NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

KRYSTLE BELEN JIMENEZ, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

STEVEN MICHAEL DOMINGUEZ, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 23-0720 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2017-093015

The Honorable Charlene D. Jackson, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Family Law Solutions, PLC, Mesa

By Melissa Weiss-Riner, James E. Riner

Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

The Cavanagh Law Firm, P.A., Phoenix

By Nicholas J. Brown

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

FILED 07-02-2024
JIMENEZ v. DOMINGUEZ

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Steven Dominguez (“Father”) appeals the superior court’s 

post-decree order reducing his parenting time and granting Krystle 

Jimenez (“Mother”) retroactive child support. Because Father has not 

shown the court abused its discretion or otherwise erred, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 Father and Mother married in 2008; they have one child in 

common, who was born in 2012 (“Child”). In 2017, Mother petitioned for 

dissolution of the marriage. In addition to other requests, each parent 

confirmed the need to establish child support in accordance with the

Arizona Child Support Guidelines. 

¶3 In 2018, the superior court entered its decree dissolving the 

marriage. The decree, which included a parenting time agreement, ordered 

joint legal decision-making authority and a relatively even parenting time 

schedule. The decree was silent, however, on child support. About six 

months later, Father petitioned to establish child support, but the court 

dismissed the petition without prejudice for lack of prosecution. 

¶4 In November 2022, Father petitioned to modify legal 

decision-making, parenting time, and child support, asserting in part that

Child’s living conditions with Mother were unfit. Father claimed that Child 

was suffering from lack of sleep and was experiencing “significant stress in 

being forced to share a bed and room with others in Mother’s apartment.” 

Father requested sole legal decision-making authority, two weekends 

(daytime only) of parenting time a month for Mother, and that each party 

pay nothing in child support. In response, Mother acknowledged living

with relatives in an apartment with two bedrooms and one bathroom due 

to safety concerns and financial hardship but asserted that she provides 

Child with his daily needs in a safe environment. Mother then alleged that 

Father had violated the decree in various instances. 
JIMENEZ v. DOMINGUEZ

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¶5 In April 2023, the superior court ordered the parties to 

participate in open negotiation on the issues of legal decision-making and 

parenting time. The parties complied and signed an agreement

(“Agreement”) in which they assented to joint legal decision-making 

authority and various provisions addressing their parenting time

arrangement, including exchanges and communication. The parties did not 

agree on a parenting time schedule, a right of first refusal, or presumably, 

child support. In June 2023, the court entered the Agreement as an order of 

the court, to remain in effect unless modified by subsequent order. 

¶6 Father then tried to unilaterally move Child to a new school.

Mother filed an expedited motion for an order to maintain school 

enrollment, which the court granted, finding that because the parents had 

joint legal decision-making authority, Father could not unilaterally decide 

to change Child’s school. 

¶7 In August 2023, Mother filed another response to Father’s 

petition to modify legal decision-making, parenting time, and child support 

as well as a counter-petition to modify legal decision-making, parenting 

time, and child support. She asked the court to order child support, 

including retroactive support “up to three years before date of filing.” 

Mother also claimed that Father’s communications were becoming 

increasingly hostile, and she pointed to Father’s interactions with law 

enforcement, referencing several police reports documenting acts of 

domestic violence between Father and his significant other. Mother alleged 

a material change of circumstances had occurred and sought sole legal 

decision-making and a reduction in Father’s parenting time. Father moved 

to dismiss Mother’s filing, asserting she never sought to amend her 

response, that her second response was untimely, and that no change in 

circumstances justified Mother’s counter-petition.

¶8 The court granted Father’s motion to dismiss Mother’s second

response as untimely but denied the motion as to her counter-petition. The

court found that although the issues of parenting time and legal 

decision-making had been resolved at the open negotiation three months 

earlier, Mother’s counter-petition “include[d] a verification of the facts that 

support . . . [a] reason to believe the child’s present environment may 

seriously endanger the child’s physical, mental, moral, or emotional 

health.” See A.R.S. § 25-411(A). The court then granted Mother’s motion to 

consolidate Father’s petition with her counter-petition. 

¶9 After an evidentiary hearing, the superior court determined 

that the new information Mother provided about Father’s contacts with law 
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enforcement justified modifying the Agreement. The court then ruled that 

the parties would continue to exercise joint legal decision-making 

authority, with Mother as the primary residential parent (resulting in a 

significant reduction in Father’s parenting time), and Father being

obligated to pay child support of $565 per month plus $9,964 for three years 

of retroactive support. Father timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction 

under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2). 

DISCUSSION

A. Parenting time

¶10 We will not disturb the superior court’s legal decision-making 

or parenting time orders absent an abuse of discretion. Nold v. Nold, 232 

Ariz. 270, 273, ¶ 11 (App. 2013). Father argues the court should not have 

allowed Mother’s counter-petition to proceed because it had been less than 

one year since the entry of the last parenting time and decision-making 

order, entered on June 19, 2023. Father points to A.R.S. § 25-411(A), which

states, 

[a] person shall not make a motion to modify a legal decisionmaking or parenting time decree earlier than one year after its 

date, unless the court permits it to be made on the basis of 

affidavits that there is reason to believe the child’s present 

environment may seriously endanger the child’s physical, 

mental, moral or emotional health. 

The superior court correctly acknowledged that Mother’s counter-petition 

was subject to the Agreement. The court then determined Mother’s filing 

included verified facts sufficient to bypass the one-year threshold under 

§ 25-411(A).

¶11 Father disagrees, asserting the evidence Mother presented 

was available before the Agreement was entered. However, as the court 

pointed out, some of the incidents between Father and the police included 

in Mother’s counter-petition happened after the Agreement. Additionally, 

Father admitted that Child was present during one of the occasions that 

required police involvement. Father has not shown the court abused its 

discretion in finding that under the circumstances there was reason to 

believe Child’s physical, mental, moral, or emotional health could be 

seriously endangered. 

¶12 Next, Father argues the court erred in allowing Mother to file 

an untimely counterclaim because she did not comply with Arizona Rules
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of Family Law Procedure (“Rule”) 28 and 33. Father summarily contends 

that Mother “failed to comply significantly” with these provisions, but 

given his failure to sufficiently develop this argument, it is waived. See 

ARCAP 13(a)(7) (requiring references to the record and citations

supporting legal authority in Appellant’s opening brief); Ritchie v. Krasner, 

221 Ariz. 288, 305, ¶ 62 (App. 2009) (holding that failure to comply with 

ARCAP 13(a)(7) resulted in waiver of an argument). His argument also 

fails on the merits. Rule 28 applies to amended and supplemental 

pleadings. Father’s argument could apply to Mother’s filing of an amended 

response past the deadline without asking for leave to amend. But the court 

dismissed Mother’s amended response. Similar to Rule 28, Father’s reliance 

on Rule 33 is misplaced. Rule 33 deals exclusively with third-party rights, 

other parties or claims, and state intervention, none of which are applicable 

here. 

¶13 Father also asserts that Mother’s counter-petition was 

improper because it did not comply with Rule 91. He argues that, had 

Mother complied with that rule, he “would have been afforded at least (30) 

days before an [evidentiary hearing] was to be set.” Again, Father has failed 

to properly develop this argument. See ARCAP 13(a)(7). Moreover, the 

portion of Rule 91 Father cites applies when a court rejects a petition to 

modify. See ARFLP 91(i)(1). In that situation, the court must provide the 

petitioner “an opportunity to correct the deficiency within 30 days.” Id. 

Nothing else in the text of Rule 91 supports the 30-day period Father 

advocates for on appeal. The court did not abuse its discretion in modifying 

the parties’ parenting time. 

B. Due Process

¶14 Father argues his due process rights were violated because he 

“had no way of knowing that [Mother’s] intention was to reinstitute . . . 

previously disclosed Police Reports as first-time knowledge or newly 

discovered evidence.” We review de novo “[w]hether the superior court 

afforded [Father] due process.” Backstrand v. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339, 346, 

¶ 28 (App. 2020). 

¶15 Father does not direct us to the portion of the record where he 

raised this argument in the superior court; it is therefore waived. See Ritchie, 

221 Ariz. at 305, ¶ 62 (holding that failure to cite to parts of the record relied 

on “can constitute abandonment and waiver of that claim”). Waiver aside, 

he has shown no error. The superior court has “broad discretion over the 

management of its docket.” Findlay v. Lewis, 172 Ariz. 343, 346 (1992). This 

discretion must be balanced against the due process right that litigants be 
JIMENEZ v. DOMINGUEZ

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heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Backstrand, 250 

Ariz. at 346, ¶ 29 (citation omitted). Father contends that Mother disclosing 

the police reports on the day of the disclosure deadline stripped him of his 

due process rights. For her part, Mother contends it was Father’s duty to 

disclose these reports under Rule 49. 

¶16 In support of his due process argument, Father cites Cruz v. 

Garcia, 240 Ariz. 233 (App. 2016), for the principle that the parties must be 

afforded due process before parenting time orders are modified. In Cruz, 

however, the superior court modified legal decision-making authority

without providing notice that legal decision-making was an issue for the 

hearing. Id. at 236, 237, ¶¶ 8, 14. Additionally, the court based its findings 

on “documents not admitted in evidence or subjected to adversar[ial]

testing.” Id. at 237–38, ¶ 17. Here, all police reports were admitted into 

evidence. And the reports previously disclosed at the open negotiation

were “admitted and given [the] weight [they] deserve[d] in light of the 

objection[s].” The parties were properly advised of what would be 

discussed at the hearing. 

¶17 Father also contends a new evidentiary hearing was 

warranted “because of [d]iscovery deficiencies and an inability to be heard 

or confront [or present] witnesses in a meaningful manner,” citing Coffee v. 

Ryan-Touhill, 247 Ariz. 68 (App. 2019). Coffee dealt with whether there was 

a right to a change of judge, which is not at issue here. 

¶18 Father was given the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful 

time and in a meaningful manner. He had notice that Mother intended to

use the recent police reports, as confirmed by her counter-petition filed two

weeks before the hearing. When testifying about the police reports at the 

evidentiary hearing, Father focused on there being no criminal charges, that 

they did not “pertain to this case,” and that the child was not around during 

those incidents. How Father used his allotted time at the hearing was 

within his control. See Backstrand, 250 Ariz. at 347, ¶ 32 (explaining that 

counsel has the duty to manage time and balance strategy). Father has not 

established any denial of his due process rights. 

C. Child Support

¶19 Father argues the superior court erred in awarding Mother 

retroactive child support. We review an award of child support for an 

abuse of discretion. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 30, ¶ 6 (App. 2002). 

¶20 According to Father, Mother waived her right to request 

retroactive child support because the issue was inactive for five years. 
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Father relies on Cordova v. Lucero, 129 Ariz. 184 (App. 1981). In that case, in 

the decree the superior court ordered husband to pay child support, but 

after failing to pay mother petitioned for calculation of and payment of 

arrearages. Id. at 184–85. The court found that because wife had not sought 

the nonpayment for several years, and advised husband she did not want 

the payments, she waived her entitlement to those payments. Id. at 186. 

Cordova is not persuasive here because child support was never established. 

Accordingly, Mother could not have waived child support under the 

reasoning applied in Cordova. 

¶21 Father claims the court was not permitted to make a 

retroactive child support order “five years after the fact,” suggesting in part

that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the issue. In 

relevant part, A.R.S. § 25-320 provides: “If the parties lived apart before the 

date of the filing [the petition to modify] . . . and if child support has not 

been ordered by a child support order, the court may order child support 

retroactively . . . but not more than three years before the date of the filing.” 

A.R.S. § 25-320(C) (emphasis added). In this case, the parties lived apart 

before Father filed his petition in November 2022 and child support had

never been ordered. Thus, the court acted under its jurisdictional authority 

and within its discretion in awarding child support to Mother going back 

to November 28, 2019, three years before Father’s petition.

D. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

¶22 Mother requests attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal under 

A.R.S. § 25-324, which authorizes a court to award fees after considering the 

parties’ financial resources and the reasonableness of their positions. In our 

discretion, we award Mother her reasonable attorneys’ fees, plus taxable 

costs, subject to compliance with ARCAP 21. See id.; A.R.S. § 12-342.

CONCLUSION

¶23 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm.