Filed 12/24/20 J.R. v. Superior Court CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

J.R.,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA 

CLARA COUNTY,

Respondent;

SANTA CLARA COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND 

CHILDREN’S SERVICES,

Real Party in Interest.

 H048420

 (Santa Clara County Super. Ct.

 Nos. 18JD025153, 18JD025155)

Petitioner J.R. is the father of Z.H-M., Gi.D., and Ga.D., who are dependents of 

the Santa Clara County Juvenile Court. Father petitions for extraordinary writ relief from 

a juvenile court order concerning Z.H-M. and Ga.D., entered after a contested, combined 

12-, 18-, and 24-month review hearing. The order terminated father’s family 

reunification services for Z.H-M. and Ga.D. and directed that a selection and 
2

implementation hearing be set for the two children under Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 366.26.

1

Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by concluding that 

returning Z.H-M. and Ga.D. to his care and custody would create a substantial risk to 

their physical or emotional well-being. Father further asserts that he was not afforded 

reasonable reunification services regarding visitation. For the reasons set forth below, we 

deny father’s writ petition.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In April 2018, the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s 

Services (Department) filed juvenile dependency petitions concerning nine-year-old Z.HM., eight-year-old Gi.D., and six-year-old Ga.D. The Department alleged that father had 

perpetrated domestic violence against his live-in partner, C.C., in the children’s presence. 

During the domestic violence incident, Gi.D. stepped in front of his father to thwart the

attack on C.C. Father turned on Gi.D., slapped and scratched his arm, and caused him 

pain. The Department took Z.H-M., Gi.D., and Ga.D. (the children) into protective 

custody. Shortly thereafter, the children were placed with C.C.

2

A. Proceedings, Reports, and Factual Background Preceding the August 2020 

Contested, Combined Review Hearing

In early August 2018, the juvenile court sustained amended juvenile dependency 

petitions and found the children came within Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, 

subdivisions (a), (b), (c), and (g).3 The court ordered the children removed from father 

and that family reunification services be provided to father. As part of father’s case plan, 

1 The juvenile court also ordered that Gi.D. be returned to father’s care with 

supervision and family maintenance services. In this writ proceeding, father challenges 

only the juvenile court’s order concerning Z.H-M. and Ga.D. 

2

In the past, father and the mother of the children, T.H. (mother), “had reportedly 

engaged in significant bouts of Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) in the presence of the 

children . . . resulting in emotional harm to all of the children.” 

3 Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
3

the court ordered father to complete a parent orientation class, a nurturing-father 

parenting class, a 16-week parenting without violence class, individual counseling, and a 

52-week batterer’s intervention program. 

Later in August 2018, father again perpetrated intimate partner violence against 

C.C. Soon thereafter, the children were moved to a foster placement. 

In January 2019, the juvenile court conducted a six-month review hearing. The 

court adopted the recommendations of the Department that the children remain in out-ofhome care and father continue to receive family reunification services. The court also set 

a 12-month review for June 2019. 

On February 3, 2019, the children were moved to their third foster placement

because their second foster caretaker had been unable to manage Gi.D.’s and Ga.D.’s 

behavior, including their violence toward each other. Subsequently, in early May 2019, 

Gi.D. was placed at St. Vincent’s School for Boys (St. Vincent’s), a short-term residential 

treatment program. That placement occurred after the children’s third foster caretakers

had reported their inability to manage Gi.D.’s behavior.4

In a status review report prepared for the June 2019 12-month review, the 

Department recommended the children remain in out-of-home care and that father 

continue to receive family reunification services. The reporting social worker, Raymond 

Gonzalez, stated that father had completed several components of his court-ordered case 

plan. Father also had made progress in individual therapy and had requested additional 

therapy sessions. But, according to Gonzalez, father’s “communication and behavior 

towards the department, service providers, the children’s foster parents, children’s school 

4 Gi.D. remained at St. Vincent’s until March 20, 2020. Between that date and the 

August 2020 hearing at issue in this writ proceeding, Gi.D. lived apart from his siblings 

in two different foster homes. In contrast, Z.H-M. and Ga.D. continued to live together 

in the same foster placement from February 2019 to August 2020. 
4

personnel, biological mother and his children for the most part ha[d] ranged from what 

could be interpreted as contentious to dangerous.” 

Gonzalez observed that father had not been able to “demonstrate lasting and 

consistent behavioral changes during th[e] reporting period and he ha[d] continued to 

have a relationship with his partner [C.C.].” In addition, regarding visitation, Gonzalez 

noted that father had not been able to “abide by visitation rules,” had been “chronically 

late” to visits, had been “unable to manage the children’s behaviors,” had not “accepted 

feedback well” from supervising staff, and had “triggered the children to the point [] they 

became violent.” 

In an addendum report filed on August 21, 2019, the Department again 

recommended that the children remain in out-of-home care and that father continue to 

receive family reunification services. Social worker Gonzalez reported that father had 

contacted a Department supervisor in late June 2019 and asked not to be contacted by 

Gonzalez any longer and said he wanted a new social worker.

5 Gonzalez also reported on 

difficulties that had occurred in Child-Family Team (CFT) meetings with father,

including father’s argumentativeness and resistance to feedback or interventions designed 

to address the trauma experienced by the children. 

Regarding father’s visits with the children, Gonzalez said the visits had recently 

improved with respect to father’s decreasing use of foul language, interactions with staff, 

and acknowledgement of the children’s needs. Z.H-M. and Ga.D. told Gonzalez in late 

July 2019 that “they would like to have a visit with their father at a park.” Gonzalez 

noted that father could benefit from continuing services “to support him with validating 

5

In testimony at a subsequent 12-month permanency hearing, father denied asking

the supervisor to remove Gonzalez. Ultimately, in late October 2019, a different social 

worker, Michael Vasquez, was assigned to the family. Vasquez had previously 

facilitated communication between father and social worker Gonzalez and had assisted 

with visitation. 
5

[Z.H-M. and Ga.D.] and acknowledging their interest and autonomy to increase their selfesteem and reduce their trauma.” 

Gonzalez further reported that since March 2019, father had “improved from a 1 

(poor) to a 2 (marginal)” on the “Beliefs and Behavior Assessment” in his batterer’s 

intervention program. Father was scheduled to complete the 52-week program by April 

1, 2020.

On August 21 and 22, 2019, the juvenile court held a contested 12-month 

permanency hearing under section 366.21, subdivision (f). Thereafter, the court issued an 

order terminating father’s family reunification services and setting the matter for a 

selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26. The court found, among 

other things, that return of the children to father’s care would create a substantial risk of 

detriment to their safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being and reasonable 

services designed to aid father to overcome the problems that led to removal of the 

children had been offered or provided. 

Father challenged the juvenile court’s order by filing a petition for extraordinary 

writ in this court. (J.R. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (Feb. 5, 2020, H047279)

[nonpub. opn.].)6In February 2020, we concluded the juvenile court prejudicially erred

6 The Department requests that we take judicial notice of the record in the prior 

writ proceeding. Father cites to the prior record in his current writ petition, but the prior 

record was not included in the current record. Moreover, two departmental reports that 

are in the prior record were admitted into evidence at the August 2020 hearing at issue in 

this writ proceeding. Father has not opposed the Department’s request for judicial notice. 

Accordingly, we take judicial notice of the prior record in case No. H047279. (See Evid. 

Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459; see also Roberson v. City of Rialto (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 

1499, 1503, fn. 3.) We also take judicial notice, on our own motion, of our unpublished 

opinion in the prior writ proceeding, J.R. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, supra, 

H047279. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459; see also In re I.A. (2019) 40 

Cal.App.5th 19, 21, fn. 1.)

In addition, the Department requests that we take judicial notice of five Santa 

Clara County Superior Court temporary emergency orders that addressed dependency 

court-ordered visitation in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The orders were filed on 
6

by admitting the August 21, 2019 addendum report at the contested hearing because the 

report had not been timely provided to father. (J.R. v. Superior Court of Santa Clara

County, supra, H047279 at pp. 14, 18–19.) Accordingly, we granted father’s petition for 

extraordinary writ and directed the juvenile court to vacate its order and conduct a new 

hearing to re-determine the issue of termination of reunification services. (Id. at pp. 19–

20.) 

While father’s writ petition in this court was pending, mother attempted suicide 

and subsequently died in December 2019. In addition, before we ruled on father’s writ 

petition, the Department in late December 2019 completed a section 366.26 report.

In anticipation of a new 12-month permanency hearing under section 366.21, 

subdivision (f), the Department filed an addendum report in March 2020. In that report, 

the Department recommended that the juvenile court continue to provide father family 

reunification services and that Z.H-M., Gi.D., and Ga.D. remain in out-of-home care. 

The report stated Z.H-M. and Ga.D. were “thriving and well-adjusted to their [foster] 

placement.”

The March 2020 addendum report also observed that father had been “consistent 

with his visitation with his children” and had “made moderate progress on his case plan 

services.” Father’s therapist reported that father exhibited the diagnostic criteria for PostTraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Father rarely missed his therapy sessions and was 

consistently respectful to his therapist. According to the therapist, father’s “love for his 

kids has humbled him to change his behaviors and practice responses for when anger 

erupts from his children.” “He is understanding his triggers and even showed strong 

awareness of how his behavior impacts his children’s own triggers” and “has been 

working hard and been open with his emotions and frustrations.” However, the 

March 19, April 13, April 30, May 29 and July 15, 2020, and were in effect while some 

of the visitation at issue in this writ proceeding occurred. We grant the Department’s 

unopposed request. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
7

addendum report disclosed that father “showed concerns of erratic behavior” and had 

been dropped from his batterer’s intervention program (although he subsequently restarted it with a new provider). 

As for visitation, Ga.D. “expressed liking visitations with her father.” Z.H-M.

“expressed he is ok with visitation with his father.”7 Further, the addendum report 

explained that “there are ongoing challenges with stability, inappropriate comments and 

inappropriate behavior in [father’s] visitations with his children despite coaching and 

support from staff.” The reporting social worker, Michael Vasquez, had received 

“several incident reports” regarding “visitation that are of concern.” Specifically, the 

addendum report documented incidents that had occurred between father and Gi.D. 

during visits at St. Vincent’s on November 2, 2019 (with all the children present) and 

November 30, 2019 (with only Gi.D.). The incidents included father “making 

inappropriate comments and making aggressive escalated statements to staff making 

them feel uncomfortable, fearful and unsafe.” After these incidents, father was banned 

from St. Vincent’s. 

In addition, the addendum report explained “there ha[d] been challenges with the 

father [] discussing his case details with the children in visitations despite signing a 

visitation guidelines and rules document detailing appropriate conversation in visitations 

with the children.” By way of example, the addendum report described concerning 

interactions between father and Gi.D., as well as between father and supervising 

personnel, at a visit on February 1, 2020. 

On June 25, 2020, father filed a petition under section 388 asking the juvenile 

court to modify its prior visitation order to permit unsupervised visits. That same day, at 

7 Regarding the frequency and duration of father’s visitation, on January 28, 2019, 

the juvenile court ordered that father receive at least two supervised, therapeutic one-hour 

visits per week with the children. After the August 2019 12-month permanency hearing, 

the court increased visitation to a minimum of two supervised visits per week for two 

hours each. 
8

a proceeding before the juvenile court, father requested a trial on the Department’s latest 

recommendations. The juvenile court set the contested hearing for August 2020, as a 

combined 12-, 18- and 24-month review to include consideration of father’s petition 

regarding visitation. 

In addition, at the June 25, 2020 proceeding, counsel for the children informed the 

juvenile court that Z.H-M. did not want to attend in-person visits with father due to 

concerns about COVID-19 and the safety of visits. Z.H-M. also did not wish to attend 

visits without Ga.D., who similarly did not want to attend in-person visits. As for Gi.D., 

he had told counsel he did not wish to see father anymore. 

Ga.D. was present at the June 25, 2020 proceeding before the juvenile court and

told the court that she “d[id] not want to go home to [her] dad because of certain 

reasons.” She said father “hits us sometimes. He does shout at us, and he does get angry 

at us quite a bit. So I do not want to go home to my dad, and I would like to stay here 

and get -- if we do get adopted, I wish to stay here.” 

On July 10, 2020, the Department filed a response to father’s section 388 petition. 

The response described father’s visitation historically as “inconsistent in quality and 

stability.” In addition, the response noted that father “transitioned to video and audio 

visitation calls with all of his children” after the March 2020 COVID-19 shelter-in-place 

order. The video and audio visits included “challenges,” such as “power struggles, 

yelling, cursing and casting [Ga.D.] out of visitations for being ‘rude,’ ” which 

demonstrated father’s lack of “ability [] to mitigate his children’s behavior” and lack of 

“understanding of his children’s trauma history.” Although some of the visitation calls 

went “well” and “without incident,” there were “considerable amounts of visitations” that

turned “problematic, chaotic, and unstable.” Further, the report noted that the children 

“appear to express resistance to visitations” and father “has been unable to cordially 

manage not getting upset at statements the children make in visits.”
9

In a combined 18- and 24-month status review report filed on July 16, 2020, the 

Department continued to recommend that the children remain in out-of-home care, but 

newly recommended that the juvenile court terminate father’s family reunification

services and set a section 366.26 hearing to establish a permanent plan for the children. 

The combined 18- and 24-month status review report observed that Z.H-M. and 

Ga.D. appeared to be comfortable, happy, and doing well in their current foster 

placement (where they had resided since February 2019). Z.H-M. and Ga.D. had told 

social worker Vasquez that they preferred to remain with their current caretakers, and 

Ga.D. said she would like to be adopted by them. In contrast, Gi.D.’s foster placement

(his second after his discharge from St. Vincent’s) was not a prospective adoptive home,

and no viable relatives or extended family members had come forward for placement. 

Gi.D. had told Vasquez, variably, that he wanted to live with his prior caretakers and that 

he wanted to live with his father. 

The report explained that father had continued to “engage in his Court ordered 

case plan services and has been consistent with audio/video and more recently in person 

visitations.” Father had completed his 52-week batterer’s intervention program in March 

2020. In addition, father continued making progress in his individual therapy (his only 

remaining case-plan service), which focused on anger management and PTSD. He also

voluntarily engaged in a parenting course. 

Regarding visitation, 38 audio/video calls occurred between father and the 

children from mid-March to the end of June 2020.8 After mid-June 2020, father had 

three, in-person visits with Gi.D., and those visits went well. In contrast, Z.H-M. and 

Ga.D. (as well as their caretakers) continued to be apprehensive about in-person visitation 

due to COVID-19. The Department explained the steps it was taking to promote inperson visitation. The efforts included Vasquez directly encouraging Z.H-M. and Ga.D. 

8 After the March 2020 COVID-19 shelter-in-place order, father and the children 

had three scheduled video/audio calls per week. 
10

to attend visits, exploring Z.H-M.’s and Ga.D.’s fears with their caretakers, discussing 

with the caretakers their own concerns regarding COVID-19, and requesting that the 

caretakers encourage visitation (which they agreed to do). Further, Z.H-M.’s and Ga.D.’s 

resistance to visitation was addressed at a CFT meeting and the clinical support teams 

were “implored to provide guidance and support” to the children regarding in-person 

visits.

The combined 18- and 24-month status review report reiterated that many of the

visitation calls went well. The report also described incidents during visits that 

demonstrated the children’s resistance to visiting with father. The report explained that 

father “needed redirection due to inappropriate discussion” and had become upset by the 

children’s comments during visits. For example, father made “inappropriate statements” 

regarding his desire to have Z.H-M. and Ga.D. removed from their caretakers. He 

persisted in making the statements despite warnings and attempts at redirection by the 

supervising social worker, which resulted in termination of the visit. In addition, 

Vasquez described “considerable challenges” in dealing with father with regard to 

scheduling visitation. Further, Vasquez reported that father “demonstrated troubling 

behavior” toward Vasquez and his supervisor, including many “personal verbal attacks,” 

“insults and foul language.” 

Vasquez explained father was “not ready for un-supervised visitations or to have 

the children returned to his care at this time. [Father] ha[d] not fully alleviated the risk 

factors that brought him and his children to the attention of the Court.” Father “ha[d] not 

fully demonstrated that he has meaningfully absorbed his engagement with his Court 

ordered case plan services on a consistent basis” or “a clear understanding that he has 

made the behavioral changes necessary to be able to parent all of the children safely.” 

In an addendum report filed on August 21, 2020, Vasquez noted that father had 

“maintained consistent un-supervised in person and telephone call visitation” with Gi.D. 

and “maintain[ed] supervised telephone contact with his children [Ga.D.] and [Z.H-M.,] 
11

with no in person visitation as yet.” Father’s visitation with Gi.D. continued to “progress 

and go well.” During a visitation call between father and Z.H-M. and Ga.D. on August 7, 

2020, father again questioned both children about visitation, and they subsequently 

refused visitation calls on three occasions. In addition, Ga.D. and Z.H-M. continued their 

resistance to in-person visitation, though Z.H-M. vacillated on this. The Department 

continued its effort to address the issue with the family, the children’s caretakers, and 

their service providers and encourage in-person visitation. Ga.D. had agreed to attend 

therapeutic sessions with father to discuss her opposition to visits. 

Regarding placement, Ga.D. had told Vasquez she enjoyed living with Z.H-M. and 

her caretakers, wanted to remain in their home long term, and did not want to return to 

father’s care. Z.H-M. similarly had told Vasquez that he wished to remain with his 

caretakers long term and not return home to father. In contrast, Gi.D. had “recently 

begun reporting [that] returning home to his father [] would be his primary choice” and 

he did not like living at his current foster home very much.

According to Vasquez, returning Z.H-M. and Ga.D. to father’s care would be 

detrimental to their emotional and physical well-being, based on father’s history of “an 

inability to control his angry and aggressive impulses and outbursts and his emotional 

and mental manipulation of all those that he interacts with.” In addition, father 

“demonstrated a lack of accountability and understanding regarding his role in th[e] 

deterioration of relationships with [Z.H-M. and Ga.D.,] placing his interests above theirs. 

[Father] continues to minimize his past and current behavior and how it has affected

[Z.H-M. and Ga.D.].” Further, Vasquez reported that Z.H-M. and Ga.D. continued to 

thrive with their current caretakers and had “extensive bonds” with them given the

“instrumental” emotional support they provided when mother died in December 2019. 

Vasquez found “no significant evidence” to support father’s allegations that the 

caretakers were “sabotaging his reunification with his children.” In addition, Vasquez 

acknowledged that Gi.D. had “progressed on a very different track of reunification and 
12

stepdown of visitation.” Nevertheless, Vasquez reiterated his prior recommendation that 

the children remain in out-of-home care and the juvenile court terminate father’s family 

reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. 

In a second addendum report filed on August 24, 2020, the Department altered its 

recommendation as to Gi.D. The Department proposed that the juvenile court return 

Gi.D. to father “on a program of Family Maintenance services.” Vasquez explained that 

father had “demonstrated an increased understanding of [Gi.D.’s] emotional well-being,”

“communicated safety to [Gi.D.,] gaining his trust and feeling of security,” “done well 

with engaging [Gi.D.] in visitations by participating in activities [Gi.D.] prefers,” and 

“show[ed] increased patience with [Gi.D.] during visitations[,] showing a greater 

understanding of his needs and emotional well-being.” Gi.D. reported that he enjoyed 

visits with his father, looked forward to them, and wished to return to father’s care. 

Further, Vasquez described some “challenges” in Gi.D.’s current foster placement and 

expressed concern that, if Gi.D. “cannot stabilize in his current placement, a new 

placement may need to be explored.” 

By contrast, Vasquez observed there had been “continued challenges” with regard 

to Z.H-M. and Ga.D. Specifically, Vasquez reported that during a family therapy session 

on August 14, 2020, father disregarded the therapist’s coaching recommendations and 

continued questioning a reticent Ga.D. about in-person visits. However, an in-person 

visit between Ga.D., Gi.D., and father five days later (which was attended by a 

supporting, non-relative extended family member) went well. 

B. Contested, Combined 12-,18-, and 24-Month Review Hearing

The juvenile court held a contested, combined 12-,18-, and 24-month review 

hearing from August 24–27, 2020. At that time, Z.H-M. was 12 years old, Gi.D. was 10 

years old, and Ga.D. was nine years old. 

Social worker Vasquez testified as an expert on risk assessment, placement, and 

permanency planning for dependent children and offered opinions consistent with the 
13

Department’s prior reports. Vasquez opined that returning Ga.D. to father’s care would 

present a substantial risk to her. Vasquez explained the children had historically shown

some resistance to visits and that, more recently, there had been considerable challenges 

regarding audio/video visits. Father had shown a lack of understanding and patience 

toward Ga.D.’s trauma history. Father also had shown a lack of accountability for his 

behavior and engaged in power struggles with Ga.D. during visits, which on occasion

escalated to yelling, cursing, and deterioration in the relationship. Further, father 

sometimes struggled with managing Ga.D.’s behaviors at visits and with redirection 

provided by supervising personnel. Father had made comments to Ga.D. at visits that 

created a problematic dynamic, including telling Ga.D. she was rude and sending her out 

of visits. Some of these interactions occurred when Ga.D. brought up adoption, the 

number of visits, or her current placement. 

Vasquez similarly opined that returning Z.H-M. to father’s care would present a 

significant risk to Z.H-M. Z.H-M., off and on, had resisted visits with father. More

recently, he exhibited increased resistance by declining to visit. Father showed a lack of 

understanding of Z.H-M.’s trauma history and a lack of accountability for behavior in 

visits. In addition, when all the children were together with father, he struggled to 

manage their behavior and lacked an understanding of his own behavior and how it 

affected the children. 

Vasquez expressed a different opinion regarding Gi.D. Vasquez explained that, 

despite some historical challenges between Gi.D. and father, Gi.D. had become very 

aligned with father and father’s behavior apparently affected Gi.D. differently than it did

the other children. Gi.D.’s visits with father had improved drastically of late, and Gi.D. 

no longer resisted visits. Vasquez explained that father appeared to exhibit a greater 

understanding of Gi.D. and his trauma history, resulting in a better outcome for their 

relationship—in contrast to father’s relationship with Ga.D. and Z.H-M. Vasquez also 
14

noted that Gi.D. had had seven placements during the preceding 28-months of his 

dependency. 

On cross-examination, Vasquez agreed that the children had opted out of visits 

often, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. Vasquez observed a deterioration in 

the relationship among the children after the pandemic began. Vasquez opined that

pointing out rude behavior is not necessarily inconsistent with appropriate parenting. 

Vasquez observed that father’s comments during visits often elicited conflict between the 

children and father. Vasquez said, in his observation, father vocalized frustration during 

visits, which had a negative effect on the bond between the children and was contrary to 

father’s stated intent to nurture them. In Vasquez’s estimation, a majority of the visits 

between father and the children went well. 

After father completed his cross-examination of Vasquez (but before the 

children’s counsel could question Vasquez), father informed the juvenile court that he no 

longer wished to proceed with the contested hearing and was “submitting requesting of 

the case of the facts [sic] for the court, understanding” the Department’s current

recommendations for the children.

The next day, August 27, 2020, father withdrew his section 388 petition requesting

unsupervised visitation with the children. In addition, father informed the juvenile court 

that he would not present any evidence and would allow the court to decide the matter 

based on the record before it. Father “believe[d] . . . all three of the children[] could be 

returned to his care” and “[did] not believe that reasonable reunification services ha[d] 

been provided.”

Counsel for the children submitted on the Department’s recommendations.

Counsel expressed concern about the instability of Gi.D.’s current temporary placement 

and the potential impact of a move to another temporary placement. Counsel said Gi.D. 

“very much does want to go home with his father.” In contrast, Z.H-M. and Ga.D. said 

they did not want to return to father’s care. Counsel maintained that father had not been 
15

able to successfully implement techniques for managing the children’s specific needs 

despite having completed some services. 

Ga.D. addressed the juvenile court directly. Ga.D. said she did not want to return 

home because she felt it was unsafe and she would not be very happy there. Among 

other things, Ga.D. said that father’s poor treatment of his former partner made her 

nervous and scared and, as a girl, hurt her feelings. Ga.D. was worried about potential 

physical altercations with Gi.D., leaving school, and losing contact with other important 

people in her life because of father’s opposition to them. On the other hand, Ga.D. said

she felt safe in her current placement, which was calmer and had “no spanking, no 

hitting, none of that.” Ga.D. also explained that at the recent in-person visit with father 

and Gi.D., she felt her boundaries were broken and COVID-19 precautions that had been 

promised were not followed. 

C. Juvenile Court’s Ruling

On August 27, 2020, after considering the Department’s reports and the testimony 

of social worker Vasquez, the juvenile court adopted the Department’s latest 

recommendations. The court reached its conclusion “based on the fact that the evidence 

shows that the children have significantly different needs and are differently situated.” 

The juvenile court noted that Gi.D.’s recent visits with father had gone well. 

Gi.D. was bonded to and trusted father, and he had aligned himself with father against 

Z.H-M. and Ga.D. The court explained that father’s behaviors affected Gi.D. differently 

than they did his siblings, and Gi.D. had “a very unstable foster placement history, with 

seven different placements in the last two years.” The court concluded that returning 

Gi.D. to father’s care with family maintenance services would not present a substantial 

risk to Gi.D.

In contrast, the juvenile court explained that Z.H-M. and Ga.D. “ha[d] had 

extremely challenging visits with [father].” The visits “were not great before the 

COVID-19 pandemic [and] seemed to have gotten materially worse recently, with a lot of 
16

conflict and blame coming from both directions.” The court observed that father 

apparently behaved differently during visits with Z.H-M. and Ga.D. Father “blam[ed] the 

children, the caregivers and various service providers, displaying anger and aggression, 

rather than showing accountability for his own behaviors.” The court explained that Z.HM. and Ga.D. had a stable placement history and were bonded to their current long-term

caretakers. In addition, Ga.D.’s behaviors had improved significantly after Gi.D. had

been transitioned out of the caretakers’ home. The court also noted that Ga.D. did not 

want to return to father’s care and her memories of father’s anger and physical abuse 

were still fresh in her mind. 

The juvenile court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that returning Z.HM. and Ga.D. to father’s care would present a substantial risk to their health, safety, and 

physical and emotional well-being. The court accordingly ordered termination of father’s 

family reunification services as to Z.H-M. and Ga.D. and directed that a section 366.26

selection and implementation hearing be set. In addition, the juvenile court found, by 

clear and convincing evidence, that reasonable services had been offered or provided to 

father for all three children. 

Father timely filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition. We stayed the 

scheduled section 366.26 hearing pending our decision on father’s writ petition.

II. DISCUSSION

Father contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by concluding, based 

on the hearing evidence, that returning Z.H-M. and Ga.D. to his care and custody would 

create a substantial risk to their physical or emotional well-being. In addition, father 

maintains that he was not afforded reasonable reunification services with regard to 

visitation. The Department opposes father’s claims, arguing that the juvenile court’s 

ruling was amply supported by substantial evidence.
17

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review

“The overarching goal of dependency proceedings is to safeguard the welfare of 

California’s children.” (In re Nolan W. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1217, 1228.) “While 

reunification is the preferred outcome when it serves the interests of both parent and 

child, no interest is well served by compelling inadequate parents to shoulder 

responsibilities they are unwilling to accept or unable to discharge.” (Id. at p. 1234.)

At the 12-, 18-, and 24-month review hearings, the juvenile court must return a 

child to the physical custody of his or her parent unless the court finds that return “would 

create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional 

well-being of the child.” (§§ 366.21, subd. (f)(1) [12-month review], 366.22, subd. (a)(1) 

[18-month review], § 366.25, subd. (a)(1) [24-month review].) At each hearing, the 

Department bears the burden to establish detriment by a preponderance of the evidence. 

(§§ 366.21, subd. (f)(1), 366.22, subd. (a)(1), 366.25, subd. (a)(1).) The detriment 

standard is “ ‘a fairly high one. It cannot mean merely that the parent in question is less 

than ideal, did not benefit from the reunification services as much as we might have 

hoped, or seems less capable than an available foster parent or other family member.’ It 

must mean what it says: that return presents a substantial risk of detriment to the child.” 

(Rita L. v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 495, 505.) 

In this writ proceeding, we review the record to determine whether substantial 

evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding of detriment. (Georgeanne G. v. Superior

Court of Los Angeles County (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 856, 864 (Georgeanne G.).) 

“Substantial evidence is that which is reasonable, credible and of solid value.” (T.J. v. 

Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1238 (T.J.).) “When an appellate court 

reviews a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we may look only at whether there is any 

evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which would support the trier of fact’s 

conclusion. We must resolve all conflicts in favor of the court’s determination, and 

indulge all legitimate inferences to uphold the court’s order. Additionally, we may not 
18

substitute our deductions for those of the trier of fact.” (In re John V. (1992) 5 

Cal.App.4th 1201, 1212.) “If there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the 

juvenile court, we uphold those findings.” (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947

(L.Y.L.).) 

Regarding the provision of reasonable services, “[f]amily reunification services 

play a critical role in dependency proceedings. [Citations.] Reunification services should 

be tailored to the particular needs of the family.” (Tracy J. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 

Cal.App.4th 1415, 1425.) “The ‘adequacy of reunification plans and the reasonableness 

of the [Agency’s] efforts are judged according to the circumstances of each case.’ 

[Citation.] To support a finding reasonable services were offered or provided, ‘the record 

should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of 

custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable

contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable

efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult. . . .’ [Citation.] 

‘The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided 

in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.’ ” 

(Id. at p. 1426.) “Visitation is an essential component of a reunification plan. [Citation.] 

To promote reunification, visitation must be as frequent as possible, consistent with the 

well-being of the child.” (Ibid.; see also § 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).) But “[n]o visitation 

order shall jeopardize the safety of the child.” (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(B).)

“At the 12-month and 18-month review hearings, the juvenile court may not set a 

section 366.26 hearing unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable 

services were offered or provided to the parent.” (In re M.F. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1, 

14; §§ 366.21, subds. (g)(1)(C)(ii), (g)(4), 366.22, subd. (b)(3)(C).) At the subsequent 

24-month permanency review hearing, the juvenile court “shall determine whether 

reasonable services have been offered or provided to the parent or legal guardian.” 

(§ 366.25, subd. (a)(3).) However, there is no clear and convincing evidence burden
19

stated in section 366.25 for the reasonable services determination required at the 24-

month hearing. (Id.; see also Evid. Code, § 115 [“Except as otherwise provided by law, 

the burden of proof requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”]) 

We review the juvenile court’s finding regarding reasonable services for 

substantial evidence. (T.J., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 1238; Angela S. v. Superior Court

(1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.) The parties do not address in their briefing to this court 

whether the apparent different standard of proof for the reasonable services determination

at the 24-month hearing should affect our review of the record for substantial evidence. 

Nevertheless, because the juvenile court stated its finding under the clear and convincing 

evidence standard after a combined 12-, 18-, and 24-month hearing, we will review the 

record for substantial evidence “account[ing] for the level of confidence” demanded by 

the clear and convincing evidence standard. (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 

989, 995 (O.B.).) Accordingly, “the question before [us] is whether the record as a whole 

contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could have found it 

highly probable that the fact was true.” (Id. at p. 1011.) Our review of the record 

otherwise is conducted under the familiar principles for evaluating the sufficiency of 

evidence in support of a factfinder’s determination. (Ibid.) 

B. Analysis

1. Risk of Detriment

We begin our analysis of father’s claims by considering whether substantial 

evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that returning Z.H-M. and Ga.D. to father’s 

care would create a substantial risk of detriment to their safety, protection, or physical or 

emotional well-being. 

Father argues that because he completed the court-mandated case plan services—

which, in his judgment, were directed at intimate partner violence—the juvenile court 

should have returned Z.H-M. and Ga.D. to his care. We are not persuaded. Although 

father’s commission of intimate partner violence was a main reason for the dependency 
20

of the children in this case, the juvenile court sustained allegations concerning harm to 

the children that extended beyond intimate partner violence and found that the children 

came within section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (c). In addition, father’s case plan 

services were not limited to intimate partner violence. The court-ordered case plan 

included programs focused on parenting in a nurturing and nonviolent manner and 

addressing father’s broader challenges through individual counseling. Thus, both the 

causes of the out-of-home placement and the case plan services themselves involved 

more than just father’s intimate partner violence. 

Further, that father participated in and ultimately completed the components of his

case plan over a two-year period is alone insufficient for us to conclude that there is no 

substantial evidence in support of the juvenile court’s finding of detriment. (See In re 

Dustin R. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1141–1142.) We acknowledge that father

actively engaged in his case plan services and had made some progress toward

ameliorating the causes for the children’s placement. We also commend father for his 

efforts and commitment to his children. However, our review of the juvenile court’s 

ruling is limited. (See L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 947.) Here, substantial 

evidence in the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that returning Z.H-M. and 

Ga.D. to father’s care would create a substantial risk of detriment to them.

The juvenile court found that father blamed Z.H-M. and Ga.D. during visits and 

displayed “anger and aggression rather than showing accountability for his own 

behaviors.” This finding is supported by the record. The evidence showed that, in 

addition to exhibiting ongoing confrontational behavior toward various service providers,

father engaged in “power struggles” with the children, yelled and used foul language, 

sent Ga.D. out of visits, persisted in making statements about Z.H-M.’s and Ga.D.’s 

placement, and questioned Z.H-M. and Ga.D. about their visitation with him. The 

evidence also showed that father made inappropriate and aggressive comments toward 

Gi.D. during a visit at St. Vincent’s while Z.H-M. and Ga.D. where present. 
21

Based on the evidence, social worker Vasquez opined that father had not 

demonstrated a clear understanding of the need to make further behavioral changes to 

safely parent all three children, notwithstanding the progress father had made on his case 

plan. Given the substantial evidence of father’s problematic behavior toward Z.H-M. and 

Ga.D., the juvenile court properly rested its decision, in part, on father’s lack of insight 

into the reasons underlying the children’s removal and failure to make appropriate 

behavioral changes during the reunification period. (See Georgeanne G., supra, 53 

Cal.App.5th at p. 867.)

We also are not persuaded by father’s reliance on the opinions of other California 

Courts of Appeal in In re E.D. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 960, Blanca P. v Superior Court

(1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1738, David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 

and M.G. v. Superior Court (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 646. These cases are materially 

distinguishable on their facts from the present case. For example, in E.D., the Court of 

Appeal observed that “[t]here was no evidence that father failed to grasp any of ‘the 

important parenting concepts’ ” and the juvenile court “did not cite any evidence” or 

explain the bases for its detriment finding. (E.D., at p. 966.) In David B., the evidence 

presented by the child welfare agency did not demonstrate any “lack of parenting skills” 

by the father and “even the social worker acknowledged he could not say [the father] 

lacked sufficient parenting skills.” (David B., at p. 791.) In Blanca P. and M.G., the 

appellate courts explained that the social workers’ opinions regarding the parents were 

vague, speculative, and not grounded in the evidence. (Blanca P., at p. 1751; M.G., at p. 

663.) Here, there is substantial evidence in the record of father’s continuing problematic 

behavior and lack of understanding. 

Further, the juvenile court properly considered the effect of moving Z.H-M. and 

Ga.D. from their current placement and their desires to remain there when evaluating the 

risk of detriment to their well-being. (See Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 

Cal.App.4th 689, 704–705 [effect of changing custody]; In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 
22

Cal.App.4th 962, 974 [child’s expressions and feelings about returning to a parent].) 

Z.H-M. and Ga.D. stated they did not wish to return home to father’s care, and Ga.D. 

expressed fear about her safety with father and Gi.D. The juvenile court’s findings 

concerning the stability and positive effects of Z.H-M.’s and Ga.D.’s remaining at their 

current placement are supported by substantial evidence. When juxtaposed with the

evidence of Gi.D.’s wishes, his placement history, and the nature and quality of his 

present relationship with father, the evidence further supported the juvenile court’s 

determination that Z.H-M. and Ga.D. had different needs and were differently situated 

than Gi.D., for whom it found returning to father would not present a substantial risk of 

detriment.

In sum, we conclude substantial evidence in the record supports the juvenile 

court’s determination that returning Z.H-M. and Ga.D. to father’s care would create a 

substantial risk of detriment to their safety, protection, or physical or emotional wellbeing. Thus, we must uphold the juvenile court’s ruling.

2. Reasonable Visitation Services

We turn next to father’s claim about his visitation with Z.H-M. and Ga.D. Father 

contends that reasonable services were not provided to him “because of deficits in the 

provision of visitation.” He asserts there was “a chronic pattern of failure to meet” the 

juvenile court’s visitation order, a failure of the Department to exercise its discretion to 

expand the minimum court-ordered visitation, and a lack of in-person visits after the 

onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. He contends that, over the period of the dependency, 

visitation was “persistently and consistently neglected,” and therefore “it is no wonder 

that there ha[d] been degradation of the quality of visitation between parents and 

children.” Father also maintains that the Department “failed to respond adequately to 

visitation barriers after COVID-19 restrictions were implemented.” 

“While visitation is a key element of reunification, the court must focus on the 

best interests of the children ‘and on the elimination of conditions which led to the 
23

juvenile court’s finding that the child has suffered, or is at risk of suffering, harm 

specified in section 300.’ [Citation.] This includes the ‘possibility of adverse 

psychological consequences of an unwanted visit between [parent] and child.’ ” (In re 

Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 50.) Moreover, the adequacy of the services and the 

reasonableness of the Department’s efforts are judged according to the circumstances of 

the case. (See Robin V. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1164; In re 

Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547.) 

With these principles in mind, we are not persuaded by father’s contention 

regarding the Department’s provision of visitation. Simply put, father’s various 

assertions are not supported by the record, and there is substantial evidence of the 

reasonableness of the services provided. Throughout the dependency, the Department 

consistently reported to the juvenile court about the status and nature of the visitation 

under the court’s visitation orders. The Department’s reports were comprehensive and 

documented both the challenges surrounding visitation related to father’s behavior and 

the Department’s efforts to address them. As for the quantity of visitation provided to 

father, in December 2019, father claimed he was owed four hours of missed visitation 

with Z.H-M. and Ga.D. In response, social worker Vasquez said he would rectify the 

situation by “mak[ing] up this time” during the children’s upcoming school holiday 

break.9 Similarly, in March 2020, Vasquez reported that father was owed six hours of 

visitation with Ga.D. and seven hours with Z.H-M. Vasquez again said he would 

continue working with father to make up this visit time, and father has not directed us to 

anything in the record demonstrating that Vasquez failed to pursue this commitment.

9 We note that a spreadsheet in the record that father had submitted with his 

withdrawn section 388 petition for unsupervised visitation purports to document the 

hours of visitation provided to father between December 30, 2018 and December 28, 

2019. The spreadsheet appears to substantially overstate the shortfall in the visitation 

hours. The overstatement occurred because the spreadsheet did not include the correct

number of visitation hours ordered by the juvenile court during the analyzed period.
24

Further, after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the related county- and 

court-mandated restrictions in mid-March 2020, father was provided more than three 

dozen audio/video visits with the children before the end of June 2020.

10

 In mid-June 

2020, the Department restarted in-person visiting and, as father concedes, made efforts to 

address Z.H-M.’s and Ga.D.’s reluctance to visit with father. Those efforts included 

enlisting the help of Z.H-M.’s and Ga.D.’s clinical support teams and caretakers (who 

agreed to encourage visitation). In addition, Vasquez encouraged Z.H-M. and Ga.D. to 

visit with father. He also continued scheduling telephone call visitations three times per

week and made in-person visits available to Z.H-M. and Ga.D., even though they had 

refused them. Relatedly, Vasquez failed to find support for father’s assertion that 

Z.H-M.’s and Ga.D.’s caretakers were attempting to undermine reunification, and the 

juvenile court concluded that father was “blaming the children, the caregivers and various 

service providers” instead of holding himself to account for his behavior. 

In our judgment, the evidence does not demonstrate, as asserted by father, either

“a chronic pattern of failure to meet” the juvenile court’s visitation order or that the 

Department “persistently and consistently neglected” visitation for two years. Rather, the 

evidence shows the Department made consistent and reasonable efforts to maintain 

contact among the family and address visitation issues as they arose throughout the 

dependency. Although the COVID-19 pandemic, resultant audio/video visitation, and the 

children’s resistance to visits added significant and unfortunate complications to the 

provision of visitation services, there is substantial evidence demonstrating the 

10 At a trial management conference on August 6, 2020, father’s counsel

complained about the “enormous” number of missed and disrupted visits in the preceding 

six months. However, counsel acknowledged that he had not yet submitted an 

accounting to the court or the Department “about how many visits have been missed and 

why in the last six months and the visitation [sic] has been absolutely horrendous.” The 

record does not include any such additional submission by counsel.
25

Department made reasonable and diligent efforts to address those challenges and 

continued providing reasonable visitation under the circumstances.

In sum, we conclude “the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from 

which a reasonable factfinder could have found it highly probable” that the Department 

provided father reasonable visitation services. (See O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1011.) 

Therefore, we must reject father’s claim and uphold the juvenile court’s ruling. 

III. DISPOSITION

The petition for extraordinary writ is denied. This court’s November 24, 2020 

stay order is vacated. This decision shall be final immediately upon filing. (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rules 8.452(i), 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
______________________________________

Danner, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________

Greenwood, P.J.

____________________________________

Grover, J.

H048420

J.R. v. Superior Court