UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

Before

COOK, CAMPANELLA, and HAIGHT

Appellate Military Judges

UNITED STATES, Appellee

v.

Private E1 CHRISTINE GONZALEZ

United States Army, Appellant

ARMY 20120984

Headquarters, United States Army Maneuver Center of Excellence

Stephen E. Castlen, Military Judge

Colonel James F. Garrett, Staff Judge Advocate

For Appellant: Colonel Patricia A. Ham, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Imogene M. 

Jamison, JA; Major Jacob D. Bashore, JA; Captain Jack D. Einhorn, JA (on brief). 

For Appellee: Colonel John P. Carrell, JA; Major Elizabeth Claus, JA; Major 

Catherine L. Brantley, JA (on brief).

17 October 2013

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SUMMARY DISPOSITION

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Per Curiam: 

A military judge sitting as a special court-martial convicted appellant, 

contrary to her plea, of one specification of desertion terminated by apprehension, in 

violation of Article 85, Uniform Code of Military Justice. 10 U.S.C. § 885 (2006)

[hereinafter UCMJ]. The military judge sentenced appellant to a bad-conduct 

discharge and confinement for two months. The convening authority approved the 

findings and sentence.

1

 

 

1

For two days of pretrial confinement, the convening authority credited appellant 

with two days against the sentence to confinement.
GONZALEZ—ARMY 20120984

2

This case is before this court for review under Article 66, UCMJ. Appellant’s 

sole assignment of error alleges that the military judge did not provide her with 

complete Pierce credit for her prior nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, UCMJ. 

See United States v. Pierce, 27 M.J. 367 (C.M.A. 1989). While the military judge

stated multiple times that the prior nonjudicial punishment would be considered and 

we presume the military judge did apply Pierce credit, he failed to “state on the 

record the specific credit awarded for the prior punishment.” United States v. 

Gammons, 51 M.J. 169, 184 (C.A.A.F. 1999). The government concedes this failure 

was error. We agree with and accept this concession and will accordingly grant 

relief.

Appellant received nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, UCMJ, and was 

later court-martialed for the same offense of desertion. Her prior punishment was 

reduction from E-2 to E-1, extra duty for 45 days, and restriction for 45 days. 

Forfeiture of $745 per month for two months was suspended and never imposed. 

At trial, appellant disclosed to the military judge in both the stipulation of 

fact and the pre-sentencing hearing that she had previously been punished under 

Article 15, UCMJ, for deserting her unit. The military judge acknowledged that he 

would consider this as a matter of mitigation in adjudging the sentence in this case. 

Immediately after announcing the sentence, the military judge reiterated that he had 

considered the prior punishment when determining the adjudged sentence but failed 

to state the specific credit he awarded for the prior nonjudicial punishment. 

In Pierce, our superior court held that an accused can face court-martial for an 

offense when that accused has previously been punished under Article 15, UCMJ, for 

that same offense. 27 M.J. at 368-369. However, an accused in this context must 

receive “complete credit for any and all nonjudicial punishment suffered: day-forday, dollar-for-dollar, stripe-for-stripe.” 27 M.J. at 367. Our superior court has 

specifically instructed military judges to “state on the record the specific credit 

awarded for prior punishment.” Gammons, 51 M.J. at 184.

Although the military judge erred by not announcing his Pierce credit 

calculation on the record, we, upon review, have the authority to “adjust appellant’s 

sentence to assure [she] was not twice punished.” Pierce, 27 M.J. at 370. 

Accordingly, we calculate the Pierce credit due appellant as follows. First, we 

presume appellant served 45 days of restriction concurrently with 45 days of extra 

duty.2 If two forms of punishment involving deprivation of liberty, such as 

 

2

See Army Reg. 27-10, Legal Services: Military Justice, para. 3-19b.(8) (3 October 

2011) (permitting restriction and extra duty to be combined and to run concurrently). 

We note the standard Army practice is to execute these punishments concurrently. 

(continued . . .)
GONZALEZ—ARMY 20120984

3

restriction and extra duty, are combined and imposed on the same day, that single 

day still amounts to but one day for purposes of calculating day-for-day credit. See

United States v. Mead, 72 M.J. 515, 519 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2013) (noting that in 

calculating Pierce credit “a fraction should not subsume the whole.”); see also 

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, (2012 ed.), pt. V, ¶ 5.d.(4) (“Restriction 

and extra duties may be combined to run concurrently, but the combination may not 

exceed the maximum imposable for extra duties.”). It follows that appellant should 

receive 45 days confinement credit for the 45 days when appellant was deprived of 

her liberty, even if that deprivation occurred in two different manners. Second, we 

award 15 days of confinement credit for appellant’s reduction from E-2 to E-1. This 

credit satisfies the “stripe-for-stripe” requirement of Pierce. Accordingly, we only 

affirm that part of the sentence extending to a bad-conduct discharge. 

CONCLUSION

On consideration of the entire record, including consideration of the issue 

personally specified by appellant pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 

(C.M.A. 1982), we hold the findings of guilty as approved by the convening 

authority correct in law and fact. Accordingly, the findings of guilty are 

AFFIRMED. After considering the entire record, the court affirms only so much of 

the sentence as provides for a bad-conduct discharge. All rights, privileges, and 

property, of which appellant has been deprived by virtue of that portion of the 

sentence set aside by this decision, are ordered restored. See UCMJ art. 75(a).

FOR THE COURT:

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR.

Clerk of Court 

 

(. . . continued)

Furthermore, nothing in the record indicates that these punishments did not run 

concurrently in this case. 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR.

Clerk of Court

FOR THE COURT: