U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

97–415 PDF 2004

STRENGTH THROUGH KNOWLEDGE: HOMELAND

SECURITY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SETTING

AND STEERING A STRONG COURSE

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, 

SCIENCE, AND RESEARCH AND 

DEVELOPMENT 

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 30, 2003

Serial No. 108–33

Printed for the use of the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and 

Research and Development, and the Select Committee on Homeland Security

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Chairman 

JENNIFER DUNN, Washington 

C.W. BILL YOUNG, Florida 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

W.J. (BILLY) TAUZIN, Louisiana 

DAVID DREIER, California 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky 

SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, New York 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

PORTER J. GOSS, Florida 

DAVE CAMP, Michigan 

LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

ERNEST J. ISTOOK, JR., Oklahoma 

PETER T. KING, New York 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

PETE SESSIONS, Texas 

JOHN E. SWEENEY, New York 

JIM TURNER, Texas, Ranking Member 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts 

JANE HARMAN, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER, 

New York 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, 

District of Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

KAREN MCCARTHY, Missouri 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, 

U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

CHARLES GONZALEZ, Texas 

KEN LUCAS, Kentucky 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

JOHN GANNON, Chief of Staff 

UTTAM DHILLON, Chief Counsel and Deputy Staff Director 

DAVID H. SCHANZER, Democrat Staff Director 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, SCIENCE, AND RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

PETE SESSIONS, Texas, Vice Chairman 

SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, New York 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

DAVE CAMP, Michigan 

ROBERT W. GOODLATTE, Virginia 

PETER KING, New York 

JOHN LINDER Georgia 

MARK SOUDER, Indiana 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

KAY GRANGER, Texas 

CHRISTOPHER COX, California, ex officio 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin 

Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

CHARLES GONZALEZ, Texas 

KEN LUCAS, Kentucky 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida 

JIM TURNER, Texas, ex officio

(II) 
C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Mac Thornberry, Chairman, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, 

Science, and Research and Development, and a Representative in Congress 

From the State of Texas ...................................................................................... 1 

The Honorable Christopher Cox, Chairman, Select Committee on Homeland 

Security, and a Representative in Congress for the State of California ......... 14 

The Honorable Robert E. Andrews, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of New Jersey 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 19

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 1

The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of North Carolina ................................................................................................. 21

The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Nevada 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 1

The Honorable Zoe Lofgren, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and Development 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 2

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3

The Honorable Pete Sessions, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Texas ................................................................................................................. 19

WITNESS 

Dr. Penrose Abright, Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8

APPENDIX 

MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Questions and Responses from Dr. Penrose Albright ........................................... 32

(III) 

(1)

STRENGTH THROUGH KNOWLEDGE: HOMELAND SECURITY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SETTING AND STEERING A 

STRONG COURSE 

Thursday, October 30, 2003

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, SCIENCE, AND

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:15 p.m., in Room 

210, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Thornberry, Sessions, Linder, Granger, 

Cox (ex officio), Lofgren, Andrews, Etheridge, Lucas, Meek, and 

Turner (ex officio). 

Mr. THORNBERRY. The subcommittee will come to order. 

And let me thank you first, Doctor, for your patience with our 

unpredictable schedule around here. 

I want to ask unanimous consent that all Members be able to 

offer opening statements into the record. 

[The information follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT E. ANDREWS, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 

The government has a history of driving technology innovations, including the essential software development conducted with Defense Department funding that laid 

a foundation for today’s Internet. It would be very unfortunate-indeed, counterproductive-if companies were reluctant to adopt promising security technologies produced by federal research. As you move forward with your research agenda, I hope 

you will support technology transfer licensing models that empower the private sector to improve upon the government’s work and to commercialize the resulting technology.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JIM GIBBONS, A 

REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEVADA 

Chairman Thornberry, thank you for bringing us together today for this hearing 

on the long-term research and development plans of the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS). Thank you, Dr. Albright for coming to testify before the Committee. 

The ability to bring together the brightest minds in America to work on the common cause of securing our homeland is one of the most important tasks that face 

us as a nation. We are in a war, not only with terrorists and terrorist organizations, 

but with states who would seek to profit off of the proliferation of weapons of mass 

destruction. In that vein, our technologies and brightest minds need to be able to 

defeat the most advanced WMD technologies while at the same time, we need to 

be able to defeat a single fanatic carrying box-cutters or a deadly disease. This is 

a daunting task, but the consequences of failure are too great. 
2

As we saw on 9–11, our enemies will go after our vulnerabilities in any way they 

can. While these threats will be hard to predict and difficult to prioritize, I wanted 

to take this opportunity to mention a serious potential threat that I see on the horizon that I do not believe is being adequately planned for. 

Currently, our nuclear plants and facilities have increased security in order to 

protect against a catastrophic attack against our nuclear facilities and infrastructure. However, in the not-so-distant future we will be confronted with a new nuclear 

security dilemma. 

Unless we change our course, we will soon have the additional burden of protecting against attacks on the shipment of highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel from 

points across this country to Yucca Mountain. I think that bears repeating: We will 

be taking this highly radioactive nuclear fuel out of secure locations, putting it on 

trucks and trains and moving it cross-country through populated areas across America. As long as these shipments are an attractive target for terrorists, they will be 

vulnerable to an attack. 

The key way to protect against this threat, from my perspective, is to not make 

these shipments in the first place . However, the Department of Energy continues 

to push forward with the Yucca Mountain license at any cost, so it is my responsibility to make sure we are prepared for this eventuality. As a result, at the very 

least, we need to make sure that the nuclear waste casks they will be shipped in 

are so ?hardened? that they will not make an attractive target. 

The design for the Spent Fuel Packages that will be used to transport this waste 

is currently being reviewed by Sandia National Labs for the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. If this study is properly performed, it can provide us with important 

information on the safety of these shipments and their vulnerabilities. However, I?m 

very concerned that the ?Package Performance Study? will not take into consideration the effects of deliberate acts of sabotage and terrorism. 

The consequences of a successful attack on one of these canisters would be horrific. It is very clear to me that this is an issue that the Department of Homeland 

Security must address immediately, since now is the time to weigh in, while the 

Spent Fuel Packages are still being reviewed. 

Thank you again Mr. Chairman and Dr. Albright. I look forward to working with 

you both to see that our homeland security science and technology needs are met.

Mr. THORNBERRY. I simply want to say that we had before this 

subcommittee Dr. McQueary back in May to talk to us about the 

beginning of the Science and Technology Directorate. We have subsequently had several sessions to try to understand better some of 

the key technologies dealing with homeland security, namely nuclear and radiological detection, first responder communications, 

and things like that. And we are interested today to get an update 

and status report both on how the Department is shaping up and 

conducting its business, but also Members may well want to explore some particular areas of technology. 

And so with that, I also want to again thank Eric Fisher and his 

team from the Congressional Research Service for their support of 

this subcommittee, as well as my partner Ms. Lofgren. And I will 

yield to her at this point for any opening. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you. I have an opening statement that I 

will submit for the record. But I just wanted to note that it has 

been about 6 months since Dr. McQueary appeared before us, and 

he at that time mentioned seven specific areas for emphasis of the 

Directorate, and I am hoping that you can give us an update of 

where we are on all seven of those. I also hope that we can find 

out the progress of the MOU with NIST, how that is working. 

Also, when Dr. McQueary appeared before us, I had an interest 

in what we were doing in terms of standards-setting on biometrics, 

and I am still interested in that and would like to be more knowledgeable about our efforts there. 

Finally, I would just like to—I don’t know how many more hearings we will have before we recess, but I would like to thank Mac 
3

Thornberry for his leadership of his subcommittee this year. I 

think you have done a terrific job, and I think you have led the 

subcommittee well and with great fairness, and I really appreciate 

the work we have done together. 

I also want to thank the staff of the subcommittee for their work 

during our inaugural year, and in particular Kim Kotlar and 

Margie Gilbert on your staff who are really very able, and on the 

Democratic side Jessica Herrera, and David Grannis and Dan 

Prieto, who have also done a very good job. And I think really this 

subcommittee is an example of what can happen when we work, 

and not on a bipartisan but really a nonpartisan basis. So it has 

been a pleasure being a part of that. And I yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I thank the gentlelady for her comments, and 

certainly share them with regard to the staff. 

[The information follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ZOE LOFGREN, RANKING 

MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, 

SCIENCE, AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 

Thank you Chairman Thornberry. 

Almost 6 months ago, Under Secretary Dr. Charles E. McQueary of the Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate testified before 

this subcommittee. It was the first hearing held by this subcommittee and it marked 

the beginning of our look into the work being done at the Department of Homeland 

Security. 

At that time, Dr. McQueary was new to the job, and he spoke about his priorities 

for the S&T Directorate. 

In his testimony, Dr. McQueary said ‘‘The most important mission for the Science 

and Technology Directorate is to develop and deploy cutting edge technologies and 

new capabilities, so that the dedicated men and women who have the awesome responsibility to secure our homeland could perform their jobs more effectively and efficiently.’’

He also mentioned 7 specific areas of emphasis for the Directorate. These included 

the following: 

1. Develop and deploy state-of-the art, high-performance, low operating-cost systems to prevent the illicit traffic of radiological/nuclear materials and weapons 

into and within the United States. 

2. Provide state-of-the art, high-performance, low operating-cost systems to rapidly detect and mitigate the consequences of the release of biological and chemical agents. 

3. Provide state-of-the art, high-performance, low operating-cost systems to detect and prevent illicit high explosives transit into and within the United States 

4. Enhance missions of all Department operational units through targeted research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E), and systems engineering 

and development. 

5. Develop and provide capabilities for protecting cyber and other critical infrastructures. 

6. Develop capabilities to prevent new-technology as a surprise weapon by anticipating emerging threats. 

7. Develop, coordinate and implement technical standards for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) non-medical countermeasures. 

Mr. Chairman, Dr. McQueary proposed an ambitious agenda at that first hearing 

and the Members of this subcommittee were willing to give the Directorate some 

time to organize. 

Now that the Directorate has had 6 months to get up and running, I think this 

is an appropriate time to review what has been accomplished thus far, and what 

has yet to be done. 

Today we will hear from Dr. Penrose (Parney) C. Albright, Assistant Secretary for 

Plans, Programs, and Budget within the Science and Technology Directorate. 

Dr. Albright, I look forward to hearing about the progress that has been made 

since we heard from Dr. McQueary. 

I hope you will take some time today to discuss the status of Dr. McQueary’s 

seven areas of emphasis. 
4

In addition, I would like you to address some other issues that I addressed to Dr. 

McQueary last spring and I hope you will take some time today to discuss the following: 

1. How is the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Department of 

Commerce’s Technology Administration’s National Institute of Standards and 

Technology (NIST) working? Do we need to be looking at any particular issues 

that have arisen out of this agreement, particurly in the area of ensuring that 

the funding needed to engage in some of this new cooperation is available?. 

2. What steps have been undertaken and or being undertaken to engage the private sector in the development of new technologies and strategies we will need 

in the future, both short-term and long-term? 

3. What has the Department of Homeland Security been doing in the area of 

biometrics? Should we being doing more and are there any challenges that you 

have encountered thus far that this subcommittee should be aware of? 

Before I conclude, I want to note that this is likely to be the last hearing this 

subcommittee will hold before Congress adjourns for the year. I want to take just 

a minute to thank my colleague Mac Thornberry for his leadership of this subcommittee this year. Mac is a smart and able public servant, and he has led this 

subcommittee in a fair and bipartisan manner. I greatly look forward to continuing 

our work in 2004. 

I also want to thank the staff of the Cybersecurity subcommittee for their work 

throughout our inaugural year. They have done terrific work getting this subcommittee up and running. In particular, let me mention Kim Kotlar and Margie 

Gilbert on Mr. Thornberry’s staff. And on the Democratic staff, let me thank Jessica 

Herrera, David Grannis and Dan Preito.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Dr. Albright, thank you for being with us. I 

would like to now turn to you for your statement. Again, our witness is Dr. Parney Albright, Assistant Secretary for Plans, Programs, and Budget in the Science and Technology Directorate of 

the Department of Homeland Security. You are recognized for your 

opening statement.

STATEMENT OF PENROSE (PARNEY) C. ALBRIGHT, PH.D., ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLANS, PROGRAMS AND BUDGET, 

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, DEPARTMENT 

OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Good afternoon, Chairman Thornberry, Congresswoman Lofgren, and other members of the subcommittee. I am 

pleased to be here with you today to report on the progress of the 

Science and Technology Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security, and report on the progress we are making in implementing Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 

As you noted, Chuck McQueary, the Under Secretary for Science 

and Technology, did appear before this subcommittee on May 21st, 

and I am here to update you on the status of our efforts to build 

out the Directorate. 

In its planning, the Science and Technology Directorate has been 

guided by the Homeland Security Act, current threat assessments, 

our understanding of existing capabilities or those that can be anticipated in the near term, and by the priorities outlined in the 

President’s National Strategy for Homeland Security. 

The Directorate’s key missions are to address chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, cyber and other emerging threats; to support the R&D needs of the Department; to organize and engage and 

sustain the resources of the national research and development 

community, private industry, academia, national and Federal laboratories in protecting the homeland. 
5

Let me first talk about the progress we have made in operating 

some of our key offices within the Directorate. All the key offices 

of the Science and Technology Directorate needed to execute the 

missions that I just articulated are, in fact, operational. Directors 

with strong credentials have been appointed to each office, and we 

continue to add highly skilled technical, professional, and support 

staff. 

The Office of Plans, Programs and Budgets, which is the office 

I direct, is, in fact, operating. I have organized this office into several portfolios that are in line with the scope of the Directorate’s 

missions. These portfolios focus on countermeasures for chemical, 

biological, radiological, nuclear, cyber, and high-explosive threats, 

meeting the needs of our Federal, State, and local customers, and 

also developing standards to help Federal, State, and local agencies 

become smart buyers of homeland security technologies. 

Directors are now in place for each of these portfolios, and we are 

continuing to build out our staff. The staff of each portfolio, their 

job is to serve as experts in their particular area and understand 

the activities and capabilities that exist in Federal agencies and 

across the broad research and development community, and to develop a strategic plan for their particular portfolio with near, mid, 

and long-range research and development activities. 

In addition, I have staff that understands the threat from a technical perspective and is tasked with integrating the various portfolios into a coherent overall plan, with develop a corresponding 

budget, and monitoring its financial execution. 

Finally, I am responsible for directing and executing the Directorate’s implementation responsibilities for the SAFETY Act. 

It is our good fortune to have Dr. David Bolka, who joined us last 

month as the Director of the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, known as HSARPA. Dr. Bolka made significant contributions in advancing technical and scientific projects 

in his prior work with Lucent Technologies and Bell Labs. 

HSARPA is the key external research funding arm of the S&T 

Directorate. Its office is engaged in private sector and research and 

development activities in support of our mission and our customers. 

HSARPA also conducts rapid prototyping efforts aimed at taking 

nearly off-the-shelf technologies and adapting them for rapid fielding of new capabilities. 

HSARPA’s first priority has been to initiate the development of 

the next generation of chemical and biological sensors and systems 

to meet anticipated threats under existing conditions. They have 

engaged the private sector in its first solicitations, seeking detection systems for chem and bio countermeasures. The interest and 

response from the private sector has been strong. We recently held 

a bidders’ conference in Washington on September 29th that drew 

approximately 400 participants, and we have received more than 

500 white papers as a result of the solicitation. We are now selecting the finalists who will be invited to submit full proposals, and 

expect to begin contract negotiations in January. 

HSARPA also plans to issue shortly a series of solicitations to address radiological, nuclear, and high-explosive threats. These and 

other solicitations will seek to engage our Nation’s research and de-
6

velopment community, including academia FFRDCs, nonprofits, 

and industry. 

In fiscal year 2004, about 60 percent of our appropriation will go 

directly to the private sector through HSARPA or other S&T entities, with about 90 percent of these funds dedicated to near-term 

technologies that can be quickly developed. 

In addition, we also are pleased to have Dr. Maureen McCarthy 

on board as a Director of Science and Technology’s Office of Research and Development. Dr. McCarthy has served as chief scientist for the National Nuclear Security Administration and the 

Department of Energy, and was DOE’s senior representative to the 

Homeland Security Transition Planning Office. In fact, she was my 

deputy as the Transition Planning Office was stood up. She leads 

the office as it strives to provide the Nation with an enduring capability in research, development, demonstration, testing and evaluation of technologies to protect the homeland. 

The activities within the Office of Research and Development address the resources that can be brought to bear to better secure the 

homeland through the participation of universities, national labs, 

and Federal research centers. Directors have been appointed to 

lead efforts in each of these areas, and staff is being added rapidly. 

We also have asked John Kubricky, and he is to join Science and 

Technology, and he arrived earlier this month as the Director of 

the Office of Systems Engineering and Development. Mr. Kubricky 

previously served as the advanced program development manager 

for Northrop Grumman, and he is leading the implementation and 

transition of large-scale or pilot systems to the field through a 

rapid, efficient, and disciplined systems engineering approach. 

One of our key challenges in S&T is to evaluate a wide spectrum 

of military and commercial technologies so that rapid, effective, and 

affordable solutions can be transitioned to the Department’s customers, to include first responders and Federal agencies. In some 

cases, for example, military technologies could be candidates for 

commercialization, but rigorous system engineering processes need 

to be applied to ensure a successful transition. 

An example of this is our 2-year effort to reengineer technologies 

developed in the military so that they can be used for protecting 

civilian aircraft against a shoulder-fired missile threat. 

Our Systems Engineering Office will identify and retire in a disciplined and efficient manner those risks associated with developing and fielding such technologies. In doing so, the office must 

view each technology through the prism of affordability, performance, and supportability, all critical to our end users. Products 

must be user-friendly, require little or no training, and consistently 

provide accurate results. So our Office of Systems Engineering will 

demonstrate and test solutions before they are released to the field, 

and will validate those solutions to assure that they meet user expectations. 

Now, as I indicated earlier, a key mission of ours is to support 

the research and development needs of the operational directorates 

within the Department. Let me say a little bit about how we support, as an example, the Information Analysis and Infrastructure 

Protection Directorate. The Department is very aware that our critical cyberinfrastructure is an attractive target for our adversaries. 
7

In support of the IA&IP activities in this area, S&T is creating a 

robust cybersecurity research and development capability aimed at 

addressing our cyber vulnerabilities and engaging, for example, in 

efforts that develop tools to make it easier to perform software 

patches or detect the insider threat. This effort will be executed 

through a cyber R&D center managed through HSARPA. A center 

director has been selected along with a deputy director, who is 

from, in fact, our IA&IP Directorate. 

A draft research agenda has been developed, and we are now soliciting for a contractor to support the center’s operation. The contractor will host the necessary public and private discussions on 

technical issues, and will further develop the research agenda 

around the issues identified. 

We also support the IA&IP Directorate with research, assessments and guidance in evaluating threats and areas of vulnerability. We provide the technical understanding of the current and 

evolving threat and cutting-edge tools to help intelligence analysts 

organize and query their data and to connect the dots. We strive 

to better understand the vulnerabilities and risks to our infrastructure while providing policymakers with the information they need 

to efficiently allocate resources for their protection. 

We have also established a National Biodefense Analysis and 

Countermeasure Center in support of our Title III responsibilities. 

The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasure Center, 

based at Fort Detrick, Maryland, is the hub within Homeland Security for research and operational capabilities to anticipate, prevent, respond to, and recover from current and next-generation biological threats to the American people and our agricultural system. 

It has three programmatic thrusts: Biodefense characterization, 

bioforensics, and agricultural security. And these are executed 

through five research and operations center. An interim capability 

is currently operational today at Fort Detrick with spoke operations at our national labs. 

DHS is also contributing to a governmentwide effort to build U.S. 

leadership in science and technology. We are reaching out to the 

academic community to provide students with opportunities to pursue career paths in sectors of science and technology that are vital 

to our national security. Two examples of this are the Homeland 

Security Centers of Excellence Program and our Scholars and Fellows Program. 

Within the Centers of Excellence Program, the Department plans 

to establish a network of university-based homeland security centers, each with a different area of focus in research and development. The first center will examine the Nation’s resiliency to various acts of terrorism in terms of impact and consequences, using 

risk-based economic modeling. Seventy universities submitted 

white papers, and of these, 12 were invited to submit full proposals. We plan to announce the first Center of Excellence in late 

November. 

Also, the first 100 awardees of the Homeland Security Scholars 

and Fellows Program began their studies this fall. These men and 

women will study in areas aligned to our mission, such as the life 

sciences, engineering, computers, information sciences, social 

sciences, and psychology. 
8

And while the Science and Technology Directorate is ramping up, 

we have also been very hard at work delivering capability. My 

statement for the record that I am submitting today includes several examples of the Directorate’s current accomplishments as well 

as capabilities that will be available within the next few months, 

in the very near term. 

Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Lofgren, and members of the 

subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I am happy 

to address any questions you have. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Dr. Albright. And let me just compliment you on your written statement. It was certainly more thorough and more direct than a lot that we get up here, and it was 

very helpful, and I want to compliment you on that. 

[The statement of Dr. Albright follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. PENROSE ALBRIGHT 

Good afternoon Chairman Thornberry, Congresswoman Lofgren, and Members of 

the Subcommittee. I am pleased to appear before you today to report on the progress 

the Science and Technology Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security is 

making in implementing Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Dr. Charles 

McQueary, Under Secretary for Science & Technology, appeared before this Subcommittee on May 21, 2003 and I am pleased to have the opportunity to update you 

on the status of our efforts to build out the Directorate. In its planning, the S&T 

Directorate has been guided by the Homeland Security Act, current threat assessments, our understanding of existing capabilities or those that can be anticipated 

in the near term, and by the priorities outlined in the President’s National Strategy 

for Homeland Security. In short, we are shaping the Directorate to serve as the Department’s hub for research and development for exposing and countering chemical, 

biological, radiological, nuclear, high-explosive and cyber threats against the United 

States and its people.

Progress in Operations of Key Offices 

I am pleased to report that all key offices of the Science & Technology Directorate 

are operational. Directors with strong credentials have been appointed to each office 

and we continue to strategically add highly skilled technical, professional and support staff. The offices originally planned are up and running and include: Plans, 

Programs and Budgets; Research and Development; Homeland Security Advanced 

Research Projects Agency; and Systems Engineering and Development. 

The Science and Technology Directorate is implementing its activities through focused portfolios that address chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear and cyber 

threats; support the research and development needs of the operational units of the 

Department; and receive valuable input from private industry and academia as well 

as national and Federal laboratories.

Office of Plans, Programs and Budgets 

The Office of Plans, Programs and Budgets (PPB) is operating under my supervision. I have organized this office into several portfolios, each of which is focused 

on a particular discipline or activity; taken together, these portfolios span the Directorate’s mission space. A key mission for the S&T Directorate is to act as the Department’s focal point and advocate for countermeasures to weapons of mass destruction. Thus, there are portfolios that address countermeasures for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, cyber, and high-explosives threats. A further key mission for the Directorate is to provide the research, development, test and evaluation 

for our customers in the other directorates. Thus, there are portfolios focused on 

borders and transportation security, intelligence analysis and critical infrastructure, 

and emergency preparedness and response. Finally, there is a portfolio dedicated to 

developing standards for technologies for homeland security to better aid Federal, 

State, and local agencies in being smart buyers of homeland security technologies. 

Directors are now in place for each of the portfolios and we are continuing to build 

out our staff. The staff of each portfolio is charged with being expert in their particular area, with understanding the activities and capabilities extant in Federal 

agencies and across the broad research and development community; and with developing a strategic plan for their particular portfolio, to include near-, mid-, and 

long-range research and development activities. In addition, I have staff that is 

charged with understanding the threat from a technical perspective, with inte-
9

grating the various portfolios into a coherent overall plan, with developing the corresponding budget, and monitoring its financial execution. Finally, I am responsible 

for executing the Directorate’s implementation responsibilities for the SAFETY Act.

Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency 

It is our good fortune that Dr. David Bolka joined us last month as director of 

the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, known as HSARPA. Dr. 

Bolka made significant contributions in advancing technical and scientific projects 

in his prior work with Lucent Technologies and Bell Laboratories, following a notable Naval career. 

HSARPA’s Chemical/Biological Technical Office is fully operational. Other offices 

will address the technical aspects of countering radiological, nuclear, high explosives 

and cyber threats. Still others will have informational analysis, rapid prototyping/

testbeds and conventional R&D as a focus. In addition, an area of special interest 

for this office will be the role that human psychology plays in terror threats and 

attacks. 

HSARPA is the external research-funding arm of the S&T Directorate. It has at 

its disposal the full range of contracting vehicles and the authority under the Homeland Security Act to engage businesses, federally funded research centers, universities and other government partners in an effort to gather and develop viable concepts for advanced technologies to protect the homeland. 

HSARPA’s mission is to identify and develop revolutionary technologies, satisfy 

DHS customers’ operational needs for advanced technology, and quickly produce 

prototypes that lend themselves to commercial applications. Its customers are State 

and local first responders and Federal agencies that are allied with homeland security such as the Coast Guard, Secret Service, Citizenship and Immigration, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and others. 

HSARPA’s first priority is to seed the development of the next generation of chemical/biological sensors and systems to meet anticipated threats under existing conditions. We are interested in a timeline of 6 to 24 months for taking a technology from 

concept to prototype. HSARPA has engaged the private sector in its first solicitation 

[HSARPA RA 03–01], seeking detection systems for chemical and biological weapons 

and associated materials. Interest and response from the private sector has been 

strong. S&T held a bidders’ conference in Washington on September 29 that drew 

approximately 400 participants and we have received more than 500 white papers 

as a result. The next step is to select the finalists who will be invited to submit 

full proposals. We expect to begin contract negotiations in late January. 

HSARPA plans to issue a series of solicitations to address radiological, nuclear 

and high-explosives threats shortly. These and other solicitations will seek to engage our Nation’s research and development community, including academia, 

FFRDC’s, non-profits, and industry. 

In fiscal year 2004, HSARPA will execute about 40 percent of appropriations for 

S&T. Nearly 23 percent of the directorate’s R&D budget of $874 million will go to 

biological countermeasures while about 6 percent is for chemical countermeasures. 

In addition, 10 percent of these funds are dedicated for revolutionary, long-range research for breakthrough technologies and systems, while the rest is dedicated to improving existing technologies that can be developed more quickly.

Office of Research and Development 

We are pleased to have Dr. Maureen McCarthy on board as Director of Science 

and Technology’s Office of Research and Development (OR&D). Dr. McCarthy has 

served as Chief Scientist for the National Nuclear Security Administration and the 

Department of Energy and was previously DOE’s senior representative to the Homeland Security Transition Planning Office. She will lead the office as it strives to provide the nation with an enduring capability in research, development, demonstration, testing and evaluation of technologies to protect the homeland. This office also 

plans to provide stewardship to the scientific community and to preserve and broaden the leadership of the United States in science and technology. 

Activities within OR&D address the resources that can be brought to bear to better secure the homeland through the participation of universities, national laboratories, Federal laboratories and research centers. Directors have been appointed to 

lead efforts in each of these areas and staff is being added rapidly.

Office of Systems Engineering and Development 

John Kubricky joined S&T earlier this month as Director of the Office of Systems 

Engineering and Development (SE&D). He is tasked with leading the implementation and transition of large-scale or pilot systems to the field through a rapid, efficient and disciplined approach to project management. Mr. Kubricky previously 

served as Advanced Program Development Manager for Northrop Grumman and 
10

has held senior positions with California Microwave, Westinghouse Defense and 

with the U.S. Army Ninth Infantry Division. 

One of S&T’s challenges is to evaluate a wide spectrum of military and commercial technologies so rapid, effective and affordable solutions can be transitioned to 

Department’s customers that include first responders and Federal agencies. In some 

cases, military technologies could be candidates for commercialization, but rigorous 

systems engineering processes need to be applied to ensure a successful transition. 

SE&D’s role is to identify and then in a disciplined manner retire risks associated 

with such technologies to ready them for deployment to the field. In doing so, the 

office must view each technology through the prism of affordability, performance 

and supportability—all critical to end-users. SE&D must weigh considerations such 

as the urgency for a solution, consequences of the threat, safety of the product, 

lifecycle support and other factors as new products are introduced. Products must 

be user friendly, have a minimum of false alarms, require little or no training and 

consistently provide accurate results. SE&D will demonstrate and test solutions before they are released to the field, and will validate that those solutions meet user 

expectations.

Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Office of Incident Management 

Under Secretary McQueary created this office to serve as S&T’s arm for crisis response. The office assists and provides scientific advice to the Office of the Secretary 

of Homeland Security in assessing and responding to threats against the homeland. 

Activities of this office, which is focused on the biological, chemical, radiological, and 

nuclear threats, revolve around response coordination, providing scientific and technical expertise in developing operational plans and assessment of threats, and continuity of operations.

Collaborative Efforts in Critical Infrastructure Protection 

America’s critical infrastructure is a web that connects virtually every aspect of 

modern society. The Department’s efforts in this area span 14 sectors and assets 

that are in need of particular attention. These include agriculture, food, water, public health, information and telecommunications, energy, hazardous materials, and 

national monuments, among others. A major disruption to any of these sectors will 

impact others and could have far-reaching implications in terms of quality of life 

for large numbers of Americans. 

Acts of terrorism are not solely about loss of life. Acts can also occur that are 

aimed at creating widespread panic among our citizens, and disrupting our financial 

markets and economic well being. The Department’s role here is prevention, protection, response and recovery. Adding to the complexity of our job is the fact that 

much of the nation’s critical infrastructure is privately held and not controlled by 

the Federal government. This underscores the need for strategic collaborations 

among DHS and other agencies in local, State and Federal government, in academia 

and the private sector—and I am pleased to say we continue to make strong 

progress in this area. 

S&T supports the Department’s Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate with research, assessments and guidance in evaluating threats and 

areas of vulnerability. We provide the technical understanding of the current and 

evolving threat, such as those posed by biological pathogens and improvised nuclear 

or radiological weapons. We are providing cutting edge tools to better enable intelligence analysts to organize and query their data, and to better ‘‘connect the dots’’. 

We are developing decision tools to better understand the vulnerabilities and risks 

to our infrastructure, so that policy makers can efficiently allocate resources to its 

protection. 

The Department is very aware that our critical cyber infrastructure is an attractive target for our adversaries. DHS has created the National Cyber Security Division under its Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate. 

NCSD operates around the clock to conduct cyberspace analysis, issue alerts and 

warnings and improve information sharing and stands ready to respond to major 

incidents and aid in national-level recovery efforts. S&T is, in coordination with 

IA&IP, creating a robust cybersecurity research and development activity aimed at 

better understanding our cyber vulnerabilities, and developing tools that make it 

easier to perform software patches, or detect the insider threat.

National Laboratories, Federally Funded Research Centers and Universities 

National Labs 

The Science and Technology directorate has created the Homeland Security National Laboratory System. The System, which is comprised of laboratories across the 

nation, provides the Department with a vigorous internal research component. Di-
11

rectorate staff members work closely with personnel from each of the national laboratories to promote innovative homeland security solutions. S&T is presently exploring ways for the national laboratories to participate in HSARPA activities.

Homeland Security Institute 

The Homeland Security Act requires that DHS establish a federally funded research and development center known as the Homeland Security Institute to assist 

the Office of the Secretary and the S&T Directorate in addressing important homeland security issues that require scientific, technical and analytical expertise. To 

start the process, DHS, working with the Army’s U.S. Medical Research Acquisition 

Agency Activity (USAMRAA) issued an early notice on September 10 seeking expressions of interest and qualifications, which are due today, October 30. The results of this effort will assist DHS and USAMRAA in developing a major solicitation 

for this activity. Plans call for the staffing of the office to begin November 1 and 

the formal solicitation to be issued in December. 

Among other functions, the Homeland Security Institute may be tasked with designing metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of homeland security programs 

throughout the Federal government including the national laboratories.

Universities 

Through the Office of Research and Development, DHS is contributing to a government-wide effort to build U.S. leadership in science and technology. The office 

is reaching out to the academic community in an effort to provide students with opportunities to pursue career paths in sectors of science and technology that are vital 

to our national security. Two examples of this are the Homeland Security Centers 

of Excellence program and our Scholars and Fellows program. 

With the Centers of Excellence program, the Department plans to establish a network of university-based Homeland Security centers, each with a different area of 

focus in research and development. The first Center will examine the nation’s resiliency to various acts of terrorism, in terms of impact and consequences, using riskbased economic modeling. The Department’s call for white papers regarding the initial Center drew over 70 responses. S&T narrowed the field to 12 universities that 

submitted full proposals earlier this month and plan to announce the first Center 

of Excellence in late November. 

The Homeland Security Scholars and Fellows Program provide scholarships for 

undergraduate and graduate students pursuing degrees in areas that are already 

aligned with our mission. The first 100 awardees of this program began their studies this fall. These men and women will study in areas such as life sciences, engineering, computers, information sciences, mathematics, physical sciences, social 

sciences and psychology.

National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasure Center 

The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasure Center (NBACC), based at 

Fort Detrick in Maryland, is the hub within homeland security for research and 

operational capabilities to anticipate, prevent, respond to, and recover from current 

and next-generation biological threats to the American people and our agricultural 

system. NBACC is dedicated to protecting human health and agriculture by advancing the scientific community’s knowledge of potential bioterrorism. NBACC aims to 

achieve efficient interagency and private sector cooperation with a structure that integrates facilities and technical expertise in biodefense and involves Plum Island 

Animal Disease Center, national and DHS laboratories, universities, the private sector and other government agencies. Biodefense characterization, bioforensics and agricultural security are the key programmatic thrusts of NBACC that are executed 

through these five research and operations centers: Biothreat Assessment Support 

Center; Biodefense Knowledge Center; Bioforensics Analysis Center; Bio–Countermeasures Testing and Evaluation Center; and the Plum Island Animal Disease Center.

Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee 

The Homeland Security Act required the S&T Directorate to put together a committee of 20 prominent individuals with expertise spanning the Directorate’s activities. They are to act, in essence, as our board of directors, advising the Under Secretary on the best ways S&T can deliver to the American people the technology and 

cutting edge capabilities that are a fundamental strength in the war on terrorism. 

We have decided on the people we would like to serve on that Committee, and are 

contacting them now. I expect the Committee to meet for the first time early in December. 

Accomplishments 

While, the Science and Technology Directorate has organized itself, is rapidly 

staffing up, it also has been at work delivering capability. I would like to mention 
12

some examples of current accomplishments as well as capabilities that will be available within the next few months. 

Biological and Chemical Defense Programs: 

• The Biowatch program has been established and deployed to numerous cities 

across the nation. The program, developed, funded, and managed by the S&T 

Directorate, is executed in cooperation with EPA and CDC. It employs environmental sampling devices to quickly detect terrorist agents, such as anthrax, in 

time to distribute life-saving pharmaceuticals to affected citizens. The Science 

and Technology directorate is now focusing its efforts on piloting the next generation of environmental samplers which will reduce the amount of labor required and response time needed for devices while keeping the detection probability high and false alarm rates low. 

• The S&T Directorate and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA), recently completed PROTECT (Program for Response Options 

and Technology Enhancements for Chemical/Biological Terrorism). PROTECT, 

which is an operational chemical agent detection and response capability program, is deployed in more than six stations and operated by the WMATA. Upon 

completion, the system will be totally owned and operated by WMATA and expanded to approximately 20 stations. The information gleaned from PROTECT 

will have direct applications to similar facility protection and response efforts 

across the nation. 

• In June 2003, the Science and Technology directorate, in coordination with 

the Department of Defense’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Department of 

Energy, and University of Oklahoma sponsored a month-long atmospheric dispersion study in Oklahoma City, OK. Nearly 150 scientists, engineers, and student assistants were dedicated to this study, which tracked the air movement 

of safe, non-toxic tracer gases in and around city buildings. The resulting data 

is being used to enhance and develop urban specific computer models that will 

allow emergency management, law enforcement and other personnel to train for 

and respond to potential chemical, biological, and radiological terrorist attacks.

Interoperability of Communications: 

• The Department is taking steps to boost the ability of 44,000 local, tribal and 

State entities and 100 federal agencies engaged in public safety to communicate 

effectively with one another, particularly during an emergency. SAFECOM is a 

Federal umbrella program under S&T that is dedicated to improving public 

safety response through enhanced interoperable wireless communications. The 

goal is to enable public safety agencies to talk across disciplines and jurisdictions via radio communications systems, exchanging voice or data with one another on demand and in real time. SAFECOM is providing seed money for the 

Department of Justice’s Integrated Wireless Network program which will create 

interoperability among local, State and Federal public safety agencies in 25 cities. In addition, technical guidance for interoperable communications that was 

developed under SAFECOM will be included in this year’s Office of Domestic 

Preparedness grants.

Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Programs: 

• Analysts from S&T built and delivered a prototype system to IAIP to perform 

Graphical Information System (GIS) based computer assisted threat and vulnerability mapping of the oil and gas infrastructure in the American Southwest. 

S&T is also in the process of delivering to IAIP cutting edge visualization, data 

searching, data correlation, and all-source analytic aids to provide IAIP advanced analytic capabilities integrated with vulnerability information. 

• The Nuclear Assessment Program is engaged in ongoing assessments and 

analysis of communicated nuclear threats and claims of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. This program also inaugurated a new capability to rapidly analyze gamma and neutron spectroscopy in support of Customs and Border Patrol 

officers to quickly resolve radiation anomalies at the borders. This capability is 

in the process of being expanded, through the National Biodefense Analysis and 

Countermeasures Center, to the biological domain.

Border and Transportation Security Programs: 

• The Science and Technology directorate has initiated the Border Safe Integrated Feasibility Experiment. This experiment creates an infrastructure in the 

Southwest United States for data sharing between the Department’s Border and 

Transportation Security directorate and local and State law enforcement officials. The resulting system will identify individuals who have already entered 

our country, either legally or not, and who engage in hostile behavior after 
13

crossing the border. The system will particularly focus on individuals who attempt to change their identity or borrow someone else’s identity. 

• S&T has deployed to sites in the New York metropolitan area (tunnels, 

bridges, ports and airports) various nuclear radiation technologies. This demonstration effort involves transition of state of the art, new detection technologies available at the National Labs to the field, the development of operational concepts and technical reach back procedures, and on-site alarm resolution. It will serve as a model for deployment of these technologies to the interior 

of the Nation, around major urban centers, and at ports and airports.

Portable Air Defense Systems: 

• The Department of Homeland Security has developed and submitted to Congress a program plan for countermeasures against the shoulder-fired missile 

threat to commercial aircraft, known as MAN–Portable Air Defense Systems 

(MANPADS). Based on this report, the Science and Technology Directorate established a program office to oversee the Department’s MANPADS efforts. 

These actions are aimed at leveraging existing military research and development programs, and re-engineering those capabilities so that they are consistent with airport operations and commercial air carrier maintenance, support, and logistics schemes. 

• In September, S&T released a solicitation announcing a program to address 

the potential threat posed by MANPADS. The solicitation is the first step in the 

Department’s two-phase systems development and demonstration program for 

anti-missile devices for commercial aircraft. Phase I will provide an analysis of 

the economic, manufacturing and maintenance issues needed to support a system that will be effective in the commercial aviation environment. Phase II will 

include development of prototypes using existing technology which will be subjected to a rigorous test and evaluation process. The Department held an Industry Day in Washington, DC on October 15 to brief contractors about the program. White papers responding to the counter-MANPADS program solicitation 

are currently being reviewed. Respondents receiving favorable reviews will be 

encouraged to submit full proposals.

Maritime Security: 

• The Science and Technology directorate’s Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) has joined with the U.S. Coast Guard to 

build a prototype integrated maritime surveillance facility covering Port Everglades, Miami and Key West. The $3.7 million, 24-month program will integrate 

existing facilities and upgrade equipment to detect, track, and identify vessel 

traffic around ports, in the near-shore zones around ports, and over the horizon. 

This evolutionary testing will provide an immediate coastal surveillance capability in a high priority area; offer the U.S. Coast Guard and other Departmental organizations the means to develop operational concepts; and implement 

and test interoperability among Homeland Security and Department of Defense 

systems and networks.

SAFETY Act: 

• On October 10, 2003, Secretary Ridge signed an interim final rule implementing the Support Anti–Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies 

(SAFETY) Act of 2002. The SAFETY Act is designed to encourage the development and rapid deployment of life-saving, anti-terrorism technologies by providing manufacturers and sellers with limited liability risks. The Department 

is now accepting applications for designation under the Act. 

• In October, the Science and Technology directorate led a series of nation-wide 

seminars (Dallas, Los Angeles, Atlanta, Chicago and Washington) to introduce 

the process to implement the SAFETY Act. The seminars provided general information about the Act, introduced the pre-application process, and provided 

a forum for questions about the Department’s implementation processes. 

Standards: 

• Staff members of the Science and Technology directorate are working with 

the emergency responder community, and other federal partners such as NIST, 

to develop standards. Initial guidelines for radiation detection technology have 

already been made available, with formal standards nearing completion. Standards are also under development for detectors of biological hazards. Guidelines 

have been published for interoperable communications gear. 

• The Science and Technology directorate is working with other Federal partners to develop a set of standards for cleanup after a biological or radiation incident. By providing states and localities with cleanup guidelines, potential hazardous impacts can be significantly decreased. 
14

Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Lofgren and Members of the Subcommittee, this 

concludes my prepared statement. I am happy to address any questions you may 

have.

Mr. THORNBERRY. I would be happy to yield my time to the chairman of the full committee, if he would like to ask questions at this 

point. 

Mr. COX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome again, Dr. Albright. Two of the things in your prepared 

testimony prompt me to ask for additional detail. One is the experiment that you have initiated for Border and Transportation Security. It is described in your written testimony briefly as the creation of an infrastructure in the Southwest for data-sharing between DHS and Border and Transportation Security Directorate on 

one hand, and State and local law enforcement on the other hand. 

The aim is to identify people who are doing bad things once they 

cross the border and perhaps in the process also swapping identities. 

How is this going to work? How is it working already? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, it is set up in, I believe, a couple locations. 

I believe it is set up in southern Arizona, along the Arizona border, 

and it is also set up in southern California. And in essence, you 

have described the program to a T. What it is is that as people 

who—the State and local people who—the State and local people 

will tell our border people who they have a particular interest in. 

And as these people cross—. 

Mr. COX. How do they do that? How do they tell DHS? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Sir, I would have to get back to you on the actual 

details of that, but my understanding is they have basically created 

a watch list of individuals and names that they are interested in 

seeing cross the border. But the actual mechanical details of that 

I would have to get back to you on. 

Mr. COX. And the brief description that you provided states that 

you are going to identify individuals who have already entered the 

country, either legally or not. Is there any coordination between the 

Border and Transportation Security Directorate and immigration? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Sir, yes, I believe there is. We have been working—as we have been implementing this program, we have been 

working closely with the senior staff. 

Mr. COX. What I mean to ask is in addition to inputs from State 

and local law enforcement, are we attempting to match up information that we have already collected within this Directorate and 

within DHS, for example, from US-VISIT or from anything else 

that we are running? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, it is my understanding that the answer in 

general is, yes; that basically we are matching up information. To 

the degree that we have those databases integrated today, that information is being matched up. Of course, US-VISIT itself isn’t up 

and running yet, so that hasn’t been happening yet. 

Mr. COX. But neither is this program. It is an experiment. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. No. Right now there are no experiments either 

from US-VISIT. There is obviously—in southern California, for example, there is a sentry program, but that only applies to 

preapproved individuals when they cross the border, and those 

tend to be fairly low-threat people. 
15

Mr. COX. I wanted to ask you also about your efforts to focus on 

communications interoperability. SAFECOM is focused on both 

voice and data. You have also apparently been connected somehow 

fundingwise to DOJ and the 25 cities that they are working in. 

What exactly are we doing, apart from that DOJ project, in DHS 

on interoperability with SAFECOM? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Okay. As you know, SAFECOM is a DHS-managed activity, but it is part of the—it is a Presidential management 

initiative that actually relies on contributions from across the Federal sector. So you are quite right, DOJ is a player in this, DOD 

is a player in this, although DHS is managing it and does do the 

bulk of the funding, I might add. 

Sort of the 25 cities that are within the public wireless network 

program within SAFECOM are the key testbeds for interoperability. However, we are also conducting additional activities. For 

example, what SAFECOM is doing is sort of its key role is developing technical standards for interoperability. And what we have 

recently done, and this is the first time this has happened, is the 

guidance associated with those standards has been included in the 

suite of grants that have been issued by ODP, by FEMA, and also 

by the COTS program. So what we are starting to see now is a uniform set of technical standards that are being issued across all the 

grants programs that DHS is involved with. 

Mr. COX. In addition to a standard setting, is there any other aspect of the program? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. There is certainly a lot of issues. Clearly, there 

is—as you said, there are testbeds occurring in multiple cities that 

we are leveraging. There are a lot of issues, as you are, I am sure, 

aware of, especially with spectrum management that we are concerned about. There is technology issues. But those are the key—

the two activities which are the testbeds and the standard setting 

are the key activities within the program. 

Mr. COX. The last thing I want to ask you about is IP and our 

focus on, for example, the grid and recent demonstration of the 

problems with the New York blackout. How has the S&T Directorate collaborated with IA&IP to mitigate this vulnerability? How 

have you leveraged industry, if you have, to be a key partner in 

providing tools? What other tools are you bringing to bear? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, there is a couple of things we have been 

doing with respect to the electrical blackout, the specifics of that. 

The first is—is, yes, in fact, we are—we have been engaging in industry to understand better these sorts of tools and predictive tools 

that may be available to—as you say, to help us do a better job of 

modeling the infrastructure and understanding where some of the 

key vulnerabilities are under the sets of circumstances that we saw 

occur in that particular blackout. 

We are also working closely with Bob Viskowsky and his people 

in the analysis of the data that has come out, that is coming out 

of this blackout. I mean, the blackout was a—it was obviously not 

a terrorism event; but from the perspective of the Department of 

Homeland Security, it is a wonderful opportunity to learn better 

some of the issues that are associated with, for example, interdependencies among infrastructures that so far have been primarily the subject of speculation, or, frankly, people sitting around 
16

a room kind of making lists up. This is an opportunity for us to 

actually put some facts on the table and understand that if an electrical power system goes out in Cincinnati, what effect it has, say, 

in Alabama, you know, on some industry because the supply chain 

got broken. 

So those kinds of analytical—that kind of analytical support is 

something we are providing directly to—as part of our systems engineering responsibilities, within the Department, to the IA&IP 

folks. 

Mr. COX. I thank you very much. 

And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, on that last point. You know, 

whether it is transportation or food supplies or energy reactors, the 

threat that links all of these together is the our cybernetwork; and 

obviously focusing on the grid and on blackouts is vitally important 

and a big responsibility of this subcommittee. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I thank the Chairman. 

Ms. LOFGREN. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am wondering. We are about 6 months into this, and we are 

basically—this part of the Department was being built from 

scratch, so I am wondering if you can tell me how many full-time 

employees the Directorate has on staff, and then how many additional people you have in detailees and contractors, and then what 

the final level will likely be. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Okay. I will try to give you an answer that was 

good as of this morning. 

Ms. LOFGREN. That would be fine. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Because it changes rapidly. 

I believe that the number of full-time employees that we have on 

board in the S&T Directorate—within the headquarters activity, I 

think, is 110. It is roughly 110. We have on top of that another 30 

or 40 contractors who are called SETA support contractors or 

detailees from other agencies. For example, we have a detailee 

from NIST who supports us. Actually we have a couple from NIST. 

So the net result is about 150, 160 people. 

Our full-time staffing level in terms of government employees, we 

expect to be fully staffed in the headquarters activity around 180 

or so, with another additional 50 or 60 contractors or detailees. We 

have got three AAAS fellows, you know, people like that on board. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Along those lines, I have had some people express 

concern, and I don’t know if it is—whether we should be concerned, 

so it is a question, about the depth or breadth of the science experience in the leadership. I believe you are a physicist, and Dr. 

McQueary is an engineer, and Dr. Bolka is a physicist, and Dr. 

McCarthy is a nuclear chemist, all of which, I mean, is pretty impressive. But there isn’t anyone from the biology part of our science 

world. And is that something that we are going to address as we 

move forward? Do you think it needs to be addressed? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. We have—in terms of the senior leadership, you 

are quite right. But I have to tell you, I don’t actually do a lot of 

physics in my job anymore. I guess I could have been glib and say 

that physicists think all science is a branch of physics. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I have heard that. 
17

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Right. But actually we have several people with 

biological training on board. I have a portfolio that is the bio—and 

I have got the chemical threat also in there as well, mainly because 

that is how I am staffed up right now. And I have got a number 

of—I have got a veterinary—I have got people who do veterinary 

research in that group. I have research people with biological degrees, immunologists, virologists. So we have access to that kind of 

talent where we need to have it. 

Ms. LOFGREN. And you don’t feel that it is a problem in terms 

of prioritizing the issues? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Not at all. 

Ms. LOFGREN. All right. 

I am interested in the—I call it ‘‘SARPA,’’ not HSARPA, because 

DARPA is easy, it flows from the tongue; ‘‘SARPA’’ flows from the 

tongue. 

Mr. COX. If the gentlelady would yield. The H should be silent; 

don’t you think? 

Ms. LOFGREN. Yeah. It is ‘‘SARPA.’’ And that way we will live 

and flourish and grow. 

As I understand it, HSARPA is now focused on more near-term, 

immediate type of needs. But DARPA really has been—that has 

been so successful over the years, and we have benefitted so much 

as a Nation from DARPA, really has a longer-range agenda. Do you 

see HSARPA morphing into that DARPA model down the road? 

And, if so, when? And, if not, how are we going to get those longrange functions accomplished? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. That is an excellent question, and I will try to call 

it ‘‘SARPA’’ from here on out. It is about the third thing we have 

tried, so we will try that. 

DARPA—first, let me say that HSARPA is always going to have 

a long-range research component, you know, a piece of it that is always looking at sort of crazy ideas, you know, things that, you 

know, no one else might be thinking about. And I certainly see that 

growing. But I think the name HSARPA is an unfortunate one for 

the Department of Homeland Security because it does bring to 

mind DARPA, and there are some very distinct differences between 

the environment which DARPA operates in and the environment 

that we operate in. 

If you look at DARPA, DARPA exists in an environment where 

there are already significant service acquisition activities within 

each of the military services. So, for example, for a lot of the directed research that you get in the military and the Pentagon, that 

directed research—if I needed a new surface air-to-air missile, I 

tend not to go to DARPA for that, I tend to go to Wright-Patterson 

for that, for example. If I need a new submarine, I don’t go to 

DARPA for that typically. And the reason for that, of course, is you 

have these very robust evolutionary capabilities within the respective services as they fulfill their Title X responsibilities. 

So DARPA is in a sense a very needed but additional piece onto 

that infrastructure that allows the Pentagon to often—and focus 

solely on those kinds of things that don’t pop up through the evolutionary acquisition chain. 

In the Homeland Security Department, in S&T, HSARPA is it. 

That is our acquisition chain. And so to the degree which we have 
18

to—so it becomes—what you are really saying is that there is a 

management challenge that we are always going to have, which is 

to make sure that we always reserve funds in our budget to assure 

that HSARPA does have the wherewithal to conduct that DARPAlike activity within its overall responsibilities. And the way we 

have chosen to do that is we have created a portfolio and a budget 

line that we call emerging threats, and this year in 2004 I believe 

it is around $25 million, and that money is there for exactly that 

purpose, to allow HSARPA, without any direction from anybody 

else, from any of the other portfolios, to basically have the Director 

go off and try out those things that we didn’t think are good ideas, 

but he thinks are good ideas and ought to explore. And that is 

what that is all about. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. And that is what that is all about. 

Ms. LOFGREN. I have only a moment left on my time, but we 

have asked a variety of witnesses, including the Secretary himself, 

whether we can provide technical assistance to the immigration 

function so that they can deploy technology; and I am so frustrated 

with this. I mean, in my other job as a member of the Immigration 

Subcommittee in Judiciary, we have been beating them up for 

years to deploy technology, and I do not see anything happening. 

Have you been able to assist them? Is that on your to-do list? 

Could you give us a report on it? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. That is very much on my to-do list, and the Secretary has put it on our to-do list. 

A lot of the activities, of course, are focused with the US-VISIT 

program that Mr. Cox was referring to earlier. There is a statutory 

requirement to deploy machine-readable documents at the border, 

so we have been looking closely with the US-VISIT program and 

with the BTS people to help them sort through what needs to be 

done there. 

As I am sure you are well aware, the NIST has a very large activity associated mainly with setting standards for fingerprints. 

That is sort of what they tend to focus on, but on other areas, in 

particular in the areas associated with fusing different kinds of biometrics, we have been very actively engaged on that. In fact, we 

have a research program designed to explore those issues; we are 

working jointly with NIST to create a database that allows us to 

perform that work, and so, yes, we are pushing forward on that. 

Ms. LOFGREN. Just one final remark: That sounds good, but they 

are still creating paper files in Immigration. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I know, I know, and that is a separate issue entirely about whether or not—you are absolutely right. They create 

paper files and those paper files sit in archives in Pennsylvania for 

100 years. 

That also is being worked, not so much by us, but by the people 

in Immigration, who do immigration, who are pushing for a modernization program along those lines. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I thank the gentlelady for some excellent questions. 

The vice chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Sessions. 

Mr. SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Dr. 

Albright, for being with us today. I will be very quick in my question to you so that it will allow you time before we go vote. 
19

I notice on page 7 of your report to us, Accomplishments, the 

Biowatch program. I would like to have you discuss that, but my 

tee-up is: You talk about going all around the country, being prepared for things that are ahead—SARS, anthrax, these sorts of 

things. Can you please tell me about those successes? And how prepared are we, how much better prepared are we than what we 

were for the things that we have been through; and in your opinion, what do we have to look forward to and what can this committee do—subcommittee and committee do to help you further? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Thank you. 

Let me first talk about Biowatch. 

As you know, Biowatch is an environmental sampling program 

that we have in place in 31 cities across the country, and what we 

have done is deploy environmental samplers that suck air continuously and the results from that sampling are then taken to the 

CDC’s Laboratory Response network labs for analysis; and this is 

done in full coordination with CDC and EPA, and the idea basically 

is to provide sufficient warning of, for example, an aerosolized anthrax attack in a time sufficient for us to be able to deploy the 

stockpile and to treat the people who have been affected. 

We also have significantly improved our plume modeling capabilities at the NARAC facility out at Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory, which allows us to understand where the contaminant 

plume has gone, to help us better focus our efforts; and we are 

working closely with HHS and CDC, not just on the Biowatch program, but also in the development of medical surveillance capabilities to also help warn us if an event has occurred and to help HHS 

and the National Institute for Infectious Diseases—Allergies and 

Infectious Diseases to help prioritize their program. 

Almost certainly the first procurement out of the bioshield program, should the bill be signed, would be the RPA vaccine for anthrax, which, if deployed and if we are able—certainly it would be 

deployed to first responders and may, if we can get it right, be deployed nationally. That will take anthrax off the table entirely. 

Mr. SESSIONS [Presiding.] I thank the gentleman for his response. 

Chairman Thornberry has left to go vote. We are going to continue on with this hearing for your being so gracious to stick with 

us when we were in trouble; and I will now yield the time to 

Mr. ndrews from New Jersey. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Doctor, for your excellent testimony. 

On page 2, you talk about the directorate or the portfolio dedicated to developing standards for technology for homeland security, 

and Federal and State and local agencies and being smart buyers 

of homeland security technologies. I think this is a crucial issue. I 

think we were wise in decentralizing responsibilities for homeland 

security to those who know their turf best. But that strategy will 

work only if people do not buy junk, and I am very concerned that 

we have standards in place so that local buyers are given a lot of 

guidance into what they ought to buy and not buy. 

The specific question I have for you is whether you anticipate the 

standards that your group will develop being incorporated into 

grant contracts with local grantees, or will they simply be suggestions? 
20

Mr. ALBRIGHT. We haven’t gotten that far yet. So far, the thinking has been that it would be in the grant guidance, so we would 

tell people that this is something they certainly ought to do. I do 

not know if we will require it or not; and to be honest with you, 

I think it will matter a lot on what the equipment is. There is certainly a kind of equipment where, I would imagine, we might be 

very—pretty insistent on that, because when an alarm goes off, we 

are the ones who get called. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Right. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. On the other hand, for other sorts of things, we 

may just leave it up to the guidance. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I would strongly urge you to consider incorporating standards into the actual contract documents. 

You know, port authorities and airport authorities are creatures 

of local politics, and one of the benefits of that is, they are very responsive to their local community, but one of the risks is that a 

technology is going to be purchased because someone’s brother-inlaw is selling it or someone’s contributor is developing it. It has 

been known to happen in American politics. 

I think it would be, at best, a waste of taxpayers’ money and, at 

worst, a disaster if a technology that purports to protect against a 

biological or chemical attack fails because it doesn’t meet standards. I think it is imperative that an operation like yours, that has 

the credibility and the scientific expertise, develop these standards 

and require they be applied in these contracts. 

The second point that I would make is about the role of the private sector, which I know you acknowledged in your written statement. You have a difficult balancing act, but I trust that you will 

be able to follow it; and that balancing act is, I think you need to 

reach out to the very best in the private, university and nonprofit 

sectors but do so in a way that doesn’t prejudice your standard of 

development that benefits their particular proprietary product. 

It is an easy thing to say, but a hard thing to do. 

Have we given you the legal tools necessary for you to accomplish that mission, or do you need other legal tools? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Right now, I think we are in great shape. The 

point you brought up is something we do talk about quite a bit, and 

that is—as you know, when you do consensus standards, you have 

to be very, very mindful of the fact that someone might be trying 

to, you know, wax the alleys. And so what we do is—we are dealing 

with some pretty experienced people out at NIST, and they understand the issues—and what we do is we certainly—it is very important that we get industry to buy into what we do, but at the end 

of the day, the standard is issued by us. 

Mr. ANDREWS. The reason I feel so passionately about the inclusion of the standards as a condition of the contract is, since September 11, I could do nothing but sit in my office and meet with 

people who purport to have homeland security technologies that 

will save the world. 

Now, many of them are very well-intentioned, eager people. Some 

of them are wackos, frankly, and I do not really have the technological expertise to distinguish between the two, and I do not think 

a lot of local decision-makers do either. I respect them and I respect their local prerogative, but I think it is very important that 
21

we not send Federal taxpayers’ money to local people that would 

buy—in good faith, buy products and technologies that would not 

work. 

I thank you for your testimony. 

Mr. SESSIONS. I thank the gentleman. 

I would advise us, at this time, that despite what I previously 

said, we have now been given the information that there are a series of votes, at least one additional vote; and so, as a result of 

that, we would ask if you could please stand by. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Sure, no problem. 

Mr. SESSIONS. Dr. Albright, it is our intent to come back in just 

a few minutes after the vote, so at this time, the subcommittee will 

be in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. [Presiding.] We sure appreciate your flexibility. It is a little difficult for us to even figure out what is happening next, and I am not sure it is going to improve tremendously, 

but in the meantime, we will do the best we can. 

I yield to the distinguished gentleman from North Carolina at 

this point. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Mr. Chairman, and to our witness, Dr. Albright 

I thank Dr. Albright for your flexibility today. 

We find ourselves a lot like you, where you talked earlier today—

and let me return to that—as relates to HSARPA’s mission to identify developing revolutionary technologies to satisfy the operational 

needs. 

I guess all of us have some major research capacity in our districts, but we have an awful lot in North Carolina as relates to the 

Research Triangle and our world class universities; they are very 

interested in the work that HSARPA is going to be doing. These 

universities, as you well know, have a long history of experience 

with rapid prototyping of new technologies, and that is what we 

are talking about and what you had talked about, and it is in your 

testimony. 

My question is: What is the director’s intent for the $45 million 

of additional research and development funds appropriated for 

rapid prototyping? 

And let me get my second one in so maybe you can combine your 

answers: How is the director planning to select products for rapid 

prototyping? And how will you go about producing and testing the 

prototyping? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Okay. 

Okay. First, obviously, by rapid prototyping, what we mean is 

technologies that are commercial off-the-shelf or government offthe-shelf technologies that may have been used for some purpose 

or another mode and maybe need to be commercialized and perhaps adapted to homeland security purposes; and the way we have 

chosen to do that, up to now, has been to basically go to our user 

communities—EP&R, B&TS, IAIP—as well as within our own equities with S&T. 

As you know, we have a mission to be service advocates for the 

chem-bio-rad-nuke weapons of mass destruction issues. So what we 

do is, we ask ourselves what are the kinds of things we can have 

that would change the way we do business right now; and what we 
22

do is, we put together a broad agency announcement. It is very 

similar to a small business, innovative research kind of booklet, if 

you are familiar with those sorts of things. We publish that and we 

ask people to respond, and we try to have a very friendly way of 

doing that, where people will respond in stages. 

They send us maybe a chart with just a single sheet of paper and 

we encourage maybe some of those to respond with a white paper 

and maybe some of those to respond with a proposal; and this is 

all aimed at making sure that small businesses in particular do not 

have to make an extraordinary investment in running a full proposal before they get things in to us, and then we evaluate those 

for our immediate needs and fund them. That is how we do it. 

The advantage to doing it that way, of course, is that you have 

the buy-in from the very beginning with the user community, the 

people who actually are going to deploy this. We are asking them 

specifically, If we make this for you, will you deploy it? And if the 

answer comes back, no, then we tend to be not too interested in 

doing anything with it. 

So that is, in essence, the philosophy. 

With the extra $45 million that was appropriated to us, clearly 

we can do more of that. We did that with the $30 million solicitation just last—just a few months ago. There are some additional, 

perhaps more focused solicitations that we could do in particular 

areas, and that is one of the options we are considering now. 

In some of the IAIP areas, in some of the EP&R areas in particular—and we haven’t really settled down yet as to how we are 

going to spend that, and we are going to have a broad-based solicitation like we did before, but have more money in it, but we are 

going to do that for part of the money and then have more focused 

solicitations. 

The other thing we need to do, and we need to use a portion of 

that money for that, is to provide the rest of the clearinghouse 

function that you all asked for in Section 313 of the act; and that 

is to take some of that rapid prototyping capability and some of 

that commercial and off-the-shelf governmental technology and put 

it into a database that State and local people can address and look 

at and get some insights as to whether or not this is something 

they ought to be thinking about buying. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you. 

Let me move to the agroterrorism piece, because as you know, 

most of that has been delegated to the Department of Agriculture, 

but as you know, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate is 

supposed to address countermeasures for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and cyber high-explosive threats. 

Can you describe the research efforts that relate to agroterrorism 

on the agriculture side; and secondly, is DHS coordinating with the 

Department of Agriculture in this area; and finally, I hope you will 

share with us what DHS is doing to address the security problem 

that GAO has just released, as relates to Plum Island Animal Disease Center. 

It is important to a lot of States, but it is particularly important 

to this country with Plum Island. And you might want to talk 

about what Plum Island is, so I will not use all my time on that. 
23

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Okay. Let me first talk about—let me first talk 

about our agricultural bioterrorism work. 

Most of our focus is on the catastrophic terrorism end of this and 

so, frankly, our focus has been on foot and mouth disease. That is 

the one that, if that gets out, that is—all the models pretty much 

show the same thing. There is no disease more infectious than foot 

and mouth disease, and so what we have been focused on has been 

to look at what USDA has been doing; and I will tell you, we are 

looking very closely with them. 

I spend a lot of time with their leadership and my staff spends 

quite a bit of time with them, as well, crafting out a joint strategy 

that addresses—their main concerns tend to be focused on natural 

outbreaks, and natural outbreaks have a certain set of protocols 

and issues attached to them that are fairly well understood, and 

they have led to a certain kind of infrastructure. For example, right 

now, if we have a foot and mouth disease sample, it always gets 

shipped back up to Plum Island for analysis because they are able 

to constrain the outbreak in the meantime, the local veterinary 

people can do that. 

If we had a delivered introduction, it is not at all clear you can 

do that, so that leads you to think about the development of new 

diagnostic tools that we can, in fact, put out into the field in the 

State veterinary facilities, so that they can actually perform a more 

robust identification of the disease in situ. So that is certainly an 

example of the sorts of things we are talking about. 

We obviously are also involved heavily with them on modeling 

and simulation activities, but basically what we are in the process 

of now—and this is actually, this is a report to Congress that is requested in early January—is crafting a joint strategy that allows 

them to continue to do the things they have been doing for a very 

long time and then allows us to address the infrastructure issues 

associated with terrorism attacks. 

With regard to Plum Island, well, as you know, we took it over, 

I believe it was June 1; and what we immediately did was, we did 

a site survey as you would when you are buying a house. For example, you go do a look, and we determined that the smart thing 

to do at that point was to do a 60-day study across the board of 

all the various issues associated with Plum. So we looked at infrastructure, we looked at compliance with the bioterrorism rules and 

regulations, we looked at security quite a bit, and we published 

that 60-day study, we completed it, and we are now undertaking 

remedial action on some of the top issues. 

The GAO report—we actually feel the GAO report was fairly accurate; I mean, it, I think, reflects the state of affairs when we took 

the facility over; and all I can tell you is that we are working very, 

very hard to bring a cultural change to the place—and I should tell 

you, it has been fairly successful so far, not completely, but fairly 

successful so far—to get people to think about the fact that, yeah, 

there is a bioterrorism act out there, and they do have to be cleared 

to handle some of the pathogens and we do have to be solicitous 

of what the rules and regulations are. 

We have also changed the site contractor as well, so we are doing 

the best we can to get that site on-line. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Dr. Albright. 
24

Mr. Chairman, as you well know, that Plum Island is an important place in this country, one of the few places that we can do the 

testing that needs to be done in this country, and it is critical that 

that security be there. 

Let me say, even though my time has expired, that we did a simulation in North Carolina, with the help of people here in Washington and the State folks, on hoof and mouth disease; and I can 

tell you, without exaggeration, it was frightening what it could do 

in this country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I thank the gentleman and I have participated 

in such exercises as well. 

Let me kind of take, I guess, a next step from Mr. Etheridge’s 

questions, Dr. Albright; I want to ask about coordination of R&D—

first question, within the Department, and secondly, among departments. It is my understanding that there are various elements of 

the Department of Homeland Security that continue to have their 

own R&D budgets. TSA, for example, the Coast Guard, possibly 

FEMA, IP, perhaps. 

I would be interested to know what other elements of the Department have an R&D budget, and how it is that you or somebody fits 

all of those pieces together to make sure that we are not duplicating and we are doing the right thing. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Okay. First, let me make a distinction between 

having an R&D budget and having R&D activities. 

There are a number of agencies with the Department that historically conducted research and development activities out of operations, of support funds, okay; so they are not identifiably R&D 

funds. And just the short answer to your question is, the agencies 

within DHS that do that—other than ourselves, of course—are, 

let’s see, TSA, DCP, former Customs people, INS has a very small 

400K budget, Coast Guard, security services, and IAIP picked up 

several activities as well when they were put together; and I believe that is the list, without having it in front of me. 

When we were planning the transition to the new department 

last year, the decision was made at the time that we would leave 

well enough alone in 2003, we would exert an oversight function—

‘‘we’’ being S&T—in 2004, and the idea would be to integrate these 

capabilities within S&T in the 2005 time frame, and that was just 

a matter of what we thought was the logical thing, the expedient 

thing to do at the time. 

Secretary Ridge made it clear last summer that he expects that 

integration to occur; and as you are probably aware, in our appropriations language for the 2004 budget, there is a requirement that 

we present a combined R&D budget in 2005; and, in fact, we are 

due a report to Congress this December 15 on how we are going 

to actually do that. So there has been for some time an activity 

within our CFO shop that has been looking at identifying the R&D 

activities and then working toward some sort of integration. 

Now, there are a couple of caveats I should give you. One, of 

course, is the Coast Guard, which does have an R&D activity. The 

Homeland Security Act keeps them as an independent entity, so 

they would remain that way unless, of course, they specifically de-
25

cided that they wanted to divest themselves of R&D activity and 

they got statutory relief. 

There are other issues, for example, the U.S. secret Service. 

There are certain R&D activities they do that it is not clear that 

it would make a lot of sense to actually, literally bring into our 

budget process. For example, the R&D on the President’s limousine 

may not make sense. 

And so we are looking at all of that, so at least in terms of the 

internal piece of this, we expect to have a combined budget and 

have everything integrated within S&T, to the degree it makes 

sense to do so, certainly within the next couple of months. 

We certainly, as I said, have to have that report to the Congress 

in the next couple of months. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Let me ask—and I understand, for example, 

the example you gave of the Secret Service. They have some unique 

responsibilities doing their own research in those areas, and it 

makes sense, but for example—and that may well be true with 

Coast Guard, too. But what is then the communication between the 

S&T Directorate and the Coast Guard for things that may well be 

overlapping, for example, related to port security in some way. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Okay. What I have in—what I have done within—

as we created the S&T Directorate, as I mentioned in the beginning, we have these portfolios; and several of these portfolios are 

focused on our CBRN missions, so I have, for example, someone 

who does bio-chem—I mentioned that earlier—we have someone 

who does rad-nuke, and there were experts in that area. 

In order to make sure that we had this kind of coordination, we 

also created portfolios at the beginning of the—when the Department stood up for EP&R, for IA, for IP, and for BTS, and the person in those portfolios, their job—and we also have one for the 

Coast Guard and one for the Secret Service—their job is to make 

sure that we understand the R&D needs associated with those particular entities. It is their job to work with the user community to 

make sure that we know what is going on over there, and that they 

know what is going on over here, and frankly, so that we can help 

them out. Because, as you know, for a lot of these agencies, their 

R&D efforts are sitting in an environment where they are constantly competing for operations and support dollars, and, therefore, they have never had the kind of investment in long-range 

R&D that, frankly, their missions probably demand that they do 

have. 

And so what we took on was also the idea and we submitted this 

in the President’s budget to, in fact, enhance those activities for 

Coast Guard, for example, for Secret Service, to enable them to do 

some of those things that might be 3 or 4 years out, that maybe 

we would never have budgeted for. The people who staff these positions tend to be detailees of the home organization, so they understand the culture and who to talk to and that sort of thing. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. That is helpful. 

If, at some point, you see an impediment in the statute to that 

coordination, I trust you will tell us, because that is something, obviously, that we are interested in. 
26

Now, let me get to Mr. Etheridge’s point: How do you coordinate 

with other departments, for example, Agriculture, on some of these 

diseases—but there are a lot of others, too. 

Some of the information, or estimates, we have is that homeland 

security R&D is about one-third of that conducted by the Federal 

Government as a whole; so how do you do that and how is that 

working at this point? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Okay. There are a couple of ways it happens. 

The first and the simplest to explain is, there are formal processes that exist for interagency coordination. The White House has 

a couple of activities that do that. One is, the Office of Science and 

Technology Policy runs something called the National Science and 

Technology Council. It is a Cabinet level post that actually reports 

to the President and its primary job is to, in fact, in a variety of 

areas, to ensure coordination, not just in homeland security, of 

course, but across the spectrum of science and technology activities 

in the Federal Government. 

Jack Marburger, over at OSTP, has been extraordinarily active 

in the homeland security arena; in fact, he—you know, before the 

Department stood up, I think the nearest thing we had to a homeland security science and technology office was OSTP; and so he 

has created several working groups that formalize this kind of 

interaction in the homeland security arena. 

I happen—Chuck McQueary actually cochairs that with Mike 

Wynne, over in the Pentagon, and they have a number of working 

groups which I am heavily involved in. And so there is a formal 

structure. 

There is also a similar structure within the Homeland Security 

Council in a few specific areas, but perhaps more importantly, 

there is an informal mechanism, and that is that we have, for example, MOUs with USDA that are formal. 

We have MOUs with HHS that establish working relationships 

that are often required by statute; for example, USDA, we have a 

statutory relationship that comes about because of the Plum Island 

language that was in the bill. The HHS, we clearly have statutory 

responsibilities. 

We also have responsibilities that are implied with places like 

NIST, we created MOUs with them. 

There are also informal relationships. I happen to know all the 

players, and we make it our business to know each other. And 

Chuck McQueary, we spend time every other month over at the 

Pentagon; and we have shared with them our plans, they share 

with us their plans, and then we try to coordinate in that manner. 

But having said that, can I guarantee there will never be any duplication? I cannot tell you that. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. But at this stage, you feel pretty good about 

the level of coordination, particularly at this stage of development 

of the Department and your Directorate? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Absolutely. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. All right. 

Let me turn to a slightly different question, but I think one that 

is very important, and that is the issue of metrics. 

How do we measure whether we are improving, or not? 
27

Obviously, this is something that you have to worry about to run 

your section of the Department. It is also something we have to 

worry about as we try to oversee the work of the Department, but 

also evaluate how taxpayer dollars are being spent. 

It seems to me that particularly in the R&D world, measuring 

progress is a very difficult thing, so I am very—I would be very interested in suggestions you have for us and, of course, your own 

management on what are the sorts of ways that we can measure 

progress and advancement in homeland security R&D. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. That is a really interesting question. 

Metrics, first of all, applied to the homeland security enterprise, 

writ large, are extraordinarily difficult to come up with. If you look 

at what our measures of effectiveness are, they tend to start with 

the words ‘‘prevent,’’ ‘‘protect,’’ and so you are proving a negative 

in a sense. How do you know that something hasn’t happened? 

How is that a measure of success? 

So it is extraordinarily difficult for homeland security as a whole; 

and as you correctly pointed out, research and development metrics 

are something the Federal Government has been wrestling with for 

a very long time. 

There are ways to measure performance that are not particularly 

satisfying, but are perhaps better than nothing. And the first one 

I would offer up is—in some areas, for example, we can just count 

things; so, for example, we can say that we are going to issue 

standards, three sets of standards, standards in three areas by the 

end of fiscal year 2005, so we can count how many standards we 

have done. 

The problem with that, of course, is that you start getting into 

counting games and what do you mean by a ‘‘count’’ and those sort 

of things. 

I think the more preferred way to do it is to actually show our 

detailed program plans to Congress, which I like to do, and to show 

you the milestones we expect to achieve, both programmatic and 

technical in terms of performance, and when we expect to achieve 

them; and then I think we ought to be held accountable to those 

milestones. If I tell you we are going to develop a detector with this 

kind of performance and this kind of operation by a certain date 

and here is the milestone and we are going to demonstrate it, I 

think you have every right and should ask us, Did you, in fact, 

take it out to the field and demonstrate it; and what did you find 

out. And that is sort of the way you do it, because what that does 

is, it forces on us a very disciplined developmental process. 

I think it is good for us that we have those kinds of way-points 

put in our path; and at the same time, I think it helps you feel 

some sense that the dollars that we are spending—which, after all, 

for those particular purposes, we are saying that is why we are 

spending them in the first place—that, in fact, some kind of 

progress is being made. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I think that is a good point. 

I guess the only thing I would say is, I do not want you to be 

reluctant to set milestones and goals for fear of what happens from 

us if you do not meet them. I mean, understandably, there are 

things that happen, particularly in your line of work, but as long 
28

as we have that communication going back and forth, it seems to 

me it ought to work. But I think that is very helpful. 

Does the gentleman from North Carolina wish to interject on 

this? 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I would. 

As it relates to this—and I think it is a great question—how does 

the Department determine the distribution of funds among the various R&D portfolios? And I know that has got to be difficult, as you 

are getting—going up and in that line, in the 2004 Homeland Security Appropriations Act, bio-countermeasures receive roughly four 

times the S&T funding as chemical countermeasures. 

Is that because the Department views the bio-threat is four times 

as great, or is it based on threat? How do we determine the threat 

and the distribution? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. That is an excellent question, and that is—it depends on a number of things, and obviously threat is one of them. 

You know, from our perspective, the threat from an anthrax attack or from a nuclear weapon is far greater than the threat from 

other potential things that you could imagine. So threat clearly determines a portion of our investment. 

But the way we operate is—we tend to do bottoms-up budgeting, 

so to give you a sense of what the process is, we look at, first, the 

threat, and we ask ourselves, you know, what are the threats that 

are, you know, for example, easy to do by the bad guys and yet 

very catastrophic. That is probably where you want to put most of 

your money, okay? 

So we tend to sort the threat. And then we ask ourselves, what 

are the activities, what are the capabilities we need to counteract 

that kind of threat; and we write that down, we create a strategic 

plan, and we, in fact, publish that. And then we ask ourselves, 

what program do we need to, in fact, execute that planning guidance, okay? 

And that is, then, where the budget comes in and the budget constraints come in, and we sort from there. So it is a bottoms-up sort 

of process, and it is not correct to say that, for example, the fact 

that I have four times the amount in bio that I have in chem, that 

that is necessarily some reflection on the relative priorities, although it may be. Partially, that is true, but it is also driven by 

what is the right investment we need to make in each of these 

areas to achieve some level of performance. 

What you find, for example, is, in some areas, like the bio area, 

there has been almost no investment in the things we need to invest in, while in the chemical area, to use your example, there has 

been a lot of investment made by the Defense Department over 

time and we are further along. 

So that is how it is done, in effect. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. In light of that, the Technical Working Group 

has conducted a number of solicitations since 9/11 for homeland security technology proposals for those solicitations and especially the 

ones that were jointly done by DHS. 

How many projects have been funded, if you know, and how 

many technologies have been fielded? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Okay. The answer is, I do not know right now. 

There were several thousand proposals that we got. 
29

Mr. ETHERIDGE. If you can just get that to us later, that will be 

fine. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. I will, but I do know the contracts are being let 

as vetted we speak. 

Mr. ETHERIDGE. Thank you. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

And before I forget it, without objection, all members will have 

the opportunity to submit written questions to Dr. Albright, and so 

we may want to follow up on some of these things, as well as, of 

course, present opening statements. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Let me follow up on that point, because it is, 

I think, a matter of interest to all Members of Congress, because 

we all have somebody in our district who wants to sell something. 

The staff had presented me with what is—as I understand, is an 

automated response that vendors are getting from the Department, 

which basically says, Go look at the Federal regulations and come 

back to us. 

I guess I would be interested in your assessment of, number one, 

how this interaction with the private sector is going. And it is a 

very tough thing, it seems to me, because you could use all of your 

150 people doing nothing but meeting with folks all day, and there 

may not be any of those meetings that really help the country be 

safer. 

The other side of it is, there may be a jewel out there, and that 

is part of the risk I know you take; but I would be interested in 

how you think that communication, that contact with the private 

sector, is going. 

I would also be interested—I think it related in TSWG and how 

their activities are going. Do you foresee them being a primary 

screening mechanism for the indefinite future? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Okay. Let me—there are several questions in 

there. 

Let me start with what our process is in dealing with the private 

sector, because that is an important point. 

When we first started up the Science and Technology Directorate, there was no process within the Department at all; and so, 

as you recall from the May testimony, Dr. McQueary actually at 

that point announced, I believe, the science.technology e-mail site; 

and so we stood that up. And that was the—and that has gotten 

a lot of press, so we have got a lot of people sending material into 

that site. 

And what we created was a process at our end for dealing with 

that, where we look at the submissions that come into that site—

and they run the gamut, including Nigerian financial scams—we 

get it all in there, and we look at the kind of material we get; and 

truth be told, some of this—some think the queries we get there 

have very little detail associated with them. There is not much 

there to do an evaluation. Even if we had the time to do it, we cannot deal with anything. 

So what we do is, we send them back actually a nice letter, telling them that there is not sufficient information here, that we will 

hold the application for what they have sent to us, and if they want 

to, you know, provide more detail, we will be happy—they should 
30

look at other samples for what a detailed solicitation would look 

like. 

And, by the way, everything I am talking about is unsolicited 

proposals, okay? If somebody brings something in that does have 

sufficient detail, we take them over to TSWG, okay, because they 

have this evaluative process in place, these groups of people who 

can examine and evaluate these things. They have several working 

groups set up. And we will inform the person who sent that thing 

to us that that is what we are doing, we are sending it to TSWG; 

and furthermore, we have a process whereby we get back to them 

in 30 days. 

So that is the process we have set up in the Science and Technology Directorate. 

So, of course, what has happened since then is, a lot of other offices, CIO shop, for example, within DHS, they too are getting hit 

by a lot of inquiries from the private sector, and they have created 

their own processes. And I guess what I am hearing from you is 

that we probably ought to work with those guys to try to get them 

the kind of robust process we have within the S&T Directorate, so 

that the private sector can feel they are better engaged. 

How are we interacting with the private sector? I think—as I 

said, I think we have as good a process as you can have that balances our ability to get our jobs done while at the same time scouting and making sure that those gems do not just fall through the 

cracks in the pavement. 

The—will the TSWG be our continued evaluative group? That is 

actually an open question. They may, but you have to remember, 

when the TSWG was formed up, it was a DOD-State entity that 

included Secret Service, Customs, TSA; and you sort of look at the 

list of agencies that comprise the TSWG, and about 90 percent of 

them are in the Department of Homeland Security. So one of the 

questions we are asking ourselves is whether or not we just want 

to go ahead and create, you know, our own process and, you know, 

work—synergize with TSWG, but at the same time not necessarily 

trouble DOD, for example, and trouble our working groups with, 

you know, technologies that have to do with new tank armor or 

things like that. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. You may have referred to this earlier, but 

have you sent people over to places like DARPA, to see what they 

have, what plans they have that may be of interest for the Department? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, yes. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Or are you waiting for them to come and say, 

look what we got for you. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, there has been a little bit of that. I mean, 

I came from DARPA, as you know. That was a few years ago. As 

a matter of fact, our program managers within HSARPA have recently departed DARPA, very recently in many cases, so we are 

fairly familiar with what goes on over at DARPA. 

Our interaction with the Pentagon, though, is through Paul 

McHale’s office almost exclusively, so to the degree—I would say 

there is no formal interaction between us and DARPA, but we 

are—again, we are aware of it, but it is all through informal mechanisms. 
31

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I am a little concerned, in that, for example, I have been told—and I do not know, and I need to go ask—

that DARPA has done some work on designing a 21st century airport security system, using primarily off-the-shelf technology. I do 

not know if that is true. 

I would be interested in it, but there may—not only DARPA, of 

course, but the Federal laboratories and other places with which 

you are very familiar. Sometimes it is kind of hard to root around 

and find some things, but there are some jewels out there, and I 

know none of us want them to fall through the cracks in the pavement. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Well, I think if there is a new airport security 

system at DARPA, I will definitely look into that, because that is 

an area obviously of concern to the Department and to S&T. 

As I said, there are a lot of informal mechanisms we have for 

dealing with DARPA in particular. There are a lot of formal mechanisms as well that deal with the Federal laboratories, and I think 

I mentioned those earlier. 

We do work through Paul McHale in the Pentagon, and to the 

degree they believe the things in DARPA over at Dale Klein’s shop, 

over at DTRA, for example, they certainly let us know. 

To date, there hasn’t—I have got—the airport security one is a 

new one on me, so—

Mr. THORNBERRY. I think it is something maybe for both of us 

to go check out—

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Okay. 

Mr. THORNBERRY.—and I hope there is something useful for us 

there. 

Dr. Albright, I think we continue to have a vote on the floor. I 

think, in light of our comings and goings, maybe we will end here. 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Okay. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. But I do appreciate your willingness to provide 

written answers to further questions that members of the subcommittee may have, and I am very grateful for all of the communication which you and your folks have had with members of the 

subcommittee staff and members. 

In addition to that, I want to thank the Budget Committee for 

letting us use their committee room and the staff for helping us 

hold this hearing. 

Thank you. We will look forward to our continued work together 

to try to help the country be safer, okay? 

Mr. ALBRIGHT. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 5:42 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
32

APPENDIX

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES FOR THE RECORD 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO DR. PENROSE ALBRIGHT FROM THE 

HONORABLE JIM TURNER 

1. Dr. Albright, you testified that the directorate makes resource allocations based on an assessment of the threat, and in particular the potential 

impact, likelihood of success, and ease of carrying out different terrorist attacks. What input do you receive from the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate in carrying out this assessment? 

Are you communicating with IAIP officials to get better tailored analyses? 

Response: We are working closely at multiple levels with the IAIP Directorate to 

understand threats and vulnerabilities. This is a particularly strong connection because S&T people and capabilities are engaged in active support of the assessment 

functions of the Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis, particularly with regard to technical issues surrounding the threat. A joint project with the Assistant 

Secretary for Information Analysis is currently underway to have intelligence community resources at the national laboratories assess the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities of known terrorist organizations, and to identify information gaps that can help prioritize future analysis and information gathering. In another example, S&T was guided on longer term RDT&E priorities in counter–Bioterrorism RDT&E by working with IAIP staff in a recent workshop to determine gaps 

in counter–BW capabilities.

In addition, regular senior level interactions at the under secretary and chief of staff 

level have provided assurance since the Department’s formation that threat and vulnerability related priorities are shared across DHS directorates.

2. Please provide details on the results of the Broad Agency Announcements and other solicitations conducted since 9/11 as regards homeland security and combating terrorism technologies? In particular, please indicate 

the number of proposals submitted to the solicitations, the number of requests from DHS and TSWG for more detailed proposals, the number of 

proposals ultimately accepted, the number and amounts of funds distributed to accepted proposals, and the number and names of technologies that 

have been fielded as a result of these processes. 

Response: May 14, 2003: The Department and the Technical Support Working 

Group (TSWG) issued the first Department of Homeland Security (DHS) S&T Broad 

Agency Announcement (BAA), entitled ‘‘Combating Terrorism Technology Support 

Office,’’ DAAD 05–03–T–0024, closed June 13, 2003. This BAA listed 50 requirements, sought quad-chart submissions in the first phase, and will down-select to 

winning proposals. There were 3,344 quad chart responses received. There were 237 

white papers requested from those submitting quad charts. As of 20 November, 

2003, 93 white papers have been rejected; 34 have been reviewed favorably and full 

proposals requested. The remaining 110 are still under evaluation. Efforts will be 

awarded to both private companies and government laboratories. DHS provided 

$30M to TSWG for awards in FY–03 and anticipates that another $30M will be 

available in FY–04 for this BAA. These funds are sufficient to fund the proposals 

already accepted and those which may be selected as the evaluation continues.

September 23, 2003: First Research Announcement (RA–03–01) for the Homeland 

Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA) was issued, entitled ‘‘Detection Systems for Biological and Chemical Countermeasures Program.’’ Its purpose 

is to develop, field-test, and transition to commercial production the next generation 

of biological and chemical detectors and systems. It addresses two areas in biological 

countermeasures and three areas in chemical countermeasures. The white paper 

deadline was October 24, 2003, and, by that deadline, 518 white papers were received. They are now entrained in an evaluation process that is on schedule to conclude by November 21, 2003. Authors of selected white papers (and other sponsors 

wishing to submit full proposals) will be asked to submit full proposals, which will 

be due December 19, 2003. Following evaluation of all proposals received, HSARPA 

expects to enter negotiations with selected proposers by the end of January 2004. 

The total amount of funds committed to this effort depends entirely on the number 

and cost of the proposals selected for execution.

October 3, 2003: The S&T Directorate released a solicitation (HSSCST–04–R–

AR001) requesting white papers and proposals for an aggressive two-phase Systems 
33

Development and Demonstration (SD&D) program for antimissile devices for commercial aircraft. DHS will investigate directed infrared countermeasures (DIRCM) 

and other technologies to provide protection against man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). DHS does not intend for this program to develop new technologies, but rather to migrate existing technologies to the commercial airline industry. Twenty-four white papers were received and evaluated. Five teams have been 

asked to submit full proposals and each has been given a date during the week of 

December 8, 2003 to present their oral submissions. The Government anticipates selecting at least two teams for negotiation and award in early January 2004. The 

total amount of funds committed to this effort depends entirely on the number and 

cost of the proposals selected for execution.

November 13, 2003: HSARPA issued a Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) 

Program Solicitation. The purpose of this solicitation is to invite small businesses 

to submit innovative research proposals that address eight high priority DHS requirements: • New system/ technologies to detect low vapor pressure chemicals (e.g., Toxic 

Industrial Chemicals) 

• Chem-bio sensors employing novel receptor scaffolds • Advanced low cost aerosol collectors for surveillance sensors and personal 

monitoring 

• Computer modeling tool for vulnerability assessment of US infrastructure • Marine asset tag tracking system • AIS tracking and collision avoidance equipment for small boats • Ship compartment inspection device • Advanced secure supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) and related distributed control systems. 

The deadline for receipt of proposals is December 15, 2003. The total amount of 

funds committed to this effort depends entirely on the number and cost of the proposals selected for execution.

November 13, 2003: HSARPA released a Request for Information (RFI) on Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures System Architectures Analysis (RNCSAA) 

Draft Statement of Work for comment (DSWC 04–01). The RFI lists four tasks: • Develop a framework for evaluating system architectures • Study systems effectiveness and vulnerability studies • Define and evaluate novel architectures, and approaches for countermeasures • Identify additional studies to support these tasks. 

This RFI will lead directly to a future solicitation based on the responses to this 

RFI and related topics.

To date, no technologies resulting from these solicitations have been fielded.

3. What was the level of interest generated by DHS’ solicitation for comments on the Homeland Security Institute RFP? What do you see as the impact on the applicant pool of the three-year sunset provision, and do you 

have any recommendations for changing that provision? When will the Department issue a final RFP for the Institute, and when will a decision be 

made on awarding a contract? Considering that the Institute is required to 

have expertise beyond the jurisdiction of the S&T Directorate, how will 

you ensure that the Institute meets the requirements set forth in the law?

What was the level of interest generated by DHS? solicitation for comments 

on the Homeland Security Institute RFP? 

Response: The interest from all sectors—not-for-profit organizations, for-profit companies, universities, consortia, and single investigators—was high. Approximately 

70 responses were received.

What do you see as the impact on the applicant pool of the three-year 

sunset provision, and do you have any recommendations for changing that 

provision? 

Response: Sec 312 of the Act provides for the formation of the Homeland Security 

Institute, with the capability for systems analysis, risk analysis and modeling and 

simulation, policy analysis, support for exercises and simulations, and other activities that are traditionally performed by an FFRDC. These capabilities are in fact 

enduring needs for the Department that require specialized and dedicated staff focused on the broad range of issues confronting homeland security and the Department. The three year sunset clause, unfortunately, serves to discourage the acquisition of permanent staff, and the investment in resources, an organization would 

need to make to compete for and conduct such an enterprise. It is worth noting that 

Sec 305 of the Act provides also for the establishment of FFRDCs, without the three 

year sunset clause. Several of the more qualified potential bidders have informally 
34

indicated that they have no interest in pursuing this contract if the three-year sunset provision is not removed. They view it as impractical to ask talented scientists 

and engineers and other analysts to pursue an alternative career path that will only 

last for a year or two. They also view it as bad business strategy to commit their 

own organization’s resources (facilities, infrastructure, etc.) for such a short-lived 

commitment. In light of this, I would be happy to work with Congress to (1) remove 

this sunset provision entirely and allow the FFRDC to function according to normal 

laws and regulations that apply to FFRDCs, or (2) extend the sunset provision to 

10 years, or (3) to put into effect a solution that allows the Department to overcome 

the difficulties created by this provision.

When will the Department issue a final RFP for the Institute, and when 

will a decision be made on awarding a contract?

Response: The RFP is scheduled to be released in early December, with a subsequent award in late spring/early summer.

Considering that the Institute is required to have expertise beyond the jurisdiction of the S&T Directorate, how will you ensure that the Institute 

meets the requirements set forth in the law? 

Response: The ultimate sponsor of the Institute is Secretary Ridge and, therefore, 

it is viewed as a resource that will be available to the Department as a whole, although it will be managed by the S&T Directorate. The core functions—a necessary 

component of any FFRDC—have been carefully crafted to ensure capabilities that 

extend beyond just science and technology (and meet the legislative requirements). 

This will be one of the criteria for evaluating the proposals.

4. The PREPARE Act (H.R. 3158) has a provision that would require the 

Directorate to within six months identify first responder equipment and 

training standards that don’t currently exist, and work with the standards 

and first responder communities to complete work on those standards 

within a year after that. What are the Department’s plans in this regard? 

Response: The S&T Standards Portfolio is working with the emergency responder 

organizations—Memorial Institute for Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), and National 

Technology Transfer Center (NTTC), as well as the InterAgency Board for Equipment Standardization (IAB) which has a co-chair from the emergency responder 

community—to identify needs for standards of the emergency responders. The 

Standards Portfolio is also working with the Homeland Security Standards Panel 

(HSSP), which has been set up by the American National Standards Institute 

(ANSI), to coordinate development of homeland security standards among 280 

standards development organizations. Work has been initiated with the Institute of 

Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) on radiation detector standards, with 

AOAC International on standards for anthrax detectors, with the National Institute 

for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) on personal protective equipment and 

with ANSI on development of a database of homeland security related standards. 

The Standards Portfolio is engaged with the principal Departmental elements involved in training for emergency responders—the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA), the Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP), and the Coast Guard—

to develop common metrics for curricula for emergency responder training.

5. The Project Bioshield plan commits NIH with doing the basic research 

that is necessary and obligates BioShield funds to purchase the final product from the private sector. What is the Science and Technology Directorates role in conducting the middle part of countermeasure development 

where research findings are converted to effective medicines. In light of 

the Homeland Security Act requirements that DHS and HHS will collaborate on setting priorities, goals, objectives, and policies and develop a coordinated strategy for R&D relating to medical countermeasures for terrorist threats: 

How often does Directorate staff meet with NIH officials to discuss their 

research and development efforts? Who attends these meetings? 

Response: In accordance with Section 302 (4) of the Homeland Security Act of 

2002, Public Law 107–296, the Secretary, acting through the Under Secretary of 

Science and Technology, ‘‘shall have the responsibility for conducting basic and applied research, development, demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities that 

are relevant to any or all elements of the Department, through both intramural and 

extramural programs, except that such responsibility does not extend to human 

health-related research and development activities.’’

Accordingly, the S&T Directorate, in coordination with other DHS Directorates, 

identifies biosecurity threats and conducts vulnerability assessments as a basis for 

defining medical countermeasure priorities.
35

The Under Secretary for S&T, or his designees, participates on the Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Medical Countermeasures Working Group, co-chaired by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office of the Assistant Secretary for 

Public Health Emergency and Response (OASPHEP) and the Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary, Health Affairs. Three subgroups focus on Research and 

Development, Acquisition, and Requirements. The Assistant Secretary for S&T cochairs the Acquisition Subgroup. The working group and subgroups provide the organizational structure to assure effective inter-agency coordination in setting medical countermeasure priorities.

In bio, chemical, and radiological defense, NIH have expanded their R&D 

effort to include middle and late stage development of medical products. Is 

the S+T directorate consulted in these programs? How is the directorate 

updated on what specific countermeasures NIH is actively developing and 

the progress of that research? 

Response: In addition to the formal working groups and subgroups described in the 

response to the question above, the Under Secretary for S&T, or his designees, also 

participates in monthly risk management meetings coordinated and chaired by the 

HHS/OASPHEP. Representatives from the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIH/NIAID), the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 

the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), as well as DHS/EP&R and S&T are active participants. Meetings are held currently on the subject of anthrax, smallpox 

and Botulinum toxin medical preparedness. These risk management meetings provide a forum for status reports on the progress and development of priority medical 

countermeasures.

How is threat assessment or the needs of first responders, as determined 

by DHS, being integrated into prioritization for medical countermeasures 

R&D? 

Response: The S&T Directorate has chartered and is working very closely with the 

HHS, as one of a number of federal organizations, to conduct of technical threat assessments of current and future biothreat agents and to develop processes to conduct systematic vulnerability assessments. The results of periodic threat and vulnerability assessments will be communicated to the Weapons of Mass Destruction Medical Countermeasures Working Group and additional agencies as appropriate.

I understand that Dr. Michael Ascher is the Directorate’s senior medical 

advisor. What is his role? To whom does he report? 

Response: Dr. Michael Ascher was the Senior Medical Advisor for the Biological 

Countermeasures Portfolio until his return to California this summer. Dr. Peter 

Estacio is in the process of joining us to fill this role. The Senior Medical Advisor 

reports directly to the Portfolio Manager for Biological and Chemical Countermeasures (Dr. John Vitko) and is responsible for interacting with the biomedical 

countermeasures community, assessing the current status and any gaps as they pertain to overall biodefense, and guiding the Portfolio and DHS S&T activities appropriately. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO DR. PENROSE ALBRIGHT BY CHAIRMAN 

THORNBERRY AND THE HON. ZOE LOFGREN OF THE HOUSE SELECT 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

Questions from Representative Dunn 

1. In your testimony, you explain that the S&T Directorate is helping the 

Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IA&IP) Directorate develop the technological ability to map vulnerabilities within the oil and gas 

infrastructure in the Southwest states. I am particularly interested in this 

issue because of a pipeline explosion in 1999 that killed three children in 

my home state of Washington. Is this mapping going to be done in other 

regions—in addition to the Southwest? Have you had success working with 

the private sector on this project so far?

Is this mapping going to be done in other regions—in addition to the Southwest? 

Yes. Our Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Decision Support System (DSS) 

project supports the IAIP Directorate to understand the functions and 

vulnerabilities of all of the nation’s 14 critical infrastructure sectors and key assets 

as well as the interdependencies among them. We have developed modeling and 

simulation capabilities at the national level as well as at the regional and metropolitan level.

Have you had success working with the private sector on this project so far? 
36

Yes. The team of Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories that is developing the 

CIP–DSS for us has collaborated and worked for years with most of the major oil 

and gas associations in addition to numerous private companies and utilities. The 

associations include the American Gas Association (AGA), Interstate Natural Gas 

Association of America (INGAA), American Petroleum Institute (API), and the Gas 

Technology Institute (GTI). They have also worked with Olympic Pipeline (BP), 

Kinder Morgan (an integrated liquids pipeline and storage company), Conoco, and 

many of the largest natural gas utilities in the US.

2. I was pleased to read in your prepared statement about how much the 

S&T Directorate has achieved—and I am also pleased that you believe longterm research must be a priority as we move forward. Do you feel you have 

the resources you need to carry out your mission on a day to day basis? 

Are there specific areas that you would like this committee to focus in on 

in the future that have not, in your opinion, received the attention they deserve? 

The Science and Technology Directorate has reviewed its authorized fiscal year 2004 

funding and its proposed fiscal year 2005 funding and presently believes the current 

and proposed funding is adequate. However, we continue to assess our research and 

development plans. If we determine that the proposed amount of our funding is not 

sufficient to meet requirements, we would bring that information forward for consideration through the appropriate mechanisms. Additionally, in order to accurately determine what level of funding is needed for our research, development, testing and 

evaluation (RDT&E) activities, we will continue to work with other agencies with 

R&D responsibilities to identify requirements and gaps in funding. This coordinated 

approach will assist in making the right investments while preventing unnecessary 

and wasteful duplication. 

The Science and Technology Directorate recognizes there are some technology needs 

that require immediate attention. However, some homeland security issues require 

basic research to solve. Our long-term portfolio plans will address basic research 

needs.

3. I have spent a considerable amount of time learning about a variety 

of homeland security-related technology being developed by some of my 

constituent companies in Washington State and I?m sure most of the other 

members of this committee have done the same. 

I am wondering how your directorate is working with other directorates 

to ensure that the technologies being used for different functions within 

the Department are the best we can get, and will be most effective in waging the war on terror here at home, and will lead to greater coordination 

among directorates? 

Coordination among directorates is a top priority of the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS). We have regular senior level management meetings to identify 

issues and share information that cross-cuts the Department. Once a week, a teleconference is held with representatives from all the components of the Department. 

This meeting ensures that personnel from each of the Directorates become familiar 

with personnel from the other Directorates to facilitate intradepartmental communication. In addition, a number of Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate staff 

sit on interagency working groups with staff from other directorates. Within the 

S&T Directorate, we have portfolio managers for Border and Transportation Security, Emergency Preparedness and Response, United States Secret Service and 

United States Coast Guard. These portfolio managers serve as liaisons to the other 

components of the Department and ensure that we are supporting their operational 

needs. The S&T Directorate is also responsible for developing standards related to 

technologies that DHS is creating or applying, and, through this function, the S&T 

Directorate makes sure that equipment and technologies are as effective as possible.

What is the best way for a business to bring an idea to the attention of 

your office? How are those proposals currently being evaluated? 

The best method is to read carefully DHS solicitations for technology concepts and 

ideas that are posted at http://www.fedbizopps.gov and on the DHS public website, 

http://www.dhs.gov. DHS is interested in pursuing technologies posted in these formal, public, competitive solicitations and has budgeted funds for awards to the most 

meritorious submissions. 

If a business has an idea or concept that does not addresses a specific requirement 

in one of our active solicitations, we invite them to contact the appropriate Program 

Manager (PM) within our Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency 

(HSARPA) by telephone or e-mail for an initial discussion of their idea. Contact information for these managers will be listed on the DHS public website 
37

(www.dhs.gov) shortly. If the proposed idea seems to match a DHS need, the 

HSARPA PM will ask them to submit a brief white paper. If after review of the 

white paper, the approach still looks good, the Program Manager will suggest that 

the business consider submitting a complete proposal. A brief listing of the HSARPA 

Program Managers and their contact information is attached for information. 

White papers should contain a top level summary of the concept; a clear description 

of the underlying principles and concept of operations; the current state of development of the key technologies proposed; identification of critical path technologies 

and the approach to ensuring that these will be sufficiently mature to meet development deadlines; an estimate of the funding level required in each year; a summary 

of related technologies and/or systems previously developed by the proposed team; 

and a brief description of the qualifications of principal team members. White papers are typically 5–10 pages in length.

The address for submitting the information is: 

Department of Homeland Security 

Attn: Science & Technology Directorate/Program Manager’s Name/Room 

Washington D.C. 20528

or, they may be submitted electronically to: 

http://www.science.technology@dhs.gov 

If businesses so choose (especially with those applications they think are nearest 

term and most useful), they may submit a complete unsolicited proposal. 

Part 15.6 of the Federal Acquisition Regulations, available on-line at http://

www.arnet.gov/far, specifies the few criteria and a nominal submission format for 

unsolicited proposals. If this format is followed, all the required information will be 

at hand to evaluate the proposal. These unsolicited proposals should be submitted 

to the addresses listed above. 

In evaluating responses to published solicitations, the evaluation criteria are always published in the solicitation. The proposing business should always read the 

solicitation carefully and match their proposal to the content and format requirements.

4. I would like you to expand on the subject of Man Portable Air Defense 

System (MANPADS)—you included in your testimony a brief description of 

your directorate’s R&D program to understand both the threat posed by 

man-portable missiles and the technology that is available to address the 

threat. What is the department doing to analyze the threat from other 

ground-based weapons to the commercial aviation system—such as non–

Infared (IR) guided missiles and propelled grenades, for example? Is the 

department taking a systematic and risk-based approach to create a comprehensive, efficient response to ALL of these threats? 

The Department of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate maintains close coordination with the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Department of State (DoS) representatives to remain abreast of all current and emerging 

ground-based threats to commercial aviation. After reviewing intelligence analyses 

from agencies such as DIA’s Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), a systematic, end-to-end countermeasures strategy is formulated, and a program is implemented to mitigate risks from the threats. The strategy focuses on three areas. 

DoS is mitigating risks from these terrorist threats through proliferation control and 

threat reduction. TSA is utilizing tactical measures to address airport vulnerability, 

perimeter security and other countermeasures working with law enforcement agencies. Based on these assessments, the S&T Directorate identifies the critical threats, 

analyzes the susceptibility and vulnerability of civilian aircraft to them, and formulates technical solutions necessary to counter these threats.

Questions from Representative Weldon 

1. The adoption of standards and certification criteria for training, equipment and protective clothing should be one of the highest priorities for 

DHS. The reason for this importance is that manufacturers are hesitant to 

invest in the development of new technologies due to a fear that the government may subsequently find that they do not meet desired needs or 

specifications. Furthermore, public safety agencies are hesitant to acquire 

new technologies due to a fear that they will be denied compensation with 

homeland security funds. Meanwhile, valuable solutions to homeland security obstacles are available with no clear vision of when they will be taken 

advantage of. For these reasons, the desires of the Department must be 

made clear in the form of standards. Can you please explain the Depart-
38

ment’s plan and timeframe for the eventual adoption or creation of standards and certification criteria? 

We agree that adoption of standards and certification criteria for training, equipment and protective clothing for emergency responders is one of the highest priorities of the Department. The responsibility for DHS standards is assigned to the 

Science & Technology Directorate. An Office of Standards has been set up that reports to the Assistant Secretary, S&T Directorate, and this office is working with 

the emergency responder communities and the private sector consensus standards 

development organizations to adopt existing standards that are appropriate, to identify needs for new standards, and to set up writing groups of experts drawing on 

the existing standards efforts at the Federal, state, and local levels and in the private sector. The S&T Directorate is working closely with the American National 

Standards Institute (ANSI) in support of their Homeland Security Standards Panel. 

ANSI is proving to be an effective partner with DHS in identifying appropriate 

standards development organizations in different homeland security technologies. 

The adoption of existing standards has already begun and certification criteria for 

laboratories are being developed that will leverage existing public and private sector 

laboratory accreditation organizations.

2. Many believe that the government should not be the entity that writes 

standards. Instead, they favor the government shaping them and even 

adopting them, however the actual drafting should be left to the industry 

and voluntary consensus process that has worked so well for first responders for many years. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) is a 

noticeable leader in the creation of codes for training and technology, 

which have been in place for many years. In addition, the voluntary consensus standard process is an effective and quick process involving the private industry, agencies, users and code writers, which is ever evolving and 

used successfully in the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program. Does the 

Department intend to draft new standards or does it intend to adopt those 

already in existence by the private sector and first responders? 

The Department supports use of the Voluntary Consensus Process. The Department 

recognizes both the need and the value in developing voluntary consensus standards 

as required by the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (PL 104–

113). The emergency responder communities—fire fighters, HAZMAT and EMS 

teams—must be directly involved in the standards development process. The Department is supporting the excellent standards development for fire fighting equipment and training by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). The S&T Directorate is working with NFPA and the Congressional Fire Services Caucus to announce five NFPA standards that will be immediately adopted by DHS for homeland 

security applications. DHS is also supporting standards development at the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) as well as research to 

develop next generation protective equipment at the North Carolina State University. Both NFPA and NIOSH will be involved in developing DHS standards for this 

next generation of personal protective equipment.

Questions from Representative Gibbons 

1. Part of the S&T Directorate’s responsibility is to unify and coordinate 

much of the federal government’s scientific efforts including national laboratories and academic institutions. While scientific research in academic 

settings can be used to thwart attacks by our enemies, it can also be used 

by our enemies to attack us, since much of the information is published 

openly. In January of this year, you spoke about ‘‘scientific Openness and 

National Security.’’ One of the problems you noted in your speech was that 

the scientific community has not established any real, unified criteria for 

the open publication of sensitive scientific research. You specifically referenced the public release of a Mouse Pox study and a Polio Virus study 

and how those could have harmed our national security. Could you briefly 

discuss—- first, how you now view this tradeoff between scientific openness 

and national security and—- second, while you have stated that you believe 

the federal government should not be setting limitations on openly published scientific works, I wonder how you would view a coordinated effort 

by the National Academies or similar entity to set the standards. 

The tradeoff between scientific openness and national security is, and will continue 

to be, a delicate balance for all federal agencies that support scientific research at 

our nation’s universities and national laboratories. Similar concerns exist within the 

private sector. The Department of Homeland Security remains committed to preserving the academic freedom and integrity that have made our nation’s higher education system the envy of the world. However, the nation cannot risk the protection 
39

of our homeland under any circumstance, including the publication of sensitive 

homeland security information. The balance between scientific openness and national security can only occur through open and ongoing communication between the 

federal entities that support federally-funded research and development and the 

performers. I continue to encourage the scientific community to establish unified criteria for open publication of sensitive scientific research and I am committed to engaging with all the scientific community as we address this issue. 

DHS would welcome the continued, thoughtful participation of the National Academies in formulating guidelines to assist federally-sponsored research organizations 

in the determination of how best to safeguard sensitive homeland security information. The recent National Academies report, Biotechnology Research in an Age of 

Terrorism, considered the question of scientific openness and national security in 

the realm of biotechnology research. The report is extremely valuable and had several worthy recommendations, including the need for the education and involvement 

of the national and international scientific societies and associations in this important issue. In addition, the report recommended that scientific societies that publish 

research results establish a system for effective self-monitoring of information that 

may be considered sensitive to our national security.

2. You mentioned that the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

(DARPA) and the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency 

(HSARPA) have different missions and responsibilities. However, I can 

imagine several areas of research that could be mutually beneficial to both 

homeland security and defense. Do you believe that HSARPA and DARPA 

are in a good position to work together to take full advantage of each others’ work? If so, what is the formal mechanism for this co-operation? 

DARPA and HSARPA are well positioned to work together. They share mutual interests in technologies related to Homeland Security missions. For example, they 

are now collaborating on a $10 million joint radiological decontamination research 

effort under the terms of a formal Memorandum of Agreement signed by both Directors. Some of the original HSARPA Program Managers are DARPA alumnae and 

maintain their professional ties and relationships. The Directors of the two organizations are in frequent contact and the immediate past Deputy Director at DARPA 

is HSARPA’s current Deputy Director. At this time, DHS does not feel the need for 

a formal agreement to further structure this close working relationship.

Questions from Representative Langevin 

1. I know the University of Rhode Island is putting together a white 

paper on its vision of what a DHS Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) should be and how it should be organized. How will 

the FFRDCs fit into DHS’s overall research framework and goals? Can you 

tell us if the Directorate is anywhere near a decision on what their purpose 

and goals will be? Since the call for white papers is ending, when do you 

anticipate a request for proposals to be made? Will you ask Congress to increase the authorization period for this FFRDC (currently only 3 years), especially since it has taken so long to start the process of establishing it? 

The Homeland Security Institute (HIS), a Federally Funded Research and Development Center, is being established under the authority of Sec. 312 of the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002 to provide research, studies, analyses, analytic and computational models, simulations, and other technical and analytical support to the Department. The HSI will adopt an integrated systems approach to evaluating homeland security systems and technologies at all stages of development, deployment, 

and use. 

A request for proposals was issued on December 3, 2003, with proposals due on January 28, 2004. The expected award date is May 1, 2004. The initial award will be 

$8.5 million in fiscal year 2004 followed by four additional option years projected 

at $30 million per year. However, legislation calls for the HSI to terminate November 2005. Although the contract will be designed to accommodate work beyond that 

date, either legislative authorization (the most desirable approach) or a completely 

new FFRDC justification will be needed to extend the operations beyond November 

2005.

2. I recently conducted a survey in my district of local officials and first 

responders, asking their opinion on homeland security concerns. Overwhelmingly, they have said that there is far too little information being 

shared by DHS with local officials, and this is hampering their efforts. I 

know they aren’t alone, and I am sure that this is a concern every Member 

shares. What progress has been made on the information sharing standards 

that the Directorate was charged with developing? I know a big part of the 
40

concern revolved around security, so I?m curious to know if the work has 

been passed to National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), or 

is it being handled by DHS? Is there a timeline that is being followed or 

a deadline for adoption and implementation? 

The Department of Homeland Security believes that this request requires several 

responses to understand the Department’s initiatives to assist the first responders 

regarding access to information, intelligence, and standards. 

DHS has several programs in place to aid in the identification, selection, and implementation of equipment and technology for first responders: 

Through the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), the Department has engaged in a research effort designed to improve local, state and federal 

emergency responders’ capabilities to deter or mitigate terrorist use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive/incendiary (CBRNE) devices and emerging 

threats. This effort has two major components:

1. The development of the architecture for an automated knowledgebase that 

provides responders and planners information about what technologies are already available, the extent to which they have been tested, the standards they 

meet, their consistency with the Interagency Board’s Standardized Equipment 

List, and reviews from other responders that have used them. The Responder 

Knowledge Base became accessible this fall and although it has limited information it has been well recived by the community and new products are being 

added reqularly.

2. The development of a national technology planning process that: 

• Identifies and prioritizes the capabilities emergency responders need. • Identifies what technologies are required to enable those capabilities, and 

characterizes the extent to which these are already available. 

• Establishes technology objectives and roadmaps by which Federal RDT&E investments can be focused towards the needs of responders. 

In addition to the MIPT programs, DHS in response to Section 313 of Public Law 

107–296 of its authorizing language is developing a technology clearinghouse, the 

Public Safety and Security Institute for Technology (PSITEC). The mission of 

PSITEC is to enhance public safety and security through the identification, development, and distribution of integrated technology, programs, and information. PSITEC 

will serve as the single point of entry to relevant public safety information such as: • access to and dissemination of information regarding commercially available 

products and innovative technologies including performance capabilities, training requirements to implement and sustain the equipment, and the availability 

of grant programs to facilitate the acquisition, deployment, and maintenance of 

the equipment, 

• provide support to individuals seeking guidance on how to pursue proposals 

to develop or deploy technologies that would enhance homeland security, 

• collect information about critical incident response training programs and develop a searchable data base that will aid responders in identifying, comparing 

and selecting the appropriate training courses, and 

• development of expert/mentoring systems and information retrieval and analysis programs to coach first responders through their online searches of existing 

databases for clear and comprehensive information about equipment, programs, 

training, and funding. 

Information sharing with state and local officials is also a top priority for the Department. In particular, both our Office of State and Local Government Coordination (OSLGC) and the IAIP Directorate are focused primarily on finding ways to improve information sharing. 

State and local homeland security officials already have a seat at the table, and are 

both providers and recipients of homeland security information. For example, the 

Administration’s Homeland Security Advisory Council has a State and Local Senior 

Advisory Committee and a First Responder Senior Advisory Committee, which facilitate communication among states and localities on homeland security issues. In 

addition, we regularly form ad hoc state and local advisory groups to assist in the 

development and implementation of homeland security policies. Finally, the Office 

of State and Local Government Coordination regularly consults with state and local 

officials as well as the major associations that represent them through publications 

such as DHS Today, Fact Sheets and Press Releases. Feedback from our state and 

local constituency indicates that these improvements are making a difference. 

The OSLGC in conjunction with the rest of DHS has made major strides, since its 

creation, to share information with states and localities. The OSLGC is responsible 

for sending out homeland security information bulletins and alerts, including a daily 

Homeland Security Operations Morning Brief. The OSLGC also coordinates bi-week-
41

ly conference calls with all of the Homeland Security Advisors in all the states and 

territories to help relay important departmental information as well as respond to 

queries from the advisors. 

Through the coordination of the OSLGC, the Department has paid for and established secure communication channels to all of our state and territorial governors 

and their state emergency operations centers. This investment in communication 

equipment included secure video teleconferencing equipment along with STU/STE 

telephones. In addition, we have worked to ensure every governor has been cleared 

to receive classified information and are working with the Governors and their 

Homeland Security Advisors to provide security clearances for five additional people 

who support the Governors? Homeland Security mission. Finally, OSLGC coordinates resource deployment to state and local governments, including BioWatch, air 

assets and radiological detection pagers, to name just a few. 

To address first responder requirements regarding communications interoperability, 

SAFECOM serves as the umbrella program within the federal government to help 

local, tribal, state, and federal public safety agencies improve public safety response 

through more effective and efficient interoperable wireless communications. To successfully achieve its vision, SAFECOM is working with existing federal communications initiatives and key public safety stakeholders to address the need to develop 

better technologies and processes for the cross-jurisdictional and cross-disciplinary 

coordination of existing systems and future networks. 

SAFECOM is a public safety practitioner driven program, and as such, solicited information from representatives of public safety from the local, state, and Federal 

level in establishing the program’s short and long-term initiatives. Two of the top 

priority initiatives that this diverse group emphasized to SAFECOM include 1) the 

need for an ‘‘information clearinghouse’’ to enable two-way communication with public safety and 2) the development of a process to advance communications equipment 

standards. The portal, which is scheduled for release in the summer of 2004 and 

which will be accessible at www.safecomprogram.gov, will provide public safety 

practitioners with planning and management applications, collaborative tools, and 

relevant and timely wireless information. SAFECOM’s activities in terms of standards will be to identify, test, and, where necessary, develop standards in coordination with the public safety community and ongoing standards activities. 

Finally, the Department has implemented a standards development program. Working with the private sector through the American National Standards Institute 

(ANSI) and its Homeland Security Standards Panel (HSSP), DHS is identifying existing standards that can be adapted for homeland security needs. The HSSP is 

working to mobilize the resources of 280 standards-development organizations that 

develop voluntary consensus standards for products and processes. The Department 

is also working directly with the National Institute of Standards and Technology 

(NIST) on development of new standards for personal protective equipment for first 

responders, as well as standards for detectors for weapons of mass destruction and 

information technology standards for cyber security and for biometrics. To compliment it’s standards development program, DHS plans to implement a standards 

based test and evaluation process to ensure that commercially available equipment 

performs as intended and meets the operational requirements of the first responders.

3. From all indications, identification of critical infrastructure seems to 

be taking far more time than was anticipated. Does DHS have sufficient capability to accomplish this task? Are you actively working on new methodology to enhance and speed-up this process?

Does DHS have sufficient capability to accomplish this task? 

Yes, but it is important to put this task into perspective. The National Strategy for 

the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets (Feb 2003) identifies 14 critical infrastructure sectors and key assets. The National Strategy also provides a sense of the magnitude of the task of identifying what is really critical from 

the following example sites; the United States has: 

• 1,912,000 Farms 

• 87,000 food-processing plants 

• 1,800 federal water reservoirs 

• 1,600 municipal waste water facilities 

• 5,800 registered hospitals 

• 87,000 emergency services entities 

• 250,000 firms in the Defense Industrial Base 

• 2,000,000,000 miles of telecomm cable 

• 2,800 electric power plants 

• 104 commercial nuclear power plants 
42

• 300,000 producing oil and natural gas sites • 5,000 public airports • 120,000 miles of major railroads • 590,000 highway bridges • 2,000,000 miles of pipelines • 500 major urban public transit systems • 26,600 FDIC-insured banks and financial institutions • 66,000 chemical plants • 137,000,000 postal and shipping delivery sites • 5,800 historic buildings • 80,000 dams • 13,300 federal government owned/operated facilities • 460 skyscrapers 

The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate is working very hard with the infrastructure owners and operators to identify the most critical sites and reduce their vulnerabilities. Progress has already been made in identifying nationally critical assets. For example, for the approximately 590,000 highway 

bridges, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the Federal Highway Administration 

(FHWA), and the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) compiled ‘‘short lists’’ after September 11, 2001. The Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA) then used these ‘‘short lists’’ as starting points for 

applying the criticality model. To date, the criticality model has been applied to approximately 15% of the nation’s transportation infrastructure.

Are you actively working on new methodology to enhance and speed-up this process? 

Yes. Our Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Decision Support System (DSS) 

project supports the IAIP Directorate to understand the functions of all of the nation’s 14 critical infrastructure sectors and key assets as well as the interdependencies among the sectors. We are developing modeling and simulation capabilities 

for the analysis of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences (risk) at the national 

level as well as at the regional and metropolitan level. This capability will help us 

more rapidly set risk-based priorities, identify critical nodes, and understand interdependencies that may change the priorities. In addition, we have initiated a university-based research and development center at the University of Southern California that will help DHS better understand and manage risk and the economic impacts of our actions and policies.

4. DHS was given broad research capabilities by the Homeland Security 

Act, how much are those assets being utilized? 

The two most prominent research capabilities granted to HSARPA were the ability 

to use Other Transactions Authority for Research and Prototypes (OTA) to facilitate 

award of contracts, and the Section 1101 Experimental Personnel Management Program to hire skilled program managers. 

HSARPA’s first major solicitation to private industry sought ideas, concepts and 

technologies for the next generation of chemical and biological sensors. As was the 

explicit intent, HSARPA expects to award winners of this solicitation using OTA. 

This powerful tool allows companies that have never done business with the government before the opportunity to participate with an absolute minimum of red tape. 

OTA will be used to create an appropriately flexible program management structure 

tailored to program development needs. 

The Section 1101 Experimental Personnel Management Program authority has been 

used to hire three program managers and is the preferred method for a fourth prospect. The authority was essential to recruiting and hiring these experienced technical program managers. Section 1101 completes the toolkit for HSARPA hiring of 

program managers. With four methods available to secure services of qualified and 

experienced program managers, (i.e., direct government hire, detail from another 

government agency, Inter–Governmental Personnel Act hiring authority and Section 

1101), HSARPA has the flexibility and authority it needs to hire, retain, and rotate 

excellent personnel. Under the provisions of the law, HSARPA is required to report 

to the Congress annually on its use and progress using this authority. The first report was submitted 16 October, 2003. 

How close is DHS in choosing a National Laboratory to carry on a good 

deal of its pure research initiatives? What about the selection of the University Centers, what is the plan for their selection? What focuses do you 

envision them having? 

The homeland security capabilities at all the Department of Energy national laboratories, technology centers, and sites are important and vital resources to the S&T 

Directorate. It is essential that the nation’s best and brightest scientific and technological expertise be engaged in the homeland security mission. The S&T Directorate 
43

is committed to utilizing the extensive capabilities of all DOE national laboratories 

to protect the homeland.

We are implementing separate mechanisms to access the capability base at the DOE 

national laboratories to guard against organizational conflicts of interest and inappropriate use of inside information in responding to competitive private sector solicitations. The S&T Directorate has designated five national laboratories (Lawrence 

Livermore, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest and Sandia) as intramural 

laboratories; all other DOE laboratories, sites and technology centers are designated 

as extramural laboratories. The DOE national laboratories designated as intramural 

labs will help the S&T Directorate set research goals and requirements and formulate research and development road maps; this level of engagement gives the intramural labs unfair advantage, were they able to compete for funding awarded 

through open solicitations. All extramural laboratories can compete for open solicitations from the S&T Directorate..

5. If DHS is focusing far more on near-term projects than long-term research, shouldn’t there be better utilization of the TSWG, focusing more of 

DHS’ research funding there? 

The S&T Directorate does not focus on the concept of near-term and far-term research as categories; rather, we seek to place the priority emphasis on meeting the 

technology requirements of first responders and DHS operational users in the field. 

Our work here must be first rate and get the technology out to the users as rapidly 

as possible. This effort involves improvements, modifications, cost reductions, rapid 

prototyping and other development work that is innately of shorter duration. We 

place a parallel, but necessarily smaller, emphasis on revolutionary technology and 

longer term directed research.

Revolutionary technology, if successful, upsets asymmetric advantages of the terrorists, re-writes technological rules of engagement substantially in our favor, or provides an individual, breakthrough capability that creates new, major operational advantages for our people. Revolutionary research provides opportunities to explore 

novel solutions, try multiple technical approaches to a problem, revisit abandoned 

techniques in light of new progress in other areas, and is the only opportunity to 

‘‘swing for the fences.’’ It is not ‘‘curiosity-based’’ research, it is mission-based research, but with adequate resources and opportunity to conceive new ideas, stretch 

existing concepts, and cut new paths toward a solution. These clearly are the efforts 

that permit breakthrough capabilities to emerge, and every dollar spent in this pursuit is worth it.

DHS provided $30 million in fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 to the interagency 

Technology Support Working Group (TSWG) to fund awards from our first joint 

Broad Agency Announcement. This Announcement contained 50 requirements in 

which both DHS and TSWG had interest. Because HSARPA Program Managers are 

members of the TSWG working groups and the Director of HSARPA sits on the 

TSWG Executive Committee, we are closely allied and understand their operations, 

funding, evaluation criteria, and management.

However, there continue to be areas where DHS requirements and TSWG requirements differ substantially. Where our interests coincide, we will be active funders 

and participants in the TSWG processes and solicitations. Where our requirements 

and theirs diverge, we retain the ability to solicit and develop precisely what our 

clients have requested. Specifically, the requirements for volume commercial manufacture and application at affordable cost often differ from requirements typically 

given TWSG by their sponsoring organizations.

6. What is the status of the HSARPA? If its goal of near-term projects is 

similar or identical to TSWG’s, why are we funding a duplication of efforts? 

How much project money has gone into HSARPA this year, and how does 

that compare to TSWG? 

HSARPA was established effective March 1, 2003, with the other components of the 

S&T Directorate and the Department. It is active and growing. Congress established 

HSARPA to ‘‘promote revolutionary changes in technologies that promote homeland 

security,’’ to advance those technologies which are ‘‘critical,’’ and to ‘‘accelerate the 

prototyping and deployment of technologies’’ that reduce homeland vulnerabilities. 

HSARPA performs these three functions by awarding procurement contracts, 

grants, cooperative agreements, or other transactions for research or prototypes to 

public or private entities, businesses, federally funded research and development 

centers, and universities. HSARPA is an external funding arm for the Department 

of Homeland Security’s Science and Technology Directorate.
44

TSWG focuses on short-term projects of interest to multiple agencies. Staff members 

from HSARPA, other S&T Directorate personnel, and representatives from other 

parts of DHS participate in the TSWG requirements setting process.

However, because TSWG’s core funding comes from DoD, and its staff are DoD personnel or contractors, their requirements list is heavily weighted with projects of 

multiple agency interest that are also of DoD interest. Many topics of interest to 

DHS do not rank highly in the TSWG process. In other areas, there may be interagency interest in general, but a specific requirement of DHS (e.g., cost of ownership, time of delivery) necessitates that HSARPA create and manage a project to 

accomplish that goal. The TSWG process allows DHS to leverage its money in those 

areas that are appropriate for interagency work. In other areas, it is appropriate 

for HSARPA to compete proposals to satisfy DHS requirements. A final control on 

preventing inappropriate duplication of efforts is that the Director, HSARPA sits on 

TSWG’s Executive Committee and is thus able to identify and resolve potential 

areas of overlap between HSARPA and TSWG.

Using fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2004 funds, HSARPA expects to award contracts exceeding a total value of $300 million to perform and support its research 

activities. TSWG receives a core budget from the Department of Defense of approximately $50M. When member contributions are included, as well as other participating support from the Department of Energy and Department of State, TSWG 

projects that its annual fiscal year 2004 budget will reach $160M.

Questions from Representative Thornberry 

1. The intent of the SAFETY Act is to remove liability and risk barriers 

to the deployment of anti-terrorism technologies so such technologies can 

be much more widely used to protect our citizens. Even companies that 

have obtained some insurance to cover liabilities associated with their 

anti-terrorism technologies may be prevented by liability and risk barriers 

from obtaining additional insurance and deploying such technologies as 

widely as they and potential additional customers would like. Is it the Department’s understanding designation and certification under the SAFETY 

Act can be granted to entities that were able to obtain limited insurance 

(thus allowing a limited distribution of their anti-terrorism technology) but 

whose global liability exposure prevented that entity from obtaining additional insurance (thus limiting the distribution of its anti-terrorism technology to less than all who might benefit from it)? 

Yes, it is the Department’s understanding that, if all of the criteria set forth in the 

Act for Designation and Certification are met by a Seller’s technology, and if the 

price of the liability insurance can be shown to be preventing the technology from 

reaching the appropriate market, then the ability of a Seller to obtain insurance at 

the higher level will not prevent the Department from granting a Designation.

2. How are technical standards being established and enforced across the 

Department for cybersecurity, law enforcement or counterterrorism? Who 

set the requirements and how are they communicated to the technology developer or purveyor? Will there be a test bed(s) established to assure that 

technologies meet the standards as claimed? 

Technical standards for products, services and systems are being developed in the 

Office of Standards in the DHS S&T Directorate. Many of the 22 agencies that were 

combined into the new Department have standards programs for products and services. These included cyber security requirements for which agencies follow regulations in the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA). These component agencies continue to use Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) as 

well as National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) guides for computer 

security (NIST 800 series guides). A common policy for standards for cyber security 

is being developed by the S&T Directorate, the other three directorates, and the office of the Chief Information Officer In the area of technical standards to support 

law enforcement, DHS is focusing on the technology requirements of emergency responders—including law enforcement personnel—in several areas including detectors for CBRNE agents, personal protective equipment, urban search and rescue robotics, and interoperable communications equipment. Performance specifications are 

being developed by consensus committees who include emergency personnel as well 

as equipment manufacturers. The Department is also establishing performance 

specifications for CBRNE detectors for use by federal, state and local personnel. 

Manufacturers are involved in the working groups to develop these performance 

standards.

In each of these areas, test beds are being established for Test & Evaluation (T&E) 

against the performance specifications developed by the S&T Office of Standards. 
45

T&E protocols are being developed for use at these test beds. T&E protocols will 

be provided to both private sector and federal test beds. Federal test beds are being 

established to allow specialized T&E for select agents and for other T&E that must 

be conducted in a secure environment.

3. How can the certification process as required by the SAFETY Act be 

accomplished when standards have not yet been set for technologies seeking certification? How will these two processes be integrated? Will technologies that may be certified, have to be recertified if new standards substantially affect product acceptability? 

The Department will use any existing standards that are directly relevant to that 

anti-terrorism technology, as deployed in a mass loss scenario, to assist in assessing 

the merit of any technology regarding SAFETY Act Certification. However, the Department anticipates that many of the technologies that the nation would most benefit from granting SAFETY Act protections will be cutting-edge, high-risk, high-benefit anti-terrorism technologies. Also, the term ‘‘technology’’ as used in the SAFETY 

Act is extremely broad. It includes not only devices, but also systems and services. 

As such, it is unlikely that applicable standards will yet exist. However, these technologies may address critical and time-sensitive needs. Therefore, we will be using 

additional methods to assess technology performance.

Certification as required by the SAFETY Act relies on the ability of a technology 

to meet all of the seven criteria required for Designation, as well as the additional 

criteria for Certification. Surrogates for meeting a standard are interpreted as those 

Designation criteria set forth in the Act as: 

• ‘‘Prior US government use or demonstrated substantial utility and effectiveness,’’ and 

• ‘‘Evaluation of scientific studies that can be feasibly conducted in order to assess the capability of the technology to substantially reduce risks of harm’’

For Certification, a technology also must be shown to: 

• Perform as intended 

• Conform to the Seller’s specifications, and 

• Be safe for use as intended 

SAFETY Act technical review teams will rely on existing technology performance 

tests and analyses provided by the Seller. The teams will also draw on their own 

expertise and any similar evaluation information to evalute the information provided. The Office of Standards within the S&T Directorate will work with SAFETY 

Act teams to identify appropriate standards and Testing and Evaluation capabilities 

as needs are identified. As accredited certification laboratoriess are established, the 

SAFETY Act Office will direct those Sellers with insufficient evidence of performance to those labs as one alternative to addressing the criteria

4. After we make the investment in R&D for new technologies and followon test and evaluation, how is the Directorate going to assure the technologies are going to be used? 

The Science and Technology Directorate will assist industry in getting their technologies (as long as they meet DHS standards) in front of operational users, including first responders. However, it is outside the scope of the S&T Directorate to guarantee that particular technologies will be selected and procured by operational 

users.

Æ