NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 17-3764

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

FRANCIS BROOKS,

Appellant 

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Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands

(District Court No. 3-10-cr-00036-002)

District Judge: Hon. Curtis V. Gomez

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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

December 10, 2019

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Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges.

(Opinion filed: January 15, 2020)

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OPINION*

___________________

McKEE, Circuit Judge.

Francis Brooks appeals his judgment of sentence, arguing that the District Court

abused its discretion by denying him a downward departure from the applicable Sentencing 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Guidelines range and that his sentence is substantively unreasonable.

1 Because the District 

Court understood but declined to exercise its authority to depart from the Guidelines, we 

will dismiss Brooks’ appeal in part for lack of jurisdiction2, and because his sentence is

substantively reasonable, we will affirm the judgment of sentence.3

I.

We review criminal sentences for both procedural error and substantive 

reasonableness.4 While Brooks concedes his sentencing was procedurally fair, he argues 

that the District Court’s denial of his request for a downward departure resulted in a

substantively unreasonable sentence.

5 We review the reasonableness of a sentence for 

abuse of discretion.6 We determine whether the District Court “gave ‘meaningful 

consideration’ to the sentencing factors set out in § 3553(a),” and if so, “we give 

 

1 App. Br. at 21. 

2 United States v. Lofink, 564 F.3d 232, 240 (3d Cir. 2009) (“we are not at liberty to 

review a discretionary denial.”).

3 The District Court of the Virgin Islands had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 3241. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

4 United States v. Hester, 910 F.3d 78, 90-91 (3d Cir. 2018).

5

If the District Court denies a request for a downward departure based on a belief that a 

departure was legally impermissible based on the grounds proffered, we have jurisdiction 

to review and determine whether the District Court’s understanding of the law was 

correct. United States v. Stevens, 223 F.3d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 2000). However, when a 

District Court understands its authority to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines but 

exercises discretion not to do so, we lack jurisdiction to review such discretionary 

denials. Lofink, 564 F.3d at 240; see also United States v. Jackson, 467 F.3d 834, 839 (3d 

Cir. 2006) (“[A]s it was pre-Booker, courts of appeals post-Booker, have no authority to 

review discretionary denials of departure motions in calculating sentencing ranges.”). 

Because the District Court understood its authority to depart from the suggested 

Guidelines range and rejected Brooks’ motion on the merits, we will dismiss Brooks’ 

appeal for lack of jurisdiction in so far as he suggests the District Court abused its 

discretion by denying him a downward departure. 

6 Hester, 910 F.3d at 90-91. 
3

deference to its discretion in choosing the ultimate sentence. Our review is accordingly 

limited to determining whether the district judge imposed the sentence he or she did for 

reasons that are logical and consistent with the factors set forth in section 3553(a).”7

Reasonableness review “is highly deferential, and we will affirm unless no reasonable 

sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence...for the reasons the district 

court provided.”8

The District Court considered the appropriate section 3553(a) factors in the 

context of Brooks’ case. The District Court considered the seriousness of the offense, 

stating “this is a case that involved law enforcement officers engaging in a breach of their 

sworn duty and engaging in conduct that involved racketeering and a number of other 

things, that at the very least reflected a conflict of interest with their sworn duties, but 

significantly involved substantive criminal acts.”9 The District Court also considered the 

need to “deter this type of conduct, protect the community from this type of 

conduct...and also impose a sentence that will be no more severe than is necessary to 

achieve the objectives of the Sentencing Commission.”10 Finally, the District Court 

imposed a sentence to “achieve parity with similarly-situated individuals, and...to ensure 

that the defendant[], to the extent necessary, receive[s] such medical treatment, mental 

 

7 United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 90 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal citation and quotation 

marks omitted). 

8 United States v. Gillette, 738 F.3d 63, 79 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

9

JA64.

10 JA64.
4

health therapy, educational opportunities, training opportunities as are appropriate under 

the circumstances.”11

Furthermore, Brooks’ health condition and family responsibilities do not make his 

sentence substantively unreasonable.12 The District Court considered and reasonably 

rejected Brooks’ arguments that his health complications related to his brain tumors and 

the symptoms of HIV made the conditions of confinement inhumane because there was 

no showing that the confinement would cause his condition to worsen nor that the Board 

of Prisons was unable to provide Brooks necessary medical care.13 Likewise, the District 

Court found Brooks’ argument that he needed to care for minor children inconsistent with 

his debilitating medical condition, explaining that “the extraordinary physical impairment 

to which the defendant refers is one that certainly undercuts the support of – or family 

responsibilities that the defendant also seeks a downward departure for.”14

Thus, Brooks has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that no reasonable 

court would have imposed the same sentence on him for the reasons provided by the 

District Court. The District Court imposed a reasonable sentence in light of the relevant 

factors under section 3553(a). We find no abuse of discretion in the decision of the 

District Court.

III.

 

11 JA64-65.

12 Because we lack jurisdiction to review the District Court’s discretionary decision to 

deny Brooks’ request for a downward departure, we review only whether his 

circumstances make his sentence substantively unreasonable.

13 JA50.

14 JA49-50. 
5

For the reasons stated above, we will dismiss Brooks’ appeal for lack of

jurisdiction in part and affirm the District Court’s judgment of sentence.