Tay lor v . H ill , N o. 03 -0 3- 00 54 0- CV , 2 00 4 T e x. Ap p. L EX I S 57 47 (T e x. App.— Aus tin 1 J uly 1, 2004, no pet.) (me m. op.). 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 285 -CV

Ear ne stTay lor , A ppe lla nt

v. Ver nice Hill and Con solid ated Rural P ropert ies, Ltd., App ellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF LEE COUNTY , 21ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. 12,3 34 , HO NORAB LE TERRY L. F LENNIK EN , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N

This a ppeal arises from a post-judg ment proce eding in which Ear nest Taylor soug ht t o a t t a c k t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rt ’ s s u

b j e c t
- m a t t e r

j ur i s d i c t i o nt o r e n d e r

a p r i o r j u d g m e n t

. P r e v i o u s l y, Ta y lor ha d un su c c e ssf

ull y a pp e a le d th e pr ior

jud g me nt t o th is C ourt

. Ta y lor ur g e s tha t w e “ re ve rs e 1 th e o r d e r d e n y in g [h is ] c h a ll e n g e to th e tr ia l c o u rt’ s s u b je c t- matt e r ju

r is d ic ti o n , r e v e rse the f

inal jud g me nt o f t

he tr ia l c ourt

and dis mis s the Ap pe lle e s’ c a us e s of a c tio n wi tho ut pr e jud ic e and

va c a te this Court’s opini on [i n his earlier appea l] for lac k of s u b

j ec t -m atter jurisdiction.” We a ffirm the district court’s orde r.

The Court’s memora

ndum opinion in the prior appea l pr esents most of the re levant underlying f

acts. To summarize, Ta

y lor and Ve rnice Hill were among 31 heirs of L ouis Taylor.See id. at *5 (quoting Tex. P rop. Code Ann. § 5.021 ( West 2004), Tex. R . Civ. P . 93(7) a nd 2 Mondragon v. M

ondragon , 257 S.W . 215, 216 (Tex. 1923)). See id. 3 See id. 4 2 I n 2003, Hill and 27 other he irs filed a pe tition i n district court alleg ing that they , Earne st Taylor, and two other he irs owned undivided inter ests in a 100-a cre trac t in L ee County that had pre viously

been owned by L ouis Taylor; seekinga dete rmination of ea ch heir ’s re spective in t er es t ; and askingthe district court to dec ide whethe r the prope rty could be partitioned. Hill and alig ned heir s claimed that L ouis Taylor h ad co n v ey ed the trac t to the 31 heirs throug h a wa rra nty deed. T he dee d bore the signature of a C lifford Marine. I n the Court’s prior opinion, it observed that Earne st Taylor had not filed a verified plea challeng ing Marine’ s authority to execute the deed on L ouis Taylor’s beha lf ; 2 and that “Ta

y lor did not object to the deed, raise any issues relate d to Marine’ s authority to sign the deed on L ouis’s behalf, or voice any other conce rns reg arding the deed’ s validity in the trial court.” 3 On J une 6, 2003, the district c ourt rende red judg ment that the 31 heirs we re the sole owner s of the proper ty deed, stating the share that eac h owned (rang ing from 1/13th to 1/728th, consist ent with the deed) , and that

th e p r o p e rty

c o u ld n o t b e p arti ti o n e d

b u t s h o u ld

b e s o ld b y a r e c e iv e r an d the pr oc e e ds div ide d amon g the he ir s a c c or din g to th eir re sp e c tiv e sh are s. Ta y lor a pp e a le d th is judgme nt, attacking , for the f irst time on appeal , t h e v ali dity of the de ed as it bore upon the evidentiar y support for the district c ourt’s f i n d i n g t hat the 31 heir s were the sole owne rs of the pr op e rt y . T ay l o r ar g u e d t h a t t h e w ar r an t y d e e d w a s v o i d b e c a u s e L o u i s T ay l o r h a d n o t s i g ne d it

. Ho ldi ng that Ea

rn e st Ta y lor ha d wa ive d thi s argume nt and that the pa rt ie s w ou ld h a ve a c qu ir e d ti tle thr ou g h a dv e rs e po sse ssi on any wa y , th e Court

a ff ir me d th e jud g me nt. 4Tay lor v. H ill , No. 03-05-00683- CV (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 6, 2006) (mem. op.) , 5 av ail ab le at http:// www.3r dcoa.c ourts.state.tx .us/opinions/ HTML opinion.asp? OpinionI D=15294. Ta y lor purp or

te d to inv ok e the Un if

or m D e c larator

y Judg me nts Ac t, a

nd so ug ht r e a so na

ble 6 attorney ’s fe es. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 37.001-.011 (West 1997 & Supp. 2007). 3 Th e dis tr ic t c ourt ha d a

pp oin te d a

re c e ive r, Marg are t A nn

B e xley , to se ll the tr a c t. I n Fe bruar

y 2005, the cour t i s s u ed an order ac ceptinga propose d ear nest money

contra ct that Ms. Be x ley

had neg otiated with Creeksi d e Rural I nvestments, I nc., and or deringher to sell the pr op e rt y in ac c or da

nc e wi th the c on tr a c t. Cr e e ks ide su bs e qu e ntl y a ssi g ne d its in te re st i n th e e a rn e st money contra ct to Consolidated Rura l Prope rties, L td. The district court de nied a motion by Taylor to set aside the sa le and, on J uly 21, 2005, over Tay lor’s objec tions, signed a

decr ee a pproving and

c on fi rm ing the sa le

. Th e de c re e fu rt he r d ir e c te d th e re c e ive r t o d ist ri bu te the ne t pr oc e e ds of

the sa le to t he he ir s in

sh are s c on sis te nt w iththe pe rc e nta g e int e res ts sp ecif ie d in the e arl ie r j ud g me nt. Taylor filed a motion for ne w trial, which the district court denie d, an d then appe aled f rom the district c ourt’s decr ee. After g ranting Taylor repe ated extensions of time to file his br ief, this Court ultimately

dismiss ed this appea l for wa nt of prosec ution in October 2006. 5 On Se pte mbe r 6 , 2 00 6, wh ile his a pp e a l f ro m the de c re e c on fi rm ingthe re c e ive r s a le

wa s st ill pe nd ing , Ta

y lor fi le d, in the same un de rl y ingc a us e , a “ Mo tio n to De c lare Judg me nt V oid Due to L ack of

Subject-Matter

J urisdiction.” Tay

lor reque sted the district court to “vac ate its Fina l Judg me nt e nte re d o n Jun e 6, 20 03 , a nd dis mis s th e Pla int if

fs ’ c a us e of a c tio n f or la c k o f s ub

je c tmatter jurisdiction.” I n s up po rt , T ay lor a g a in a tta c ke d th e va lid ity of the wa rr anty de e d o n th e ba sis 6 that L ouis Ta

y lor had not sig ned it—the sa me issue addre ssed in this C ourt’s prior opinion—but now

rec asting his argument as going to the di strict court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to render its orig inalAt the hea ring , counsel for

the re ceive r stated that the sa le proc eeds ha d n o t y et bee n 7 distributed. 4 jud g me nt. Spe c if

ic a lly , Ta y lor c on te nd e d th a t ( 1) be c a

us e L ou is T ay lor

ha d n ot s ig ne d th e wa

rr a nty deed; ( 2) the deed was void a nd had not passed title to the heirs, so that; (3) the Hill-alig ned heir s had lac ked st anding to file t heir partition action in district court; (4) the district court ha d thus lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction to determine the he irs’ re spective interests; and (5) an inquiry that was i n s t ea d wi t h i n t h e ex cl u s i v e ju ri s d i ct i o n o f th e C o u n t y C o u rt o f L ee C o u n t y t o d et er m i n e t h ro u gh an heir ship procee ding. H ence , Taylor rea sons, the 2003 judgme nt is void.

Following a hea

ring at which only argument was prese nted, the district cour t denied Ta y lor ’s mot ion

wi tho ut s ta tin g its g ro un ds

. I t fur the r o rd e re d th e c le rk

of the Cou rt “ to i mme diate ly dis burs e the fu

nd s h e ld i n the re g istry of the Court in a c c or da nc e wi th the De c re e Con fi rm ingSa le By Rece iver of Prope rty

dated July

22, 2005.” Taylor appea ls from this order, br ingingforwa rd the 7

same a rg uments he made below. Hill urg es that Tay lor’s attac k on the 2003 judgme nt is barre d by res judicata and collatera l estoppel. Also, observing that the trac t has alre ady been sold a

nd urg ing that the net proc eeds ha

ve now bee n distributed to the heirs, (including Taylor), Hill urg es that the

un de rl y ingc on tr ov e rs y

is m oo t. The re ceive r, Ms. Be x ley , and current owner of the prope rty , Consolidated, eac h filed amicus cur iae br iefs in support of the district court’s r uling. See Tex. R. App. P . 11. I n response , Taylor filed motions to strike both amicus briefs. Subsequently , out of appa rent conce rn that we might g rant Tay lor relief and that it would have no means of protec ting its owner ship interest in t heE.g ., Taylor seems to de ny that he is attacking Consolidated’s title to the trac t, as s erting 8 that Consolidated “is not bound by the orde r and/or f

inal judgme nt that are the subject of this appe al [be c a us e ] t he De c re e Con fi rm ingSa le B y Re c e ive r o f P ro pe rt

y ha s n ot b e e n a

pp e a le d a nd is n ot a portion of this appellate pr ocee ding.” 5 proper ty , Consolidated filed a motion to intervene in this appe al and a motion for emer g ency

stay pending our ruling on its mot ion to intervene.

Hill has raised se rio u s co n cer ns that the underly

ing c ontroversy

may be moot as

conce rning him because the property has been sold to Cons olidated. Our a naly sis of that question is somewhat complicate d by the vagueness of

Taylor’s asse rtions r eg arding the nature of the re lief he is seekingand the state of the re cord. I t is unclear w hether a live co n troversy

exis ts betwee n 8 Ta y lor and Hi ll, Taylor

and Con so lid a te d, bo th, or

ne ith e r. I n li g ht o f t

his un c e rt a int

y , w e wi ll pr oc e e d to a dd

re ss C on so lid a te d’ s mo tio n to int e rv e ne in t his a pp e a l. Th e su pr e me c ourt

ha s h e ld t hat pe rm itt inga

pp e llate -l e ve l in te rv e nt i o n i s a pp ro pr ia te wher e “the movant meets the re quirements nec essar y to assert the virtua l-repres en t ati on doctrine, and if e quitable consider ations do not weig h ag ainst allowing the m ovant to participate on appe al.” In re Lumberm ens Mut. Cas. Co. , 184 S .W.3d 718, 722 (Tex. 2006). The doctrine of virtual

re pr e se ntatio n p ro vid e s th a t a lit ig ant i s d e e me d to be a pa rt y if it w ill be b ou nd by th e jud g me nt, its pr ivi ty

of e state , ti tle , o r i nte re st a pp e ars fr om th e reco rd, an d th e re is a n id e nti ty of intere st betwee n the litigant a nd a name d party

to the judgme nt. Motor Vehicle Bd. of Tex.

v . E l P a s o I

n d e p . A u to

. D e a le r

s A s s’n , 1 S .W .3 d 1 08 , 1 10 (T e x. 19 99 ). “ B e c a us e on e wh o is vir tua lly re pr e se nte d is alr e a dy de e me d to be a pa rt y , th e or e tic a lly

it ‘ is n ot r e qu ir e d to int e rv e ne in order to appea l.’” In re Lumberm ens , 184 S.W .3d at 722 (quoting City of San Benito v. Rio Grande6

Valley Gas Co. , 109 S.W .3d 750, 752 (Tex. 2003)). “Howe ver, as a practica l matter, one who see ks to inv ok e the vir

tua l- re pr e se ntatio n d oc tr ine in o rd e r t o a sse rt an in te re st o n a

pp e a l mu st t a ke so me timely , appropr iate ac tion to attain named-pa rty status.” Id . The supre me cour t considers a

motion to intervene on appea l to be an “a ppropriate vehicle to obtain named-pa rty status.” Id

. We conclude that Cons o l idated satisfies e ach of the virtual-r epre sentation require ments. First, Consolidated will be bound by our judg ment. I t is undisputed that Consolidated is n owthe re c or d o wn e r o f t he 10 0- a c re tr a c t. O ur

jud g me nt wil l di re c tly

imp a c t it s c ha in o f t itl e to the proper

ty . Second, Consolidated’s privity of estate , title, or intere st appea rs in the re cord. Third, there is an identity of inter es t betwee n Consolidated and Hill, eac h of whom ar e def ending the validity

of the district cour

t’s judgme nt requiring the par tition s al e. Cf. id . at 724 (finding ide nti ty of int e re st b e c a

us e bo th p art ie s’ “ ult imate a im” wa s to re ve rs e the un de rl y ingjud g me nt i n order to “protec t[ ] t he funds that the unde rlying judg ment put at risk”). We also hold that equitable co n s i d erations do not weigh a g ainst allowing C o n s o l i d ated to par

ticipate as a

named pa

rty on appea l. See id. at 729 (“ [W ]hether a would- be intervenor

is entitled to appeal unde r the virtual- repr esentation doc trin e is a n e q uitable deter

mination that mu st b e de c ide d o n a c a se -b y -c a se ba sis .” ). “ [T]he me re fa c t th a t th e pa rt y do e s not atte mpt

to i n v o k e [ ap p el late] rights until after judgme nt, when the ne ed to invoke them ar ose, is not dispositi ve.” Id. at 726. I nstead, the court considers other fa ctors that may weig h ag ainst allowing intervention af

ter fina l judgment ha s been r ender ed, including “(1) the leng th of time during which the would-be intervenor

should ha ve known of its intere st in the ca se bef ore attempting to interve ne; (2) the e x tent of pre

judice that the exis ting parties m ay suffe r as a result of the w ould-be interve nor’sAdditionally , Consolidated “now re cog nizes a proce dural be nefit to positi o ning itself a s 9 a name d party

in this appe al to e nsure its a bility to a lso pa

rticipate in a

ny future pr ocee ding in the Texas Supreme Court conc erningthis appeal.” 7 fa ilure to a

pp ly fo r i nte rv e nti on a s so on a s it a c tua lly kn e w o r s ho uld have kn ow n o f i ts i nte re st i n the case ; ( 3) the extent of prejudice the would-be intervenor would suffe r if intervention is denied; and (4) the exist ence of unusual cir cumstance s mili tating either for or aga inst a dete rmination that the application is t imely .” Id

.

There is cl ea rl y a ri sk of g reat prejudice to Consoli dated if the district court’s jud g me nt i s o ve rt

ur ne d o n a pp e a l. A s Co ns oli date d e xpla ins :

I f the District Court’s J udg ment and Orde r are overturne d on appea l, Consoli dated’ s potential loss o f t i t l e to t he prope rty , its inabili ty to rec oup the quar

ter of a milli on dollars paid for

the prope rty (bec ause the money has alre ady been distributed to the proper ty ’s orig inal thirty -one c o-owne rs), its potential loss of the bene fit of the ba rg a in b y pu rc ha sin g the pr op e rt

y , to g e the r w ithCon so lid a te d’ s a c tua l pr e se nt l os s of use a nd enjoy ment of the property (bec ause the title is clouded by this appeal) a nd loss of use of the pur chase money , vest Consolidated with an interest prote cted unde r the Due Process Clause of the Four teenth Amendment to the Un i t ed S t ates Constit ution and the due- course -of law provision of the Texas Constit ution. And, althoug h Hill’s arguments are somewhat a ligne d with Consoli dated’ s, Consolidated ur g es that Hill’s brief omits arguments that are “potentially dispositi ve of this appe al.” We observe a g ain that 9 Hill has r a is e d

s e r io u s qu e s ti o n s a s to w h e th e r a li v e ju s ti c ia

b le c o n tr o v e r s y

s ti ll e xis ts b e tw een him and Taylor. Reg ardle ss of its merits, Hill’s moot ness ar gu m en t bespea ks a per ceive d le sse r s take in t

he lit ig a tio n th an Co ns oli date d may ho ld. Th e se c on sid e ra tio ns we ig h h e a vil y in favor of

allowing Consolidated to intervene, a nd they outweigh any

other fa ctorsConsolidated filed its motion on November 7, 2007, almost seven months after the district 10 c ourt ’s fi na l ju dg me nt wa s re nd e re d on Apr il 3, 200 7, and a lmo st six mon ths a ft e r Tay lor fi le d h is notice of appea l on May

4, 2007. Howeve r, an unusua l circumstanc e in this case is that Consolidated first attemp te d

to d e f e n d it s in te r e s ts thr o u g h ana mi c u s c u r ia e b r ie f , w h ic h w e r e c e iv e d

on October 4, 2007. Fur

thermore , Taylor has not demonstrated, unde r the c ircumstance s of this case, any prejudice related t o the t iming of Consolidated’s intervention. In re Lumberm ens , 184 S.W .3d 718, 727 (Tex. 2006) (explaining this fac tor is co ncer ned only with prejudice cause d by the delay in filing the motion to intervene , not the prejudice which may result if interve ntion is allowed). Th e sty le of the c a se is m od if

ie d to re fl e c t th e a dd iti on

of Con so lid a te d a s a

name d p a rt

y 11 to t his a pp e a l. 8 milit ating agai n s t intervention. We a c c or din g ly g ra nt C on so lid a te d’ s mo tio n to int e rv e ne a s a 10

name d p art

y in t his a pp e a l. 11 Turn ingto Tay lor ’s a tta c k on the dis tr ic t court ’s or de r, we ob se rv e tha t he ult imate ly challeng es the district cour t’s subject-matter jurisdiction to rende r its J une 6, 2003 judg ment that the 31 heirs wer e the sole owner s of the proper ty deed and order ing the proper t y s o l d an d p roce eds distributed acc ording to the heirs’ r espec tive owner ship shares unde r the wa rra nty deed. T houg h that judgme nt repre sented only one phase of the multi-step proce ss involved in a partition case , it was final and a

ppeala ble. See Long v. Spe ncer , 137 S.W .3d 923, 925-26 (Tex . App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.). As with other final, appealable order s, Taylor was r equire d to bring any challeng es to the issues determined by

that judgme nt in accor dance with the rules of a ppellate pr ocedur e g overning direc t appea ls—and he did so, unsucc essfully

. See id. (“I s sues deter mined by the par tition order must be challeng ed following its entry ; they cannot be attacke d collater ally afte r the entry of a later order or judg ment.”). The same rule applies for an order approving the terms of a proposed sa le of

r e a l p r o p e rt y i na

p art i t i o ns u i t : “ t h e t e r

m s o f t h a t o r d e r m u s t b e a p p e a l e d

— i f a ta l l

— a f t e r i t s e n t r y, befor e the pr operty

is sold.” Id. “ Th e re a so nin g be hin d th e ru le is c le ar: in t he pa rt iti on pr oc e ss, decisions must be made upon which other decisions wil l be based. An appe al at ea ch stag e provide s9

prac tical way

to reviewcontrolling , intermediate decisions befor e the conseque nces of any err or do irrepa rable injury .” Id. at 926. Her e, Ta y lor attempts to attack the district court’s J une 2003 judgme nt over 3 y ear s

a ft e r t he c ourt re nd e re d it

and ro ughl y 2 y e ars a ft e r t

his Court iss ue d it s ma

nd a te to e nf

or c e its jud g me nt af

fi rm ing the dis tr ic t court

. I n an a tte mpt to av oid the ob vio us re s judi c a ta ba r fr om t ho se proce eding s, Taylor cha

rac terizes his latest challeng e to the wa rr an t y d ee d as g oing to the district court’s subjec t-matter jurisdiction. We first observe that Taylor filed his “Motion to Decla re J udg ment Void Due to L ack of Subject-Matter

J urisdiction” in the same unde rlying pr ocee ding, a nd it amounts to an unti mely motion to s et aside the J une 2003 judg ment. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 329(b). The dis tr ic t c o urt c o u ld h a v e d e n ie d

r e li e f f o r th is r e a s o na lo n e . I nan y e v e n t, T a y lo r ’s “jurisdictional” c halleng e must fail bec ause t h e d i s t ri ct cour t had subject-matter jurisdiction over Hill’s suit for partition based on the de ed, see Tex. P rop. Code Ann. § 23.001- .002 (West 2000), and thi s C o u rt has alre ady

reje cted Ta

y lor’s cor e pre mise that the district court er red in holding the

war ranty deed to be valid. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the district c ourt’s order

. We dismiss as moot Taylor’s motion to strike the amicus brief s of Consolidated and B exley and Consolidated’s motion f o r ane m e r g e n c y s t ay.

_____________________________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: F ebrua

ry 15, 2008