Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 75A03-1602-PC-278 | September 16, 2016 Page 1 of 5

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Nathan Hummel

Michigan City, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

James B. Martin

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Nathan Hummel,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Respondent.

September 16, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No.

75A03-1602-PC-278

Appeal from the Starke Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Kim Hall, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

75C01-1508-PC-2

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 75A03-1602-PC-278 | September 16, 2016 Page 2 of 5

Statement of the Case

[1] Nathan Hummel was convicted of dealing in a narcotic drug, as a Class B 

felony; two counts of robbery, as Class B felonies; and disarming an officer, as a 

Class C felony, pursuant to a plea agreement. Hummel subsequently petitioned 

for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. He now 

appeals, challenging the post-conviction court’s judgment, and he raises a single 

issue for our review, namely, whether he was denied the effective assistance of 

trial counsel. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 

[2] In December 2011, the State charged Hummel with six felony counts related to 

his participation in an armed robbery of a CVS pharmacy. In particular, the 

State alleged that Hummel: jumped over the counter in the pharmacy and, 

armed with a knife, took controlled substances from the presence of the 

pharmacist and stole cartons of cigarettes; possessed with intent to deliver 

morphine, methadone, oxycodone, oxycontin, Ritalin, Fentora, Nucynta, and 

Avinza; and attempted to take a police officer’s gun. During a guilty plea 

hearing in April 2012, Hummel pleaded guilty to dealing in a narcotic drug, as 

a Class B felony; two counts of robbery, as Class B felonies; and disarming an 

officer, as a Class C felony. In exchange for Hummel’s plea, the State reduced 

the dealing count from a Class A felony to a Class B felony and dismissed two 

of the felony counts. And the terms of the plea agreement provided for an 

aggregate sentence of twenty-five years executed. The trial court entered 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 75A03-1602-PC-278 | September 16, 2016 Page 3 of 5

judgment of conviction and sentence according to the terms of the plea 

agreement.

[3] On August 18, 2015, Hummel filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. 

In that petition, Hummel alleged that his “plea of guilty was not knowingly and 

voluntarily entered into due to receiving ineffective assistance of trial 

[counsel].” Appellant’s App. at 36. Following a hearing, the post-conviction 

court concluded that Hummel “freely and voluntarily, after advise [sic] of 

counsel who was not ineffective, pled guilty under the terms of the Plea 

Agreement.” Appellant’s Br. at 23.1 This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Hummel contends that his plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 

because he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

petitioner must demonstrate both that his counsel’s performance 

was deficient and that the petitioner was prejudiced by the 

deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687 (1984). However, failure to satisfy either prong will cause 

the claim to fail. French v. State, 778 N.E.2d 816, 824 (Ind. 2002). 

“[I]f we can dismiss an ineffective assistance claim on the 

prejudice prong, we need not address whether counsel’s 

performance was deficient.” Lee v. State, 892 N.E.2d 1231, 1233 

(Ind. 2008).

 

1

 Hummel did not include the post-conviction court’s order in the appendix on appeal. See Ind. Appellate 

Rule 50(A)(2)(b).
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Counsel’s performance is deficient if it falls below an objective 

standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional 

norms. French, 778 N.E.2d at 824. Counsel is afforded 

considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics, and we 

will accord those decisions deference. Timberlake v. State, 753 

N.E.2d 591, 603 (Ind. 2001). A strong presumption arises that 

counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant 

decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Id. 

To meet the appropriate test for prejudice, the petitioner must 

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different. Id. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Perez v. State, 

748 N.E.2d 853, 854 (Ind. 2001).

There are two different types of ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims that can be made in regards to guilty pleas: (1) failure to 

advise the defendant on an issue that impairs or overlooks a 

defense and (2) an incorrect advisement of penal consequences. 

Segura v. State, 749 N.E.2d 496, 500 (Ind. 2001); see also Smith v. 

State, 770 N.E.2d 290, 295 (Ind. 2002). . . . The specific standard 

for showing prejudice on [the first type of claim] was articulated 

by our Supreme Court in Segura and requires:

a showing of a reasonable probability of success at 

trial if the alleged error is one that would have 

affected a defense. . . . A new trial is of course 

necessary if an unreliable plea has been accepted. 

But its costs should not be imposed needlessly, and 

that would be the result if the petitioner cannot show 

a reasonable probability that the ultimate resultconviction-would not have occurred despite counsel’s 

error as to a defense.

749 N.E.2d at 503.
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McCullough v. State, 987 N.E.2d 1173, 1176-77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[5] We agree with the State that Hummel has waived this issue for review on 

appeal for failure to present a cogent argument in support of his contentions. 

See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). While Hummel sets out the applicable 

standard of review and cites case law relevant to his burden to prove ineffective 

assistance of counsel in general, he does not state with any specificity how his 

trial counsel’s performance was allegedly deficient or direct us to any evidence 

in the record to support his bare contentions. See id. For instance, in his brief 

on appeal, Hummel states that his trial counsel made “unprofessional errors,” 

but he does not describe those alleged errors or direct us to any part of the 

record to support that allegation. Appellant’s Br. at 15. And Hummel avers 

that his trial counsel did not “properly advise [him] on the offen[s]e of dealing 

in a narcotic” drug, but he does not explain what his trial counsel’s advice was 

or how it was improper. Id. at 16. Because of the lack of cogent argument and 

citation to the record or relevant authority, Hummel has waived his ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel claim for our review.

[6] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Baker, J., concur.