Subcommittee on National Security, 

Emerging Threats, and International 

Relations, Committee on Government 

Reform, House of Representatives 

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST 

Tuesday, February 3, 2004 COMBATING TERRORISM

Evaluation of Selected 

Characteristics in National 

Strategies Related to 

Terrorism 

Statement of Randall A. Yim, Managing Director 

Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

GAO-04-408T 
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-408T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Randall A. Yim 

at (202) 512-6787 or YimR@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-04-408T, testimony

before the Subcommittee on National 

Security, Emerging Threats, and 

International Relations, Committee on 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

February 3, 2004

COMBATING TERRORISM 

Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in 

National Strategies Related to Terrorism 

National strategies are not required by either executive or legislative 

mandate to address a single, consistent set of characteristics. However, 

based on a review of numerous sources, GAO identified a set of desirable 

characteristics to aid responsible parties in further developing and 

implementing the strategies—and to enhance their usefulness in resource 

and policy decisions and to better assure accountability. The characteristics 

GAO identified are: (1) purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) problem 

definition and risk assessment; (3) goals, subordinate objectives, activities, 

and performance measures; (4) resources, investments, and risk 

management; (5) organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and 

(6) integration and implementation. 

GAO found considerable variation in the extent to which the seven strategies 

related to combating terrorism and homeland security address the desirable 

characteristics. A majority of the strategies at least partially address the 

six characteristics. However, none of the strategies addresses all of the 

elements of resources, investments, and risk management; or integration 

and implementation. Even where the characteristics are addressed, 

improvements could be made. For example, while the strategies identify 

goals, subordinate objectives, and specific activities, they generally do not 

discuss or identify priorities, milestones, or performance measures—

elements that are desirable for evaluating progress and ensuring effective 

oversight. On the whole, the National Strategy for Homeland Security

and the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 

Infrastructure and Key Assets address the greatest number of desirable 

characteristics, while the National Security Strategy and the National 

Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction address the fewest.

The Pentagon in Flames Moments after International Terrorists Crash a Hijacked Aircraft into 

the Building on September 11, 2001 

Following the terrorist attacks of 

September 11, 2001, the Bush 

administration developed and 

published seven national strategies 

that relate, in part or in whole, to 

combating terrorism and homeland 

security. These were the:

- National Security Strategy of 

the United States of America.

- National Strategy for 

Homeland Security.

- National Strategy for 

Combating Terrorism.

- National Strategy to Combat 

Weapons of Mass Destruction.

- National Strategy for the 

Physical Protection of Critical 

Infrastructure and Key Assets.

- National Strategy to Secure 

Cyberspace.

- 2002 National Money 

Laundering Strategy.

In view of heightened concerns 

about terrorism and homeland 

security, GAO was asked to identify 

and define the desirable 

characteristics of an effective 

national strategy and to evaluate 

whether the national strategies 

related to terrorism address those 

characteristics. The purpose of this 

testimony is to report on GAO’s 

findings on this matter. 
Page 1 GAO-04-408T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to participate in this hearing 

that examines the various national strategies published by the Bush 

Administration following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 

These strategies represent the administration’s guidance to the federal 

state, local, private, and international sectors, for combating terrorism and 

securing the homeland and, equally important, for sustaining efforts into 

the future. Specifically, these seven strategies cover a broad range of 

related topics—from preparing against terrorist attacks to combating 

weapons of mass destruction, protecting our physical infrastructure, 

securing cyberspace, and blocking terrorist financing. The new strategies 

accompany the federal government’s biggest reorganization in more than 

50 years, resulting in the creation of a new Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) to address the new threat environment. 

Based upon heightened concerns about terrorism and homeland security, 

the Subcommittee asked us (1) to identify and define the characteristics of 

an effective national strategy and (2) to evaluate whether the strategies 

related to terrorism address those characteristics. This work expands 

upon our testimony to the Subcommittee in March 2003 and a related 

report in May 2003, as well as prior work for this Subcommittee and other 

committees over the past 7 years.1

After providing some background on the strategies related to terrorism, 

my statement will identify a set of desirable characteristics for any 

effective national strategy and compare and contrast the extent to which 

each of the strategies we address contains such characteristics. We believe 

these desirable characteristics would help shape the policies, programs, 

priorities, resource allocations, and standards that would enable federal 

agencies and other stakeholders to implement the strategies and achieve 

the identified results. We hope that the value of our review lies in assisting 

the evolution and implementation of these national strategies, so that 

homeland security efforts nationwide are clear, sustainable, and integrated 

into agency, governmental, and private sector missions; and, further, that 

 1

 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Observations on National 

Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-03-519T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 3, 2003) and 

Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address the 

Overseas Threat, GAO-03-165 (Washington, D.C.: May 2003). In addition, a list of related 

GAO products is at the end of this statement. 
Page 2 GAO-04-408T 

these efforts are balanced with other important priorities, and transparent 

enough to ensure accountability. 

We recognize the difficulty of the tasks presented to the strategy 

developers—and that national strategies are only starting points for 

federal agencies and other parties responsible for developing more 

detailed implementation plans. In some areas, so much needed to be done 

quickly that even general strategic statements added value. Some of the 

differences in detail in the national strategies may be attributed to their 

different breadths of scope and/or the maturity levels in their underlying 

program activities. We hope it is instructive to compare and contrast these 

strategies not only to each other, but also with other complex strategic 

planning efforts, so that the value of the strategies as guidance is enhanced 

and the timeframe for further refinements and implementation is 

expedited, given the critical nature of our homeland security efforts. 

The new or updated national strategies released in the past 2 years that 

relate to combating terrorism and homeland security, in part or in whole, 

are: 

• The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 

September 2002. 

• The National Strategy for Homeland Security, July 2002. 

• The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003. 

• The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, 

December 2002. 

• The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 

Infrastructure and Key Assets, February 2003. 

• The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, February 2003. 

• The 2002 National Money Laundering Strategy, July 2002. 

As agreed with your staff, we will report separately on the classified 

National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism. 

National strategies are not required by executive or legislative mandate to 

address a single, consistent set of characteristics, and they contain varying 

degrees of detail based on their different scopes. Furthermore, we found 

there was no commonly accepted set of characteristics used for an 

effective national strategy. Nonetheless, after consulting numerous 

sources, we identified a set of desirable characteristics that we believe 

would provide additional guidance to responsible parties for developing 

and implementing the strategies—and to enhance their usefulness as 

Summary 
Page 3 GAO-04-408T 

guidance for resource and policy decision-makers and to better ensure 

accountability. Those characteristics are: (1) a statement of purpose, 

scope, and methodology; (2) problem definition and risk assessment; 

(3) goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures; 

(4) resources, investments, and risk management; (5) organizational roles, 

responsibilities, and coordination; and (6) integration and implementation. 

We identified these desirable characteristics by consulting statutory 

requirements pertaining to certain strategies we reviewed, as well as 

legislative and executive branch guidance for other national strategies. In 

addition, we studied the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 

(GPRA); general literature on strategic planning and performance; and 

guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on the 

President’s Management Agenda. We also gathered published 

recommendations made by national commissions chartered by Congress; 

past GAO work; and various research organizations that have commented 

on national strategies. 

The seven national strategies related to homeland security and combating 

terrorism vary considerably in the extent to which they address the 

desirable characteristics that we identified. All seven strategies we 

reviewed partially address goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and 

performance measures. Four of the strategies address problem definition 

and risk assessment, while one strategy partially addresses that 

characteristic. And a majority of the strategies at least partially address the 

four other characteristics: purpose, scope, and methodology; resources, 

investments, and risk management; organizational roles, responsibilities, 

and coordination; and integration and implementation. However, none of 

the strategies addresses all of the elements of resources, investments, and 

risk management; or integration and implementation. Furthermore, even 

where the strategies address certain elements of the characteristics, there 

is room for improvement. For example, while the strategies identify goals, 

subordinate objectives, and specific activities, they generally do not 

discuss or identify priorities, milestones, or performance measures—

elements that we consider to be desirable for evaluating progress, 

achieving results, and ensuring effective oversight. On the whole, the 

National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Strategy for 

the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets address 

the greatest number of the desirable characteristics, while the National 

Security Strategy and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 

Destruction address the fewest. Table 1 shows the extent that the 

strategies address, partially address, or do not address our characteristics. 
Page 4 GAO-04-408T 

Table 1: National Strategies and the Extent they Address GAO’s Desirable Characteristics 

National 

Strategy 

(short titles) 

Purpose, 

scope, and 

methodology 

Problem 

definition and 

risk assessment 

Goals, 

subordinate 

objectives, 

activities, and 

performance 

measures 

Resources, 

investments, 

and risk 

management 

Organizational 

roles, 

responsibilities, 

and coordination

Integration and 

implementation 

National 

Security 

Does not 

address 

Does not 

address 

Partially 

addresses 

Does not 

address 

Does not 

address 

Does not 

address 

Homeland 

Security 

Addresses Addresses Partially 

addresses 

Partially 

addresses 

Addresses Partially 

addresses 

Combating 

Terrorism 

Partially 

addresses 

Addresses Partially 

addresses 

Does not 

address 

Partially 

addresses 

Partially 

addresses 

Weapons of 

Mass 

Destruction 

Does not 

address 

Does not 

address 

Partially 

addresses 

Does not 

address 

Partially 

addresses 

Partially 

addresses 

Physical 

Infrastructure 

Addresses Addresses Partially 

addresses 

Partially 

addresses 

Partially 

Addresses 

Partially 

addresses 

Secure 

Cyberspace 

Partially 

addresses 

Addresses Partially 

addresses 

Partially 

addresses 

Partially 

Addresses 

Partially 

addresses 

Money 

Laundering 

Partially 

addresses 

Partially 

addresses 

Partially 

addresses 

Partially 

addresses 

Partially 

addresses 

Partially 

addresses 

Source: GAO analysis. 

Note: Per our methodology, a strategy “addresses,” a characteristic when it explicitly cites all 

elements of a characteristic, even if it lacks specificity and details and thus could be improved upon. 

A strategy “partially addresses” a characteristic when it explicitly cites some, but not all elements of a 

characteristic. Within our designation of “partially addresses” there is a wide variation between a 

strategy that addresses most of the elements of a characteristic and a strategy that addresses few of 

the elements of a characteristic. A strategy “does not address” a characteristic when it does not 

explicitly cite or discuss any elements of a characteristic, and/or any implicit references are either too 

vague or general. See appendix I for more details on our methodology. 

In the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, seven new 

national strategies were developed and published to help guide U.S. efforts 

to combat terrorism. Of these, five were newly published strategies that 

related to specific aspects of homeland security and combating terrorism, 

such as weapons of mass destruction, protecting physical infrastructure, 

and securing cyberspace. Two strategies, the National Security Strategy 

of the United States of America and the 2002 National Money 

Laundering Strategy, were updated from pre-September 11 versions to 

specifically include terrorism. “Terrorism” may be generally defined as 

Background 

Seven National Strategies 

Related to Combating 

Terrorism Released Since 

September 11 Attacks 
Page 5 GAO-04-408T 

politically motivated violence to coerce a government or civilian 

population. “Combating terrorism” refers to the full range of policies, 

programs, and activities to counter terrorism, both at home and abroad. 

There is a further distinction within “combating terrorism,” with 

“homeland security” referring to domestic efforts and “combating 

terrorism overseas” referring to international efforts.2 Some of these 

national strategies were specific to combating terrorism, while others 

involved terrorism to lesser degrees. Table 2 describes the new national 

strategies related to combating terrorism. 

Table 2: National Strategies Related to Combating Terrorism 

Strategy Description of strategy 

National Security Strategy of the United 

States of America 

• Issued by the President, September 

2002 

The National Security strategy provides a broad framework for strengthening U.S. security 

in the future. It identifies the national security goals of the United States, describes the 

foreign policy and military capabilities necessary to achieve those goals, evaluates the 

current status of these capabilities, and explains how national power will be structured to 

utilize these capabilities. It devotes a chapter to combating terrorism that focuses on the 

disruption and destruction of terrorist organizations, the winning of the “war of ideas,” the 

strengthening of homeland security, and the fostering of cooperation with allies and 

international organizations to combat terrorism. 

National Strategy for Homeland Security 

• Issued by the President, July 2002 

The Homeland Security strategy addresses the threat of terrorism in the United States by 

organizing the domestic efforts of federal, state, local, and private organizations. It aligns 

and focuses homeland security functions into six critical mission areas, set forth as 

(1) intelligence and warning, (2) border and transportation security, (3) domestic 

counterterrorism, (4) protecting critical infrastructure and key assets, (5) defending against 

catastrophic threats, and (6) emergency preparedness and response. Additionally, it 

describes four foundations that cut across all the mission areas, across all levels of 

government, and across all sectors of society as being (1) law, (2) science and 

technology, (3) information sharing and systems, and (4) international cooperation. It also 

addresses the costs of homeland security and future priorities. 

National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 

• Issued by the President, February 2003 

The Combating Terrorism strategy elaborates on the terrorism aspects of the National 

Security strategy by expounding on the need to destroy terrorist organizations, win the 

“war of ideas,” and strengthen security at home and abroad. Unlike the Homeland Security

strategy that focuses on preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, the 

Combating Terrorism strategy focuses on identifying and defusing threats before they 

reach the borders of the United States. In that sense, although it has defensive elements, 

this strategy is an offensive strategy to complement the defensive Homeland Security

strategy. 

National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 

Mass Destruction 

• Issued by the President, December 

2002 

The Weapons of Mass Destruction strategy presents a national strategy to combat 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) through three major efforts: (1) nonproliferation, 

(2) counterproliferation, and (3) consequence management in WMD incidents. The plan 

addresses the production and proliferation of WMD among nations, as well as the 

potential threat of terrorists using WMD agents. 

 2

 For a more detailed discussion of the definition of terrorism, combating terrorism, and 

homeland security, see GAO-03-165. 
Page 6 GAO-04-408T 

Strategy Description of strategy 

National Strategy for the Physical 

Protection of Critical Infrastructures and 

Key Assets 

• Issued by the President, February 2003 

The Physical Infrastructure strategy provides a statement of national policy to remain 

committed to protecting critical infrastructures and key assets from terrorist attacks and is 

based on eight guiding principles, including establishing responsibility and accountability, 

encouraging and facilitating partnering among all levels of government and between 

government and industry, and encouraging market solutions wherever possible and 

government intervention when needed. The strategy also establishes three strategic 

objectives. The first is to identify and assure the protection of the most critical assets, 

systems, and functions, in terms of national level public health and safety, governance, 

and economic and national security and public confidence. The second is to ensure 

protection of infrastructures and assets facing specific, imminent threats. The third is to 

pursue collaborative measures and initiatives to ensure the protection of other potential 

targets that may become attractive over time. 

National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace 

• Issued by the President, February 2003 

The Secure Cyberspace strategy is intended to provide an initial framework for both 

organizing and prioritizing efforts to protect our nation’s cyberspace. Also, it is to provide 

direction to federal departments and agencies that have roles in cyberspace security and 

to identify steps that state and local governments, private companies and organizations, 

and individual Americans can take to improve the nation’s collective cybersecurity. The 

strategy is organized according to five national priorities, with major actions and initiatives 

identified for each. These priorities are: (1) a National Cyberspace Security Response 

System, (2) a National Cyberspace Security Threat and Vulnerability Reduction Program, 

(3) a National Cyberspace Security Awareness and Training Program, (4) Securing 

Governments’ Cyberspace, and (5) National Security and International Cyberspace 

Security Cooperation. In describing the threats to, and vulnerabilities of, our nation’s 

cyberspace, the strategy highlights the potential for damage to U.S. information systems 

from attacks by terrorist organizations. 

2002 National Money Laundering Strategy 

• Issued by the Secretary of the Treasury 

and the Attorney General, July 2002 

The Money Laundering strategy is intended to support planning for the efforts of law 

enforcement agencies, regulatory officials, the private sector, and overseas entities to 

combat the laundering of money generated from criminal activities. Although the 2002 

strategy still addresses general criminal financial activity, that plan outlines a major 

governmentwide strategy to combat terrorist financing. The strategy discusses the need to 

adapt traditional methods of combating money laundering to unconventional tools used by 

terrorist organizations to finance their operations. 

Source: Published national strategies and GAO analysis. 

These seven national strategies differ from other federal government 

planning documents, such as agency-specific strategic plans that GPRA 

requires.3

 These strategies are national in scope, cutting across levels of 

government and sectors and involving a large number of organizations and 

entities (i.e., the federal, state, local, and private sectors). In addition, 

national strategies frequently have international components, and they 

may be part of a structure of overlapping or supporting national strategies. 

Furthermore, the federal government does not control many of the 

sectors, organizations, entities, and resources involved in implementing 

the national strategies. 

 3

P.L. 103-62 (Aug. 3, 1993). 

National Strategies 

Are Broad but Vary 

in Scope and Detail 
Page 7 GAO-04-408T 

We found that the strategies we studied are organized in a rough 

hierarchy, with the National Security strategy providing an overarching 

strategy for national security as a whole, including terrorism. The 

Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism strategies provide, 

respectively, a more specific, defensive approach to combating terrorism 

at home and an offensive approach to combating terrorism overseas.4 The 

other strategies provide further levels of detail on the specific functions 

related to weapons of mass destruction, cyber security, protection of 

physical infrastructure, and money laundering. While the national 

strategies we studied generally overlap in their coverage of terrorism, 

some contain elements unrelated to terrorism. For example, both the 

Secure Cyberspace and Money Laundering strategies include domestic 

criminal elements that are not necessarily associated with national 

security or terrorism.5

 

In addition, other executive branch guidance in the form of executive 

orders or presidential directives elaborates on the national strategies and 

provides further direction to the implementing parties. Most recently, for 

instance, the Homeland Security Presidential Directives 7 and 8, issued in 

December 2003, refine the national strategies with respect to critical 

infrastructure and national preparedness, respectively. In fact, those 

presidential directives identify specific priorities and milestones and 

assign certain responsibilities, which address some of our concerns on the 

lack of specificity and delineation of clear lines of responsibility in the 

national strategies. Further down the hierarchy, agency-specific strategic 

plans and performance plans; federal or agency-level enterprise 

architectures; and state, local, private and international sector plans 

provide even further details and guidance to implementing parties. In 

addition, these plans and reports may address goals and objectives beyond 

terrorism and homeland security. Figure 1 shows the hierarchy among the 

national strategies and other plans and guidance. 

 4

 We recognize that our characterization of these two strategies simplifies a complex 

relationship. Both strategies contain both defensive and offensive elements. For example, 

while we characterize the Homeland Security strategy as mainly defensive, it includes 

some offensive initiatives to target and attack terrorist financing, and to track foreign 

terrorists and bring them to justice. Similarly, while we characterize the Combating 

Terrorism strategy as mainly offensive, it includes some defensive objectives to implement 

the Homeland Security strategy and to protect U.S. citizens abroad. 

5

 For example, the Secure Cyberspace strategy also covers nonterrorism-related computer 

hacking, and the Money Laundering strategy deals with all types of crimes associated with 

money laundering, such as drug trafficking. 
Page 8 GAO-04-408T 

Figure 1. Hierarchy of National Strategies and Other Plans and Guidance for 

Combating Terrorism and Homeland Security 

Because national strategies are not governed by a single, consistent set of 

requirements, we consulted a variety of public and private sector sources 

to identify a set of desirable characteristics. Those sources included 

legislative and executive branch mandates pertaining to the strategies we 

reviewed, as well as some nonterrorism-related strategies. We also studied 

GPRA; general literature on strategic planning and performance; and 

guidance from OMB on the President’s Management Agenda. We also 

gathered published recommendations made by national commissions 

chartered by Congress; past GAO work; and various research 

organizations that have commented on national strategies. Based upon this 

methodology, we identified six characteristics to be desirable for a 

national strategy, which are described later in this testimony. 

GAO Developed A 

Set of Desirable 

Characteristics for 

National Strategies 

Source: GAO.

Strategy Hierarchy 

Alignment of Strategies

and Examples of

Other Guidance

Examples of Guidance

Through the Hierarchy --

From Broad to Detailed

Overarching: 

Broad guidance

on national security,

including terrorism

National Security Strategy

Homeland Security Strategy

Physical Infrastructure Strategy

HSPD 8-National Preparedness

HHS Annual Plan for Fiscal Year 2004

HHS Strategic Plan to Combat

 Bioterrorism and Other Public Health

 Threats and Emergencies

Terrorism-Specific:

More detailed guidance;

specific to terrorism

Homeland Security Strategy

Combating Terrorism Strategy

National Security Strategy

Sector/Function-Specific:

Additional detail by specific

sectors, functions

Physical Infrastructure Strategy

Secure Cyberspace Strategy

Money Laundering Strategy

Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategy

Other Executive Guidance:

Greater detail, specific instruction,

amplifying guidance

Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 6-

 Integration and Use of Screening Information

HSPD 7-Critical Infrastructure Identification, 

 Prioritization and Protection

HSPD 8-National Preparedness

Dept. of Homeland Security (DHS) Strategic Plan

Dept. of Health and Human Services (HHS) 

 Annual Plan for Fiscal Year 2004

Dept. of Justice Strategic Plan

Dept. of State Strategic Plan

Transportation and Security Admin.

 Strategic Plan

Federal Emergency Management Agency

 Strategic Plan

U.S. Customs Service Comprehensive Strategy

 to Address the Threat of Nuclear and

 Radiological Terrorism

HHS Strategic Plan to Combat Bioterrorism and

 Other Public Health Threats and Emergencies

Department-Specific:

Details, guidance, instructions

for department

Subordinate Plans for Departmental

Units or Functions:

Details, guidance, instruction for departmental

unit or function

Strategy, Directive or Planning Document

(order and relationship shown below in example)

Corresponding Excerpts

from Guidance (see below):

"As was demonstrated by the losses on September 11, 2001, 

mass civilian casualties is the specific objective of terrorists..."

"Prepare health care providers for catastrophic terrorism..."

HHS "will work with state and local health officials...during 

consequence management planning to set priorities..."

DHS and HHS "shall establish and maintain a 

comprehensive training plan...for the Nation's first 

responders, officials, and others with major event 

preparedness, prevention, response, and 

recovery roles."

States that "...all facets of the public health 

system require extensive training in order to 

effectively respond"; describes specific 

subordinate organization responsibilities for 

ensuring necessary training is conducted

Directs subordinate organizations specifically to 

"provide training for public health professionals 

in all aspects of public health emergency 

preparedness and response."
Page 9 GAO-04-408T 

National strategies are not required, either by executive or legislative 

mandate, to address a single, consistent set of characteristics. 

Furthermore, we found that there is no commonly accepted set of 

characteristics used to develop an effective national strategy. Thus to 

identify desirable characteristics for all national strategies, including those 

related to terrorism, we consulted numerous sources. First, we identified 

statutory or executive requirements specific to some of the individual 

strategies for insight into whether those requirements could be generalized 

as desirable characteristics for all national strategies. Two of the seven 

strategies we reviewed—the National Security and Money Laundering

strategies—are required by statutes that mandate specific content 

elements.6

The statute mandating the Money Laundering strategy generally calls for 

the strategy to contain provisions on setting goals, objectives, and 

priorities; coordinating prevention efforts; specifying detection and 

prosecution initiatives; and enhancing intergovernmental cooperation (at 

the federal, state, and local levels) and partnerships between the private 

sector and law enforcement agencies.7

 In addition, that statute calls for 

providing 3-year program projections and budget priorities; an assessment 

of how the budget is to be utilized and its sufficiency; the development of 

improved communication systems; and evaluations of the effectiveness of 

policies to combat money laundering and related financial crimes. 

The statute mandating the National Security strategy calls for the 

document to provide a comprehensive description and discussion of U.S. 

worldwide interests, goals, and objectives vital to national security; detail 

the foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense 

capabilities necessary to deter aggression and implement the strategy; 

identify the proposed short- and long-term uses of national power to 

protect our interests and achieve our goals and objectives; and assess the 

adequacy of our capabilities to carry out the national strategy.8

 6

 Section 801(b) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires DHS to develop a process 

for receiving meaningful input from states and localities to assist in the development of a 

national strategy “for combating terrorism and other homeland security activities,” but 

does not establish specific content elements as do the laws pertaining to the Money 

Laundering and National Security strategies. 

7

 31 U.S.C. 5341. 

8

 50 U.S.C. 404a. 

No Single Set of 

Requirements in Place 

for Characteristics That 

National Strategies 

Should Contain 
Page 10 GAO-04-408T 

However, the requirements set forth in these two statutes, in addition to 

being different from one another, do not impose any requirements on the 

five other national strategies we reviewed. 

Given that there is no established set of requirements for all national 

strategies—or even the seven related specifically to homeland security and 

combating terrorism—we developed a set of desirable characteristics by 

reviewing several sources of information. First, we gathered statutory 

requirements pertaining to some of the strategies we were asked to 

assess—namely, the Money Laundering and the National Security

strategies, as mentioned earlier—and legislative and executive branch 

guidance for other strategies, such as the National Drug Control Strategy. 

We also reviewed GPRA; general literature on strategic planning and 

performance; and guidance from OMB on the President’s Management 

Agenda. Furthermore, we studied our past reports and testimonies for 

findings and recommendations pertaining to desirable elements of a 

national strategy. Similarly, we researched recommendations by national 

commissions chartered by Congress in recent years on combating 

terrorism and protecting the homeland—namely, the Bremer, Gilmore, and 

Hart-Rudman Commissions9

 –-and various research organizations that 

have commented on national strategies.10 Simultaneously, we consulted 

widely within GAO to incorporate the most up-to-date thinking on 

strategic planning; integration across and between government and its 

partners; implementation; and other related subjects. This included 

consulting our economists and methodologists to include cost-benefit 

analysis and other economic criteria. Furthermore, we consulted outside 

experts from the Bremer and Hart-Rudman Commissions. We used our 

judgment to develop desirable characteristics based upon their underlying 

support in legislative or executive guidance and the frequency with which 

they were cited in other sources. We then grouped similar items together 

 9

 Even before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress was concerned with the 

issue of homeland security and had chartered three national commissions, which examined 

terrorist threats and the government’s response to terrorism, and made numerous 

recommendations. The full names of these commissions are the National Commission on 

Terrorism (also known as the Bremer Commission), the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic 

Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Gilmore 

Commission), and the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (the HartRudman Commission). 

10 The research organizations whose work and commentary on homeland security, 

combating terrorism, and national strategies since 2000 that we primarily reviewed include 

the ANSER Institute on Homeland Security, RAND Corporation, and Brookings Institution. 

We Developed 

Characteristics Desirable 

for National Strategies 
Page 11 GAO-04-408T 

in a logical sequence from conception to implementation. This was GAO’s 

first effort to develop desirable characteristics for a national strategy, so 

they may evolve over time. Table 3 provides a summary of the six 

characteristics. 

Table 3: Summary of Desirable Characteristics for a National Strategy, from Conception to Implementation 

Desirable characteristic Description 

Purpose, scope, and methodology Addresses why the strategy was produced, the scope of its coverage, and the 

process by which it was developed. 

Problem definition and risk assessment Addresses the particular national problems and threats the strategy is directed 

towards. 

Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and 

performance measures 

Addresses what the strategy is trying to achieve, steps to achieve those 

results, as well as the priorities, milestones, and performance measures to 

gauge results. 

Resources, investments, and risk management Addresses what the strategy will cost, the sources and types of resources and 

investments needed, and where resources and investments should be targeted 

based on balancing risk reductions with costs. 

Organizational roles, responsibilities, and 

coordination 

Addresses who will be implementing the strategy, what their roles will be 

compared to others, and mechanisms for them to coordinate their efforts. 

Integration and implementation Addresses how a national strategy relates to other strategies’ goals, 

objectives, and activities, and to subordinate levels of government and their 

plans to implement the strategy. 

Source: GAO data. 

We believe a national strategy should ideally contain all of these 

characteristics. Although the authors of national strategies might organize 

these characteristics in a variety of ways and/or use different terms, we 

present them in this order because they flow logically from conception to 

implementation. Specifically, the strategy’s purpose leads to the definition 

of the problems and risks it intends to address, which in turn leads to 

specific actions for tackling those problems and risks, allocating and 

managing the appropriate resources, identifying different organizations’ 

roles and responsibilities, and finally to integrating action among all 

relevant parties and implementing the strategy. 

We describe the desirable characteristics in more detail in the following 

section, where we evaluate the extent to which the strategies address 

them. See appendix I for additional details on these characteristics and 

our scope and methodology in developing them. 
Page 12 GAO-04-408T 

The seven national strategies related to homeland security and combating 

terrorism vary considerably in the extent to which they address the 

desirable characteristics that we identified. All seven strategies we 

reviewed partially address goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and 

performance measures. Four of the strategies address problem definition 

and risk assessment, while one strategy partially addresses that 

characteristic. And a majority of the strategies at least partially address the 

four other characteristics: purpose, scope, and methodology; resources, 

investments, and risk management; organizational roles, responsibilities, 

and coordination; and integration and implementation. However, none of 

the strategies addresses all of the elements of resources, investments, and 

risk management; or integration and implementation. Furthermore, even 

where the strategies address certain elements of the characteristics, there 

is room for improvement. For example, while the strategies identify goals, 

subordinate objectives, and specific activities, they generally do not 

discuss or identify priorities, milestones, or performance measures—

elements that we consider to be desirable for evaluating progress, 

achieving results, and ensuring effective oversight. On the whole, the 

National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Strategy for 

the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets address 

the greatest number of the desirable characteristics, while the National 

Security Strategy and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 

Destruction address the fewest. 

We recognize that strategies themselves are not endpoints, but rather, 

starting points. In our view, the strengths of some strategies are useful in 

suggesting ways to enhance the value of other strategies, fill in gaps, speed 

implementation, guide resource allocations, and provide oversight 

opportunities. As with any strategic planning effort, implementation is the 

key. The ultimate measure of these strategies’ value will be the extent they 

are useful as guidance for policy and decision-makers in allocating 

resources and balancing homeland security priorities with other 

important, nonhomeland security objectives. It will be important over time 

to obtain and incorporate feedback from the “user” community as to how 

the strategies can better provide guidance and how Congress and the 

administration can identify and remedy impediments to implementation, 

such as legal, international, jurisdictional, or resource constraints. 

This characteristic addresses why the strategy was produced, the scope of 

its coverage, and the process by which it was developed. For example, a 

strategy might discuss the specific impetus that led to its being written (or 

updated), such as statutory requirements, executive mandates, or other 

National Strategies 

Address Some, but 

Not All, of Desirable 

Characteristics GAO 

Identified 

Purpose, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Page 13 GAO-04-408T 

events like terrorist attacks. Furthermore, a strategy would enhance 

clarity by including definitions of key, relevant terms (such as “combating 

terrorism,” and “homeland security” in this context). In addition to 

describing what it is meant to do and the major functions, mission areas, 

or activities it covers, a national strategy would ideally address its 

methodology. For example, a strategy might discuss the principles or 

theories that guided its development, what organizations or offices drafted 

the document, whether it was the result of a working group, or which 

parties were consulted in its development. 

Five of the national strategies we evaluated address at least some 

elements of this characteristic, with four at least partially discussing their 

overall purpose and scope, and three addressing, to varying degrees, their 

methodology. For example, the Homeland Security strategy explicitly 

identifies its fundamental objectives, coverage, and how it was developed. 

It describes itself as a framework to answer four basic questions—such as 

what is homeland security, and what goals it should pursue—and 

identifies six “critical mission areas,” or homeland security functions, such 

as intelligence and warning, and border and transportation security. The 

Physical Infrastructure, Secure Cyberspace, and Money Laundering

strategies also use explicit language to define their purposes and scope. 

For example, the Physical Infrastructure strategy identifies its scope as 

13 critical sectors (such as agriculture, water, and public health) and five 

types of key assets (e.g., national monuments and dams). Concerning 

methodology, the Homeland Security strategy explicitly lays out the 

principles behind its creation and the numerous parties consulted in its 

development. Similarly, the Physical Infrastructure strategy explicitly 

discusses the guiding principles behind, and the consultations involved in, 

its creation. The Combating Terrorism and Secure Cyberspace strategies 

also describe their guiding principles—and the latter discusses, in even 

greater detail, the stakeholders involved in its development. And the 

Money Laundering strategy provides its background and highlights 

changes from the previous version to include terrorist financing. 

However, three of the strategies discuss their purpose and scope only in 

vague terms, and four strategies do not address their methodology at all. 

For instance, regarding its purpose and scope, the Weapons of Mass 

Destruction strategy says only that, “The United States must pursue a 

comprehensive strategy to counter the WMD threat in all of its 

dimensions,” without providing any further details. Similarly, while the 

National Security strategy emphasizes the importance of pursuing 

freedom, peace, and prosperity, it does not state its own purpose or scope. 

The Combating Terrorism strategy also uses vague language, such as “the 
Page 14 GAO-04-408T 

world must respond and fight this evil,” but does not explicitly describe its 

purpose and scope. In addition, these three strategies, plus the Money 

Laundering strategy, do not discuss who was involved in their 

development. In our view, a complete description of the purpose, scope, 

and methodology in a national strategy could make the document more 

useful to the organizations responsible for implementing the strategy, as 

well as to oversight organizations, such as the Congress. 

This characteristic addresses the particular national problems and threats 

the strategy is directed towards. Specifically, this means a detailed 

discussion or definition of the problems the strategy intends to address, 

their causes, and operating environment. In addition, this characteristic 

entails a risk assessment, including an analysis of the threats to, and 

vulnerabilities of, critical assets and operations.11 If the details of these 

analyses are classified or preliminary, an unclassified version of the 

strategy could at least include a broad description of the analyses and 

stress the importance of risk assessment to implementing parties. A 

discussion of the quality of data available regarding this characteristic, 

such as known constraints or deficiencies, would also be useful. 

Five of the strategies at least partially address this characteristic. 

Specifically, five define national problems and the environments in which 

they occur, while three discuss the importance of assessing risks, threats, 

and vulnerabilities. For example, the Combating Terrorism strategy 

contains an explicit section on “the nature of the terrorist threat today,” 

which provides some historical background to terrorism, the structure of 

its leadership, and underlying conditions such as poverty, corruption, 

religious conflict, and ethnic strife. Similarly, the Homeland Security, 

Physical Infrastructure, Secure Cyberspace, and Money Laundering

strategies define the problems in their sectors and describe the nature of 

the terrorist threat. Concerning risk assessment, three of them—the 

Homeland Security, Physical Infrastructure, and Secure Cyberspace

strategies—stress the importance of national, comprehensive vulnerability 

 11 This risk assessment is the first phase of a two-part risk management process. Risk 

assessment includes a threat assessment, a vulnerability assessment, and a criticality 

assessment. For a more in-depth discussion of these subjects, see U.S. General Accounting 

Office, Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach, GAO-02-150T

(Washington, D.C.: Oct.12, 2002). The second aspect of risk management is discussed 

below in the “Resources, Investments and Risk Management” characteristic. It consists of 

taking the information from the risk assessment and making management decisions about 

resource allocations to minimize risks and maximize returns on resources expended. 

Problem Definition and 

Risk Assessment 
Page 15 GAO-04-408T 

assessments of all critical infrastructures and key assets, setting the stage 

for risk management. The Homeland Security strategy contains an explicit 

“threat and vulnerability” section that provides many details, such as 

defining the different ways and means for terrorist attacks. This strategy 

also stresses the importance of comprehensive vulnerability assessments 

of all critical infrastructures and key assets, saying they “are important 

from a planning perspective in that they enable authorities to evaluate the 

potential effects of an attack on a given facility or sector, and then to 

invest accordingly in protecting such facilities and sectors.” 

However, two strategies do not address this characteristic. The National 

Security strategy says the war against terrorism is global and that “The 

enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology,” 

but provides no further definition of the problems it seeks to address. 

Similarly, the Weapons of Mass Destruction strategy states that such 

weapons represent a great security challenge when in the possession of 

hostile states and terrorists, and that some terrorism-supporting states 

already possess such weapons, but provides no details defining the threat. 

Furthermore, while some of the strategies say that intelligence gathering 

must be strengthened, the strategies generally do not address limitations 

in collecting data. That is, few of the strategies discuss the difficulties of 

collecting intelligence on terrorist organizations, plans, and tactics. In our 

view, more specific information on both problem definition and risk 

assessment in many of the strategies would give the responsible parties 

better guidance to implement those strategies. For example, we recently 

recommended that future Money Laundering strategies link to periodic 

assessments of threats and risks, which would provide a basis for ensuring 

that clear priorities are established and focused on the areas of greatest 

need.12

Without necessarily prescribing in detail the “solution,” better problem 

definition and risk assessment also provide greater latitude to responsible 

parties to develop innovative approaches that are tailored to the needs of 

specific regions or sectors—and are able to be implemented as a practical 

matter, given fiscal, human capital, and other limitations. For example, 

better problem definition or risk assessment can foster regional 

approaches or cooperative agreements, and stimulate the development of 

national systems or management standards to link the capabilities of the 

 12 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Money Laundering: Opportunities 

Exist to Improve the National Strategy, GAO-03-813 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 2003). 
Page 16 GAO-04-408T 

responsible parties in a more effective manner. Such assessments help 

identify desired goals and “end-states” without “one-size-fits-all” solutions. 

This characteristic addresses what the national strategy strives to achieve 

and the steps needed to garner those results, as well as the priorities, 

milestones, and performance measures to gauge results. At the highest 

level, this could be a description of an ideal “end-state,” followed by a 

logical hierarchy of major goals, subordinate objectives, and specific 

activities to achieve results. In addition, it would be helpful if the strategy 

discussed the importance of implementing parties’ establishing priorities, 

milestones, and performance measures to help ensure accountability. 

Ideally, a national strategy would set clear desired results and priorities, 

specific milestones, and outcome-related performance measures while 

giving implementing parties flexibility to pursue and achieve those results 

within a reasonable timeframe. If significant limitations on performance 

measures exist, other parts of the strategy might address plans to obtain 

better data or measurements, such as national standards or indicators of 

preparedness. For example, national strategies related to terrorism might 

discuss the lack of national indicators or standards for emergency 

preparedness against attacks. 

All seven national strategies partially address this characteristic by 

identifying their individual, high-level goals, subordinate objectives, and 

specific activities to achieve results.13 For example, the Homeland 

Security strategy identifies three major goals—prevent terrorist attacks, 

reduce vulnerability, and minimize damage and recover from attacks—

which are underpinned by six objectives (called critical mission areas), 

such as intelligence and warning, and border and transportation security. 

Those objectives in turn, have anywhere from 5 to 12 accompanying 

activities apiece. Figure 2 illustrates an example of an overall goal, 

subordinate objective, and specific activity in the Homeland Security

strategy. 

 13 The strategies differ in their terminology for goals, objectives, and activities. For 

example, some strategies refer to their top-level vision as “goals,” while others describe 

that as “objectives.” The same is true at the next level of support—some are called 

objectives, while others are “priorities” or “critical mission areas”—and at the most 

detailed level of activities (alternatively called “priorities” or “initiatives”). For the purpose 

of consistency in this testimony, we are using the terms “goals,” “subordinate objectives,” 

and “activities” (in order of broad to specific). 

Goals, Subordinate 

Objectives, Activities, and 

Performance Measures 
Page 17 GAO-04-408T 

Figure 2: The Homeland Security strategy contains an overall goal on recovering from terrorist attacks, a subordinate 

objective on emergency preparedness and response, and a specific initiative to prepare for chemical, biological, and nuclear 

decontamination 

Source: GAO. 

Similarly, the Combating Terrorism strategy contains four overarching 

goals: defeat terrorists and their organizations; deny sponsorship, support, 

and sanctuary to terrorists; diminish the underlying conditions that 

terrorists seek to exploit; and defend U.S. citizens and interests at home 

and abroad. These goals are broken down into 15 objectives, such as 
Page 18 GAO-04-408T 

identifying terrorists and terrorist organizations, and are further supported 

by one to four activities each. Concerning milestones, the Money 

Laundering strategy provides a few deadlines for specific activities, such 

as the Departments of Treasury and Justice conducting a study by April 

2003 on how the Internet could be used by terrorist groups to raise money. 

In addition, the Homeland Security strategy calls for DHS to develop and 

coordinate implementation of a comprehensive national plan to protect 

infrastructure against terrorist attacks, building on baseline protection 

plans due by the end of fiscal year 2002.14 Regarding performance 

measures, the Homeland Security and Money Laundering strategies 

provide some general language on the subject. For example, the former 

says that, “Every department or agency will create benchmarks and other 

performance measures by which we can evaluate our progress and 

allocate future resources.” And the latter says that methods for measuring 

performance should be consistent with the President’s Management 

Agenda, and that the Department of the Treasury will develop a “traffic 

light” scorecard to track performance and assess how well the strategies’ 

initiatives are being implemented. 

However, the strategies do not address this characteristic in that they 

generally lack priorities, milestones, or performance measures. Regarding 

priorities, only the Homeland Security strategy identifies a priority order 

by stressing the importance of four specific activities in the fiscal year 

2003 budget. Five strategies do not designate specific priorities; and the 

Money Laundering strategy, as highlighted in our recent report, identifies 

more priorities than can be achieved in a reasonable timeframe and does 

not rank them in order of importance.15 Concerning performance 

measures, only two of them—the Homeland Security and Money 

Laundering strategies—explicitly stress the importance of measuring 

performance or identify specific measures. As we said in an earlier 

testimony, the Homeland Security strategy’s initiatives often do not 

provide a baseline set of performance goals and measures upon which to 

 14 The Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires DHS to develop a comprehensive national 

plan for securing the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States (P.L. 

107-296, sec. 201(d)(5). Consistent with the Act, section (27) of the Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive 7 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to complete a 

comprehensive, integrated National Plan for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 

Protection that outlines national goals, objectives, milestones, and key initiatives by 

December 2004. 

15 See GAO-03-813. 
Page 19 GAO-04-408T 

assess and improve preparedness.16 Similarly, we recently recommended 

that future Money Laundering strategies require the principal agencies to 

develop outcome-related performance measures that are linked to goals 

and objectives.17 Also, we previously reported that neither the Physical 

Infrastructure nor the Secure Cyberspace strategies indicate timeframes 

or milestones for their overall implementation or for accomplishing 

specific actions or initiatives; nor do they establish performance measures 

for which entities can be held responsible.18 We believe a better 

identification of priorities, milestones, and performance measures would 

aid implementing parties in achieving results in specific timeframes—and 

would enable more effective oversight and accountability. 

This characteristic addresses what the strategy will cost, the sources and 

types of resources and investments associated with the strategy, and 

where those resources and investments should be targeted. Ideally, a 

strategy would also identify criteria and appropriate mechanisms to 

allocate resources, such as grants, in-kind services, loans, and user fees, 

based on identified needs. Alternatively, the strategy might identify 

appropriate “tools of government,” such as regulations, tax incentives, and 

standards, to mandate or stimulate nonfederal organizations to use their 

unique resources. Furthermore, a national strategy would ideally elaborate 

on the risk assessment mentioned earlier and give guidance to 

implementing parties to manage their resources and investments 

accordingly—and begin to address the difficult but critical issues about 

who pays, and how such efforts will be funded and sustained in the future. 

Four of the strategies we evaluated partially address this characteristic by 

identifying numerous resource and investment needs to achieve their goals 

and objectives, and by discussing, to varying degrees, risk management. 

The Homeland Security strategy goes even farther, devoting a chapter to 

this topic in which it identifies a general principle to allocate homeland 

security investments based upon balancing risk reductions and costs. For 

example, the strategy states, “Decisions on homeland security activities 

 16 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental 

Coordination is Key to Success GAO-02-1011T (Washington, D.C.: August 2002).

17 See GAO-03-813. 

18 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Information Sharing 

Responsibilities, Challenges, and Key Management Issues, GAO-03-1165T (Washington, 

D.C.: September 2003).

Resources, Investments, 

and Risk Management 
Page 20 GAO-04-408T 

and spending must achieve two overarching goals: to devote the right 

amount of scarce resources to homeland security and to spend these 

resources on the right activities.” In addition, the Homeland Security

strategy cites the concept that “the federal government will provide an 

incentive to minimize costs and reward innovation by permitting 

maximum flexibility in meeting those objectives.” While the Homeland 

Security strategy cites these principles, it still provides relatively few 

details on the types and levels of resources associated with 

implementation. The Physical Infrastructure strategy also partially 

addresses this characteristic by identifying planning and resource 

allocation as one of its five objectives—and by stressing the importance of 

incentives for private organizations, and market solutions where 

appropriate. And the Secure Cyberspace strategy is one of only two 

strategies (the other being the Homeland Security strategy) to link some 

of its investment requests—such as completing the installation of the 

Cyber Warning and Information Network in key government operation 

centers—to the fiscal 2003 budget. The Money Laundering strategy also 

briefly discusses the importance of cost-benefit analysis of asset forfeiture 

strategies “so that future programs can allocate resources where they are 

most needed and productive.” Figure 3 shows spending for combating 

terrorism by federal agency. 
Page 21 GAO-04-408T 

Figure 3: Budget Authority for Combating Terrorism by Agency for Fiscal Year 2004 (total budget authority is $52,732 million) 

Source: OMB 2003 Report on Combating Terrorism. 

Note: “Other Agencies” includes the Departments of Energy ($1,588 million), Agriculture ($368 

million), Transportation ($283 million), Commerce ($153 million), Veterans Affairs ($145 million), 

Interior ($115 million), Treasury ($90 million), Labor ($67 million), Housing and Urban Development 

($2 million), and 18 other independent agencies (totaling $2,432 million). 

Regarding risk management, the Homeland Security strategy makes 

explicit reference to the subject, such as when it says, “The national effort 

to enhance homeland security will yield tremendous benefits and entail 

substantial financial and other costs.” The Physical Infrastructure and 

Secure Cyberspace strategies also mention risk management, building on 

their aforementioned sections on risk assessment. In the former, for 

instance, increased sharing of risk-management expertise between the 

public and private sectors is an activity identified under the planning and 

resource allocation objective. 

On the other hand, three of the strategies—the National Security, 

Combating Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction strategies—do 

not explicitly address either resource and investment needs or risk 

management. And of those that partially address this characteristic, only 

two—the Homeland Security and Physical Infrastructure strategies—

provide explicit guidance or principles concerning resource allocation. 

Along those lines, none of the strategies provides cost estimates for 

DOJ 

2,289

HHS 

3,776

DOD 

15,172

DHS 

23,891

DOS 

2,366

Other

5,243

Department of Homeland

Security (DHS)

Department of Defense 

(DOD)

Department of Justice 

(DOJ)

Department of Health and

Human Services (HHS)

Department of State 

(DOS)

Other Agencies
Page 22 GAO-04-408T 

implementation in the aggregate, nor for specific goals, objectives, or 

activities. In addition, none of the strategies contains distinct chapters or 

sections, or detailed discussions of risk management. In our view, more 

guidance on resource, investment, and risk management would help 

implementing parties allocate resources and investments according to 

priorities and constraints, track costs and performance, and shift such 

investments and resources as appropriate. Such guidance would also 

assist Congress and the administration in developing more effective 

federal programs to stimulate desired investments, enhance preparedness, 

and leverage finite resources. 

This characteristic addresses which organizations will implement the 

strategy, their roles and responsibilities, and mechanisms for coordinating 

their efforts. It helps answer the fundamental question about who is in 

charge, not only during times of crisis, but also during all phases of 

homeland security and combating terrorism efforts: prevention, 

vulnerability reduction, and response and recovery. This characteristic 

entails identifying the specific federal departments, agencies, or offices 

involved and, where appropriate, the different sectors, such as state, local, 

private, or international sectors. A strategy would ideally clarify 

implementing organizations’ relationships in terms of leading, supporting, 

and partnering.19 In addition, a strategy could describe the organizations 

that will provide the overall framework for accountability and oversight, 

such as the National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, OMB, 

Congress, or other organizations. Furthermore, a strategy might also 

identify specific processes for coordination and collaboration between 

sectors and organizations—and address how any conflicts would be 

resolved. For example, a strategy might also provide for some mechanism 

to ensure that the parties are prepared to fulfill their assigned 

responsibilities and use their available resources appropriately to enhance 

their capabilities and preparedness. 

Six strategies at least partially address this characteristic. Specifically, two 

of them—the Homeland Security and Physical Infrastructure

strategies—contain distinct chapters on “organizing,” which discuss roles 

and responsibilities among the federal, state, local, private, and 

 19 By “partnering,” we refer to shared, or joint, responsibilities between implementing 

parties where there is otherwise no clear or established hierarchy of lead and support 

functions. 

Organizational Roles, 

Responsibilities, and 

Coordination 
Page 23 GAO-04-408T 

international sectors.20 Furthermore, those two strategies, plus the Secure 

Cyberspace and Money Laundering strategies, frequently designate lead, 

and sometimes support, roles by objective, sector, or even specific 

activity.21 Regarding accountability and oversight, the Combating 

Terrorism strategy identifies the creation of an international standard as 

one of its objectives, and the Homeland Security and Physical 

Infrastructure strategies highlight the importance of accountability. And 

concerning coordination between implementing parties, the Homeland 

Security and Money Laundering strategies designate some specific tools 

or processes (e.g., steering committee or task force), and the Physical 

Infrastructure strategy identifies the need to create collaborative 

mechanisms for government-industry planning; it also designates DHS as 

the primary liaison and facilitator for cooperation between all relevant 

parties. 

On the other hand, the National Security strategy does not address this 

characteristic at all, and there is room for improvement in the other six 

strategies as well. For example, many of the references to U.S. roles and 

responsibilities in the National Security and Combating Terrorism 

strategies simply designate “the United States,” rather than a specific 

federal agency, level of government, or sector. Thus those two strategies 

do not identify lead, support, and partner roles like the other strategies do. 

In addition, none of the strategies defines an overarching accountability or 

oversight framework, and five of the strategies do not identify specific 

tools or processes for coordination. For example, we recently 

recommended that future Money Laundering strategies address, among 

other things, strengthening the leadership structure and establishing a 

mechanism to resolve disputes among agencies and ensure accountability 

for implementation.22 Also, we previously reported that neither the 

Physical Infrastructure nor the Secure Cyberspace strategies adequately 

define the roles, responsibilities, and relationships among the key critical 

infrastructure protection organizations, including state and local 

 20 The Homeland Security strategy places many responsibilities on DHS, which had not 

been created yet when the strategy was published. 

21 The unclassified Weapons of Mass Destruction strategy outlines only a few specific 

responsibilities for the Homeland Security Council, National Security Council, and 

Department of State. However, its classified version contains more relevant details, which 

cannot be addressed in this unclassified statement. 

22 See GAO-03-813. 
Page 24 GAO-04-408T 

governments and the private sector.23 The inclusion of these subjects in a 

national strategy would be useful to agencies and other stakeholders in 

fostering coordination and clarifying specific roles, particularly where 

there is overlap, and thus enhancing both implementation and 

accountability. 

This characteristic addresses both how a national strategy relates to other 

strategies’ goals, objectives, and activities—and to subordinate levels of 

government and their plans to implement the strategy. For example, a 

national strategy could discuss how its scope complements, expands 

upon, or overlaps with other national strategies, such as transportation 

infrastructure recapitalization or energy reliability. Similarly, related 

strategies could highlight their common or shared goals, subordinate 

objectives, and activities. In addition, a national strategy could address its 

relationship with relevant documents from implementing organizations, 

such as the strategic plans, annual performance plans, or annual 

performance reports required of federal agencies by GPRA. A strategy 

might also discuss, as appropriate, various strategies and plans produced 

by the state, local, private, or international sectors. It could also provide 

guidance such as the development of national standards to link together 

more effectively the roles, responsibilities, and capabilities of the 

implementing parties. 

Five of the strategies address certain elements of this characteristic. 

Specifically, in terms of integration, the Homeland Security strategy states 

that it complements the National Security strategy in providing a 

framework for other security-related strategies and, in this vein, lays out 

goals, objectives, and mission areas that are shared with other strategies. 

The Combating Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Secure 

Cyberspace strategies also address integration by discussing the 

importance of other strategies and their complementary relationships. The 

Homeland Security and Physical Infrastructure strategies also provide 

some language on this subject, such as the latter’s statement that DHS will 

collaborate with state and local governments as well as other federal 

agencies and the private sector to implement structures and processes for 

protecting assets and infrastructure. Regarding implementation, the 

Homeland Security strategy contains a distinct section on the subject, 

acknowledging that executive branch agencies need to issue detailed plans 

 23 See GAO-03-1165T. 

Integration and 

Implementation 
Page 25 GAO-04-408T 

for the strategy’s initiatives. And the Money Laundering strategy, for 

many of its activities, lists specific “action items” for agencies to 

implement. Two other strategies—the Physical Infrastructure and Secure 

Cyberspace strategies—make some general references to implementation. 

For example, the former says that “DHS and designated federal lead 

departments and agencies will prepare detailed implementation plans to 

support the activities outlined.” 

However, one of the strategies we reviewed—the National Security 

strategy—does not address this characteristic. It does not define its 

relationship to the other strategies; nor does it (along with the Combating 

Terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Secure Cyberspace, and Money 

Laundering strategies) address their relationship with other plans by 

federal, state, local, and other implementing parties. Furthermore, three 

strategies—the National Security, Combating Terrorism, and Weapons of 

Mass Destruction strategies—do not explicitly address implementation, 

and none of the strategies provides detailed guidance on the subject. We 

believe more information on this characteristic in a national strategy 

would build on the aforementioned organizational roles and 

responsibilities—and thus further clarify the relationships between 

various implementing parties, both vertically and horizontally. This, in 

turn, would foster effective implementation and accountability. 

The seven national strategies addressing homeland security and combating 

terrorism that we discuss in this testimony were developed to help the 

United States respond to an array of potential threats brought sharply into 

focus after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We recognize that 

these strategies were issued to meet a variety of homeland security needs 

and, furthermore, that they were not required, for the most part, to address 

the characteristics that we consider to be desirable. In addition, we do not 

expect all of the strategies to provide the same degree of detail because of 

their different scopes; for example, we consider it appropriate for the 

National Security strategy to contain fewer specifics than the Physical 

Infrastructure or Money Laundering strategies. Nonetheless, in our view, 

it would be useful for all of the strategies to address each of the 

characteristics, which logically flow from conception to implementation, 

in order to provide guidance to the federal agencies and other parties 

responsible for achieving results, evaluating progress, and ensuring 

accountability. Even where the strategies address our characteristics, we 

have identified potential areas for improvement. The numerous examples 

that I have cited today of the characteristics’ inclusion in the national 

Concluding 

Observations 
Page 26 GAO-04-408T 

strategies may serve as a model for future versions of these and other 

strategies. 

The ultimate value of these strategies will be determined through time as 

the strategies are implemented by the federal, state, local, private, and 

international sectors—and as homeland security actions are embedded or 

integrated into ongoing governmental and private sector missions in 

sustainable and balanced ways. To achieve these goals, it will continue to 

be important to solicit the feedback and input from all responsible 

parties—legislative, federal, state, local, private, and international—and to 

incorporate this information to better achieve the parties’ shared goals of 

improved homeland security and national preparedness. We will continue 

our work for the Subcommittee to evaluate these national strategies and 

their implementation. In the coming weeks, we look forward to reporting 

on (1) the extent that these strategies address recommendations by 

national commissions and GAO, (2) the extent to which implementing 

agencies are incorporating the national strategies into their own plans, and 

(3) the challenges faced in implementing these national strategies. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be pleased to 

respond to any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee 

may have. 
Page 27 GAO-04-408T 

Randall Yim at (202) 512-6787 

Individuals making key contributions to this statement include Stephen L. 

Caldwell, Sharon Caudle, Josey Ballenger, Heather MacLeod, Jared 

Hermalin, Wayne A. Ekblad, Amy Bernstein, and Christine Davis. 

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

GAO 

Acknowledgments 
Page 28 GAO-04-408T 

This appendix describes how we developed the characteristics that we 

consider to be desirable for a national strategy and how we used them to 

evaluate the national strategies related to combating terrorism and 

homeland security. 

There are no legislative or executive mandates identifying a uniform set of 

required or desirable characteristics for all national strategies, including 

those related to combating terrorism and homeland security. While two of 

the seven strategies we reviewed—the National Security and Money 

Laundering strategies—are required by statutes to include specific 

content elements, the requirements set forth in these two statutes, in 

addition to being different from one another, do not levy any requirements 

on the five other national strategies we reviewed. 

Given that there is no established set of requirements for all national 

strategies—or even the seven related specifically to combating terrorism 

and homeland security—we identified a set of desirable characteristics by 

reviewing several sources of information. First, we gathered statutory 

requirements pertaining to some of the strategies we were asked to 

assess—namely, the Money Laundering and National Security strategies, 

as mentioned earlier—as well as legislative and executive branch guidance 

for other strategies, such as the National Drug Control Strategy. We also 

consulted the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993; 

general literature on strategic planning and performance;1

 and guidance 

from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on the President’s 

Management Agenda. In addition, we studied our past reports and 

testimonies for findings and recommendations pertaining to desirable 

elements of a national strategy. Similarly, we researched 

recommendations by national commissions chartered by Congress in 

recent years on combating terrorism and protecting the homeland—

namely, the Bremer, Gilmore, and Hart-Rudman Commissions–-and 

various research organizations that have commented on national 

strategies, such as the ANSER Institute on Homeland Security, RAND 

Corporation, and Brookings Institution. 

 1

 Examples of such literature include John M. Bryson’s book Strategic Planning for Public 

and Nonprofit Organizations: A Guide to Strengthening and Sustaining Organizational 

Achievement (Jossey-Bass, 1995) and Edward Filiberti’s article, National Strategic 

Guidance: Do We Need a Standard Format? (Parameters, U.S. Army War College, Autumn 

1995).

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Developing Desirable 

Characteristics for a 

National Strategy 
Page 29 GAO-04-408T 

Simultaneously, we consulted widely within GAO to incorporate the most 

up-to-date thinking on strategic planning, integration across and between 

government and its partners, implementation, and other related subjects. 

This included consulting our economists and methodologists to include 

cost-benefit analysis and other economic factors. Furthermore, we 

consulted outside experts from the Bremer and Hart-Rudman 

Commissions. 

We used our judgment to develop desirable characteristics based on their 

underlying support in legislative or executive guidance and the frequency 

with which they were cited in other sources. We then grouped similar 

items together in a logical sequence, from conception to implementation. 

This is our first effort to develop desirable characteristics for an effective 

national strategy, so they may evolve over time. The desirable 

characteristics are: 

• Purpose, scope, and methodology. 

• Problem definition and risk assessment. 

• Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance measures. 

• Resources, investments, and risk management. 

• Organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination. 

• Integration and implementation. 

Later in this appendix, we provide a more detailed description of the six 

characteristics, plus examples of elements that a strategy might include to 

address them. We believe a national strategy should ideally contain all of 

these characteristics. Although the authors of national strategies might 

organize them in a variety of ways and/or use different terms, we present 

the characteristics in this order as a logical flow from conception to 

implementation. Specifically, the strategy’s purpose leads to the definition 

of the problems and risks it intends to address, which in turn leads to 

specific actions for tackling those problems and risks, allocating and 

managing the appropriate resources, identifying different organizations’ 

roles responsibilities and, finally, to integrating action among all relevant 

parties and implementing the strategy. 

One challenge we encountered in identifying and applying these 

characteristics was determining the appropriate level of specificity a 

national strategy might contain. We found that there was no consensus on 

this issue among the sources and experts we consulted. Furthermore, the 

strategies we reviewed vary in their scope of coverage—some are broad 
Page 30 GAO-04-408T 

strategies, while others focus on implementation—and thus their level of 

detail varies.2

 We recognize that by their nature, national strategies are 

intended to provide broad direction and guidance—rather than be 

prescriptive, detailed mandates—to the relevant implementing parties. 

Thus it is unrealistic to expect all of the national strategies to provide 

details on each and every key characteristic we identified. Nonetheless, we 

believe the more detail a strategy provides, the easier it is for the 

responsible parties to implement it and achieve its goals. Table 4 provides 

the desirable characteristics and examples of their elements. 

Table 4: GAO Desirable Characteristics for a National Strategy 

Desirable Characteristic Brief description Examples of elements 

Purpose, scope, and 

methodology 

Addresses why the strategy was 

produced, the scope of its 

coverage, and the process by 

which it was developed. 

• Statement of broad or narrow purpose, as appropriate. 

• How it compares and contrasts with other national 

strategies. 

• What major functions, mission areas, or activities it covers. 

• Principles or theories that guided its development. 

• Impetus for strategy, e.g. statutory requirement or event. 

• Process to produce strategy, e.g. interagency task force; 

state, local, or private input. 

• Definition of key terms. 

Problem definition and risk 

assessment 

Addresses the particular national 

problems and threats the strategy 

is directed towards. 

• Discussion or definition of problems, their causes, and 

operating environment. 

• Risk assessment, including an analysis of threats and 

vulnerabilities. 

• Quality of data available, e.g. constraints, deficiencies, and 

“unknowns.” 

Goals, subordinate objectives, 

activities, and performance 

measures 

Addresses what the strategy is 

trying to achieve, steps to achieve 

those results, as well as the 

priorities, milestones, and 

performance measures to gauge 

results. 

• Overall results desired, i.e. “end-state.” 

• Hierarchy of strategic goals and subordinate objectives. 

• Specific activities to achieve results. 

• Priorities, milestones, and outcome-related performance 

measures. 

• Specific performance measures. 

• Process for monitoring and reporting on progress. 

• Limitations on progress indicators. 

 2

 For example, the strategies range from the high-level, “grand” strategy (e.g., the National 

Security strategy) to the mid-level strategies specific to terrorism (e.g., the Homeland 

Security and Combating Terrorism strategies) and, finally, to the more detailed, sector- or 

function-specific strategies geared towards implementation (e.g., the Secure Cyberspace, 

and Money Laundering strategies).
Page 31 GAO-04-408T 

Desirable Characteristic Brief description Examples of elements 

Resources, investments, and risk 

management 

Addresses what the strategy will 

cost, the sources and types of 

resources and investments needed, 

and where resources and 

investments should be targeted by 

balancing risk reductions and costs.

• Resources and investments associated with the strategy. 

• Types of resources required, such as budgetary, human 

capital, information technology, research and development, 

contracts. 

• Sources of resources, e.g., federal, state, local, and 

private. 

• Economic principles, such as balancing benefits and costs.

• Resource allocation mechanisms, such as grants, in-kind 

services, loans, or user fees. 

• “Tools of government,” e.g., mandates or incentives to spur 

action. 

• Importance of fiscal discipline. 

• Linkage to other resource documents, e.g. federal budget. 

• Risk management principles. 

Organizational roles, 

responsibilities, and coordination 

Addresses who will be 

implementing the strategy, what 

their roles will be compared to 

others, and mechanisms for them 

to coordinate their efforts. 

• Roles and responsibilities of specific federal agencies, 

departments, or offices. 

• Roles and responsibilities of state, local, private, and 

international sectors. 

• Lead, support, and partner roles and responsibilities. 

• Accountability and oversight framework. 

• Potential changes to current organizational structure. 

• Specific processes for coordination and collaboration. 

• How conflicts will be resolved. 

Integration and implementation Addresses how a national strategy 

relates to other strategies’ goals, 

objectives and activities – and to 

subordinate levels of government 

and their plans to implement the 

strategy. 

• Integration with other national strategies (horizontal). 

• Integration with relevant documents from implementing 

organizations (vertical). 

• Details on specific federal, state, local, or private strategies 

and plans. 

• Implementation guidance. 

• Details on subordinate strategies and plans for 

implementation, e.g., human capital, and enterprise 

architecture. 

Source: GAO. 

The following sections provide more detail on the six characteristics and 

our support of each of them. 

This characteristic addresses why the strategy was produced, the scope of 

its coverage, and the process by which it was developed. For example, a 

strategy might discuss the specific impetus that led to its being written (or 

updated), such as statutory requirements, executive mandates, or other 

events like terrorist attacks. Furthermore, a strategy would enhance 

clarity by including definitions of key, relevant terms (such as “homeland 

security” and “combating terrorism,” in this context). In addition to 

Purpose, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Page 32 GAO-04-408T 

describing what it is meant to do and the major functions, mission areas, 

or activities it covers, a national strategy would ideally address its 

methodology. For example, a strategy might discuss the principles or 

theories that guided its development, what organizations or offices drafted 

the document, whether it was the result of a working group, or which 

parties were consulted in its development. 

We found support for this characteristic in legislation mandating two of 

the seven national strategies as well as by related legislation, executive 

orders, and GAO and policy research organization publications. For 

example, provisions relating to “purpose, scope, and methodology” appear 

in the statutes mandating the National Security3

 and Money Laundering 

strategies4

 (e.g., the statute requiring the Money Laundering strategy sets 

forth 12 areas that the strategy shall address.) Other legislative and 

executive branch guidance justifying the inclusion of this characteristic in 

our typology include: statutory requirements and related government 

publications describing the required purpose, scope, and methodology for 

the National Drug Control Strategy;

 5 GPRA legislation calling for a 

comprehensive mission statement in agency strategic plans;6

 and an 

executive order determining the purpose and scope of a national 

council/strategy on information infrastructure.7

 In addition, at least two of 

our testimonies have directly addressed the relevant purpose and scope 

issues to be included within a homeland security strategy (e.g., the 

strategy is to be “national” in scope; its purpose is to include setting 

overall priorities and goals for homeland security). 8

 But, we also pointed 

out in a 2002 testimony, that based upon interviews with officials at a 

dozen federal agencies, a broadly accepted definition of homeland security 

does not exist and that further clarification is needed.9 The Gilmore 

 3

 50 U.S.C. 404a. 

4

 31 U.S.C. 5341. 

5

 See Section 1005 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, P.L. 100-690 (Nov. 18, 1988). 

6

 See P.L. 103-62, sec. 3 (Aug. 3, 1993). 

7

 Executive Order 12864 (Sept. 15, 1993). 

8

 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts 

Are Underway but Uncertainty Remains, GAO-02-610 (Washington, D.C.: June, 2002), p. 9; 

and Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, But Implementation 

Will be Pivotal to Success, GAO-02-886T (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2002), p. 4. 

9

 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction 

and Partnership Sought, GAO-02-490T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 12, 2002), p. 9. 
Page 33 GAO-04-408T 

Commission and ANSER Institute for Homeland Security have also 

addressed aspects of “purpose, scope, and methodology” issues that need 

to be addressed in a national strategy (e.g., the Gilmore Commission 

indicates that the strategy should be functionally comprehensive and 

address the full spectrum of the nation’s efforts against terrorism).10

This characteristic addresses the particular national problems and threats 

the strategy is directed towards. Specifically, this means a detailed 

discussion or definition of the problems the strategy intends to address, 

their causes, and operating environment. In addition, this characteristic 

entails a risk assessment, including an analysis of the threats to, and 

vulnerabilities of, critical assets and operations.11 If the details of these 

analyses are classified or preliminary, an unclassified version of the 

strategy could at least include a broad description of the analyses and 

stress the importance of risk assessment to implementing parties. A 

discussion of the quality of data available regarding this characteristic, 

such as known constraints or deficiencies, would also be useful. 

Again, we found support for this characteristic in a variety of sources. 

While we have not identified any legislation that requires use of this 

characteristic in the national strategies on combating terrorism and 

homeland security that we reviewed, the importance of this characteristic 

is supported by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as well as other 

legislation, presidential directives, and GAO and policy research 

organization publications. For example, the Homeland Security Act of 

2002 directs the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to conduct 

comprehensive assessments of vulnerabilities, including risk 

 10 Second Annual Report to The President and The Congress Of the Advisory Panel to 

Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (aka Gilmore Commission), II. Toward A National Strategy For Combating 

Terrorism (Dec. 15, 2000), p. 4; Ruth David, Homeland Security: Building A National 

Strategy, The Bridge, 32, 1 (Spring, 2002), p. 2. 

11 This risk assessment is the first phase of a two-part risk management process. Risk 

assessment includes a threat assessment, a vulnerability assessment, and a “criticality” 

analysis. For a more in-depth discussion of these subjects, see Homeland Security: Key 

Elements of a Risk Management Approach, GAO-02-150T (Washington, D.C.: Oct.12, 2002). 

The second aspect of risk management is discussed in the “Resources, Investments and 

Risk Management” characteristics. It consists of taking the information from the risk 

assessment and making management decisions about resource allocations to minimize 

risks and maximize returns on resources expended. 

Problem Definition and 

Risk Assessment 
Page 34 GAO-04-408T 

assessments;12 GPRA requires the identification of key factors external to 

an agency that can significantly impact that agency’s attainment of its 

goals and objectives; 13 Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 

7, which addresses critical infrastructure protection, contains a 

background section that defines problem areas, and assesses the national 

risk potential if such problem areas are not effectively addressed. 

Likewise, an earlier critical infrastructure directive, Presidential Decision 

Directive (PDD) 63 defines the growing concern about the nation’s 

vulnerability.14 Additionally, we testified in 2002 that use of common 

definitions promotes more effective intergovernmental operations and 

more accurate monitoring of expenditures, thereby eliminating 

problematic concerns.15 We also said that a national homeland security 

strategy should be based on a comprehensive national threat and risk 

assessment.16 The Gilmore Commission, ANSER, and RAND have all 

suggested the need to conduct threat assessments to the homeland.17

This characteristic addresses what the national strategy strives to achieve 

and the steps needed to garner those results, as well as the priorities, 

milestones, and performance measures to gauge results. At the highest 

level, this could be a description of an ideal “end-state,” followed by a 

logical hierarchy of major goals, subordinate objectives, and specific 

activities to achieve results. In addition, it would be helpful if the strategy 

discussed the importance of implementing parties’ efforts to establish 

priorities, milestones, and performance measures which help ensure 

 12 P.L. 107-296, sec. 201(d)(2). 

13 P.L. 103-62, sec. 3. 

14 See Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7, Critical Infrastructure 

Identification, Prioritization and Protection, Dec. 17, 2003, and Presidential Decision 

Direction/NSC-63, Critical Infrastructure Protection, May 22, 1998. HSPD-7 states that it 

supersedes PDD/NS C-63 to the extent of any inconsistency. 

15 See GAO-02-490T. 

16 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing 

the Nation’s Efforts, GAO-01-1158T (Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001), p. 1. 

17 First Annual Report to The President and The Congress Of the Advisory Panel To Assess 

Domestic Response Capabilities For Terrorism Involving Weapons Of Mass Destruction 

(aka Gilmore Commission), I. Assessing the Threat (December 15, 1999), p. 55; Ruth David, 

Homeland Security: Building a National Strategy, The Bridge, 32, 1 (Spring, 2002), p. 4; 

Bruce Hoffman, Combating Terrorism: In Search of a National Strategy RAND 

Corporation, CT-175, March 2001, pp. 3,6-7. 

Goals, Subordinate 

Objectives, Activities, and 

Performance Measures 
Page 35 GAO-04-408T 

accountability. Ideally, a national strategy would set clear desired results 

and priorities, specific milestones, and outcome-related performance 

measures while giving implementing parties flexibility to pursue and 

achieve those results within a reasonable timeframe. If significant 

limitations on performance measures exist, other parts of the strategy 

might address plans to obtain better data or measurements, such as 

national standards or indicators of preparedness.18 For example, national 

strategies related to terrorism might discuss the lack of national indicators 

or standards for emergency preparedness against attacks. 

As in the case of the first characteristic, we found support for this 

characteristic in legislation mandating the Money Laundering and 

National Security strategies, as well as support derived from related 

legislation, presidential directive, the President’s Management Agenda, and 

GAO and policy research organization publications. Both the National 

Security strategy and the Money Laundering strategy statutes emphasize 

the need for goals and objectives, as well as operational initiatives to 

promote those goals and objectives. There is also related legislative and 

executive supporting guidance for this characteristic in the following: the 

National Drug Control Strategy legislation, which requires a complete list 

of goals, objectives, and priorities;19 the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 

which requires DHS to develop, in connection with a national terrorism 

countermeasures strategy, comprehensive, research-based definable goals 

and annual measurable objectives and specific targets to accomplish and 

evaluate such goals;20 GPRA, which requires federal agencies to set goals 

and objectives in their strategic plans;21 PDD 63, which includes a 

statement of presidential intent and national goals; 22 and the President’s 

Management Agenda of FY2002,23 which describes OMB’s work regarding 

program objectives. Additionally, we testified that a national strategy 

 18 For more information on the importance of national indicators for measuring problems, 

see U.S. General Accounting Office, Forum on Key National Indicators: Assessing the 

Nation’s Position and Progress (GAO-03-672SP, May 2003). 

19 See Section 1005 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, P.L. 100-690 (Nov. 18, 1988). 

20 See P.L. 107-296, sec. 302(2). 

21 See P.L. 103-62, sec. 3. 

22 See Presidential Decision Directive 63, Critical Infrastructure Protection, May 22, 1998. 

23 Office of Management & Budget, The President’s Management Agenda, Fiscal Year 

2002, p. 29 
Page 36 GAO-04-408T 

should establish goals, objectives, and performance measures.24 The 

Gilmore Commission, Brookings Institution and ANSER Institute for 

Homeland Security also commented on the need for setting priorities 

(goals), measurable outcomes and assessment of activities toward these 

ends. 

This characteristic addresses what the strategy will cost, the sources and 

types of resources and investments needed, and where those resources 

and investments should be targeted. Ideally, a strategy would also identify 

appropriate mechanisms to allocate resources, such as grants, in-kind 

services, loans, and user fees, based on identified needs. Alternatively, a 

strategy might identify appropriate “tools of government,” such as 

regulations, tax incentives, and standards, to mandate or stimulate 

nonfederal organizations to use their unique resources. Furthermore, a 

national strategy might elaborate on the risk assessment mentioned earlier 

and give guidance to implementing parties to manage their resources and 

investments accordingly—and begin to address the difficult but critical 

issues about who pays, and how such efforts will be funded and sustained 

in the future. Furthermore, a strategy might include a discussion of the 

type of resources required, such as budgetary, human capital, information, 

information technology (IT), research and development (R&D), 

procurement of equipment, or contract services. A national strategy might 

also discuss linkages to other resource documents, such as federal agency 

budgets or human capital, IT, R&D, and acquisition strategies. Finally, a 

national strategy might also discuss in greater detail how risk management 

will aid implementing parties in prioritizing and allocating resources, 

including how this approach will create society-wide benefits and balance 

these with society-wide costs. Related to this, a national strategy might 

discuss the economic principle of risk-adjusted return on resources. 

In similar fashion, we found support for this characteristic in legislation 

mandating the Money Laundering and National Security strategies. 

Additionally, this characteristic receives related legislative and executive 

support, and is further supported by GAO and research policy organization 

publications. The Money Laundering strategy legislation requires a 3-year 

projection for program and budget priorities and a “complete assessment” 

 24 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental 

Partnership in a National Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness, GAO-02-

547T (Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2002), p. 3, and GAO-03-519T, p. 17.

Resources, Investments, 

and Risk Management 
Page 37 GAO-04-408T 

of how the proposed budget is intended to satisfy strategy 

implementation.25 The National Security strategy legislation requires an 

evaluation of whether the nation’s “capabilities” (political, economic, and 

military) are adequate to support the implementation process.26 Related 

legislative and executive branch supporting guidance for this 

characteristic derives from: the budget and resource balance provisions of 

the National Drug Control Strategy; HSPD-8 provisions targeting resource 

priorities against perceived risk of attack;27 and the integration of 

performance monitoring and budgetary decision-making in the President’s 

Management Agenda of Fiscal Year 2002.28 GAO has also discussed the 

importance of this characteristic in recent testimonies, suggesting that the 

executive branch should link resources to threats, using a risk 

management approach and that carefully constructed investment 

strategies are needed to make appropriate use of limited fiscal and human 

resources. 29 The Hart-Rudman Commission and the Gilmore Commission 

have similarly discussed the need for a homeland security strategy to be 

appropriately resourced;30 ANSER likewise has indicated the need for a 

 25 31 U.S.C. 5341(b)(6), (7). 

26 50 U.S.C. 404a(b)(3), (4). 

27 Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-8, National Preparedness, sec. (6), Dec. 

17, 2003. 

28 Office of Management & Budget, The President’s Management Agenda, Fiscal Year 

2002, p. 29. 

29 See U.S. General Accounting Office, National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, 

State, Local, and Private Sector Efforts is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for 

Homeland Security, GAO-02-621T (Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002), p. 3; and 

GAO-03-519T, pp. 7-8. 

30 The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (aka The Hart-Rudman 

Commission), Seeking A National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and 

Promoting Freedom: Phase II Report (Ap. 15, 2000), p. 16; Second Annual Report to The 

President and The Congress Of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response 

Capabilities For Terrorism Involving Weapons Of Mass Destruction (aka Gilmore 

Commission), II. Toward A National Strategy For Combating Terrorism (Dec. 15, 2000), 

pp. iv, 5; Fourth Annual Report to the President and the Congress of the Advisory Panel to 

Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (aka Gilmore Commission), IV. Implementing the National Strategy (Dec.15, 

2002), p. 37. 
Page 38 GAO-04-408T 

strategy to be supported by a comprehensive budget plan that aligns 

resources with national priorities.31

This characteristic addresses what organizations will implement the 

strategy, their roles and responsibilities, and mechanisms for coordinating 

their efforts. It helps to answer the fundamental question about who is in 

charge, not only during times of crisis, but also during all phases of 

homeland security efforts: prevention, vulnerability reduction, and 

response and recovery. This characteristic entails identifying the specific 

federal departments, agencies, or offices involved and, where appropriate, 

the different sectors, such as state, local, private, or international sectors. 

A strategy would ideally clarify implementing organizations’ relationships 

in terms of leading, supporting, and partnering.32 In addition, a strategy 

should describe the organizations that will provide the overall framework 

for accountability and oversight, such as the Homeland Security Council, 

OMB, Congress, or other organizations. Furthermore, a strategy might also 

identify specific processes for coordination and collaboration between 

sectors and organizations—and address how any conflicts would be 

resolved. 

We found support for this characteristic in the Money Laundering 

strategy legislation, which provides that the strategy must address the 

coordination of regulatory and enforcement efforts; the enhancement of 

cooperation between federal, state, and local officials, as well as private 

sector entities; and the improvement of communications systems.33 This 

characteristic also enjoys broad support from related legislation, executive 

orders, presidential directives, and recent GAO and policy research 

organization publications. For example, the Homeland Security Act of 

2002 charges DHS with various functions, including coordination with 

nonfederal entities and promotion of public-private partnerships, among 

 31 Ruth David, Homeland Security: Building a National Strategy, The Bridge, 32, 1 

(Spring, 2002), p. 3; David McIntyre, The National Strategy for Homeland Security: 

Finding the Path Among the Trees, ANSER Institute for Homeland Security, (July 19, 

2002), pp. 4-5. 

32 By “partnering,” we refer to shared, or joint, responsibilities among implementing parties 

where there is otherwise no clear or established hierarchy of lead and support functions. 

33 31 U.S.C. 5341(b)(2), (4), (5) and (11). 

Organizational Roles, 

Responsibilities, and 

Coordination 
Page 39 GAO-04-408T 

other things.34 In addition, the statute mandating the National Drug 

Control Strategy calls for cooperative efforts between federal, state, and 

local governments and private sector initiatives.35 Furthermore, HSPD-6, 

HSPD-7, PPD 63, and National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 207 

each seek to delineate the roles and responsibilities of various federal 

agencies and department heads; and Executive Order 13228 and HSPD-1 

seek to coordinate implementation of the national strategy.36 In addition, 

we emphasized that a national strategy should define the roles of federal, 

state, and local governments as well as the private sector, and that a 

national strategy needs to provide both direction and guidance to 

governments and the private sector so that missions and contributions can 

be more appropriately coordinated.37 The Gilmore Commission, ANSER, 

and the Brookings Institution have also discussed the need for clearly 

assigning roles, responsibilities, accountability, liaison, and coordination 

among intergovernmental agencies, multilateral institutions, and 

international organizations.38

This characteristic addresses both how a national strategy relates to other 

strategies’ goals, objectives, and activities (horizontal integration)—and to 

subordinate levels of government and other organizations and their plans 

to implement the strategy (vertical integration). For example, a national 

strategy could discuss how its scope complements, expands upon, or 

 34 See P.L. 107-296, sec. 102(c), (f). 

35 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, P.L. 100-690, sec. 1005(b)(2). 

36 See generally Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-6, Integration and Use of 

Screening Information, Sept. 16, 2003; Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7, 

Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, Dec. 17, 2003; 

Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63, Critical Infrastructure Protection, May 22, 1998; 

National Security Decision Directive/NSDD-207, The National Program for Combating 

Terrorism, Jan. 20, 1986; Executive Order 13228, Establishing the Office of Homeland 

Security and the Homeland Security Council, Oct. 8, 2001; and Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive/HSPD-1, Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security 

Council, Oct. 29, 2001. 

37 See GAO-03-519T, pp. 15-16; and GAO-02-621T, p. 3. 

38 First Annual Report to The President and The Congress of the Advisory Panel To Assess 

Domestic Response Capabilities For Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

(aka Gilmore Commission), I: Assessing the Threat (December 15, 1999), pp. x-xi; Ruth 

David, Homeland Security: Building a National Strategy, The Bridge, 32,1 (Spring, 2002), 

p. 5; Michael E. O’Hanlon et al., Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On, 

Brookings Institution, 2003, p. xxv. 

Integration and 

Implementation 
Page 40 GAO-04-408T 

overlaps with other national strategies. Similarly, related strategies could 

highlight their common or shared goals, subordinate objectives, and 

activities. In addition, a national strategy could address its relationship 

with relevant documents from implementing organizations, such as the 

strategic plans, annual performance plans, or annual performance reports 

GPRA requires of federal agencies. A strategy might also discuss, as 

appropriate, various strategies and plans produced by the state, local, 

private or international sectors. A strategy could also provide guidance 

such as the development of national standards to link together more 

effectively the roles, responsibilities, and capabilities of the implementing 

parties. 

We found support for this characteristic in the Money Laundering

strategy legislation, which requires the strategy to address how to enhance 

intergovernmental cooperation and the flow of information between 

federal, state, and local governments; the coordination of regulatory and 

enforcement efforts; and the role of the private sector in a more integrated 

approach.39 Related legislative and executive support derives from the 

National Drug Control Strategy legislation, presidential directive and 

executive order. The National Drug Control Strategy statutory 

requirements call for improving the timely flow of information to federal 

agencies by enhancing the compatibility of automated information and 

communication systems.40 In addition, HSPD-7 addresses coordination and 

integration,41 and Executive Order 13228 states that executive departments 

and agencies shall, to the extent permitted by law, make available to the 

Homeland Security Council all necessary information relating to terrorist 

threats and activities within the United States.42 We indicated that the 

national strategy would benefit from addressing how intergovernmental 

and private sector initiatives can be operationally coordinated and 

integrated and, specifically, that an “overarching, integrated framework” 

can help deal with issues of potential duplication, overlap and conflict.43

Similarly, the Gilmore Commission defined a “New Normalcy” of vertical 

 39 31 U.S.C. 5341(b)(4), (5), and (11). 

40 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, P.L. 100-690, sec. 1005(b)(6). 

41 See Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7, Critical Infrastructure 

Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, Dec. 17, 2003. 

42 Executive Order 13228, Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland 

Security Council, sec. 3(b)(ii), Oct. 8, 2001. 

43 See GAO-02-1122T, p. 12; and GAO-03-260, p. 38. 
Page 41 GAO-04-408T 

and horizontal information and intelligence sharing and ANSER has called 

for federal program integration where possible.44

After developing the characteristics, we reviewed the content of each 

national strategy to determine the extent to which it satisfied each of the 

six desirable characteristics. We did this by first summarizing the structure 

of each strategy in terms of its overall goals, subordinate objectives, and 

specific initiatives. Next, we carefully read through each strategy to apply 

our characteristics and recorded our results on individual matrixes so we 

could compare characteristics across the strategies. Finally, we 

summarized our results on a matrix “snapshot,” using our judgment to rate 

each national strategy on each characteristic. Strategies could obtain one 

of three potential scores: “addresses,” “partially addresses” or “does not 

address.” Per our methodology, a strategy “addresses,” a characteristic 

when it explicitly cites all elements of a characteristic, even if it lacks 

specificity and details and thus could be improved upon. A strategy 

“partially addresses” a characteristic when it explicitly cites some, but not 

all elements of a characteristic. Within our designation of “partially 

addresses” there is a wide variation between a strategy that addresses 

most of the elements of a characteristic and a strategy that addresses few 

of the elements of a characteristic. A strategy “does not address” a 

characteristic when it does not explicitly cite or discuss any elements of a 

characteristic, and/or any implicit references are either too vague or 

general. 

To verify our work, the members of the project team independently 

reviewed the matrix summaries at every stage and made adjustments 

accordingly. Specifically, the project team verified that examples of where 

 44 Fifth Annual Report to The President and The Congress of the Advisory Panel To Assess 

Domestic Response Capabilities For Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 

(aka Gilmore Commission), V: Forging America’s New Normalcy, December, 15, 2003, pp. 

i, iv; David McIntyre, the National Strategy for Homeland Security: Finding the Path 

Among the Trees, The ANSER Institute for Homeland Security, 2002, p. 7. 

Applying the 

Desirable 

Characteristics to the 

National Strategies 
Page 42 GAO-04-408T 

strategies “address” or “partially address” characteristics were valid and, 

furthermore, that we properly characterized the strategies as not 

addressing the characteristics. In addition, we asked other internal teams 

who are familiar with the strategies from past reports and testimonies to 

verify our summary analysis. 
Page 43 GAO-04-408T 

Terrorist Financing: U.S. Agencies Should More Systematically Assess 

the Use of Alternative Financing Mechanisms. GAO-04-163. Washington, 

D.C.: November 14, 2003. 

Combating Money Laundering: Opportunities Exist to Improve the 

National Strategy. GAO-03-813. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2003. 

Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to 

Address Overseas Threat. GAO-03-165. Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2003. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to 

Terrorism. GAO-03-519T. Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2003. 

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of

Homeland Security. GAO-03-102. Washington, D.C.: January 1, 2003.

Homeland Security: Management Challenges Facing Federal Leadership. 

GAO-03-260. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 2002.

Homeland Security: Information Technology Funding and Associated 

Management Issues. GAO-03-250. Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Funding Data Reported to Congress Should Be 

Improved. GAO-03-170. Washington, D.C.: November 26, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Effective Intergovernmental Coordination is Key to 

Success. GAO-02-1013T. Washington, D.C.: August 23, 2002.

Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues. 

GAO-02-957T. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Proposal for Cabinet Agency has Merit, But 

Implementation Will be Pivotal to Success. GAO-02-886T. Washington, 

D.C.: June 25, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Key Elements to Unify Efforts Are Underway but 

Uncertainty Remains. GAO-02-610. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Responsibility and Accountability for Achieving 

National Goals. GAO-02-627T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002.

GAO Related Products 

Management 

(including 

Intergovernmental 

Coordination, 

Fiscal & Strategic 

Planning) 
Page 44 GAO-04-408T 

Homeland Security: Challenges and Strategies in Addressing Short-and 

Long-Term National Needs. GAO-02-160T. Washington, D.C.: November 7, 

2001. 

Homeland Security: A Risk Management Approach Can Guide 

Preparedness Efforts. GAO-02-208T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2001. 

Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Issues. 

GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related

Recommendations. GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources. 

GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2000. 

Combating Terrorism: How Five Countries Are Organized to Combat 

Terrorism. GAO/NSIAD-00-85. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2000. 

Bioterrorism: A Threat to Agriculture and the Food Supply. 

GAO-04-259T. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003. 

Homeland Security: Challenges in Achieving Interoperable 

Communications for First Responders. GAO-04-231T. Washington, D.C.: 

November 6, 2003. 

September 11: Overview of Federal Disaster to the New York City Area. 

GAO-04-72. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2003. 

Homeland Security: Reforming Federal Grants to Better Meet 

Outstanding Needs. GAO-03-1146T. Washington, D.C.: September 3, 2003.

Hospital Preparedness: Most Urban Hospitals Have Emergency Plans 

but Lack Certain Capacities for Bioterrorism Response. GAO-03-924. 

Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2003. 

Bioterrorism: Information Technology Strategy Could Strengthen 

Federal Agencies' Abilities to Respond to Public Health Emergencies. 

GAO-03-139. Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003. 

Bioterrorism: Adequacy of Preparedness Varies Across State and local 

Jurisdictions. GAO-03-373. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2003. 

Emergency 

Preparedness 

and Response 
Page 45 GAO-04-408T 

Homeland Security: Intergovernmental Coordination and Partnerships 

Will Be Critical to Success. GAO-02-899T. Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2002.

National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State, Local, and Private 

Sector Efforts is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland 

Security. GAO-02-621T. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Enhancing Partnerships Through a National 

Preparedness Strategy. GAO-02-549T. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2002.

Combating Terrorism: Critical Components of a National Strategy to 

Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-548T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 25, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Intergovernmental Partnership in a National 

Strategy to Enhance State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-547T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Progress Made; More Direction and Partnership 

Sought. GAO-02-490T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Key Aspects of a National Strategy to Enhance 

State and Local Preparedness. GAO-02-473T. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 

2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Considerations for Investing Resources in 

Chemical and Biological Preparedness. GAO-02-162T. Washington, D.C.: 

October 17, 2001. 

Bioterrorism: Review of Public Health and Medical Preparedness 

Programs. GAO-02-149T. Washington, D.C.: October 10, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal 

Response. GAO-01-660T. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2001. 

Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist 

Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000.
Page 46 GAO-04-408T 

Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target 

Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington, 

D.C.: December 16, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen 

Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: November 20, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address 

Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2003. 

Homeland Security: Overstay Tracking is a Key Component of a 

Layered Defense. GAO-04-170T. Washington, D.C.: October 16, 2003. 

Coast Guard: New Communication System to Search and Rescue Faces 

Challenges. GAO-03-1111. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2003. 

Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress 

Made and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.: 

September 24, 2003. 

Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation 

Security Program Need to be Addressed. GAO-03-1083. Washington, D.C.: 

September 19, 2003. 

Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime 

Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T. 

Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security 

Efforts. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Progress Since September 11th and the Challenges 

Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003. 

Land Border Ports of Entry: Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies in the 

Inspections Process. GAO-03-1084R. Washington, D.C.: August 18, 2003. 

Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require

Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington, 

D.C.: July 25, 2003. 

Border and 

Transportation 

Security 
Page 47 GAO-04-408T 

Border Security: New Policies and Increased Interagency Coordination 

Needed to Improve Visa Process. GAO-03-1013T. Washington, D.C.: July 

15, 2003. 

Transportation Security: More Federal Coordination Needed to Help 

Address Security Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 

2003. 

Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland 

Security in Balancing Its Trade Facilitation and Border Protection 

Missions. GAO-03-902T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Post 9/11 Initiatives and Long-Term 

Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003. 

Border Security: Challenges in Implementing Border Technology. 

GAO-03-546T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the 

Air Cargo Security System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 

2002. 

Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New 

Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges in Securing Control 

Systems. GAO-04-140T. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2003. 

Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges, 

and Key Management Issues. GAO-03-1165T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 17, 2003. 

Homeland Security: Counterfeit Identification and Identification Fraud 

Raise Security Concerns. GAO-03-1147T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 

2003. 

Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be 

Strengthened. GAO-03-760. Washington, D.C.: August 27, 2003. 

Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges 

and Key Management Issues. GAO-03-715T. Washington, D.C.: May 8, 

2003. 

Information Analysis 

and Infrastructure 

Protection 
Page 48 GAO-04-408T 

Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated 

to Promote Better Integration and Sharing. GAO-03-322. Washington, 

D.C.: April 15, 2003. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges for Selected Agencies and 

Industry Sectors. GAO-03-233. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2003. 

Protecting Information Systems Supporting the Federal Government and 

the Nation’s Critical Infrastructure. GAO-03-121. Washington, D.C.: 

January 30, 2003. 

Homeland Security: Information Sharing Activities Face Continued 

Management Challenges. GAO-02-1122T. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 

2002.

National Preparedness: Technology and Information Sharing 

Challenges. GAO-02-1048R. Washington, D.C.: August 30, 2002. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Federal Efforts Require a More 

Coordinated and Comprehensive Approach to Protecting Information

Systems. GAO-02-474. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002. 

Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management Approach. 

GAO-02-150T. Washington, D.C.: October 12, 2001.

Nuclear Security: Federal and State Action Needed to Improve Security 

of Sealed Radioactive Sources. GAO-03-804. Washington, D.C.: August 6, 

2003. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Oversight of Security at Commercial 

Nuclear Power Plants Needs to be Strengthened. GAO-03-752. Washington, 

D.C.: September 4, 2003. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International Assistance Efforts to 

Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening. GAO-03-638. 

Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2003. 

Homeland Security: Title III of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 

GAO-02-927T. Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2002. 

Science and 

Technology; 

Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and 

Nuclear 

Countermeasures 

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