The 

ire I m 

r rtl 8l tr 0 

Lieutenant Cabnet ary B. Griffin 
“War is the redm of chance. No other human activity gives it greater scope: 

no other has such incessant and varied dealings with this intruder. Chance 

makes. everything more uncertain and interferes with the whole course of events.” 

So wrote Karl von CIausewitz in his clas.sie, On WQ~. This inherent uncertainty 

in war, when combined with exertion, danger, and chance, produces an everpresent friction. The commander’s role throughout military ?&story has been to 

reduce the uncertainties of war for his own side and increase them for his 

enemy. Notwithstanding great advances in the arts and sciences of command 

and control, the best commanders have traditionally used trusted subordinates 

as extensions of their own minds as a way of penetrating the fog of war. This 

technique has come to be called the “directed telescope.‘” 

The Directed TeiescQpe: A ~~~~~~~om~~ Element orf .E:fectiue Command, by 

Lieutenant Colonel Gary I3 Griffin, was first pubhsbed by the Combat Studies 

Institute in I985 a8 a CSL Report. Since its publication, 2Yz.e Directed TePescope 

has been widely read across our Army and quite a few others, amd as the 

Persian Gulf operatians began several months ago, the study took on a particular 

relevance and timeliness. Lientenant~ Colonel Griffin examines the historic rote 

played by liaison officers, aides-de-camp, and staff observers as extensions of 

the commander. The study focuses on the relationship between several great 

commanders and their liaison of&ens, as well as the systems, techniques, and 

organizations they employed. With this study in hand, modern-and futurecommanders can draw on an expert analysis of various command and control 

expedients as they create new versions af the directed telescope. 

ROGER J. SPILLER 

Director 

Combat Studies InstiLute 

CSI publications cover a variety of military history topics. The views expressed 

herein 8~8 those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of 

the Army OF the Department of Defense. 
Directed Telescope: 

A Traditional Element 

of Effective Command 

bY 

Liecrtenant Colonel Gary B. Griffin 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

GrifEn, Gary B. 

The directed telescope : a traditional element of effective 

command / by Gary B. Griffin. 

p. cm. 

Includes bibliographical references. 

1. Armies-Staffs-History-19th century. 2, Armies-StaffsHistory-20th century. 3. Command of troops-History-19th 

century. 4. Command af troops-History-20th century. 5. Military 

intelligence-Histary-19th century. 6. Military intelligenceHistory-20th century. 7. Communications, Military-History-E&h 

century. 8. Communications, Military-History-20th century. 

I. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. II. Title. 

UB22Q.G75 1991 

355.3’3042~de20 91-25093 

CIP 
CONTENTS 

Tables ....................................................... v 

Preface .................................................... 

..vi i 

I. Introduction ............................................ 1 

II. The Prenineteenth-Century Era ........................ 3 

III. The Napoleonic Era ................................... 5 

IV. The Modern Era ....................................... 9 

The American Civil War ............................... 9 

World War I ........................................... 13 

The Interwar Years .................................... 17 

World War IL .......................................... 20 

Post-World War II ..................................... 32 

V. Conclusions ............................................ 35 

Notes ....................................................... 39 

Bibliography ................................................ 41 

. . . 

111 
TABLES 

1. Continerum of Cammand and Control Functions . . . . . . . . I 35 

V 
PREFACE 

This Combat Studies Institute study was originally prepared 

in response to a request by the United States Army Organizational Effectiveness Center and School (QECS) for historical 

support. Specifically, the OECS asked CSI to conduct a historical 

study of commanders’ use of aides, liaison officers, observers, 

and other representatives in the course of campaigns and battles. 

Intending to use the study to support the development of new 

doctrine concerning the role of organizational effectiveness staff 

officers in combat, the OECS posed a number of investigative 

questions: 

* What functions did such personnel perform during combat? 

l In what ways did such personnel enhance the command 

and control of units, generate initiative, create agility and depth, 

and contribute toward the synchronization of combat power? 

0 What special preparation and training did these personnel 

receive? 

* What qualities, attributes, competencies, and capabilities 

did these personnel possess‘? 

0 For whom did these personnel work? 

* How did these personnel go about performing their duties? 

0 How were these personnel selected? 

* Who used these personnel? What are the similarities and 

differences between the battlefield effectiveness of units that used 

such personnel versus units that did not? 

e What authority did these personnel possess? 

Within these guidelines, this study proceeds from a general 

description of aide and liaison systems of the prenineteenth century to a more detailed assessment of those of the Napoleonic 

and modern periods of military history. The broad mandate of 

the study and the limited time available prohibited a more detailed analysis. Furthermore, throughout this report, the historical 

cases selected depended on the availability of source material 

at the Command and General Staff College. Nevertheless, the 

historical examples used illustrate the effectiveness of aides, liaison officers, and other agents of the commander in the command 

and control process. Historical evidence reveals, for the most 

part, that the function, authority, and utility of these types of 

vii 
officers were highly situational and, as a result, varied widely 

over time and space. Their use and organization have seldom 

been formally defined, especially regarding their intimate relationships with commanders and the means in which mutual trust 

and confidence were instilled. 

While the 1985 OECS request established the research objectives for this study, no attempt was made to link the study 

with developing organizational effectiveness doctrine. Nevertheless, it was hoped that the material presented would assist the 

OECS in the formulation of doctrine for organizational effectiveness staff officers on the AirLand Battlefield and, for that 

matter, liaison officers in general. Moreover, this study should 

be valuable and stand on its own merits by virtue of the information and analysis that it provides on the subject of techniques 

of command. 

.,. 

Vlll 

- 
I. INTRODUCJTION 

If yen can fill these positions with proper officers I . . you might hope 

to have the finest army in the world. 

General Robert E. Lee 

21 March 1863 

A study of command, a principal element of the art of war, 

reveals that its most fundamental characteristics have remained 

unchanged throughout time. Although command functions appear 

eternal, the command system, or the means through which command is exercised, has experienced centuries of almost continuQUS development. Consequently, organizations, techniques, and 

procedures far command have been constantly redefined in order 

to meet the demands of an increasingly sophisticated and complex art. Despite modification, however, common patterns exist 

within the great diversity of command systems. In fact, the 

degree of similarity in systems is remarkable. Many command 

system characteristics seem to transcend time. They appear as 

historical constants. There are several distinctive features of the 

traditional “‘line and stafr’ organizatian that have remained 

virtually unchanged. They stand unaltered in theory as well as 

applieation despite centuries of organizational variations and 

technological advances. One of the more important fixed elements 

of command is what historian Martin Van Creveld has called 

the ““directed telescope.” Van Creveld asserts that, from “Plato 

to NATO,“’ command in combat has consisted of a search for 

certainty more than anything else. The commander’s unending 

quest for certainty in battle has, however, never been fully 

satisfied. As a result, commanders at every level have been 

historically presented with a continuous and elusive challenge 

to develop the most rapid, reliable, and efficient means of 

obtaining tactical information, communicating critical orders, 

and controlling subordinate units. 

The directed telescope or, more specifically, the use of 

specially selected, highly qualified, and trusted young officers 

as special agents or observers for the commander has been a 

fundamental method of responding to this persistent challenge. 

These young officers have been popularly referred to as the 

““eyes” of the commander. Throughout military history, the use 

of officers in this capacity has been critical in obtaining battlefield command information for the commander. The utility of 

1 
2 

these special agents, whether they are aides, liaison personnel, 

or special staff officers, has been proven in war after war for 

thousands of years. The directed telescope has survived despite 

successive waves of information-gathering communications technology. From the loyal aides-de-camp of the Napoleonic era to 

the British command liaison officers of World War II, command 

and staff liaison systems, an often overlooked technique of 

command, have played an extremely important role in successful 

command and control at the tactical, operational, and strategic 

levels of warfare. 

As stated earlier, the trusted subordinate used in his role 

as a skilled observer and objective adviser is a traditional tool 

of command. While this tool may appear to be an anachronism, 

modern commanders and military theorists can ill afford to 

ignore the time-honored directed telescope concept in developing 

command systems capable of meeting the Army’s AirLand 

Battle-Future command and control responsibilities. A historical 

analysis of this effective command and control expedient can 

assist the Army in creating a modern updated version of the 

directed telescope. 

The directed telescope system is as old as the military staff 

itself. Even the earliest commanders in history employed orderlies of some type to assist them in the execution of command. 

As a result, a general survey of the development of command 

systems employing staff officers offers a useful background for 

examining similar techniques in the modern era, especially those 

since the start of World War II. Certain periods of military 

history have been more productive than others in the evolution 

of the military staff and the directed telescope. Thus, it is fruitful 

to trace the development of aide, adviser, and liaison systems 

over three distinct periods in the history of warfare: the 

prenineteenth-century, Napoleonic, and modern eras. 
II. THE PRENINETEENTH-CENTURY ERA 

Surprisingly, the armies of this period displayed a remarkably high degree of efficiency, even by modern standards. These 

armies had functional staffs that included aides-de-camp. The 

aides’ primary duties were to assist their commanders in administering army affairs and helping commanders execute eommand responsibilities. 

A study of Alexander the Great’s staff organization (inherited 

from his father Philip) reveals many strong similarities to more 

modern systems. Alexander’s staff was designed to support his 

widespread campaigns and included officer specialists for engineering and siege operations and younger officers called somatophylaxes who served under Alexander’s personal direction 

except when entrusted with the command of subordinate units.1 

Among other duties, these junior officers served as aides-de-camp 

and heralds, and their responsibilities included assisting in the 

command and control of the often widely separated columns of 

Alexander’s army as couriers and observers. They were, in 

essence, the young Greek conqueror’s “eyes.” As heralds, 

Alexander’s aides communicated with commanders of opposing 

camps and, obviously, held Alexander’s full trust and confidence 

in order to be entrusted with such sensitive and critical details. 

Also included within Alexander’s staff was a small advisory 

circle of highly qualified trusted staff officers, among them 

several somatophylaxes, who acted as an informal council of 

war and who routinely performed special missions and filled 

high military and administrative positions. Thus, Alexander’s 

staff council and sonatophylaxes set an early pattern for the 

directed telescope system. 

Alexander’s example of using young officers as aides in 

exercising command and control (a practice probably predating 

Alexander) continued with the staff developments of the Roman 

Army under Scipio Africanus Major (237-183 B.C.) and Julius 

Caesar (100-44 B.C.). As with Alexander, Seipio and Caesar 

both employed junior officers on their staffs. Their volunteer 

aides, called contubernales, acted as observers and trusted 

couriers for top-priority missions.2 Additionally, both Roman 

leaders kept a close circle of these subordinates as mess eompanions. This group primarily consisted of aides-de-camp and 

close political and military advisers. The contubernales appeared 

3 
4 

to have the same general duties and responsibilities as 

Alexanders somaCophylaxes, that of gathering critical information and performing important missions for the commander. 

Essential qualities far these aides were good judgment, military 

skill, and, most of all, absolute trust and loyalty to the 

commander. 

Whatever their official titles, these primitive forerunners of 

modern command and staff liaison systems demonstrated that 

even the earliest military commanders had an appreciation of 

the many problems assoeiated with exercising effective command 

and control during campaigns and battles. This concern 

continued through the Middle Ages. For example, King Edward 

III used his aides with great effect as information-gathering 

agents and couriers at both Crecy and Poitiers.3 For the most 

part, the original observer and adviser role of these early directed 

telescope systems changed little until the Napoleonic era, when 

the military staff underwent dynamic changes resulting in the 

emergenee of formal aide-de-camp and liaison systems. 
III. THE NAPOLEONIC ERA 

The advent of firearms in the sixteenth century required 

military formations to become more widespread and, as a result, 

more disciplined. During the era of Gustav Adolphus and 

Waflenstein, emphasis was placed on better organization and 

control. Staffs grew in size and structure, and positions were 

defined. Aides-de-camp began to function as special assistants 

to the commander. For example, toward the end of the Seven 

Years” War (of the mideighteenth century), Frederick the Great, 

after the deaths of his many senior advisers, selected junior 

officers of tactical aptitude and expertise and trained them as 

command observers. Recognizing the increased complexity of 

warfare, Frederick called on these officers to assist in controlling 

the line troops and assisting other staff officers in coordinating 

more specialized functions (administration, supply, and so forth).* 

Although Frederick still exercised direct command, his system 

may be considered an early forerunner of the Prussian general 

staff liaison system of a century later. 

The proliferation of firearms during this period also caused 

a revolution in tactics as well as in command. The scope of 

battle expanded with a corresponding increase in chaos. The 

‘“fog of war,” now accompanied by gunsmoke, became even more 

dense. Combat formations could no longer be effectively controlled by a single man. Consequently, aides-de-camp made their 

first formal appearance as command observers and messengers. 

Commanders used their aides to help them exercise control over 

battles. The aides literally became the commanders’ “‘eyes, ears 

and voice,” as well as the primary means of obtaining the vital 

information that the field commanders required to maintain effective command and control over their rapidly growing, increasingly widespread, and decentralized forces. 

Virtually every major commander of the Napoleonic period 

used aides in the same manner. However, many historians 

consider the Duke of Marlborough’s use of aides-de-camp in a 

liaison role at Blenheim in 1704 as the best example prior to 

Napoleon. Positioning himself at the center of his army, the 

duke used aides extensively to communicate orders to his flanks. 

Once a battle had commenced, young aides provided him with 

updated information as he moved about the battlefield. The 

effectiveness of this arrangement allowed the duke to position 

himself at the most critical point of his line. Thus, when an 

5 
6 

opportunity developed to deliver a decisive blow, he was invariably at the point of greatest importance and readily available 

to influence the action. 

The duke’s aides were personable, above-average junior officers who were able to judge the terrain as well as the tactical 

situation. F. W. von Zanthier, a famous military theorist of the 

era, stated that they clearly “understood how important it is to 

transmit an order exactly, correctly estimate the situation, and 

be sufficiently enterprising to ensure a decisive opportunity did 

not pas5 bye,‘5 The ability of these officers to assist in accurately 

conveying the commander’s intent to subordinates, coupled with 

their duties as reliable observers, is clear, They were the earliest 

prototype of the aide-de-camp and liaison systems of Napoleon, 

Wellington, and, well over a century later, Field Marshal 

Bernard L. Montgomery. 

The Napoleonic era brought about wholesale changes in 

strategy and tactics and probably the greatest revolution ever 

in the art of command. Napoleon’s command structure incorporated the first fully comprehensive staff organization, and his 

use of both high- and low-ranking aides to assist him in controlling the Grande Armee is we11 documented. Napoleon, perhaps 

more than any other commander before him, emphasized the 

absolute necessity of having critical command information available to him at ail times. The emperor knew full well the value 

of personal observation, and he used his aides extensively to 

gather information and to convey orders to his subordinate 

commanders. However, Napoleon’s aides were not simply limited 

to gathering tactical and operational information; they supplied 

strategic information as well. 

As with every commander, Napoleon relied heavily on the 

routine reports of his commanders and staff. Nevertheless, he 

often found them lacking in detail, thus not fully useful. Also, 

unit reports frequently neglected to express the more intangible 

aspects of a unit’s status-like leadership, morale, and esprit. If 

subordinate commands did address these vital areas in reports, 

they were often less than objective and sometimes totally biased. 

To keep him informed on the significant conditions within his 

various commands and to verify his subordinates’ reports, 

Napoleon used his aides as a directed telescope to augment the 

regular reporting system. Napoleon viewed the formal staff 

system as totally inadequate when reporting what Van Creveld 

refers to as “less structured information.” The emperor-general 

also turned his telescope toward the enemy on occasion and on 
7 

the terrain where campaigns were to be fought. It was Napoleon’s 

use of aides and his system of formal reporting procedures that 

contributed to his leadership techniques becoming a wholesale 

revolution in military command. 

Napoleon used a dual system-his formal staff and his aides 

and liaison officers (a group of six to thirteen lesser-grade 

officers)-for cutting through established command channels to 

gather time-sensitive information. The emperor’s general-grade 

aides-de-camp, his lower-ranking liaison officers, and his commissioned orderlies were young, active, and in the “full flower 

of their mental and physical power.” Their duties were both 

broad and diverse, ranging from carrying battlefield messages 

to reconnoitering entire countries and negotiating surrender 

terms. Periodically, aides were also called on to accomplish strategic missions, such as bearing important diplomatic messages 

to foreign heads of state. Napoleon’s aides-de-camp, as a result 

of their sensitive duties, had to possess savoir faire and an 

ability to get along with and be trusted by subordinate commanders and staff officers of higher rank. They had to be welltrained, professional soldiers; precise in their observations; able 

to isolate problems; and, perhaps most of all, capable of discriminating between vital and nonvital tactical information. The 

aides also had to master the operational philosophy of their 

emperor, understand his intent fully, and be able to answer subordinate commanders’ questions. Napoleon’s aides often spoke 

in the name of the emperor and, as a result, were respected as 

possessing his utmost confidence. Napoleon’s instructions to 

General Bertrand provide an example of the type of missions 

Napoleon’s aides performed: 

Tommorrow at dawn you depart and travel to Worms. . . make 

sure all preparations for crossing the river by my guard are being 

made. You will then go on to Kassel to make sure the place is 

being put in a state of defensive and provisioned. Taking due security precaution, you will visit the fortress of Hanau. Can it be 

occupied by a coup de main?” 

Another example of an aide’s orders, in the context of verifying the accuracy of a subordinate’s report, is a mission given 

to Lebrun: 

You will first visit t,he Corps of the Duke of Regis and inform 

me about his person. You will copy me a picture of his entire corps. 

YOU will report on the state of his infantry, artillery, trains, magazines and hospitals also the rumors circulating in and around the 

corps, in brief anything that might interest me.7 
8 

Although younger officers were sent on more limited missions, the objectives were virtually the same-collecting specific 

information on the fighting condition of the Grande Armee, 

gathering intelligence, and assisting in the control of forces in 

battle. Napoleon’s younger, lower-ranking aides-de-camp were 

handpicked, often coming from noble famihes with a military 

tradition. Two years’ troop service was the only bask prerequisite 

for selection. Beyond that, however, they had to be loyal, dedicated officers, both mentally alert and physically fit. 

Napoleon’s aide and liaison officer system played an instrumental role in the command and control of the best organized 

army that history had seen until then and was the model for 

several similar arrangements of the modern era. His directed 

telescope system enabled him, as the commander of the Grande 

Armee, to circumvent the command hierarchy as needed. The 

use of aides-de-camp gave him the means to focus on any one 

part of his army and obtain the specific, sometimes intangible, 

and often vital information required for successful operations. 

Noting the effectiveness of Napoleon’s use of aides, one of 

his principal adversaries, the Duke of Wellington, employed a 

similar system. A common practice within the British Army of 

the Napoleonic era was that each general officer was allowed 

at least one aide-de-camp, lieutenant generals were permitted two, 

and commanders of forces were allotted as many as they needed. 

During the Peninsula campaign, Wellington, because of his high 

command position, had six aides-de-camp ranging from lieutenant 

to lieutenant colonel.6 The relationship between the famous 

British commander and his aides was so close that he once 

stated that even in retirement he must have his young aides at 

his side. Wellington’s subordinates performed the same basic 

roles as Napoleon’s but were of special use in gathering intelligence. Perhaps of even greater importance, however, Wellington’s aides, like those of Napoleon, helped compile information 

on the condition of his own forces.s 

During the remainder of the nineteenth century, armies 

throughout the world followed the examples set by Napoleon 

and Wellington in using aides and liaison officers. The large 

armies of the American Civil War proved to be no exception. 

During the Civil War, which has often been considered the last 

great war of the Napoleonic era and the first one of the modern 

era, the use of aides in a liaison role by several famous commanders, both Union and Confederate, provides an excellent 

example of an early American version of a directed telescope 

system. 
IV. THE MODERN ERA 

The American Civil War 

Several famous Union and Confederate commanders differed 

in their approach to command procedures. For example, Generals 

Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman made extensive use 

of young aides in a directed telescope role. Like other Civil War 

commanders, they used their aides primarily to assist in the 

command and control of their forces, perform sensitive missions, 

and gather critical information on enemy as well as friendly 

forces. On the other hand, many leading Confederate generals 

failed to use their aides to the full effect, limiting them strictly 

to a commissianed courier role.* The Confederates’ failure to use 

any truly effective command and staff liaison system often 

frustrated their greatest military leader, General Robert E. Lee. 

Eventually, as a result of numerous command and staff failures, 

attributable mainly to Lee’s ineffective means of obtaining 

valuable tactical information and the undisciplined conduct of 

many of his subordinate generals, the general created a corps 

of officers within the Confederate Army to perform duties strikingly similar to those of a general staff directed telescope system. 

As a brigadier general early in the war, Grant had two captains as aides-de-camp. One of them, John A. Rawlins, rose to 

general officer rank. He ultimately served as Grant’s chief of 

staff and was briefly appointed Grant’s secretary of war when 

the general became president. As can be expected, the number 

and rank of Grant’s aides-de-camp increased with the general’s 

rank. Eventually, as a lieutenant general, he had four lieutenant 

colonels as aides-de-camp (out of a staff of only fourteen). 

Lieutenant Colonels Comstock, Porter, Babcock, and Dent were 

all known for their good judgment, great personal courage, professional competence, and ability to communicate effectively with 

otherslO They all had abundant field experience and were young, 

active, and fully prepared to perform any duty called for by 

their chief. They acted as Grant’s ““eyes” on countless occasions 

throughout the war. Their role in battle, however, was especially 

critical. 

Prior to a battle, Grant would communicate his overall intent 

to his aides, explain how he saw the battle progressing, state 

“There are at least two exceptions: Longstreet’s “Sorrels” and Forrest’s 

“Gallopers.” 

9 
his plan of maneuver, and stress the importance of overcoming 

any delays in the communication of his orders. Grant clearly 

stated what he expected from his close circle of young staff 

officers. For example, on the eve of the Battle of Petersburg, 

Grant provided the following instructions to his assembled aides: 

I want you to discuss with me freely from time to time the 

details of the orders given for the conduct of a battle, and learn 

my views as fully as possible as to what course should be pursued 

on all contingencies which may arise. I expect to send you to the 

critical points of the line to keep me promptly advised of what is 

taking place, and in cases of great emergency, when new dispositions 

have to be made on the instant, or it becomes suddenly necessary 

to reinforce one command by sending to it troops from another, 

and there is not time to communicate with headquarters, I want 

you to explain my views to commanders, and urge immediate action, 

looking to cooperation without specific orders from me.‘1 

The trust Grant had in his young aides-de-camp is as obvious 

as the heavy weight of their responsibilities. 

The relationship between these officers and their army commander, as with Wellington and his aides, was clearly a close 

one. This strong personal relationship between commander and 

subordinate, one based on mutual respect, was a trend that 

became a prime characteristic of many successful directed telescope systems of the future. Grant’s aides dined with him nightly 

in an informal, almost family-like environment. The routine 

evening discussions, often driven by the events of the day, 

provided the commanding general with key insights into the 

status of his army. As with Napoleon, Grant’s aides often provided information that he was unable to gather through the 

more conventional formal reports sent up the chain of command. 

His aides’ observations gave him an accurate impression of the 

morale and esprit of his soldiers, as well as their overall readiness to engage the enemy. 

Grant’s aides also performed the more traditional aide-decamp role of conveying orders in combat. Since the general 

routinely positioned himself centrally in the field (so he could 

be found and could issue his orders rapidly), his four aides-decamp were important in maintaining effective command and 

control of the often widespread units of the army. Grant’s use 

of his aides, like that of the Duke of Marlborough over 150 

years earlier, enabled him, through proxies, to be at the critical 

point in the line when he was most needed, and on occasion, 

this proved decisive to the outcome of battles. 
11 

Another famous Union general, William T. Sherman, admired 

the reduced, streamlined effectiveness of Grant’s staff. He closely 

modeled his own small staff after it, especially regarding how 

to use his aides-de-camp best. As a division commander, Sherman 

had two aides, both lieutenants. He used these officers extensively to gather information, make observations, verify reports, 

and convey orders. As with Grant’s aides, the two lieutenants 

rose in rank along with their commander. Even as the commander of the Military Division of the Mississippi, however, 

Sherman maintained a reduced staff when he was in the field. 

In fact, Sherman relied heavily on three captains as primary 

aides during his Atlanta campaign.12 The effectiveness of 

Sherman’s field staff information-gathering system, and perhaps a hint of the general’s overall command philosophy, is 

reflected in his requiring only a single report-a trimonthly 

strength report-from his subordinate commands during his 

hard-driving campaigns.l” 

While Sherman credited technology, especially the telegraph, 

for improving command and control, he stated that usually the 

best command and control system for every purpose was paper, 

pencils, and a good aide. He also proposed that military headquarters, from brigade to army, include among the staff “a 

couple of young aides-de-camp, habitually selected from the 

subalterns of the brigade, who should be good riders, and intelligent enough to give and explain the orders of their general”14 

Sherman’s campaign successes, like those of Grant, attest to 

the effectiveness of these generals’ almost identical directed telescope aide and liaison systems. Unfortunately, many federal 

generals did not use their aides as effectively. As a result, they 

often paid the consequences, stumbling into battles without adequate intelligence while lacking an effective means of controlling 

their forces once they engaged the enemy. 

Although Robert E. Lee used his staff and aides efficientlyespecially Colonels Charles Venables, Walter Taylor, Charles 

Marshall, and Randolph Falcott-many other Confederate 

commanders did not.15 Consequently, their overall performance 

as operational commanders often suffered accordingly. In 

selecting officers for his staff, Lee considered individual personalities more than professional attributes and, like other commanders of the period, chose junior officers, often much younger 

than himself. Furthermore, Lee insisted that his staff officers’ 

personalities blend with the overall tone of his headquarters and 

his unique style of decentralized command and control. Despite 
12 

his overemphasis on personality, Lee was an excellent judge of 

professionalism and individual character for all of his aides. 

Like their Union counterparts, Lee’s aides were known for their 

coolness under fire, tact, and judgment. 

Lee recognized that the Confederacy’s severe shortage of 

experienced “Old Army” staff officers at virtually every level of 

headquarters prohibited centralized control of tactical operations 

in the Confederate Army. As a result, he was forced to assume 

that his armies must function in concert with one another without centralized control. He did not find a staff model adequate 

to serve the rapidly changing needs of technology, so he relied 

heavily on simple mission-oriented orders. One biographer, 

Clifford Dowdy, stated that nothing was required of Lee’s subordinate commanders beyond the most rudimentary and fundamental techniques of command. Lee simply saw no need for a 

directed telescope system early in the war. He assumed that 

because of the simplicity of his orders, the skilled leadership of 

his subordinates, and their renowned fighting spirit, his officers 

would operate effectively within his orders and support his overall intent when he was absent from the battlefield. Lee did not 

feel it necessary to investigate what was happening in his subordinate commands, let alone verify reports and closely scrutinize 

the conduct of their operations. After several Confederate tactical 

setbacks, however, he painfully recognized that he needed to 

increase the overall effectiveness of his rather loose command 

and control system and to establish firm control over the undisciplined actions of many of his subordinate commanders, After 

the Seven Days’ Battles, he realized that when in combat he 

had no way of knowing just how his division commanders were 

operating in relation to the general headquarters.16 

Early in the war, Lee recognized the shortcomings of his 

army’s staff system and the failure of his staffs to provide 

correct and timely information. The weaknesses inherent in 

appointing relatives, political associates, or old friends to key 

staff positions, instead of selecting officers with more professional credentials, exacerbated the already dysfunctional Confederate command and control system.* In March 1863, Lee 

called for the establishment of a separate corps of officers to 

fill critical positions within the army to correct the chronic 

*This “‘patronage” practice was common in most armies of the period but 

the rule more than the exception in the Confederate Army and Union militia 

units. 
13 

“information vacuum” problem. He wrote to President Jefferson 

Davis: 

The greatest difficulty I find is in causing orders and regulations 

to be obeyed. We therefore have need of a corps of officers to teach 

others their duty, see to the observance of orders, and to the regularity and precision of all movements. . . . 

In reference to aides and other staff officers, Lee states in the 

same correspondence: 

If you can fill these positions with proper officers-not relations 

and social friends of the commanders, who, however agreeable their 

company, are not the most useful-you might hope to have the finest 

army in the world.17 

Obviously, Lee saw the need for some type of directed telescope system. However, the suggestion by the famous Southern 

general for a separate corps of trained staff officers and observers is somewhat unique. 

CVorld War I 

The American Civil War marked the end of one era of military history and the beginning of another. The art of war was 

clearly in a state of flux during this period. Large conscripted 

armies with expanded and more specialized staffs became popular. Consequently, by the end of the nineteenth century, aidede-camp duties had changed drastically. The aides’ traditional 

responsibilities were being redefined by both staff specialization, 

reorganization, and the rapid pace of communications technology. 

The formation of general staff systems in many leading armies 

around the world resulted in the battlefield functions of aidesde-camp being passed to either operations, intelligence, or liaison 

offices. 

With the advent of new weapons and larger armies, the 

implementation of tactics became further decentralized. Strategic 

movement of troops and materiel, now firmly tied to railroads, 

allowed the strategic and operational concentration of forces close 

to the battlefield. Although the telegraph and railroad enhanced 

the centralization of command and control, the growth in the 

size of armies and new weaponry had the opposite effectspreading armies farther apart. The telegraph made instantaneous communication possible, but it was also extremely 

insecure, unreliable, and vulnerable. In the long run, its importance to field commanders proved negligible, for even though 

the telegraph proved instrumental in exercising effective eommand and control at army level, it was seldom utilized at corps 
14 

and division. It was simply an impractical frontline communications system. So, during these early days of the modern era, 

despite advances in staff organization and technology, commanders still relied largely on staff officers on horseback to 

monitor the activities of subordinate commands. The directed 

telescope system may have been modernized and redesigned in 

theory, but in practice, it remained the same. Prussia’s central 

European wars against Austria and France m the late nineteenth 

century again showed the utility of the system, despite the 

advances in technology and the creation of formidable general 

staff systems by the Prussians, Austrians, and French. 

During this period, General Helmuth von Moltke, creator of 

the first truly modern staff system, also depended on an aidetype liaison system for battlefield information.18 Within the staff 

of each Prussian field army, Moltke assigned trusted subordinates-general staff officers who were to supplement the units’ 

official reports with private correspondence. Moltke’s officers 

roamed the battlefield and observed key events as they occurred. 

They carried important messages and often served as their 

commander’s most effective means of gathering critical information. Assigned to front&e units, his young officers were able 

to gain details on battles that went beyond their commander’s 

view. As with their aide-de-camp forerunners, they compiled 

information not included in standard telegraphic reports, freely 

reporting the intangibles of combat and the bottlenecks to efficiency. Unlike many of their predecessors, however, these officers 

had a great deal of authority. Carefully selected and trained, 

they were military experts and analytical abservers. These professional attributes made the quality of the late nineteenthcentury Prussian directed telescope system extraordinary. Although the Prussian system was imperfect, it proved to be an 

extremely consistent, trustworthy, and reliable means of keeping 

high-level commanders informed as to the conditions on the front. 

As the all-too-brief phase of World War I maneuver deteriorated into static trench warfare, many headquarters were quickly 

formed behind the front lines. Housed in comfortable, semipermanent or permanent facilities and interconnected by a vast 

complex of telecommunications systems (telegraph, field telephone, and wireless), these headquarters soon assumed total 

control of the war. As a result of their relative isolation from 

the front, high-level commanders quickly lost touch with the 

harsh realities of battle. Major General J. F. C. Fuller describes 

command conditions during this period in his postwar work 

Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure: 
As the general became more and more bound to his office, and, 

consequently divorced from his men, he relied for contact not upon 

the personal factor, but upon the mechanical telegraph and telephone. 

They could establish contact, but they could accomplish this only 

by dragging subordinate commanders out of the firing line, or more 

often persuading them not to go into it, so that they might be at 

the beck and call of their superiors. In the World War nothing was 

more dreadful to witness than a chain of men starting with a battalion commander and ending with an army commander sitting in 

telephone boxes, improvised or actual, talking, talking, talking in 

place of leading, leading, leading [Emphasis added].19 

Headquarters succumbed to the temptation of overcentralizing 

their tactical operations. It was only natural that operational 

flexibility was sacrificed for disciplined control. The British 

Army, for example, was limited to command that could be exercised by wire. British liaison officers simply relayed information 

or sat idly by representing their headquarters “interests.” This 

ineffective use of liaison and the overreliability on the telephone, 

the telegraph, and later the wireless severely reduced British 

command flexibility. Consequently, the operational thinking of 

many leading staff officers and commanders became stunted. 

Initiative suffered, and the thinking in the rear headquarters 

ultimately became as stagnant as the trench-line defenses of 

the front. Lacking a truly effective directed telescope system, a 

general headquarters relied solely on telegraphic or telephonic 

descriptions and appraisals from the front. The only tactical 

information available originated from divisional headquarters, 

which were themselves too far from their units to know true 

comb,at conditions, This overreliance on technology gave highlevel commanders a poor conception of the battlefield and contributed directly to one disaster after another, the crucial Battle 

of the Somme being one of the best examples. 

In that battle, one communications system after another 

failed to provide an accurate appraisal of the battlefield. Without 

a directed telescope system, General Sir Douglas Haig, British 

commander at the Somme, stubbornly stuck to his plan, totally 

ignorant of actual battlefield conditions. Carrying out the orders 

of a general headquarters out of touch with reality, intermediate 

commands threw wave after wave of British infantry units into 

the line. When it was over, almost 60,000 men had been lost in 

a single day’s fighting. So poor were the communications that 

it was days before the magnitude of the Somme defeat was 

realized. 

Similar incidents occurred in other battles, including Passchendaele ridge, where the chief of staff of the British armies 
16 

in Europe remarked after the battle: “Do you mean to tell me 

that the soldiers had to fight under such conditions? Why was 

I never told about this before?“20 A young British staff officer, 

Major Bernard L, Montgamery, overheard the chief’s remarks 

and vowed that, if ever he attained high command, he would 

never be so absolutely ignorant of frontline conditions. A generation later during the next world war, Montgomery developed a 

directed telescope liaison system second to none. 

The German experience in the war with France in 1870 

taught them a number of staff lessons that the British belatedly 

learned in World War I. In the Great War, the Germans resorted 

to their proven and effective general staff liaison system. General 

staff officers .of higher headquarters visited the front line weekly. 

Each was assigned a specific section and given a questionnaire 

for evaluating the state of morale, supply, fortifications, and 

conditions in general During battles, as a backup to the more 

technical means of gathering information, these officers were 

sent to their assigned areas to gain a direct impression of the 

fighting. After awhile, these observers developed a personal relationship with the unit commanders of their assigned segment 

of the front. Eventually, they were accepted and not considered 

outsiders. As a result, they were able to obtain even more critical 

and candid information. Unlike the British, the Germans recognized early in the war that their type of liaison, the one originally developed by Moltke some fifty years earlier, enabled 

commanders to make timely decisions based on actual combat 

conditions, not ones driven by a conditioned response to a formalized plan. 

Seeking a more balanced approach, the French, like their 

British allies, were determined to maintain centralized control. 

The commander of the French armies, Field Marshal Joseph 

Joffre, realized that, while the telephone, the telegraph, and the 

wireless would enable him to receive information and transmit 

orders, an improved means of maintaining close command supervision had to be developed. As a result, Joffre created his famous 

vertical liaison system. 

Joffre’s liaison officers, a group of young officers, mostly 

captains and majors, were carefully selected and attached to 

the operations sections of subordinate headquarters. Their duties 

were to inspect units, carry instructions, and verify the execution 

of missions assigned by the general headquarters. On returning 

from their tours of duty, these officers would report, directly to 
17 

the commander. Once again, as with previous systems, the greatest value of the system was the reporting of intangible information that never reached headquarters through routine reporting 

channels. Like the German system, however, there were probrems 

with command relationships due to the excessive authority given 

some of Joffre’s liaison officers (many commanders were relieved 

due to adverse reports by liaison officers). In that regard, the 

system was not entirely successful. Nevertheless, despite occasional abuses of authority, the French vertical liaison system 

served its primary purpose by promoting an understanding of 

orders up and down the chain of command.21 

Observing French and German successes, as well as British 

failures, in exercising command and control, one American officer 

developed his own somewhat unique command and control system. Colonel George C. Marshall, then chief of operations of 

the American Expeditionary Forces’ First Army, assembled a 

group of young Army officers -captains and lieutenants-to act 

as combat observers. Marshall told them what information he 

wanted from the divisions to which they were to report. Each 

officer accompanying the division assault formations was directed 

to carry six courier pigeons and to release the birds at 0700, 

0900, and 1500. For the most part, the officers were to provide 

the location of the front line, accompanied by a brief description 

of the status of the fighting.“2 Marshall stated that the information provided by these officers, a form of American World 

War I directed telescope, proved invaluable. 

Lessons in command and control from Worlid War I were 

numerous. Command liaison remained a viable staff principle 

despite technological advances. Nevertheless, lacking any truly 

effective liaison system, the British perhaps learned their bitter 

lesson better than anyone, for as Fuller concluded after the war: 

Formerly there wasl a, general’s staff. This was composed of 

aides-de-camps, not spruce, young officers who do flunkey work, but 

experienced men who delivered the general’s orders and saw that 

they were carried out. Though this system of contact and control is 

just as valuable today as it was in the days of Napoleon, it has 

fallen into abeyance; for the present day liaison officer is far removed 

from the old-fashioned aides-de-camp.23 

The Intel-war Years 

The history of World War I abounds with stories of effective 

and ineffective command and control systems. Various combat 

information systems were utilized by virtually every belligerent 
18 

and were usually patterned after a formal command and staff 

liaison network. Fortunately, the many painful lessons learned 

in command and control techniques during the war were not 

lost in postwar military education. Interwar-year field service 

regulations, field manuals, professional journals, and other 

professional literature reflect the absolute necessity of developing 

directed telescope-type liaison systems for modern war. 

Answering Fuller’s call for a “system of contact and contro1:’ 

and studying the many British command failures during the 

Great War, a postwar British field service regulation stresses 

that “during battle all commanders in their degree must keep 

in close and constant touch with the fighting troops.f’24 This 

same regulation cites that a commander’s greatest challenge in 

modern war is to develop an accurate idea of the actual battlefield situation. Once again, Van Creveld’s axiom about the quest 

of war being a search for certainty is recognized. The British 

regulation calls for liaison officers to keep their commanders 

informed of all combat conditions. As a result, liaison duties in 

the British Army were greatly expanded and were described as 

follows: 

The duties of haison officers are to provide a closer touch between 

the headquarters concerned than is possible by other means; to 

convey the higher commander’s orders, and, when necessary, forecasts of his intentions, to his subordinate commanders; to bring 

information of the situation in the forward area to the higher 

commander at frequent intervals, generally at the end of definite 

phases of an operation.25 

French liaison doctrine was also refined shortly after World 

War I. A high-level military board, headed by Marshal Philippe 

Petain, studied ways to improve the command and control of 

large formations. The French Army’s Prouisional Instructions 

for the Tactical Employment of Large Units, published in 1924, 

was the result of the board’s research. The regulation, translated 

into English for instructional use at Fort Leavenworth, vividly 

describes the necessity of a type of directed telescope system. 

Explaining the functions and characteristics of the French 

General Staff as an auxiliary of command, the manual clearly 

outlines the necessity of general staff liaison officers possessing 

“superior qualities of general and professional knowledge, of tact, 

of devotion and of abnegation.“26 The absolute necessity of 

commanders being in constant touch with subordinate commands 

so as to fully understand the actual combat conditions, the status 

of soldiers and equipment, and the progress of battle was seen 

as paramount. The regulation also calls for general staff officers 
19 

to be sent, on a frequent basis, to subordinate commands to 

either verify combat conditions or clear up situations. The board 

emphasized that without effective liaison a major command 

would be unable to “animate the execution of its orders and to 

coordinate the efforts of all into a single, powerful and continuous force.‘f2T 

Somewhat surprisingly, the most in-depth descriptions of the 

duties and responsibilities of liaison officers in a directed telescope role are found in the U.S. Army’s Command and Staff 

PrineipEes, a 1937 text at the Command and General Staff College, and the pre-World War II FM 101-5, Stuff Officers Field 

Munuat. These American manuals, like their foreign counterparts, 

describe the liaison system as the commanders’ principal means 

of keeping in touch .with the tactical situations. The small 1937 

textbook, however, stresses the importance of the system throughout modern military history and fully describes what is required 

to make it work to its full effect. Accordingly, two purposes for 

liaison officers are identified in Command and Staff Principles. 

First, the liaison officers’ primary duties are explained. According 

to the manual, the liaison officers’ most important mission is 

to keep the commander up to date on the situation within subordinate units by providing information not available in routine 

reports, information that could ultimately prove critical in the 

commanders decision-making process. Second, liaison officers are 

required to dedicate themselves fully to facilitating communications at all levels in order to achieve a “concerted effort.” 

In discussing the necessity of liaison as a means of obtaining 

critical information and enhancing overall command and control, 

the Leavenworth publication emphasizes the point made by 

Napoleon over a century before that routine reports are often 

prepared carelessly due to either forgetfulness, stress, or simply 

communication problems. In appraising the professional and 

personal attributes of good liaison officers, Command and Stuff 

Principles states that they should possess the following seven 

traits in order to be successful: 

o Good judgment. 

* Unfailing tact. 

* Initiative. 

* Sympathy, which implies a desire to help rather than to 

criticize. 
20 

* Acute perception, coupled with exactness and accuracy in 

determining facts. 

0 Ability to express themselves and deliver impartial reports 

in the clearest and most concise terms. 

0 Good tactical knowledge.28 

The World War I lessons learned and the resultant liaison 

doctrine that emerged during the interwar years provided the 

foundations for the many directed telescope systems that followed 

in a second great war, Interwar command and staff liaison doctrine, however, was not entirely discarded with the advent of 

World War IX. Many famous Allied and Axis field commanders, 

among them Montgomery, Patton, Rommel, and Manteuffel, used 

liaison systems. In an attempt to hastily update and refine World 

War I-based interwar liaison doctrine so it could support the 

new dynamic nature of highly mobile blitzkrieg warfare, uniquely 

different systems began to emerge. In principle, however, the 

new systems were remarkably similar to previous ones. The new 

systems shared several key characteristics with one another as 

well as with the many systems of the past. However, for a 

number of reasons-new technology and tactics being the most 

prominent-redefined directed telescope systems developed either 

a distinctly technical, tactical, or staff character. 

WorLd War II 

The art of war experienced yet another technological revolution at the beginning of World War II. Consequently, commanders and military theorists sought ways to overcome the 

challenges associated with mobile warfare. The new tactics and 

technology obviously demanded increased decentralization. Complete decentralization, however, would risk battlefield chaos. In 

order to offset the decentralization trend, effective state-of-theart means of enhancing command and control were eagerly 

sought. As in previous conflicts, operational experience early in 

the war emphasized the necessity of obtaining information on 

actual combat conditions outside of normal command channels. 

To meet this requirement, most major armies instituted modernized, yet traditional, versions of directed telescope systems during 

the conduct of the war. The Wehrmacht’s staff information service, the Soviet’s STAVKA “flying circus” observers, the American signal information and monitoring (SIAM) units, and the 

British Phantom service all had similar missions. Nevertheless, 

they differed somewhat in how the missions were accomplished. 
21 

Regardless, early wartime Axis and Allied professional literature 

emphasizes liaison as an important means of enhancing overall 

command and control in mobile warfare, and liaison was a primary responsibility of all these units. 

The effectiveness of liaison, however, depended entireEy on 

the commander’s support of the system. All World War II armies 

had liaison officers; some armies used them poorly, others quite 

well. When used properly, these officers contributed to the highly 

successfu’ul command and control systems employed by several 

famous field commanders. The many liaison systems described 

in the interwar doctrine of the different armies were functional 

in basic design and theory, but often, the systems’ effectiveness 

in the field suffered due to the lack of command support, especially when relatively incompetent, poorly trained officers were 

assigned liaison duties. On the other hand, there are many 

examples of successful liaison-minded commanders who appointed 

highly qualified young officers to perform the directed telescope 

duties: Rommel’s lieutenants, Manteuffel’s “Cowboys,” Patton’s 

Third Army staff and liaison officers, and, perhaps most of all, 

Montgomery”s 21st Army Group liaison officers. 

It was also discovered early in the war that the use of the 

radio as the prime means of controlling and coordinating frontline activities enhanced the overall effectiveness of liaison as a 

means of command and control. Liaison patrols extensively used 

long-range radios to report tactical conditions directly to general 

headquarters. The British Army’s Phantom service and the U.S. 

Army’s SIAM companies were two such units designed to 

supplement information from normal channels of communication 

with more timely and detailed data sent directly to general 

headquarters. Both units employed command liaison officers in 

mobile patrols, and their general responsibilities were strikingly 

similar to those of the aides-de-camp and general staff liaison 

officers of the past. 

Phantom 

Phantom originated in 1939 as the General Headquarters 

Liaison Regiment and was employed in Belgium and France in 

1939-40. Phantom patrols bypassed normal reporting channels 

and sent information directly to corps and army headquarters. 

Information was also acquired by intercepting friendly radio 

traffic on unit command nets (a separate signals component 

originally known as the “‘J” service; “J” service intercept sections 

were combined with Phantom patrols in 1944). 
22 

The primary mission of Phantom, much like the directed 

telescope systems of the past, was to provide army and intermediate headquarters with the most accurate, confirmed, and 

timely frontline information available. This was accomplished 

by posting patrols at ail major subordinate levels of command. 

Consequently, unlike systems of the past, Phantom was able to 

produce identical and simultaneous information at division and 

corps levels. Information was passed laterally to adjacent commands in the same manner. Phantom patrols carried out their 

missions by working at either the division headquarters or one 

of the division’s forward units. Obtaining information from the 

most reliable sources available, the patrol would transmit the 

information in cipher to the Phantom squadron headquarters, 

which was usually collocated with army headquarters. If necessary, the information was then sent to Phantom regimental 

headquarters at army group. Once deciphered and verified, it 

was passed directly to the operations branch of the army headquarters. Concurrent with its transmission to the squadron, the 

Phantom detachment at the corps headquarters of the division 

where the message initially originated would monitor the coded 

information, decipher it, and provide it to the corps commander. 

The same message, monitored by Phantom detachments of the 

remaining divisions in the corps, was provided to their commanders accordingly. This system proved to be extremely effective. One World War II after-action report on the activities of 

Phantom detachments in the U.S. sector during Operation Overlord stated that information was usually “cleared” within onehalf hour of the time of the event. Nevertheless, there were some 

“customary” problems with the system-Phantom liaison officers 

were sometimes considered “spies” from higher headquarters. 

As with similar systems in the past, especially those employing general staff officers, many subordinate commanders and 

staff officers looked on Phantom liaison officers with suspicion, 

and their presence was often unwelcome. The reaction of one 

high-level U.S. commander to the arrival of his British Phantom 

liaison officer at Normandy was, “What the hell are you doing 

here?’ or words to that effect.2Q Even though Phantom officers 

had virtually no authority, especially when compared to their 

general staff officer predecessors in the German and French 

Armies of a generation earlier, they had to explain their presence 

time and time again to their host commander. In order to dispel 

the false image of Phantom command liaison officers usurping 

command authority or %nooping,” strict rules were established 

concerning the conduct of these officers and the control of the 
23 

information they obtained. For example, Phantom officers were 

required to transmit facts not their own conclusions, and every 

message had to cite the source of the information (usually a 

staff officer or the commander of the unit being supported). The 

following is a typical Phantom message transmitted from an 

American unit: 

Phantom Msg No 7 130630 

xv us corps 

Aug 13, 1944 

Third US Army 

SOURCE MAJ G-3, 5 ARMD Div, No Change in Forward 

Positions up to 0630 hrs CCB Concentrated Area 

64630-5630 

TSQ1209523~ 

To overcome the higher headquarters inspector image, officers 

selected to serve on Phantom patrols were screened closely. The 

liaison officers were generally junior to the officers they had to 

work with, so they compensated for the disparity in rank and 

experience with personality, poise, tact, and energy. In addition, 

they had to have a good background in operations, physical 

and mental stamina, and, perhaps most of all, initiative. Simply 

stated, they had to “sell themselves” in order to be successful. 

Nevertheless, as the war progressed and Phantom proved itself 

the only reliable source of information on many occasions, most 

Allied commanders became sold on the system, and problems 

with the relationships between Phantom patrols and supported 

units decreased greatly. Eventuaily, Phantom became fully accepted at lower headquarters and often was viewed as a vital 

source of information, a directed telescope for both the higher, 

lower, and intermediate commanders. 

Toward the end of the war, the mission of Phantom units 

changed considerably: they were to obtain more specific information, emphasizing battlefield intelligence rather than command 

information. For example, the Canadian First Army gave the 

following orders to its Phantom detachment, outlining what its 

focus should be: 

1. QPS. General information on progress down to battalion 

level. Intentions-change of plans. 

2. INT. Identifications and re-identifications ad nauseum. 

Gossip of the enemy. 

3. AIR. Line for forward troops, or estimate ditto by any and 

every means. 

4. R.E. Constant bridge information. 

5. R.A.F. INT. Information on enemy air. 

6. SD. Headquarters of own traops down to battalions. 

7. A.Q. Road surface or traffic news.31 
24 

In order to obtain the type of information being requested 

by general, intermediate, and subordinate headquarters, Phantom 

liaison patrols often found themselves behind enemy lines. At 

one time, a Phantom patrol was operating between the battalions 

of a German regiment. Phantom patrols were also the first units 

to make contact when the Allied pincers closed around the 

Pal&se pocket. As a result, the British XXX Corps and U.S. 

VII Corps commanders were aware of the juncture before the 

lead division commanders knew about it.32 

Clearly, the intelligence and command and control value of 

Phantom was obvious. Once again, however, routine channels 

of communication proved inadequate. Staff officers, even though 

instructed to keep higher headquarters informed, found themselves so overwhelmed by their other responsibilities that they 

were unable to pay full attention to sending information. The 

many fluid combat situations of the war, conditions that doctrinal communications systems such as wire could not adequately 

support, made Phantom an absolute necessity at times. Phantom 

and the “J” service deeply impressed the few U.S. commanders 

who were exposed to them early in the war during the closing 

months of the North African campaign. The Combined Operations Headquarters August 1943 Monthly Information Summary 

outlined the value of the system to all Allied commanders as 

follows: 

A. Phantom is a regiment solely engaged in obtaining information for the Commander it is ordered to serve. It is not a special 

signals unit. 

B. The patrols “J” Sections can be directed to any part of the 

battle from which the Commander required more detailed and more 

speedy information than he can obtain by normal channels. 

C. Though normally serving G(Qps), G(Int), and Air, the regiment has also frequently been of assistance to Staff and Services. 

D. The organization is flexible so that it can fit into any force. 

E. By the wide deployment of the regiment, and by the use of 

the W/T [radiotelegraphy] sets provided in the officer patrol and in 

the ‘“J” Section to listen in to W/T nets, the regiment can give 

valuable information about flanking formations to Commanders at 

all levels. This is especially useful where the flanking formation is 

an Allied one. 

F. As mentioned above (para 9) the information available is 

often very detailed. The Commander being served should lay down 

how much detail he wants to receive. 

G. It is evident that when Phantom patrol officers are sent to 

formation I-IQ they must have access to the Commander or to his 

- 
25 

principal Staff Officer on whose appreciation of the situation, their 

reports must be made.33 

Signal Information and Monitoring (SIAM) 

Patterned after the British Phantom, or more specifically 

the radio intercept “J” service used extensively by the British 

Eighth Army during the Narth African campaign, American 

SIAM units were first organized on a provisional basis by the 

U.S. Seventh Army in Sicily. Radio monitoring teams of attached 

division signal company intelligence pIatoons were consohdated 

at army level and placed under the direct operational supervision 

of the army signal officer. As with its British counterpart, SIAM 

proved highly successful in providing frontline information, 

verifying intelligence gained from other sources, and previewing 

reports sent through normal command channels. 

Impressed by the results of Seventh Army’s SIAM detachments, the U.S. Fifth Army organized its awn provisional SIAlQ 

service prior to the Italian campaign. Organized in August 1943 

along the same lines as the Seventh Army units, the Fifth Army 

SIAM service functioned directly under the signal intelligence 

section of the army signal office. Attached divisions, however, 

retained administrative control of the units. To increase the 

general effectiveness of SIAM units, a liaison service was added 

by the end of the year in order to supplement intercepted information. Similar to Phantom”s liaison system, SIAM liaison 

officers served primarily as information gatherers interfacing 

with division operations and intelligence sections and reporting 

the information they obtained through the corps to army 

headquarters. 

In July 1944, based on Fifth Army recommendations and 

on SIAM’s successful record in combat, the War Department 

authorized the formal activation of a signal information and 

monitoring campany. Consisting of approximately 350 officers 

and men, the SIAM company was organized into eight sections: 

a headquarters platoon, an army platoon, two corps platoons, 

and four division platoons.34 Drawn from Fifth Army signal 

assets, the newly activated 3151st SIAM Company accompanied 

the U.S. Seventh Army in the invasion of southern France and 

remained with that command until the end of the war in Europe. 

SIAM’s mission was essentially the same as Phantom’s. The 

SIAM company provided the field army, corps, and division with 

timely and accurate tactical information closely coordinated by 

liaison officers with principal staff officers of divisions on the 
26 

line. This information was obtained directly through monitoring 

the command nets of elements in contact with the enemy. In 

addition to its information-gathering mission, SIAM also provided 

a means of checking the overall signal security of radio nets 

operating within the field army. During the peak of operations 

in January 1945, the 3151st supported a field army of three 

corps (totaling twelve divisions) while concurrently maintaining 

effective liaison with the flank corps of adjacent armies. 

Army Information Service (AIS) 

Another U.S. field army to recognize the value of SIAM was 

the U.S. Third Army under General George S. Patton. After being 

informed of the nonavailability of a SIAM company until several 

months after the Normandy landing, the army commander, as 

an expedient, measure, converted the 6th Cavalry Group, consisting of the 6th and 28th Cavalry Squadrons, into an 

information-gathering unit until a SIAM company could be 

activated. The group's mission was to operate a special liaison 

and monitoring system for the army commander and his staff. 

A number of means were used to accomplish the mission, the 

liaison officer not being the least. 

Similar to SIAM and Phantom, the 6th Cavalry Group 

established direct communications with the army command post 

from frontline locations. However, unlike the other systems, the 

information bypassed intermediate command channels. Third 

Army also organized an intercept system similar to Phantom 

and SIAM that manitored battalion, regimental, divisional, and 

corps reconnaissance nets, transmitting the intercepted information directly to army headquarters. Of even greater significance, 

however, was the 6th Cavalry Group’s extensive use of command 

liaison officer patrols. 

Led by highly quarified junior officers, the Third Army’s 

liaison patrols would routinely visit command and observation 

posts of units in contact with the enemy, as well as exchange 

information with subordinate division G2s and G3s. All these 

duties were accomplished by a single squadron with extra manpower and additional radio equipment. A second squadron performed the more traditional mission of conducting ground 

reconnaissance. Third Army considered the speed in which 

information was passed through the system as a primary prerequisite to success. Essential command and control information 

obtained from frontline liaison patrols was to be passed directly 

to the cava1ry group headquarters collocated at the army’s 
27 

advanced command post, eliminating the intermediate stages. 

The 6th Cavalry, commanded by Colonel Edward W. Fickett, 

was known officially as the Third Army Information Service, 

but it has also been popularly referred to as Patton’s “Household 

Cavalry.” Regardless of its title, the group provided an essential 

service and no doubt played a key role in Third Army’s many 

successes. 

Like other directed telescope units, Third Army’s liaison 

officer patrols also had the “snooper”’ image problem. The fact 

that the army was consistently better informed than corps did 

not help the reputation of the liaison patrols, especially from 

the perspective of the division and corps headquarters. Commanders simply did not like higher-level headquarters’ observers 

attached to their units who roamed throughout the area of operations gathering all sorts of information The liaison officer was 

sometimes looked on as the parochial general staff officer or, 

even worse, a “Gestapo” agent sent to spy on the commander. 

Suspicions were usually allayed, however, when G3s realized that 

the liaison officers had standing orders not to send messages 

unless they were first checked and approved by the G3 or a 

responsible member of the operations section. 

It was not long, however, before division staffs relied on 

the Third Army headquarters patrols for up-to-date information. 

In several instances toward the end of the war, divisions requested that patrols be attached to armored formations making 

deep attacks. Some subordinate commanders accepted the patrols 

as part of their own staffs, and as such, the patrol liaison officer 

briefed the host commander daily along with his other staff 

sections. Although the patrols were designed to serve all command levels, they were ultimately responsible to the army headquarters. In that regard, they provided a steady stream of tactical and operational information to the Third Army command 

post, As one Patton biographer stated, the patrols of the 

“Household Cavalry were behind Patton’s uncanny knowledge 

of the situation.“35 

Army Tactical Information Service (ATIS) 

As the campaign in Europe progressed, the U.S. Army’s 

technically oriented information services (SIAM and the Third 

Army Information Service) became known collectively as the 

Army Tactical Information Service (ATIS). A General Board, 

chaired by General Patton, was convened in Europe shortly after 

the war to prepare a factual analysis of overall operations in 
28 

the European theater, and the ATIS was the focus of the board’s 

study number 18. Stressing the importance of all information 

obtained by ATIS being sent directly to higher headquarters 

after first being coordinated by either the local commander or 

a senior staff officer, the postwar report emphasized that liaison 

officers are “servants of the whole command . . . not staff officers 

expected to interfere with or advise any lower echelon”36 Even 

though the General Board concluded that the ATIS is an absolute necessity in modern war, it was decided that the monitoring 

of friendly nets should be a separate responsibility of existing 

signal units instead of the ATIS. The board recommended, with 

only one dissenting member (Patton the leading proponent of 

his own army’s information service), that the ATIS become a 

part of the U.S. Army’s standing peacetime establishment. 

General Eisenhower’s comments concerning the board’s findings 

were that the system was “a highly valuable instrument and 

one which commanders at all levels will soon learn to appre 

ciate.“37 Nevertheless, Eisenhower also held a caveat to his 

praise; he expressed deep concern about the system’s chances 

for abuse, stating that “‘unless it is carefully handled it can 

become a most objectionable thing, utilizing men and equipment 

to the detriment of personal relationships between commanders 

of the several echelons.“38 

Phantom and ATIS are excellent examples of modern, technically oriented directed telescope systems designed to meet the 

timeless needs for information by battlefield commanders. As 

with so many previous wars, routine reporting channels during 

World War II proved inadequate. Consequently, the information 

challenge, the commanders’ eternal quest for certainty, was met 

with the marriage of a modern system-the radio-with traditional doctrine and practice-liaison. An even more classic means 

of attaining information in World War II, however, was the use 

of staff officers by General Patton and personal liaison officers 

by Field Marshal Montgomery. 

Staff Systems 

Patton did not rely solely on his Third Army Information 

Service to gather information on combat conditions but used 

his staff thoroughly in that capacity as well. Members of the 

Third Army staff were required to visit frontline units daily, 

frequently at night, gathering the latest information while, at 

the same time, providing encouragement. These staff visits also 

created a sense of understanding and cohesiveness throughout 
29 

the command that, according to many, could not be found within 

other U.S. field armies. This effective use of Patton’s staff also 

reduced the number of reports needed from subordinate commands. In fact, Third Army required fewer reports than any 

other field army in the European theater. In addition to Patton’s 

own staff visits, commanders and staffs of Third Army’s corps 

and divisions were also encouraged to visit the front line daily. 

To Patton, 95 percent of command responsibility was ta supervise 

the execution of orders, while only 5 percent was to devise the 

plan or order. Patton’s command and staff visits served to verify 

directly that critical orders were being carried out. In essence, 

every staff officer in Third Army was charged with the traditional aide-de-camp role of being a command observer. 

General Patton’s information-gathering systems-Third 

Army Information Service, staff visits, routine reports, and 

Patton’s practice of seeing for himself and positioning his beadquarters well forward-made him one of the best informed cammanders of World War II. Patton’s directed telescope system 

contributed greatly toward his many successful campaigns in 

North Africa, Sicily, and Central Europe. 

Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, more than any other 

major World War II Allied commander, made the best use of 

liaison officers in their provincial role as a commander’s directed 

telescope. Montgomery’s young liaison officers had personal 

relationships with their colorful commander much like those of 

the traditional aides-de-camp of the Napoleonic era.39 Stealing 

a leaf fram Wellington’s book, Montgomery made extensive use 

of his close circle of personal liaison officers in ways similar to 

the earlier British commander. Although technology and the art 

of war had changed drastically over the previous century, the 

principles and theory behind Montgomery’s employment of these 

young officers remained almost classical. They were his “eyes 

and ears” as much as the aides-de-camp of the past were. With 

a combination of Ultra intelligence, Phantom intercepts and transmissions, and the insightful reports of his young liaison officers, 

Montgomery was able to maintain an extraordinary grip on the 

battle and campaign situations of his 21st Army Group. The 

general’s World War I pledge of never being ignorant of frontline 

conditions was fully met as a high-level commander. His promise 

was more fulfilled by his liaison officer system than by any 

other separate information system because it provided him with 

accurate and timely information. 

“.a 
30 

Residing with the field marshal at the tactical command 

post, Montgomery’s liaison officers were part of a close circle of 

advisers and confidants just as their ancient predecessors, the 

somatophylares and contubernales, had been. The officers also 

held a great deal of respect and affection for Montgomery, often 

referring to him as “Master.” Montgomery, in turn, described 

them as “the boys.” This close, almost paternal, personal relationship between Montgomery and his liaison officers, like that 

of Grant and his aides, enabled these officers to express their 

observations and opinions freely to their leader. Despite his high 

regard for his subordinates, Montgomery never let his liaison 

officers’ observations go unchallenged. Their observations had 

to be accurate, comprehensive, and concise in order to be accepted. As one liaison officer put it, interrogation by the “Master” 

was at times grueling. 

Often sarcastically referred to as Montgomery’s “Walkers” 

or his “Homing Pigeons,” all Montgomery’s liaison officers were 

young combat arms officers, relatively junior in rank (mostly 

majors}. Usually, no more than six to eight of them reported to 

him at any one time, and within the group were also several 

American and Canadian Army officers used for lia.ison with the 

U.S. and Canadian divisions attached to the British 21st Army 

Group. All the liaison officers possessed great strength of character, initiative, independence, and courage. Montgomery personally handpicked them, and his standards for selection were 

extremely high. The young officers were all combat veterans, 

many of them had been wounded, and most had been decorated 

for bravery under fire. Their combat experience enabled them 

to report accurately and objectively on often critical tactical 

situations. Surprisingly, most had no military career ambitions 

either before or after the war. Montgomery’s “boys” were outstanding officers in every respect. Often resented, but nonetheless 

invaluable, they formed a corps d’elite within the 21st Army 

Group staff. 

Montgomery’s liaison officers also had unusual influence and 

tremendous responsibility. Montgomery authorized them to “break 

through quicker than signals,” and their battlefield reports were 

often the only basis for vital command decisions. The liaison 

officers were also often given potentially embarrassing duties, 

such as asking a division commander why his division was 

making such slow progress, Obviously, with such questions, they 

were quite often looked on with disfavor, especially in units not 

accustomed to their presence. 
31 

Montgomery’s young liaison officers were, nevertheless, his 

special agents, his acknowledged “eyes and ears,” reporting 

directly to him daily in a personal and candid manner. They 

had unrestricted license to travel anywhere within the 21st Army 

Group’s area of operations and, as stated by several Montgomery 

biographers, were on “nodding terms with senior commanders 

and the many important politicians who would periodically visit 

Montgomery’s CP [command post].” Like so many observer systems of the past, and echoing General Eisenhower’s postwar 

apprehensions about the ATIS, Montgomery’s system was open 

to abuse. It is a credit to both the British commander and his 

liaison officers that there is no evidence of the system being 

misapplied. 

What prevented the system from becoming an army group 

spy ring was, for the most part, the personalities of the selected 

officers. They were junior officers, modest in the presence of 

superiors, and perhaps most importantly, they did not gossip. 

Utterly devoted to Montgomery and the army group as a whole, 

these liaison officers routinely risked death to obtain the information requested. In fact, a high percentage of them were killed 

in action. Their routine exposure to subordinate commanders and 

staff officers, their professionalism, their personality and courage, 

and the confidence the army group commander bad in them 

eventually resulted in their presence being fully accepted, if not 

desired, in many of Montgomery’s subordinate headquarters (even 

in the division command posts of the U.S. First Army). 

The simplicity of the system also contributed greatly to its 

success. After the morning briefings, the liaison teams would 

travel to the front to obtain information. The following provides 

the type of information Montgomery requested from a Canadian 

Army liaison officer, Major Dick Malone: 

Find out the form of the unit, no highlights, exact details. How 

far forward are his patrols . . . the real FLT [frontline trace]? What 

are his Battalion HQs and company CP locations? What’s the real 

ammunition status along the front line? Esprit? How many POWs 

taken? How many casualties? What did the commander do today, 

what”s his plan for tomorrow? Personally see the commander and 

give him your report.40 

Winston Churchill, in one of his World War II history volumes, Triumph and Tragedy, provides one of the best overall 

descriptions of Montgomery’s liaison system. Churchill reveals 

the means in which the system evolved and its value and benefit 

to modern command and provides striking similarities with systems of the past: 
32 

For nearly two hours a succession of young officers, of about 

the rank of major3 presented themselves. Each had come back from 

a different sector of the front. They were the direct personal representatives of the Commander-in-Chief, and could go anywhere and 

see anything and ask any questions they liked of any commander, 

whether at the divisional headquarters or with the forward troops. 

As in turn they made their reports and were searchingly questioned 

by their chief the whole shory of the day’s battle was unfolded. This 

gave Monty a complete account of what had happened by highly 

competent men whom he knew well and whose eyes he trusted. It 

afforded an invaluable cross-check to the reports from all the various 

headquarters and from the commanders. “I thought the system admirable, and indeed the only way in which a modern Commanderin-Chief could see as well as read what was going an in every part 

of the front.“*’ 

Field Marshal Montgomery considered his liaison system 

absolutely invaluable. Time and again in his memoirs as well 

as in his numerous biographies, his almost classic directed telescope system is cited as playing an instrumental role in the 

successful command and control of the 21st Army Group. 

Through his own eyes and those of his trusted liaison officers, 

Field Marshal Montgomery is credited with never losing a firm 

grip on the tactical situation or the ‘“hearts and minds” of his 

soldiers. His use of young, personable, and courageous liaison 

officers was one of his personal leadership characteristics, yet 

a historically proven and entirely traditional element of effective 

command. 

Despite official postwar reports of every type (Army ground 

force observer reports, general board documents, after-actian 

reports, and so forth), articles in professional journals, and even 

entire books describing the value of liaison detachments, the 

liaison units disappeared shortly after the end of the war. Their 

existence, a wartime necessity, proved to be an unaffordable 

peacetime luxury. Greatly reduced strength and equipment tables 

resulted in skilled officers and expensive radio equipment being 

put to better use elsewhere. Several serious proposals, one made 

as late as E&%3, called for the formation of Phantom- or SIAMtype battalions in the US. Army Reserve or Army National 

Guard. They were summarily rejected as no longer being needed 

on the modern battlefield. As the U.S. Army lost its operational 

focus, the importance of liaison units in the command and control of corps and field armies became less visible. 

In a 1970 book, Alternative to Armageddon, a number of 

distinguished military men, including U.S. Generals Lyman L. 
33 

Lemnitzer and I. D. White, as well as German General von 

Manteuffel., propose the resurrection of a Montgomery-type liaison 

system in the U.S. Army. Utilizing deputy or assistant commanders at different echelons as supervisors, groups of highly 

qualified officer observers would perform duties similar to those 

of Montgomery’s “Walkers.” The generals’ proposal, based on 

their individual as well as collective experiences, emphasizes that 

outside observers from higher headquarters provide both a 

“silent” and an extremely effective means of encouraging factual 

reporting and saving precious time in getting critical, often 

intangible information to the force commander. 

The only liaison system in recent wars comparable to the 

World War II systems has been the Israeli Defense Forces’ 

Phantom-type command liaison patrols. Led by majors in halftracks or armored personnel carriers, these patrols provided frontline information directly to army command from widely spread, 

rapidly moving combined arms columns operating in the Sinai 

during the 1967 and 1973 Middle East Wars. Other than the 

Israeli experience, it appears that the many World War II cornmand liaison systems, despite their recognized effectiveness, have 

been almost totally overlooked as an effective means of enhancing the command and control of modern armies. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 

This study has illustrated a number of battlefield command 

and control systems that could be used in the future. In that 

regard, several conclusions can be drawn from this brief analysis 

of both traditional and unique means of exercising command 

and control in combat, especially in the context of the US. 

Army’s new doctrine. 

Throughout military history, regardless of the era or period, 

changes in force design, advances in technology, new staff configurations, and the several revolutions in the art of war brought 

on by these changes, the battlefield commanders’ driving quest 

for certainty concerning battle. conditions has remained a historical constant. Within the overall search for certainty, a continuum of command and control functions existed (see table 1). 

In his work, Oaz Mrar, Clausewitz identifies uncertainty, along 

with exertion, danger, and chance, as the key elements of war. 

He also emphasizes that most often “the commander finds himself in a constant whirlpool of false and true information.” Lacking clear, objective information, he often has to trust either the 

“talents at hand” or pure luck. The effective use by commanders 

of their liaison officers has resulted in the formation of the many 

information systems reviewed in this study. 

Table 1. Continuum of Command and Control Functions 

Passive Authority Active 

Couriers 

Somatophylaxes 

Contubernales 

Napokonie aides 

Info Coltectors 

Somatophylaxes 

Contubernales 

Napoleonic aides 

World War II 

liaison officers 

Phantom 

SIAM 

AIS 

ATIS 

Observer/Evaluators Executors 

21st Army Group Prussian Genliaison officers era1 Staff 

(Assess capabilities, (Convey inrecommend changes, tent, direct 

evaluate intangibles) changes) 

A commander’s timeless necessity for objective, accurate, and 

timely battlefield information has been met by different means: 

aides-de-camp in the primitive and Napoleonic era and, in the 

wars of the modern period, liaison officers or general staff observers and signals monitors. The existence of information gatherers in one form or another has continued to play a vital role 

35 
36 

in command for thousands of years. Battlefield command and 

control realities dictated the use of aides-de-camp and liaison 

officers as information gatherers even after full staffs came into 

existence. From Alexander the Great to the Israeli Defense Forces, these information-gathering systems, when properly used in 

a directed telescope role, have proven to be instrumental components of effective command and control in combat. 

If the systems of the past have similarities, so have the 

officers that served in them. Normally, directed telescope functions were performed by aides, liaison officers, or general staff 

officers with similar characteristics. They were usually young, 

highly charismatic, energetic, brave, independent, physically fit, 

mentally alert, and relatively junior in rank. In the more recent 

periods of military history, they became a well-trained body of 

professionally skilled and trained observers, often belonging to 

a separate elite corps of officers-the general staff. Their character, judgment, tact, and trust have been highly regarded by 

seniors and subordinates alike, and as a result, they have enjoyed 

a close, often intimate, relationship with commanders and higherranking staff officers. 

Even though the duties of these officers have differed greatly 

in practice, they have remained the same in principle. Primarily, 

these officers observed and, on occasion, personally evaluated 

tiontline battlefield conditions. Routinely, they were charged with 

seeking out intangible information, such as that pertaining to 

morale, esprit, and cohesiveness, which was usually not found 

in routine reports sent up the chain of command. However, they 

were not restricted to this role, for they also verified the execution 

of orders and the adherence to policies. Also, of perhaps greater 

importance, they ensured that the commander’s intent was being 

followed. They were least successful when strictly confined to a 

courier role. As representatives of their commanders, the liaison 

officers often issued orders to superiors in their commanders’ 

names-an aspect of their role often looked on with extreme 

disfavor and, on occasion, well-justified suspicion. Breaking the 

chain of command in this fashion, regardless of the outcome, 

was considered a negative trait by other links in the’ chain of 

command. 

The history of the directed telescope system has not always 

been positive. Numerous historical events confirm the worst fears 

of those who view the system as a breach of the proper relationship between senior and subordinate commanders. There have 

been many instances of abuses by aides, observers, and liaison 
officers who were granted excessive authority. Even worse, sometimes commanders took these officers’ observations at face value, 

which resulted in command decisions that brought about failure 

in battle. These negative aspects of the system, however, were 

more often the exception than the rule. Generally speaking, the 

value of the system far outweighed any problems associated with 

its sensitive operations. 

If we accept the overall worth of the directed telescope system 

as it has been successfully applied in the past by many great 

military leaders, what implications exist for its consideration in 

the deveIopment of modern command and control doctrine, or 

has technology finally made the directed telescope obsolete? 

Certainly, today’s AirLand Battle doctrine, especially its deepattack aspects, presents one of the greatest challenges ever in 

the development of effective command and control. A fundamental characteristic of the type of leadership inherent in 

current US. doctrine is that all operations, at every echelon, 

must proceed from a full understanding of the commander’s 

intent. Helping to establish clarify, and gain commitment to 

the commander’s intent has been a classic role of past aide and 

command liaison systems. 

Today’s functional staff officers, even more than their World 

War II predecessors, will be consumed by their duties; they will 

find it exceedingly difficult to relay important tactical and 

operational information and to monitor the rapidly changing 

battlefield. The AirLand Battle doctrine requirement for staff 

officers to concentrate the operational focus ahead in time and 

space, combined with the technology enabling them to do so, 

will result in an even greater influx of combat information 

During World War II, SIAM, Phantom, and ATIS were created 

to augment heavily burdened conventional reporting systems by 

picking out salient information and sending it directly to the 

command that needed it most. As a result, the World War II 

systems enabled high-Ievel commanders and staffs to anticipate 

and assess situations rapidly, thus allowing them to gain, maintain, or retain the tactical and operational initiative. Rapidly 

and accurately obtaining vital battlefield infarmation specifically 

requested by commanders enabled them to respond quickly and 

decisively in countless situations, greatly increasing the overall 

agility of their operations. The vertical and horizontal liaison 

functions of the systems also had tremendous command and 

control implications in the area of synchronization of overall 

operations. The’ reconnaissance role of several modern systems 
38 

(Phantom and Patton’s “Household Cavalry”) provided the commander with an additional means to “see deep” in terms of 

gathering precise and direct firsthand intelligence on the enemy, 

assessing his capabilities, and predicting his actions. Clearly, 

the accompIishments of these systems of the past have application in the development of contemporary command and control 

doctrine. 
NOTES 

1. 

2. 

3. 

4. 

5. 

6. 

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

II. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

15. 

16. 

17. 

18. 

19. 

20. 

21. 

James D. Hittle, The Military Stuff: Its History and Development, 3d ed. 

(Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Division, Stackpole Co., 1961), 24. 

Martin Van Creveld, “Command” (Washington, DC: Department of Defense/ 

Net Assessment, 1979), 31. 

Ibid., 50. 

Ibid., 36. 

F. W. von Zanthier, Versuch Uber die Marsche der Armeen, die Lager, 

Schlachten und die Operations-Plan (Dreaden, 1’778), as cited in Van Creveld, 

“Command,” 54. 

Correspondence, XIII, no. 15854, 21, 9, 1806 cited in Van Creveld, “Command,“’ 76. 

Ibid., 77. 

Samuel George Peregrine Ward, Wellington’s Headquarters: A Study of the 

Administrative Problems in the Peninsula, 1809-1814 (London: Oxford 

University Press, 195’7), 36. 

Ibid., 39. 

Horace Porter, Campaigning With Grant (New York: The Century Co., 1907, 

c1897), 32. 

Ibid., 37-38. 

William T. Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman (New York: 

Da Capo Press, 1984), 22. 

Hugh Cuthbert Basset Rogers, The Confederates and Federals at War (New 

York: Hippocrene Books, 1973), 135. 

Sherman, Memoirs, 402. 

Armistead Lindsay Long, Memoirs of Robert E. Lee (New York Stoddart 

& Co., 1886), 161. 

Clifford Dowdey, Lee (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), 272. 

Long, Memoirs, 619. 

Van Creveld, “Command,” 142. 

J. F. C. Fuller, Generalship: Its Diseases end Their Cure-A Study of the 

Personal Factor in Command (Harrisburg, PA Military Service Publishing 

Co., 19361, 61. 

Bernard Law Montgomery, Montgomery of Alamein, 1st Viscount, Memoirs 

of Field Marshat the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein (Cleveland, OH: 

World Publishing Co., 1958), 34. 

George P. Winton, ‘“The Liaison Officer-Past, Present and Future,” Military 

Reuiew 24 (July 1944):44. 

39 
22. George C. Marshall, Memoirs of My Seruice in the World War, 1917-18 

(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1976), 183. 

23. Fuller, Generalship, 64. 

24. Great Britain, Army, Field Service Regulations, vol. 3, Operations-Higher 

Formations (London: Ris Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1935), 30. 

26. Ibid., 31. 

26. United States Army General Service Schools, Provisional Instructions for 

the Tactical. Employment of Large Units (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The General Service Schools Press, 1924), 4. 

27. Ibid., 35. 

28. United States Army Command and General Staff School, Commdtlzd arzd 

Staff PrincipEes (Tentative) (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The Command and 

General Staff Schaol Press, 1937), 157. 

29. Howard Sargent, “Phantom Passes the Word,” Army 8 (March 1958):34. 

301. “Phantom Operations in U.S. Sector, Operation Overlord” (N.p., nd.). 

31. Ibid.; and Sargent, ‘“Phantom,” 34. 

32. John North, iliorth-West Europe 1944-G: The Achievement of 21st Army 

Group (London: Rer Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1953), 73. 

33. Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, “Combined Operations 

Headquarters, Monthly Military Information Summary #4” (August 1943), 

4. 

34. Walter B. Potter, “SIAM: Signal Information and Monitoring,” Military 

Review 25 (May 1945):%X 

35. Ladislas Farago, Patton: Ordeal and Triumph (New York: Obolensky, 1964), 

493. 

36. United States Forces, European Theater, General Board, “Army Tactical 

Information Service,” Study no. 18 (20 November 1945), 3. 

37. Ibid., app. 2, 2. 

38. Ibid. 

39. Reginald William Thompson, Montgomery, the Field Marshal (New York: 

Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1969), 223. 

40. Dick Malone, Missing From the Record (Toronto, Canada: Collins, 1946), 

46. 

41. Winston Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 6, Triumph and Tragedy 

(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953), 259. 
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6 U. S. Gavemment Printing Office: 1992 I 654-001 (42053) 
Lieutenant Colonel Gary B. Griffin is an 

&my War College Advanced Operational Studies 

Fellaw at the School of Advanced Military 

Studies, USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

Ke is a 1970 graduate of the Field Artillery 

Officer Candidate School and holds bachelor’s 

and master’s degrees in history from Cameron 

University and the University of Kansas respectively. After graduating from the USACGSC in 

1984, he became an instructor at the Combat 

Studies Institute, where he wrote this study. 

Lieutenant Colonel Griffin’s command and staff 

assignments include serving as commander of 

the 3d Battalion, 17th Field Artillery, and as 

deputy chief of staff of the 1st Armored Division. 

The Combat Studies Institute was established on 18 June 1979 as a department-level activity within the US. Army Command and General Staff College, 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. CSI has the following missions: 

1. Prepare and present instruction in military history at USACGSC and assist 

other USACGSG departments in integrating military history into their in- 

§t~MCtiQXl. 

2. Serve as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command’s executive agent 

for the development and coordination of an integrated, progressive program 

of military history instruction in the TRADOC service school system. 

3. Conduct research on histarical topics pertinent to the doctrinal concerns of 

the Army and publish the results in a variety of formats for the Active 

Army and Reserve Components. 
U.S. At-my Command and General Staff College 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas