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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:20cr18/MCR

MICHAEL JOE GREEN, II, 

 Defendant.

______________________________/

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Suppress Evidence by 

Defendant Michael Joe Green II, see ECF No. 19, which the Government opposes, 

see ECF No. 20. The Court held an evidentiary hearing on June 18, 2020 and took 

Green’s motion under advisement. Having fully and carefully considered the 

evidence, the applicable law, and the written and oral arguments of the parties, the 

Court denies the motion.

Green is charged with one count of possession of a firearm and ammunition1

by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Trial is scheduled for 

August 3, 2020. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3), Green

1 Specifically, Count One charges Defendant with knowingly possessing a Canik 9-

millimeter pistol and Aguila 9 x 19 millimeter ammunition on January 18, 2020.

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moves to suppress the firearm and ammunition as “fruit of an illegal stop of his 

automobile and detention of his person.” ECF No. 19. More specifically, Green 

argues that law enforcement officers did not have the requisite reasonable suspicion 

to stop his vehicle and detain him, and therefore the firearm and ammunition found 

inside his car are inadmissible. The Government responds that the seizure of firearm 

and ammunition from Green’s vehicle was the result of a traffic stop supported by 

both reasonable suspicion and probable cause. 

I. Background

The sequence of events leading up to and following Green’s traffic stop is not 

in dispute. Security footage shows that on January 18, 2020, at approximately 2:47 

a.m., Green pulled into a well-lit public parking lot at the northwest corner of 

Jefferson Street and Government Street in downtown Pensacola and reverse-parked 

his black Cadillac sedan into a parking spot along the perimeter, such that the front 

of the vehicle faced into the parking lot as opposed to the street. It was Gallery 

Night, a lively, monthly celebration of the local culture, so a number of cars were 

circling in and out of the parking lot, and there were a lot of people out and about. 

Green was seated in the driver’s seat, and John McNeil was in the front passenger 

seat. Less than ten minutes later, a Pensacola Police Department officer, Officer 

Charles Restifo, approached Green from the driver’s side window and spoke to him 

for approximately one minute. As Officer Restifo walked away, Green started

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driving towards the parking lot’s exit. But before he could reach Jefferson Street, a 

marked police vehicle pulled in front of Green, blocked the exit, and turned on its 

blue lights. Green and McNeil were subsequently removed from the vehicle and 

placed in handcuffs. Either simultaneously or shortly thereafter, Officer Restifo

observed a visible firearm under the driver’s seat. Approximately 25 minutes later, 

a canine sniff was conducted, which signaled the presence of narcotics. Green and 

McNeil were arrested. A search of the vehicle by Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 

agents on the scene uncovered an open, partially empty bottle of Patrón tequila, a 

plastic cup containing a cocktail straw in the center console of the vehicle, an ashtray 

containing several smoked or fully smoked marijuana blunts, and a small plastic bag 

containing 3.8 grams of fresh marijuana. Presumably, the firearm that Officer 

Restifo observed under the driver’s seat was also collected during the search.

2

The parties dispute what was observed in and around Green’s car before the 

traffic stop. At the hearing, the Government presented testimony from several 

Pensacola Police Department detectives and officers, including two detectives from 

the VICE and narcotics unit, Detectives Mark Norman and Richard Ghigliotty, and 

one patrol officer, Officer Restifo. All three law enforcement officers encountered 

2 A photograph of the firearm was not admitted into evidence and no witness testified to 

when the firearm was seized.

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Green and his vehicle within ten minutes prior to the traffic stop.3 Green presented 

testimony from McNeil, the sole passenger in Green’s vehicle immediately before 

and at the time of the traffic stop.

4

 The Court summarizes the relevant testimony 

below.

Pensacola Police Department Detective Mark Norman was the first law 

enforcement official to encounter Green. Detective Norman and Detective Richard 

Ghigliotty5 were patrolling the area that night in plain clothes and are seen on 

security footage walking south through the parking lot, in the direction of Green’s 

car. Detective Norman testified that as he was walking through the parking lot, he 

observed Green in the driver’s seat of a parked black Cadillac, with the window 

rolled down. Detective Norman recognized Green from an intelligence bulletin he 

had reviewed with other Pensacola Police Department officers prior to his patrol that 

night. The bulletin, reviewed in preparation for the upcoming Martin Luther King, 

3 The Government also presented testimony from Detective Amanda Davis of the Pensacola 

Police Department and Special Agent Adam Zeithammel of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 

Firearms and Explosives. Both witnesses provided testimony regarding events immediately 

following the traffic stop. The Government also introduced security camera footage of the parking 

lot where Green’s encounter with law enforcement took place. 

4 Green also presented testimony from Maasin Wallace, an investigator for the Federal 

Public Defender’s Office, regarding his interview with one of the arresting officers, Officer 

Wayne Berthiaume of the Pensacola Police Department. Additionally, Green introduced into

evidence body camera footage from Officer Berthiaume after he had stopped Green’s vehicle. 

5 Detectives Norman and Ghigliotty were also accompanied by a third law enforcement 

officer, who Special Agent Adam Zeithammel of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 

Explosives (“ATF”) identified as Special Agent Matthew Murray. Special Agent Murray did not 

testify at the evidentiary hearing.

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Jr. parade, provided intelligence on several individuals who were suspected of being 

involved in recent violent crimes in Pensacola, and contained photographs of those 

individuals, including Green.

Detective Norman separated from Detective Ghigliotty and approached the 

front driver’s side several feet in front of the headlight of Green’s vehicle, where he

paused briefly and turned around to rejoin Detective Ghigliotty on the sidewalk. 

Detective Norman testified that when he stopped by the driver’s side headlight, he 

could smell a “strong odor” of marijuana “emanating” from Green’s vehicle. The 

security footage shows another vehicle6 parked next to Green, but Detective Norman 

testified that the marijuana smell came from Green’s vehicle only. 

Thereafter, Detective Norman testified that he immediately walked north to 

two nearby uniformed officers, one of whom was Detective Amanda Davis of the 

Pensacola Police Department, and told her they needed to stop Green’s vehicle. He 

did not tell the uniformed officers that he smelled marijuana emanating from Green’s 

vehicle or otherwise explain why they needed to stop Green’s car.7

 Officer Davis 

testified that in response, she radioed several other police officers to conduct a traffic 

6 The security footage shows that the vehicle parked next to Green was facing the opposite 

direction, i.e. with the trunk facing Detective Norman. The driver’s side window was also rolled 

down.

7 Detective Norman has served as a detective in the VICE and narcotics unit for 

approximately five years and has received specific training on detecting and identifying marijuana.

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stop of Green’s vehicle.

Approximately 10 seconds after Detective Norman started walking away from 

Green’s vehicle, at 2:55 a.m., Officer Restifo approached Green’s open driver’s side 

window from the rear. Officer Restifo, who was wearing a black vest with the word 

“POLICE” in large font across the front and back8

, was attempting to clear out the 

parking lot, and had just asked the occupants of the only vehicle parked next to 

Green’s to exit the lot. Officer Restifo testified that when he reached Green, he 

directed a flashlight into the vehicle and observed Green and McNeil with money 

fanned out across their laps. Green said the money was “for the ladies,” and asked 

Officer Restifo if he was free to leave, to which Officer Restifo responded he was. 

Officer Restifo testified that he did not smell marijuana when he was at Green’s 

vehicle and did not observe an open liquor bottle in the car. Green then began 

driving away from Officer Restifo and towards the parking lot exit. There were 

several other cars attempting to exit the lot, and Green’s vehicle moved forward 

approximately one car length only before it reached a short standstill behind a line 

of vehicles attempting to exit. 

As Green’s car waited to proceed, Detective Ghigliotty became the third 

Pensacola Police Department official to encounter Green. Detective Ghigliotty is 

8 The surveillance video also shows Officer Restifo with a gun and holster strapped around 

his right thigh. 

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seen on the security footage walking north to south through the parking lot while 

appearing to be on his cell phone. He walked past Green’s vehicle along the driver’s 

side, stopped near Green’s rear bumper to speak with two uniformed police officers, 

and then turned around and walked south to north, back alongside Green’s car but 

on the passenger side. Detective Ghigliotty testified that as he walked by the driver’s 

side of the car and peered inside the open driver’s side window, he recognized Green 

from the same bulletin that Detective Norman reviewed prior to their patrol that 

night. Detective Ghigliotty also smelled burnt marijuana coming from the car, 

particularly as he walked back north along the passenger side. 

While Green’s vehicle inched towards the exit to the parking lot, Detective 

Norman and Detective Ghigliotty separately walked by Green’s vehicle again. 

Detective Norman was first. He walked southwest across the parking lot, passing

Green’s car along the passenger side, but remained several feet away. Detective 

Norman testified that he continued to smell marijuana emanating from the car,

through the closed passenger window.

9

 Several seconds later, Detective Norman 

strolled past Green’s car again, this time heading northeast, and testified that he

caught another “overwhelming” odor of “fresh” marijuana coming from the car, this 

time with the passenger side window rolled down. 

9 It is unclear in the surveillance footage whether the passenger side window was 

completely or only partially closed.

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A couple of minutes later, when Green was in the exit lane about to leave the 

parking lot, Detective Ghigliotty walked by Green’s vehicle for a second time. He 

walked in front of the car along the front bumper, and then turned right and walked 

immediately along the passenger side, heading west. Detective Ghigliotty testified 

that as he walked along the front bumper, he looked through the front windshield10

and saw in the center console a clear plastic cup used by nearby bars to serve liquor

and in Green’s lap an open bottle of Patrón tequila. Detective Ghigliotty then called 

Sergeant Pat Bradley11 and requested that he arrange for a stop of Green’s car. 

Detective Ghigliotty told Sergeant Bradley that he “ha[d] enough” to stop the 

vehicle, but did not specifically mention the marijuana odor or open liquor bottle.

12

As soon as Green reached the front of the exit lane, Officer Wayne Berthiaume 

pulled his marked police vehicle directly in front of Green’s black Cadillac, blocking

the exit. Detective Davis, who was nearby on foot, approached the driver’s side of 

the vehicle and Officer Berthiaume approached the passenger side. The driver’s side 

window was down, and Detective Davis immediately observed what appeared to be 

10 According to Detective Ghigliotty and Detective Norman, the windows of Green’s vehicle 

were not tinted.

11 Detective Ghigliotty testified that he believed Sergeant Bradley was the supervisor that 

night.

12 Maasin Wallace testified that when he interviewed Officer Wayne Berthiaume, one of the 

officers who conducted the traffic stop, Officer Berthiaume recalled that Detective Ghigliotty 

approached him in the parking lot briefly and instructed him to conduct the traffic stop. Officer 

Berthiaume could not recall whether he was told why Detective Ghigliotty wanted to stop the 

vehicle, but he nevertheless did receive a “green light” to proceed with the traffic stop.

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an open bottle of Patrón. She also observed Green fidgeting under his car seat and 

ordered him to show his hands several times. Detective Davis instructed Green to 

exit the vehicle and advised him that he would be placed in handcuffs. Detective

Davis testified that she did not smell marijuana until she approached the open 

passenger side door and McNeil exited the vehicle. 

McNeil testified he was unaware of any marijuana and did not see a bottle of 

Patrón in the car that night. He denied any marijuana being smoked in the car the 

entire time he was in the passenger seat. Additionally, although McNeil agreed there 

was a plastic cup in the center console, he recalled it being empty.

II. Discussion

“The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable search and 

seizure.” United States v. Holt, 777 F.3d 1234, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015). A warrantless 

traffic stop is an unreasonable “seizure” that violates the Fourth Amendment, 

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979), unless it is supported by probable 

cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred or reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity.13 United States v. Spoerke, 568 F.3d 1236, 1248 (11th Cir. 2009); United 

States v. Harris, 526 F.3d 1334, 1338 (11th Cir. 2008). 

13 Here, there is no dispute that Green was “seized” when Officer Berthiaume used his

patrol car to block Green’s ability to exit the parking lot and Officer Davis subsequently 

removed Green from the car and placed him in handcuffs. See Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 

249, 255 (2007); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). 

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Green argues that law enforcement did not have reasonable suspicion or 

probable cause to stop him, and thus his traffic stop was unconstitutional.14 In so 

arguing, he asks the Court to reject the testimony of Detective Norman and Detective 

Ghigliotty regarding their observations of a marijuana odor emanating from Green’s

vehicle and an open liquor bottle inside Green’s vehicle. 

The Court declines and instead finds (1) the detectives’ testimony credible 

and (2) that the officers had both reasonable suspicion and probable cause to stop 

Green’s car. 

a. The Officers’ Testimony Was Credible

District Court rulings on motions to suppress evidence “involve mixed 

questions of law and fact.” United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 

2012); United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002). When 

14 Green does not challenge the constitutionality of the prolonged traffic stop or the 

subsequent search of his vehicle, but rather argues that the firearm and ammunition uncovered in 

the search were fruits of an illegal stop. See Mot. to Suppress at 4. In any event, the marijuana 

odor emanating from the vehicle also provided law enforcement with probable cause to search the 

vehicle without a warrant. See United States v. Dixon, 901 F. 3d 1322, 1339 (11th Cir. 2018) 

(citing United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc)) (holding that officer 

who testified that he “smelled the odor of marijuana” as he approached the vehicle had probable 

cause to search it); see, e.g., United States v. Clark, 605 F. App’x 892, 895 (11th Cir. 2015) 

(affirming finding of probable cause to search vehicle without a warrant where officers smelled 

marijuana coming from defendant’s car); United States v. Smith, 481 F. App’x 540, 544 (11th Cir. 

2012) (same). That the officers waited 25 minutes for drug-sniffing dogs to corroborate the smell 

does not render the length of the stop unconstitutional. See Holt, 777 F.3d at 1257 (holding traffic 

stop constitutional where the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicions that the defendant was 

illegally transporting narcotics or currency and the stop lasted 27 minutes before a drug-sniffing

dog was deployed).

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opposing parties present conflicting testimony regarding questions of fact, the 

district court must evaluate which testimony is more credible, accounting for the 

interests of the witness, any internal consistencies in the witness’s testimony and the 

witness’s candor and demeanor on the stand. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d at 749. The 

district court’s credibility determination is conclusive unless it appears to be 

“unbelievable,” or “so inconsistent or improbable on its face that no reasonable 

factfinder could accept it.” Holt, 777 F.3d at 1255; Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d at

749. 

First, during their testimony, both Detective Norman and Detective Ghigliotty

were professional, calm and courteous, which only adds to their credibility. See 

United States v. Sims, No. 9:19-CR-80106, 2019 WL 7879878, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 

20, 2019) (finding testimony of deputy credible in part because his demeanor was 

“honest, professional, and courteous” on the witness stand).

Second, the testimonies of Detective Norman and Detective Ghigliotty were

not only internally consistent, but also largely consistent with what could be 

observed on the security footage and what was eventually found in Green’s vehicle: 

several fully and partially smoked marijuana cigarettes and approximately 3.8 grams 

of unburnt marijuana. See United States v. Rembert, No. 117CR00316MHCAJB, 

2018 WL 7283630, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 6, 2018) (finding credible officer’s 

statement that he smelled marijuana, in part because the search of the vehicle 

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uncovered unburned marijuana in a backpack).15

Third, the fact that both detectives have had extensive training and experience

with marijuana in their law enforcement careers enhances their credibility with 

respect to identifying the odor of marijuana. See United States v. Clark, 605 F. 

App’x 892, 895 (11th Cir. 2015) (“The court did not clearly err in crediting the 

detectives’ testimony that they could smell the scent of marijuana coming from [the 

defendant’s] car, especially given that both detectives had made numerous narcotics 

arrests involving marijuana over the course of their careers.”). Detective Norman 

has been in the VICE and narcotics unit for five years and has received specific 

training on detecting and identifying marijuana. He has also made at least several 

hundred marijuana related arrests in his law enforcement career. Similarly, 

Detective Ghigliotty is also in the VICE and narcotics unit. Although he joined the 

unit in December of last year, he has over five years of total law enforcement 

experience and has been involved in several hundred narcotics-related 

investigations, including marijuana.

16 

Moreover, although Green argues that Officer Restifo’s testimony regarding 

15 The fact that Detective Norman characterized the marijuana smell as “fresh” and Detective 

Ghigliotty characterized it as “burnt” does not render the testimony implausible, improbable, or 

unreasonably inconsistent. See United States v. Reed, No. 118CR00612KOBHNJ, 2019 WL 

2710088, at *7 (N.D. Ala. May 3, 2019).

16 Detective Ghigliotty also testified that he was able to recognize the plastic cocktail cup and 

Patrón bottle based on his bartending experience at local bars in Pensacola.

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the absence of any marijuana odor discredits the contrary testimonies of Detective 

Norman and Detective Ghigliotty, the Court does not agree. In fact, the accounts of 

Detective Norman and Detective Ghigliotty are not necessarily inconsistent with 

Officer Restifo. Detective Norman, Detective Ghigliotty, and Officer Restifo 

encountered Green at different times. That Officer Restifo did not smell marijuana 

or see an open bottle of liquor in the car does not necessarily mean that Detectives 

Norman and Ghigliotty could not have smelled marijuana or that Detective 

Ghigliotty could not have seen an open Patrón bottle, particularly when they 

encountered Green’s vehicle at different times. Additionally, Officer Restifo never 

walked by the passenger side of vehicle, where both Detective Norman and 

Detective Ghigliotty found the marijuana odor most apparent, or the front of the 

vehicle, where Detective Norman first detected the marijuana odor. Officer Restifo 

approached Green’s vehicle from the rear on the driver’s side, and walked up to only 

the driver’s side window; he never past that point, and after his brief encounter with 

Green, Green drove away. Furthermore, unlike Detective Norman and Detective 

Ghigliotty, Officer Restifo was not dressed in plain clothes, and instead sported a 

vest with clear law enforcement insignia. Officer Restifo had been clearing out other 

cars across the parking lot before he crossed it and approached the vicinity of 

Green’s vehicle to continue clearing out the lot. Since Green’s vehicle was reverseparked such that the front faced into the parking lot, it is reasonable to infer that 

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Green and/or McNeil saw Officer Restifo clearing out the parking lot. It is also 

reasonable to infer that when Green and/or McNeil spotted Officer Restifo, they hid

the open Patrón bottle and tried to mask any marijuana smell inside Green’s vehicle. 

Indeed, these inferences would likely explain why Detective Norman, who had 

walked by Green’s vehicle several seconds before Officer Restifo, like Officer 

Restifo did not observe the Patrón bottle. Thus, the testimony of Detective Norman 

and Detective Ghigliotty are not improbable or unbelievable on its face. 

Accordingly, the Court credits their testimony. See, e.g., United States v. White, 593 

F.3d 1199, 1203 (11th Cir. 2010) (accepting district court’s factual findings 

regarding marijuana smell because the fact that one officer remembered the 

marijuana smell and one did not recollect it did not make the existence of marijuana 

odors “inconceivable” or “unbelievable”); United States v. Johnson, 445 F. App’x 

311, 313 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming denial of motion to suppress where police 

officer’s testimony regarding the smell of raw marijuana was credible and not 

inherently unbelievable); United States v. Benitez, 541 F. App’x 961, 963 (11th Cir. 

2013) (finding no reversible error in crediting police officer’s testimony when it 

“was not improbable or inconsistent on its face”).

Lastly, the Court finds the testimony of Detectives Norman and Ghigliotty 

more credible than that of John McNeil. McNeil testified he did not smell marijuana 

or see a bottle of Patrón in the car. However, some of McNeil’s testimony also 

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contradicts the video evidence. For example, he testified that the police officers who 

stopped Green’s car approached from the back, when the video clearly shows that 

they came from the police vehicle in the front and from the sidewalk on the driver’s 

side. McNeil also testified that he did not see a bottle of Patrón in the car. But the 

body camera footage from Officer Berthiaume showed that Green picked up a bottle 

of Patron from his right armrest during his encounter with Officer Davis, all while 

McNeil was sitting next to Green in the passenger seat. Additionally, McNeil was 

effectively impeached by the Government based on his prior criminal history. See 

Fed. R. Evid. 609. Finally, McNeil has a strong motive for disclaiming any 

knowledge or smell of marijuana in Green’s car given that he is facing marijuanarelated charges for the marijuana found in the car.

b. The Traffic Stop Was Constitutional

The Court next addresses whether the stop was justified by reasonable 

suspicion or probable cause. Reasonable suspicion is a “less demanding standard 

than probable cause,” and exists when the totality of the circumstances provides law 

enforcement with “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular 

person stopped of criminal activity.” Lewis, 674 F.3d at 1303, 1305; see Ornelas v. 

United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996). Reasonable suspicion may draw from the 

collective knowledge of the law enforcement officers involved in the stop. United 

States v. Bishop, 940 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Cotton, 721 

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F.2d 350, 352 (11th Cir. 1983)); see United States v. Glinton, 154 F.3d 1245, 1257 

(11th Cir. 1998). Probable cause is based on “the facts and circumstances within the 

collective knowledge of law enforcement officials, of which they had reasonably 

trustworthy information.” United States v. Willis, 759 F.2d 1486, 1494 (11th Cir. 

1985) (emphasis added); United States v. Allison, 953 F.2d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 

1992). But the facts and circumstances must be “sufficient to cause a person of 

reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.” Willis, 

953 F.2d at 1494; Allison, 953 F.2d at 1350. 

Here, the officers involved in the stop had reasonable suspicion to stop Green. 

Detective Ghigliotty and Detective Norman had a particularized and objective basis 

for believing that Green’s vehicle contained marijuana, which is illegal for 

recreational use in Florida, see Fla. Stat. §§ 893.02-893.03, when they detected 

marijuana odor coming from the car. Detective Norman provided credible testimony 

that he detected a “strong” marijuana odor as he walked past Green’s car three 

separate times. Detective Ghigliotty similarly testified that he could smell marijuana 

coming from Green’s car when he walked by twice. It is well-established in this 

Circuit that the smell of marijuana provides reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity. White, 593 F.3d at 1203; United States v. Hunter, 373 F. App’x 973, 976 

(11th Cir. 2010). The detectives did not need to physically see the marijuana or 

observe Green recreationally using marijuana to stop him; the marijuana odor is 

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sufficient for an objectively reasonable officer, particularly with the same level of 

training and experience with marijuana-related offenses as the detectives, to suspect

that the vehicle’s occupants were involved in criminal activity. See United States v. 

Williams, 619 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 2010) ([T]he law does not require absolute 

certainty or even probable cause before an officer stops a car; he need only 

reasonably suspect that its occupants are involved in criminal activity.”).

There was also probable cause to stop Green for violating two traffic laws. 

Law enforcement “may stop a vehicle when there is probable cause to believe that 

the driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment 

regulations relating to the operation of motor vehicles.” United States v. Cooper, 

133 F.3d 1394, 1398 (11th Cir. 1998). This includes noncriminal traffic violations, 

even if it is an offense punishable by fine. See, e.g., Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 

1252 (11th Cir. 2012) (driving without highlights); United States v. Spoerke, 568 

F.3d 1236, 1248 (11th Cir. 2009) (littering); see also Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 

532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (holding arrest was properly supported by probable cause 

to believe that the defendant violated a misdemeanor seatbelt requirement 

punishable only be a fine). 

Detective Ghigliotty observed in Green’s front seat an unsealed, half empty

bottle of liquor and a plastic cup frequently used by surrounding bars—perhaps with 

even more frequency on Gallery Night—to hold cocktails as Green headed towards 

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the parking lot exit in his vehicle. In Florida, it is unlawful for any person “to possess 

an open container of an alcoholic beverage . . . while operating a vehicle in the state.”

Fla. Stat. § 316.1936(2)(a). Additionally, in Escambia County, where Green was 

stopped, it is “unlawful for any person to consume any alcoholic beverage or possess 

an open container of any alcoholic beverage while stopping, standing or remaining 

in or upon any public parking area when such area is open to the view of the general 

public or accessible to vehicular traffic.” Escambia County Code of Ordinances § 

6-63. Under both the Florida law and the Escambia County Ordinance, an “open 

container” is any container of alcoholic beverage that has a broken seal. Compare 

Fla. Stat. § 316.1936(1)(a) (“open container” means “any container of alcoholic 

beverage which is immediately capable of being consumed from, or the seal of which 

has been broken”); Escambia County Code of Ordinances § 6-61 (“Open container 

means any bottle, can, cup, glass or other receptacle containing any alcoholic 

beverage which is open, which has been opened, which has its seal broken, or which 

has had its contents partially removed.”). Based on the totality of the circumstances, 

a reasonably prudent officer in Detective Ghigliotty’s position would have probable 

cause to believe that Green was in violation of both Fla. Stat. § 316.1936(2)(a) and 

Escambia County Code of Ordinances § 6-63. 

Although Detective Norman and Detective Ghigliotty did not physically 

conduct the traffic stop themselves, the traffic stop was nevertheless constitutional. 

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As the Court previously observed, reasonable suspicion and probable cause are 

determined from the collective knowledge of all officers involved in the traffic stop. 

See Terrell, 668 F.3d at 1251-52 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Hensley,

469 U.S. 221, 231 (1985)); Glinton, 154 F.3d at 1257. “Where there is at least 

minimal communication between different officers, the collective knowledge of the 

officers determines probable cause.” Allison, 953 F.2d at 1350. The same applies 

for reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Glinton, 154 F.3d at 1257; United States v. 

Guzman, No. CV117CR00405TWTLTW2, 2018 WL 7361073, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 

13, 2018). For example, in Glinton, the defendant, like Green here, argued that the 

initial traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers who stopped 

him did not observe firsthand the reasonably suspect activity. The Court rejected 

defendant’s argument and found that there was reasonable suspicion for the stop 

where the task force agents who observed the reasonably suspect activity ordered 

the other officers, by radio, to stop the car. See Glinton, 154 F.3d at 1249, 1257. 

Here, Detective Davis and Officer Berthiaume, the two law enforcement 

officials who stopped Green, did not observe firsthand any marijuana odor or an 

open liquor bottle prior to the stop. But they were directly instructed to conduct the

stop by Detective Norman and Detective Ghigliotty, who did have reasonable 

suspicion and probable cause to stop Green. That Detective Norman and Detective 

Ghigliotty may not have shared with the officers conducting the stop the precise 

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reason for conducting the stop does not preclude their knowledge from being

considered as part of the shared, collective knowledge of the other officers involved 

in the stop. See United States v. Kapperman, 764 F.2d 786, 791 n.5 (11th Cir. 1985) 

(explaining that even though the arresting officer may not have known all the facts 

of the investigation, the collective knowledge of all officers involved provided 

probable cause for the arrest). Thus, collectively, the officers had sufficient 

justification to stop Green’s car under the Fourth Amendment. See Glinton, 154

F.3d at 1257; see also United States v. Burrows, 566 F. App’x 889, 892 (11th Cir. 

2014) (“In reaching the conclusion that reasonable suspicion supported an 

investigatory stop, the district judge did not err in assessing the collective knowledge 

of all officers at the time [defendant was stopped].”). 

Green also argues that he was specifically targeted by the officers because he 

appeared in the evening’s intelligence bulletin. But both Detective Norman and 

Detective Ghigliotty denied having any ulterior motives for the stop. In any event, 

an officer’s subjective motivations “play[s] no role in ordinary, probable-cause 

Fourth Amendment analysis,” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810-13 (1996), 

and thus “does not invalidate what is otherwise objectively justifiable behavior under 

the Fourth Amendment,” Harris, 526 F.3d at 1337. See United States v. Holloman, 

113 F.3d 192, 194 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that police officers’ subjective intent in 

conducting the traffic stop did not invalidate seizure of defendant and his vehicle 

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where officers had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred).

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the Pensacola Police 

Department detectives and officers who stopped Green’s vehicle had both 

reasonable suspicion and probable cause to stop and detain him. Accordingly, 

Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence, ECF No. 19, is DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of July 2020.

 M. Casey Rodgers M. CASEY RODGERS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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