NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 09a0038n.06 Filed: January

16, 2009 No. 07-4093 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v.

WI L L I AM L EE QUI

NN, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE S OUT HER

N DI S TR I CT OF O H IO

B e fo re : RY AN , SI L ER, and GR I F F I N, Cir c uit

Judg e s. SILE R , Circuit Judge

. Def endant Wil liam L ee Quinn appea ls his sentenc e of 7 0 m o nths imprisonment following his plea of g uilty to attempted bank larc eny . He argues that the district cour t (1) e rre d by

calc ulating a

n advisory

Guidelines ra

ng e base d on fac ts not admitt ed by him or proven to a jury bey ond a re asonable doubt and (2) misca lculated the G u i d elines ra ng e, misapplying the economic r eality

test when de termining the amount of “ intended loss,” so that the re sulting sentenc e

was unre asonable . For

the following rea sons, we AF F IRM

. I. F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND I n 2007, Quinn enter ed a plea of g uilty to Count 1 of the Superse ding I nformation cha

rg ing him with attempting to enter a bank with the intent to commit a felony by taking over $1,000 ( i.e. , atte mp te d b an k la r c e n y ) in v io lati o no f

1 8 U

. S. C. § 2 1 1 3 ( a )

. I nth e p le a a g r e e me n t, th e parties ag ree d that Quinn attempted to enter the Northside B ank and T rust Company in Cincinnati, Ohio,No. 07-4093

United States v. Quinn

- 2 - wi th t he int e nt t o s te a l $4 ,0 00 ,0 00 in 2 00 6. Qu inn re c ru ite d c o- de fe nd ant L isa Mo ss t o d

ri ve him fr om I nd iana po lis , Ind iana , to Cinc inn a ti. Th e n, a g ov e rnme nt c oo pe ra

tin g wi tne ss b ro ug ht h im a bagto car

ry the money

and drove him to the bank. The F BI took Quinn into cust o d y as h e was approa ching the bank. I n sentenc ing Q uinn, the di strict court calculate d the advisory Guidelines rang e of 70 to 87 months two way s that y ielded identica l r esults: ( 1) using an intended loss amount of $1,390,794 (the amount on hand in the bank at the time of the attempted bank larc eny ) and (2) using the stipulated intended loss amount of $4,000,000 and de parting downwar d to a ra ng e that reflec ted a loss amount of $1,390,794 bec ause othe rw i s e t he off ense le vel would over state the ser iousness of the off ense. I t th e n c on sid e re d th e oth e r § 35 53 (a ) fa c tor s and imp os e d a se nte nc e of 70 mon ths imp ri so nme nt, within the advisory

Guidelines ra

ng e. II. STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW We reviewthe constitutionality of sentenc es de novo, the district c ourt’s calc ulation of the amount of loss for c lear

err or, and the re asonable ness of the se ntence for a buse of discr etion. United States v. Conatser , 5 14 F .3 d 5 08 , 5 37 (6 th C ir . 2 00 8) ; United States v. Se xton , 512 F. 3d 326, 331 (6th Cir. 2008); Un ite d S

tat es v . B lac k

we ll , 459 F.3d 739, 772 ( 6th Cir. 2006). III . D ISC USS ION (1 ) U sing fac ts notadm it te d by Q uinn o r pr ov e n t o a ju r y be yo nd a r e as ona ble doubt Quinn argues that the district co u rt v i o l ated his S ix th Amendment rig ht to a trial by jury beca use (1) the Gover

nment did not establish the amount of “ intended loss” and ( 2) the district cour tNo. 07-4093

United States v. Quinn

- 3 - should not have used the $1,390,794 of cash a lleg edly

on hand at the bank as the loss amount beca use the amount was not ag ree d to by Quinn or found by

a jury bey ond a re asonable doubt. The Gove rnment met i ts burden of establishing the amount of “intende d loss.” I n the plea ag ree me n t, th e p arti e s s ti p u late d an d a g r e e d th a t t h e “ inte n d e d

lo s s ” w a s $ 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0

. T he Go ve rnme nt r e a d th is s tip ulatio n to the dis tr ic t c ourt a t the c ha

ng e of ple a he ari ng , and

Qu inn did not challeng e this stipulat i o n. Then, the pr esente nce inve stigation report (“ PSR ”) inc luded the stipulate d “int ended loss” a mount of $4,000,000, and at sente ncing , the district court a dopted the fa c tua l st a te me nts in t

he PSR. We have squa

rely reje cted the a

rg ument t hat af

ter United States v. Book er , 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a nd Blakely

v. W ashington , 542 U.S. 296 (2004), all fa cts that i n cre ase the sever ity of a sentenc e must be admitted by the def endant or found by a jury bey ond a rea sonable doubt. United States v. Sex ton , 512 F.3d 326, 329- 30 (6th Cir. 2008). “Where , as here , the district court re cog nized the advisory

nature of the guidelines, the increase in a defe ndant’s sente nce ba sed on fa cts not

a dmi tte d b y

the de fe nd ant o r p ro ve n to a jur y be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t do e s n ot v iol a te the Sixth Amendment.” United States v. Conatser , 514 F.3d 508, 527 (2008). The district c ourt proper ly used the $1,390,794 of c ash in the bank to c ome up with a more ap p ro p ri at e s entenc e. Althoug h not included in the PSR , the probation office r called the bank to a scer tain the amount of funds on hand at t h e t i m e o f t h e a t t em p t edro b b ery . T h i s d et er m i n at i o ni n u re d t o t h e b en ef

i t o f Qu i n nat s en t en ci n g. Fur ther, b y d ep ar t i n g d o wn wa rdt o t h e G u i d el i n es ra n ge f o r a n“i n t en d edl o s s ” o f $ 1,390,794, the d i s t ri ct court did not incre ase the sentenc e beyond the maxim um authorized. United States v. Jones , 41 7 F .3 d 54 7, 55 1 (6 th Cir

. 20 05 ) (“ A do wnwa rd de pa rt ur e . . . re su lts in a di scre tio na ri lyNo. 07-4093

United States v. Quinn

Any sentenc ing e rror arising from the alternate deter mination that the “ intended loss” wa s 1 $1,390,794 is ha

rmless beca

use the two de terminations y ielded identica l results. See, e .g., United States v. Christopher , 415 F.3d 590, 593 ( 6th Cir. 2005). - 4 - reduce d sentenc e, not one that is mandatorily incre ased be y ond the maxim um authorized by a jury verdic t or g uilty

plea.” ). “Since defe ndants wer e sente nced unde r an a dvisory Guidelines sche me, the maxim um statutory

penalty that the district court c ould impose was deter mined by the statute of conviction, rather than by a Guidelines r ang e ca lculated using only jury finding s.” Sexton , 512 F.3d

a t 33 0. Th e ma ximum statut or y pe na lty fo r a vio la tio n of 18 U. S.C. § 21 13 (a ) is 24 0 mon ths , w e ll above the sentenc e that Quinn re ceive d. (2 ) T he e c ono m ic r e ali tyte st T h e d i s t r i c tc o u rt ’ s d e t e r m i n a t i o nt h a tt h e i n t e n d e d l o s s w a s $ 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 , f

o l l o w e d b y a downw ar d d ep arture beca use the off

ense le vel over stated the ser iousness of the off ense, w as not

c le arl y e rr on e ou s. Th e of

fe ns e le ve l for larc e ny de pe nd s on the a mou nt o f a c tua l or

int e nd e d lo ss. 1 United States v. Mc

Bride , 362 F.3d 360, 37 3 (6t h Cir. 20 04 ) (c iti ng USS G § 2B 1. 1) . “ ‘I nte nd e d lo ss’ (I ) mea ns the pecunia

ry harm that was intended to r esult from the of fense ; and (I I ) includes intende d pecunia ry harm that would have been impossibl e or unlikely to occur ( e.g. , as i n a g overnme nt sting operation, or an insuranc e fr aud in which the c laim exceeded the insured v al u e).” USSG § 2B 1. 1c mt. n. 3( A) (i i) . T he de fi nit ion o f i nte nd e d lo ss m ay

re a c h unli ke ly

or imp os sib le los se s, un le ss the offe nder’ s mistaken b el i ef of the fa cts is “so irrational that the words ‘intende d loss’ can no longe r re asonably

apply .” McBride , 362 F.3d at 374. The stipulated in t en d ed l o s s amount of $4,000,000 was proper even t houg h Quinn could never have cause d this level of loss. His relianceNo. 07-4093

United States v. Quinn

- 5 - on a g ov e rnme nt c oo pe ratin g wi tne ss, la c k o f f a mil iari ty wi th t he sp e c if ic ba nk, a nd ina bil ity to p h ys i c a l l y c ar

r y $ 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 d o n o tt r i g g e r t h e r e qu i s i t e l e v e l o f

i r r a t i o n a l i t y. Howeve r, if the advisory Guidelines offe nse level substantially overstate s the seriousness of the offen s e , a

d o w n w ar d

d e p artu r e ma y b e w ar r an te d u n d e r th e “ e c o n o mi c r e a li ty

p r in c ip le .” McBride , 362 F .3 d at 375 (“ Whe re a de fe nd ant de vis e s an am bit iou s sch e me ob vio us ly do ome d to fail and w hich ca

uses little or no actua l loss, it may be unfa ir to sentence based on the intended ( but highly improbable) loss determination from the [§ 2B1.1] table.”) . The district cour t determined that

su c h a do wnwa rd de pa rt ur e wa s nec e ssa

ry be c a us e the “ e c on omi c re a lity” wa s th a t th e re wa s o nly $1,390,794 in the bank at the time of the attempted of

fense . I t used this amount to calculate a more appropr iate advisory

g uidelines rang e. To the e xten t th a t Q uinn c ha lle ng e s th e e xten t of the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s do wnwa rd de pa rt ur e , h is argument is forec losed. S e e J o n es v . U n it e d S tates , 417 F.3d 54 7 , 5 5 1 n . 3 ( 6 th Ci r . 2 0 0 5 )

. We cannot r eview a

district court’s de cision to deny a downwa

rd depa rture or on the prope r extent of the downwar d depar

ture. (3 ) R e as ona ble ne ss Even thoug h the district court ha s complete discr etion reg ardingdo wn wa rd depa rtures, “ a defe ndant who re ceive d a downwa rd depa rture .
. . is f

ree to a rg ue that the sentenc e fr om which the d i s t ri ct court de parte d was unre asonable .” Jones , 417 F.3d at 551 n. 3. We “must review . . . f or

rea sonablene ss, the district court’s c onsideration of the Guideline sentence in the contex t of the other section 3553(a ) fa ctors,” inc luding its dec ision “not to im pose a lowe r sentenc e base d on the economic r eality

principle.” McBride , 434 F.3d at 477.No. 07-4093

United States v. Quinn

- 6 - Reasonable ness re view has pr ocedur al and substantive c omponents. United S t a t es v. Madden , 515 F.3d 601, 609 (6th Cir. 2008). I f t he district cour t commits no si g nificant proc edura l

e rr or s duri ng se nte nc ing , “ su c h a s fa ili ng to c on sid e r the § 35 53 (a ) fa c tor s . . . or fai li ng to adequately

exp l ai n t h e chosen sentence ,” then we revie w the substantive re asonable ness of the sentenc e using an abuse of discre tion standard. Id. “ [A] se nte nc e that fa lls wi th in a prope rl y calc ulated Guidelines r ang e is ac corde d a re buttable pre sumption of reasona bleness.” Id. Th e se nte nc e imp os e d w a s r e a so na ble . A s d isc us se d a

bo ve , th e dis tr ic t cour t pr op e rl y

c on sid e re d f

a c ts n ot a dmi tte d by Qu inn or pr ov e n to a jur y be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t and

pr op e rl y calc ulated the advisory Guidelines rang e of 70 to 87 months imprisonment using t h e s t i p u l ated intende d lo s s a mo u n t o f $ 4 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 an d e xe r c is in g it s d is c r e ti o n to d e p art d o w n w ar d b a s e d upon the ec onomic rea lity

principle be cause the offe nse level substantially overstate d the seriousne ss of the offe nse. I t then proper ly considere d the other § 3553( a) fac tors and did not abuse its discretion by imp os ing a se nte nc e wi thi n the a dv iso ry ra ng e of 70 mo nt hs im pr iso nme nt. I t a de qu a te ly explained that a sen t ence within the calculated ra ng e wa s appropr iate g iven the natur e and circ umstances of

the offe nse and the history and cha rac teristics of the de fenda nt. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1). AF F IRMED.