Docket No . 109581.



### IN THE SUPRE ME COURT OF THE STAT E OF ILLIN OIS

THE PEOP LE OF THE STATE OF ILL IN OI S, Appe llant, v. R ICKY

KIN G, A ppel l ee.
Opinion filed January 21, 2011.

JUSTICE KARME IE R de livered t he judg ment o f the cou rt, wi th op inion. Chi ef Jus t ice Kilbride and Jus t ices Fr eeman, Tho mas, G ar man, Bur ke, and T heis co ncur re d in t he judg ment a nd o pinion.

OPINI ON

I. BACKG

ROUND In 2002, defe

ndan t, Ricky K i n g, was ch arge d w i th f i v e c oun ts of fi rst degree m

urder (720 ILCS 5/9–1(a) (1 ) , ( a) ( 2) ( We st 20 00 ) ) , in
con ne cti on wit h t he Aug ust 8, 200 2, beat ing dea t h of Ro ber t Nas h. Defend ant wa s 1 5 ye ar s o f ag e a t t he t ime of th e i n ci den t. On Jun e 19, 2003, t he St at e file d a n a dd it io na l c oun t of attempted fi

rst degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8–4(a), 9–1(a) (West 2000)) arisi ng out of t he
sa me inc id en t

. T ha t sa me d ay, defen dant entered a

n eg oti ate d p l ea

to t he attempted m

urder c ha rge i n e xc ha ng e f ordis mi ssal of the m urder chargesan d a 15

- yea rse nt en ce in t he Dep ar t ment o f Cor re ct ions. The ci rc uit c ou rt of Cha mpaign Co unt y im mediat ely ente re d jud gment-2- pur sua nt to the ple a agreem ent, sentenced def

endan t t o t he agreedupon 1 5-y

ear pr i son ter m , and di sm

i sse d the m urder c ha rges

. On October 10, 2008, defen da nt fi le d a pro se pos tcon

vi cti on pe ti ti on pursuant to t he Post-Convi ction Hearin g Act (725 I LCS 5/122–1 et seq. (West 2006)), arguing that he wa s no t pr o pe r ly ad moni shed ab out m an da tory su pervi se d r el

ea se . Th e c i rc ui t cour t di sm i ss ed th e p eti ti on as f ri v ol ous an d p ate n tl y wi th out m eri t. On appeal , defen

dant argued for the f

irst tim e that hi s sen

tence was v oi d b ec au se

th e S tate f ai l ed to re qu est a

he ari ng un de r s ec ti on 5– 13 0( 1) ( c) ( ii) of

the Ju ve ni l e C ourt A

ct of 1987 (t he Act) (705 I LCS 40 5/ 5– 13 0( 1) ( c) ( ii) (Wes t 200 0) ) t o d et er mine whet her he sho uld be sentence d as an adul

t. The ap pe l l ate court agreed. 395 Ill . App. 3d 985, 992. A cc ordi

n gl y , the a pp el l ate cou rt reve rs ed the j udg men t of t he circ uit co ur t and r emande d wit h dire ct ions to vacate defendant’s crim in al convi ction, enter

an ad ju di ca t io n o f d elin qu en cy, and en ter an order se n ten ci n g h i m un der the A ct to t i me s er v ed as of h i s twen ty

f i rst bi rthda y
. Id. at 994-95. T he St at e s o ug ht r ev iew in t his court , arguin g that (1) defend ant sho uld be es t op ped fro m arg uing tha t the sente nc i ng prov i si on of t he fully n eg oti ate d p l ea

ag re em en t i s v oi d b ec au se

h e en j oy ed th e b en ef i ts of the plea

agreem ent, in cl udin g the dis mi ssal of f irst degree m

urder charges; an

d (2 ) i f the sente nc i ng prov i si on o f t he fully

negotiated pl ea agr eement is v

oid, the plea should be v acated in i

ts e nti re t y, t he murder char ges re insta t ed, and the parties returned to t he status quo an te f or fu rther p l ea proc eedi

ngs or tria l

. On t his c o ur t ’s o wn mo t io n, t he pa r t ies we r e g ive n le av e t o file suppl em ental bri efs addressi ng the f oll owing two is sues of statutory i nte rpreta ti on in volv in g sections 5–130 ( 1)(a) thro ugh (1)(c) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5–130(1)(a) thro ugh (1)(c) (West 2000)): (1) whether
an off ense “covered by

” s ection 5–130( 1)(a) in cludes onl

y those charges“ sp ec i f

i ed i n” tha t se cti on or b oth charges “ specifi

ed i n” that
se ct io n and “a ll ot her char ges ar ising ou t of t he sa me incident ”; and (2) if an off ense “cover ed by

” s ec ti on 5– 13 0( 1) (a) i

n cl udes b oth charges“speci

fi ed i n” that section an

d “al l other charges

aris in g out o f t he same incident ,” whet her sec t ion 5 –13 0( 1) (c )( ii) req uire d t he Sta te to re qu est a

he ar ing t o de t er mine w he t he rde fen da nt sho uld be sent enced a s an adul

t o r whether he was properly sentence d as an adu lt wi thou t a hea ri ng pur suan t to se cti on 5 –13 0(1 )(c )(i

). B ot h-3- parties h av e f i l ed suppl em en tal bri ef s. For the followi

ng reasons, we conc lude

that an off

ense “covered by” section 5–130(1)(a) i ncl udes both charges

“speci fi ed in ” that
se cti on and “ all other charges

aris in g out o f t he sa me in

ci dent,” that
section 5–130 (1)(c)(i

i) did not req

ui re th e S tate

t o r equ est a hea ring to det er mine whet her defend ant should be sen tenced as a n adu lt, and that he wa s pr op er ly sente nced as a n adu lt w itho ut a hea ring p ur sua nt to sec t ion 5 –13 0( 1) (c )( i). Ac co rd ingly, we r ever se t he judg ment of t he appe l l ate court an

d af f i rm the j udgm

en t of the ci rcui t court.

II. AN AL YSIS T he di sposi

tiv e i ssues on

appe al are issues of

statutory co nst ru ct ion, which are questions of law su bje ct to de novo review. Solon v. Midwes t Medical Records Ass’n, Inc. , 23 6 I ll. 2d 433, 439 (2010 ). Our pr imary object ive in inter pr et inga st at ut e is t o a sce rt ain and give ef f ect to the i

nten t of the l egi slature. Id. at 440 . T he be st i nd i ca torof such

in tent is the l

anguage of

the statut e, which

is to be giv en i ts plai n a nd ord i na ry mean i ng. I d. In det er mining t he pla in meaning of the stat ute, we consi de r t he st at ut e in its e nt iret y, t he subj ect it addresses , and the apparent i ntent of the legi sl at ur e in
enacti ng i t. Id

. W i th these pri nci ple s in mi nd, we turn to the a

ppl i cab l e statutory pr ovisio n, sec t ion 5 –13 0 o f the Act , w hich pr ovid es, in per t inent pa rt, as foll ows: “(1)(a) Th e d ef

i ni ti on o f de l i nq ue nt m i nor un de r Se cti on 5– 12 0 of th i s A rti cl e sh al l n ot ap pl y to an y m i nor who at t he t ime of an of

fen se wasat leas t 15 yea r s o f ag e a nd wh o is charged wit h first degreemurder , aggravated crim in al sexual
as sa ul t, agg ra vat ed ba t t er y with a fire ar m committ ed in a
sc ho o l, on the real

pr o pe r t y co mpr ising a s ch o o l, wit hin 1,000 feet of the rea l prop erty com prisi ng a s ch ool , at a school related acti vi ty, or on , boa

rd ing, o r d epa rt ing fro m any convey ance owned, leased, or cont rac te d by a s ch ool or school dis trict to transport students to or from sch ool or a
school re late d ac t ivity reg ar dless o f the t ime of da y or ti me of ye ar that t he off

ense was comm

itted, armed

ro bber y when t he-4- armed ro bber y was co mmi

t t ed w ith a f

i rea rm, or aggravated veh ic ula r hi ja cki ng when the hi ja cki ng was com

mi tt ed wit h a fire ar m. These charges and all other char ges arising

ou t of the
same i n ci d en t sh a l l b e p ro se cu t edu n d

er th e c ri m i n a l

la ws of this State. * * * ( b) ( i) If be f ore tr i al or pl ea an i nf orm ati on or indict ment is fil

ed t hat do es no t char ge a n offens e specifi ed i n p ara gra ph (a)of this subse ction (1) the S tat e’s Atto rney ma y proc ee d on

any le sser cha rge or charges, but
o nly i n J uven i l e C ourt u

nd er th e p rovi si ons of t his Articl

e. The S t at e’ s A t t o rne y may pro ceed under the Cri mi nal Code of 196 1 on a l

es ser ch arg e if be f ore tr i al the m i nor defend ant kno wingly and

w ith advi

ce of counsel wai

ves, in writi ng, his or her righ

t t o have t

he m atter pr o ce ed in Ju v en i l e C our t. ( ii) If b efore trial

or plea an i nf orm ati on or indict ment is f i l ed th at inc ludes one or more charges specified i n paragraph (a) of this subse ction (1) and addi

tional charges that are not spec ified in that pa ragra ph, all of the charges arising out of the same incident shall beprosecuted under the Criminal Code of 1961

. ( c) ( i) If af ter tr i al orplea t he minor is co nvicte d o f any
o ff ense covered by

par agr aph ( a) of t his subse ct ion (1) , then , in sentenci ng the m

in or, t he court shall h

av e av aila ble an

y orall dispositions prescribed for that o ff ense under Chapter V o f the Uni fi ed Code o f Correct ions. ( ii) If af ter trial or pl ea the cou rt f i nds th at the m i nor comm itted an off ense not covered by

paragraph

(a) o f t his
su bs ec ti on (1), t hat fi ndi ng sh all n ot in val ida te the verdict ort he pros ecution of

the m i nor un de r the c ri m i na l l aw s of t he Stat e; however, unless t he State req ue sts a h ea ri ng f or t he pur po se o f sent encing t he minor unde r Cha pter V of t he Unifi ed Code of Correcti ons, th e Court mus t pro ceed under S ect ions 5–705 and 5–71 0 of thi s A rtic l e. To
re quest a h ea r ing , t he St at e mu st file a wr it t en mo ti o n-5- wit hin 10 day s f

oll owing t he en t r y of a finding or t he
r et ur n o f a v er dic t

. Re as o na ble not ice o f the mo t io n sh all be gi v en to the m i nor or hi s or he r cou ns el . If the moti on is made by t he Stat e, th e c our t sh al l con duct a h ea ri n g to det er mine if t he mino rsho uld be sen tenced under Ch apter V of th e Un i f i ed Code of C orrections. * ** If

af ter th e hear ingthe c ourt finds t hat t he minor sho uld be sentence d under Chapter V of the Un

if ie d Code of Corrections, then t he court shal

l s entence the m

in or accor din

gl y having
av aila ble to it an

y or all di sposi tions so pre scri

be d.” (Emphasesad de d.) 705 ILCS 405/5–130(1)(a) t hrough (c)(i i) (We st 2000 ). In the present case, def

endan t was origi

nal ly charge d w it h five
cou n ts of f irst degree m

urder, an of f ense “ sp ec i f i ed i n” se cti on 5–130(1)(a). E xcl

usi ve j urisdi ction f or fi rst degree murder

when t he accused i s at leas

t 15 yea rs of ag e l i esi n c ri m i na l cou rt, n ot juv en ile
cou rt. 705 ILCS 405 /5–130( 1)(a) (West 2000). In addition, if “other chargesaris in

g out of the sam

e i nci dent” are alle ged i

n an i n di ctm en t, to gether with c harges “ specifi

ed i n” section 5–130(1)(a), t he en t ir e pros ec uti ont ak es pla ce in c r iminal co urt . 705 ILC S 40 5/ 5– 13 0( 1) ( b) ( ii) (West 2000)

. Her e, t he St at e ad ded t o t he indict ment an attempted fi rst degree murder ch

arge, which

had t o be prosecuted in

crim in al court with the f

irst degree m

urder charges be caus e i t arose out of

the s am e i nc i den t. Ult imat ely, defen

dant ple aded guilty

to attempted fi

rst degree murder in exch ange f or dism is sal of the f irst degree murder ch

arges and a 15-yea

r sentence. Theref

ore, h e plea ded guilt y only to t he offense “ ari si

n g ou t of th e s am e i n ci den t” as t he o ffense “sp ecified in”
section 5–130 (1)(a), w

hi ch wasf i rst deg ree m urder. Sec ti on 5–1 30( 1) (c )( i) o f the Act go ver ns s ent enc ing o f a m i nor convi cted of any

off en se “co ve r ed by” s ec t io n 5 –1 30 ( 1) ( a) , wh ile
se cti on 5–1 30( 1) (c )( ii) go ver ns sentenci ng of a m in or co nvi cted of an offense “n

ot covered by

” section 5–130(1)(a). Section 5–130(1)(a) sp ec ifica lly

li sts several

of fenses, including first deg re e mur der , a nd states that “[t]hese charges a nd alloth er char ges ar ising ou t of t he
sa me in ci den t sha ll b e p r o se cu t ed un de rt he cr iminal la ws o f t his State.” 70 5 ILC S 405/ 5–130 (1)(a) (W est 200 0). Both par t ies and t he ap pe llat e c o ur t in t his case ass ume d, without-6- di scus si on or ana lysis , th at a

n of f ense “ covere d by

” s ec ti on 5–130 (1)(a), as u se d in sections 5–130(1)(c)(i) and (1)(c)(ii ), was sy nony mouswith a

n off ense “ specifi

ed i n” sect ion 5–130(1)(a), as used in section 5–130(1)(b). See 395 Ill. A pp. 3dat 989 (“

Howev er, th e statu te pr o vid es if a d efe nd an t eit he rple ad s o ris f oun d gu i l ty of only the non -s ec ti on 5–130(1)(a) ch

arge s, th en

a c our t i s req ui re d to proceed unde r se ct ions 5 –70 5 and 5–7 10 o f the Act , u nless t he Sta te request s, wi

th i n 10 da y s of th e p l ea or tri al, a

h ea ri n g a t w hi ch t he courtwo uld determi

ne wh ether to sentence

the defe ndan t as an adul t.” ( E mph as is in

original .)). In maki

ng this ass

um pti on , the a

pp el l ate courtci ted pr io r a ppe llate c ou rt op inions in which t he pa rt ies and courthad m

ade th e sa me as sum pti on. See , e.g. , People

v. Jardon , 393 I ll. App. 3d 7 25 ( 200 9); People v. Mathis , 357 Ill . App. 3d 45 (20 05); People v. Champ , 32 9 I ll. App. 3d 1 27 ( 200 2); People v. Brazee , 333 I ll. App. 3d 4 3 (2 002 ); People v. Brazee , 3 16 Ill . App. 3d 1230 (2000 ). On t his c o ur t ’s o wn mo t io n, t he pa r t ies we r e g ive n le av e t o file suppl em ental bri efs addressi ng the f oll owing two is sues of

statutory i nte rpreta ti on in volv in g s e ct ions 5 –13 0( 1) (a ) t hro ugh ( 1) (c ) o f the A ct: (1) whether

an o ffe ns e “ co ve r ed by” section 5–130(1)(a) i ncl udes
o nly t hos e cha rg es “sp ecified in” t hat sec t ion o r bo t h c ha rg es

“ sp eci fi ed in” tha t sec t ion and “all ot her char ges ar ising ou t of t he
sa me in ci dent”; and (2) if an

offense “covered b

y” section 5–130(1)(a) in cl udes both charges “ specifi ed i n” that se ct io n a nd “a ll

ot her cha rges ar ising o ut o f t he sa me inc ide nt , ” w he t he rse ct io n 5 –1 30 ( 1) ( c) ( ii) requ ired the Stat e to r equest a heari ng to deter mi

ne wh ether defend ant sho uld be sente nc ed asan ad ul t orwh et he rhe wa s p r o pe r ly sentence d as an adul

t without a hearin

g pursuant to s ec ti on 5–130 (1)(c)(i

). In their supplem

ental briefs, the part ies agreed that an offense “covered by ” s ec ti on 5–130(1)(a) incl

udes both charges

“spe cified in” tha t se cti on and “a ll ot her char ges ar ising ou t of t he sam e i nc i den t.” The pa rties di sa gr ee d, h owev er , a s to wh et he rse ct io n 5 –1 30 ( 1) ( c) ( ii) requi re d the Stat e to r equest a heari ng to deter mi

ne wh ether defend ant sho uld be sente nc ed asan ad ul t orwh et he rhe wa s p r o pe r ly senten ced as an ad ult wit ho ut a h ea r ing pu r su an t t o se ct io n 5–130 (1)(c)(i

). Pu rsu ant to sect ions

5–130(1)(c)(i) and (1)(c)(ii ), whether-7- defend ant could b e sentenc ed as an adul

t without a heari

ng depen ds
on whet her t he o ffense t o w hich he pl eaded guil ty (att empted fi

rst degree m urder) i s “covere d by

” s ec ti on 5–1 30( 1) (a ). The di cti onary de f i ni ti on of “cove r” is “to tr eat or deal wi

th,” as i n “ ma terial covered in t he firs t ch ap t er

. ” W eb st er ’s T hir d N ew I nt er na t io na l Dic t i onary 524 (1976). Accordingl

y, wh en section 5–130(1)(c)(i) dis cusses an offense “c o ve r ed by” section 5–130 (1)(a), it m

eans an off ense treated
orde alt wit h in

that section, whi

ch i ncl udes the off

enses “spe cified in” that section as

well as “al

l other charges

aris in g out of th e s ame i nc i den t.” See 7 05 IL CS 40 5/5–1 30(1)(a ) (We st 2000 ). Thatinter pr et at ion is co nfirmed by the use of o t he r ter ms i n se cti on 5–130(1). For instance , section 5–130(1)(b) addresses whether th e p ros ecuti

on sh oul d oc cu r i n j uven i l e or cri m i n al cou rt, and the answer h

in ges on whether the ch

argin g in strumen t in cl udes any charge of a

n offense “sp ec ified in” se ct io n 5 –1 30 ( 1) ( a)

. T he pla in
mea ni ng of “sp ec ify” is “t o men t io n o rna me in a sp ec ific o rex plic it
man ner.” Webster’s Thi

rd New International

Dic tionary 2187 (1976 ). Thus, wh en se ct io n 5 –1 30 ( 1) ( b) dis cu ss es an o ffen se “sp ec ified in ”
sec t ion 5 –13 0( 1) (a ), it means t he o ffenses e xplicitly named t her ein. Moreov er, t he Act i

tself dem onstrates t hat off

enses “speci fi ed in”
se cti on 5–130(1)(a) do es not mean off enses expl ic itl y n am ed i n that
se cti on plus ot her cha

rges aris in

g out of the s ame inc i de nt. Sec ti on 5– 13 0( 1) ( b) ( ii) ma

ndates t hat when a n informat ion o r indict ment inc lu des ch

arg es“ sp ec i f

i ed i n” se cti on 5 –13 0(1 )(a

) “ an d a ddi ti on a l chargestha

t are not s peci fi ed i n that paragraph, all of

the charges
ar ising out of the sam

e i nci dent shal l b e prosecuted under the Crim in al Code of 1 961.” In

othe r wor ds , th e of f ense s “ sp ec i f

i ed i n” se cti on 5–130(1)(a) do no t inc lud e “ o t he rch ar ge s a r isin g out o f t he sa me in ci dent.” The leg isla tu re’s de ci si

on to u se

“ sp ec i f i ed i n” i n s ec ti on 5–1 30( 1) (b) and “ cover ed by ” i n section 5–130(1)(c) demonstrates that it i ntended di

ff erent mea ni ngs f or t hese terms. See People v

. Hudson , 228 Ill . 2d 181, 193 (2008) (“When the le gis la

ture use s ce rta in la nguage i n one part of a statute and dif feren t langua ge i n another, we m

ay as su me dif

f ere nt m ea ni ng s w ere i nte nd ed .”) . Se cti

on 5–1 30( 1) (b) di scus se s th ose of f ense s “ sp ec i f

i ed i n” se cti on 5–130 (1)(a), i.e. , t ho se o ffen se s e xp lic it ly named in t hat sec t ion, wh ere as se ct io n 5 –1 30 ( 1) ( c) di sc us se s t ho se o ffe ns es “c o ve r ed by”-8- se cti on 5–130 (1)(a), i.e. , those

of f ense s dea l t wi th i n th at s ec ti on, whi ch in cl udes those expl

ic itl y n am ed i n that sec t ion and t hos e ar ising out o f t he sa me inc ide nt

. T he leg isla t ur e r ep ea t ed t he pa ir ed use of b oth “co ver ed by” a nd “sp ecified in” t hro ugho ut t he Act –t he di sti nc ti on appears agai

n i n sect ions 5–130(2)(b) and (2)(c) (705 ILCS 405/5–13 0(2)( b), (2)( c) (West 200 0)), sections 5–13 0( 3) (b) and (3)(c) (7 05 I LCS 405 /5 –13 0( 3) (b) , ( 3) (c ) ( West 200 0) ), and s ect ions 5–1 30( 5) (b) and (5)(c) (70 5 ILCS 405/5 –130(5) (b), (5) (c) (West 2000))–co nfi rmingthat t he use of the two distin

ct ter ms was int en t io na l. Moreov er, the Act as a wh ole, i ncl udin g its us e of

th e term “prosecu te,” con f i rm s th at th e le gi sla t ur e in t en de d “ co ve r ed by”
se cti on 5– 13 0( 1) ( a) t o inc lud e a ll ch ar ge s a r ising o ut o f t he sa me i n ci den t. Section 5–130(1)(a) states that “[t]hese charges a nd al l other chargesaris in

g out of the sam

e i nci dent shal l b e prosecuted unde r t he crim in al la ws of

thi s State.”

The Act does n

ot def i ne the term “prosecu te.” However, section 2–16 o f t he Cri mi nal Code of 1961 defi nes“[p]rosecution” as “all l egal proceedin

gs by whi ch a perso n’s l i ab i l i ty fo ran o ffen se is de term

i ne d, c om men ci ng wi th th e re turn of t he in dictment or the iss

uance of the in form ation, and in cluding t he fi nal disposi t io n o f t he case upon appeal.” 720 ILCS 5/2 –16 (West 2000)

. Thus, secti on 5–130(1) (a) manda t es t hat char ges of t he “speci fi ed off enses ” as wel

l as all other

chargesar ising o ut o f t he sa me incident pr o ce ed as a c r iminal p r o se cu t io n u nt il f ina l dis pos i

ti on on appe al

. The l eg i sl

atu re’ s u se of “pros ecute ” e l sewhere i n s ec ti on 5–1 30( 1) (b) f

urth er d em ons trate s th at of f ense s “covere d by

” s ec ti on 5–130(1)(a) in

cl ude all c harges ar ising ou t of t he same incident as t he sp ec ifica lly

enum erated offenses. Section 5–130(1)(b) address es wh eretrial

and pl ea proceedin

gs sh oul d oc cu r. Se cti on 5– 13 0( 1) ( b) ( i) states th at if the c har ges do not include a n offense “spe cified in”
se cti on 5–1 30( 1) (a ), t he S t at e’s At t or ney sho uld “pr oc eed ” o n t he le sser ch ar ge o rch ar ge s in ju ve nile court but“may pro cee d und er t he Crim in al Code of 1961” on a l esser ch

arge not “specifi

ed i n” se cti on 5–130(1)(a) i f

the m i nor waive s in w r it ing t he r igh t t o pr o ce ed in juv en ile cou

rt. S ee W eb ste r’ s Th i rd New I n ter n ati ona l Dicti onary 1807 (1976) (defi

ni ng proceed a s “to ca

rry on a l eg al ac ti on or proces s”). On

the other han d, se ct io n 5– 13 0( 1) (b )( ii) s t at es t hat if a-9- m i nor is char ged wit h an of

fen se “s peci fi ed i n” section 5–130(1)(a) “andaddi tional charges that are not speci fi ed i n that pa rag raph, al l of t he char ges ar ising ou t of t he same incident shall be prosecuted under t he Cri m i na l Code of

196 1.” Th e l eg i sl atu re’ s dec i si

on t o use “proceed” i

n the wai ver con tex t an d “ pros ecution”

i n th e c onte xt of ot her charge s a

ri si n g ou t of th e s am e i n ci den t demon strate s i

ts dif feri ng i ntent. See Hudson , 228 Il l . 2d at 19 4. Thatdi sti nc ti on is further ref

le cted i n s ec ti on 5 –13 0(1 )(c ). Se cti on 5– 13 0( 1) ( c) ( i) sta

testha t i f the m i nor isco nvi cted o f an

y off ense “covered by” sec t ion 5 –13 0( 1) (a ), “the co ur t shall have ava ilable any or al l di sp osi ti ons pre scri be d f ort hat offense unde r Cha pt er V o f the Unifi ed Code of Corrections.” As discussed above, off

enses “covered by” section 5–130(1)(a) i

ncl ude t he o ffenses “sp ecified in” tha t se cti on as well as all c

harges ar ising o ut o f t he sa me inc ide nt

. T his is
co nsist ent wit h sec t ion 5 –13 0( 1) (b) (ii)’s mand at e t hat t he o ffe nses “speci fi ed i n” section 5–130(1)(a) and “al l of the charges arisi

ng out of t he sam e i nci dent shal l b e prosecuted un

de r th e C ri

m i na l Code of 1961” and wi

th se cti on 5–1 30(1)( a)’s directi ve that the charges specifi ed t he r ein an d “ all o t he rch ar ge s a r ising o ut o f t he sa me incident shal l b e prosecuted under the crim in al la ws of thi s State.” On the other hand, beca

use a m in or charged wit h o nly a l esser offense (of

an o ffense “sp ecified in” se ct ion 5 –13 0( 1) (a )) who wai ved t he ri gh t to p roceed in

juv eni le court would not be conv icted of an offense “co ver ed by” s ect ion 5 –13 0( 1) (a ), t he minor w ou ld no t be subj ect to sentenci

ng unde r the Unifi ed Code of

Co rr ect ions u nless t he Sta te requested a heari

ng unde r sec tion 5– 13 0( 1) ( c) ( ii). T his is
co nsist ent with section 5–130(1)( b)(i), whi ch al lows t he Stat e to proceed under the Crimi nal Co de o f 1961 o nly

upo n the min

or ’s written wai ver. Thus, if de fend an

t h ad b een ch ar ge d on l y wi th attem pted m urder, bot h his writ t en wa iver and a hea ring wo uld have been required to proceed in cr im inal court and sen

tence hi m as an adul t. T his constru

cti on i s a l so c ons i stent w

i th th e f ram ew ork of th e A ct, whi ch tur n s on th e of f ense s i n th e ch argi

n g i n str um en t. This court

has long recogni

zed that the clas si fi

cation at i ssuein

the Act i s b as ed on t he mi nor’s age and the ty

pe of of f en se cha rged. People v. J.S. , 103 I ll. 2 d 395, 403 (1984). Thus, it is the chargi

ng i nstrume nt that determi neswh et he rt he mino rha s t he r igh t t o ha ve t he pr o ce ed ing s in-10- j uven i l e c our t. As dis cu ss ed ab o ve , se ct io n 5 –1 30 ( 1) ( c) ( i) states that if after trial
orpl ea, a minor i s c onv i cte d of an of f ense “ covere d by

” s ec ti on 5–130 (1)(a), in

sentenci ng the m in or, t he c i rc ui

t c o ur t ha s a va ilable “any o rall di sp osi

ti ons pre scri be d f ortha t of f ense un de r Ch ap ter V of t he Un i f i ed Code of Corr ec ti ons .” O f

f ense s “covere d by

” s ec ti on 5–130(1 )(a) incl

ude tho se “speci

fi ed i n” that section as

well as those
ari si n g ou t of th e s am e i n ci den t. In the present ca se, d efendan t was ini tiall y ch arged with fi

rst degree murd er . T he Sta

te subs equ ent ly f

iled an ad dit ional infor matio n, whi ch ad de d a n a dd it io na l count for att em pted fi rst degree murder
ar ising out of the sam

e i nci dent. Thus, the attempted fi rst degree murder ch ar ge wa s “ co ve r ed by” se cti on 5–130(1)(a) (“These ch

arges and all o t he rch ar ge s a r ising o ut o f t he sa me inc ide nt sha ll b e prosecuted unde r t he cr imi nal laws o f this S t at e. ”) . D efenda nt ple aded gui l ty to the attem pted f i rst deg ree m urder c ha rge that sam

e day

. Defend ant argu es

th at th e a tte mpted f

irst degree m

urder charge
was no t “co ver ed by” s ec t io n 5– 13 0( 1) (a ) b ec au se t he fi rst degr ee m urder c ha rges were sub seq uen tly di sm i sse d. W e di sag

ree. The fi rst degree murder

cha rg es w er e st ill

pend ing when t he cir cu it court accept ed de fendant ’s plea and s ent ence d him to t he agree d-u pon 15-year s entence. The ci

rcuit court t hereaf

ter dism is sed the f i rst deg ree m urder c ha rges pursuan t to t he pl ea a greem en t. Theref ore, we fi nd that defen

dan t ple aded guil

ty to an off

ense (att em pted fir st degree murder) “cove red by ” section 5–130(1)(a) becaus e it ar os e o ut of t he sa me incident as t he cha rg es p ending agains t hi m f or an off ense “ specifi

ed in ” section 5–130(1 )(a) ( fi

rst degree murder). Accordi ngl y, we co nc lude

that defenda

nt was properl y sent en ce d w i thou t a hea ri ng pursuan

t to se cti

on 5– 13 0( 1) ( c) ( i) and tha

t hi s se nten ce is the ref ore not void as prohi

bi ted by statute.

CONCLUSION For t he fo re go ing re aso ns, w e r ever se t he judg ment o f the appe l l ate cou rt a n d a f f i rm th e j udgm

en t of th e c i rc ui t cou rt.-11- Appellate co urt judgment rever sed; ci rcuit court judgm

ent aff irm ed.