F No. 1 

+a!, 

The Evolution of US Army 

Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76 

by Majar Robert A. Doughty 

Combat Studies institute 

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027 

AUGUST 1979 
FOREWORD 

In June 1979, the Combat Studies institute was formed within the US 

Army Command and General Staff College. Among its several missions, the 

institute is charged by the commander, US Army Training and Doctrine 

Command, to undertake historical research into problems having a bearing 

upon the concerns of the modern Army and to disseminate 

research throughout the Army. Major Robert A. Doughty’s, 

US Army Tactical Doctrine, 7946-76, is the first of a series 

the Leavenworth Papers to be published under the auspices 

Review. 

It is fitting that this inaugural study of the Combat Studies 

the fruits of this 

The Evolution of 

of studies called 

of the Military 

Institute should 

focus upon the formulation of doctrine since World War II. In no comparable 

period in history have the dimensions of the battlefield been so altered by 

rapid technological changes. The need for the tactical doctrines of the Army to 

remain correspondingly abreast of these changes is thus more pressing than 

ever before. 

Future conflicts are not likely to develop in the leisurely fashions of the 

past where tactical doctrines could be refined on the battlefield itself. It is, 

therefore, imperative that we apprehend future problems with as much 

accuracy as possible. One means of doing so is to pay particular attention to 

the business of how the Army’s doctrine has developed historically, with a 

view to improving methods of future development. This study is the first step 

along the road. 

DireCtOr 

Lieutenant Colonel Willlam A Stafft 

John F Morrrson Professor of Milifary Hisfory 

Dr. Ira 0. Gruber 

Chief, Research Commirree 

Major Charles R Shrader 

Research Felfows 

Dr. Allen F. Chew 

Dr. Roger J. Spiller 

Chid leaching Commtrtee 

Major(P) Davrd M Giantz 

Teaching Feltows 

Major Robert T Frank 

Malor Robert K. Grlfflth, Jr. 

Malot Thomas W. Sweeney 

Captam John C Brnkley 

Dr. Robert H. Berltn 

Or Edward J. Drea 

lSG(P) Kenneth Chaws. Jr 

staff 

Major Stanley L Walker 

SFC Nelson C Rogers 

Mrs. Lana S. Kielmon 

J , R. THURMAN 

The Leavenworth Papers are issued 

irregularly by the Fellows of the Combat 

Studies Institute, an element of the 

United States Army Command and 

General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas 66027. Publication is under the 

auspices and with the editorial 

assistance of the Military Review. The 

views expressed in this publication are 

those of the author and not necessarily 

those of the Department of Defense or 

any element thereof. Request for additional copies or for permission to 

reprint Leavenworth Papers in whole or 

part should be addressed to the Director, 

Combat Studies Institute, United States 

Army Command and General Staff 

College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

66027. 
The Library of Congress has cataloged the first print­ ing of this title as foIlows: 

Doughty, Robert A 

The evolution of US Army tactical doctrine, 1946761by Robert A. Doughty. - Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat 

Studies Instikte, US Army Command and General 

Staff College, 1979. 

57 p.; 25 cm. - (Leavenworth papers; no. 1) 

Includes bibliographical references. 

1. Tactics. 2. Military art and science-United States 

-History-20th century. 3. United States. Army--I%+ tory-29th century. I. United States. Army Command and 

General Staff College,, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. Combat 

Studies Institute. II. Title. III. Series. 

U165D58 79-604167 

355.4’2’0973-dc19 

MARC 

Library of Congress 

For sale by the Superintendent of Document. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. 20402 
CONTENTS 

PAGE 1 

2 

7 

12 

19 

25 

29 

INTRODUCTEON 

THE ARMY, 1945-50 

ADAPTATION DURING THE KOREAN WAR 

THE OPENING QFTHEATDMIC ERA 

THE ROAD CONCEPT 

COUNTERlNSURe~NCY 

THEVIETNAM WAR 

40 THE RETURN TOTHECONVENTIONAL 

46 CONCLUSION 
n of US Army 

Tactical octrine, 946-76 

by Major Robert A. Doughty 

US Army 

HE tactical doctrine of the US Army 

changed considerably between 1946 and 

1976.The changeswhich took place were influenced by a variety of factors, including 

improved conventional weapons, increased 

mobility, the development of nuclear 

weapons, the desires of different military 

leaders, wartime demand, parochial clashes 

between various branches, interservice 

rivalry and evolving nationa security policy. 

The competing or conflicting demands of 

these various influences often affected the 

formulation and dissemination of tactical 

doctrine. Army doctrine evolved amid great 

cycles of change, with new methods appearing only to be overwhelmed by the 

resurgence of older methods or the appearanceof even newer methods. Although 

Europe remained the center of its primary 

concerns, virtual revolutions in tactical doctrine occurred in the late 195Os,early 1960s 

and early 197Os,as the Army shifted the 

focus of its doctrine from conventional, to 

nuclear, to counterinsurgency, to conventional operations. The combination of these 

changes has contributed to modern Army 

tactical doctrine being more complex than at 

any other time in American history. 

The purpose of this study is to describe 

and analyze the major trends in Army doctrine since Warld War II. While the development of doctrine for individual branches is 

-If 

,

-?a? 

1 

important, this study avoids a detailed 

analysis of the narrower aspectsand concentrates on broader themes or issues in the 

evohnion of US Army tactical doctrine. 

Since the development of tactical organization and equipment cannot be separated artificially from tacticaI methods, the study 

also describesthe major organizational and 

weaponry changes which were an integral 

part of doctrinal innovations. 

Throughout the period under study, the 

general purposes of doctrine remained 

relatively unchanged. Doctrine continued to 

provide guides for action or to suggest 

methods that would probably work best. 

Similarly, doctrine facilitated communication between Army officers, for it defined 

terms and provided concepts which enabled 

the numerous arms on the battlefield to act 

together in a coherent manner or to be successfuhy orchestrated. 

Sincedoctrine is also that which is officially approved to be taught, it provided the 

primary content of the curriculum of the Army school system. Doctrine also assistedin 

the development of organizations and 

weapons systems, for it established the 

potential functions of the various systems 

and the parameters under which units were 

organized. This enabled the Army’s leaders 

to favor the development of a particular 

organization or weapon system. Doctrine 

has thus affected several widespread and important aspectsof the Army. 

By examining broad themes in the evolu1 
tion of tactical doctrine, significant insights 

can be gained which can help the Army officer understand and apply contemporary 

doctrine. Indeed, the evolution of tactical 

doctrine illustrates that the great value of 

doctrine is less the final answers it provides 

than the impetus it creates toward developing innovative and creative solutions for tactical problems on future battlefields. 

Il. THE ARMY, 1945-M 

N THE years between World War II and 

Korea, the Army carefully consideredits tactical doctrine, but its methods remained 

essentially those of World War II. While the 

postwar strategic environment encouraged 

the reconsideration of doctrine, it also made 

the formulation of Army doctrine especially 

difficult. 

Since the American atomic monopoly 

seemed to have provided the perfect 

response to any threat, many Americans 

questioned the need for large ground forces. 

Many believed an act of aggressicmwould 

result in all-out war which the United States 

would inevitably win with its atomic 

weapons. Given the Air Force monopoly 

over the delivery means for these weapons, 

the Army’s potential contribution seemed 

much less than in the past, and questions 

concerning its tactical doctrine also seemed 

less important. The introduction of atomic 

weapons seemed to forecast the demise of 

ground combat. 

The Army, nevertheless, argued that its 

contribution in any future war was indispensable. The War Department Board of 1946 

on Army equipment, headed by General 

Joseph W. Stilwell, stated that the next war 

might open with a surprise attack which 

would be followed by “retaliation with 

bombing, long range missiles, and biological 

weapons.’ ’ Yet the ultimate victory could 

only be achieved by “occupation of the 

hostile territory.‘“l 

In 1949, General Omar N. Bradley, the 

Army chief of staff, envisioned a war occurring in three stages. In the first stage, the 

-2-

United States would employ its strategic 

weapons against the enemy, and, in the second, American military forces would seize 

strategic bases from which the enemy’s 

homeland might be bombed or from which 

the enemy might bomb the United States. 

Airborne forces, because of their strategic 

mobility, would be especially useful in this 

second phase. The third and fina phase 

would be a large-scale ground assault to 

defeat the enemy.* 

Consequently, from the Army’s viewpoint, ground combat was far from obsolete. A final victory could still be gained 

only by rather traditional ground operations, and the World War II experience, 

especially in the European theater, remained 

a valid basis for postwar doctrinal development. 

Accordingly, as part of its energetic attempt to demonstrate the need for a ground 

combat capability, the Army carefully 

reviewed its experience in the recent war 

through a series of postwar conferences 

designedto improve its weapons, tactics and 

organization. Perhaps the most common 

characteristic of these conferences was their 

assumption that ground combat would CORtinue to be nonatomic, for the Army did not 

change its doctrine to reflect an atomic battIefield. The 1949 Field Service Regulations 

(Field Manual (FM) lOO-5),for example, included only a discussion on the dangers of 

radiation and of radioactive materials and 

said nothing about tactics on the atomic battlefield.’ 

Instead, when the Army initially considered the range of possible battlefields or 

types of combat in which it might participate, the major consideration was terrain 

rather than different types of combat along a 

spectrum of warfare. The Army had just 

participated in a global war, and the broad, 

worldwide responsibilities of rhe United 

States after the war indicated that the Army 

might fight again in widely varying types of 

terrain. 

The 1949 Field Service Regulations 

discussed “special” operations in towns, 

woods, mountains, extreme cold, jungle and 
desert, but it considered the “basic principles of combat” applicable to each operation. While methods would differ, the essential features of conventional warfare would 

continue to apply. If there was an exception, 

it was “partisan warfare,“4 but the manual’s 

treatment of this subject hardly diverged 

from its treatment of other conventional 

operations. 

Acceptance of widely varying possible 

types of battlefields soon dissipated. .4s the 

late 1940swaned and accelerating events of 

the Cold War raised the specter of a Soviet 

invasion of Europe, that. Continent became 

the focal point for Army doctrine. Concern 

for European security as the most important 

strategic problem thus reinforced the Army’s 

doctrinal preference for large-scaleconventional operations. Although the Army did 

not rule out the possibility of operations 

elsewherein the world, its doctrine was increasingly oriented toward a European-type 

battlefield reminiscent of World War II. 

* * * 

The requirement for closely coordinated 

and effective firepower emerged as one of 

the primary lessonsof World War II. Consequently, the problem of fire support coordination was studied in detail after 1945. 

Prior to the war, artillery had beenthe major 

supporting weapon for land operations, but 

the events of 1939-45demonstrated that tactical air and naval gunfire could also furnish 

important fire support. Following World 

War II, the number of artillery tubes was increased from four to six in the battery, and 

the cannon company in the infantry regiment was eliminated. A new method of adjusting on the observer-target line, converted 

to the gun-target line by use of a target grid, 

was introduced at the Artillery School at 

Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Used earlier by balloon 

observers,this method facilitated the control 

of naval gunfire in joint operations and 

simplified the duties of the artillery forward 

observer.5 

With regard to close air support, no single 

system of coordination or control had been 

common in all the theaters of World War II. 

-3-

The doctrine for the European theater was 

created in North Africa, developed in Italy 

and polished after the Normandy invasion. 

The actual procedures employed by the 

ground forces, however, were often ad hoc 

and varied widely from unit to unit. 

In the war in the Pacific, the Army profited from the Marines earlier experience 

and quickly developed a fire support coordination standing operating procedure for 

army, corps and division levels6 This doctrine differed from that employed in the 

European theater. Following the war, 

General Jacob L. Devers, chief of Army 

ground forces, stressedthe integration of all 

available fire support means. FM 31-35, ,4irGround Operations, was published in 

August 1946,’ and, in December 1949, the 

Army published its first training circular on 

fire support coordination. 

Formulation of the doctrines on fire support coordination and air-ground operations 

did not occur without serious disagreements 

between the Army and the newly independent Air Force. A major object of contention was the tactical air control party 

(TACP). The Artillery School maintained 

that a TACP should be provided on the basis 

of one per infantry and armored battalion 

and should be “organic to the direct support 

artillery battalion.” The school also argued 

that observers in ‘“artillery planes” should 

be able to perform the function of forward 

air controllers. It also objected to the 

establishment of separate air control nets 

and argued that requests for tactical air support should be handled like any other fire 

support request.% 

The final solution favored the Air Force 

position, for only one TACP was furnished 

to a regiment. The Air Force kept its forward air controllers, as well as operating a 

separateair-request net. It was not about to 

relinquish some of its newly won independenceto the artillery. 

While every potential problem had not 

been resolved, important progress had been 

made in establishing a clear doctrine for tactical air support of ground troops. Considering the intensity of the interservice rivalry 
before the Korean War, this accomplishment 

is especially noteworthy. Et stands in sharp 

contrast to the pre-World War El era when 

only lip servicehad beenpaid to the problem 

of air-ground operations by the Army and 

the Army Air Corps. 

Nevertheless, interservice rivalry and the 

pre-eminent emphasis on the atomic weapon 

affected other Army programs. For example, advanceswere made after World War II 

with the helicopter, but those advanceswere 

not as rapid as they might have been. The 

few heficopters manufactured in the United 

States during the last two years of Worid 

War 11 were used primarily for administrative and rescue purposes.9After the 

war, the Army conducted studies of the 

helicopter at Forts Benning, Sill and Bragg. 

The 1946 War Department Board on Army 

equipment analyzed the capabilities of the 

helicopter, but considered its employment 

appropriate only for assisting the supply of 

airborne troops or for use in ship-to-shore 

operations. I0 

Although the infantry conference in June 

1946 at Fort Ben&g a&o studied the 

helicopter, its report described the new aircraft as “particularly adaptable to usessuch 

as supply and evacuation, reconnaissance, 

observation, photography, column control, 

wire laying, and liaison and courier missions.“‘L Since the existing helicopters were 

very small and fragile, it was difficult for 

anyone to envision their playing an important combat role in large-scale ground operations. 

With the postwar reorganization of the 

War Department, the Army agreed to procure all its air vehicles through the newly 

formed US Air Force. However, with the advent of the “Big Bomber” and the atomic 

bomb, there was little room for the 

helicopter. When Lieutenant General James 

M. Gavin discussedthe development of the 

helicopter with the director of requirements 

for the Air Force, he was told, “The 

helicopter is aerodynamically unsound. . . . 

No matter what the Army says, I know that 

it does not need any.“” 

The development of the helicopter fell to 

-4-

the Marine Corps which saw the new aircraft 

as a means of adapting its amphibious warfare operations to the Atomic Age. When 

the Korean War came, the Marines were better prepared to employ their helicopters for 

command and control, medical evacuation, 

supply, etc. In September 1951, the Marines 

used helicopters in an airmobile operation 

for the first time.‘) On the eve of the Korean 

War, however, the Army’s methods continued to resemble those of World War II. 

Steps were taken to improve air-ground 

cooperation, but the Army developed no 

dramatically new concepts or weapon 

systems. 

* * * 

One of the most important and enduring 

concepts to emergefrom the severalpostwar 

studies concerned the role of the tank. The 

1946 Stilwell Board concluded, “The best 

antitank weapon is a better tank.“‘” This 

conclusion was strongly supported by an armor conference of the same year and by an 

infantry conference which recommended 

that the antitank company be deleted from 

the infantry regiment and three tank battalions be assigned to each infantry 

division.15 The artillery conference of 1946 

also recommended that the armored arm 

assume most of the antitank 

responsibilities. I6 Along with the other 

studies, the General Board of the United 

States Forces in the E.uropeanTheater stated 

that “the medium tank is the best antitank 

weapon.“” Perhaps the most remarkable 

aspect of this conclusion was the relatively 

wide and uncontested support for the tank as 

the best antitank weapon. 

While the armor protection, firepower 

and mobility of the tank made it an effective 

antitank system, its presumed superiority in 

this role was not based solely on its own 

capabilities. It was also based upon the 

perceived failure of the American antitank 

gun and self-propelled antitank destroyer in 

World War II. The primary antitank gun of 

the US forces during the war bad been the 

57mm gun, but this gun had not performed 

in a completely satisfactory manner. The 
General Board of the European Theater, for 

example, concluded, “Lack of cross-country 

mobility, coupied with the fact that the 

penetrating power of the 57mm projectile is 

insufficient to stop the modern tank, makes 

it imperative that another weapon be 

substituted.““8 

During World War II, the Army had 

developed self-propelled tank destroyers on 

which were mounted effective antitank guns 

f3-inch, 76mm and 9Qmm)long before those 

guns were mounted on tanks. Yet 

widespread dissatisfaetion with tank 

destroyer units resulted in their disbanding 

following the war. The Stilwell Board coneluded, “The thin-skinned, self-propelled 

tank destroyer has too limited a role to warrant further development now that comparable gun power can be attained in tank 

development.‘“’ 

In comparison with the 57mm gun and the 

self-propelled tank destroyer, the bazooka 

had performed extremely well. The General 

Board of the European Theater noted, 

however, that the primary function of the 

bazooka had been as an assault weapon and 

the secondary function had been as an antitank weaponZoAlthough a 3.5inch bazooka 

had been introduced toward the end of the 

war to replace the 2.36-inch weapon, and a 

recoilless rifle had also been developed during the war, there was no move to designate 

either of these weapons as a primary antitank weapon. Rather, they would be usedto 

supplement the medium tank which was 

viewed as the primary antitank weapon. In 

contrast to the perceptions of other nations 

of the world, the United Statesconcluded, in 

effect, that it could manufacture a tank that 

could outshoot and outmaneuver other 

tanks of the world. 

In its reconsideration of armored warfare, 

the Army concluded that there had not been 

enough infantrymen in the World War II armored divisions or enough tanks in the infantry division. It soon authorized four armored infantry battalions (with four infantry companies in each battalion) for eacharmored division. This increased the number 

of infantry companies in the armored divi-

-5--

sion from nine to 16. While the infantry division was suited for a wide range of responsibilities, it could engage, according to the 

doctrine, in “decisive operations” in many 

situations only if it were supported by other 

arms.2i 

The experience of World War II reinforced this perception. The General Board 

of the European Theater, for example, concluded, “The uniformly better performance 

of infantry, in any operation, when closely 

supported by tanks is probably the biggest 

single tactical lesson of the European campaign.rt22Accordingly, the postwar solution 

was to add tanks to the infantry division, 

and, by the iate 194Os,the infantry division 

had an organic tank battalion, plus one tank 

company per regiment. 

The postwar review thus strongly reaffirmed the need for combined arms operations. The 1949 Field Service Regulations 

repeated a phrase which had often appeared 

in prewar manuals: “No one arm wins battles. The combined coordinated action or 

team work of all arms and services is essential to success.” This injunction notwithstanding, the most important element 

within the combined arms team was the infantry which remained the center of focus of 

US Army doctrine. There was no intention 

to form Iarge armored formations, and, if an 

armored division was employed, it would be 

within an infantry-heavy corps in which 

there was one armored division and two or 

three infantry divisions. The tank had 

demonstrated its potential in World War II, 

but the infantry remained the “queen of battie.” 

* * * 

As for its concepts for the conduct of 

ground operations before the Korean War, 

Army doctrine emphasized the offensive. 

“The purpose of offensive action,” according to the 1949Field Service Regulations, “is 

the destruction of the effectiveness of the 

enemy’s armed forces and of his will to 

fight.“23 The Field Service Regulations also 

stressed the envelopment over the penetration and explained, “When the situation 
does not favor an envelopment, the main attack is directed to a penetration of the hostile 

front.” Selection of the envelopment or the 

penetration would be made only after a 

careful estimate of the situation. If a 

penetration was necessary, its objective 

became that of enveloping one or more of 

the flanks created by the breakthrough.t4 

Army tactical doctrine for the defensewas 

much more specific than that for the offense, but only one type of defensewas considered. Although it had no precise name, 

this defense was essentiaElyan area defense 

which resembled 6. F. C. Fuller’s “archipelago” defense. The major purpose of 

the defense was to maintain control of terrain, and the doctrine envisioned the selection and organization of a fighting position 

which was to be held “‘at all costs.” Covering forces were to be placed forward of the 

main battle position to delay and disorganize 

the advance of the enemy, as well as to 

deceivehim as to the true location of the battle position. 

The main battle position consisted of a 

“zone of resistance”21in which there were a 

series of occupied defense areas organized 

for all-around defense.A line along the most 

advanced defense areas was &led the main 

line of resistance, but the doctrine envisioned a defense in depth rather than a linear 

concentration of forces along the main line 

of resistance. Large reserves,especially large 

armored formations, were retained to relieve 

units in the main battle position, participate 

in a counterattack or to occupy a rear position. Relatively immobile infantry-heavy 

forces in the main battle area, however, were 

to bear the brunt of the heaviest fighting. 

When an enemy attacked, he would initially encounter the covering forces and then 

enter the main battle area. Here, he would 

encounter a defense made up of islands of 

resistance which would canalize the 

attacker’s forces and disorganize the 

cohesivenessof his attack. If the attack was 

halted, it would be by defensive forces 

toward the rear of the main battle area or by 

counterattack.‘6 

But the objective was to maintain control 

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of terrain, not to destroy the enemy’s forces. 

The defense was considered a method used 

only to gain time or economize forces in 

order to permit the development of more 

favorable circumstances under which the 

decisive blow would be dealt. Under 

American doctrine, defeat of the enemy occurred through offensive or counteroffensive action which destroyed the 

enemy’s “effectiveness” and his “will to 

fight.” Attrition was not necessarily a part 

of destroying the enemy’s combat effectiveness, for the ultimate purpose of larger 

unit operations was destruction of enemy 

units not soldiers. 

* * * 

Between 1945 and 1950, a number of 

changes thus occurred in Army doctrine. 

Despite thesealterations, much remained the 

same. Notwithstanding the atomic bomb 

and the intense postwar studies of the 

Army’s tactics, equipment and organizations, the doctrine for the employment of 

American tactical units in 1950 effectively 

remained that of World War II. 

The most important changes were designed to increaseand make more responsive 

the firepower available to American ground 

troops. Army units became somewhat 

heavier than they had beenin World War II. 

However, the extra bulk did not come from 

the creation of more US units because the 

Army continued to be small up to the eve of 

the Korean War. Rather, the extra bulk 

came from the additional elements designed 

to increasethe firepower of the infantry division which was the dominant division in the 

Army’s force structure. 

The issues encountered or addressed between 1946and 1950were not germane only 

to that short period. Several of them-in 

various forms-remained the concern of AFmy tacticians and doctrine writers for the 

next three decades.Problems such as the impact of atomic weaponry, the changing 

nature of mobility and the demand for 

greater and more accurate firepower were 

constant topics of discussion among Army 

thinkers. Other perceptions, such as the role 
of the tank in aneitank warfare, remained 

rooted in the conchrsions reachedduring this 

short period. 

Relations between the various branchesof 

service or Army branches continued to be 

subjects of controversy. Attempts to formulate better doctrine (such -asfor fire support coordination) or to develop new 

weapon systems(such as the helicopter) were 

influenced by sometimes competing interests. Questions concerning national 

security pohcy also affected the development 

of Army doctrine. By the late 194Os,Army 

doctrine was oriented toward a Europeantype battlefield-an oriemation which varied 

only slightly during the next 30 years. In 

sum, the evolution of tactical doctrine continued to be influenced by a variety of concerns, not all of which were technical in 

nature. 

ttt, ADAPTATtQN DURING THEKOREANWAR 

CCORDING to General MatEhew B. 

Ridgway, who served as commander of the 

Eighth Army in Korea and US commander 

in chief in the Far East, the Army was in a 

state of “shamefuul unreadiness” when the 

Korean War unexpectedly began.*’ Except 

for a single division in Germany, every division had been skeletonized. Infantry 

regiments were reduced from three to two 

battalions, and artillery battalions from 

three to two batteries. Even then, most battalions were not maintained at 100~percent 

strength. 

As a result of the several studies completed after World War II, a tank company 

was included in each infantry regiment and a 

tank battalion in each division, but most of 

the tanks bePongingto the first units to arrive 

in Korea had been stored or deleted from the 

skeleton units. Equipment problems were 

compounded by poor physical conditioning 

of soldiers and a generai insufficiency of 

training. AH American planning had assumed that the next war would be a global 

war; according to General Ridgway, “The 

concept of “limiaed’ war never entered our 

-7-

councits.“28 In the initial dark and 

tumultuous days of this unexpected war, 

American soldiers paid a bloody price for 

this unpreparedness. 

During the bleak summer and eariy fall of 

1950, the ground forces, under the dogged 

leadership of Lieutenant General Walton H. 

Walker, strove to maintain a semblance of 

cohesiveness as they delayed south and 

eslablished the Pusan Perimeter. Following 

the fnchon landing on 15 September 1958, 

the tide of the war swiftly reverseditself, and 

the United Nations’ (UN) forces rushed 

north to the Yam, only to be attacked by the 

Chinese Communists in November. The UN 

forces delayed south of Seoul but, by April 

1951I had. again pushed forward to the 

vicinity of the 38th parallel where the 

Chinese launched another major offensive. 

By May, the enemy attack had failed, and 

the UN forces were again on the offensive. 

But the fighting soon degenerated into a 

static war of position, reminiscent of World 

War I, which ended only with the cease-fire 

of 27 July 1953. 

The first parr of the war was thus 

characterized by relatively mobile operations 

as the opposing armies swept up and down 

Korea. Ahhough comments from leaders 

such as General Walker indicated no real 

changes in tactical doctrine or tables of 

organization and equipment were needed,29 

the Army experienced difficulties with its 

doctrine. The combination of the terrain, 

weather and enemy tactics tended to hamper 

employment of much of the tactical doctrine 

and equipment of the Army which were 

oriented toward another world war that 

would be fought primarily in Western 

Europe. Major problems were encountered 

with the mountainous terrain, for it limited 

the full use of American mechanized and 

motorized might. 

* * * 

The enemy’s tactics often took advantage 

of American weaknesses.The North Korean 

tactic of envelopment was especially effective. In the initial phasesof the war, the thinly held defensive lines of the Americans had 
numerous holes or exposed flanks. Infiltrating enemy units frequently occupied 

positions to the Americans’ rear, striking 

command posts, support units or artillery 

positions. GuerrilEaswere also used. Groups 

of about 15 men operated as tactical units, 

and their raids struck throughout the 

American rear.” 

Much of the initial North Korean success 

resulted from its employment of about four 

battalions of tanks which were often sent 

boldly forward of the main body. The 

Americans were ill-equipped in the initial 

fighting to deal with the Russian T34 tanks 

since the 2.36inch rocket launcher was effective only at very short ranges and, even 

then, could penetrate only certain parts of 

the T34’s armor. In addition, there was a 

shortage of antiarmor ammunition for the 

artillery. The first American tanks to arrive 

in Korea were the light M24s, and they 

hardly fared better than the infantry’s anritank weapons against the rugged enemy 

tanks. The Americans could effectively deal 

with the enemytanks only after the arrival of 

the 3,5-inch rocket launcher, medium tanks, 

and bomber and fighter aircraft. 

When the Chinese entered the war, they 

also stressedthe penetration of weak points 

and the envelopment or encirclement of 

defensive positions. During the approach 

march, the Chinese usually moved with two 

units forward and one back. When they encountered defensive resistance, they 

withdrew one of the two forward units to 

create a “one-up’” and “two-back” formation. Following a seriesof probing attacks to 

identify the defender’s weaknesses, the 

Chineseshifted their units and made their attack through the weak points identified in 

the defender’s lines. After penetrating deep 

enough to engagethe defender’s reserves,a 

portion of the attacking units engaged the 

reserves while the remainder attempted an 

encirclement of the forward defenders.l’ 

Perhaps the best method employed by the 

Chinese to Eimit the effect of US air strikes 

and aerial observation was the superb useof 

camouflage and concealment. Air observers 

often stressed the remarkable differences 

-8-

between the enemy and American positions, 

While the US positions were filled with easily 

seen vehicles, weapons, bunkers and litter, 

the enemy positions were frequently 

undetectable. Without the threat of enemy 

air strikes, US ground units grew accustomed to the luxury of not stressing 

camouff age or concealment. 

Because of the massive UN air, artillery 

and tank support, most Chinese attacks 

came at night to limit the effectiveness o.f 

these weapons.z2 Similarly, the enemy 

learned to scheduiehis major attacks during 

periods when he knew bad flying weather 

would limit effective air support. The enemy 

was also abIe to reduce the effectiveness of 

American firepower by moving close to a 

defensive position in the darkness and staying as close to the position as possible, thus 

making it difficult to use supporting air and 

artillery. 

Night attacks often consisted of large 

numbers of soldiers moving closely behind a 

usuaEly weak artillery barrage and hurling 

grenadeswithout regard to losses. Without 

adequate communications or command and 

control, severalChinese units often followed 

one another in an attack on the same position, giving the effect of waves of attackers. 

The weapons of the defender were more effective when employed against the massed 

attacks of the Chinese than against dispersed 

individuals. The defender’s artillery, mortars, tanks, automatic weapons and small 

arms fire caused thousands of Chinese 

casualties. 

* * * 

The Americans were forced to respond to 

the enemy’s tactics. The initial phase of 

retrograde operations was especiallydifficult 

becauseof the hasty commitment of the iUprepared units and because few Americans 

had ever participated in such an operation. 

In World War II, Americans had usually 

been on the offensive, and very few units 

had ever conducted a sustained defense.:A 

1954study by the Infantry School discussed 

the initial difficulties with retrograde operations in the Korean War and noted, “‘Many 
. . . withdrawals were mob movements 

rather than military movements, and the 

men were cut to pieces.“33 

The shock of the initial combat experience 

and the lack of disciphne and training combined to create panic withdrawals in the first 

part of the fighting. After the combatseasoningof men and units, the Americans 

slowly learned to remain in position until 

ordered to withdraw and then to conduct a 

cohesive, fighting withdrawal, Such tactics 

sharply reduced. American casualties, but 

their slow adoption and application revealed 

the great difficulties inherent in training men 

and units for retrograde operations. 

The Americans were also unaccustomed to 

operating on the wide frontages imposed by 

the shortage of units. They initially attempted to defend in a thin line stretching 

across the entire defensive area. This 

resulted in grave problems with command 

and control, and defensive positions often 

lacked the necessary depth to halt mass 

enemy attacks. After becoming commander 

of the Eighth Army, General Ridgway stressed the occupation of strong night defensive 

positions with all-around protection. By occupying suitabfe hill or ridge tops, and permitting enemy penetrations through the 

valleys, the enemy could be destroyed at 

daylight by strong combined arms teams of 

armor, infantry, artillery and air. 

Another technique used effectively at the 

division level involved a more mobile 

defense. While a division’s front was lightly 

outposted, major forces (often armor-heavy) 

were held back to counterattack when the 

enemy managed to penetrate the front. This 

method was used primarily when the enemy 

forces were not so numerous that all units of 

the mobile reserve had to be committed at 

the sametime. Similarly, a greater emphasis 

was placed on counterattacks which often 

upset the rhythm of the enemy’s operation 

and enabled the Americans to seize the initiative. 

Part of the improved fighting capability of 

the soldiers came from better use of cover. 

The Americans were initially reluctant to dig 

or to provide sufficient overhead cover for 

their firing positions. Experience and exposure to enemy fire proved to be the best 

teacher, along with an increased command 

emphasis on preparing foxholes, trenches 

and bunkers. 

Another aspect of the enhanced fighting 

capability of the Americans resulted from a 

better use of firepower. Despite continued 

problems with coordination and communications between air and ground forces, 

air support became almost indispensable, 

especially in the initial phaseswhen insufficient artillery units were in Korea, Improvements in the effectiveness of American 

fire also resulted from the improved employment of weapons. Weapons such as the 

recoilless rifle and machinegun often had not 

been used to the best advantage, and inadequate fire support planning frequently 

reduced the effectiveness of supporting 

weapons. 

Proper planning and careful preparation 

soon corrected many of these faults. At the 

same time, the density of automatic 

weapons, recoilless rifles and bazookas was 

increased. This reduced the number of rifles 

but dramatically increased the firepower of 

the small unit.34 When attacks on fortified 

positions were necessary, additional 

augmentation with fiamethrowers and 

demolitions occurred. 

Offensive tactics were also modified and 

improved in the first part of the war. In the 

initial fighting, some American units had 

gotten into serious trouble by charging on 

the roads up valleys without first securing 

the high ground on the flanks. This exposed 

them to ambush or to envelopment or encirclement tactics. After he became commander of the Eighth Army, Genera1 

Ridgway pushed to get the Americans off the 

roads and into the surrounding hills. The effect was to broaden the front of American 

attacks. Closely coordinated armor-infantry 

teams still operated in the valleys, but they 

maintained a presenceon the hills to the left 

or right. 

Another successful technique was derived 

from World War II but resembledthe North 

Korean and Chinese envelopments. While 

-9-
frontal pressure prevented an enemy from 

withdrawing or maneuvering, a strong force 

moved around the enemy’s flank to attack 

his rear. Airborne troops were also used to 

seize positions to the enemy’s rear. When 

blocking positions were occupied and other 

units attacked toward them, the enemy-to 

use General Ridgway’s phrase-was caught 

between a “hammer and anvil.“3” 

In the initial fighting, the Americans did 

not stress night operations. Many successful 

day attacks stopped promptly at dark with 

littEe or no pressure being exerted by a continuation of the attack or by increased 

patrolling. Since the enemy was an expert at 

digging in rapidly, the next morning’s attack 

was often ~ostly.~~Consequently, US commanders began placing a greater emphasis 

on night attacks or continuing attacks after 

darkness. 

Technical innovations also occurred. Battlefield illumination techniques were improved and added substantially to the defensive capability of the Americans. Sources of 

illumination were the flareship, searchiight 

tanks, engineer searchlights, and artillery 

and mortar illuminating shells. Illumination 

support for offensive operations, however, 

remained difficult because of the normal 

dust and smoke causedby incoming artillery 

and mortar rounds. 37 

* * * 

The Chinese Communists’ system of 

defensein the early part of the war differed 

from that of the UN forces. While the UN 

forces normally depended on strong defensive positions supported by artillery and air 

cover, the Chinese, due to a lack of such support, rehed on a more fluid defense which 

stressed maneuver. The Chinese usually 

defended in a formation of one up and two 

back. While the forward unit served as a 

screening force and delayed the enemy, the 

two rear units strengthened their defenses 

and prepared for a possible counterattack. If 

these two units were also forced back, the 

Chinese withdrew and awaited more 

favorable circumstances rather than risk a 

decisive engagement along a main line of 

-IO-­

resistance. The purpose of the defense was 

not to hold terrain, but to create weaknesses 

in the attacker’s forces which could be exploited by counterattack. )* 

During the large-scale, mass attacks of 

1951, the Americans were also forced to use 

a more mobile form of defense. One such 

method was called the “fight and roll.” The 

US I Corps created the new method which 

was based upon the premise that an inflexible defensive line had Iittle or no effect 

against a massattack. Waves of troops couId 

charge a position almost faster than they 

could be killed, and the smallest penetration 

allowed the attackers to envelop the remaining line. 

Under the concept of “fight and roll,” the 

defenders remained in their positions as long 

as possible-until the enemy had paid the 

maximum price and before the defensive 

positions were engulfed by the attackers. 

After the highest possible cost was levied 

against the enemy, a rapid and orderly 

preplanned withdrawal was conducted to a 

previously arepared defense position. 

Although the defenders might be forced to 

occupy as many as five or six subsequent 

positions, it was “inevitable,“” according to I 

Corps, that the surging mass would eventually halt. The I Corps’ description of the 

“fight and roll’” defense stated: ‘“Units will 

be decimated, command and control channels lost and equipment gone. The mass 

becomesa struggling, chaotic mixture of the 

remnants of many broken units.“39 

The defense, however, was not simply one 

of continually occupying subsequent positions. Local counterattacks were planned 

and were launched at critical times by tankinfantry teams. Most counterattacks, 

however, consisted of massive concenfrations of artillery fire. Such techniques made 

excellent use of the firepower of the 

Americans and produced creditable results 

in the spring offensive by the Chinese in 

April 1951.40 

After armistice negotiations began in 

November 1951, the UN forces refrained 

from large offensive operations, allowing 

the war to enter its static phase. For the re-
mainder of the war, American defensive 

positions were heavily fortified and much 

more elaborare, especially in mountainous 

areas. Main battle positions were often not 

based upon the strength of the terrain, but 

upon the location of the line of contact when 

armistice negotiations began. 

Although, American doctrine and the 

Korean experience favored a defense in 

depth, the established defenseswere actually 

a shallow linear defense. Terrain features 

were occupied across the entire front, and 

defensivepositions could often be supported 

only by adjacent, positions. The primary 

means of gaining depth was to place relatively strong outposts forward of the main 

line of resistance. Such outposts constituted 

centers of resistance which provided mutual 

support for each other, served as patrol 

bases and limited enemy infiltration of the 

main defensive line.“” As the war dragged 

on, someof the bloodiest battles were fought 

over these seemingly inconsequential outposts./ 

Artiilery also became much more important. The American artillery had made its 

reputation in World War II through its ability to mass fires rapidly and by its responsiveness. In Korea, it was not unusual to 

have massed fire from. as many as 14 battalions, with each firing 10 volleys within the 

space of two minutes. In one operation, the 

38th Eield Artillery Battalion fired 11,600 

rounds in 12 hours, a rate of one round per 

minute per 105mm howitzer.“* Although the 

results were impressive, critical shortagesof 

ammunition resulted, and, in several instances,artillery rounds had to be strictly rationed. 

Ammunition for the heavy artillery was 

especially short even though its employment 

was essential against solidly entrenched 

enemy positions. Despite the public uproar 

over the shortages, ammunition continued to 

be rationed since the long Pacific sea lines 

and insufficient road and rail net compounded the delivery problem. Nevertheless, 

Americans continued to rely on massive artillery support, and General Ridgway explained, “Steel is cheaper than lives and 

--IImuch easier to obtain.“‘3 

Tank units aiso provided additional 

firepower to the defensive positions. Special 

roads were often constructed along the main 

line of resistance, and tanks were kept 

behind the crest of a hill. When targets of 

opportunity appeared, they were moved forward to prepared positions. Other tanks 

were often left on the ridges, but only after 

being carefully dug-in and well 

sand-bagged.“’ In some cases, tanks were 

used as indirect fire weapons. 

Armored personnel carriers were also 

useful, for they frequently moved supplies, 

equipment, wounded, and replacements or 

reinforcements along routes exposed to 

enemy fire. In the battle for Pork Chop HilE 

in July 1953, for example, armored personnel carriers played an especially crucial roIe 

in the movement of men and equipment.“5 

Despite the presenceof the.tanks and armored personnel carriers, the Korean War 

was dominated by the infantry and artillery 

from late 19.51until the war ended. Close 

cooperation between these two arms determined the character and nature of the 

fighting during those last two years. 

During the period of static warfare, foot 

patrols were especially valuable for capturing enemy prisoners, disrupting enemy 

probes and maintaining contact with the 

enemy. Despite the frequency of the patrolling, major problems were encountered. The 

patrols frequently produced little or no 

results and often avoided enemy contact. 

One staff study completed in the 7th Infantry Division concluded that the most important reason for the failure of US patrols 

was “psychological.“46 After armistice 

negotiations began, the Eighth Army maintained strict control of attacks in an effort to 

avoid casualties and in the hope that a truce 

would be signed. This lack of aggressiveness 

filtered down through the ranks of the 

soldiers who believed ma-ny of the patrols 

were pointless and merely served to fill a 

quota. As long as the war dragged on, there 

was no easy answer to the problem of 

patrolling. 

Throughout the latter phases of the war, 
tactical air continued to play a key role even 

though some argued that aircraft were often 

used when artillery would have been sufficient. Perhaps the greatest controversy arose 

over the actual contribution of the Air 

Force, particularly in its interdiction role. 

For example, General Otto P. Weyland, 

commander of the Far East Air Forces, said, 

“We are pretty sure now that the Communist wanted peace, not because of a 

&year stalemate on the ground, but to get 

airpower off their back.“‘“’ 

GeneralsMaxwell D. Taylor and Matthew 

B. Ridgway, however, argued that even 

though airpower had been vital to ground 

success, it had never successfully closed 

enemy supply lines.48The real measure of 

success,according to the Army generals,had 

been the ability of the ground forces to hold 

ground, or to move up and down the Korean 

peninsula. From their perspective, the most 

important aspect of airpower had been the 

support it provided, both directly and indirectly, to the ground forces. Perhaps more 

than anything else, Korea demonstrated that 

one cannot artificially separate air from 

ground operations or vice versa. Unfortunately, continued interservice rivalry was 

to blur and almost erase this important 

lesson. 

* * * 

When the Korean War ended in July 1953, 

the official position was that no real changes 

in doctrine had occurred or had been 

necessary during the war. For exampie, a 

special bulletin from the Army Field Forces 

originalEy entitled “Lessons Learned” was 

sooil retitled “Training Bulletin.” The introduction to one of the training bulletins explained that the fighting in Korea had provided “few items” that could be describedas 

“lessons learned.“49 A I954 study at the Infantry School noted that a more appropriate 

title might be “Lessons Relearned in 

Korea.“So One of the training bulletins of 

the Army Field Forces concluded, “The 

mass of material from Korea . . . reaffirms 

the soundness of US doctrine, tactics, 

techniques, organization, and equipment.“5’ 

-12-

Despite thesedisclaimers, a subtle but important changehad occurred in Army thinking if not in its doctrine. The Army had 

become accustomed to massive amounts of 

firepower which came at the expense of 

mobility. The Army had also perfected its 

techniques of employing firepower and the 

defenseto inflict huge losses on an attacker. 

Thus, the Army focused upon attrition at the 

expenseof maneuver and its offensive spirit. 

Finally, the Army had become somewhat 

bitter about the constant clashes with the 

other services, and the I954 Field Service 

Regulations stated, “Army combat forces 

do not support the operations of any other 

component.“52 

IV. THEOPENINGOFTHEATOMICERA 

W HEN the atomic weapon was studied 

after World War II, most observers considered it to be solely a strategic weapon 

whose powers had been demonstrated 

against Japan. The views of many military 

leaderson this new weapon were reflected in 

the doubts of one general officer: “Show me 

how to use this weapon in tactical roles, if 

you can. It is nof a tactical weapon.“” 

In addition to doubts about the suitability 

of the atomic bomb as a tactical weapon, 

problems of delivery also stymied potential 

tactical application of the weapon, The few 

bombs produced after the war were so 

cumbersome and heavy that only the Air 

Force’s B29 bomber was suitable for delivering them, Army leaders foresaw many difficulties in creating another delivery system. 

In a June 1946 presentation, for example, 

Major General Leslie R. Groves said, 

“Future delivery of atomic bombs . . *, if it 

is ever delivered again, will be [by] an 

airplane until such time as guided’ missiles 

come into being.“s4 

Despite thesereservations and difficulties, 

the Army had begun by 1949 to study the 

problem of the tactical use of atomic 

weapons, and a flurry of studies soon appeared. EarIy in 1949,the Army Field Forces 

produced a paper entitled, “Tactical 
Employment of the Atomic Bomb.” A short 

time later, the Weapons System Evaluation 

Group (WSEG) completed a project entitled, 

“A Study on Tactical Use of the Atomic 

Bomb.““3 Major General JamesM. Gavin, a 

member of WSEG, published an article on 

‘“The Tactical Use of the Atomic Bomb” in 

Corn& Forces Journal in November 1950.‘6 

In September 1949,General Jacob L. Devers 

recommendedthat the atomic bomb be used 

as a “‘tactical weapon,“f7 and, in 1950 and 

1951, the Operations Research Office produced a variety af studies on target analysis 

and weapon effects. 

In early 19.51)Project Vim was established at the California Institute of Technology as a joint undertaking of the Army, 

Navy and Air Force. Its purpose was to 

study ground and air tactical warfare with 

special attention to the defense of Western 

Europe, but Its most important recommendation was for the maximum possible 

development of tactical nuclear weapons.$a 

One of the earliest efforts to study the 

atomic battlefield occurred in 1949 at the 

Command and General Staff College 

(CGSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Lieutenant General Manton S. Eddy, commandant of the CGSC, assigneda small group of 

officers the mission of studying the role of 

the Army in modern warfare, and employment of atomic weaponsby the Army was an 

integral part of this study. The group eventualiy completed a draft field manual on the 

‘“tactical use of atomic weapons,‘” and, in 

November 1951, an improved and edited 

version was issued by the Department of the 

Army.-‘9 

One of the first books on atomic weapons 

was written by two members of the faculty at 

the CGSC, Colonel G. C. Reinhardt and 

Lieutenant Colonel W. R. Kintner. Their 

book, entitled Atomic Weapons in Land 

Combaf, suggested the direction for many 

other efforts in the 1950s. The authors explained, “,4tomic weapons, tactically 

employed, should be incorporated into our 

first line of defenseagainst any creeping aggression.“6” 

The major result of numerous Army 

-13-

studies was to emphasizethe effectiveness of 

atomic weapons against ground targets of a 

tactical nature and to r-tote the threat of such 

weapons against World War II-type targets. 

The studies also emphasized the potential of 

massdestruction weaponsemployed tactically against the Soviet or Chinese hordes. 

After mentioning, for example, the “‘traditional Soviet tactics of massing the men and 

means to do a job regardlessof losses” and 

alluding to the mass Chinese attacks in 

Korea, General Gavin concluded that the 

atomic bomb could be used successfully 

against massedSoviet forces.6’ Similarly, an 

Operations ResearchOffice study on the use 

of atomic bombs against massedarmor concluded that such concentrations were “profitable targets for A-bombs.“6’ 

Steps were also taken to develop Army 

weapons capable of delivering atomic 

weapons on the battlefield. The first weapon 

to appear was the mammoth 280mm gun 

whose development had been initiated in 

November 1944by the Ordnance Corps as a 

conventional, but very large, artillery 

piece.63In 1948-49, the Army concentrated 

on development of atomic capable artillery. 

In June 1950, lessthan two weeksbefore the 

Korean War began, the Army chief of staff, 

General J. Lawton Collins, publicly 

acknowledged the Army’s efforts in atomic 

artillery. O4 

Since the 280mm gun had already been 

designed, the major developmental problem 

was evidently the design of a stable, rugged 

and relatively small atomic round that could 

be fired by the artillery. With reductions in 

size and an increase in the variety of yields, 

production of such a round soon became 

possible. In May 1952, the secretary of the 

Army, Frank Pace, officially announced the 

Army’s development of an atomic 

howitzer.&” To publicize its work in atomics, 

the Army included the 280mm gun in the 

January 1953inauguration parade of President Dwight D. Eisenhower. In May 1953, 

the Army successfully fired an atomic shell 

from the World War 11vintage 280mm gun. 

The resulting explosion not only symbolized 

the addition of an awesome new weapon to 
the Army’s arsenal, but also symbolized the 

true beginning of the atomic era for the 

Army. 

***‘ 

During the Korean War, the Army had 

considered employing atomic weapons 

against the Chinese. A June 1952 study by 

the US I Corps argued that atomic weapons 

could “be used profitably on distant massed 

targets, with conventional artillery taking up 

the task as the human sea moves in.‘raa 

When he returned to the United Statesat the 

end of his tour as Eighth Army commander, 

General James A. Van Fleet counseled 

against the use of atomic weapans but, 

nevertheless, conceded that they could be 

used against troop cOncentrations.6’ 

His successor, General Maxwell D. 

Taylor, later explained why atomic weapons 

were ‘not employed in Korea. First, the 

United States did not have enough atomic 

weapons to risk their use on a target which 

did not represent a major threat to the 

security of the United States. Second, the effectiveness of the weapons might have been 

red.uced by the mountainous terrain of 

Korea. Finally, there were numerous fears 

that employment of the weapons might 

reveal-shortcomings which could diminish 

their deterrent value elsewhere.68 

The United States perceived the major 

threat to be in Europe, and it did not want 

the demands of the Korean War to upset the 

delicate balance in Europe. Korea did not 

seem to be worth the price of crossing the 

atomic threshold, but the experience with 

masses of Chinese soldiers in Korea was 

believed to offer many par&e& to the 

possibility of a Soviet attack in Europe. As 

the United States refocused its foreign and 

national defense policies on Europe, atomic 

weapons appeared to be a feasible means of 

offsetting the apparently Overwhelming 

Soviet superiority in conventional military 

forces on the Continent. 

Following the Korean War, the Army intensified its study Of tactics, organization 

and equipment for the atomic battlefield, 

especially after the E,isenhower administra-

-14-

tion began placing greater emphasis on the 

employment of atomic weapons rather than 

expensivemanpower. The Army’sinterest in 

atomic weapons, however, was not solely the 

result of the administration’s faith in 

massiveretaliation. Many military observers 

believed the new weapons promised an unparalleled revolution in tactics. 

The potential effect of the new weapons 

was suggestedby General Charles L. Bolte,, 

vice chief of staff, in an addressto the Infantry School in 1954. General Bolte described 

their presence as introducing “a new complexity of conditions to the battlefield hitherto undreamed of.” He added, “Warfare, 

perforce, at once becomesdispersed, leading 

to a wide open, fluid battlefield. Mass, in the 

Old senseof concentrating units and material 

to achieve a breakthrough or to mount an 

assault, becomes suicidal.” He noted that 

the use of atomic weapons might be as 

“‘commonplace” on future battlefields as 

“heavy artillery is today.‘“6? 

Such views of the future tended to bring 

into question many concepts that had provided the foundation for ground combat 

methods for centuries. Given the potential of 

the new weaponry, the Army had little 

choice but to reconsider its methods. Yet it 

chose to move incrementally and to avoid 

risking organizationai and doctrinal chaos 

by hasty, wholesale changes. 

When the 1954 Field Service Regulations 

were published, the envisioned atomic battlefield was a clear descendantof World War 

II and Korea. Although the manual discussed atomic weapons,‘* the tactics were not 

dramatically different from those usedin the 

past. As for the offense, rhe manual noted 

that chemical, biological and radiological 

agents could be used “to’ reinforce the effects of the attack,” but it did not alter the 

basic methods previously used. 

Greater changes occurred in the Army”s 

doctrine for the defense, but they did not 

necessarily reflect the anticipated effects of 

atomic weapons. In contrast to earlier 

manuals which had envisioned only Onetype 

of defense, the 1954edition of the field service regulations stated that there were. two 
basic types of defense-the position defense 

and the mobile defense. 

The position defense was clearly a 

descendantof previous methods, for it relied 

on a “zone of resistance” with a number of 

mutually supporting defenseareasorganized 

for all-around defense. The majority of the 

forces were placed forward, and a reserve, 

rarely larger than one-third of the force, was 

retained to counterattack, to occupy blocking positions, or to replace or reinforce 

troops in defensive areas. The emphasison a 

defensein depth also resulted in a downplaying of the idea of a main ‘line of resistance 

and its replacement by the idea of a forward 

edge of the defensive position. Yet decisive 

combat was expected to take place in front 

of or within the forward battle positions.” 

In the mobile defense, the bulk of the 

defending force was retained as a “mobile 

striking force” whiEethe remainder occupied 

the forward defensive position. In this fluid 

defense, the forward positions could consist 

of islands of resistance, strongpoints or 

observation posts. They were, nevertheless, 

not completely static positions since they 

were not expected to halt the enemy. The 

idea was for the forward forces to canalize 

the attacking forces and delay or disorganize 

their attack while the mobile force was 

“employed in offensive action to destroy the 

enemy at the time and place most favorable 

to the defender.” The armored division was 

ideally suited for the mobile defense, but the 

infantry division could employ it only under 

special circumstances.72 

Although the origins of the mobile defense 

are not entirely clear, the methodology 

resembled some of the counterattacks or active defensesof World War II. It also bore 

some resemblance to the defensive operations in Korea when mass attacks had been 

bled by defensive fires from successivepositions until the time was ripe for a counterattack by massedfires or tank-infantry teams. 

More importantly, there had been a 

resurgence of enthusiasm for armor in the 

US Army, following the success of North 

Korean tanks in 19.50and the growing threat 

of massesof Russian tanks in Europe. In Ju-

-15-

ly 1948, there had been only one armored 

division in the 10divisions in the active force 

structure, and this division had only one 

combat command. In 1949, the division was 

expandedto its full size, but severepersonnel 

shortages persisted. Similarly, there was a 

cavalry division stationed in the Far East in 

1948, but, by 1949, that division was little 

more than a weakened infantry division.:j 

The early and mid-19.50switnessed a clear 

growth of American armor. In March 1951, 

a second armored division was activated,‘4 

and, by 1956, there were four armored divisions out of a total of 20 divisions.r’ 

Following the shock of the North Korean 

tanks in the summer of 1950, intensive efforts were devoted to developing tanks. In a 

remarkably short period, the Army produced the M4I,M47, and 12148tanks, and it 

soon produced the &B9 armored personnel 

carrier and began developing the hf11.5’. 

Such vehiclesand units were considered idea1 

for operating on the atomic battlefield and 

for conducting a rapid and violent strike 

against a numerically superior enemy. 

At the same time, armored units were 

“best suited for the mobile defense or for 

use as the mobile reserve for a larger 

force.“‘6 Given the specter of a dispersed 

atomic battlefield in which mobility provided the extra ingredient for rapid strikes and 

counterstrikes, the mobile defense-for the 

moment-seemed to provide a logical solution to the perplexing and difficult probEem 

of balancing the need for dispersion against 

the need for mass. 

Changes to the 1954Field Service Regulations appeared in 1956 and 1958, but they 

did not dramatically alter existing practices. 

The major thrust of the changes, from the 

viewpoint of atomic warfare, was to emphasize that an artificial separation between 

atomic fires and maneuver was not possibIe. 

If the maximum effect was to be gained from 

each, the commander had to consider their 

employment concurrently in order to obtain 

their complete and proper integration. In 

that sense, atomic fires could complement 

conventional fire support by assisting 

maneuver, or the maneuver plan could be 
tied to the use of atomic fires.‘7 

* * * 

Despite the appearance of the mobile 

defense and the envisioned employment of 

mass destruction weapons, the concepts for 

the atomic battlefield included in the 1954 

Field Service Regulations and amended in 

1956 and 1958 resembled wars previously 

fought. Very different ideas, however, were 

being discussed and soon came to the 

forefront. American thinkers recognized 

that the US monopoly on tactical nuclear 

weapons would end at some undetermined 

date and force major changes in ground 

combat doctrine. 

Although the movement toward the new 

ideas in the early 1950smay have been initiated or at least accelerated by forces autside or above the Army, a significant portion 

of the Army was sympathetic to or supported the move. After being appointed 

chief of staff in 1953, General Matthew B. 

Ridgway strongly emphasizedthat on future 

battlefields American forces “must expect to 

be outnumbered” and the Army had to 

multiply its effective strength by increasing 

its mobility and firepower.‘* There was no 

doubt that atomic weapons provided the 

preponderant part of the new firepower. 

In 1954, General Maxwell D. Taylor, 

Lieutenant General Bruce C. Clarke and a 

number of other senior officers studied the 

possibility of reorganizing the American 

division and thereby changing fundamental 

tactical concepts.79During the same period, 

Major General James M. Gavin, while commander of the US VII Corps in Germany, 

ran exerciseson tactics for the atomic battlefield and noted that World War II-type 

organizations could not “adapt themselves 

to nuclear tactics. The one exception was our 

armored divisions.” Gavin concluded that it 

was necessaryto redesign the infantry division into relatively autonomous and widely 

dispersed “battle groups, each one capable 

of sustained combat on its own.“” Interestingly enodgh, Cblonel Reinhardt and 

Lieutenant Colonel Kintner had reached the 

same conclusion in their 1953 book on 

atomic warfare.8’ 

-16-

The official Army study was entitled­

“Atomic Field Army-l 1956 (,ATFA-I).” 

The formal field tests began in 1954with the 

1st Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas, 

and the 47th Infantry Division at Fort Benning, Georgia. The extensive tests were 

designed to determine what changes in 

organization and tactics were necessaryfor 

fighting in atomic warfare and for improving “the Army combat potential-to-man+: 

power ratio.“B” The ATFA-I study was 

followed by the PENTANNA study which 

placed an even greater emphasis on the 

atomic battlefield. 

The major results of the tests were suggested by Major General Gavin in a news 

conference in February 1955 when he explained that the new concepts envisioned a 

“cellular rather than linear” battlefield. 

Gavin also explained that the new standard 

divisions would be prepared for atomic or 

nonatomic warfare, but the nonatomic war 

was more iikely.E3 The tests also indicated 

that improved communications permitted a 

division commander to control more units 

than the traditional three regiments, and that 

the “optimum number of subordinate 

units” was probably fiveas” 

In September 1956, the newly activated 

1Olst Airborne Division was reorganized in 

consonancewith the conceptsemerging from 

the several tests. In December 1956, the Army recommended to the secretary of defense 

and the president that they approve the 

reorganization of all the Army’s divisions. 

The announcement stated, “It is felt that 

this ‘newdivision structure will raise the combat effectiveness of the Army by exploiting 

to a maximum modern technology for the 

improvement of firepower, mobility, and 

contr01.‘18” 

Full plans for the new “pentomic” division-a term General Maxwell D. Taylor 

later describedas a “Madison Avenue adjective” used to add glamor to ground combat 

in the era of massive retaliationp6-were 

publicly unveiled at the annual meeting of 

the Association of the United StatesArmy in 

October 1956.General Taylor, who was then 

chief of staff of the Army, opened the 
meeting by explaining that the Army could 

not maintain two sets of forces, one for 

fightmg atomic wars and the other for 

fighting nonatomic wars. He stated that a 

“basic necessity for Army forces” was to 

possess“the built-in capability to useatomic 

and non-atomic weapons In any combination,“8i 

Lieutenant General C. D. Eddleman, the 

deputy chief of staff for military operations, 

emphasizedthat the Army must “be capable 

of participating successfuily in any type of 

war, in any area in which we may be called 

upon to engage, ranging from sustained 

operations with major forces to smaller scale 

operations in varied terrain. ” Yet he also 

stated, ‘“The most significant factor affecting the future Army is the introduction of 

atomic weapons to the battlefieEd.“88 When 

the concepts for employing the pentomic infantry division were announced, there is no 

doubt that the new division was primarily 

oriented toward the atomic battlefielddespite a clear consensus among Army 

leaders that this was the least likely type of 

war. 

* * * 

The new division consisted of five “battle 

groups” which were relatively self-contained 

and semi-independent units including many 

of the support elements previously found in 

the regimental combat team. The basic component of the division was the infantry battle 

group which was larger than the previous 

battalion but smaller than a regiment. Each 

battle group contained five rifle companies, 

a combat support company (including a 

mortar battery), and a headquarters and 

service company. The battle group was 

directly controlled by the division commander though special task forces of two or 

more battle groups could be formed under 

an assistant division commander. 

The division also included an armor battalion of five tank companies, a cavalry 

squadron of three troops, five direct support 

artillery battalions and one genera1support 

artillery battalion. Armored personnel carriers were maintained under the centralized 

-17-

control of the transportation battalion. 

All the Army’s divisions were affected by 

the pentomic reorganization. The infantry 

division was affected the most, however, 

since the numerous changes resulted in a 

reduction of about 3,000 men in each infantry division. The reduction came primarily at 

the expense of command and controi and 

combat service support since one of the 

guiding principles of the division restructuring had been to increase the relative “foxhole strength” of the division. The personnel 

eliminated from the old division were supposed to be absorbed by a larger support 

base outside the new division. 

The armored divisions were only slightly 

affected by the pentomic reorganization, for 

they retained the earlier combat command 

organization and were reduced only a few 

hundred men. The primary changes in the 

armored division included the addition of an 

atomic capability, more nonatomic firepower and a stronger aviation detachment. 

Greater emphasis was placed on strategic 

mobility, With the exception of the tanks, a 

division”s equipment was supposed to be 

transportable by long-range aircraft. Such 

mobility was essential given the emerging 

concept of rapid employment of ground 

forces throughout the world in “limited” 

engagements. In many ways, the emphasis 

on strategic mobility made the late 19.50sthe 

golden age of the airborne units which were 

also organized under the pentomic concept. 

According to the Army’s new concept, the 

combat zone in an atomic war would be vastly larger in width and depth than those of 

previous wars. Army leaders concluded that 

many more ground troops would be required 

on the extended nuclear battlefield than on 

the comparatively smaller conventiona battlefield. 

Army leaders also believed that Iarge 

massed troop concentrations could not remain in an area for an extended time without 

becoming an extremely lucrative target for 

the enemy. Combat units must be dispersed 

and must be organized in “checkerboard” 

fashion with considerable gaps between 

units. Each pentomic battle group was 
designedto operate and sustain itself on this 

“cellular” battlefield, and each was capable 

of all-around defense. An atomic strike 

might damage a battle position or cause 

some disruption, but it would not result in a 

complete “fracturing” of the entire position. 

As for tactical mobility, units were to be 

rapidly shifted from one position to another 

within a battlefield. Indeed, small, highly 

mobile tactical units were one of the most 

important elementsin the pentomic concept. 

The division’s tactical mobility ranged from 

foot mobility to the use of trucks, armored 

personnel carriers and aircraft. Army units 

were designed to converge rapidly from 

dispersedformations in order to make an attack, exploit the effects of atomic weapons 

or to destroy enemy forces. Then, they were 

to disperse rapidly to ,minimize their 

vulnerability to enemy counteraction. 

Being able to concentrate or disperse 

quickiy was the key to successand survival 

on the atomic battlefieid. In the offense, 

atomic weapons could destroy major enemy 

concentrations while highly mobile infantry 

and armor forces could rapidly exp!oit deep 

into the enemy’s position. In the defense, 

some penetration between the dispersed 

defensive positions by the enemy was 

unavoidable. However, once his attack was 

disrupted by the seriesof battle positions, he 

would be vulnerable to the defender’s atomic 

weapons or to counterattacks on his flanks 

or rear. General C. D. Eddleman explained, 

“Flexibility and rolling with the punch, 

rather than rigidity, will be the keynote of 

the defense.f’Bg Flexibility was also the 

keynote of the offense. 

* * * 

Ripples from the sudden impact of these 

new ideas were quickly felt throughout the 

Army as existing methods came into question or were changed. The intellectual adjustment required by the officer corps is suggestedby the sweepingchangesthat occurred 

at the CGSC. Prior to academic year 

1957-58,almost all of the college instruction 

portrayed general war in Europe, often in a 

-18-

World War II-type environment. In 1957-58, 

however, the college instruction included the 

study of tactical problems in settings 

throughout the world. Similarly, prior instruction had seen the conventional battlefield as the standard battle and the atomic 

battlefield as the exception. In 1957-58,the 

concept was reversed, and the atomic battlefield became the standard while the conventional became the exception.90 

These changes forced a complete reversal 

of many established practices. The Army 

probably has never experienced a more 

radical change during peacetime in its 

thought, doctrine and organizations. 

Yet the changes were not accomplished 

easily, and many were not successful. The 

concept for the employment of the pentomic 

division was based on a wide variety of new 

equipment, much of which did not appear 

until the late 11950s.The new equipment included communications, radar or sensing 

devices, and aircraft which were not initially 

available but which were essential for the 

maneuver and control of the new division. 

Mobility problems were especially acute. 

Great difficulty was encountered in making 

all the division’s equipment air transportable. Similarly, the Department of Defense 

agreement of 1957 between the Army and 

Air Force giving the Army authority to expand its numbers and employment of aircraft also included the stipulation that as the 

Army increased its airlift capability “compensatory reductions” would be made in 

“other forms of Army transportation.“g’ 

Firepower problems also were evident 

sincethe delayed delivery of some of the new 

conventional weapons caused the new division to lack the destructive capability and 

staying power required against an enemy 

armed with modern weapons. In short, the 

difficulties encountered in making the transition from a linear to a porous battlefield 

were far more complex than was usually admitted, and the new units and doctrine could 

only have been employed on a conventional 

battlefield with difficulty. 

The entire pentomic concept was further 

jeopardized by reductions in the Army’s size 
as the Eisenhower administration placed an 

even greater emphasis on strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in the late 1950s.Even 

though the Army’s leaders believed an 

atomic battlefield required more men and 

equipment becauseof its greater dimensions, 

the Army was reduced from 1,025,778 to 

861,964soldiers between 1956and 1959, 

While greater emphasis was placed on the 

useof the Reserves,the National Guard and 

allied forces, many of the personnel reductions- came from Active ground combat 

units. The pentomic infantry divisions were 

3,000 men smaller than previous divisions, 

and the number of divisions was reduced to 

15.9’ The Army did not believe that increased firepower could replace some of its 

active manpower. However, dependenceon 

the atomic weapon and reduced budgetary 

resourcescombined to result in a smaller Army whase doctrine was primarily oriented 

toward the nuclear battlefield. 

In the final analysis, the pentomic concept 

and the Army’s infatuation with the atomic 

battIefield may have been ideas that appeared before their proper time, but they 

were also ideas that were incompletely applied. The Army undoubtedly overreacted, 

as well as being shoved too far; without actually having the weapons and equipment 

that were essential for the proper application 

of the new doctrine. 

The resulting unpreparednessof the Army 

illustrates the dangers of a strategic concept 

dictating tactical doctrine without consideration of the technical and intellectual 

capability to follow the doctrine. Similarly, 

the Army’s subsequent problems with the 

pentomic concept illustrate the dangers of 

making too rapid changes in doctrine and 

organizations without possessing the requisite weapons and equipment. Enshort, the 

technology lagged behind the doctrine, and 

strategic concepts raced ahead of tactical 

realities. 

Y. THEROADCONCEPT 

Y 1959,the Army was well aware of the 

-19-

shortcomings of the pentom.ic organization. 

When the pentomic concept was approved in 

1956,the Army decided that its retention or 

modification would be subject to evaluation 

within five years, but numerous studies had 

been conducted throughout the late 1950s. 

Neither the studies nor the pentomic 

organization provided answers to the complex problems facing the .4rmy. 

In January 1959, the commanding general 

of the US Continental Army Command 

(USCONARC), General Rruce C. Clarke, 

ordered preparation of a study entitled the 

“Modern Mobile Army 1965-1970 

(MOMAR I)-” An initial draft of that study 

was completed in July 1959,and a final draft 

was published in February 1960. The objective of the study was to develop the operational and organizational concepts for the 

Army in the field during the time frame 

1965-70.p3 

The basic premise of MOMAR I was that 

the Army had to be capable of conducting 

combat operations throughout the world in 

either a nuclear or nonnuclear environment 

and against a variety of enemy forces. Consequently, units had to be capable of independent or semi-independent operations 

under a variety of conditions. The conventional firepower of the units had ,to be 

upgraded over that of the pentomic division, 

and tactical mobility and maneuverability 

had to be enhanced by armor-protected 

vehicles and aircraft. 

There were only two divisions under the 

initial MOMAR concept-a heavy and a 

medium division. While the heavy division 

was strong in armored tanks, artillery and 

personnel carriers, the medium division was 

equipped for “sustained mobile combat,” 

but with fewer heavy vehicles. The emphasis 

on mechanization undoubtedly reflected 

General Clarke’s own preferences. The imprint of General Clarke was apparent 

throughout the MOMAR concept, from the 

seven-maninfantry squads, to the revitalized 

combat commands, to the heavy emphasis 

on mechanized forces. As USCONARC 

commander, this renowned armor officer’s 

tactical and organizational concepts could 
not be ignored. 

Some of the precepts for the pentomic 

organization were retained under MOMAR 

I, but more flexible features were also added. For example, the future MOMAR division would consist of five combat commands 

which were self-sustained combined arms 

forces similar to the Worid War 11combat 

commands., Five, rather than three, intermediate control headquarters were now 

possible becauseimproved communications 

and command and control enabled commanders to have a greater span of control 

than was possible during the World War II 

and Korean era. The increased span of control had been tried with the pentomic 

reorganization and was retained under the 

MOMAR I concept. The new combat commands could be tailored by attachment or 

detachment of subordinate units. Since the 

combat commands were interchangeable, 

the composition of a division could be 

altered by the exchanging of heavy or 

medium combat commands. 

The MOMAR I field army directly controlled the division, for the corps was 

eliminated under the MOMAR concept. The 

field army would also have air-transportable 

combat brigades for rapid reaction on either 

the strategic or tactical leve1.9” 

In April 1960, the CGSC was designated 

the coordinating agency for the continued 

development of the MOMAR concept.g5The 

college was to “fill in, expand and refine” 

the MOMAR I concept before it was approved by the Department of the Army 

(DA). When the new study was completed by 

the CGSC, it strongly emphasized that the 

Army had to be capable of operations in a 

wide variety of tactical circumstances ranging from a limited war without nuclear 

weapons to a general war with nuclear 

weapons. 

Since a standard division organization 

could not function in all the widely varying 

possibilities of operational environment and 

terrain, the Leavenworth study group suggested the creation of divisions which could 

be tailored or custom-made to fit various 

operational needs.Whether the needwas for 

-2oinfantry, armor or airborne units, a 

“building block approach” could be usedto 

organize a division to operate in any terrain 

or against any enemy. 

The building block approach was certainly 

a forerunner of later concepts? but it was 

also a logical descendant of the World War 

II combat command and the MOMAR concept, as well as other concepts developed 

after the Korean War.96 The concept of external and internal tailoring had become 

widely accepted in the Army before 

MOMAR I appeared. Perhaps more importantly, the building block approach strongly 

supported the theory of a spectrum of coriflict, with variations in enemy, terrain and 

mission adding a third dimension pertaining 

to different types of organizations and tactics. Yet the initial Leavenworth study suggestedonly two major types of battalions-a 

battalion designedprimarily for dismounted 

combat and another designed for mounted 

combat. 

Meanwhile, DA was not receptive to some 

of the ideasincluded by MOMAR 1. In a letter dated 16 December 1960, General C. D. 

Eddleman, the vice chief of staff, wrote to 

the commanding general of USCONARC 

and srated: “While MOMAR is useful as a 

reference, it does not provide the simplicity, 

homogeneity, versatility, and flexibility required by the Army for its diverse, 

worldwide tasks in the coming decade.“g7 

Although Army thinking had not yet been 

redirected by the threat of guerrilla warfare 

or combat against irregular forces, it was 

clear that the heavily mechanized forces of 

MOMAR I were unsuited for many areasof 

the world. 

General Eddleman then provided 

guidelines for a new study. These included 

having divisions capable of effective operations in both nuclear and nonnuclear war, 

analyzing the retention of the battle group 

versus a return to the battalion, considering 

the use of a combat command or similar 

organization, and concentrating on infantry,, 

mechanized and armored divisions. While 

the initial MOMAR I concept did not meet 

the needs established by DA, some of the 
considerations in the ongoing Leavenworth 

study did. Much of the theoretical work suggested in the vice chief of staff’s December 

1960 letter had already been accomplished 

by the Leavenworth study group and by the 

combat development groups at the various 

service schools. 

In the next phase, USCONARC produced 

a study entitled “Reorganization Objectives 

Army Division (ROAD) 1965,” .which was 

based upon the earlier studies done at Fort 

Leavenworth and the various service 

schools. The ROAD 1965 study was 

presented to DA in March 1961and quickly 

approved by the chief of staff, General 

George H. Decker. Following approval by 

the secretariesof the army and defense, the 

president pubhcly announced in May 196I 

his approval of the reorganization of the 

Army’s divisions which would commence in 

early 1962. 

As Robert S. McNamara later explained, 

the Kennedy administration had wanted to 

‘(separate the problem of strategic nuclear 

warfare from all other kinds of war.” This 

goal was based upon a belief that strategic 

nuclear forces could not constitute a ‘“credible deterrent to the broad range of aggression” and that tactical nuclear weapons 

could not be substituted for conventional 

forces in the most likely types of conflict envisaged for the 1960~.~~ 

This position had been supported by the 

Army since the early 1950~~but it took 

changing world events and the entrance of a 

new presidential administration to bring it 

finally to the forefront of national security 

policy. Fortunately for the Army, a seriesof 

excellent staff studies provided the conceptual basis for the resurrection of a powerful 

conventional force capability and for the 

shift of emphasis from nuclear to nonnuclear warfare, 

* * * 

The thrust of the new changes was suggested during a presentation by Major 

General Harold K. Johnson in May 1961at 

the CGSC. He explained, “The basic 

fighting structure to which we are returning 

-Zlis one with which most of us have a 

reasonable degree of famUiarity.“99 The 

Reorganization Objectives Army Division, 

commonly known as the ROAD division, 

represented a logical extension of the armored division and its combat commands 

which had evolved from World War II 

through the post-Korean War years. The 

ROAD concept was initially applied to infantry, mechanizedand armor divisions, but 

the airborne division was soon added. The 

ROAD mechanized division was the first 

such organization in American military 

history though the number of armored personnel carriers had increased significantly in 

the late 1950s. 

The basic feature of the new ROAD division was a common division baseto which a 

varying number of basic combat maneuver 

battalions could be attached. While the exact 

makeup of the division depended upon the 

types of maneuver battalions added in a 

building bEock fashion, an infantry division 

usually consisted of eight infantry and two 

tank battalions. A mechanized division normally had seven mechanized infantry and 

three tank battalions, and an armor division 

had six tank and five mechanized infantry 

battalions, Combined arms task forces could 

be formed by the cross-attachment of tank 

and infantry companies. 

The new division also included three 

brigade (rather than the infantry “regiment” 

8r armor “combat command”} headquarters which primarily had a tactical function and which could control from two to 

five tactical battalions. The division also had 

three lO5mm howitzer battalions and two 

155mm howitzer battalions. Both of the 

155mm battalions had one battery of g-inch 

howitzers which provided the division a 

nuclear capability. When development of the 

Davy Crockett weapon system was completed, it was placed with the maneuver battalions and thus augmented the already existing nuclear capability. 

Another important changewas an increase 

in aviation assets; the ROAD divisions had 

approximately double the aviation assetsof 

the pentomic divisions. Finally, the division 
-- 

included a support command and a support 

command commander, somewhat similar to 

the already existing division artihery commander. For the first time, the division had a 

logistics commander. 

Perhaps the major advantage of the new 

division was the capability to tailor a unit for 

an operation. With the ability to vary the 

organization of a division, brigade or battalion, the Army had created the most flexible organizational structure it had ever had. 

The new division organization was not 

without its critics who claimed that it 

weakened Army traditions and implicitly 

belittled the need for matual confidence between units from previous associations. 

Despite these criticisms, the new organization provided a simple but versatile answer 

to the problem of the wide variety of terrain 

and missions the Army might face. 

Many of those who criticized the ROAD 

concept were quick to note their even greater 

dislike of the pentomic concept. For example, General Garrison H. Davidson said, 

“Ground commanders everywhere breathed 

a sigh of relief when they were no longer 

faced with the grim possibility of having to 

employ it [the pentomic division] in 

combat.“‘00 In spite of the criticisms, most 

observers agreed that the Army was returning to an organizational structure that had 

already stood the test of combat. 

* * * 

Under the ROAD concept, Army forces 

were designed to operate in either a nuclear 

or nonnuclear environment. While ground 

units had theoretically been organized to do 

the same thing under the pentomic concept, 

the previous doctrine had placed greater emphasis on the nuclear battlefield and units 

were designedto transition from the nuclear 

to the nonnuclear environment. This 

capability responded to what was then 

perceived as the greatest threat. 

In contrast, ROAD units placed the 

greatest emphasis on the nonnuclear battlefield and were designedto transition from 

the nonnuclear to the nuclear environment. 

Although problems had been encountered in 

-22-

the pentomic division’s capability to wage 

nonnuclear warfare, similar difficulties were 

not anticipated with the ROAD’s capability 

to wage nuclear warfare. The greater adaptability and flexibility of the ROAD division 

promised an increasedcapability to make the 

difficult transition. 

The change was not made without some 

doubts. The commander of the 8th Infantry 

Division, for example, on the eve of its transition to a ROAD mechanized division, 

stated, “Although the armored personnel 

carriers offer significant protection against 

atomic weapons, commanders should 

recognize that their units will be easier to 

locate, and therefore, attract heavy atomic 

and non-atomic fire.“lO’ 

Much of the tactical doctrine for the 

ROAD division was similar to that existing 

before the pentomic revolution, and perhaps 

the most remarkable feature of the new doctrine was the return to the methods of the 

past. The methods for conducting offensive 

operations were not significantly different 

from those envisioned in the 1954Field Service Regulations. 

One change, however, resulted from, a 

greater emphasis on vertical envelopments, 

especially by helicopters, even though 

significant advances for employing the 

helicopter had already beenmade in the pentomic era. Changesalso occurred in the conduct of the defense, for the fundamental 

types of defense became the mobile and the 

area defenses. Although the mobile defense 

was normally conducted by division and 

larger units, ROAD doctrine also envisioned 

it being conducted by the brigade, including 

the infantry brigade.‘O’ 

The terminology change from the “posil 

tion” to the “area” defense signaled the 

need for a defense in depth, as well as emphasizing that key terrain did not necessarily 

have to be occupied since enemy nuclear 

weapons might easily eliminate defenses on 

such obvious positions. In the area defense, 

nonetheless, there was a subtle increase in 

the emphasis placed on destroying or ejecting the enemy from the defender’s position. 

The great fluidity of the pentomic defense 

I_--_ 
was replaced by more rigid methods reminiscent of, but somewhat more flexible than, 

those in the 1954Field Service Regulations. 

There were other changesin terminology. 

The area where the main defensive effort 

would take place was called the “main battle 

area” before the Korean War, the “forward 

defensive area” after that war, the “battle 

area” in the pentomic concept and once 

again the “forward defensive area’* under 

the ROAD concept. The “reconnaissance 

and security line, ‘I a term which had endured from the late 1940sthrough the 195Os, 

now became the “general outpost” and 

“combat outpost” lines. The term “main 

line of resistance” completely disappeared, 

and the term “forward edge of the battle 

area,” or FEBA, was retained from the pentomic concept. For the offense, the major 

terminology changewas to replacethe earlier 

‘%econdary attack” with the new “supporting attack.” While the changes may seem 

minor, each was designed to emphasize the 

greater dispersion and mobility of the 

ROAD units. 

One of the major changes under the 

ROAD concept was the creation of 

mechanized infantry units of division, 

brigade and battalion size. Under this concept, mechanized units mounted their 

fighting elementsand supporting weapons in 

fully tracked, lightly armored vehicles (the 

MI13 armored personnel carrier). The 

vehicles provided a high degree of crosscountry mobility, protection from small 

arms and fragmentation, and substantial 

protection from the effects of nuclear 

weapons. 

Mechanization permitted the rapid massing or dispersal of units, as well as enabling 

them to maneuver under enemy fire and to 

exploit the effects of supporting fires. 

Becausethe typical mechanized division had 

three tank battalions, it possesseda significant offensive as well as antitank capability, 

and the mechanized elements were better 

able to “complement and enhance” the 

capabilities of tank elements. 

However, the mechanized division was 

distinctly different from the armor division. 

-23-

The mechanized division placed the greatest 

emphasis on the infantry while the armored 

division placed the greatest emphasis on the 

tank. This was clearly evident in FM 7-20, 

lafanrry, Airborne Infantry, and kfechanized Infbntry Battakms, which stated: 

“[Almechanized infantry battalion in an armored division is normally employed to support the advance of tank elements. In the infantry and mechanized divisions, the reverse 

is true-armored elementsare usedprimarily 

to support the advance of infantry 

elements.“‘03 While this might vary within 

normal operations since brigades could be 

tailored to be infantry or armor-heavy, the 

title “infantry” or “armor” usually suggestedthe focus of the operations. 

Although all the combat arms were affected by the adoption of the ROAD concept, the doctrine for the employment of 

tank forces was the feast affected by these 

changes. The artillery was only slightly affected since it had already made important 

steps toward increased mechanization. The 

infantry was the combat arms branch most 

affected by the new ROAD concepts which 

included increases in mobility and 

mechanization of the infantry. The formation of mechanized infantry units forced the 

infantry to adopt many of the practices and 

thinking of the armor and irrevocably linked 

a significant portion of its resourcesand intellectual energiesto the mechanized battle. 

Tactical doctrine, nevertheless,stressedcontinuity rather than change. 

When FM 7-20, the manual on the different types of infantry battalions, discussed 

the characteristics and capabilities of the 

various battalions, its major point was that 

the mechanized infantry battalion had a 

“‘sustained capability for rapid movement” 

while the airborne infantry battaiions had 

the “capability to conduct frequent airborne 

assaults.t’Lc4 Once dismounted, infantry 

techniques theoretically remained similar to 

those of the past two decades. To accomplish its mission, the infantry was still 

required to dismount from its vehicles which 

primarily were viewed as a means of allowing the soldier to enter combat faster and 
better prepared to fight. Litrle or no emphasis was placed on the infantry fighting 

from its armored vehicles. A 1965manual on 

the mechanized infantry battalion, for example, noted that Ihe infantry should not remain mounted too long because of the 

danger of “group destruction by short-range u,eapons.“““’ 

The increases in mobility and firepower 

supposedly did nat changethe basic function 

of the infantryman; they onIy improved his 

ability to accomplish that function. Yet importanb doctrinal questions appeared that 

were not directly associated with tradilional 

infantry doctrine. The debate over the 

proper dismounF point far mechanized infantry units in a tank-infantry attack illustrates the increasing complexity of accomplishing infantry Functii3nsin the traditional fashion. Changesin mobility made the 

responsibilities of the infantry commander 

much broader and much more complex, forcing him TVconsider his ‘“traditional” problems in an entirely different manner. The 

entire realm of mechanized warfare, with ali 

its complexities, was now added to an 

already long list of infantry oacrical skills 

which would become even more complex 

when airmobile operations captured the attention of the Army. 

* * * 

Prescribed frontages or densities for 

ROAD units differed greatly from those of 

the past. The changescan be seenmost clearly in the conduct of the defense. During and 

immediately after World War II, the standard infantry division of approximately 

13,207 men was expected to defend a from 

of about 7,OOOmeters, and a defensealong a 

broad front was defined as a distance of 

about 15,000 meters.‘O”In the Korean War, 

an infantry division consisted of abouF 

17,629men and usually defended a front of 

about 21,000 meters. While this front was 

considered extremely broad, there were not 

enough ground units to reduce it significantty. Fortunately, the difficult Korean terrain 

strengthened the defenses of the thinly 

stretched troop line. With the pentomic divi-

-24-

sion of about 12,191 men, the “normal” 

front was about 24,000 meters. This was 

considered acceptable because of the need 

for greater dispersion and depth on the 

atomic battlefield. 

When the ROAD mechanized infantry 

division was created, it usually had about 

13,512 men and was expected to defend 

along a front of aboui 20,000 meters. Interestingly enough, two ROAD mechanized 

infantry battalions were expectedto defend a 

front almost equal to that of the World War 

II division, and the “normal” frqnt of a 

ROAD division was about 5,000 meters 

greater than that of a World War II division 

defending along a broad front.‘0’ Thus, the 

grealer dispersion appearing in the Korean 

War was continued through the 1950sand 

early 1960s. 

The reasons for Fhegreater dispersion are 

complex, but several can be identified. 

Following the Korean War experience with 

defenses on broad fronts, the US Army 

focused on the defense of Europe, and 

ground commanders became accustomed to 

thinking of broader fronts because of the 

shortage of NATO forces. The tendency to 

accept larger frontages was reinforced by armor commanders who tended to think in 

terms of a more mobile and extended battlefield. 

Increases in mobility and mechanization 

of the infantry also supported the extension 

of fronts. With the increased use of the 

helicoprer and armored personae1 carrier, 

the infantryman was no longer bound by the 

distance he could walk in a single day. 

Similarly, with improved weapons, in terms 

of range and effect, the area concrolied by an 

infantry unit was greatly expanded. 

Finally, under the ROAD concept, ;he 

main tenet of defending against nuclear attack remained dispersion, and manuals often 

used the term “fluid” to characterize the 

nuclear battlefield. The greater mobility of 

ROAD units supposedly increased their 

ability to mass and also to disperse rapidly. 

The combination of all of thesefactors led to 

a significant expansion in the distance’that 

was accepted as the “normal” front.’ 
Subtle but important changealso occurred 

in the American perception of the purposes 

of the defense. Whereas previous doctrine 

had focused on the retention of terrain, the 

ROAD concept placed greater emphasis on 

the destruction of enemy forces. The 1949 

Field Service Regulations, for example, 

stated, “Defensive doctrine contemplates 

the selection and organization of a battie 

position which is to be held at all ~osts.“‘~” 

The 1962Field Service Regulations included 

five purposes of the defense, three of which 

were traditional in the sense of using the 

defense to prepare for offensive action. Yet 

the list of purposesalso included to “destroy 

or trap a hostile force” and to “reduce the 

enemy capability for offensive action.“lns 

While these two purposes were by no means 

new to military history, they did reflect the 

increasing focus of the 1950son the destruction of enemy forces. 

The Plmerican doctrine of the offense was 

also affected. The offense was no longer 

considered the primary means of destroying 

the effectiveness of the enemy forces. 

Ironically, the doctrinal changesinherent 

in the ROAD concept did not result in a 

greater emphasis on the offense even though 

ROAD units possesseda greater capability 

for offensive action than did pentomic units. 

While many tactical methods remained very 

similar to those of World War II, the 

postwar emphasis on the offense had 

dissipated. 

Important alterations had also occurred in 

the Army’s perceptions of concentration and 

dispersion. During the decade between the 

early 1950s and early 1960s, the Army’s 

thinking had changed as a result of its experiencesduring the Korean War, the greater 

emphasison the defensein Western Europe, 

the long-term focus on attrition rather than 

maneuver and the habitual tendency to 

assumethat tactical nuclear weapons would 

be available to employ against massed, attacking enemy forces. While these changes 

were based upon technological advances, 

they were also the result of increasing confidence in the power of the defense. 

-25-

VI. COUNTERlNSURGENCY 

I-IRQUGHOUT the i%Os, a basic 

theme of Army policy was the need to be 

prepared to operate anywhere along the 

spectrum of conflict-from a show of force 

to general nuclear war. Although “limited”’ 

war (meaning less than total) was discussed 

in detail, especially in the late 1950s, 

counterinsurgency doctrine suffered from 

neglect and misunderstanding throughout 

mast of that decade. 

Following the North Korean employment 

of guerrillas in the Korean War, a momentary blossoming of interest in unconventional warfare had occurred which resulted 

in the creation of the 10th Special Forces 

Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, In 

June 1952. The Special Forces, however, 

concentrated on unconventional warfare 

behind enemy lines, and Army doctrine 

linked guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare objectives.l I0 As for defense against 

guerriila forces, the model provided by the 

defense against North Korean guerrillas 

prevailed. Little or no attention was paid to 

the problem of combating guerrilla forces in 

an insurgency. 

As the Army became more and more concerned with nuclear warfare in the late 

195Os,its interest In counterinsurgency and 

unconventional warfare waned. By the 

beginning of the 196Os,the US Army was 

not prepared in doctrine or equipment for 

conducting counterinsurgency operations. 

One of the first official studies in the early 

1960s on counterinsurgency concluded, 

“The tacticai doctrine for the employment 

af regular forces against insurgent guerrilla 

forces has not been adequately developed, 

and the Army does not have a clear concept 

of the proper scale and type of equipment 

necessaryfor these operations.“‘“’ 

Although a slow revival of interest in 

counterinsurgency had begun somewhat 

earlier amid changing perceptions of the 

threat and emerging convictions that nuclear 

parity between the superpowers made other 
forms of warfare more likely, the interest in 

counterinsurgency increased tremendously 

after President John I?. Kennedy’s election. 

Interest further increased when Nikita 

Khrushchev proclaimed in January 1961that 

the Communists should avoid world and 

limited wars but that “wars of liberation” 

were necessary and inevitable. The 1962 

Field Service Regulations reflected the increasing importznce of insurgency, for it included a chapter on military operations 

against irregular forces.lL2 

Perhaps the most difficult obstacle facing 

the Army as it attempted to prepare for 

counterinsurgency operations was the mental redirection and re-education required of 

its officers and soldiers, most of whom had 

only been exposed to nuclear or conventional tactical doctrine. In undertaking the 

effort to change thinking, a variety of short 

courses was conducted on a crash basis 

throughout the Army school system, The 

president directed that ‘“guerrilla warfare 

libraries” be established for the use of officers and soldiers. Attempts to redirect 

thinking, however, were hampered by the 

absence of any clear doctrine. The Army 

paid for its lack of interest in counterinsurgency in the 1950swith the diffuse and 

often hastily constructed crash programs of 

the early 1960s. ’ 

The lack of preparation by the Army can 

be seenin the confusion which existed over 

terms. A variety of publications attempted 

to explain the difference between unconventional guerrilla, counterguerrilla, counterinsurgency 2nd special warfare, as well as 

between indigenous, irregular, partisan and 

guerrilla forces. Ii3 The confusion over terms 

was exceededonly by the confusion over the 

proper methods to employ in the various 

types of warfare. The conceptual problem 

was made even more complex by the 

simultaneous adoption of the ROAD 

organization and the wholehearted movement into counterinsurgency. It was compounded by the need to search simultaneously for the best weapons and organizations * 

Wnfortunately, the crash nature of the 

-26-

new entry into counterinsurgency causedthe 

Army to focus much of its initial efforts OR 

tactical methods. The elusive ideal of identifying the goals of military action within 

counterinsurgency was thus overwheImed by 

the more immediate task of developing tactical organizations, equipment and doctrine. 

Where there should have beenclarity, confusion reigned. 

If there was any hesitation by the Army 

about the importance of counterinsurgency, 

it was soon overcome by President 

Kennedy’s personal interest in guerrilla warfare. The president became particularly interested in the Special Forces which he considered to have immense potential as a 

counterinsurgency force. Ironically, the sudden interest in counterinsurgency completely 

reversed the main function of the Special 

Forces. They reverted from fomenters of 

rebeilion to combatants against rebellion. 

Yet their techniques did not drastically 

change, for they continued to concentrate on 

the organization and employment of indigenous forces. 

Considering the enormous scope of the 

problem, the Army responded rapidly, 2nd 

numerous doctrinal publications soon appeared. The dominant theme of some of the 

initial publications on special warfare was 

the need for offensive operations. FM 31-15, 

Operations Against Irregular Forces, for example, stated, “A defensive attitude. . .permits the guerrilla to concentrate superior 

forces, inflict severe casualties, and lower 

morale.“‘*4 A handbook on the suppression 

of guerrilla operations, published by the 

Special Warfare Division, also stressed 

maintaining the initiative through prompt 

offensive action. *1s 

The tactics usually consisted of small-unit 

operations, and meeting engagements, attacks, ambushes, raids and pursuits were 

often described. Very different tactics, such 

as provoking the guerrilla to attack or conducting searches, were also mentioned. Yet 

most tactics for counterinsurgency remained 

extensions of, or resembled, small-unit tattics for a conventional battlefield. 

If there were benefits from the war in 
Southeast Asia in the early 19605,it was the 

ability of the Army to learn from ongoing 

combat operations. Following the official request from South Vietnam in 1961 for. immediate help, President Kennedy increased 

the number and expanded the role of 

American advisers. The Army subsequently 

extracted ideas from combat operations, 

gained practical experience with advisers to 

the South Vietnamese and tested new equipment in a combat environment. The experienceand knowledge gained by the Army 

were invaluable, and, without them, the 

transition from conventional warfare to 

counterinsurgency would have been immensely more difficult. 

* * * 

By the early 196Os,the Army recognized 

the potential of the helicopter in counterinsurgency operations since its mobility promised immediate response to the swift guerrilla. Yet the Army’s development of the 

helicopter during the 19505 had not taken 

place within the framework of guerrilla warfare. The Korean War had,demonstrated the 

potential of the helicopter, but further impetus for Army aviation was provided in the 

1950sby a growing Army perception that the 

Air Force was primarily interested in 

strategic bombardment and had very little 

interest in tactical transport and close air 

support. The helicopter was thus developed 

within the framework of the Army placing 

greater emphasis on air transport and support for ground operations, and the number 

of Army aircraft continued to increaseuntil 

t-herewere about 5,500 aircraft in 1961*II6 

When Major General James M. Gavin 

published an article in April 1954 entitled 

“Cavalry, and I Don’t Mean Horses,” he 

identified himself as one of the earliest 

helicopter enthusiasts.LIT His vision of a 

“sky cavalry” unit provided much of the 

conceptual basis for doctrinal development 

of the helicopter in the 1950s. 

Some of the most important and earliest 

work was done at the US Army Aviation 

School at Fort Rucker, Alabama, under 

Brigadier General Carl 1. Hutton. After 

-27-

USCONARC instructed the Aviation School 

to develop “highly mobile task forces with 

an improved ratio of firepower to manpower 

for employment on the nuclear battlefield,‘* 

Colonel Jay D. Vanderpool directed most of 

the requisite combat development efforts. 

The doctrinal effort was extremely complex, 

and, when the first doctrinal pamphlet on 

the fledgling sky cavalry unit was written, 

Colonel Vanderpool, in his own words, 

“plagiarized the last field manual written for 

horse cavalrymen in 1936.“‘18 As further ex­

.periments and field tests were conducted, the 

potential of the helicopter becameevenmore 

apparent, and more sophisticated concepts 

emerged. 

In early 1956,Major General Hamilton I-I. 

Howze, the new director of Army aviation, 

became the leading spokesman for the 

helicopter. General Howze’s major point 

concerned the need for air movement of 

troops in the atomic era. With dispersed 

troop formations on the atomic battlefield, 

helicopters could be used to shift combat 

power rapidly. ’ I3 

In opposition to those arguing for a simple 

“thinning out of the battlefield” in the 

atomic era, Army aviators insisted that the 

soldier’s effectiveness could be increased by 

providing him greater mobility. Following 

an atomic attack, a highly mobile force 

could conduct a rapid and deepexploitation. 

The exposure time, or time in which troops 

might be subjected. to atomic attack, was 

described as a “direct function” of the 

soldier’s speed; thus, greater mobility 

reduced.his vulnerability. Since heavy combat equipment could not be transported 

easily, a substantial portion of the fire support for such units had to come from Army 

aviation or the Air Force-if not from 

missiles with atomic warheads. Therefore, 

the greater dispersion of the atomic battlefield seemingly provided an ideal operating 

environment for the helicopter and 

helicopter-borne forces. 

As for nonatomic wars, aviators considered mobility the key to the Army’s 

operations. Given the dispersal and mobility 

of partisans and irregulars, no major change 
in Army doctrine, equipment or organizations was foreseen if the Army had to fight a 

nonatomic or limited war. A 1957 study at 

the Aviation School concluded: “The required forces, then, for the small war appear 

to be much the sameas those for the atomic 

war against the Soviet Union.“‘*lJ 

Helicopter enthusiasts followed the 

French employment of helicopters in North 

Africa in the mid-1950s with interest. 

However, given the great emphasisin the US 

defense establishment on atomic warfare 

and the rather tenuous position of the Army 

helicopter, aviation enthusiasts continued to 

place the greatest emphasis on possible 

employment of aircraft on the atomic battlefield and made no clear-cut distinction 

between atomic and nonatomic methods. 

The controversial nature of Army aviation 

was later made clear by Lieutenant General 

John J. T&on when he described the clash 

between the Army and Air Force over the 

Caribou and Mohawk airplanes. He explained, “More time was devoted to thesesystems 

than to the entire airmobility concept 

itself.““*” 

An opportunity for improvement appeared in early 1960, when the chief of staff 

established the Army Aircraft Requirements 

Review Board, headed by Lieutenant 

General Gordon B. Rogers. Following a 

detailed analysis of Army requirements, the 

Rogers Board made a number of recommendations which concentrated on improving 

the technical design and capability of Army 

helicopters. It also recommended a formal 

study to determine “whether the concept of 

air fighting units was practical.““*2 The 

recommendations of the board were, 

nonetheless,limited and did not signal a new 

wave of helicopter development. By the end 

of 1960, the basic objective of the Army’s 

airmobile program was for “each division to 

havethe capability of moving at least a company of infantry by its organic airlift.‘““3 

Much remained to be done. 

Beginning in 1961,a number of important 

events accelerated development of the 

helicopter. In December 1961, two US 

hehcopter transportation companies arrived 

-28-

in South Vietnam and were employed successfully in their first airmobile combat action before the end of that month. 

The helicopter was also affected by the 

Kennedy administration’s greater emphasis 

on counterinsurgency. Following his initial 

proposal to cut back the Army aviation programs, Secretary of Defense Robert S. 

McNamara and his staff conducted a 

thorough study of Army aviation requirements in late 1961I Much to the Army’s 

amazement, the secretary of defense sent a 

memorandum to the secretary of the Army 

in April 1962in which he described the Army’s program as being too conservative. The 

secretary of defense believed the Army was 

not exploiting the potential of aviation and 

neededto take another look at aviation requirements for land warfare.“24 

Within a week after McNamara’s ApriI 

memorandum, Major General Hamilton H. 

Howze was appointed president of an ad hoc 

board to re-examine the roEeof Army aviation. In the following months, elaborate 

tests were conducted to analyze the 

capabilities of Army aircraft against an 

enemy force of irregulars, and the final 

report of the Howze Board was submitted on 

20 August 1962. 

The Howze Board’s most important 

recommendation concerned the formation 

of an air assault division consisting of more 

than 450 aircraft. The suggestedair assault 

division followed the example of other 

ROAD divisions; it had three brigade headquarters, to which combat battalions and 

support elements could be assigned according to the mission and terrain. The division’s 

organic aircraft could transport one-third of 

the ground assault elements at a time, The 

Howze Board also recommended formation 

of an air cavalry combat brigade whose 

functions were the traditional ones for 

cavalry-reconnaissance, security and 

economy of force actians. Unlike the air 

assault division, however, it did not have 

organic infantry units for ground combat. 

The board concluded, “Adoption by the Army of the airmobile concept . . . is necessary 

and desirable. In some respects, the transi-
tion is inevitable, just as was that from 

animal mobility to motor.“lzs 

During the next two years, the Army continued to conduct intensive studies of airmobire organization, equipment and tactics. 

In February 1963, the 11th Air Assault Division (Test) was activated at Fort Benning, 

Georgia, to test the Howze Board concepts 

in a mid-intensity environment. 

At the same time, US Army pilots in 

South Vietnam were learning how to employ 

helicopters effectively in a counterinsurgency environment. Many airmobile concepts 

were tested under combat conditions before 

they became part of American tactical doctrine. For example, the Army Concept Team 

in Vietnam tested the effectiveness of the 

armed helicopter company in late 1962 and 

early 1963 though the rules of engagement 

precluded the tests of any tactical concepts 

involving “offensive” employment. lZ6The 

long process of study and experiment 

culminated on 1 July 1965 when the 1st 

Cavalry Division (Airmobile) was activated. 

When the first US Army ground units 

entered combat in the summer of 1965, airmobile or counterguerrilta tactics had not yet 

been perfected. But the Army had made excellent progress since the special warfare 

study in January 1962 had concIuded that 

the Army’s tactical doctrine for counterguerrilla warfare had not been “‘adequately 

developed.” In contrast to the Korean War, 

American units were much better prepared 

when they entered combat in South Vietnam. Doctrinal and equipment problems 

persisted, but they were neither as acute nor 

numerous as they would have beenif US Army units had been committed in 1961. 

Between I953 and 1965, the Army had 

suffered through a number of dramatic 

changesin its tactical doctrine. Theseabrupt 

shifts in the focus of its doctrine forced the 

Army to reconsider every aspect of its tactics, organization and equipment. Considering the sweeping nature of the changes, the 

ability of the Army to respond to counterinsurgency needswas remarkable. When the 

decade of doctrinal chaos ended, the Army 

entered one of the most difficult and com-

-29-

plex wars in its history. 

VII. THEVIETNAMWAR 

LTHOUGH the United States contended that counterinsurgency operations 

should be combated through a combination 

of military operations and social reform, the 

demands of tactical operations in the Vietnam War remained the most important concern of the US Army. The focus on combat 

action was especially true from the middle of 

1966 when US forces launched their first 

prolonged offensive, through late 1968when 

“Vietnamization” of the war began in 

earnest. During the intervenmg period, 

South Vietnamese troops emphasized 

pacification duties while US units carried the 

brunt of the major fighting. Xn late 1948, 

South Vietnamese units began assuming an 

increasing responsibility for military operations. This responsibility continued to increase until the last US ground troops 

withdrew in August 1972. 

Because of strategic and political considerations, the ground strategy remained 

that of a gigantic mobile defense. The 

strategy sought to defeat the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Vietcong (VC) 

forces and to permit the people of South 

Vietnam to manage their own affairs. Tactical operations within the mobile defense 

were predominately offensive, for the essential idea was to find and destroy the enemy. 

Such operations theoretically enabled the 

government of South Vietnam to extend its 

control over the people within an area. 

Military operations were thus an inherent 

part of the pacification effort even though 

their contribution to the pacification effort 

was often not immediately apparent at the 

local or village leve1.12’ 

From the moment the US Marines first 

entered South Vietnam in March 1965, the 

war was characterized by its nonlinear and 

multidirectional nature. Following the arrival of the 173d Airborne Brigade in May 

1965, American tactical operations concentrated on defeating or destroying the enemy 
within an area rather than capturing terrain 

features or conventional objectives. Consequently, tactical methods were usually very 

different from those previously envisioned 

for a limited war, especially one similar to 

the Korean Conflict. Although tactical 

methods intended for a general war. in 

Europe were often not applicable to combat 

operations in South Vietnam, the American 

movement toward a more dispersed battlefield in the 19.50sproved to be a fortunate 

development. 

By the early 196Os,major advances had 

been made in tactical communications, and 

when this was coupled with the great mobility of the helicopter, larger unit commanders 

were able to control their subordinate units 

in a fashion heretofore impossible. The improved communications, greater flexibility 

in command and control, increased 

American mobility and the nature of the 

enemy ensured that tactical operations in 

South Vietnam often bore little resemblance 

to those of the past. 

There were some exceptions to the fighting 

in South Vietnam being very different from 

that of the past, for the shifting intensities 

and scale of combat sometimes included 

variations of conventional war. The invasion 

of Cambodia in April-June 1970, the South 

Vietnamese operation in Laos in FebruaryApril 1971and the North Vietnamese offensives in March-April 1972 and March-April 

1975 are dear examples of conventional 

operations. But the majority of the fighting 

remained nonconventional. The dilemma for 

American commanders was the continued 

threat ‘of large-scale operations in an environment where relatively small-scale 

operations were the rule. Neither extreme”of 

the possible scale of operations could be ignored. 

* $ *-

When US forces entered combat in 1965, 

the VC and NVA forces had recently 

changed their tactics from small-unit to 

larger unit operations. They were enjoying a 

considerable degree of success, and, as 

General William C. Westmoreland said, 

-3o-

“The South Vietnamese government-already exhausted by a decade of 

struggle-was thus faced with defeat.““* 

Consequently, the initial phase of fighting 

by the Americans stressed“arresting the losing trend, stifling the enemy initiative, protecting the deployment of our forces, and 

providing security to populated areas to the 

extent possible.““29 

The “fire brigade” approach extended 

throughout 1965, and, according to General 

Westmoreland, “Attacks by air and artillery 

fire constituted the bulk of our offensive 

operations in early 1966 until our ground 

strength reached appropriate and effective 

levels.” During the early phase of the war, 

ground operations were thus launched only 

against enemy forces constituting “an immediate and grave threat.“13“ By the spring 

of 1966, the possibility of an immediate 

enemyvictory had disappeared, and, according to Lieutenant General Richard G. 

Stilwell, “the initiative began to pass to the 

allies.“‘4’ 

From the Battle of the Ia Drang Valley in 

October-November 1965 through Junction 

City in February-May 1967, US Army commanders sometimes employed division or 

multidivision-sized forces to destroy larger 

VC and NVA units. ‘32Division or larger size 

units were also used after 1967such as in the 

area around Khe Sanh in early 1968 or 

following the Tet offensive in January 1968. 

Large units frequently conducted spoiling 

attacks or reconnaissances in force into 

enemy baseareas.The focus on semiconventional, large-unit operations came at the expense of the local pacification effort.lS3 

From the Army’s view, however, such a 

focus was essential given the circumstances 

of the US entry into the war. General 

Westmoreland explained, “‘We had learned 

. * ~ that we had to take the fight to the 

enemy if pacification was ever to succeed.” 

The threat of enemy main force units attacking local security forces had to be 

eliminated.‘-‘” 

Despite the number of large-unit operations in the initial phases of American involvement, tactical operations by brigades, 
battalions and companies comprised the 

bulk of the American effort throughout the 

war. Since allied units were scattered widely 

in order to control large areas and to increase chances of finding the enemy, aggressive and competent leadership for 

smaller units remained essential for all tactical operations. 

Operation by units smaller than the division (or even brigade) were the key to the 

pacification effort and the key to finding the 

enemy. In jungle operations, small-unit tactics were essential, for heavy vegetation and 

broken terrain provided ideal conceaimenc 

for the enemy. If a commander expected to 

find the enemy, he had to dispersehis subordinate units even though reinforcement 

becameextremely difficult when contact was 

made with the enemy.‘35The need for smallunit operations also applied to mechanized 

infantry, and one former battalion commander stated, “As I saw the war in Vietnam, it belonged to the company commander. He was the key to success-a planner, a doer, an independent operator, and a 

leader of men.“13& 

After the end of the US ground role in 

Vietnam, two general officers noted that 

they had initially thought the best combat 

results were obtained from larger 

engagementsrather than smaller ones. After 

smaller unit operations received greater emphasis, they discovered that the number of 

enemy casualties increasedand that the great 

majority of these losses came in small contacts.“’ Larger unit operations, however, 

were necessaryto provide a protective shield 

for’ smaller unit operations and to destroy 

large enemy concentrations. 

In the initial phases of US participation, 

the helicopter emerged as one of the most 

important innovations of the war. Its great 

mobility and carrying capacity provided the 

essential ingredient for operations in the 

diverse terrain of Southeast Asia against the 

enemy’s light infantry. As a carrier of supplies, ammunition, equipment and wounded 

personnel, its functions ranged far beyond 

that of simply being a combat vehicle. Only 

the ‘helicopter could accomplish the variety 

-31-

of tactical tasks ranging from the insertion 

of a long-range patrol to the vertical assault 

of an entire division. 

Employment of the helicopter enabled the 

free world forces to mass men and equipment in a fashion fundamentally affecting 

tactical methods. Helicopters could 

transport units to a battle area and could 

also enable them to maneuver or to reinforce, displace or withdraw combat power 

during the battle. Helicopters could also be 

used to concentrate forces quickly. The 

dominant characteristic of the development 

of infantry organizations and tactics during 

the war was the increasing application of airmobile concepts and tactics.‘38 

Before US troops entered the war, the Army had developed the operational terminology to describe the three basic types of 

operations conducted. The terms signaled 

the difference betweenthe Vietnam War and 

previous American wars. 

The first type of operation was “search 

and destroy.“L39As is obvious from its titie, 

operations of this type sought to locate the 

enemy and destroy him, and variations could 

be conducted from company to multidivisional level though the norm was probably a 

multibattalion operation. No fixed model 

existed for such operations. “Horseshoes” 

could be formed by placing units in blocking 

positions, and ground thrusts could drive into the center of the horseshoe. Or, in a 

“hammer and anvil” operation, a blocking 

position could be occupied, and an attacking 

force could move toward it. Another variation included the emplacement of ambushes 

along likely avenues of escape. When an 

ailied force moved into the area, escaping 

enemy units were ambushed as they attempted to flee. Straightforward attacks were also 

used. Ground forces often moved into 

enemy base areas, seeking contact and hoping to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy 

before he escaped. 

In April 1968,the Army dropped the term 

“search and destroy” since it was, as 

General Westmoreland noted, “equated in 

the [American] public mind with aimless 

searches in the jungle and destruction of 
property.“‘4Q Other terms, such as combat 

sweep, reconnaissancein force and spoiling 

attack, replaced the term “search and 

destroy.” But the original term was 

sometimes carelessly used in a blanket 

fashion to describealmost any kind of offensive operation. 

Although “clearing” operations resembled search-and-destroy operations, they 

usually placed a greater emphasis on 

pacification. While search-and-destroy 

operations chasedthe enemy from an areaor 

destroyed him, clearing operations kept him 

off balance and allowed the South Vietnamese government to extend its influence 

into the area. 

Reconnaissancesin force, combat sweeps 

or other offensive operations continued to 

be conducted, but the greatest emphasis in 

clearing operations was placed on 

eliminating local or main force enemy 

resistance and destroying his support base. 

L,ocal commanders and politicai authorities, 

for example, often used cordon-and-search 

operations’41 to “clear” a village or area. 

Thus, clearing operations usually lasted 

longer than search-and-destroy operations. 

The final type was the “securing” operation. Theseoperations protected pacification 

accomplishments, but concentrated on 

eliminating local guerrilla units and the 

enemy”s political infrastructure and support 

base. Although multibattalion offensive 

sweepscould be used to secure an area, the 

norm was probably saturation patrolling and 

cordan and searchesof hamlets. With effective Vietnamese police assistance, these efforts emphasized thorough interrogation 

and identification of the civilian populace. 

They also included an intense civic action 

program and such things as medical 

assistance.lJ2Such efforts demonstrated the 

commitment of the South Vietnamese 

government and the free world forces to protect the civilian population and to maintain 

control within an area. 

Theoretically, the proper sequence of 

operations was searchand destroy, clear and 

secure,with the final phasebeing dominated 

by the South Vietnamese Regional and 

-32-

Popular Forces and the pohce. While searchand-destroy operations engagedthe enemy’s 

main force and provincial battalions, the remaining smaller eEementswere rooted out 

with clearing and securing operations. 

The ideal models for types of operatjans, 

however, often resembled actual operations 

only in their purpose rather than in their 

specific techniques. Given the wide diversity 

of terrain, weather and enemy throughout 

South Vietnam, commanders who 

unimaginatively applied ideal models to Iess 

than idea1 conditions were more likely to 

meet failure than success. Innovation and 

diversity were the rule rather than the exception, and orthodox procedures were often 

revised in Vietnam’s nonconventional environment. 

From the perspectiveof most ground commanders, the primary purpose of ground 

tactical operations was to defeat enemy 

forces. Consequently, “find, fix, fight, and 

finish” the enemy became a much-repeated 

slogan during the Vietnam War. The goal of 

destroying enemy forces eventually assumed 

a greater importance than the theoretical sequence of search-and-destroy, clear and 

secureoperations. An underlying reason for 

this focus on attrition was the nature of the 

enemy. His great mobility and unpredictability frequently forced the free world 

forces to conduct search-and-destroy operations or fight major battles in areasthat had 

supposedly been freed from most enemy influence. 

* * * 

The tactics employed by American ground 

troops in South Vietnam were heavily influenced by the enemy’s organization and 

tactics. The enemy’s armed forces essentially 

consisted of three major groups-local and 

provincial VC guerrillas, main force VC 

units and members of the regular North 

Vietnamese Army. 

The local VC guerrillas usually operated 

as part-time soldiers who blended into the 

civilian population by day and becameeffecrive fighters at night. They operated in-small 

units (usually squad, platoon or company). 
The provincial Vietcong (usually organized 

into battalions) consisted of forces recruited 

from local villages. They normally operated 

in the province from which the unit’s 

members were drawn. 

Main force VC units were organized into 

battalions and regiments, but could also be 

organized into divisions for operations 

throughout South Vietnam. They were bet1eerequipped and trained than the local and 

provincial VC units and were fully capable 

of relatively large-scale and violent operations. Yet they could also break down into 

squads and platoons and could operate in 

the same fashion as the local Vietcong. 

Because of their detailed knowledge of 

local terrain, extensive combat experiencein 

guerrilla warfare and often intense dedication to their cause, the VC soldiers were formidable opponents throughout the war. One 

American officer described the Vietcong as 

“a fanatically dedicated opponent who 

would take on tanks, if necessary, armed 

only with bow and arrow.“*43 

The NVA units were better equipped than 

the VC units and usually operated as bat­

,talions, regiments or even divisions. The 

NVA units possessedgreater combat power 

than the Vietcong, as is illustrated by their 

eventual employment of heavy artillery and 

tanks, particularly in the latter phasesof the 

war. Except for the greater firepower and 

usually larger units, NVA methods of operation resembledthose of main force Vietcong. 

At times, the NVA units also conducted 

light and highly mobile guerrilla operations, 

similar to those of the local Vietcong, but 

such operations were often not as successful 

as those conducted by local forces. Because 

of his lack of familiarity with South Vietnam 

and relatively easy identification as a 

foreigner, the NVA soldier sometimes could 

not blend into the local popuiation. By 

mid-1967, large-scale offensive operations 

by free world forces had flushed the enemy’s 

larger units from many of their base camps 

and sanctuaries near large urban areas in 

South Vietnam. Thenceforth, NVA units 

often operated in border areas where they 

could elude pursuing free world units by 

-33-

fleeing across the Vietnamese border into 

relatively safe sanctuaries. 

Despite the variety of units, the enemy’s 

forces operated in an interdependent 

fashion. There was no notion of each type 

unit fighting in its own way without regard 

to the methods or mission of other units. 

Local force Vietcong, for example, provided 

important logistics support for main force 

units while continuously harassing allied 

troops. Similarly, main force units bore the 

brunt of the heaviest fighting in the larger 

operations, but, without the intelligence, 

preparation and assistance of the local 

forces, their successeswould have been extremely limited. 

The Vietcong and North Vietnamese Army used essentially infantry tactics, and 

mobility was the key to all operations, from 

the small actions of the local forces to the 

larger actions of the regular forces. The 

enemy rarely accepted battle in unfavorable 

situations and only accepteddecisivecontact 

under exceptional circumstances. His operations were usually ruled by the maxim: 

“‘When the enemy advances, withdraw; 

when he defends, harass; when he is tired, 

attack; when he withdraws, pursue. . . .“144 

If unexpected developments prevented an 

operation from being executed according to 

plan, the enemy often broke contact and 

awaited more favorable circumstances. Yet 

the Tet offensive of February 1968 

demonstrated that the enemy was more than 

willing to accept massive casualties if he 

deemed it necessary, and his tough defense 

after the offensive of Marsh-April 1972 

demonstrated that he was willing to stand 

and fight. 

The enemy’s tactics attempted to compensate for his relatively weak firepower. Since 

his light infantry units did not possessthe 

same firepower and staying power of most 

of the allied units, he sought to inflict the 

most casualties with his rifles and automatic 

weapons in the early minutes of an engagement. The VC and NVA forces often 

employed the ambush with excellent results. 

Whether in the jungle or along routes of 

movement, no patrol or column was safe. 
Various techniques of ambush were often 

used effectively. For example, the “lure and 

ambush” sometimes drew pursuing soldiers 

into carefully prepared traps. Another variation often accompanied a sharp, violent attack on an installation or unit. When a relief 

column rushed forward to assist or relieve 

the threatened position, it sometimes found 

itself to be the real prey, The Vietcong were 

especially adept at harassment. Sniper fire, 

booby-traps, mines and mortars constantly 

harassedfree world forces. ‘45 

The enemy also employed rapid strikes 

against allied weak points. An example of 

such tactics occurred on 10-11 March 1975 

when Banmethuot was captured. According 

to Genera1Van Tien Dung, the NVA chief of 

staff, his troops avoided defensive-positions 

on the auter perimeter of the city and struck 

the command and control centers of the 

South Vietnamese inside the city. After capturing the command centers, NVA troops 

moved outward to capture perimeter positions. Such tactics enabled the North VietnameseArmy to capture Banmethuot in just 

over 32 hours.ld6 

NVA and VC units also used mass 

assaults, sometimes supported by heavy supporting fires. Rapid, violent attacks against 

carefully selected objectives enabled the 

Vietcong and North Vietnameseto maximize 

the combat forces of their infantry and to inflict casualties on the defender. Such attacks 

were minutely pIarmed, meticulously prepared and frequently rehearsed, but weak 

tacticai communications often forced the 

enemy to adopt highly inflexible plans. 

Regardlessof the method used, the enemy 

normalEysought to inflict casualtiesand then 

escape.‘4i 

VC and NVA units used several other 

techniques to weaken the effects of the allied 

firepower. One of the most important of 

these was night fighting Their ability to 

operate at night under the concealment of 

darkness often served to nullify an overwhelming firepower advantage of an 

American unit. 

If the Vietcong or North Vietnamese Army were forced to defend or were to remain 

-34-

immobile for a period, they built elaborate 

networks of trenches, bunkers and tunnels 

which provided protection against the 

firepower of attacking allied units. The 

enemy also engagedallied units at very cIose 

distances, especially in jungle fighting. By 

“hugging” an opposing unit, the VC and 

NVA units could limit the allied use of artillery, air strikes and helicopter support. 

Their stress on surprise and mobility also 

enabled them to strike and escape before 

allied firepower could be concentrated 

against them. 

The individual soldiers, nevertheless, remained vulnerable, and the VC and NVA 

units often suffered casualties-even in 

favorable circumstances-far beyond those 

of their opponents. Such lossesinevitably affected the quality of the enemy forces as a 

whole, for many superbly trained and wellmotivated soldiers fell victim to superior 

allied firepower. But the enemy’s wiilingness 

to accept heavy casualties and ability to 

strike without warning forced the free world 

forces to approach every movement and action as if it were a combat operation.14g 

* * * 

Because of the enemy’s light, highIy 

mobile and unpredictable nature, finding 

him emerged as one of the most important 

but frustrating parts of any operation. A 

former brigade commander explained, “The 

brigade that cannot find the enemy has no 

successful operations.““49 Since that dictum 

applied to units of any size, allied units 

placed a special premium on intelligence. 

The methods employed included traditional 

means such as the use of informants, interrogation of prisoners and exploitation of 

captured documents. They also included 

more sophisticated methods such as “pattern activity analysis” which involved plotting patterns of enemy activity over extended 

periods of time.lSo Exotic technological 

devices, such as “people sniffers,” were 

employed, as well as ground radar, sidelooking airborne radar, active and passive 

night vision devices, a variety of sensorsand 

imagery interpretation from photographic, 
infrared and electronic equipment. But the 

purpose of each method remained very 

simple-to locate an elusive enemy. 

As for their effectiveness; Lieutenant 

General W. 0. Kinnard noted, after considering the range of equipment and 

methods for callecting combat intelligence, 

“Our ability to find the enemy did not match 

our battlefield mobility and firepower. ‘Y15i 

The intelligence effort, nevertheless, often 

succeededin determining where an enemy 

farce or base camp might be located. When 

this occurred, an operation was usually 

launched to exploit that information as 

rapidly as possible.“’ 

To enhance chancesof finding the enemy, 

a number of semiguerrilla tactics were 

employed by ground units. The “checkerboard” tactic was a method of searching an 

area by covering alternate squareswith small 

units ranging from platoon to squad size. 

The areas of ,operations were analogous to 

the squares of a checkerboard, and units 

within the squares sought to move continually (especially at night) in order to saturate 

an entire area and preclude any enemymovement. 

The “bushmaster” tactic sought to interdict known enemy communications-liaison 

routes. Since it was normally used in areas 

where the enemy was strong, units were 

usually not broken down into elements 

smaller than platoon size. Small units occupied blocking, defensive or ambush positions in prescribed areas, but all the platoons 

af a company, for example, remained close 

enough so they could reinforce one another. 

Although the bushmaster tactic was primarily a nighttime operation, it could also be 

used during the day.“’ 

Another tactic involved saturation patrolling. By inundating an area with patrols 

operating in a “cloverleaf” fashion, for example, detailed searchescould be conducted 

and enemy activity sharply curtailed. Longrange patrols were especially valuable for 

penetrations deep into enemy-controlled territory. ‘“Stay-behind” forces were also used. 

When the main body of troops departed at 

the’ end of an operation, small forces 

-3% 

sometimes concealed themselves and hid in 

the area where the operation had been conducted. When enemy forces returned, they 

were ambushed or destroyed with artillery 

fires. 

Some of the most successful techniques 

for finding the enemy involved the 

helicopter. Air assaults struck suspected 

enemy locations, and a series of successive 

assaultsoften checked a number of areasfor 

possible enemy presence. The “Jitterbug” 

was a variation of this, for it emphasizedthe 

insertion of small assault forces into a 

number of potential areas where the enemy 

might be located. The enemy’s description of 

the “Jitterbug” as “Hawk Tactics” aptly 

described its purpose of “swooping” down 

on unsuspecting targets. If4 

The helicopter also provided an easy 

method for reconnoitering large areas. 

Decoy helicopters could be used to draw 

enemy fire, and “Eagle Flights” consisting 

of approximately one heliborne infantry platoon could develop the situation.“s The 

helicopter’s mobility permitted commanders 

to extend their influence over areas vastly 

greater than they otherwise would have 

been. 

Mechanized forces also provided an additional capability to find the enemy. Movement by mechanized units often forced the 

enemy to keep moving and thus made him 

vulnerable to ambush or discovery by aerial 

or ground observers. Their great firepower 

and capability for rapid reaction enabled 

mechanized units to control about twice as 

much terrain as an infantry battalion. fJ6 

The rapid and wide-ranging sweeps of 

tanks and armored personnel carriers permitted commanders to search large areasfor 

the enemy. While such operations usually 

could IXX be conducted in mountainous terrain, tanks could be used in a “junglebusting”” role and could sometimes move 

more rapidly in such terrain than foot 

soldiers. Commanders considered the 

resulting maintenance problems and damage 

to suspension systems as small costs for the 

benefits derived.li7 Tanks. were also used for 

‘“thunder runs.” In these operations, small 
groups of tanks dashed down roads, often 

late at night, to surprise unsuspectingenemy 

troops or to preclude the enemy from mining 

important communications routes. 

Another method of finding the enemy was 

to lure him from his hidden camps. By offering the “bait”’ of supposedly vulnerable 

forces, the allied forces could deceive the 

enemy and lure him into an area where he 

could be found. For example, fire support 

bases or special forces camps were 

sometimes placed in areaswhere they invited 

attack, or convoys were dispatched when 

they appeared vulnerable.‘SS Other techniques were used, but the main idea was to 

deceivethe enemy into thinking he could inflict casualties without suffering inordinate 

losses. 

After enemy contact was established, 

mobile US units reinforced the unit in contact and encircled the enemy’s position. 

Thesewere the first stepsin what cameto be 

called “pile on” tactics. If there was any 

maneuver, it usually occurred before contact 

was made or during the “pile on” of additional troops and equipment. Lf9Every unit 

not in contact was considered to be in 

reserve.Colonel George S. Patton noted that 

after a unit made contact the commander 

had to act “by literahy throwing forces 

together from all directions in order to first 

encircle or fix, then compress, and finally, 

destroy the enemy.“160 Using the great 

mobility of heliborne or mechanized forces, 

units occupied peripheral blocking or ambush positions in order to destroy fleeing 

enemy forces. According to the size of forces 

and area involved, such encircling methods 

were sometimes tailed “‘rat hole” or 

“bull’s-eye” tactics.‘6’ 

During and following the concentration of 

US forces, attacks were usually conducted 

by fire rather than by ground assault. Under 

normal circumstances’, an infantry assault 

was avoided or it was delayed until after the 

enemy had been virtually destroyed by supporting fires. The high density of automatic 

weapons among the enemy causedhigh loss 

rates in assaulting and exposedallied troops. 

The function of ground forces (especiallythe 

-36-

infantry) thus became the “finding”’ and 

“fixing” of the enemy, but the “fighting”’ 

and “‘finishing” were most often accomplished by massive artiilery and air 

firepower I 

Such tactics minimized American 

casualties and made maximum use of the 

overwhelming US advantage in firepower. 

The standing operating procedure for most 

units became, “Save lives, not 

ammunition. “‘16*The main idea remained to 

find the enemy, to fix him with small arms or 

immediate supporting forces, to encircle him 

with other units and to destroy him by an 

overwhelming mass of artillery and air support. These “pile on” tactics representeda 

new high in the US Army’s emphasis on 

firepower and enemy attrition.lbs 

* * * 

The coordination and empIoyment of supporting fires became one of the central 

features of US Army tactics. Artillery support was especially important, for ground 

units rarely operated outside its firing range. 

Becauseground units were widely scattered, 

artiilery units aEsohad to be dispersed, and 

this resulted in single batteries occupying 

separate fire support bases. Commanders 

usually located these basesso they could be 

mutually supporting. Thus, most artillery 

support came from single batteries rather 

than battalions, and the capabihty to mass 

fires from more than one or two batteries 

often did not exist. Instead of firing a few 

rounds from many tubes-as in the Korean 

War-artillery units fired many rounds from 

a few tubes.‘6J 

The need to provide adequate fire support 

clearly affected the conduct of ground 

operations. The establishing of fire support 

bases often became the first step in major 

operations. While this sometimes revealed 

an upcoming operation to the enemy, the 

deceptive emplacement of fire support bases 

tended to keep the enemy guessing about 

allied intentions. An interesting variation 

was the artillery raid. This involved rapidly 

Enserting artillery into a new fire sdqpport 

base, firing quantities of ammunition into 
suspected enemy locations and then 

evacuating the fire support base before the 

enemy had time to prepare an attack against 

it. 

Most fire bases contained 105mm 

howitzers which were effective against personnel targets but which lacked the power to 

destroy bunkers and fortifications. Medium 

and heavy artillery functioned effectively 

against such targets, and 155mm howitzers 

often accompanied the 105mm tubes into 

newly established fire bases. The heavy artillery (g-inch and /75mm) was not moved 

very often and usually provided harassing 

and interdiction fires from base camps.‘6f 

The emphasis on operating from and 

defending these bases, however, led to what 

General Westmoreland described as a “fire 

base psychosis.“‘66 American commanders 

were reluctant to operate beyond the support 

of their artillery and to risk fighting on nearequal terms with VC or NVA units. While 

this excessive caution detracted from the 

maneuver and offensive capabilities of US 

units, it minimized American casualties. 

Armed helicopter and aerial rocket artillery also provided important support to 

ground units. Helicopters armed with 

machineguns, rockets and grenadelaunchers 

provided ‘Eightfire support which was particularjy effective against enemy troops in 

the open or without fortifications. Aerial 

rocket artillery units provided heavier fire 

support, often in areasbeyond the range of a 

unit’s direct support artillery. Such aerial 

rocket units normally operated in a general 

support role and provided immediately 

responsive fires. The highly mobile aerial 

rocket artillery units could answer calls for 

fire over extremely large areas, and along 

with armed helicopters provided especially 

important support in air assault operations. 

Their ability to furnish responsive and 

discriminating fires proved invaluable in 

many frenzied air assaults.‘G 

No mention of fire support for ground 

troops would be complete without mentioning the US Air Force. En many ways, the 

Vietnam War represented the highest point 

in liaison and cooperation between ground 

-37-

and air units. The heavy bombs and napalm 

of the Air Force were especially suited for 

employment against enemy fortifications, 

and tactical air support often proved invaluable to ground operations. 

The Air Force’s AC47 gunship, which was 

dubbed “Puff the Magic Dragon” or 

“Spooky,” provided a different type of 

ground support. When the DC3 transport 

aircraft was armed with three miniguns 

capable of firing 6,000 rounds a minute, it 

had the capability of remaining above an 

area for long periods of time and delivering 

devastatingly effective fire against exposed 

enemy troops. When B52 strategic bombers 

began striking targets of high tactical value, 

the entire spectrum of airpower was made 

available to assist the ground commands. It 

was not uncommon to have B52s drop their 

bombs on targets to “prepare” them for 

ground assault. The responsiveness,mobility 

and effect of Air Force support for ground 

operations was undoubtedly due to the 

nature of the war being fought in Southeast 

Asia. But it was also due to more than two 

decadesof effort to improve the ability of 

the Army and Air Force to work together. 

If there was any criticism elf aerial operations in support of combat. operations, it 

revolved around their inability to halt infiltration of enemy units into South Vietnam. In that sense,aerial interdiction of the 

battlefield was about as successful(or unsuccessful) asthat of the Korean War. When the 

newly developed ‘rsmart” bombs were 

employed against targets in North Vietnam, 

however, a single airplane often accomplished a mission that previously had taken 

many more aircraft, This successindicates 

that future interdictory rules against difficult 

targets might be immensely more successful 

than those of the past. 

Naval gunfire added the final dimension 

of possible sources of support for ground 

operations. During an operation, a ground 

unit may have been supported by mortars, 

artillery, armed helicopters, aerial rocket artillery, tactical aircraft, A C47 gunships, 

strategic bombers or naval gunfire. Goordinating these sources of fire support 
proved to be extremely taxing and would not 

have been possible without the numerous innovations of the previous 20 years. 

Gaining clearance to fire emerged as one 

of the most persistent problems of fire support coordination. Since the war was being 

fought in and around population centers, 

commanders would not fire without permission of local authorities. Assigning tactical 

areas of responsibility (TAOR) partially 

eliminated this problem, for a separate 

brigade or division habitually controlled a 

specific area of influence for long periods. In 

contrast to TAORs, areas of operation were 

assigned for specific operations or short 

periods. But within their TAOR, units 

became more accustomed to clearance procedures, as well as becoming more familiar 

with the terrain and enemy.‘@Although fire 

support coordination problems were reduced 

somewhat, they still remained a major concern of all commanders. The employment of 

massive firepower remained one of the most 

important features of US, Army tactical 

operations. 

Mechanized forces added significantly to 

the fighting capability of ground units. 

Although there were some initial reservations about the ability to employ mechanized 

infantry or armored forces in South Vietnam, such forces more than proved their 

worth after being committed. The principal 

features of mechanized forces which enabled 

them to contribute significantly were their 

mobility, firepower and protection. Mobile 

units could usually traverse much larger 

areas than foot soldiers, and, when contact 

was made with the enemy, mechanized units 

possessed an overwhelming amount of 

firepower. Their armor protection enabled 

them to assault heavily armed enemy units. 

Since the enemy did not possess 

sophisticated antitank weapons, the M113 

armored personnel carrier was often 

employed as if it were a tank. Similarly, the 

armored cavalry squadron and regiment 

were assigned missions previously assigned 

to tank and infantry battalions. These were 

in addition to their traditional missions of 

reconnaissance, security and economy of 

-38-

force. When mechanized units reinforced infantry maneuver units, they added a significant degree of offensive assault capability 

and mobility. Ifi The ability to support 

mechanized formations with supplies 

transported by helicopters added substantially to their operational capability. 

* * * 

In summary, firepower becamethe dominant characteristic of American operations. 

Maneuver was used primarily for locating 

and fixing the enemy. By de-emphasizingthe 

infantry assault and concentrating massive 

firepower against the enemy, American commanders minimized their losses while maximizing the strength of their forces. Such tactics, however, relied on their ability to 

counter the enemy’s mobility, and this was 

not always successful. Lieutenant General 

Bernard W. Rogers explained, “It was a 

sheer physical impossibility to keep him 

from slipping away whenever he wished if he 

were in terrain with which he was familiargenerally the case.“L’D 

The operational mobility of American 

forces was far greater than that of the enemy 

since US commanders could shift battahons, 

brigades and divisions over long distance 

with relative ease. Similarl.y, heliborne 

troops moved effortlessly throughout the 

battlefiefd as long as they remained in their 

helicopters. Yet the ground mobility of US 

units usually did not equal that of the lightly 

equipped enemy units. Heavy equipment 

and reliance on firepower hampered US tactical mobility. A former brigade commander 

stated) “‘We are too noisy, clumsy, 

awkward, and slow to catch the wary, 

elusive guerrilla.““’ The analogy of 

“elephants chasingjackrabbits” suggeststhe 

dilemma faced by US tacticians. While 

American commanders maximized their advantages with firepower, helicopters and 

mechanized forces, the enemy continued to 

emphasize surprise, mobility and intense, 

sharp clashes. 

Analyses of Army doctrine during the 

Vietnam War, nevertheless, concluded:$hat 

the tactical doctrine was ‘“generally sound”’ 
even though “‘expansion and emphasis” 

were required to take advantage of the Vietnam experience.“z Numerous combat afteraction reports emphasized techniques rather 

than major tactical changes, and each unit 

modified basic doctrinal methods to fit the 

mission, enemy and terrain in its tactical 

area of responsibility. If there was a consistent call for change, it concerned the needfor 

an additional rifle company in the infantry 

battalion. The primary thrust of most suggestions for doctrinal change was to “expand” current doctrine to incorporate the 

“lessons learned’” in Vietnam. 

A number of criticisms have been made 

against US tactics in South Vietnam. Colonel Dave R. Palmer has criticized the 

reliance on “‘fire tactics to the all but absolute exclusion of shock tactics.” He suggeststhat “shock tactics” should have been 

used more widely. “3 While his suggestion is 

appealing, it overlooks the fact that the infantry assault has become progressively difficult and costly throughout the 20th century. It also underestimates the lethality of 

the enemy’s infantry weapons and the 

strength of his defensive positions which 

often resembled World War I positions with 

their labyrinth of trenches and tunnels. 

Despite these qualifications, Colonel Palmer 

is probably correct in his implicit suggestion 

that maneuver by units in contact with the 

enemy shouEd have been used more aggressively. The use of maneuver, however, 

does not require a frontal assault. 

Lieutenant Colonel David H. Hackworth 

becameone of the most persuasivecritics of 

American tactics. He argued: “Perhaps the 

most important lesson to be drawn from the 

war in Vietnam is that a lightly equipped, 

poorly supplied guerrilla force cannot easily 

be defeated by the world’s most powerful 

and sophisticated army, using conventional 

tactics alone. . . .To defeat the guerrilla, we 

must become guerrillas.“y’4 

In another publication, Colonel 

Hackworth stated: “As I seeit, in Vietnam 

our country has tried to kill a fly with a 

sledgehammer-a sledgehammer made of 

gimmicks and gadgets. We have tried to 

-39-

wear down the enemy by a massiveoutpouring of bombs, bullets and materiel from the 

nation’s great assembly Iines.“l’s Thus, 

Colonel Hackworth argued that the allied 

forces should have employed guerriha tactics 

and should not have placed such an emphasis on technology and firepower. 

In response to Coionel Hackworth”s 

charges, Lieutenant Colonel Zeb B. Bradford Jr. argued that the US Army is ‘“inherently unsuited for producing substantial 

numbers of soldiers” with the qualities 

necessaryto function effectively as guerrilla 

fighters. While American soldiers could 

function effectively as guerrilla fighters in 

the United States, their capabilities would be 

limited in different environments.L’6 

Other responsescan be made to Colonel 

Hackworth’s charges. Although the Army 

was clearly infatuated with technological 

devices, for example, US commanders 

would have sacrificed their greatest asset if 

they had avoided the use of massive 

firepower. Also, the emproyment of guerrilla 

tactics would almost invariably have resulted 

in increasedcasualties, and, in an increasingly unpopular war, such losses would obviously have been unacceptable. 

At the same time, there is no evidence to 

suggestthat guerrilla tactics would have been 

any more successful than the semiconventional tactics employed against the enemy. 

As the war progressed, VC losses exceeded 

their capability to recruit. By the end of 

American involvement in the war, the North 

Vietnamesecomprised the bulk of the enemy 

forces, and the battles they fought often 

bore little resemblance to guerrilla 

engagements.American units, nevertheless, 

inflicted terrible casualties on the enemy, 

and, as numerous military leaders have 

noted, US units were not defeated on the 

battlefield. 

Given the eventual outcome of the war, 

however, one cannot help but experience 

lingering doubts about the validity of 

American tactics. One should not assumeUS 

techniques were correct simply because 

North Vietnam had not yet triumphed when 

the American ground role ended. US forces 
fought in South Vietnam from March 1965 

until August 1972, a period of seven years 

and five months. During that time, the 

enemy suffered many losses, and the allies 

won many victories. Those victories, 

however, did not prevent South Vietnam’s 

defeat, and the unbridled use of firepower 

often detracted from the pacification program. 

The root of the failure probably resides 

more in the realm of strategy than tactics. 

One observer noted, “Our forces won every 

battle, but this country lost the war. . . . The 

cause was a senselessstrategy that foiled us 

for 14 straight years.” He added, “Body 

counts on the battlefield never meant as 

much as the battle for men’s minds.” He 

concluded that “indiscriminate” firepower 

strengthenedthe insurgency and that a better 

strategy would have focused on counterinsurgency and pacification rather than conventional combat. :7’ Given thastrategic and 

political situation, however, viable alternatives to the actual tactical methods usedin 

South Vietnam are no more apparent today 

than they were from 1965 to 1972. Just as 

winning the battles did not ensure the winning of the war, improved tactical methods 

probably would riot have changed the final 

outcome of the war. 

The Vietnam War greatly affected the US 

Army. General Hamilton H. Howze observed, “Our troops fought very well indeed 

through the first three or four years, exhibiting commendable individual skill and 

devotion to duty.” In the latter phase of the 

war, the Army’s performance changed. 

“Some units,“’ according to General Howze, 

‘“turned against their officers, in some instances trying to kill them; drug abuse and 

racial difficulties became widespread and 

units rapidly lost combat efficiency.““s 

While such problems are partially attributable to the nature of the fighting in 

Southeast Asia, they also reveal fundamental problems with leadership. morale and 

training. 

The US Army’s tactical thinking was also 

greatly influenced by the long war in 

SoutheastAsia. For aImost a decade,the Ar-

-4Omy’s attention remained riveted on the 

infantry-intensive war in Vietnam, and the 

Army became accustomed to smali-unit 

operations and to enjoying a massive 

superiority over the enemy on the battlefield. 

The emphasis on firepower and enemy attrition also reached new heights in this war. 

Ironically, the great effort to redirect thinking into counterinsurgency in the early 1960s 

was now repeated as the Army focused on 

conventional operations. 

VIII. THE RETURNTO THE CONVENTIONAL 

Y LATE 1972, the environment was 

favorable for fundamental changes in US 

Army tactical doctrine. The major thrust of 

these changes revolved around the shift of 

the Army’s focus from South Vietnam to 

Europe. As the US military began withdrawing from Southeast Asia, the Army staff 

began devoting increased efforts to restructuring the Army. 

After examining potential areas of conflict, the Army’s leadership concluded that 

the United States might face two types of 

wars-a mechanized war in Western Europe 

or a light infantry war in another part of the 

world. Even though a mechanized war in 

Western Europe seemedthe “least likely” of 

the two potential types of war, it represented 

the greatest threat to the national security 

and might involve the United States’ 

“strongest and most dangerous enemy.““9 

General Donn A. Starry, commander of the 

US Army Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC), noted, “So, we decided to 

begin with developing operational concepts 

to cope with our most difficult problem, the 

mechanized war.“lea 

The early 1970swere also a time when the 

Army clearly returned to the fundamentals 

of military operations. Major General John 

J. Hennessey, commandant of the CGSC, 

stated in 1972, “The Army faces serious 

problems of manpower, morale, strategy 

and leadership. It has entered a period.of 

searching inquiry, of readjustment ,;and 

redirection.“‘*’ 
Part of the “searching inquiry” was 

related 10the ending of conscription and the 

establishing of the Volunteer Army. Another 

aspect was a feeling of malaise engendered 

by the complexities of the Vietnam War and 

relating to ongoing problems with personnel 

and morale. While these factors did not 

directly influence the development of doctrine, they did convince the Army’s Ieadership that the Army could not rest on its 

laurels. The Army needed a period of hard 

work and retraining in which some of the 

problems of the Vietnam experiericecould be 

left behind. 

In that sense,the Middle East War of October 1973 was an opportune occurrence. 

The. combatants in that war came from 

relatively sophisticated and technical 

societies, employing modern weaponry in a 

mid-intensity environment. The startling 

violence and consuming nature of that war 

served to accelerate the transition from the 

previous focus on counterinsurgency to the 

new focus on conventional warfare. Few 

doubted that a concerted effort was 

necessaryif the US Army was to be prepared 

for such a war. 

The October War was revealing in several 

aspects. Modern weaponry demonstrated 

itself to be immensely more lethal than in the 

past. The war acted as a “proving ground” 

for some of the new weapons (especially 

antitank weapons) which had been introduced in the past decade. While such 

weaponshad beenused in Vietnam, they had 

not been employed in the numbers or with 

the sameeffect as they had been in the Middle East. The unexpected level of violence in 

that war convinced many observers that 

future wars would be remarkably more 

violent and lethal than those of the past and 

that the successfuloutcome of the war would 

depend on the results of the first crucial and 

violent battles. 

At the sametime, the combined arms team 

increasedin importance. Following its study 

of the 1973October War, the Army concluded that while most armies based their land 

combat power on the tank that weapon 

system could not survive without assistance 

-41-

from other members of the combined arms 

team. The cohesivecombined arms team was 

the most lethal instrument on the 

battlefieid. Ia2 

The “lessons” of the 1973 Middle East 

War were reinforced by the common belief 

that as General William E. DePuy explained, 

‘“Because of the cost of and preoccupation 

with the Vietnam War, the Army lost a 

generation of modernization.“:8j During the 

period from 1965to 1972, substantial forces 

had remained in Western Europe, but no 

major changes had been made in weapons, 

equipment or doctrine. In contrast, the 

USSR had substantially modernized and 

strengthened its forces while the United 

States was invoEved in Southeast Asia. 

Although the size of the Soviet Union’s 

forces had remained relatively stable over 

the past decade, qualitative improvements in 

force structuring and weapons had substantially improved their combat capability. 

Perceptions of a need to improve American 

ground combat power were also reinforced 

by the recognition (stemming from the 1973 

Middle East War) that the United States did 

not have.to face a modern world power to 

encounter modern weapons in vast numbers. 

With the appearanceof a battlefield of unparalleled lethality and violence, with the absolute necessity to employ all advanced 

weapons of the complex combined arms 

team, with the crucial requirement for 

readinessand with the possibility of fighting 

outnumbered or at a disadvantage, the US 

Army faced what it considered to be a completely new situation. The new FM 100-5, 

Operations, analyzed these factors and coneluded, “This circumstance is unprecedented. . . .” The manual added, “Today the US Army must above all else, 

prepare to win the first battle of the next 

Wfft-.“la4 

The threat of the “come-as-you-are war” 

modified many of the previous assumptions 

upon which tactical doctrine had recently 

rested. Since the Army was “historically unprepared for its first battle,” it had to concentrate on winning the first battle of the 

next war. In Europe, the Army faced a much 
larger enemy employing blitzkrieg-type tactics. If it lost the first battle, the chance of 

winning subsequent battles was shm at best. 

These circumstances increased the need 

for a clear, coherent and rigorous doctrine 

which could contribute to the combat efficiency and power of American forces by ensuring that each weapons system was 

employed in the best possibie fashion. The 

new doctrine would be erected on the 

possibility of an exceptionally violent, intense war in a European-type environment. 

While somecriticized this as a short war concept, it was more clearly a “rejection of the 

old mobilization concept” that the United 

States had the time “to mobilize and train 

forces to go into combat.““E5 The US Army 

had not ruled out the possibility of a seriesof 

battles, but it placed its greatest emphasison 

the first of those battles, 

The I976 doctrine also envisioned a different approach to the problem of nuclear 

warfare. In the late 195Os,there had been a 

fixation on the nuclear battlefield, and the 

changesof the early 1960shad envisioned a 

clear dichotomy between nuclear and conventional operations. In contrast, the new 

doctrine resEedupon the implicit assumption 

that a war might begin with a conventional 

battle, move into “a combined 

conventional-nuclear phase of uncertain 

length” and, finally, return to a conventional battle. In sharp contrast to the 

generally held view of the late 1950s and 

1960sthat nuclear weapons would invariably 

be used (especially in Europe), Army commanders concentrated on fighting without 

nuclear weapons. 

Although tactical nuclear weapons had 

previously been considered essential for 

halting a mass enemy attack, the 1976 FM 

100-5 stressed the employment of nuciear 

weapons against second-echelon or reserve 

forces. The manual stated: “Tactical advantage may be gained by neutralizing lead 

elements in the second echelon, and by 

eliminating his committed echelon’s support 

and supporting fire systems. This can defeat 

the enemy’s tactic of echelonment by 

destroying the follow-up reserves for the 

-42-

breakthrough, and by weakening enemysupport. This will reduce pressure on friendly 

units in contact so they can contain engaged 

forces by conventional means and control 

the battle. “Ia6 Thus, nuclear warfare was 

treated as ancillary to the major concern-the conventional battle against the 

enemy’s first- echeIon forces. I8: 

* * * 

In preparing the new doctrine, the Army 

recognized that much had changed since the 

early 1960swhen the doctrine for the RGAD 

division had been estabhshed. The changes 

had beenprimarily technological and included (among others): the introduction of accurate, long-range antitank weapons; the 

development of greater ranges for artillery 

by the use of rocket-assisted projectiles and 

larger calibers; the introduction and improvement of the helicopter; the increased 

coverage and range of air defense weapons; 

the increased number and availability of 

automatic weapons; and the development of 

more accurate and lethal tank weapons. Improvements had also been made in communications, for the new family of radios introduced in the early 1960s had become 

widely available by the mid-1960s. 

Despite these numerous technological advances, doctrine for tanks, armored cavalry 

and mechanized infantry had changed little 

during the past decade. And that doctrine 

had essentially been derived from World 

War TI and had been modified in the late 

1950s and early 1960s. Given the 

technological improvements, there was a 

clear need for improvement in tactical doctrine. 

Attempts to improve Army doctrine QCcurred in several areas. The Infantry School 

offered what it called the “force-oriented 

defense” which was basedupon the principle 

of offering “a degree of resistance appropriate to the existing combat power 

ratio.” If confronted with overwhelming 

enemy combat power, friendly forces did not 

attempt to hold terrain, but occupied r’attrition areas” and destroyed enemy forces as 

they entered these areas. Rather than at­

-
tempting to halt the enemy immediately, 

small infantry units inflicted maximum 

casualties and then withdrew to the next attrition area before becoming decisively 

engaged. After the enemy forces had been 

depleted to the point where they no longer 

possessedan overwhelming superior combat 

power ratio, friendly armor was committed 

in a decisive counterattack.‘a8 

Instead of trading space for time, the 

force-oriented defense traded space for 

enemy casualties. Although it was strongly 

supported by the Infantry School, the new 

tactic never became an official part of US 

Army doctrine. 

Another effort centered on the formation 

of the “TRICAP” division which had a “triple capability” based upon its three major 

eIements-armor, airmobile infantry and air 

cavalry with attack helicopters. Lieutenant 

General John Norton explained, 

“Technically, we are combining an airborne 

tank-destroying force with a ground armored force.“ls9 The test organization 

capitahzed upon the helicopter’s mobility 

and attempted to combine airmobility and 

tanks in something other than a Iowintensity environment. As the Army 

withdrew from Southeast Asia, the new 

organization also provided a convenient 

place to put some of the returning units and 

KpipmenE. As with the force-oriented 

defense, however, the TRICAP division did 

not survive. 

The new concepts, which were to form the 

basis of a new doctrine, began appearing in 

small bits and pieces after 1973. Most of 

them came from the US Army Training and 

Doctrine Command under the driving 

leadership of General William E. DePuy. 

The framework of the new doctrine was 

scheduled to appear in a new edition of FM 

100-5, Operafions. 

When the CGSC completed an initial draft 

of the new manual, it was submitted to 

TRADOC Headquarters but was deemed 

unacceptable. The manual writers of 

TRADOC then wrote another edition, and 

General DePwy took personal and careful interest in the project. Major General Donn A. 

-43-

Starry, commandant of the US Army Armor 

School, also made important contributions. 

When the new manual was published in July 

1976, it became one of the most controversial field manuals ever published by the US 

Army. 

The focus of the manual was apparent in 

the first chapter which emphasized that the 

Army must prepare its units to fight outnumbered and win. According to the 

manual, the major factor influencing the 

employment of modern weapons on the battlefield was a great increase in Iethality. It 

derived from a large number of destructive 

weapons with increased range, rate of fire, 

probability of hit and kihing power. 

The 1976manual recognized that the battlefield was also affected by changes in 

mobility, night-fighting capability, eleetronic warfare developments, etc. For example, the manual stated in bold type, “The 

airmobile concept is the most dramatic 

organizational advance in the US Army.“lga 

Nevertheless, it stressed the effects of 

firepower by devoting much more spaceto a 

discussion of its effects. 

Despite the emphasis on technological advances favoring firepower, the manual did 

not reject maneuver whether on the offense 

or defense. According to the doctrine, the 

key to successlay in concentrating combat 

power. Such concentration could not occur 

without mobile formations that could move 

from one position to another on the battlefield. 

For example, the doctrine envisioned 

‘“battle positions” rather than ‘“kill zones” 

or “attrition areas.” While the former 

stressesflexibility, mobility and fighting in 

depth, the latter two suggest a static defensive position with little flexibility. Yet the 

new doctrine stressed m’aneuver 

predominantly in the sense of moving to 

deliver firepower or to increase combat 

power. Using maneuver to strike at the 

enemy’s will to fight was not an inherent 

part of the doctrine. 

* * * 

Given the abrupt transition from 
Southeast Asia to Western Europe, and 

from low-intensity to mid to high-intensity 

war, someof the operational priorities of the 

Army changed in the early l97Os, especially 

those relating to a focus on the offense or 

defense. Such changes were essential in the 

transition from a war in which US forces had 

aimost always been on the offensive to a 

potentiaE conflict in which the US forces 

would probably be ORthe defensive. 

Consequently, the Army placed more emphasis on defensive operations between I973 

and 1977 than it previously had. By 1977, 

however, an increased emphasis was being 

piaced ONthe offense. Though this was still 

not as great as that placed on the defense, it 

representedan increase over that of 1973. 

Despite public assurancesfrom TRADOC 

Headquarters that offensive action was 

usually the “preferred form of combat,” 

such a preference was stated explicitly in 

almost every manual but FM.lOO-5, Operations. The manuaE on the tank and 

mechanized infantry team, for example, 

stated, “Even though defensive operations 

are often necessary and admittedly preferred, the outcome of battle is ultimately 

determined by offensive operations.f’EY’ 

The absenceof such an explicit statement 

in the 1976FM 180-5was probably the result 

of the initial emphasisplaced on the defense, 

and the presenceof such a statement in later 

manuals suggests that a greater emphasis 

was placed on the offense. Unfortunately, 

some observers perceived what they considered to be too great an emphasis on the 

defense, and analyses of the viability of the 

tactical doctrine were often obscured by 

emotional debatesover the relative merits of 

the offense and defense. Such debates were 

further complicated by objections to the 

strategic doctrine suggested in FM 100-5, 

especially its obvious focus on the defenseof 

Western Europe. 

Contrary to the perception of some critics, 

the 1976FM 100-5,Operrarions.did not state 

that the new lethality ensured the “superiority” of the defense over the offense.lg2 

Rather, it stated that the advantages of the 

defender enabled him to conduct a suc-

-44-

cessful defenseagainst an attacker “superior 

in combat power by a ratio of about 3:l.” 

The attacker could not employ his weapons 

as effectively as the defender, and he needed 

a much higher combat power ratio. If the attacker was to succeed, he needed a combat 

power ratio of “at least 6:l at the point of 

decision.“19’ While the assumed ratio of 

6-to-1 was greater, the ratio of 3-to-1 was 

similar to that of the past. 

One of the most important changes was 

the assumption that the US Army would 

conduct a counterattack only if it resulted in 

“decisively greater enemy iossesf’ or in the 

capture of objectives crucial to the outcome 

of the larger battle.““?” The manual clearly 

rejected the notion of a ceaselessoffensive 

spirit, untrammeled and unaffected by the 

realities of the new lethal weaponry. 

When the 1976 FM 100-5 and other new 

manuals addressed the offense, they envisioned no fundamental changes in its conduct. FM 71-100, Armored and Mechanized 

Division Operations, for example, repeated 

a theme frequently emphasized in Army 

manuals: “Envelopment is usually the 

preferred form of maneuver. , ~ .” The 

manual also stated, “Attacks are aimed at 

weak points in the enemy defense. If no 

weak point can be found, then one must be 

created.“19” 

Some modifications, nevertheless, 

occurred. The new doctrine strongly stressed 

the needto mass forces along a narrow front 

to break through enemy defenses. The requisite amount of combat power was greater 

than that considered necessary in the past, 

and the appropriate frontage far the attack 

was much narrower. 

Another important change concentrated 

on controI measures. Given the increasing 

amount and longer range of firepower and 

the greater ability to move units becauseof 

enhanced mobility and improved command 

and control capabilities, traditional boundaries seemed to preclude or hamper larger 

unit commanders from massing fires or units 

in order to increase combat power in a particular area. Consequently, increasing 

latitude was given to subordinate com-
manders for firing across or shifting haundariesI 

The perception soon emerged that the 

zone of attack, which had heretofore been 

considered the control measure giving the 

greatest freedom to commanders, actually 

limited the ability of higher commanders to 

concentrate combat power. Thus, the axis of 

advance emerged as the preferred control 

measure for providing greater flexibility in 

the conduct of offensive operations. Such 

changes seemed to accord with previous 

methods and encountered little resistance. 

The discussion of the defensein FM 100-5, 

Operations, became the most controversial 

aspectof the new tactical doctrine. When the 

manual writers considered the defensein the 

early l!X?Qs, they were convinced the 

previously accepted mobile and area 

defenses were not completely applicabie to 

the more lethal, modern battlefield. They 

were also convinced that commanders often 

employed the two defenses without adequately analyzing whether they were appropriate for the situation faced at that time. 

Hence, the 1976manual avoided a name for 

the new defense and stressed the following 

fundamentals: Yrnderstand the enemy,” 

“see the battlefield,‘” “concentrate at the 

critical times and places,” “fight as a combined arms team” and “exploit the advantages of the defender.“lq6 

In its Iist of purposes of the defense, the 

1976 FM 100-5, Operations, added a purpose which had not heretofore beenincluded 

in such lists. The new one was to ‘“force the 

enemy to mass so that he is more vulnerable 

to our firepower.‘“9i The concept suggested 

in this purpose of the defense provided the 

foundation for the new methods, which soon 

came to be called the “active defense.” 

En the active defense, the commander 

organized his forces into three areas-the 

covering force area, the main battle area and 

the rear area. In addition to gaining time, inflicting casualties and deceiving the enemy as 

to the location and size of the main defensive 

forces, the covering forces attempted to 

“force the enemy into revealing the strength, 

-45-

location, and general direction of his main 

attack.“!9s 

Once the enemy entered the main battle 

area, the friendly commander concentrated 

much of his combat power against the 

enemy’s main thrusts by taking risks or conducting economy-of-force operations in 

other areas. The defending forces fought a 

“succession of advantageous actions” but 

sought to “maintain coherence along the 

FEBA or in the zone just behind it.‘““99 

The defense was thus elastic rather than 

brittle, and it concentrated on destroying the 

mechanized forces of the enemy by employ: 

ing tanks and antitank guided missiles. It did 

nat envision giving up terrain so easily as 

had the force-oriented defense. 

More detailed information on the active 

defense appeared in later manuals. FM 

7 l-100, Armored and Mechanized Division 

Operations, stated: ‘“The concept of the active defense is to defeat the attacker by confronting him with strong combined arms 

teams fighting from battle positions organized in depth. As the enemy attack moves 

into the defended area, it encounters fires of 

increased intensity delivered from the front 

and especially the flanks. The defender constantly shifts forces to take maximum advantage of the terrain, and to put himself in a 

favorable posture to attack.“*0” 

For control measures, the active defense 

relied upon battle areas, battle positions and 

strongpoints. Each method represented a 

method for controlling the movement, fires 

and degree of resistance from units as they 

maneuvered against the enemy forces. 

Carefully selectedcounterattacks were an integral part of the active defense, but every 

manual warned that an attacker forfeited the 

advantages of the defense. 

By the early 197Os,the Army”s ieadership 

had apparently concluded that the firepower 

improvements fundamentally affected 

maneuver on the battlefield. This can be seen 

in the evolution of the defense from a 

defense in depth over an area, to a mobile 

defense or an area defense, to an active 

defenseretying on the concentration of com-
bat power in the area of a penetration. 

In the earlier forms, a large reservewas retained to counter mass attacks or blitzkriegtype tactics. In the active defense, however, 

the preponderant portion of the forces were 

kept forward so that all their firepower 

could be brought to bear against the enemy. 

When a commander decided to concentrate 

his forces, the high mobility of armored and 

mechanized forces permitted him to reinforce rapidly by committing reserves from 

the rear or by moving units from lessthreatened flanks. 

Such tactics assumedthe firepower of the 

defender would retard the mobihty of the attacker. While the active defense rests upon 

the capability to move units, its perception 

of maneuver is different from that of 1949 

when maneuver was primarily associated 

with the offense. 

As with any major change, criticisms of 

the tactical doctrine continued. Critics of the 

tacticai doctrine concentrated on three major areas- intelligence, communications and 

the ability to concentrate. As for intelligence, the successof the active defense 

rested on the ability of the commander to 

detect the main enemy thrusts. The commander then.had to communicate his desires 

to his subordinates, especially as he attempted to maneuver his forces for the battle 

in depth. Finally, he had to move his forces, 

sometimes in a late& direction, to concentrate their combat power. To the critics, each 

of these seemedvulnerable to disruption by 

the enemy or by the increasingly urbanized 

terrain of Western Europe.“” 

In the final analysis, the active defense 

was exactly what it purported to be: a 

method US ground forces could use for 

fighting outnumbered and for accomplishing 

their primary mission-winning the land 

battle. Interestingly enough, the active 

defense was simiiar to the “fight and roll” 

defense used by the US I Corps in the 

Korean War except that tactic had been 

emptoyed against massedinfantrymen rather 

than massed mechanized forces. In general 

terms, the active defense also resembled the 

“pile on” tactics of Vietnam with their em-

-46-

phasis on concentration, massive firepower 

and movement to increase relative combat 

power ratios. 

Despite their similarity to some previous 

tactical methods, the active defense and the 

other new doctrinal methods appearing after 

1973 were the first attempts to obtain the 

maximum from some of the new weapons 

which had been entering the arsenals of the 

world since the early 1960s.The doctrine for 

employing US mechanized farces had 

changed only slightly since 1945, and the 

new tactics represented a major effort to 

provide more advanced and modern doctrine. At the same time, the new tactics 

stressed technological developments and 

represented the zenith of emphasis on 

firepower during the three decades since 

World War II. 

IX. CONCLUSION 

EVEN though all of America’s military 

conflicts since World War II have been outside Europe, the Army and the nation have 

invariably refocused their concerns after 

these conflicts upon the defense of Western 

Europe. And doctrine for the postwar Army 

has centeredon a European-type battlefield. 

Considerable changes in doctrine, nevertheless, occurred in the late 195Os, early 

1960sand early 1970s. 

During the first period, the Army radically 

changed its doctrine and organization to 

contend with the nuclear battlefield. In the 

early 196Os,the Army consciously moved 

away from a pre-eminent focus on nuciear 

operations and erected severaldoctrines concentrating on counterinsurgency or on a conventional or nuclear battlefield in a 

European-type environment. In the early 

197Os, the Army began to move out of 

counterinsurgency and to concentrate on a 

conventional-nuclear battlefield in Europe. 

Each of these periods brought widesweeping changesthroughout the Army. 

No single factor “drove” the development 

of Army doctrine, but changes in national 

security policy lay at the basis of the sweep-
ing changesin the late 195Os,early 1960sand 

early 197%; When the focus of national 

security policy shifted in these periods, profound changesoccurred in the Army’s doctrine, organization and equipment. For that 

reasan, the development of doctrine has not 

been propelled saiely by technical concerns. 

While the doctrine has been affected by 

technological advances (for example, 

helicopters, antitank weaponry, communications), the selection of types of technology 

has depended upon the initial decisionwhich was usually made outside the Armyon where a future battie might be fought. 

This initial decision has provided the 

parameters(such as types of mission, enemy, 

terrain, etc.) within which the Army has 

structured its. forces for fighting. The erection of an offensive doctrine for the European theater, for example, has never been a 

possibility for the US military. Thus, the 

selection of the “superior arm”’ and the 

development of how it will be employed has 

generally dependedupon the selection of the 

possible future battlefield and the conditions 

under which a battle might be fought. 

While such a system is eminently supportable in our democratic society, one should 

recognize that the restructuring of forces for 

other battlefields or other conditions cannot 

be easily accomplished. In each of the three 

periods of major change, one of the most 

difficult tasks has been the changing of the 

Army officers’ and saldiers” thinking. 

One would suppose such changescan occur with easein a hierarchical system. The 

experience of the past three decades, 

however* amply demonstrates that one cannot’ simply erect a new doctrine, organize 

new formations and procure new equipment 

without an intense effort to redirect the 

thinking of individuals in the Army. If the 

three major periods of doctrinal changehave 

a consistent ,theme, it is the earnest and 

sincereobjection by individuals in and out of 

thesystem that the envisioned changeswere 

tampering with the sacrosanct and should be 

halted or greatly modified. 

The experience of the past also 

demonstratesthat a doctrine constructed for 

-47-

one theater cannot be projected easily to 

another theater. In some instances, the focus 

on a previous doctrine has retarded attempts 

to evolve a more viable doctrine for a different environment. In the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the previous focus on the European theater initially affected the Army’s 

ability to respond to the very different needs 

of those areas. 

While major changes in doctrine did not 

occur in either war, the establishing of new 

techniques could not be divorced from the 

Army’s previous experiences. The problems 

of fighting a delaying action in Korea in 

1950, for example, were compounded by the 

Army’s lack of experience with and emphasis on such an operation. When special 

techniques or methods evolved for those 

wars, short rotation tours ensured that the 

process of retraining individuaIs was neverending. 

In short, intellectual changes can 

sometimes be more difficult to achieve than 

materiel changes. One of the purposes of 

doctrine is to ensure common thinking, but, 

when changes are necessary, that common 

thinking can become an obstacle for needed 

modifications or improvements. When the 

major components of a doctrine are 

estabhshed, military leaders must recognize 

that attempts to operate in a different manner, even on an emergencybasis, can only be 

accomplished with great difficulty. 

During the period under study, tactical 

doctrine became more complex as potential 

enemiesapproached or exceededUS ground 

forces in size and technical capability. As the 

American technological advantage was 

reduced, the Army placed an increased Cmphasis on doctrine in order to improve its 

relative combat capability. Yet Army doctrine was caught between two conflicting 

trends. Admitting the existence of a spectrum of war cahed for variegated and flexible doctrine while fighting outnumbered or 

at a disadvantage called for a more specific 

and less flexible doctrine. 

Over the long term, the Army has placed a 

greater emphasis on the development of new 

weapons than on the development of how 
the new weapons should be employed. In 

some instances, this has resuIted in new 

weaponry being grafted onto existing tactical 

concepts. Despite its greater capabilities, the 

TOW antitank weapon, for exampIe, was 

initiahy empIoyed in the same manner as the 

106mm recoilless rifle. 

The helicopter provides another example. 

While some advanceswere made in the 1950s 

in concepts for its employment, major innovations did not occur until the early 1960s. 

Until then, many Army officers viewed the 

helicopter as nothing more than a vehicle for 

ferrying men and supplies on the battlefield. 

Only in recent years has the creation of 

new tactical concepts and development of 

doctrine received the same emphasis as the 

development of equipment. If the present 

system continues to prosper and is further 

improved, a much-needed emphasis on the 

formuEation and promuIgation of doctrine 

shotrEd continue. The Army should never 

forget that the best weapon can be rendered 

uselessby improper employment, and that 

materiel and organizational deveIopments 

cannot occur without doctrinat devefopmerit. 

In comparison to the other combat arms, 

infantry doctrine changed the most in the 

three decadesfollowing World War II. With 

the introduction of mechanized infantry, 

counterinsurgency and airmobile operations, 

infantry doctrine became broader and more 

compiex than it previously had been. Other 

modifications included Ehe creation of the 

fire team in the infantry squad, the addition 

of new infantry weapons and the deletion of 

the WorId War II cannon company in the infantry regiment. Yet, within these changes, 

much remained the same. Once dismounted, 

the infantry fought in essentially the same 

manner throughout this period, using 

methods reminiscent of those employed in 

World War II. 

In comparison to the infantry, doctrine 

for the armor and artillery branches seems 

almost static. For most of the period under 

study, both performed in essentially the 

same fashion they had in World War II. For 

armor, the major changes included the 

-48-

redirection of armored cavalry doctrine 

toward a clear offensive and defensive role, 

as opposed to its traditiona reconnaissance, 

security and economy of force roles. 

Another important change concerned the 

creation of mechanized infantry formations 

which worked in close cooperation with tank 

formations. As for the artillery, the major 

changes involved the adoption of longer 

range and larger caliber weapons and the 

perfection of techniques for massing fires. 

All branches were affected relatively 

equally by the changes in the early 1970s. 

But the infantry witnessed a mueh greater 

emphasis being placed on its mechanized 

formations. 

The greatest changesin offensive doctrine 

occurred in the 1960sand early 1970s. The 

most important innovation in offensive 

operations was the development of airmobile 

operations. In the low or mid-intensity environment of Southeast Asia, the helicopter 

added significantly to the offensive capability of infantry units. In a mid to highintensity environment, the helicopter added 

a new dimension for vertical envelopment 

which had not previously existed. Its ability 

to survive in such an environment, however, 

remained controversial. 

Additional changes in offensive doctrine 

in the early 1970s stressed the requirement 

for concentrating forces. Traditional views 

of control measures had to be modified 

slightly to permit commanders to use to the 

maximum their greater mobility, improved 

command and control, increasedamounts of 

firepower and longer ranges of weapons. 

Major changesoccurred in defensive doctrine-an area which absorbed large 

amounts of resources and intellectual 

energies from 1946 to 1976. Relatively 

speaking, the Army was much more concerned with the defense rather than the offense during this entire period. The increasing focus on the defense was obviously 

rooted in the progressively greater emphasis 

placed on the defenseof Europe. The operations in South Vietnam were the major exception. 

The most controversial periods were the 
mid-1950s when the mobile defense was 

created and the early 1970swhen the active 

defensewas created. In both instanceswhen 

fundamental changes were made, the new 

defenses concentrated on a European-type 

battlefield in which the US Army engaged 

well-equipped, mechanized forces. Sweeping 

changesin offensive and defensive doctrines 

also occurred when the pentomic division 

was created, but these changes lasted only a 

few years. 

Within the numerous changes, major 

alterations occurred in firepower and 

maneuver: The addition of the armored personnel carrier, the improvement in tank 

agility and mobility, the creation of 

mechanized artillery and the adaption of the 

helicopter added significantly to tactical and 

operational mobility. The improvements in 

tactical mobility, however, came at the expense of strategic mobility. US forces 

became progressively heavier and more difficult to transport, 

Major improvements also occurred in 

firepower. The addition of the nuclear 

weapon to the Army’s arsenal promised to 

provide vast amounts of firepower to the 

battlefield. But, as the years passed, 

restraints on the potential employment of 

such weapons, plus doubts that they would 

ever be employed, altered the Army’s thinking on nuclear weapons. Additional conventional firepower was added to every echelon 

of the Army. From the infantry squad with 

the M79 grenade launchers and l%f16rifles, 

to the more accurate and lethal tank and antitank guns, to the more powerful artillery 

weapons, Army units acquired significantly 

greater firepower than their World War II 

counterparts. 

‘The US Air Force’s firepower also increasedand slowly began to contribute more 

directly to the ground battle. In sharp contrast TV the late 1940s and 195Os,close air 

support received greater emphasis in the 

early 1970sfrom the Army and Air Force. In 

terms of its potential impact on tactical 

operations, the increased emphasis on close 

air support is the most important 

-49-

characteristic of the development of US Air 

Force doctrine. 

Although the evolution of doctrine since 

World War II has been affected by a variety 

of influences, the emphasison firepower, the 

defense and attrition has slowly and progressiveryincreased until they have become 

the primary characteristics of US Army tactical doctrine. The greater amounts and 

types of firepower available on the battlefield have created extraordinary problems 

of fire support coordination. They also have 

brought into question the entire relationship 

between firepower and maneuver. 

For a number of reasons, Army doctrine 

progressively placed a greater emphasis cm 

attrition of the enemy. Combat in Korea and 

South Vietnam, the long-term focus on the 

defense of Western Europe and the perceived impact of tactical nuclear weapons 

reinforced and accentuated the emphasis on 

attrition. This focus was reinforced by the 

adoption of improved conventional weapons 

with their greater range, rate of fire, probability of hit and killing power. When one 

considers the long-term development of US 

Army doctrine after World War II, the 

amount of firepower has increasedrelatively speaking-much more than mobility. And the emphasis on attrition has increasedat the expenseof maneuver. 

Despite the severalcycles of change, Army 

doctrine has become much more important 

in recent years. Its study and formulation 

presently receive greater emphasis and consume more resources and intellectual 

energiesthan at any time in recent history. 

Doctrine, nevertheless, cannot perform the 

impossible. It can only provide guidelines 

for action; it cannot provide final answers. 

Given the infinitely varied situations on the 

battlefield due to changing missions, enemy, 

terrain, weather and troops available, the 

application of doctrine requires judgment. 

While doctrine is important for providing 

models for adaptation, the prime factors remain the imagination, the inventive genius 

and the will to fight of the American soldier. 

Those who write doctrine cannot conceive 
of every possible situation, and those who doctrine no longer accomplishes its most imfight cannot be expected to remember every portant purpose. As Brigadier Generai S. I.,. 

possible answer. In that sense, too many A. Marshall once observed, reiterations of 

doctrinal changesor too much doctrine can doctrine cannot transform human nature or 

weaken the soldier’s understanding and “change cockroaches into butterflies.“‘2o2 

reliance on doctrine. When that happens, 
END NOTES 

’ General Joseph W. Stilweil, Reporf OR War Department Equipment Board, 19 January 1946, p 

10, US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) 12960. 

2 General Omar N. Eradley: “‘Creating aSound Military Force,” MNtary Review, May 1949, pp 3-6. 

3 Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Field Service ReguEations, Operations, Department of the Army, 

Washington, DC., August 1949, p 60. 

4 Ibid., pp 231-33. 

5 Colonel C. 6. Blanchard, “‘General Discussion of Gunnery Changes,” Reporf of Arfillery Conference, 6-20 December 1948, Office of the Commandant, Artillery School, Fort Sill, Okla., 20 

January 1949, p 3, USACGSC 16896.1. 

’ Captain Charles L. Sartain: “Fire Support Coordination,” and Colonel Frank Q. Goodell, 

‘“Responsibiiities of the Fire Support Coordination,” Report on Artillery Instructors Conference, 27-31 August 1951, Office of the Assistant Commandant, Artillery School, Fort Sill, 

Okla., 1 October 1951, pp CF-1-l and GF-2-1, USACGSC 16896.4. 

’ FM 31-35, Air-Ground Operations, War Department, Washington, D.C., 1946. 

a Goodell, op. cit., p CF-2-3. 

’ Lynn Montross, Cavalry of the Sky: The Story of U.S. Marine Combaf Helicopfers, Harper & 

Brothers, N.Y., 1954, p 6. 

Ia Stilwell, op, cit., p 55. 

” Cecfures and Demonsfrationsr Infantry Conference, Fort Benning, Ga., June 1946, Tab D-3, p 

46, USACGSC 13561. 

I2 Quoted in Lieutenant General James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age, Harper & 

Brothers, N.Y., 1958, pp 109-11. 

I3 Montross, op. cit., pp 162-65 and 167-71. 

I4 Stilwell, op. cit., p 12. 

” Report of Committee “A” OR Tactics and Technique, Infantry Conference, Fort Benning, Ga., 

June 1946, Tab T-7, p 5, USACGSG 13558 A. 

I6 Lieutenant Colonel A. B. Sundin! “Lecture on Field Artillery,” Cectures and Demonstrations, 

op. cif., p 6. 

I7 Organization, Equipment, and Tactical Employment of the Infantry Divison, General Board, US 

Forces, European Theater, p 6, USACGSC 13032.15. 

IQ Stilwell op. cit., p IO. For a detailed analysis of tank destroyers in World War II, see Major 

Charles M. Bailey, Faint Praise: The Development of American Tanks and Tank Destroyers 

During World War II, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke University, Durham, N.C., 1977. 

*O Organization, Equipment, and Tactical Employment of fhe Infantry Division, op. cit., p 8. 

*’ FM 1005, Field Service Regulations, Operations, op. cit., pp 6 and 256-57. 

22 Types of Divisions-Posf-War Army, General Board, US Forces, European Theater, p 8, 

USACGSC 13032.17. For an in-depth description of infantry organizations after World War II, 

see John K. Mahon and Romana Danysh, Infantry, Part I: The Regular Army, Office: Chief of 

Military History, Washington, D.C., 1972, pp 70-121. 

23 FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations, op. cit., p 80. 

24 Ibid., pp 84-85. 

25 Ebid., o 123. 

ia Ibid.; pp 120-40. 

27 General Matthew 8. Ridgway: Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway, Harper & Brothers, 

N.Y.1 1956, p 191. 

” General Matthew B. Ridgway, Tt?e Korean War, Doubleday & Co. Inc., N.Y., 1967, p 11. 

2’ The Korean Campaign, September to October 195Q, Report of the Artillery School Representative Army Field Forces ObserverTeam Number 2,27 November 1950, p 17, USACGSC 17055.7. 

3a Training Bulletin Number 2, Lesson Learned, Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, Fort Monroe, 

Va., 9 November 1950, pp 5-8, USACGSC 17055.1. 

3’ Enemy Tactics, Techniques, and Doctrine, EXCorps, September 1951, USACGSC 17055.40; and 

Chinese Tactics and CessonsXearned, Office, Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Headquarters, 2d 

Infantry Division, APO 248, 13 November 1952, USACGSC 17048.13. 

32 Training Bulletin Number 8. Combat /nformation, Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, Fort 

Monroe, Va., 16 November 1951, p 16: USACGSC 17055.1. 

33 Lessons From Korea, 1954, Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga., p 5, USACGSC 17055.138. A 

good summary of infantry tactics is included in S. L. A. Marshall, Notes on infantry Tactics in 

Korea, Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., ORO-T-7, 

28 February 1951, USACGSC 16454.58. 

34 Extract of Letter, Commanding General, I Corps. 24 September 1951, USACGSC 17055.1. 

35 Ridgway, The Korean War, op. cit., p 116. 

-51-
36 

37 

3a 

39 

40 

41 

42 

43 

44 

45 

46 

47 

48 

49 

50 

51 

52 

53 

54 

55 

56 

57 

58 

5% 

60 

61 

82 

63 

Training Bulletin Number 1, Gombaf fnformation, Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, Fort 

Monroe, Va., 20 March 1953, p 3, USACGSC f7055.1. 

Special After-Action Reporf, Hill 395 (White Horse Mountain), Headquarters, IX Corps, APO 

264, 6-15 October 1952, pp 39 and 53, USACGSC 17056.9. 

Enemy Tactics, Headquarters, Eighth US Army, Korea, APO 301, 26 December 1951, pp 76-78, 

LJSACGSC 17055.72. 

Defense Against Mass Attack, Headquarters, I Corps, Korea, 18 June 1952, p 5, USACGSC 

17055.56 

The Communist First Spring Offensive, Headquarters, I Corps, Korea, April 1951, pp 45-41, 

USACGSC 17055.96. 

Requested comments to General Maxwell D. Taylor by Major General Lionel C. McGarr, May 

1954, Part 2, Section 5, USACGSC 17048.13. 

Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, Conference on Battle Empioyment of Artillery in 

Korea, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 11 February 1952, pp 2 and 6, USACGSC 

17055.73. 

Tactical Observations of the Commanding Generai, Eighth US Army, Korea, May 1951, p lr 

USACGSC 17055.1. 

Training Bulletin Number 4, Combat Information, Office, Chief of Army FieEd Forces, Fort 

Monroe, Va., 2 Ju[y 1953, p 6, USACGSC 17055.1. For other information ofi tanks in Korea, see 

The Emalovmenf of Armor in Korea. ODerations Research Office, The Johns Hoakins University, Bakihre, Md., Far East Command, ORO-R-1, 8 April 1951, iolumes i and ii, USACGSC 

16454.114; Employment of Armor in Korea, Headquarters, 2d Infantry Division, APO 248, 1 

August 1951, USACGSC 17055.31; Lieutenant Colonel George B. Pickett Jr., “Tanks in Korea: 

f950-1951.‘” Armor, November-December 1951, pp 12.16; Employmenf of Armor in Korea-The 

First Year, Armor School, Fort Knox, Ky., May 1952, Volumes I and II, USACGSC 2146.119; and 

Employment of Armor in Korea-The Second Year, Armor School, Fort Knox, Ky., April 1953, 

USACGSC 2146.22. 

Tactical and iogistical Employment of the M-39 and TlBEl Armored Personnel Carriers During 

the Baftle for butpost P&k-Chop, Vicinity Chorwon, North Korea, 6-11 duly 1953, Hea& 

auarters. 7th lnfantrv Division. APO 7. 9 Auaust 1953. USACGSC 17048.11. 

see requested comments to deneral Maxwell D. Tailor by Major General Lionel G. McGarr, 

May 1954, Part 2, Section 4, Tab B, pp 16-19, USACGSC 17048.73. 

Cited in Robert Frank Futrell, Brigadier General Lawson S. Mosley and Albert F. Simpson, The 

United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953, Duell, Sloan & Pearce, N.Y., 1961, p 643. 

General Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, W. W. Norton &. Co. [nc.> N.Y., f972, p 158; 

and Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matfhew 8. Ridgway, op. cit., pp 75-76, 186: 191 and 244. 

Training Bulfetin Number 8, Combat Information, op. cit., p f. 

Lessons From Korea, 1954, op. cit., p 1. 

Training Eulletin Number 8, Combat Information, op. cit., p 1. 

FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 

27 September 1954, p 4. This phrase was deleted in FM 100-5, Change 2, 27 July 1956. 

Quoted in G. C, Reinhardt, Nuclear Weapons and Limited Warfare: A Sketchbook History, 

Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif., P-3011% 1964, p 4. 

Major General Leslie R. Groves, ‘“Atomic Energy,” Lectures and Demonstrations, op. cit.? Tab 

L-6, p 23. 

Cited in “Atomic Warfare,” Analysis of Mitifafy Assistance Program, Operations Research Of. 

fice. The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., ORC-R-3, 21 January 1950: Part lil, Appendix B. p f67, USACGSC 16454.19-L. 

Major Genera! James M. Gavin, “The Tactical Use of the Atomic Bomb,” Combat Forces 

JournaE, November 1950, pp 9-11. 

“Devers Vatedictory: Atom Is a Ground Aid,” Tt?e New York Times, 29 September 1949, p 7. 

Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age, op. cit., pp 129.35; Hanson Baldwin, “Experts Urge 

Tactical Air Might,” The New York Times, 5 June 1952, p 13; and David Lilienthal, In the Matter 

of J. Robert Oppenheimer: Transcript of the Hearings Before the Personnel Security Board, 

Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office. Washington, DC., 1954, 

passim. 

Reinhardt, op. cit., pp 3-4. See Colonel George C. Reinhardt, “Notes on the Tactical Employ 

ment of Atomic Weapons,” Military Review, September 1952, pp 28-37. 

Colonel G. C. Reinhardf and Lieutenant Cofcrnel W. R. Kintner. Atomic Weapons in &and Gombat, The Military Service Publishing Co., Harrisburg, Pa., 195!+, p 224. 

Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age, op. cit., pp 447.48. 

Project Aftack: Nypothetical Use of A-Bombs un Massed Armor lllrrsfrated by Operatiun 

“Totalite,” Phase I, 7-8 August 7944, Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md.? ORQ-T-137, p 3, USACGSC 16454.105. 

Colonel Theodore C. Mataxis and Lieutenant Colonel Seymour L. Goldberg, Nuclear ~?actics, 

Weapons, and Firepower in the Penfomic Division, Batfle Group, and Company, The Military 

Service Publishing Co., Harrisburg, Pa., 3958, pp 32.33. 

-52-
e4 Hanson W. Baldwin, “Atom’s Role in Tactics,” The New York Times, 13 June 1950, p 16. 

et7 “Pace Hails Army’s Atomic Gun,” The New York Times, 9 May 1952, p I. 

66 Defense Aoainst Etlass Attack. Headauarters, 1 Corps. Korea, 18 June 1952. P 3. USACGSC 

17055.56. -

ST Harold B. Hinton, “Ammunition Ampie to Repel Reds ifl Karea, Says Wilson,” The New York 

Times. 7 March 1953. D 2: and ‘,Van Fleet Said to Favor ‘Limited’ Atomic Attacks,” The Mew 

York Times. 9 March ‘7953, p 8. 

‘a Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, op. cit. p 134. 

es Speech made by General Charles L. Bolte, Vice Chief of Staff, US Army, to the Infantry School, 

Fort Renning, Ga., I4 September 1954, p 3, USACGSC M506lG4lA.73. 

r” FM 100-5, F/&d ServEce Regulations, Operations, op. cit., 1954, pp 40, 103, 123, 130-31 and 162. 

7% IbEd., pp 117 and 119-20. 

72 Ibid., pp ‘i17 and 120. 

75 Second Report of the Secretary oi Defense for the Fiscal year 1949, Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington. D.C., !950, pp 142-43. 

74 Major Genera! Bruce 6. Clarke and Brigadier General L. L. Doan. “The New Armored Division 

Qrganization,” Armor, November-December 7952, p 42. 

75 Semiannuai Report of fhe Secretary of Defense, January 7 to Jlune 30, 7956, Superintendent of 

Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1957. pp 86-87. 

” FM 100-5, field Service Regulations, Operations, op. cit., 1954, p 16. 

” FM igO-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations, op. cit., 1954, Change 2, 27 July 1956, pp 2-3. 

‘a Quoted in William P. Mwrden Jr. and Lieutenant Colonel John R. Yakshe, Evaluation of Procedures Employed in Tests of the 1956 FieFdArmy(ATFA-I], Combat Operations Research Group, 

Ooerations Research Office. US Continental Armv Command FUSCONARCI. I_ Fort Monroe. Va.. 

Ok0T-4, October 1956, p 8.’ 

‘$ Taylor! Swords and Plowshares, op. cit., p 152; and General Bruce C. Ciarke, “The Designing of 

New Divisians for Our Army,” Armor. May-June 4955, pp 22-25. 

&a Gavin! War and Peace in the Space Age, op. cit., pp 137-39. 

s’ Reinhardt and Kintner, op. cit., pp 201-11. 

*2 “Eegin Tests,” MiEirary Review, September 1954, p 63; and Murden and Yakshe, op. cit., p 3. 

s3 “‘New Divisional Organizations,” Army-Navy-Air Force Register, 12 February 1955, pp 1 and 21. 

a4 Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, op. cit.. p 152. 

85 “Smaller ‘Pentomic’ Divisions on the Way,” Army-Navy-Air Force Journal, 29 December 1956, 

8e !a;Ior Swords and PEowshares, op. cit.: p 171. 

*7 General Maxwell D. iaylor, “’ Safety Lies Forward’ -Technologically and Tactically,” Army, 

December 1956, p 21. 

‘* Lieutenant General C. D. Eddleman, “Men, Missiles, and Atom& on the Futurarmy Battlefield,” Army, December 1956, p 24. 

a8 Ibid., p 25. For a detailed analysis of tactics on the atomic batttefield, see Mataxis and Goldberg, op. cit.; Major General Hamilton H. Howze, “Combat Tactics for Tomorrow’s Army,“’ 

Army, October $957, pp 24-30; Lieutenant Colonel Mitchei Goldenthal, “Corps in the Mobile 

Defense.” Militarv Review. Seotember 1957. pp 14-24: Maior John H. Cushman. “Pentomic 

infantry ‘Division ‘in Combat,” ‘Military Review,’ January 1958, pp 19-30; Lieutenant Colonel 

William L. Boylston, “Armor on the Atomic Battlefield,” Armor, May-June 1957, pp 24-29; Major 

E. 8. Moore Jr. and Lieutenant Colonel Edwin C. Gibson, ‘“The Infantry Battle Group in the 

Offense,” Infantry, July-September 1959, pp 14-20; Lieutenant Colonel Edwin C. Gibson and 

Major E. B. Moore Jr., ““The Infantry Battle Group in the Defense,” Infantry, October-November 

1959, pp 4-8: and Lieutenant Colonel James W. Hungate, ‘“ROCID Battle Group: Tactics for 

Defense,” infantry, October 1957, pp 12-19. 

sa Major General Lionel C. MeGarr, SpeciaE Report of the Commandant, f January 7959, USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth, Kan., 1959, USACGSC 13423.178. 

$’ The text of the agreement is included in “DOD Gives Army Aviation New Charter Replacing 

Agreement With USAF,” Army-Navy-Air Force Journal, 30 March 1957, p 11. 

” Annual Report of fhe Secrefary of Defense, JuEy 1, 1958 to June 30, 1959, Superintendent of 

Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1960, p 8. 

53 Dr . EI F. Fisher Jr.. Reiationshbs of the ROAD ConceDf to MaraE Considerations in SfrateW 

PFanning, Qffice, dhief of Military History, Washington, D.C., OCMH Monograph Number 1065, 

pp 5963, USACGSC 16436.121. See General Bruce C. Clarke, “Some Thoughts on Military 

Tactical Organization,” Armor, May-June 1963, pp 4-7. 

s4 Colonel George T. Metcalf, “The MOMAR Field Army,” Army, September 1960, pp 55-59. See 

“Board Briefing-MOMAR Study,” Colonel Metcalf’s presentation to the Combat Develop 

ments Logistical Conference, Headquarters, USCONARC, Fort Monroe, Va., 29 April 1959, 

USACGSC 18662.1.A.7. 

” Letter from Headquarters, USCONARC, Fort Monroe, Va., Subject: Study, MoUern Mobile 

Army, 19651970, 10 March 1960, USACGSC 18662.1-B 

-53-
a’ Fisher, op. cit., pp 63-68. 

” Department of the Army, Office, Chief of Staff, General C. D. Eddleman to Commanding 

General, USCONARC, Fort Monroe, Va.. Subject: Reorganization of Infantry and Armored Divisions and Creation of a Mechanized Division, 16 December 1960, US&CGSC 18662.13-A.3. 

” Robe0 S. McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office, Harper & Row, N.V., 

ma, p 69. 

gg Major General Harold K. Johnson “ROAD Briefing, 27 May 196$.“’ USACGSC 18662.13-G. 

‘Do ‘General ‘Gar’ Davidson’s Censored Comments on Shortcomings of Army ROAD Divisron,” 

Army-Navy-Air Force Journal and Register, 16 May 1964, p IO. 

lo1 Major General Edward C. Doleman. Commandina General, 8th Infantry Division, Preearaftion 

for’Mechani.zstion, 9 October 1961, p 2, USACGS~l2524.17. For an excellent analysis of smallunit operations, see Training Pamphlet Number 525-1, Combat Operations: Smati L&if Tactics 

En Nuclear Warfare, Headquarters, US Army, Europe, 15 July 1966, USACGSC N-17848.241. 

la2 FM 7-30, Infantry, Alrborne, and Mechanized Division Brigades, Department of the Army, 

Washington, DC., 19 May 1965, pp 82-85. 

‘03 FM 7-20 Infantry,.AErborne Infanfry. and Mechanized Infantry Batfafions, Department of the 

Army, Washington D.C., 28 May 1965, p 81. 

‘04 ibid., pp 6-7. 

TO5 Ibid., p 125. 

ras Lieutenant Colonel E. M. Postiethwait, “Cofps Defense on a Broad Front,” Military Review, 

July 1949, p 50. 

‘07 See Major William A. Brown, “ROAD Doctrine: Battalion in the Defense,” infantry, March-April 

1962, pp 32.39. 

loa FM 100-5, Field Sewice Regulations, Operations, op. cit., 1949, p 120. 

lo9 FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations. Operations, Department of the Army, Washington, DC.; 

1962> p 74. 

‘lo Colonel Francis J. Kelly, U.S. Army Specia! Forces, 7967-1977, Department of the Army, 

Washington, D.C.: 1973, pp 3-5. 

I” Lieutenant General Hamilton H. Wowze, Special Warfare &oar& Final Report, Headquarters, 

USCONARC, Fort Monroe, Va., 28 January 1962, p 12, USACGSC 18662.18. 

‘I2 FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operattons, op. cit., 1962, pp 136-43. 

‘I3 See Brigadier General Wlfliam B. Rosson. “Accent on Cold War Capabilities,” Army Information Digest, May 1962, pp 2-9; and “Cold War Terminology,” Army Information Digest, June 

1962, pp 53-54. 

Ii4 FM 31-15, Operations Againsf Irregular Forces, Department of the Army, Washington, DC., e May 1961, p 25. 

‘I5 Counter insurgency Operations: A Handbook for the. Suppression of Commlrnist Guerri!lal 

Terrorist Operations, Office, Director of Strategic Plans and Poiicy, Special Warfare Division, 

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army, Washington, 

D.C., 1 March 1962, p 43. 

“13 Richard P. Weinert, A History of Army Aviation, 1950-1962, Phase IE: 1955-1962, Historica! Office, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOCJ, Fort Monrae, Va.. November 1976, 

pp 182 and 244, USACGSC 18668.146-B. 

I” Major General James M. Gavin, “Cavalry, and f Don’t Mean Horses,” Harper’s Magazine, April 

f954, pp 54-60. 

I’* Colonel Jay D. Vanderpool, “We Armed the Helicopter,” United States Army Aviafion Digest, 

June 1971,. p 29. 

Ifg Among his many articles, see Major General Hamilton H. Howze, “Helicopters in the Army,” 

Ordnance, January-February 1958, pp 634-38. 

I20 7957EstEmate of the Sltuation, Department of Combat Aviation, US Army Aviation School,‘Fort 

Rucker, Ala., p 11, USACGSC 18184.8. 

I21 Lieutenant General John J. Tolson, AirmobiEity, 1961-7977, Superintendent of Documents, US 

Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1973, p 13. 

122 Ibid. p 9. See atso Lieutenant Colonel John W. Oswalt, “Report on the ‘Rogers’ Board,“United 

Sfa&s Army Aviation Digest, February 1961, pp 15-17. 

123 Tolson, op. cit., p 14. 

“’ Ibid., p 18. 

125 Quoted in Ibid., pp 22-24. See also J. B. S., “‘Irwin School’s Summer Term: How the “HOwZe 

Board’ Did Its Work,” Army, September 1962, pp 74-78. 

lz6 Tofson op. cit., p 30. For examples of such studies, see Airmobiie Company in Cour?t&nsUfgency bperations, Army Concept Team in Vietnam, APO 143, San Francisco, Calif., 25 July 

1964, USACGSC 5849.6; and Mechanized Rifle Troop (M-7731, interim Tesf Report Number 70, 

f November to 37 December 7963, Army Concept Team In Vietnam, APO 143, San Francisco, 

Calif., 25 May 1964, USAGGSC 5849.55. 

12’ See General Harold K. Johnson: “The Army Chief of Staff on Military Strategy in Vietnam,” 

Army Digest, April 1968, pp 6-9. 

-54-

- __ ~--.-
128 

129 

130 

131 

f32 

133 

134 

135 

136 

137 

138 

Address by General W. C. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff, US Army, Brazilian National War 

College, Rio de Janerio, Brazil, 24 September 1968, ‘“Vietnam-A Recapitulation,” in Addresses by General W. C. Westmoreland, Washington, D.C., Volume I, p 41. 

General William C. Westmoreland, “Report on Operations in South Vietnam, January 1964. 

June 1968,“’ Report on Ihe War in Vietnam, Superintendent of Documents, US Government 

Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1969, Section II, p 100. 

Ibid., p 117. 

Lieutenant General Richard G. Stilwell, “Evolution in Tactics-The Vietnam Experience,” 

Army, February 1970, p 18. 

See Lieutenant General John l-l. Hay Jr., 7aotica! and Material Innovations, Department of the 

Army, Washington, D.C., 1974, pp 10-23; and Lieutenant General Bernard William Rogers, 

Cedar Falls--Junclion City: A Turning Paint, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1974, 

passim. 

Robert W. Komer, “Clear, Hod, and Rebuild,” Army, May 1970, pp 16-24; and Robert W. Kamer, 

“Pacification: A Look Back . , . And Ahead,” Army, June 1970, pp 20-29. 

Westmoreland, “Report on Operations in South Vietnam, January 1!%4-June 7968,“’ Rebort on 

the War in Vietnam, op. cit., p 91. 

What a Ptatoan Leader Should Know About the Enemy’s Jungle Tactics, Headquarters, US 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 12 October 1967, p 37, USACGSC 18745.691. 

Lieutenant Colonel William E. Klein, ‘“Mechanized Infantry in Vietnam,” Enfantry, March-April 

Tolson, op. 139 The three types 

1961, p 21. 

Lieutenant General Julian J. Ewell and Major 

Edge: The Use of Analysis to Reinforce 

Washington, D.C., 1974, p 83. 

cit., passim. 

of operations are described 

Vietnam @hart Title: ARCOV): Basic Report, 

General Ira A. Hunt Jr., Sharpening the Combat 

MEEitary Judgmenf, Department of the Army, 

in EvaEuation of U.S. Army Combat Operations in 

US Army, Vietnam, 25 April 1966, Volume 1, pp II-4 

140 

141 

142 

143 

144 

145 

148 

147 

448 

149 

155 

151 

152 

153 

154 

155 

156 

157 

165 

through 11.7, USACGSC 19090.4; and Westmoreland, “Report on Operations in South Vietnam, 

January 1964.June 1968,” Repoft OR the War in VEetnam, op. cit., p 91. 

Ibid. 

The US Marines referred to this type of operation as a “County Fair.” 

Lessons Learned No. 75, Cordon and Search Operations, Headquarters, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, 20 January 1970, USACGSC 18745.838. 

Colonel David H. Hackworth, “Our Great Vietnam Goof!,‘” Popular Mechanics, June 1972, p 73. 

ARGOV: Basic Report, op. cit., Volume 1, p l-12. 

See Herbert L. Smith, Landmine and Countermine Warfare: Vietnam, 7964-1969, Engineer 

Agency for Resources Inventories, for OffEce, Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army, 

Washington, D.C., June 1972, USACGSC 19217.3. 

General Van Tien Dung, Our Great Spring Victory: An Account of the LiberaFEon of South 

Vietnam, Monthly Review Press, N.Y., 1977, pp 31-76. 

Order of BattEe Study No. 66-45, VC Withdrawal Tactics, Headquarters, US Military Assistance 

Command, Vietnam, 9 May 1966, USACGSC 18745.188. 

For genera! works on the Vietcong, see Douglas Pike, Viet Gong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Viefnam, The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 

1966; Colonel Jack Samson, “Viet Cong Tactics: ‘Ten Against One,“’ Military Review, January 

1967, pp 89-93; Lieutenant Colonel David H. Hackworth, “The Battlefield, the Enemy, and You,” 

Army Digesl, April 1968, pp 51-66; and “Viet Gong: The Hidden Enemy,” Army Digest, October 

1968, pp 45-48. 

Colonel Sidney B. Berry Jr., “Observations of a Brigade Commander: Part 1,” Military Review, 

January 1968, p 6. 

Rogers, O&J.cit., p 17. 

Lieutenant General Harry W. 0. Kinnard, “Narrowing the Combat lntehligence Gap,” Army, 

August 1969, p 23. 

For a detailed analysis of combat intelligence in South Vietnam, see Major R. L. Platt, Intelligence and Vietnam Operations, Unpublished Master of Military Arts and Science Thesis, 

USACGSC, Fort Leavenworth Kan., 1967, USACGSC 19052.80; and Major General Joseph A. 

McChrlstian, The Roie of Military Intelligence, 1965-67, Department of the Army, Washington, 

D.G., 1974. 

Ewell and Hunt, op. cit., pp 117-19. 

/bid., pp 109.‘10 and 144. 

Toison, op. cit., pp 38-39. 

Rogers, op. cit., p 77. 

For critical comments on the employment of mechanized forces! see Colonel Hugh ..I. Bartley, 

“Some Critical Notes,‘” Armor, November-December 1969, pp 36-37. 

We5tmoFeiand, “Report on Operations in South Vietnam, January 1964-June 1968,” Reporl on 

the War in Vietnam, op. cit.. p 121. 

-55-
T5S 

160 

161 

162 

163 

164 

165 

166 

167 

168 

169 

170 

171 

172 

173 

174 

175 

176 

177 

178 

179 

I.30 

181 

162 

183 

ia4 

185 

186 

167 

ta8 

189 

For an analysis of the ‘“pile on” tactic and examples of combat actions in which it was 

employed, see Lessons Learned No. 55, The Battle of Annihilation, Headquarters, US Military 

Assistance Command, Vietnam, 15 March 1966, USACGSC l&745.16-7. 

Colonel George S. Patton, “Black Horse Operations,” Armor, July-August 1969, p 37. 

Lieutenant Colonel John R. Gaivin, “Three lnnavatiansr Prime Tactical Lessons of the Vfetnam 

War,” Army, March 1972, p i9. 

Brigadier General Willard Pearson, “‘Find ‘em, Fix ‘em, Finish “em,” Army Digestl December 

1966, p 19. One of the earliest descriptions of the changing role of the infantryman occurs in 

John B. Spore, “The US. Army in Vietnam: Professionally Competent. High Spirited, Confident,” Army, May 1966, pp 28-32 and 8086. For an analysis of fire and maneuver in Vietnam, 

see Report on Dynamics of Fire and Maneuver (FIRMA It!}, US Army Combat Developments 

Command, Fort Belvoir, Va., 15 August 1969, pp 25-27. 

For further analysis of these tactics. see Lieutenant CoEonel Zeb B. Bradford Jr., “US Tactics 

in Vietnam,” Mliitary Review, February 1972, pp 63-76. The most extreme example of the 

emphasis on firepower at the expense of maneuver occurs in Lieutenant Colonel William L. 

Hauser, “‘Firepower Battlefield,” Military Review, October 1971, pp 21-27. 

Hay, op. cit., pp 53-54; and ARCOV: Firepower, op. cit., Volume 4, p C-7-5. 

Ibid., p C-T-4. 

Quoted in Dave Richard Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet: U.S.-Vietnam in Perspective, 

Presidio Press, San Rafael, Calif., 1978, p 48. 

Hay, op. cif., pp 32-33; and ARCOV: Firepower, op. cit., Volume 4 p C-7-2. 

ARCOV: Basic Report, op. cit., Volume 1, pp II-2 and 11-4. 

For analyses of the employment of mechanized forces in Southeast Asia, see Evaluation of 

U.S. Army Mechakzed and Armor Combat Operations in Veitnam @Short Title: MACOVj, US 

Army, Vietnam, 28 March 1967,Voiumes l-7, USACGSC 19090.15; Rrigadier General James M. 

Gibson, “A Case for Mechanized Infantry,” Miiitary Review, September 1970, pp 56-70; and 

Colonel Donn A. Starry, “A Report on the 11th Armored Cavalry in Southeast Asia1969-l$TCr,” Armor, JanuaryFebruary 1971. pp 14-20. 

Rogers, op. cit., p 157. 

Pearson, op. cit., p 16. 

ARCOV: Basic Report, op. cif., Volume 1, p 11-43. 

Palmer, op. cit., p 140. 

Lieutenant Colonel 5avid H. Hackworth, “Your Mission--Out Guerrilla the Guerrilla,” Army 

Digest, July 1968, p 61. 

Hackworth, “Our Great Vietnam Goof!,” Popular Mechanics, op. cit., p 72. 

Bradford, op. cit., pp 73.76. 

John M. Collins, “Vietnam Postmortem: A Senseless Strategy,” Parameters, March 1978, pp 8 

and lg. 

General Hamilton H. Howze, “Vietnam-An Epilogue,“’ Army, July 1975, pp 15-16. 

General Donn A. Starry, “A Tactical Evolution-FM 100-5,” I(lfi/itary Review, August 1978, p 4. 

Ibid., pp 3-4. For a further elaboration of this theme, see Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, 

Annual Defense Department Report. FY 7973, Superintendent of Documents, US Government 

PrEnting Office, WashFngton, D.C., 1972, p 86; Brigadier General Dan 6. Loomis, “FM 100-5, 

Operations: A Review,” Military Review, March 7977, pp 66-69; and Colonel Zeb 5. Bradford 

and Colonel Frederic J. Brown, “Implications of the Modern Battlefield,“” Military Review, Juiy 

1977, pp 3-11. 

Major General John H. Hennessey, “A Look Ahead,” Military Review, February 1972, p 113. 

See General Dorm A. Starry, “Combined Arms,” Armor, September-October 7378, pp 21-22; and 

General Donn A. Starry, “TRADOC’s Concentration, 1978: Focus Is ‘Central Battle,“’ Army, 

October 1978, pp 30-33. 

General William E. DePuy, ‘“The U.S. Army: Are We Ready for the Future?,” Army, September 

1978, p 24. 

FM 100-5, Operations, Department of the Army, Washington. D.C.. 1 duly 1976, p I-1. 

“TRADOC’s Reply,” Armed Forces Journal. October 1976. p 27. 

FM 100-5, Operations, op. cit.! 1976: p 10-8. 

One critic concluded, ‘“In essence, the US Army does not have what can appropriately be 

called an authoritative ‘tactical nuclear warfighting’ doctrine for tactical nuclear weapons and 

forces.” Major John Paul Rose, United States Army Nuclear Docfrinal DeveEopments: The 

Nuclear Battlefield. 1945.1977, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Southern California, Los Angeles Calif.! 1978, p 299. 

See Lieutenant Colonel Robert Carmichael and Major Joseph Keyes, ‘“Defense Requires 

Mobi[ity,” Infantry, March-April 1972, pp 40-42; Lieutenant Colonel Robert Carmichael, “ForceOriented Defense,” Infantry, May-June 1972, pp 20-22: Major Joseph Keyes, “Tactics for the 

Force-Oriented Defense,” infantry, July-August 1972, pp 23-27; and Captain Robert B. 

Killebrew, “Force-Oriented Defense,” Infanfry, May-June 1973, pp 40-43. 

Lieutenant General John Norton, ‘“TRICAP,” Army, June 1971, p 15. 

--56-
Igo FM 150-5, Operations, op. cit., 1976. p 2-30. 

lgl FM 71.1 (HIF), The Tank and Mechanized lnfanfry Company Team (How to FE@@, Department 

of the Army, Washington, D.C., 30 June 1977, p 4-1. One of the most extreme examples of 

emphasis on the defense occurs rn Lieutenant Colonel Steven L. Canby, “Regaining a Conventional Military Balance in Europe: Precision Guided Munitrons and lmmobiliztng the Tank,” 

MElifary Review, June 1975. pp 26-38. 

lg2 See William S. Lind, “Some Doctrinal Questions for the United States Army,” MEEitary Review, 

March 1977, pp 54-56. 

153 FM 100-5, Operations, op. cit., 1976, p 3-4. 

IS4 Ibid., p 4-3. 

‘% FM 71.100 Armored and Mechanized Dkision Operalions, Department of the Army, 

Washington, D.C., 29 September 1978, pp 4-11 through 4-13. 

Is6 FM 100-5, Operations, op. cit., 1976, p 5-2. 

‘S7 Ibid., p 5.1. 

Is6 ibid., p 5-10. 

‘ss Ibid., p 5-13. 

“* PM 71-100 Armored and Mechanized Rivis~~ Operations, op. cit., p 5-2. See Lieutenant 

Colonel David L. Tamminen, “How to Defend Outnumbered and Win,” Armor, NovemberDecember 1975, pp 39-44. 

‘*I Lind, op. cit.. pp 54-65; Lieutenant Colonel John W. Burbery Jr., How Stable the SfooE?: The 

Active Defense Revisited, paper presented at the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces 

and Society/Symposium on Tactics and Military Posture, US Army Combined Arms Center, 

Fort Leavenworth, Kan., 30 March-l April 1978 and Archer Jones, “The New FM 100-5: A View 

From the Ivory Tower,“ Military Review, February 1978, pp 27-36. 

“’ Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshail. “Group Shack and the Future Battle,” Army. May 1957, 

p 49. 

-57­ *U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1988554.001/82058 
STUDIES IN PROGRESS 

“The Lebanon Intervention, 1958: A Case Study” 

e 

“The Development of Combat Service Support Forces 

in the United States Army, 1860-l 975” 

e 

‘Selected Operations of the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940” 

Major Robert A. Doughty is currently the S3, 3d 

Squadron, 8th Cavalry, US Army, Europe. A graduate of the 

USMA, he received an M.A. in history from the University 

of California at Los Angeles and a Ph.D. from the University 

of Kansas. His previous assignments include a tour with the 

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, as an adviser to 

the Vietnamese 4th Armored Cavalry Regiment. He has 

served as an assistant professor with the Department of 

History, USMA, and as an instructor with the Department of 

Unified and Combined Operations, USACGSC, and assisted 

with the establishment of the Combat Studies Institute. 

Major Robert A. Doughty 

US Armv 
SYNOPStS OF LEAVE”NWORTH PAPER I 

The United States Army’s tactical doctrine in the 

generation following the Second World War owed its 

character to the influence of a number of factors, not 

all of which were consonant with one another or 

calculated to produce a fighting doctrine which 

reflected battlefierd realities. Among these factors, 

national security policy, a new and more importunate 

technology, service and branch parochialism. and 

actual battlefield experience were the most effective 

arbiters of what the Army’s doctrine would be. 

“Even though all of America’s military conflicts 

since World War II have been outside Europe, the 

Army and the nation have invariably refocused their 

concerns after these conflicts upon the defense of 

western Europe,” the author writes. While ‘“no single 

factor ‘drove’ the development of Army doctrine” 

during this period, changes in national security policies 

profoundly affected the Army’s doctrine, as well as its 

organization and equipment. As the Army attempted to 

respond to the shifts in mission required by policy, 

Army doctrine-makers attempted to capitalize upon the 

new potentials for firepower and mobility provided by 

technological advances. Doctrinal trends during this 

period indicate, therefore, that doctrine is often a 

compromise between national security policy and 

military realities. Seen in this light, the author writes, 

“the great value of doctrine is less the final answers it 

provides, than the impetus it creates toward 

developing innovative and creative solutions for tactical problems on future battlefields.” 

Mission 

The Combat Studies Institute was established on 18 

June 1979 as a separate, department-level activity 

within the United States Army Command and General 

Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for the 

purpose of accomplishing the following missions: 

1. Conduct original, interpretive research on 

historicaf topics pertinent to the current doctrinal 

concerns of the United States Army in accordance 

with priorities established by the Commander, 

United States Army Training and Doctrine 

Command, and to publish the results of such 

research in a variety of useful formats; 

2. Prepare and present instruction in military history 

at the United States Army Command and General 

Staff College and to assist other College 

departments in Integrating applicable military 

history materials into their instruction; 

3. Act as the proponent agency for devefopment and 

coordination of an integrated, progressive program 

of military history instruction in the United States 

Army Training and Doctrine Command service 

school system.