2019 UT App 82

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KIRSTEEN DIDI BLOCKER,

Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL PHILLIP BLOCKER,

Appellant.

Opinion

No. 20170167-CA

Filed May 16, 2019

Fourth District Court, Provo Department

The Honorable James R. Taylor

No. 024402553

Michael Phillip Blocker, Appellant Pro Se

Grant W. P. Morrison, Matthew G. Morrison, and 

Justin T. Morrison, Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and KATE APPLEBY 

concurred.

MORTENSEN, Judge:

¶1 We previously considered this case in Blocker v. Blocker 

(Blocker I), 2017 UT App 10, 391 P.3d 1051, and remanded it to 

the district court to enter findings of fact to support its ruling 

granting Kirsteen Didi Blocker (Mother) unsupervised 

parent-time with her now sixteen-and-a-half year old son

(Child). Michael Phillip Blocker (Father) appeals the district 

court’s post-remand judgment. We affirm.
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20170167-CA 2 2019 UT App 82

BACKGROUND1

¶2 Mother and Father were married in 1997, separated just 

weeks after Child’s birth in 2002, and divorced in 2004. Mother 

and Father were awarded joint custody, with Child’s primary 

physical care and residence being with Mother. In response to 

Father’s petition to modify custody and concerned about the 

detrimental impact of Mother’s behavior on Child, the district

court granted sole legal and physical custody to Father in 2010

(2010 Order). The district court ordered that Mother’s parenttime be supervised until she “changed her mind set with regard 

to her own parenting abilities and Father’s relationship with the 

child.” Blocker I, 2017 UT App 10, ¶ 4, 391 P.3d 1051 (cleaned up). 

But concerned that supervised parent-time would be impractical 

for financial reasons, the court permitted Mother to have 

unsupervised parent-time provided that she retain a special 

master and participate in individual therapy by herself and joint 

therapy with Child. Id. Until she verified compliance with these 

conditions, Mother’s parent-time remained supervised. Id.

¶3 In 2014, in response to Mother’s motion to modify the 

2010 Order and based on a home study report, the district 

court temporarily granted Mother unsupervised parent-time. 

Id. ¶¶ 5–6. Nearly one year later, having received no other 

evidence or testimony, the court decided to make Mother’s 

unsupervised parent-time permanent without entering any 

findings of fact. Id. ¶ 7.

¶4 Father appealed, and we determined that the court 

had made its order granting unsupervised parent-time to 

Mother “permanent without explaining the basis for its 

decision.” Id. ¶ 16. Because the court modified the parent-time

requirements without providing any findings, we concluded 

 

1. The facts of this case are set out in further detail in the original 

appeal. See Blocker I, 2017 UT App 10, ¶¶ 2–7, 391 P.3d 1051.
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20170167-CA 3 2019 UT App 82

that we were unable to review its decision and remanded for 

more detailed findings. Id. ¶ 21.

¶5 Regarding the changed circumstances, on remand the 

district court made the following findings of fact: (1) Mother had 

continued professional therapy; (2) Mother and Mother’s father 

were maintaining a relationship with Child by going to Father’s 

house and being allowed to spend time with Child in their car, at 

the curbside, for about one hour, two to three times a week; 

(3) Father’s brother (Uncle) supervised visits between Mother 

and Child during the Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays 

without problems being noted; (4) Child was allowed to sit and 

visit with Mother and her family during a church Christmas 

program without incident; (5) Mother was allowed to speak by 

phone with Child two to three times per week; (6) Child was 

older when the district court modified parent-time; and (7) Child 

had received substantial therapy at the time the district court 

modified parent-time. The court also identified three 

circumstances that rendered the 2010 Order unenforceable: 

(1) the parties were unable to afford the cost of supervised 

exchanges, supervised visitation, or the services of a special 

master; (2) the therapist identified in the 2010 Order to oversee 

therapy of Mother and Child was no longer available; and (3) the 

agency assigned to supervise Mother’s parent-time in the 2010 

Order was no longer in business in Mother’s geographical area.

¶6 Regarding Child’s best interest, the district court on 

remand noted that both parties “wished to reasonably 

accommodate a relationship between [Child] and [Mother].” The 

court explained that “curbside parent time . . . was not in the 

best interest of [Child]. He needed a more reasonable and less 

artificial opportunity to know his [Mother] and her family.”

¶7 The district court further described the process by which 

it granted Mother unsupervised parent-time. Because parenttime supervised by Uncle had been “successful and without 

incident,” the court concluded that Mother should be allowed to 

exercise unsupervised parent-time on a temporary basis. At the 
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20170167-CA 4 2019 UT App 82

time the district court modified parent-time, Mother had been 

exercising unsupervised parent-time for nearly one year without 

any reported incidents. Although Father speculated that Mother 

was engaging in “parental alienation” during her parent-time, 

the court noted that Father offered no evidence to support this 

contention. The court concluded by pointing out, “[Child] was 6 

years older and in spite of the curbside restrictions and other 

difficulties over the years, he and [Mother] had developed and 

continued to maintain a positive parent/child relationship.” And 

with regard to Mother, the court noted that she had

“demonstrated an ability through the evaluation and her 

practice over several months to maintain a reasonable 

relationship with [Child].”2 Thus, the court concluded that it was 

appropriate to “reconcile the now unenforceable 2010 Order and 

the current state of affairs” by allowing unsupervised 

parent-time as the means to “most effectively foster a continuing 

relationship” between Child and Mother. Father appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶8 The first issue on appeal is whether the district court 

erred when it determined that the unenforceability of the 

conditions for Mother to have unsupervised parent-time with 

Child constituted a material change in circumstances to support 

a modification of the parent-time arrangements in the 2010 

Order. The second issue is whether the district court erred by not 

conducting a best interest analysis when it modified the parenttime conditions of the 2010 Order. Both issues share the same

standard of review. “We review a district court’s decisions 

regarding parent-time for an abuse of discretion.” Jones v. Jones, 

2016 UT App 94, ¶ 8, 374 P.3d 45. “The district court’s proximity 

 

2. The district court had ordered and received a home study to 

determine if Mother was competent to have unsupervised 

parent-time with Child.
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20170167-CA 5 2019 UT App 82

to the evidence places it in a better position than an appellate 

court to choose the best custody arrangement. Thus, we 

generally will not disturb the district court’s parent-time 

determination absent a showing that the district court has 

abused its discretion.” Stephens v. Stephens, 2018 UT App 196, 

¶ 34, 437 P.3d 445 (cleaned up).

ANALYSIS

I. The Preclusion of Previously Disposed Arguments

¶9 With regard to the first issue, we note that the scope of 

our review of the district court’s post-remand ruling is limited 

by the mandate rule. “The mandate rule, a subset of the law of 

the case doctrine, binds both the district court and the parties to 

honor the mandate of the appellate court. Under this rule, the 

decisions of an appellate court become the law of the case and 

cannot be reconsidered on remand.” State v. Oliver, 2018 UT App 

101, ¶ 29 n.8, 427 P.3d 495 (cleaned up); see also Thurston v. Box 

Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037 (Utah 1995) (“[T]he mandate 

rule[] dictates that pronouncements of an appellate court on 

legal issues in a case become the law of the case and must be 

followed in subsequent proceedings of that case.”). Furthermore, 

when this court disposes of an argument as inadequately 

briefed, “the law of the case doctrine precludes us from 

addressing this argument anew.” See NPEC LLC v. Miller, 2018 

UT App 85, ¶ 9, 427 P.3d 357 (per curiam) (cleaned up). 

¶10 Under the mandate rule, Father cannot re-litigate on 

remand issues we previously determined were inadequately 

briefed. But this is exactly what he does now. In this postremand appeal, Father reintroduces a previously disposed issue 

by presenting two arguments in support of it.

¶11 First, he argues, “The district court abused its discretion 

when it used Mother’s inability to comply with the conditions 

[for unsupervised parent-time] in the initial Parent Time Order 
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20170167-CA 6 2019 UT App 82

as a change in circumstances to justify modification of [Mother’s]

parent time because those circumstances were not those upon 

which the earlier decision was based.” Next, Father argues,

“[T]he district court abused its discretion in finding that 

[Mother’s] unwillingness to comply with a standing court order

provided the basis for a change in circumstances sufficient to 

modify parent time as such rewards a noncompliant parent and 

incentivizes her to continue her noncompliant behavior.”

¶12 Similarly, in his previous appeal, Father argued, “The 

[district] court erred when it decided that [Mother’s] inability to 

comply with conditions for her unsupervised parent time 

constituted a material change in circumstances upon which to 

base a modification of a custody award.”3 A panel of this court 

declined to address this issue because it was inadequately 

briefed. Blocker I, 2017 UT App 10, ¶ 18, 391 P.3d 1051.

¶13 Thus, in this post-remand appeal, Father raises essentially 

the same issue—namely, that the district court erred in 

concluding the unenforceability of the original parent-time 

conditions constituted a material change in circumstances—that 

he raised in his original appeal. But we have already declined to 

address this very issue in Father’s original appeal due to 

inadequate briefing. “In effect, [Father] now attempts to 

supplement the briefing submitted in his earlier appeal. The 

mandate rule bars such attempts.” See State v. MacNeill, 2016 UT 

App 177, ¶ 39, 380 P.3d 60. Therefore, we decline to reconsider 

this issue in Father’s post-remand appeal. 

 

3. The order of the district court giving rise to the original appeal 

was entitled “Order Modifying Custody.” In fact, that order 

modified only parent-time and did not disturb the underlying 

custody arrangement. Father repeated this error when, in the 

original appeal, he imprecisely referred to a “modification of 

custody” when he was actually arguing that the court erred in 

modifying parent-time.
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20170167-CA 7 2019 UT App 82

II. The Post-remand Judgment

¶14 The scope of the remand directed the district court to 

enter findings of fact showing that there had been a material 

change in circumstances necessary to support a change in the 

parent-time provisions. See Blocker I, 2017 UT App 10, ¶ 21, 391 

P.3d 1051.

¶15 Modification of parent-time involves two separate steps. 

“First, the court must find that the petitioner has made some

showing of change in circumstances that would support a 

modification of parent-time.” Stephens v. Stephens, 2018 UT App 

196, ¶ 33, 437 P.3d 445 (cleaned up). “Second, the court must 

consider the changes in circumstance along with all other 

evidence relevant to the welfare or best interests of the child to 

determine de novo which custody arrangement will serve the 

welfare or best interest of the child, and modify, or refuse to 

modify, the decree accordingly.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Becker 

v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608, 611 (Utah 1984) (“[A] modification of 

visitation rights also requires a bifurcated procedure.”); Hogge v. 

Hogge, 649 P.2d 51, 54 (Utah 1982) (“A . . . two-step procedure 

should be followed where the petition to modify a custody 

decree requests a material change in visitation rights.”).

¶16 In the context of modifying parent-time, a material 

change of circumstances is a “different inquiry” from a material 

change regarding custody. Erickson v. Erickson, 2018 UT App 184, 

¶ 16, 437 P.3d 370 (cleaned up). “When modifying parent-time, 

the petitioner is required to make only some showing of a change 

in circumstances, which does not rise to the same level as the 

substantial and material showing required when a district court 

alters custody.” Id. (cleaned up). Furthermore, in determining 

parent-time, “the [district] court gives highest priority to the 

welfare of the children over the desires of either parent. Such 

determinations are within the [district] court’s sound 

discretion.” Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 946 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 

1998) (cleaned up).
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20170167-CA 8 2019 UT App 82

¶17 Finally, “[t]he [district] court’s findings on remand must 

be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to 

disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on [each] 

factual issue was reached.” Jensen v. Jensen, 2000 UT App 213U, 

para. 8 (cleaned up); accord Lay v. Lay, 2018 UT App 137, ¶ 19, 

427 P.3d 1221; Shuman v. Shuman, 2017 UT App 192, ¶ 5, 406 P.3d 

258. “Put another way, findings are adequate when they contain 

sufficient detail to permit appellate review to ensure that the 

district court’s discretionary determination was rationally 

based.” Lay, 2018 UT App 137, ¶ 19 (cleaned up). “This 

obligation facilitates meaningful appellate review and ensures 

the parties are informed of the [district] court’s reasoning.”

Shuman, 2017 UT App 192, ¶ 5. Furthermore, the Utah Code 

requires the court to “enter the reasons underlying its order for 

parent-time.” Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-34(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 

2018).4

¶18 Thus, on remand, the district court in this case had two 

tasks. First, it was to enter findings of fact to support its ruling 

modifying parent-time. Second, based on those findings, the 

district court needed to explain the process by which it 

concluded that eliminating supervised parent-time was in the 

best interest of Child. The district court completed both tasks in 

its post-remand decision.

¶19 First, the district court identified changed circumstances 

that supported its decision to modify parent-time. See supra ¶ 5. 

Most notable among these is that Mother and Child had received 

substantial therapy at the time of the modification, there had 

been no problems reported during Mother’s supervised 

parent-time, and Child was older and had grown in maturity. 

The 2010 Order stated that supervised parent-time was to 

 

4. Because the statutory provision in effect at the relevant time 

does not differ in any material way from that now in effect, we 

cite the current version of the Utah Code.
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20170167-CA 9 2019 UT App 82

continue “until such time that [Mother] demonstrates that she 

has changed her mind set with regard to her own parenting

abilities and [Father’s] relationship with [Child].” Mother’s

reception of therapy and the absence of reported problems are 

changed circumstances relative to the condition (that is, 

Mother’s uncooperative mind-set) that originally gave rise to the 

imposition of supervised parent-time. The court also noted that 

modification was necessary because the conditions (namely, the 

prohibitive costs associated with supervised parent-time, the 

unavailability of a joint therapist, and the demise of the original 

supervising agency) originally imposed for Mother’s 

unsupervised exercise of parent-time had so substantially 

changed as to make the 2010 Order unenforceable. By 

highlighting these changed circumstances, the district court 

made “some showing of a change in circumstances” necessary to 

modify parent-time. See Erickson, 2018 UT App 184, ¶ 16 (cleaned 

up).

¶20 Second, the district court explained the process by which 

it concluded a modification in parent-time was needed to serve 

Child’s best interest. Given the unenforceability of the 2010 

Order, the court noted that Uncle had been supervising Mother’s 

parent-time for a few months as of April 2014. Mother had 

exercised this parent-time without incident. The court also noted

that, given the parties’ desire “to reasonably accommodate a 

relationship” between Child and Mother, “curbside parent 

time . . . was not in the best interest of [Child]” because “[Child] 

needed a more reasonable and less artificial opportunity to know

his [Mother] and her family.” Thus, the court allowed Uncle to 

continue to supervise Mother’s parent-time on a temporary 

basis. And at the same time, the court ordered a home study. The 

case was set for further review after completion of the home 

study and continuation of parent-time supervised by Uncle.

Four months later, after receiving the home study and hearing 

that supervised parent-time had been “successful and without 

incident,” the district court granted Mother unsupervised 

parent-time on a temporary basis. About a year later, the court 
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20170167-CA 10 2019 UT App 82

determined that Mother had exercised unsupervised, statutory 

parent-time without incident, and it permanently granted her

unsupervised parent-time. The court explained that granting 

Mother unsupervised parent-time was in Child’s best interest 

because “it would most effectively foster a continuing

relationship” between Child and Mother.

¶21 “[District] courts have particularly broad discretion in 

ordering parent-time, and we will only intervene when the 

[district] court’s action is so flagrantly unjust as to constitute an 

abuse of discretion.” Jones v. Jones, 2016 UT App 94, ¶ 13, 374 

P.3d 45 (cleaned up). “The best interests of a minor child are 

promoted by having the child respect and love both parents, 

which includes fostering a child’s relationship with the 

noncustodial parent.” Hanson v. Hanson, 2009 UT App 365, ¶ 3, 

223 P.3d 456 (cleaned up); see also Jones, 2016 UT App 94, ¶ 14

(“The paramount concern in [parent-time] matters is the child’s 

welfare or best interest. Fostering a child’s relationship with the 

noncustodial parent has an important bearing on the child’s best 

interest.” (cleaned up)). Thus, the district court acted well within 

its broad discretion when it found that modifying Mother’s 

parent-time from supervised to unsupervised status was in 

Child’s best interest as the most effective means to “foster a 

continuing relationship” between Mother and Child.

CONCLUSION

¶22 We conclude that, upon remand, the district court 

properly entered findings of fact that were sufficiently detailed 

to identify the steps it took to modify Mother’s parent-time. We 

further conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in reaching the conclusion that unsupervised 

parent-time was in Child’s best interest.

¶23 Affirmed.