Laur a St ohl H al kai des was r es t ored t o h er mai den name, Laur a St ohl , by order of t he t r i al cour t on D ece mb er 1 4 , 2 0 0 3

. 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON N ove m be r 17, 200 4 S es sio n LAU RA STOH L HA LKIAD ES v. DA VID AL LAN HA LKIAD ES, ET AL.

Direc t Appeal fromthe Chancer y Court for Shelby Cou nty No. CH-03-0743- 3 D. J. Alissand ratos, Chancellor

No. W2004-00226-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Dece m ber 29, 2004

This appeal arises fro m a d i v o rceaction. De fendant/Dr. Halkaides appe als the trial court’s order dividing the pa

rties’ prope rty

and debt and awa

rding Wife/Ms. S tohl alimony

. He also asserts the trial c o u rt e rr e d in f

in d in g D r
. H a lk a id e s h a d d is s ip a te d th e p arti e s ’ ma rit a l a s s e ts

. We a f

f irm as modified. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed as Modif ied; and Rem anded
D AVI D R. F ARMER , J. , d e li v e r e dth e o p in io n o f th e c o u rt, inw h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., joined.
Dan T . B ing , M e mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or theapp e llant, DavidAl lan H a lki a de s.
Am y J. Amun ds e n, Me mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or theAp pe lle e , L aur a

Sto hl H a lki a de s. OP IN ION The pa rties to this divorce ac tion, Dr. David Allan Halkaides (Dr. Halkaides) and L aura Stohl Halkiade s (Ms. Stohl) wer e mar ried in 1992. At the t ime of t he marriag e, Ms. Stohl was 41 y ear s 1 of ag e and D r. Ha lkaides wa s 26 y ear s of age

. No childre n wer e born of the marriag e. Ms. Stohl is a nu rs e ; D r. Halki a de s is a n o pto mis trist

. In April 2003, Ms. Stohl filed a complaint for divorc e. In her c omplaint, Ms. S tohl alleg ed Dr . H a lk a ide s h a d f

a ile d to dis c on tin uea n e xtra -m ari ta l r e latio ns hip wi th an e mpl oy e e of his business, Dr. Halkiades Ey es for You. She furthe r alleg ed that Dr

. Ha l k ai d es ’ par amour ha d thr ea t en ed her . Ms. Stohl additionally alleg ed that Dr . Halkaide s was misappropriating and dissipating funds f

rom the Ey es for You business, a business in which Dr . Halkaide s held fifty -one-2-

perc ent of the stock and Ms. Stohl held forty -nine perc ent of the stock. She asserted Dr. H alkaides ha d u se d c or

po rate fu nd s to pay

fo r n on -b us ine ss i te ms s uc h a s mo tor ve hic le s andho te l bi lls . M s. Stohl pray ed for

the court to enjoin Dr. Hal kaides fr om spending monies not nece ssary for the op e ratio n o f thebu sin e ss andto a pp oin t a sp e c ia l ma ste r t o r e vie w thec or po rate r ecor ds

. I n his an s we r, Dr . Halkaide s denied Ms. Stohl’s alleg ations and counte r-c laimed for divor ce ba sed on irrec oncilable diff

ere nce and inappropriate marital c onduct.
The trial c ourt enter ed a c onsent order appointing a

specia l master in May 2003. On May 28, theg e ne ral se ssi on s c ou rt e nte re d a jud g me nt a g a ins t D r. Halkaide s f or pa st d uere nt at thebu sin e ss premises. In J une 2003, Dr. Halkaides closed his business and post ed a sign that Ey es for You was c los ed du e to un for e se e n c ir c ums tanc e s. Heva c a te d th eEy e s f or Yo u p re mis e s, bu t le ft

c e rt a in property behind. Dr. Halkaide s asserts he lost c ontrol of his Ey es for You business in J une 2003 due to (his own) bad manag ement. He further asserts t hat, after June 2003, the business had a va lue of zero. Ms. Stohl submits Dr. Halkaides purchased the prac tice fr om a long -time frie nd and assoc iate, Dr . D a vidGo lds te in (D r. Go lds te in) in 20 01 , andthe n tu rn e d h is p ra c tic e ba c k o ve r t o D r. Go lds te in in J une 2003. She asserts that after he hung a “CL OSED” sig n on his business, Dr, Halkaides left town with a fully

loaded ve hicle and that for ten day s no one knew his where abouts.
In J uly 2003, the trial court entere d an orde r g ranting the spec ial master acce ss to Dr. Halkaide s’ Ey e s fo r Yo u. Th e c ou rt or de re d thema ste r t o c on du c t a fu ll i nv e nto ry

of thec on te nts of the business. In its order, the court noted that Dr. Halkaides could not be loc ated by counsel and had lef t the city (Memphis).
Th e sp e c ia l ma ste r r e po rt e d th a t D r. Halkaide s h a d in fo rm e d h im that hepl a nn e d to “voluntarily

return” the business to Dr. Goldstein on June 21, 2003. Dr. Halkaides failed to inform the master, how ever , that he had been evicted from the premises pursuant to a de tainer w arr ant for being over thre e months delinquent on his r ent. The master further reported that he we nt to the Ey es for You office on J une 24, 2003, to discuss the m onitoring of the bus iness, but when he arrived he found the business had be en close d and t h at a “c l o s ed due to unforese en cir cumstance s” sig n had been poste d on the door.
As order ed by

the court and wit h the consent of the landlord, the ma ster inspec ted the Ey es for You pr emises on J uly

8, 2003. The master

determined that key

business rec ords, computer s, and v i d e o t ap e s f

r o mth e s e c u ri t y s ys t e mw e r e m i s s i n g
. T h e m a s t e r a l s o f o u n dth a tm a n y p a i r s o f

e ye g la sse s th at ha d be e n paid fo r by patie nts re maine d in the of fi c e , an d that patie nts we rec omi ng to the of fi c e to pic k the m up
. Up on re c omm e nd a tio n of thema ste r, thebu sin e ss w a s r e -o pe ne d w ith Dr. Goldstein executing a new lease , and the pr e-paid orders w erefilled. The spec ial master r eporte d that he rec eived “ minimal documentation” from Dr . Halkaide s and his associates reg arding the Ey es for You business. He r eporte d that Dr. Halkaides did not have the usual ac counting and filing sy stems expected of a medical pr actice , and that the business rece ived a larg e po rtionof

its payme nts in ca sh

. Th e ma ste r re po rt e d, ho we ve r, that hewa s u na bleto l oc a te any cash. A dditionally , the master r eporte d that the “Day Sheets” used to ke ep tra ck of the-3-

customers and which formed the basis of Dr. Halkaide s acc ounting sy stem wer e in complete disarr ay and did not include totals of the daily sales. Themaster also reporte d that therewer e no monthly or y early ledg ers. The spec ial master r eporte d that, as a r esult of t he scanty and disorg anized documentation, he had to spe nd a conside rableamount of time computing the proba ble worth of the Ey es for You business. He re ported, [t ]he [ s]pecial [m ]aster’s dete rmination of 50% of total gr oss reve nue as the proper formula for valuing the business is c orrobor ated by Dr. Halkaide s
. . . . Dr. Halkaides ag ree d to pay

Dr. Goldstein $600,000 for the business, which is appr ox imately 50% of thebu sin e ss’ s ann ua l g ro ss r e ve nu e at th e time of pu rchase . D r. Halkaide s, the re fo re , a

pp are ntl y be lie ve d th a t 50 % g ro ss ann ua l sale s w a s a fair val ue for thi s type of business be causehe ag ree d to pay that amount in 2001.
Wor kin g wi th thedata

pr ov ide d to him

by Dr . H a lkaide s, th e mas ter det e rm ine d th e a nn ua l g ro ss reve nue of D r. Ha lkaides Ey es for You to be $1,300,442.56. Mul tiply ing this by 50 perc ent, the master de termined the f

air mar ket value of

the business to be $650,221,28.
Th e tria l c ou rt g rante d the pa rtie s a div or c e on De c e mbe r 4, 20 03

. It a wa rd e d the p artie s’ residenc e to Ms. Stohl, findi ng Dr. Halkaides had w aived all inter es t s in the home at the time of purcha se. The c ourt awa rded thefurnishing s of the home and personal property remaining in the residenc e to M s. Stohl , and aw arde d Dr. Halkaides per sonal property in his possession. The trial court found thespecia l master’s report to be cre dible and determined Dr. Halkaide s had embe zz led cash f rom his prac tice and dissipated a sset s o f at l east $100,000. Thecourt a war ded Ms. Stohl $50,000 of this amount, pay able a s alimony . It also awa rded Ms. S t o h l an additional $50,000 as transitional alimony and $12,500 as back alimony

. By consent of the parties, the trial court orde red that Ms. H alkaides would rec eive title to one vehicle; the bank acc ount in her name; her r etireme nt fund; and de bts and liabiliti es held in her name. Also by

consent, the c ourt awa

rded D r. Ha lkaides bank ac counts held in his name, and assigne d him his school loans and liabilit ies held in his name. The c ourt order ed Dr . Halkaide s to t ra n s fe r his life insurancepolicies to Ms. St ohl. The court order ed that all debts and obligations of Dr. Ha lkaides Ey es for You would be the r esponsibilityof Dr. Halkaides. It further order ed Dr. Halkaide s to indemnify and hold Ms. Stohl harmless for any a nda ll d e bts , li e ns , andlia bil iti e s o f thebu sin e ss. Th e c ou rt div ide d $ 10 3, 00 0 d e bt h e ld i n M s. Sto hl’ s n a me , o rd e ri ng Dr

. Halkaide s to pay on e -h a lf of thi s a mou nt to Ms. Sto hl a s a lim on y . T hu s, the trial court awa

rded Ms. Stohl $187,500, pay able as alimony at a rate of $2,500 pe r month, nonmodifiable, and te rminable only upon full payment. The c ourt also awa rded Ms. Stohl her attorne y ’s fee s as additional al i m o n y
. I t also order ed that Dr . Halkaide s would be solely responsible for

the costs associate d with the specia l ma ster and discretionary costs. Dr. Halkaide s filed a timely notice of app e a l to thi s Co urt.-4- Issues Presented
Dr. Halkaides pre sents the following issues, as re stated, for revie w: (1) Whether the trial c ourt err ed in finding Dr

. Halkaide s embezzl ed, sec rete d, or absc onded with funds fr om Dr. Ha lkaides Ey es for You. (2) Whether the trial c ourt err ed in stating that the total amount of debt of Wife at the time of trial wa s $103,000. (3 ) Whe the r thetria l c ou rt e rr e d inits a wa

rda nda mou nt o f alim on y of a ll type s. (4) Whether the tri al court erre d in failing to make an e quitable distribution of the marital e state. (5) Whether the trial c ourt erred in orde ring Dr. Halkaides to pay Wife’s atto rn e y ’s fe e s.
Ms. Sto hl r e qu e sts atto rn e y ’s fe e s in c ur re d f or thi s a pp e a l.
Stan dard of Revie w
We r e vie w thetria l c ou rt ' s f ind ing s o f f

a c t de novo with a presumption of correc tness. Tenn. R.A pp . P. 13 (d ); Berryhill v. Rhode s , 21 S.W .3d 188, 19 0 (Tenn. 2000) . We may not reve rse the trial court' s fac tual finding s unless they are contra ry to the preponde ranc e of theevidenc e. Id. Our re vie w o f thetria l c ou rt ' s c on c lus ion s o n matte rs of l aw is de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss. Bo wde n v . W ar d , 27 S.W .3d 913, 916 (Tenn.2000) . Be causeit is i n the best position t o a s s e s s w i t n e s s e s , w e a f

f o r d th e tri a l g r e a t c o n s i d e r ab l e d e f e r e n c e o n m a t t e r s o f

w i t n e s s c r e d i b i l i t y. Se e W e lls v . Te nn e sse e Bd

. o f R e ge nts , 9 S.W .3d 779, 783 (Tenn.1999)

. Th us , w e wi ll n ot r e ve rs e thetria l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s in so far as th e y areba se d o n is su e s o f w itn e ss cre dibilit y in the absenc e of clea r and convincing evidenc e to thecontra ry
. Sullivan v. Sullivan , 107 S.W .3d 507, 510 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). We r eview an awa rd of alimonyunder an abuse of discretion standa

rd. Id. I f a

dis c re tio na

ry de c isi onis w ith in a rangeof a c c e pta blea lte rn a tiv e s, app e ll ate c o u rts w il l n o t s u b s ti tu te th e ir d e c is io n f o r th a t o f th e trial c o u rt s imp ly because the appellate court would ha ve chose n a diffe rent a lternative. W hite v . V an de rb ilt Un iv e rsi ty , 21 S.W .3d 215, 223 (Tenn. Ct. App.1999). We review thetrial court' s discretionary decisions to determine: (1) whether the dec isions are supporte d b y t h e fa cts in evidenc e; (2) w hether the trial court identified an dap p l i ed th e ap p l i cab l e l ega l p ri n ci p l es ; (3 ) w h et h erth e t ri al co u rt 's d ec i s i o n s ar e wi th i n th e r an ge of ac cepta

ble alternatives. Id.
Di ssi pa tio n of Ma rit al A sse tsD r. H a lka id e s d o e s n o t co n te n d tha t his b u sin e ss w a s n o t m a rita l p ro p e rty. 2
-5- The trial c ourt found Dr . Halkiade s had dissipated the pa rties’ m ar i t al as sets that wer e c on ne c te d to his bu sin e ss. Th e tria l c ou rt fo un d: 2
Dr. Halkaides conspire d to secre te assets of the business; and the [c]ourt finds t hat over Seve nty

Thousand Dollar s ($70,000.00) in ca sh this y ear alone ha s been secr eted by Dr. Halkaide s. The [c] ourt finds other assets have been dissipated by Dr. Halkaide s to total at least One Hundr ed Thousand D ollars ($100,0 0 0

. 0 0 )

. . . and embezzled out of the business, Dr. Ha lkaides’ Ey es for You.”
The trial c ourt awa

rded Ms. Stohl one-half

of $100,000 of the dissipated f unds, to be paid as alimony

. Onapp e a l, D r. Halkaide s a sse rt s th e tria l c ou rt e rr e d infi nd ing he ha d dis sip a te d thepa rtie s’ assets. Heasserts that he lost the assets of his busines s d u e t o p o o r manag ement, albe it his own, rathe r than a s a re su lt of pu rp os e fu l dis sip a tio n or se c re tin g
. Whe n c on sid e ri ng wh e the r a pa rty in a divorce action has di ssipated t he parties’ m arital assets, the t rial court must “distinguish betwee n what marital expenditures arewastef ul and self-se rving and those which may be ill-advised but not so fa r r e mov e d f

ro m ‘ no rm a l’ e xpe nd itu re s o c c ur ri ng pr e vio us ly

wi thi n th e mari ta l r e latio ns hip to rende r them destruc tive.” W ar d v . W ar d , No. W2003-01630-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 787158, at *2 (T en n
. C t

. Ap p
. Ap ri l 1 2 , 2 0 0 4 )( q u o t i n g W ar d v . W ar d , N o
. W2 0 0 1

- 0 1 0 7 8

- CO A

- R3

- CV , 2 0 0 2 WL 31845229, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2002) ).
In W ar d , we r ece ntly

held t hat a finding of fraud i s not require d for a finding of dissipation of marital a ssets. Id. Rather, whe n determining whe ther a party has dissipated marital a ssets, the tria l c o u rt s h o u ldc o n s id e r th e f o ll o w in g f

a c to r s : ( 1 ) w h e th e r

th e e v id e n c e s u p p o rts th e a ll e g ed purpose of

the expenditures, and, if so, (2) whe ther the alleg ed purposeconstitutes dissipation under the circ umstances. To satisfy the first, objective prong of t his test, the spouse acc used of dissipation may bring forwa

rd evide nce suc h as re ceipts, vouche rs, claims, a n d o t her similar e videncethat independe ntly

support the alleg ed purposeof the ex penditures. The second pr ong of the test re quires the trial cour t to make an e quitable determination based upon a numbe r of f actor s including: (1) whether the e x p en d i t u re w as ty

pically made during themarria g e; (2) w ho benef itted from the expenditure - whe ther the e x penditure primarily benef itted the marria g e or the alleg edly dissipating spouse; (3) the pr ox imityof the e x penditure to the br eakdow n of the mari t al relationship; (4) the amount of the e x penditure. Id. (citing L ee R. Russ, Annotation, Spouse's Dissipat ion of Marital Assets Prior to Divorce as a Fac tor in Divorce Court's Determination of Property Division , 41 A.L .R. 4th 416, 420-21 (1985)).T h er e wa s e v i den ce t h at a por t i on of t h es e s u ms wer e u s ed for e x pen di t u r es s u ch a s t h e pu r ch as e of a c ar for 3 D r. H alka i d es p ara m o ur a nd ho t el b i l l s.

T he t ri al co urt fo und D r. H al kai d es gui l t y of cri m i nal co nt em p t fo r t he act of p erjur y and fo r di sr up t i ng t he 4 procee di ng s of

t he cour t an d “ s ent enc e[ d] D r
. H al kai des t o be i mm edi at el y r emanded t o t he s her i f f

. . . an d t o be re l eas ed at 6:00 " t he next m o rni ng. A d d iti o n a lly, the trial c o u rt o rd e re d :
A s a res ul t o f f

i nd i ng D r. H al kai d es em b ezzli ng m o ni es and D r. H al kai d es’ f ai l ure t o f i l e t he ap p rop ri at e i nco m e t ax ret urns , t he C o urt has p ri m a f aci e evi d ence o f t he co m m i ss i o n of a fel o ny and t herefo re r eq ui res C o unsel for the P l ai nt i f f to repo rt D r. H al kai d es’ a ct i vi t i es t o t he Int ernal R evenue Ser vi ce. ”

T h e Code i n e f

fec t a t t h e t i me of

t h e t r i al c ou r t ’ s or der i n D ec embe r 2003 pr ov i ded: 5
(d )( 1 )( A ) S p o u se s h a v e tra d iti o n a lly stre n g the n e d the fam ily u n it t h ro u g h p riv a te a rr a n g e m e n ts (c o n tinu e d ...) -6- Upon re view of theevidenc e, weag ree that Ms. Stohl satisfied her burden of demonstrating that considera

ble sums simpl y

disappea red f rom the Ey es for

You business. Indeed, D r. Ha lkaides

3 do e s no t c on te ndthat th e se su ms w e reno t r e mov e d f ro m th e bu sin e ss, bu t a sse rt s th a t c on sid e ra ble a mou nts of

c a sh , w hic h w e reno t de po sit e d in to the bu sin e ss bank a c c ou nt, we re us e d f or bu sin e ss pu rp os e s su c h a s p a ying e mpl oy e e s. However , Dr. Hal kaide s si mpl y ha s f a ile d to bring fo rth cre di b l e ev idencedemonstrating that the funds we re use d leg itimately and not dissipated. For e xamp le , n o p a yro ll or ta x r e c or ds we re int ro du c e d to su pp ort Dr

. Halkaide s’ a sse rtionthat th e c a sh was used f

or pay roll. Moreove r, t he trial court de termined that both Dr. H alkaides and his paramour , Ms. J ulia Payne, who wa s an employ ee of Dr. Halkaides Ey es for You, were “knowing and willful perjure r(s)” and not cr edible. It f urther found the specia l ma ster’s report to be cre dible with respec t 4 to the fac t that about fifty perc ent of Dr . Halkaide s ’ busi ness was a cash business. Thetrial court additionally

noted that the spec ial master’ s work wa s made much morecu m b er s ome by “the connivanc e and contrivanc es of Dr. Halkaides.” The trial court further noted that Dr. Ha lkaides had failed to c all his business associate , Dr. David Goldstein, as a witness and, applyin g t h e m i s s i ng wi tne ss r ule , c on c lud e d th at D r. Gol ds tein ’s te sti mon y wo uldno t havesu pp orte d D r. Halkaide s’ te sti mon y . We a ff

or d g reat de fe re nc e to thetria l c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio ns onmatte rs of wi tne ss cre dibilit y , and the e videncedoes not preponde ra t e aga inst the trial court’s finding s that Dr. Halkaide s dissipated at least $100,000 in ma rital assets. We ac cording ly aff irm the judg ment of the tri a l c o u rta w ar d i n g M s
. S t o h l $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 , p a yab l e a s a l i m o n y in solido

. Alimony
Dr. Halkaides conte nds the trial court erre d in awar ding Ms. S t ohl alimony . Whether an alimony awa rd is appropriate is depe ndent on the fac ts and circ umstances of eac h case
. The ne ed of the re cipient spouse, followe d by the obligor ' s abilityto pay , are the primary considerations in the determination of an aw ard of alimony

. Sullivan v. Sullivan , 107 S.W

. 3d 507, 510 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). In making its determination of an alimony awa rd, the court must balance se veral statutory fac tors including those enumer ated in sec tion 36-5-101(d)( 1 ) o f t he Te nnesseeCode. 5(

. . . con t i n u ed) 5 whereb y one (1 ) spo use fo cuses o n nurt uri ng t he p ers o nal s i d e o f t he m arri age, i ncl ud i ng t he care and
n u rtu rin g o f t h e c h ild re n , w h ile the o the r sp o u se fo c u se s p rim a rily o n b u ild ing th e e c o n o m ic stre n g th
o f t he f ami l y u n i t

. T h i s ar r an g eme n t of t en r es u l t s i n ec on omi c det r i men t t o t h e s pou se who
s ubordi nat ed s uch s po us e' s own per s onal ca r eer for t he benef i t of t he marr i age
. I t i s t he publ i c pol i cy of t h i s s t at e t o e n cou r ag e an d s u ppor t ma r r i ag e, a n d t o e n cou r ag e f ami l y ar r an g eme n t s t h at pr ov i de f o r t h e r ea r i n g of

h ea l t h y a n d pr odu ct i v e ch i l dr en w h o w i l l be come h ea l t h y a n d pr odu ct i v e ci t i ze ns of our s t at e. (B ) T he general ass em b l y f i nd s t hat the contr i b ut i o ns t o t he m arri age as hom em aker or p arent ar e of e qu al di g n i t y a n d i mpor t an ce a s e con omi c con t r i bu t i on s t o t h e mar r i ag e. Fur t h er , w h er e on e ( 1) spo use s uf

fers eco no m i c d et ri m ent for the b enef i t of t he m arri age, t he general ass em b l y f i nd s t hat t he
e c o n o m ic a lly d isa d v a n ta g e d sp o u se ' s sta n d a rd o f l ivin g a ft e r t h e d ivo rc e sh o u ld b e re a so n a b ly compa r abl e t o t h e s t an dar d of l i v i n g en j oy ed du r i n g t h e mar r i ag e or t o t h e pos t

- di v or ce s t an dar d of l i vi ng exp ect ed t o be avai l ab l e t o t he o t her spo use, c o nsi d eri ng the rel evant st at ut o ry fact o rs a nd t he eq uit i es b etwe en t he p arti es.

( C ) I t i s t he i nt ent of t he gen er al as s emb l y t hat a s po us e who i s economi cal l y di s advan t age d rel at i ve t o t he o t her s p o use, b e rehab i l i t at ed wheneve r p o ss i b l e b y t he grant i ng of an o rder fo r payment o f re h a b ili ta tive , t e m p o ra ry su p p o rt a n d m a inte n a n c e . T o b e re h a b ili ta te d m e a n s to a c h ie v e , w ith
r e a s o n a b l e e f

fo r t , a n e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y t h a t w i l l p e r m i t t h e e c o n o m i c a l l y d i s a d v a n t a g e d s p o u s e 's
s t a n da r d o f

l i v i n g a f

t e r t h e di v or c e t o b e r e a s on a bl y c om pa r a bl e t o t h e s t a n da r d o f l i v i n g e n

j oy ed dur i ng t he marr i age , o r to the p ost

- di vor ce s t andar d of l i vi ng ex pect ed t o be ava i l abl e t o t he ot her sp o u se , co n sid e rin g the re le v a n t statu to ry fa c to rs a n d the e q u iti e s b e tw e e n th e p a rtie s. W h e re the re is rel at i ve econ omi c di s adv an t ag e an d r eh abi l i t at i on i s n ot f ea s i bl e i n c on s i der at i on of a l l r el ev ant f ac t or s , i n cl u d i ng t h os e s et ou t i n t h i s s u bs ec t i on ( d) , t h e cou r t ma y g r an t a n or der for pa y men t of
s u ppor t a n d ma i n t en an ce on a l on g
- t er m bas i s or u n t i l t h e dea t h or r ema r r i ag e of t h e r ec i pi en t e x ce pt a s o the rw ise p ro v id e d in su b d ivisio n (a )( 3 ). A n a w a rd o f p e rio d ic a lim o n y m a y b e m a d e e ithe r in
a d d iti o n t o a r e h a b ili ta tio n a w a rd , w h e re a sp o u se m a y b e p a rtia lly re h a b ili ta te d a s d e fine d in this
s ubdi vi s i on ( d)( 1)( C ) , or i ns t ead of a r eha bi l i t at i on awa r d, wh er e r eha bi l i t at i on i s not f eas i bl e. W hen ap p rop ri at e, t he co urt m ay al so award t rans i t i o nal al i m o ny as p rovided i n s ub d i vi si o n (d)(1)(D ). R eha bi l i t at i ve s uppo r t an d m ai nt ena nce i s a s epar at e c l as s of s po us al s uppo r t as di s t i ng ui s hed f r om al i mo ny i n s ol i do , per i od i c a l i mo ny , an d t r ans i t i o na l al i mo ny
. An awa r d of r eha bi l i t at i ve, t empor ar y s u ppor t a n d ma i n t en an ce s h al l r ema i n i n t h e cou r t ' s con t r ol for t h e du r at i on of s u ch a wa r d,
a n d m a y b e inc re a se d , d e c re a se d , t e rm ina te d , ex te n d e d , o r o the rw ise m o d ifi e d , up o n a s h o w ing o f a
su b sta n tial a n d m a te ria l ch a n g e in c irc u m sta n c e s. R e h a b ili ta tive su p p o rt a n d m a inte n a n c e sh a ll t erm i nat e up o n t he d eat h o f t he reci p i ent

. Such supp o rt and m ai nt enance shal l al so t erm i nat e up o n t he deat h of t he pay or u nl es s o t her wi s e speci f i cal l y st at ed. T he r eci pi ent o f t he s uppo r t an d m ai nt ena nce shal l have t he b urden o f pro vi ng that a l l reaso nab l e ef fo rt s at rehab i l i t at i o n ha ve b een m ad e and have b e e n un su c c e ssfu l.

(D ) T ra n sitio n a l alim o n y m e a n s a su m o f m o n e y p a ya b le b y o n e (1 ) p a rty to , o r o n b e h a lf o f, the o the r p a rty fo r a d e te rm ina te p e rio d o f tim e . T ra n sitio n a l a lim o n y s h a ll te rm ina te up o n the d e a th of t h e r e c i pi e n t a n d a s pr ov i de d i n s u bd i v i s i on ( a ) ( 3) w h i c h pr ov i s i on s h a l l a pp l y t o t r a n s i t i on al ali m o ny. S uc h sup p o r t a n d m a inten an ce shall also t erm i na t e u p o n the d ea t h o f t he p ayo r unless ot her wi s e spe c i f

i c a l l y s t a t e d. T h e c ou r t ma y a t t h e t i me of e n t r y of t h e or de r t o p a y t r a n s i t i on al al i mo ny , order t hat i t may t er mi nat e u po n t he occur r enc e o f o t her condi t i ons s uch as , but not l i mi t ed t o, t h e r ema r r i ag e of

t h e par t y r ecei vi ng tr an s i t i on al a l i mon y
. T r an s i t i on al a l i mon y s h al l be nonmod i f

i abl e u nl es s t he part i es ot her wi s e agr ee i n an agr eement i ncor po r at ed i nt o t he i ni t i al order of di v or ce , l eg al s epa r at i on or or der of pr ot ec t i on or t h e c ou r t ot h er wi s e or der s i n t h e i n i t i al or der or di v or ce , l eg al s epa r at i on or or der of pr ot ec t i on
. T r an s i t i on al al i mon y i s awa r ded wh en t h e cou r t f i n ds tha t re h a b ili ta tio n is no t ne c e s s a ry, b u t t h e e c o n o m ic a lly d isa d v a n ta g e d sp o u se ne e d s a ssista n c e to (c o n tinu e d ...) -7-(

. . . con t i n u ed) 5 adju s t t o t he economi c c ons equen ces of a di vor ce, l ega l separ at i on o r o t her p r oceedi ng wh er e s po us al supp o rt m ay b e award ed , s uch as a pet i t i o n fo r an orde r of pro t ect i o n. ( E ) I n det er mi ni ng wh et her t he gr ant i ng of an order for pay ment of s uppo r t an d m ai nt ena nce t o a pa r t y i s a ppr opr i at e, a n d i n det erm i ni ng th e n at u r e, a mou n t , l en g t h of t er m, a n d ma n n er of p ayment, t he co urt s hal l co nsi d er al l rel evant fact o rs , i ncl ud i ng:

(i) T h e re la tive e a rn ing c a p a c ity, o b liga tio n s, ne e d s, a n d fi n a n c ia l r e s o u rc e s o f ea c h p a rty i nc l ud i ng i nc o m e fro m p en si o n, p ro f i t sharing o r reti rem en t p l an s and all o t he r so urc es; (ii) T h e re la tive e d u c a tio n a n d tra inin g o f e a c h p a rty, the a b ili ty an d o p p o rtu n ity o f ea c h p a rty t o s ecure such ed ucat i o n and t rai ni ng, and t he ne c e ssity of a p art y t o s ecure f urt her educ at i o n and tra inin g to im p ro v e su c h p a rty' s e a rn ing c a p a c ity to a re a so n a b le lev e l;

( i i i ) T he dur at i on of

t he marr i age ; (iv ) T h e a g e a n d m e n ta l co n d iti o n o f ea c h p a rty; ( v ) T h e ph y s i ca l c on di t i on of ea ch par t y , i n cl u di n g , bu t n ot l i mi t ed t o, ph y s i ca l di s abi l i t y or i nca paci t y due t o a ch r oni c debi l i t at i ng di s eas e;

(vi ) T he ext ent t o whi ch i t wo ul d be unde si rable f o r a part y t o s eek em p l o y m ent outs i d e t he home becaus e s uch par t y wi l l be cu s t od i an of a mi nor ch i l d of

t he marr i age ; ( vi i ) T he s epar at e a s s et s of ea ch part y , bot h r eal an d pers onal , t ang i bl e a nd i nt ang i bl e; ( v i i i ) T h e pr ov i s i on s ma de wi t h r eg ar d t o t h e mar i t al pr oper t y a s de f i n ed i n § 36- 4- 121; ( i x) T he s t andar d of

l i vi ng of

t he part i es es t abl i s hed dur i ng t he marr i age ; (x) T he ext ent to whi ch each p art y ha s m ad e such t angi b l e and int angi b l e co nt ri b ut i o ns t o t he
m a rr ia g e a s m o n e ta ry a n d h o m e m a k e r c o n trib u tio n s, a n d ta n g ib le a n d in ta n g ib le c o n trib u tio n s b y a p a rty to the e d u c a tio n , t ra inin g o r in c re a se d e a rn ing p o w e r o f t h e o the r p a rty;

(x i) T h e re la tive fau lt o f t h e p a rtie s in c a se s w h e re the c o u rt, in its d isc r e ti o n , d e e m s it ap p rop ri at e t o do s o ; and

(x ii) S u c h o the r fa c to rs , i n c lud ing the tax c o n se q u e n c e s to e a c h p a rty, a s a re ne c e ssa ry to co nsid er the e q uit i es b etwe en t he p arti es.
T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 6

- 5

- 1 0 1 (d) (Sup p
. 20 0 3 ). -8- Id. at 511. The trial co u rt h as b ro ad discre tion in determining the type, amount, and dur ation of alimony based upon the particular fa cts of ea ch ca se. Id. Th e a mou nt o f alim on y is l arg e ly wi thi n the discre tion of the trial court. Burlew v. Burlew , 4 0 S. W.3 d 4 65 , 4 70 (T e nn . 2 00 1) . T his Cou rt is not inclined to alter a

trial court' s awa

rd of a limonyabsent a

finding of an a

buse of discretion. Id.
The trial c ourt found, [a]f te r c on sid e ri ng a ll of the fa c tor s of T.C .A . 36- 5- 10 1 .

. . the[c]o urt f ind s th a t [Ms

. St o h l] is e n ti tl e dto a li mo n y to a d ju s t t o th e e c o n o mi c c o n s e q u e n c e s o f a d iv o rce
. The [c]ourt finds that Dr. Halkai d es ag ree d during the cour se of the ma rriag e that [Ms . Stohl] could see k a Master ’s deg ree . Ms

. [ S t o hl] has bee n doing that for approximately

four y ear s and has two morey ear s of schooling . The [c]ourt finds that it would be inappropriate for he r to be de nied that opportunity but the [c] ourt finds that [Ms

. Stohl] could work pa rt-time while attending school. Ms. [S tohl] needs spousal support to supplement her incomefrom part-time work and pay for he r e du c atio n. Th us , [Dr

. Halkaide s] sh ou ld pay a lim on y in the a mou nt of Fif ty Thousand Dollar s ($50,000.00).-9-

Al tho ug h n ot l abe le d a s a pa rtic ula r ty peof a lim on y , th is a wa

rdis c le arl y

int e nd e d to bo th reha bilitate Ms. St ohl and to assist her in during the a t ra n s i t ional period. Upon r eview of the e vid e nc e , we fi nd no abu se of dis c re tio n inthetria l c ou rt ’s a wa rdof a lim on y . We a c c or din g ly a f f ir m th e tri a l c o u rt ’ s a w ar d o f $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 t o M s
. S t o h l , p a y ab l e a s tr a n s i t i o n a l a l i m o n y
. We a d d i t i o n a l l y a f

f i rmth e a w ar do f

$ 1 2 , 5 0 0 a s b a c k

a l i m o n y, p a yab l e a s a l i m o n y in solido

. Di v ision o

f D e bt a nd M

ar ita l P ro pe rty
Ms. Stohl ag ree s that the t rial court err ed in its calc ulation of her debt at the t ime of trial. She submits t he cor

rec t amount was $99,900, and not $103,000. Dr . Halkaide s, howeve r, asserts the trial court e rre d in first assig ning one -half of a business-re lated debt to the B ank of B artlett to him, and in then including this amount in the $103,000 total which the court divided in half. Essentially , Dr. Halkaide s asserts the tria l court calculated the Bank of B artlett debt twice , first separ ately assig ning one-half to him and then including it in the $103,000 total. Up onre vie w o f there c or d, a ndsp e c if ic a lly Ms. Sto hl’s Ru le 14 aff idavit , w e fi ndMs. Stohl’s debt at the time of trial to have been $99,900. This includes the B ank of B artlett loan, whic h is labeled “ca

pital for business,” but doe s not include her attorney ’s fe es. We ag reethat para g raph 28 of the trial c ourt’s dec reeis somewhat ambig uous. We ac co rd i n g ly aff irm the division of the debt, but modify

the amount owed to Ms. Stohl to $49,950. This amount i nclude s t h e Ba nk of B art le tt l oa d andthediv isi onof “ oth e r d e bt” he ld i n M s. Sto hl’ s n a me fo r thebe ne fi t of thepa rtie s.
Dr . Ha lkaide s als o co nte nd s th e tria l c ou rt e rr e d indiv idi ng thepa

rtie s’ pr op e rty . H e su bmi ts that althoug h he executed a deed of trust in fav o r o f M s
. Stohl when the parties’ home was purcha sed, the trial court err ed in f inding he had waived any

interest in the marital home. He f urther arg ue s th at hesu pp lie d f un ds fo r themortg a g e wh e n M s. Sto hl wa s n ot w or kin g , andthat heis entitled to a portion of the increa se i n the equityof the home. H oweve r, Dr. H alkaides f ails to point thi s Co urt to a ny

e vid e nc e in the re c or d w hic h w ou ld s up po rt his c on te nti on s. F urthe r, hefails to cite to any portion of t he record to indicate this issue was raised below. We cannot say the evidenc e pr e po nd e rate s a g a ins t th e trial c ou rt ’s fi nd ing that D r. Halkaide s wa ive d an y int e re st i n th e pa

rtie s’ marital home.
In light of thetrial court’ s findings, w e cannot say the evidence preponder ates ag ainst the trial c o u rt ’ s d i v i s i o n o f

o th e r p r o p e rt y. T ri a l c o u rt s m u s t s e e k a n e q u i t ab l e d i v i s i o n o f m ari t a l p r o p e rt y. An equitable division is not nece ssarily an equal one. Po we ll v . P owe ll , 124 S.W .3d 100, 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). “It is not a chieve d by a mec hanica l application of the statutory fac tors, but rather by considering and we ighing the most relevant fac tors in light of the unique facts of the c ase.” Id. (q u o t i n g Batson v. Baston, 76 9 S. W.2 d 8 49 , 8 59 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 98 8) . A pp e llate c ou rt s g e ne rally g ive g reat weig ht to the trial court’s de terminations wh en d i v i d i n g marital prope rty . We are not inclined to disturb the trial court' s decision unless the pre ponderance of evidenc e compe ls a diffe rent determination or the trial court’s division results from an error of law or incorre ct application of the statutory require ments. He rre ra v . H e rre ra , 944 S.W .2d 379, 389 (Tenn. Ct. App.1996).-10-

In this ca s e, t h e t ri al court based its awa rd of much of

the prope rty

on the conse nt of the parties. By consent of theparties, the c ourt awa rded Ms. Stohl the parties’ 1996 F ord Explorer, her re tir e me nt a c c ou nts va lue d at $3 3, 09 9. 25 , andhe r b a nk a c c ou nt v a lue d at $3 5. 00 . A lso by c on se nt, Dr. Halkaides wa s awa

rded theparties’ 1996 Mus t an g and other property in his possession. Additionally , the trial court determined that Dr. Halkaide s was totally and solely

responsible for

the los s o f thepa

rtie s’ prima

ry a sse t, theEy e s f

or Yo u bus ine ss. Th e tria l c ou rt fo un d th is a sse t w ou ld have been worth in e x cess of $600,000 had Dr. Halkaide s not misappr opriated f unds g ener ated by c a shsa le s and , g e ne rally , s qu a nd e re d th e bu sin e ss. In li g ht o f thetot a lity of the c ir c ums tanc e s in this case , we c annot say

the trial court’s awa

rd wa s not equitable. Award of At

torney’s Fees
Dr. Halkai d es asserts the trial court e rre d by awa rding Ms. Stohl $38,660.19 in attorney ’s fee s. I n a divorc e ca se, an a war d of attorne y ' s fee s is treated a s an aw ard of alimony . When determining whe ther to aw ard attorn ey ' s fee s, the trial court must consider the same f actor s used when c onsidering a re quest for alimony

. Sullivan v. Sullivan , 107 S.W .3d 507, 512 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). An awa

rd of attorney ' s fee s is pr oper when one spouse is disadvantag ed and doe s not have sufficie nt resourc es with which t o pay those fee s. Id. at 513. The que stions of whether to a war d attorney ' s fee s, and t he amount there of, are larg ely left t o the di scre tion of t he trial court. Aaron v. Aaron , 9 0 9 S

. W.2d 408, 411 (Tenn.1995). Upon a ppeal, weg ener ally

will not dis turb the trial court’s decision unless the evidence preponder ates ag ainst it. Storey v . Storey , 835 S.W .2d 593, 597 (Tenn. Ct. App.1992). We f ind no abuse of discre t i on in this case. Ms. Stohl requests additional attorney ’s fe es on appe al. We decline.

Hol ding The judg ment of the trial court is a ffirme d as modified. We af firm the aw ard to Ms. Stohl o f $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 a s h e r

s h ar e o f d i s s i p at e dm ari t a l a s s e t s
. T h i s s h a l l b e p a i da s a l i m o n y in solido at the rateof $416.67 per

month f or 120 months, until paid in its entirety . We affirm the awa rd of $12,500 o f b a c k , p a s t

- d u e a l i m o n y. T h i s a l s o s h a l l b e p a yab l e a s a l i m o n y in solido and shall be paid at the rateof $1,000 per

month for 12 and one -half months, until paid i n full. We also affirm the awa rd of $50,000 in transitional alimony to Ms. St ohl. This shall be pay able ove r a thre e y ear period at the rateof $1,388.89 per

month. The division of marital deb t i s modified to ref lect that Dr . Halkaids shall pay to Ms. St ohl $49,950. This shall be pay able a s alimony in solido at the rate of $416.25 pe r month for appr ox imately 120 months, until paid in f ull. The division of marital prope rty is affirme d i n i t s e n t i r e t y
. T h e a w ar do f a t t o rn e y’ s f

e e s i s a l s o a f

f i rm e d , a n ds h a l l b e p a yab l e a s a l i m o n y in solido at a rate of $6 44 .3 3 p e r m on th f

or app ro ximate ly

60 mon ths , u nti l paid in f

ull . We a g re e wi th the trial court that t h i s awa rd, in its entirety , is not discharg eable(insofar as permitted by

Fe deral bankruptc y

law) and is subject to wag e g arnishment. Except for transit i o n al alimony awa rd payments, this award is not modifiable, e x cept the payment periods may be extended or altered by ag ree ment of the pa

rties and after entry

of a c onsent order

in the trial court. Costs of this appea l are-11-

ta xedto theAp pe llant, DavidAl lan H a lkaide s, and his su re ty , f or wh ic h e xec uti onmay

iss ue if nece ssary
.

___________________________________ DAVID R. FARMER, J UDGE