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SEAN C. KEENAN v. PATRICIA A. CASILLO

(AC 34872)

Gruendel, Bear and West, Js.

Argued February 10—officially released April 22, 2014

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Danbury, Hon Howard T. Owens, Jr., judge trial referee

[motion to remove guardian ad litem]; Adelman, J.

[judgment].)

Samuel V. Schoonmaker IV, with whom was Wendy

Dunne DiChristina, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Brendon P. Levesque, with whom were Karen L.

Dowd and, on the brief, Susan A. Moch, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

GRUENDEL, J. The plaintiff, Sean C. Keenan, appeals

from the judgment of the trial court awarding him and

the defendant, Patricia A. Casillo, joint legal custody

of their minor children, and ordering him to pay permanent alimony and child support to the defendant. On

appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in (1)

awarding the parties joint custody of the children, (2)

refusing to remove the guardian ad litem, and (3) awarding permanent alimony to the defendant. We affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

The parties married in April, 2007. They have two

minor children, a daughter born in December, 2007, and

a son born in August, 2009. In October, 2010, the plaintiff

filed for the dissolution of their marriage, and sought

joint custody of their children. The defendant’s subsequent accusations of sexual abuse by the plaintiff

against their daughter changed the tenor of the parties’

relationship. The parties were unable to reach a settlement, and a trial followed. The court thereafter issued

a memorandum of decision, finding that joint custody

was in the best interests of the children. It also ordered

the plaintiff to pay the defendant permanent alimony

and child support. This appeal followed.

‘‘The standard of review in family matters is well

settled. An appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s

orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has

abused its discretion or it is found that it could not

reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts presented. . . . In determining whether a trial court has

abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor

of the correctness of its action. . . . Appellate review

of a trial court’s findings of fact is governed by the

clearly erroneous standard of review. The trial court’s

findings are binding upon this court unless they are

clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the record as a whole. . . . A finding of fact is

clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the

record to support it . . . or when although there is

evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed. . . . Therefore, to

conclude that the trial court abused its discretion, we

must find that the court either incorrectly applied the

law or could not reasonably conclude as it did.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Demartino v. Demartino, 79 Conn. App. 488, 492–93,

830 A.2d 394 (2003).

I

The plaintiff claims that the court erred in ordering

joint custody because it lacked the statutory authority

to do so. He alternatively argues that the court’s joint

custody orders are inconsistent with its findings and
the evidence. We disagree.

A

The plaintiff first claims that the court lacked statutory authority to award joint custody, thus depriving

him of due process of law. We disagree.

The following undisputed facts are relevant to this

issue on appeal. When the plaintiff filed his complaint

in October, 2010, he asked forjoint custody of the minor

children. After the defendant accused the plaintiff of

improper sexual contact with their daughter in November, 2010, both parties moved for sole custody pendente

lite.1 The plaintiff, however, did not amend his complaint to remove the requested relief of joint custody.

Before trial began in April, 2012, the parties filed

proposed orders with the court. In those orders, the

defendant proposed that she receive sole custody of

the children, and the plaintiff similarly proposed that

he receive sole custody. During trial, however, the

defendant orally informed the court that she would be

seeking joint custody as an alternative to sole custody.

She subsequently filed a revised proposed custody and

parenting plan, stating that she ‘‘should have sole legal

custody of the minor children . . . . In the alternative,

the parties shall have joint legal custody of the minor

children, with final decision making authority to be with

the [defendant].’’

In its decision, the court recognized that ‘‘[i]n order

to enter an order of joint legal custody, the court must

find that such an order in addition to being in the best

interests of the children is also based on an agreement

of the parties or upon motion of at least one of the

parents. Tabackman v. Tabackman, [25 Conn. App. 366,

368, 593 A.2d 526] (1991).’’ After concluding that such

requirements were met, the court ordered joint legal

custody.

General Statutes § 46b-56a (c) provides: ‘‘If only one

parent seeks an order of joint custody upon a motion

duly made, the court may order both parties to submit

to conciliation at their own expense with the costs of

such conciliation to be borne by the parties as the court

directs according to each party’s ability to pay.’’ Our

precedent is clear, however, that ‘‘joint custody cannot

be an alternative to a sole custody award where neither

seeks it and where no opportunity is given to the recalcitrant parent to embrace the concept. Further, it is significant that the statute contains no additional subsection

providing for a procedure in the event neither parent

seeks joint custody.’’ Emerick v. Emerick, 5 Conn. App.

649, 658, 502 A.2d 933 (1985), cert. dismissed, 200 Conn.

804, 510 A.2d 192 (1986).

The plaintiff claims that the court lacked statutory

authority to grant joint custody to the parties in the

present case. He states that although he originally

sought joint custody in his complaint, both parties
thereafter filed pendente lite motions with the court

seeking sole custody of the children. The plaintiff also

claims that the defendant’s proposed orders of joint

custody were filed after the trial was completed, and

therefore do not take the place of a motion for leave

to amend or serve as a properly pleaded basis for joint

custody. Consequently, the plaintiff concludes that he

was deprived of his constitutional right to due process

because he lacked notice that the court was considering

an award of joint custody, and he therefore was not

given an opportunity to be heard on the matter.

Our previous decision in Giordano v. Giordano, 9

Conn. App. 641, 520 A.2d 1290 (1987), is dispositive of

this issue. In Giordano, ‘‘[a] request for joint custody

was made by the defendant in his answer and counterclaim, but was not specifically raised by either party

thereafter during the course of the trial, although the

court inquired of some witnesses about custody

arrangements other than sole custody.’’ Id., 643. In that

decision, we stated: ‘‘When one of the parties has sought

joint custody in the pleadings, it is not error for the

court, in the exercise of its discretion, to award joint

custody.’’ Id., 645; see also Tabackman v. Tabackman,

supra, 25 Conn. App. 368 (‘‘[a] court may award joint

legal custody . . . if the parties agree to joint custody

or if one party seeks joint custody’’).

In the present case, there was a pleading requesting

joint custody, namely, the plaintiff’s October 6, 2010

complaint.2 The court, therefore, had statutory authority to grant joint custody to the parties, so long as it

found that it was in the best interests of the children.

We further conclude that there was no violation of

due process. See In re Jason M., 140 Conn. App. 708,

716, 59 A.3d 902 (in order to afford due process, ‘‘[p]arties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be

heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they

must first be notified’’), cert. denied, 308 Conn. 931, 64

A.3d 330, cert. denied, U.S. , 134 S. Ct. 701,

187 L. Ed. 2d 564 (2013). In addition to the plaintiff’s

complaint, which sought joint custody, there was testimony at trial about whether the parties could coparent.

The defendant’s attorney also indicated at trial that

her proposed orders would include a request for joint

custody. The plaintiff was therefore on notice that the

issue of custody, in general, was before the court and

that it had the authority to enter an order of joint custody. As a result, the plaintiff had a fair opportunity to

be heard on the issue.3

B

The plaintiff alternatively claims that the court’s joint

custody orders do not logically and legally flow from

its findings and, consequently, should be vacated. We

do not agree.

The following additional facts, as set forth in the
court’s memorandum of decision, are relevant to this

claim. When the defendant accused the plaintiff of

improper sexual contact with their daughter,4‘‘the

plaintiff responded with horror and then with anger.

. . . The anger, unfortunately, has not passed despite

the considerable period of time that has passed. It is,

to a large degree, that anger that calls into question

any joint custody arrangement for the two very young

children. . . . In [the plaintiff’s] words, expert help

would be required for the [parties] to come to [a] ‘common understanding of what happened and what did not

happen’ before it would be possible to coparent. . . .

‘‘The plaintiff is, by all accounts, an excellent parent

to both of his children. He is described as attentive and

attuned; appropriate and disciplined; and very loving.

. . . Nevertheless, the level of his anger is apparent

to all, and it calls his overall parental judgment into

question. . . . [His] anger has already had negative

consequences for his children just within the eighteen

months since [the parties] have lived apart. Most significantly, his daughter experienced unnecessary anxiety

by his cancellation of her therapy last spring. . . .

[T]he plaintiff was upset that Dr. [Mary Frances] Sink

[the child’s therapist] would not speak to him on any

type of regular basis and that he was not informed that

the defendant was using a particular type of behavior

modification technique at her home on the therapist’s

advice. He withdrew his consent for the therapy and

insisted that a new, more cooperative therapist be hired.

. . . The matter was resolved when he agreed to

attempt to work out his relationship with Dr. Sink, and

she agreed to be more communicative. However, the

little girl was in some distress during the lull and both

the [guardian ad litem] and Dr. [Joan] Oppenheim [the

court appointed evaluator] noted that stance on the

part of the plaintiff [was] a poor parenting decision

given the situation. The court agrees. . . .

‘‘The court has very serious concerns about the parenting skills of the defendant. Her behavior around the

allegations of abuse in the fall of 2010 are very difficult

to understand. When she first claims to have seen the

abuse, she did nothing to stop it and even allowed the

plaintiff to have unsupervised access to the girl for two

more nights. . . . Despite ongoing concerns voiced by

the defendant during the investigation, she once again

does not seek to go forward with a hearing, but agrees

to provide the plaintiff with additional unsupervised

access to the children . . . . It is extremely difficult

to understand why she would agree to such terms if

she believed that her daughter had been molested. The

defendant testified that she felt that she had no choice,

but that testimony, along with the other troubling

behavior noted, makes the excuse very unconvincing.

‘‘In addition to the unexplained behavior . . . the

defendant was not at all consistent in to whom she
would make the allegations. She did not report it to the

children’s pediatrician even though she brought [both

children] to the office within days of reporting the

behavior to [the Department of Children and Families].

She brought the girl to a local emergency room after

one overnight visit [with the defendant] with the claim

that abuse had occurred and the child was complaining

of pain, but left the facility against medical advice without allowing her daughter to complete the work up.

The defendant’s reason for leaving was entirely lacking

in credibility.

‘‘All of these inconsistencies, as well as others not

enumerated, call into question the quality of the defendant’s parental decision-making. Either she knew the

allegations were false and there was nothing to protect

her children from, or she believed the truth of the allegations and felt helpless to protect her daughter. A third

possibility is that she believed the allegations to be true

and just did not care enough to take action. Having

already indicated that the court does not find any evidence of malicious intention on the part of the defendant, the first possibility is to be ruled out. The last one

is also not a real possibility. That leaves a mother with

so little fortitude and so few personal resources that

she cannot protect her own child from a perceived

danger. Hardly an endorsement for a custodial parent.

‘‘The [guardian ad litem] recommended to the court

that, despite all of these very negative indicators, an

attempt to maintain a joint legal custodial arrangement

might still be in the best interests of the minor children.

It is partially due to the fact that the children are so

young that she believes they need the joint custodial

arrangement. She points to the fact that, at the present

time, there are no safety issues in either home and both

children are deeply and closely bonded to both parents.

She also sees the parents needing each other. Despite

the plaintiff’s claims that he can adjust his work schedule to be the full-time custodial parent, that claim is

not very credible. The defendant, for her weaknesses,

is a fairly competent parent under most situations and

is available due to her disability to be a full-time mother.

Having a parent rather than a paid worker be the primary caregiver to the children is certainly preferable

if possible to arrange.

‘‘The statutory criteria for custody orders are spelled

out in . . . General Statutes § 46b-56 (c).5

In reviewing

those criteria, the court is struck by the inability of

either parent to significantly meet some of those criteria

individually. Neither parent, for example, has demonstrated a great ability to understand or meet the ‘temperament and developmental needs of the child.’ Ample

evidence of the defendant’s weakness in this area was

provided by the videotapes she made as part of her

litigation efforts, and the plaintiff’s lack of ability in this

area was also clear in his decision to terminate his
daughter’s therapy for a six week period. Clearly neither

parent has excelled in promoting the children’s relationship with the other parent. The court recognizes that

there is a distinct possibility that the plaintiff would

quickly marginalize the defendant’s parental role if he

were given sole custody, while her past actions in this

litigation does not recommend her for that role either.

It would appear that the best interests of the children

would be served by forcing these parents to cooperate

with one another at least on a limited basis and with

an appropriate structure imposed on them.’’ (Footnotes

altered.) The court thereafter ordered the parties to

share joint legal custody of the two minor children.

In deciding whether to order joint custody in a particular circumstance, § 46b-56 instructs the court to look

to the best interests of the child. Section 46b-56 (a)

provides in relevant part: ‘‘Subject to the provisions of

section 46b-56a, the court may assign parentalresponsibility for raising the child to the parents jointly, or

may award custody to either parent or to a third party,

according to its best judgment upon the facts of the

case and subject to such conditions and limitations

as it deems equitable. . . .’’ Furthermore, § 46b-56 (b)

provides in relevant part: ‘‘In making or modifying any

order as provided in subsection (a) of this section, the

rights and responsibilities of both parents shall be considered and the court shall enter orders accordingly

that serve the best interests of the child and provide

the child with the active and consistent involvement

of both parents commensurate with their abilities and

interests. . . .’’

The plaintiff claims that the court’s decision to award

joint custody does not logically and legally flow from

its findings. He states that the court found that he was

an excellent parent, whereas the court described the

defendant’s parenting skills as only fairly competent.

In the court’s full decision, however, it described, at

length, the strengths and weaknesses of both the plaintiff and the defendant with regard to their parenting. It

also cited the guardian ad litem’s recommendation that

an order of joint custody was in the best interests of

the children. After deliberating on the factors provided

in § 46b-56 (c), the court set forth various reasons for

ordering joint custody. Most important was the court’s

finding that due to the parties’ respective weaknesses,

neither the plaintiff nor the defendant would be the

proper sole custodial parent of the children. Rather, it

found that joint custody had the greatest potential to

serve the best interests of the children. ‘‘The trial court’s

findings are binding upon this court unless they are

clearly erroneous in light of the evidence and the pleadings in the record as a whole.’’(Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Demartino v. Demartino, supra, 79 Conn.

App. 492. The court’s findings were not clearly erroneous because they were supported by evidence in the

record. We therefore conclude that the joint custody
orderlogically and legally flows from the court’s evidentiary findings and from its determination of what was

in the best interests of the children.

II

The plaintiff nextraises claims regarding the guardian

ad litem. The plaintiff argues that the court erred in

refusing to remove Attorney Sharon Wicks Dornfeld as

the guardian ad litem, and that it further committed

plain error by allowing Dornfeld, who was also serving

as the attorney for the minor children, to abandon her

role as attorney to testify at trial as the guardian ad

litem. He lastly argues that the court improperly delegated judicial authority to Dornfeld. We do not agree.

The following additional facts are relevant to the

resolution of the aforementioned claims. Dornfeld

served as the guardian ad litem for the minor children

beginning on November 8, 2010. Following an argument

between the parties on November 17, 2010, regarding

the defendant’s allegation that the plaintiff sexually

abused their three year old daughter, the defendant

filed a complaint with the local police department, and

the plaintiff was arrested.Aprotective order was issued,

requiring the plaintiff to leave the home and mandating

that the plaintiff visit with the children under supervision. On November 23, 2010, however, the parties

entered into a stipulation in which the children would

not be supervised when with the plaintiff. Despite this

agreement, the defendant subsequently made a complaint to the Department of Children and Families

(department) expressing concern that her daughter was

being sexually abused by the plaintiff.6

In February, 2011, after the defendant filed her complaint with the department, Dornfeld filed an ex parte

motion to modify the plaintiff’s parental access to

require supervised visitation. The court denied that

motion and found that ‘‘after weighing all of the testimony and evidence . . . the best interests of the child

would be impaired by modifying the order of January

10, 2011, and that order is reinstated.’’ The plaintiff

thereafter filed a motion to remove Dornfeld as guardian ad litem, which was denied by the court.

A

The plaintiff first argues that the court erred in denying his motion to remove Dornfeld as the guardian ad

litem. We cannot agree.

In the plaintiff’s motion to remove Dornfeld, he stated

that she, among other things, had abused and misused

her power as guardian ad litem, attempted to cover up

her negligent actions by pressuring and threatening the

plaintiff, and interfered with the ongoing independent

psychological evaluation of the parties. In his memorandum in support of the motion for removal, he argued:

‘‘Dornfeld’s conduct and lack of objectivity has made

it impossible for her to fulfill the role of [guardian ad
litem] in a fair and nonprejudicial manner. As evidenced

in this motion, [Dornfeld] has engaged in gross misconduct and has apparently become personally involved in

the situation in a manner designed to cover up her

failure to act, rather than to safeguard the best interests

of her ward[s].’’ He further stated: ‘‘Even if the court

concludes that [Dornfeld’s] conduct did not rise to the

level of misconduct, it has been unprofessional and has

undermined the plaintiff’s confidence in her ability to

act in the best interests of the child[ren] in such a way

that makes it impossible for her to continue in the role

of [guardian ad litem].’’

The court denied the plaintiff’s motion to remove

Dornfeld as the guardian ad litem, finding that ‘‘[a]fter

a lengthy hearing and after considering the evidence

presented, the court finds that it is not unusual for a

party who is charged with misconduct, as in the present

case, to remonstrate.’’ The court then concluded that

it was ‘‘not satisfied after hearing all the evidence that

[Dornfeld] has manifested any bias or prejudice that

would affect the outcome of the case.’’

The plaintiff claims that the court erred in denying

his motion to remove Dornfeld as the guardian ad litem.

He first argues that the court had ample evidence that

Dornfeld was acting outside the proper bounds of a

guardian ad litem. He also argues that Dornfeld was

attempting to manipulate the court in a way that prejudiced his case, but in deciding on his motion to remove,

the court misapplied the best interests standard to

require a showing of future prejudice that would affect

the outcome of the case.

A court is permitted to remove a guardian ad litem

in dissolution matters, subjectto General Statutes § 45a132, which provides in relevant part: ‘‘(f) The guardian

ad litem may be removed by the judge or magistrate

which appointed the guardian ad litem, without notice,

whenever it appears to the judge or magistrate to be in

the best interests of the ward or wards of the guardian.’’

Multiple decisions of our Superior Court have interpreted this statute to mean that ‘‘it is the burden of the

[moving party] . . . to allege and prove that the [guardian ad litem] should be disqualified from representing

the interests of the minor child because her continued

representation prejudices the [moving party] from prosecuting his case.’’ Petrone v. Connolly, Superior Court,

judicial district of New London, Docket No. FA-09-

4111149-S (May 8, 2013) (36 Conn. L. Rptr. 600); see

also Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, Superior Court, judicial

district of New London, Docket No. FA-96-0537581-S

(March 5, 2004) (moving party needs to prove prejudice

in prosecuting claim for custody based on prior or present positions taken by guardian ad litem on behalf of

minor child).

We conclude that the court did not err in denying

the motion to remove Dornfeld as the guardian ad litem.
The standard set forth in § 45a-132 focuses on the best

interests of the children. The court held that, after

reviewing all of Dornfeld’s allegedly improper actions,

she had not ‘‘manifested any bias or prejudice that

would affect the outcome of the case.’’ This broad standard, used by the court in the present case, encompassed the requirements as set forth by multiple

decisions of our Superior Court. Here, the court determined whether the outcome of the case had been prejudiced in any manner, and, by answering in the negative,

it ensured that the best interests of the children were

protected. We therefore cannot say that the court erred

in denying the plaintiff’s motion to remove Dornfeld as

the guardian ad litem.

B

The plaintiff further claims that it was plain error for

the court to allow Dornfeld to testify as the guardian

ad litem after she previously had acted as the attorney

for the minor children. We disagree.

The court appointed Dornfeld as the attorney for

the minor children on April 29, 2011, and, after that

appointment, she testified at pendente lite hearings in

the dissolution action. After the case failed to settle,

Dornfeld sought to vacate her appointment as attorney

for the minor children. In her motion, she cited Rule

3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides that a lawyer shall not act as an advocate at a

trial in which she is likely to be a necessary witness.

She made clear, however, that ‘‘[t]he children, due to

their young ages, have not communicated any privileged

or confidential information to me.’’ The court thereafter

vacated Dornfeld’s appointment as attorney for the

minor children, and allowed her to testify at trial in her

capacity as guardian ad litem.

The plaintiff did not preserve this claim in the proceeding before the trial court and now seeks review

pursuant to the plain error doctrine. ‘‘Codified in Practice Book § 60-5, [t]he plain error doctrine . . . is a

doctrine that should be invoked sparingly and only on

occasions requiring the reversal of the judgment under

review. . . . Success on such a claim is rare. Plain

error review is reserved for truly extraordinary situations where the existence of the error is so obvious

that it affects the fairness and integrity of and public

confidence in the judicial proceedings. . . .

‘‘We engage in a two step analysis in reviewing claims

of plain error. First, we must determine whether the

trial court in fact committed an error and, if it did,

whether that error was indeed plain in the sense that

it is patent [or] readily discernable on the face of a

factually adequate record, [and] also . . . obvious in

the sense of not debatable. . . . [T]his inquiry entails

a relatively high standard, under which it is not enough

for the [party] simply to demonstrate that his position
is correct. Rather, the party seeking plain error review

must demonstrate that the claimed impropriety was

so clear, obvious and indisputable as to warrant the

extraordinary remedy of reversal. . . . Because [a]

party cannot prevail under plain error unless it has

demonstrated that the failure to grant relief will result

in manifest injustice . . . under the second prong of

the analysis we must determine whether the consequences of the error are so grievous as to be fundamentally unfair or manifestly unjust.’’ (Citations omitted;

emphasis omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Clougherty v. Clougherty, 131 Conn.

App. 270, 273–74, 26 A.3d 704, cert. denied, 302 Conn.

948, 31 A.3d 838 (2011).

In support of his argument that the court committed

plain error by permitting Dornfeld to testify, the plaintiff

cites General Statutes § 46b-129a (2) (D), which provides in relevant part: ‘‘No person who has served as

both counsel and guardian ad litem for a child shall

thereafter serve solely as the child’s guardian ad litem.’’

Section 46b-129a, however, is contained within chapter

815t of the General Statutes and is thus limited to juvenile matters. This statute does not control dissolution

matters like the present case. Rather, chapter 815j of the

General Statutes controls marital dissolution matters.

‘‘Where a statute, with reference to one subject contains

a given provision, the omission of such provision from

a similar statute concerning a related subject . . . is

significant to show that a different intention existed.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hatt v. Burlington

Coat Factory, 263 Conn. 279, 310, 819 A.2d 260 (2003).

Chapter 815j does not have a similar limitation as that

in chapter 815t on a person serving both as a guardian

ad litem and as an attorney for the same minor children.

Such limitation, then, cannot be read into chapter 815j.

The plaintiff’s reliance on § 46b-129a (2)(D)is therefore

misplaced. As a result, we conclude that the court did

not commit plain error by allowing Dornfeld to testify

as the guardian ad litem after serving for a period of

time both as attorney for the minor children and as

their guardian ad litem.

C

The plaintiff also argues that the court improperly

delegated its judicial authority to the guardian ad litem.

He argues that although courts have statutory authority

to appoint a guardian ad litem, the court must not delegate its judicial authority to such person. More specifically, he claims that the court ordered joint legal

custody to the parties on terms substantially similar to

those set forth by the guardian ad litem in her recommendations to the court; allowed the guardian ad litem

to select the parties’ coparenting therapist; and required

each party to select an individual therapist from a list

prepared by the guardian ad litem. This claim is

unavailing.
‘‘It is well settled authority that [n]o court in this

state can delegate its judicial authority to any person

serving the court in a nonjudicial function. The court

may seek the advice and heed the recommendation

contained in the reports of persons engaged by the

court to assist it, but in no event may such a nonjudicial

entity bind the judicial authority to enter any order

or judgment so advised or recommended.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Nashid v. Andrawis, 83

Conn. App. 115, 120, 847 A.2d 1098, cert. denied, 270

Conn. 912, 853 A.2d 528 (2004). A court improperly

delegates its judicial authority to a guardian ad litem

when that person is given authority to issue orders that

affect the parties or the children. Such orders are part

of a judicial function that can be done only by one

clothed with judicial authority. Weinstein v. Weinstein,

18 Conn. App. 622, 628–29, 561 A.2d 443 (1989).

In the present case, the court did not give Dornfeld

authority to make the final decision regarding custody

of the children, nor did it allow her to issue orders that

were binding on the parties. Rather, the court accepted

the recommendations that Dornfeld submitted to the

court and implemented them in its own orders. It also

accepted Dornfeld’s recommendations in choosing a

therapist for each of the parties. Dornfeld’s involvement

in this marital dissolution case, therefore, was proper.

A court is permitted to seek advice, and accept recommendations, from the guardian ad litem. Nashid v.

Andrawis, supra, 83 Conn. App. 120. The plaintiff’s

disagreement with Dornfeld’s recommendations, and

the court’s agreement and adoption of those recommendations in its orders, in no way supports a conclusion

that the court improperly delegated its judicial authority

to her.

III

The plaintiff lastly claims that the court abused its

discretion in awarding permanent alimony to the defendant. We disagree.

The court, in its memorandum of decision, found

the following: ‘‘[M]any of the details of [the parties’]

finances are clear and undisputed including the fact

that the great majority of the family’s assets have been

spent during this litigation. The plaintiff has a base

salary exceeding three hundred thousand dollars gross

annually and historically has also received annual bonus

payments in six figure amounts. His most recent bonus

received a few months ago was almost equal to his base

salary. In addition to his salary, he enjoys generous

employment benefits that have significant financial

value to him. The defendant is on social security disability benefits receiving less than sixteen thousand dollars

annually. The plaintiff argued during the trial that the

defendant can work, but that testimony was based on

his own observations, and he provided no medical testi-
mony or other expert opinion of any kind to support

his conclusions. An alimony award of some type is

clearly warranted in this matter based on the criteria

as set forth in . . . General Statutes § 46b-82.

‘‘The marital home is currently being marketed for

sale and has been on the market for just a little over

one year. . . . They also own the adjacent lot which

does not appear to be part of the four plus acres on

which the residence sits, but is being indicated as ‘available’ according to the listing information . . . . The

combined value of the real estate based on the financial

affidavits of the parties is over $1.3 million. . . .

‘‘A comparison of the financial affidavits . . . filed

with the court while the case has been pending shows

that approximately $365,000 in deferred income assets

were liquidated along with approximately $120,000 in

liquid bank accounts. A $50,000 loan against the plaintiff’s 401 (K) plan was taken, and he also liquidated a

large portion of the account. Most recently in early

April, 2012, the plaintiff’s stocks were sold valued at

approximately $61,000. He reported net proceeds from

that sale in the amount of $35,000. Testimony was

offered that the plaintiff, without permission, also sold

the defendant’s stocks originally purchased for $22,000,

and those funds were spent by the plaintiff on litigation

costs and other expenses. . . .

‘‘The court has considered all of the testimony offered

during the trial and its observation of the demeanor of

the parties and other witnesses. . . . Consideration

has also been given to the various statutory criteria for

. . . making financial orders . . . . A review of the

applicable case law was also conducted by the court.’’

(Footnote omitted.) The court then ordered the plaintiff

to pay permanent alimony to the defendant, in addition

to child custody payments.7

‘‘We will not reverse a trial court’s rulings regarding

financial orders unless the court incorrectly applied the

law or could not reasonably have concluded as it did.

. . . A fundamental principle in dissolution actions is

that a trial court may exercise broad discretion in

awarding alimony and dividing property as long as it

considers all relevant statutory criteria. . . . In

reviewing the trial court’s decision under [an abuse of

discretion] standard, we are cognizant that [t]he issues

involving financial orders are entirely interwoven. The

rendering of judgment in a complicated dissolution case

is a carefully crafted mosaic, each element of which

may be dependent on the other. . . . A reviewing court

must indulge every reasonable presumption in favor of

the correctness of the trial court’s action to determine

ultimately whetherthe court could reasonably conclude

as it did. . . . This standard of review reflects the

sound policy that the trial court has the opportunity to

view the parties first hand and is therefore in the best

position to assess all of the circumstances surrounding
a dissolution action, in which such personal factors

such as the demeanor and the attitude of the parties

are so significant.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Kunajukr v. Kunajukr, 83 Conn. App. 478, 481–82, 850

A.2d 227, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 903, 859 A.2d 562

(2004).

The plaintiff argues that an award of permanent alimony to a forty year old woman after a three year

marriage was an abuse of discretion. He states that the

court failed to recognize that the defendant’s past health

concerns and receipt of social security benefits are

not conclusive proof that she is permanently disabled

from work.8

‘‘[Section] 46b-82 governs awards of alimony. That

section requires the trial court to consider the length

of the marriage, the causes for the . . . dissolution of

the marriage . . . the age, health, station, occupation,

amount and sources of income, vocational skills,

employability, estate and needs of each of the parties

. . . . In awarding alimony, [t]he court must consider

all of these criteria. . . . It need not, however, make

explicit reference to the statutory criteria that it considered in making its decision or make express findings

as to each statutory factor.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Wiegand v. Wiegand, 129 Conn. App. 526, 536,

21 A.3d 489 (2011).

The court did not abuse its discretion in awarding

permanent alimony to the defendant. The court cited

§ 46b-82 and thereafter described, in detail, the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s income and assets. Because

the court considered all of the relevant statutory criteria, it is given broad discretion in awarding alimony

payments. Kunajukr v. Kunajukr, supra, 83 Conn. App.

481; see also McMellon v. McMellon, 116 Conn. App.

393, 396, 976 A.2d 1 (no bright line rule as to how long

a marriage must last for one party to be entitled to

permanent alimony), cert. denied, 293 Conn. 926, 980

A.2d 911 (2009). We therefore review the record only

to determine if the court correctly applied the law and

reasonably concluded that permanent alimony to the

defendant was appropriate under the circumstances of

this case. We conclude that it did.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Pendente lite motions address the temporary custody of the children

during the pendency of the action. In response to the parties’ motions, the

court ordered, pendente lite, that the plaintiff would have unsupervised

parenting with the minor children, and set forth a schedule. ‘‘[P]endente

lite orders, by their very definition, are orders that continue to be in force

during the pendency of a suit, action, or litigation. . . . Pendente lite orders

necessarily cease to exist once a final judgment in the dispute has been

rendered because the purpose is extinguished at that time.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Milbauer v. Milbauer, 54 Conn. App.

304, 309, 733 A.2d 907 (1999).

2 At no time did the plaintiff seek to amend that complaint.

3

In fact, the plaintiff presented an expert who was questioned by the

plaintiff’s counsel about whetherthe plaintiff and the defendant could copar-
ent successfully.

4 The court stated that it‘‘need not describe in detail the specific allegations

raised by the defendant against the plaintiff as there is no credible evidence

that they are true.’’ It went on to state, however, that ‘‘[i]n the same vein,

there is no credible evidence that the defendant fabricated them. Because

her allegations were not malicious in nature, how she came about to believe

these horrid things about [the defendant] is now simply not relevant. How

each party reacted to the allegations is, on the other hand, most relevant

to the court’s decision.’’

5 General Statutes § 46b-56 (c) provides: ‘‘In making or modifying any

order as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the court shall

consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so may consider,

but shall not be limited to, one or more of the following factors: (1) The

temperament and developmental needs of the child; (2) the capacity and

the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the needs of the child;

(3) any relevant and material information obtained from the child, including

the informed preferences of the child; (4) the wishes of the child’s parents

as to custody; (5) the past and current interaction and relationship of the

child with each parent, the child’s siblings and any other person who may

significantly affect the best interests of the child; (6) the willingness and

ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parentchild relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate,

including compliance with any court orders; (7) any manipulation by or

coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the

parents’ dispute; (8) the ability of each parent to be actively involved in the

life of the child; (9) the child’s adjustment to his or her home, school and

community environments; (10) the length of time that the child has lived

in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining

continuity in such environment, provided the court may consider favorably

a parent who voluntarily leaves the child’s family home pendente lite in

order to alleviate stress in the household; (11) the stability of the child’s

existing or proposed residences, or both; (12) the mental and physical health

of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial

parent or other party, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody

unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of

the child; (13) the child’s cultural background; (14) the effect on the child

of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence has occurred between

the parents or between a parent and another individual or the child; (15)

whether the child or a sibling of the child has been abused or neglected,

as defined respectively in section 46b-120; and (16) whether the party satisfactorily completed participation in a parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b-69b. The court is not required to assign any

weight to any of the factors that it considers.’’

6 Following investigation, the department found that the allegations

were unsubstantiated.

7 The plaintiff was required to pay the defendant a weekly amount of $500

in child support and $1200 in alimony. Despite the use of the term ‘‘lifetime,’’

the court did not order that the alimony be nonmodifiable as to term or

amount. See General Statutes § 46b-86 (a); but see General Statutes § 46b-85.

8 Despite making this bald assertion, the plaintiff fails to point to evidence,

or a lack of evidence, that would support a conclusion that the court’s

assessment of the defendant’s health concerns was clearly erroneous. We

therefore only address his claim that the court’s alimony award was an

abuse of discretion.