alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 301.86-4 Conditions governing the interstate movement of regulated articles from quarantined areas. ( a ) Any regulated article may be moved interstate from a quarantined area only if moved under the following conditions: ( 1 ) With a certificate or limited permit issued and attached in accordance with §§ 301.86-5 and 301.86-8;
( 2 ) Without a certificate or limited permit if: ( i ) The regulated article is moved by the United States Department of Agriculture for experimental or scientific purposes; or
( ii ) The regulated article originates outside the quarantined area and is moved interstate through the quarantined area under the following conditions: ( A ) The points of origin and destination are indicated on a waybill accompanying the regulated article; and
( B ) The regulated article is moved through the quarantined area without stopping (except for refueling and for traffic conditions such as traffic lights and stop signs); and
( C ) The regulated article is not unpacked or unloaded in the quarantined area; and
( D ) The article has not been combined or commingled with other articles so as to lose its individual identity.
( b ) When an inspector has probable cause to believe a person or means of conveyance is moving a regulated article interstate, the inspector is authorized to stop the person or means of conveyance to determine whether a regulated article is present and to inspect the regulated article. Articles found to be infested by an inspector, and articles not in compliance with the regulations in this subpart, may be seized, quarantined, treated, subjected to other remedial measures, destroyed, or otherwise disposed of.
Page 1 of 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

GAINESVILLE DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v. CASE NO. 1:94-cr-01004-MP

THOMAS FRANKLIN WOODY,

Defendant.

___________________________/

O R D E R 

This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate

Judge, doc. 65, recommending that doc. 51, the motion to vacate sentence under § 2255, be

denied with prejudice as untimely. After the first attempt to mail the Report and

Recommendation to the defendant was returned undelivered, the Clerk resent the Report and

Recommendation to defendant’s current address and it was not returned. The Court then gave

the defendant additional time to file objections, but none were filed. 

The Court agrees that the defendant should have filed a motion to challenge his sentence

by May of 2000. Since he did not initiate the instant motion until 2004, it is untimely. 

Accordingly it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. The Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (doc. 65) is adopted

and incorporated herein.

2. This motion at doc. 51 is denied with prejudice.

DONE AND ORDERED this 18th day of June, 2008

 s/Maurice M. Paul 

 Maurice M. Paul, Senior District Judge

Case 1:94-cr-01004-MP-AK Document 68 Filed 06/18/08 Page 1 of 1
Exhibit
      32.1




CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO


18
      U.S.C.
      ss.1350


AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
      connection with the Annual Report of Datascension Inc. (the "Company")on Form
      10-KSB for the year ended December 31, 2007 as filed with the Securities and
      Exchange Commission on the date therein specified (the "Report")"Report"),
      I, D.
      Scott Kincer, Chief Executive Officer and Principal Executive Officer of the
      Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
      906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my
      knowledge:





(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities
      Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




/s/
                D. Scott KincerDAVID
                SCOTT KINCER
              CEO
                and Prin. Executive OfficerDated:
                April 14, 2008
<partyblock><br><br><div align="center"><b><font size="+1">The People of the State of New York, Respondent, <br><br>against<br><br>Kawahn Strachn, Defendant-Appellant.</font></b></div><br><br><p>Defendant appeals from a judgment of the Criminal Court of the City of New York, New York County (Tamiko A. Amaker, J.), rendered March 30, 2016, after a nonjury trial, convicting him of attempted criminal possession of a forged instrument in the third degree, and imposing sentence.</p><p>Per Curiam.</p><p>Judgment of conviction (Tamiko A. Amaker, J.), rendered March 30, 2016, affirmed.</p><p>The verdict convicting defendant of attempted criminal possession of a forged instrument in the third degree (<i>see</i> Penal Law §§ 110.00/170.20) was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence (<i>see People v Danielson</i>, 9 NY3d 342, 348—349 [2007]). The evidence presented at trial by the People, which included the police officer's testimony that defendant bent a Metrocard along the magnetic strip in a manner that the officer knew, based on his training and experience, can obliterate the encoded data of the value remaining on the card, and then swiped the bent card in an attempt to gain access to the subway without paying the required fare, was sufficient to support the conviction (see <i>People v Mattocks</i>, 12 NY3d 326, 330 [2009]; <a href="../2009/2009_05391.htm" target="_blank"><i>People v McFarlane</i>, 63 AD3d 634</a>, 635 [2009],<i> lv denied</i> 13 NY3d 837 [2009]; <a href="../2008/2008_03106.htm" target="_blank"><i>People v Taylor</i>, 50 AD3d 358</a> [2008], <i>lv denied </i>11 NY3d 795 [2008]; <a href="../2018/2018_04971.htm" target="_blank"><i>cf. People v Ross</i>, 163 AD3d 428</a> [2018]).</p><p>Nor was the accusatory instrument jurisdictionally defective. The instrument sufficiently alleged defendant's possession of a forged instrument, consisting of the bent MetroCard, as well as information from which his knowledge and intent could be inferred (<i>see People v Mattocks</i>, 12 NY3d at 330).</p><br> THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE COURT.<br>I concur I concur <br>Decision Date: January 27, 2020<br><br><div align="center"><form method="LINK" action="../../slipidx/at_1_idxtable.shtml"><input type="submit" value="Return to Decision List"></form></div></partyblock>
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-16-00444-CV

Tawnya Brigandi

v.

American Mortgage Investment 

Partners Fund I Trust

§

§

§

§

From County Court at Law No. 2

of Denton County (CV-2016-01542)

April 20, 2017

Per Curiam

JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that 

the appeal should be dismissed. We grant American Mortgage Investment 

Partners Fund I Trust’s motion to dismiss, vacate the underlying court’s 

judgments without consideration of the merits, and dismiss the case as moot. 

It is further ordered that appellant Tawnya Brigandi shall bear the costs of 

this appeal, for which let execution issue. 

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

PER CURIAM
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

TRACI COLLINS,

Appellant, 

v.

LENA LAXTON,

Appellee.

§

§

§

§

§

§

No. 08-20-00041-CV

Appeal from the

53rd District Court

of Travis County, Texas1

(TC# D-1-FM-15-006800)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Traci Collins filed an unopposed motion for voluntary dismissal of this appeal. 

See TEX.R.APP.P. 42.1(a)(1). The motion is granted, and this appeal is dismissed. Costs are taxed 

against the Appellant. See TEX.R.APP. P. 42.1(d).

April 8, 2020

YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice

Before Alley, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.

1 We hear this case on transfer from the Third Court of Appeals in Austin. See TEX.R.APP.P. 41.3.
#### Apparel Trimming Corp., Respondent, v B & R Textile Corp., Appellant.

— Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered May 4, 1979, is modified, in the exercise of discretion, to condition the granting of plaintiff-respondent's motion to vacate a prior order of preclusion upon payment, within 20 days after service of a copy of the order entered hereon, by the attorney for plaintiff-respondent personally of $500 costs to defendant-appellant, otherwise affirmed, with costs and disbursements of this appeal, to be paid by plaintiff-respondent to defendant-appellant, and in default of the payment of all such costs, as aforesaid, the order appealed from is reversed, in the exercise of discretion, and the motion to vacate the order of preclusion is denied, with costs and disbursements of this appeal, to be paid by plaintiff-respondent to defendant-appellant. The excuse for inordinate delay in responding to the demand for the bill may be said to be plausible but barely adequate. No reason is given for not advancing that explanation at the time that it was discovered that compliance with the demand could not be made timely instead of waiting until actual preclusion had been ordered and the case assigned to a trial part. In these circumstances we have imposed the stated sanction. Concur — Fein, J. P., Sullivan, Markewich, Silverman and Ross, JJ.
```

[108th Congress Public Law 388]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]

[DOCID: f:publ388.108]

[[Page 118 STAT. 2238]]

Public Law 108-388
108th Congress

                                 An Act

 
To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 
555 West 180th Street in New York, New York, as the ``Sergeant Riayan A. 
      Tejeda Post Office''. <<NOTE: Oct. 30, 2004 -  [H.R. 4046]>> 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

    The facility of the United States Postal Service located at 555 West 
180th Street in New York, New York, shall be known and designated as the 
``Sergeant Riayan A. Tejeda Post Office''.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other 
record of the United States to the facility referred to in section 1 
shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Sergeant Riayan A. Tejeda 
Post Office''.

    Approved October 30, 2004.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--H.R. 4046:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 150 (2004):
            Sept. 28, considered and passed House.
            Oct. 10, considered and passed Senate.

                                  <all>
```
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Brian Vigliotti, Appellant.

by defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County, rendered May 17, 1978, convicting him of burglary in the third degree and criminal mischief in the fourth degree, after a nonjury tried, and imposing sentence. The appeal also brings up for review the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress certain statements. Judgment reversed, on the law, motion to suppress granted only as to statements made by the defendant in the station house in response to police questioning, and new trial ordered. The record indicates that defendant was informed of his *Miranda*rights *(Miranda v Arizona,*384 US 436) both at the time of his arrest, and subsequently, at the police station, and indicated, on each occasion, that he understood those rights. There is nothing in the record, however, to indicate that defendant waived his rights, either by express statement *(People v Schroder,*71 AD2d 907), or by conduct *(North Carolina v Butler,*441 US 369). Accordingly, the trial court should have suppressed statements made by the defendant in the station house in *860response to police questioning. Furthermore, although the evidence of defendant’s guilt was persuasive, it cannot be said that the error in admitting the testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt *(People v Crimmins,*36 NY2d 230). Accordingly, reversal is required. There is no merit to defendant’s suggestion that a statement made by him while in the patrol car, which was volunteered, should also be suppressed. Nor can we agree with defendant that his trial counsel was ineffective, or that the proof offered at trial was insufficient to convict him. Mollen, P. J., Hopkins, Titone and Mangano, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Lightwave Logic, Inc. (the Company) for the period ending March 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Andrew J. Ashton, Treasurer of our Company, certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that, to my knowledge:

1.

The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.

The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of our Company.



Date:  May 16, 2011

/s/ Andrew J. Ashton

Andrew J. Ashton

Treasurer

(Principal Financial Officer)
# L_2020314EN.01000101.xml

| 29.9.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 314/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

29.9.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 314/1

---

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2020/1340

of 22 September 2020

entering a name in the register of protected designations of origin and protected geographical indications [‘Brački varenik’ (PGI)]

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 November 2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs (1), and in particular Article 52(2) thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | In accordance with Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, Croatia’s application to register the name ‘Brački varenik’ was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (2). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

In accordance with Article 50(2)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012, Croatia’s application to register the name ‘Brački varenik’ was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (2).

| (2) | As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the name ‘Brački varenik’ should therefore be entered in the register, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

As no statement of opposition under Article 51 of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 has been received by the Commission, the name ‘Brački varenik’ should therefore be entered in the register,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

The name ‘Brački varenik’ (PGI) is hereby entered in the register.

The name specified in the first paragraph denotes a product in Class 1.8. – other products listed in Annex I to the Treaty (spices etc.), as listed in Annex XI to Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 668/2014 (3).

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 22 September 2020.

For the Commission

On behalf of the President

Janusz WOJCIECHOWSKI

Member of the Commission

---

(1)  
  OJ L 343, 14.12.2012, p. 1.

1

(2)  
  OJ C 183, 3.6.2020, p. 12.

2

(3)  Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 668/2014 of 13 June 2014 laying down rules for the application of Regulation (EU) No 1151/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs (OJ L 179, 19.6.2014, p. 36).

3

---
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the
undersigned officer of MagnaChip Semiconductor Corporation (the Company) hereby certifies, to such officers knowledge, that:

(i) the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
of the Company as of the dates and for the periods expressed in the Report.



|                   |  |  |  |                                                                
|------------------ |  |  |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------
|Dated: May 3, 2011 |  |  |  | /s/ Sang Park                                                  
|                   |  |  |  | Sang Park Chief Executive
Officer (Principal Executive Officer)

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 1350 and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
as amended or incorporated by reference in any registration statement of the Company filed under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
staff upon request.
1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

GAINESVILLE DIVISION

SHAWN M. KESLING,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 1:20-cv-143-AW-MAF

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Shawn Kesling is serving a state sentence in Idaho. He was earlier serving his 

Florida probationary sentence in Idaho pursuant to an Interstate Compact. The same 

conduct that led to his current Idaho prison sentence also led to a Florida warrant for 

a probation violation. That led to the Florida Department of Corrections’ lodging a 

detainer with Idaho authorities. Kesling has filed a § 2241 petition to contest that 

detainer. ECF No. 1. 

The State filed a response, contending that the petition is untimely and also 

fails on the merits. ECF No. 12. Kesling had an opportunity to file a reply, but he 

filed none. The magistrate judge then issued a report and recommendation

concluding the petition should be dismissed as untimely or, alternatively, denied on 

the merits. ECF No. 25. Kesling requested (and received) an extension of time to file 

objections, but he has filed none. 

Case 1:20-cv-00143-AW-MAF Document 28 Filed 05/23/23 Page 1 of 2
2

I have carefully considered the report and recommendation, and I agree with 

the magistrate judge and the State that the petition is untimely. It will be dismissed 

on that basis. I therefore need not address the merits.

I now adopt the report and recommendation1and incorporate it into this order.

The clerk will enter a judgment that says, “The § 2241 petition is dismissed as 

untimely.”

A certificate of appealability is DENIED. The clerk will close the file.

SO ORDERED on May 23, 2023. 

s/ Allen Winsor

United States District Judge

1 Because I do not address the merits, I do not adopt or incorporate into this 

order the portion of the report and recommendation under the “Merits” heading

(pages 11-16). I otherwise incorporate it in full. 

Case 1:20-cv-00143-AW-MAF Document 28 Filed 05/23/23 Page 2 of 2
EX-10.1






The following table sets forth the cash bonuses paid to each officer for 2004:



	 	 	 	 	 
	Name and Principal Position	 	Cash Bonus
	Russell A. Doll
	 	$	60,000	 
	Acting President and
	 	 	 	 
	Chief Executive Officer
	 	 	 	 
	Mitchell I. Rosen
	 	$	25,500	 
	Vice President and
	 	 	 	 
	Chief Financial Officer
	 	 	 	 
	Charles S. Troy
	 	$	80,000	 
	Vice President
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

The Honorable Frederic Block, Senior United States District Judge for ***

the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PEDRO DELGADO-SALIZAR, aka

Salizar Delgado, Pedro Salizar, Pedro

Delgado-Salazar,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 07-70677

Agency No. A092-733-221

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 7, 2010** 

Pasadena, California

Before: O’SCANNLAIN and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges, and BLOCK, District

Judge.*** 

FILED

MAY 12 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

Pedro Delgado-Salizar petitions for review of a decision of the Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). As the facts are known to the parties, we repeat

them only as necessary to explain our decision.

I

Delgado-Salizar first contends that the IJ abused his discretion by refusing to

grant his motion for a continuance. Delgado-Salizar’s attorney told the IJ that she

needed the continuance to file paperwork necessary to Delgado-Salizar’s request

for an adjustment of status. The IJ denied the requested continuance, but granted

Delgado-Salizar several additional days to file the required form. That same day,

IJ denied Delgado-Salizar's adjustment of status request, but explicitly stated that

he did not base his denial on Delgado-Salizar’s failure to file the paperwork. 

Accordingly, Delgado-Salizar has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by

the IJ’s decision. See Colmenar v. INS, 210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000).

II

Delgado-Salizar next contends that the IJ violated his Due Process rights by

permitting the government to “cross examine” him before his own attorney

conducted a direct examination. After the government completed its examination

of Delgado-Salizar, his attorney conducted an examination. Thus, Delgado-Salizar

had an adequate opportunity to present evidence on his behalf. His hearing was
3

fundamentally fair and did not violate his Due Process rights. See Kaur v.

Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 734, 736-37 (9th Cir. 2004).

III

Finally, Delgado-Salizar claims that the government violated his Due

Process rights by failing to enter into evidence a “rap sheet” that it used during its

examination of him. The BIA’s decision that Delgado-Salizar was not entitled to a

waiver of removability was not based on the contents of the rap sheet, but rather on

his testimony during the government’s examination. Thus, Delgado-Salizar was

not deprived of the right to see any evidence used against him, see 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229a(b)(4)(B), nor did the government’s actions fail to follow fundamentally

fair procedures, see Kaur, 388 F.3d at 737.

IV

Accordingly, Delgado-Salizar’s petition for review is

DENIED.