Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Escambia County Board of County Commissioner, and Rayme Edler (Official 

Capacity) Motion to Dismiss

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

MATHEW SELOVER

Plaintiff, 

vs. CASE NUMBER: 3:20-CV-4698-

TKW-HTC

 

ESCAMBIA COUNTY BOARD

OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS and

RAYME EDLER, 

Defendants.

 /

PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS ESCAMBIA 

COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS AND RAYME EDLER’S

(OFFICIAL CAPACITY) MOTION TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT

I. INTRODUCTION

This case concerns Defendant Rayme Edler (Edler), abusing her authority as 

the Escambia County Medical Director to discipline and retaliate against an 

Escambia County employee, i.e., Plaintiff Mathew Selover, in retaliation for 

complaints of inappropriate work conduct that Plaintiff filed against Defendant 

Edler. This case also concerns the Escambia County Board of County 

Commissioners’ (the Board) policy, practice, or custom of ignoring previous 

complaints against Defendant Edler and allowing Defendant Edler carte blanche 

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Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Escambia County Board of County Commissioner, and Rayme Edler (Official 

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authority to discipline Plaintiff without adhering to the Board’s written policies, 

essentially ratifying Defendant Edler’s conduct. 

Defendants’1 conduct caused the deprivation of Plaintiff’s due process rights 

in that Plaintiff had a clearly established right to notice, service, escalating 

disciplinary measures, and appeal rights prior to suffering any disciplinary measures, 

measures, but Defendants did not provide Plaintiff with same, and they failed or 

refused to provide a pre or post deprivation hearing allowing Plaintiff to seek redress 

for the deprivation of his rights within a meaningful time. Thus, in an effort to 

vindicate his rights, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the 

Florida Whistle-blower’s Act, Fla. Stat. § 112.3187 (FWA). The other 

The Board has moved to dismiss the FAC, arguing that the FAC fails to state 

a claim upon which relief may be granted. For the reasons stated below, the Board’s 

arguments are without merit, thus Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court 

DENY the Board’s motion to dismiss the FAC.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following factual allegations are relevant for purposes of Plaintiff’s 

response to the Board’s Motion to Dismiss:

1 Hereinafter, Defendant Edler and the Board are collectively referred to as 

“Defendants.”

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Plaintiff, brought the instant action alleging that the Escambia County Board 

of County Commissioners (ECBCC), and Edler, the Escambia County Medical 

Director, in her official and individual capacities, deprived Plaintiff of his 

constitutionally protected rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the 

U.S. Constitution, and that the Board unlawfully retaliated against Plaintiff pursuant 

to Section 112.3187, Florida Statutes. [ECF No. 20]. Specifically, as alleged in the 

FAC, since approximately February 2012, Plaintiff was employed by the ECBCC as 

a paramedic, even serving as a shift captain in the three and one half (3 1/2) years 

prior to the events giving rise to this lawsuit. [ECF No. 20, ¶¶ 5-6]. Prior to the 

allegations raised in the FAC, the ECBCC never had cause to discipline Plaintiff for 

work related conduct because Plaintiff had an exemplary performance history. [ECF 

No. 20, ¶ 7]. 

In approximately April 2018, Defendant Edler began serving as the Escambia 

County Medical Director. [ECF No. 20, ¶ 3]. In that capacity, Edler is responsible 

for the medical performance of all Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) and 

Paramedics of Escambia County; however, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 401.265(1), a 

medical director’s duties explicitly do not include “administrative and managerial 

functions.” Fla. Stat. § 401.265(1). Further, ECBCC’s own attorney, Charles 

Peppler, found that under § 401.265(1), Edler does not have the authority to demote, 

terminate, or otherwise discipline paramedics, including Plaintiff, as those duties are 

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Capacity) Motion to Dismiss

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administrative and/or managerial. [ECF No. 20, ¶¶ 8, 42, Ex. A- Peppler Memo].

Additionally, Edler herself has testified that she does not have the authority to hire, 

fire, or discipline employees in her role as Escambia County Medical Director in a 

separate legal matter. See Rayme Edler v. Melissa Pino, Case No. 2019-CA-001206 

(Escambia County Circuit Court) transcripts attached hereto as Exhibit A.

Nevertheless, the FAC makes clear that Edler did demote, terminate, and otherwise 

discipline Plaintiff more than three weeks after she convened a Quality Assurance 

(QA) board meeting, which did not comply with ECBCC’s own written policies on 

notice and service in the first place, to discuss certain calls Plaintiff participated in. 

[ECF No. 20, ¶ 31]. Further, the FAC makes clear that Defendant Edler did not seek 

to impose such disciplinary action until after she learned that Plaintiff lodged a 

complaint against her regarding the inappropriate QA meeting. [ECF No. 20, ¶¶ 30-

31]. 

Specifically, on or about April 23, 2019, Edler convened a QA meeting to 

discuss Plaintiff’s actions during certain work-related calls. [ECF No. 20, ¶¶ 16-17].

Defendants informed Plaintiff of the QA meeting just fifteen (15) minutes prior to 

the start of the meeting; provided no details regarding the specific subjects to be 

raised at the meeting, either verbally or in writing. [ECF No. 20, ¶ 16]. Plaintiff was 

assured by ECBCC Human Resources and Edler that the meeting was not 

disciplinary in nature. [ECF No. 20, ¶¶ 19, 26]. Additionally, at the QA meeting, 

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Capacity) Motion to Dismiss

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Defendant Edler raised issues concerning calls which dated back almost a year prior 

to the QA meeting. [ECF No. 20, ¶ 28]. Moreover, the composition of the QA board 

was defective in that Shawn Hoopaugh, an ECBCC employee who Plaintiff had 

recently lodged a complaint against regarding sexual harassment, and Bill Hopkins, 

a close personal friend and confidant of Edler’s, were members of the QA board in 

addition to Edler, Captain Craig Ammons and Maddrey. [ECF No. 20, ¶¶ 14-15, 21]. 

At the time of the QA meeting, Plaintiff’s complaint against Hoopaugh was still 

open and unresolved. [ECF No. 20, ¶ 25].

Nevertheless, as explained further below, the Board, at the behest of Edler,

ultimately took disciplinary action against Plaintiff without providing written notice 

of the disciplinary action, including the nature of the action taken, the effective date 

of the action taken, and the duration of the action taken. [ECF No. 20, ¶¶ 19, 26, 93, 

Ex. D- ECBCC Human Resources Policies and Procedures]. But Edler did not seek 

to impose discipline on Plaintiff immediately after the QA meeting, instead, it was 

not until Edler learned that Plaintiff had filed a complaint against her that she first 

informed ECBCC that she wanted to discipline Plaintiff- approximately 23 days 

after the QA meeting. 

Because of the inappropriate QA meeting, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the 

ECBCC HR department. [ECF No. 20, ¶ 28]. For approximately 23 days after the 

QA meeting, Plaintiff continued to work as a paramedic with no restrictions. [ECF 

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No. 20, ¶ 29]. However, after Defendant Edler was informed by Chief Leon Salter 

(Salter) and Interim Public Safety Director John Dosh (Dosh) of Plaintiff’s 

complaint on or about May 13, 2019, Defendant Edler suddenly decided the issues 

raised in the QA meeting warranted disciplinary action against Plaintiff- despite 

assurances from the Board, and Edler herself, that the QA meeting was nondisciplinary in nature- and declared that Plaintiff was unable to work as a paramedic 

under her license- essentially demoting Plaintiff to an administrative role, which cost 

Plaintiff overtime and advancement opportunities. [ECF No. 20, ¶ 31]. Plaintiff was 

never given proper notice of the discipline and was never given an opportunity to 

respond to the charges against him, he was simply removed from his position as a 

paramedic operating in the field and placed in an administrative role for an indefinite 

period of time. [ECF No. 20, ¶ 36]. 

In response to Edler’s sudden intent to discipline Plaintiff, Dosh specifically 

advised Edler that her conduct appeared to be retaliatory in nature. [ECF No. 20, ¶ 

32]. Nevertheless, despite Dosh’s warnings, Edler continued to discipline Plaintiff 

by refusing to return him to full status, and then, almost a month after the QA 

meeting, and after learning of Plaintiff’s complaint against her, Edler also filed a 

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complaint against Plaintiff with the Florida Department of Health (DOH).

2 [ECF 

No. 20, ¶ 37].

After the May 13, 2019 meeting with Dosh, Edler, and Salter, Interim County 

Administrator Mathew Coughlin (Coughlin) instructed Dosh to prepare a 

performance improvement plan (PIP) in order to restore Plaintiff to his full position, 

and Dosh subsequently instructed Edler to draft the PIP. [ECF No. 20, ¶¶ 40-41]. 

However, Edler refused to draft the PIP, and instead pressed for Plaintiff to be further 

demoted to an EMT, or that ECBCC terminate Plaintiff’s employment all together. 

[ECF No. 20, ¶ 41].

Growing concerned with what they identify as a due process issue, Dosh and 

Coughlin requested Charlie Peppler’s opinion (Senior Assistant County Attorney), 

and Peppler found that (1) Edler did not have the authority to discipline Plaintiff; (2) 

Edler’s conduct in removing Plaintiff from working as a paramedic was in effect a 

demotion; and (3) that Plaintiff had due process rights regarding disciplinary action 

taken against him. [ECF No. 20, ¶ 42, Ex. A- Peppler Memo]. At or about the same 

time, Ed Spainhower (Spainhower), ECBCC HR associate, was investigating 

Plaintiff’s complaint against Edler regarding the inappropriate QA meeting and 

2 To date, the DOH has taken no action against Plaintiff, and a third-party 

physician who reviewed Edler’s complaints against Plaintiff determined that 

Edler’s complaints are unfounded. [ECF No. 20, ¶ 39].

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retaliation. Spainhower issued a report in June 2019 which stated “Edler may have 

engaged in conduct that could be construed as harassment given the manner which 

the board was assembled and the processes that were followed in both reporting 

[Plaintiff] to the FDOH and in attempting to demote him without due process.” [ECF 

No. 20, ¶ 45, Ex. B- Spainhower Report]. Spainhower’s report went on to state “It 

is clear that Mr. Selover was not afforded the type of due process required . . . .” 

[ECF No. 20, ¶ 46]. Spainhower ultimately recommended that Plaintiff be returned 

to his full operational status based on Peppler’s opinion that Edler did not have the 

authority to discipline Plaintiff has she had, but ECBCC failed or refused to 

implement Spainhower’s recommendations, and they failed to provide Plaintiff a 

copy of Spainhower’s report to Plaintiff until months later despite the fact that 

Plaintiff repeatedly called HR to check on the status of his complaint over the 

ensuing months. [ECF No. 20, ¶¶ 48-50].

In the meantime, Edler continued her refusal to draft the PIP that Dosh had 

instructed her to draft. [ECF No. 20, ¶ 53]. To make matters worse, Defendant Edler 

took it upon herself to contact the Medical Director of Santa Rosa County to 

disparage Plaintiff’s abilities as a paramedic in an effort to interfere with Plaintiff’s 

second job/part time employment with Santa Rosa County. [ECF No. 20, ¶ 79]. 

Eventually, in July 2019, Salter drafted a PIP which required Plaintiff to work under

the supervision of a Field Training Officer (FTO) for a period of 90 days, but the 

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Capacity) Motion to Dismiss

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PIP was not approved and implemented until August 2019. [ECF No. 20, ¶¶ 54, 57]. 

All the while, Plaintiff had no idea that Spainhower had released a report, let alone 

that the report was favorable to Plaintiff. Nevertheless, Plaintiff completed the terms 

of the PIP, including the full 90 day period, but the Board continued to allow Plaintiff 

to languish in his demoted administrative role, and/or continued to require Plaintiff

work under the supervision of a FTO, which is effectively a demotion, after Plaintiff 

completed the PIP. [ECF No. 20, ¶¶ 58-59]. 

Then, on December 12, 2019, months after all this began, Jana Still (Still), the 

newly appointed Escambia County Director of Human Resources as of 

approximately November 2019, issued a new report backtracking on Spainhower’s 

conclusions, and failing or refusing to address whether Plaintiff was afforded due 

process. [ECF No. 20, ¶ 69]. It is believed that Still drafted her report after a private 

meeting with Defendant Edler and Edler’s attorney. 3 [ECF No. 20, ¶ 72]. Further, 

Still asserted she relied on additional evidence in reaching her conclusions; however, 

when pressed by County Commissioner Jeff Bergosh what additional evidence Still 

relied on, Still was unable to locate said evidence. [ECF No. 20, ¶ 76]. Nevertheless, 

Plaintiff made a timely request to appeal Still’s report on December 17, 2019 but

was told by Still that he had no further appeal rights, and that he should seek further 

3 Still did not meet with Plaintiff before preparing her report. 

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avenues of redress. [ECF No. 20, ¶ 70]. Additionally, ECBCC attorney Alison 

Rogers specifically advised Commissioner Bergosh that Plaintiff would have to file 

his appeal with the courts, and Commissioner Bergosh relayed that message to 

Plaintiff. [ECF No. 20, ¶ 71]. 

Thus, on or about January 17, 2020, Plaintiff filed his lawsuit in Escambia 

County Circuit Court raising various causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a 

Florida Public Whistle Blower claim.

4 In between the original filing of the complaint 

and the FAC, Defendants have constructively discharged Plaintiff from his 

employment. [ECF No. 20, ¶¶ 77, 82]. The FAC alleges seven (7) counts against 

Defendants. Regarding the Board, Count I alleges the Board violated Plaintiff’s 14th 

Amendment due process rights; Count III alleges the Board violated Plaintiff’s 14th 

Amendment substantive property rights; and Count V alleges the Board violated 

Plaintiff’s 1st and 14th Amendment rights by retaliating against Plaintiff for 

exercising his rights to free speech;

5 Count VII alleges the Board violated the Fla. 

Stat. § 123.3187. [ECF No. 20]. The Board moves to dismiss Counts I, III, V, and 

VII, arguing that the FAC fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 

because, according to the Board, (1) the FAC fails to plead sufficient facts to 

4 Defendants timely removed the case to this Court, and thereafter, Plaintiff filed 

the FAC after obtaining consent of the parties and leave of Court. 

5 Counts I, III, and V are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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establish municipal liability under § 1983; (2) the FAC fails to plead sufficient facts 

to establish a violation of due process; (3) Plaintiff’s speech is not protected by the 

First Amendment; (4) Plaintiff failed to comply with Fla. Stat. § 112.3187; and (4) 

Plaintiff’s property interests in his public employment is not a fundamental right 

protected by substantive due process.6 [ECF No. 31]. 

Plaintiff opposes the Board’s Motion to Dismiss, and in support thereof states:

III. MEMORANDUM OF LAW

a. MOTION TO DISMISS LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain a

"short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."

The pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007)). At the motion to dismiss stage, "all-well pleaded facts are accepted as

true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff." Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n.1

(11th Cir. 1999). The Eleventh Circuit has stated that “a complaint should not be 

dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ‘unless it appears beyond doubt that the 

6 Defendant Edler has filed a separate motion to dismiss, [ECF No. 32], to which 

Plaintiff will file a separate response. 

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plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to 

relief.”’ Thomas v. Town of Davie, 847 F.2d 771,773 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Conley 

v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). The issue to be decided in considering a motion 

to dismiss is “not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant 

is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 

236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974).

Thus, a Plaintiff must allege enough facts to state a claim of relief that is 

merely plausible on its face. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (2007). A complaint is

plausible on its face when the plaintiff pleads factual content necessary for the court

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the conduct alleged.

Id. Also, the discretion to dismiss a complaint without leave to amend is “severely 

restrict[ed] by Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) which directs that leave to amend “shall be freely 

given when justice so requires.” Thomas supra at 773 (citing Dussouy v. Gulf Coast 

Investment Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 597 (5th Cir. 1981)). “Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals are 

especially disfavored in cases where the complaint sets forth a novel legal theory 

that can best be assessed after factual development.” Wright v. North Carolina, 787 

F.3d 256, 263 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 

1270 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Baker v. Cuomo, 58 F.3d 814, 818-19 (2d Cir. 1995))). 

b. CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: 

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Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 

other proper proceeding for redress.... 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Through § 1983, Congress sought to give a remedy to parties 

deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official’s abuse of 

his position.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991). “To state a claim under § 1983, 

a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws 

of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by 

a person acting under the color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988). 

Under § 1983, “[p]ersonal capacity suits . . . seek to impose individual liability upon 

a government officer for actions taken under the color of state law.” Hafer v. Melo, 

502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). 

There are several ways to establish municipal liability under § 1983. Under § 

1983, a municipality can be liable (1) based on an official policy of the municipality; 

(2) if the municipality’s final policy makers have acquiesced in a longstanding 

practice that constitutes the entity’s standard operating procedure; or (3) when a 

subordinate public official makes an unconstitutional decision and when that 

decision is then adopted by someone who does have final policymaking authority. 

Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2016). A longstanding 

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and widespread practice that constitutes the entity’s standard operating procedure 

may be shown by establishing the final policy making officials must have known 

about the practice but failed to stop it. Smart v. City of Miami, 740 Fed. Appx. 952, 

961 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Brown v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474, 1481, 

1481 n.11 (11th Cir. 1991)). 

Additionally, while “municipal officials who have final policymaking 

authority may by their actions subject the government to § 1983 liability,” St. Louis 

v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988), in the Eleventh Circuit, “identifying and 

proving that a final policymaker acted on behalf of a municipality is an evidentiary 

standard, and not a pleading requirement.” Hoefling, 811 F.3d at 1280 (internal 

quotations omitted). Nevertheless, “a municipal official who has final policy making 

authority in a certain area of the city’s business may by his or her action subject the 

government to § 1983 liability when the challenged action falls within that 

authority.” Brown, 923 F.2d at 1480. 

However, at the motion to dismiss stage, all a Plaintiff must allege is a policy, 

practice, or custom of the municipality which caused the deprivation of the 

plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Hoefling, 811 F.3d at 1280. Thus, a plaintiff need 

only establish that his rights were violated pursuant to (1) policy, custom, or practice 

of the municipality; or (2) the actions of a final policy maker, not both. Brown, 923 

F.2d at 1481 (“if plaintiff succeeds in proving a city policy of discrimination based 

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on actions of a ‘final policy-maker,’ he would have no need to prove in addition a 

custom or practice of racial discrimination.”). 

Considering the above framework, under § 1983, a claim for procedural due 

process requires a plaintiff to show “(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected 

liberty or property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate 

process.” Catron v. City of St. Petersburg, 658 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 2011) 

(internal quotations omitted). A claim of entitlement to a property interest must be 

decided by reference to state law. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345 (1976). “A 

property interest can . . . be created by ordinance, or by an implied contract.” Id. 

“The essential requirements of due process . . . are notice and opportunity to 

respond.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). 

c. ARGUMENT

The Board has moved to dismiss Counts I, III, V, and VII of the FAC, arguing 

that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim on each count. Specifically, regarding 

Plaintiff’s constitutional claims pleaded in Count I, the Board argues that the FAC 

fails to establish municipal liability under § 1983. Additionally, regarding Plaintiff’s 

due process claim pleaded in Count I, the Board argues that the FAC fails to establish 

a due process violation. Regarding Plaintiff’s Florida Public Whistle Blower claim, 

the Board argues the FAC fails to establish that Plaintiff complied with the technical 

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requirements of Fla. Stat. § 123.3187.7 However, as explained in detail below, the 

Board’s arguments regarding dismissal of Counts I, and VII are without merit.

c.1 The First Amended Complaint has pleaded enough facts to establish 

municipal liability.

As discussed above, municipal liability under § 1983 can be established by 

(1) the municipality’s official policy; (2) the municipality’s final policy makers 

acquiescing to long standing practice, i.e., custom and practice; or (3) when the 

municipality’s final policy makers ratify the conduct of a subordinate. Hoefling, 811 

F.3d at 1279. Further, because final policy makers establish the policy of a 

municipality, the actions of a municipality’s final policy maker may subject the 

municipality to § 1983 liability. See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 123. 

Here, though Plaintiff need only establish one of the theories of liability 

discussed above, as argued below, the FAC states enough factual allegations to 

plausibly infer that the actions complained of (1) were taken pursuant to the Boards 

policy, custom, or practice; or (2) that the ECBCC’s final policy maker(s) ratified 

Edler’s conduct. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. (requiring “only enough facts to 

state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”). 

7 The Board also argues for dismissal of Plaintiff’s substantive due process claims 

pleaded in Count III, and Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims pleaded in 

Count V. Plaintiff does not dispute dismissal of Count III and V. 

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Custom and Practice

The FAC adequately alleges municipal liability against the Board through 

custom and practice. At this stage, all that is required to be alleged is a policy, 

practice, or custom of ECBCC which caused the deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. See 

Hoefling, 811 F.3d at 1280. This Court should find Brown v. City of Fort Lauderdale

instructive. There, the plaintiff was a police officer who brought § 1983 claims 

against the City of Fort Lauderdale alleging that he was terminated due to his race. 

Brown, 923 F.2d at 1475. The district court dismissed the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims 

against the city, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that the plaintiff had 

sufficiently pleaded a custom of racial discrimination. Id. at 1481. In Brown, the 

plaintiff proceeded pro se, but the plaintiff merely alleged “that his experiences were 

the result of discriminatory practices accepted by the police department.” Id. The 

Eleventh Circuit found the allegations enough to overturn the district court’s 

dismissal of the § 1983 claims, stating “a long-standing and widespread practice is 

deemed authorized by the policy-making officials because they must have known 

about it but failed to stop it.” Id. 

Similarly, in Smart v. City of Miami, the Eleventh Circuit approved of the trial 

court’s finding as a matter of law that the constitutional violation arose from the city 

defendant’s custom or practice. Smart, 740 Fed. Appx. At 965. There, the plaintiff’s 

claims arose from the non-consensual filming and broadcast of his apartment, 

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questioning, arrest, and interrogation by the television show The First 48. The 

Eleventh Circuit found that at least two of the instances of non-consensual filming 

were constitutional violations pursuant to the City of Miami’s custom and practice 

of permitting filming without obtaining consent. Id. 

There, with the benefit of a fully developed record, the Eleventh Circuit noted 

the value of circumstantial evidence in establishing a municipal custom or practice 

due to inaction. See id. at 964 (“in the § 1983 context we have held that 

circumstantial evidence . . . can help demonstrate municipal custom or practice due 

to city officials choosing not to take corrective action.” (citing Kerr v. City of W. 

Palm Beach, 875 F.2d 1546, 1556 (11th Cir. 1989)). In approving the trial court’s 

ruling that the city was liable under § 1983 as a matter of law, the Eleventh Circuit 

reasoned that the evidence was enough to permit a reasonable jury to find that the 

city knew about the systemic failure to get consent and did nothing about it. Id. at 

965. 

Also, in Fundiller v. Cooper City, the Eleventh Circuit found that the city’s 

persistent failure to take disciplinary action against officers can give rise to the 

inference that a municipality has ratified conduct, thereby establishing a custom. 

Fundiller v. Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436, 1443 (11th Cir. 1985). There, the complaint 

alleged the city adopted a custom of allowing the use of excessive force by acting 

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with gross indifference to the conduct engaged in by its police officers. Id. at 1442. 

Thus, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s order dismissing the case. Id.

Here, like Brown, Smart, and Fundiller, this Court should find that Plaintiff 

has sufficiently pleaded municipal liability through custom and practice. 

Specifically, here, the FAC alleges that the Board was aware (1) of the improper QA 

meeting convened by Defendant Edler, including the lack of proper notice, the 

conflicted members comprising the board, and the assertion that the QA meeting 

was not disciplinary in nature; (2) that Defendant Edler sought to discipline Plaintiff 

by demoting him, and in fact did demote him by refusing to allow him to work as a 

paramedic in the field; (3) the Board itself did not believe Edler had the authority to 

discipline Plaintiff; (4) other ECBCC employees believed Edler’s conduct to be in 

retaliation for Plaintiff’s complaint; (5) other ECBCC employees believed Edler’s 

conduct violated Plaintiff’s due process rights; and (6) the Board had a history of 

ignoring similar complaints against Edler, and permitting Edler to flout ECBCC 

written policies, and discipline employees with unfettered authority, including the 

five (5) similar instances raised in the FAC.

8 [ECF No. 20, ¶¶ 31, 32, 42, 45, 66, 93]. 

8 Plaintiff has made public records request to obtain information on the five (5) 

similar complaints raised in the FAC, but Defendants have refused to provide 

same, arguing the records are exempt from public records disclosure because the 

incidents are still under investigation. Plaintiff has also requested the records 

through discovery in this case, but Defendants responses to discovery are not due 

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Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Escambia County Board of County Commissioner, and Rayme Edler (Official 

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All the while, the Board allowed the discipline Edler imposed on Plaintiff to stand, 

and in the process, failed or refused to provide Plaintiff with proper notice and 

opportunity to be heard, and took no action to reprimand Edler or to ensure her 

compliance with ECBCC’s written policies. [ECF No. 20, ¶¶ 68, 93]. Thus, the FAC 

alleges the Board’s widespread and established policy of looking the other way as 

Edler violates ECBCC’s employees’ due process rights. 

Nevertheless, the Board argues the above allegations are insufficient, but in 

doing so, the Board ignores most of the allegations pleaded, misconstrues and/or 

misunderstands their significance, or misstates the law. For example, the Board 

argues that the FAC is defective because it fails to identify the final policy maker 

responsible for the policy articulated above; the Board cites a case which Plaintiff is 

unable to locate in support of that proposition.9 [ECF No. 31, p. 11]. However, 

“identifying and proving that a final policymaker acted on behalf of a municipality 

is an evidentiary standard, and not a pleading requirement.” Hoefling, 811 F.3d at 

1280 (internal quotations omitted). Nevertheless, the FAC alleges sufficient factual 

detail to plausibly infer that Still is the final policy maker as the Escambia County 

Director of Human Resources, and the person responsible for preparing the last 

until June 8, 2020. 

9 Plaintiff is unable to verify the cite Knight through Kerr, 856 F.3d at 819. 

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Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Escambia County Board of County Commissioner, and Rayme Edler (Official 

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report stating ECBCC’s position on its investigation into Defendant Edler’s actions, 

a report which the Board adopted as its position on the matter. [ECF No. 20, ¶¶ 69, 

73]. Thus, at the motion to dismiss stage, the Board’s argument is without merit. 

Ratification

The FAC also adequately alleges municipal liability against the Board through 

ratification. Like in Fundiller, here, the FAC also adequately alleges that the Board 

ratified Defendant Edler’s conduct of disciplining Plaintiff without providing due 

process because “a persistent failure to take disciplinary actions . . . can give rise to 

the inference that a municipality has ratified the conduct, thereby establish a custom” 

for purposes of municipal liability under § 1983. Fundiller, 777 F.2d at 1443. 

Moreover, the Board expressly ratified Edler’s conduct when it ultimately adopted 

Still’s report, which effectively condoned Defendant Edler’s conduct. Regarding 

ratification through the Board’s failure to act, the FAC alleges inaction in the face 

of ECBCC’s own employees, including its legal counsel, believing that Edler (1) did 

not have the authority to discipline Plaintiff; (2) was violating Plaintiff’s due process 

rights; and (3) was retaliating against Plaintiff. [ECF No. 20, ¶¶ 41, 42, 45]. Further, 

the FAC also alleges that the Board adopted Defendant Edler’s conduct as its own 

when it refused to take any action against Edler, and refused to return Plaintiff to his 

full status as a paramedic in the field, even after Plaintiff completed the PIP, and all

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in the face of an established and known history of Edler refusing to abide by 

ECBCC’s written policies in at least five (5) other instances. [ECF No. 20, ¶ 93]. 

Thus, not only does the Board’s indifference, and refusal to act support 

municipal liability based on custom, or practice, but ECBCC’s express action 

adopting Eder’s discipline of Plaintiff all but expressly approved of, i.e., ratified, 

Defendant Edler’s conduct. Moreover, the Board’s adoption of Still’s report in fact 

expressly ratified Edler’s conduct. Thus, the FAC adequately alleges the County 

Defendants violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights under the custom and practice, 

and ratification theories of municipal liability.

Finally, the Board asserts that the FAC fails to adequately allege that the 

policy, custom or practice at issue was the moving force behind the constitutional 

violation. Here, again, the Board ignores or misconstrues the allegations of the FAC. 

For example, the Board asserts that the FAC fails to attach any documents which 

identify, reference, or allege a widespread practice policy, or custom that was the 

moving force behind the constitutional deprivation. Aside from the fact that the 

Board cites no authority which requires a complaint attach such documents to 

survive a motion to dismiss stage, where all reasonable inferences are drawn in 

Plaintiff’s favor, the statement is simply untrue. Moreover, as noted above, Plaintiff 

has requested these documents through public records request and discovery, but 

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Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Escambia County Board of County Commissioner, and Rayme Edler (Official 

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Defendants have asserted the documents are exempt from public records requests, 

and Defendants’ discovery responses are not due until June 8, 2020. 

Nevertheless, as explained above, the FAC attached the Board’s HR policies, 

identified which policies applied to Plaintiff’s circumstances, and explained how the 

Board had a widespread and established history of permitting Defendant Edler to 

flout ECBCC’s disciplinary procedures to the detriment of other ECBCC’s 

employees. [ECF No. 20, ¶¶ 61, 66, 93]. But for the Board’s failure to take any action 

against Edler to force her to comply with ECBCC’s written policies and procedures, 

Plaintiff would not have suffered the deprivation of his due process rights. Thus, the 

FAC clearly establishes that the Board’s policy of inaction in light of what it knew 

or should have known was the moving force behind Plaintiff’s constitutional 

deprivation. 

d.2 The First Amended Complaint has pleaded enough facts to establish the 

Board violated Plaintiff’s due process rights.

To state a claim for a due process violation, the complaint must 

plausibly plead “(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or property 

interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.” Catron v. City 

of St. Petersburg, 658 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations 

omitted). Whether Plaintiff has a property interest in his employment will be 

determined by state law. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345 (1976). “The essential 

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Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Escambia County Board of County Commissioner, and Rayme Edler (Official 

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requirements of due process . . . are notice and opportunity to respond.” Cleveland 

Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). 

Here, there is no dispute regarding Plaintiff’s property interest, as the Board 

acknowledges that public employment is a constitutionally protected interest. See 

[ECF No. 31, p. 18]. Instead, the Board argues that the FAC fails to establish that 

the process was constitutionally adequate because Plaintiff was given a notice and 

opportunity to be heard. The Board’s argument either ignores much of the factual 

allegations pleaded in the FAC or fundamentally misunderstands what happened 

here. The fact is, the Board provided no notice and no opportunity to be heard prior 

to or after Plaintiff suffering disciplinary action, or alternatively the notice was 

improper.

10

To be clear, the constitutional violation in this case is not encompassed by the 

Board’s refusal to follow its own written policies regarding the QA meeting, or the 

10 Given that the Plaintiff was told by Defendants that the QA meeting was nondisciplinary, Plaintiff believes that he has a constitutional right to be heard when 

Defendant Edler tried to punish/reprimand the Plaintiff, which was 23 days after 

the QA meeting. However, to the extent that the Defendants believe that the QA 

meeting would satisfy his constitutional rights, then Plaintiff contends that the QA 

meeting was insufficient as (1) he had a lack of notice of the meeting itself; (2) he 

was not provided any notice of the subject of the meeting, (3) he was told that the 

meeting was non-disciplinary, (4) the meeting did not follow the Boards policies 

and procedures, and (5) the make-up of the QA board was improper.

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Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Escambia County Board of County Commissioner, and Rayme Edler (Official 

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QA meeting itself- though Edler and the Board did completely fail to adhere to 

ECBCC’s written policies. Instead, here, the constitutional violation is that after the 

QA meeting convened by Edler, a meeting which the Board and Edler assured 

Plaintiff was non-disciplinary, the Board, at the behest of Edler, in fact disciplined 

Plaintiff, but not until 23 days after the QA meeting, and then, the Board refused to 

give Plaintiff any opportunity to confront the charges against him which gave rise to 

the disciple the Board sought to impose. [ECF No. 20, ¶¶ 19, 26, 31]. That the QA 

board did not recommend remediation, re-training, or performance improvement at 

the conclusion of the QA meeting further supports Plaintiff’s argument that the 

constitutional violation in this case stems from Defendants’ actions after the QA 

meeting, not actions directly related to the QA meeting. [ECF No. 20, ¶ 27]. Thus, 

stated succinctly, the constitutional violation in this case was in failing to provide 

Plaintiff with a meaningful opportunity to be heard, either through a pre or post 

deprivation hearing, regarding Defendants’ decisions to (1) permit Edler to fail or 

refuse to follow ECBCC’s written policies; (2) demote Plaintiff and require him to 

comply with the PIP; (3) constructively discharge Plaintiff. 

The Board’s actions after the QA meeting in refusing to provide Plaintiff with 

a meaningful notice and opportunity to be heard is clearly established by the fact 

that the Board itself thought that, not only did Edler not have the authority to 

discipline Plaintiff, but that Edler was violating Plaintiff’s due process rights and 

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Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Escambia County Board of County Commissioner, and Rayme Edler (Official 

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retaliating against him, ECF No. 20, ¶¶ 41, 42, 45, yet the Board (1) refused to 

release the Spainhower report, with findings favorable to Plaintiff, (2) refused to 

return Plaintiff to full work status, even after he completed the PIP, and (3) then 

refused to allow Plaintiff to appeal the Still report. [ECF No. 20, ¶¶ 50, 58, 70]. All 

the while, the Board continued to keep Plaintiff in his demoted role for more than 

ten (10) months. [ECF No. 20, ¶ 82]. 

With the Board refusing (1) to return Plaintiff to full working status, even after 

he completed the PIP; (2) to comply with its own written procedures; (3) Plaintiff’s 

request to appeal the Still report; and (4) to permit Plaintiff’s attendance at 

supervisors’ meetings for such a prolonged period of time with no end in sight, 

Plaintiff was forced to resign, i.e., constructively discharged. See Bryant v. Jones, 

575 F.3d 1281, 198 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Constructive discharge occurs when an 

employer deliberately makes an employee’s working conditions intolerable and 

thereby forces him to quit his job.”). Under these circumstances, Plaintiff has a 

clearly defined property interest which garners constitutional due process 

protections because, under Florida law, Plaintiff could only be disciplined for cause, 

and because Plaintiff was entitled to a QA meeting and disciplinary measures to be 

conducted in accordance with ECBCC’s written policies. See Bishop, 426 U.S. at 

345 (A property interest can . . . be created by ordinance, or by an implied contract.);

[ECF No. 20, Exhibit D- HR Policies]. Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to meaningful 

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Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Escambia County Board of County Commissioner, and Rayme Edler (Official 

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notice and an opportunity to be heard if the Board sought to act outside the scope of 

its written policies, if it sought to demote him and force him to comply with the PIP, 

or if it sought to discharge him. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 547 (“The Due Process 

clause requires provision of a hearing at a meaningful time.”). In the employment 

context, Plaintiff was entitled to a pre-deprivation opportunity to respond coupled 

with a full evidentiary hearing post-deprivation. See id. at 546-48. But no notice or 

hearing was conducted here. 

The Board argues that the QA notice given to Plaintiff verbally 15 minutes 

prior to the QA meeting, and the QA meeting itself satisfies the Board’s obligation 

to provide Plaintiff with a meaningful opportunity to be heard, but the Board’s 

argument is misplaced. While “the state is obligated only to make available the 

means by which [the employee] can receive redress for the deprivations . . .” here, 

the Board has provided no such means. McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1562 (11th 

Cir. 1994). The Board’s argument that it provided due process to Plaintiff relies on 

its assertion that notice and opportunity to be heard was satisfied by the April 23, 

2019 QA meeting, but that argument is misplaced because (1) the QA meeting failed 

to adhere to ECBCC’s own written policies; (2) the Board, and Edler assured 

Plaintiff the QA meeting was non-disciplinary; (3) Defendant Edler did not impose 

discipline on Plaintiff until well after the meeting, in fact, it was not until after Edler 

learned of Plaintiff’s complaint against her, despite the Board’s assurances; (4) the 

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Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Escambia County Board of County Commissioner, and Rayme Edler (Official 

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Board kept Plaintiff in the dark, failing to timely release the Spainhower report, 

contrary to their policies; (5) the Board ultimately disciplined Plaintiff at Edler’s 

behest; (6) the Board failed to allow Plaintiff to return to full work status, even after 

he completed the PIP; (7) when Plaintiff requested to appeal the Still report, Still 

told Plaintiff he had no more appeal rights- preventing him from having any 

opportunity to redress the deprivations through the Board’s processes- leaving 

Plaintiff in career limbo, and creating circumstances which amount to a constructive 

discharge of Plaintiff’s employment; and (8) as argued above, the constitutional 

violation in this case stems from Defendants’ actions after the QA meeting. [ECF 

No. 20, ¶¶ 19, 26, 28, 31, 36, 49-50, 70, 77]. 

Accordingly, the board has refused to provide Plaintiff with due process, 

either before the deprivation of his rights, or after, completing the violation of 

Plaintiff’s rights. McKinney, 20 F.3d at 156 (“a procedural due process violation is 

not complete unless and until the State fails to provide due process.”). Thus, the 

Board’s argument that the FAC fails to establish a violation of due process is without 

merit.219 

d.3 The FAC has pleaded enough facts to establish Plaintiff’s Florida 

Whistle-blower Claim.

To establish a prima facia case of retaliatory discharge under the FWA, the 

complaint must show that the Plaintiff (1) engaged in a statutorily protected 

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Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Escambia County Board of County Commissioner, and Rayme Edler (Official 

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expression; (2) he suffered a materially adverse action of a type that would dissuade 

a reasonable employee from engaging in statutorily protected activity; and (3) there 

was some causal relation between the events. Batz v. City of Sebring, 794 Fed. Appx. 

889, 901 (11th Cir. 2019). The FWA protects “employees who file any written 

complaint to their supervisory officials . . . .” Fla. Stat. § 112.3187(7). Because this 

case concerns a local government, to be protected under the FWA, the information 

disclosed “must be disclosed to . . . a chief executive officer as defined in s. 

447.203(9), or other appropriate local official. The FWA “should be liberally 

construed.” King v. Florida, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1162 (N.D. Fla. 2009). 

The Board argues for dismissal because, according to the Board, the FAC fails 

to establish the first element. Here, the Board argues the FAC fails to establish the 

first element because, according to the Board, Plaintiff did not report his complaints 

about Edler to the right person, and because Plaintiff’s complaints about Edler do 

not rise to the level of gross neglect of duty, or substantial and specific danger to the 

public’s health, safety, or welfare. See Fla. Stat. § 112.3187(5) (“the information 

disclosed under this section must include: Any violation or suspected violation of 

any federal, state, or local law, rule, or regulation . . . which creates and presents a 

substantial and specific danger to the public’s health, safety, or welfare . . . [a]ny act 

or suspected act of gross mismanagement, malfeasance, misfeasance, gross waste of 

public funds . . . or gross neglect of duty . . . .”).

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However, the Board’s argument is misplaced for two reasons. First, at the 

motion to dismiss stage, all reasonable inferences are to be drawn in Plaintiff’s favor. 

Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1273 n.1. Here, the FAC plainly alleges that Plaintiff’s 

complaints about Edler were disclosed to Spainhower in ECBCC’s human resources 

department, and that Spainhower was tasked with investigating same. [ECF No. 20, 

¶ 44]. As a member of ECBCC’s HR department whom ECBCC tasked with 

investigating Plaintiff’s complaints, Spainhower is an “other appropriate official.” 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s complaint was disclosed to Mathew Coughlin, the Interim 

County Administrator at the time. See Plaintiff’s HR Complaint, attached hereto as 

Exhibit B. Thus, while the FAC may not specifically state that Plaintiff’s complaints 

against Edler were disclosed to Spainhower, or Coughlin, at the motion to dismiss 

stage, with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of Plaintiff, the Court should 

find that the FAC adequately alleges facts showing that Plaintiff’s complaints were 

disclosed to the proper individual(s) under the FWA. 

Next, the Board argues that the nature of the information Plaintiff disclosed 

in his complaint is not protected by the FWA. Here, again, the Board’s argument is 

misplaced as is its reliance on King v. Florida. First, “the liberal construction of the 

Whistle-blower’s Act applies to this element as well.” King, 650 F. Supp. 2d at 1164. 

Second, King supports Plaintiff’s position here. For example, there, the Northern 

District of Florida found that the allegations satisfied the FWA requirements when 

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the plaintiff alleged (1) that the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) 

engaged in bias, or favoritism during the hiring process; and (2) that the DEP bureau 

chief used emergency dispatch lines to report a false crime in order to incriminate 

another employee. Id. at 1161. The King Court noted that the plaintiff’s complaint 

was “vague and convoluted” but “based upon the liberal construction of the 

Whistleblower’s Act and the low pleading threshold . . . to survive a 12(b)(6) 

motion” the plaintiff’s whistleblower claims should not be dismissed. Id. at 64. 

Here, similar to King, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient allegations to establish 

that his complaint against Edler disclosed information concerning Edler’s gross 

neglect of duty, or substantial and specific danger to the public’s health, safety, or 

welfare under the liberally construed FWA. For example, here, Plaintiff alleged that 

after the QA meeting, he filed a complaint with HR expressing concerns over Edler’s 

failure or refusal to abide by ECBCC’s policies and procedures regarding QA 

meetings, and that Plaintiff believed Edler’s conduct was in retaliation for Plaintiff 

reporting Glenda Owens, and Amanda Frando for inappropriate conduct. [ECF No. 

20, ¶ 28]. Thus, here, Plaintiff’s allegations are similar to the allegations of 

favoritism, or bias in King. Moreover, here, Plaintiff’s complaints against Edler 

directly implicate a “substantial and specific danger to the public’s health, safety, or 

welfare” because it concerns the operation of Escambia County’s Emergency 

Medical Services, services which the residents of Escambia County rely on for 

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health, safety and welfare, including preventing Plaintiff, a qualified paramedic, 

from operating in his full capacity as a paramedic at a time when Escambia County 

EMS was short staffed.11

Accordingly, the FAC establishes that Plaintiff’s complaints about Edler were 

disclosed to the appropriate individual(s), and that Plaintiff’s complaints against 

Edler concerned gross neglect of duty, or substantial and specific danger to the 

public’s health, safety, or welfare. Thus, the Court should find that the Board’s 

argument is without merit. 

IV. ALTERNATIVELY, PLAINTIFF REQUESTS THE OPPORTUNITY 

TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT

Although Plaintiff believes the FAC adequately alleges liability against the 

Defendant Edler, should this Court find Plaintiff’s Complaint defective in any way, 

Plaintiff respectfully requests leave to amend. Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure declares that leave to amend a complaint should be freely given by 

the Court when justice so requires. See also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 83 S.Ct. 

227 (1962) (“Rule 15(a) declares that leave to amend 'shall be freely given when 

justice so requires'; this mandate is to be heeded...”). “If the underlying facts or 

11 Though not specifically alleged in the FAC, Plaintiff has recently come into 

possession of additional evidence concerning Escambia County EMS being short 

staffed. See Email from Ed Spainhower to John Dosh and Leon Salter, attached 

hereto as Exhibit C. 

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circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought 

to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits.” Id. “In the absence of 

any apparent...reason – such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part 

of the movant, repeated failures to cure deficiencies by amendments previously 

allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party... futility of amendment, etc. – the 

leave sought should, as the rules require, be freely given. ” 

Here, this case is in its preliminary stages, and the parties will suffer no 

prejudice by permitting amendment to Plaintiff’s Complaint. While the original 

Complaint has been amended once, that amendment occurred subsequent to the 

Defendants removing this case to Federal Court. Accordingly, should the Court find 

that the FAC is defective for any reason, under the liberal standard for leave to 

amend, the Court should grant Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his Complaint.

While Plaintiff believes the FAC satisfies the plausibility pleading standard, 

amendment would not be futile because Plaintiff would seek to add additional 

allegations such as attaching Plaintiff’s written complaint to HR showing that the 

information was disclosed to Interim County Administrator Coughlin; and attaching 

an email from Spainhower to Dosh and Salter regarding Escambia County EMS 

being short staffed

V. CONCLUSION

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Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, this Honorable Court should find that 

the Board’s Motion to Dismiss is without Merit. Thus, Plaintiff respectfully requests 

that the Court deny Defendant Edler’s Motion to Dismiss. 

Alternatively, should the Court find that the FAC does not adequately allege 

claims against the Board, then Plaintiff respectfully requests leave of Court to file 

an amended complaint.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Jeremiah J. Talbott

JEREMIAH J. TALBOTT, ESQ.

Fla. Bar No. 0154784

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL RULE 7.1(F)

In accordance with N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 7.1(F), counsel for the Plaintiff hereby 

certifies there are 7,999 words in this Response in Opposition to the Board’s Motion 

to Dismiss, not including the case style, signature blocks, or certificates. 

/s/ Jeremiah J. Talbott

JEREMIAH J. TALBOTT, ESQ. 

Attorney for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 8th day of June 2020, a true and 

correct copy of the foregoing Response was furnished to counsel for the Defendant

as listed below via CMC/ECF, E-Mail and U.S. Mail.

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Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Escambia County Board of County Commissioner, and Rayme Edler (Official 

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/s/ Jeremiah J. Talbott

JEREMIAH J. TALBOTT, ESQ.

SERVICE LIST

Stephanie Pidermann, Esquire

Lydecker Diaz

1221 Brickell Avenue, 19th Floor

Miami, FL 33131

sp@lydeckerdiaz.com

kg@lydeckerdiaz.com

ksm@lydeckerdiaz.com

Cecily L. Kaffer, Esq.

The Kullman Firm

P.O. Box 1287

Mobile, AL 36633

clk@kullmanlaw.com

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