FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DALE BOZZIO, individually and on

behalf of all others similarly

situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

EMI GROUP LIMITED; CAPITOL

RECORDS, LLC; EMI MUSIC NORTH

AMERICA, LLC; EMI RECORDED

MUSIC; and EMI MARKETING,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-15685

D.C. No.

4:12-cv-02421-

YGR

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 10, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed January 26, 2016

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Sandra S. Ikuta,

and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Christen
2 BOZZIO V. EMI GROUP

SUMMARY*

Standing / Third-Party Beneficiary

The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of a

complaint filed by third-party beneficiary Dale Bozzio

alleging breach of a recording contract between Bozzio’s

former band, Missing Persons, and defendant recording

companies, and remanded.

The panel held that the district court erred in concluding

that under California law Missing Persons, Inc.’s status as a

suspended corporation precluded Bozzio’s third-party

beneficiary suit. The panel further held that it could not

affirm on the ground that Bozzio waived the benefits of the

Missing Persons, Inc. contract. The panel held that Bozzio

pleaded facts sufficient to establish her standing to sue as a

third-party beneficiary on the contract between Missing

Persons, Inc. and the recording companies. Finally, the panel

held that the district court erred in dismissing Bozzio’s

complaint with prejudice because amendment may not have

been futile.

COUNSEL

Cadio Zirpoli (argued), Guido Saveri, R. Alexander Saveri,

and Carl N. Hammarskjold, Saveri & Saveri, San Francisco,

California; Robert J. Bonsignore and Lisa Sleboda,

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
BOZZIO V. EMI GROUP 3

Bonsignore and Brewer, Belmont, New Hampshire, for

Plaintiff-Appellant.

Peter I. Ostroff, Rollin A. Ransom, and Michelle B. Goodman

(argued), Sidley Austin LLP, Los Angeles, California, for

Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge:

BACKGROUND

This is a breach of contract case. Dale Bozzio, front

woman of the former band Missing Persons, claims the

defendant recording companies improperly treated certain

sales of Missing Persons’s recordings—through music

download services, mobile phone mastertone downloads, and

licensing for music streaming services—as record sales rather

than revenue from licensing, and, as a result, paid the artists

a lower royalty rate than the one provided for in their

recording contracts. Bozzio is not a party to the recording

contracts she seeks to enforce, but she filed suit as a thirdparty beneficiary.

The district court dismissed Bozzio’s complaint. The

court reasoned that even if Bozzio was an intended thirdparty beneficiary, the contracting party, Missing Persons,

Inc., was a suspended corporation when Bozzio filed her

complaint and its suspended status prevented it from bringing

suit under California law. The district court ruled that

because Missing Persons, Inc. lacked capacity to sue, a thirdparty beneficiary of Missing Persons, Inc.’s contract was
4 BOZZIO V. EMI GROUP

similarly without capacity to sue. The district court decided

that any amendment would be futile and dismissed Bozzio’s

complaint with prejudice.

Bozzio’s appeal requires us to resolve two questions: 

(1) Whether the district court erred by concluding that

Missing Persons, Inc.’s suspended status precluded Bozzio’s

suit; and (2) whether Bozzio pleaded facts sufficient to

establish her standing to sue as a third-party beneficiary of

the contract between Missing Persons, Inc. and the recording

companies. We answer “yes” to both questions, and we

therefore reverse.1

I. Facts2

In 1980, Dale Bozzio (“Bozzio”), Terry Bozzio, and

Warren Cuccurullo founded the band Missing Persons. 

According to the complaint, as the band’s front woman,

Bozzio “personified the sound and the look of the new wave

scene in 1980s Los Angeles.”

Capitol Records signed the band and entered into a

Personal Services Agreement with the individual artists in

1982. Their agreement provided that the artists comprising

Missing Persons would create master recordings that Capitol

1 The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we

have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

2 These facts are taken from the complaint and its exhibits. See Akhtar

v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (“When reviewing a motion

to dismiss, we ‘consider only allegations contained in the pleadings,

exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly subject to judicial

notice.’” (quoting Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 763 (9th Cir.

2007) (per curiam))).
BOZZIO V. EMI GROUP 5

would sell and license. In return, Capitol promised to “pay

royalties at rates ranging from 20% to 24% for sales in the

United States and Canada, and from 7% to 8% for sales in the

rest of the world.” The agreement also provided that the

artists would receive 50% of Capitol’s net royalties from

licensing, and that it would be construed in accordance with

California law.

In 1983, Bozzio and the other band members formed

Missing Persons, Inc., a California corporation, to serve as a

loan-out companythrough which theywould provide services

to Capitol. “A loan-out corporation is a legal fiction

employed for the financial benefit of successful artists and

entertainers. It is a duly organized corporation, typically

wholly owned by an artist, the sole function of which is to

‘loan out’ the services of the artist-owner to producers and

other potential employers.” Aaron J. Moss & Kenneth Basin,

Copyright Termination and Loan-Out Corporations:

Reconciling Practice and Policy, 3 Harv. J. Sports & Ent. L.

55, 72 (2012). The form offers “limited personal liability and

beneficial tax treatment.” Id. At least initially, Bozzio served

as the president of Missing Persons, Inc.

Capitol subsequently entered into a new contract, called

the Loan-Out Agreement, with Missing Persons, Inc. The

Loan-Out Agreement substituted Missing Persons, Inc. in

place of the individual band members in the original Personal

Services Agreement and required Capitol to pay all artist

royalties to Missing Persons, Inc., not to the artists. It also

stated that Missing Persons, Inc. was to receive all contractual

benefits, and that it, not Capitol, was to pay the individual

artists all required royalties and advances. As part of the

Loan-Out Agreement, each band member executed an Artist

Declaration “as further inducement for Capitol to enter into
6 BOZZIO V. EMI GROUP

the Capitol-Company Agreement.” Bozzio’s declaration

states that she “agree[s] to look solely to [Missing Persons,

Inc.] for the payment of [her] fees and/or royalties . . . , and

will not assert any claims in this regard against Capitol.”

The music group disbanded in 1986, and, as of July 1,

1988, Missing Persons, Inc. was suspended under California

Revenue and Taxation Code § 23301 due to failure to pay

franchise taxes. The parties do not dispute that Missing

Persons, Inc. remained a suspended corporation when Bozzio

filed her complaint in this lawsuit.

II. Proceedings

In 2012, Bozzio filed a putative class action suit in the

Northern District of California. The operative complaint

alleges breach of contract and other claims against EMI

Group, Ltd., Capitol Records, LLC, EMI Music North

America, LLC, EMI Recorded Music, and EMI Marketing

(collectively, “Capitol”). Specifically, the complaint alleges

that Capitol failed to “properly account for and pay its

recording artists and music producers for income it has

received, and continues to receive, from the licenses of its

recorded music catalog for the sale of digital downloads,

ringtones (or ‘mastertones’), and streaming music.” It

requests declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, restitution,

and attorneys’ fees.

Capitol moved to dismiss Bozzio’s complaint under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Capitol primarily

argued that Bozzio could not file suit because she expressly

agreed in the Artist Declaration to “look solely to” the loanout corporation for royalty payments and promised to “not

assert any claim in this regard against Capitol.” Bozzio
BOZZIO V. EMI GROUP 7

countered that she was an intended third-party beneficiary of

the Loan-Out Agreement with an individual right to sue that

is separate from the corporation’s. According to Bozzio, the

Artist Declarations “only prohibit[] an artist from asserting a

claim against EMI when there is a dispute among individual

band members over the internal allocation and distribution of

royalties that have already been properly accounted for and

paid by the record label to the artists’ musical group or loanout corporation.” She further argued that the intent of the

parties in executing the Artist Declarations presents factual

questions that cannot be resolved by a motion to dismiss. 

Recognizing the corporation’s suspended status, the district

court requested additional briefing from the parties on the

following question: “[S]hould plaintiff be permitted to

proceed directly against Capitol if the loan-out company that

is the party to the agreements with Capitol is a suspended

corporation?”

After supplemental briefing and oral argument, the

district court granted Capitol’s motion to dismiss. The court

did not resolve whether Bozzio is a third-party beneficiary of

the Loan-Out Agreement. Instead, the court decided that

because the contracting party, Missing Persons, Inc., was a

suspended corporation, “regardless of Bozzio’s standing to

bring claims as a third party beneficiary, she cannot sue to

enforce that agreement when the contracting corporation

would have no capacity to do so.” The court observed that

California suspends corporate powers under California

Revenue and Taxation Code § 23301 and § 23305 to induce

corporations to pay taxes and maintain good standing. It

concluded that allowing Bozzio to sue as a third-party

beneficiary of the recording contract would permit her to

“us[e] the corporate entity to contract, and gain the benefits

of the corporate form, yet [allow her] to retain the right to sue
8 BOZZIO V. EMI GROUP

as an individual, third party beneficiary even when the

corporation could not, on account of its failure to comply

[with] its corporate obligations, including its tax liability.” 

The district court ruled that it would be futile to grant leave

to amend and dismissed Bozzio’s complaint with prejudice. 

Bozzio timely appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant a

motion to dismiss. Lacano Invs., LLC v. Balash, 765 F.3d

1068, 1071 (9th Cir. 2014). We review “the district court’s

denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion.” Id.

DISCUSSION

I. The district court erred by granting Bozzio’s motion to

dismiss on the ground that Missing Persons, Inc. lacked

capacity to sue.

Bozzio’s complaint alleged that Missing Persons, Inc. and

Capitol entered into the Loan-Out Agreement for her own

benefit and for the benefit of her bandmates, and that she is

therefore entitled to bring suit to protect her interests. The

district court held that Bozzio cannot sue on the contract

because, even if she is a third-party beneficiary to the

Agreement, the contracting party—Missing Persons, Inc.—is

a suspended corporation. On appeal, Bozzio argues that the

suspended status of the contracting corporate party is

irrelevant when the party bringing the action is a third-party

beneficiary of the contract, and the district court’s dismissal

of the First Amended Complaint on that basis constitutes

reversible error. We agree with Bozzio that the district court

erred in holding that, even if Bozzio is a third-party
BOZZIO V. EMI GROUP 9

beneficiary, she cannot bring an action while Missing

Persons, Inc. is suspended.

California law provides that if a corporation fails to pay

taxes, penalties, interests, or any liability, its “corporate

powers, rights and privileges” will be suspended. Cal. Rev.

& Tax Code § 23301. “The suspension of the corporate

powers, rights, and privileges means a suspended corporation

cannot sue or defend a lawsuit while its taxes remain unpaid.” 

Kaufman & Broad Cmtys., Inc. v. Performance Plastering,

Inc., 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 33, 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); see also

Gar-Lo, Inc. v. Prudential Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 116 Cal. Rptr.

389, 390 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (discussing the effect of

suspension under § 23301 on a corporation’s right to sue).

In dismissing Bozzio’s complaint, the district court

concluded that, even if Bozzio is a third-party beneficiary of

the contract between Missing Persons, Inc. and Capitol

Records, she cannot sue to enforce the agreement because the

contracting party would have no capacity to do so. But the

cases cited by the district court for this proposition, Kaufman

& Broad Communities, Inc., 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 33, and

AMESCO Exports, Inc. v. Associated Aircraft Manufacturing

& Sales, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 1014 (C.D. Cal. 1997), order

vacated on other grounds, 87 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (C.D. Cal.

1997), do not support it. Kaufman & Broad Communities,

Inc. held only that an insurance company could not step into

the shoes of a suspended corporation and litigate in its name;

rather, it had to intervene in the legal action against its

insured. 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 34–37. The court did not address

whether a third-party beneficiary, which has an independent

cause of action on a contract, see Cal. Civ. Code § 1559,

could bring an action for breach of contract against the

promisor when the promisee is a suspended corporation. 
10 BOZZIO V. EMI GROUP

AMESCO Exports, Inc. also fails to support the proposition. 

It concluded that the sole shareholder of a suspended

corporation could not bring a breach of contract claim against

a manufacturer based on a contract signed by the suspended

corporation and the manufacturer, but this conclusion was

premised on the sole shareholder’s inability to demonstrate

that it was a third-party beneficiary of the contract. AMESCO

does not answer whether the shareholder would have been

allowed to sue if the promisee had intended to give the

beneficiary such a right. 977 F. Supp. at 1016.

The parties have not cited, and we have not found, any

California case holding that a third-party beneficiary cannot

sue the promisor for breach of contract when the promisee is

a suspended corporation. Further, the California case most

closely on point supports Bozzio’s argument that Missing

Persons, Inc.’s incapacity does not bar her third-party

beneficiary suit. See Performance Plastering v. Richmond

Am. Homes of Cal., Inc. (Richmond American Homes),

63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 537 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). Richmond

American Homes involved a series of construction claims

between a homebuilder and one of its subcontractors,

Performance Plastering. Id. at 540. Throughout the series of

claims, Performance Plastering was a suspended corporation

for failing to pay taxes. Id. at 541.

After the homebuilder received complaints about the

quality of Performance Plastering’s stucco work, the two

entered into a settlement agreement that released Performance

Plastering and its insurers from liability for claims arising

from the construction of sixty-five homes in exchange for a

cash payment. Id. Additional defective construction claims

were alleged, and the homebuilder and Performance

Plastering’s insurer entered into a second settlement
BOZZIO V. EMI GROUP 11

agreement by which the homebuilder accepted another cash

payment, dismissed Performance Plastering from all claims,

and agreed to give five-days notice to the insurer of any

potential indemnity claims. Id. A third complaint was filed

for construction defects, this time against the homebuilder,

and the homebuilder filed a cross-complaint against

Performance Plastering. Id. In response, Performance

Plastering filed a cross-claim in which it alleged that the

homebuilder’s claims were barred because it failed to give the

insurer five days notice as required by the second settlement

agreement. Id. Through the insurer, the parties entered a

third settlement agreement, reserving the “right to seek

judicial determination of the applicability and enforceability”

of the previous agreements. Id. The insurer and Performance

Plastering then sued the homebuilder for breach of contract

and declaratoryrelief based on the homebuilder’s violation of

those previous settlement agreements. Id.

The trial court dismissed the case because it concluded

that Performance Plastering’s suspended corporate status

prevented it from bringing suit, and the insurer had no

standing to sue as either a party or third-party beneficiary. Id.

at 542. The California Court of Appeal reversed. Id. at 545. 

It held that Performance Plastering’s suspended status

rendered its contracts with the homebuilder voidable, but

because neither party to the contract had sought rescission,

the insurer had standing to sue the homebuilder for breach of

contract as a third-party beneficiary of the settlement

agreements. Id. at 544–45. Although the court did not

expressly address the question whether Performance

Plastering’s lack of capacity to sue due to its suspended status

deprived the insurer of that capacity, the court let the case go

forward, implying that such lack of capacity does not
12 BOZZIO V. EMI GROUP

necessarily deprive a third-party beneficiary of standing to

sue.

Like the insurer in Richmond American Homes, Bozzio

argues that she is a third-party beneficiary of the Loan-Out

Agreement and that the suspended status of Missing Persons,

Inc. does not bar her individual suit. Although Richmond

American Homes does not go that far, it indicates that

California courts do not consider the incapacity of the

promisee to a contract to be an absolute bar to a lawsuit by a

third-party beneficiary. See id.; Ronay Family Ltd. P’ship v.

Tweed, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 680, 687 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013)

(“[T]he rule that a promisor’s defense against a promisee is

also good against a third party beneficiary does not apply

when the language of the contract or the circumstances

surrounding its execution establish that the rights of the

beneficiary are not subject to that defense.”).

The district court recognized that Richmond American

Homeslends support to Bozzio’s position, but it distinguished

the case from Bozzio’s situation based on Bozzio’s

relationship to Missing Persons, Inc. The district court

reasoned that “the insurer in [Richmond American Homes]

was not closely related to the [suspended] corporation and

was not in a position to revive the corporation and pursue its

legal rights.” The court considered Bozzio’s relationship to

Missing Persons, Inc. to be dispositive:

By contrast, in this case Bozzio is directly,

though not necessarily entirely, responsible

for the suspended status of the corporation. 

While the loan-out corporation here is not in

Bozzio’s sole control, she has alleged that she

is its president and the “driving force” behind
BOZZIO V. EMI GROUP 13

it. [Citing to First Amended Complaint

paragraphs 22 and 23] Presumably, she could

take action to revive the corporation. 

Moreover, whether Bozzio could revive the

corporation on her own does not present a

question of fact barring dismissal, as she

contends. To the contrary, the corporation’s

and thus Bozzio’s, lack of capacity to pursue

the claims appears from the face of the

complaint.

When sitting in diversity jurisdiction, “[t]his court will

follow a state supreme court’s interpretation . . . in the

absence of extraordinarycircumstances.” Dimidowich v. Bell

& Howell, 803 F.2d 1473, 1482 (9th Cir. 1986). Where the

state’s highest court has not decided an issue, “this court

looks for ‘guidance’ to decisions by intermediate appellate

courts of the state and by courts in other jurisdictions.” Id.

Here, the California Supreme Court has not decided whether

a promisee corporation’s suspended status precludes suit by

a third-party beneficiary of the contract, but in Richmond

American Homes, the California Court of Appeal suggested

that a third-party beneficiary suit may go forward

notwithstanding the promisee’s incapacity to sue. See 63 Cal.

Rptr. 3d at 544–45. Therefore, the district court erred in its

determination that a third-party beneficiary cannot state a

claim if the promisee is a suspended corporation under Cal.

Rev. & Tax Code § 23301.

We are not persuaded that Bozzio’s relationship to

Missing Persons, Inc. ends her appeal. First, whether Bozzio

“could take action to revive the corporation” does not

necessarily distinguish her from the insurer in Richmond

American Homes. California law provides that revival of a
14 BOZZIO V. EMI GROUP

corporation “may be made by any stockholder or creditor, by

a majority of the surviving trustees or directors thereof, by an

officer, or by any other person who has interest in the relief

from suspension.” Cal. Rev. & Tax Code § 23305 (emphasis

added). As an entity impacted by Performance Plastering’s

tax default, the insurer in Richmond American Homes appears

to have had “an interest” in that company’s revival and

therefore—like Bozzio—likely had the ability to apply for its

revival.

Second, no California case has decided whether a party’s

status as a former shareholder or officer of a suspended

corporation negates that party’s ability to bring suit as a thirdparty beneficiaryof a contract entered into by the corporation. 

The district court concluded that permitting Bozzio to sue on

her own behalf would allow her to reap the benefits of the

corporate form while avoiding the consequences of Missing

Persons, Inc.’s tax default, but its analysis fails to account for

§ 23305b, a provision that expressly allows the Franchise Tax

Board to revive a corporation “without full payment of the

taxes, penalties, and interest due” if revival “will improve the

prospects for collection of the full amount due.” Cal. Rev. &

Tax Code § 23305b. This statute reflects the legislature’s

intention that certain suspended corporations may be revived

if doing so serves the state’s ultimate goal of collecting back

taxes and penalties. Considering this provision, we do not

agree that allowing Bozzio’s suit to go forward would

necessarily undermine legislative intent. As far as we know,

the State of California has not considered whether to reinstate

Missing Persons, Inc. to allow it to pursue its claim against

Capitol.

Finally, the record does not support the district court’s

finding that Bozzio has control over the defunct corporation
BOZZIO V. EMI GROUP 15

and an ability to revive it. Contrary to the district court’s

interpretation, Bozzio never alleged she is currently the

driving force behind the loan-out corporation. Rather, the

complaint alleged that—from the time the band was formed

in the 1980s, until the group broke up—Bozzio was a

“member and driving signature force” of the band. Bozzio

served as president of Missing Persons, Inc. for some period

of time, but she argued in our court that she cannot revive the

corporation under § 23305 because only Missing Persons,

Inc. can access the royalty statements and relevant records

that are necessaryto calculate the amount of back taxes owed. 

According to Bozzio, she cannot calculate, much less pay, the

corporation’s back taxes because she cannot access the

royalty statements. Case law applying § 23301 recognizes

that its purposes are not served “by penalizing an innocent

person or entity.” Biggs v. Cal. Ins. Guarantee Assn.,

179 Cal. Rptr. 16, 19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). While Bozzio is

not “innocent” in the sense that she is unrelated to the defunct

corporation, the face of the complaint does not demonstrate

that Bozzio is “directly . . . responsible for the suspended

status of the corporation.”

In light of the above, it was an error to grant the motion

to dismiss on the ground that Missing Persons, Inc. was a

suspended corporation.

II. We cannot affirm the district court on the ground that

Bozzio waived the benefits of the Missing Persons, Inc.

contract.

Even if Missing Persons, Inc.’s suspended status does not

preclude Bozzio’s suit, Capitol maintains that dismissal is

proper because Bozzio waived any right to sue

Capitol—including the right to sue as a third-party
16 BOZZIO V. EMI GROUP

beneficiary—by signing an Artist Declaration in which she

agreed that she would not “look to” Capitol for payment of

royalties:

For the express and direct benefit of Capitol,

I hereby:

. . .

Agree to look solely to [Missing Persons,

Inc.] for the payment of my fees and/or

royalties, as the case may be, and will not

assert any claim in this regard against Capitol

or attempt to prevent the manufacture, sale,

licensing or distribution of records

manufactured from the masters produced

under the Capitol-Company Agreement.

This language from the Artist Declaration suggests that

Bozzio waived her right to sue as a third-party beneficiary,

but other language in the Loan-Out Agreement is in tension

with that conclusion.

“Under California law, a ‘contract, made expresslyfor the

benefit of a third party, may be enforced by him at any time

before the parties thereto rescind it.’” Balsam v. Tucows Inc.,

627 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Cal. Civ. Code

§ 1559). “[A] third party beneficiary contract must either

satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the

beneficiary, or the circumstances indicate the promisee

intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised

performance.” Med. Staff of Doctors Med. Ctr. in Modesto v.

Kamil, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 853, 858 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
BOZZIO V. EMI GROUP 17

Whether “the circumstances indicate that” Capitol and

Missing Persons, Inc. intended to give Bozzio “the benefit of

the promised performance” cannot be resolved on the face of

the parties’ pleadings. See id. The Loan-Out Agreement

expressly provides that Bozzio and her bandmates would

incur obligations and receive benefits, notwithstanding the

fact that they were no longer contracting parties. For

example, if Missing Persons, Inc. ceased to exist, the

individual artists were to assume its contractual obligations in

the Agreement with Capitol:

If during the term of the Capitol-Company

Agreement or any extensions, renewals or

modifications thereof, Companyshall cease to

be entitled to make my services available to

Capitol in accordance with the terms of the

Capitol-Company Agreement, or if Company

shall fail or refuse to make my services

available to Capitol, I shall, at Capitol’s

request, do all such acts and things as shall

give to Capitol the same rights, privileges and

benefits as Capitol would have under the

Capitol-CompanyAgreement if Companyhad

continued to be entitled to my services, and I

shall make the same available to Capitol, and

such rights, privileges and benefits shall be

enforceable on Capitol’s behalf against me.

Further, the Loan-Out Agreement contemplates royalty

payments to individual artists:

Company [Missing Persons, Inc.] shall have

the benefit of all agreements, representations

and warranties made by Capitol to Artist in
18 BOZZIO V. EMI GROUP

the [original agreement] provided, however,

that Company shall not receive any rights

hereunder greater than those which Artist

would receive under the [original agreement]

had this document never been executed. 

Company shall pay Artist all royalties and

advances required to be paid pursuant to the

Exhibit.[3]

(emphasis added). These provisions suggest the parties

contemplated that “the promisee intends to give [Bozzio] the

benefit of the promised performance.” See Med. Staff of

Doctors Med. Ctr. in Modesto, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 858; see

also Prouty v. Gores Tech. Grp., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178, 184

(Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (“If the terms of the contract necessarily

require the promisor to confer a benefit on a third person,

then the contract, and hence the parties thereto, contemplate

a benefit to the third person.” (citation omitted)).

Capitol strenuously argues that by agreeing “not [to]

assert any claim[s] . . . against Capitol,” Bozzio waived her

right to sue as a third-party beneficiary. Bozzio counters that

this “look solely to” clause was intended to prohibit an artist

from asserting a claim against Capitol only “when there is a

dispute among individual band members over the internal

allocation and distribution of royalties that have already been

properly accounted for and paid by the record label to the

artists’ musical group or loan-out corporation.” Nothing in

3

In the Loan-Out Agreement, the footnote to this text indicates:

“[P]rovided that such monies are paid by Capitol to Company, which

payment by Capitol shall be conditioned upon Company’s and Artist’s

performance of its material obligations hereunder and pursuant to the

Agreement.”
BOZZIO V. EMI GROUP 19

the record forecloses Bozzio’s reading of this contract

language.

We agree with Bozzio that whether she forfeited the

ability to sue as a third-party beneficiary is a fact-bound

inquiry ill-suited to resolution at the motion to dismiss stage. 

See Prouty, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 184 (“Whether the third party

is an intended beneficiary or merely an incidental beneficiary

involves construction of the intention of the parties, gathered

from reading the contract as a whole in light of the

circumstances under which it was entered.” (quoting E.

Aviation Grp., Inc. v. Airborne Express, Inc., 8 Cal Rptr. 2d

355, 357–58 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)). On remand, a record can

be developed that will allow consideration of Bozzio’s claim

that she was an intended third-party beneficiary of the

Agreement.

III. Amendment may not have been futile.

Because amendment may not have been futile, it was

error to dismiss Bozzio’s complaint with prejudice. See

Sharkey v. O’Neal, 778 F.3d 767, 774 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting

that district courts are required to allow parties to freely

amend absent “undue delay, bad faith . . . repeated failure to

cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue

prejudice to the opposing party . . . , [or] futility of

amendment” (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182

(1962))).

The district court dismissed Bozzio’s complaint on the

sole ground that Bozzio “cannot sue to enforce [the]

agreement when the contracting corporation[, Missing

Persons, Inc.,] would have no capacity to do so.” The court

denied Bozzio leave to amend presumably because Bozzio
20 BOZZIO V. EMI GROUP

disclaimed any ability to revive the corporation under

§ 23305, rendering any amendment futile.

Likely because the parties failed to brief the issue, the

court’s order did not take into account that California’s tax

code may allow Bozzio to revive Missing Persons, Inc.

without paying back taxes. Section 23305b provides: “[T]he

Franchise Tax Board may revive a corporation to good

standing without full payment of the taxes, penalties, and

interest due if it determines that the revivor will improve the

prospects for collection of the full amount due.” Cal. Rev. &

Tax Code § 23305b (emphasis added). An application to

revive a suspended corporation “may be made by any

stockholder or creditor, by a majority of the surviving trustees

or directors thereof, by an officer, or by any other person who

has interest in the relief from suspension.” Id. § 23305. It

appears that Bozzio is eligible to apply to have Missing

Persons, Inc. restored to good standing under § 23305b

because she is a “person who has interest in the relief from

suspension.” California may decide that revival under this

provision is consistent with its objective of securing payment

of corporate taxes because—once revived—MissingPersons,

Inc. could pursue its claims and thereby “improve the

prospects for collection of the full amount due.” See id.

§ 23305b. Because revival under § 23305b may be possible,

we cannot say that amendment was futile. The district court

therefore abused its discretion by dismissing Bozzio’s

complaint with prejudice. See Sharkey, 778 F.3d at 774.

CONCLUSION

The district court erred in dismissing the complaint, and

we cannot affirm on different grounds.
BOZZIO V. EMI GROUP 21

REVERSED AND REMANDED.