J-S80044-18

2019 PA Super 154

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Appellant

v.

TRAVIS SCOTT

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3994 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order November 15, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0002581-2017

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and NICHOLS, J.

DISSENTING OPINION BY BOWES, J.: FILED MAY 10, 2019

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision herein. In my view, 

the warrantless search of Appellee’s trunk was supported by probable cause 

under controlling legal precedent, thereby requiring reversal of the trial court’s 

suppression ruling.

The majority correctly recognizes that in Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 

A.3d 102 (Pa. 2014) (plurality),1the Pennsylvania Supreme Court aligned 

Pennsylvania jurisprudence with the United States Supreme Court’s 

interpretation of the Fourth Amendment with regard to vehicle searches. In 

so doing, it held that, where police possess probable cause to search a car, a 

warrantless search is permissible. Id. at 138 (holding that, in this 

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1 Gary was a plurality opinion announcing the judgment of the Supreme Court. 

However, this Court has adopted the holdings of Gary in subsequent opinions. 

See Commonwealth v. Freeman, 128 A.3d 1231, 1243 (Pa.Super. 2015); 

In re I.M.S., 124 A.3d 311, 317 (Pa.Super. 2015).
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Commonwealth, the law governing warrantless searches of motor vehicles is 

coextensive with federal law under the Fourth Amendment). 

The majority also acknowledges that in United States v. Ross, 456 

U.S. 798 (1982), the Supreme Court of the United States held that, “[i]f 

probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies 

the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal 

the object of the search.” Id. at 825 (emphasis added). In applying Ross,

this Court has ruled “if a police officer possesses probable cause to search a 

motor vehicle, he may then conduct a search of the trunk compartment 

without seeking to obtain probable cause relative to the particularized area.” 

Commonwealth v. Bailey, 545 A.2d 942, 944 (Pa.Super. 1988).

Here, the majority tacitly concludes, as did the trial court, that the 

officers lawfully stopped Appellee’s vehicle and developed probable cause to 

conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle for contraband when they smelled 

a strong odor of burnt marijuana and observed Appellee attempting to place 

a marijuana blunt in the center console. Indeed, as the majority points out, 

the trial court denied suppression as it related to the marijuana, even though 

Appellee did not contest the search insofar as it encompassed the passenger 

compartment of the vehicle. See Majority Opinion at 4 n.3. However, the 

majority adopts the trial court’s finding that the probable cause that supported 

the officers’ warrantless search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle 
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did not support a search of the trunk compartment. Such a conclusion flies in 

the face of Ross and Bailey, and is legally incorrect.

Under Ross, once the officers developed probable cause to conduct a 

warrantless search of the vehicle, the scope of the search was not limited to 

the passenger area of the vehicle, but broadly extended to “every part of the 

vehicle . . . that may conceal the object of the search.” Ross, supra at 825; 

see also Bailey, supra. The High Court explained that the scope of a 

warrantless search of an automobile “is defined by the object of the search 

and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be 

found.” Id. at 824 (emphasis added). The High Court specifically instructed 

that

When a legitimate search is under way, and when its purpose and 

its limits have been precisely defined, nice distinctions between 

closets, drawers, and containers, in the case of a home, or 

between glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, 

and wrapped packages, in the case of a vehicle, must give 

way to the interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the 

task at hand.

Ross, supra at 821.

Here, it is undisputed that a legitimate warrantless search was 

underway, and that the object of the search was contraband.

2

 Therefore, 

under Ross and Bailey, the officers were permitted to search every part of 

Appellee’s vehicle in which contraband might be found, including the trunk. 

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2 Philadelphia Police Officer Kerr testified at the suppression hearing that he 

was searching the vehicle for narcotics. N.T., 10/30/17, at 11-12.
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Ross, supra at 825, Bailey, supra at 944. The majority’s attempt to exempt 

the trunk compartment from a legitimate vehicle search constitutes the very 

type of “nice distinctions” that the High Court expressly rejected in Ross. 

Ross, supra at 821. It is also inconsistent with established Pennsylvania 

precedent. See Commonwealth v. Runyan, 160 A.3d 831, 837-38

(Pa.Super. 2017) (holding that where police smelled burnt marijuana and 

observed a small bag of what appeared to be marijuana, they had probable 

cause to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle for contraband, and were 

permitted to search any container found therein where the contraband could 

be concealed, including appellee’s purse); In re I.M.S., supra (holding that, 

where driver admitted that his juvenile passenger had been smoking 

marijuana in the car, and police smelled an odor of burnt marijuana and 

observed marijuana flakes on the juveniles shirt and pants, the police had 

probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the automobile for 

contraband, including a search the juvenile’s drawstring bag where 

contraband could be concealed); Bailey, supra (holding that the officer’s

observance of a clear plastic baggie containing a white substance believed to

be a controlled substance, coupled with the officer’s detection of a “chemicaltype” smell, established probable cause to search the passenger area and

trunk of the vehicle); Commonwealth v. Stoner, 344 A.2d 633, 635

(Pa.Super. 1975) (holding that probable cause to search the vehicle for 
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contraband arose after police observed marijuana seeds and leaves inside the 

passenger compartment of the vehicle).

As I believe that the majority’s conclusion that the probable cause 

supporting the warrantless search of the passenger compartment did not also 

extend to the trunk of the vehicle is erroneous, I dissent.