J-A02001-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

STARINA PIETZ

v.

BREANNA HADRYCH 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 745 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered May 25, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Civil Division at 

No(s): 2022-3242

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MURRAY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 28, 2023

Breanna Hadrych (“Appellant”) appeals from the May 25, 2022 order 

entered by the trial court in favor of Starina Pietz (“Grandmother”) on behalf 

of minor K.G., pursuant to the Protection of Victims of Sexual Violence or 

Intimidation (“PVSVI”) Act.

1

 We affirm.

The trial court succinctly summarized the factual and procedural history 

as follows:

On May 2, 2022, . . . [the] maternal grandmother of the 

minor children . . . filed a petition for protection from intimidation

on behalf of minor children, C.G. ([born in January] 2005) and 

K.G. ([born in August] 2007) against [Appellant]. [Grandmother] 

averred that the children were subject to constant violence in the 

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*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Appellant is the live-in girlfriend of K.G.’s father, C.G. The trial court also 

entered a final three-year Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) order against C.G., 

which is the subject of a separate appeal.
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house where they lived with [Appellant]. The averments specified 

that [Appellant], in the presence of the children, had tried killing 

herself by grabbing a knife and slitting her wrist. [Grandmother] 

further averred that [Appellant] had previously dragged K.G. up 

the stairs by her hair and threw her up against a wall. After a 

review of the petition and an ex parte proceeding in which 

[Grandmother] and C.G. testified, this court entered a temporary 

[protection from intimidation] order. A [protection from 

intimidation] hearing was scheduled for May 11, 2022. However, 

on May 9, 2022, the parties agreed to continue the matter to May 

25, 2022. After a hearing on May 25, 2022, in which the children 

and [Appellant] both testified, this court granted [Grandmother’s] 

request for a final protection from intimidation order on behalf of 

minor child K.G. for a period of three years and denied the request 

as to minor child C.G. 

Trial Court Opinion, 7/19/22, at 1-2 (cleaned up).

Appellant timely appealed from the final PVSVI order, and both she and 

the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant raises the following 

issues for our review:

1. Do the actions of [Appellant], as a matter of law, rise to the 

level of abuse?

2. Is the testimony of the children wholly deserving of credibility, 

given the surrounding circumstances, as a matter of law and of 

common sense?

3. Is the penalty of a [three-]year [Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) 

order] appropriate in this case?

Appellant’s brief at 10.

Our standard of review for a challenge to the propriety of an order issued 

pursuant to PVSVI Act is whether the trial court committed an abuse of 

discretion or an error of law. See E.A.M. v. A.M.D. II, 173 A.3d 313, 316 

(Pa.Super. 2017) (employing the standard of review utilized in Protection from 

Abuse (“PFA”) appeals to those raised under the PVSVI Act). An abuse of 
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discretion is “not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion 

the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by 

the evidence or the record.” Id. (citation omitted).

Appellant first claims that the evidence of abuse was insufficient to allow 

the trial court to enter a PFA order. See Appellant’s brief at 37-39. 

Specifically, she contends that her actions did not amount to abuse, since 

there was no claim of persistent injury. Id. at 39 (claiming pulling K.G. up 

the stairs by her hair was “within the appropriate bounds of parental 

correction”). Grandmother disagrees, correctly pointing out that the trial 

court did not enter a final PFA order. See Grandmother’s brief at 12-13. 

Instead, the court issued a final PVSVI order, which is a separate statute that 

does not require proof of abuse before a trial court can issue a PVSVI order. 

Id. at 13. We agree with Grandmother.

In relevant part, the PVSVI Act is intended to protect minor or

incapacitated adult victims of “sexual violence or intimidation.” 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 62A01. The protections are extended to victims who “desire safety and 

protection from future interactions with their offender, regardless of whether 

they seek criminal prosecution.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 62A02(5); see also 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 62A05(a) (explaining that adults and emancipated minors may seek relief 

under the PVSVI Act on behalf of minor children and incapacitated adults). 

The PVSVI act separately defines intimidation as 
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conduct constituting a crime under either of the following 

provisions between persons who are not family or household 

members: 

18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(4), (5), (6) or (7) (relating to 

harassment) where the conduct is committed by a person 

[eighteen] years of age or older against a person under 

[eighteen] years of age.[2]

18 Pa.C.S. § 2709.1 (relating to stalking) where the conduct 

is committed by a person [eighteen] years of age or older 

against a person under [eighteen] years of age.[3]

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2 A person commits the crime of harassment when, with intent to harass, 

annoy or alarm another, the person:

(4) communicates to or about such other person any lewd, 

lascivious, threatening or obscene words, language, drawings or 

caricatures;

(5) communicates repeatedly in an anonymous manner;

(6) communicates repeatedly at extremely inconvenient hours; or

(7) communicates repeatedly in a manner other than specified in 

paragraphs (4), (5), and (6).

18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(4)-(7).

3 A person commits the crime of stalking when the person either:

(1) engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts 

toward another person, including following the person without 

proper authority, under circumstances which demonstrate either 

an intent to place such other person in reasonable fear of bodily 

injury or to cause substantial emotional distress to such other 

person; or

(2) engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly communicates 

to another person under circumstances which demonstrate or 

communicate either an intent to place such other person in 

reasonable fear of bodily injury or to cause substantial emotional 

distress to such other person.

18 Pa.C.S. § 2709.1(a)(1), (2).
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42 Pa.C.S. § 62A03. Thus, “the statutory language of the Act does not require 

that a petitioner prove sexual violence with intimidation to obtain a 

[protection from intimidation] order.”4 N.E.B. on behalf of N.P.B. v. S.S.J., 

229 A.3d 345, *3 (Pa.Super. 2020) (non-precedential decision) (analyzing the 

PVSVI Act and finding that the Act provides a civil remedy to victims of 

intimidation separate and apart from the one it offers victims of sexual 

violence.) (emphasis in original); see also A.M.D. on Behalf of A.D. v. 

T.A.B., 178 A.3d 889, 894 (Pa.Super. 2018) (“The Act provides a civil remedy 

to victims of intimidation . . .”). 

Before a trial court enters a final order under the PVSVI act, the court 

must conduct a hearing at which the plaintiff is required to:

(1) Assert that the plaintiff or another individual, as 

appropriate, is a victim of sexual violence or intimidation 

committed by the defendant; and

(2) Prove by preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff or 

another individual, as appropriate, is at a continued risk of 

harm from the defendant.

42 Pa.C.S. § 62A06(a). For the first prong, the plaintiff must “assert that [he 

or she] was a victim of . . . intimidation committed by the defendant” and the 

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4 The PVSVI Act separately defines “sexual violence” as conduct constituting 

a crime under one of six enumerated sexual offenses that do not pertain to 

requirements needed to prove intimidation. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 62A03. The 

PVSVI also demands additional action on behalf of law enforcement for victims 

of “sexual violence” that are not mandated for victims of “intimidation.” See 

42 Pa.C.S. § 62A05(d)(5) (“In the case of a minor victim of sexual violence, 

a copy of the petition and order shall be served upon the county agency and 

the Department of Public Welfare”). 
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court must find the assertion credible. See E.A.M., supra at 319 (emphasis 

omitted). As to the second prong, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance 

of the evidence, “a more likely than not inquiry,” that she is at a continued 

risk of harm from the defendant. Id. at 319-20. The risk of harm includes 

the risk of mental and emotional harm, such as “apprehension, fear, and 

emotional distress.” Id. at 321. Importantly, the statutory language does 

not require the plaintiff to prove that criminal harassment or criminal stalking

was committed by the defendant, only that it is more likely than not that the 

defendant presents a continued risk of harm. See A.M.D. on Behalf of A.D., 

supra at 894 (interpreting 42 Pa.C.S. § 62A06(a)(1) and Pa.R.C.P. 1957 

governing decisions in PVSVI actions). Most pertinent to the instant appeal, 

the PVSVI Act does not contain any requirement that the plaintiff prove the 

defendant attempted to cause or inflicted bodily injury. 

Apparently failing to appreciate that the trial court here entered an order 

pursuant to the PVSVI Act rather than the PFA Act, Appellant argues that there 

was insufficient evidence presented at the hearing to demonstrate that K.G. 

suffered “abuse,” as that term is defined in the PFA Act, because Appellant did 

not cause K.G. “persistent marks or lasting [physical] pain.” See Appellant’s 

brief at 39; see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 6102(a) (delineating the five acts that 

constitute “abuse” under the PFA). However, as discussed above, by its plain 

language the PVSVI Act merely required Grandmother “to assert” that her 

granddaughter “[was] a victim of . . . intimidation” committed by Appellant 

and “to prove by [a] preponderance of the evidence” that K.G. faced “a 
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continued risk of harm” from Appellant. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 62A06(a) 

(emphasis added); see also K.N.B. v. M.D., 259 A.3d 341, 351-52 (Pa. 2021) 

(analyzing the PVSVI Act and explaining that, unlike the PFA Act, the PVSVI 

Act’s “continued risk of harm element does not require trial courts to evaluate 

the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s mental and emotional reaction when she 

encounters the defendant”). Accordingly, Appellant’s first claim fails.

Even if Appellant had challenged the sufficiency of the evidence relative 

to the PVSVI statute, her claim would not succeed, as we would affirm on the 

basis of the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Jesse Pettit. See Trial 

Court Opinion, 7/19/22, at 4 (paraphrasing the testimony of K.G. describing 

multiple instances of physical assault and intimidation perpetrated by 

Appellant and expressing fear that Appellant would continue to harm her in 

the future, analyzing the evidence in accordance with controlling precedent, 

and finding that Appellant’s actions rose to the level of intimidation and posed 

a continued risk of harm to K.G. within the meaning of the PVSVI Act).5 

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5 At oral argument, Appellant argued for the first time that the word sexual

modified intimidation as well as violence and that Grandmother failed to prove 

that Appellant had engaged in sexual intimidation. Since this argument was 

not raised below and does not appear in Appellant’s brief, it is waived. See 

Karn v. Quick & Reilly Inc, 912 A.2d 329, 336 (Pa.Super. 2006); see also 

Pa.R.A.P. 2111-2119 (discussing the required content of appellate briefs and 

addressing the specific requirements of the various subsections of appellate 

briefs). Nevertheless, as noted in the body of this memorandum, the PVSVI 

Act separately defines “sexual violence” and “intimidation,” and defines a 

“victim” as one “who is a victim of sexual violence or intimation.” 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 62A03; see also N.E.B. on behalf of N.P.B. v. S.S.J., 229 A.3d 345, *3 

(Pa.Super. 2020) (non-precedential decision) (analyzing the PVSVI Act and 

finding that the Act “provides a civil remedy to victims of intimidation.”). 
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Appellant’s second issue challenges the weight of the evidence, arguing 

that the trial court abused its discretion when it found the children “wholly 

deserving of credibility.” Appellant’s brief at 39-40. In reviewing this claim 

we are mindful of the following:

Absent an abuse of discretion, error of law, or lack of support in 

the record, this court does not disturb a trial court’s factual 

findings. Moreover, as to issues involving credibility, we defer to 

the [trial court sitting as] fact finder that had the opportunity to 

observe the demeanor of the witness.

A.M.D., supra at 895 (citations and quotations omitted).

Herein, Appellant contends that K.G. was “in tears” during her testimony 

because she was “ashamed about lying” and that C.G. had an “incentive to 

lie” because he had been “involved” with a fourteen-year-old girl. Id. at 41-

42. However, the trial court found Appellant’s unsupported accusations 

unpersuasive, explaining:

This court found K.G. to be extremely credible in her testimony. 

K.G. testified in detail and emotionally as to the conduct of 

[Appellant]. C.G. corroborated his sister’s testimony and testified 

in similar detail regarding [Appellant] pulling K.G. up the stairs by 

her hair on one occasion because K.G. was being loud and 

annoying. [Appellant], when asked if she ever pulled K.G.’s hair, 

testified that she’s done so when they’ve played around but she’s 

never done so physically or to punish K.G. [Appellant] further 

testified that she has never struck or pushed K.G. and further 

stated that K.G. is not afraid of her. Moreover, when asked why 

the children testified [Appellant] has hit K.G., [Appellant] testified 

that “they’re not getting their way right now. So they’re, I guess, 

making up lies.” This court did not find the testimony of 

[Appellant] to be credible.

Trial Court Opinion, 7/19/22, at 5 (cleaned up).
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Our review of the certified record supports the trial court’s findings. 

Both children testified about specific instances of harmful conduct that 

Appellant directed at K.G. See N.T., 5/25/22, at 18-19 (C.G. testifying that 

Appellant grabbed K.G. by the hair and pulled her upstairs for “being loud and 

annoying”); id. at 32-33 (K.G. testifying that Appellant had taken her out of 

bed and thrown her into the kitchen wall a couple of times, dragged her up 

the stairs by her hair, and struck her once or twice). Moreover, the court was 

under no obligation to accept Appellant’s denials and her bald claim that the 

allegations were the result of K.G. not “getting her way.” Id. at 50; see 

A.M.D., supra at 895. Accordingly, we defer to the trial court’s 

determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses at the hearing and find 

that Appellant’s second issue merits no relief. See N.T., 5/25/22, at 74 (“I 

found the testimony of both of the children to be concerning and certainly 

understandable that they would be in fear for their safety based on what 

they’ve testified to.”); see also Kaur v. Singh, 259 A.3d 505, 509 (Pa. Super. 

2021) (stating that, “this Court will defer to the credibility determinations of 

the trial court as to witnesses who appeared before it[, and it] is well-settled 

that the trier[-]of[-]fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part[,] or none of 

the evidence”).

Appellant’s final argument is that a three-year PFA order is too “drastic,” 

since it separates the family. Appellant’s brief at 43 (“Instead of wrenching 

[the children] out of their home, less drastic measures could have been 
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taken.”). However, a review of Appellant’s brief demonstrates that she has 

failed to set forth an argument with citation to appropriate legal authorities in 

support of this issue. See Appellant’s brief at 42-43. As such, Appellant has 

waived it as a basis for relief. See e.g. C.H.L. v. W.D.L., 214 A.3d 1272, 

1276 (Pa.Super. 2019) (finding a PFA claim waived due to deficiencies in the 

appellant’s brief); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). 

In any event, the trial court found Appellant’s argument unpersuasive, 

explaining that the final order appropriately provided for K.G.’s safety and 

protection from future interactions with Appellant. See Trial Court Opinion, 

7/19/22, at 5-6. We agree. The PVSVI Act empowers the court to issue a 

protection from intimidation order “for a fixed period of time not to exceed 

[thirty-six] months.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 62A07(c). After finding that intimidation 

occurred and that Appellant continued to pose a risk of harm to K.G., the trial 

court properly entered an order that fell within the PVSVI statute’s 

parameters. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/28/2023 
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