COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Willis and Bray 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

RICKY A. TAYLOR 

v. Record No. 0995-94-1 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA MAY 23, 1995 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 

Robert P. Frank, Judge 

 George B. Pavek, III, for appellant. 

 Robert B. Condon, Assistant Attorney General 

(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Ricky A. Taylor contends that making the victims get out of 

their car during the robbery and attempted robbery does not 

constitute the separate crime of abduction. We find no error and 

affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

 When reviewing criminal convictions, we consider the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, giving 

to it all inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Sutphin v. 

Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 241, 243, 337 S.E.2d 897, 898 (1985). A 

conviction will be affirmed unless plainly wrong or without 

evidence to support it. Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 

349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). 

 Larry Davis and Natasha Calver were sitting in Calver's car 

when Taylor and his brother pulled up in a vehicle next to them. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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 Taylor approached the passenger side of Calver's car. His 

brother approached the driver's side and shoved a shotgun in the 

open window. Taylor's brother forced Davis out of the car and 

made him lie on the ground, face down. He put his foot on 

Davis's back and held the shotgun to his head. He demanded 

Davis's money, but Davis had none. Taylor ordered Calver out of 

the car and made her kneel on the ground. He then took her purse 

containing $110, ordered her back into the car, and threatened to 

kill her if she looked up before he left. 

 Code § 18.2-47 defines abduction and provides, in pertinent 

part: 

 Any person, who, by force, intimidation or deception, 

and without legal justification or excuse . . . detains 

. . . the person of another, with the intent to deprive 

such other person of his personal liberty . . . shall 

be deemed guilty of "abduction" . . . . 

 In Brown v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 310, 337 S.E.2d 711 

(1985), the Supreme Court held "in the enactment of the abduction 

statute the General Assembly did not intend to make the kind of 

restraint which is an intrinsic element of . . . robbery . . . a 

criminal act, punishable as a separate offense." 230 Va. at 314, 

337 S.E.2d at 713. The Court went on to define the type of 

detention addressed by the abduction statute as a "detention 

. . . separate and apart from and not merely incidental to, the 

restraint employed in the commission of the other crime." 230 

Va. at 314, 337 S.E.2d at 714. 

 The question before us is whether the detention of the 
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victims in this case was "separate and apart" from or "merely 

incidental" to the robbery and attempted robbery. We find the 

evidence sufficient to support the conclusion that the detentions 

were separate and apart. The victims were forced out of their 

car onto the ground. This was more than was needed to accomplish 

the robbery and attempted robbery. Thus, forcing the victims out 

of the car before committing the robbery is "not an act inherent 

in or necessary to the restraint required" for the robbery. 

Coram v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 623, 626, 352 S.E.2d 532, 

533-34 (1987). 

 We affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

 Affirmed.