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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

DEBRA CONN, DIANE HANSON, and
PAULA SCHLOSSBERG

Plaintiffs,

and

VIRGINIA SHAMEL,

Plaintiff-Appellant, UNPUBLISHED February 19, 2015

v No. 316120
Oakland Circuit Court PARK WEST GALLERIES, INC., ALBERT SCAGLIONE, MORRIS SHAPIRO, and ALBERT MOLINA, LC No. 2012-130035-CZ

Defendants-Appellees.

Before: M URRAY , P.J., and H OEKSTRA and W ILDER , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.
Plaintiffs alleged that they purchased artwork from defendant Park West Galleries, Inc. (“Park West”), and in their complaint asserted that some of the art was fraudulently misrepresented, that they were overcharged, or that they did no t receive what defendants represented was being purchased. In similar cases brought agai nst these defendants, the issues have generally focused on the arbitration clauses in defendant Park West’s invoices and the
statute of limitations. This case raises a different issue. A fter the trial court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion for summary disposition pursu ant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), we granted plaintiffs’ application for leave to appeal “limited to the issues of whether plaintiff Conn may challenge the validity of the arbitration clause in her 200 9 sales contract based on fraud in the inducement and whether plaintiffs Hanson and Shamel have st anding.” Conn v Park West Galleries, Inc , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered December 1 7, 2013 (Docket No. 316120). However, pursuant to t he parties’ stipulation, th is Court subsequently dismissed appellants Debra Conn and Diane Hanson as parties to this appea l. Conn v Park West Galleries,-2- Inc , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 1 9, 2014 (Docket No. 316120). 1 Accordingly, the only issue before this Court is whether the trial court erred in ruling that plaintiff Shamel lacked standing to pursue any claims invo lving works of art that were purchased in transactions in whic h only Shamel’s late husband, George Trauthwei n, was listed as the purchasing party on the invoice. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A trial court’s summary disposition decision is reviewed de no vo. Spiek v Dep’t of Transp , 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). Although defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (10), a motion for summar y disposition based on standing is properly considered under MCR 2.116(C)(5), for lack of legal capacity to sue. Int’l Union, United Auto, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v Central Mich

Univ Trustees , 295 Mich App 486, 493; 815 NW2d 132 (2012). This Court may r eview a summary disposition decision unde r the appropriate subrule, eve n if the parties did not raise it, where, as here, neither party has been misled. Computer Network, Inc v AM Gen Corp , 265 Mich App 309, 312-313; 696 NW2d 49 (2005).

In reviewing a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2 .116(C)(5), this Court must consider the p leadings, depositions, admissions , affidavits, and other documentary evidence submitted by the parties. This Cour t reviews de novo a trial court’s determination on a motion for summary disp osition as well as the legal question of whether a party has standing to sue. [ Int’l Union , 295 Mich App at 493 (citations and quotation marks omitted).]

“The purpose of the standing doctrine is to assess whether a l itigant’s interest in the issue is sufficient to ensure sincere and vigorous advocacy.” Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n v Lansing Bd of
Ed

, 487 Mich 349, 355; 792 NW2d 686 (2010). Standing involves whet her a particular litigant is a proper party to request adjudication of an issue and not w hether the issue is justiciable. Id. Therefore, one with a legal cause of action has standing. Id. at 372. One can also have standing under the declaratory ju dgment rule, MCR 2.605, or

[w]here a cause of action is not provided at law, then a court should, in its discretion, determine whether a litigant has standing. A litig ant may have standing in this context if the litigant has a special injury o r right, or substantial interest, that will be detrimentally affected in a manner diffe rent from the citizenry at large or if the statutory scheme implies that the Legislature intended to confer standing on the litigant. [ Id . at 372.]

Shamel relies on Aichele v Hodge , 259 Mich App 146, 164-165; 673 NW2d 452 (2003),
in which this Court stated:

1 Because this Court did not grant leave to appeal with respect to plaintiff Paula Schlossberg, she is not a party to t his appeal.-3- In Bowie v Arder, 411 Mich 23, 42-43; 490 NW2d 568 (1992), quot ing 59 Am Jur 2d, Parties, § 30, p 414, our Supreme C ourt explained standing stating that,

“One cannot rightfully invoke t he jurisdiction of the court to enforce private rights, or maintain a civil action for the enforcement of such rights, unless one has in an individual or representative capacity some real interest in the cause of acti on, or a legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject m atter of the controversy. This interest is generally spoken of as ‘stan ding’
. . . . “

See also Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n , 487 Mich at 358.

The trial court concluded that Shamel had no legal right to pu rsue claims for artwork purchased in September 2004 and May 2006 because only her late husband was named in the invoices for those purchases. T here is a significant amount of facial appeal to that proposition, since outside the warranty cont ext, how could an individual sue a company for breach of contract or related claims based upon the purchase of an item that the i ndividual did not purchase? However, that reasoning is related to the merits of Shamel’s cl aims, not to whether she has standing to assert the legal causes of action set forth in the complaint. See Rogan v Morton , 167 Mich App 483, 486; 423 NW2d 237 (1988) (“Standing in no way dep ends on the merits of the case.”) Instead, under Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n , “a litigant has standing whenever there is a legal cause of action,” Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n , 487 Mich at 372, and whether one asserts a legal cause of action is not determined by addressing the merits of the cla im. Id . at 357. Here, the trial court’s conclusion was based on the merits, i.e., that Shamel c ould not sue because she was not a party to the original purchase nor the relevant recipient of th e allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations. But those facts are material to issues suc h as privity and reliance, not whether Shamel has asserted legal causes of action. In other w ords, Shamel set forth valid causes of action, and under Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n’s broad approach to standing, that appears to be enough. Accordingly, the trial c ourt erred in dismissing th ose claims for lack of standing.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder