1

“WE HAVE 

SOME PLANES”

Tuesday, September 11, 2001, dawned temperate and nearly cloudless 

the eastern United States. Millions of men and women readied themselves 

work.Some made their way to the Twin Towers,the signature structures of t

World Trade Center complex in New York City.Others went to Arlington,V

ginia, to the Pentagon.Across the Potomac River, the United States Congr

was back in session. At the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, people began 

line up for a White House tour. In Sarasota, Florida, President George W. Bu

went for an early morning run.

For those heading to an airport, weather conditions could not have be

better for a safe and pleasant journey.Among the travelers were Mohamed A

and Abdul Aziz al Omari, who arrived at the airport in Portland, Maine.

1.1 INSIDE THE FOUR FLIGHTS

Boarding the Flights

Boston:American 11 and United 175.Atta and Omari boarded a 6:00 A

flight from Portland to Boston’s Logan International Airport.1

When he checked in for his flight to Boston,Atta was selected by a com

puterized prescreening system known as CAPPS (Computer Assisted Passe

ger Prescreening System), created to identify passengers who should 

subject to special security measures. Under security rules in place at the tim

the only consequence of Atta’s selection by CAPPS was that his checked b

were held off the plane until it was confirmed that he had boarded the a

craft. This did not hinder Atta’s plans.2

Atta and Omari arrived in Boston at 6:45. Seven minutes later,Atta app

ently took a call from Marwan al Shehhi, a longtime colleague who was 

another terminal at Logan Airport.They spoke for three minutes.3 It would 

their final conversation.
Between 6:45 and 7:40,Atta and Omari, along with Satam al Suqami,W

al Shehri, and Waleed al Shehri, checked in and boarded American Airlin

Flight 11, bound for Los Angeles.The flight was scheduled to depart at 7:4

In another Logan terminal, Shehhi, joined by Fayez Banihammad, Moha

al Shehri, Ahmed al Ghamdi, and Hamza al Ghamdi, checked in for Unit

Airlines Flight 175,also bound for Los Angeles.A couple of Shehhi’s colleagu

were obviously unused to travel;according to the United ticket agent,they h

trouble understanding the standard security questions, and she had to go ov

them slowly until they gave the routine, reassuring answers.5 Their flight w

scheduled to depart at 8:00.

The security checkpoints through which passengers, including Atta and 

colleagues, gained access to the American 11 gate were operated by Glo

Security under a contract with American Airlines. In a different terminal, t

single checkpoint through which passengers for United 175 passed was co

trolled by United Airlines, which had contracted with Huntleigh USA to p

form the screening.6

In passing through these checkpoints,each of the hijackers would have be

screened by a walk-through metal detector calibrated to detect items with 

least the metal content of a .22-caliber handgun.Anyone who might have 

off that detector would have been screened with a hand wand—a procedu

requiring the screener to identify the metal item or items that caused the alar

In addition, an X-ray machine would have screened the hijackers’ carry-

belongings.The screening was in place to identify and confiscate weapons a

other items prohibited from being carried onto a commercial flight.7 None 

the checkpoint supervisors recalled the hijackers or reported anything sus

cious regarding their screening.8

While Atta had been selected by CAPPS in Portland, three members of 

hijacking team—Suqami,Wail al Shehri, and Waleed al Shehri—were select

in Boston.Their selection affected only the handling of their checked bags,n

their screening at the checkpoint. All five men cleared the checkpoint a

made their way to the gate for American 11. Atta, Omari, and Suqami to

their seats in business class (seats 8D, 8G, and 10B, respectively).The She

brothers had adjacent seats in row 2 (Wail in 2A,Waleed in 2B), in the fir

class cabin. They boarded American 11 between 7:31 and 7:40. The aircr

pushed back from the gate at 7:40.9

Shehhi and his team, none of whom had been selected by CAPPS, board

United 175 between 7:23 and 7:28 (Banihammad in 2A, Shehri in 2B, Sheh

in 6C, Hamza al Ghamdi in 9C, and Ahmed al Ghamdi in 9D).Their aircr

pushed back from the gate just before 8:00.10

Washington Dulles:American 77. Hundreds of miles southwest of Bosto

at Dulles International Airport in the Virginia suburbs of Washington, D.

five more men were preparing to take their early morning flight.At 7:15,a p
of them, Khalid al Mihdhar and Majed Moqed, checked in at the Americ

Airlines ticket counter for Flight 77, bound for Los Angeles.Within the ne

20 minutes,they would be followed by Hani Hanjour and two brothers,Naw

al Hazmi and Salem al Hazmi.11

Hani Hanjour, Khalid al Mihdhar, and Majed Moqed were flagged 

CAPPS.The Hazmi brothers were also selected for extra scrutiny by the a

line’s customer service representative at the check-in counter. He did 

because one of the brothers did not have photo identification nor could 

understand English, and because the agent found both of the passengers 

be suspicious.The only consequence of their selection was that their check

bags were held off the plane until it was confirmed that they had board

the aircraft.12

All five hijackers passed through the Main Terminal’s west security scree

ing checkpoint; United Airlines, which was the responsible air carrier, h

contracted out the work to Argenbright Security.13 The checkpoint featur

closed-circuit television that recorded all passengers, including the hijacke

as they were screened. At 7:18, Mihdhar and Moqed entered the secur

checkpoint.

Mihdhar and Moqed placed their carry-on bags on the belt of the X-

machine and proceeded through the first metal detector.Both set off the alar

and they were directed to a second metal detector.Mihdhar did not trigger t

alarm and was permitted through the checkpoint. After Moqed set it off

screener wanded him. He passed this inspection.14

About 20 minutes later, at 7:35, another passenger for Flight 77, Hani Ha

jour, placed two carry-on bags on the X-ray belt in the Main Terminal’s w

checkpoint,and proceeded,without alarm,through the metal detector.A sh

time later, Nawaf and Salem al Hazmi entered the same checkpoint. Salem 

Hazmi cleared the metal detector and was permitted through;Nawaf al Haz

set off the alarms for both the first and second metal detectors and was th

hand-wanded before being passed.In addition,his over-the-shoulder carry-

bag was swiped by an explosive trace detector and then passed. The vid

footage indicates that he was carrying an unidentified item in his back pock

clipped to its rim.15

When the local civil aviation security office of the Federal Aviation Adm

istration (FAA) later investigated these security screening operations, t

screeners recalled nothing out of the ordinary.They could not recall that a

of the passengers they screened were CAPPS selectees.We asked a screeni

expert to review the videotape of the hand-wanding, and he found the qu

ity of the screener’s work to have been “marginal at best.”The screener shou

have “resolved” what set off the alarm; and in the case of both Moqed a

Hazmi, it was clear that he did not.16

At 7:50, Majed Moqed and Khalid al Mihdhar boarded the flight and w

seated in 12A and 12B in coach. Hani Hanjour, assigned to seat 1B (first cla
soon followed.The Hazmi brothers,sitting in 5E and 5F, joined Hanjour in t

first-class cabin.17

Newark: United 93. Between 7:03 and 7:39, Saeed al Ghamdi, Ahmed 

Nami,Ahmad al Haznawi, and Ziad Jarrah checked in at the United Airlin

ticket counter for Flight 93, going to Los Angeles.Two checked bags; two d

not.Haznawi was selected by CAPPS.His checked bag was screened for exp

sives and then loaded on the plane.18

The four men passed through the security checkpoint, owned by Unit

Airlines and operated under contract by Argenbright Security. Like the chec

points in Boston, it lacked closed-circuit television surveillance so there is 

documentary evidence to indicate when the hijackers passed through t

checkpoint,what alarms may have been triggered,or what security procedu

were administered.The FAA interviewed the screeners later;none recalled an

thing unusual or suspicious.19

The four men boarded the plane between 7:39 and 7:48. All four had se

in the first-class cabin; their plane had no business-class section. Jarrah was 

seat 1B, closest to the cockpit; Nami was in 3C, Ghamdi in 3D, and Hazna

in 6B.20

The 19 men were aboard four transcontinental flights.21 They were pla

ning to hijack these planes and turn them into large guided missiles, load

with up to 11,400 gallons of jet fuel. By 8:00 A.M. on the morning of Tuesd

September 11,2001,they had defeated all the security layers that America’s ci

aviation security system then had in place to prevent a hijacking.

The Hijacking of American 11

American Airlines Flight 11 provided nonstop service from Boston to L

Angeles. On September 11, Captain John Ogonowski and First Offi

Thomas McGuinness piloted the Boeing 767.It carried its full capacity of ni

flight attendants. Eighty-one passengers boarded the flight with them (inclu

ing the five terrorists).22

The plane took off at 7:59. Just before 8:14, it had climbed to 26,000 fe

not quite its initial assigned cruising altitude of 29,000 feet.All communicatio

and flight profile data were normal.About this time the “Fasten Seatbelt” si

would usually have been turned off and the flight attendants would have beg

preparing for cabin service.23

At that same time, American 11 had its last routine communication w

the ground when it acknowledged navigational instructions from the FA

air traffic control (ATC) center in Boston.Sixteen seconds after that transm

sion,ATC instructed the aircraft’s pilots to climb to 35,000 feet.That messa

and all subsequent attempts to contact the flight were not acknowledg

From this and other evidence, we believe the hijacking began at 8:14 

shortly thereafter.24
Reports from two flight attendants in the coach cabin, Betty Ong a

Madeline “Amy” Sweeney, tell us most of what we know about how t

hijacking happened. As it began, some of the hijackers—most likely Wail 

Shehri and Waleed al Shehri,who were seated in row 2 in first class—stabb

the two unarmed flight attendants who would have been preparing for cab

service.25

We do not know exactly how the hijackers gained access to the cockp

FAA rules required that the doors remain closed and locked during flight.O

speculated that they had “jammed their way” in. Perhaps the terrorists stabb

the flight attendants to get a cockpit key,to force one of them to open the coc

pit door, or to lure the captain or first officer out of the cockpit. Or the flig

attendants may just have been in their way.26

At the same time or shortly thereafter, Atta—the only terrorist on boa

trained to fly a jet—would have moved to the cockpit from his business-cl

seat, possibly accompanied by Omari.As this was happening, passenger Dan

Lewin, who was seated in the row just behind Atta and Omari, was stabbed 

one of the hijackers—probably Satam al Suqami, who was seated direc

behind Lewin. Lewin had served four years as an officer in the Israeli milita

He may have made an attempt to stop the hijackers in front of him, not re

izing that another was sitting behind him.27

The hijackers quickly gained control and sprayed Mace, pepper spray, 

some other irritant in the first-class cabin, in order to force the passengers a

flight attendants toward the rear of the plane.They claimed they had a bomb

About five minutes after the hijacking began, Betty Ong contacted t

American Airlines Southeastern Reservations Office in Cary, North Caroli

via an AT&T airphone to report an emergency aboard the flight.This was t

first of several occasions on 9/11 when flight attendants took action outsi

the scope of their training, which emphasized that in a hijacking, they were 

communicate with the cockpit crew.The emergency call lasted approximat

25 minutes,as Ong calmly and professionally relayed information about eve

taking place aboard the airplane to authorities on the ground.29

At 8:19, Ong reported:“The cockpit is not answering, somebody’s stabb

in business class—and I think there’s Mace—that we can’t breathe—I do

know,I think we’re getting hijacked.”She then told of the stabbings of the tw

flight attendants.30

At 8:21, one of the American employees receiving Ong’s call in North C

olina, Nydia Gonzalez, alerted the American Airlines operations center in F

Worth,Texas,reaching Craig Marquis,the manager on duty.Marquis soon re

ized this was an emergency and instructed the airline’s dispatcher responsi

for the flight to contact the cockpit. At 8:23,the dispatcher tried unsuccessfu

to contact the aircraft. Six minutes later,the air traffic control specialist in Am

ican’s operations center contacted the FAA’s Boston Air Traffic Control Cen

about the flight.The center was already aware of the problem.31
Boston Center knew of a problem on the flight in part because just befo

8:25 the hijackers had attempted to communicate with the passengers. T

microphone was keyed, and immediately one of the hijackers said,“Nobo

move. Everything will be okay. If you try to make any moves, you’ll endang

yourself and the airplane.Just stay quiet.”Air traffic controllers heard the tran

mission;Ong did not.The hijackers probably did not know how to operate t

cockpit radio communication system correctly, and thus inadvertently broa

cast their message over the air traffic control channel instead of the cab

public-address channel. Also at 8:25, and again at 8:29, Amy Sweeney g

through to the American Flight Services Office in Boston but was cut off af

she reported someone was hurt aboard the flight.Three minutes later,Sween

was reconnected to the office and began relaying updates to the manag

Michael Woodward.32

At 8:26,Ong reported that the plane was “flying erratically.”A minute lat

Flight 11 turned south. American also began getting identifications of t

hijackers, as Ong and then Sweeney passed on some of the seat numbers 

those who had gained unauthorized access to the cockpit.33

Sweeney calmly reported on her line that the plane had been hijacked

man in first class had his throat slashed; two flight attendants had be

stabbed—one was seriously hurt and was on oxygen while the other’s woun

seemed minor; a doctor had been requested; the flight attendants were una

to contact the cockpit; and there was a bomb in the cockpit. Sweeney to

Woodward that she and Ong were trying to relay as much information as th

could to people on the ground.34

At 8:38, Ong told Gonzalez that the plane was flying erratically aga

Around this time Sweeney told Woodward that the hijackers were Middle Ea

erners, naming three of their seat numbers. One spoke very little English a

one spoke excellent English.The hijackers had gained entry to the cockpit,a

she did not know how.The aircraft was in a rapid descent.35

At 8:41, Sweeney told Woodward that passengers in coach were under t

impression that there was a routine medical emergency in first class. Oth

flight attendants were busy at duties such as getting medical supplies while O

and Sweeney were reporting the events.36

At 8:41, in American’s operations center, a colleague told Marquis that t

air traffic controllers declared Flight 11 a hijacking and “think he’s [Americ

11] headed toward Kennedy [airport in New York City].They’re moving ever

body out of the way.They seem to have him on a primary radar.They seem 

think that he is descending.”37

At 8:44, Gonzalez reported losing phone contact with Ong. About t

same time Sweeney reported to Woodward,“Something is wrong.We are i

rapid descent . . . we are all over the place.”Woodward asked Sweeney to lo

out the window to see if she could determine where they were. Sween

responded:“We are flying low.We are flying very, very low. We are flying w
too low.”Seconds later she said,“Oh my God we are way too low.” The pho

call ended.38

At 8:46:40,American 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Tra

Center in New York City.39 All on board, along with an unknown number 

people in the tower, were killed instantly.

The Hijacking of United 175

United Airlines Flight 175 was scheduled to depart for Los Angeles at 8:00.Ca

tain Victor Saracini and First Officer Michael Horrocks piloted the Boeing 76

which had seven flight attendants. Fifty-six passengers boarded the flight.40

United 175 pushed back from its gate at 7:58 and departed Logan Airp

at 8:14.By 8:33,it had reached its assigned cruising altitude of 31,000 feet.T

flight attendants would have begun their cabin service.41

The flight had taken off just as American 11 was being hijacked,and at 8

the United 175 flight crew completed their report on a “suspicious transm

sion”overheard from another plane (which turned out to have been Flight 1

just after takeoff.This was United 175’s last communication with the ground

The hijackers attacked sometime between 8:42 and 8:46.They used kniv

(as reported by two passengers and a flight attendant), Mace (reported by o

passenger), and the threat of a bomb (reported by the same passenger).Th

stabbed members of the flight crew (reported by a flight attendant and one p

senger).Both pilots had been killed (reported by one flight attendant).The ey

witness accounts came from calls made from the rear of the plane, fro

passengers originally seated further forward in the cabin, a sign that passeng

and perhaps crew had been moved to the back of the aircraft. Given simila

ties to American 11 in hijacker seating and in eyewitness reports of tactics a

weapons, as well as the contact between the presumed team leaders,Atta a

Shehhi, we believe the tactics were similar on both flights.43

The first operational evidence that something was abnormal on Unit

175 came at 8:47, when the aircraft changed beacon codes twice within 

minute. At 8:51, the flight deviated from its assigned altitude, and a minu

later New York air traffic controllers began repeatedly and unsuccessfully tr

ing to contact it.44

At 8:52, in Easton, Connecticut, a man named Lee Hanson received 

phone call from his son Peter, a passenger on United 175. His son told hi

“I think they’ve taken over the cockpit—An attendant has been stabbed

and someone else up front may have been killed. The plane is maki

strange moves.Call United Airlines—Tell them it’s Flight 175,Boston to LA

Lee Hanson then called the Easton Police Department and relayed what 

had heard.45

Also at 8:52, a male flight attendant called a United office in San Francis

reaching Marc Policastro.The flight attendant reported that the flight had be

hijacked, both pilots had been killed, a flight attendant had been stabbed, a
the hijackers were probably flying the plane.The call lasted about two minut

after which Policastro and a colleague tried unsuccessfully to contact t

flight.46

At 8:58, the flight took a heading toward New York City.47

At 8:59, Flight 175 passenger Brian David Sweeney tried to call his wi

Julie. He left a message on their home answering machine that the plane h

been hijacked. He then called his mother, Louise Sweeney, told her the flig

had been hijacked, and added that the passengers were thinking about stor

ing the cockpit to take control of the plane away from the hijackers.48

At 9:00, Lee Hanson received a second call from his son Peter:

It’s getting bad, Dad—A stewardess was stabbed—They seem to have

knives and Mace—They said they have a bomb—It’s getting very bad

on the plane—Passengers are throwing up and getting sick—The

plane is making jerky movements—I don’t think the pilot is flying the

plane—I think we are going down—I think they intend to go to

Chicago or someplace and fly into a building—Don’t worry, Dad—

If it happens, it’ll be very fast—My God, my God.49

The call ended abruptly.Lee Hanson had heard a woman scream just befo

it cut off. He turned on a television, and in her home so did Louise Sween

Both then saw the second aircraft hit the World Trade Center.50

At 9:03:11, United Airlines Flight 175 struck the South Tower of the Wo

Trade Center.51 All on board, along with an unknown number of people 

the tower, were killed instantly.

The Hijacking of American 77

American Airlines Flight 77 was scheduled to depart from Washington Dul

for Los Angeles at 8:10. The aircraft was a Boeing 757 piloted by Capt

Charles F. Burlingame and First Officer David Charlebois. There were fo

flight attendants. On September 11, the flight carried 58 passengers.52

American 77 pushed back from its gate at 8:09 and took off at 8:20.At 8:4

the flight reached its assigned cruising altitude of 35,000 feet. Cabin serv

would have begun.At 8:51,American 77 transmitted its last routine radio co

munication.The hijacking began between 8:51 and 8:54.As on American 

and United 175, the hijackers used knives (reported by one passenger) a

moved all the passengers (and possibly crew) to the rear of the aircraft (report

by one flight attendant and one passenger).Unlike the earlier flights,the Flig

77 hijackers were reported by a passenger to have box cutters. Finally, a p

senger reported that an announcement had been made by the “pilot” that t

plane had been hijacked.Neither of the firsthand accounts mentioned any sta

bings or the threat or use of either a bomb or Mace,though both witnesses beg

the flight in the first-class cabin.53
At 8:54, the aircraft deviated from its assigned course, turning south.Tw

minutes later the transponder was turned off and even primary radar cont

with the aircraft was lost.The Indianapolis Air Traffic Control Center repe

edly tried and failed to contact the aircraft.American Airlines dispatchers a

tried, without success.54

At 9:00,American Airlines Executive Vice President Gerard Arpey learn

that communications had been lost with American 77.This was now the se

ond American aircraft in trouble. He ordered all American Airlines flights 

the Northeast that had not taken off to remain on the ground. Shortly befo

9:10, suspecting that American 77 had been hijacked, American headquart

concluded that the second aircraft to hit the World Trade Center might ha

been Flight 77. After learning that United Airlines was missing a plane,Am

ican Airlines headquarters extended the ground stop nationwide.55

At 9:12, Renee May called her mother, Nancy May, in Las Vegas. She s

her flight was being hijacked by six individuals who had moved them to t

rear of the plane. She asked her mother to alert American Airlines. Nancy M

and her husband promptly did so.56

At some point between 9:16 and 9:26, Barbara Olson called her husban

Ted Olson, the solicitor general of the United States. She reported that t

flight had been hijacked,and the hijackers had knives and box cutters.She fu

ther indicated that the hijackers were not aware of her phone call,and that th

had put all the passengers in the back of the plane. About a minute into t

conversation, the call was cut off. Solicitor General Olson tried unsuccessfu

to reach Attorney General John Ashcroft.57

Shortly after the first call, Barbara Olson reached her husband again. S

reported that the pilot had announced that the flight had been hijacked, a

she asked her husband what she should tell the captain to do.Ted Olson ask

for her location and she replied that the aircraft was then flying over hous

Another passenger told her they were traveling northeast.The Solicitor Ge

eral then informed his wife of the two previous hijackings and crashes.She d

not display signs of panic and did not indicate any awareness of an impendi

crash.At that point, the second call was cut off.58

At 9:29, the autopilot on American 77 was disengaged; the aircraft was 

7,000 feet and approximately 38 miles west of the Pentagon.59 At 9:32, co

trollers at the Dulles Terminal Radar Approach Control “observed a prima

radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed.” This was later det

mined to have been Flight 77.

At 9:34,Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport advised the Secret S

vice of an unknown aircraft heading in the direction of the White House.Am

ican 77 was then 5 miles west-southwest of the Pentagon and began 

330-degree turn.At the end of the turn, it was descending through 2,200 fe

pointed toward the Pentagon and downtown Washington.The hijacker pilot th

advanced the throttles to maximum power and dove toward the Pentagon.60
At 9:37:46,American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon, trav

ing at approximately 530 miles per hour.61 All on board, as well as many civ

ian and military personnel in the building, were killed.

The Battle for United 93

At 8:42, United Airlines Flight 93 took off from Newark (New Jersey) Libe

International Airport bound for San Francisco.The aircraft was piloted by Ca

tain Jason Dahl and First Officer Leroy Homer,and there were five flight atte

dants. Thirty-seven passengers, including the hijackers, boarded the pla

Scheduled to depart the gate at 8:00, the Boeing 757’s takeoff was delay

because of the airport’s typically heavy morning traffic.62

The hijackers had planned to take flights scheduled to depart at 7:45 (Am

ican 11), 8:00 (United 175 and United 93), and 8:10 (American 77). Three 

the flights had actually taken off within 10 to 15 minutes of their plann

departure times. United 93 would ordinarily have taken off about 15 minu

after pulling away from the gate.When it left the ground at 8:42, the flight w

running more than 25 minutes late.63

As United 93 left Newark, the flight’s crew members were unaware of t

hijacking of American 11.Around 9:00, the FAA,American, and United w

facing the staggering realization of apparent multiple hijackings. At 9:03, th

would see another aircraft strike the World Trade Center. Crisis managers 

the FAA and the airlines did not yet act to warn other aircraft.64 At the sam

time,Boston Center realized that a message transmitted just before 8:25 by t

hijacker pilot of American 11 included the phrase,“We have some planes.”

No one at the FAA or the airlines that day had ever dealt with multip

hijackings.Such a plot had not been carried out anywhere in the world in mo

than 30 years,and never in the United States.As news of the hijackings filter

through the FAA and the airlines, it does not seem to have occurred to th

leadership that they needed to alert other aircraft in the air that they too mig

be at risk.66

United 175 was hijacked between 8:42 and 8:46, and awareness of th

hijacking began to spread after 8:51. American 77 was hijacked between 8

and 8:54. By 9:00, FAA and airline officials began to comprehend that attac

ers were going after multiple aircraft. American Airlines’ nationwide grou

stop between 9:05 and 9:10 was followed by a United Airlines ground sto

FAA controllers at Boston Center, which had tracked the first two hijackin

requested at 9:07 that Herndon Command Center “get messages to airbor

aircraft to increase security for the cockpit.”There is no evidence that Her

don took such action. Boston Center immediately began speculating abo

other aircraft that might be in danger,leading them to worry about a transco

tinental flight—Delta 1989—that in fact was not hijacked.At 9:19, the FA

New England regional office called Herndon and asked that Cleveland Ce

ter advise Delta 1989 to use extra cockpit security.67
Several FAA air traffic control officials told us it was the air carriers’respo

sibility to notify their planes of security problems. One senior FAA air traf

control manager said that it was simply not the FAA’s place to order the a

lines what to tell their pilots.68 We believe such statements do not reflect 

adequate appreciation of the FAA’s responsibility for the safety and security 

civil aviation.

The airlines bore responsibility, too.They were facing an escalating numb

of conflicting and, for the most part, erroneous reports about other flights

well as a continuing lack of vital information from the FAA about the hijack

flights.We found no evidence, however, that American Airlines sent any coc

pit warnings to its aircraft on 9/11. United’s first decisive action to notify 

airborne aircraft to take defensive action did not come until 9:19, when 

United flight dispatcher, Ed Ballinger, took the initiative to begin transmitti

warnings to his 16 transcontinental flights: “Beware any cockpit intrusion

Two a/c [aircraft] hit World Trade Center.” One of the flights that receiv

the warning was United 93. Because Ballinger was still responsible for 

other flights as well as Flight 175, his warning message was not transmitted 

Flight 93 until 9:23.69

By all accounts, the first 46 minutes of Flight 93’s cross-country trip pr

ceeded routinely. Radio communications from the plane were normal. Hea

ing, speed, and altitude ran according to plan.At 9:24, Ballinger’s warning 

United 93 was received in the cockpit.Within two minutes, at 9:26, the pil

Jason Dahl, responded with a note of puzzlement: “Ed, confirm latest m

plz—Jason.”70

The hijackers attacked at 9:28.While traveling 35,000 feet above easte

Ohio, United 93 suddenly dropped 700 feet. Eleven seconds into the desce

the FAA’s air traffic control center in Cleveland received the first of two rad

transmissions from the aircraft. During the first broadcast, the captain or fi

officer could be heard declaring “Mayday”amid the sounds of a physical stru

gle in the cockpit.The second radio transmission, 35 seconds later, indicat

that the fight was continuing.The captain or first officer could be heard shou

ing:“Hey get out of here—get out of here—get out of here.”71

On the morning of 9/11, there were only 37 passengers on United 93—

in addition to the 4 hijackers.This was below the norm for Tuesday mornin

during the summer of 2001. But there is no evidence that the hijackers man

ulated passenger levels or purchased additional seats to facilitate their operation

The terrorists who hijacked three other commercial flights on 9/11 op

ated in five-man teams.They initiated their cockpit takeover within 30 m

utes of takeoff.On Flight 93,however,the takeover took place 46 minutes af

takeoff and there were only four hijackers.The operative likely intended 

round out the team for this flight,Mohamed al Kahtani,had been refused en

by a suspicious immigration inspector at Florida’s Orlando International A

port in August.73
Because several passengers on United 93 described three hijackers on t

plane, not four, some have wondered whether one of the hijackers had be

able to use the cockpit jump seat from the outset of the flight. FAA rules allo

use of this seat by documented and approved individuals, usually air carrier 

FAA personnel.We have found no evidence indicating that one of the hijac

ers, or anyone else, sat there on this flight. All the hijackers had assigned se

in first class, and they seem to have used them.We believe it is more likely th

Jarrah, the crucial pilot-trained member of their team, remained seated a

inconspicuous until after the cockpit was seized;and once inside,he would n

have been visible to the passengers.74

At 9:32, a hijacker, probably Jarrah, made or attempted to make the follo

ing announcement to the passengers of Flight 93:“Ladies and Gentlemen:H

the captain, please sit down keep remaining sitting.We have a bomb on boa

So, sit.” The flight data recorder (also recovered) indicates that Jarrah th

instructed the plane’s autopilot to turn the aircraft around and head east.75

The cockpit voice recorder data indicate that a woman, most likely a flig

attendant, was being held captive in the cockpit. She struggled with one of t

hijackers who killed or otherwise silenced her.76

Shortly thereafter,the passengers and flight crew began a series of calls fro

GTE airphones and cellular phones.These calls between family, friends, a

colleagues took place until the end of the flight and provided those on t

ground with firsthand accounts.They enabled the passengers to gain criti

information, including the news that two aircraft had slammed into the Wo

Trade Center.77

At 9:39, the FAA’s Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center overhea

a second announcement indicating that there was a bomb on board, that t

plane was returning to the airport,and that they should remain seated.78 Wh

it apparently was not heard by the passengers, this announcement, like those 

Flight 11 and Flight 77, was intended to deceive them. Jarrah, like Atta earli

may have inadvertently broadcast the message because he did not know ho

to operate the radio and the intercom.To our knowledge none of them h

ever flown an actual airliner before.

At least two callers from the flight reported that the hijackers knew that p

sengers were making calls but did not seem to care. It is quite possible Jarr

knew of the success of the assault on the World Trade Center. He could ha

learned of this from messages being sent by United Airlines to the cockpits 

its transcontinental flights, including Flight 93, warning of cockpit intrusi

and telling of the New York attacks. But even without them, he would c

tainly have understood that the attacks on the World Trade Center wou

already have unfolded, given Flight 93’s tardy departure from Newark. If J

rah did know that the passengers were making calls,it might not have occurr

to him that they were certain to learn what had happened in New York,there

defeating his attempts at deception.79
At least ten passengers and two crew members shared vital information w

family, friends, colleagues, or others on the ground. All understood the pla

had been hijacked. They said the hijackers wielded knives and claimed to ha

a bomb.The hijackers were wearing red bandanas, and they forced the passe

gers to the back of the aircraft.80

Callers reported that a passenger had been stabbed and that two people w

lying on the floor of the cabin, injured or dead—possibly the captain and fi

officer. One caller reported that a flight attendant had been killed.81

One of the callers from United 93 also reported that he thought the hijac

ers might possess a gun. But none of the other callers reported the presence 

a firearm. One recipient of a call from the aircraft recounted specifically a

ing her caller whether the hijackers had guns.The passenger replied that he d

not see one.No evidence of firearms or of their identifiable remains was fou

at the aircraft’s crash site, and the cockpit voice recorder gives no indication 

a gun being fired or mentioned at any time.We believe that if the hijackers h

possessed a gun, they would have used it in the flight’s last minutes as the p

sengers fought back.82

Passengers on three flights reported the hijackers’ claim of having a bom

The FBI told us they found no trace of explosives at the crash sites. One 

the passengers who mentioned a bomb expressed his belief that it was not re

Lacking any evidence that the hijackers attempted to smuggle such ille

items past the security screening checkpoints, we believe the bombs w

probably fake.83

During at least five of the passengers’ phone calls, information was shar

about the attacks that had occurred earlier that morning at the World Tra

Center. Five calls described the intent of passengers and surviving crew me

bers to revolt against the hijackers. According to one call, they voted 

whether to rush the terrorists in an attempt to retake the plane. They decid

and acted.84

At 9:57, the passenger assault began. Several passengers had terminat

phone calls with loved ones in order to join the revolt. One of the call

ended her message as follows:“Everyone’s running up to first class. I’ve got 

go. Bye.”85

The cockpit voice recorder captured the sounds of the passenger assa

muffled by the intervening cockpit door. Some family members who listen

to the recording report that they can hear the voice of a loved one among t

din.We cannot identify whose voices can be heard. But the assault was su

tained.86

In response, Jarrah immediately began to roll the airplane to the left a

right, attempting to knock the passengers off balance. At 9:58:57, Jarrah to

another hijacker in the cockpit to block the door. Jarrah continued to roll t

airplane sharply left and right, but the assault continued. At 9:59:52, Jarr

changed tactics and pitched the nose of the airplane up and down to disru
the assault.The recorder captured the sounds of loud thumps, crashes, shou

and breaking glasses and plates.At 10:00:03, Jarrah stabilized the airplane.87

Five seconds later, Jarrah asked,“Is that it? Shall we finish it off?”A hijack

responded,“No. Not yet.When they all come, we finish it off.” The sounds 

fighting continued outside the cockpit. Again, Jarrah pitched the nose of t

aircraft up and down.At 10:00:26, a passenger in the background said,“In t

cockpit. If we don’t we’ll die!” Sixteen seconds later, a passenger yelled,“R

it!” Jarrah stopped the violent maneuvers at about 10:01:00 and said,“Allah 

the greatest! Allah is the greatest!”He then asked another hijacker in the coc

pit,“Is that it? I mean, shall we put it down?” to which the other replied,“Y

put it in it, and pull it down.”88

The passengers continued their assault and at 10:02:23,a hijacker said,“P

it down! Pull it down!”The hijackers remained at the controls but must ha

judged that the passengers were only seconds from overcoming them.The a

plane headed down; the control wheel was turned hard to the right.The a

plane rolled onto its back, and one of the hijackers began shouting “Allah 

the greatest.Allah is the greatest.”With the sounds of the passenger count

attack continuing,the aircraft plowed into an empty field in Shanksville,Pen

sylvania, at 580 miles per hour, about 20 minutes’ flying time fro

Washington, D.C.89

Jarrah’s objective was to crash his airliner into symbols of the Americ

Republic, the Capitol or the White House. He was defeated by the alert

unarmed passengers of United 93.

1.2 IMPROVISING A HOMELAND DEFENSE

The FAA and NORAD

On 9/11, the defense of U.S. airspace depended on close interaction betwe

two federal agencies: the FAA and the North American Aerospace Defen

Command (NORAD).The most recent hijacking that involved U.S. air tr

fic controllers, FAA management, and military coordination had occurred 

1993.90 In order to understand how the two agencies interacted eight ye

later,we will review their missions,command and control structures,and wor

ing relationship on the morning of 9/11.

FAA Mission and Structure. As of September 11, 2001, the FAA was ma

dated by law to regulate the safety and security of civil aviation. From an 

traffic controller’s perspective, that meant maintaining a safe distance betwe

airborne aircraft.91

Many controllers work at the FAA’s 22 Air Route Traffic Control Cent

They are grouped under regional offices and coordinate closely with t

national Air Traffic Control System Command Center, located in Herndo
BOSTON

NEW

YORK NEW

YORK CLEVELAND

INDIANAPOLIS

Boston

Center

Otis 

Air Fo

Base

Langley 

Air Force Base

Northeast Air

Defense Sector

(NEADS)

NORAD

Headquarters

Continental Aerospace 

Command Region (CONR

Cleveland

Center

Indianapolis Center

New York

Center

FAA Air Traffic Control Centers

Reporting structure, Northeast Air Defense Sector

Graphics courtesy of ESRI
Virginia, which oversees daily traffic flow within the entire airspace syste

FAA headquarters is ultimately responsible for the management of t

National Airspace System.The Operations Center located at FAA headquart

receives notifications of incidents, including accidents and hijackings.92

FAA Control Centers often receive information and make operational de

sions independently of one another. On 9/11, the four hijacked aircraft w

monitored mainly by the centers in Boston, New York, Cleveland, and In

anapolis. Each center thus had part of the knowledge of what was going 

across the system.What Boston knew was not necessarily known by centers 

New York, Cleveland, or Indianapolis, or for that matter by the Comma

Center in Herndon or by FAA headquarters in Washington.

Controllers track airliners such as the four aircraft hijacked on 9/11 prim

ily by watching the data from a signal emitted by each aircraft’s transpond

equipment.Those four planes, like all aircraft traveling above 10,000 feet, w

required to emit a unique transponder signal while in flight.93

On 9/11, the terrorists turned off the transponders on three of the fo

hijacked aircraft.With its transponder off, it is possible, though more difficu

to track an aircraft by its primary radar returns. But unlike transponder da

primary radar returns do not show the aircraft’s identity and altitude. Co

trollers at centers rely so heavily on transponder signals that they usually do n

display primary radar returns on their radar scopes. But they can change t

configuration of their scopes so they can see primary radar returns.They did t

on 9/11 when the transponder signals for three of the aircraft disappeared.94

Before 9/11, it was not unheard of for a commercial aircraft to devi

slightly from its course, or for an FAA controller to lose radio contact with 

pilot for a short period of time. A controller could also briefly lose a comm

cial aircraft’s transponder signal, although this happened much less frequen

However,the simultaneous loss of radio and transponder signal would be a r

and alarming occurrence, and would normally indicate a catastrophic syste

failure or an aircraft crash.In all of these instances,the job of the controller w

to reach out to the aircraft,the parent company of the aircraft,and other plan

in the vicinity in an attempt to reestablish communications and set the aircr

back on course.Alarm bells would not start ringing until these efforts—whi

could take five minutes or more—were tried and had failed.95

NORAD Mission and Structure. NORAD is a binational command esta

lished in 1958 between the United States and Canada. Its mission was, and 

to defend the airspace of North America and protect the continent.That m

sion does not distinguish between internal and external threats; but becau

NORAD was created to counter the Soviet threat, it came to define its job 

defending against external attacks.96

The threat of Soviet bombers diminished significantly as the Cold W

ended, and the number of NORAD alert sites was reduced from its Cold W

high of 26. Some within the Pentagon argued in the 1990s that the alert si
should be eliminated entirely. In an effort to preserve their mission, memb

of the air defense community advocated the importance of air sovereign

against emerging “asymmetric threats” to the United States: drug smugglin

“non-state and state-sponsored terrorists,” and the proliferation of weapons 

mass destruction and ballistic missile technology.97

NORAD perceived the dominant threat to be from cruise missiles. Oth

threats were identified during the late 1990s,including terrorists’use of aircr

as weapons.Exercises were conducted to counter this threat,but they were n

based on actual intelligence. In most instances, the main concern was the u

of such aircraft to deliver weapons of mass destruction.

Prior to 9/11, it was understood that an order to shoot down a comm

cial aircraft would have to be issued by the National Command Authority 

phrase used to describe the president and secretary of defense). Exercise pla

ners also assumed that the aircraft would originate from outside the Unit

States,allowing time to identify the target and scramble interceptors.The thr

of terrorists hijacking commercial airliners within the United States—and usi

them as guided missiles—was not recognized by NORAD before 9/11.98

Notwithstanding the identification of these emerging threats,by 9/11 th

were only seven alert sites left in the United States, each with two fighter a

craft on alert.This led some NORAD commanders to worry that NORA

was not postured adequately to protect the United States.99

In the United States, NORAD is divided into three sectors. On 9/11, 

the hijacked aircraft were in NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector (a

known as NEADS), which is based in Rome, New York. That morni

NEADS could call on two alert sites, each with one pair of ready fighters: O

Air National Guard Base in Cape Cod, Massachusetts, and Langley Air Fo

Base in Hampton,Virginia.100 Other facilities, not on “alert,” would need tim

to arm the fighters and organize crews.

NEADS reported to the Continental U.S. NORAD Region (CON

headquarters, in Panama City, Florida, which in turn reported to NORA

headquarters, in Colorado Springs, Colorado.

Interagency Collaboration. The FAA and NORAD had developed prot

cols for working together in the event of a hijacking.As they existed on 9/

the protocols for the FAA to obtain military assistance from NORA

required multiple levels of notification and approval at the highest levels of go

ernment.101

FAA guidance to controllers on hijack procedures assumed that the aircr

pilot would notify the controller via radio or by “squawking”a transponder co

of “7500”—the universal code for a hijack in progress.Controllers would not

their supervisors,who in turn would inform management all the way up to FA

headquarters in Washington.Headquarters had a hijack coordinator,who was t

director of the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security or his or her designate.

If a hijack was confirmed, procedures called for the hijack coordinator 
duty to contact the Pentagon’s National Military Command Center (NMC

and to ask for a military escort aircraft to follow the flight, report anythi

unusual, and aid search and rescue in the event of an emergency.The NMC

would then seek approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to pr

vide military assistance. If approval was given, the orders would be transmitt

down NORAD’s chain of command.103

The NMCC would keep the FAA hijack coordinator up to date and h

the FAA centers coordinate directly with the military.NORAD would rece

tracking information for the hijacked aircraft either from joint use radar or fro

the relevant FAA air traffic control facility. Every attempt would be made 

have the hijacked aircraft squawk 7500 to help NORAD track it.104

The protocols did not contemplate an intercept.They assumed the figh

escort would be discreet,“vectored to a position five miles directly behind t

hijacked aircraft,” where it could perform its mission to monitor the aircra

flight path.105

In sum, the protocols in place on 9/11 for the FAA and NORAD 

respond to a hijacking presumed that

• the hijacked aircraft would be readily identifiable and would not

attempt to disappear;

• there would be time to address the problem through the appropriate

FAA and NORAD chains of command; and

• the hijacking would take the traditional form: that is, it would not

be a suicide hijacking designed to convert the aircraft into a guided

missile.

On the morning of 9/11,the existing protocol was unsuited in every resp

for what was about to happen.

American Airlines Flight 11

FAA Awareness. Although the Boston Center air traffic controller realized 

an early stage that there was something wrong with American 11, he did n

immediately interpret the plane’s failure to respond as a sign that it had be

hijacked. At 8:14, when the flight failed to heed his instruction to climb 

35,000 feet, the controller repeatedly tried to raise the flight. He reached o

to the pilot on the emergency frequency.Though there was no response, 

kept trying to contact the aircraft.106

At 8:21,American 11 turned off its transponder,immediately degrading t

information available about the aircraft.The controller told his supervisor th

he thought something was seriously wrong with the plane, although neith

suspected a hijacking.The supervisor instructed the controller to follow sta

dard procedures for handling a “no radio” aircraft.107
The controller checked to see if American Airlines could establish comm

nication with American 11. He became even more concerned as its rou

changed,moving into another sector’s airspace.Controllers immediately beg

to move aircraft out of its path, and asked other aircraft in the vicinity to lo

for American 11.108

At 8:24:38, the following transmission came from American 11:

American 11: We have some planes. Just stay quiet, and you’ll be okay.

We are returning to the airport.

The controller only heard something unintelligible; he did not hear the sp

cific words “we have some planes.” The next transmission came seconds lat

American 11: Nobody move.Everything will be okay.If you try to make

any moves,you’ll endanger yourself and the airplane.Just stay quiet.109

The controller told us that he then knew it was a hijacking. He alerted 

supervisor, who assigned another controller to assist him. He redoubled 

efforts to ascertain the flight’s altitude.Because the controller didn’t understa

the initial transmission, the manager of Boston Center instructed his qual

assurance specialist to “pull the tape” of the radio transmission, listen to 

closely, and report back.110

Between 8:25 and 8:32, in accordance with the FAA protocol, Boston Ce

ter managers started notifying their chain of command that American 11 h

been hijacked.At 8:28,Boston Center called the Command Center in Hernd

to advise that it believed American 11 had been hijacked and was heading tow

New York Center’s airspace.

By this time,American 11 had taken a dramatic turn to the south.At 8:3

the Command Center passed word of a possible hijacking to the Operatio

Center at FAA headquarters.The duty officer replied that security personn

at headquarters had just begun discussing the apparent hijack on a conferen

call with the New England regional office. FAA headquarters began to follo

the hijack protocol but did not contact the NMCC to request a figh

escort.111

The Herndon Command Center immediately established a teleconf

ence between Boston, New York, and Cleveland Centers so that Bost

Center could help the others understand what was happening.112

At 8:34, the Boston Center controller received a third transmission fro

American 11:

American 11: Nobody move please.We are going back to the airport.

Don’t try to make any stupid moves.113
In the succeeding minutes,controllers were attempting to ascertain the al

tude of the southbound flight.114

Military Notification and Response. Boston Center did not follow t

protocol in seeking military assistance through the prescribed chain of co

mand.In addition to notifications within the FAA,Boston Center took the i

tiative, at 8:34, to contact the military through the FAA’s Cape Cod facil

The center also tried to contact a former alert site in Atlantic City, unaware 

had been phased out. At 8:37:52, Boston Center reached NEADS.This w

the first notification received by the military—at any level—that American 

had been hijacked:115

FAA: Hi. Boston Center TMU [Traffic Management Unit], we have a

problem here.We have a hijacked aircraft headed towards New York,

and we need you guys to, we need someone to scramble some F-16s

or something up there, help us out.

NEADS: Is this real-world or exercise?

FAA: No, this is not an exercise, not a test.116

NEADS ordered to battle stations the two F-15 alert aircraft at Otis A

Force Base in Falmouth, Massachusetts, 153 miles away from New York C

The air defense of America began with this call.117

At NEADS, the report of the hijacking was relayed immediately to Bat

Commander Colonel Robert Marr.After ordering the Otis fighters to bat

stations, Colonel Marr phoned Major General Larry Arnold, commandi

general of the First Air Force and NORAD’s Continental Region.Marr soug

authorization to scramble the Otis fighters. General Arnold later recall

instructing Marr to “go ahead and scramble them, and we’ll get authorit

later.” General Arnold then called NORAD headquarters to report.118

F-15 fighters were scrambled at 8:46 from Otis Air Force Base.But NEAD

did not know where to send the alert fighter aircraft, and the officer directi

the fighters pressed for more information:“I don’t know where I’m scrambli

these guys to. I need a direction, a destination.” Because the hijackers h

turned off the plane’s transponder, NEADS personnel spent the next minu

searching their radar scopes for the primary radar return.American 11 stru

the North Tower at 8:46.Shortly after 8:50,while NEADS personnel were s

trying to locate the flight, word reached them that a plane had hit the Wo

Trade Center.119

Radar data show the Otis fighters were airborne at 8:53. Lacking a targ

they were vectored toward military-controlled airspace off the Long Isla

coast.To avoid New York area air traffic and uncertain about what to do, t

fighters were brought down to military airspace to “hold as needed.”From 9

to 9:13, the Otis fighters stayed in this holding pattern.120
In summary, NEADS received notice of the hijacking nine minutes befo

it struck the North Tower.That nine minutes’ notice before impact was t

most the military would receive of any of the four hijackings.121

United Airlines Flight 175

FAA Awareness. One of the last transmissions from United Airlines Flig

175 is, in retrospect, chilling. By 8:40, controllers at the FAA’s New York Ce

ter were seeking information on American 11.At approximately 8:42, shor

after entering New York Center’s airspace, the pilot of United 175 broke 

with the following transmission:

UAL 175: New York UAL 175 heavy.

FAA: UAL 175 go ahead.

UAL 175:Yeah.We figured we’d wait to go to your center.Ah,we heard

a suspicious transmission on our departure out of Boston, ah, with

someone, ah, it sounded like someone keyed the mikes and said ah

everyone ah stay in your seats.

FAA: Oh, okay. I’ll pass that along over here.122

Minutes later,United 175 turned southwest without clearance from air tr

fic control. At 8:47, seconds after the impact of American 11, United 17

transponder code changed, and then changed again.These changes were n

noticed for several minutes,however,because the same New York Center co

troller was assigned to both American 11 and United 175.The controller kn

American 11 was hijacked; he was focused on searching for it after the aircr

disappeared at 8:46.123

At 8:48, while the controller was still trying to locate American 11, a N

York Center manager provided the following report on a Command Cen

teleconference about American 11:

Manager, New York Center: Okay.This is New York Center.We’re

watching the airplane. I also had conversation with American Airlines, and they’ve told us that they believe that one of their stewardesses was stabbed and that there are people in the cockpit that

have control of the aircraft, and that’s all the information they have

right now.124

The New York Center controller and manager were unaware that Americ

11 had already crashed.

At 8:51,the controller noticed the transponder change from United 175 a

tried to contact the aircraft.There was no response.Beginning at 8:52,the co

troller made repeated attempts to reach the crew of United 175. Still 

response.The controller checked his radio equipment and contacted anoth
controller at 8:53, saying that “we may have a hijack” and that he could n

find the aircraft.125

Another commercial aircraft in the vicinity then radioed in with “repo

over the radio of a commuter plane hitting the World Trade Center.”The co

troller spent the next several minutes handing off the other flights on his sco

to other controllers and moving aircraft out of the way of the unidentified a

craft (believed to be United 175) as it moved southwest and then turn

northeast toward New York City.126

At about 8:55, the controller in charge notified a New York Center ma

ager that she believed United 175 had also been hijacked.The manager tri

to notify the regional managers and was told that they were discussing 

hijacked aircraft (presumably American 11) and refused to be disturbed.At 8:5

the New York Center controller searching for United 175 told another N

York controller “we might have a hijack over here, two of them.”127

Between 9:01 and 9:02, a manager from New York Center told the Co

mand Center in Herndon:

Manager,New York Center:We have several situations going on here.It’s

escalating big,big time.We need to get the military involved with us....

We’re, we’re involved with something else, we have other aircraft that

may have a similar situation going on here.128

The “other aircraft” referred to by New York Center was United 175. E

dence indicates that this conversation was the only notice received by eith

FAA headquarters or the Herndon Command Center prior to the second cra

that there had been a second hijacking.

While the Command Center was told about this “other aircraft” at 9:0

New York Center contacted New York terminal approach control and ask

for help in locating United 175.

Terminal: I got somebody who keeps coasting but it looks like he’s going

into one of the small airports down there.

Center: Hold on a second. I’m trying to bring him up here and get

you—There he is right there. Hold on.

Terminal: Got him just out of 9,500—9,000 now.

Center: Do you know who he is?

Terminal:We’re just, we just we don’t know who he is.We’re just picking him up now.

Center (at 9:02):Alright.Heads up man,it looks like another one coming in.129

The controllers observed the plane in a rapid descent; the radar data term

nated over Lower Manhattan. At 9:03, United 175 crashed into the Sou

Tower.130
Meanwhile, a manager from Boston Center reported that they had de

phered what they had heard in one of the first hijacker transmissions fro

American 11:

Boston Center: Hey . . . you still there?

New England Region:Yes, I am.

Boston Center: . . . as far as the tape, Bobby seemed to think the guy

said that “we have planes.” Now, I don’t know if it was because it was

the accent, or if there’s more than one, but I’m gonna, I’m gonna

reconfirm that for you, and I’ll get back to you real quick. Okay?

New England Region: Appreciate it.

Unidentified Female Voice: They have what?

Boston Center: Planes, as in plural.

Boston Center: It sounds like, we’re talking to New York, that there’s

another one aimed at the World Trade Center.

New England Region:There’s another aircraft?

Boston Center: A second one just hit the Trade Center.

New England Region: Okay.Yeah, we gotta get—we gotta alert the

military real quick on this.131

Boston Center immediately advised the New England Region that it w

going to stop all departures at airports under its control. At 9:05, Boston Ce

ter confirmed for both the FAA Command Center and the New Engla

Region that the hijackers aboard American 11 said “we have planes.”At t

same time,New York Center declared “ATC zero”—meaning that aircraft w

not permitted to depart from, arrive at, or travel through New York Cente

airspace until further notice.132

Within minutes of the second impact, Boston Center instructed its co

trollers to inform all aircraft in its airspace of the events in New York and 

advise aircraft to heighten cockpit security. Boston Center asked the Hernd

Command Center to issue a similar cockpit security alert nationwide.We ha

found no evidence to suggest that the Command Center acted on this requ

or issued any type of cockpit security alert.133

Military Notification and Response. The first indication that t

NORAD air defenders had of the second hijacked aircraft, United 175, cam

in a phone call from New York Center to NEADS at 9:03.The notice came 

about the time the plane was hitting the South Tower.134

By 9:08, the mission crew commander at NEADS learned of the seco

explosion at the World Trade Center and decided against holding the fight

in military airspace away from Manhattan:

Mission Crew Commander, NEADS: This is what I foresee that we

probably need to do.We need to talk to FAA.We need to tell ’em if
this stuff is gonna keep on going, we need to take those fighters, put

’em over Manhattan.That’s best thing, that’s the best play right now.

So coordinate with the FAA.Tell ’em if there’s more out there, which

we don’t know,let’s get ’em over Manhattan.At least we got some kind

of play.135

The FAA cleared the airspace. Radar data show that at 9:13, when the O

fighters were about 115 miles away from the city,the fighters exited their ho

ing pattern and set a course direct for Manhattan.They arrived at 9:25 a

established a combat air patrol (CAP) over the city.136

Because the Otis fighters had expended a great deal of fuel in flying first 

military airspace and then to New York, the battle commanders were co

cerned about refueling.NEADS considered scrambling alert fighters from La

gley Air Force Base in Virginia to New York, to provide backup.The Lang

fighters were placed on battle stations at 9:09.137 NORAD had no indicati

that any other plane had been hijacked.

American Airlines Flight 77

FAA Awareness. American 77 began deviating from its flight plan at 8:5

with a slight turn toward the south.Two minutes later,it disappeared complet

from radar at Indianapolis Center, which was controlling the flight.138

The controller tracking American 77 told us he noticed the aircraft tur

ing to the southwest, and then saw the data disappear.The controller look

for primary radar returns. He searched along the plane’s projected flight pa

and the airspace to the southwest where it had started to turn.No primary t

gets appeared. He tried the radios, first calling the aircraft directly, then the a

line.Again there was nothing.At this point, the Indianapolis controller had 

knowledge of the situation in New York. He did not know that other aircr

had been hijacked. He believed American 77 had experienced serious elect

cal or mechanical failure, or both, and was gone.139

Shortly after 9:00, Indianapolis Center started notifying other agencies th

American 77 was missing and had possibly crashed.At 9:08, Indianapolis Ce

ter asked Air Force Search and Rescue at Langley Air Force Base to look fo

downed aircraft.The center also contacted the West Virginia State Police a

asked whether any reports of a downed aircraft had been received.At 9:09

reported the loss of contact to the FAA regional center, which passed this info

mation to FAA headquarters at 9:24.140

By 9:20,Indianapolis Center learned that there were other hijacked aircra

and began to doubt its initial assumption that American 77 had crashed.A d

cussion of this concern between the manager at Indianapolis and the Co

mand Center in Herndon prompted it to notify some FAA field facilities th

American 77 was lost. By 9:21, the Command Center, some FAA field fac

ties, and American Airlines had started to search for American 77.They fear
it had been hijacked.At 9:25, the Command Center advised FAA headqu

ters of the situation.141

The failure to find a primary radar return for American 77 led us to inv

tigate this issue further.Radar reconstructions performed after 9/11 reveal th

FAA radar equipment tracked the flight from the moment its transponder w

turned off at 8:56. But for 8 minutes and 13 seconds, between 8:56 and 9:0

this primary radar information on American 77 was not displayed to controll

at Indianapolis Center.142 The reasons are technical, arising from the way t

software processed radar information, as well as from poor primary radar co

erage where American 77 was flying.

According to the radar reconstruction,American 77 reemerged as a prima

target on Indianapolis Center radar scopes at 9:05, east of its last known po

tion.The target remained in Indianapolis Center’s airspace for another six m

utes, then crossed into the western portion of Washington Center’s airspace 

9:10.As Indianapolis Center continued searching for the aircraft,two manag

and the controller responsible for American 77 looked to the west and sout

west along the flight’s projected path, not east—where the aircraft was no

heading. Managers did not instruct other controllers at Indianapolis Center 

turn on their primary radar coverage to join in the search for American 77.

In sum, Indianapolis Center never saw Flight 77 turn around. By the tim

it reappeared in primary radar coverage, controllers had either stopped loo

ing for the aircraft because they thought it had crashed or were looking towa

the west.Although the Command Center learned Flight 77 was missing, n

ther it nor FAA headquarters issued an all points bulletin to surrounding ce

ters to search for primary radar targets. American 77 traveled undetected 

36 minutes on a course heading due east for Washington, D.C.144

By 9:25, FAA’s Herndon Command Center and FAA headquarters kn

two aircraft had crashed into the World Trade Center.They knew American 

was lost.At least some FAA officials in Boston Center and the New Engla

Region knew that a hijacker on board American 11 had said “we have som

planes.”Concerns over the safety of other aircraft began to mount.A manager 

the Herndon Command Center asked FAA headquarters if they wanted to ord

a “nationwide ground stop.”While this was being discussed by executives at FA

headquarters, the Command Center ordered one at 9:25.145

The Command Center kept looking for American 77.At 9:21,it advised t

Dulles terminal control facility, and Dulles urged its controllers to look for p

mary targets. At 9:32, they found one. Several of the Dulles controll

“observed a primary radar target tracking eastbound at a high rate of speed”a

notified Reagan National Airport.FAA personnel at both Reagan National a

Dulles airports notified the Secret Service.The aircraft’s identity or type w

unknown.146

Reagan National controllers then vectored an unarmed National Guard 

130H cargo aircraft, which had just taken off en route to Minnesota, to ide
tify and follow the suspicious aircraft.The C-130H pilot spotted it, identifi

it as a Boeing 757, attempted to follow its path, and at 9:38, seconds af

impact, reported to the control tower:“looks like that aircraft crashed into t

Pentagon sir.”147

Military Notification and Response. NORAD heard nothing about t

search for American 77. Instead, the NEADS air defenders heard renew

reports about a plane that no longer existed:American 11.

At 9:21, NEADS received a report from the FAA:

FAA: Military,Boston Center.I just had a report that American 11 is still

in the air, and it’s on its way towards—heading towards Washington.

NEADS: Okay. American 11 is still in the air?

FAA:Yes.

NEADS: On its way towards Washington?

FAA: That was another—it was evidently another aircraft that hit the

tower.That’s the latest report we have.

NEADS: Okay.

FAA: I’m going to try to confirm an ID for you, but I would assume

he’s somewhere over, uh, either New Jersey or somewhere further

south.

NEADS: Okay. So American 11 isn’t the hijack at all then, right?

FAA: No, he is a hijack.

NEADS: He—American 11 is a hijack?

FAA: Yes.

NEADS: And he’s heading into Washington?

FAA: Yes.This could be a third aircraft.148

The mention of a “third aircraft”was not a reference to American 77.Th

was confusion at that moment in the FAA.Two planes had struck the Wo

Trade Center, and Boston Center had heard from FAA headquarters in Was

ington that American 11 was still airborne.We have been unable to identify t

source of this mistaken FAA information.

The NEADS technician who took this call from the FAA immediat

passed the word to the mission crew commander, who reported to t

NEADS battle commander:

Mission Crew Commander, NEADS: Okay, uh,American Airlines is

still airborne. Eleven, the first guy, he’s heading towards Washington.

Okay? I think we need to scramble Langley right now.And I’m gonna

take the fighters from Otis, try to chase this guy down if I can find

him.149
After consulting with NEADS command, the crew commander issued t

order at 9:23:“Okay . . . scramble Langley. Head them towards the Washingt

area. . . . [I]f they’re there then we’ll run on them. . . .These guys are smar

That order was processed and transmitted to Langley Air Force Base at 9:2

Radar data show the Langley fighters airborne at 9:30. NEADS decided 

keep the Otis fighters over New York.The heading of the Langley fighters w

adjusted to send them to the Baltimore area.The mission crew command

explained to us that the purpose was to position the Langley fighters betwe

the reported southbound American 11 and the nation’s capital.150

At the suggestion of the Boston Center’s military liaison,NEADS contact

the FAA’s Washington Center to ask about American 11. In the course of t

conversation, a Washington Center manager informed NEADS:“We’re loo

ing—we also lost American 77.”The time was 9:34.151This was the first not

to the military that American 77 was missing, and it had come by chance

NEADS had not placed that call, the NEADS air defenders would ha

received no information whatsoever that the flight was even missing, althou

the FAA had been searching for it.No one at FAA headquarters ever asked 

military assistance with American 77.

At 9:36, the FAA’s Boston Center called NEADS and relayed the discove

about an unidentified aircraft closing in on Washington:“Latest report.Aircr

VFR [visual flight rules] six miles southeast of the White House. ...Six,sout

west. Six, southwest of the White House, deviating away.” This startling ne

prompted the mission crew commander at NEADS to take immediate cont

of the airspace to clear a flight path for the Langley fighters:“Okay,we’re goi

to turn it . . . crank it up. . . . Run them to the White House.” He then disco

ered, to his surprise, that the Langley fighters were not headed north towa

the Baltimore area as instructed,but east over the ocean.“I don’t care how ma

windows you break,” he said.“Damn it. . . . Okay. Push them back.”152

The Langley fighters were heading east, not north, for three reasons. Fir

unlike a normal scramble order,this order did not include a distance to the t

get or the target’s location.Second,a “generic”flight plan—prepared to get t

aircraft airborne and out of local airspace quickly—incorrectly led the Lan

ley fighters to believe they were ordered to fly due east (090) for 60 miles.Thi

the lead pilot and local FAA controller incorrectly assumed the flight p

instruction to go “090 for 60” superseded the original scramble order.153

After the 9:36 call to NEADS about the unidentified aircraft a few mi

from the White House, the Langley fighters were ordered to Washington, D

Controllers at NEADS located an unknown primary radar track, but “it ki

of faded” over Washington.The time was 9:38.The Pentagon had been stru

by American 77 at 9:37:46.The Langley fighters were about 150 miles away.

Right after the Pentagon was hit, NEADS learned of another possi

hijacked aircraft.It was an aircraft that in fact had not been hijacked at all.Af

the second World Trade Center crash,Boston Center managers recognized th
both aircraft were transcontinental 767 jetliners that had departed Logan A

port. Remembering the “we have some planes” remark, Boston Cen

guessed that Delta 1989 might also be hijacked.Boston Center called NEAD

at 9:41 and identified Delta 1989, a 767 jet that had left Logan Airport for L

Vegas, as a possible hijack. NEADS warned the FAA’s Cleveland Center 

watch Delta 1989.The Command Center and FAA headquarters watched 

too. During the course of the morning, there were multiple erroneous repo

of hijacked aircraft. The report of American 11 heading south was the fir

Delta 1989 was the second.155

NEADS never lost track of Delta 1989, and even ordered fighter aircr

from Ohio and Michigan to intercept it. The flight never turned off 

transponder. NEADS soon learned that the aircraft was not hijacked, a

tracked Delta 1989 as it reversed course over Toledo, headed east, and land

in Cleveland.156 But another aircraft was heading toward Washington, an a

craft about which NORAD had heard nothing: United 93.

United Airlines Flight 93

FAA Awareness. At 9:27, after having been in the air for 45 minutes, Unit

93 acknowledged a transmission from the Cleveland Center controller.This w

the last normal contact the FAA had with the flight.157

Less than a minute later, the Cleveland controller and the pilots of aircr

in the vicinity heard “a radio transmission of unintelligible sounds of possi

screaming or a struggle from an unknown origin.”158

The controller responded, seconds later:“Somebody call Cleveland?”T

was followed by a second radio transmission, with sounds of screaming.T

Cleveland Center controllers began to try to identify the possible source of t

transmissions, and noticed that United 93 had descended some 700 feet.T

controller attempted again to raise United 93 several times, with no respon

At 9:30,the controller began to poll the other flights on his frequency to det

mine if they had heard the screaming; several said they had.159

At 9:32, a third radio transmission came over the frequency:“Keep rema

ing sitting.We have a bomb on board.”The controller understood, but cho

to respond: “Calling Cleveland Center, you’re unreadable. Say again, slowl

He notified his supervisor, who passed the notice up the chain of comman

By 9:34, word of the hijacking had reached FAA headquarters.160

FAA headquarters had by this time established an open line of commu

cation with the Command Center at Herndon and instructed it to poll all 

centers about suspect aircraft.The Command Center executed the request an

a minute later, Cleveland Center reported that “United 93 may have a bom

on board.”At 9:34, the Command Center relayed the information concerni

United 93 to FAA headquarters.At approximately 9:36, Cleveland advised t

Command Center that it was still tracking United 93 and specifically inquir

whether someone had requested the military to launch fighter aircraft to int

cept the aircraft. Cleveland even told the Command Center it was prepared 
contact a nearby military base to make the request.The Command Center to

Cleveland that FAA personnel well above them in the chain of command h

to make the decision to seek military assistance and were working on the issue.

Between 9:34 and 9:38,the Cleveland controller observed United 93 clim

ing to 40,700 feet and immediately moved several aircraft out its way.The co

troller continued to try to contact United 93,and asked whether the pilot cou

confirm that he had been hijacked.162There was no response.

Then, at 9:39, a fourth radio transmission was heard from United 93:

Ziad Jarrah: Uh, this is the captain.Would like you all to remain seated.

There is a bomb on board and are going back to the airport, and to

have our demands [unintelligible]. Please remain quiet.

The controller responded: “United 93, understand you have a bomb 

board. Go ahead.”The flight did not respond.163

From 9:34 to 10:08,a Command Center facility manager provided freque

updates to Acting Deputy Administrator Monte Belger and other executives 

FAA headquarters as United 93 headed toward Washington, D.C. At 9:4

Cleveland Center lost United 93’s transponder signal. The controller locat

it on primary radar, matched its position with visual sightings from other a

craft, and tracked the flight as it turned east, then south.164

At 9:42, the Command Center learned from news reports that a plane h

struck the Pentagon.The Command Center’s national operations manager,B

Sliney, ordered all FAA facilities to instruct all aircraft to land at the near

airport.This was an unprecedented order.The air traffic control system ha

dled it with great skill, as about 4,500 commercial and general aviation aircr

soon landed without incident.165

At 9:46 the Command Center updated FAA headquarters that United 

was now “twenty-nine minutes out of Washington, D.C.”

At 9:49, 13 minutes after Cleveland Center had asked about getting m

tary help,the Command Center suggested that someone at headquarters shou

decide whether to request military assistance:

FAA Headquarters: They’re pulling Jeff away to go talk about United

93.

Command Center: Uh, do we want to think, uh, about scrambling

aircraft?

FAA Headquarters: Oh, God, I don’t know.

Command Center: Uh, that’s a decision somebody’s gonna have to

make probably in the next ten minutes.

FAA Headquarters: Uh, ya know everybody just left the room.166

At 9:53,FAA headquarters informed the Command Center that the depu

director for air traffic services was talking to Monte Belger about scrambli
aircraft. Then the Command Center informed headquarters that controll

had lost track of United 93 over the Pittsburgh area.Within seconds,the Co

mand Center received a visual report from another aircraft,and informed hea

quarters that the aircraft was 20 miles northwest of Johnstown. United 93 w

spotted by another aircraft, and, at 10:01, the Command Center advised FA

headquarters that one of the aircraft had seen United 93 “waving his wing

The aircraft had witnessed the hijackers’ efforts to defeat the passengers’ cou

terattack.167

United 93 crashed in Pennsylvania at 10:03:11, 125 miles from Washingto

D.C.The precise crash time has been the subject of some dispute.The 10:03

impact time is supported by previous National Transportation Safety Boa

analysis and by evidence from the Commission staff’s analysis of radar,the flig

data recorder, the cockpit voice recorder, infrared satellite data, and air traf

control transmissions.168

Five minutes later, the Command Center forwarded this update to hea

quarters:

Command Center: O.K. Uh, there is now on that United 93.

FAA Headquarters:Yes.

Command Center:There is a report of black smoke in the last position

I gave you, fifteen miles south of Johnstown.

FAA Headquarters: From the airplane or from the ground?

Command Center: Uh, they’re speculating it’s from the aircraft.

FAA Headquarters: Okay.

Command Center: Uh,who,it hit the ground.That’s what they’re speculating, that’s speculation only.169

The aircraft that spotted the “black smoke” was the same unarmed A

National Guard cargo plane that had seen American 77 crash into the Pen

gon 27 minutes earlier. It had resumed its flight to Minnesota and saw t

smoke from the crash of United 93, less than two minutes after the plane we

down. At 10:17, the Command Center advised headquarters of its conclusi

that United 93 had indeed crashed.170

Despite the discussions about military assistance, no one from FAA hea

quarters requested military assistance regarding United 93. Nor did any ma

ager at FAA headquarters pass any of the information it had about United 

to the military.

Military Notification and Response. NEADS first received a call abo

United 93 from the military liaison at Cleveland Center at 10:07.Unaware th

the aircraft had already crashed, Cleveland passed to NEADS the aircraft’s l

known latitude and longitude. NEADS was never able to locate United 93 

radar because it was already in the ground.171
At the same time, the NEADS mission crew commander was dealing w

the arrival of the Langley fighters over Washington,D.C.,sorting out what th

orders were with respect to potential targets. Shortly after 10:10, and havi

no knowledge either that United 93 had been heading toward Washington 

that it had crashed, he explicitly instructed the Langley fighters: “negative

negative clearance to shoot” aircraft over the nation’s capital.172

The news of a reported bomb on board United 93 spread quickly 

NEADS.The air defenders searched for United 93’s primary radar return a

tried to locate other fighters to scramble. NEADS called Washington Cen

to report:

NEADS: I also want to give you a heads-up,Washington.

FAA (DC): Go ahead.

NEADS: United nine three, have you got information on that yet?

FAA:Yeah, he’s down.

NEADS: He’s down?

FAA:Yes.

NEADS: When did he land? ’Cause we have got confirmation—

FAA: He did not land.

NEADS: Oh, he’s down? Down?

FAA: Yes. Somewhere up northeast of Camp David.

NEADS: Northeast of Camp David.

FAA: That’s the last report.They don’t know exactly where.173

The time of notification of the crash of United 93 was 10:15.174 T

NEADS air defenders never located the flight or followed it on their rad

scopes.The flight had already crashed by the time they learned it was hijack

Clarifying the Record

The defense of U.S. airspace on 9/11 was not conducted in accord with p

existing training and protocols. It was improvised by civilians who had nev

handled a hijacked aircraft that attempted to disappear,and by a military unp

pared for the transformation of commercial aircraft into weapons of m

destruction. As it turned out, the NEADS air defenders had nine minut

notice on the first hijacked plane,no advance notice on the second,no advan

notice on the third, and no advance notice on the fourth.

We do not believe that the true picture of that morning reflects discredit 

the operational personnel at NEADS or FAA facilities. NEADS command

and officers actively sought out information,and made the best judgments th

could on the basis of what they knew. Individual FAA controllers, facility ma

agers,and Command Center managers thought outside the box in recommen

ing a nationwide alert, in ground-stopping local traffic, and, ultimately, 

deciding to land all aircraft and executing that unprecedented order flawless
American Airlines Flight 11

(AA 11)

Boston to Los Angeles

United Airlines Flight 175 

(UA 175)

Boston to Los Angeles

7:59 Takeoff 

8:14 Last routine radio 

communication; likely takeover

8:19 Flight attendant notifies AA of

hijacking 

8:21 Transponder is turned off 

8:23 AA attempts to contact the

cockpit

8:25 Boston Center aware of 

hijacking 

8:38 Boston Center notifies NEADS

of hijacking 

8:46 NEADS scrambles Otis fighter

jets in search of AA 11 

8:46:40 AA 11 crashes into 1 WTC

(North Tower) 

8:53 Otis fighter jets airborne

9:16 AA headquarters aware that

Flight 11 has crashed into

WTC

9:21 Boston Center advises NEADS

that AA 11 is airborne heading

for Washington

9:24 NEADS scrambles Langley

fighter jets in search of 

AA 11

8:14 Takeoff 

8:42 Last radio communication

8:42-8:46 Likely takeover 

8:47 Transponder code changes 

8:52 Flight attendant notifies UA 

hijacking 

8:54 UA attempts to contact the

cockpit

8:55 New York Center suspects

hijacking 

9:03:11 Flight 175 crashes into 2 WT

(South Tower) 

9:15 New York Center advises

NEADS that UA 175 was th

second aircraft crashed into

WTC 

9:20 UA headquarters aware that

Flight 175 had crashed into

WTC

Boston

Boston

New York City

New York City
American Airlines Flight 77 

(AA 77)

Washington, D.C., to Los Angeles

United Airlines Flight 93 

(UA 93)

Newark to San Francisco

8:20 Takeoff

8:51 Last routine radio 

communication

8:51-8:54 Likely takeover

8:54 Flight 77 makes unauthorized

turn to south

8:56 Transponder is turned off

9:05 AA headquarters aware that

Flight 77 is hijacked

9:25 Herndon Command Center

orders nationwide ground stop

9:32 Dulles tower observes radar of

fast-moving aircraft (later 

identified as AA 77)

9:34 FAA advises NEADS that 

AA 77 is missing

9:37:46 AA 77 crashes into the 

Pentagon

10:30 AA headquarters confirms

Flight 77 crash into Pentagon

8:42 Takeoff

9:24 Flight 93 receives warning

from UA about possible 

cockpit intrusion

9:27 Last routine radio 

communication

9:28 Likely takeover

9:34 Herndon Command Center

advises FAA headquarters th

UA 93 is hijacked

9:36 Flight attendant notifies UA 

hijacking; UA attempts to 

contact the cockpit

9:41 Transponder is turned off

9:57 Passenger revolt begins

10:03:11 Flight 93 crashes in field in

Shanksville, PA

10:07 Cleveland Center advises

NEADS of UA 93 hijacking

10:15 UA headquarters aware that

Flight 93 has crashed in PA;

Washington Center advises

NEADS that Flight 93 has

crashed in PA

Dulles Newark

Shanksville, PA

Pentagon
More than the actual events,inaccurate government accounts of those eve

made it appear that the military was notified in time to respond to two of t

hijackings,raising questions about the adequacy of the response.Those accou

had the effect of deflecting questions about the military’s capacity to obt

timely and accurate information from its own sources. In addition, they ov

stated the FAA’s ability to provide the military with timely and useful inform

tion that morning.

In public testimony before this Commission in May 2003, NORAD of

cials stated that at 9:16,NEADS received hijack notification of United 93 fro

the FAA.175This statement was incorrect.There was no hijack to report at 9:

United 93 was proceeding normally at that time.

In this same public testimony, NORAD officials stated that at 9:2

NEADS received notification of the hijacking of American 77.176This sta

ment was also incorrect.The notice NEADS received at 9:24 was that Am

ican 11 had not hit the World Trade Center and was heading for Washingto

D.C.177

In their testimony and in other public accounts, NORAD officials a

stated that the Langley fighters were scrambled to respond to the notificatio

about American 77,178 United 93, or both.These statements were incorrect 

well.The fighters were scrambled because of the report that American 11 w

heading south, as is clear not just from taped conversations at NEADS but a

from taped conversations at FAA centers; contemporaneous logs compiled 

NEADS, Continental Region headquarters, and NORAD; and other recor

Yet this response to a phantom aircraft was not recounted in a single pub

timeline or statement issued by the FAA or Department of Defense.The ina

curate accounts created the impression that the Langley scramble was a logi

response to an actual hijacked aircraft.

In fact, not only was the scramble prompted by the mistaken informati

about American 11, but NEADS never received notice that American 77 w

hijacked.It was notified at 9:34 that American 77 was lost.Then,minutes lat

NEADS was told that an unknown plane was 6 miles southwest of the Wh

House. Only then did the already scrambled airplanes start moving direc

toward Washington, D.C.

Thus the military did not have 14 minutes to respond to American 77

testimony to the Commission in May 2003 suggested. It had at most one 

two minutes to react to the unidentified plane approaching Washington, a

the fighters were in the wrong place to be able to help.They had been respon

ing to a report about an aircraft that did not exist.

Nor did the military have 47 minutes to respond to United 93, as would 

implied by the account that it received notice of the flight’s hijacking at 9:

By the time the military learned about the flight, it had crashed.

We now turn to the role of national leadership in the events that mornin
1.3 NATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT

When American 11 struck the World Trade Center at 8:46,no one in the Wh

House or traveling with the President knew that it had been hijacked.Wh

that information circulated within the FAA, we found no evidence that t

hijacking was reported to any other agency in Washington before 8:46.179

Most federal agencies learned about the crash in New York from CNN.

Within the FAA,the administrator,Jane Garvey,and her acting deputy,Mon

Belger, had not been told of a confirmed hijacking before they learned fro

television that a plane had crashed.181 Others in the agency were aware of 

as we explained earlier in this chapter.

Inside the National Military Command Center,the deputy director of op

ations and his assistant began notifying senior Pentagon officials of the in

dent.At about 9:00, the senior NMCC operations officer reached out to t

FAA operations center for information.Although the NMCC was advised 

the hijacking of American 11, the scrambling of jets was not discussed.182

In Sarasota, Florida, the presidential motorcade was arriving at the Em

E. Booker Elementary School, where President Bush was to read to a class a

talk about education.White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card told us he w

standing with the President outside the classroom when Senior Advisor to t

President Karl Rove first informed them that a small, twin-engine plane h

crashed into the World Trade Center.The President’s reaction was that the in

dent must have been caused by pilot error.183

At 8:55, before entering the classroom, the President spoke to Natio

Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice,who was at the White House.She recall

first telling the President it was a twin-engine aircraft—and then a comm

cial aircraft—that had struck the World Trade Center,adding “that’s all we kno

right now, Mr. President.”184

At the White House,Vice President Dick Cheney had just sat down fo

meeting when his assistant told him to turn on his television because a pla

had struck the North Tower of the World Trade Center.The Vice President w

wondering “how the hell could a plane hit the World Trade Center” when 

saw the second aircraft strike the South Tower.185

Elsewhere in the White House,a series of 9:00 meetings was about to beg

In the absence of information that the crash was anything other than an ac

dent, the White House staff monitored the news as they went ahead with th

regular schedules.186

The Agencies Confer

When they learned a second plane had struck the World Trade Center, nea

everyone in the White House told us, they immediately knew it was not 

accident. The Secret Service initiated a number of security enhanceme
around the White House complex.The officials who issued these orders d

not know that there were additional hijacked aircraft, or that one such aircr

was en route to Washington.These measures were precautionary steps tak

because of the strikes in New York.187

The FAA and White House Teleconferences.The FAA,the White Hou

and the Defense Department each initiated a multiagency teleconferen

before 9:30. Because none of these teleconferences—at least before 10:00

included the right officials from both the FAA and Defense Department,no

succeeded in meaningfully coordinating the military and FAA response to t

hijackings.

At about 9:20, security personnel at FAA headquarters set up a hijacki

teleconference with several agencies, including the Defense Department.T

NMCC officer who participated told us that the call was monitored only pe

odically because the information was sporadic,it was of little value,and there w

other important tasks.The FAA manager of the teleconference also reme

bered that the military participated only briefly before the Pentagon was h

Both individuals agreed that the teleconference played no role in coordinati

a response to the attacks of 9/11.Acting Deputy Administrator Belger was fru

trated to learn later in the morning that the military had not been on the call.

At the White House,the video teleconference was conducted from the S

uation Room by Richard Clarke, a special assistant to the president lo

involved in counterterrorism. Logs indicate that it began at 9:25 and includ

the CIA; the FBI; the departments of State, Justice, and Defense; the FAA; a

the White House shelter. The FAA and CIA joined at 9:40. The first top

addressed in the White House video teleconference—at about 9:40—was t

physical security of the President, the White House, and federal agenci

Immediately thereafter it was reported that a plane had hit the Pentagon.W

found no evidence that video teleconference participants had any prior info

mation that American 77 had been hijacked and was heading directly towa

Washington.Indeed,it is not clear to us that the video teleconference was fu

under way before 9:37, when the Pentagon was struck.189

Garvey, Belger, and other senior officials from FAA headquarters parti

pated in this video teleconference at various times.We do not know who fro

Defense participated, but we know that in the first hour none of the perso

nel involved in managing the crisis did.And none of the information convey

in the White House video teleconference, at least in the first hour, was bei

passed to the NMCC.As one witness recalled,“[It] was almost like there w

parallel decisionmaking processes going on; one was a voice conferen

orchestrated by the NMCC . . . and then there was the [White House vid

teleconference]. . . . [I]n my mind they were competing venues for comma

and control and decisionmaking.”190

At 10:03, the conference received reports of more missing aircraft,“2 po
sibly 3 aloft,” and learned of a combat air patrol over Washington.There w

discussion of the need for rules of engagement.Clarke reported that they w

asking the President for authority to shoot down aircraft.Confirmation of th

authority came at 10:25, but the commands were already being conveyed 

more direct contacts with the Pentagon.191

The Pentagon Teleconferences. Inside the National Military Comma

Center, the deputy director for operations immediately thought the seco

strike was a terrorist attack.The job of the NMCC in such an emergency is 

gather the relevant parties and establish the chain of command between t

National Command Authority—the president and the secretary of defense

and those who need to carry out their orders.192

On the morning of September 11, Secretary Rumsfeld was having brea

fast at the Pentagon with a group of members of Congress. He then return

to his office for his daily intelligence briefing.The Secretary was informed 

the second strike in New York during the briefing; he resumed the briefi

while awaiting more information. After the Pentagon was struck, Secreta

Rumsfeld went to the parking lot to assist with rescue efforts.193

Inside the NMCC, the deputy director for operations called for an a

purpose “significant event” conference. It began at 9:29, with a brief recap: tw

aircraft had struck the World Trade Center, there was a confirmed hijacking 

American 11,and Otis fighters had been scrambled.The FAA was asked to pr

vide an update, but the line was silent because the FAA had not been added 

the call.A minute later,the deputy director stated that it had just been confirm

that American 11 was still airborne and heading toward D.C. He directed t

transition to an air threat conference call. NORAD confirmed that Americ

11 was airborne and heading toward Washington, relaying the erroneous FA

information already mentioned.The call then ended, at about 9:34.194

It resumed at 9:37 as an air threat conference call,* which lasted more th

eight hours.The President,Vice President,Secretary of Defense,Vice Chairm

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Deputy National Security Advisor Steph

Hadley all participated in this teleconference at various times, as did milita

personnel from the White House underground shelter and the President’s m

itary aide on Air Force One.195

Operators worked feverishly to include the FAA, but they had equipme

problems and difficulty finding secure phone numbers. NORAD asked th

times before 10:03 to confirm the presence of the FAA in the teleconferen

The FAA representative who finally joined the call at 10:17 had no famili

ity with or responsibility for hijackings, no access to decisionmakers, and no

of the information available to senior FAA officials.196

* All times given for this conference call are estimates, which we and the Department of Defense believ

be accurate within a ± 3 minute margin of error.
We found no evidence that, at this critical time, NORAD’s top comman

ers, in Florida or Cheyenne Mountain, coordinated with their counterparts 

FAA headquarters to improve awareness and organize a common respon

Lower-level officials improvised—for example, the FAA’s Boston Cen

bypassed the chain of command and directly contacted NEADS after the fi

hijacking. But the highest-level Defense Department officials relied on t

NMCC’s air threat conference, in which the FAA did not participate for t

first 48 minutes.197

At 9:39, the NMCC’s deputy director for operations, a military offic

opened the call from the Pentagon,which had just been hit.He began:“An 

attack against North America may be in progress. NORAD, what’s the situ

tion?” NORAD said it had conflicting reports. Its latest information was “o

possible hijacked aircraft taking off out of JFK en route to Washington D.C

The NMCC reported a crash into the mall side of the Pentagon and request

that the Secretary of Defense be added to the conference.198

At 9:44,NORAD briefed the conference on the possible hijacking of De

1989.Two minutes later, staff reported that they were still trying to locate Se

retary Rumsfeld and Vice Chairman Myers. The Vice Chairman joined t

conference shortly before 10:00;the Secretary,shortly before 10:30.The Cha

man was out of the country.199

At 9:48, a representative from the White House shelter asked if there w

any indications of another hijacked aircraft.The deputy director for operatio

mentioned the Delta flight and concluded that “that would be the fourth po

sible hijack.”At 9:49, the commander of NORAD directed all air sovereign

aircraft to battle stations, fully armed.200

At 9:59, an Air Force lieutenant colonel working in the White House M

itary Office joined the conference and stated he had just talked to Depu

National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley.The White House requested (1) t

implementation of continuity of government measures, (2) fighter escorts 

Air Force One, and (3) a fighter combat air patrol over Washington, D.C.20

By 10:03, when United 93 crashed in Pennsylvania, there had been 

mention of its hijacking and the FAA had not yet been added to the te

conference.202

The President and the Vice President

The President was seated in a classroom when,at 9:05,Andrew Card whisper

to him:“A second plane hit the second tower. America is under attack.”T

President told us his instinct was to project calm, not to have the country 

an excited reaction at a moment of crisis.The press was standing behind t

children; he saw their phones and pagers start to ring.The President felt 

should project strength and calm until he could better understand what w

happening.203

The President remained in the classroom for another five to seven minut
while the children continued reading. He then returned to a holding roo

shortly before 9:15, where he was briefed by staff and saw television covera

He next spoke to Vice President Cheney,Dr.Rice,New York Governor Geor

Pataki, and FBI Director Robert Mueller. He decided to make a brief sta

ment from the school before leaving for the airport.The Secret Service told 

they were anxious to move the President to a safer location, but did not thi

it imperative for him to run out the door.204

Between 9:15 and 9:30,the staff was busy arranging a return to Washingto

while the President consulted his senior advisers about his remarks. No one 

the traveling party had any information during this time that other aircraft w

hijacked or missing.Staff was in contact with the White House Situation Roo

but as far as we could determine,no one with the President was in contact w

the Pentagon.The focus was on the President’s statement to the nation.The on

decision made during this time was to return to Washington.205

The President’s motorcade departed at 9:35, and arrived at the airp

between 9:42 and 9:45.During the ride the President learned about the atta

on the Pentagon. He boarded the aircraft, asked the Secret Service about t

safety of his family, and called the Vice President. According to notes of t

call, at about 9:45 the President told the Vice President:“Sounds like we ha

a minor war going on here, I heard about the Pentagon.We’re at war . . . som

body’s going to pay.”206

About this time,Card,the lead Secret Service agent,the President’s milita

aide,and the pilot were conferring on a possible destination for Air Force O

The Secret Service agent felt strongly that the situation in Washington was t

unstable for the President to return there, and Card agreed. The Preside

strongly wanted to return to Washington and only grudgingly agreed to 

elsewhere.The issue was still undecided when the President conferred with t

Vice President at about the time Air Force One was taking off. The Vice Pr

ident recalled urging the President not to return to Washington.Air Force O

departed at about 9:54 without any fixed destination.The objective was to 

up in the air—as fast and as high as possible—and then decide where to go.

At 9:33, the tower supervisor at Reagan National Airport picked up 

hotline to the Secret Service and told the Service’s operations center th

“an aircraft [is] coming at you and not talking with us.”This was the fi

specific report to the Secret Service of a direct threat to the White Hou

No move was made to evacuate the Vice President at this time.As the of

cer who took the call explained, “[I was] about to push the alert butt

when the tower advised that the aircraft was turning south and approac

ing Reagan National Airport.”208

American 77 began turning south,away from the White House, at 9:34

continued heading south for roughly a minute,before turning west and beg

ning to circle back.This news prompted the Secret Service to order the imm

diate evacuation of the Vice President just before 9:36. Agents propelled h
out of his chair and told him he had to get to the bunker.The Vice Preside

entered the underground tunnel leading to the shelter at 9:37.209

Once inside,Vice President Cheney and the agents paused in an area of t

tunnel that had a secure phone, a bench, and television. The Vice Preside

asked to speak to the President, but it took time for the call to be connect

He learned in the tunnel that the Pentagon had been hit, and he saw tele

sion coverage of smoke coming from the building.210

The Secret Service logged Mrs.Cheney’s arrival at the White House at 9:5

and she joined her husband in the tunnel. According to contemporaneo

notes,at 9:55 the Vice President was still on the phone with the President adv

ing that three planes were missing and one had hit the Pentagon.We belie

this is the same call in which the Vice President urged the President not 

return to Washington. After the call ended, Mrs. Cheney and the Vice Pre

dent moved from the tunnel to the shelter conference room.211

United 93 and the Shootdown Order

On the morning of 9/11, the President and Vice President stayed in cont

not by an open line of communication but through a series of calls.The Pr

ident told us he was frustrated with the poor communications that mornin

He could not reach key officials,including Secretary Rumsfeld,for a period 

time.The line to the White House shelter conference room—and the Vice Pr

ident—kept cutting off.212

The Vice President remembered placing a call to the President just af

entering the shelter conference room. There is conflicting evidence abo

when the Vice President arrived in the shelter conference room.We have co

cluded, from the available evidence, that the Vice President arrived in the roo

shortly before 10:00,perhaps at 9:58.The Vice President recalled being told,j

after his arrival, that the Air Force was trying to establish a combat air pat

over Washington.213

The Vice President stated that he called the President to discuss the rules 

engagement for the CAP. He recalled feeling that it did no good to establ

the CAP unless the pilots had instructions on whether they were authoriz

to shoot if the plane would not divert. He said the President signed off on th

concept.The President said he remembered such a conversation, and tha

reminded him of when he had been an interceptor pilot.The President emph

sized to us that he had authorized the shootdown of hijacked aircraft.214

The Vice President’s military aide told us he believed the Vice Preside

spoke to the President just after entering the conference room, but he did n

hear what they said. Rice, who entered the room shortly after the Vice Pre

dent and sat next to him, remembered hearing him inform the President,“S

the CAPs are up. Sir, they’re going to want to know what to do.” Then s

recalled hearing him say, “Yes sir.” She believed this conversation occurred 

few minutes, perhaps five, after they entered the conference room.215

We believe this call would have taken place sometime before 10:10 to 10:
Among the sources that reflect other important events of that morning, th

is no documentary evidence for this call, but the relevant sources are inco

plete. Others nearby who were taking notes, such as the Vice President’s ch

of staff, Scooter Libby, who sat next to him, and Mrs. Cheney, did not not

call between the President and Vice President immediately after the Vice Pr

ident entered the conference room.216

At 10:02, the communicators in the shelter began receiving reports fro

the Secret Service of an inbound aircraft—presumably hijacked—headi

toward Washington.That aircraft was United 93.The Secret Service was g

ting this information directly from the FAA.The FAA may have been trac

ing the progress of United 93 on a display that showed its projected path 

Washington,not its actual radar return.Thus,the Secret Service was relying 

projections and was not aware the plane was already down in Pennsylvania.

At some time between 10:10 and 10:15, a military aide told the Vice Pr

ident and others that the aircraft was 80 miles out.Vice President Cheney w

asked for authority to engage the aircraft.218 His reaction was described 

Scooter Libby as quick and decisive, “in about the time it takes a batter 

decide to swing.” The Vice President authorized fighter aircraft to engage t

inbound plane. He told us he based this authorization on his earlier conver

tion with the President.The military aide returned a few minutes later, prob

bly between 10:12 and 10:18, and said the aircraft was 60 miles out. He ag

asked for authorization to engage.The Vice President again said yes.219

At the conference room table was White House Deputy Chief of St

Joshua Bolten.Bolten watched the exchanges and,after what he called “a qu

moment,”suggested that the Vice President get in touch with the President a

confirm the engage order. Bolten told us he wanted to make sure the Pre

dent was told that the Vice President had executed the order. He said he h

not heard any prior discussion on the subject with the President.220

The Vice President was logged calling the President at 10:18 for a tw

minute conversation that obtained the confirmation. On Air Force One, t

President’s press secretary was taking notes; Ari Fleischer recorded that 

10:20, the President told him that he had authorized a shootdown of aircr

if necessary.221

Minutes went by and word arrived of an aircraft down in Pennsylvan

Those in the shelter wondered if the aircraft had been shot down pursuant 

this authorization.222

At approximately 10:30, the shelter started receiving reports of anoth

hijacked plane, this time only 5 to 10 miles out. Believing they had only 

minute or two, the Vice President again communicated the authorization 

“engage or “take out” the aircraft.At 10:33, Hadley told the air threat conf

ence call: “I need to get word to Dick Myers that our reports are there’s 

inbound aircraft flying low 5 miles out.The Vice President’s guidance was 

need to take them out.”223

Once again, there was no immediate information about the fate of t
inbound aircraft.In the apt description of one witness,“It drops below the rad

screen and it’s just continually hovering in your imagination; you don’t kno

where it is or what happens to it.” Eventually, the shelter received word th

the alleged hijacker 5 miles away had been a medevac helicopter.224

Transmission of the Authorization from the White House 

to the Pilots

The NMCC learned of United 93’s hijacking at about 10:03.At this time t

FAA had no contact with the military at the level of national command.T

NMCC learned about United 93 from the White House. It, in turn, w

informed by the Secret Service’s contacts with the FAA.225

NORAD had no information either.At 10:07, its representative on the 

threat conference call stated that NORAD had “no indication of a hijack hea

ing to DC at this time.”226

Repeatedly between 10:14 and 10:19, a lieutenant colonel at the Wh

House relayed to the NMCC that the Vice President had confirmed fight

were cleared to engage inbound aircraft if they could verify that the aircr

was hijacked.227

The commander of NORAD,General Ralph Eberhart,was en route to t

NORAD operations center in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, when t

shootdown order was communicated on the air threat conference call.He to

us that by the time he arrived, the order had already been passed dow

NORAD’s chain of command.228

It is not clear how the shootdown order was communicated with

NORAD.But we know that at 10:31,General Larry Arnold instructed his st

to broadcast the following over a NORAD instant messaging system:“10

Vice president has cleared to us to intercept tracks of interest and shoot the

down if they do not respond per [General Arnold].”229

In upstate New York, NEADS personnel first learned of the shootdow

order from this message:

Floor Leadership: You need to read this. . . .The Region Commander

has declared that we can shoot down aircraft that do not respond to

our direction. Copy that?

Controllers: Copy that, sir.

Floor Leadership: So if you’re trying to divert somebody and he won’t

divert—

Controllers: DO [Director of Operations] is saying no.

Floor Leadership: No? It came over the chat. . . .You got a conflict on

that direction?

Controllers: Right now no, but—

Floor Leadership: Okay? Okay, you read that from the Vice President,

right? Vice President has cleared. Vice President has cleared us to
intercept traffic and shoot them down if they do not respond per

[General Arnold].230

In interviews with us, NEADS personnel expressed considerable confusi

over the nature and effect of the order.

The NEADS commander told us he did not pass along the order becau

he was unaware of its ramifications.Both the mission commander and the se

ior weapons director indicated they did not pass the order to the fighters c

cling Washington and New York because they were unsure how the pil

would, or should, proceed with this guidance. In short, while leaders 

Washington believed that the fighters above them had been instructed to “ta

out”hostile aircraft,the only orders actually conveyed to the pilots were to “

type and tail.”231

In most cases, the chain of command authorizing the use of force runs fro

the president to the secretary of defense and from the secretary to the comb

ant commander.The President apparently spoke to Secretary Rumsfeld for t

first time that morning shortly after 10:00.No one can recall the content of t

conversation, but it was a brief call in which the subject of shootdown autho

ity was not discussed.232

At 10:39, the Vice President updated the Secretary on the air thr

conference:

Vice President: There’s been at least three instances here where we’ve

had reports of aircraft approaching Washington—a couple were confirmed hijack. And, pursuant to the President’s instructions I gave

authorization for them to be taken out. Hello?

SecDef:Yes, I understand.Who did you give that direction to?

Vice President: It was passed from here through the [operations] center at the White House, from the [shelter].

SecDef: OK,let me ask the question here.Has that directive been transmitted to the aircraft?

Vice President:Yes, it has.

SecDef: So we’ve got a couple of aircraft up there that have those

instructions at this present time?

Vice President: That is correct. And it’s my understanding they’ve

already taken a couple of aircraft out.

SecDef: We can’t confirm that.We’re told that one aircraft is down but

we do not have a pilot report that did it.233

As this exchange shows, Secretary Rumsfeld was not in the NMCC wh

the shootdown order was first conveyed. He went from the parking lot to 

office (where he spoke to the President), then to the Executive Support Ce

ter,where he participated in the White House video teleconference.He mov
to the NMCC shortly before 10:30, in order to join Vice Chairman Mye

Secretary Rumsfeld told us he was just gaining situational awareness when 

spoke with the Vice President at 10:39.His primary concern was ensuring th

the pilots had a clear understanding of their rules of engagement.234

The Vice President was mistaken in his belief that shootdown authorizati

had been passed to the pilots flying at NORAD’s direction.By 10:45 there w

however, another set of fighters circling Washington that had entirely differe

rules of engagement.These fighters, part of the 113th Wing of the District 

Columbia Air National Guard, launched out of Andrews Air Force Base 

Maryland in response to information passed to them by the Secret Service.T

first of the Andrews fighters was airborne at 10:38.235

General David Wherley—the commander of the 113th Wing—reached o

to the Secret Service after hearing secondhand reports that it wanted fight

airborne. A Secret Service agent had a phone in each ear, one connected 

Wherley and the other to a fellow agent at the White House, relaying instru

tions that the White House agent said he was getting from the Vice Preside

The guidance for Wherley was to send up the aircraft, with orders to prot

the White House and take out any aircraft that threatened the Capitol. Ge

eral Wherley translated this in military terms to flying “weapons free”—that 

the decision to shoot rests in the cockpit, or in this case in the cockpit of t

lead pilot.He passed these instructions to the pilots that launched at 10:42 a

afterward.236

Thus, while the fighter pilots under NORAD direction who had scra

bled out of Langley never received any type of engagement order,the Andre

pilots were operating weapons free—a permissive rule of engagement. T

President and the Vice President indicated to us they had not been aware th

fighters had been scrambled out of Andrews, at the request of the Secret S

vice and outside the military chain of command.237There is no evidence th

NORAD headquarters or military officials in the NMCC knew—during t

morning of September 11—that the Andrews planes were airborne and op

ating under different rules of engagement.

What If?

NORAD officials have maintained consistently that had the passengers n

caused United 93 to crash, the military would have prevented it from reac

ing Washington, D.C.That conclusion is based on a version of events that 

now know is incorrect.The Langley fighters were not scrambled in respon

to United 93; NORAD did not have 47 minutes to intercept the flig

NORAD did not even know the plane was hijacked until after it had crash

It is appropriate,therefore,to reconsider whether United 93 would have be

intercepted.

Had it not crashed in Pennsylvania at 10:03, we estimate that United 
could not have reached Washington any earlier than 10:13,and probably wou

have arrived before 10:23.There was only one set of fighters circling Washin

ton during that time frame—the Langley F-16s.They were armed and und

NORAD’s control.After NEADS learned of the hijacking at 10:07,NORA

would have had from 6 to 16 minutes to locate the flight, receive authori

tion to shoot it down, and communicate the order to the pilots, who (in t

same span) would have had to authenticate the order, intercept the flight, a

execute the order.238

At that point in time, the Langley pilots did not know the threat they w

facing, did not know where United 93 was located, and did not have sho

down authorization.

First, the Langley pilots were never briefed about the reason they w

scrambled.As the lead pilot explained,“I reverted to the Russian threat. ...I

thinking cruise missile threat from the sea.You know you look down and 

the Pentagon burning and I thought the bastards snuck one by us. . . . [Y]

couldn’t see any airplanes, and no one told us anything.”The pilots knew th

mission was to divert aircraft, but did not know that the threat came fro

hijacked airliners.239

Second, NEADS did not have accurate information on the location 

United 93. Presumably FAA would have provided such information, but 

do not know how long that would have taken, nor how long it would ha

taken NEADS to locate the target.

Third, NEADS needed orders to pass to the pilots.At 10:10, the pilots ov

Washington were emphatically told,“negative clearance to shoot.”Shootdow

authority was first communicated to NEADS at 10:31. It is possible th

NORAD commanders would have ordered a shootdown in the absence of t

authorization communicated by the Vice President,but given the gravity of t

decision to shoot down a commercial airliner, and NORAD’s caution tha

mistake not be made, we view this possibility as unlikely.240

NORAD officials have maintained that they would have intercepted a

shot down United 93.We are not so sure.We are sure that the nation owe

debt to the passengers of United 93.Their actions saved the lives of countl

others, and may have saved either the Capitol or the White House fro

destruction.

The details of what happened on the morning of September 11 are com

plex, but they play out a simple theme. NORAD and the FAA were unp

pared for the type of attacks launched against the United States on Septemb

11, 2001.They struggled, under difficult circumstances, to improvise a hom

land defense against an unprecedented challenge they had never befo

encountered and had never trained to meet.

At 10:02 that morning, an assistant to the mission crew commander 

NORAD’s Northeast Air Defense Sector in Rome, New York, was worki
with his colleagues on the floor of the command center. In a brief moment 

reflection, he was recorded remarking that “This is a new type of war.”241

He was, and is, right. But the conflict did not begin on 9/11. It had be

publicly declared years earlier,most notably in a declaration faxed early in 19

to an Arabic-language newspaper in London. Few Americans had noticed 

The fax had been sent from thousands of miles away by the followers of a Sau

exile gathered in one of the most remote and impoverished countries on ear