process. The unc ontradicted record evidence is that they are, instead, the products of an assembly process. AEFTC also argues that “the Court specifically recognized that aluminum extrusions containing non-extruded parts are covered under the scope, al beit under the description of partially-assembled merchandise.” Def.-Int.’s Remand Comments 6 (citation omitted). This argument misunderstands Whirlpool I and misinterprets the scope language. “Aluminum extrusions containing no n-extruded parts” are not included in the scope, and the court did not decide that they were. Under the terminol ogy employed by the scope language, there can be no such thing as an aluminum extrusion that contai ns non-extruded parts. If a single good containsCourt No. 14-00199 Page 16 non-extruded parts, it is necessarily an assembly of parts and cannot fall within the definition of an “extrusion” that the scope language contains. The subassemblies provision (which is not at issue in this case), by its own terms, can apply only to the aluminum extrusion components of a subassembly considered to be “partially assemble d merchandise,” not to the entire subassembly. Finally, defendant-intervenor contends that Commerce was incorrect in refusing to engage in an analysis of Whirlpool’s assemb led handles under the exclusions to the general scope language, having already f ound that these handles are not w ithin the genera l scope of the Orders. Id. at 7-9. According to AEFTC, becau se Commerce properly found Whirlpool’s assembled handle to be within the general scope of the Orders in the Final Scope Ruling, an “assessment of whether Whirlpool’s handles with e nd caps are eligible for exclusion as ‘finished merchandise,’ then, is appropriate and should render a finding that Whirlpool’s handles with end caps remain ineligible for exclusion from th e scope of the Orders, even as ‘finished merchandise.’” Id. at 7-8. For the reasons provided in Whirlpool I and discussed above, the court views as correct the Depart ment’s decision, albeit made unde r protest, that the assembled handles are not covered by the gene ral scope language to the Orde rs. Therefore, the court will not disturb the Department’s decision in the Remand Redetermination to refrain from engaging in an analysis of the exclusions to the scope.
III. C ONCLUSION The court rules that Commerce was correct in deciding that Whirlpool’s assembled handles are not within the scope of the Orders. The court affirms this decision on the reasoning,Court No. 14-00199 Page 17 adopted by Commerce (albeit under pr otest), that the assembled ha ndles are not described by the general scope language of the Orders. Judgment will enter accordingly. /s/ Timothy C. Stanceu Timothy C. Stanceu Chief Judge Dated: New York, New York August 26, 2016