and international partners to perform non-
military stabilization and reconstruction tasks
that might otherwise often become military
responsibilities by default. Our intent is to
focus our efforts on those tasks most directly
associated with establishing favorable long-
term security conditions.

To that end, the Department will work with
interagency and international partners to
improve our ability to transition from
military- to civilian-led stability operations.
We will capitalize on our security
cooperation efforts by working with allies
and partners to promote a secure environment
in support of stabilization and reconstruction
activities.

We will help international and domestic
partners increase their capabilities to
contend with complex issues of common
concern.

B. ATTRIBUTES

To execute this strategy, U.S. military forces
possess a number of attributes:

1. SHAPE AND SIZE OF MILITARY
FORCES

The shape, size, and global posture of U.S.
military forces are configured to:

© Defend the U.S. homeland; '

¢ Operate in and from four forward regions
to assure allies and friends, dissuade
competitors, and deter and counter aggression
and coercion;

¢ Swiftly defeat adversaries in overlapping
military campaigns while preserving for the
President the option to call for a more

decisive and enduring result in a single
operation; and,”

© Conduct a limited number of lesser
contingencies.

These force planning standards have
informed decisions to date on the force’s
overall mix of capabilities, size, posture,
patterns of activity, readiness, and capacity to
surge globally. This framework and these
standards will be reviewed in the 2005 QDR.

The force planning framework does not focus
on specific conflicts. It helps determine
capabilities required for a range of scenarios.
The Department analyzes the force
requirements for the most likely, the most
dangerous, and the most demanding
circumstances. Assessments of U.S.
capabilities will examine the breadth and
depth of this construct, not seek to optimize
in a single area. Doing so allows decision-
makers to identify areas where prudent risk

Homeland Defense activities represent the employment of unique
military capabilities at home—at varying levels—to contend with
those circumstances described at the conclusion of Section II, C, 1.

2 Campaigns to “swiftly defeat” the efforts of adversaries are
undertaken to achieve a circumscribed set of objectives aimed at
altering an adversary’s behavior or policies, swiftly denying an
adversary’s operational or strategic objectives, preventing attacks or
uncontrolled conflict escalation, and/or rapidly re-establishing
security conditions favorable to the United States and its partners.
“Swiftly defeating” adversary efforts could include a range of
military activities—from stability operations to major combat that
will vary substantially in size and duration. Examples of “swift
defeat” campaigns include Operation(s) Desert Storm and Allied
Force.

Campaigns to “win decisively” are undertaken to bring about
fundamental, favorable change in a crisis region and create enduring
results. They may entail lengthy periods of both major combat and
stability operations; require regime change, defense, or restoration;
and entail significant investments of the nation’s resources and time.
“Win decisive” campaigns will vary significantly in size and scope
but will be among the most taxing scenarios. Examples of “win
decisive” campaigns include Operation(s) Just Cause and Iraqi
Freedom.

> Lesser contingency operations are undertaken to resolve or
ameliorate particular crisis circumstances and typically describe
operations more limited in duration and scope than those outlined
above. These operations include military activities like strikes and
raids, non-combatant evacuation operations, peace operations, and
disaster relief or humanitarian assistance. Lesser contingency
operations range in size from major undertakings like Operation(s)
Restore Hope ot Provide Comfort to the much smaller, episodic
dispatch of U.S. forces to respond to emergency conditions.

16


Preventive actions include security
cooperation, forward deterrence,
humanitarian assistance, peace operations,
and non-proliferation initiatives—including
international cooperation to interdict illicit
WMD transiting the commons. Preventive
actions also might entail other military
operations—for example, to prevent the
outbreak of hostilities or to help defend or
restore a friendly government. Under the
most dangerous and compelling
circumstances, prevention might require the
use of force to disable or destroy WMD in
the possession of terrorists or others or to
strike targets (e.g., terrorists) that directly
threaten the United States or U.S. friends or
other interests.

The United States cannot achieve its defense
objectives alone. Our concept of active,
layered defense includes international
partners. Thus, among the key goals of the
National Security Strategy is to work with
other nations to resolve regional crises and
conflicts. In some cases, U.S. forces will
play a supporting role, lending assistance to
others when our unique capabilities are
needed. In other cases, U.S. forces will be
supported by international partners.

Another layer in an active, layered approach
is the immediate physical defense of the
United States. At the direction of the
President, the Department will undertake
military missions at home to defend the
United States, its population, and its critical
infrastructure from external attack. Our
missile defense program aims to dissuade
adversaries by imposing operational and
economic costs on those who would employ
missiles to threaten the United States, its
forces, its interests, or its partners.

In emergencies, we will act quickly to
provide unique capabilities to other Federal
agencies when the need surpasses the
capacities of civilian responders and we are
directed to do so by the President or the
Secretary. Under some circumstances, the

Department will provide support to outside
agencies for one-time events of limited scope
and duration.

We will focus our military planning, posture,
operations, and capabilities on the active,
forward, and layered defense of our nation,
our interests, and our partners.

2. CONTINUOUS TRANSFORMATION

Continuous defense transformation is part of
a wider governmental effort to transform
America’s national security institutions to
meet 21-century challenges and
opportunities. Just as our challenges change
continyously, so too must our military
capabilities.

The purpose of transformation is to extend
key advantages and reduce vulnerabilities.
We are now in a long-term struggle against
persistent, adaptive adversaries, and must
transform to prevail.

Transformation is not only about technology.
It is also about:

e Changing the way we think about
challenges and opportunities;

« Adapting the defense establishment to
that new perspective; and,

¢ Refocusing capabilities to meet future
challenges, not those we are already most
prepared to meet.

Transformation requires difficult
programmatic and organizational choices.
We will need to divest in some areas and
invest in others.

Transformational change is not limited to
operational forces. We also want to change
long-standing business processes within the
Department to take advantage of information
technology. And, we are working to
transform our international partnerships,
including the capabilities that we and our
partners can use collectively.

10



employment of U.S. and coalition forces
worldwide in a crisis.

Consistent with our partners’ sovereign
considerations, we will seek new legal
arrangements that maximize our freedom to:

¢ Deploy our forces as needed;

¢ Conduct essential training with partners
in the host nation; and,

e Support deployed forces around the
world.

Finally, legal arrangements should encourage
responsibility-sharing between us and our
partners, and provide legal protections for our
personnel through Status of Forces
Agreements and protections against transfers
of U.S. personnel to the International
Criminal Court.

Global sourcing and surge. Our military
needs to be managed in a way that will allow
us to deploy a greater percentage of our force
where and when it is needed, anywhere in the
world. Thus, the Department is transitioning
to a global force management process. This
will allow us to source our force needs from a
global, rather than regional, perspective and to
surge capabilities when needed into crisis
theaters from disparate locations worldwide.
Our global presence will be managed
dynamically, ensuring that our joint
capabilities are employed to the greatest
effect.

Under this concept, Combatant Commanders
no longer “own” forces in their theaters.
Forces are allocated to them as needed—
sourced from anywhere in the world. This
allows for greater flexibility to meet rapidly
changing operational circumstances.

A prominent consideration in our global
posture changes is to move our most rapidly
deployable capabilities forward. For.
example, heavy forces will return to the
United States, to be replaced in large part by
more expeditionary capabilities such as

airborne forces and Stryker brigades. As a
result, our immediate response times should
be greatly improved.

20


NATIONAL DEFENSE
STRATEGY

OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA

I. AMERICA’S SECURITY IN
THE 21* CENTURY

A. AMERICA’S ROLE IN THE WORLD

America is a nation at war. We face a
diverse set of security challenges.

Yet, we still live in an era of advantage and
opportunity. We also possess uniquely
effective military capabilities that we are
seeking to transform to meet future
challenges.

As directed by the President in his 2002
National Security Strategy, we will use our
position “to build a safer, better world that
favors human freedom, democracy, and free
enterprise.” Our security and that of our
international partners—our allies and friends
—is based on a common commitment to
peace, freedom, and economic opportunity.
In cooperation with our international
partners, we can build a more peaceful and
secure international order in which the .
sovereignty of nations is respected.

The United States and its allies and partners
have a strong interest in protecting the
sovereignty of nation states. In the secure
international order that we seek, states must
be able to effectively govern themselves and
order their affairs as their citizens see fit.
Nevertheless, they must exercise their
sovereignty responsibly, in conformity with
the customary principles of international law,
as well as with any additional obligations that
they have freely accepted.

It is unacceptable for regimes to use the
principle of sovereignty as a shield behind
which they claim to be free to engage in

activities that pose enormous threats to their
citizens, neighbors, or the rest of the
international community.

While the security threats of the 20" century
arose from powerful states that embarked on
aggressive courses, the key dimensions of the
21" century—globalization and the potential
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
—mean great dangers may arise in and
emanate from relatively weak states and
ungoverned areas. The U.S., its allies, and
partners must remain vigilant to those states
that lack the capacity to govern activity
within their borders. Sovereign states are
obligated to work to ensure that their
territories are not used as bases for attacks on
others.

Despite our strategic advantages, we are
vulnerable to challenges ranging from
external attacks to indirect threats posed by
aggression and dangerous instability. Some
enemies may seek to terrorize our population
and destroy our way of life, while others will
try to 1) limit our global freedom to act, 2)
dominate key regions, or 3) attempt to make
prohibitive the costs of meeting various U.S.
international commitments.

The United States follows a strategy that
aims to preserve and extend peace, freedom;
and prosperity throughout the world.

The attacks of 9/11 gave us greater clarity on
the challenges that confront us. U.S. officials
and the public saw then that, without resolute
action, even more harmful attacks would
likely occur in the future. A reactive or
defensive approach would not allow the
United States to secure itself and preserve our
way of life as a free and open society. Thus,
the United States is committed to an active
defense of the nation and its interests. This
new approach is evident in the war on
terrorism.

The United States and its partners have made
progress in the war on terrorism through an
unprecedented level of international


could be accepted and areas where risk
should be reduced or mitigated. Importantly,
operations related to the war on terrorism
span the breadth of this construct.

Defend the homeland. Our most important
contribution to the security of the U.S.
homeland is our capacity to identify, disrupt,
and defeat threats early and at a safe distance,
as far from the United States and its partners
as possible. Our ability to identify and defeat
threats abroad—before they can strike—
while making critical contributions to the
direct defense of our territory and population
is the sine qua non of our nation’s security.

Operate in and from four forward regions.
Our military presence abroad comprises
tailored and increasingly rotational forces
operating in and from four forward regions
—Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian
Littoral, and the Middle East-Southwest Asia.
Complemented by our capabilities for prompt
global action, our forces overseas help assure
partners, dissuade military competition, and
deter aggression and coercion.

Our forward deterrence capabilities, in
particular, are adaptable forces able to
respond rapidly to emerging crises and
control escalation on our terms. These forces
are complemented by immediately
employable global strike, special operations,
and information operations capabilities that
provide additional options for preventing and
deterring attacks.

Our military presence in the four regions
does not constrain our capacity to undertake
military missions worldwide, nor does it
delimit our global interests. For example, we
remain steadfast in our commitment to the
security of the Americas, yet we require a
very small military presence in Central and
South America. Our current military
presence abroad recognizes that significant
US. interests and the bulk of our forward
military presence are concentrated in the four

regions, even as our forces are positioned to
undertake military operations worldwide.

Swiftly defeat adversaries and achieve
decisive, enduring results. We cannot be
certain in advance about the location and
specific dimensions of future conflicts.
Therefore, we maintain a total force that is
balanced and postured for rapid deployment
and employment worldwide. It is capable of
surging forces into two separate theaters to
“swiftly defeat” adversaries in military
campaigns that overlap in time.

Further, recent experience highlights the need
for a force capable of turning one of two
“swift defeat” campaigns, if the President so
decides, into an operation seeking more far-
reaching objectives. Accomplishing these
goals requires agile joint forces capable of
rapidly foreclosing an adversary’s options,
achieving decisive results in major combat
actions, and setting the security conditions
for enduring conflict resolution. We must
plan for the latter to include extended
stability operations involving substantial
combat and requiring the rapid and sustained
application of national and international
capabilities spanning the elements of state
power.

Conduct lesser contingencies. Our global
interests require our armed forces to

undertake a limited number of lesser
contingency operations, perhaps for extended
periods of time. Lesser contingencies include
smaller-scale combat operations such as
strikes and raids; peace operations;
humanitarian missions; and non-combatant
evacuations. Because these contingencies
place burdens on the same types of forces
needed for more demanding military
campaigns, the Department closely monitors
the degree and nature of involvement in
lesser contingencies to properly balance force
management and operational risks.

17


conducting elaborate exercises to achieve
proficiency in joint and combined operations,
and the “nuts and bolts” of providing support
to ongoing operations. They also involve the
force protection that we and our allies
provide to each other.

Facilities. A network of forward facilities
and capabilities, mainly in four critical
regions, provides the United States with an
unmatched ability to act globally. However,
the threat posed by catastrophic challenges
and the risks of surprise place an even higher
premium on the ability to take rapid military
action.

To strengthen our capability for prompt
global action and our flexibility to employ
military forces where needed, we require the
capacity to move swiftly into and through
strategic pivot points and remote locations.
The new global posture—using main
operating bases (MOB), forward operating
sites (FOS), and a diverse array of more
austere cooperative security locations (CSL)
—will support such needs. In addition, our
prepositioned equipment and stocks overseas
will be better configured and positioned for
global employment. We will make better use
of “reach-back” capabilities for those
functions that can be accomplished without
deploying forward.

MOBs are permanent bases with resident
forces and robust infrastructure. They are
intended to support training, security
cooperation, and the deployment and
employment of military forces for operations.
The more austere facilities —FOSs and CSLs
—are focal points for combined training and
will expand and contract as needed to support
military operations. FOSs are scalable,
“warm” facilities intended for rotational use
by operational forces. They often house pre-
positioned equipment and a modest,
permanent support presence. FOSs are able
to support a range of military activities on
short notice. CSLs are intended for
contingency access, logistical support, and

rotational use by operational forces. CSLs
generally will have little or no permanent
USS. personnel assigned. In addition to these,
joint sea-basing too holds promise for the
broader transformation of our overseas
military posture.

Increasing the flexibility and support
provided by prepositioned equipment and
materiel is another important aspect of our
facilities infrastructure. A decade of
operational experience indicates that a new,
more innovative approach to prepositioned
equipment and stocks is needed. Support
materiel and combat capabilities should be
positioned in critical regions and along key
transportation routes to enable worldwide
deployment.

Prepositioned capabilities afloat are
especially valuable. In addition, single-
service prepositioned capabilities will no
longer suffice. As in all other aspects of
transformation, prepositioning must be
increasingly joint in character.

The new posture will be enabled by “reach-
back” capabilities—support capabilities that
are available remotely rather than in forward
theaters. For example, intelligence support,
including battle damage assessment, can be
provided from outside the theater of
operations. Leveraging reach-back
capabilities reduces our footprint abroad and
strengthens our military effectiveness. We
also seek to increase the involvement of our
partners in reach-back functions.

Legal arrangements. Many of the current
legal arrangements that govern overseas
posture date from an earlier era. Today,
challenges are more diverse and complex, our
prospective contingencies are more widely
dispersed, and our international partners are
more numerous. International agreements
relevant to our posture must reflect these
circumstances and support greater
operational flexibility. They must help, not
hinder, the rapid deployment and

19


of operation at risk, the more likely we are to
limit their strategic options.

A key goal is developing the capability to
surge military forces rapidly from strategic
distances to deny adversaries sanctuary. In
some cases, this will involve discrete Special
Operations Forces (SOF) or precision attacks
on targets deep inside enemy territory. In
others, sustained joint or combined combat
operations will be necessary, requiring the
comprehensive defeat of significant state and
non-state opponents operating in and from
enemy territory or an ungoverned area.

To deny sanctuary requires a number of
capabilities, including: persistent
surveillance and precision strike; operational
maneuver from strategic distances; sustained
joint combat operations in and from austere
locations, at significant operational depths;
and stability operations to assist in the
establishment of effective and responsible
control over ungoverned territory.

We will deny our enemies sanctuary by
conducting effective military activities and
operations in and from austere geographic

locations and at varying operational depths.

6. CONDUCTING NETWORK-
CENTRIC OPERATIONS

The foundation of our operations proceeds
from a simple proposition: the whole of an
integrated and networked force is far more
capable than the sum of its parts. Continuing
advances in information and communications
technologies hold promise for networking
highly distributed joint and combined forces.
Network-centric operational capability is
achieved by linking compatible information
systems with usable data. The functions of
sensing, decision-making, and acting—which
often in the past were built into a single
platform—now can work closely even if they
are geographically distributed across the
battlespace.

Bringing decisive capabilities to bear
increasingly will rely on our capacity to
harness and protect advantages in the realm
of information. Networking our forces will
provide the foundation for doing so.
Operations in the war on terrorism have
demonstrated the advantages of timely and
accurate information, while at the same time
reinforcing the need for even greater joint,
interoperable command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR).

Beyond battlefield applications, a network-
centric force can increase efficiency and
effectiveness across defense operations,
intelligence functions, and business processes
by giving all users access to the latest, most
relevant, most accurate information. It also
enables “reach-back” by more effectively
employing people and capabilities without
deploying them forward.

Transforming to a network-centric force
requires fundamental changes in processes,
policy, and culture. Change in these areas
will provide the necessary speed, accuracy,
and quality of decision-making critical to
future success.

We will conduct network-centric operations
with compatible information and
communications systems, usable data, and
flexible operational constructs.

7. IMPROVING PROFICIENCY
AGAINST IRREGULAR CHALLENGES

Irregular conflict will be a key challenge for
the foreseeable future. Challenges from
terrorist extremist organizations and their
state and non-state supporters will involve
our forces in complex security problems for
some time to come, redefining past
conceptions of “general-purpose forces.”

Comprehensive defeat of terrorist extremists
and other irregular forces may require
operations over long periods, and using many
elements of national power; such operations

14



Il. A DEFENSE STRATEGY
FOR THE 21% CENTURY

This National Defense Strategy outlines how
DoD will support broader U.S. efforts to
create conditions conducive to a secure
international system—as the President’s
National Security Strategy states, a balance
of power that favors freedom. Such
conditions include the effective and
responsible exercise of sovereignty,
representative governance, peaceful
resolution of regional disputes, and open and
competitive markets.

Our strategic circumstances are far different
today from those of the Cold War.

Today, we enjoy significant advantages vis-a-
vis prospective competitors, including an
unprecedented capacity for constructive
international leadership.

However, as described in Section I, we
remain vulnerable to security challenges. We
have learned that an unrivaled capacity to
respond to traditional challenges is no longer
sufficient. The consequences of even a single
catastrophic attack, for example, are
unthinkable. Therefore, we must confront
challenges earlier and more comprehensively,
before they are allowed to mature.

We aim, by various means, to preclude the
emergence of the gravest dangers. The
Defense Department’s capabilities are only
one component of a comprehensive national
and international effort. For example,
battlefield success is only one element of our
long-term, multi-faceted campaign against
terrorism. Our activities range from training
and humanitarian efforts to major combat
operations. Non-military components of this
campaign include diplomacy, strategic
communications, law enforcement operations,
and economic sanctions.

A. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

1, SECURE THE UNITED STATES
FROM DIRECT ATTACK

The September 11"" attacks caused the United
States to recognize it was at war. Our enemy
is a complex network of ideologically driven
extremist actors. They have used various
means—and some are working to develop
catastrophic capabilities—to terrorize our
population, undermine our partnerships, and
erode our global influence. The danger of
catastrophic violence dictates a new strategic
imperative: we will actively confront—when
possible, early and at safe distance—those
who directly threaten us, employing all
instruments of our national power.

We will give top priority to dissuading,
deterring, and defeating those who seek to
harm the United States directly, especially

extremist enemies with weapons of mass
destruction.

2. SECURE STRATEGIC ACCESS AND
RETAIN GLOBAL FREEDOM OF
ACTION

The United States cannot influence that
which it cannot reach. Securing strategic
access to key regions, lines of
communication, and the global commons:

e Promotes the security and prosperity of
the United States;

e Ensures freedom of action;
e Helps secure our partners; and

¢ Helps protect the integrity of the
international economic system.

We will promote the security, prosperity and
freedom of action of the United States and its
partners by securing access to key regions,
lines of communication, and the global
commons.



capabilities to influence security conditions
in their region. However, allied superiority
in traditional domains, coupled with the costs
of traditional military competition, drastically
reduce adversaries’ incentives to compete
with us in this arena.

As formidable as U.S. capabilities are against
traditional opponents, we cannot ignore the
challenges that such adversaries might
present. Traditional challenges require us to
maintain sufficient combat capability in key
areas of military competition.

Irregular challenges. Increasingly
sophisticated irregular methods—e.g.,
terrorism and insurgency—challenge U.S.
security interests. Adversaries employing
irregular methods aim to erode U.S.
influence, patience, and political will.
Irregular opponents often take a long-term
approach, attempting to impose prohibitive
human, material, financial, and political costs
on the United States to compel strategic
retreat from a key region or course of action.

Two factors have intensified the danger of
irregular challenges: the rise of extremist
ideologies and the absence of effective
governance.

Political, religious, and ethnic extremism
continues to fuel conflicts worldwide.

The absence of effective governance in many
parts of the world creates sanctuaries for
terrorists, criminals, and insurgents. Many
states are unable, and in some cases
unwilling, to exercise effective control over
their territory or frontiers, thus leaving areas
open to hostile exploitation.

Our experience in the war on terrorism points
to the need to reorient our military
capabilities to contend with such irregular
challenges more effectively.

Catastrophic challenges. In the face of
American dominance in traditional forms of
warfare, some hostile forces are seeking to

acquire catastrophic capabilities, particularly
weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Porous international borders, weak
international controls, and easy access to
information-related technologies facilitate
these efforts. Particularly troublesome is the
nexus of transnational terrorists, proliferation,
and problem states that possess or seek
WMD, increasing the risk of WMD attack
against the United States.

Proliferation of WMD technology and
expertise makes contending with catastrophic
challenges an urgent priority. Even a single
catastrophic attack against the United States
or an ally would be unacceptable. We will
place greater emphasis on those capabilities
that enable us to dissuade others from
acquiring catastrophic capabilities, to deter
their use and, when necessary, to defeat them
before they can be employed.

Disruptive challenges. In rare instances,
revolutionary technology and associated
military innovation can fundamentally alter
long-established concepts of warfare. Some
potential adversaries are seeking disruptive
capabilities to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities and
offset the current advantages of the United
States and its partners.

Some disruptive breakthroughs, including
advances in biotechnology, cyber operations,
space, or directed-energy weapons, could
seriously endanger our security.

As such breakthroughs can be unpredictable,
we should recognize their potential
consequences and hedge against them.

2. CHANGING RELATIONSHIPS

Alongside the four security challenges are
far-reaching changes in the international
system:

¢ We continually adapt our defense
partnerships.


cooperation. More than 170 countries are
engaged in activities ranging from freezing
terrorist assets to sharing intelligence to
providing combat forces for coalition
operations. In Afghanistan, a multinational
coalition defeated a regime that provided one
of the world’s principal havens for terrorists.
In Iraq, an American-led effort toppled the
regime of Saddam Hussein—a tyrant who
used WMD, supported terrorists, terrorized
his population, and threatened his neighbors.

Experience in the war on terrorism has
underscored the need for a changed defense
establishment—one postured both for
extended conflict and continuous
transformation. This demands an adaptive
strategy, predicated on creating and seizing
opportunities and contending with challenges
through an active, layered defense of the
nation and its interests.

B. A CHANGING SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT

Uncertainty is the defining characteristic of
today’s strategic environment. We can
identify trends but cannot predict specific
events with precision. While we work to
avoid being surprised, we must posture
ourselves to handle unanticipated problems
—we must plan with surprise in mind.

We contend with uncertainty by adapting to
circumstances and influencing events. It is
not enough to react to change. This strategy
focuses on safeguarding U.S. freedoms and
interests while working actively to forestall
the emergence of new challenges.

1. MATURE AND EMERGING

CHALLENGES

“America is now threatened less by conquering states
than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by
fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in
the hands of the embittered few.” — National Security
Strategy, September 2002

The U.S. military predominates in the world
in traditional forms of warfare. Potential
adversaries accordingly shift away from

challenging the United States through
traditional military action and adopt
asymmetric capabilities and methods. An
array of traditional, irregular, catastrophic,
and disruptive capabilities and methods
threaten U.S. interests:

¢ Traditional challenges are posed by
states employing recognized military
capabilities and forces in well-understood
forms of military competition and conflict.

¢ Irregular challenges come from those
employing “unconventional” methods to
counter the traditional advantages of stronger
opponents.

© Catastrophic challenges involve the
acquisition, possession, and use of WMD or
methods producing WMD-like effects.

¢ Disruptive challenges may come from
adversaries who develop and use break-
through technologies to negate current U.S.
advantages in key operational domains.

These categories overlap. Actors proficient
in one can be expected to try to reinforce
their position with methods and capabilities
drawn from others.

Indeed, recent experience indicates that the
most dangerous circumstances arise when we
face a complex of challenges. For example,
our adversaries in Iraq and Afghanistan
presented both traditional and irregular
challenges. Terrorist groups like al Qaeda are
irregular threats but also actively seek
catastrophic capabilities. North Korea at once
poses traditional, irregular, and catastrophic
challenges. Finally, in the future, the most
capable opponents may seek to combine truly
disruptive capacity with traditional, irregular,
or catastrophic forms of warfare.

Traditional challenges. These challenges are
most often associated with states employing
armies, navies, and air forces in long-
established forms of military competition.
Traditional military challenges remain
important, as many states maintain


may require changes to the way we train,
equip, and employ our forces, particularly for
fighting terrorists and insurgents and
conducting stability operations.

Working together with other elements of the
U.S. Government, allies, and partners
(including indigenous actors), we require the
capabilities to identify, locate, track, and
engage individual enemies and their
networks. Doing so will require greater
capabilities across a range of areas,
particularly intelligence, surveillance, and
communications.

In addition, we will need to train units for
sustained stability operations. This will
include developing ways-to strengthen their
language and civil-military affairs
capabilities as required for specific
deployments.

We will improve our capability to defeat
irregular challenges, particularly terrorism,
by re-shaping and balancing the force.

8. INCREASING CAPABILITIES OF
PARTNERS—INTERNATIONAL AND
DOMESTIC

Our strategic objectives are not attainable
without the support and assistance of capable
partners at home and abroad.

Abroad, the United States is transforming its
security relationships and developing new
partnerships. We are strengthening our own
capabilities to support changing relationships,
and we are seeking to improve those of our
partners, through efforts like the Global
Peace Operations Initiative. We want to
increase our partners’ capabilities and their
ability to operate together with U.S. forces.

One of the principal vehicles for
strengthening alliances and partnerships is
our security cooperation program. It works
by:

e Identifying areas where our common
interests would be served better by partners
playing leading roles;

e Encouraging partners to increase their
capability and willingness to operate in
coalition with our forces;

e Seeking authorities to facilitate
cooperation with partner militaries and
ministries of defense; and,

e  Spurring the military transformation of
key allies through development of a common
security assessment and joint, combined
training and education; combined concept
development and experimentation;
information sharing; and combined command
and control.

Security cooperation is important for
expanding international capacity to meet
common security challenges. One of our
military’s most effective tools in prosecuting
the Global War on Terrorism is to help train
indigenous forces.

At home, we are increasing the capabilities of
our domestic partners—local, state, and
federal—to improve homeland defense. This
Department seeks effective partnerships with
domestic agencies that are charged with
security and consequence management in the
event of significant attacks against the
homeland. In doing so, we seek to improve
their ability to respond effectively, while
focusing the unique capabilities of this
Department on the early defeat of these
challenges abroad.

The U.S. Government created the Office of
the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization at the State Department to
bolster the capabilities of U.S. civilian
agencies and improve coordination with
international partners to contribute to the
resolution of complex crises overseas. The
Department is cooperating with this new
office to increase the capacity of interagency

15


This strategy is built on key assumptions
about the world, the nature of U.S. strengths
and vulnerabilities, and the opportunities and
challenges we may see in the coming decade.

OUR STRENGTHS

The United States will continue to enjoy a
number of advantages:

¢ We will retain a resilient network of
alliances and partnerships.

« We will have no global peer competitor and
will remain unmatched in traditional military
capability.

¢ We will maintain important advantages in
other elements of national power—e.g.,
political, economic, technological, and cultural.

¢ We will continue to play leading roles on
issues of common international concern and
will retain influence worldwide.

OUR VUEENERABEDEEIES

Nevertheless, we have vulnerabilities:

© Our capacity to address global security
challenges alone will be insufficient.

¢ Some allies and partners will decide not to
act with us or will lack the capacity to act with
us.

¢ Our leading position in world affairs will
continue to breed unease, a degree of
resentment, and resistance.

e Our strength as a nation state will continue
to be challenged by those who employ a
strategy of the weak using international fora,
judicial processes, and terrorism.

e We and our allies will be the principal
targets of extremism and terrorism.

¢ Natural forces of inertia and resistance to
change will constrain military transformation.

OUR OPPORTUNTTIES.

The future also offers opportunities:

¢ The end of the Cold War and our capacity
to influence global events open the prospect
for a new and peaceful state system in the
world.

¢ Positive developments in Iraq and
Afghanistan strengthen U.S. influence and
credibility.

¢ Problem states themselves will
increasingly be vulnerable to the forces of
positive political and economic change.

e Many of our key partners want to deepen
our security relationships with them.

¢ New international partners are seeking
integration into our system of alliances and
partnerships.

OUR CHALLENGES

In the framework of the four mature and
emerging challenges outlined earlier, we will
contend with the following particular challenges:

¢ Though we have no global peer, we will have
competitors and enemies—state and non-state.

¢ Key international actors may choose
strategic paths contrary to the interests of the
United States.

¢ Crises related to political stability and
governance will pose significant security
challenges. Some of these may threaten
fundamental interests of the United States,
requiring a military response.

¢ Internationally—even among our closest
partners—threats will be perceived differently,
and consensus may be difficult to achieve.

AN ACTIVE DEFENSE

All this necessitates an active defense of the
nation and its interests, as explained below
and in the National Military Strategy.


The National Defense Strategy

of
The United States of America

March 2005


e Prevent attacks (e.g., by destroying
terrorist networks); and

¢ Protect against attacks (e.g., by fielding
missile defenses).

While it is harder to deter certain non-state
actors, such as terrorists and insurgents
inspired by extremist ideologies, even these
actors will hesitate to commit their resources
to actions that have a high likelihood of
failure. Our deterrent must seek to influence
these actors’ cost/benefit calculations, even
as we continue prosecuting operations against
them.

We will deter by maintaining capable and
rapidly deployable military forces and, when
necessary, demonstrating the will to resolve

conflicts decisively on favorable terms.

4, DEFEAT ADVERSARIES

When deterrence fails or efforts short of
military action do not forestall gathering
threats, the United States will employ
military power, together with other
instruments of national power, as necessary,
to defeat adversaries. In doing so, we will act
with others when we can.

In all cases, we will seek to seize the
initiative and dictate the tempo, timing, and
direction of military operations. Bringing
military operations to a favorable conclusion
demands the integration of military and non-
military actions. When combined, these
measures should limit adversaries’ options,
deny them their means of support, defeat
organized resistance, and establish security
conditions conducive to a secure peace.

This strategy is intended to provide the
President a broad range of options. These
include preventive actions to deny an
opponent the strategic initiative or preempt a
devastating attack; combat operations against

a capable and organized military, paramilitary,
or insurgent adversary; and stability
operations that could range from peace-
keeping to substantial combat action.

Today’s war is against terrorist extremist
networks, including their state and non-state
supporters. These entities are hostile to
freedom, democracy, and other U.S. interests;
and use terrorism, among other means, to
achieve their political goals.

Victory on battlefields alone will not suffice.
To win the Global War on Terrorism, the
United States will help to create and lead a
broad international effort to deny terrorist
extremist networks what they require to
operate and survive. To defeat the enemy,
we must deny them what they need to
survive; in the meantime, we are denying
them what they need to operate.

The United States will target eight major
terrorist vulnerabilities:

© Ideological support — key to recruitment
and indoctrination;

e Leadership;

¢ Foot soldiers — maintaining a regular flow
of recruits;

e Safe havens — ability to train, plan, and
operate without disruption;
Weapons — including WMD;
Funds;
Communications and movement —
including access to information and
intelligence; ability to travel and attend
meetings; and command and control; and

« Access to targets — the ability to plan and
reach targets in the United States or
abroad.

Our strategy consists of three elements:

Protecting the homeland. Each partner
nation in the coalition against terrorist
extremism has a special interest in protecting
its own homeland. The Defense Department
contributes to protecting the U.S. homeland


3. STRENGTHEN ALLIANCES AND
PARTNERSHIPS

A secure international system requires
collective action. The United States has an
interest in broad-based and capable
partnerships with like-minded states.
Therefore, we are strengthening security
relationships with traditional allies and
friends, developing new international
partnerships, and working to increase the
capabilities of our partners to contend with
common challenges.

commitment to our international partners. We
shared risks by contributing to their physical
defense. Now, given new challenges, we aim
to assure a growing and more diverse
community of partners of that same
commitment.

We will provide assurance by demonstrating
our resolve to fulfill our alliance and other
defense commitments and help protect
common interests.

We will expand the community of nations that
share principles and interests with us, and we
will help partners increase their capacity to
defend themselves and collectively meet
challenges to our common interests.

4, ESTABLISH FAVORABLE
SECURITY CONDITIONS

The United States will counter aggression or
coercion targeted at our partners and
interests. Further, where dangerous political
instability, aggression, or extremism
threatens fundamental security interests, the
United States will act with others to
strengthen peace.

We will create conditions conducive to a
Savorable international system by
honoring our security commitments and
working with others to bring about a
common appreciation of threats; the steps
required to protect against these threats;
and a broad, secure, and lasting peace.

B. HOW WE ACCOMPLISH OUR
OBJECTIVES

1, ASSURE ALLIES AND FRIENDS

Throughout the Cold War, our military
presence and activities abroad upheld our

2. DISSUADE POTENTIAL
ADVERSARIES

Would-be opponents will seek to offset our
advantages. In response, we seek to limit
their strategic options and dissuade them
from adopting threatening capabilities,
methods, and ambitions.

We will work to dissuade potential
adversaries from adopting threatening
capabilities, methods, and ambitions,
particularly by sustaining and developing our
own key military advantages.

3. DETER AGGRESSION AND
COUNTER COERCION

We remain committed to the active
deterrence of aggression and coercion.
Deterrence derives from our recognized
capacity and will to defeat adversaries’
attacks, deny their objectives, and dominate
at any level of potential escalation. However,
as the character and composition of our
principal challengers change, so too must our
approaches to deterrence.

During the Cold War our deterrent was based
necessarily on the threat of a major response
after we suffered an attack. In the current era
there are many scenarios where we will not
want to accept the huge consequences of an
attack before responding. Therefore, our
deterrence policy in this new era places
increasing emphasis on denying enemy
objectives by seeking to:



e Key states face important decisions that
will affect their strategic position.

¢ Some problem states will continue to
pose challenges, while others could realize
that their current policies undermine their
own security.

¢ Hostile, non-state actors have substantial
numbers, capability, and influence.

International partnerships. International
partnerships continue to be a principal source

of our strength. Shared principles, a common
view of threats, and commitment to
cooperation provide far greater security than
we could achieve on our own.

Unprecedented cooperation in the war on
terrorism is an example of the benefit of
strong international partnerships.

Today, the United States and its partners are
threatened not just by enemies who seek to
oppose us through traditional means, but also
by an active spectrum of non-traditional
challenges. Key U.S. relationships around the
globe are adapting and broadening in
response to these changes. Also, we have
significantly expanded our circle of security
partners around the world.

Key states. Several key states face basic
decisions about their roles in global and
regional politics, economics, and security,
and the pace and direction of their own
internal evolution. These decisions may
change their strategic position in the world
and their relationship with the United States.
This uncertainty presents both opportunities
and potential challenges for the United
States. Some states may move toward greater
cooperation with the United States, while
others could evolve into capable regional
rivals or enemies.

Over time, some rising powers may be able
to threaten the United States and our partners
directly, rival us in key areas of military and
technological competition, or threaten U.S.
interests by pursuing dominance over key

regions. In other cases, if adverse economic, —

political, and demographic trends continue,
large capable states could become
dangerously unstable and increasingly
ungovernable, creating significant future
challenges.

While remaining alert to the possibility of
renewed great power competition, recent
developments in our relations with states like
Russia and China should encourage a degree
of hope. As the President’s National
Security Strategy states, “Today, the
international community has the best chance
since the rise of the nation-state in the
seventeenth century to build a world where
great powers compete in peace instead of
continually prepare for war.”

Problem states. Problem states will continue
to undermine regional stability and threaten
USS. interests. These states are hostile to
US. principles. They commonly squander
their resources to benefit ruling elites, their
armed forces, or extremist clients. They often
disregard international law and violate
international agreements. Problem states
may seek WMD or other destabilizing
military capabilities. Some support terrorist
activities, including by giving terrorists safe
haven.

As recently demonstrated by Libya, however,
some problem states may recognize that the
pursuit of WMD leaves them less, not more,
secure.

Significant non-state actors. Countering the
military capabilities of state competitors
alone cannot guarantee U.S. security.
Challenges today emanate from a variety of
state and non-state sources. The latter are a
diverse collection of terrorists, insurgents,
paramilitaries, and criminals who seek to
undermine the legitimate governance of some
states and who challenge the United States
and its interests.

3. ASSUMPTIONS FRAMING THE
STRATEGY


2. GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE

To better meet new strategic circumstances,
we are transforming our network of alliances
and partnerships, our military capabilities,
and our global defense posture. Our security
is inextricably linked to that of our partners.
The forward posture of U.S. forces and our
demonstrated ability to bring forces to bear in
a crisis are among the most tangible signals
of our commitment to the security of our
international partners.

Through the 1990s, U.S. forces remained
concentrated in Cold War locations—
primarily in Western Europe and Northeast
Asia. In the Cold War we positioned our
forces to fight where they were stationed.
Today, we no longer expect our forces to
fight in place. Rather, operational experience
since 1990 indicates we will surge forces
from a global posture to respond to crises.
This recognition, combined with rapid
advances in technology, new concepts of
operation, and operational lessons learned, is
driving a comprehensive realignment of U.S.
global defense posture.

The President stated, “A fully transformed
and strengthened overseas force posture will
underscore the commitment of the United
States to effective collective action in the
common cause of peace and liberty.” Force
posture changes will strengthen our ability to
meet our security commitments and contend
with new challenges more effectively. As we
transform our posture, we are guided by the
following goals:

e Expanding allied roles and building new
security partnerships;

e Developing greater flexibility to contend
with uncertainty by emphasizing agility and
by not overly concentrating military forces in
a few locations;

e Focusing within and across regions by
complementing tailored regional military

presence and activities with capabilities for
prompt global military action;

e Developing rapidly deployable
capabilities by planning and operating from
the premise that forces will not likely fight in
place; and,

e Focusing on capabilities, not numbers,
by reinforcing the premise that the United
States does not need specific numbers of
platforms or personnel in administrative
regions to be able to execute its security
commitments effectively.

Key changes to global defense posture. Key
changes in global defense posture lie in five

interrelated areas: relationships, activities,
facilities, legal arrangements, and global
sourcing and surge.

Relationships. Our ability to cooperate with
others in the world depends on having a
harmony of views on the challenges that
confront us and our strategy for meeting
those challenges. Strengthening defense
relationships at all levels helps build such
harmony.

Changes in global posture seek both to
strengthen our relationships with partners
around the world and to help cultivate new
relationships founded on common security
interests. We are transforming many of our
alliances to contend with our new
circumstances. Command structures are
another important part of our relationships
and are being tailored to address our new
political and operational needs. We also will
lower the operational vulnerability of our
forces and reduce local social and political
friction with host populations.

Activities. Our posture also includes the
many military activities in which we engage
around the world. This means not only our
physical presence in key regions, but also our
training, exercises, and operations. They
involve small units working together in a
wide range of capacities, major formations

18


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

America is a nation at war. We face a
diverse set of security challenges.
Yet, we still live in an era of advantage and

opportunity.

The National Defense Strategy outlines an
active, layered approach to the defense of
the nation and its interests. It seeks to create
conditions conducive to respect for the
sovereignty of nations and a secure
international order favorable to freedom,
democracy, and economic opportunity. This
strategy promotes close cooperation with
others around the world who are committed
to these goals. It addresses mature and
emerging threats.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Secure the United States from direct
attack. We will give top priority to
dissuading, deterring, and defeating those
who seek to harm the United States directly,
especially extremist enemies with weapons
of mass destruction (WMD).

Secure strategic access and retain global
freedom of action. We will promote the
security, prosperity, and freedom of action
of the United States and its partners by
securing access to key regions, lines of
communication, and the global commons.

Strengthen alliances and partnerships.
We will expand the community of nations
that share principles and interests with us.
We will help partners increase their capacity
to defend themselves and collectively meet
challenges to our common interests.

Establish favorable security conditions.
Working with others in the U.S.
Government, we will create conditions for a
favorable international system by honoring
our security commitments and working with
other nations to bring about a common
appreciation of threats; the steps required to
protect against these threats; and a broad,
secure, and lasting peace.

How WE ACCOMPLISH OUR OBJECTIVES

Assure allies and friends. We will provide
assurance by demonstrating our resolve to fulfill
our alliance and other defense commitments and
help protect common interests.

Dissuade potential adversaries. We will
work to dissuade potential adversaries from
adopting threatening capabilities, methods,
and ambitions, particularly by developing our
own key military advantages.

Deter aggression and counter coercion.
We will deter by maintaining capable and
rapidly deployable military forces and,
when necessary, demonstrating the will to
resolve conflicts decisively on favorable
terms.

Defeat adversaries. At the direction of the
President, we will defeat adversaries at the time,

place, and in the manner of our choosing—setting
the conditions for future security.

IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES

Four guidelines structure our strategic
planning and decision-making.

Active, layered defense. We will focus our
military planning, posture, operations, and
capabilities on the active, forward, and
layered defense of our nation, our interests,
and our partners.

Continuous transformation. We will
continually adapt how we approach and confront
challenges, conduct business, and work with
others.

Capabilities-based approach. We will
operationalize this strategy to address mature
and emerging challenges by setting priorities
among competing capabilities.

Managing risks. We will consider the full range
of risks associated with resources and operations
and manage clear tradeoffs across the Department.

iv


We seek to foster a culture of innovation.
The war on terrorism imparts an urgency to
defense transformation; we must transform to
win the war.

We will continually adapt how we approach
and confront challenges, conduct business,
and work with others.

3. CAPABILITIES-BASED APPROACH

Capabilities-based planning focuses more on
how adversaries may challenge us than on
whom those adversaries might be or where
we might face them. It focuses the
Department on the growing range of
capabilities and methods we must possess to
contend with an uncertain future. It
recognizes the limits of intelligence and the
impossibility of predicting complex events
with precision. Our planning aims to link
capabilities to joint operating concepts across
a broad range of scenarios.

The Department is adopting a new approach
for planning to implement our strategy. The
defense strategy will drive this top-down,
competitive process. Operating within fiscal
constraints, our new approach enables the
Secretary of Defense and Joint Force
Commanders to balance risk across
traditional, irregular, disruptive, and
catastrophic challenges.

We will operationalize this strategy to address
the spectrum of strategic challenges by setting
priorities among competing capabilities.

4. MANAGING RISKS

Effectively managing defense risks is central
to executing the National Defense Strategy.

The 2001 QDR is the Department’s vehicle
for risk assessment. It identifies the key
dimensions of risk and enables the Secretary
to evaluate the size, shape, posture,
commitment, and management of our armed
forces relative to the objectives of the

National Defense Strategy. It allows the
Secretary of Defense to assess the tradeoffs
among objectives and resource constraints.
The risk framework comprises: operational
risk, future challenges risk, force
management risk, and institutional risk:

¢ Operational risks are those associated
with the current force executing the strategy
successfully within acceptable human,
material, financial, and strategic costs.

e Future challenges risks are those
associated with the Department’s capacity to
execute future missions successfully against
an array of prospective future challengers.

« Force management risks are those
associated with managing military forces
fulfilling the missions described in this
National Defense Strategy. The primary
concern here is recruiting, retaining, training,
and equipping a ready force and sustaining
that readiness.

¢ Institutional risks are those associated
with the capacity of new command,
management, and business practices.

We assess the likelihood of a variety of
problems—most notably, failure or
prohibitive costs in pursuit of strategic,
operational, or management objectives. This
approach recognizes that some objectives,
though desirable, may not be attainable,
while others, though attainable, may not be
worth the costs.

Choices in one area affect choices in others.
The Department will make deliberate choices
within and across each broad category and
will maintain a balance among them—driven
by this National Defense Strategy.

We will consider the full range of risks
associated with resources and operations and
manage explicit tradeoffs across the
Department.

11



against such challenges and increase our
capacity to defeat them at a distance.

requires fundamental shifts in processes,
policies, and culture.

We will protect critical bases of operation,
including the U.S. homeland, against all
challenges.

3. OPERATING FROM THE GLOBAL
COMMONS

Our ability to operate in and from the global
commons—space, international waters and
airspace, and cyberspace—is important. It
enables us to project power anywhere in the
world from secure bases of operation. Our
capacity to operate in and from the strategic
commons is critical to the direct defense of
the United States and its partners and
provides a stabilizing influence in key
regions.

Such capacity provides our forces operational
freedom of action. Ceding our historic
maritime advantage would unacceptably limit
our global reach. Our capacity to operate
from international airspace and outer space
will remain important for joint operations. In
particular, as the nation's reliance on space-
based systems continues to grow, we will
guard against new vulnerabilities. Key goals,
therefore, are to ensure our access to and use
of space, and to deny hostile exploitation of
space to adversaries.

Cyberspace is a new theater of operations.
Consequently, information operations (IO) is
becoming a core military competency.
Successful military operations depend on the
ability to protect information infrastructure
and data. Increased dependence on
information networks creates new
vulnerabilities that adversaries may seek to
exploit. At the same time, an adversary’s use
of information networks and technologies
creates opportunities for us to conduct
discriminate offensive 10 as well.
Developing IO as a core military competency

We will operate in and from the commons by
overcoming challenges to our global
maritime, air, space, and cyberspace

operations.

4, PROJECTING AND SUSTAINING
FORCES IN DISTANT ANTI-ACCESS
ENVIRONMENTS

Our role in the world depends on effectively
projecting and sustaining our forces in distant
environments where adversaries may seek to
deny us access. Our capacity to project
power depends on our defense posture and
deployment flexibility at home and overseas,
on the security of our bases, and on our
access to the strategic commons.

Adversaries could employ advanced and
legacy military capabilities and methods to
deny us access. Ultimately, they may
combine their most advanced military
capabilities with future technologies to
threaten our capacity to project power.

Other opponents may employ less
sophisticated but effective means either to
deny access to us or intimidate others to do
so. Their options are numerous, including
the innovative employment of legacy
capabilities and indirect threats intended to
impose unacceptable costs on friendly
governments.

We will project and sustain our forces in
distant anti-access environments.

5. DENYING ENEMIES SANCTUARY

Adversaries who threaten the United States
and its interests require secure bases. They
will use great distance or the sanctuary created
by ungoverned territory to their advantage.
The more we hold adversaries’ critical bases

13



FOREWORD

We live in a time of unconventional challenges and strategic uncertainty. We are confronting
fundamentally different challenges from those faced by the American defense establishment in
the Cold War and previous eras. The strategy we adopt today will help influence the world’s
strategic environment, for the United States is an unusually powerful player in world affairs.
President George W. Bush is committed to ensuring the security of the American people,
strengthening the community of free nations, and advancing democratic reform, freedom, and
economic well-being around the globe.

The Department of Defense is implementing the President’s commitment to the forward
defense of freedom as articulated in the National Security Strategy. This National Defense
Strategy outlines our approach to dealing with challenges we likely will confront, not just those
we are currently best prepared to meet. Our intent is to create favorable security conditions
around the world and to continue to transform how we think about security, formulate strategic
objectives, and adapt to achieve success.

This strategy emphasizes the importance of influencing events before challenges become
more dangerous and less manageable. It builds upon efforts in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense
Review (QDR) to develop an adaptable, global approach that acknowledges the limits of our
intelligence (in all senses of the term), anticipates surprises, and positions us to handle strategic
uncertainty.

Since the QDR was released, events have confirmed the importance of assuring allies and
friends, dissuading potential adversaries, deterring aggression and coercion, and defeating
adversaries. The war on terrorism has exposed new, challenges, but also unprecedented strategic
opportunities to work at home and with allies and partners abroad to create conditions favorable
to a secure international order.

When President Bush took office four years ago, he gave us the mission to prepare the
Department of Defense to meet 21*-century challenges. This strategy is designed to fulfill that
mission. Knowing the dedication and capabilities of our uniformed men and women and of the
civilians who support them, I am confident we will succeed.

Donald H. Rumsfeld
Secretary of Defense

iii


Table of Contents

FOREWORD

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY..........cccceccccssereceesseeeecesseeeessneeseneaneeesesiaeeeesnsaeseeesnnaaecen season saeas iv

I. AMERICA’S SECURITY IN THE 21" CENTURY...

A. AMERICA’S ROLE IN THE WORLD

B. A CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT .....

Il. A DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR THE 21* CENTURY

A. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVEB........

B. HOW WE ACCOMPLISH OUR OBJECTIVES...

C. IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES...

Ill. DESIRED CAPABILITIES AND ATTRIBUTES

A. KEY OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

B. ATTRIBUTES.

ii


by sustaining the offensive against terrorist

organizations by:

¢ Conducting military missions overseas;

¢ Sharing intelligence;

© Conducting air and maritime defense
operations;

e Providing defense support to civil
authorities as directed; and

e Ensuring continuity of government.

Countering ideological support for

terrorism. The campaign to counter
ideological support for terrorism may be a
decades-long struggle, using all instruments
of national power to:

¢ Delegitimate terrorism and extremists by,
e.g., eliminating state and private support
for extremism.

© Make it politically unsustainable for any
country to support or condone terrorism;
and

e Support models of moderation in the

Muslim world by:

- Building stronger security ties with
Muslim countries;

- Helping change Muslim
misperceptions of the United States
and the West; and

- Reinforcing the message that the
Global War on Terrorism is not a war
against Islam, but rather is an
outgrowth of a civil war within Islam
between extremists and those who
oppose them.

The debate within the world of Islam
between extremists and their opponents may
be far more significant than the messages that
non-Muslim voices transmit to Muslim
audiences.

Countering the ideological appeal of the
terrorist network of networks is an important
means to stem the flow of recruits into the
ranks of terrorist organizations. As in the
Cold War, victory will come only when the
ideological motivation for the terrorists’
activities has been discredited and no longer

has the power to motivate streams of
individuals to risk and sacrifice their lives.

Disrupting and attacking terrorist networks.
The Department disrupts and attacks terrorist

networks by:

¢ Identifying, targeting, and engaging such
networks, particularly the Al-Qaeda
terrorist network;

e Preventing the exploitation by terrorist
organizations of large, ungoverned spaces
and border areas; and

¢ Improving the military counterterrorism
capabilities of allies and partners.

At the direction of the President, we will
defeat adversaries at the time, place, and in
the manner of our choosing—setting the
conditions for future security.

C. IMPLEM)

TION GUIDELINES

These are guidelines for the Department’s
strategic planning and decision-making:

1, ACTIVE, LAYERED DEFENSE

The United States will seize the strategic
initiative in all areas of defense activity—
assuring, dissuading, deterring, and defeating.
Our first priority is the defeat of direct threats
to the United States. Terrorists have

"demonstrated that they can conduct

devastating surprise attacks. Allowing
opponents to strike first—particularly in an
era of proliferation—is unacceptable.
Therefore, the United States must defeat the
most dangerous challenges early and at a safe
distance, before they are allowed to mature.

Prevention is thus a critical component of an
active, layered defense. We will aim to
prevent destabilizing conflict. If conflict
becomes unavoidable, we will strive to bring
about lasting change to check the emergence
of similar challenges in the future.



III. DESIRED CAPABILITIES
AND ATTRIBUTES

Our strategy requires a high-quality, joint
force. We remain committed to increasing
levels of joint competency and capability.

Our goal is not dominance in all areas of
military capability, but the means to reduce
vulnerabilities while fortifying warfighting
advantages. We will:

© Develop and sustain key operational
capabilities;

e Shape and size forces to meet near- and
mid-term needs;

© Divest and invest for the longer term; and,

¢ Strengthen our global defense posture to
increase our ability to work with other
countries on matters of common interest.

A. KEY OPERATIONAL
CAPABILITIES

Eight operational capabilities are the focus
for defense transformation:

1, STRENGTHEN INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence directly supports strategy,
planning, and decision-making; it facilitates
improvements in operational capabilities; and
it informs programming and risk
management. Three areas, in particular, are
priorities:

e Early Warning. The first priority is to
improve our capacity for early warning.
Decision-makers require early warning of
imminent crises—e.g., instability, terrorist
threat, or missile attack.

© Deliver Exacting Intelligence. We will
improve support to intelligence consumers
through transformation in both organization
and process. Specifically, we aim to increase

our capabilities for collection; shift to a more
consumer-friendly approach; and better
anticipate adversary behavior through
competitive analysis.

e Horizontal Integration. The intelligence
community can play a central role in
developing joint solutions. To the extent
possible, we seek to fuse operations and
intelligence and break down the institutional,
technological, and cultural barriers that
separate them. This will enable us better to
acquire, assess, and deliver critical
intelligence both to senior decision-makers
and to warfighters.

In addition, counterintelligence also directly
supports our strategy, planning, and decision-
making. Counterintelligence is critical to
defending our information advantage in a
number of areas (e.g., technology, operations,
etc.)

We will strengthen our intelligence
capabilities and integrate them into
operations to inform decision-making and
resource planning.

2. PROTECTING CRITICAL BASES OF
OPERATION

Our premier base of operation is the United
States itself. Secure bases of operation make
possible our political and military freedom of
action, reassure the nation and its partners,
and enable the timely generation and
deployment of military forces worldwide.
Securing critical bases requires actionable
intelligence, strategic warning, and the ability
to defeat threats—if possible before they.are
able to mature.

The entire range of strategic threats can put at
risk our bases of operation at home and
abroad. While we can identify some—e.g.,
missiles and WMD—others, like those
employed against the United States and its
partners since 9/11, may be harder to
identify. We need to improve defenses

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