The Cannon Centenary Conference 

The Changing Nature of the Speakership 

Cannon House Office Building 

Wednesday, November 12, 2003 


spkrhse.#08
Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division

Speaker Joseph G. Cannon, circa "*!* 


92800.002
j 108TH CONGRESS, 2D SESSION HOUSE DOCUMENT NO. 108–204 k 

The Cannon Centenary Conference 

The Changing Nature of the Speakership 

Cannon House Office Building 

Wednesday, November 12, 2003 

Compiled Under the Direction of the 

Joint Committee on Printing, 

Chairman Robert W. Ney 

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON : 2004 


spkrhse.#08
This conference was sponsored by the Congressional Research 

Service, Library of Congress, and the Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center, University of Oklahoma; and funded in 

part by a grant from the McCormick Tribune Foundation. 

Walter J. Oleszek, the editor of this document, gratefully acknowledges the production assistance of Daphne Bigger and Karen 

Wirt of the Congressional Research Service and Suzanne Kayne of 

the Government Printing Office. 

The Congressional Research Service has produced six videotapes 

of the Cannon Centenary proceedings for use by Members of Congress. The videotapes cover, respectively, the O’Neill, Wright, 

Foley, and Gingrich speakerships, as well as the presentation of 

Speaker J. Dennis Hastert and Professor Robert V. Remini. 

iii 

House Concurrent Resolution 345 

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 

SECTION ". PRINTING OF DOCUMENT. 

(a) IN GENERAL.—The transcripts of the proceedings of ‘‘The Changing Nature of the House Speakership: The Cannon Centenary Conference’’, sponsored 

by the Congressional Research Service on November 12, 2003, shall be printed 

as a House document, in a style and manner determined by the Joint Committee 

on Printing. 

(b) ADDITIONAL COPIES FOR HOUSE AND SENATE.—There shall be 

printed for the use of the House of Representatives and the Senate such aggregate 

number of copies of the document printed under subsection (a) as the Joint Committee on Printing determines to be appropriate, except that the maximum number of copies which may be printed shall be the number for which the aggregate 

printing cost does not exceed $65,000. 

v 

Contents 

Page 

Part I 

The Changing Nature of the Speakership 

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 3 

Daniel P. Mulhollan, Director, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress ...................................................... 3, 6 

Gary Copeland, Director, Carl Albert Center ......................... 4 

THE O’NEILL SPEAKERSHIP ................................................... 9 

Gary Hymel ................................................... 9, 22, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31 

John A. Farrell ...................................................................... 11, 30 

The Honorable Dan Rostenkowski ................................ 22, 29, 30, 31 

The Honorable Mickey Edwards ............................................ 24, 30 

THE WRIGHT SPEAKERSHIP ................................................. 33 

Janet Hook ..................................................................... 33, 48, 54, 56 

Speaker James C. Wright, Jr ................................................. 34 

The Honorable David E. Bonior ............................................ 48 

The Honorable Tom Loeffler ................................................. 54 

REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE SPEAKER IN THE 

MODERN DAY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ............... 59 

Introduction, The Honorable Robert H. Michel .................... 59 

Speaker J. Dennis Hastert ...................................................... 60 

THE FOLEY SPEAKERSHIP ...................................................... 65 

Jeff Biggs ................................................................ 65, 80, 82, 84, 86 

Speaker Thomas S. Foley .............................................. 69, 80, 83, 84 

The Honorable Bill Frenzel ................................................... 75 

The Honorable Vic Fazio ....................................................... 77 

THE HISTORICAL SPEAKERSHIP ........................................... 87 

Introduction, James C. Billington, Librarian of Congress ... 87, 95, 97 

Professor Robert V. Remini, Kluge Scholar ........................... 89, 96 

THE GINGRICH SPEAKERSHIP .............................................. 99 

Donald Wolfensberger ................................. 99, 107, 110, 115, 117, 118 

Speaker Newt Gingrich ................................................... 100, 115, 118 

The Honorable Leon E. Panetta ............................................ 107, 117 

The Honorable Robert S. Walker .......................................... 110 

vi The Cannon Centenary Conference 

Part II 

Perspectives on the Speakership 

Chapter 1: The Speakership in Historical Perspective, by Ronald 

M. Peters, Jr .............................................................................. 121 

Chapter 2: Speakers Reed, Cannon, and Gingrich: Catalysts of 

Institutional and Procedural Change, by Walter J. Oleszek and 

Richard C. Sachs ....................................................................... 128 

Chapter 3: The Speaker of the House and the Committee on 

Rules, by Christopher M. Davis ................................................ 141 

Chapter 4: The Speaker and the Senate, by Elizabeth Rybicki ....... 158 

Chapter 5: The Speaker and the Press, by Betsy Palmer ................ 168 

Chapter 6: The Speaker and the President: Conflict and Cooperation, by R. Eric Petersen ........................................................... 181 

Chapter 7: Speakers, Presidents, and National Emergencies, by 

Harold C. Relyea ....................................................................... 195 

Chapter 8: The Changing Speakership, by Ronald M. Peters, Jr ... 218 

Part III 

Appendices 

Biographies ................................................................................... 239 

List of Conference Participants ...................................................... 248 

Part I 

The Changing Nature 

of the Speakership 

3 

Introduction 

Mr. MULHOLLAN. I’m Dan Mulhollan, Director of the Congressional 

Research Service, and it is my distinct pleasure to welcome all of you to 

this first-ever conference on the changing nature of the speakership. I say 

first-ever because never before has there been a conference at which all living 

former Speakers—Jim Wright, Tom Foley and Newt Gingrich—have participated with the current Speaker, Dennis Hastert, to discuss their role as 

Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

In addition, I am pleased to welcome the other important presenters 

at this conference: the former House Members who will serve as commentators on the various speakerships, the four moderators for each speakership 

period, and, of course, Jack Farrell of the Denver Post, who will start things 

off with an examination of the O’Neill speakership. Professor Robert Remini, 

one of our Nation’s most distinguished historians, will present his views 

on the evolving speakership. I believe all of us are in for a unique and historic opportunity. We will listen to several of the most knowledgeable people in our Nation discuss the variety of elements necessary to lead such 

a large and complex institution as the House of Representatives. 

This conference has been organized to commemorate the election on 

November 9—3 days ago, but also 100 years ago, in 1903—of Representative 

Joseph Cannon, Republican of Illinois, as Speaker of the House. How fitting 

it is that we convene this conference in the Cannon Caucus Room, after 

whom this entire building is named. Joe Cannon, the first person ever to 

grace the cover of Time magazine, was one of the most powerful and controversial Speakers in the entire history of the House. When Cannon neared 

retirement from the House in 1922 after nearly 50 years of service, he modestly said, ‘‘A hundred years from now people will say it does appear that 

there was a man from Illinois by the name of Cannon, but I don’t know 

much about him.’’ But we are here more than 100 years later and if ‘‘Uncle 

Joe,’’ as he was fondly called by some, was still around he would find many 

books, articles, and Ph.D. dissertations written about his long career and 

impact on the House. 

This conference on the contemporary speakership is another reminder 

that people still remember Speaker Cannon’s significant influence on the 

House and the course of the country at the dawn of the 20th century. To 

expand upon this welcome I’d like to introduce Gary Copeland, director 

4 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

of the Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center at the University of Oklahoma with whom CRS is fortunate to be able to co-sponsor 

this event. 

Mr. COPELAND. Thank you, Dan. I’m pleased to be with you today 

representing the Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center at 

the University of Oklahoma, which is a co-sponsor of this important conference on the changing nature of the House speakership. It is appropriate 

that we use the centennial of the Cannon speakership as the occasion to 

hold this conference because his service reflects the dynamic relationship between the Speaker and his colleagues in the House. 

The Speaker, as we know, must possess and utilize enough authority 

to effectively lead a body of 435 individuals who are formal equals, yet he 

must exercise that authority with enough discretion that Members accept 

it as in the best interest of the Nation, the body, and themselves. 

As we look over the last 100 years, we see a constant shift on where 

that balance is comfortably found. The balance will be affected by the personality of the Speaker, the formal powers given to him at the time, the 

character of the membership of the body, and the social and political culture 

of the time. There is no magic point that guarantees both effectiveness and 

widespread support. The Speakers we will consider today each approached 

the office in his own way and each reflected the times in which he served 

as well as dramatically affecting those times. Understanding the changing 

nature of the speakership puts the records of previous Speakers in appropriate 

historical perspective but also provides guidance as we move forward into 

the future. 

The Carl Albert Center is very pleased to serve as a co-sponsor of this 

conference with the widely respected Congressional Research Service jCRSk. 

CRS is, of course, uniquely qualified to put together a conference of this 

sort and to contribute their expertise on the changing nature of the speakership. On this topic, the partnership between the CRS and the Carl Albert 

Center seems particularly appropriate and Dan Mulhollan has allowed me 

to elaborate a little bit on that. 

The Carl Albert Center, named for the 46th Speaker of the House, 

has played a role in the academic understanding of the House generally and 

the speakership specifically for almost 25 years. The Carl Albert Center was 

founded and directed for over 20 years by the leading scholar of the speakership, Ron Peters. Ron’s major work, The American Speakership, is the foremost 

book on the topic, providing a thorough analysis and interpretation of the 

speakership in historical perspective. Professor Peters has published numerous other works on the topic, and he is with us today contributing a paper 

to this conference. 

Beyond the speakership, the Carl Albert Center faculty and graduate 

students have researched a variety of other topics including campaign fiVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 8164 Sfmt 8164 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.001 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
Introduction 5 

nance, committees, the seniority system, and so forth. But the center has 

multiple missions, which I will briefly mention to you, in addition to the 

research function. We offer unique academic programs at both the graduate 

and undergraduate level, including a congressional fellowship for graduate 

students that includes a year working on the Hill in affiliation with the 

Congressional Fellowship Program of the American Political Science Association. And we have an undergraduate program that matches our students 

one-to-one with faculty members to develop a mentoring relationship. Many 

of those students have become partners in the research projects with which 

they were originally assisting and have gone on to present their research 

findings at professional meetings. 

Third, and perhaps of interest to many of you in this room, is that 

the Carl Albert Center serves as an important resource on the history of 

Congress, primarily through our congressional archives, a collection of 20th 

century papers. We hold the papers of notable Oklahoma lawmakers such 

as Speaker Albert, Representatives Mike Synar and Mickey Edwards, and 

Senator Robert S. Kerr, as well as some out-of-state Members, such as Representatives Millicent Fenwick and Helen Gahagan Douglas. Our most recent 

additions include the important papers of two retired Republican leaders: 

Congressman J.C. Watts and Majority Leader Dick Armey. 

Finally, the center fosters a variety of programs to provide outreach 

to the community at large. We are pleased to sponsor the Julian J. 

Rothbaum Distinguished Lecture in Representative Government, and we also 

frequently host speakers from Washington, including current and former 

Members of Congress. The center is actively engaged in programs aimed 

at students and young people, including being a partner in the Project 540 

Grant which some of you should be familiar with. We’ve worked with the 

Center for American Women and Politics at Rutgers University to develop 

a leadership program aimed at encouraging women to become involved in 

politics. We’ve worked with the Close-up Foundation on their Great American Cities Project to encourage teenagers in effective citizenship skills and 

participation in political life. Everything we do is aimed at reflecting the 

quality of life and leadership practiced by our namesake, Carl Albert. 

As we’ll understand better as a result of this conference, Speakers are 

unique and special individuals who have perhaps the toughest task in our 

political system. Just as Speaker Albert led the House in a critical period 

of change, each of his successors that we will discuss today had unique circumstances and unique gifts. The Carl Albert Center is pleased to present 

this conference with the CRS with the hope of promoting better understanding of each of the Speakers and the special challenges and opportunities 

of their position. I thank all of you for being here today and, like the rest 

of you, I look forward to the proceedings. 

6 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

Mr. MULHOLLAN. Thank you, Gary. Many people on Capitol Hill 

assisted CRS in initiating and organizing this conference, including the joint 

leadership of the House Administration Committee: Chairman Bob Ney and 

Ranking Member John Larson, who just came in. John, thank you very 

much. Thanks go as well to the leadership of the House Rules Committee. 

But I especially want to thank Speaker Hastert and Democratic Leader 

Nancy Pelosi for endorsing the organization of this conference. And last, 

but certainly not least, I must acknowledge the critical support not only 

of the Carl Albert Center but also the McCormick Tribune Foundation without whose support this conference would not have taken place. John Sirek 

is representing McCormick Tribune. Thank you, John, very much. 

Now to some logistics. It’s our plan that CRS will use the videotape 

of this conference for the benefit of Members of Congress and their staff. 

In addition, we expect that the transcript of today’s proceedings, along with 

several reports on various aspects of the speakership, will be published and 

made available to Members of Congress. One of these reports is by Professor 

Ron Peters, who was just mentioned by Gary Copeland. Professor Peters 

is the noted scholar on the speakership. His paper is available as a handout 

to everyone who is attending this conference. At this point, in an effort 

to minimize distraction in today’s program, please turn off your cell phones. 

Should today’s program be preempted by an emergency or test alarm, all 

occupants should exit the building and proceed to designated assembly areas. 

If you don’t know where your assembly area is, just ask a helpful police 

officer in an orange vest. 

Please direct any questions or concerns regarding today’s program to 

any CRS staff member wearing a tag. Further, most of today’s panelists will 

be available for questions following their presentations. A wireless microphone will be circulating the room so if you have questions, please raise 

your hand and we’ll try to accommodate you. At this point, before we begin, 

I must turn to the person who is the originator, the conceiver, and implementer of this whole conference, Walter Oleszek, a senior specialist in American National Government at CRS. 

Mr. OLESZEK. Thanks very much, Dan, for those kind remarks, but 

there are a lot of people who helped put this conference together. Dan, I’m 

sure, will highlight them at a later point. My job is to introduce the moderators so we can get under way with the program at hand. Not only do we 

have a whole group of wonderfully knowledgeable people about the House 

of Representatives who we’re all anxious to hear from, but we also have 

a terrifically talented crew of moderators. I want to introduce the moderator 

for this panel right now. He is Gary Hymel, whom many of you may know 

from his time on the Hill. He served for 8 years as administrative assistant 

to Majority Whip and Majority Leader Hale Boggs. He also served for 8 

years as administrative assistant to Speaker Tip O’Neill. Mr. Hymel coVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 8164 Sfmt 8164 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.001 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
Introduction 7 

authored a book with Tip O’Neill called All Politics is Local, a classic statement for which Speaker O’Neill is famous. Currently, Mr. Hymel is senior 

vice president at Hill & Knowlton. Gary, take it away. 

U.S. House of Representatives photographer

Hon. Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr., Speaker "*((–"*)( 


92800.007
9 

The O’Neill Speakership 

Mr. HYMEL. Thank you, Walter, and thank you for putting together 

this excellent panel of people who knew Tip. It’s been 10 years since Tip 

was with us but a week doesn’t go by that his name isn’t in the paper, 

usually associated with that saying, ‘‘All politics is local,’’ something his 

father taught him. It was used last Tuesday, in the Kentucky election, for 

instance. The Democratic candidate was upset and a consultant said afterward that Tip O’Neill was right—all politics is local. Many Kentucky voters 

were angry with the previous Governor’s sexual escapades. I’m not so sure 

Tip meant that his saying should apply in that context, but if it fits I guess 

it’s all right. 

Just last month I was talking to Lindy Boggs and she was telling me 

about when she was at Tip’s funeral. It was very crowded because it was 

at Tip’s parish church in Cambridge. And the fellow next to her said, ‘‘They 

should have had this funeral at a cathedral where they could accommodate 

everybody. This is too crowded.’’ And Lindy said, ‘‘I looked at him and 

said, ‘All politics is local.’ ’’ Two weeks ago in The Hill newspaper, there 

was a cartoon strip about a Congressman who wants to get all the benefits 

for his district but didn’t want to vote for an increase in taxes. The last 

cartoon panel said, ‘‘Well, you taught me ‘all politics is loco.’ ’’ Another 

case when Tip was invoked occurred when Arnold Schwarzenegger was elected Governor of California. The reporters interviewed John Burton who is 

the president pro tem of the California Senate, and they asked, ‘‘How are 

you going to get along with Governor Schwarzenegger?’’ And Burton said, 

‘‘I’m going to treat him like Tip O’Neill treated Ronald Reagan.’’ He said, 

‘‘They had a wonderful personal relationship and they fought over policy, 

as we should.’’ 

Tip ruled by anecdote and he ruled by humor, and I’m sure you all 

know that. Senator John McCain, last week in a Washington Post story about 

the disappearance of the real characters in Congress, said, ‘‘To be honest 

my favorite was Tip O’Neill.’’ He said, ‘‘One time I spent five hours with 

him on a plane, and it was probably the most entertaining five hours of 

my life.’’ The other day I was taking a client through the Rayburn Building. 

He said, ‘‘I need a shoe shine.’’ So we went in the barbershop and Joe 

Quattrone, the longtime barber there said, ‘‘Gary, I got to tell you my favorite Tip O’Neill story.’’ And my client’s listening, of course. He said, ‘‘You 

10 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

know Richard Kelly,’’—some of you may remember the Congressman from 

Florida who got in trouble for taking a bribe and was about to be sentenced. 

Quattrone said to Kelly, ‘‘I’m sorry for what happened,’’ and Kelly said, 

‘‘Joe, don’t worry about it. I’m at peace with myself. I’m really feeling good 

about myself. I was just on the House floor and Tip O’Neill put his arm 

around me and said, ‘I’m sorry for what happened, and my door will always 

be open to you.’ ’’ That was Tip O’Neill. 

I want to tell one last story, one former Congressman Joe McDade told 

me about 2 weeks ago when I saw him at a book signing. Joe said, ‘‘Gary, 

you don’t know this story but one time we were traveling with Tip through 

Europe and we stopped at the airport in Shannon, Ireland,’’—and if you 

ever took a trip with Tip, you always stopped at the Shannon Airport because 

they have a great duty-free shop. ‘‘So everybody was getting off the plane 

and Tip said, ‘You know I’m not feeling well. You go on and shop, I’m 

going to stay on the plane.’ ’’ Joe said, ‘‘Tip, I’ll stay with you and keep 

you company.’’ So they’re sitting there shooting the bull—I’m sure talking 

sports and politics, and the pilot, an Air Force colonel, came back and said, 

‘‘Mr. Speaker, can I get you anything?’’ Tip said, ‘‘No, no. Everything’s 

fine. On second thought, could you take the plane up so we can see Ireland 

from the air?’’ And the colonel said, ‘‘Sure.’’ So Joe said they revved up 

the engines and took this United States of America airliner up and circled 

for awhile. Tip saw Ireland from the air, and then they landed and got 

everybody on and went home. To me that typified Tip O’Neill. 

Now let me tell you about some of the people who will speak about 

him today. First is Jack Farrell. Now Jack didn’t know Tip as well as Danny 

Rostenkowski or Mickey Edwards or myself, but he got to know him. Jack 

spent 6 years researching Tip’s life. He did 300 interviews and wrote a book 

called, Tip O’Neill and the Democratic Century. It sold 38,000 copies. You can 

still buy it today. Jack did an excellent job. Everybody co-operated with 

Jack because former Congressman Joe Moakley, Tip’s very dear friend, said 

you could trust Jack Farrell. Jack is now the bureau chief of the Denver 

Post, and he will talk to you about what he learned about Tip. 

Next on the podium is former Congressman Danny Rostenkowski, who 

was very, very close to Tip. They are very similar. They’re both big persons, 

their fathers were in politics, they are Catholic, ethnic, big-city organization 

Democrats. Danny had a lot of ideas about how the House could be run 

better and he was very generous about giving his opinions to Tip O’Neill. 

And some of his ideas are still in place today. For instance, Danny is the 

guy who came up with the idea to have weekly whip meetings. They had 

never had them before. The practice of rolling votes from Monday into Tuesday, which helped the ‘‘Tuesday-to-Thursday Club,’’ also was Danny’s idea. 

Dan could have been on the leadership ladder. He could have been the whip 

The O’Neill Speakership 11 

for Tip, but he chose to be chairman of the Ways and Means Committee 

instead. 

Mickey Edwards, our final panel member, is a former GOP Congressman from Oklahoma. He was sworn in by Tip when he was a freshman. 

He became a member of the loyal opposition. Edwards was head of the Republican Policy Committee, and chair of the American Conservative Union. 

In fact, he now teaches a class in American conservatism at the Kennedy 

School at Harvard, which he’s meeting this afternoon at 2:30. We’ll let each 

panel member speak and then take questions from the audience. With that, 

I’ll turn it over to Jack Farrell. 

Mr. FARRELL. Good morning. So a few months ago I got a call from 

Walter, who has now slunk away somewhere, and he asked me if I would 

give a talk about Tip O’Neill. And I thought I was going to be in a small 

conference room with maybe a few members of the Congressional Research 

Service staff. It was only a couple of weeks ago that I actually got an invitation and noted that this was going to be a historic event featuring all three 

living former Speakers and the current Speaker. And it came to me that 

Speakers Foley and Wright and Gingrich were all going to be here, appearing in person, giving first-hand accounts with behind-the-scenes nuggets 

that historians would prize forever. And if that was not daunting enough 

I had been selected to stand in for one of the greatest storytellers of all 

time, Speaker Tip O’Neill. So I was struck by one of those moments of 

stark panic. Desperately, I came up with the idea that I was going to deliver 

this speech in the first person, like Hal Holbrook doing Mark Twain. I 

would dress up like Tip, comb my hair back, sprinkle some flour in it so 

I’d have that grand O’Neill white shock of hair. Maybe strap a pillow around 

my waist and speak through the stub of a cigar. I ran this by Gary and 

Walter and got what I guess could be described as politely nervous chuckles. 

But as always the sharpest perspective came from my wife Catharina. She 

said, ‘‘Jack, I love you. But you’re a lousy actor and you’re a worst mimic. 

In all the weeks of your book tour, all the stories you told, you never once 

gave a good impression of Tip O’Neill. Your ‘dahlings’ and your ‘old pals’ 

were never persuasive. Your Boston accent is unconvincing and when you 

sing it’s off key. You barely need the pillow and you can douse your head 

with as much flour as you want. It’s never going to make you look like 

Tip O’Neill, but a little bit more like snow on Old Baldy. You just don’t 

have enough trees at the peak.’’ So Tip remains to be played maybe in a 

one-man show by John Goodman or Ned Beattie or Charles Durning. And 

having watched John Goodman play a Speaker on ‘‘West Wing’’ this fall, 

I think he might be the best bet even though he did play a Republican. 

So now I get to talk about Tip, not to try and channel him. And 

the sound that you are hearing is that of 1,000 C–SPAN viewers sighing 

in relief. Though I spent 6 years on my biography of Speaker O’Neill, I’m 

12 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

very modest about my ability to describe his motivation on many matters. 

As he once said, ‘‘You cannot look into a man’s heart. Human beings keep 

great secrets.’’ But I do believe—I do know that Tip would have approved 

what we’re doing here today. He revered the House and the Speaker’s Office 

and, this may come as a surprise to some in the room, he was a life-long 

student of history. Many of you may travel to Boston for the Democratic 

Convention next summer or to New England to see the leaves of autumn, 

and if you pause at Minuteman Park and follow where the Redcoats were 

chased by the Rebels down the road from Concord to Lexington, or you 

go to Charlestown to walk the decks of Old Ironsides or you visit the Old 

North Church or the Paul Revere House or many of the other carefully 

preserved historic sites on the Freedom Walk in Boston, you should tip 

your hat to Tip, who was responsible, or at least shared in the responsibility, 

of winning Federal protection and funding for these sites when he served 

with great enthusiasm on the National Historic Sites Commission. Tip’s 

ability to bring home the bacon for matters of historic preservation is part 

of a pattern. For one of the things I discovered when doing the research 

for my book was that in the days before he entered the House leadership 

he was a colossal collector of ‘‘pork’’ for Massachusetts. From a junior seat 

on the Rules Committee, according to one reputable academic study, Tip’s 

share of Federal postal, health, welfare, anti-poverty and education funds was 

demonstratively greater than those claimed by the chairman of the authorizing committee or the chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee that 

had jurisdiction over those matters. And I see heads nodding among the 

cognoscenti in appreciation of that particular trick. Congressman Jim 

McGovern wherever you are, eat your heart out. 

If you go to Massachusetts to visit those historic sites, you’ll no doubt 

travel on roads that Tip played a major role in building. Not just the multibillion dollar Central Artery Project which is rightly known as Tip’s Tunnel 

in Boston, but also the aging elevated Fitzgerald Expressway that they’re 

tearing down to make way for the new artery. Tip helped build it when 

serving as the first Democratic speaker of the Massachusetts House after 

World War II. In those days, before the creation of the interstate highway 

system, the States paid for their own roads and the Massachusetts government cut corners in the form of exit and entrance ramps to save money 

when building the expressway. Soon it would take 45 minutes to get from 

one side of Boston to the other. So when he came to Congress, Tip set 

about solving this. In a way, he inherited his own problem and the way 

he solved it 40 years later was by tapping the U.S. Treasury to the tune 

of $12 billion, and Massachusetts thanks you. 

As he raked in the Federal largesse for his State and district, O’Neill 

also took the time to make sure that the Minuteman Park and the Old 

The O’Neill Speakership 13 

North Church were protected. It’s a small but perhaps telling indication 

that in Tip O’Neill you have a somewhat more complicated character than 

the popular image suggested. He was a wardheeler to be sure, but one of 

the first to be blessed with a college diploma from Boston College. No one 

was better at swapping favors, but when he first ran for office, and in his 

years in the Massachusetts State House, he had the tiniest bit of a hint 

of a sheen of a middle-class reformer about him. He was certainly no James 

‘‘Take a Buck’’ Coffey, that memorable State rep from Beacon Hill who 

so eloquently summed up the code of a certain class of Massachusetts politicians. Coffey publicly announced, ‘‘I’ll take a buck. And who the hell doesn’t 

know it? I’m probably the only one who has guts enough to say I’ll take 

a buck. I’d like to see the guy who doesn’t.’’ 

Tip knew the ways, and could throw a mean elbow, but he appreciated 

youth and idealism and was able to change with the times. He had street 

smarts and Jesuit schooling. Representative Barney Frank, a Harvard graduate, once told me that he thought Tip was smart enough to teach history 

on the faculty at Boston College. It was only after leaving the interview 

and upon some reflection that I began to worry that Barney was playing 

with me and that his comment said more about how Harvard views Boston 

College than it does of Tip’s particular gifts and abilities. But I brought 

it up with him later and Barney assured me that he meant it as a compliment to Tip, not a knock at BC. 

Tip’s ability to bridge the gap between the new and the old would 

prove to be an invaluable asset as he rose to the speakership. He and his 

predecessor, Carl Albert, are rightly known amongst students of Congress 

as the key transitional figures in the development of the modern Speaker. 

And, in fact, I have my own thanks to give to the Carl Albert Center and 

to Mr. Peters for much of the analysis that I’m about to present, and for 

also preserving and sharing a remarkable oral history by Carl Albert in which 

Carl laid it down as he saw it, with absolutely no reservations, when commenting about the character of his peers in all those years in Congress. 

Albert and O’Neill presided over the transition from old to new, there’s 

no doubt. Consider what preceded them for most of the 20th century— 

a rigid seniority system with tyrannical old southern chairmen, and a closeddoor leadership characterized by Speaker Sam Rayburn’s ‘‘board of education.’’ The board was located in a high-ceilinged room one floor below 

the House Chamber and Tip visited when he was invited by his patron 

Speaker John McCormack, who was then majority leader. Tip sat around 

with Mr. Sam’s closest buddies drinking hard liquor, and using the small 

sink that, as D.B. Hardeman and Donald Bacon so memorably put it, 

‘‘served as a public urinal for some of America’s most famous political figures.’’ It was from that room that Harry Truman was summoned to the 

White House to be sworn in as President when Franklin Roosevelt died. 

14 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

And Mr. Sam routinely invited a few up-and-comers like Albert, Hale 

Boggs, and Tip O’Neill to listen as he and Lyndon Johnson and John McCormack or House Parliamentarian Lewis Deschler discussed the day’s events 

and struck a blow for liberty. 

That was the House as Tip knew it when he arrived in Congress in 

1953. Even the arrival of Jack Kennedy did not change things. The southern 

chairmen remained in control, and Tip found it particularly frustrating because—though JFK was from Massachusetts—political rivals on the President’s staff kept O’Neill away from the new President. When he turned 

50, he took his daughter Rosemary to dinner. 

‘‘That’s it. My career is over,’’ Tip told Rosemary. ‘‘We had a President 

from my own State, from my own district and I can’t get in to see him.’’ 

Well, as someone who’s just a few months from turning 50, I hope that 

the next 35 years do for my career what the next 35 did for Tip. The war 

in Vietnam turned out to be his great opportunity. He was an early foe, 

representing a district that turned against the war before much of the rest 

of America. His stance against the war gave him credibility, and a following, 

among the flock of young representatives who were then beginning to arrive 

in Washington. Like them, he was frustrated by the way that the tough 

old southern chairmen refused to allow recorded votes on the war. Out of 

sympathy, and expediency, he joined many of their attempts to reform Congress. 

Though a northerner, Tip was a veteran Democrat who could appeal 

to the South; he could also appeal to both the ‘‘old guard’’ and the ‘‘new 

turks.’’ So he was selected by Albert and Majority Leader Boggs to become 

the Democratic whip. Then, of course, came the stroke of fortune that put 

Tip just a step away from the Speaker’s Office. Boggs’ airplane took off 

in unsettled weather in Alaska and he was never seen again. So it was Tip 

who faced off against Richard Nixon. He found himself the leader of the 

House Democrats in the turbulent years of Watergate. And it was clear 

throughout the early seventies that his strength in the House came from 

his ability to span this gap between North and South, young and old, new 

suburban representatives, and the lingering captains of the old city machines. 

It was a very delicate balancing act but it got him where he wanted to 

be—the Speaker of the House in 1976, just in time for the return of a Democratic Presidency. 

But as he took the oath of office, O’Neill looked out on a House that 

was far different from the one he had joined in 1953. ‘‘The group that came 

in 1974, the ‘‘Watergate babies,’’ were a bunch of mavericks,’’ said Jim 

Wright. ‘‘All of them had run on reform platforms intent on changing anything and everything they found that had needed changing.’’ Indeed, while 

the turbulence of the sixties, the Vietnam war, and the years of Watergate 

had led millions of young Americans to abandon the political process and 

The O’Neill Speakership 15 

turn inward, those who persisted in politics—in Democratic politics—were 

highly committed activists who had cut their teeth on civil rights, the antiwar movement or the Kennedy, McCarthy and McGovern campaigns. They 

viewed Washington as a capital in need of purging. 

Tip recalled that ‘‘these youthful, able, talented people, they didn’t like 

the establishment. They didn’t like Washington. They didn’t like the seniority system. They didn’t like the closeness of it and they came down here 

with new ideas. They wanted to change the Congress of the United States, 

which they did.’’ The old politics had fallen into disrepair. The Democratic 

Members of the classes of 1970, 1972, 1974, and 1976 were prototypes of 

a new kind of Senator and Representative. They were comfortable with their 

ideological allies in the press corps that was undergoing similar changes. 

They were conversant in the politics of televised imagery and campaign commercials and generally beholden to few party leaders. They were independent 

political entrepreneurs who raised their own funds, hired professional advisors, and reached out to the voters using direct mail appeals, single-issue 

interest groups, radio, and television advertising. Said Tip, ‘‘About 50 percent of these people had never served in public life before. When I came 

to Congress the average man had been in the legislature, had been a mayor 

or district attorney or served in the local city council. They grew up knowing 

what party discipline was about. These new people came as individuals. They 

got elected criticizing Washington. They said, ‘Hey, we never got any help 

from the Democratic Party. We won on our own and we’re going to be 

independent.’ They started in 1974 and they broke the discipline.’’ 

The House was thoroughly remade from the sleepy institution of Tip’s 

early years in Congress. The southern autocracy was broken; the shuffling 

old bulls swept from the Capitol’s halls. Of 292 Democrats when Tip took 

over as Speaker in January 1977, only 15 had served in Congress longer than 

he had. The average age in the House had dropped to 49.3, the youngest 

since World War II. The regional distribution of the two parties had begun 

to reflect the transformative success of the Republican southern strategy. 

And the old urban strongholds of ethnic white Democrats had been washed 

away by the great post-war migration of black Americans from the South 

and the subsequent white flight to the suburbs. The new breed of Democratic office holders, Tim Wirth, Gary Hart, Paul Tsongas, Michael Dukakis, 

and the rest, were neoliberals who sold the notion of political reform and 

their own personalities to suburbanites who gathered political information 

from television, not the local block captain. Ticket splitting was far more 

common. The percentage of voters who chose the party line dropped in 

House elections from 84 percent to 69 percent in the 20 years after 1958. 

Without an old-time party machine to distribute winter coats and turkeys, 

those new political entrepreneurs invested considerable resources into sophisVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 8164 Sfmt 8164 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.001 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
16 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

ticated constituent service operations, answering mail and telephone calls, 

staffing satellite mobile field offices, chasing down wayward Social Security 

checks. 

Between 1971 and 1981 the volume of incoming mail to Congress more 

than tripled. Watts lines, word processors, and computerized mailing systems became commonplace features in congressional offices. Members of this 

new Congress depended on televised imagery and telegenic forums. The 

number of committee and subcommittee chairmen had doubled to some 200 

during the time O’Neill had been in Congress. The duties of constituent 

service and the work of these subcommittees fueled the demand for more 

staff. The 435 Members of the House had 2,000 employees on their payroll 

when O’Neill arrived in 1953. There were 7,000 such employees in 1977 

and another 3,000 working for committees, subcommittees, and the party 

leadership. The Rules Committee served as a prime illustration. Chairman 

Howard Smith (D–VA), had two committee aides in 1960 when Tip served 

on Rules. Twenty years later there were 42. Congress was now a billiondollar business with a commensurate demand for more lobbyists, special interest groups, trade associations, and journalists. 

The average number of days in session jumped from 230 in the Eisenhower years to 323 in the 95th Congress. And the number of recorded votes 

went from 71 in O’Neill’s first year to 834 in 1978. Gone were the days 

when Carl Albert, following Sam Rayburn’s advice, would spend his days 

in the House Chamber soaking up knowledge and forging collegial relationships. Gone as well were the hours when Harold Donohue (D–MA), and 

Phil Philbin (D–MA), would slump in the soft leather chairs of the House 

Chamber each afternoon like aged hotel detectives, whiling away the hours 

with gossip and the occasional rousing snore. A 1977 study by a House Commission found that Members worked 11-hour days of which only 33 minutes 

were spent at contemplative tasks like reading, thinking, or writing. The 

House became a place to cast a vote and flee, not as much to mingle, converse, or enjoy the debate. 

For many it was hard not to hearken back to George Washington 

Plunkett, the legendary sage of Tammany Hall who asked in 1905, ‘‘Have 

you ever thought what would become of the country if the bosses were put 

out of business and their places were taken by a lot of cart-tail orators and 

college graduates? It would mean chaos.’’ 

And so, in the early years of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency, O’Neill pioneered a process by which he would govern the House for the next decade. 

It came to be known as the ‘‘politics of inclusion.’’ The idea was to rope 

your colleagues in to secure their allegiance by giving them a stake in the 

results, to share the responsibility as well as the spoils, and to co-opt resistance. Did the new breed of congressmen and congresswomen—the political 

entrepreneurs—demand a piece of the action and a ticket to the 5 o’clock 

The O’Neill Speakership 17 

news? Then O’Neill would give it to them in return for their loyalty. Starting with an Ad-hoc Energy Committee and three energy task forces, soon 

every major issue had a task force and bright, young Members to chair it: 

willing to trade their independence for the power and celebrity of serving 

in the leadership. ‘‘O’Neill didn’t direct his colleagues to do his bidding,’’ 

said Phil Sharp (D–IN). ‘‘He entrusted them.’’ 

The rise of Representative Richard Gephardt, elected in 1976, was illustrative. Soon after taking office, the Carter administration had discovered 

that the cost-of-living increases were soaring in a time of high inflation and 

threatening to bankrupt Social Security. The Democrats ultimately concluded that a massive hike in the payroll tax was the best way to keep 

the system solvent. To head the Social Security Task Force, O’Neill selected 

the 36-year-old Gephardt, and they pushed the bill through the House before 

the 1978 election season. It passed in 1977 by a 189 to 163 margin, the largest 

increase in payroll taxes in history—$227 billion over 10 years—but Gephardt and his task force had gotten it done. He moved into the leadership’s 

favor and was soon being hailed in the press as a force to be reckoned with 

because of his ability to deal with a cross section of House Members. 

O’Neill aide Irv Sprague later wrote a memo to Tip about the task 

force system, saying it triumphed because it ‘‘involved as many people as 

possible and gave them a personal stake in the outcome.’’ 

‘‘We have the Policy Committee. We have the Whip Organization 

working. We got the Rules Committee working and we got the Chairmen 

all working together,’’ O’Neill told the National Journal. ‘‘They’re part and 

parcel of the organization. They’re part and parcel of making decisions. There 

are more people in the decisionmaking. That’s the way I like it and I’m 

sure that’s the way the members like it.’’ 

It wasn’t enough. The Carter years were a political disaster for Tip 

O’Neill’s Democrats and justly so. When handing the Democrats control 

of both the White House and the Congress in 1976, the voters had looked 

to the party for competence, resolve, and the promise of national revival. 

Handed the opportunity the Democrats staged a thoroughly miserable performance. They had been petty, selfish, and spiteful. They had looked beholden to oil companies, the health care industry, and other special interests. 

They had refused to curb their insistent liberal base and chosen to fight 

a destructive and self-indulgent civil war in the Presidential primaries. They 

were intellectually clueless, politically inept, and O’Neill stood as the symbol 

of their failure. I don’t know how many here remember, but the Republican 

television commercials showed a white-haired burley actor who ran out of 

gas on a highway. It clicked not because it represented just any generic 

big-city pol, but because it lampooned the Speaker of the clownish House 

in Washington. 

18 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

After a fine first year as Speaker with the passage of ethics and energy 

packages, O’Neill’s performance had lapsed to adequate in 1978 and piteous 

in 1979 and 1980. There were good reasons for the disaster and few in Washington were more adept than Tip at deflecting the blame toward the White 

House, the centrifugal effects of congressional reform, or the ideological incohesion of his party. But at a time of economical, international, and political 

crisis when his party and countrymen looked at Tip, he had failed. His was 

the party of Tongsun Park and CETA jComprehensive Education and Training Actk, of 18 percent inflation and gas lines. When they could have been 

addressing the problem of America’s economy, the Democrats had spent their 

time squabbling. The electorate’s retribution had been just and severe. It 

was not just that the Republicans won—the White House, the Senate and 

the 33 seats gained in the House of Representatives in 1980—it was who 

won: Ronald Reagan. 

‘‘Until such time as we nominate a new Presidential candidate you are 

the leader of the Democratic Party as well as the highest public official 

of the party,’’ leadership aide Burt Hoffman wrote the Speaker. ‘‘You are 

also more than ever the only person in a position to continue representing 

the ideas of justice and compassion.’’ 

It would be the final battle, the defining historic moment for this 

bruised, old, white-haired guy, and O’Neill knew it. He would sit alone 

in his darkened office brooding over each day’s reversals. He would be betrayed by captains, scored by old foes, challenged by young rebels in his 

rank. His name and his pride were on the line, but so, more importantly, 

was what he believed. If Tip O’Neill bungled this job, if he failed to hold 

the bridge, the hill, the last foothold, he knew his place in history would 

suffer, but so would Roosevelt’s legacy: the elderly whose fears of poverty 

and illness had been eased by Social Security and Medicare; the working 

class kids carrying their families’ dreams of going to college with the help 

of Pell grants; the water and the air that were getting cleaner and the wilderness preserved from development. 

Tip was no saint. Win or lose there would be no canonization of Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr. In a lifetime in politics, he’d gouged eyes, thrown elbows, 

bent the law, and befriended rogues and thieves. He could be mean and 

small-minded. But at his core there lay a magnificence of spirit, deep compassion, and a rock-hard set of beliefs. He had a sense of duty that he refused 

to abandon for those whom Heaven’s grace forgot. He would sooner die 

on the floor of the House or watch his party be vanquished and dispersed 

than desert them. 

‘‘You know you’re right?’’ his wife Millie would ask him as she adjusted 

his tie at the door in the morning. ‘‘Yes,’’ he would say and he knew it. 

He knew it like he knew the sidewalks of North Cambridge, the liturgy 

of the Sunday Mass, or how to stack a conference committee. ‘‘Then do 

The O’Neill Speakership 19 

your best,’’ Millie would say and off he would go. He may not have had 

the looks of a movie star but he had great instincts and sound judgment 

and a joy for life that could match Reagan’s charm. And like the new President, he had an innocence that had survived many years in a cynical game, 

and given time and exposure, would allow Americans to come to love him. 

Indeed, Reagan and O’Neill had much in common. They were broadbrush types who liked to joke and never let the facts get in the way of 

a good story. They would take a punch and come back swinging. They 

prized their downtime, loved to be loved, and bore without complaint, or 

much interest in correcting, the liabilities of their parties. They each had 

spectacularly talented staffs. Most important, despite their acting talents, 

they stood out among the sharpies and trimmers in the Nation’s Capital 

as men of deep conviction. Each was sustained in much the same way by 

his own distinctive mythology. Reagan was the son of the small-town Midwest, a lifeguard and radio announcer who had made his way to the Golden 

State and become a wealthy movie star. He revered individual liberty, and 

his icons were the cowboys, the entrepreneurs, the singular heroes of sporting 

fields and war. His speeches never failed to cite the American Revolution, 

which had thrown down the government of a rotten tyranny and claimed 

the freedom and rights of man. 

O’Neill was the product of the East. Of the great crowded cities. He 

reveled in the collectivity of purpose and the fruits of charity, neighborhood 

and fellowship. His was the creed of Honey Fitz and Jim Curly, Roosevelt, 

and the Sermon on the Mount. He, too, revered the Founding Fathers— 

but for the magnificent system of government they had built which had 

proven so adaptable and addressed so many social ills. Tip O’Neill versus 

Ronald Reagan. This was no sophistic debate: these were world views clashing—hot lava meeting thundering surf. And good it was for the country 

to have the debate—to stake the claim of a ‘‘more perfect union’’ against 

the demand for ‘‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’’ once again. History was happening. The heritage of the New Deal, a philosophy of governing that had lasted for half a century was at stake. Reagan didn’t want 

to trim the sails. He wanted to turn the ship around and head back to 

port. For more than 50 years Republicans had argued that the country had 

taken a horribly wrong turn in the thirties, that Roosevelt’s social insurance 

programs and the taxes that supported them were seductively undermining 

the American way: breeding lethargy, dependence, and corruption of the 

spirit. Nor was there ambivalence at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, 

in the Speaker’s lobby. 

As Reagan proved himself so formidable a foe, the Democrats scrambled 

to reinforce their Speaker. Tony Coelho (D–CA), was recruited to take over 

as chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, and he 

raised a lot of money. One of his first acts was to put Chris Matthews on 

20 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

the payroll: detached to the Speaker to help, as O’Neill put it, with ‘‘the 

media stuff.’’ Once again O’Neill’s great sense of timing extended to his 

selection of staff. Leo Diehl was his indispensable pal and protector who 

had notified the wise guys that times had changed. Gary Hymel had been 

a bridge to the southern barons and envoy to the pencil press, and he helped 

Tip run the House when O’Neill was majority leader. Kirk O’Donnell was 

hired in 1977 when the post-Watergate era called for a legal counsel with 

well-honed political instincts. Ari Weiss was the Speaker’s chief policy analyst. ‘‘I’ve never seen a staff like Tip O’Neill’s. There’s not even a close 

second,’’ said journalist Al Hunt. It said a lot about O’Neill—that he was 

an incredibly secure man. 

Matthews found that O’Neill was self-conscious about his looks, and 

dubious about competing with the movie star in the White House. ‘‘He 

was scared to death of it because it was live television. He was so afraid 

he would say something wrong. He was afraid of being embarrassed. He 

lacked confidence. He was never sure of his looks. He was always talking 

about his cabbage ears and his big nose. He was mean to himself,’’ Matthews 

remembered. 

Television news liked simple stories. Reagan was a skilled performer 

and his media advisor, Michael Deaver, and his colleagues were exceptionally 

good at crafting scripted moments in which the President could perform. 

Deaver recalled that cable TV had not yet arrived. You could target the 

three networks and talk to 80 percent of the public. O’Neill could never 

hope to match such superb Reagan moments as the 40th anniversary of the 

D-day landings or the President’s rallying address to the stunned Nation 

after the space shuttle Challenger exploded. 

But there was a sturdy journalistic imperative—‘‘get the other side of 

the story’’—that provided O’Neill with an opening, as did the media’s unquenchable thirst for controversy. Reporters from the networks and other 

national news organizations needed a Reagan foil, someone to whom they 

could go and get the other side, and that was a role the Speaker could 

play. But it was a tough, evolutionary process, especially for a man who 

had just endured 3 years of pummeling from the press. ‘‘You had to beg 

him to do interviews and when you did your butt was on the line. If you 

strung two bad interviews in a row, you were dead,’’ Matthews remembered. 

‘‘And I wanted desperately to say to him, I let the reporters in because 

I came here to help you become what you can become. And the way to 

do it is to be publicized. And the only way to be publicized is to let people 

write about you and the only way to let them write about you is to let 

them take some shots at you. That’s the only way to become a figure in 

American politics. You cannot customize it. You cannot come in and tailor 

it. All you can do is go in, let them see who you are and let them make 

their own judgments.’’ 

The O’Neill Speakership 21 

The Speaker, who railed against the Reagan tax bill in July, was a 

far better tailored, scripted and prepared politician than the befuddled bear 

who had opposed the Gramm-Latta budget cuts in May 1981 or who had 

replied, ‘‘What kind of fool do they think I am?’’ when House Democrats 

urged him to seek network time to respond to Reagan’s triumphant spring 

attack on the Federal budget. 

Said Representative Newt Gingrich, ‘‘If you were to study Tip in his 

last year as Speaker and compare him to the first year as Speaker, you saw 

a man who had learned a great deal about television as the dominant medium in his game.’’ Democratic pollster Peter Hart remembered, ‘‘At the 

beginning he was the perfect caricature of old-time politics. The Republicans 

took advantage of it. And he was compelled to take a position to which 

he was ill-prepared and ill-equipped, which was the voice of the Democratic 

Party.’’ But by 1986 not only was he more comfortable with his stature 

and his feel for the role, but as much as the President represented an ideology 

and a purpose, the public saw that Tip represented an ideology and a purpose 

as well, and it was a purpose that as we moved through the eighties, Americans began to see as pretty important—that it was an important set of values 

that this man represents. He’s not going to allow Congress to cut the safety 

net or the environmental programs or Social Security or education. 

In no small part due to Ronald Reagan, the United States would embark on a new entrepreneurial era, claim triumph in the cold war, reach 

giddy new heights of freedom and prosperity, and command both the attention and the obligation of greatness at the end of the century. But in no 

small part because of Tip O’Neill, the country would reach that pinnacle 

without leaving its working families and old folks and sick kids and 

multihued ethnic and racial minorities behind. Reagan had turned the country in a new direction. The changing world with its disorienting pace of 

economic, scientific, and technological advancement would inevitably demand that the mechanisms of the New Deal be reexamined and rebuilt. 

But in 1981 Tip O’Neill drew a line for his party and his country and the 

core of Roosevelt’s vision was preserved. It was a stirring rear guard action 

worthy of Horatius at the bridge or Kutuzov at the gates of Moscow. 

The final point I’d like to make about the Albert and O’Neill speakerships is how many of these changes that were made in this period—television, the rise of committees, huge numbers of staff, televised sessions of 

the House—all were seen as liberating, creative adjustments by progressives 

at the time. But they helped bring on the end of the Democratic era. The 

shattering of the seniority system, the successful attack upon the old, southern chairmen, the advent of television and its effect on the House all helped 

Republican as well as Democratic young turks: Republican names familiar 

to us now—Jack Kemp, Trent Lott, Newt Gingrich. The Democratic reformers had shown the way and left it open for a group of real revolutionVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 8164 Sfmt 8164 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.001 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
22 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

aries, the young Republican entrepreneurs who finally triumphed in 1995 

and took back control of the House. 

But that’s a story for the rest of the day. I’m here to talk about Tip 

O’Neill and to sum up by quoting from Rev. J. Donald Monan’s eulogy 

at Tip’s funeral. ‘‘Those of us who have lived through the decades since 

the 1930s of dramatic change in the moral dilemmas that modernity brings, 

in the crisis of wars and the threats of war . . . realize that Speaker O’Neill’s 

legendary sense of loyalty, either to old friends or to God, was no dull or 

wooden conformity. It jwask a creative fidelity to values pledged in his 

youth that he kept relevant to a world of constant change.’’ And that, in 

my opinion, was his greatest genius. 

Mr. HYMEL. Congressman Rostenkowski. 

Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI. I guess what you expect from me today is 

a personal view and, also, a legislative view of Tip O’Neill. I think Tip 

and I had a great deal in common. 

We both came from an urban area. We saw poverty first hand. But, 

you can’t look at Tip O’Neill’s speakership without first looking at what 

a really unique challenge had been created for him by having Ronald Reagan 

in the White House. 

Reagan was a wonderful public speaker; a classic ‘‘outside’’ politician 

who had good sound bites but not creative legislative ideas or interest in 

legislative detail. 

Tip O’Neill was a classic ‘‘inside’’ guy. He looked like an old-fashioned 

politician. Some people liked that image, some didn’t. But, there was no 

avoiding his physical structure. When Tip became the de facto Democratic 

spokesman, it was not an uneven contest. He had a very delicate balancing 

act. President Reagan was tremendously popular and the question became 

how to moderate what he and the Congress were trying to do without confronting the President head on. 

In the first context, with the 1981 tax cuts, Democrats foolishly got 

into a bidding war that made things worse than they otherwise would have 

been. A lot of ‘‘blow-dried’’ Democrats elected post-Watergate thought that 

O’Neill was the wrong face for the party at that time and that it was their 

turn to govern. 

So, even while Tip tried to present a united Democratic front, he was 

challenged by plotting from within his own party. The fact that there never 

was a public explosion is certainly to Speaker O’Neill’s credit. 

Unlike today’s situation, the committee chairmen in the House, people 

like myself, had a lot of independence. The Speaker couldn’t order them 

to do anything because they wouldn’t automatically all obey. When Newt 

became Speaker, he centralized power, and was able to do things, especially 

involving the scheduling of legislation in the House of Representatives that 

Tip could never have accomplished. 

The O’Neill Speakership 23 

Tip just didn’t have the powers conferred on Newt. I should know. 

I was appointed chief deputy majority whip by Jim Wright. As a matter 

of fact, Tip didn’t like the idea that I was going to be the deputy whip, 

but Jim Wright insisted because of the fact that we had had a hell of a 

fight for majority leader. Leo Diehl, a top O’Neill aide, who was orchestrating it with the help of Jimmy Howard from New Jersey and Danny 

Rostenkowski, had worked like the Devil along with people like Tony Coelho to get Jim Wright elected majority leader. We had been the ones who 

had talked Jim Wright into running for majority leader. Jim was very comfortable on the Public Works Committee and, believe me, made more friends 

in the Congress than anyone. But after the election and Tip’s ascension to 

the speakership it was kind of an intimate legislative process. 

Tip couldn’t command Members to do things the way the Republicans 

have done since. Instead, he had to convince them. Tip would put his arm 

around you and give you one of these, ‘‘Gosh darn, you gotta help me on 

this.’’ And, in most instances, Members of Congress would bend to the wishes of Tip O’Neill. Tip O’Neill had a great deal of faith in the system and 

he had tremendous respect for the individual legislator’s ability to govern. 

It was in those days when committee chairmen were very powerful that 

Speaker O’Neill recognized that he came from within that group of representatives who wanted their voices to be heard. In contrast to the present 

day leadership authority, O’Neill would wait for the legislative process to 

work and come to the Speaker’s office. What he did draw out of you was 

a compelling competition to do the job. If you failed, it’d be at dinner 

that night that he’d say, ‘‘Jesus, you know Rosty, you’re not doing so well 

over there.’’ And, it would really boil me just like it would boil John Dingell 

or it would boil Jack Brooks. 

Tip O’Neill had the ability to convince a legislator because he was 

what was termed ‘‘a legislator’s legislator’’ himself. He had come up through 

the ranks and been in the trenches and that, I believe, was the secret of 

the successes we had. 

Certainly O’Neill competed with Ronald Reagan. You’ve got to remember that Ronald Reagan, elected in 1980, was probably one of the most 

popular individuals who ever came to Washington. He broke all precedents. 

He came to Capitol Hill as President-elect, visiting the Speaker in the ceremonial office—never been done before. Came to the House of Representatives for the State of the Union Message and violated House rules by introducing people in the gallery—never done before. It was this ‘‘so-called’’ 

warmth that Reagan expressed and brought through to television. To his 

credit, and I just did a C–SPAN show this morning about the creation of 

C–SPAN, during the time of this creation, no one was more influential in 

having C–SPAN in the House of Representatives than Tip O’Neill. Tip 

24 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

worked with C–SPAN founder Brian Lamb as hard as I’ve ever seen anyone 

ever work to accomplish this. 

I’ve got to admit that I was on the other side of the argument with 

respect to C–SPAN. But, the day that we initiated C–SPAN, you couldn’t 

buy a blue shirt in Washington. 

Tip, in my opinion, depended a great deal on staff, depended a great 

deal on information that came through the legislative process, and tried to 

make judgments based on the coalitions which he could put together. He 

was good at it. 

I’ll never forget the first day as leadership when Tip; Jim Wright, the 

majority leader; John Brademas, the majority whip; and Danny Rostenkowski, chief deputy whip, went to the White House for an 8 a.m. Tuesday 

morning meeting. We were ushered into a small dining room off the East 

Room where then-President Jimmy Carter was hosting a ‘‘breakfast’’ for the 

leadership. There were little fingertip sandwiches and small biscuits and Tip 

O’Neill looked at Jimmy Carter and said, ‘‘Jesus, Mr. President, I thought 

we won the election for crying out loud!’’ The next Tuesday, and we were 

there every other Tuesday, you’d have thought we were all ‘‘Paul Bunyons’’ 

at breakfast. 

O’Neill, to his credit, came to the speakership at a time when I think 

somebody up there liked us because it was very tough competing with Ronald Reagan. I can say this personally. Ronald Reagan as President made 

my job at the Committee on Ways and Means very easy because all I had 

to do was try to bring Ronald Reagan to the middle and he’d bring along 

the Republican votes that were necessary. That, coupled with Tip O’Neill’s 

coalitions, made it possible to pass legislation. 

I’ve so many pleasant personal memories over the years with Tip and 

Millie, with Silvio Conte, with Bob Michel. In summation, just let me say 

this. Last night, I had dinner with Guy Vander Jagt, Bob Michel, Leon 

Panetta, and Marty Russo. I wonder if in 10 years or 8 years, after their 

service, the present majority and minority leaders will get together for dinner. It’s a sad commentary. 

Mr. HYMEL. Thank you, Congressman. 

Congressman Edwards. 

Mr. EDWARDS. Well, first of all, I want to say that I probably feel 

more comfortable in this room than some of the other people here, like 

Jim Wright, Tom Foley, and Danny Rostenkowski, because we Republicans 

always had to have our conferences in this room because the Democrats were 

meeting on the House floor, so we couldn’t use it. So I’ve spent a lot of 

time in here. 

I can’t tell the personal stories about Tip because I wasn’t involved 

in the same way that the members of the Democratic Party were, but I 

do have some reflections I’d like to share. I had great respect for and friendVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 8164 Sfmt 8164 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.001 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
The O’Neill Speakership 25 

ship with the men who followed Tip as Speakers—men like Jim Wright 

and Tom Foley—but when I came to the House they were just ‘‘Mr. Chairman’’ and every Democrat was Mr. Chairman of something. But Tip was 

‘‘Mr. Speaker’’ and he remained that. It was not only his presence and the 

fact that he was the Speaker when I came to the House and the man who 

swore me in, but he looked, he sounded, he acted the way you would expect 

a leader of the Nation to look and sound and act. He was that imposing 

and that impressive. 

When I teach my classes at the Kennedy School, one of the things 

I emphasize in the very first class period is the word ‘‘passion.’’ That politics 

is about passion. Passion is what drives you to get up and do the things 

you have to do to get elected and to go through the very tiresome job of 

actually being a day-to-day legislator. You really have to be driven by your 

beliefs. All politics is passion just like all politics is local. And Tip was 

a very passionate person as those who knew him realized. But he was a 

different kind of politician when he first came to the Congress. He was, 

in fact, the quintessence of a local pol. 

He was passionate about issues, but he was passionate about issues that 

mattered to the people in Cambridge and South Boston and the areas that 

he knew. He was not a Massachusetts politician. He was strictly a Boston 

politician, which is a lot different from Brookline or Wellesley or Newton. 

It was inner city. It was neighbors. It was knowing the people in the barbershop and the deli and the dry cleaners, and it was a very personalized, localized, kind of bring-home-the-bacon politics. So he was connected to the local 

highways and the local hospitals. What he did when he came to Congress 

was to be the voice, the spokesman, for the people of his area. Now I didn’t 

realize until I started teaching at Harvard that political scientists like to 

refer to what they call a choice between being a ‘‘delegate’’ or a ‘‘trustee.’’ 

I had never heard those terms before. But in the sense of being a ‘‘delegate,’’ 

somebody who really represented the home people, that’s what Tip O’Neill’s 

politics was about. 

I am reminded of a story about one of my colleagues from Oklahoma, 

Mike Synar, a really fine young man who died all too soon. Mike was once 

interviewed by the New York Times and there was a little flap that occurred 

as to whether Mike was an Oklahoma Congressman or a U.S. Congressman 

from Oklahoma. He, of course, argued that he was a U.S. Congressman from 

Oklahoma, which made people in Oklahoma very unhappy because they 

wanted him to be an Oklahoma Congressman. Well, when he got here Tip 

was a Boston Congressman. He was not a national Congressman in that 

sense. He was very much a local kind of person. 

And then something happened. I’ve got a photograph that I hope is 

going to be passed out to the tables, something I found as I was going 

26 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

through my files. Something happened to Tip that changed his life, that 

changed his speakership, and to a large extent changed the country. 

When Ronald Reagan was elected President, all of a sudden Tip became 

not just the master of the institution which, as Danny said, he ran very 

well by allowing various committee chairs to be powerful in their own right. 

Suddenly, Tip O’Neill became the champion of progressive politics. He became the national voice—the passion of the progressive politics that had 

begun with FDR and had continued since and that Ronald Reagan threatened. 

What Reagan brought was not only a new vision, but if you were on 

the other side of the aisle, an attempt to really undo a lot of what had 

been done over the previous decade. So Tip O’Neill had thrust upon him 

something he had really not prepared for. He had thrust upon him the job 

of being the last bulwark of liberalism—becoming the champion of the 

forces opposing the Reagan and Bush foreign policy proposals, preserving 

domestic social programs. 

All of a sudden it was Tip not just being in the Speaker’s office, but 

taking the floor, taking the microphone, and becoming the voice to challenge Ronald Reagan. 

Tip became the Democratic Party, and what happened as a result of 

this was that we had these geniuses over at the National Republican Congressional Committee who decided that the way for Republicans to take 

control was to run against Tip, to demonize Tip O’Neill. That’s where those 

television spots came from that showed this actor playing Tip and characterizing him, and, through him, the Democratic Congress as big, fat, and out 

of control. It turned out that the voters really thought he looked a lot more 

like Santa Claus. The public did not share the antipathy toward Tip O’Neill 

that the Republican Congressional Committee had anticipated, and the ad 

campaign didn’t work. 

There was also something else about Tip. I remember Tip, of course, 

as an adversary, as the advocate of what we were trying to change. But 

Tip’s word was good. On the one hand, there was the public Republican 

attempt to gain control, and so, those television spots attacking Tip O’Neill. 

But in Republican leadership meetings, we all knew that Tip’s word was 

good. He was tough. He was a hard fighter, but he was fair. 

Let me tell a little story. Actually Jim, the story is about you, but 

also there is a lesson here about Tip O’Neill. I got an e-mail recently from 

a political science professor on the West Coast. He said he was watching 

a video of a debate on the House floor and since I was very involved in 

that debate, he wanted my input about what had happened. Jim Wright, 

who was then the Speaker, announced at the end of the vote—Republicans, 

of course, were winning the vote—that he was going to keep the vote open 

so people who had not yet voted could cast their votes or people who wanted 

The O’Neill Speakership 27 

to change their votes could change their votes. As it happened, of course, 

Jim Wright and his team being very good at this, before time had run 

out, the Democrats were in the lead on the vote. Then the gavel came down 

and the Democrats had won. 

The political scientist wrote to me and said, ‘‘I don’t understand what 

happened. The Speaker announced that he was going to keep the vote open 

for anybody who wanted to change their votes, so why didn’t you Republicans do the same thing and say you wanted to continue this a little longer 

while you tried to change people’s minds.’’ 

So I wrote him back and said, ‘‘I don’t think you understood. Jim 

Wright was the Speaker. He had the gavel. He could determine when the 

vote was over.’’ The political scientist wrote back to me again and said, 

‘‘Oh, I understand now. You didn’t trust Jim Wright.’’ And I wrote back 

and said, ‘‘No, you don’t understand. We trusted Jim Wright. He is a very 

honest, decent man, who believed passionately that what he was doing was 

good for the country and that what we were doing was bad for the country. 

And he would do everything that he could within the rules, within the 

proper procedures of the House, to prevail on a cause he thought was important.’’ 

That, I think, is not only what Jim did, but it’s also what Tip did. 

What you always knew was that Tip O’Neill could be a tough adversary. 

When we wanted to give Special Orders and make the whole world think 

we were speaking to the entire Congress, he would order the TV cameras 

to pan the Congress and show that we were giving these great orations to 

nobody in particular except a couple of our Members and our staff. So Tip 

was a very tough fighter, but he was always fair. He was always decent. 

He was dignified and people on the Republican side liked him a lot—we 

opposed him, but liked him a lot. 

When he died, people said, ‘‘Well, he was one of a kind. There will 

never be another like Tip O’Neill.’’ And I wrote a newspaper column in 

which I said, I hoped that was not true. It would be a terrible loss to America if there was never another like Tip O’Neill. 

Mr. HYMEL. Thank you, Congressman. Before we take questions I’d 

like to summarize by saying again that Tip ruled by anecdote and humor, 

but there are four things he should be remembered for and only one has 

been mentioned. First, Tip brought television to the House. A lot of discussion had gone on before, and there was a lot of running up and down hills 

by Members and staff. When he became Speaker he said, ‘‘Turn on the TV 

cameras.’’ It was that simple and, of course, we wouldn’t have C–SPAN 

today if it wasn’t for that decision which he made by himself. 

Tip also destroyed the seniority system. One time in the Democratic 

Caucus at the beginning of a Congress, we were doing reforms and Tip 

offered an amendment that you could get a vote on a committee chairman 

28 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

if one-fifth of the caucus wanted it. Before that, it was automatic that the 

most senior person on the committee became the chairman—no exceptions. 

Well, Tip’s motion passed because you could always get one-fifth of the 

Members. Two years later, three chairmen were thrown out. Now, the committee leadership always had to run in the whole caucus. Seniority didn’t 

mean as much anymore. So Tip was responsible for destroying the seniority 

system. 

A third thing he did was eliminate the unrecorded teller vote. Some 

of the oldtimers might remember that. Just like in the British Parliament 

today, there was a procedure where Members walked through lines and were 

counted and then the majority decided whether an amendment wins or loses. 

Well, Tip and Charlie Gubser, a Republican from California, had an amendment that abolished that procedure. 

The other thing was a code of ethics. Tip established a commission 

to write a code of ethics and Representative Dave Obey told me when Members came to Tip and said, ‘‘Tip, we have two versions—kind of a soft one 

and a tough one. What do we go with?’’ Tip said, ‘‘The tough one.’’ Tip 

was linking that with a pay raise. By the way, the ethics code did go through 

and it still exists today. So with that, I’d like to ask the first question, 

if you don’t mind, of Congressman Rostenkowski. Please embroider a little 

bit on why would a Member of Congress, who has a constituency and his 

own mind made up, and Tip would come over and put that big arm around 

him and say, ‘‘Can’t you help us like a good fella?’’ And that’s all he would 

say. Why would you then vote with Tip O’Neill? 

Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI. Well, we have to set the stage for that. We 

did have a cushion. We had a lot more Democrats for a period of time, 

certainly with Lyndon Johnson. 

President Johnson could really work the room when it came to a whip 

count. I think Tip credited Tom Foley and Danny Rostenkowski as probably 

his best whip counters. Once you found out that a certain Member had 

a problem with a particular vote, then you tried to figure out why. Was 

it because he wanted something for his district, say a bridge? Was it because 

he was mistreated by a chairman? Tip would do the groundwork and then 

walk over the rail on the House floor and whisper in that particular Member’s ear, ‘‘We’re going to solve your problem. Now come on, you’ve got 

to help us here. I mean, this is a Democratic vote. It would be embarrassing 

for us not to pass it.’’ And, with this big arm around you, you’d cave. He 

had a natural, warm ability. 

There are so many stories I could tell you about Tip as a person. Tip 

O’Neill would enter a room with his ‘‘God love you, darlin’,’’ all of a sudden, 

he’d take over the party. He was an empowering figure with tremendous 

warmth. Every Democratic congressional campaign dinner, it was Tip 

O’Neill’s party, and you’d never leave that dinner without the room joining 

The O’Neill Speakership 29 

him in singing the tune, ‘‘Apple Blossom Time’’ to his lovely wife Millie. 

It was just a warm personality. 

Mr. HYMEL. Thank you. Do we have any questions from the audience? 

Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI. If I may I’d like to say one thing in response 

to what my colleague has just pointed out. Over the years, Tip O’Neill 

formed lasting friendships. One way he did this was that he honestly believed that Members of Congress should visit overseas and that we should 

have a legislative exchange with other countries. The most outstanding congressional delegation trip that Tip O’Neill organized and took was the one 

to Russia. 

We were the first to be exposed to Gorbachev. Silvio Conte, myself, 

Bob Michel, and Tip O’Neill sat with Mikhail Gorbachev. At that meeting 

Mikhail Gorbachev suggested that we do this more often. You ought to 

come here and visit us; we ought to come and visit you. We reported this 

to President Reagan upon our return, and we told him we felt if there was 

anybody in the leadership of the Soviet Union who was looking for democracy, it might well be Mikhail Gorbachev. It was after that congressional 

trip, which Tip O’Neill chaired, that we started to see a so-called melting 

of the Iron Curtain. You can describe congressional delegation visits however 

you want, but they are a very important instrument in our democracy and 

friendship with other nations. Thank you. 

Mr. HYMEL. Anyone? Yes? 

Question. Is there anyone in the House today like Speaker O’Neill? 

Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI. The changing of the House of Representatives has come so swiftly since I left it. I’m really not as close to the membership as I’d like to be. I just don’t know of anyone who has the chemistry 

that Tip O’Neill had. Tip O’Neill, even as a liberal, had the unique capacity 

to get votes from the southern Members of the Congress. That’s why he 

was able to work so well with people with very different backgrounds, like 

Jim Wright. 

With respect to electing Jim Wright the majority leader, Tip O’Neill 

stayed as far away from that election as he possibly could because we had 

Majority Whip John McFall, we had Representative Dick Bolling, we had 

Representative Phil Burton in the race. Our plan was to get all the McFall 

votes for Jim Wright on the second count. Tip would stay away from that 

and, I think to his credit, when Jim Wright was elected the majority leader, 

he was relieved that he had as stable an individual as Jim Wright for the 

position. I don’t know of anyone like Tip today, and I don’t know that 

the times are the same now as they were then. There’s a lot of hate in 

the air in the House of Representatives and that’s a sad thing. 

Mr. HYMEL. Congressman Edwards. 

Mr. EDWARDS. I was going to make the same point that Danny 

did at the very end. I don’t know the Democratic Members as well as I 

30 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

should and I’m not sure that the times have changed for the better, but 

I think it would be very hard for somebody with Tip’s approach to bringing 

people together and to lining up votes to succeed today. The balance between 

the two parties is very close. Since 1980, there has been more and more 

of a sharp divide between what the Democrats want to achieve and what 

the Republicans want to achieve, so I’m not sure that’s exactly what’s called 

for at this time. 

But if I can tell a little story here. I went by to see David Obey, 

who was chairman of the subcommittee of which I was the ranking member—the Foreign Operations Subcommittee on Appropriations. I’ve always 

liked Dave, and we were sitting and talking and he said to me, ‘‘Mickey, 

it’s not the same anymore. They don’t talk to us. They don’t let us in. 

They don’t let us in on the decisions. It’s all very partisan.’’ And I said, 

‘‘No, Dave it’s not different. You just weren’t in the minority then.’’ 

Mr. HYMEL. Jack, you want to respond? 

Mr. FARRELL. I asked that question of Mike McCurry, who was then 

the press secretary for President Clinton. Mike’s theory at that time was 

it would not happen again until conditions were such that ‘‘all politics is 

local’’ was again important. You need politicians coming to Washington 

whose basic connection with the voters was on the level of providing a winter 

coat, or that had a gut feeling for what people were thinking. And Mike 

said the Democratic Party is never going to be that Democratic Party again 

until the day that we actually get together and meet at bars, or we go 

out and we do car washes to raise money, like the Kiwanis Club, or you 

bring it down once again to the party of $50 contributions. 

So I would never say that Howard Dean has any kind of personality 

like Tip O’Neill’s. I don’t know what it is that Howard Dean has tapped 

out there in the country with his Internet fundraising, with the ‘‘Move On’’ 

phenomenon, but it’s interesting to me that what Mike forecast has evolved 

from out of nowhere. Progressives on that side of the Democratic Party are 

getting together and actually finding that it reinforces their values, and they 

feel that they have a voice by doing this kind of small-dollar fundraising 

that is coming back. 

And for Democrats, it may be interesting to know that any Republican 

fundraiser will tell you that they’ve had just huge success with small donors 

and with making average people feel part of the cause. Whether or not that 

would ever produce somebody of the kind of charismatic personality of Tip 

would just be a roll of the dice. 

Mr. HYMEL. Thank you Jack. One more thing from Congressman 

Rostenkowski. That will wrap it up. 

Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI. I don’t mean to say to you that I believe 

Tip O’Neill was totally unique. It was the time and I think also that Tip 

was blessed with the fact that he had a Bob Michel as minority leader. 

The O’Neill Speakership 31 

Because, from the day that we opened the session, we were legislators and 

it was not a sin to compromise. If you compromised and you weren’t satisfied 

with all you got in the bill, you were coming back next year. You were 

going to get a little more next year. 

Those of us who had programs, and Tip O’Neill had programs, were 

patient. We knew eventually that the social change would come. I believe 

that had Bill Clinton and Hillary Clinton listened the first year that they 

initiated comprehensive health reform and done it incrementally, we would 

today have had all we need as opposed to the dissent that’s taking place 

today in both the energy and the health bills. 

Mr. HYMEL. Thank you very much for your attention. 

Hon. James C. Wright, Jr., Speaker "*)(–"*)* 


92800.006
33 

The Wright Speakership 

Mr. OLESZEK. To start the Speaker Wright years, let me introduce 

the moderator for this segment, and that is Janet Hook. She is the chief 

congressional correspondent for the Los Angeles Times. Previously, she covered 

Capitol Hill for many, many years with Congressional Quarterly. Ms. Hook 

won the Everett McKinley Dirksen Award for superlative congressional coverage. She is also a graduate of Harvard University and the London School 

of Economics. It gives me a great deal of pleasure to turn the podium over 

to Janet Hook. 

Ms. HOOK. Thank you, Walter. Walter’s right. I have been covering 

Congress for a long time. In fact at the very beginning of my career working 

for Congressional Quarterly, I covered Congress when Jim Wright was Speaker. 

It was in covering Speaker Wright’s House that I developed my now longterm affection for covering Congress. I’ve found it to be a stimulating and 

tumultuous place to cover. And I first learned those lessons covering Speaker 

Wright. 

Jim Wright’s career in the House spanned more than a quarter-century 

of great change in Congress, the country, and the speakership. When Jim 

Wright first came to Congress, Eisenhower was President, Sam Rayburn was 

Speaker of the House, and, at that point, the baby boom was just a bunch 

of babies. When Wright left Congress in 1989, George Herbert Walker Bush 

was President, baby boomers were running around the House, and the challenge of running the House as Speaker was far greater, or maybe it was 

just different, than it was for Sam Rayburn. 

Jim Wright began his career in the Texas State legislature and as mayor 

of Weatherford, Texas. He was elected to the House in 1954 and quickly 

found his legislative home on the Public Works Committee. He unexpectedly leapt into the House Democratic leadership in 1976 when he was elected 

majority leader in a hotly contested race, which in the end was decided 

by a one-vote margin. That put him in position to rise without opposition 

to become House Speaker in 1987 after Tip O’Neill retired. 

Jim Wright’s role as Speaker was far broader than just being head of 

the House. He was, like Tip, the leader of a Democratic opposition to a 

Republican President. And he left his stamp on more than just House procedures. He left his stamp on policy, particularly on U.S. foreign policy in 

Central America where he played a key role in fostering the peace process 

34 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

that eventually settled a decade-long conflict in the region. He left the 

speakership and the House in 1989 in the middle of a politically charged 

ethics investigation of the sort that was becoming quite common around 

that time. And it was a trend in American politics that Speaker Wright 

denounced as ‘‘mindless cannibalism’’ in his last memorable speech to the 

House. Speaker Wright returned to Texas where he has pursued an active 

life in business, education, and writing. He’s mined his Washington experience in teaching a popular course at Texas Christian University called ‘‘Congress and the President.’’ He’s been writing newspaper columns, reviewing 

books and lecturing, and we’re glad he could come here to talk to us about 

his years as Speaker. 

After we hear from Speaker Wright, we will hear a Democratic perspective on Wright’s speakership from David Bonior, who served in the House 

for 26 years and rose himself to the upper ranks of his party’s leadership. 

He was first elected in 1976 and represented a blue-collar district in southeastern Michigan for all those years. And one of his first big steps into 

leadership came during Jim Wright’s era when Mr. Bonior was named chief 

deputy whip. In 1991 he was elected majority whip by the House Democratic 

Caucus. He retired from the House in 2002 to run for Governor of Michigan. 

Since then he’s served on the boards of several public service organizations 

and he teaches labor studies now at Wayne State University. 

After we hear from Mr. Bonior, we will hear from the Republican side 

of the aisle, from former Texas Congressman Tom Loeffler, who was in his 

day David Bonior’s counterpart in the House Republican leadership. He was 

chief deputy whip when Bob Michel was the GOP leader, and he helped 

to round up the votes in 1981 for Ronald Reagan’s tax and spending policies. 

After leaving the House in 1986, he worked in the Reagan White House 

and with Speaker Wright on resolving the conflict in Central America. He’s 

gone on to found his own law and lobbying firm, and he’s continued to 

be active in Presidential and party politics. Let’s start with Speaker Wright. 

Speaker WRIGHT. Thank you for that gracious introduction. I can’t 

begin without commenting about the thoroughly sentimental attachment 

I have to this occasion, this day, here in this gracious room. It was exactly 

31 years ago today—on November 12, 1972—that I had the wonderful honor 

to be married to Betty. And it was right here in this room, by the grace 

of Speaker Carl Albert, that we had our wedding reception. 

This has been a marvelous, even celebratory, occasion for me. I hope 

that our collective recollections will be beneficial to all of us here, and to 

those who view them on C–SPAN or read of them in the published transcript. Looking back in retrospect and rejoicing in remembered incidents 

that some of us shared together reminds me that to be chosen by one’s 

colleagues to serve as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives is probVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 8164 Sfmt 8164 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.002 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
The Wright Speakership 35 

ably the greatest honor and among the highest responsibilities that anyone 

could bestow, and I shall always be grateful for that enormous privilege. 

The speakership provides fully as much challenge as any Speaker is prepared 

to accept. Over the years, the office has been what changing times and individual occupants have made of it. 

Sam Rayburn was Speaker when I entered the House in 1955. He impressed me enormously. It was from his example, no doubt, that I formed 

my basic concept of a Speaker’s role. Rayburn was an effective leader. He 

saw national needs and made things happen. Under his guidance, the legislative branch was more creative than passive. During the Eisenhower Presidency, it initiated most of the domestic agenda. 

Mr. Rayburn was a stickler for polite and civil debate. He taught that 

a lawmaker’s greatest asset was the ability to disagree without being disagreeable. He insisted that Members treat one another with courtesy and 

respect. ‘‘The Speaker,’’ said Rayburn, ‘‘always takes the word of a Member.’’ 

In his mind, we all were gentlemen—and ladies were ladies. 

One illustration of the way Rayburn led is vivid in my mind. It was 

1957, my second term in Congress. The Senate, for the first time since Reconstruction days, voted cloture on a civil rights bill and passed it. Throughout 

the Old South, including Texas, there erupted a cascade of editorial and 

vocal outrage. Several hundred letters of bitter denunciation flooded my office. 

As the bill came to the House, Speaker Rayburn sent a page to ask 

me to come to the podium and talk with him. He didn’t cajole and didn’t 

threaten. I remember exactly what he said: ‘‘Jim, I think you want to vote 

for this bill. I’m sure you’re getting hundreds of letters threatening you 

with all manner of retribution if you do. But I believe you’re strong enough 

to overcome that, and I know you’ll be proud in future years that you did!’’ 

As things turned out, he was right on all four counts. 

That’s the way he led. He appealed to the best in us. Never to fear 

or hate, or negative motivations. That’s why I loved him. And that’s why 

I wanted to emulate him. 

From this, and from my personal friendships with Speakers John 

McCormack, Carl Albert and Tip O’Neill, I had developed over a period 

of 32 years an exalted view of the Speaker’s role, maybe even an impossibly 

demanding conception of what a Speaker should be able to achieve for the 

country. 

Four Policy Changes 

Challenges beset every Speaker. Perhaps my most difficult balancing 

act lay in trying to advance a progressive domestic agenda that I thought 

36 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

important, over the active opposition of a popular and determined President, 

while trying to bridge the gap between that President and his severest critics 

in matters of foreign affairs. 

As I prepared to assume the Speaker’s office in January 1987, our government faced three problems of critical proportions: a historic budget deficit, a threatening trade deficit, and a growing social deficit. I firmly believed 

that all three deserved active attention. 

Before I could implement a plan to address these problems, a fourth 

challenge arose. We were suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with a 

shocking constitutional crisis whirling around the Iran-Contra revelations. 

That news exploded on the public consciousness just 6 weeks prior to my 

election as Speaker. 

These four realities of the historic moment would shape the thrust and 

direction of my 2 years of tenure. Although clearly related, each of these 

problems represented a separate challenge and required a separate strategy. 

What we were able to do was far from a one-man effort. I discussed 

these problems daily with Majority Leader Tom Foley, wise and more cautious than I; Majority Whip Tony Coelho, brilliant and creative; and my 

newly appointed deputy whip, David Bonior, a man of forthright convictions 

and trusted implicitly by our Members. 

Budget Deficit 

The budget deficit, unattended, could doom any serious effort to come 

to grips with the other two deficits. In the past 6 years, we had doubled 

military expenditures (from $148 billion in 1980 to approximately $300 billion in 1986) while cutting taxes by approximately $165 billion a year. 

As a result, we had almost tripled the national debt. In 6 years it had 

skyrocketed from slightly under $1 trillion to almost $3 trillion as I took 

the Speaker’s chair. The annual interest payments on the debt had skyrocketed from about $50 billion in 1980 to some $150 billion, draining away 

that much more money from our Government’s commitments. 

President Reagan, with all his winsome wit, inspiring charm and 

unshakable faith in what he called ‘‘supply side’’ economics, actually seemed 

to believe that we could double military spending, drastically reduce taxes 

for the top brackets, and still balance the budget simply by cutting ‘‘waste, 

fraud and abuse’’ in domestic programs. 

Unfortunately, by 1987, the total elimination of all discretionary domestic expenditures would not have balanced the budget. The President, however, refused to agree to altering course. Obviously, if a change were to 

come, Congress would have to take the initiative. 


1

/2
The Wright Speakership 37 

It seemed clear to me that the costly drift could not be arrested except 

by a combination of three things: more revenues (translate taxes), and cuts 

in both military and domestic expenditures. No one of these three could 

attain the result alone. Most Members of Congress recognized this truth, 

but convincing them that the public understood and would applaud heroic 

action on the budgetary front was a major challenge. 

What is a Speaker to do? He sees the Treasury hemorrhaging but is 

aware of his colleagues’ nervousness about applying the only tourniquet that 

will stop the bleeding. 

I knew how hard it would be to patch together any budget resolution 

that would pass the House, let alone one with real teeth in it. And the 

country sorely needed serious increases in several vital domestic programs. 

Bill Gray of Pennsylvania was chairman of the Budget Committee and 

a gifted ally. Articulate, knowledgeable and patient, he led the committee 

with skill and understanding as its members worked and groped their way 

toward a realistic plan. Several times, at his invitation, I came and sat with 

them as they talked their way to a logical conclusion. 

The resolution that emerged in mid-spring called for $36 billion in 

actual deficit reduction, half of this in new taxes and half in spending cuts. 

The $18 billion in reduced expenditures was divided evenly between defense 

spending and domestic programs. This budget package passed the House 

by a comfortable margin. 

Congress still was a long way from achieving the goal, but we had 

made a beginning. Ultimately, I would learn just how hard it was to pass 

any tax bill with the White House adamantly opposed. 

Trade Deficit 

The trade deficit, as 1987 began, was only starting to command serious 

public attention. It had already stretched its fingers deeply into American 

pockets. Six years earlier, at the end of the seventies, we were the world’s 

biggest creditor nation. By the time I assumed the speakership, our country 

had become the world’s largest debtor. During 1986, Americans spent $175 

billion more for goods from other countries than we sold abroad in American-made products. 

A growing number of forward-looking American business, labor and 

academic leaders, alarmed by the trends they saw, had begun to ask for 

a concerted national effort to stem the tide. Our role had reversed from 

seller to buyer and from lender to borrower. We were borrowing from other 

countries not only to finance our purchases from them but to finance our 

national debt. More and more of our Government bonds, and more and more 

private domestic assets were held by foreigners—land, banks, factories, hoVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 8164 Sfmt 8164 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.002 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
38 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

tels, newspapers. We were like a family which used to own the community 

bank but discovered suddenly that it no longer did and owed more to the 

bank than any other family in town. 

The Democratic Leadership Council held its annual conference in Williamsburg, Virginia, on December 12, 1986. There I addressed the trade 

issue—the need to improve America’s competitive position by enhancing 

productivity, reviving the level of industrial research, modernizing factories, 

updating job skills, and tightening reciprocity requirements in our trade 

agreements with other countries, to include fair wages for workers who produced goods in bilateral trade. 

Afterward, I had a long conversation with Lloyd Hand, former White 

House Chief of Protocol. He and I went to see John Young who, along 

with other business leaders, had in the past year at President Reagan’s request conducted an intensive study of the trade problem. The business group 

issued a report, which they felt had been generally ignored. 

At their encouragement, I began to explore the possibility of a national 

conference on competitiveness to be attended by distinguished specialists 

in the fields of business, labor and academia. 

Eager that our efforts should be bipartisan, I talked personally with 

House Republican Leader Bob Michel and Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole, 

as well as with Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd. All agreed we needed 

such a meeting, and we made up a broad list of invitees. We sent out invitations to this blue ribbon list jointly in our four names. 

This conference was scheduled for January 21, 1987, here in the Cannon 

Caucus Room. I talked with Treasury Secretary Jim Baker and U.S. Trade 

Representative Clayton Yuetter, inviting their attendance. 

A week later the invitations went out to the selected cross section of 

experts, and I discovered how difficult it would be to perfect a truly bipartisan approach to the trade issue. Both Republican leaders, Bob Michel and 

Bob Dole, called to tell me they were under heavy pressure from Reagan 

administration officials to withdraw from formal sponsorship of the event. 

The White House may have felt that we needed no change in our trade 

policies, or possibly it resented congressional efforts to take an initiative. 

I was disappointed but not discouraged. It just meant we would have to 

work that much harder to achieve bipartisan accord. 

The conference took place as scheduled, attended by many Republican 

and Democratic Members of each House. The panel of distinguished authorities included corporate executives, union leaders, university presidents, and 

academic specialists. 

So broad was the range of their constructive suggestions—from improved job training for America’s work force to a renewal of business incentives for modernizing America’s aging industrial plants, from antitrust enforcement to renegotiation of copyright and intellectual property rights 

The Wright Speakership 39 

agreements—that I knew it would require the active cooperation of at least 

12 House committees. 

On the next day, I hosted a luncheon for House committee chairmen 

in the Speaker’s private dining room. In the first 2 weeks of the session, 

the House, at my urging, had already passed a clean water bill and a highway 

bill by votes easily big enough to override vetoes. We had begun committee 

hearings on the first major bill to provide help for the homeless. A spirit 

of ebullience prevailed. We discussed the agenda for the year, the bills which 

would comprise our effort to surmount the three deficits. One famous first: 

committee chairmen all accepted specific deadlines for having their bills 

ready for floor action. 

On the trade bill I promised to respect each committee’s turf by assigning separate titles of a composite work to the committees that had jurisdiction over the varied segments. Chairmen Dan Rostenkowski of Ways and 

Means, John Dingell of Commerce, Jack Brooks of Judiciary, and Kika de 

la Garza of Agriculture each promised to give top priority to their segments 

of this important centerpiece of our common agenda. 

Five days later, following President Reagan’s State of the Union Message, Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd and I divided the 30 minutes allotted by the television networks for the Democratic response. Senator Byrd 

addressed foreign and military affairs and I the domestic policy agenda. 

From the cascade of mail and spontaneous telephoned response, I knew 

within days that we had struck a vital nerve with the public and could 

count on a lot of popular support if we stuck with our promises. 

Eager for a bipartisan approach, I invited leading Democrats and Republicans from 12 House committees to sit together around the tables in 

the Speaker’s dining room and discuss ways to improve our Nation’s trade 

balance. We agreed to incorporate the best ideas from our several sources 

into an omnibus bill and to schedule it for action in the House on April 

28. 

This omnibus bill, H.R. 3, passed the House with Democratic and Republican support by the preponderant vote of 290 to 137. H.R. 3 represented 

the most important trade legislation since the thirties. The Senate held the 

bill under consideration for more than a year, altering and fine tuning several 

of its provisions, before finally passing it largely intact in the summer of 

1988. 

One provision, requiring advance notification to the workers before 

summarily shutting down an American plant, drew the ire of President 

Reagan. He vetoed the big bill, protesting that such a requirement had no 

place in trade legislation. 

We probably could have overridden his veto. To avoid conflict, we simply removed that provision, made it into a separate bill, and then reenacted 

both bills simultaneously without changing so much as a comma. President 

40 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

Reagan signed the two bills. What mattered to us was the result, not winning a partisan fight with the President by overriding his veto. 

Social Deficit 

The social deficit—a growing backlog of human problems and unmet 

social needs here in our country—presented a different challenge entirely. 

As hard as I tried to promote consensus on issues of international trade, 

I knew it would be futile to try to conciliate the position of the congressional 

majority on social policy with that of the Reagan administration. Too wide 

a gulf separated us. 

Since the Reagan budget amendments and tax cuts of 1981, a lot of 

Americans at the bottom of the economic spectrum had fallen through the 

safety net. For the first time since the thirties, an army of homeless people 

had begun to appear on America’s streets. 

The level of funding had been cut for education and civilian research. 

Several years of underinvestment had begun to rip holes in our social fabric. 

There’d been a slow deterioration of America’s public infrastructure—the 

roads, bridges, airports, dams, navigable waterways, underground pipes— 

all that lifeline network of public facilities on which Americans depend. 

The cities of America, and their problems, were being ignored. 

Since 1980 our annual investment in America—public services such as 

education, transportation, law enforcement, environmental protection, housing and public health—those things that tend to make life better for the 

average citizen—had declined by about one-fourth. 

Something else, new and alien to the American experience, was beginning to appear—the disturbing phenomenon of downward mobility. For the 

first time since polling entered the American scene, a majority of Americans 

were saying they did not expect their children to enjoy as good a standard 

of living as they, themselves, had enjoyed. 

As Kevin Phillips would point out in his book, The Politics of Rich 

and Poor, the gap between rich and poor was widening, thanks in considerable part to the conscious economic policies of the past 6 years—less for 

student loans to improvident youngsters, more breaks for upper-income taxpayers. 

Our spending priorities during the eighties, I was convinced, had been 

badly skewed. A big majority of the Democrats in Congress were eager to 

begin a reversal of the 6-year trend, to restore some of the necessary social 

underpinnings. There was evidence that the public supported this objective. 

Polls showed that 62 percent of the people rated the economy ‘‘not so good’’ 

or ‘‘poor’’ and 72 percent believed Congress must do more for the homeless, 

for affordable housing and educational opportunities. 

The Wright Speakership 41 

As Speaker, I felt a strong obligation to set in motion a reversal of 

the trends that were moving so rapidly toward the concentration of America’s wealth into fewer hands. This meant confronting the administration 

directly on a wide range of domestic priorities. Tom Foley, Tony Coelho, 

David Bonior, and I agreed that we would have to begin with a few identifiable and achievable objectives. 

Getting the Congress and the public to focus on these specific objectives was the challenge. In my State of the Union response in January 1987, 

I named six action priorities. We had reserved low bill numbers to identify 

these agenda items. One year later, at the beginning of 1988, I was able 

to give a televised progress report. The clean water bill, the highway bill 

and the trade reform bill were H.R. 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Each was passed 

on schedule and each prevailed over a Presidential veto. 

Additionally, we passed the first bill to provide help for volunteer 

groups offering shelters and meals for the homeless, and the first important 

expansion of Medicare for catastrophic illnesses, a bill which later would 

be repealed in a fight over funding. We increased amounts for college student aid. We authorized a massive effort to combat drugs, and this omnibus 

bill, like the trade bill, was crafted and passed with bipartisan sponsorship 

and support. 

In 1988, for the first time in more than 40 years, Congress passed all 

thirteen major appropriation bills and delivered them to the President for 

signing into law before the start of the new fiscal year. 

The public responded enthusiastically to this activist schedule. Polls 

showed the American people were giving Congress higher job ratings than 

they had done in many years. 

Of the first three, overriding challenges, the 100th Congress made good 

on two of them—the trade deficit and the social deficit. On those, Congress 

may have earned an A¥. 

We did less well on the budget. While the House passed a budget 

resolution cutting the fiscal deficit by an appreciable amount and also pushed 

through by a hard-fought one-vote margin a reconciliation bill to carry out 

that objective, that level of deficit reduction, particularly as it involved taxes, 

could not be sustained in the Senate. 

Our House budget resolution had called for a net deficit reduction of 

$38 billion. We had divided this figure equally among military expenditures, 

domestic expenditures, and selective reductions in the Reagan tax breaks 

of 1981 for some of America’s most affluent citizens. The House reconciliation 

bill remained true to this pattern, and confronted me with the most legislatively confounding day of my speakership. That day was mentioned in the 

prior discussion segment. Looking back, I am not sure I made the right 

or wisest personal judgments that day. 

42 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

That was the first and only time in my speakership when our system 

of vote counters failed us. Their composite report had showed we could pass 

the rule for the reconciliation bill. To my great surprise, we lost the vote 

on the rule. The unexpected controversy involved inclusion in the bill of 

some reforms in the welfare system that many Members thought should be 

handled as a separate bill. They prevailed, and the rule went down. 

Ordinarily, this would have meant we would have to wait for the next 

legislative day to consider an amended rule. Meanwhile, the news media 

would have had 24 hours in which to trumpet the news that the House, 

confronted with the tough decisions on taxes and the budget, had been unable to face up to the hard choices. 

Eager to forestall that, I adjourned the House and reconvened it a few 

minutes later. Technically, we now were in a second legislative day and could 

take up an amended rule and the bill, dropping the one disputed provision 

to be handled separately, on its own. 

That was legal, but it was a rarely used tactic. A good number of my 

Republican colleagues thought my decision heavyhanded. Maybe it was. To 

make matters worse, later that afternoon, on the final passage of the reconciliation bill, there was a jone vote—205 to 206—defeat of a deficit reduction bill.k Told that Democrats Marty Russo of Illinois and George Miller 

of California, who were recorded ‘‘no,’’ had changed their minds and were 

returning from the House Office Building to change their votes, I held the 

vote open for about 10 minutes to accommodate them. And their changed 

votes, of course, would have resolved the vote in the affirmative. They didn’t 

return. 

Just as I was about to rap the gavel and declare that the bill had failed 

of passage, Democrat Jim Chapman of Texas did return. He went to the 

well of the House and changed his vote from ‘‘no’’ to ‘‘aye.’’ That flipped 

the margin. That vital reconciliation bill passed by that one vote! 

But the way I had handled it provoked a storm of protest among the 

minority. Trent Lott, for one, hit the back of a seat so hard with his open 

hand that I supposed he’d broken it. Others, too, were quite angry. 

The bottom line is that what I’d done that day did not contribute 

to harmonious relations. Although the maneuvers were legal and in keeping 

with the rules, my mind was too determined, my attitude too insistent. 

I believe that I offended a number of my Republican colleagues. I won the 

vote but sacrificed a more precious commodity—good will. In the end, it 

wasn’t worth it. If that day were to do over again, I like to think I’d do 

it differently. 

Our ultimate performance on the budget was impressive only in the 

sense that it kept things from getting much worse. Maybe we deserve only 

a C+ on the budget. Maybe a B+ overall. 

The Wright Speakership 43 

As Speaker, I spent a large piece of my political capital in the effort 

to make the tax burden fall more fairly, only to discover that I had overmatched myself! 

Any tax bill, I learned to my dismay, was virtually unattainable absent 

the President’s agreement. It takes two-thirds to override vetoes. We simply 

could not get public opinion focused clearly on the issue of tax fairness and 

the unambiguous fact that, without more taxes from somebody, the budget 

can never be balanced. Having failed to draw that issue sharply enough, 

I believe my leadership was just not quite equal to that particular challenge. 

Iran-Contra 

One major challenge remained—to head off the constitutional crisis 

brewing over the newly revealed Iran-Contra scandal, and to settle the bitterly divisive issue of our covert involvement in Central American wars. 

On three occasions, Congress had voted to discontinue all military assistance to the Contras attempting to overthrow Nicaragua’s Government. 

In the previous year, we had voted to ban the selling of any weapons to 

Iran. 

Now we learned that a secret group, operating out of the White House, 

had contrived, contrary to these laws, to sell U.S. weapons to Iran. Perpetrators had turned over the proceeds, without notifying anyone in Congress, 

to the military forces trying to overthrow Nicaragua’s Government. President 

Reagan vowed that he had not known personally of this, and I wanted ardently to believe him. 

This was the most shocking revelation since the Watergate burglary 

and coverup. At least four laws—the National Security Act, the Arms Export 

Control Act, the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, and the AntiTerrorism Act—had been blatantly violated. 

So flagrant was the flouting of law that a hot volcanic lava of anger 

began boiling inside the Congress. First whispers, the audible demands for 

impeachment proceedings growled in private conversations wherever Democratic Members met. Congress was out of session when the shocking news 

broke, but pressure was building. Soon word leaked out that Lt. Col. Oliver 

North was systematically shredding all written evidence relating to the illicit 

adventure before Congress could reconvene and subpoena the documents. 

This fanned the flames to a higher intensity. 

This situation had explosive potential. During December, several House 

committee and subcommittee chairmen contacted me, each wanting to 

schedule hearings on some separate facet of the big story, which dominated 

Washington news that month. Without a clear sense of direction, the new 

Congress could degenerate into a ten-ring circus as committees vied with 

44 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

one another for sensational confrontations with various officials of the executive branch. 

The last thing we needed was an impeachment outcry, or a frontal 

challenge to the President’s personal integrity. Like other Members and millions of private citizens, I had agonized through the long weeks in 1973 

that led to the impeachment hearing on President Nixon, culminating in 

his resignation. I wanted no repeat of that scenario. The country could ill 

afford it. 

Determined that all of the pertinent facts must be disclosed in a dignified way, preserving the congressional authority without precipitating a 

full scale constitutional crisis, I met with Senate Majority Leader Robert 

Byrd. He felt exactly as I did. We saw no national purpose to be served 

by embarrassing the President personally. 

Jointly, we announced that there would be one congressional hearing 

on the subject, not several. It would be a joint meeting of select House 

and Senate committees. Senator Byrd and I would appoint Democratic Members; Minority Leaders Michel and Dole would select Republican Members. 

Anxious to protect the credibility and prestige of the special select committee, I very carefully chose the most respected authorities I could find: 

Chairmen Peter Rodino of Judiciary, Jack Brooks of Government Operations, 

Dante Fascell of Foreign Affairs, Les Aspin of Armed Services, and Louis 

Stokes of Intelligence. 

To signal the importance I attached to this mission, I asked House 

Majority Leader Tom Foley to serve as my personal representative and appointed Edward P. Boland to the panel, the principal author of several of 

the laws that had been violated. And I told each of them personally that 

I thought it would be a disservice to the Nation if anyone mentioned the 

word ‘‘impeachment.’’ 

I thought a long while before choosing a chairman for the whole group 

and finally settled on Lee Hamilton of Indiana, ranking member of the 

Foreign Affairs Committee and former chairman of the House Intelligence 

Committee. He had a reputation for objectivity and a judicious, noninflammatory manner. I did not want the hearing to be, or even seem to 

be, a witch hunt. As much as I disagreed with Mr. Reagan on domestic 

priorities, I disapproved anyone with a private agenda of personally embarrassing the President. To complete my list of appointees, I named Ed Jenkins 

of Georgia, a good country lawyer. I was not trying to prejudge the committee’s findings. I was trying to moderate their explosive potential to split 

the country apart. 

Senator Byrd also chose a responsible panel. He and I agreed that, to 

the extent of our ability to influence it, the hearing must not smack of 

partisanship. It would be open to the media and nationally televised. Byrd’s 

chairman, Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawaii, was ideally suited by temperaVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 8164 Sfmt 8164 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.002 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
The Wright Speakership 45 

ment and conviction for his role. His demeanor was calm and rational. He 

and Hamilton did their best to be impartial and scrupulously fair to Republican colleagues appointed by Dole and Michel and to hold down temptations to inflammatory rhetoric. 

Hamilton wanted to agree in advance to an arbitrary date to terminate 

the proceedings. Otherwise, he argued, they could go virtually forever to 

the detriment of other business. He also proposed giving limited immunity 

from prosecution to induce testimony from Lt. Col. North, the individual 

most involved in handling a number of the details of the covert transaction. 

At least two of the House panelists privately protested, but a majority agreed 

to back the chairman’s decision. As it turns out, this may have compromised 

the efforts of the special prosecutor, Lawrence E. Walsh. But our overriding 

concern in the congressional leadership, frankly, was less in embarrassing 

the administration and sending people to jail than in getting at the truth, 

maintaining the Nation’s equilibrium, emphasizing the rule of law, and 

avoiding a bloody constitutional confrontation. 

Additionally, I felt that we had to heal the malingering wound that 

had festered for 5 years over our country’s secret and sometimes illegal sponsorship of the gory attempts to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government by 

force of arms. More than 100,000 people had died in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Congress itself had been closely divided, vacillating between funding 

and rebuffing President Reagan’s demands for military aid to the Contras. 

In July 1987, my friend and former colleague, Tom Loeffler, came by 

my office to inform me that he had been appointed by the President as 

an emissary to Congress. We talked about Central America. I told him I 

thought the Iran-Contra revelations had destroyed any chance of the President’s getting renewed funding to resume the war. 

Tom Loeffler was already a good friend, a fellow Texan, and I trusted 

his word implicitly. He suggested something entirely new and different: 

That as Speaker I join President Reagan in a bipartisan initiative for peace. 

We would jointly call on the Central American nations to negotiate settlements in Nicaragua and El Salvador based on a cease-fire, political amnesty 

for those who had been in revolt, and free elections to resolve the issues 

in dispute by popular will. In other words, ballots instead of bullets, with 

assurances of U.S. support. 

That idea appealed strongly to me. After talking with the White 

House, Republican House leaders, and the bipartisan Senate leadership, I 

was encouraged. Some of my fellow Democrats were skeptical of the President’s intentions, but most felt I should take the risk if there were a chance 

it could lead to peace. I talked also with Secretary of State George Shultz, 

who was instructed by President Reagan to work with me in the drafting 

of a joint statement. 

46 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

Before formally agreeing, however, I wanted to test the waters in Central America. I had personal conversations with Presidents Duarte of El Salvador and Arias of Costa Rica. Both of them rejoiced at the prospect. They 

believed a united propeace front in Washington could lead to a series of 

negotiated settlements throughout Central America and end the bloodshed. 

House Republican Leader Bob Michel and I asked Nicaraguan Ambassador Carlos Tunnermann to meet with us in the Capitol to probe the Nicaraguan Government’s probable response to such an initiative as we had in 

mind. ‘‘What would it take,’’ we asked, ‘‘for your country to get rid of 

Cuban and Russian military personnel, live in peace with your neighbors 

and restore the constitutional freedoms of your people that were suspended 

in the emergency law?’’ 

Tunnermann answered that his government would be quite willing to 

do all of these things if we would simply ‘‘stop financing the invasion’’ 

of Nicaragua. 

The President and I jointly issued the call for a regional cease-fire, 

and peace negotiations on August 5, just 2 days before the five Central American Presidents were to meet in conference in Esquipulas, Guatemala. 

The result was better than I had dared hope. The Costa Rican Ambassador called me from the conference site to report the happy news that all 

five Presidents had entered a formal agreement embodying almost all the 

elements of the Wright-Reagan plan. The principal architect of the 

Esquipulas accord was President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica. For this work, 

he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. 

At my invitation, Arias stopped off on his way through Washington 

in September and addressed the House. Meanwhile, the Nicaraguan Government appointed a peace commission, opened newspapers and radio stations 

that had been shut down, offered amnesty to those who had made war 

against the government, and invited them to participate in the political process including truly free elections, which ultimately would be held in 1990. 

The same amnesty procedure was going on under Duarte’s direction in El 

Salvador. I was on cloud nine! From my point of view, everything was on 

track. 

At about this point, I discovered that the White House was far from 

happy with the turn events had taken. While I fully expected our joint 

statement to stimulate the movement toward peace, President Reagan’s advisors apparently anticipated refusal by the Nicaraguan Government to comply. Negative comments emanating from the White House gradually made 

it clear to me that highly placed people in the administration did not actually want a peacefully negotiated settlement in Nicaragua. They fully expected the talks to end in acrimony so they could use the ‘‘failure’’ of the 

attempted peace efforts as a justification for renewing the war. 

The Wright Speakership 47 

This confronted me with a moral dilemma. At the urging of the administration, I had joined in the bipartisan call for peace. Overjoyed at the initial 

success of our efforts, I had met, at the White House’s request, with leaders 

of the Contra directorate. Most of them, I saw, had faith in the peace effort. 

I also met with the Sandinista leaders whenever they came to my office. 

I was convinced that most Nicaraguans on both sides were eager for peace. 

But some bitterness lingered. Someone, aside from me, had to be a gobetween, an honest broker who could bring the two sides together. Ideally, 

a Nicaraguan. 

The only Nicaraguan fully trusted by both factions, I had learned from 

trips I’d taken to the region, was Catholic Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo. 

Responsible people in both camps agreed that he was the one to monitor 

the cease-fire and help arbitrate the differences. As Speaker and co-author 

of the call for peace, I met with the cardinal, whom I knew personally, 

at the papal nuncio’s office in Washington, on November 13, 1987, and encouraged him to undertake that critical role. He agreed, and Nicaraguan 

President Daniel Ortega, at my personal urging, agreed to give the cardinal 

a free hand. 

The White House, bitterly resentful of my efforts in helping to keep 

the peace process on track, began attacking me angrily in the press. The 

President and Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams considered my endeavors intrusive and presumptuous. Perhaps they were. But having committed myself in good faith to the effort to make peace, I was unwilling 

to be a party to its deliberate unraveling or allow that result if I could 

prevent it. Too many lives already had been lost. As a percentage of Central 

America’s population, their war dead would equate to something like 5 million Americans—more than we have lost in all of our wars combined. 

On two occasions—in December 1987 and February 1988—the President’s forces tried to forsake the peace process altogether and revive the war 

by renewing military aid for the Contras. On both occasions, a majority 

in Congress voted down the request. At my personal urging, Congress did 

appropriate funds for humanitarian assistance—food, clothing, shelter and 

medical needs—for the Contra forces during the cease-fire. 

As a consequence of my unwillingness to abandon the effort I had 

helped set in motion, I became a target for many personal attacks, both 

in the conservative press and from some of my Republican colleagues in 

Congress. It is ironic that, in bringing peace to Central America, I unconsciously drove a wedge between myself and the congressional minority, 

which ultimately inhibited my capacity to promote consensus on other 

issues. 

In retrospect, I firmly believe I did the right thing. We ended the 

war and brought democracy to the region. One of the unavoidable challenges 

of the speakership is determining when the end result is worth risking one’s 

48 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

own popularity, perhaps even one’s moral authority, with a segment of the 

membership. I do regret my inability to make peace between Democrats 

and Republicans over this issue. Perhaps a more cautious, more sensitive, 

more understanding person could have done that. 

Shortly before the inauguration of the first President George Bush, the 

new President-elect and I had a long personal visit over lunch in my office— 

just the two of us. We explored the areas in which we could find agreement—including Central America and a balanced budget. 

It was March 1989, with George Bush’s blessing, that Secretary of State 

James Baker and I, along with others of both parties in the congressional 

leadership, issued a second statement which clearly disavowed the use of 

American-supported military force, and put all the influence of the United 

States behind the peace negotiation. This culminated in the free and fair 

election from which Violetta Chamorro emerged on February 25, 1990, as 

President of Nicaragua. In a broad sense, the fourth goal of my speakership 

was attained, but its attainment used up almost all that remained of my 

political capital. 

What we did achieve is a result of the unstinting cooperation of many 

dedicated and cooperative Members. I am indebted to Minority Leader Bob 

Michel, as is the country, for his unstinting patriotism and his personal kindness. I could have done nothing as Speaker without the active advice and 

support of Tom Foley, Tony Coelho, David Bonior, and a host of others 

too numerous to name here. 

Today, almost 14 years after retiring from Congress, I look back in 

amazement and look forward in hope, grateful to have been one of those 

few privileged to serve our country in this capacity, and hopeful that my 

colleagues and I may have contributed something worthwhile to the ongoing 

success of the dream that is America. 

Ms. HOOK. Thank you very much Speaker Wright. And now we’ll 

hear from David Bonior. 

Mr. BONIOR. Good morning. How wonderful it is to be back with 

so many friends to share our experiences and to listen to those who were 

at the helm. Let me also express my thanks to the Congressional Research 

Service, the Carl Albert Research and Studies Center at Oklahoma University, and the McCormick Tribune Foundation for their commitment to the 

study of Congress and, in particular, the speakerships we recognize and we 

celebrate today. 

In February 1999, I was accorded the honor of representing the House 

of Representatives at the funeral of King Hussein of Jordan and the U.S. 

delegation was led by President Clinton but it also included former Presidents Ford, Carter, and Bush. As we waited in a very ornate palace room 

for the funeral procession to begin, an aide entered the room and announced 

The Wright Speakership 49 

for all to hear, ‘‘Mr. President it is time to proceed.’’ I could not help but 

notice at the words ‘‘Mr. President’’ that all four Presidents, as well as their 

staffs, moved forward. Despite the somber nature of our roles that day, I 

was moved by the historic moment of being with four Presidents—two 

Democrats, two Republicans. It was a remarkable feeling. It was an affirmation of our democracy and I feel that very same way today. It is such a 

privilege to participate in this conference. 

With wisdom and enthusiasm, Speaker Wright has just shared with 

us his speakership. What I would like to do is comment upon his speakership first by offering some thoughts about Jim Wright the man. Second, 

I want to make some observations about the historic 100th Congress which 

he led so magnificently. Finally, I want to reflect upon the role he played 

as we have just heard in bringing about peace in Central America. 

First, Jim Wright the man. Jim Wright has always had a commitment 

to ideas, often big ideas. And his ideas spring from a rigorous intellectual 

foundation. A serious thinker, a prolific writer, Jim Wright is a man of 

letters—a wordsmith, an author of many books and articles. He is a literary 

man. Jim Wright loves history and he understands well the prerogatives 

accorded the Congress under our Constitution. Like Senator Robert C. Byrd, 

Jim Wright appreciated our Founding Fathers’ fear of granting excessive 

power to the Executive. He was a steadfast champion of the institutional 

power assigned to the Congress. A serious student of Lyndon Johnson and 

Sam Rayburn, Jim Wright could also expound upon the ideas of Henry 

Clay to whom some scholars have favorably compared you. 

Proverbs advise us that where there is no vision the people perish. 

Drawing from his broad historical perspective, Jim Wright had a vision and 

the ability and the will to pursue that vision. He rejected the notion that 

the President proposes and the Congress disposes. Rather, he believed as 

John Barry so very ably illustrated in his book The Ambition and the Power 

that Congress is a body which can initiate, a creative body which can lead. 

The columnist Murray Kempton once observed about Walt Reuther 

that Walt Reuther is the only man I have ever met who could reminisce 

about the future. Well, I would likewise add Jim Wright. Jim Wright had 

an unusual wisdom about the connectivity of our past and present to our 

future, and he was famously determined and forceful in pursuing that future. 

A plaque in his Capitol office read, ‘‘Don’t tell me it can’t be done. Show 

me how it can.’’ He’s always been a doer. And to be a successful doer requires 

toughness. It requires daring qualities, which marked his tenure as Speaker. 

Jim Wright was smart enough and tough enough and daring enough 

to take advantage of rule changes both in the Democratic Caucus and in 

the House of Representatives. You may recall that the newly elected Democratic Congress classes of 1974 and 1976 shifted powers away from committee 

chairs and put them on notice that the caucus would not tolerate separate 

50 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

committee fiefdoms at the expense of the caucus or the House. The days 

of autocratic rule by the likes of Judge Howard Smith (D–VA), on the Rules 

Committee, were over. The stage was set for a Speaker to centralize power 

and to move a coordinated agenda forward. That reality, however, would 

await the election of Jim Wright as Speaker of the House in 1986. As the 

labor scholar Taylor Dark wrote, ‘‘Speaker Wright successfully concentrated 

power taking advantage of the previously unrealized potential of congressional reforms of the previous decade.’’ 

Together with his loyal and dedicated staff, Speaker Wright assembled 

a team which I was proud to be a part of, including Tom Foley, Tony Coelho, Danny Rostenkowski, Dick Gephardt and others. We initiated. It was 

the right time. The stars were aligned. President Reagan’s Presidency had 

lost the momentum of its last 2 years. The Democrats had just regained 

the Senate and we had picked up seats in the House of Representatives. 

For 40 years Jim Wright had prepared for this opportunity. The previous 

10 years were spent as a loyal majority leader to Speaker Tip O’Neill’s team. 

Seneca once said, ‘‘Loyalty is the holiest good in the human heart.’’ Leader 

Jim Wright had shown that loyalty to Tip O’Neill. Now, in turn, Tom 

Foley, Tony Coelho, and myself would demonstrate a similar loyalty to 

Speaker Wright as he inspired us with his passion and with his enthusiasm. 

And so we turn to the 100th Congress. In Jim Wright we had a populist and an egalitarian as our Speaker. Seizing the moment, he crafted an 

agenda that resulted in one of the most productive Congresses in the history 

of the country. As the Speaker himself has recounted for us all, parts of 

the legislative machine were finely tuned so that when he started the engine 

in January 1987, our agenda would take off. 

In preparation, Jim Wright gathered the committee chairs. He said 

he would be fair with them but that certain priority bills must be reported 

and reported on schedule. And, I’ll tell you, I remember that meeting— 

the first one—with each chairperson taking the measure of their new leader 

knowing he was tough. There was no doubt about his expectations. Yes, 

these committee chairs would parent their legislation, but they would work 

with a progressive whip operation. 

As a member of the Rules Committee appointed by Speaker Tip 

O’Neill, I knew where my responsibility to the caucus rested, in my appointment by the Speaker. Speaker Wright requested a meeting with each Democratic Rules Committee member, individually seeking their interest in serving another term and clearly conveying his expectations. This unprecedented 

process was another expression of Speaker Wright’s determination to get off 

to a quick start. 

Beside Speaker Wright, Tom Foley had the most experience in our 

leadership ascending from whip to majority leader. He was a generous source 

of counsel in helping us navigate the rules and the precedents and the subVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 8164 Sfmt 8164 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.002 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
The Wright Speakership 51 

stance and the politics. And, of course, Tony Coelho brought enormous talents to our whip operation, which met with stunning success especially in 

the early months. As effective as Speaker Wright was within the institution, 

he was equally impressive in rallying the support of the outside. You’ve 

got to have an inside and an outside. 

A very close relationship existed between Jim Wright and the AFL– 

CIO, especially Lane Kirkland, its president; and Bob McLaughton, its chief 

lobbyist on the Hill. The AFL–CIO saw the 100th Congress as a moment 

of opportunity. Kirkland appointed McLaughton, an African-American, and 

Peggy Taylor as his assistants, adding much diversity to their operation. 

In addition, three important international unions during the eighties returned to the AFL–CIO: the UAW, the Mineworkers, and the Teamsters. 

A valuable symbiotic relationship developed. Our leadership would reinforce 

the concerns of labor and working people. The AFL–CIO would, in turn, 

support a broad array of issues. So there was born a process of effective cooperation between Capitol Hill and the ‘‘House of Labor’’ on 16th Street. 

Bob McLaughton was able to speak forcibly for a united labor movement 

and their growing army of lobbyists on the Hill. Indeed, his virtual authority 

to make a deal on the spot was crucial to our effectiveness in moving bills 

quickly and successfully. 

So no one in our caucus would mistake our priorities, Speaker Wright, 

as he has just illustrated for us, reserved the first several House bill numbers 

for the clean water bill, the highway bill, and the omnibus trade bill. During 

the first 2 weeks, we passed the clean water bill and the highway bill by 

enough votes to overcome a Presidential veto. A few months later H.R. 3, 

the most significant trade bill since the thirties, passed by a vote of 290 

to 137, again enough to override a veto. We inserted one of the most important labor provisions that the Congress would enact in the eighties—the 

plant closing and notification bill—into that trade bill, which Reagan vetoed 

in May 1988. We also reported out the plant and notification bill separate 

from the trade bill, and they both went to the President and became law. 

In 1981 the AFL–CIO’s rate of success in the House of Representatives during 

the Reagan Presidency was 47 percent. Under Jim Wright, it went up to 

92.8 percent in 1988. 

In addition, the 100th Congress passed into law major bills to aid the 

homeless, the first important expansion of Medicare for catastrophic illnesses, 

and a welfare reform bill with progressive features to move people from welfare to work. Amazingly, the Congress also passed all 13 major appropriation 

bills and delivered them to the President for signing into law before the 

start of the new fiscal year. 

There were sure to be some legislative disappointments for Speaker 

Wright. When the budget deficit exploded out of control, as he has just 

recounted for us, Speaker Wright early on in our caucus pushed hard for 

52 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

tax fairness. But in his own words, he admitted, and I quote, ‘‘I spent a 

large piece of my political capital in the effort to make the tax burden fall 

more fairly only to discover that I had over-matched myself.’’ 

Well, many also thought that he had overmatched himself in challenging President Reagan in Central America, but his critics underestimated 

Jim Wright’s passion for peace. He was not about to surrender his constitutional responsibilities. The right to declare war, as written in Article I of 

the Constitution, rested with the Congress. Henry Clay, who became Speaker 

in 1811, was the last Speaker to dominate foreign policy. Too many subsequent decades of congressional acquiescence had accompanied American foreign policy, none more devastating and misplaced than during the IndoChina war in the sixties and seventies. 

A new crop of Vietnam generation legislators increased the congressional role in foreign affairs from enacting the War Powers Resolution to 

an aggressive human rights advocacy campaign. With the Contra war and 

the war in El Salvador ravaging Central America, claiming some 100,000 

deaths, some of us were not going to tolerate it in silence or without a 

legislative fight. The previous legislative abdication had lasted 16 years and 

cost over 58,000 American lives and over 1 million Vietnamese lives. 

Ronald Reagan gave more speeches on Nicaragua than on any other 

issue of his Presidency. During the eighties, we had 15 major debates on 

the House floor on this contentious issue, voting three times to cut off all 

military assistance to the Contras. Secretary of State Jim Baker accurately 

noted, and I quote, ‘‘The war in Central America was the Holy Grail for 

both the left and the right in the United States. It was the divisive foreign 

policy issue.’’ Personally, I sometimes felt as if I spent more time in Managua 

and San Jose and San Salvador than in my own district. 

The Reagan doctrine and the Monroe Doctrine were colliding with selfdetermination and with liberation theology. The mix was volatile and deadly 

and the region had spun out of control. Into this maelstrom stepped Jim 

Wright. Once again he was the right person at the right time. He spoke 

Spanish. He was a student of the region. He personally knew the leaders. 

Speaker Wright has told us how he proceeded—the meetings with Ambassador Tunnermann; the Wright-Reagan plan; the Esquipulas accord; our 

meeting with Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo; our continued fight to keep 

military aid from the Contras; our furious work to wind this all down while 

we had the momentum. 

Before I close permit me to share one personal story that I’m sure Tom 

Loeffler will elaborate on. When Tom came to see the Speaker about a joint 

peace proposal, I was adamantly set against it. I did not trust the administration. I thought it was another setup that would fail and when it did the 

floodgates for more military aid would open up. I strenuously pressed my 

point of view in a very emotionally charged meeting. Finally, the Speaker 

The Wright Speakership 53 

said to me, ‘‘People who are interested in peace do something about it.’’ 

I paused. I thought. I reflected. I went along. 

While I had lost faith in the administration, I had not lost faith in 

Speaker Wright. It became my job, along with Tom Foley and others, to 

sell the proposal to our caucus. You know, sometimes you just have to take 

a chance for peace. You do not make peace with your friends. You make 

peace with your enemies. This lesson I learned from Jim Wright. In a handwritten ‘‘thank you’’ to Jim Wright, Secretary Baker wrote, ‘‘But for you 

there would have been no bipartisan accord, without which there would have 

been no election.’’ 

President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, 

which many believe should have been shared with Jim Wright, included 

in his ‘‘thank you’’ to Speaker Wright the following, and I quote, ‘‘Those 

jwho advocatedk peace will not forget you and thank you for your vision 

and your deep commitment to the highest ideals of justice, peace, and 

progress. The Esquipulas II process finally moved forward and is showing 

visible results for 28 million Central Americans.’’ President Arias continued, 

‘‘The Wright-Reagan plan, the bipartisan agreement between the Congress 

and the Executive, and finally the change in policy of the Bush Administration toward Central America are a testimony and confirmation that you were 

not mistaken. In truth, you did more for us in Central America than many 

of those who here call themselves standard-bearers of freedom. I feel that 

it has been a privilege to know you. Count me among your friends,’’ concluded President Arias. 

Wallace Stegner, one of our greatest American writers, wrote of friendship in his fine novel, Crossing to Safety. He said this about friendship. 

‘‘Friendship is a relationship that has no formal shape. There are no rules 

or obligations or bonds as in marriage or families. It is held together by 

neither law, nor property, nor blood. There is no glue in it but mutual 

liking. It is therefore rare.’’ Jim Wright is my dear friend. He has many 

friends in this room and around the country and around the world. He has 

done marvelous good deeds in his life. With a lust for life, he continues 

to live productively contributing to the public dialog, teaching at TCU, 

enjoying his many friends and family. John Barry captured my intense respect and admiration for Jim Wright’s speakership with these words, ‘‘The 

ambition belongs to many men but none more than Jim Wright. He would 

use the 100th Congress of the United States, convened during the Bicentennial anniversary of the Constitution to earn his place in history. He would 

rise up and fill the sky with lightning bolts and he would become a target 

for them.’’ 

Mr. Speaker, it was a high honor to be part of your team. Bless you 

and Betty for your extraordinary service to our country. 

54 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

Ms. HOOK. Thank you very much, Mr. Bonior. And now we’ll hear 

from Tom Loeffler. 

Mr. LOEFFLER. Thank you, Janet. It is an honor for me to be included amongst this distinguished group, and to be able to share my observations concerning an individual I admire and respect, Speaker Jim Wright. 

I’m delighted to appear with David Bonior. In one of the highlights of 

Jim’s career, David’s career, and my post-House career, we were able to work 

together to bring about something that was extraordinary given the political 

climate of the time. In a moment, I will go into more detail on the remarkable achievement, which would never have been possible without the leadership of Speaker Wright. 

As a Texan fresh out of law school and new to Washington, D.C., 

I had the great opportunity to grow up under the tutelage of Senator John 

Tower. I also had the privilege of working in the Ford White House, where 

I met many of my senior congressional colleagues before I actually served 

alongside them in the Congress. I can recall a moment in December 1976 

after the election of Jimmy Carter when the newly elected Members were 

convening to organize the new Congress for 1977–1978. The tickertape in 

the East Wing of the White House was just going nuts. I walked over 

to it, and I looked, and it says: ‘‘Jim Wright wins by one vote’’ the majority 

leader position in the House of Representatives. Little did I know that 2 

years later I would be his colleague. 

Before I speak of Jim Wright in a global way, I wish to share with 

you the perception of those of us who served with him in the Texas delegation. Whether we were Democrats or Republicans, we knew that Speaker 

Wright had an incredibly tight rope to walk. Politically, he did this in 

a very adroit fashion because Texas politics were changing. In 1971, when 

I was beginning my work with Senator Tower, Texas was evolving into a 

two-party State. 

It is important to understand that as Jim grew in leadership within 

this body, his advocacy for issues didn’t necessarily jive with the evolving 

Texas political landscape. Through his astute political skills, Jim was able 

to continue to grow in leadership within his party, ultimately rising to the 

pinnacle of Speaker, while still having the absolute stout support of all Texans. He did all this in spite of the changing party dynamic back home. 

And remember in Texas, as we were reflecting upon the O’Neill speakership, 

Texans liked to poke fun at Tip. But that never transferred to Jim. Even 

before he was part of the official leadership on the Democratic side, he was 

a capable leader in the Texas delegation. Jim was always there to help on 

every issue that was a Texas issue, whether it was in a Democratic congressional district or a Republican congressional district. There was a bond 

among those of us in the Texas delegation where we always knew that when 

The Wright Speakership 55 

there was a day of reckoning and we needed help for Texans, Jim Wright 

would be right by our side. 

Jim Wright’s word is his bond. He is one of the fairest people that 

I have ever worked with. He is also one of the most articulate Members 

that this Congress has ever had or will ever have in its body. Mr. Speaker, 

I will never forget the time at a Texas State Society luncheon when you 

and Senator Tower were speaking together, and, all of a sudden, Tower became quiet. Never one to yield the floor, unless of course he was good and 

ready, I asked the Senator why he had stopped talking. He answered very 

strictly, ‘‘Because I didn’t want to take Jim Wright on. I knew I’d lose.’’ 

The final comments that I have concern the formulation of the WrightReagan plan. I had left Congress to return to my home State and run for 

statewide office, as David Bonior recently did in Michigan. After my failed 

run for Governor, I had a call from Howard Baker asking me, on behalf 

of the President, if I would return to the White House to work with my 

many friends in Congress to bring about a unique and unbelievable occurrence. It was President Reagan’s hope that the Congress and the White 

House would speak with one voice on American foreign policy as it related 

to Central America. In my lifetime I could not remember when that had 

been the case. 

After I arrived at the White House, my first call was to Jim Wright. 

I went to his leadership office and we sat down and began a frank discussion. 

As we concluded, the only thing that we could give to each other was the 

understanding that we would be honest with one another, we would tell 

each other the truth, and if we could move it forward on behalf of the 

President and the speakership, we would. And, if we couldn’t, we would 

shake hands and go about our business knowing that we had done our very 

best. 

Before returning to the White House, I stopped in to see Minority 

Leader Bob Michel and reported that in our meeting the Speaker indicated 

an extremely high interest in moving this forward. As one could have expected, after our initial meeting a lot of things happened that nearly derailed 

the process. I remember when David Bonior and Majority Leader Foley and 

I were alone after one of Speaker Wright’s meetings—Trent Lott and Bob 

Michel had gone off, and Tony Coehlo and Jim had gone off—and the two 

of them looked at me and said, ‘‘Do you know what you’re doing to the 

Speaker? You’re absolutely setting him up.’’ All I could say was, ‘‘I hope 

not.’’ They, obviously being very honorable and very close friends with respect for me and knowing what a failed outcome could mean, said, ‘‘We 

pray you’re not.’’ 

During the course of this 10-day period, something rare and significant 

occurred. Speaker Wright and Senate Majority Leader Bob Byrd convened 

a meeting in H127. The room was full, 25 to 30 Members of Congress on 

56 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

both sides of the aisle, along with Secretary of State George Schultz and 

Colin Powell, Deputy National Security Advisor to the President. Here the 

initial parts of what was being discussed between the congressional leadership and the administration were laid out for those who would be critical 

in seeing the legislation through. This group consisted of such people as 

Congressman David Obey and Senator Jesse Helms, and everyone in between. That meeting—and all of our meetings for 10 days—never became 

public knowledge. If they had gone public, I do not believe that the WrightReagan plan would have reached fruition. 

The night before the Speaker and the bipartisan congressional delegation from the House and the Senate arrived at the White House for the 

final stamp of approval on the Wright-Reagan plan, Jim Wright called and 

said, ‘‘You know, Tom, we’ve had a great run together. You know the President and I are not the closest of friends. I would really like to do something 

that would be meaningful to the President because I know this is an unbelievable moment, and I know that he has shot straight with me, been honest 

and fair, and this is going to be a big day. What would you suggest?’’ 

After some thought, the commonality of their western influence struck me, 

so I said, ‘‘Jim, why don’t you wear your black ostrich boots?’’ 

Well, the morning that everyone was arriving at the White House, 

we had a few little glitches that we had to iron out, and I was never able 

to get to the President and give him the heads up on Jim’s wearing of 

cowboy boots as a friendly gesture. So, everyone went in, and I was the 

last one into the Oval Office. The President was sitting with Jim at his 

side, and I’ll be darned if President Reagan didn’t turn to the Speaker to 

say, ‘‘Jim, I sure like those boots.’’ And I thought at that moment: ‘‘We’ve 

made it!’’ 

Jim is a rare breed in our business. A most distinguished gentleman, 

master politician and negotiator, loyal and honest as the day is long. Mr. 

Speaker, I’m delighted we’ve had a chance to play a role together. And I’m 

honored to stand here today once again by your side. Thank you. 

Ms. HOOK. Thanks very much Mr. Loeffler and Mr. Bonior, and I’m 

sure many of you would like to ask questions of the Speaker. We’re running 

a little late though, but I’m sure Speaker Wright will be around and maybe 

you can approach him and talk to him informally. I’d just like to close 

by thanking Speaker Wright for traveling here to join us today and thanks 

to the Congressional Research Service for making this whole panel possible. 

I want to close by recalling a line that I remember. I don’t know what 

the context was when Mr. Wright said this but it stuck in my mind while 

I was covering him and it has stuck in my mind for many years. I think 

it’s something that summarizes Jim Wright’s ambitious approach to the 

The Wright Speakership 57 

speakership. He once said, ‘‘We make a greater mistake when we think too 

small than when we think too big.’’ Thank you all very much. 

Hon. J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker "***– 


92800.004
59 

Reflections on the Role of the Speaker in 

the Modern Day House of Representatives 

Mr. MULHOLLAN. It is my great pleasure and honor to introduce 

Robert Michel, who served in the House of Representatives from 1956 to 

1994 and was the Republican leader from 1981 until his voluntary departure 

from the House. 

I think it is appropriate on this day after Veterans’ Day to acknowledge 

Mr. Michel’s service with the 39th Infantry Regiment as a combat infantryman in England, France, Belgium, and Germany from February 10, 1943 

through January 26, 1946. He was wounded by machine gun fire, awarded 

two Bronze Star medals, the Purple Heart, and four battle stars. 

In 1993, Mr. Foley said of Mr. Michel, ‘‘As prevailing political philosophies have changed over the years, Bob Michel remains steadfast in his commitment to consensus in the interest of the nation and the institution of 

the House of Representatives.’’ It is the esteem that Mr. Michel holds for 

this institution of Congress for which we are all grateful. Thus, it is so 

fitting that he introduce our next Speaker, Dennis Hastert, who, on assuming the speakership of the House, was quoted as saying that he would try 

to emulate ‘‘the humility and grace of his one-time mentor, Bob Michel.’’ 

Mr. MICHEL. It was indeed a distinct honor and privilege to serve, 

and what a fulfilling experience it was. I’ve enjoyed so much this morning’s 

session listening to the comments from all those who participated. My role 

here at the moment is to introduce the current Speaker and I relish that 

opportunity. 

In times of crisis, the United States always seems to find exactly the 

right leader—maybe we’re just plain lucky. Maybe it’s the flexibility and 

the responsiveness of our political system. Or maybe it’s the working out 

of divine providence, although it is probably not politically correct to say 

such a thing these days. The House of Representatives in 1999 found in 

Denny Hastert exactly the right person for the right job at the right time. 

In sports, we say about certain players that they lead by example. In 1999, 

the House, where words mean so much, was at a point where rhetoric could 

not do the job of healing and renewal. The House needed a leader who 

would lead by example. The House didn’t need any more hype. It needed 

reason to hope. The House needed a leader who was capable of walking 

60 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

the walk, not just talking the talk. The House needed someone with a solid 

foundation of character on which, over time, trust could be rebuilt. 

The House found all of these things—yes, and much more—in Denny 

Hastert. Winston Churchill once said short words are the best words. And 

old words, when short, are the best of all. Churchill in this, as in so many 

other things, was right. When we think of Denny Hastert, we think of 

old words, simple words, strong words. Words like trust and strength, fairness, faith, decency, honesty, integrity and courage. History will say of 

Denny Hastert that in a moment of institutional crisis, the House of Representatives was led by his example, strengthened by his resolve, and renewed 

by his character. It is a distinct honor and high privilege for me to introduce 

a man who continues to lead by example, my dear friend, the Speaker of 

the House, Denny Hastert. 

Speaker HASTERT. Bob, thank you for that very kind introduction. 

I want to thank you, Bob, for what you’ve meant to me. You were my 

first mentor here in Washington. 

You, Bob, the man who should have and deserved to be Speaker, taught 

me the value of patience. You took me under your wing when I first came 

to Congress, and you showed me how Congress worked. You helped me 

with my committee assignments, and gave me my first leadership responsibility heading up the Republican leader’s Health Care Task Force in response 

to First Lady Hillary Clinton’s efforts on health care. You taught me that 

it is the workhorse who wins in the legislative game, not the show horse. 

Your cheerful demeanor hid a will of steel, and your abundant common 

sense served your colleagues and your country well. 

Bob, we know that you are going through a tough time with the loss 

of your beloved wife Corrine. We share your grief. Know that our thoughts 

and prayers are with you during this most difficult time. 

I appreciate this opportunity to reflect on my current job. Clearly, the 

role of the Speaker has changed over the years. It has changed because of 

the times, because of those who have occupied the office, and because of 

the nature of the institution. 

Joseph Cannon, the man from Danville, ruled from the Speaker’s chair 

with iron power. Tip O’Neill ruled with Irish charm. Newt Gingrich 

brought star power to the office. Sam Rayburn ruled for a generation, while 

Joe Martin had only a fleeting chance to assert Republican control. 

Each used their principles to guide them in times of great challenge. 

O’Neill was challenged by a popular President, Carl Albert was challenged 

by a constitutional crisis, Rayburn through war, and Tom Foley by a series 

of institutional crises. 

I have my own set of principles that have worked for me. 

I never thought I would be Speaker. I didn’t run for the job. I didn’t 

campaign for it. I didn’t play the P.R. game. I just did my job as best 

The Role of the Speaker 61 

I could for my constituents and for my colleagues. In fact, if you had asked 

me to predict Newt Gingrich’s successor, I wouldn’t have been on my own 

list. 

My first principle is one I learned from my friend Bob Michel. To 

be good at the job of Speaker, you must be willing to put in the time 

to be a good listener. By this, I mean you must listen to the Members 

of the House. 

Before I became Speaker, I thought I knew the importance of paying 

attention to Members’ needs. I had served in the whip organization when 

Bob Michel was leader and I served as chief deputy whip when Newt Gingrich became Speaker. 

When you are a whip, you need to listen, because to get and win votes, 

you need to hear what the Members are saying. But when you are Speaker, 

the sheer volume of voices is increased, and the problems become more difficult to solve. I learned that the best way to find solutions was to get people 

around the table to talk it through. 

When you have a small majority, like I have had for pretty much my 

entire tenure, you have to do a lot of listening. And when you talk, you 

have to keep your word. 

That brings me to my second principle. When you are Speaker, people 

expect you to keep your word, and they will not quickly forgive you if 

you cannot deliver. I learned that keeping your word is the most important 

part of this job. You are better off not saying anything than making a promise that you cannot keep. And you have to keep both the big promises and 

the small promises. 

My third principle is that a Speaker must respect the power of regular 

order. I am a regular order guy. 

I think it is important to rely on the committees to do their hearings 

and markups. I don’t like to create task forces to craft legislation. The committees are there for a reason, and we should use them. There are times 

when you need to establish working groups to coordinate the work of standing committees when big projects cross jurisdictional lines, but those working groups should ‘‘coordinate’’ not supplant the committee structure. I have 

also found that it is easy to find the problems in legislation through the 

committee process. 

My fourth principle is that while a Speaker should strive to be fair, 

he also is judged by how he gets the job done. 

The job of the Speaker is to rule fairly, but ultimately to carry out 

the will of the majority. Unlike some other parliamentary bodies, the Speaker in the U.S. House of Representatives is the leader of his party. He is 

not merely a disinterested arbiter of parliamentary rules. This creates a 

unique tension within the Office of the Speaker. It is not always easy to 

be fair when you have a vested interest in the outcome. But if the chair 

62 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

is seen as being unfair, the likely result is a breakdown in parliamentary 

comity. We take the job of fairness very seriously. 

We seek our best parliamentary experts to serve in the chair as Speakers 

pro tempore, people like Ray LaHood, Doc Hastings, Mac Thornberry, Mike 

Simpson and others. We also have professional Parliamentarians who avowedly are non-partisan. Charlie Johnson and his team play a critical role in 

advising me on jurisdictional referrals and parliamentary judgments from 

the chair. This is traditional stretching back beyond Louis Deschler, and 

it is a good tradition. We make certain that those serving in the chair do 

not serve on the committees of jurisdiction for the business on the floor. 

And we try to be fair in the Rules Committee process. We guarantee 

the minority the right to recommit the bill with instructions, giving them 

one last chance to make their best arguments to amend the pending legislation. 

But while we strive to be fair, we also strive to get the job done. We 

are not the Senate. The rules of the House, while they protect the rights 

of the minority, also insure that the will of the majority of the House will 

prevail. 

So, on occasion, you will see us taking effective action to get the job 

done. Sometimes, we have a hard time convincing the majority of the House 

to vote like a majority of the House, so sometimes you will see votes stay 

open longer than usual. But the hallmark of an effective leadership is one 

that can deliver the votes. And we have been an effective leadership. 

My fifth principle is to please the majority of your majority. On occasion, a particular issue might excite a majority made up mostly of the minority. Campaign finance is a particularly good example of this phenomenon. 

The job of Speaker is not to expedite legislation that runs counter to the 

wishes of the majority of his majority. As in campaign finance reform, our 

majority thought it was a bad bill that weakened the party structure and 

promoted abuse by special interests. As a side note, the emergence of 527 

organizations in the next election will prove our point that special interests, 

and not political parties, will have more influence because of campaign finance reform. So we fought the efforts by advocates of campaign regulation 

to pass it. They did what they thought they had to do, getting enough 

signatures to sign a discharge petition. I made them go through that process 

twice in order to prove two points. First, I wanted my troops to know I 

opposed the bill. Second, I wanted to let them know that I had no choice 

but to schedule the legislation. I was not going to abandon my party’s position under any circumstances. 

On each piece of legislation, I actively seek to bring our party together. 

I do not feel comfortable scheduling any controversial legislation unless I 

know we have the votes on our side first. 

The Role of the Speaker 63 

My sixth principle is the Speaker’s job is to focus on the House and 

nothing but the House. This is a big job. It is a time-consuming job. And 

it is an exhausting job. I said that when I became Speaker, I would focus 

only on running the House. And I found out that means more than just 

sitting in the Speaker’s chair. It means doing those things necessary to keeping the majority, whether that means fundraising for incumbents or campaigning for challengers. You don’t see me spending too much time on television shows, or giving big speeches. I have no interest in running for President or making the jump to the Senate. This is an important and big job. 

And it requires singular focus to get it done. 

My final principle is my most important principle: Never forget who 

sent you to Congress in the first place—your constituents. I get home to 

Illinois every weekend. Of course, it is nice to see my wife, who inevitably 

gives me a list of chores to complete when I get there. But it is also important to see my friends and my constituents. 

It is very easy to get lost in the muddle of Washington, DC. The 

world of amendments, campaign fundraisers, motions to recommit, and jurisdictional battles is foreign to Yorkville, Illinois. As a matter of fact, most 

of my constituents are none too impressed with the trappings of power. 

My constituents sent me to Washington not to argue, not to debate. They 

sent me here to get the job done. They are not content to play the blame 

game, they don’t want to hear about how this bill died in the House or 

that bill died in the Senate. They want us to pass laws that make their 

lives better. 

When I go home, I am not Mr. Speaker. To my wife and friends and 

voters, I am Denny. And I tell you, that healthy dose of humility does 

me a world of good every time I come back here to Washington. It helps 

me to connect to what the American people are really thinking about, and 

it helps me to understand what concerns my colleagues are facing. 

At the end of the day, the Speaker of the House is really just the 

guy who stands up for the people of America. In our Constitution, the 

Speaker of the House is the first officer mentioned, because in our system 

of government, it is the people who rule. Since January 1999, I have had 

the great honor and privilege to be that guy. Thank you for inviting me 

here today and for this most fascinating symposium. I wish you the best 

of luck the rest of the day. 

Hon. Thomas S. Foley, Speaker "*)*–"**& 


92800.005
65 

The Foley Speakership 

Mr. OLESZEK. It’s my pleasure to introduce Jeff Biggs as our moderator for the Foley speakership. Mr. Biggs was a long-time press secretary 

to Speaker Foley. I want to point out that Mr. Biggs and Speaker Foley 

co-authored a book on Mr. Foley’s career in the House, which I recommend 

to all of you, entitled Honor in the House. It was published in 1999 by the 

Washington State University Press. Today, Mr. Biggs is the director of the 

Congressional Fellowship Program of the American Political Science Association jAPSAk. With that, let me turn the podium over to Mr. Biggs. 

Mr. BIGGS. Thank you, Walter. All of us on the podium would like 

to thank the Carl Albert Center, the McCormick Tribune Foundation, and 

particularly the Congressional Research Service jCRSk for having sponsored 

this special day. I would like to extend a special thanks to the Congressional 

Research Service. For some 50 years, the CRS has helped prepare the journalists, political scientists, RWJ jRobert Wood Johnsonk health policy fellows, 

a Native American Hatfield fellow, domestic and foreign policy specialists 

from the public service, and international congressional fellows for their 10- 

month congressional staff assignments on the Hill. This year’s 40 APSA 

congressional fellows are part of the audience today. In fact, I believe that 

every Member of Congress in the audience today hosted a fellow during 

their congressional tenure. 

Memories are short, and the two commentators on our panel did great 

honor to the institution of the U.S. House of Representatives during their 

years in Congress. They deserve more than a cursory introduction. My thanks 

to Congressional Quarterly’s Politics in America and National Journal’s The 

Almanac of American Politics for their admirable biographies of the Members 

of Congress. On my left is former Congressman Bill Frenzel. Before arriving 

in Washington, DC, he was an executive in his family’s warehousing business, and served four terms in the Minnesota State legislature. His moderate 

brand of Republicanism appealed to his Third Congressional District constituents in 1970, and they never tired of it. Over two decades, his Twin 

City supporters always returned him to office with more than 60 percent 

of the vote. While he would come to be regarded by his colleagues as one 

of the intellectual guardians of GOP economic orthodoxy, he maintained 

his moderate views on many social and foreign policy issues. Over the course 

of his congressional career, Bill Frenzel became a senior member of the MinVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 8164 Sfmt 8164 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.004 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
66 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

nesota delegation and emerged as one of the hardest working and most influential Republicans in the House. 

Described by National Journal as ‘‘loud and brainy, partisan and 

thoughtful,’’ he put his stamp on every debate in which he participated. 

With intellectual ability, oratorical skills and the work habits of a true legislator, Bill Frenzel left his mark in both policy and institutional arenas. As 

the ranking member of the House Administration Committee, he introduced 

a bill to create the Federal Election Commission in 1974. His interest in 

congressional ethics led to his participation in writing an ethics code in 

1977. On the Ways and Means Committee, he became the Republicans’ leading voice on trade matters and, along with Tom Foley, was an outspoken 

advocate of free trade. 

But if he fared well as a Member of Congress, his party did not. Frustrations began to emerge. He must frequently have recalled 19th century Republican Speaker Thomas Brackett Reed, who was once asked by a Democratic Member, ‘‘What is the function of the minority?’’ ‘‘The function of 

the minority, sir,’’ the Speaker replied, ‘‘is to make a quorum and to draw 

its pay.’’ Bill Frenzel’s frustration with what would become the 40-year 

Democratic majority in the House, from 1954 to 1994, rose to the surface 

in early 1989 when he threw his political weight behind Representative Newt 

Gingrich’s effort to vault himself into the Republican leadership. Bill Frenzel 

nominated Mr. Gingrich to be GOP whip. As a respected senior member 

of both the Budget and Ways and Means Committees, Frenzel was just the 

kind of legislatively-oriented, older generation Republican who would have 

seemed a natural adversary of Mr. Gingrich’s confrontational, partisan style. 

But support from Members such as Mr. Frenzel went a long way toward 

explaining Mr. Gingrich’s upset victory. Bill Frenzel was a formidable legislator and advocate during his congressional career in the minority. 

He retired in 1991 after 20 years of service. One can only imagine what 

the talents of this moderate Republican could have achieved in the majority. 

Bill Frenzel is a guest scholar at the Brookings Institution and, along with 

Messrs. Fazio and Foley, serves on the American Political Science Association 

Congressional Fellowship Programs Advisory Committee. I guess that’s my 

third plug. 

Former Congressman Vic Fazio is on my right. As was the case with 

Speaker Foley and our Republican commentator, Mr. Frenzel, Vic Fazio is 

one of that unfortunately diminishing breed, an institutionalist in the U.S. 

House of Representatives. During two decades representing California’s 

Third Congressional District in the House, he carried an enormous amount 

of water for his colleagues on both sides of the aisle. He took on responsibility for what most observers would characterize as an insider’s portfolio. 

He served in what one might regard as the trenches of House politics. He 

did so without losing sight of how these tasks also served to improve the 

The Foley Speakership 67 

operation of the U.S. House of Representatives as the great deliberative body 

of our Nation. As one of the so-called ‘‘college of cardinals,’’ the 13 Appropriations subcommittee chairs, Mr. Fazio chaired the Legislative Branch Subcommittee responsible for such unpleasant housekeeping chores as defending 

congressional pay raises and congressional office budgets. His willingness 

to bear those burdens warranted the respect and gratitude of Members from 

across the ideological spectrum who were glad to have someone else take 

the heat for what they wanted. 

During an era of heightened public antipathy toward the Congress, a 

phenomenon which seems ever with us, Mr. Fazio added to his burdens when 

he chaired the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, served as 

the vice chair, and then chaired the Democratic Caucus. He accepted a position on the House Ethics Committee during the period it reviewed the case 

of Speaker Wright. In 1989, he co-chaired an ethics task force under Speaker 

Foley which, among other reforms, eliminated speaking honoraria for the 

Members of Congress. A strong, unapologetic partisan, these were roles 

which unquestionably added burdens at home in what was becoming a marginally Republican district. 

To the end of his time in the House, Mr. Fazio was outspoken against 

those Members whose electoral instincts were to vilify the House in order 

to gain political advantage, particularly incumbents who ran for reelection 

as purported ‘‘outsiders,’’ criticizing the very body in which they served. 

At the same time, he was sensitive to the public perceptions of Congress 

and its possible excesses. During the 101st Congress, for example, he pushed 

for substantial reforms of the congressional franking privilege despite the 

criticism of his colleagues. He was a politician in the very best sense of 

the word. For Vic Fazio, there is life after Congress. He is currently a partner 

at Clark and Weinstock. And, according to his wife Judy, he is overly involved in non-profit and charitable activities. 

And now to the subject of this panel: Thomas Stephen Foley. Thomas 

Foley would never have described himself as the predominant Washington, 

DC, ‘‘type A’’ personality. He rose to the top of the leadership ladder without displaying the type of vaunted ambition usually associated with such 

success. Even his first candidacy to represent the voters of eastern Washington’s Fifth Congressional District in Congress was reluctantly undertaken 

at the urging of others. In 1974, he chaired the Democratic Study Group, 

which served as the strategy and research arm of liberal and moderate Democrats. The next year, he became Agriculture Committee chair under unusual 

circumstances. His predecessor, the elderly and conservative W.R. Poage of 

Texas, was targeted for removal by the huge bloc of reform-minded Watergate-baby Democrats. Ever the institutionalist, Foley backed Poage. But 

when Poage was unseated anyway, the Democratic Caucus turned to Foley 

and promoted him chairman of the committee. 

68 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

Foley continued to rise within Democratic ranks. After the 1980 election, the position of Democratic whip opened up. And when Mr. Rostenkowski (D–IL), chief deputy whip and first-in-line, decided to take over the 

Ways and Means Committee chair, Speaker Tip O’Neill and Majority Leader 

Jim Wright, both looking for someone with parliamentary skills, chose Foley 

as the party’s whip. When Speaker O’Neill announced his plan to retire 

at the end of the 99th Congress, there was no guarantee Foley would ascend 

to the majority leader’s spot. A number of Members wanted a more partisan 

figure. In the end, no challenger to Foley emerged and the same dynamic 

was there in 1989 when Foley rose without opposition to the speakership. 

It sounds like a happily-ever-after story. It wasn’t. Not only was Foley 

the first Speaker from west of the Rocky Mountains, he was a rare Speaker 

who did not represent a safe seat in his marginally Republican district. The 

higher his Democratic profile became, the greater his vulnerability. Ultimately, he was the first Speaker defeated for reelection since 1862. Maybe 

it could have been avoided. But he felt putting your career on the line, 

and at risk on principled stands, was a test of doing the job right. And 

he did so in favor of gun control and in opposition to what he viewed as 

an unconstitutional Washington State term limits referendum. Later, the 

Supreme Court after the 1994 elections confirmed his view. Foley had built 

his career and reputation in part on being a facilitator and conciliator with 

the ability to appreciate opinions on the other side of the aisle, and in part 

on congressional reform initiatives. 

As Speaker, Foley inherited a Democratic Caucus which had gotten too 

used to big majorities and now struggled to find the discipline to marshal 

tough votes. In the seventies, he had played a key role in the reforms which 

opened up the Congress to the press and the public, and challenged the 

power of committee chairs by making their appointment subject to a secret 

ballot in the caucus. As Speaker, his reform instinct was called forth to 

counter what emerged as decades-old institutional abuses, such as the House 

bank. The abolition of the bank led to the appointment of a House administrator, the elimination of long cherished perks, and the appointment of a 

bipartisan panel to look at more sweeping reforms. Foley initiated a program 

under the direction of Representative Martin Frost to provide congressional 

assistance to the emerging eastern European democracies. Most of these 

changes remain to this day. 

His long-admired bipartisan instinct was newly challenged under the 

unified government of President Clinton. Foley undertook to pass a legislative agenda, including a budget proposal that failed to receive a single Republican vote, and comprehensive health care reform which ultimately failed 

to make it to the floor of the House. These brief illustrations highlight 

the value and importance of the qualities that Foley brought to the House 

for three decades. He placed a premium on governance following an election, 

The Foley Speakership 69 

whether the President be Democratic or Republican. He stressed a legislative 

search for solutions, rather than the perpetuation of the campaign. He urged 

a willingness to accept bipartisan compromise. He recognized the international role of the Speaker. These were qualities which remain essential 

to the institution of the Congress and remain part of his legacy to the speakership of the House. 

Speaker FOLEY. Thank you, Jeff. I’d like to begin by repeating what 

others have said about the Congressional Research Service, the Carl Albert 

Center, and the McCormick Tribune Foundation for their support of this 

wonderful day for me, and for many others. The day provides a chance to 

see so many friends and associates of past years, and a chance to reminisce 

over three or four decades of one’s past life. It is a special pleasure for me 

today to be with Jim and Betty Wright, my predecessor in the Office of 

the Speaker. And later with Newt Gingrich, my successor. The day prompts 

many pleasant memories of Carl Albert and Tip O’Neill. I am also delighted 

to be here with Bob Michel, who was the Republican leader all the time 

that I was Speaker and a man for whom I have unbounded admiration as 

a model of congressional and public service. And as Speaker Hastert said 

today, we all are saddened by your wife’s recent death. 

Looking back at the time that I first came to Congress, I recall a story 

I’ve told before. I hope those who have heard it may forgive me. I joined 

the Congress in 1964 as a part of the 89th Congress. It was a young and 

rather large Democratic majority. In those days and today, the parties meet 

in December to organize their work and to offer newly-elected Members 

a chance to familiarize themselves with their responsibilities. Speaker John 

McCormack addressed us newly-elected Members at that 1964 December 

meeting. He said that the leadership probably would have to make a judgment 2 years later about whether we had been elected seriously by our constituents or by accident. Members are sometimes elected by accident, he 

said, and we won’t really know which you are until you are reelected, if 

you are. With that warm greeting, we proceeded into the orientation program. 

One of the speakers was Michael Kirwan from the State of Ohio, who 

was a powerful member of the Committee on Appropriations. In fact, he 

was ‘‘Mr. Public Works.’’ You couldn’t get a footbridge built in the United 

States without Mike’s approval. He leaned forward to tell us that he wanted 

to warn us about the single greatest danger that could occur to a new Member of Congress entering his or her congressional service. We leaned forward 

to hear what this was—an ethical problem or whatever. He said that the 

danger was thinking for yourselves! Avoid that, he said, at all costs. Avoid 

thinking for yourselves. You must follow the subcommittee chairman, follow 

the committee chairman. Support the chairman of the Democratic Caucus. 

70 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

Follow the majority whip. Support the majority leader. And especially, above 

all, support, defend and follow the Speaker. 

I remember being quite outraged. I had gotten elected as a new Member of Congress, I thought, to make some contribution to my time in public 

life and perhaps even beyond. And the idea that I should subcontract my 

judgment to the political leadership of the party was really offensive. And 

Kirwan went on to say that in his experience, more people had gotten into 

trouble in the Congress of the United States by thinking for themselves 

than by stealing money. That unbelievably shocking statement made me 

truly angry. Later on, it was my opportunity to become a subcommittee 

chairman, a committee chairman, the chairman of the Democratic Caucus, 

the Democratic whip, the majority leader under Jim Wright, and, finally, 

taking the oath of office as Speaker of the House of Representatives. And 

I recall that as I was taking the oath, the wise words of Mr. Kirwan came 

back across a generation of time. How right he was! 

But fortunately, then and now, Members do think for themselves. And 

they not only think for themselves on the Republican and the Democratic 

sides of the aisle, they think for themselves inside each party. I had an opportunity to talk a little bit with Speaker Hastert today at lunch. We both 

recognize that one of the problems of the speakership is to deal with very 

strong and powerful voices within one’s own party. I came to the speakership 

of the House as a former committee chairman, but not the most senior of 

them. Dan Rostenkowski, John Dingell, Jack Brooks and others had been 

powerful and wonderfully effective legislators and committee chairmen. They 

had extensive knowledge and experience in their fields. This is true not only 

with the committee chairmen, but with subcommittee chairmen, who have 

proliferated dramatically over the years. I think we had something like 160 

Democrats in the House of Representatives who were subcommittee chairmen. Sometimes there were conflicting jurisdictions between Appropriations 

subcommittee chairmen and authorizing committee chairmen or subcommittee chairmen. There is a problem, sometimes, of managing strong, 

effective, and powerful personalities. That’s one of the jobs that I didn’t 

really anticipate when I became Speaker—how much time is required managing jurisdictional disputes and trying to mediate between conflicts of approach. It’s the sort of kitchen work, as my former mentor Senator Warren 

Magnuson spoke of, in terms of the day-to-day work of a Speaker—conciliating, organizing, trying to move the tasks of the Congress forward. 

As Speaker Hastert said, I had a particular notion that it was the institutional responsibility of the Speaker, a special obligation, to be absolutely, 

as far as humanly possible, fair in the judgments made from the chair. The 

British model, the Westminster model as it’s called, takes the Speaker out 

of all party politics. My first opportunity to meet a British Speaker after 

I became Speaker was Bernard Wetherow, who moved from the House of 

The Foley Speakership 71 

Lords to become the Speaker of the British House of Commons. He resigned 

even from social clubs that were overly associated with the Conservative 

Party, so that his absolute impartiality would never be questioned. By the 

way, Speaker Wetherow asked me what number Speaker I was. I said, ‘‘Mr. 

Speaker, I’m the 49th.’’ He said that he was the 322d. I said, ‘‘Sir, that’s 

what we call in the United States a put-down. I’m the 49th, you’re the 

322d, or whatever.’’ He said, ‘‘Well, we started in 1277 or in 1388, depending 

on how you count the speakerships in the House of Commons in the U.K.’’ 

And he said, ‘‘And 10 of us were beheaded, 2 on the same day when the 

king was in a particularly unhappy mood.’’ We don’t have that problem 

here, at least physical beheading. We sometimes have political beheading. 

I know something about political beheading. 

But the role of the U.S. Speaker is a combination, as Speaker Hastert 

said, of the party leader and the impartial British-type judicial Speaker. It’s 

not an easy task. You are pushed by your own party to move legislation 

forward and you want to do it. You face the problem that sometimes a 

motion to recommit with instructions if proposed in a certain way may create great problems. There’s a tendency, sometimes, to perhaps cut a little 

too close on what others feel is the absolute right of the minority. Those 

are tough decisions. I had, however, the great benefit of having an impartial 

Parliamentarian, who Speaker Hastert also talked about. The two offices that 

are voted on that are usually without any controversy are the Parliamentarian 

and the Chaplain. It is important that the rulings of the chair in critical 

times can be depended upon by both parties. 

We had a few occasions when there was an objection to the ruling 

of the chair, and someone called for a vote on that decision. I don’t think 

any time that happened that Bob Michel didn’t support the chair. He felt, 

I think, that the chair’s ruling had been correct and that it should not be 

the subject of controversy in the House. On the other hand, the price for 

that support was that, as Speaker, I had to ensure that the rulings are fair 

so that they can elicit bipartisan support. In many legislatures, appealing 

the ruling of the chair is a constant event and takes place routinely. I think 

in 50 years, we may have had a dozen or so formal challenges to the ruling 

of the chair. 

During the time I was Speaker, I served with President George Bush 

41, as we now say. President Bush was President for 3 years of my speakership 

and President Clinton for 2. It was interesting to me that there is a difference 

in whether you have divided or united government between the congressional leadership and the Presidential leadership. We have had, for most 

of the period after World War II, divided political responsibility—generally 

Republican Presidents with Democratic majorities in the Congress and those 

have a particular dynamic. There is a tendency, frankly, for relations between 

the Congress and the Presidency to be as good, and in some cases even 

72 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

better, with divided government. For some, that might come as a surprise. 

But the fact is that the need to make the system of government work leads 

to a kind of elaborate, almost diplomatic, sensitivity between the White 

House and the Congress to the reactions of the other. 

In contrast, if there is united government with the White House and 

Congress under control of one party, Congress expects that the new, let’s 

say, Democratic President is going to solve all the problems that they want 

to have addressed and they now think it’s possible to go forward with a 

very energetic and effective legislative program. The congressional majority 

Members expect all those they appointed in their districts to be happy and 

satisfied with them. At the same time, the President feels that his program 

should be taken up without much question and enthusiastically passed by 

his congressional colleagues. The disappointments that are possible on both 

sides of this united government are great. 

During the period of divided government, I was blamed, along with 

then-Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, for having talked President 

George H.W. Bush 41 into agreeing to some tax increases. Some attribute 

his defeat in 1992 to his having allegedly broken his ‘‘no new taxes’’ promise. 

As I look back on that period, one of the things that I admired most about 

President Bush was his willingness to confront internal problems in the Republican Party by taking that decision. It was a decision taken along with 

spending restrictions on the budget. But an agreement on spending cuts 

and new taxes was obviously going to be a problem for President Bush and 

it turned out to be. 

I used to say, somewhat jokingly, that there are two sins in politics— 

one is the obvious sin of not keeping your campaign promises. But sometimes I think that’s the more venal sin. The sometimes more mortal sin 

is keeping your campaign promises. If they turn out to be wrong for the 

country, wrong for the future of the Nation, then I think whether we’re 

in Congress or the White House, we have to reconsider that. I had great 

respect for President Bush’s willingness to take that risk. 

When President Clinton came to office, he was the first Democratic 

President in 12 years. With George Mitchell in the Senate and me in the 

House, there were many Democrats who wanted to see the new President 

succeed and wanted to support his major legislative agenda. Looking back 

on it, I think that perhaps we could have been more supportive of the administration by, once in awhile, being a bit more candid with the President. 

I think the new administration came in with great enthusiasm, particularly 

on health care. The White House overstressed the institutional support of 

the House. We had to decide, for example, whether to put the President’s 

health care reform bill through the established committees of Congress, such 

as Ways and Means and Commerce, or push the legislation through a task 

force. The task force idea I rejected. I thought the legislation should go 

The Foley Speakership 73 

through the ordinary committee structure. But that required multiple committee referrals. 

Eventually, the Congressional Budget Office was overwhelmed by the 

demands of individual Members to examine the cost of their amendments. 

The system slowed down and was greeted on the Republican side with a 

decision to straight-out oppose, rather than just try to modify, the health 

care bill. We all know the consequence of that—the bill did not proceed 

through the end of that Congress. I think this was a contributing factor 

to the country’s disillusionment with the Democratic leadership and the 1994 

defeat of the majority in Congress. In retrospect, I think we would have 

been wiser, as Dan Rostenkowski suggested today, with a more incremental 

approach such as the Kennedy-Kassebaum bill, a step-by-step process, as 

opposed to trying to achieve everything overnight in the way of health care 

reform. We might have been more effective and successful. 

Tony Coelho gave me good advice one time after he left Congress. He 

said, ‘‘Don’t look back and don’t regret.’’ I think that’s a good rule. You 

may have made mistakes. There may have been opportunities you didn’t 

fulfill, but you did what you could while you were there. 

In the session on Jim Wright, the question arises as to whether it’s 

better to be more assertive or more cautious. If I have a regret, it’s probably 

been on two or three occasions that I wasn’t as assertive as I think now 

perhaps I should have been. But one of the things that I hoped we would 

see—and I’m disappointed we do not see today—is a continuation of the 

kind of relationship between the majority and the minority that existed 

when I was Speaker and Bob Michel was the Republican leader. We met 

almost every day and the staff certainly met every day. We went back and 

forth to the other’s offices. I always felt that Bob was an extremely effective 

Republican leader. It was necessary to know exactly where we wanted to 

go and to see if we could compromise or find an approach that would lead 

to some accommodation of the issue, rather than a confrontation. 

Our efforts in those times were sometimes rewarded with success, such 

as was the case with most of our party members in different camps on the 

1991 Gulf war. Despite those differences, we had a debate which I still think 

was one of the most thoughtful and impressive that I can recall in the Congress. There was a full discussion of whether the United States should authorize war and give the President authority to enter the war. It’s interesting 

to me that President Bush 41 wanted this vote to come after the election 

so it would not be politicized. The vote in the present case came before 

the election. In any event, I’ll never forget Bob Michel coming up to the 

Speaker’s chair, where I was sitting, wearing that combat infantryman’s 

badge, which he won so well in World War II. Here was a big tough guy 

with tears in his eyes. He said, ‘‘This is the hardest vote I think I’ve ever 

had to cast because I’m putting young men and women at risk and I know 

74 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

it. But I think it’s the right thing to do.’’ He and I voted differently on 

the bill, but it was a sense of, I think, the mutual respect that Republicans 

and Democrats throughout the House had with the differing opinions of 

their colleagues on an issue of enormous importance to the country. 

I regret that in recent years there’s been a tension between persons, 

as well as between parties and policies. There was even a civility conference 

a few years ago at Hershey, Pennsylvania, where Members of both parties 

came with their families to try and reconcile those harsh personal relationships in the House and try to get a sense of comity and friendship and 

a common effort. 

The House of Representatives is the voice of the American people, the 

Senate the voice of the States. That’s the way we see it in the House. Former 

Representative Richard Bolling was once accused of making a derogatory 

comment about the House, saying it was made up of ‘‘provincials.’’ He defended his remark by saying that that is what the House was supposed to 

be. It is intended to be the place where people represent their districts, 

represent the differences in our country. House Members represent the communities in which they grew up and where they have their primary residence 

in life. I think Speaker Hastert reflected that again today when he spoke 

of returning to his district on weekends and his desire to keep always in 

front of him the origin of his service in the Congress and his speakership. 

Former Speaker John McCormack once said another thing that I’ll never 

forget. He said if the day comes when you look up at the Capitol as you 

come to work in summer, in fall, in rain or in snow, and you are not individually thrilled and heartened by the enormous honor of representing 500,000 

or 600,000 people as constituents, and if you don’t think that that is something that you should be deeply grateful for—he said quit, just quit. Because 

if you don’t have that sense of thrill, that sense of great honor and opportunity, he said you’ve stayed too long. I think that’s good advice, and I 

think that those who have had a chance to serve here will look back on 

that service, regardless of their party, with a sense of first great obligation 

and thanks to their constituents. 

For over 30 years, my constituents sent me to Washington and allowed 

me to represent them as best I could. Those of us who have held the Office 

of Speaker have had a second honor bestowed on us. Speakers have that 

special sense that they have been chosen by their fellow Members—all of 

them representatives and delegates of a great national constituency. To be 

elected Speaker is even a greater honor in many respects than being elected 

to represent a constituency. And whether we have done the job well or less 

well, whether we have achieved all that we might or not—and none of us 

achieves everything we wish—I think we can look back on being Speaker 

as one of the great opportunities and one of the great honors of our lives. 

And I am happy today, regardless of differences between individuals and 

The Foley Speakership 75 

parties and personalities, to join with others who have had that experience. 

I thank you all for taking part in this conference. Thank you. 

Mr. FRENZEL. Thanks, Tom Foley. Thanks, Library of Congress. 

Thanks to all of you for being here. And thanks to whomever was rash 

enough to invite me. 

Being asked to comment on the Foley speakership creates a real temptation to deliver a eulogy while a body is still warm. And I’m going to have 

to succumb to it, because it was my great privilege to serve all my time 

in Congress concurrently with Speaker Foley and have had many opportunities to interact with him. 

I remember the first time I really met him was in the early seventies 

on a trip to Japan. Tom was then a very ancient senior Member of four 

or five terms, and I was just a rookie from the minority. He showed me 

around and I remember being very impressed with his reception by the Japanese and with his knowledge of that country and its political system. And, 

of course, more than 20 years later, it was my pleasure to dine in his house 

at our Embassy in Japan where he was representing all of us with distinction 

as our Ambassador in Tokyo. 

Of course, distinction has followed Tom wherever he has gone. Those 

of us who served in the House are wont to say that he really gave politics 

a bad name. He was forever thinking selfish thoughts about integrity and 

decency and service and trustworthiness and about doing a good job for 

the constituents. That really was Tom’s hallmark. 

I have served with only four Speakers, all of them Democrats, and all 

of whom I consider friends. And so I’m not really anxious to get into comparisons. But one of the things that I enjoyed about Tom and his leadership—not just as Speaker, but as majority leader, as a committee chairman— 

almost certainly from the time I came to Congress, was that he could be 

a real Democrat, a ‘‘big D’’ Democrat, but still respect and be respected 

by all of the Members of Congress, be they Republicans or Democrats. 

I don’t know if that arose from the fact that Tom came from a fairly 

competitive congressional district where you had to make friends with everybody. Perhaps it did, or perhaps it simply originates from the fact that he 

is that kind of a person, respectful and respected. 

In watching him, I learned that you could be a party loyalist, but still 

remember that you had representational responsibilities to the whole country, to all the people within your district. And remember, too, that you 

have to be fair to every Member of the House, especially when you’re the 

boss. As he spoke of trying to work compromises with my great hero Bob 

Michel in the House, with whom I was also favored to serve, I thought 

that with great men like that, compromise does not represent weakness. On 

the contrary, it represents the strength of our system. That made me terribly 

proud to be a part of the system. 

76 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

The House is a very tough political environment. Compared to the 

other body, it is like the difference between professional football and chess. 

The majority has an important duty to move a program. Often, it is moved 

over the dead bodies of the minority, or by stretching the rules a bit. But 

that’s not an easy chore, because the majority has to put its troops together. 

And I can imagine that when Tom got ahold of the gavel and got 

up there on the Speaker’s podium, he was praying that every one of his 

caucus would follow the admonitions of Chairman Kirwan and follow the 

Speaker’s wishes. But sometimes they didn’t. And that’s one of the reasons 

that it is rash to compare speakerships. The House is different at all times. 

It has different Members. It has different issues. It has different crosscurrents. There are different coalitions. Everything is different. And Speakers 

are different, too. And while their problems are similar, they are by no means 

the same. 

Tom presided over the House in what we now recognize was a period 

of the decline of the Rooseveltian coalition, which was beginning to come 

apart. It apparently had good, strong majorities. But, on the other hand, 

after 62 years of ascendancy with two small imperfections, most of its Democratic Members believed that they were born to rule and that their rule 

was ordained by the Almighty. 

That was a nice feeling, except for Tom. It gave him an army of all 

generals and no foot soldiers. And it was not a really easy matter to put 

all of those people together in a single place for any bill. He also ruled 

at a time when the committees were manned by very senior ‘‘old bulls’’ 

in the party. As everyone knows, when they are at full strength, the Speaker 

is never quite at full strength. 

Jeff touted him as a conciliator, a facilitator, a mediator, and so do 

I. He was, for me, just a remarkable affirmation of what our system should 

be. As a member of the minority, I trusted and respected Tom Foley. 

Now remember, I didn’t vote with Tom Foley a lot. I thought he was 

kind of squirrelly in his voting habits. But he was doing the best he could. 

You remember Dennis Hastert gave us his admonition, which is people expect you to keep your word. For me, you could put Tom’s word in the 

bank. And that’s pretty hard to equal. That’s about as good as you can 

do in Washington in my judgment. 

I saw Leon Panetta out in the audience and I was just remembering 

that there was a time when Leon and I went to see Tom about a matter 

that had to do with the Budget Committee. Leon was then chairman and 

I was a flunky. Leon said, ‘‘Mr. Speaker, can you help us with this problem?’’ 

And the Speaker said, ‘‘Of course. I think you’re right on this.’’ The Speaker 

made one phone call and resolved our problem instantly. 

The following year we were back with the same problem. I said, ‘‘Mr. 

Speaker, can you help us with this problem?’’ And the Speaker said, ‘‘No, 

The Foley Speakership 77 

I can’t do that for you.’’ Since I was the minority person, I had to challenge 

the statement. I said, ‘‘Why not, Mr. Speaker? You did it last year.’’ And 

he said, ‘‘Ah, but I was new in the job and then I did not know the limitations of my power.’’ 

So if you think it is an easy job to be Speaker, forget it. But also, 

if you think it’s going to be easy for any future Speakers to live up to 

the reputation and achievements of Tom Foley, abolish those thoughts as 

well. As far as I’m concerned, he was the greatest. 

Mr. FAZIO. Jeff, thank you and the Library of Congress for including 

me in this discussion of the speakership. I think it is the most important, 

most difficult, most under-appreciated and least-understood leadership position in American Government, second only to the President. There’s no 

question that I tend to agree with a lot of what Bill Frenzel has said. I’d 

like to concentrate on the question of Foley’s marginal seat and the impact 

it had. I think he’s the last—not just one of the few as Jeff said—but the 

last Speaker who will come from a district that was evenly balanced and 

could go either way in any election. 

Tom Foley was elected to the House in the midsixties during a Democratic ascendancy. He kept the district with some tight races for 30 years, 

largely because of the force of his own personality and his effective representation of the wheatgrowers and all the other elements of that district. He 

always put the needs of his constituents first. That was his first and most 

compelling assignment and he always carried it out well. But the speakership 

had evolved to a multifaceted, 24–7 job. It became not just the internal 

collaborative leadership that the Speakers are required to provide, but also 

the ‘‘outside job,’’ the fundraising, the Sunday talk shows, the speeches in 

faraway places—not just to help your colleagues with their fundraising and 

their reelection campaigns, but as a way of projecting the party on issue 

after issue and raising money for the Congressional Campaign Committees. 

It means that inevitably the district fades to some degree. And it’s not just 

the fact that you can’t be there as much as you may have been, but it’s 

also the reality that you have to take more partisan positions than they are 

used to hearing you express at home. 

So inevitably, I think, Tom Foley’s career in the eastern district of 

Washington State ended when his speakership did because not only was the 

Democratic Party in eastern Washington State weakening, but the traditional Democratic Party that Bill Frenzel referred to as their Rooseveltian 

coalition was disintegrating as well. The style of leadership that Foley 

brought to the speakership was also changing. No question it influenced 

how he ran the House. Tom Foley was like Tip—a man of the House that 

he grew up in. That was why Speaker Foley was so much a regular order 

kind of guy. 

78 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

I was thinking earlier today about the health care legislation, still referred to as the Clinton health care plan. Other names have been attached 

over the years, but the bottom line is this Speaker felt regular order needed 

to prevail in order to bring a health bill to the floor that could pass. I 

am sure Danny Rostenkowski remembers meeting after meeting in the 

Speaker’s office when we tried to put together the votes, either in the Commerce Committee or the Ways and Means Committee, to begin the process. 

We didn’t have those votes and could not move the legislation. I realize 

now what Newt Gingrich would have done, and we did it regularly in the 

next speakership—put a task force together. Denny Hastert earlier referred 

to them as, he said, a way of undermining the committee system. But Speaker Gingrich would not have hesitated about moving a bill of that importance 

to his party and his President through by irregular order. He would have 

found another way to do it and it somehow would have gotten to the floor 

and probably passed by a couple of votes, as so often has been the case 

since 1995. 

I respect Tom Foley’s approach. He knew his caucus was not as unified 

as it needed to be and most of all he respected the committee system that 

had served the House so well. He was a product of that tradition. It was 

also regular order for Speaker Foley when it came to supporting the Clinton 

administration. Having observed the conflicts between the O’Neill speakership and the Carter Presidency, Tom Foley took a different, more supporting 

approach. You remember it was Hamilton Jordan, Carter’s Chief of Staff, 

who was frequently called ‘‘Hannibal Jerkin.’’ There was real antipathy there. 

Most Democrats saw, in retrospect, that the discord didn’t necessarily aid 

the Carter administration in their difficult reelection quest. 

Speaker Foley, as he’s already indicated, did all he could possibly do 

to help implement President Clinton’s agenda. All those who were members 

of his last caucus look back with pride on that budget vote in 1993 which 

brought us, Democrats believe, a balanced budget and a decade of prosperity. 

It also probably contributed significantly to the decline and ultimate defeat 

of our majority. I remember later when we took the crime bill to the floor, 

we had a very tough choice to make. Do we move the assault weapons ban 

as a separate, stand-alone piece of legislation, or do we make it part of the 

omnibus crime bill, however difficult that would make it for many moderate 

and conservative Democrats with strong NRA constituencies to vote for it? 

Parenthetically, we even had some on the left voting against the crime bill 

rule because they didn’t support any provisions relating to the death penalty. 

It was a very good example of how fragmented and diverse our Democratic 

Caucus had become, and how difficult it was to bring it all together. We 

chose to, as I think my friend Leon Panetta said, give the President a victory 

The Foley Speakership 79 

and pass that bill with the assault weapon ban in it. But we also had tremendous negative fallout for many of our Members just 1 year later. 

Speaker Foley personally paid the price for the bill in his own race. 

He lost the NRA’s support for the first time in his career. There’s no question that Tom Foley liked to work with his fellow committee chairs. He 

was one of them. He came through the Agriculture Committee to be its 

chair, then moved into the elected leadership and ultimately the speakership. 

He respected the diversity within the bipartisan committee process. Remember, it was an era when you put out bills with as broad a bipartisan majority 

as you could get. When possible, you worked with the Republicans during 

those years in the majority, in part because it gave us more impetus, more 

momentum when we got to the floor. After all, we weren’t always sure where 

all those elements of that Democratic coalition were going to be at vote 

time. Fragmentation had set in within our caucus, and the committee structure normally gave the Democratic leadership the broader support it needed 

to pursue its agenda on the floor. 

Tom Foley’s time in the leadership was already an era when we were 

closely divided. But it was also the era when the one-party South, the Democratic majority in the South, had totally disintegrated. It was also a period 

where the diversity that had become one of the keys to changing our caucus 

in the eighties and into the nineties, worked against us. We didn’t all know 

or empathize with each other. We didn’t share common experiences. And 

that certainly was true of the House in general as well as the Democratic 

Caucus. 

I remember hearing stories about Bob Michel and Danny Rostenkowski 

driving to and from Illinois together through many of their years in Washington. That sort of friendship, that sort of personal relationship above and 

beyond party, had almost vanished during Tom Foley’s speakership. What 

existed was a more divided House with little community. It’s a trend that 

has continued to this day. Families live in their districts, not in Washington. 

Two- and three-day weeks are common with jet travel back and forth to 

the district. There is pressure on the leadership from the Members to come 

in late and go out early. These circumstances contributed to an incredible 

amount of disarray, not just in one party, but in the House in general. 

On top of that, we suffered greatly from the internal troubles brought 

about by all of the so-called ‘‘scandals’’ that the House came under scrutiny 

for—the bank, the post office, and so on. We had elements of our caucus, 

generally older Members and those from safe seats, who felt that if we would 

just hold tight, these problems were transitory and they would all blow 

away. Other elements, people younger and more marginal in their seats, 

were under such pressure in their districts that they couldn’t go home for 

a weekend without coming back fully inflamed about what these problems 

that they didn’t really know much about, or hadn’t participated in, were 

80 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

doing to their reelection chances. So Tom Foley had a very tough time reconciling the generational shift that was going on within his caucus—the large 

influx of people in 1974, plus the Members who carried over for 30 and 

40 years, and a lot of people who had been elected in the late eighties and 

into the nineties whose tenure was quite tenuous. 

And so I think Tom Foley epitomized modern collaborative leadership 

in this very difficult environment. He worked very hard at bringing people 

together, brokering compromises, working with State delegations and the 

exploding number of informal caucuses, dealing with committee assignments, and assigning legislation to one or more committees. These kinds 

of one-on-one, small group gatherings are leadership requirements that are 

really the hallmark of the speakership. It wasn’t just that other strength 

he has of being a great stentorian speaker and floor leader. It was also the 

personal touch. The need to be putting your arm around somebody, bringing 

together a compromise that might otherwise have been lost. 

There’s no question when you ask Members to look back on their years 

in the Foley House, they will relate to his ability to go into the well and 

extemporaneously make remarks that actually moved votes, and, I believe, 

probably on both sides of the aisle. He was also great in our districts. For 

those of us who had him come by and speak to our contributors and our 

supporters, it was always a positive experience. He has wonderful rhetorical 

skills. I think back on all those stories that I came to know almost so well 

that I could repeat them myself—the words on Jefferson’s tomb were the 

basis for one of my favorites. And Mike Kirwan—a far more familiar figure 

with the American public today because of Tom Foley’s stories that you 

heard a version of earlier. This was a man who could communicate in every 

sense of that term. He was someone whom I was proud to serve with, and 

I look back on that time very fondly. Thank you. 

Mr. BIGGS. We still have some time and would welcome questions. 

Question. How important is it for Congress to be more assertive in 

foreign and defense policy? That concern has come up in a couple of different 

speakerships, and I think in today’s climate it is an appropriate question. 

Speaker FOLEY. I think it’s obviously important for the House and 

the Speaker to have their voices heard on foreign policy. The President, by 

some constitutional opinion, inherited the powers of George III to make 

foreign policy and to command the military services as commander in chief. 

But the power of the purse, the power to implement foreign policy, which 

is essential today in any foreign policy undertaking, requires the House and 

the Senate to be involved. I think the Speaker must be involved in that. 

We talked earlier here today about Jim Wright and the work that was done 

with the Reagan administration. Looking back, for example, on Tip O’Neill’s 

service—I was a whip when Tip was Speaker—I never saw a case where 

President Reagan called and asked Tip O’Neill to do something that Reagan 

The Foley Speakership 81 

thought was in the interest of the country’s foreign policy that Tip didn’t 

agree to do it. But he would also tell the President what he thought about 

various foreign policy issues. He told him privately and told him candidly. 

But, on the other hand, Tip felt very strongly that the Speaker should be 

supportive of the President on those issues where he could conscientiously 

support him in the interest of the foreign policy of the country. 

I want to take the opportunity again to express my regret at the sort 

of permanent campaign we have under way now. It’s a function of both 

congressional and Presidential politics that the campaign never really ends. 

Fundraising goes on constantly, and preparing for the next election almost 

begins the day after the returns come in from the last one. That has consequences for the ability of the House or the government to work together 

after an election to move the country’s agenda and purposes forward. It can 

be a very critical problem, obviously, in foreign policy. 

So, how do we get over the political consequences of the permanent 

campaign and restore a sense of comity and trust that both branches are 

trying to move the country’s agenda forward? As a Democratic Speaker, I 

also wanted to see a Republican President succeed in every way when I could 

conceive it as being in the interest of the country. Anyone who doesn’t want 

a President to succeed, who wants a total failure, is, as they say, no friend 

of the republic. 

I should also say that one of the things I felt when I was in office 

was that we needed to have opportunities for Democrats and Republicans 

to find ways to talk together outside the formal debates of the House. There 

was a case that occurred when I was Speaker in the 102d Congress when 

we had one of those briefings for new Members. I was telling the new Democratic Members that I thought they should take an opportunity—I didn’t 

think the press was present—to miss a vote. Not a serious vote, not one 

that would affect their reelection, obviously, or affect public policy, just miss 

some kind of ordinary, routine vote so they could never, ever think about 

having a 100 percent voting record. I mentioned this because we had a couple 

of Members who had 100 percent voting records. When one of them finally 

failed to get back to the House in time, he wept on the floor after missing 

the first vote after 17,372 consecutive votes. I also recall that former Representative Bill Natcher came from the Bethesda Naval Hospital on a gurney, 

on life supports, to vote so his consecutive voting record would not be broken. 

I told the new Members to avoid that situation. Just sit through a 

roll call vote on approving the Journal or something—you get 99.99 percent, 

but you can’t get 100. Second, I said that you ought to travel, if you get 

a chance in your committee, to some place where the committee’s jurisdiction is involved. You’ll learn something important about the committee’s 

work. But you’ll also have a chance to have some association with your colVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00091 Fmt 8164 Sfmt 8164 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.004 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
82 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

leagues. There’s nothing like being together on an airplane for awhile, and 

being in a foreign country, to make Members who don’t usually have much 

opportunity to see or talk to each other do that. You learn that there’s a 

lot of wisdom and judgment and good character on the other side of the 

aisle, if you had any doubts about that. If you needed a political reason 

for travel, sometime later in your career you might get a vote from the 

Republican side of the aisle on something the Member had no particular 

interest in except the fact that you and he were together, or you and she 

were together, somewhere on committee business. 

Anyway, it turned out there was a press reporter in the room, and 

the next day he reported that Tom Foley, as Speaker of the House, told 

the Democrats of the 102d Congress to miss a vote and take a junket. Fox 

Morning News the next morning said they were shocked to learn that the 

Speaker of the House had told the newly elected Democrats to miss as many 

votes as they could—miss as many votes as they could—and never miss 

a chance to take a publicly financed trip abroad. 

There is a need for Members of Congress to have this opportunity to 

get through the divisions that we have on committees, the divisions that 

we have across the aisle, and to have a chance to know each other and to 

learn the kind of respect that follows from that. I think it helps in the 

legislative process. I think it helps bring about an opportunity for compromise and common effort. 

When you sit down here and reminisce about the past with other 

Speakers, I am reminded that I always had the problem of being mistaken 

for Tip, in part because Tip and I were about the same weight. Naturally, 

we both have white hair and big Irish mugs, as Tip said. When I became 

Speaker, I weighed about 283 pounds. I weigh about 90 pounds less than 

that today. But I remember I went to a gym in New Orleans when I was 

Speaker. A very old retainer of the club had been very helpful to me, and 

I thanked him. He said, ‘‘Don’t thank me, Mr. Speaker. It’s been an honor 

and pleasure to have you here, and I’m going to tell all the club members 

we had the Honorable Mr. Tip O’Neill here in our club today.’’ I didn’t 

know what to say except thank you. A year later I was in Nordstrom’s in 

San Francisco with Tom Nides, who was on my staff, and I bought a shirt. 

As I was leaving the counter, I heard the two clerks talk and one of them 

said, ‘‘Do you know who that was?’’ And the other said, ‘‘No.’’ He said, 

‘‘That’s the Speaker of the House of Representatives.’’ He said, ‘‘Tip 

O’Neill?’’ The other said, ‘‘No, dummy—Jim Wright.’’ Anyway, it was an 

honor to have followed both Tip and Jim. 

Mr. BIGGS. We’ve got time for one last question. 

Question. You talked about carrying out the speakership through processes of negotiation and coalition building that had to span both sides of 

the aisle. That’s a mode of operation, as we’ve heard today, that goes right 

The Foley Speakership 83 

back to the ‘‘Board of Education’’ room and Sam Rayburn, if not before. 

I remember having the impression that when the New Yorker magazine did 

a profile of you during your speakership, that in a lot of cases the negotiations you were engaged in tended to be putting together different factions 

within what was a very large Democratic majority. We’ve also heard commentators say today that we’re now in a more partisan era where a lot of 

the coalition building tends to take place within the majority party. 

To what extent, then, did the necessity of carrying out coalition negotiations—just to hold the large and diverse Democratic majority together— 

contribute to the situation in which the minority tend to get more and 

more left out of the coalition process? Did this trend contribute to a more 

partisan operation in the House? 

Speaker FOLEY. I think there’s some truth to what you say. I think 

in recent years a close majority in the House and the Senate put an emphasis 

on getting legislation through with your own troops, and keeping the core 

coalition of your own party together. And that inhibits reaching out very 

much to the other party. It all depends on time and circumstances. In the 

Democratic Party, frankly, we had many more Members who were on the 

conservative side politically than Republicans had Members who were very 

liberal. There were a few, but I think the spectrum in the Democratic Party 

was much broader than it was in the Republican Party. So we had to deal 

with the possibility that Republicans would attract some support from 

Democrats. We had a committee chairman, I should say a subcommittee 

chairman, who somebody calculated had voted against the Democratic position on key bills 85 percent of the time. I had to justify our continued 

support for him by the fact that he voted to organize the House, which 

was an important vote by the way. 

Coalition building also depends on whether there’s a closely divided 

House and what party is in the White House. If you’ve got a Republican 

White House with a Democratic majority in the House, that requires greater 

consultation. It is true, frankly, that Republicans, I think, felt much more 

abused—I don’t know what the right word is—much more ignored or much 

more overridden than the Democrats felt they were overriding or abusing. 

So it’s a perception problem, in part. Now Democrats tell me whatever we 

did then pales compared to what the Republican majority is doing to the 

Democrats in the minority. 

I remember Speaker Hastert saying about a month ago, when this issue 

arose in the press, that at least the Republicans didn’t take away the Democrats’ parking spaces or office keys. With great respect to the Speaker, who 

I do admire very much, I can never recall us going so far as taking away 

a parking space or an office key. That would be really intervening. But it’s 

always as seen by the beholder. I guess the other thing that’s gone, in my 

judgment, is this kind of bipartisan social relationship. There was, I think, 

84 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

a tendency to become almost like the British parties. There is a tension 

not only on policy and even on party principle, but even personal tension. 

That is the degree to which, I think, the situation has gone too far and 

where it has had a deleterious effect on the House and its operations. 

Actually, my admiration and interest goes to the great Speakers of the 

19th century, who were pretty authoritarian Speakers, by the way. My favorite is Thomas Brackett Reed, who was an enormously powerful Speaker and 

a very witty one. As legend has it, he was asked one time if he was going 

to go to the funeral of a political opponent. He said, ‘‘No, I’m not going, 

but I approve of it highly.’’ Somebody suggested that he might be a candidate for President himself and he said, ‘‘They could go farther and do 

worse and they undoubtedly will.’’ One Member was excited on the floor 

making a speech and said, ‘‘Mr. Speaker, I’d rather be right than be President.’’ The Speaker leaned down and said, ‘‘The gentleman need not exorcise 

himself. He has very little chance of being either.’’ 

Mr. BIGGS. Could you speak for just a couple of minutes about something that is a little extra-legislative, and that is the whole idea of the budget summits during your speakership? 

Speaker FOLEY. The budget summits are the only time that I have 

a twinge of nostalgia about not being in the House anymore. And I don’t 

understand why because budget summits were great periods of tension. We 

had two or three of them when I was a majority leader and Speaker. They 

involved various problems. One was the stock market crash of 1987. We 

had to do an emergency reduction of the budget in order to strengthen 

the market, along with the Federal Reserve’s quick infusion of a lot of liquidity. I chaired a bipartisan House-Senate committee at that time—a task 

force, I guess. Senator John Stennis asked someone if that young Foley was 

chairing it. They said, ‘‘Yes,’’ to which he responded, ‘‘I like young people 

to get their chance.’’ I treasure that remembrance. 

We also had budget summits with President George H.W. Bush and 

it involved constant meetings in my office and other places where Nick 

Brady jTreasury Secretaryk and John Sununu jWhite House Chief of Staffk 

and Mr. Dick Darman jOMB Directork would come up and we would work 

over the various alternatives. I remember the famous budget summit we 

had over the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill. Senator Fritz Hollings said his 

name on the end of the legislation was a sure way to anonymity because 

the proposal generally became known as Gramm-Rudman. 

This is an interesting form of the previous question. The House was 

then in Democratic control and the Senate was in Republican control. The 

summit was between House Democrats and Senate Republicans. We sat 

around my office—Senator Pete Domenici, Senator Warren Rudman, Senator 

Hollings, and others. The question was whether we should invite the minority to take part in it, that is, House Republicans and Senate Democrats. 

The Foley Speakership 85 

It was one of the Republican Members, who shall remain anonymous, who 

said, ‘‘No, no, no. We are the governing coalition, the Democrats of the 

House and the Republicans of the Senate on this bill. And if we invite 

in the minority, yours or ours, they will have no particular incentive except 

to obstruct and delay.’’ I didn’t think that was right. I thought we should 

have invited the minority Members. But it was overruled at that time. Budget summits also can lead to very serious consequences. I think the defeat 

of the budget summit by the House under Newt Gingrich’s leadership was 

a seminal event at the time. 

By the way, it’s interesting for me to recall that single events that 

don’t seem to be connected can have significant consequences. For example, 

Senator John Tower was appointed by President George Bush 41 to be the 

Secretary of Defense. He ran into the opposition of Senator Sam Nunn, and 

the Senate Armed Services Committee failed to report his nomination affirmatively. This was an embarrassment for the administration and they decided, 

I think, that they needed someone to appoint as Secretary of Defense that 

would be instantly confirmable—unanimously confirmable. They decided 

that person was Dick Cheney, who was then Republican whip. He was taken 

from the House whip’s job, nominated as Secretary of Defense, and unanimously confirmed by the Senate. Cheney’s departure led to a race in the 

House between a moderate Member and Newt Gingrich to replace Secretary 

Cheney as GOP whip and Newt won by one vote. All this came about 

as a consequence of the opposition of some Democrats to John Tower’s nomination to the Secretary of Defense job. 

Events have consequences. There are connections and some of us are 

old enough to recall them. By the way, I think Dick Cheney did a very 

credible job as Secretary of Defense and that, I think, led to the possibility 

of him becoming Vice President of the United States. So these things are 

interestingly connected. 

I’m generally not very much in favor of these extraordinary legislative 

vehicles like task forces and budget summits. But in times of emergency, 

sometimes regular order just doesn’t function that quickly and that responsively to a crisis that exists in the country. 

I’d like to—because he’s here and others are here—just say a word 

of great admiration for Dan Rostenkowski. He talked about Tip being a 

great legislator. I think Dan Rostenkowski was a great legislator. He also 

was a legislator who worked between the two parties in getting legislation 

out that was otherwise difficult to do. He would charge the President, if 

it was President Bush or whomever, to take care of his side of the aisle 

and he would take care of the Democrats. People I’ve talked to over the 

years remember with great respect Dan’s service on the Ways and Means 

Committee. They have always commented that Dan kept his eye on the 

ball, knew where the legislation had to go, and was extraordinarily effective 

86 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

at getting things done. It was an era of great figures like Dan and John 

Dingell. Both of them were great figures because they were both great chairmen. 

Mr. BIGGS. Thanks to Messrs. Fazio and Frenzel, Speaker Foley, and 

the audience. We can now declare a recess until the next session begins. 

87 

The Historical Speakership 

Dr. BILLINGTON. It is my pleasure as Librarian of Congress to be 

here with you at this commemoration of Speaker Cannon and this happy 

gathering of so many distinguished and historymaking Speakers of the 

House. I always say that the Congress of the United States has been the 

greatest single patron of a library in the history of the world, gathering 

in books and materials as no other legislature, or no other government for 

that matter, has done so effectively. The collections come to us through 

copyright deposit of the creative output of the whole private sector of America, and also include much of the world’s knowledge: two-thirds of our books 

are in languages other than English. 

I have to say that all of the Speakers that have been discussed so far, 

as well as the Speaker yet to come, have themselves played interesting and 

important roles sustaining the idea that every democracy—and especially 

one in a big, complex country like this—has to be based on knowledge 

and on ever more people having ever more access to ever more information. 

That was certainly true of everyone on the last panel that spoke, and I want 

to just take a moment to particularly single out Vic Fazio who, in his thankless work as chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on the Legislative 

Branch, played a particularly important role in the restoration of the Jefferson Building, without which that beautiful, extraordinary structure would 

not be seen in the same beauty and majesty that it is today. He also offered 

the first congressional support for the Library’s digital outreach to the Nation, which has now reached the point that we had 3 billion electronic transactions last year. This began in a small way with an important congressional 

appropriation, even though it has been largely funded by private money. 

And I should also mention in that regard the special role that Speaker 

Newt Gingrich played with his desire to have congressional information 

placed online: the whole THOMAS system owes a great deal to his initiative 

and support. I am here in active, humble gratitude for past and future users 

of the Library of Congress and also to give thanks to the private supporters 

of this important centennial; the foundations that have also made it possible; 

and, of course, to the Congressional Research Service under Dan Mulhollan’s 

able leadership for putting all of this together. 

My job today is to introduce a real expert on this whole subject, Professor Robert Remini. He is associated with the Library to fulfill a congresVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00097 Fmt 8164 Sfmt 8164 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.005 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
88 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

sional mandate, a mandate from the House in particular, to produce a history 

of the House of Representatives—one that would have scholarly substance 

and at the same time be accessible to a broad audience. We have been very 

fortunate to have enlisted the services of one of the most distinguished of 

American historians, Robert Remini. He is at present a distinguished senior 

scholar at the Kluge Center at the Library of Congress. As some of you 

may know, last week we gave out the first international prize in humanities 

and social sciences at the Nobel level through a Kluge endowment, and 

that has enabled us to bring some very distinguished scholars to the Library 

of Congress. The former President of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, 

just joined us last week. One of the most distinguished of all of these scholars is Bob Remini, and certainly one of the most important of the projects 

being done there is his history of the House of Representatives. 

Despite the bad light and my failing eyes, I will read you some of 

his many distinctions. He is compiling a congressionally authorized onevolume narrative history of the House of Representatives, which he has 

called—I’m quoting now—‘‘an extraordinary institution with its vivid and 

sometimes outrageous personalities.’’ You can see the little bit of adjectival 

twinkle already even in this brief characterization. He hopes his book will 

capture—I’m quoting again—‘‘all the excitement and drama that took place 

during the past 200 years so that the record of jthe House’sk triumphs, 

achievements, mistakes and failures can be better known and appreciated 

by the American people.’’ 

Professor Remini was educated at Fordham University, and graduated 

in 1947 from Columbia University, where he finished his Ph.D. in 1951. 

He has been a teacher of American history for more than 50 years, the author 

of a three-volume biography of Andrew Jackson, and many other studies 

of Jackson’s Presidency and of the Jacksonian era. He has also written biographies of Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, John Quincy Adams, and Joseph 

Smith. We know him as an earlier collaborator with the Library of Congress 

because he crafted the historical overview to a volume called Gathering History: the Marion S. Carson Collection of Americana in 1999. This is one of the 

Library’s most important private collections of American history. It deals 

particularly with families in Pennsylvania from the early 1800s, and includes 

the first picture of a human face probably ever taken anywhere by a photograph, which was taken, it turned out, in Philadelphia, and which turned 

up in this collection. Professor Remini brought it to life in this wonderful 

volume, as he has brought to life so much of the American past and particularly our history and the functions of our government. 

Thus, we have with us a historian who has looked at America through 

a variety of perspectives from the top down, from the bottom up, through 

the lives of great men, and through the artifacts of American cultural life. 

Now he is writing about the legislative institution that for over 200 years 

The Historical Speakership 89 

has grown to be the most consequential one in the free world. It is really 

hard to imagine a person better qualified by his long experience, and, I 

might add, by his energetic prowling of the halls of the House that he 

has been doing for the better part of a year. He has won many friends here. 

It is hard to imagine anyone better qualified by learning, experience, and 

temperament to undertake this task. Necessarily, his perspective, of course, 

has given him some insight into the role of Speakers over the years, and 

it is about them and their activities that he will speak to us this afternoon. 

So, it is my pleasure to present to you as close as we will ever get to a 

full chronicler of some of the early history of the House and someone who, 

with his own energy, vitality, and endless questioning for more than a year 

now, has this noble task of recording the story of the most important and 

the most representative legislature in the world. I give you Professor Robert 

Remini. 

Professor REMINI. Thank you very much, Dr. Billington, for that 

gracious introduction. I have a lot of people to thank. First of all, the Congressional Research Service who invited me here to come and talk about 

what I’m doing now in writing the history of the House of Representatives. 

I want to begin by singling out Congressman John Larson, whose idea it 

was to have a history written of this most important institution. Such a 

work has never been really done well, but there are indeed many books 

written about the House. I also want to thank Dr. Billington for inviting 

me to become a Kluge Scholar, and for providing me with an office in the 

Library of Congress, where I could write the history. 

I wasn’t sure I could do justice to this history. I’ve always done biographies. I’ve never written an institutional history. But all of the biographies, 

or most of them, are about people who have served in the House, like Jackson, like Martin Van Buren, like Henry Clay, like Daniel Webster, like 

John Quincy Adams. And I thought writing such a history would be fun. 

I could come into Congress and meet all the Congressmen and get involved 

in congressional politics, observing the problems and challenges that the 

Members have to contend with. 

One of the things that is disheartening to me is that we do not honor 

the men and women who have shaped this most important institution. And 

especially the men who were the Speakers. This institution has evolved, and 

it is continuing to evolve, just as the Office of the Speaker has evolved 

from what Speaker Foley said was the British system. Which is what the 

Founders, I think, intended. 

When I was researching Henry Clay, a student of mine came to me 

and said, ‘‘What are you working on now?’’ And I said, ‘‘I’m doing a biography of Henry Clay. Do you know who Henry Clay was?’’ He said, ‘‘Sure.’’ 

I said, ‘‘That’s wonderful. Who was he?’’ He replied, ‘‘He was the father 

of Cassius Clay.’’ And he didn’t mean the abolitionist Cassius Clay, either. 

90 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

Who today knows who Henry Clay was, for example? The Senate has 

selected five, I think it is, of their greatest Senators and recognized them. 

There is a room where their portraits are displayed. The presiding officers 

have their busts done after they step down. Two months ago, they had a 

commemorative ceremony for former Vice President Quayle. If you go into 

the Chamber of the House of Representatives, what do you see? George 

Washington—well, that’s OK. I mean after all, he is the father of the country—you wouldn’t have a republic without him. But what’s his relationship 

to the House of Representatives? He gave it the back of his hand the first 

time they asked him for the appropriate documents related to the Jay Treaty 

so that they could legislate the moneys needed to implement the treaty. 

He wouldn’t give the documents to them, replying instead, ‘‘If you want 

to impeach me, then you can ask for these documents.’’ But there he stands. 

In truth, he is the father of the country and deserving of great honor. 

On the other side of the rostrum is the Marquis de LaFayette. Now 

you tell me in God’s name what did LaFayette have to do with the House 

of Representatives? He was the first foreigner to speak to the House. Big 

deal. You see what I mean? Rather, we should honor the people who have 

done important things in the House such as Henry Clay. The Founders, 

I think, intended that the legislature would be central to the whole governmental operation. Notice the Constitution talks a great deal about the Congress and all of its responsibilities and powers while those not listed are 

reserved to the States and the people. But then you look at the other two 

branches, which are supposed to be separate and equal, and there is relatively 

little discussion. The judiciary—there will be a supreme court and such inferior courts as Congress shall, from time to time, establish. The executive 

was not much better. He may receive reports from the departments. What 

departments? It does not say. It was up to the Congress, then, to flesh out 

these other two co-equal branches. 

It was also expected that the men who attended the First Congress 

would complete the process of establishing the government, and indeed they 

did. First, they chose a Speaker. As the present Speaker, Dennis Hastert, 

said, ‘‘That’s the first office that is mentioned.’’ And in creating the office 

they were thinking, I believe, of someone akin to the British Speaker, who 

was nothing more than a traffic cop, recognizing one person over another, 

calling for votes, being non-partisan. 

The Office of the Speaker changed almost immediately with the formation of political parties because then you had two distinct views about how 

the government should operate. And I must say, as an aside, that what has 

happened here today having this conference is something that should be 

done much more often. There ought to be a greater awareness and sense 

of our past. We honor the living Speakers here present, but how about those 

who came before? This is, in part, my job and I think the fact that the 

The Historical Speakership 91 

Members of the House have asked for a history of their institution shows 

some indication that they are anxious to have the collective memory of the 

House preserved and respected. 

Theodore Sedgwick was the first Speaker who really used his office in 

a partisan way. But none of those early leaders were really creative in revolutionizing the office. Not until you get Henry Clay. He was elected on the 

first vote of the first day of his own tenure in the House. But the Members 

knew who he was, and his reputation. They wanted somebody who could 

really lead this country in the direction that they felt they needed to go. 

And here was a man who saw his opportunity to take an office which was 

practically insignificant and so reshape it to be the most powerful in the 

country politically after the Office of the President. Because that is what, 

in effect, he did. And the Members who elected him Speaker knew he would 

be dealing with very difficult men, in particular John Randolph of Roanoke. 

Randolph had been a powerful chairman of the Ways and Means Committee 

and Jefferson’s floor manager in the House until he broke with him. He 

brought his dogs into the House. How about that? And anybody who tried 

to interfere, he would strike them with his riding whip. It was chaotic. 

Let me give you an example of some of the chaos that we’ve had in 

the House. I’m sort of jumping out of the period for the moment, but I’ll 

be right back. I’m quoting from the Cincinnati Enquire of June 20, 1884. 

‘‘If every man in the House should fall dead in his seat, it would be a God’s 

blessing to the country. And in less than two months, we would have a 

new set of men who would be just as wise and good as their predecessors. 

Today the Congress is a conclave of hirelings, wind bags, mediocrities and 

dawdlers. Members of the House are sprawled in their chairs and put their 

feet on the desks. They abuse door keepers, munch peanuts, apples, toothpicks, suck unlit cigars. jUncle Joe Cannon was a great one for sucking 

unlit cigars.k Spit tobacco on the rugs and carpets and clean their fingernails 

with pocket knives. No matter how persistently the Speaker pounded the 

gavel, the representatives kept right on talking to one another. With bar 

rooms in the cloak rooms and below stairs, whiskey flowed as freely as oratory. Saturdays were special in the House—then representatives could hold 

forth with bunkum speeches that no one heeded on any subject they pleased 

and fill 70 pages of the Congressional Record.’’ 

It was when you had strong leadership and Speakers who embrace a 

vision of where they think the country needs to go and have the will, the 

brains, the strength to direct them in that direction, toward that goal, that 

is when the House really asserts its authority. Clay had his American system, 

and for 10 years it was the House of Representatives, under his direction, 

that determined domestic policy in this country, which is amazing. But he 

had problems in handling particular Members. A man like John Randolph 

of Roanoke, for example. They finally fought a duel, as you probably know. 

92 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

Once, they were walking down the street toward one another, each coming 

closer and closer, neither willing to give way. Let the other man step aside 

for me. And when they got practically eyeball to eyeball, Randolph stopped 

in his tracks and he looked at Clay and said, ‘‘I never side-step skunks.’’ 

When Henry Clay heard that he said, ‘‘I always do.’’ And he jumped out 

of the way! 

Speakers have to be smart to be great, I find. Sam Rayburn said it 

best, ‘‘You need two things to be Speaker: brains and backbone.’’ I have 

found that many of the great Speakers have very sharp minds and very sharp 

tongues. You heard what Speaker Foley said about Speaker Reed—I’ve got 

a lot of examples of Reed’s quick mind and tongue. For example, he said 

to one Representative at the time, ‘‘You are too big a fool to lead and you 

haven’t got enough sense to follow.’’ In other words you’re useless. 

Henry Clay, of course, is a very unique figure. And the pity is that 

he has not had the attention and recognition that the House itself ought 

to accord him. And, it should be noted, when you don’t have a Henry Clay, 

you get a Thaddeus Stevens, who isn’t the Speaker, he’s the chairman of 

the Ways and Means Committee, but during Reconstruction, the most powerful man operating in the House. It’s not until you get toward the end 

of the century with Samuel Randall and Thomas Reed that things change, 

men who then begin to realize that the only way you can really do the 

people’s business and get men to attend to their duties is to use the rules 

and shape the rules for that purpose. 

Many Speakers have described what they believe are the responsibilities 

of a Speaker. Notice the Speaker today talked about what he felt his duties 

were. Henry Clay, when he spoke of them, said that they ‘‘enjoin promptitude and impartiality in deciding various questions of order as they arise; 

firmness and dignity in his deportment toward the House; patience, good 

temper, and courtesy toward the individual Members, and the best arrangement and distribution of talent of the House, in its numerous subdivisions 

for the dispatch of the public business, and the fair exhibition of every subject presented for consideration. They especially require of him, in those 

moments of agitation from which no deliberative assembly is always exempted, to remain cool and unshaken amidst all the storms of debate, carefully 

guarding the preservation of the permanent laws and rules of the House 

from being sacrificed to temporary passions, prejudice or interests.’’ 

Each of the many men who have served in this office tries to describe 

his duties in a way that recognizes that there is this tension between a man 

who is really the majority leader of his party and also the presiding officer 

of the House who is expected to be impartial and even-handed in his relations with all the Members. 

In the 19th century, they didn’t have a majority or a minority leader 

as such. Presumably, the man who lost the election for Speaker from the 

The Historical Speakership 93 

opposite party was the minority leader. But there was no whip. All of that 

comes at the end of the 19th century. And the role of Speaker is one in 

which he uses his office to forward a program or a vision that he has (or 

is stated in the party platform) that says that these are the things that we 

stand for, that we feel are important and helpful to the American people, 

and want to see legislated. Yet he has another role, which is to be the moderator of a number of men who can disagree violently and have in the past 

actually attacked each other with knives. We have lots of stories just before 

the Civil War, as you know, when they were physically attacking one another because of their differences over slavery. How do you balance those 

two aspects of the Speaker’s position? Notice that the Speakers today always 

mention that they tried to be fair in their dealings with all the Members 

to be sure everybody and each side receives equal treatment. Reed, who was 

probably the first great Speaker after Clay, said this: ‘‘Whenever it is imposed upon Congress to accomplish a certain work, it is the duty of the 

Speaker who represents the House and who, in his official capacity is the 

embodiment of the House to carry out that rule of law or of the Constitution. It then becomes his duty to see that no factious opposition prevents 

the House from doing its duty. He must brush away all unlawful combinations to misuse the rules and he must hold the House strictly to its work.’’ 

He also said, ‘‘The best system to have is one in which one party governs 

and the other party watches. And on general principle, I think it would 

be better for us to govern and the Democrats to watch.’’ 

He had trouble with the Democrats who would pull what was called 

a ‘‘disappearing quorum.’’ They would call for a roll call, and they were 

present in the Chamber, and those who did not respond when their names 

were called were marked absent. Finally, Reed decided he would put an 

end to the disappearing quorum. So when the clerk called the roll and an 

individual didn’t answer, the clerk was ready to mark him ‘‘absent.’’ When 

the clerk got to the Member from Kentucky by the name of McCreary, 

who did not answer and would normally be marked absent, Reed directed 

the clerk to mark him present. 

McCreary objected. ‘‘I deny your right, Mr. Speaker,’’ he said, ‘‘to count 

me as present.’’ Then Reed very calmly turned to him and said, ‘‘The Chair 

is making a statement of the fact that the gentleman from Kentucky is 

present. Does he deny it?’’ So from then on, if a Member was physically 

present in the House, he was counted present whether he said ‘‘present’’ 

or not. Sometimes when they would start the roll call, Members would duck 

under the chairs and under the tables so they wouldn’t be seen. 

Dilatory amendments were another technique to stall action on bills. 

Sometimes the session ended with 1,000 bills still waiting for action. When 

Reed was Speaker not only did they pass all the bills they were supposed 

to, they appropriated for the first time $1 billion. And people said, ‘‘My 

94 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

1A reference to a character from Gilbert and Sullivan’s operetta The Mikado. 

God—a billion dollars.’’ And Reed responded, ‘‘It’s a billion dollar country.’’ 

Joseph Cannon inherited this power. Now Cannon was a very gregarious, 

delightful, loveable tyrant. He used his power to maintain the status quo. 

They said if there had been a meeting or a caucus to decide whether creation 

would be brought up out of chaos, Cannon would have voted for chaos rather 

than creation. Let’s keep things the way they are. This was his motto. When 

he was the chairman of the Appropriations Committee, he supposedly said, 

‘‘You think my business is to make appropriations, it is not. It is to prevent 

their being made.’’ That gives you some idea of his position. He also said 

to William McKinley, ‘‘That it was easier for a politician to get along with 

a reputation as a sinner than with a reputation as a saint. I have been accused 

of being a profane man, who played cards and showed other evil tendencies. 

While McKinley had a reputation for being thoroughly good and kind and 

gentle. Who never swore or took a drink or played a game of cards. He 

couldn’t talk plainly to people because of his gentleness. And he could not 

take a glass of beer without shocking the temperance people who had endorsed him. On the other hand, I could do much as I pleased without unduly 

shocking anybody. For little was expected of me. If I showed gentility, I 

simply caused surprise at my improvement. Or,’’ he said, ‘‘I could throw 

the responsibility on the newspapers for misrepresenting me.’’ 

Cannon also said that he had looked into the matter of being Speaker. 

‘‘I have control of the South half of the Capitol. I manage the police, run 

the restaurant, settle contests over committee rooms and in general, I’m a 

Poo Bah 1

.’’ The Speaker who followed him was a totally different man. As 

you know, Cannon became Speaker in 1903, which is 100 years ago. So in 

that sense, we do honor him particularly today. He showed what it was 

like to have the kind of government in which nothing really happened. He 

opposed any kind of reform, whether it came from his own party or not. 

He disliked Teddy Roosevelt and his program, as well as the program of 

the opposition. 

But he finally pushed it too far. The revolution continued and he was 

stripped of his powers in 1910. The House then had to remake itself and 

the Office of the Speaker. You have people coming forward like Nicholas 

Longworth, who aided the process. When he was elected Speaker he recognized this tension between presiding over the House and leading his party. 

He said, ‘‘I propose to administer with the most rigid impartiality, with 

an eye single to the maintenance, to the fullest degree, of the dignity and 

the honor of the House and the rights and the privileges of its members. 

I promise you that there will be no such thing as favoritism in the treatment 

by the chair of either parties or individuals. But on the other hand, the 

political side, to my mind, involves a question of party service. I believe 

The Historical Speakership 95 

it to be the duty of the speaker standing squarely on the platform of his 

party to assist in so far as he properly can the enactment of legislation in 

accordance with the declared principles and politics of his party. And by 

the same token, to resist the enactment of legislation in variance thereof. 

I believe in responsible party government.’’ 

I think, following him, the most important Speaker—and I’m not 

going to comment at all on those who are still living. I’ll have my say 

when the book is finished later in a few years—was Sam Rayburn, who 

presided longer than any other Speaker. He is a fit candidate for recognition 

as a statesman and great leader. Lyndon Johnson seemed to think otherwise. 

He claimed, ‘‘Rayburn is a piss poor administrator. He doesn’t anticipate 

problems and he runs the House out of his back ass pocket.’’ Others had 

a better opinion in which one man said, ‘‘Mr. Sam is very convincing. There 

he stands, his left hand on your right shoulder holding your coat button. 

Looking at you out of honest eyes that reflect the sincerest emotions. He’s 

so dammed sincere and dedicated to a cause, and he believes in his country 

and his job, and he knows it inside out so well that I would feel pretty 

dirty to turn him down and not trust him knowing that he would crawl 

to my assistance if I needed him.’’ I think that almost sounds like what 

they jparticipants in this conferencek were saying earlier with respect to 

Tip O’Neill. Rayburn himself said—and I mentioned this before—that a 

man needs to have a backbone and brains in his head. He remembered Reed, 

and he said, ‘‘I remember him well—big head, big brains.’’ He added, ‘‘I 

always wanted responsibility, because I wanted power. The power that responsibility brings. I hate like hell to be licked. It always kills me.’’ 

I think what the Speakers, the good ones, have learned is that the only 

way you get things done is not to treat the Members the way this man 

jpointing to a picture of Cannonk did, as just servants or slaves to do his 

bidding. Instead, treat those men as his equal, to whom he can go and 

make his pitch with all of the sincerity and the passion in him if he really 

cares about the bill that he’s trying to sponsor, and get these men to know 

that he feels sincerely that this is what the people want. This is what is 

good for the country. Because that, in the long run, is what their duty 

is to the country, to the Nation. They are legislating for all of us and we 

only hope to God they are doing it for all the right reasons and are led 

by men and women who care passionately about what they were doing. 

My research has taught me something else that surprised me. And that 

was how intelligent, how gifted so many of the men and women who are 

Representatives today really are and how mistaken the American people are 

about the quality of the men and women who serve them. I think it is 

a great shame, and I hope to do something to change that opinion. Thank 

you very much. 

96 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

Dr. BILLINGTON. We’re a little over time, but I think we have 

time for perhaps one question if there is one from the floor. 

Question. Is there in Longworth’s speakership the beginnings of the 

process of trying to find the levers by which to recentralize power in the 

House that continues through Rayburn and subsequent Speakers. Can you 

speak to that? 

Professor REMINI. You see, you have two different types, and I didn’t 

really have time to develop them, in which you get men who are very, very 

intelligent, quick-witted, well-read. And those who come out of the prairie 

like Uncle Joe and are much more interested in the process rather than in 

the results. And they know, of course, that they have these levers of power 

and they have to use them. When it got to a point where power was misused, 

then you got a new man, Longworth, who was intelligent, educated, and 

felt passionately about the House and what he was doing. He was a man 

of great ability to handle different sides of a difficult question. He could 

handle difficult people. After all, he was married to Alice Roosevelt, who 

was a very difficult woman. He knew how to win compromises. You know, 

I’m going off on a tangent, but I hope I’m making the point. 

When I wrote my book on Henry Clay, the title of it was Henry Clay: 

The Great Compromiser. And the editor said that, ‘‘No, today people think 

of compromisers as men and women who have no principles at all.’’ But 

that is not what Henry Clay was. Henry Clay was looking for solutions 

to avoid conflict. To him compromise meant simply this: that each side 

gives something that the other side wants so that there is no loser and no 

winner. Because if you have a loser and a winner, you are going to perpetuate 

the quarrel. The only way to resolve these problems is to give a little, to 

get a little, and be willing to accept that. That’s what happened with the 

Missouri Compromise. That’s what happened with the Compromise of 1850. 

That’s what happened with the Compromise Tariff of 1833. And that was 

the lesson that they understood. 

This is what Longworth then tried to do. He wanted to compromise 

the differences between those like Cannon who wanted an authoritarian kind 

of leadership, and those who were determined to go the other way and have 

a freewheeling, very liberal kind of leadership. And it’s that kind of individual who can find those means to make men who have to work together 

co-exist. That’s why I think it’s important today to have sessions like this, 

so that men and women of the two different parties can at least speak to 

one another. Did you notice how often it was mentioned today the civility 

that once existed seems to have been diminished? Oh, there’s always incivility. When Thomas Hart Benton made some remarks that offended southerners, the argument became very heated. When one southerner reached into 

his pocket and pulled out a pistol, Benton tore open his shirt and said, 

The Historical Speakership 97 

‘‘Shoot, you damn assassin—shoot.’’ And you can imagine what happened 

in the Chamber. 

Oh, there are some glorious scenes of pandemonium in the House and 

in the Senate as men tried to compromise their differences. And I’m not 

saying that you have to give up what is essential to your position. But you 

have to give in order to take. I don’t want to go into any specifics with 

Longworth as to his style. It would take more time than I have. But it 

is that kind of leadership, I think, that makes the difference between great 

Speakers and those who are failures. I’ve always thought that Speakers are 

like Presidents. We’ve had great ones and we’ve had failures, and a lot of 

in-betweens. We have the Lincolns and the Washingtons and the Roosevelts 

who were Speakers, and we also have the Buchanans and the Hardings. The 

difference, I think, is one in which men try to bring about a consensus 

for the sake of the American people and what they need and what has to 

be done. 

Dr. BILLINGTON. Many of you will remember that for the 200th 

anniversary of the Congress, David McCullough spoke to a joint session and 

pointed out how little attention has been paid to the history of the Congress. 

He specifically mentioned a large list of Speakers for whom there is no reliable, serious biography. Certainly the historical study of the Congress as 

a whole is an important and neglected subject. I know that former Congressman John Brademas is trying to set up an institute for the study of Congress 

at New York University. There is great and growing interest in this subject. 

So I hope that this conference is not the last where we will get people together so that we hear both from the distinguished Members who have sat 

in these important positions and from the historical profession that gives 

us some perspective on it all. I think you will all want to join me in thanking Bob Remini for sharing with us his vitality and enthusiasm, that I think 

is infectious, and his knowledge. We all look forward to seeing those qualities in the history of the House when it comes out. Thank you again. 

Photograph by DeJonge Studio

Hon. Newt Gingrich, Speaker "**&–"*** 


92800.003
99 

The Gingrich Speakership 

Mr. OLESZEK. This conference now turns to an examination of the 

Gingrich speakership. I am delighted to introduce our moderator for this 

panel—Don Wolfensberger. As many of you know, Don is a 30-year House 

veteran who was staff director of the Rules Committee during the chairmanship of the late Gerald Solomon of New York. Currently, Mr. Wolfensberger 

is the director of The Congress Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center for 

International Scholars. He is also the author of an award-winning book titled 

Congress and the People: Deliberative Democracy on Trial. Don, the podium is 

yours. 

Mr. WOLFENSBERGER. Thank you, Walter. I want to add my 

thanks to the Carl Albert Center and to the McCormick Tribune Foundation 

for sponsoring this event. I also want to add my kudos to the Congressional 

Research Service, Dan Mulhollan, Walter Oleszek and their whole team, for 

putting together just a marvelous all-day conference. Please join me in 

thanking them. What I’ll do is introduce Newt Gingrich first and then 

I’ll have introductions for each of our two discussants, Leon Panetta and 

Bob Walker, when it’s their turn to speak. 

I vividly recall a day in early October 1994—I think it was after a 

Republican leadership meeting—and Newt Gingrich made me a bet, or tried 

to. He said, ‘‘Wolfie—I’ll bet you 50 cents that we take control of the House 

in the next month’s elections.’’ Well, I kind of brushed it off and I said, 

‘‘I’m not really a betting man, but I sure hope you’re right.’’ But I remember 

thinking to myself—does he really believe that’s going to happen? You 

know, all the pundits, the political pros, the prognosticators at the time 

were saying, in effect, that the Republicans might pick up 20, maybe even 

30, seats in the 1994 elections for the House. 

Well, as you know, the rest is history. On November 8, 1994, the tsunami happened and Republicans picked up not just the 40 seats that they 

needed for a bare 218 majority, but 52 seats and brought in 74 freshmen 

Republican Members. I think, to his credit, Newt Gingrich had prepared 

his party for the takeover. Not only was the ‘‘Contract with America’’ unveiled in September, the product of a year-long development effort by the 

Republican conference, but he had also tasked each of the ranking minority 

members on the committees and their staff to put together an organizational 

100 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

plan, a game plan, for how they would run their committees for the first 

year once we won the majority. And this was done early in 1994. 

I was really grateful, as the appointed staff director of the Rules Committee, that we had that document in our hands when we awakened on 

the morning of November 9. Everyone was plugged in to Newt’s planning 

model—‘‘vision, strategy, projects, tactics.’’ And everyone also knew the 

leadership model of ‘‘listen, learn, help, and lead.’’ So we were trained for 

this, but we had no idea, really, of what we were getting into. 

The Rules Committee, where I was working for Jerry Solomon, was 

at the center of the action in processing the Contract bills. You may recall 

that the Contract with America was a 10-plank legislative program. But 

that really translated into about two dozen bills when it was broken down. 

And most of these, if not all of them, were coming through the Rules Committee where we were busily still trying to find out where the bathrooms 

were. I remember thinking in the middle of the 100-day Contract period 

that I wish Newt Gingrich had been a little more like Joe Cannon in one 

respect. Joe Cannon once said, ‘‘We don’t need any new legislation. Everything is just fine back in Danville.’’ 

But for me, the high point really of the whole experience was the opening day of 104th Congress when we worked all day and well into the night 

debating and voting on a package of House reforms that had been developed 

over the years. Not only did the Contract have an 8-point plan for various 

House reforms such as banning proxy voting, putting term limits on committee chairmen and so on, but there were 24 other reforms that had evolved 

over a 3-decade period that I had had the pleasure and the honor to work 

with our leadership in developing. Most of these were put into effect in 

just 1 day. You can imagine how that would be the highlight of a career 

for someone like me. 

As I mentioned in my book about this whole experience, I did leave 

the Congress after the first 2 years of the Republican takeover. I had my 

30 years of government service and was ready to do something new. But 

I looked back on it and I said that this was a very interesting 2 years. It 

was like a roller coaster ride when you consider all of the ups and downs 

of the 104th Congress. But I would not have missed it for the world. So 

with that, I probably for the first time want to thank you for quite a ride, 

Newt. And with that, I give you Speaker Newt Gingrich. 

Speaker GINGRICH. Thank you, Don. It’s very good to be here with 

two of the friends I served with for years. Bob Walker, who helped found 

the Conservative Opportunity Society—we did so many different projects 

together—and Leon Panetta, with whom I served in the House and got 

to know even more when he became Chief of Staff for President Clinton. 

I also want to acknowledge Chairman Rostenkowski—it’s great to see you 

back. We were over just now in Speaker Hastert’s office reminiscing with 

The Gingrich Speakership 101 

four Speakers, which I think is the only time I know of that you’ve had 

four Speakers at one place. Many of you who are true students of the House 

will appreciate the speed with which we arrived on the topic of the Senate 

and found a bipartisan, non-ideological passion and agreement, which I’m 

not going to go into today because of my interest in comity. 

I thought about this chance to talk, and I want to try to keep it fairly 

brief. I want to give you an overview of my understanding of what happened 

to us when we won control of the House. And I want to suggest to everyone—if you get a chance—please read Kings of the Hill by Dick and Lynne 

Cheney, both the first edition, which came out in 1983, and the second edition, which came out after I had become Speaker. 

The first point I want to make is that they captured two things in 

their works. First, if you look at page 194, they said, ‘‘Today’s House has 

neither strong leadership nor any other well-developed centralized power. 

Authority is dispersed among a few elected leaders, many committee chairmen, and a multitude, or so it sometimes seems, of subcommittee chairmen 

(there are currently 137).’’ They then go on to describe the kind of leadership 

that might be needed in the information age, arguing that it would be a 

party leader who could combine debates on the floor with grassroots activism 

in real time—a synergistic network. They wrote this in 1983 and I think 

it’s a very good forerunner for what we actually did in the intervening period. Again, I would encourage everyone to look at the two editions of Kings 

of the Hill, they are very revealing each in their own right. 

To a degree that it’s almost impossible to get this city to think about, 

the Republican capture of the House was an intellectual effort. I think that 

has been very hard for people to appreciate. It was a long march in the 

sense that there are some fundamental things that I had learned early on. 

I always recommend Peter Drucker’s The Effective Executive to groups, which 

I first read in the late sixties. If you read books like that, you begin to 

think about how much we had to aggregate resources and how many things 

we had to do right, because 1994 was not an accidental campaign. It was 

a campaign which required some help from our opponents and which we 

would not have won under other circumstances. We could have gained 25 

seats and probably would have but not without all of the previous 16 years 

of work. And so I start with that. 

Additionally, I would say that House GOP campaign chairman Guy 

Vander Jagt was the unsung hero, both because Vander Jagt insisted on 

supporting my candidacy when I had lost twice, and because when I became 

a freshman, even before I was even sworn in, he asked me to chair the longrange planning committee to look at how to become a majority. I always 

point out to people—we failed in 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, and 

1992 before we won in 1994. So first of all, it wasn’t like there was this 

sudden magic moment. I mean we had a lot of things that didn’t work 

102 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

right. It’s a sign that if you can persevere, that can be a very important 

component of victory over time. In that context, I think you have to look 

at a series of stages. 

However, I just want to cite another book for 1 more minute. The 

1994 election was essentially based upon Norman Nie’s The Changing American Voter, and Robert Remini’s The Election of Andrew Jackson, and it is actually worth your time to read these two books if you are a serious student 

of how this business works. We were looking for models of how do you 

get very large-scale change? Remember, the point Don made wasn’t unusual. 

I think only a small number of chairmen, including Bob Walker, thought 

we could win a majority. If you look at the news media prediction outtakes 

during the weekend before the election, they are almost funny in retrospect 

because it was inconceivable that we could create a majority—it had been 

so long. What people failed to understand is the hardest election was going 

to be in 1996. Republicans had become a majority in 1946 and we had become a majority in 1952, but we had not won a second consecutive election 

since 1928. 

September 17, 1994, was the day that Joe Gaylord briefed the GOP 

team. We had a team that was going on a campaign swing on September 

17—Dan Meyer, Steve Hanser, Kerry Knott, Joe Gaylord, and myself. Literally, as we were taking off at National, I asked both Kerry Knott, who 

headed up our planning operation, and Dan Meyer, what were we planning 

on the night after the election? At that time, I was still the minority whip 

and Bob Michel was still the GOP leader. I said, ‘‘On election night, are 

we planning for me to be minority leader or to be Speaker?’’ And Gaylord 

broke in and said, ‘‘Well, you better be planning to be Speaker, because 

you’re going to be.’’ Dan Meyer then turned to him and said, ‘‘OK, before 

we do anything else, explain this prediction.’’ Gaylord started in Maine and, 

by memory, went through every congressional seat in the country and came 

up with a 52-seat gain. I think we gained 53, so he was off by 1. 

From that date on, my entire goal was to be able to maintain the momentum of doing what we had pledged while winning a second election 

in 1996. And I would argue the second election was much harder. Leon 

Panetta may want to comment on that. Democrats did a brilliant job of 

orchestrating resources, designing images, and really taking it to us. By our 

count, there were 125,000 negative ads around the country that had me in 

it. We made a conscious decision not to defend me, and we made a decision 

that our historic goal was to keep control. We also decided to balance the 

budget and we knew that meant you had to reform Medicare. We were 

close enough to AARP and Horace Deets, its executive director, who had 

the nerve to stay with us long enough that we ran seven points ahead of 

Bob Dole among senior citizens and that was the margin of victory. Very 

briefly, I think that there are six stages that are worth looking at. First, 

The Gingrich Speakership 103 

how did we grow the majority? You have to look at Bob Walker, Vin 

Weber, Connie Mack, Duncan Hunter and the entire GOP team that created 

the Conservative Opportunity Society as well as GOPAC and the extraordinary work of people like Bo Callaway and Gay Gaines in creating a nationwide network of literally, at its peak, 50,000 activist Republican candidates 

and incumbents receiving audio tapes and training. 

Second, how did we implement the revolution? And there you have 

to look at what was really an extraordinary team in a specific moment as 

the loyal opposition. Dick Armey, Tom DeLay, Bob Walker, Bill Paxon 

and I sat down and said, ‘‘OK, can we be a single team? Because if we’re 

a single team, we can amass the energy to win the election, but if we are 

five independent egos competing with each other, we probably can’t win 

a majority.’’ And to his credit Dick Armey, who was clearly the decisive 

person at that point, said, ‘‘This is really hard for me. I’ve always flown 

solo. You’re asking me to fly in formation. I really have to go home and 

talk to my wife and pray about it.’’ And within a week, he came back and 

said, ‘‘We are one team.’’ We operated, from that point on, as one single 

unified team, and it was an amazing accomplishment. 

The other person you have to recognize is the new Governor of Mississippi, Haley Barbour, and it concerned a key moment in Annapolis, Maryland, where the Republican Senators had gone to decide what to do about 

Hillary Clinton’s health care plan. Over a drink at the tavern right across 

from the State Capitol, I said to Haley Barbour, then the chairman of the 

Republican National Committee jRNCk, ‘‘If you will help us, we will do 

a contract with America and we’ll include tort reform.’’ And he said, ‘‘By 

George, if you’ll include that, I’ll pay for the ad.’’ It was at that point 

that his assistant said he would never again go out for a drink, because 

it was the most expensive single trip he had ever made. 

All this became a process. We now had a commitment from the RNC 

to run a two-page ad in TV Guide, so you could now go back to Members 

and say, ‘‘Gee, we’ve got to get a contract, because we’ve got the ad to 

fill.’’ We began a dialog where ‘‘listen, learn, help, lead’’ came in because 

you had to get 350 independent entrepreneurs called Republican candidates 

to sign a contract. Remember: this is the only time in American history 

that candidates didn’t have a platform which says, ‘‘We believe in such and 

so.’’ Instead, we had a contract which said, ‘‘We will vote on specifications,’’ 

which is a much higher standard. 

There were only three incumbents, to the best of my knowledge, who 

did not sign the contract. Everyone else signed the contract. The contract, 

in my mind, was a management document which enabled me to pivot and 

turn to Bob Walker, Dick Armey, and Tom DeLay and say, ‘‘You guys 

get this through.’’ Armey literally had total control of the floor in a way 

I don’t think any Speaker normally has delegated that responsibility. From 

104 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

day one, I turned over control of the floor so I could then focus on figuring 

out with Bob Livingston, Bill Archer, and John Kasich how we were going 

to balance the budget, because you couldn’t have done both in the same 

setting. You had to have different leadership operating both projects. So 

everything that was driving Don crazy on the floor was being driven by 

Armey based on what was in the contract we had signed before the election. 

By the way, we wouldn’t have gotten it signed after the election. Once these 

guys got to be chairmen, there was no hope they were going to sign a contract because it gave away too much power. We then had a pretty serious 

effort to centralize authority in the speakership, something, which is fair 

to say, has continued to this day. 

The next phase after that was winning the crucial election of 1996. 

And there the key, as Don was saying, was an enormous effort. I have a 

tremendous respect for Dan Miller of Florida, because he trained every single 

one of our Members with very few exceptions. They could then all go home 

and answer Medicare questions and win the Medicare argument, because we 

thought that was the crisis of the campaign on our side. The other two 

things I’d say is we had a very close working relationship with Scott Reed, 

Dole’s 1996 Presidential campaign manager, a guy named Don Rumsfeld 

over at the Dole campaign, and a very close relationship with Haley Barbour. 

Frankly, if we had not had the foreign campaign contribution scandal of 

the last 10 days, I think we might have lost control of the House. But 

the combination of winning Medicare, having raised enough resources with 

the aid of Bill Paxon, and then having the ability to focus a lot of energy 

on the question about foreign contributions got us through winning reelection for the first time since 1928. 

Fourth, we had a phase of working with Bill Clinton. And the fact 

is, if you look at welfare reform, which was signed; you look at the balanced 

budget, which was negotiated out and signed; you look at a number of other 

issues, including creating the Hart-Rudman Commission; there were a whole 

series of things working in 1996 and then particularly in 1997, where I 

thought there was a real momentum of cooperation. This is a period that 

you have to look at as genuine bipartisan cooperation. We were actually 

passing bills and routinely getting about half of the Democratic Caucus to 

vote with us. 

Part five of this in my mind is that perjury drowned out the bipartisanship. The question of what was happening with the Presidency just shattered 

party cooperation, and the President couldn’t risk any of his left so we were 

pinned into being in a fight with him. All of 1998 was, in a sense, a great 

lost opportunity. If that had not happened, if that particular scandal had 

not broken out, my hunch in retrospect is you would have seen a much 

different 1998. We would have passed an amazing amount of very positive 

The Gingrich Speakership 105 

legislation on a bipartisan basis. I think that’s where President Clinton was 

headed, and I think that all went down the tubes in December and January. 

Finally, the sixth and last stage for me was when it was clearly time 

for a new Speaker and there were a lot of different factors there. One was 

my exhaustion. A second was the fact that the ethics war against me had 

taken its toll. A third was the fact the House is really not designed to 

have an entrepreneurial dominating figure in the speakership position. Henry 

Clay pulled it off in a very different world in very different settings. But 

it’s very difficult to do because the House really is a collection of equallyelected people who have real authority and real power. Far more than the 

Senate, the House really delegates authority to its committees, and its committee chairmen really acquire mastery of their topic. The idea that there 

might be some guy at the center who is going to run over them is anathema 

to the way the House has been structured—except for a very brief period, 

I would argue, under Cannon and a very brief period earlier than that under 

Speaker Reed from Maine and under Clay in a very different world. It’s 

very hard to go back and imagine the House of Representatives when Clay 

was Speaker because it was so much smaller and so very different. 

I basically had burned out the centralizing process. Losing seats in November 1998 sealed that and, in my judgment, made it appropriate for me 

to leave and to permit a different kind of speakership to emerge. I also 

think that Speaker Hastert has actually carried out a more conciliatory, more 

managerial speakership with extraordinary skill and has gotten an amazing 

amount done, given the size of his majorities. 

In retrospect, I’ll just close by saying there are four big things I would 

do differently. The first, looking back on September 17, 1994, I should have 

understood that the jump from the minority whip’s job to the leader of 

a national movement at the center of the national news media and chief 

organizer of the House was an enormous jump. We should have brought 

in a number of very senior people with Presidential and gubernatorial experience, because we needed to upgrade our operations. This is not a bad comment about anyone on the team, nor is it a bad comment about any of 

our staffs, who are fabulous. It is simply an objective fact. We were suddenly 

on a different playingfield and we were going to get overmatched by reality, 

even though I think we accomplished an amazing amount. 

The second is I should have had much more media discipline. I say 

this not because of the times when I would say things that would get me 

in trouble, when I was just being a partisan Speaker, but because I would 

get confused about my role. There’s a side of me that’s permanently analytical, that likes coming and giving the speech, and that side of me should 

not have been allowed out of the box for the entire time I was Speaker. 

If I really had to say something, I should have said it into a tape recorder 

for the archives and brought it out as a book 20 years later. Instead, I would 

106 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

go and say something controversial. You go back and look at the whole 

Air Force One example where I just handed Leon Panetta and his boss an 

opportunity to just beat me around the head and shoulders for no good 

reason. 

If you actually go and look at the text of my comments at a Sperling 

breakfast jsponsored by the Christian Science Monitork, they were analytical 

comments about the difficulty of understanding how to negotiate with Clinton. I wasn’t complaining about what happened except to say, ‘‘I don’t know 

how you read him.’’ Within an hour, my observation was immediately 

turned to ‘‘Gingrich was whining,’’ which then got turned into a picture 

of me as a crybaby on the front page of the New York Daily News. That 

story led some of my colleagues to think I’d lost my mind. Well, I will 

tell you in retrospect, they were right. A fully professional Speaker would 

have understood that it was somebody else’s job to comment on Clinton, 

that that wasn’t my job. I have the greatest respect for President George 

W. Bush and the later phase of President Clinton’s term, when he got much 

more disciplined, and for President Reagan, who understood that this is who 

I have to be in this context to play this game, captured brilliantly by John 

Keegan in a book called The Mask of Command. 

Third, the ethics charges have never been actually looked at. I really 

recommend, if you want to understand my speakership, that you read the 

volume published by the Ethics Committee. It includes all of my planning 

documents. You’ll understand how intellectual this process really was, because it’s all been published. It’s all available for students of how you do 

these things. In retrospect, I underestimated the degree to which there was 

a legal strategy. Frankly, we should have gotten an attorney who was prepared for that kind of litigation-style strategy. Early on we didn’t and if 

you go back and look at the 83 charges, no serious charge was ever judged 

to be true. What I got hammered on was having signed a letter which 

was inaccurate, which was written not by my attorney nor by a partner 

in his firm, but by a new hire who was an assistant. Now, that’s still my 

responsibility. I still failed, but in retrospect, it was a combination of bad 

litigation and not taking the entire fight seriously enough. That was an 

erosive process and the truth is, without Randy Evans having come in and 

having fired my prior attorney, I probably wouldn’t have survived. The entire process just eroded my authority substantially. 

Last, I would say in retrospect, we should have insisted on celebrating. 

We did so many things so rapidly that we never slowed down. I’ll give 

you an example: the Medicare fight. Because we never stopped and celebrated 

being the first reelected majority since 1928, the only majority ever elected 

to the House as Republicans with a Democratic President in American history, we never had 1 day of stopping and saying—this is amazing. So nobody 

figured out that we had won the argument over Medicare, and that we had 

The Gingrich Speakership 107 

run seven points ahead of Dole in the November 1996 elections, and that, 

in fact, senior citizens were our margin of victory. And so people felt like 

you lost because you’re so badly bruised and you’re so tired. That was sort 

of the mood that we had throughout a good bit of late 1996 and early 1997. 

Those are the things I would have changed. I look forward to my colleagues’ 

comments. Don, as you said, it was a pretty wild ride. 

Mr. WOLFENSBERGER. Our first discussant on the Gingrich speakership is Leon Panetta, who is the co-director with his wife Sylvia of the 

Panetta Institute in Monterey, California. It’s a non-partisan center dedicated 

to the advancement of public policy. Mr. Panetta served from 1977 to 1993 

as a Representative from the Monterey area in California. And then beginning in 1993, Mr. Panetta served 4 years in the Clinton administration, first 

as OMB Director, and then as White House Chief of Staff. On the one 

hand, he was spared serving in the House under a Republican majority; 

on the other hand, he was fated to deal with that same majority during 

2 of the most turbulent years in the history of Presidential-congressional 

relations. In the House, he was known as the top budget expert on the 

Government’s budget. In the White House, he became known as the top 

expert on how to keep the Government running without a budget. I give 

you Leon Panetta. 

Mr. PANETTA. Thank you very much. I also want to extend my 

thanks to the Congressional Research Service, and to the Carl Albert Center 

for having this forum on the changing nature of the speakership. There are 

obviously differences as we look at each of the Speakers who are reviewed 

today in terms of their personal relationships with Members, as well as their 

leadership styles. And I think it helps us define the place in history for 

each of them. When it comes to my friend Newt Gingrich, I don’t think 

there’s any question that, of the four Speakers, he represents the more controversial figure, because of both the personal and leadership styles that he 

brought to the speakership. 

Let me preface my remarks by saying that I had the opportunity to 

serve with Newt as a colleague in the House, and developed a friendship 

with him during that time. I then had the opportunity, obviously, to work 

with him when I became Chief of Staff to President Clinton. We began 

a series of efforts to try to negotiate various issues. 

Incidentally, if you all want to feel insignificant, you want to sit in 

a room where Newt Gingrich and Bill Clinton are having a conversation. 

These are two individuals who are extremely bright, well-read, full of ideas, 

and full of enthusiasm about how to resolve issues. If you listened to the 

both of them, there was no question in your mind that they could solve 

any issue in the world. What was interesting is that they came to basically 

oppose each other on most issues that they dealt with. But it was interesting. 

108 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

Part of the reason I term his speakership controversial is because it 

became a conflict between the role of the Speaker as leader of his party, 

and the role of the Speaker as leader of the House dealing with individual 

Members and also the Speaker as leader of the Nation. I think he was without question a successful leader of his party. His ability to be able to pull 

the party together, to consolidate the political power that was important 

to obtain the majority, and the fact that he put together a very effective 

agenda that became the platform for the Republican Party—this was an 

exceptional achievement. He, in effect, created a revolution in politics. But 

the challenge was also how to convert that revolution into effective policymaking on a continuing basis to help govern the Nation. And that’s where 

I think the distinction has to be made. 

In academic terms, for those of you who are academics, let me refer 

you to James MacGregor Burns’ book on leadership, in which he talks about 

transformational leadership, and what’s called transactional leadership. Transformational leadership is leadership that tries to attract people by offering 

a higher purpose, a higher calling. It goes beyond simply cutting deals. 

On the other hand, the transactional leader is a person who provides rewards 

or penalties for compliance. And generally, if you want to be Speaker, it 

probably involves using both of those capabilities. There was no question 

that Newt Gingrich wanted to be a transformational leader. He wanted to 

be a Disraeli, a Wellington, a Churchill, a Jack Welch. He tried to inspire 

Members and push them to a higher calling, to a higher standard, that went 

beyond just simply cutting deals, and basically serving their own interests. 

He tried to rise to a higher calling with regards to the party and the agenda 

of the party. But the problem is that a Speaker is not a CEO. A Speaker 

is not a general. And a Speaker is not a Prime Minister. You can’t take 

the parliamentary model and try to apply it to a branch of government that 

is based on the separation-of-powers approach to governing. 

The House of Representatives, as has been pointed out time and time 

again during this forum, is a unique legislative body. It’s a unique institution in which each Member is autonomous and independent; in which Members basically try to ensure their survival through their own election and 

through responding to their constituency. That’s the nature of a House of 

Representatives. So, you’re not going to get Members to take the hill unless 

they’re convinced that in the end it’s in their interests to take the hill. 

The point is, if you’re going to be a visionary or a transformational leader 

in the House, and if you really want to transform both the House and the 

country, which I believe Newt Gingrich was trying to do, then you damn 

well had better make the right decisions. And beyond that, you had better 

be able to adapt to changing circumstances, or else you’re going to lose 

the support of your Members. The force of your personality is simply not 

The Gingrich Speakership 109 

enough in itself. There has to be a pragmatic side to that leadership as 

well. 

There’s no question that Newt had great successes as the leader of his 

party—the first GOP majority in 40 years. That is a significant achievement 

for an individual, to nationalize the congressional elections. This is really 

one of the first times, instead of every Member fighting on his own in his 

district, where Newt broadly nationalized elections with the Contract with 

America. Moreover, he brought all of those items in the Contract with 

America to a vote within the first 100 days, which is also a significant 

achievement. He did implement reforms. He cut the number of committees. 

He implemented term limits. He got rid of proxy voting. He also accomplished some significant legislation like welfare reform, the freedom to farm 

bill, the telecommunications bill, and the line item veto. He pushed for 

a balanced budget. Which leads one to ask, ‘‘Where the hell are you now, 

when we need you, Newt?’’ jLaughter.k 

So he clearly achieved some successes. But if you’re going to have a 

high profile, if you’re going to be a high-profile charismatic leader, the transformational-type of leader in a legislative body, you have to be careful that 

you don’t make some big mistakes. I think the problem was that he made 

some mistakes that began to erode the support that he needed from his 

own Members. 

What were some of those mistakes? I guess they’re obvious to all of 

us. First of all were the shutdowns that took place in 1995 and 1996. I mean, 

clearly, when you’re going to impact the citizens of this country, either 

through an inconvenience or through a reduction or a temporary loss of benefits, you’re going to suffer a blow. I remember Bob Dole, when we were 

sitting in the Oval Office, talking about the fact that we really shouldn’t 

be in a shutdown. Bob Dole said, ‘‘You know, in my experience, you can 

probably shut the Government down over the weekend, but if you shut 

it down for any longer period of time, people are going to come looking 

for you.’’ And he was right. I think Bob Dole understood that it would 

be a mistake to do that. Frankly, my own view, I think Newt Gingrich 

understood this point as well. But the problem was that he had created 

a revolution within his own Members, with the sense they would wholeheartedly fight for everything they were trying to achieve. And that led 

to an almost impossible situation in that the strong ideological constituency 

that he had created in the House made it impossible for him to be able 

to compromise. We were probably very close to compromising at one point. 

But for whatever reason, it just could not happen. And that, of course, led 

to the shutdown. 

In addition, I think the disaster relief he asked for—disaster relief, flood 

relief, for the Midwest—was important, but it had a couple of amendments 

attached to it by the Republicans, and was ultimately vetoed by the PresiVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00119 Fmt 8164 Sfmt 8164 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.006 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
110 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

dent. I think the Republicans were basically blamed again for preventing 

disaster relief because of those amendments. I think that was a tactical mistake. 

Obviously, the handling of President Clinton’s impeachment, which 

created the impression of being more partisan than balanced, and the Speaker’s own ethics violation, continued to erode his status. Ultimately what 

happened is that he became in a very real way a campaign liability. He 

was polling badly in the country as a result of that. If you’re a charismatic 

leader you can’t afford to poll badly in the country. So the consequence 

was like all revolutions: in the end, Members turned on their own leader 

and moved him out of the speakership. 

Let me just reiterate that the speakership of Newt Gingrich, as I defined it, was controversial and it perhaps may go down in history as one 

of those that was the most controversial. As a result, there is a profound 

lesson, I think, to be gained from that speakership. There is no question 

that you can be a strong charismatic leader of the party, and there have 

been strong charismatic leaders within the House of Representatives. But 

at the same time, if you’re going to be a leader of the House, you have 

to stay in touch with your Members. You have to respond to their needs. 

You’ve got to listen to them. You’ve got to compromise when necessary 

in order to govern. And you always have to be willing to change with the 

needs of the Nation, to adapt to changing circumstances, even if that involves compromising an ideology. I think that’s the difference between success and failure; and I think that is perhaps the profound lesson of the Gingrich speakership. Thank you. 

Mr. WOLFENSBERGER. Our second discussant on the Gingrich 

speakership is Bob Walker, who is chairman of Wexler and Walker Public 

Policy Associates here in Washington. Many of you remember him, though, 

as a 10-term Pennsylvania Congressman from 1977 to 1997, a ubiquitous 

floor presence in the House, and a top Republican strategist, tactician, and 

parliamentary guru over most of those years. As someone who worked closely 

with Bob Walker and the Republican leadership on various procedural matters, I often wondered where he got his kinetic energy. I stopped wondering 

after I once sat down with him for breakfast in the Rayburn cafeteria, and 

his breakfast of chocolate milk, a chocolate-covered donut, and a half-grapefruit covered with sugar. Now you know the secret of what it is that makes 

the ‘‘Energizer Walker’’ run. Congressman Bob Walker. 

Mr. WALKER. My staff always said they knew it was going to be 

a bad day when I had two chocolate donuts. Newt has done a pretty good 

job of walking through how we got to where we were in 1994 when we 

took over the House. But it seems to me that when we got there, we discovered a few things about ourselves that speak to the issues that Newt faced 

inside his speakership. 

The Gingrich Speakership 111 

The main lesson that we learned very quickly was that governing is 

hard. When we had been in the minority, we never had any responsibility 

to do any governing. We had fought the good fights, we had charged up 

the hill every day, we had gotten bloody fighting with our flags flying, 

and so on. We would come down off the hill if we lost, but we felt really 

good about it because we had fought glorious battles. All of a sudden, we 

found ourselves in a position where we actually had to govern, where it 

did require compromise, where it did require a lot of work with individual 

Members. And at the end of the day you got part way to where you wanted 

to go. You won, but you didn’t feel really good about it. 

It was going through that transition in the majority that for everybody 

was a huge learning experience. And Newt was in the position of having 

to work through that. He was in the position of having to work with a 

number of things that we had set up in advance very consciously. The Contract with America was a political document and a governing document. 

How much of a governing document became very clear to us on one of 

the opening days when we had come back to Washington after the elections 

were over. We were faced with all of the freshmen who had been elected, 

who came in and said very clearly to the people who were going to be 

in the leadership, ‘‘We’re going to do the Contract, right?’’ 

You know, they had internalized this to the point that there was no 

changing anything that was in the document. They were determined to ensure that it was the direction that the leadership was going to go. And 

that was a positive thing from the standpoint of our being able to do an 

agenda right at the beginning of the 104th Congress. Remember, we had 

also committed to do that agenda within 100 days. While the 100 days 

was an arbitrary figure that we thought had great political saliency, when 

it came to actually accomplishing it, it was a major slog through the legislative process, because you had the rules of the House to contend with, such 

as layover requirements and a number of different procedural things that 

you had to be aware of. 

What it meant was that you had to have a lot of direction from the 

top. And Newt did use his leadership to help implement the agenda. The 

fact is that committee chairmen learned from the very earliest days of the 

Gingrich speakership that they were taking orders from the Speaker’s Office, 

and that we were going to go through this agenda. It was going to get 

done in a way that reflected exactly what we had put in the Contract with 

America. That seems to me to be something that then played itself out 

in a variety of ways throughout the speakership. 

From then on, people who ended up with problems inside their committee structure as they dealt with issues felt that they could come to the 

Speaker because, after all, the Speaker had in the earliest days forced the 

agenda through. So we were constantly in some of those committee battles. 

112 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

The chairmen were also faced with a new situation where we had termlimited them. They did not have long-term prospects in the job. Their power 

was somewhat diminished by the fact that they were only going to be there 

a short period of time. It seems to me that the 100-day agenda was a very 

important part of shaping the way the speakership evolved in the years 

ahead. 

There’s another thing that has not been discussed here that I think 

needs to be recognized about Newt’s speakership. There was a great technology focus in it. Dr. Billington made mention here a little while ago 

of the fact that Newt in the earliest days, as a personal crusade, created 

the THOMAS computer system for the House of Representatives. For the 

first time, it brought online all of the documents of the House of Representatives for the public to have easy access to and to learn what was actually 

going on inside the Congress. It was Gingrich’s recognition that we had 

entered a new technological era in this country, and that Congress needed 

to be a part of it. I believe that it is a technology revolution that continues 

today. 

It has certainly changed the shape of those of us who are lobbying 

in town. It used to be that one of the things that a lobbyist could produce 

was the documents out of the House of Representatives. Only lobbyists could 

easily get them because they went to the House document rooms for their 

clients out across the country. Now the clients can get the documents simply 

by going online. 

Speaker Gingrich also was focused on science and technology as a broad 

general subject. The whole business of doubling the budgets of NIH grew 

out of a relationship between Newt and John Porter on the need to have 

amounts of money flowing into some of these technology areas that were 

so important. Technology also was frustrating for him because that was a 

part of the agenda for which the Republican conference was not completely 

on board. 

I remember going out to the Xerox center outside of town just after 

we had completed the 100-day agenda, and Newt was determined to have 

us adopt a new agenda to move forward. Part of that agenda was to make 

the Republican Party into the leadership party of the information age. Newt 

had drafted some concepts for the conference to consider and ultimately 

adopt that would move us in that direction. When we got to the Xerox 

center and broke into groups to discuss these various agenda items, Members 

took a look at some of the things that were supposed to take us into the 

information age. I remember one committee chairman—where I walked into 

the room to listen—who described the discussion as ‘‘psychobabble.’’ That 

was probably one of the kindest things that was said about these discussions. 

By the time we got back into the general session, this was a portion of 

the agenda that was just written off. I remember Newt, following the meetVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00122 Fmt 8164 Sfmt 8164 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.006 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
The Gingrich Speakership 113 

ing, being very discouraged because it was clear that the conference participants simply didn’t understand where we were headed at that point in the 

economy and how we could be leaders in that arena. 

Another thing, as I reflect on this, that seemed to me to be a shaper 

of the Gingrich speakership was the fact that we had a number of people 

in the freshman class who arrived in 1994 who were ‘‘self’’ term-limited. 

They had decided on their own that they were only going to be here for 

a short period of time. Those folks became people inside the conference who 

resisted whenever we attempted to make long-term deals and look down 

the road a long way. They were there for a very short period of time. They 

wanted to get things done now, or they wanted to stop things from being 

done now. Interestingly enough, it was a number of those people who ended 

up being at the base of the revolt that took place against Newt’s leadership 

later on. 

Newt’s operational style was often not understood by a lot of people. 

It was to empower folks to go out and do things with regard to issues 

that came up. If a young Member of Congress came to the Speaker and 

said, ‘‘You know, I’d like to do something about this issue.’’ Newt’s tendency was to say ‘‘yes’’ and empower them to go do it. The problem with 

that was, for a number of us who were part of his leadership team, we almost 

immediately got a call from a committee chairman or a subcommittee chairman who didn’t realize that this responsibility had now been given to some 

freshman Member of Congress. The chairman was outraged by the fact that 

this person had seemingly been empowered by the Speaker. So there were 

a number of us in the leadership team and on Newt’s staff who would have 

to go to the freshman and say, ‘‘You may not have understood exactly what 

the Speaker was saying.’’ We would try to work out some of these arrangements. 

Certainly, part of the problem that Newt ultimately ran into were the 

dozens of ethics charges that were filed against him. The ongoing issues 

there stem from the fact that many people in the opposition party, in the 

Democratic Party, never really got over their anger about the confrontational 

tactics that had been used in order to take the majority. That made it very 

difficult to work with the Democratic leadership. And it may have been 

partially work that we didn’t do very well. Additionally, many in the Democratic leadership didn’t work very hard at forging a relationship. That reality 

really led to much of the decision of the Republicans that we had to go 

it alone. No matter how narrow our majority we had to do it on our own, 

and it was a way of shaping policy throughout the Gingrich speakership. 

I must say that working with President Clinton was different, and Leon 

Panetta has somewhat characterized this relationship. Newt and President 

Clinton did have this ability to talk to each other, because they were both 

policy wonks. Yet there was no end of frustration on our end of Pennsylvania 

114 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

Avenue when Newt and the President would get together and talk about 

something, and Newt would come up to explain this great deal he had just 

cut. Somebody in the leadership would say, ‘‘Newt, we can’t do that!’’ And 

then there would have to be more discussions that followed our meetings. 

I believe that there was an understanding that we could, through that relationship, forge some legislative packages. As has been mentioned, there were 

some things that were done, such as the welfare reform package that ultimately was a major change of direction in American policy. 

I have a somewhat different view of the Government shutdown than 

Leon’s. I think that most of us felt as though that was very successful. It 

would have been a disaster had it led to us not being able to retain the 

majority in 1996. The fact was that we were able to retain our majority 

despite having gone through the shutdowns. Many of us have felt that the 

shutdowns convinced a lot of the markets that there was a serious effort 

under way to balance the budget. It wasn’t just rhetoric anymore. There 

was, in fact, a serious effort under way. A lot of the growth that happened 

in the economy after that really resulted from the willingness of the Republicans to take the political heat that came with the government shutdowns. 

Let me just sum up here. There are a half a dozen things that I would 

say are probably the legacy of the Gingrich speakership. First, it seems to 

me that his speakership affirmed the national Republican political ascendancy. Up until then there had been a lot of feeling that the Republican 

Party was basically a party where a personality, Ronald Reagan, had managed 

to bring us to a status that gave us a fighting chance in politics. With 

the speakership of Newt, and the ability to win successive elections after 

1994, it certainly affirmed our political ascendancy. 

Second, his legacy should certainly include that he moved the House 

of Representatives into the modern technology era. Third, it seems to me 

that his speakership also changed the relationship between the Speaker and 

committee chairmen. Clearly, there is a much different relationship that continues to this day. Fourth, the speakership of Newt Gingrich and the way 

in which the Republican majority approached legislation assured the longterm vibrancy of Reaganism. We took much of the Reagan agenda and assured that it was what we were enacting as a result of our work in the 

Congress. Fifth, it seems to me that the Gingrich speakership created a positive visionary platform for dealing with national issues from a conservative 

base. In large part, that kind of visionary outlook resulted in our ability 

to keep a majority in the House over a long term. 

Finally, sixth, it seems to me that what the Gingrich speakership also 

did was change the nature of the political dialog in the country. Up until 

then we had debated the issues largely from the standpoint of liberal rhetoric. We changed a lot of that rhetoric. Just the idea that we went from 

discussing how long we were going to have large deficits to the fact that 

The Gingrich Speakership 115 

we could actually have a balanced budget was a tremendous change in rhetoric. Despite the fact that we’re having trouble keeping those balanced budgets today, we still talk in terms of balanced budgets in ways different than 

we did before. That’s my view. Thanks. 

Mr. WOLFENSBERGER. Because we did get a late start, I’ve been 

authorized by the organizers to go a little late in this, so we can allow 

for some questions. But what I’d like to do is first of all give Newt a couple 

of minutes to make some comments on what was said since he last spoke, 

and also if Mr. Panetta would like to do so as well. Mr. Panetta will probably 

have to leave before our question period is over to catch a plane. So I want 

to make sure he has an opportunity for a last word as well. Newt. 

Speaker GINGRICH. First of all, just a couple of quick observations. 

I think there are two grounds for focusing on my speakership. The first 

is that it was actually a team effort all the way through. You can’t describe 

my rise without talking about the Congressional Campaign Committee, Guy 

Vander Jagt, Joe Gaylord, and others. You can’t describe our rise in the 

House without mentioning the Conservative Opportunity Society and people 

like Bob Walker and Vin Weber and Connie Mack and others. You can’t 

describe how we ran the Contract with America without looking at the extraordinary role Dick Armey played. And you can’t look at how we ran 

the House in the first couple of months without looking at Armey and 

Walker and DeLay. Finally, you can’t describe balancing the budget without 

including Kasich and Livingston and Archer. So there was an extensive team 

process. I was the central executor and I had very substantial power, but 

it was as the leader of a collectivity. It wasn’t just me and then you drop 

down 100 feet to the next person. The team concept was a very conscious 

design. 

Second, because of the separation of powers that Leon pointed out, I 

believe it is a mistake to see 1994 in isolation, and Bob Walker came closer 

to the right model—which is, Reagan in 1980 brings us back from a distinct 

minority party status to being competitive. We, I think, helped get ourselves 

to parity, recognizing that much of the Contract was in fact standing on 

Ronald Reagan’s shoulders. Bush now has to see whether or not he can move 

beyond parity to majority. 

You can go back to earlier studies of American politics in the 19th 

century. There are three things to think about in terms of what I tried 

to accomplish: the political, the policy, and the personal. The first thing, 

and I wrote down what Leon said because I thought he caught it right, 

although he and I probably will disagree on it. He said, ‘‘effective policymaking on a continuing basis to help govern.’’ This is the 9th year of a 

Republican majority in the House. The last time we were in the 9th year 

of a Republican majority in the House was 1927. So at a political level, 

it’s pretty hard to argue that we weren’t successful. Just as a fact. 

116 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

Second, on policy grounds, look at welfare reform, balancing the budget, reforming the FDA, strengthening the National Institutes of Health, increasing the Central Intelligence Agency’s budget, cutting taxes. It’s hard 

not to say that those 4 years were fairly substantial at a policy level. 

And the third is personal. Here I’m quite happy to have people decide 

that I failed in the end because I left the House. But it’s a little hard for 

me to look back and not feel success as a former Army brat who had no 

great personal wealth, no ties, and I arrived in Georgia courtesy of the U.S. 

Army at a time when it was segregated and Democratic. Georgia is now 

a State that has a Republican Governor, a Republican Senator, I think a 

soon-to-be Republican second Senate seat, and a majority of Republicans 

in the House. I arrived in Washington when we were in our 24th year of 

being in the minority. We’re now in our 9th year of being in the majority. 

I got to have a dinosaur in the Dinosaur Room, as Denny Hastert reminded 

me today. What’s to feel bad about? This was an enormously successful run 

that changed the House, changed the Republican Party, and marginally 

changed the country. 

In the end, I don’t think you can be that aggressively entrepreneurial 

in Washington in the speakership and sustain it very long. So you either 

have to decide, ‘‘I really want to get all of these things done and then I’ll 

have to go do something else for a while,’’ or you have to decide, ‘‘I’d rather 

stay around here and get a lot less done.’’ I don’t think there’s a game in 

the middle between those two styles. Most successful Speakers don’t try to 

do as many different things, and they’re right. But we had a very unique 

brief window to really change things. 

Last, I agree totally with Leon about the disaster relief fiasco in 1997. 

That was one of the reasons we ended up with my leadership in rebellion. 

I thought it was crazy for us to be in the fight. It was a moment of saying, 

‘‘You know how good Bill Clinton is at this stuff, why are you putting 

your head up so he can just beat on you for three hours?’’ I couldn’t agree 

more. That’s one of the places I failed. I failed in part because by then 

there were too many things going on and too many moving parts, which 

is the weakness of a centralized leadership in the House. 

The shutdown, though, is really important for sophisticated people to 

look at for a long time. Livingston and Kasich have both told me in the 

last year they are absolutely convinced we wouldn’t have gotten to a balanced 

budget without the shutdown. They see it as shock therapy. But there’s 

a key mantra, which is, ‘‘We lost.’’ I want all of you to think about this. 

We were the first reelected majority since 1928. We are the only majority 

ever reelected with a Democratic President winning the national election 

in 1996. What is it we lost? People say, ‘‘Oh, that was a terrible period, 

and we lost.’’ But what did we lose? We had a running brawl 9 months 

before the election. We proved that we were really deadly serious about 

The Gingrich Speakership 117 

solving our Nation’s problems. Leon has his version, and mine is a totally 

different discussion. We have to get Bob Livingston to come in some time 

and do an entire session on whether the shutdown was a mistake. I think 

you would have Leon on one side and you would have Kasich and Livingston 

on the other side. 

I would just say that as a professional designer of campaigns, the shutdown did not cost us anything except in the press corps and in this city 

and at cocktail parties. It didn’t cost us anything in the country. In the 

end, we were able to win election in a way that nobody had done since 

1928. We didn’t feel good about it, so people tend to undervalue the sheer 

fact that it’s still Speaker Hastert. 

Mr. PANETTA. Well, I guess I would just caution that the fact of 

simply holding power in and of itself is not necessarily an indication that 

you’re governing the country. Democrats made the mistake of basically assuming that because we held power, that somehow we didn’t have to deliver 

in terms of governing the country. I’ve often said that we govern in our 

democracy either through leadership or crisis. Leadership that’s willing to 

compromise and willing to find solutions is the most effective way of governing this country, in order to avoid crisis. But I think if you look at 

the last few years, we are a Nation that more and more governs by crisis, 

as opposed to leadership. Crisis drives policy. It drives energy policy. You’ve 

got to have the lights shut down in order for the country to respond to 

the energy problem. On budget issues, there’s always the threat of some 

kind of shutdown or forcing Members to stay beyond an adjournment date 

to pass appropriations bills in this place. The same thing is true on health 

care. The same thing is true for Social Security. The same thing is true 

for Medicare. Ultimately, we are doing more and more as a result of crisis 

driving policy. Now, whether we’re Democrats or Republicans, I think that’s 

a reality. And let me add, the public may for a period of time basically 

allow that kind of gridlock to proceed. But, as the California example demonstrates, there is a point at which angry and frustrated people are going 

to take their vote out on leaders who are in office. If there’s any lesson 

you should take away from the California recall experience, it’s that incumbents ought not to feel too comfortable about where they are at the present 

time. I think there is an angry and frustrated public out there, that at some 

point may do exactly what happened in 1994, which is to change the leadership because they are frustrated with the fact that we are doing more by 

crisis than by leadership. 

Mr. WOLFENSBERGER. I think we have time for one question. 

Question. In what way did your view of the speakership change during 

your tenure? 

Speaker GINGRICH. Virtually none. My view was that we had to 

be very different than traditional speakerships. My assumption was that we 

118 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

would be faced with overwhelming resources against us from the White 

House, large parts of the media, and the capacity to raise money from interest groups who would be threatened by changing government and changing 

priorities. Leon mentioned Wellington, and Wellington is one of the leaders 

I looked at because I expected to be in a peninsular kind of campaign where 

the other side had more resources. We had to be very sure we were focused 

on what it took to win. And my models were actually not so much prior 

speakerships, although I understood a fair amount about people like Tom 

Reed and Henry Clay and Cannon and Rayburn. My models were much 

more how do you organize people to be effective in a situation of enormous 

pressure where you’re trying to get things done? In that sense, I do accept 

Leon’s point that I tended to take as models Alfred Sloan of General Motors 

or George Catlett Marshall in the Second World War or a Franklin Delano 

Roosevelt. I was trying to find ways to be able to rally our people to do 

the things we wanted to do. 

Mr. WOLFENSBERGER. I’m now going to call on CRS Director Dan 

Mulhollan to make a few closing remarks, but please join me in thanking 

our panel for doing an outstanding job. 

Mr. MULHOLLAN. This closes our session. I want to thank everyone 

who participated in this important conference and everyone who attended 

the various sessions. One of the things it underscores is that each one of 

you being here indicates an interest, a caring about the institution of the 

U.S. Congress, and for that we are quite grateful. I must also add that, 

in order for this event to take place, a lot of people worked very hard. I 

wanted to mention Justin Paulhamus, Karen Wirt, Jill Ziegler, and Robert 

Newlen of CRS who worked to make the conference a success. Another CRS 

person merits special mention because he had the idea for the conference 

and carried it out in a highly successful manner. He is Walter Oleszek, 

my colleague and friend for over three decades, and we should thank him 

for his initiative and efforts. 

Part II 

Perspectives on the 

Speakership 

Four Speakers, Cannon Centenary Conference, November "#, #!!$ 


92800.008
121 

Chapter 1 

The Speakership in Historical Perspective 

Ronald M. Peters, Jr. 

Regents’ Professor, Carl Albert Research and Studies Center and 

Department of Political Science, University of Oklahoma 

Just over 100 years ago, on November 9, 1903, 

the Honorable Joseph Gurney Cannon, a Republican from Illinois, was sworn in as the 34th 

Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. 

‘‘Uncle Joe’’ Cannon became, perhaps, the most 

powerful Speaker in the history of that office, exercising almost complete control over the legislative process, dominating the committee system, 

often determining the content of legislation, and 

standing toe to toe with Republican Presidents 

Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft. 

Cannon was a colorful figure, earthy in appearance, demeanor, and sense of humor. He was the 

most prominent legislator of his day and perhaps, 

at that time, the only Member of Congress to 

gain extensive public recognition. In fact, his 

power in the House of Representatives became 

increasingly controversial until finally, on St. 

Patrick’s Day 1910, the Members of the House 

rebelled against him, stripping him of control 

over the Rules Committee and putting the party 

regime that had evolved since the Civil War on 

the path of extinction. 

The speakership of the House had not always 

been so powerful an office nor such a pure expression of party interest as Cannon made it. During 

the formative years of the Republic, the political 

party system was in flux, and House Speakers 

were not usually cast in the role of national party 

leaders. Henry Clay of Kentucky, the most important Speaker of the antebellum period, was indeed a partisan figure; but his influence extended 

beyond the circle of his partisan supporters and 

as a national figure he, in effect, transcended the 

offices that he held. Other antebellum Speakers 

were less noteworthy. It was not until after the 

Civil War, with the rise of the stable, two-party 

system that we have known since, that the speakership became defined as a position of party responsibility. This development sharpened the 

fundamental tension between the Speaker’s partisan and institutional roles that is latent in the 

constitutional design. From 1865 until the turn 

of the 20th century, the political parties became 

more entrenched and the speakership became an 

increasingly important position of party governance. Several Speakers during this period became 

powerful political leaders. These included Republicans James G. Blaine of Maine, Thomas B. 

Reed of Maine, and Cannon himself, and Democrats such as Samuel J. Randall of Pennsylvania, 

John G. Carlisle of Kentucky, and Charles F. 

Crisp of Georgia. Clearly, however, Cannon was 

the most powerful of them all, and his speakership represented the apotheosis of the office. Cannon came to the speakership just as that office 

reached its zenith under the rules of the House 

and of the Republican conference. The Speaker 

controlled floor recognition, named the members 

of committees, chaired the Rules Committee, determined referral of bills to committees, and controlled the floor agenda. Speaker Cannon’s power 

122 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

1Nelson Polsby, ‘‘The Institutionalization of the House of Representatives,’’ American Political Science Review, v. 62, March 1968, pp. 

144–168. 

was made emblematic by one disgruntled GOP 

progressive Member who, when asked by a constituent for a copy of the rules of the House, sent 

a picture of the Speaker. 

Today, we remember Cannon as the Czar of 

the House, and the office building that bears his 

name is a monument to his power. It is equally 

important to remember, though, that Cannon’s 

speakership witnessed the peak of the Speaker’s 

powers and the beginning of their decline. The 

St. Patrick’s Day revolt of 1910 stripped the 

Speaker of his control over the Rules Committee 

and led to the defeat of the Republican Party and 

of Cannon himself in the 1912 elections. Cannon 

was reelected in 1914 and the Republicans recaptured their House majority in the election of 

1918. The speakership, however, was never again 

as powerful as it had been under Cannon. It is 

ironic that the building that bears Cannon’s 

name was emblematic of an institutional shift 

that would, over time, erode the power that he 

had enjoyed. 

When the Cannon House Office Building was 

completed in 1908, it was the first detached office 

building serving the U.S. House of Representatives, and it symbolized, and gave further effect 

to, an underlying transformation in American 

politics and in the House of Representatives. It 

was at or near the beginning of the era of ‘‘institutionalization’’ of the House.1 The demands of 

legislative work and constituency service had created the need for each Member of the House to 

have adequate staff and appropriate office space 

in which to operate. No longer would Members 

have to meet with constituents in the halls, lobbies, hotels, and restaurants. Henceforth, Members would have their own space and that space 

would be at some distance from the legislative 

Chamber. The first step in isolating Members 

from each other was taken out of institutional 

necessity. 

The Cannon House Office Building opened 

during a period of electoral realignment and the 

attendant sharp political conflicts. Progressive 

western Republicans allied with northern and 

southern Democrats to dislodge Cannon from the 

Rules Committee. When the Democrats took the 

House in 1911 their Speaker, Champ Clark of 

Missouri, relinquished to Floor Leader Oscar 

Underwood of Alabama control over the House 

floor. Underwood experimented with government through the Democratic Caucus (much to 

the displeasure of their erstwhile allies, the progressive Republicans), but eventually power 

flowed to the committee system where it remained ensconced until the reform movement of 

the early seventies. 

The transformation of the House from a partycentered to a committee-centered legislative body 

was manifested by the construction of two additional office buildings. The Longworth Building, 

named after Speaker Nicholas Longworth (R– 

OH), was completed in 1933. The Rayburn 

Building was completed in 1965 and was named 

in honor of the House’s longest-serving Speaker, 

Sam Rayburn of Texas. These buildings were 

monuments to the power of the committees. 

While the Cannon Building had few committee 

hearing rooms, both the Longworth and Rayburn 

Buildings are organized around them. With the 

exception of the Appropriations, Rules, Standards 

of Official Conduct, and Ways and Means Committees, which today occupy offices in the Capitol Building, all other committees established 

their operations in the detached office buildings. 

The party leaders occupied space in the Capitol. 

Just as the physical layout of Washington, DC, 

reflects the constitutional separation of powers, 

so, too, did the arrangement of Capitol Hill reflect the institutional divisions between the party 

leaders and the committees and their chairs. 

The influence of political party competed with 

that of the committee system under Democratic 

majorities from 1911 to 1918 and under Republican majorities from 1919 until 1930. The Democrats experimented with ‘‘King Caucus’’ while 

diminishing the role of the Speaker. The Republicans managed business through a small group 

of legislators whose most influential Member was 

Longworth. As Speaker, Longworth demonstrated 

vestiges of the power that Cannon had enjoyed, 

but only that. Beneath the surface, a trend was 

already underway that would alter the House and 

the speakership for generations: longevity in 

service was steadily on the rise. This trend was 

especially accentuated in the southern States 

dominated by Democrats. When the Democrats 

The Speakership in Historical Perspective 123 

2Ronald M. Peters, Jr., The American Speakership, 2d ed. (Baltimore, 

MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990 j1997k). 

3Anthony Champagne, Congressman Sam Rayburn (New Brunswick, 

N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1984). 

returned to power in 1931, southern Democrats 

were at the top of the seniority lists and came 

to chair many key committees. The Democrats 

were to hold power for all but 4 of the next 64 

years, and, until the reforms of the early seventies, the southerners sat astride the committees 

and the House like statues on the balustrades of 

an ancient castle. 

I have elsewhere labeled this the ‘‘feudal’’ era 

in the history of the speakership because of the 

manner in which Speakers showed deference to 

the committee chairs.2 There were related political and institutional reasons for this deference. 

Politically, the ascendency of the committees and 

the relative decline of the speakership was the 

product of the Democratic Party and the coalition that supported it. The Roosevelt coalition 

combined voters from northern cities with the 

‘‘solid South.’’ The quid pro quo was always implicit: the South would provide reliable congressional majorities and the North would leave civil 

rights alone. To ensure that this political bargain 

stuck, congressional Democrats opted for seniority as an almost inviolate rule for advancement 

up the committee lists. They granted extraordinary powers to the committee chairs, powers 

that enabled them to set the agenda, determine 

committee meeting times, cast proxy votes, name 

the subcommittees, and, in effect, control legislation. The southern barons could block any legislation thought inimical to southern interests. 

The Rules Committee, which had been the bastion of Cannon’s power, now functioned autonomously and often at odds with the leadership. 

The Ways and Means Committee, whose chair 

had formerly served as floor leader and deputy 

to the Speaker, now functioned autonomously in 

controlling vital legislation and serving as the 

party’s Committee on Committees. The speakership that Cannon knew had become unrecognizably eroded. 

This was just fine with Democratic Speakers. 

Their job was to preserve the Democrats’ hold 

on power. This meant holding the coalition together. Conflict resolved or avoided in the committee rooms would not infect the Democratic 

Caucus or erupt on the House floor. It was in 

this context that Sam Rayburn became the longest-serving (and by many accounts) most esteemed Speaker of the House. Rayburn represented a district in a southern State. His obligations as a national Democrat were always in 

tension with the attitudes of his Texas constituents.3 Rayburn shaped the culture of the House 

of Representatives. He was both feared and revered by Members. Because he did not exercise 

active control over the committees, he was not 

held to account for their actions. At the same 

time, he was able to influence the committees 

when he needed to do so, precisely because he 

cultivated relationships with their chairs, his fellow southerners. Together, they taught a generation of new Members that ‘‘to get along, go 

along,’’ go along, that is, with Rayburn and the 

committee dons. 

This House of Representatives defined what 

political scientists later called the ‘‘textbook Congress,’’ replete with ‘‘norms’’ such as reciprocity, 

collegiality, deference, hard work, and, of course, 

seniority. These values were ingrained in Members and those who best adapted to them were 

the most likely to rise in the party hierarchy. 

Rayburn’s socialization of the House even 

stretched across party lines. While the Republican Party always demonstrated a more centralized tendency than did the Democrats, their 

most senior Members rose on the committee rosters and learned that their best interests were 

served by embracing the Democratic system and 

working with its leadership. Rayburn developed 

a close friendship with Republican Leader Joseph 

Martin of Massachusetts, and, when Martin 

served as Speaker during the 80th (1947–1949) 

and 83d (1953–1955) Congresses, he perpetuated 

many of the values that he had assimilated during his service in Rayburn’s House. Rayburn 

held daily sessions in a room at the Capitol that 

was dubbed the ‘‘Board of Education.’’ Martin 

would join the Speaker in bending an elbow on 

bourbon and branch water while discussing the 

issues of the day. A generation of favored Democrats and Republicans assimilated bipartisan 

norms as they absorbed the Speaker’s liquor. 

124 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

The ‘‘textbook Congress’’ did not last forever, 

indicating perhaps why textbooks always need to 

be revised. During the fifties, there arose increasing tension between the northern, liberal wing 

of the Democratic Party and the southern conservatives. The two Texans leading the Congress, 

Rayburn in the House and Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson, were tugged to the left, 

Johnson by his Presidential ambitions, Rayburn 

by the increasingly restless liberals in the Democratic Caucus. When John F. Kennedy was elected President in 1960, he realized that the southern stranglehold on the House would frustrate 

many of his policies. In 1961, in the last great 

battle of his career, Sam Rayburn led a successful 

effort to enlarge the Rules Committee to give it 

a loyal majority. Thus, the path was cleared for 

the subsequent passage of the landmark Civil 

Rights Act of 1964. 

After Johnson’s landslide Presidential election 

in 1964, substantial liberal majorities in the 

House and Senate swept away southern opposition to enact his Great Society. Still, House liberals such as Richard Bolling (D–MO.) believed 

that the time had come to break the southern 

grip on the committee system. By the decade’s 

end, they had enough votes to push through the 

Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 and, during the early seventies, a series of Democratic 

Caucus reforms that both strengthened the 

speakership and weakened the committee barons. 

The Speaker was given operating control over the 

Rules Committee. By party rule, he named the 

chair and the majority members of the committee. The Democratic Steering and Policy 

Committee became the party’s Committee on 

Committees, and the Speaker appointed a number of its members. All committee chairs were 

to be nominated by Steering and Policy and ratified by the full caucus, as were the subcommittee 

chairs of the Appropriations Committee. The 

caucus itself met monthly, providing a venue for 

the liberal majority to express itself. 

Even as the power of the speakership was thus 

enhanced, that of the committee chairs was reduced. The Democrats pushed through a ‘‘subcommittee bill of rights’’ that guaranteed that 

bills would be referred to the subcommittee of 

jurisdiction. Subcommittees were provided staff, 

budget, and jurisdiction. With a more autonomous set of subcommittees beneath them, and 

with the full caucus and its liberal majority hovering over them, committee chairs could no 

longer control the legislative process and dictate 

the content of legislation. The erosion of the 

power of the full committee chairs reached its 

apex in 1975 when, led by the Watergate class 

of 1974, three southern committee chairs were 

deposed by the caucus. After that happened, 

committee chairs were more careful to nurture 

their relations with the caucus as a whole. 

The general effect of these reforms may be described in three rings. At the center, the party 

leadership, especially the Speaker, was empowered by these reforms. Leadership stock went up, 

committee chair stock went down. In the middle 

ring, power was decentralized within the committee system. By the late seventies, over 150 

members of the Democratic Caucus served as 

subcommittee chairs. Each was granted considerable autonomy in managing the subcommittee’s 

business. To sustain their influence, committee 

chairs had to negotiate relationships with the 

subcommittee chairs. Rivalries naturally developed and the committees became venues for bargaining and compromise. In the outer layer, the 

House floor became a more important venue. The 

weakened committee system was the subject of 

less deference on the floor. The introduction of 

electronic voting, in 1973, made Members more 

accountable. Televised coverage made the floor 

more accessible to the public. Issues that might 

once have been resolved behind the closed doors 

of the committee rooms were now settled in open 

floor fights. And the floor was leadership territory. 

Thus, the modern speakership was to operate 

in a very different legislative milieu than at any 

time in the history of the House. During the late 

19th century, the Speaker was able to dominate 

the House. During most of the 20th century, the 

committee barons were in control. During the 

last three decades of the 20th century, the decentralization of power created the need for other 

control mechanisms. Under these circumstances, 

more power was given to the Speaker, but more 

was expected of him as well. Thrust onto center 

stage, House Speakers became more pivotal and 

more vulnerable. Members had higher expectaVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00134 Fmt 8165 Sfmt 8165 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.007 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
The Speakership in Historical Perspective 125 

4 Kevin Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New Rochelle, 

NY: Arlington House, 1969); Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. 

Wattenberg, The Real Majority (New York: Coward-McCann, 1970). 

tions; political opponents had greater incentive 

and opportunity to cause mischief. 

Political scientists have written for a long time 

now about the ‘‘post-reform House.’’ The term 

remains useful in differentiating the transition 

away from the committee-centered regime of the 

textbook Congress. By now, however, it may obscure more than it reveals. It has not been the 

reforms alone that have altered the context of the 

modern speakership. An underlying realignment 

has reshaped the political landscape that gives 

definition to institutional processes. The most 

obvious manifestation of this realignment is the 

fact that in 1994 the Republicans won control of 

the House for the first time in 40 years. As early 

as 1968, pundits had been anticipating a rightward drift in American politics.4 Barry Goldwater had prophesied it and Ronald Reagan had 

pressed it forward. Newt Gingrich completed it. 

The linchpin of this realignment has been the 

transition of the South from Democratic to Republican control. This process began with the 

passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 

drove many southern, white Democrats into the 

camp of the Republicans. This development has 

led us to where we are today. Richard Nixon carried a substantial percentage of the black vote 

in 1960. More Democrats voted against the Civil 

Rights Act than Republicans. The Republican 

decision to seek the votes of southern whites had 

its intended effect, swinging a majority of southern congressional districts, Senate seats, and electoral votes to the GOP; but it has cost them 

dearly among black voters who now vote 95 percent for the Democrats. This racial and regional 

polarization meshes with religion and other cultural variables to shape the present narrow political division in the country. 

The parity between the two parties shapes the 

political and institutional context of the speakership today. The reformed House had one set of 

consequences when it was run by entrenched 

Democrats holding a comfortable majority of 

seats most of the time. It runs differently when 

run by a narrow Republican majority determined 

to hold on to power in a protracted war for control of the House. For example, the relationship 

between the party leadership and the committees 

is fundamentally different under the Republicans 

than it had been under the Democrats. The 

Democratic committee chairs saw their power 

eroded, but were never dominated by the party 

leaders. Even when several committee chairs were 

deposed by the Democratic Caucus, the initiative 

came from within the caucus and the leadership 

supported the chairs. The Republicans have simply bypassed several senior Members as committee or subcommittee chairs, and have punished deviating Members by denying them chairs 

to which their seniority would have entitled 

them. Thus, if the reformed House is different 

from the pre-reformed House, the Republican 

House is different from the Democratic House. 

No matter which party is in the majority, the 

narrow division that has been in place between 

the two parties since 1995 has shaped the legislative environment in ways that the reformers of 

the early seventies could not have anticipated. 

One manifestation of this new environment is 

the upheaval that the speakership has experienced 

in the past 15 years. Almost a century ago, Uncle 

Joe Cannon was stripped of much of his power, 

defeated for reelection and, upon being reelected, 

reduced to the role of elder statesman within the 

Republican conference. During the 20th century, 

the speakership has witnessed great stability, 

even as its stature was in many ways diminished 

in relationship to the committee system. The reform movement and the development of partisan 

struggle for control of the House have created 

a more politicized environment than any since 

Cannon’s time. This has taken a toll on the 

speakership. One Speaker resigned from office, a 

second was defeated for reelection, and a third 

declined to seek another term in office. These 

events say as much about the contemporary climate of American politics as they do about the 

individual Speakers. 

This inquiry into the speakership today, then, 

comes at a critical moment in the history of that 

office. This volume presents a variety of perspectives on the changing speakership. Part I provides the proceedings of the Cannon Centenary 

Conference on ‘‘The Changing Nature of the 

Speakership,’’ co-sponsored by the Congressional 

Research Service and the Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center of the UniverVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00135 Fmt 8165 Sfmt 8165 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.007 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
126 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

sity of Oklahoma. (Funding for the conference 

was also provided by the McCormick Tribune 

Foundation.) The conference addressed in detail 

the speakerships of: Thomas P. ‘‘Tip’’ O’Neill 

(D–MA; 1977–1987); Jim Wright (D–TX; 1987– 

1989); Tom Foley (D–WA, 1989–1993); and Newt 

Gingrich (R–GA; 1995–1999). In examining each 

speakership, the book offers a statement by the 

Speaker himself (or, in the case of the late Speaker O’Neill, by his biographer, John Farrell) along 

with commentary from Democratic and Republican Members who served with that Speaker. 

Additional insight is provided by noted historian 

Robert Remini, who traces the broad path of the 

speakership’s evolution. Of particular note is the 

contribution of Speaker Dennis Hastert (R–IL; 

1999– ) who offers his most definitive statement on the speakership and his conduct of it 

to date. 

Part II provides additional depth of analysis 

in chapters arrayed topically. Prepared by political scientists and congressional specialists at the 

Congressional Research Service, these chapters 

offer an analytic perspective on the speakership. 

In Chapter 2, Walter Oleszek and Richard C. 

Sachs examine the impact of three Speakers— 

Reed, Cannon, and Gingrich—on the rules of the 

House. They argue that these three Speakers were 

distinctive in their proactive efforts to implement 

a fundamentally new institutional order in the 

House. Their account reminds us that Speakers 

are not entirely hostage to circumstance, and that 

exceptional Speakers have been able to bring 

about important institutional changes. 

Chapter 3, by Christopher Davis, surveys the 

history of the House Rules Committee and the 

relationships of House Speakers to it. During the 

partisan era of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Rules Committee served as a reliable 

arm of the majority party leadership, and Speakers such as Reed and Cannon used control over 

the committee to push party legislation. With 

the rise of the conservative coalition in the late 

thirties, the Rules Committee assumed considerable independence, and became an impediment 

to legislation pushed by the liberal Democratic 

majority. Since the reform movement of the early 

seventies, Houses Speakers have once again taken 

control of the Rules Committee. The Republicans, who complained bitterly about the tyrannical dictates of the committee when in the minority have, Davis finds, been as assertive as the 

Democrats in using their control over Rules to 

structure floor debate and to shape legislation 

brought to the floor. 

In Chapter 4, Elizabeth Rybicki traces the relationship between the Speaker of the House and 

the leadership of the Senate. She identifies the 

key differences between the two bodies that 

structure this relationship, and examines how the 

role of the Speaker in bicameral coordination has 

become more challenging in the modern era. Of 

particular interest is her description of the mechanics of bicameral relations. Among these are 

the legislative conferences through which the two 

Chambers reach agreement on the final language 

of bills. 

Of increasing importance has been the relationship between the Speaker and the press, addressed by Betsy Palmer in Chapter 5. Her account stresses the changing relationship between 

House Speakers and the media, affected by the 

historical and partisan context, the personalities 

of individual Speakers, and evolving media technologies. During most of American history to 

date, Speakers had informal and sometimes personal relationships with a core group of press 

corps veterans. With the emergence of broadcast 

television, cable television, and Internet technologies, Speakers have had to develop more sophisticated media strategies to counter those of 

the President, Senators, and other House Members. The decision to open House proceedings to 

broader media coverage has changed the political 

environment. The increasing partisanship we see 

today echoes that of a century ago, but the relationship between the Speaker and the media is 

greatly different today than it was then. 

There has been no more important relationship 

for House Speakers than that which they have 

encountered with Presidents of the United States. 

In Chapter 6, Eric Petersen provides a template 

for understanding the Speaker-President nexus by 

considering the relationship between Speaker 

Cannon and President Theodore Roosevelt, on 

the one hand, and Speaker Rayburn and President Franklin Roosevelt on the other hand. In 

the former case, despite Theodore Roosevelt’s efforts to court Cannon, the relationship was at 

times strained, as Speaker Cannon often disVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00136 Fmt 8165 Sfmt 8165 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.007 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
The Speakership in Historical Perspective 127 

dained the legislative initiatives of the President. 

Forty years later, Speaker Rayburn was a pillar 

of support for Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal and 

wartime policies. In each case, however, the 

Speaker’s relationship to the President was 

shaped by the needs and expectation of the Members of the House. 

Chapter 7 elaborates on the relationship between Speakers and Presidents by considering 

that relationship in the context of national emergencies: the Civil War, World War I, the Great 

Depression, and World War II. In it, Harold 

Relyea argues that times of national emergency 

affect the role of the Speaker and the relationship 

of the speakership to the Presidency. In our system of separated institutions sharing powers, the 

Presidency naturally emerges during times of national crisis. The Congress, in general, and the 

speakership, in particular, tends to defer to Presidential leadership. This may take the form of 

passing Presidential legislation or in acquiescing 

to Presidential actions. In such times, House 

Speakers tend to be supportive of Chief Executives. Still, relationships between Speakers and 

Presidents during national emergencies have varied due to personality, partisanship, ideology, institutional stature, and statesmanship. 

In the book’s final chapter, I provide an overview of the many changes the speakership has experienced and offer a reflection on its role in the 

House today. This discussion echoes many of the 

specific themes developed by the other authors. 

In particular, it reinforces the perspective that 

the speakership has evolved over time according 

to underlying changes in the American political 

system, producing periods of partisan turmoil as 

well as periods of bipartisan stability. Speakers 

have had to adapt their leadership style to the 

contexts in which they were called upon to serve, 

yet each Speaker has put his stamp on the office. 

The present period is characterized by a strong 

partisanship not experienced since Uncle Joe 

Cannon was at the zenith of his power, a century 

ago. Whether this augurs well or ill for the 

House of Representatives, the speakership, and 

the country, is a story yet to be told. 

128 

1Asher Hinds, ‘‘The Speaker and the House,’’ McClure’s, vol. 35, 

June 1910, p. 196. Hinds, a former Member and long-time Parliamentarian of the House, was quoting Speaker Nathaniel Macon (R–NC, 

1801–1807). 

Chapter 2 

Speakers Reed, Cannon, and Gingrich: 

Catalysts of Institutional and 

Procedural Change 

Walter J. Oleszek 

Senior Specialist in the Legislative Process 

Congressional Research Service 

and 

Richard C. Sachs 

Specialist in American National Government 

Congressional Research Service 

‘‘The elect of the elect of the people’’ is how 

a little-known Speaker described his position 

more than two centuries ago.1 Most of the early 

Speakers with very few exceptions, such as Speaker Henry Clay (1815–1820, 1823–1825), functioned 

largely as presiding officers rather than leaders 

of their parties. This condition began to change 

during the post-Civil War era with the growth 

of partisan sentiment and party-line voting in the 

House and in the country. Speakers became both 

their party’s leader in the House and influential 

actors on the national scene. Perhaps the most 

powerful and institutionally important of these 

late 19th century Speakers was a man nicknamed 

‘‘Czar’’ Reed, which is why our analysis begins 

with him. 

From Thomas Brackett Reed (R–ME, 1889– 

1891; 1895–1899) to J. Dennis Hastert (R–IL, 

1999– ), 20 lawmakers have served as Speakers 

of the House of Representatives. Only a few are 

remembered for the procedural or institutional 

changes they initiated or supported during their 

occupancy of this constitutionally-established position. Arguably, three Speakers during this century-plus period ushered in ideas and meaningful 

developments that reshaped the operations of the 

House: Reed, Joseph Cannon (R–IL, 1903–1911), 

and Newt Gingrich (R–GA, 1995–1999). A central feature of the three speakerships was the exercise of ‘‘top down’’ command in an institution 

Speakers Reed, Cannon, and Gingrich 129 

2 D.B. Hardeman and Donald C. Bacon, Rayburn: A Biography (Austin, TX: Texas Monthly Press, 1987), p. 319. 3Ronald M. Peters, Jr., The American Speakership: The Office in Historical Perspective (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 

p. 151. 4Richard Bolling, Power in the House (New York: E.P. Dutton and 

Co., 1968), p. 248. 5 U.S. House of Representatives, Hinds’ Precedents of the House of Representatives jby Asher C. Hindsk, 5 vols. (Washington: GPO, 1907), 

vol. 5, p. 353. 6 Ibid., p. 354. 

largely known for its decentralized power structure. Each Speaker, too, was a formidable protagonist to the President at the time (William 

McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, and Bill Clinton, 

respectively). 

Reed, Cannon, and Gingrich were strong personalities, but much of their claim to institutional fame arises because they changed the culture and work ways of the House. Reed ended 

the virtually unstoppable dilatory practices of the 

minority and riveted the majoritarian principle 

into the rulebook of the House; Cannon so dominated institutional proceedings that he provoked 

the famous 1910 ‘‘revolt,’’ which diminished the 

Speaker’s authority and facilitated the rise of the 

committee chairs to power; and Gingrich introduced procedural changes that permitted him to 

lead the House as few other Speakers before him. 

To be sure, other Speakers presided during periods of important procedural change. Speaker 

Sam T. Rayburn (D–TX; 1940–1947, 1949–1953, 

and 1955–1961) led the House when it enacted the 

Legislative Reorganization Act jLRAk of 1946. 

He was also instrumental in expanding the size 

of the Rules Committee, a 1961 initiative to ensure that President John F. Kennedy’s New Frontier agenda would not be buried in a panel hostile to JFK’s legislative program. The expansion 

marked the beginning of the end of an era— 

roughly from the 1910 revolt to the early seventies—in which powerful committee barons exercised significant sway over Chamber proceedings. 

John W. McCormack (D–MA, 1962–1971), was 

Speaker during debate and passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970; Carl Albert (D– 

OK, 1971–1977), and Thomas P. O’Neill (D–MA, 

1977–1987), both led the House during periods 

of major institutional change—from a resurgent 

Democratic Caucus to changes in the bill referral 

and committee assignment process to statutory 

reforms such as the War Powers Resolution of 

1973, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, and the Balanced 

Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 

1985. 

The principal advocates of many of these innovations, however, were change-oriented individuals (Richard Bolling, D–MO, for instance) or 

informal entities such as the Democratic Study 

Group, rather than the Speaker. When the Senate 

passed its version of the 1946 LRA and sent it 

to the House, Rayburn ‘‘gave it a skeptical 

glance and let it sit on his desk for six weeks;’’ 2

Speaker McCormack ‘‘resisted the reform of the 

House’’; 3 or, as Representative Bolling said 

about McCormack’s efforts in trying to block 

what eventually became the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970: ‘‘Behind the scenes, Speaker 

McCormack has exerted every effort to prevent 

enactment of any version of the bill designed to 

provide a limited measure of modernization of 

the antiquated machinery and antiquated ways of 

doing business in both House and Senate.’’ 4 By 

contrast, Reed, Cannon, and Gingrich were the 

principal advocates or instigators of momentous 

institutional change. 

THOMAS BRACKETT REED AND THE ‘‘REED

RULES’’ 

THE PRE-REED CONTEXT.—Thomas Brackett 

Reed, Republican of Lewiston, Maine, became 

Speaker on December 2, 1889, at the start of the 

51st Congress. Previous occupants of that high office had little success in preventing a determined 

minority from delaying and obstructing the business of the House. With few procedural tools to 

move the legislative agenda, Speakers before 

Reed entertained motions that were plainly dilatory in intent, or as Reed himself characterized 

them, ‘‘motions made only to delay, and to weary 

. . .’’ 5 The dilatory motions came in numerous 

forms: repeated motions to adjourn, to lay a 

measure on the table, to excuse individual Members from voting, to reconsider votes whereby individual Members were excused from voting, and 

to fix the day to which the House should adjourn, among others.6 These filibustering tactics 

often prevented the majority party from enacting 

its legislative priorities and opened it to public 

criticism. 

130 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

7Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (Boston: Houghton, 

Mifflin and Co., 1885), p. 80. 8 Samuel W. McCall, Thomas B. Reed (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 

and Co., 1914), p. 166. 

9Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek, Congress Against Itself 

(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977), p. 23. 10 L. White Busbey, Uncle Joe Cannon (New York: Henry Holt and 

Co., 1927), p. 74. 11 U.S. House of Representatives, History of the United States House 

of Representatives, Üåçé–Üééâ, 103d Cong., 2d sess., H. Doc. No. 103– 

324 (Washington: GPO, 1994), p. 181. Hereafter referred to as Üééâ 

History of the House. See also U.S. House of Representatives, Journal 

of the House of Representatives, 48th Cong., 2d sess., March 2, 1885 

(Washington: GPO, 1885), pp. 731–765. 12 Quoted in Üééâ History of the House, p. 181. 13Randall Strahan, ‘‘Thomas Brackett Reed and the Rise of Party 

Government,’’ in Roger H. Davidson, Susan Webb Hammond, and 

Raymond W. Smock, eds., Masters of the House: Congressional Leadership 

Over Two Centuries (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), p. 36. 

Woodrow Wilson wrote critically of the 

House’s inability to conduct business because of 

the paralyzing effect of dilatory practices. In his 

classic study, Congressional Government (1885), Wilson described the conduct of a pre-Reed House 

filibuster on a pension bill brought to the floor 

by the Democratic majority during the 48th 

Congress (1883–1884): 

jTkhe Republican minority disapproved of the bill with 

great fervor, and, when it was moved by the Pension Committee, late one afternoon, in a thin House, that the rules 

be suspended, and an early day set for consideration of the 

bill, the Republicans addressed themselves to determined and 

persistent ‘‘filibustering’’ to prevent action. First they refused 

to vote, leaving the Democrats without an acting quorum; 

then, all night long, they kept the House at roll-calling on 

dilatory and obstructive motions . . .’’ 7

By ‘‘leaving the Democrats without an acting 

quorum,’’ Wilson is referring to the infamous 

and long-standing House practice dubbed the 

‘‘disappearing quorum.’’ Under Article I, Section 

5, of the Constitution, ‘‘a Majority of each 

jHousek shall constitute a Quorum to do Business.’’ This provision was, however, interpreted 

by Reed’s predecessors to mean one-half of the 

total membership plus one, who formally acknowledge their presence in the Chamber as determined by a roll call vote. Though physically 

present on the floor, the disappearing quorum allowed Members to avoid being counted as 

‘‘present’’ for the purpose of a constitutional 

quorum if they failed to respond when the Clerk 

called their names. ‘‘The position had never been 

seriously questioned that, if a majority of the 

representatives failed to answer to their names on 

the calling of the roll,’’ stated a biographer of 

Reed, ‘‘there was no quorum for the transaction 

of business even if every member might actually 

be present in the hall of the House.’’ 8

The practice of the disappearing quorum originated in 1832 when Massachusetts Representative 

John Quincy Adams, former President of the 

United States (1825–1829), first used the tactic to 

frustrate House action on a proslavery measure. 

Prior to Adams, it had been customary for every member 

who was present to vote. In 1832, when a proslavery measure 

was being considered, Adams broke precedent by sitting silently in his seat as the roll was called during voting; enough 

members joined him so that fewer than a quorum voted on 

the measure. Without a quorum . . . the House could only 

adjourn or order a call of the House to muster a quorum. 9

In short, the House Chamber could be filled 

with the total membership, but if less than half 

responded to a call of the House, there was no 

quorum and no substantive business could be 

conducted. No wonder Representative Joseph 

Cannon referred to the disappearing quorum as 

‘‘the obstruction of silence.’’ 10

These two procedural devices—dilatory motions and the disappearing quorum—enabled 

partisan minorities to slow or stop the flow of 

House business. The stalling tactics were effective, for example, in forcing the House, in 1850, 

to conduct 31 roll call votes in a single day on 

a California statehood bill; to require, in 1854, 

101 roll call votes during one legislative day on 

the Kansas-Nebraska bill; and, on a legislative 

day in 1885, to conduct 21 roll call votes.11 Critics 

of these procedural logjams, Woodrow Wilson 

among them, charged that ‘‘more was at stake 

than the ability of the majority to act in pursuit 

of its legislative agenda; the public reputation 

and even the legitimacy of the House as a democratic institution was under challenge.’’ 12

THE REED RULES.—It may appear surprising 

to some that filibustering tactics often prevented 

the majority party from advancing its agenda 

during the post-Civil War period. This era witnessed the rise of the current two-party system 

and greater partisan cohesion in Congress. It was 

an era ‘‘marked by strong partisan attachments 

jin the electoratek, resilient patronage-based 

party organizations, and especially in the later 

years jof the 19th centuryk, high levels of party 

voting in Congress.’’ 13 Yet, despite the rise of 

party government in the House, no Speaker until 

Speakers Reed, Cannon, and Gingrich 131 

14Representative James Blaine, remarks in the House, Congressional 

Record, Feb. 24, 1875, appendix, vol. 3, p. 1734. 15Representative Thomas B. Reed, ‘‘Rules of the House of Representatives,’’ Century, vol. 37, March 1889, pp. 794–795. 16 Strahan, ‘‘Thomas Brackett Reed and the Rise of Party Government,’’ p. 51. 

17 Quoted in Strahan, ‘‘Thomas Brackett Reed and the Rise of Party 

Government,’’ p. 53. 18Congressional Record, vol. 60, Dec. 2, 1889, p. 84. 19 Peters, The American Speakership: The Office in Historical Perspective, 

p. 63. 20 Douglas H. Price, ‘‘The Congressional Career—Then and Now,’’ 

in Nelson Polsby, ed., Congressional Behavior (New York: Random 

House, 1971), p. 19. 

Reed used the power of his office to end the filibustering tactics of the minority party. Speaker 

James Blaine (R–ME, 1869–1875), said when a 

lawmaker suggested he count as present Members in the Chamber who refused to vote: ‘‘The 

moment you clothe your Speaker with power to 

go behind your roll call and assume there is a 

quorum in the Hall, why gentlemen, you stand 

on the very brink of a volcano.’’ 14

Reed was willing to ‘‘stand on the very brink’’ 

for two key reasons. First, he was a strong proponent of the idea that the majority party must 

be able to govern the House. ‘‘Indeed, you have 

no choice,’’ he wrote when he was Speaker-elect 

prior to the convening of the House in the 51st 

Congress (1889–1890). ‘‘If the majority do not 

govern, the minority will; and if tyranny of the 

majority is hard, the tyranny of the minority is 

simply unendurable. The rules, then, ought to 

be arranged to facilitate action of the majority.’’ 15 Second, the 1888 elections produced unified GOP control of Congress and the White 

House for the first time in 14 years. (The House’s 

partisan composition was 166 Republicans and 

159 Democrats.) These two conditions, ‘‘together 

with the frustrations and criticism that had surrounded the House in the previous Congress, created a ‘critical moment’ in which an unusual opportunity was present for large-scale institutional 

innovation.’’ 16

When the 1st session of the 51st Congress convened on December 2, 1889, Speaker Reed was 

determined to end the long-standing ability of 

the minority party to frustrate majority lawmaking through dilatory motions and disappearing quorums. Unsure whether he had the 

votes to make these fundamental changes, Reed 

even planned to resign as Speaker and from the 

House if the Chamber did not sustain his rulings. ‘‘jIk had made up my mind that if political 

life consisted of sitting helplessly in the chair and 

seeing the majority powerless to pass legislation, 

I had had enough of it and was ready to step 

down and out.’’ 17

Part of Reed’s strategy was to block adoption 

of the rules of the preceding Congress and have 

them referred to the Rules Committee, the panel 

he, as Speaker, chaired. On the opening day, the 

House adopted a resolution directing that the 

rules of the 50th Congress be referred to the 

Committee on Rules for review and revision.18

Until new rules were promulgated for the House, 

Speaker Reed presided using general parliamentary law and could, therefore, decide when to rule 

dilatory motions and disappearing quorums out 

of order. For example, functioning ‘‘as the presiding officer under general parliamentary law, 

Speaker Reed consistently refused to accept dilatory motions’’—a harbinger of the procedural 

changes to come.19

The House operated under general parliamentary rules—which included adoption of resolutions establishing committees and the Chamber’s 

order of business—for nearly 3 months. It was 

during this period that Reed made one of the 

most consequential rulings of any Speaker: terminating the disappearing quorum. Speaker Reed 

understood that he was handling political dynamite and carefully calculated how best to end the 

practice. He chose a contested election to force 

the issue because these cases were highly partisan 

and would galvanize Republicans to support the 

Speaker. Under the Constitution, the House is 

the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own Members, but the usual practice 

was that contested seats were nearly always 

awarded to the majority party’s candidate as a 

way to increase their margin of control. In the 

period from 1800 to 1907, ‘‘only 3 percent of the 

382 ‘contests’ were resolved in favor of the candidate of the minority party.’’ 20 Mindful of this 

history, the minority Democrats realized that the 

Reed-led Republicans would surely seat the GOP 

Member in any election contest. Their plan: employ the disappearing quorum. 

132 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

21Representative Thomas B. Reed, remarks in the House, Congressional Record, vol. 61, Jan. 29, 1890, p. 948. 22 Ibid., p. 949. 

The procedural battle was joined on January 

28, 1890, when a contested election case was 

brought to the floor. The specific issue involved 

who should be seated from the Fourth District 

of West Virginia: Charles B. Smith, the Republican, or James M. Jackson, the Democrat. 

Unsurprisingly, the GOP-controlled Committee 

on Elections submitted a resolution to the House 

that recommended the seating of Smith. Speaker 

Reed then put this question to the House: ‘‘Will 

the House now consider the resolution?’’ 21

Democrats demanded the yeas and nays on the 

question, which produced a vote of 162 yeas, 3 

nays, and 163 not voting. With 165 a quorum 

at the time, Reed appeared to prevail until two 

Democrats withdrew their votes upping the nonvoting total to 165. With Democrats crying ‘‘no 

quorum,’’ Speaker Reed directed the Clerk to 

record as present Members who refused to vote, 

declared that a quorum was indeed present, and 

ruled that the resolution was in order for consideration. 

Bedlam erupted in the Chamber. Outraged 

Democrats used such words as tyranny, scandal, 

and revolution to describe the Speaker’s action. 

One Member, James McCreary (D–KY), prompted this exchange with the Speaker: 

MR. MCCREARY. I deny your right, Mr. Speaker, to count 

me as present, and I desire to read the parliamentary law 

on the subject. 

THE SPEAKER. The Chair is making a statement of fact 

that the gentleman from Kentucky is present. Does he deny 

it? 22

The parliamentary turmoil lasted 3 days before 

the House again turned to the case of Smith v. 

Jackson. Democrats ended their delaying tactics 

and motions when it was plain that Reed had 

the votes to sustain any of his rulings. On January 31, 1890, the House resumed consideration of 

Smith v. Jackson, and on February 3, Smith was 

seated by a vote of 166 yeas, 0 nays, and 162 not 

voting. Smith was immediately sworn into office. 

With the seating of Smith, Speaker Reed apparently believed that he had the votes to definitely ensure adoption of new House rules. On 

February 6, 1890, the Rules Committee reported 

to the floor new House rules, the so-called Reed 

rules. Eight days later, by a vote of 161 to 144, 

with 23 Members not voting, the House adopted 

new rules which augmented the Speaker’s authority and limited the minority party’s power of obstruction. Among the changes were four key provisions. 

First, the disappearing quorum was eliminated. House Rule 15 stated that nonvoting 

Members in the Hall of the House shall be 

counted by the Clerk for purposes of establishing 

a quorum. Second, Rule 16 declared: ‘‘No dilatory motions shall be entertained by the Speaker.’’ No longer could lawmakers offer dilatory 

motions and have them accepted by the Chair. 

Now the Speaker had formal authority to rule 

them out of order. Third, Rule 23 established a 

quorum of 100 in the Committee of the Whole. 

Before, a quorum in the Committee was the same 

as that for the full House: half the membership 

plus one. Lawmakers frequently delayed action in 

the Committee of the Whole by making a point 

of order that a quorum was not present. Finally, 

Rule 22 authorized the Speaker to refer all bills 

and resolutions to the appropriate committee 

without debate or authorization from the House. 

Defeated on the floor, the Democrats turned 

to the Supreme Court to negate the Speaker’s 

quorum ruling. On April 30, 1890, they contended that a quorum was not present when the 

House voted to approve a bill relating to the importation of woolens. The bill was supported by 

a vote of 138 to 0, with 189 lawmakers not voting. In the case of United States v. Ballin (1892, 

144 U.S. 1), the Court held that the House can 

decide for itself how best to ascertain the presence of a quorum. The advantages or disadvantages of such methods were not matters for judicial consideration. 

Democrats recaptured control of the House in 

the 1890 and 1892 elections and their Speaker 

(Charles Crisp of Georgia) reverted to the practice of the silent quorum, refusing to count lawmakers in the Chamber who were present but 

who remained silent when their names were 

called for votes. Reed, now the minority leader, 

made such strategic use of the disappearing 

quorum to foil Democratic plans that in 1894 the 

Democratically controlled Chamber reinstated 

the rule counting for quorum purposes Members 

present in the Chamber but who did not vote. 

Speakers Reed, Cannon, and Gingrich 133 

23Charles O. Jones, ‘‘Joseph G. Cannon and Howard W. Smith: 

An Essay on the Limits of Leadership in the House of Representatives,’’ Journal of Politics, vol. 30, Aug. 1968, p. 619. 

24Representative William P. Hepburn, remarks in the House, Congressional Record, vol. 63, Feb. 18, 1909, p. 2653. 25Representative David De Armond, remarks in the House, Congressional Record, vol. 63, March 1, 1909, p. 3569. 26Representative Everis A. Hayes, remarks in the House, Congressional Record, vol. 65, March 19, 1910, p. 3434. 27Busbey, Uncle Joe Cannon, p. 217. 28Representative John Nelson, remarks in the House, Congressional 

Record, vol. 62, Feb. 5, 1908, p. 1652. 

Reed returned as Speaker of the 54th (1895–1897) 

and 55th (1897–1899) Congresses; however, in 

1899 he resigned from the House to protest 

what he characterized as President William 

McKinley’s imperialist policies in the Philippines and Hawaii. 

SPEAKER CANNON AND THE 1910 REVOLT

Joseph Cannon was first elected to the House 

in 1872 and served for nearly 50 years—suffering 

two electoral defeats in 1890 and 1912—before retiring in 1923. A popular Republican called 

‘‘Uncle Joe’’ by friends and foes alike, Cannon 

unsuccessfully challenged Reed for Speaker in the 

GOP Caucus of 1888, but his lengthy experience, 

party loyalty, and parliamentary skills prompted 

Reed to appoint him chair of the Appropriations 

Committee as well as to the Rules Committee. 

Elevated to the speakership on November 9, 

1903, Cannon served in that capacity until March 

3, 1911. As Speaker, Cannon was the inheritor and 

beneficiary of Reed’s procedural changes. 

Cannon did not have the intellectual or oratorical abilities of Reed, but, like the hedgehog, 

Cannon knew one great thing: within the formal 

structure of House procedure, the Reed rules now 

provided the opportunity for a Speaker to dominate life in the House; not just legislative policymaking on the floor, but the committee system, 

administrative functions, the granting of favors 

large and small. When Cannon became Speaker 

in 1903, he seized this opportunity and dominated the House. His speakership has been described as a case of ‘‘excessive leadership.’’ 23

Briefly enumerated, Cannon’s exercise of 

power included the following: he assigned Members to committees; appointed and removed committee chairmen; regulated the flow of bills to 

the floor as chairman of the Rules Committee; 

referred measures to committee; and controlled 

floor debate. Taken individually, Cannon’s powers were little different from those of his immediate predecessors, but taken together and exercised to their limits, they bordered on the dictatorial. 

A GOP lawmaker said of his recognition 

power, for example, that it made a Member ‘‘a 

mendicant at the feet of the Speaker begging for 

the right to be heard.’’ 24 Claiming the Rules 

Committee was simply a pawn of the Speaker’s, 

Representative David De Armond (D–MO), suggested that Cannon ‘‘personally, officially, and 

directly . . . make his own report of his own action and submit to jak vote of the House the 

question of making his action the action of the 

House.’’ 25 In making committee assignments, 

Cannon was not reluctant to ignore seniority. In 

1905 he appointed as chair of the Appropriations 

Committee a Member who had never before 

served on the panel. On another occasion, he denied the request of GOP Representative George 

W. Norris of Nebraska, who as a progressive 

leader opposed Cannon’s heavy-handed parliamentary rule, to be named to a delegation to 

attend the funeral of a Member who had been 

a personal friend of Norris’. 

Frustration and anger with Cannon’s autocratic 

ways began to soar inside and outside the House 

during his final years as Speaker. No Speaker, 

said a lawmaker, is ‘‘entitled to be the political 

and legislative dictator of this House in whole 

or in part.’’ 26 Other factors aroused opposition 

to Cannon’s leadership. His economic and social 

views were seen as reactionary by many. His relationship with President Theodore Roosevelt was 

often strained because of policy differences. As 

Cannon admitted, the two ‘‘more often disagreed’’ than agreed over legislation.27 As one insurgent Republican—John Nelson of Wisconsin—said to his House colleagues, ‘‘Mr. 

Chairman, I wish to say to my Republican fellow 

Members who believe in the Roosevelt policies, 

let us look at the rules of the House. President 

Roosevelt has been trying to cultivate oranges for 

many years in the frigid climate of the Rules 

Committee, but what has he gotten but the proverbial lemons.’’ 28

134 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

29 See, for example, Jones, ‘‘Joseph G. Cannon and Howard W. 

Smith: An Essay on the Limits of Leadership in the House of Representatives,’’ pp. 617–646. Also, Kenneth Hechler, Insurgency; Personalities and Politics of the Taft Era (New York: Russell and Russell, 

1964), pp. 27–82; Chang-Wei Chiu, The Speaker of the House of Representatives Since Üçéã (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928); and 

Paul DeWitt Hasbrouck, Party Government in the House of Representatives 

(New York: MacMillan Co., 1927), pp. 1–13. 30 Donald R. Wolfensberger, ‘‘The Motion to Recommit in the 

House: The Creation, Evisceration, and Restoration of a Minority 

Right.’’ A paper prepared for presentation at a conference on the History of Congress, University of California, San Diego, December 5– 

6, 2003. Mr. Wolfensberger is director of The Congress Project, 

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC. 31Rager, ‘‘Uncle Joe Cannon: Brakeman of the House,’’ in Davidson, Hammond, and Smock, Masters of the House, p. 77. 

32H. Res. 502, 61st Cong., 2d sess., Congressional Record, vol. 65, 

March 19, 1910, p. 3429. 

Dissatisfaction with Cannon’s leadership eventually triggered one of the most noteworthy 

events in the history of the House: the revolt of 

1910. 

THE 1910 REVOLT.—The story of the 1910 revolt has been told many times.29 Suffice it to say 

that the rebellion by insurgent Republicans and 

minority Democrats began more than a year before Cannon was stripped of important procedural powers. Recognizing that he needed to 

defuse the mounting discontent, Speaker Cannon 

in 1909 backed several procedural changes. He 

agreed to a new unanimous consent calendar, 

which allowed lawmakers 2 days during a month 

to call up minor bills without first receiving 

prior approval of the Speaker. A Calendar 

Wednesday rule was adopted, which could only 

be set aside by a two-thirds vote, that provided 

1 day each week for standing committees to call 

up reported bills, bypassing the Cannon-run 

Rules Committee. The Speaker, too, agreed to a 

rules change granting opponents of a bill an opportunity to amend a measure just prior to final 

passage by offering a motion to recommit—or 

send the bill back to the committee that had reported it to the floor. (Previously, the Speaker 

recognized whomever he wanted to offer this motion.) Further, the Rules Committee was prohibited from reporting a rule that denied opponents 

the chance to offer a motion to recommit.30

These rules changes did little to halt insurgent 

and public attacks on the Speaker. Several national magazines ran ‘‘articles in regular installments that not only detailed the Speaker’s 

wrongdoings but also praised the insurgents.’’ 31

Eventually, opponents of Cannon successfully 

marshaled their forces—employing a procedural 

resolution offered by Representative Norris—to 

weaken the power of the Speaker. The insurgent 

forces removed the Speaker from the Rules Committee and stripped him of the right to appoint 

lawmakers to that panel. On March 19, 1910, the 

House agreed to the Norris resolution, which 

provided that ‘‘there shall be a Committee on 

Rules, elected by the House, consisting of 10 

Members, 6 of whom shall be Members of the 

majority party and 4 of whom shall be Members 

of the minority party. The Speaker shall not be 

a member of the committee and the committee 

shall elect its own chairman from its own members.’’ 32 Nearly 3 months later, on June 17, 1910, 

the House further weakened the power of the 

Speaker by adopting a discharge calendar. This 

new rule established a procedure to discharge (or 

extract) bills from committee, providing them 

with an opportunity to be voted on by the 

House. 

With ‘‘Cannonism’’ an issue in the November 

1910 elections, Democrats recaptured control of 

the 62d Congress (1911–1913). On April 5, 1911, 

they adopted a new rule which removed from the 

Speaker his authority to appoint Members to the 

standing committees. This authority was formally assigned to the House. In reality, each 

party nominated its partisans to the standing 

committees through its Committee on Committees, which was followed by pro forma House approval of these decisions. 

Cannon’s ability to act as an autocratic Speaker 

was due in part to Reed’s skillful remodeling of 

the rules to remove procedural obstacles to lawmaking erected by the minority party. Cannon’s 

contribution was his forceful use of the rules to 

discipline not just minority party members, but 

members of his own party as well. The Speaker’s 

heavy-handedness was also attributable to those 

Republicans who opposed Cannon but feared— 

and so remained silent—that his downfall could 

produce a Democratic Speaker who would use the 

rules no differently. Various factors, as noted earlier, have been suggested to explain Cannon’s fall 

from power: he exercised procedural power so 

autocratically that it provoked the rebellion 

against his leadership; he ignored for too long 

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Speakers Reed, Cannon, and Gingrich 135 

33 David Brady, ‘‘After the Big Bang House Battles Focused on 

Committee Issues,’’ Public Affairs Report, University of California, 

Berkeley, March 1991, p. 8. 34There was a brief interlude of governance by ‘‘King Caucus.’’ 

When the Democrats took control following the one-man rule of Cannon, they employed their caucus, for example, to debate and mark 

up legislation prior to its introduction in the Chamber and to bind, 

by a two-thirds vote of the caucus, all Democrats to support the party’s position on the floor. However, enthusiasm for governing this 

way faded, and Democrats gradually made less use of King Caucus; 

it did not survive the return to power of the Republicans following 

the November 1918 elections. See Wilder H. Haines, ‘‘The Congressional Caucus of Today,’’ American Political Science Review, vol. 9, Nov. 

1915, p. 699. 35Nelson W. Polsby, et al., ‘‘The Growth of the Seniority System 

in the U.S. House of Representatives,’’ American Political Science Review, 

vol. 63, Sept. 1969, pp. 790–791. 

36 ‘‘What Influences Congress: An Interview with Sam Rayburn, 

Speaker of the House of Representatives.’’ U.S. News and World Report, 

vol. 26, Oct. 13, 1950, p. 30. 

form movement, preferring instead to adhere to 

the status quo of Republican regularity; and he 

was a 19th century man arriving at a position of 

national political power in a 20th century moment—a modern moment—of rapid social, economic, and political change for which he was unprepared. 

THE RISE OF COMMITTEE GOVERNMENT

Whatever combination of forces led to the 

1910 revolt, its aftermath for the institution was 

dramatic. If the House of Speaker Cannon was 

‘‘partisan, hierarchical, majoritarian and largely 

populated by members serving less than three 

terms,’’ it gradually became ‘‘less partisan, more 

egalitarian, and populated by careerists.’’ 33

The 1910 revolt produced a major shift in the 

internal distribution of power in the House. 

Committees and their leaders came to dominate 

policymaking for the next 60 years.34 Various 

reasons account for this development, such as the 

rise of congressional careerism and the institutionalization of the seniority system.35

Seniority—longevity of continuous service on 

a committee—became not just an established 

method for naming committee chairs, but an ingrained, inviolate organizational norm for both 

parties. As a result, committee chairmen owed 

little or nothing to party leaders, much less 

Presidents. This automatic selection process produced experienced, independent chairs, but it 

also made them resistant to party control. Many 

lawmakers chafed under a system that concentrated authority in so few hands. Members 

objected, too, that the seniority system promoted 

lawmakers from ‘‘safe’’ one-party areas—especially conservative southern Democrats and midwestern Republicans—who could ignore party 

policies or national sentiments. 

Committee government was characterized by 

bargaining and negotiating between party and 

committee leaders. Speakers had to persuade 

committee chairs to support priority legislation. 

‘‘A man’s got to lead by persuasion and the best 

reason,’’ declared Speaker Rayburn, ‘‘that’s the 

only way he can lead people.’’ 36 For example, by 

the early thirties, and continuing for virtually all 

of Rayburn’s service as Speaker, the Rules Committee was dominated by a conservative coalition 

of southern Democrats and Republicans. Thus, 

much of Speaker Rayburn’s time was spent persuading and bargaining with Rules members to 

report legislation favored by various Presidents 

and many legislators. 

The late sixties and seventies saw a rapid influx of new lawmakers, many from the cities and 

suburbs, who opposed the conservative status 

quo. Allying themselves with more senior Representatives, especially Democrats (recall that 

Democrats controlled the House continuously for 

40 years from 1955 to 1995), they pushed through 

changes that diffused power and shattered seniority as an absolute criterion for naming committee 

chairs. A resurgent Democratic Caucus initiated 

many of the procedural changes that transformed 

the distribution of internal power. Some of the 

changes were enacted into law (the Legislative 

Reorganization Act of 1970, for example); some 

made rules of the Democratic Caucus—the ‘‘subcommittee bill of rights’’ is an example which 

required, among other procedural changes, that 

committee chairs refer legislation to the appropriate subcommittee within 2 weeks after initial 

introduction. 

Among the important consequences of these 

various enactments were: the spread of policymaking influence to the subcommittees and 

among junior lawmakers; the enhancement of 

Congress’ role in determining Federal budget 

priorities through a new congressional budget 

process; the infusion of flexibility and accountability into the previously rigid seniority system; 

the tightening of the Speaker’s control over the 

136 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

37Roger H. Davidson, The Postreform Congress (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 114. 

38Alan Ehrenhalt, ‘‘Speaker’s Job Transformed Under O’Neill,’’ 

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, vol. 43, June 22, 1985, p. 1247. 39 Leroy N. Rieselbach, Congressional Reform: The Changing Modern 

Congress (Washington: CQ Press, 1994), p. 129. 

Rules Committee (he was granted the authority 

to select its chair and the other majority members of the panel); and greater transparency of the 

House’s deliberative processes heretofore closed 

to public observation, including gavel-to-gavel 

televised coverage of floor proceedings over C– 

SPAN jCable Satellite Public Affairs Networkk. 

Institutionally, dual and contradictory changes 

were underway in the House during the seventies. Power was shifted from committee chairs 

downward to the subcommittee chairs (subcommittee government as it was called by some 

scholars), as well as upward to the centralized 

party leadership. House Democratic reformers 

wanted to make the committee system more accountable to the Speaker and the Democratic 

Caucus as a whole. They brought about some 

centralization of authority—examples include removing the committee assignment process from 

the Democrats on the Ways and Means Committee and lodging it in the party Steering and 

Policy Committee and augmenting the party 

whip system—but in other ways the changes 

produced a highly decentralized and individualized institution that made it harder for party 

leaders to mobilize winning coalitions. Before, 

party leaders could often rely on a few powerful 

committee chairs or State delegation leaders to 

deliver blocs of votes; under subcommittee government, scores of entrepreneurial lawmakers had 

the capacity to forge coalitions that could pass, 

modify, or defeat legislation. 

The decentralizing forces of the seventies 

gradually subsided and strong leadership began 

to reemerge in the eighties. ‘‘jTkhe latent power 

of centralized party leadership was aroused by 

unanticipated changes in the political landscape 

and the policy agenda.’’ 37 These changes included the election of Ronald Reagan as President in 1980 and 1984. Leading the House became more difficult with sharp differences erupting between the branches—and between the 

House and Senate, the latter in GOP hands from 

1981 to 1987—over the role of the Federal Government and national policy priorities. 

Challenged by President Reagan to limit the 

domestic role of government, cut taxes, and increase defense spending, Democratic Members 

recognized the importance of strengthening their 

party leaders both to overcome institutional fragmentation and to negotiate bicameral and interbranch differences with the White House and the 

GOP-controlled Senate. Rank-and-file Democrats 

looked to Speaker Thomas P. ‘‘Tip’’ O’Neill (D– 

MA), to develop and publicize party programs, 

and to negotiate equitable budget deals with the 

Reagan administration, sometimes in high-stakes 

budget summits. In response, O’Neill used leadership task forces to promote party priorities, created ad hoc panels to process major legislation, 

and innovated the use of special rules from the 

Rules Committee to advance the party’s program. 

As partisan disagreements became sharper, Republicans repeatedly made O’Neill a media target during congressional November elections. In 

turn, as the first Speaker to preside over a televised House, and as his party’s highest elected 

official, O’Neill became a vocal critic of Reagan’s 

domestic and foreign policies. As a result, the 

speakership itself was transformed during 

O’Neill’s time. ‘‘Today, O’Neill is as much a celebrity and news source as he is an inside strategist.’’ 38 In short, when O’Neill retired from the 

House at the end of 1986, the speakership was 

an office of high national visibility. 

The speakership, too, had accumulated additional centralized authority for the management 

of the House’s business. At the urging of the 

party rank-and-file, the Speaker-controlled Rules 

Committee began to issue more restrictive rules 

to protect Democrats from having to vote on 

electorally divisive, GOP-inspired ‘‘November’’ 

amendments. By at least the mideighties, 

‘‘Democratic party leaders in the House became 

more active, more forceful in moving party legislation forward.’’ 39

In 1987, James C. Wright (D–TX), became 

Speaker. An aggressive leader, Wright took bold 

risks and exercised his leadership prerogatives in 

an assertive manner. For example, he prodded 

committee chairmen to move priority legislation, 

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Speakers Reed, Cannon, and Gingrich 137 

40 John Berry, The Ambition and the Power: The Fall of Jim Wright 

(New York: Viking, 1989), p. 6. 

41C. Lawrence Evans and Walter J. Oleszek, Congress Under Fire: 

Reform Politics and the Republican Majority (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 

Co., 1997), pp. 35–38. 42 David Cloud, ‘‘Gingrich Clears the Path for Republican Advance,’’ Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, vol. 52, Nov. 19, 1994, 

p. 3319. 

cits, for example) over the opposition of the 

Reagan White House and many Democratic colleagues, and employed procedural tactics—limiting GOP amendment opportunities, for example—that made Republicans’ minority status 

more painful and embittered their relations with 

Democratic leaders. ‘‘If Wright consolidates his 

power, he will be a very, very formidable man,’’ 

said Representative Newt Gingrich (R–GA). 

‘‘We have to take him on early to prevent 

that.’’ 40

Gingrich represented a new breed of Republican who entered the House starting with the 

election of 1978. They were unhappy with the institutional status quo and the cooperative relations their GOP leaders had established and 

maintained with Democrats. These Gingrich-led 

Republicans sought to portray the Democratic 

leadership as corrupt and to undermine public 

confidence in congressional operations. The strategic goal was to win Republican control of the 

House. Gingrich employed two long-term plans 

in his eventual rise to power. First, he urged all 

Republicans to work together to advance a unified conservative agenda and to use that agenda 

to nationalize House elections. Second, GOP 

Members would aggressively confront the Democratic leadership about what Republicans viewed 

as the unfairness of the legislative process and attempt to make the internal operations of the 

Chamber a public issue. For example, Gingrich 

and his Republican allies argued vociferously that 

special rules from the Rules Committee were 

skewed to bolster the majority party and that the 

Democratic leadership was stifling legitimate debate on national issues. Gingrich also employed 

ethics as a partisan weapon against Speaker 

Wright, which led to his departure from the 

House in June 1989. (Wright was charged with 

violating several House rules, such as accepting 

gifts from a close business associate.) 

Wright was succeeded as Speaker by Majority 

Leader Thomas Foley (D–WA). Elected to the 

House in November 1964, Foley rose through the 

ranks to become Speaker during an era of sharp 

partisan animosity and political infighting. Republicans found Foley easier to work with than 

the more pugnacious Wright, but they also lamented his willingness to use procedural rules to 

frustrate GOP objectives. Significantly, public 

approval of Congress reached an all-time low of 

17 percent as citizens learned in September 1991 

about Members bouncing personal checks at a socalled House bank.41 Voters also learned that 

some lawmakers had converted campaign and official office funds into cash for personal use. 

Speaker Foley worked to win back the public’s 

trust by supporting such initiatives as more professional administrative management of the 

House and tighter restrictions on lobbyists. 

Democratic reform efforts proved to be insufficient. In November 1994, after a 30-year congressional career, Foley lost his bid to return to the 

House in that year’s electoral earthquake. That 

election returned Republican majorities to both 

the House—for the first time since 1954—and 

the Senate. 

THE RETURN OF THE STRONG SPEAKERSHIP

Newt Gingrich, who was his party’s unanimous choice for Speaker, took the office to new 

heights of influence, initially challenging even 

the President as a force in national politics and 

policymaking. Three factors help to explain this 

development: recognition on the part of most 

Republicans that Gingrich was responsible for 

leading his party out of the electoral wilderness 

of the ‘‘permanent minority’’; the broad commitment of GOP lawmakers to the Republican agenda; and the new majority’s need to succeed at 

governance after 40 years in the minority. Not 

since the Cannon era had there been such vigorous party leadership in the House. Speaker 

Gingrich explained the need for greater central 

authority. The GOP must change, he said, ‘‘from 

a party focused on opposition to a majority party 

with a responsibility for governing. That requires 

greater assets in the leader’s office.’’ 42

A key centralizing aspect of Gingrich’s speakership was his influence over committees. Not 

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138 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

43Roger Davidson, ‘‘Congressional Committees in the New Reform 

Era,’’ in James A. Thurber and Roger H. Davidson, eds., Remaking 

Congress: Change and Stability in the ÜééÖs (Washington: Congressional 

Quarterly Inc., 1995), p. 41. 

44 Erin P. Billings, ‘‘Democrats Protest Closed Rules in the House,’’ 

Roll Call, March 17, 2003, p. 16. 

publicans to chair several standing committees, 

ignoring seniority in the process, he also required 

the GOP members of the Appropriations Committee to sign a written pledge that they would 

heed the Republican leadership’s recommendations for spending reductions. Furthermore, he 

often bypassed committees entirely by establishing leadership task forces to process legislation, dictated orders to committee chairs, and 

used the Rules Committee to redraft committeereported legislation. Party power during this period dominated committee power. 

The centerpiece of Gingrich’s early days as 

Speaker was a 10-point Republican Party program titled the ‘‘Contract with America,’’ which 

the House acted upon within the promised first 

100 days of the 104th Congress. The contract set 

the agenda for Congress and the Nation during 

this period. An important component of the contract was a wholesale reworking of the Rules of 

the House, the most significant since Speaker 

Reed. ‘‘The elections of November 8, 1994, transformed the politics of congressional structures 

and procedures,’’ declaimed a congressional 

scholar.43 With GOP cohesion and solidarity especially high, Speaker Gingrich consolidated and 

exercised power to transform House operations in 

significant ways. 

Among the administrative, legislative, and 

procedural actions taken by Republicans during 

the 104th Congress were these: (1) passing the 

Congressional Accountability Act, which applied 

workplace safety and antidiscrimination laws to 

Congress; (2) hiring Price Waterhouse and Company, a nationally known accounting firm, to 

conduct an independent audit of House finances; 

(3) cutting House committee and subcommittee 

staffs by one-third; (4) imposing 6-year term limits on committee and subcommittee chairs; (5) 

banning proxy—or absentee—voting in committees; (6) permitting radio and television coverage 

of open committee sessions as a matter of right 

and not by authorization of the committee; (7) 

guaranteeing to the minority party the right to 

offer a motion to recommit with instructions; (8) 

restricting Members to two standing committee 

assignments and four subcommittee assignments; 

(9) requiring more systematic committee oversight plans; (10) prohibiting commemorative 

measures; (11) doing away with the joint referral 

of legislation—referring measures to two or more 

committees simultaneously—but authorizing the 

Speaker to designate a primary committee of jurisdiction upon the initial referral of a measure; 

(12) prescribing term limits—8 years of consecutive service—for the Speaker (abolished at the 

start of the 108th Congress); (13) eliminating 

three standing committees (District of Columbia, 

Post Office and Civil Service, and Merchant Marine and Fisheries) and consolidating their functions in other, sometimes renamed, standing 

committees; (14) transforming the Committee on 

House Administration into a leadershipappointed panel; and (15) reorganizing the administrative units of the House. 

These and many other formal and informal 

Gingrich-led changes made the 104th House 

(1995–1997) considerably different from its immediate predecessor, modifying the legislative culture and context of the House. Civility between 

Democrats and Republicans eroded as both sides 

exploited procedural and political devices in efforts either to retain, or win back, majority control of the House. Some of the attempted reforms 

also proved hard to implement. The new majority promised a more open and fair amendment 

process compared to the restrictive amendment 

opportunities Republicans often experienced during Democratic control of the House. This goal, 

however, sometimes clashed with a fundamental 

objective of any majority party in the House: the 

need to enact priority legislation even if it means 

restricting lawmakers’ amendment opportunities. 

Throughout the 104th Congress, Democrats and 

Republicans prepared ‘‘dueling statistics’’ on the 

number of open versus restrictive rules issued by 

the Rules Committee. Democratic frustration 

with GOP-reported rules that limit their amendment opportunities has escalated in subsequent 

years.44

In 1995, Time named Gingrich their ‘‘Man of 

the Year.’’ (Ironically, the person to appear on 

the first issue of the magazine’s cover was Joe 

Speakers Reed, Cannon, and Gingrich 139 

45Jackie Koszczuk, ‘‘Party Stalwarts Will Determine Gingrich’s 

Long-Term Survival,’’ Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, vol. 55, 

July 26, 1997, pp. 1751–1755. 46 David McCullough, ‘‘Time and History on Capitol Hill,’’ in 

Roger H. Davidson and Richard C. Sachs, eds., Understanding Congress: 

Research Perspectives, U.S. House of Representatives, 101st Cong., 2d 

sess., 1991, H. Doc. 101–241, p. 32. 

Cannon.) However, Speaker Gingrich soon encountered political and personal problems. In an 

unsuccessful confrontation with President Bill 

Clinton, the Gingrich-led Republicans were 

twice publicly blamed for shutting down parts 

of the government in late 1995 and early 1996 

because of failure to enact appropriations bills in 

a timely manner. Rank-and-file Republicans became upset with the Speaker’s impulsive leadership style. A small group of Republicans, with 

the encouragement of some in the leadership, 

planned in summer 1997 to depose Gingrich as 

Speaker, but the plot was uncovered and averted.45 Nonetheless, the coup attempt exposed the 

deep frustration with the Speaker within GOP 

ranks. Gingrich, too, was reprimanded by the 

House for ethical misconduct and blamed for the 

loss of GOP House seats in the 1996 and 1998 

elections. Weakened by these developments, 

Gingrich resigned from the House at the end of 

the 105th Congress. 

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The historian David McCullough once wrote, 

‘‘Congress . . . rolls on like a river . . . always there 

and always changing.’’ 46 His observation fits the 

speakerships of Reed, Cannon and Gingrich. Although each served in different political, economic, and social circumstances—with a President of their own party or not, for example, 

Reed, Cannon and Gingrich centralized procedural control of the House in their hands to accomplish policy and political goals. Each was 

willing to hamstring the minority party and to 

challenge the White House. Whether the influence of these Speakers stems primarily from the 

context in which they served (the strength of partisan identification in the electorate, the autonomy of committees, the cohesiveness of the majority party, etc.) or their personal skills, abilities, and talents, there is little doubt that, at the 

apex of their power they shaped and reshaped the 

procedures, policies, and politics of the House. 

The return of dictatorial Speakers on the order 

of Joe Cannon is unlikely in the contemporary 

era. The reasons seem mostly self-evident: greater 

transparency in almost all of Congress’ activities; 

larger, more diverse, and more sophisticated 

media coverage of Congress; a congressional 

membership that is not only better educated but 

one that has thrived in an era where policy and 

political entrepreneurship is a norm and overly 

strict adherence to the directives of a single party 

leader an uncommon occurrence; and the expectations of attentive and well-educated constituents who want Members to participate in public 

debates and media events and to initiate policy 

proposals. 

The speakership in its most recent incarnation 

draws its strength in part because of a procedural 

change adopted during the Gingrich speakership: 

the three-term limit on committee chairs. These 

committee leaders are unlikely to remain in their 

post long enough to accrue political influence 

sufficient to challenge the Speaker on a regular 

or sustained basis. Moreover, the decision to appoint a new committee chair is exercised by the 

Speaker-led Republican Steering Committee. 

Congressional history demonstrates, however, 

that centralized authority is not a permanent 

condition. Instead, the forces of centralization 

and decentralization are constantly in play, and 

they regularly adjust and reconfigure in response 

to new conditions and events. 

Another large source of influence for today’s 

Speaker is the heightened level of partisanship in 

the House. This situation often enables majority 

party leaders to demand, and often get, party loyalty on various votes. Broadly, the Speaker has 

the dual task of mobilizing majority support for 

party goals and, concurrently, formulating and 

publicizing issues that attract the support of partisans and swing voters nationally so his party 

retains majority control of the House. 

The Reed, Cannon, and Gingrich speakerships 

highlight how each defined their role according 

to time, place, and circumstance. The office itself 

has changed shape time and again, and its ability 

to procedurally and politically control the business of the House has waxed and waned. The 

heightened partisanship in today’s House means 

140 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

47Herbert Bruce Fuller, The Speakers of the House (Boston: Little, 

Brown and Company, 1909), p. 292. 

that the Speaker often gets party loyalty on key 

votes. Probably the Speaker’s most compelling 

argument to his partisans is that if they are to 

maintain majority control, they must stick together and do whatever it takes politically and 

procedurally to retain their status. Speakers may 

lose key votes on the floor, but it is seldom for 

lack of trying. 

In its present configuration, the speakership is 

as significant an office as any time in the past, 

a product now of its occupant and lieutenants 

collectively and the conditions in which they operate. These circumstances today favor strong 

party leadership, but Speakers always operate 

under a range of constraints, such as the independence of lawmakers and size and unity (or 

fragmentation) of the majority party. At bottom, 

the Speaker’s authority rests on the willingness 

of lawmakers to follow his lead. Without 

followership, Speakers can still be ‘‘the sport of 

political storms.’’ 47

141 

1 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Rules, A History of 

the Committee on Rules, committee print, 97th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington: GPO, 1983), p. 6. 

Chapter 3 

The Speaker of the House and the 

Committee on Rules 

Christopher M. Davis 

Analyst in American National Government 

Congressional Research Service 

The rules . . . are not for the purpose of protecting the 

rights of the minority, but to promote the orderly conduct 

of the business of the House. 

Speaker Thomas B. Reed 

jTo provide the Speakerk absolute control of the House 

through its Committee on Rules is giving greater power to 

the Speaker of the House than any man in this free Republic 

ought to possess. 

Representative Joseph W. Bailey 

The Speaker of the House and the Committee 

on Rules have existed since the First Congress. 

In fact, the first select committee established in 

the House in 1789 was a Committee on Rules; 

the first rule it reported detailed the duties of 

the Speaker. 

For the first 90 years of its existence, the Rules 

Committee was a temporary and relatively unimportant entity. From 1789 to 1880, however, both 

the link between the Speaker and the Rules 

Committee, and the power of each, would grow. 

This accumulation of influence was gradual, and 

was tied directly to the actions and aspirations 

of individual Speakers. In 1858 a sitting Speaker 

was named a member of the Select Rules Committee, and in 1880, the panel was made a permanent standing committee which the Speaker 

chaired. 

Since 1880, the committee has been at various 

times an agent of the Speaker’s power, an opponent and counterweight to it, a political traffic 

cop, a leadership gatekeeper, an unmovable parliamentary roadblock, an investigative and oversight body, and a secondary legislative filter. The 

Rules Committee has played an increasingly important role in the Congress. Through it, Speakers of the House have been able to largely control 

not only the flow, but the substance, of legislation from the standing committees to the House 

floor. The committee has become one of the most 

important ingredients in a Speaker’s ability to 

govern. 

As one scholar points out, ‘‘Sometimes a 

Speaker has dominated the jRulesk Committee 

from his position as its chairman; more often 

than not, he has exerted great influence over it 

through his impact on the selection of its members. More rarely, he has been confronted with 

an independent and sometimes rebellious committee.’’ 1

The power relationship between the Rules 

Committee and the Speaker has often been a synergistic one, each reinforcing the other. It is little 

142 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

2 Journal of the House of Representatives, 1st Cong., 1st sess., April 2, 

1789, p. 6. 3 DeAlva Stanwood Alexander, History and Procedure of the House of 

Representatives (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1916), p. 182. 

4 James A. Robinson, The House Rules Committee (Indianapolis: 

Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), p. 59. 5 Ibid., p. 57. 6A History of the Committee on Rules, pp. 44–45. 7 Ibid., p. 44. 8 Ibid., p. 45. 

wonder, then, that the House Rules Committee 

is often called ‘‘the Speaker’s committee.’’ 

THE ORIGIN OF THE RULES COMMITTEE

While today the Rules Committee is central 

to the power of the Speaker and the operations 

of the modern Congress, the origin of the committee is far more modest. In April 1789, when 

a quorum was finally achieved in the First Congress after weeks of waiting for Members to arrive from the 13 States, the first select committee 

established was a committee on rules. The 11- 

member panel, appointed by Speaker Frederick 

A.C. Muhlenberg of Pennsylvania and chaired by 

Representative Elias Boudinot of New Jersey, 

was directed to ‘‘prepare and report such standing rules and orders of proceedings as may be 

proper to be observed in this House.’’ 2 When 

the select committee reported back to the House 

5 days later, the first rule it recommended outlined the duties and powers of the Speaker of the 

House. This rules package was known as the 

‘‘Boudinot rules,’’ after the chair of the select 

committee. 

At this time, and indeed, for the next 90 years, 

the Committee on Rules wielded scant influence 

over the substance of legislation or the order of 

procedural business in the House. During these 

early years, when the Congress was small, and 

conducted comparatively little legislative business, the Rules Committee was largely a housekeeping panel that met at the beginning of a session to craft a rules package or, more frequently, 

simply to readopt the Boudinot rules of the First 

Congress. In many early congressional sessions, 

the Rules Committee met once to accomplish 

this task, and not again; in other Congresses, the 

panel did not make a single report. One congressional scholar has pointed out, ‘‘the custom of 

re-adopting the Boudinot Rules . . . left little 

jworkk to a Committee on Rules.’’ 3 In fact, in 

its early history, the select committee was so insignificant to the operations of the House that, 

during one 11-year period—from 1817 to 1828— 

Speakers of the House did not even bother to appoint Members to the committee.4

From 1841 to 1883, however, the Rules Committee began a gradual evolution that would 

transform it into one of the House’s most powerful committees. As a result of this evolution, the 

Rules Committee would become so central to the 

power of the Speaker and the scheduling of the 

business of the House, that in spring 1910, almost 121 years to the day after the first Select 

Rules Committee was established, the House, in 

a rare instance of open revolution, would rise up 

in bipartisan revolt against the Speaker of the 

House and strip him of his seat on the Rules 

Committee, an entity which had become ‘‘the 

citadel of his power.’’ 5

This journey to the heights of power was a 

slow one, however, that evolved even as the 

young legislative body grew. In June 1841, the 

House gave the Rules Committee the power to 

report from time to time; prior to that, the panel 

had only been permitted to report at the beginning of a Congress on possible revisions to the 

rules. This change was made in the hope that 

the additional power granted the committee 

would allow it to undertake a comprehensive reform of the Chamber’s rules, which had become 

a ‘‘hodgepodge’’ that ‘‘bordered on chaos.’’ 6 The 

committee, however, was unable to make a comprehensive reform of House rules. Shortly thereafter, Speaker John White of Kentucky, conferred 

additional influence on the committee by ruling 

that the panel could ‘‘make reports in part at different times.’’ 7

In 1849, the House, frustrated with the continued confused state of the rules, briefly made 

Rules a standing committee with the hopes that 

doing so would enable it to comprehensively reform the Chamber’s rules. After 4 years, however, 

the panel had still not been able to accomplish 

this task. Simply put, ‘‘what resulted was more 

of the same.’’ 8

In 1853, the House adopted a resolution making legislation reported from the Rules Committee privileged for consideration, mandating 

The Speaker of the House and the Committee on Rules 143 

9 ‘‘The Rules Again,’’ Congressional Globe, vol. 23, Dec. 5, 1853, p. 

4. 

10 ‘‘Revision of the Rules,’’ Congressional Globe, vol. 28, June 14, 1858, 

p. 3048. 11 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, A Short 

History of the Development of the Committee on Rules, typed report by 

Walter Kravitz and Walter J. Oleszek, Jan. 30, 1978, p. 4. 12 Ibid. 

13 George B. Galloway, History of the United States House of Representatives, 89th Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. 250 (Washington: GPO, 1965), 

p. 47. 14 Ibid., p. 47. 15 Ibid., p. 48. 

that reports from the panel be ‘‘acted upon by 

the House until disposed of, to the exclusion of 

all other business.’’ 9 This additional grant of 

power failed to help the panel achieve comprehensive rules reform and, in 1857, the panel 

remained so unimportant that the House did not 

even create it until a full 6 months of the 35th 

Congress had elapsed. 

In 1858, however, an important breakthrough 

occurred. The House established a select panel 

made up of the Speaker and four other Members 

to revise the rules and report back to the full 

House; this was the first time that a Speaker had 

served on one of the Chamber’s legislative committees. Under the resolution, the Speaker named 

the four other members of the select committee. 

During floor debate, one Member offered an 

amendment to have the House, rather than the 

Speaker, appoint these members, but it was overwhelmingly defeated and the resolution establishing the select committee was adopted with 

almost no debate.10 Although the action received 

little debate on the floor, it marked the first time 

the Speaker was in full command of the Rules 

Committee. 

In the 36th Congress, the select committee reported back its suggested revisions of the rules, 

which were subsequently adopted by the House. 

Included in the report were provisions providing 

for a five-person Rules Committee appointed and 

chaired by the Speaker of the House.11 The 

Speaker would remain a member of the House 

Rules Committee, serving as its chair, appointing 

its members (as well as the members of all House 

committees) and exercising its power and authority for the next three decades. Thus, after 1858, 

the powers of the committee and the authority 

of the Speaker became even more closely linked, 

‘‘a circumstance which served both to enhance 

the role of the committee and to strengthen the 

influence of the Speaker.’’ 12

In 1880, the Rules Committee was made a permanent standing committee of the House and 

given legislative jurisdiction over ‘‘all proposed 

action touching the rules and joint rules.’’ The 

House undertook this action in the course of another comprehensive overhaul of its rules, which 

reduced the number of standing rules from 166 

to 44.

13

The first chairman of the revamped committee, Speaker Samuel J. Randall (D–PA), used 

his authority on the Rules Committee to bolster 

the influence of his office, establishing that all 

future rules changes should be referred to the 

Rules Committee, and that its reports could be 

brought to the floor any time.14

The powers of the committee and the Speaker 

continued to grow when control of the Chamber 

shifted again in 1881. One of the first Members 

to recognize the full potential of the Rules Committee to manage legislative business was Representative Thomas Brackett Reed (R–ME), who 

was appointed to the Rules Committee in 1882. 

In February 1883, in an important development 

that foreshadowed the role of the modern Rules 

Committee, the House upheld a Speaker’s ruling 

that the committee could report a special order 

of business for a specific bill. The significance 

of this ruling was that it allowed the House to 

take up individual bills by a simple majority vote 

rather than being forced to rely on the cumbersome suspension of the rules procedure, which 

required a super majority vote of two-thirds, or 

by unanimous consent.15

This ruling was prompted by Representative 

Reed, who called up a resolution reported by the 

Rules Committee that sought to allow the House 

to suspend the rules by simple majority vote and 

request a conference with the Senate on tariff legislation. A point of order was made by Representative Joseph Blackburn (D–KY) against the 

resolution on the grounds that the Rules Committee did not have the authority to report such 

a resolution. In making his argument, Blackburn 

pointed out that the resolution was neither a 

House rule nor an amendment to House rules, 

and should thus be ruled out of order. Speaker 

J. Warren Keifer (R–OH) overruled the point of 

144 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

16House Committee on Rules, Official Web site, www.house.gov

rules, accessed on Aug. 12, 2003. 17Chang-Wei Chiu, The Speaker of the House of Representatives Since 

Üçéã (New York: Columbia University Press, 1928), pp. 120–121. 18Asher C. Hinds, Hinds’ Precedents of the United States House of Representatives, 5 vols. (Washington: GPO, 1907), vol. IV, § 3152. 

19 Ibid., § 4321. 20Asher C. Hinds, ‘‘The Speaker of the House of Representatives,’’ 

American Political Science Review, vol. 3, May 1909, pp. 155–156. 

order on grounds that the resolution was ‘‘reported as a rule from the Committee on Rules.’’ 

The Speaker explained that, just as the Rules 

Committee could report a rule to suspend or repeal any or every rule of the House, subject to 

approval by the House itself, it could also issue 

a rule that would ‘‘apply to a single great and 

important measure . . . pending before the Congress.’’ 16

While this was the first instance of the House 

adopting a ‘‘special rule’’ for the consideration of 

a specific bill, it did not at that time lead to 

a flood of special rules from the Speaker, or give 

an indication of the tremendously important procedural development it would later prove to be. 

‘‘The method of adopting a special order from 

the Committee on Rules by a majority vote,’’ one 

historian noted, ‘‘was not in favor for the following three Congresses. In 1887, it was regarded 

as a proceeding of ‘doubtful validity’ . . . it was 

not until . . . 1890 that this method . . . gained 

the favor of the House as an efficient means of 

bringing bills out of their regular order for . . . 

immediate consideration.’’ 17

By 1890, the function of providing special orders of business for the consideration of legislation became routine and was the sole prerogative 

of the Rules Committee and its chair, the Speaker. Speaker John G. Carlisle (D–KY), regularly 

issued special rules from the committee for individual bills, further cementing the practice. 

‘‘Since that time,’’ former House Parliamentarian 

Asher Hinds points out, the issuance of special 

rules ‘‘has been in favor as an efficient means of 

bringing up for consideration bills difficult to 

reach in the regular order and especially as a 

means for confining within specified limits the 

consideration of bills involving important policies for which the majority party in the House 

may be responsible.’’ 18

When Republicans retook control of the 

House in the 51st Congress, 1889–1891, Representative Reed was chosen Speaker. He immediately took advantage of his position as chairman of the Rules Committee to control legislative business on the floor through the use of special rules. More importantly, Speaker Reed used 

his power as Speaker and chairman of the Rules 

Committee in tandem to clear minority obstruction of floor business. 

As presiding officer, Reed issued several landmark rulings that in effect, outlawed minority 

obstructive tactics, particularly the ‘‘disappearing 

quorum,’’ a parliamentary innovation pioneered 

by John Quincy Adams during his 17 years as 

a Member of the House following his one term 

as President. By this tactic, minority Members, 

although physically present in the House Chamber, would refuse to vote, thus denying the body 

the quorum needed to do business. Speaker Reed 

ruled against these obstructions as presiding officer, and then, as chairman of the Rules Committee, codified his rulings into the standing 

rules of the House. These provisos, together with 

a comprehensive overhaul of the rules undertaken 

by Reed, came to be known as the ‘‘Reed rules,’’ 

and serve as the basis for the power of the modern Speaker and the operations of the presentday House. Most notably, the Reed rules established a framework by which the Speaker, as 

leader of the majority party in the House, could 

move his legislative agenda forward. 

Additional power accrued to the Speaker 

through the Rules Committee when, in 1891, the 

committee was given the authority to report at 

any time. Two years later it was also granted the 

right to sit during sessions of the House.19

Even when viewed through the prism of the 

House in later periods of centralized power, it 

is difficult to convey the absolute control exercised by the Speaker during this period. 

So absolute was ‘‘Czar’’ Reed’s control of the 

business of the House through the scheduling 

powers of the Rules Committee, that, when told 

of a particularly long debate that had consumed 

the time of the Senate, the Speaker was able to 

remark without humor or irony, ‘‘Thank God the 

House of Representatives is not a deliberative 

body.’’ 20

The Speaker of the House and the Committee on Rules 145 

21Charles O. Jones, ‘‘Joseph G. Cannon and Howard W. Smith: 

An Essay on the Limits of Leadership in the House of Representatives,’’ The Journal of Politics, vol. 30, Aug. 1968, pp. 617–646. 22 Michael Kilian, ‘‘Tough Act to Follow,’’ Chicago Tribune, Jan. 23, 

1995, sec. 2, p. 1. 

23Chiu, The Speaker of the House of Representatives Since Üçéã, pp. 124– 

125. 

24 ‘‘A Glimpse Into Speaker Cannon’s Famous Red Room,’’ New 

York Times, Dec. 13, 1908, p. SM8. 25Representative Champ Clark, remarks in the House, Congressional 

Record, vol. 45, March 17, 1910, p. 3294. 26 Ibid., p. 1. 27 Kilian, ‘‘Tough Act to Follow,’’ sec. 2, p. 1. 

THE REVOLT AGAINST SPEAKER CANNON

The power of the Speaker of the House, 

through and by the Rules Committee, continued 

to grow under Speaker Joseph G. ‘‘Uncle Joe’’ 

Cannon (R–IL), who served as the Chamber’s 

presiding officer from 1903 to 1910. Speaker Cannon was a colorful figure, and a strong believer 

in party discipline. He did not hesitate to use 

his power in appointing committee members and 

even committee chairs, and in punishing those 

who did not obey his wishes. 

In assessing the leadership of Speaker Cannon, 

one scholar has remarked, ‘‘Particularly significant was Speaker Cannon’s power as chairman of 

the Committee on Rules. The Committee was 

small—never over five Republican Members 

prior to 1910. The three-to-two edge of the Republicans was potent, however, since the Speaker 

appointed the members carefully—insuring that 

they agreed with his views.’’ 21

Cannon was well prepared to use the committee as an instrument of power, having observed its use under Speaker Reed. Indeed, Cannon was no stranger to the use of raw political 

power. As chairman of the House Appropriations 

Committee in 1898, Cannon ‘‘wooshed through 

a then staggering $50 million appropriation to 

allow President William McKinley to fight the 

Spanish American War—without consulting or 

even informing his fellow committee members 

about it.’’ 22

Cannon continued that use of political power 

when he became Speaker and Rules chair. ‘‘Before March, 1910, the power of the Speaker was 

in part due to the increase in the power of the 

Committee on Rules,’’ as one writer has observed, because the committee ‘‘had privileges 

which were not accorded by the House to any 

other committee. Through a special order, the 

Committee . . . regulated what should be considered, how long debate on a bill should last, when 

a vote should be taken, or whether a bill should 

be voted with or without amendment. It proposed amendments to legislative bills over which 

other committees had jurisdiction.’’ 23

Speaker Cannon used his power over the Rules 

Committee coupled with his power of recognition to manage the business of the House down 

to the smallest detail. Writing of Cannon’s daily 

meetings with his Rules Committee lieutenants 

and rank and file Members seeking the Speaker’s 

permission to consider their bills, one reporter 

related: 

If the Speaker decides in the applicant’s favor, he takes 

a little pad and writes the Congressman’s name and number 

of the bill on it. Later, when the House assembles and the 

Speaker calls it to order, he has this little pad in his hand 

or lying beside him on his desk. The various successful applicants arise and shout ‘‘Mr. Speaker!’’ while the unsuccessful 

ones sit glumly in their seats . . . The Speaker does not even 

look at the shouting applicants. He studies his pad and calls 

out, ‘‘The Gentleman from Ohio,’’ or ‘‘The Gentleman from 

Illinois,’’ until the entire list is exhausted. There is more finality in a Cannon ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ than in that of any other 

man in America. 24

Minority Leader (and later Speaker), Champ 

Clark, summed up Speaker Cannon’s partisan use 

of the Rules Committee when he told his House 

colleagues in 1910, ‘‘I violate no secret when I 

tell you the committee is made up of three very 

distinguished Republicans and two ornamental 

Democrats.’’ 25

It is clear that, ‘‘the legislative agenda, the 

progress of bills, members’ committee assignments, almost every function of the House, all 

. . . was under the control of the Speaker and the 

five-member House Rules Committee, which was 

made up of Cannon and four of his hand-picked 

colleagues.’’ 26 So absolute was Speaker Cannon’s 

rule, that one, perhaps apocryphal, story claimed 

that, ‘‘when a constituent asked one representative for a copy of the rules of the House toward 

the end of Cannon’s Speakership, the member 

simply mailed the man a picture of the whitebearded Cannon.’’ 27

In 1909, the House, which had become increasingly frustrated with Speaker Cannon’s iron 

grip over the legislative agenda, enacted a potenVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00155 Fmt 8165 Sfmt 8165 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.009 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
146 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

28Hinds, ‘‘The Speaker of the House of Representatives,’’ p. 162. 29Robinson, The House Rules Committee, p. 61. 

30 Greg Pierce, ‘‘Joe Made Them Cry Uncle,’’ Washington Times, 

May 7, 1986, p. 2D. 31Jones, ‘‘Joseph G. Cannon and Howard W. Smith,’’ pp. 617–646. 32 ‘‘Cannon Disciplines House Insurgents,’’ New York Times, Aug. 

6, 1909, p. 2. 

tial restriction on his scheduling power through 

the Rules Committee when it adopted the ‘‘Calendar Wednesday’’ procedure. Under this procedure, each Wednesday was reserved exclusively 

for the various standing legislative committees to 

call up measures in their jurisdiction for floor 

consideration. This procedure could be used to 

bring to the floor measures for which the Rules 

Committee had granted no hearing or special 

rule. While the adoption of Calendar Wednesday 

was an attack on the power of the Speaker, in 

practice, Cannon was largely able to render it ineffective. 

Noted parliamentary expert with the House, 

Asher C. Hinds, argued that far too much was 

made of the Speaker’s power vis-a-vis the Rules 

Committee. He wrote in 1909, ‘‘The power of the 

Speaker, as it is related to the Committee on 

Rules, is much overestimated. When a committee has once reported a bill, that bill is in 

the hands of the House.’’ 28 Hinds further argued 

that the Rules Committee did nothing in practice that was revolutionary or inappropriate, but 

only did what the party caucuses had routinely 

done in previous years. It is important to keep 

in mind, however, that while Hinds was intimately familiar with the operations of the Cannon House, he was also the clerk at the Speaker’s 

table, so his viewpoint arguably cannot be considered entirely unbiased. 

Speaker Cannon and his Republican majority 

had ample warning of the unrest brewing among 

the more progressive Members of both parties 

during the 60th and 61st Congresses. Some observers of Congress have alleged that this mounting frustration was attributable less to Cannon’s 

absolute control of the House through the Rules 

Committee than the fact that he used that power 

to prevent the House from voting on progressive 

legislation which rank and file Members of Congress of both parties supported. ‘‘It was ‘Uncle 

Joe’ Cannon’s economic and social philosophy,’’ 

one scholar argues, ‘‘that first aroused jRepublican insurgentsk against his autocracy’’ 29 Whatever the genesis of the reform movement, Speaker 

Cannon was steadfastly unwilling to heed the 

growing chorus calling for reform. In characteristically blunt style, he said, ‘‘I am damned tired 

of listening to all this babble for reform. America 

is a hell of a success.’’ 30

Member frustration spilled onto the floor 

when, ‘‘Twelve insurgents refused to vote for 

Cannon for Speaker at the opening of the special 

session in 1909 called by President Taft to consider the tariff . . . jandk a combination of insurgents and Democrats defeated a motion to adopt 

the rules of the previous Congress. At that point 

Minority Leader Clark offered a resolution which 

would have increased the size of the Committee 

on Rules, removed the Speaker from the committee and taken from the Speaker his power of 

appointing all committees except Ways and 

Means.’’ 31

The Speaker was able to fend off this attack 

by agreeing to a compromise motion to establish 

a unanimous consent calendar, a motion of 

recommital for the minority party, and increases 

in the number of votes necessary to set aside the 

Calendar Wednesday procedure. 

Speaker Cannon later meted out his revenge 

against the rebels. As one reporter noted days 

after the quashed revolt, ‘‘With few exceptions, 

members of the House who opposed the Speaker’s candidacy or opposed the adoption of the . . . 

rules find themselves tonight with undesirable 

committee assignments or without the promotion long service on a particular committee 

entitled them to expect.’’ 32

While he was able to delay the inevitable, in 

the end, even Speaker Cannon’s mastery of the 

Rules Committee could not prevent the full 

House from working its will. Frustration with 

‘‘Cannonism’’ came to a final head on St. Patrick’s Day, 1910, when a small band of progressive Republican Members, led by Representative 

George W. Norris (R–NE), joined with Democrats to again challenge the powers of the Speaker. Cannon had given opponents a parliamentary 

opening when he tried to shut down the use of 

the Calendar Wednesday procedure. In response, 

Norris rose and offered a resolution as a matter 

of constitutional privilege to change House rules 

The Speaker of the House and the Committee on Rules 147 

33Jones, ‘‘Joseph G. Cannon and Howard W. Smith,’’ pp. 617–646. 

34 Galloway, History of the United States House of Representatives, p. 

122. 

35James S. Fleming, ‘‘Oscar W. Underwood: The First Modern 

House Leader, 1911–1915,’’ in Roger H. Davidson, Susan Webb Hammond, and Raymond W. Smock, eds., Masters of the House: Congressional Leadership Over Two Decades (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 

1998), p. 108. 36Clarence Cannon, Cannon’s Precedents of the House of Representatives, 

6 vols. (Washington: GPO, 1935–1941), vol. VIII, § 3388. 37 ‘‘House Inquiry Plan is Again Blocked,’’ New York Times, May 

28, 1922, p. 2. 

by removing the Speaker as chair and member 

of the Rules Committee, and by expanding the 

panel’s membership from 5 to 15, to be chosen 

by State delegations. 

In later years, Representative Norris recalled 

of his reform resolution, ‘‘I had carried it for a 

long time, certain, that in the flush of its power, 

the Cannon machine would overreach itself. The 

paper upon which I had written my resolution 

had become so tattered it scarcely hung together.’’ 33

Supporters of the Speaker quickly raised a 

point of order against the Norris resolution, arguing that it did not carry the constitutional 

privilege its author claimed. Speaker Cannon allowed debate on the point of order to continue 

for 2 days, after which he sustained it. Cannon’s 

decision that the Norris resolution was not in 

order was then appealed to the full House which 

overturned the Speaker’s ruling by a vote of 182 

to 162. The Norris resolution was then adopted, 

191 to 156, after Representative Norris amended 

it to provide for a 10-member Rules Committee 

elected by the entire House. Cannon continued 

to serve as House Speaker, but without the unchecked power he had previously commanded. 

DECENTRALIZATION OF THE SPEAKER’S

POWER OVER RULES COMMITTEE

Although the overthrow of Speaker Cannon 

drastically reduced the power of the Speaker to 

singlehandedly manage the flow and content of 

legislative business, the Rules Committee’s 

power remained largely intact. The post-Cannon 

period was a time of general decentralization of 

authority in the House of Representatives, and 

one where power resided in the caucus and the 

majority floor leader even more than in newlyelected Speaker Champ Clark (D–MO). When 

Democrats regained control of the House in 1911, 

they set up a system of governance largely 

through party apparatus, making extensive use of 

binding votes in caucus to compel Democratic 

Members to support the majority legislative 

agenda on the floor. This era of ‘‘King Caucus’’ 

meant that gone were the days when the Speaker 

was ‘‘considered . . . an officer second only in 

power and influence to the President of the 

United States himself, and so far as the enactment of legislation was concerned, to exercise 

powers superior to jthe Presidentk.’’ 34

It would be a mistake, however, to conclude 

that after 1910 the weakened Office of the Speaker did not continue to exert influence over the 

Rules Committee in the service of the majority 

party agenda, or to continue to accumulate power 

for the panel. The Speaker, in conjunction with 

the newly influential floor leader, Representative 

Oscar Underwood (D–AL), continued to use the 

power of the Rules Committee as one of his most 

powerful management tools. ‘‘Excepting only the 

caucus,’’ the Rules Committee during 

Underwood’s speakership became, ‘‘the most necessary and essential feature of the new floor leader 

system in the House.’’ 35 Democratic leaders 

made certain that the Rules Committee continued to serve as an organ of the majority party 

by carefully stocking the committee with solid 

party loyalists. 

Although the speakership was weakened during this period, Speakers continued to accrue 

power for the panel. In 1920, for example, Speaker Frederick H. Gillett of Massachusetts ruled 

that the committee might report a resolution 

providing for the consideration of a bill that had 

not yet been introduced.36 The ruling was an important one that foreshadowed the modern Rules 

Committee’s ability to manage not only the consideration, but the content, of legislative business 

in the House. 

Speakers also continued to use their influence 

to prevent the Rules Committee from reporting 

rules for legislation they and the majority party 

opposed. In 1922, for example, the committee 

blocked a resolution demanding answers about 

the Department of Justice’s handling of an investigation relating to war contract fraud 37 which 

the majority opposed. 

148 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

38 ‘‘Howard Charges Gag Rule in the House,’’ New York Times, 

March 19, 1930, p. 19. 39 Donald C. Bacon, ‘‘Nicholas Longworth: The Genial Czar,’’ in 

Masters of the House, p. 134. 40Anthony Champagne, ‘‘John Nance Garner,’’ in Masters of the 

House, p. 170. 

41 ‘‘Discharge Rule Approved,’’ New York Times, April 19, 1933, p. 

3. 

42 Galloway, History of the United States House of Representatives, p. 

135. 

The power of the Speaker to control the legislative agenda was further increased in 1924, when 

the ‘‘pocket veto’’ power of the chairman of the 

Rules Committee was curbed by Speaker Gillett 

after the Rules Committee chairman had exercised his discretion to hold resolutions from floor 

consideration long after the Rules Committee 

had reported them. 

In 1925, during the speakership of Nicholas T. 

Longworth (R–IL), one Member bemoaned this 

ability to obstruct legislation, stating that the 

Speaker and the members of the Rules Committee ‘‘were empowered by . . . House ‘gag rules’ 

to allow legislation to live or to make it die’’ 

while other Members looked on, ‘‘. . . as helpless 

as little children.’’ The Member in question concluded that this was simply, ‘‘too damned much 

power.’’ 38

Soon after assuming the speakership, Longworth had moved to restore the Speaker’s power 

over the Rules Committee. ‘‘To consolidate his 

control, Longworth had the Committee on Committees remove three jinsurgent progressivek 

Members from the Rules Committee . . . and replace them with dependable party regulars.’’ 

During Longworth’s tenure, Rules Committee 

chair Bertrand Snell was a member of a group 

known as the ‘‘Big Four’’ which acted as Speaker 

Longworth’s inner circle of advisors and the party’s principal policy body.39

This trend toward restoring the Speaker’s 

power over the committee continued under 

Speaker John Nance Garner (D–TX), who ‘‘functioned as a broker, a negotiator who put together 

coalitions and compromises by working with and 

through committee chairs,’’ including the Rules 

Committee.40

In another important development, in 1933, 

Speaker Henry T. Rainey (D–IL) upheld the 

Rules Committee’s right to report a resolution 

for consideration of a bill on which the House 

had refused to act under suspension of the rules. 

Speaker Rainey also shepherded through the 

Chamber an increase in the threshold needed to 

discharge legislation from committees—from 145 

to 218—to stop legislation awarding veterans a 

cash bonus from being brought up in Congress.41

This latter development further empowered the 

Rules Committee and the Speaker in relation to 

rank and file Members. 

Still later in the Rainey speakership, a Member was named to the Rules Committee over the 

Speaker’s objections. That Member was ‘‘Judge’’ 

Howard W. Smith of Fauquier County, VA, who 

would play a crucial role in the future of the relationship between the Speaker and the Rules 

Committee. 

THE SPEAKER VS. THE COMMITTEE: THE

EMERGENCE OF THE ‘‘CONSERVATIVE

COALITION’’ 

During the speakership of William B. 

Bankhead (D–AL), 1936–1940, the Rules Committee ceased to be an unquestioned agent and 

ally of majority party leadership, due to the advent of a ‘‘conservative coalition’’ of southern 

Democrats and Republicans on the panel. For the 

next three decades, Speakers would find the committee to be, at least on some issues, an independent and competing power base in need of 

cajoling and catering and, at worst, a legislative 

adversary. 

The rise of the conservative rules coalition was 

a gradual one. The Rules Committee played an 

instrumental part in expediting much of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation during his first ‘‘hundred days,’’ and 

through his initial term in office, by reporting 

closed rules on major legislation forwarded by 

the President. As the economic emergency of the 

Depression receded, however, a backlash against 

Presidential policies that were viewed by southern Democrats as increasingly liberal and unwise, 

set in during the 74th Congress. This growing 

suspicion of New Deal policies coincided with, 

and was furthered by the election of Representative John J. O’Connor (D–NY), a New Deal critic, as chair of the committee.42

‘‘By 1937, the House Democratic Leadership 

could no longer count on Rules Committee 

The Speaker of the House and the Committee on Rules 149 

43A History of the Committee on Rules, p. 138. 44 Ibid., p. 138. 45 ‘‘Rule Denied, 8 to 6,’’ New York Times, April 30, 1938, p. 1. 46A History of the Committee on Rules, p. 139. 47Robinson, The House Rules Committee, p. 61. 48A History of the Committee on Rules, p. 139. 49Charles A. Michael, ‘‘New Deal ‘Purge’ Said to Seek Control of 

House Rules Group,’’ New York Times, June 30, 1938, p. 1. 

Southern Democrats in granting of rules.’’ 43 As 

a result, Speaker Bankhead was increasingly unable to promise prompt consideration of administration legislative priorities. 

One visible split between the Speaker and the 

Rules Committee occurred during consideration 

of the President’s wage and hour bill, a legislative proposal that would have set a national minimum wage, established standards for maximum 

hours of work, and implemented several child 

labor reforms. After the legislation was passed by 

the Senate in August 1937, it was subsequently 

reported from the House Labor Committee. That 

is where its progress abruptly stopped. ‘‘With 

the five southern Democrats and four Republicans on the Rules Committee opposed to it, no 

rule was granted and no hearing was even held 

on the Wage and Hour bill.’’ 44 When a compromise wage and hour measure was also 

scotched by the Rules Committee, the House 

Democratic leadership had to resort to a discharge petition to bring the plan forward for consideration. In explaining the failure to grant a 

rule for wage and hour legislation, Rules Committee member Representative Edward E. Cox 

(D–GA) made an argument presaging the coming civil rights battles of the next two decades, 

stating, ‘‘This bill is an attempt to . . . destroy 

the reserved powers of the states over the local 

concerns,’’ 45

The ‘‘gatekeeping committee’’ had shut the 

gate on the Speaker himself. ‘‘The 1937–1938 

fight over the wage and hour legislation was extremely significant,’’ one scholar has noted, ‘‘it 

not only highlighted and aggravated the split in 

the Democratic Party, but it meant that on some 

issues the jRules Committeek was a bipartisan 

coalition,’’ rather than an arm of the Speaker and 

the majority party.46

Other observers of Congress have argued that, 

far from being an example of a stubborn minority 

holding legislation hostage, the wage and hour 

fight was actually an instance of the Rules Committee fulfilling a legitimate role as a filter for 

legislation that was not ready for consideration 

by the entire Chamber. Following debate on the 

bill, the full House overwhelmingly voted to recommit the first wage and hour bill to committee. ‘‘To say that the Rules Committee was 

defying the majority will of the House in not 

granting a rule,’’ one author has reasoned, ‘‘must 

be qualified in light of the difficulties in getting 

a majority in favor of the principle of the bill’’ 

in the House.47

Regardless of the interpretation of the significance of the battle, the wage and hour fight heralded the beginning of a three-decade fight between Democratic Speakers of the House, most 

notably Speaker Sam Rayburn (D–TX), and the 

committee on issues such as labor protections, 

civil rights, and social policy. 

The advent of the conservative coalition did 

not mean that the Speaker lost all control of the 

Rules Committee. ‘‘It is important to note that 

on many issues, the Rules Committee continued 

to act on behalf of the majority party, albeit at 

times reluctantly.’’ 48 The rise of the conservative 

bloc did, however, make the ability of the Speaker to schedule and manage legislative business on 

behalf of the majority significantly more difficult. 

Deeply concerned by this ‘‘loss’’ of the Rules 

Committee to the conservative coalition, the 

Roosevelt administration actively campaigned for 

the defeat of three renegade Rules Committee 

Democrats in the 1938 elections—Representatives 

O’Connor, Smith of Virginia, and Cox of Georgia. ‘‘The chief desire of the jRoosevelt Administrationk ‘purge,’ ’’ a New York Times writer observed at the time, ‘‘is to eliminate the important 

Rules Committee members who have consistently opposed Administration measures. If these 

can be beaten . . . the group feels that the Administration will have unquestioned control of 

the direction of House affairs in the next session.’’ 49 When the smoke cleared on the morning after the election, however, only Representative O’Connor was defeated, a development that, 

when coupled with the loss of several New Deal 

allies on the panel, left the ‘‘conservative bloc’’ 

on Rules unchanged. 

150 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

50 Galloway, History of the United States House of Representatives, pp. 

57–58. 51Robinson, The House Rules Committee, p. 67. 

52William S. White, ‘‘House Gives Speaker Large Grant of Power,’’ 

New York Times, Jan. 9, 1949, p. 1 53William S. White, ‘‘Sam Rayburn, the Untalkative Speaker,’’ New 

York Times, Feb. 27, 1949, p. SM10. 54Representative Chet Holified, remarks in the House, Congressional 

Record, vol. 106, Sept. 1, 1960, p. 19393. 55 Galloway, History of the United States House of Representatives, pp. 

57–58. 

Even worse for the Speaker, the election returned fewer Democrats to the House as a whole, 

a development that sounded the death knell to 

the Speaker’s ability to skirt the committee by 

using discharge petitions. Further complicating 

this strained relationship was the emboldened nature of the Rules Committee, which proceeded 

to hold public hearings on issues embarrassing 

to the Roosevelt administration, actively undermined the Speaker’s use of the suspension procedure, negotiated concessions from committees on 

the content of bills, and granted rules for the 

consideration of legislation that favored conservative interests. 

ENACTMENT OF THE 21-DAY RULE

After World War II, the Speaker worked to 

undermine the power of the Rules Committee’s 

conservative coalition over the legislative agenda. 

On January 3, 1949, Speaker Sam Rayburn, who 

took office following the death of Speaker 

Bankhead, shepherded through the House the 

adoption of the so-called ‘‘21-day rule.’’ ‘‘Under 

this rule, the chairman of a legislative committee 

which had favorably reported a bill could call it 

up for House consideration if the Rules Committee reported adversely on it or failed to give 

it a ‘green light’ to the House floor within 21 

days.’’ 50

The Speaker, together with allies in the Truman administration, employed the procedure of 

binding Democrats through a vote of their party 

caucus to support the resolution that enacted the 

21-day rule. Indeed, Speaker Rayburn expended 

considerable effort and personal prestige in pushing for the rule change, making a rare speech on 

the House floor urging Members’ support. One 

scholar observed that Rayburn’s remarks: 

were especially directed toward his southern colleagues, many 

of whom were voting against the 21-Day rule because they 

feared it would increase the chances for the passage of civil 

rights legislation, which they opposed. Rayburn contended 

that civil rights legislation was not the issue. ‘The rules,’ he 

said, ‘of a legislative body should be such at all times as to 

allow the majority of a legislative body to work its will.’ 51

Rayburn’s efforts were ultimately successful, 

and when the 21-day rule was initially passed, 

observers called it a major power surge for the 

Speaker and a defeat for the renegade Democrats 

on the Rules Committee. William S. White, of 

the New York Times, wrote after the vote: 

Mr. Rayburn, as he is well aware, has received a power 

and a responsibility not given in generations to a Speaker 

of the House. He will be in command. He will be responsible 

in almost the complete sense of that term, for what the House 

does, in so far as the Administration Democrats are not outweighed from time to time by the orthodox Republicans and 

whatever bloc of rebellious southern Democrats can be marshaled.52

For critics of the 21-day rule, White subsequently observed, ‘‘this meant . . . a return to 

‘czarism,’ for in cutting down the Rules Committee the Members . . . had simply left it all up 

to one man’s yea or nay rather than to twelve.’’ 53

During the 81st Congress, the 21-day rule was 

successful in helping Speaker Rayburn bring 

anti-poll tax legislation to the floor, as well as 

forcing a vote on controversial housing and minimum wage bills. The Rule was also instrumental in obtaining consideration of legislation 

establishing the National Science Foundation, as 

well as bills granting Alaska and Hawaii statehood. The rules helped the Speaker get around 

an obstructive Rules Committee. As one Member 

of Congress later noted, ‘‘Altogether, during the 

81st Congress, eight measures were brought to 

the floor and passed by resort to the 21-Day rule, 

and its existence forced the Rules Committee to 

act in other cases.’’ 54

The 21-day rule was eventually repealed after 

a bitter political fight in 1951 between Speaker 

Rayburn and the conservative coalition of southern Democrats and Republicans. ‘‘As a result, the 

power of the Rules Committee to blockade bills’’ 

sought by the Speaker and the majority party was 

restored.55 This turnaround was made possible 

largely by solid increases in Republican strength 

in the House following the 1950 elections, coupled with mounting concern by many southern 

The Speaker of the House and the Committee on Rules 151 

56CRS, A Short History of the Development of the Committee on Rules, 

p. 11. 

57Charles and Barbara Whalen, The Longest Debate: A Legislative History of the Üéãâ Civil Rights Act (New York: Mentor Press, 1985), p. 

92. 

58 John D. Morris, ‘‘Rayburn Rebuffs Move By Liberals,’’ New York 

Times, Jan. 3, 1959, p. 1. 59 Galloway, History of the United States House of Representatives, p. 

143. 

60 John D. Morris, ‘‘Stakes High in Rules Struggle for Rayburn, 

79, and Smith, 77,’’ New York Times, Jan. 30, 1961, p. 12. 61 Galloway, History of the United States House of Representatives, p. 

143. 

Democrats about the possible use of the 21-day 

rule to force consideration of civil rights legislation. 

From 1955 to 1960, the new chairman of the 

Rules Committee—‘‘Judge’’ Howard W. Smith 

of Virginia—the same Member who had been 

placed on the committee over the objections of 

Speaker Rainey nearly three decades earlier, and 

who had been unsuccessfully targeted for electoral defeat in the FDR ‘‘purge,’’—was the ‘‘acknowledged leader of the jconservativek coalition.’’ 56 The coalition’s ability to independently 

block legislation would continue largely unchallenged until 1961, when 79-year-old Speaker Sam 

Rayburn would mount an assault on the power 

of the Rules Committee in one of the final political battles of his four-decade career in the 

House. 

SPEAKER RAYBURN AND THE PURGE OF THE

RULES COMMITTEE

Toward the end of the fifties, Speaker 

Rayburn’s continued frustration with the Rules 

Committee spilled over into public view. 

‘‘Judge’’ Smith’s ability to block legislation supported by the Speaker was legendary: 

Often, when he did not want to bring a bill out of his 

jRulesk committee, the Judge would leave town and go to 

his 70-acre farm in Fauquier County, Virginia, to avoid calling a meeting. Early in 1957, he resorted to this tactic to 

delay consideration of President Eisenhower’s civil rights proposal, insisting that he had to return home to inspect a barn 

that had burned down. ‘‘I knew Howard Smith would do 

almost anything to block a civil rights bill,’’ said Speaker 

Sam Rayburn upon hearing this excuse, ‘‘but I never knew 

he would resort to arson.’’ 57

Speaker Rayburn arguably did all that he 

could to avoid the head-on battle with the committee’s conservative coalition that eventually 

erupted in 1961, preferring instead to negotiate 

and cajole Smith to forward his majority party 

agenda. In 1959, for example, when members of 

the liberal Democratic Study Group jDSGk demanded reform of the Rules Committee by enlarging its size to defeat the coalition of four Republicans and two southern Democrats that 

dominated the 12-person panel, Speaker Rayburn 

refused to back the plan, seeking instead to ‘‘assure the House liberals of steps under existing 

rules’’ that could be used to outmaneuver the obstructive committee, including, ‘‘the use of . . . 

seldom-invoked Calendar-Wednesday.’’ 58 In response to Rayburn’s rebuff, the liberal Members 

issued the following statement: 

We have received assurances from Speaker Rayburn that 

legislation which has been duly considered and reported by 

the legislative committees will be brought before the House 

for consideration within a reasonable period of time. Our confidence in the Speaker is great, and we believe he will support 

such procedural steps as may be necessary to obtain House 

consideration of reported bills.59

This ‘‘go along to get along’’ approach was in 

keeping with Speaker Rayburn’s leadership style. 

‘‘jRayburn’sk effectiveness has rarely if ever rested on the use of raw power, coercion or threats,’’ 

one reporter wrote at the time. ‘‘Rather, it has 

stemmed from his great personal prestige, close 

friendships with other House Democrats in positions of power, and the esteem, and respect held 

for him by nearly all colleagues.’’ 60

As 1961 dawned, however, Rayburn’s position 

on the Rules Committee gradually changed as ‘‘it 

became evident that enactment of President Kennedy’s legislative program would hang upon 

overcoming the conservative coalition control of 

the Rules Committee.’’ 61

In many ways, the 1961 battle between the 

Rules Committee and the Speaker was the direct 

opposite of the 1910 overthrow of Speaker Cannon. In 1910, Members had risen up because a 

Speaker, who, through his tight control of the 

power of the Rules Committee, had prevented 

legislation he opposed from being considered by 

rank and file Members of the House. In 1961, 

however, it was the Rules Committee that was 

blocking consideration of legislation, thwarting 

the will of a powerful Speaker, the majority leadership, and an increasing number of rank and file 

Members who wished to act on the ‘‘progressive’’ 

bills supported by their constituents. 

152 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

62 Ibid., p. 143. 

63Neil MacNeil, Forge of Democracy: The House of Representatives, 

(New York: David McKay, Co., 1963), p. 432. 64 John D. Morris, ‘‘Rayburn Shifts in Rules Battle,’’ New York 

Times, Jan. 18, 1961, p. 17. 65John D. Morris, ‘‘Rayburn Rejects All Compromise on Rules Battle,’’ New York Times, Jan. 29, 1961, p. 1. 66Congressional Record, vol. 107, Jan. 31, 1961, pp. 1589–1590. 

An editorial cartoon by the satirist Herblock 

during this period summed up many liberal 

Members’ feelings on the Rules Committee: it 

pictured a baseball player in catcher’s face mask 

and pads standing in front of, rather than behind, 

home plate, catching a fastball pitch before the 

batter could have a chance to swing at it. The 

batter represented Members of Congress and the 

catcher wore a jersey labeled ‘‘Rules Committee.’’ 

‘‘Speaker Rayburn kept his own counsel until 

the eve of the session,’’ George B. Galloway has 

written, ‘‘when he came out on the side of the 

reformers with a plan to enlarge the membership 

of the Rules Committee from 12 to 15’’ members.62 In doing so, the Speaker resisted—after 

initially embracing—the suggestion of members 

of the Democratic Study Group to balance the 

committee by purging it of one of its renegade 

southern Democrats, Representative William M. 

Colmer (D–MS). The Rayburn plan would instead increase the size of the committee by three, 

enlarging the number of Democratic Rules members from eight to ten, and Republicans from 

four to five, breaking the conservative coalition’s 

traditional six-six deadlock on the panel. 

In the weeks leading up to the opening of the 

87th Congress, the Kennedy administration, lobbyists from labor unions and progressive groups, 

and the Speaker and his loyalists, including 

Rayburn’s close ally on the committee (and later 

Rules Committee chair) Representative Richard 

Bolling (D–MO), lined up votes for the plan to 

enlarge Rules. The scramble for votes between 

the Rayburn camp and the allies of the conservative coalition was intense, for the vote was to 

be an extremely close one. One historian later illustrated this situation by relating the see-sawing 

battle waged by the Rayburn and Smith forces 

to secure the vote of one southern Member, Representative Frank W. Boykin (D–AL): 

Boykin was a friend of Rayburn and a conservative; he was 

pulled emotionally to vote both ways. He committed himself 

to Rayburn; then under pressure from Smith’s camp, he 

changed his mind and committed himself to Smith. 

Rayburn’s lieutenants applied new pressure to Boykin and 

again he switched. Smith’s lieutenants fought back hard for 

Boykin’s vote, and once more he switched. Again Rayburn’s 

people won Boykin back, only to lose him again . . . At this 

point, Boykin had been on both sides three separate times 

. . . jbutk the fight for Boykin’s vote . . . illustrated the desperation of the struggle. It was so close that every single vote 

was of crucial importance.63

In seeking support for his plan, the Speaker 

utilized all of the powers of his office. Initially, 

Rayburn intended to employ caucus rules to bind 

Democrats to support for the enlargement plan, 

repeating the tactic he used successfully in his 

earlier campaign to enact the 21-day rule. Rayburn abandoned the strategy, however, after 

many southern Democrats bristled at the arm 

twisting and threatened to bolt.64 Speaker Rayburn also reportedly utilized the Kennedy administration’s control of local public works 

projects to help convince Members to vote with 

him. Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall personally made a number of calls to Members during the days immediately preceding the vote to 

discuss ‘‘water projects of vital interest to members in many sections of the country, particularly 

in the West and South.’’ 65

The resolution to enlarge the panel was reported by the Rules Committee by a vote of six 

to two on January 14, 1961, after ‘‘Judge’’ Smith 

promised Rayburn he would do so. Smith and 

Representative William M. Colmer (D–MS) were 

the only Democrats to oppose the resolution; no 

Republicans attended the committee markup. 

Following a spirited debate on the resolution on 

January 31, 1961, which included a passionate 

floor speech from Speaker Rayburn, the House 

adopted the enlargement plan by a vote of 217 

to 212.

66

Speaker Rayburn’s victory was a significant 

step in restoring control of the Rules Committee 

as an arm of the Speaker and his majority leadership. This win alone, however, did not defeat the 

conservative coalition. Just 2 years later, under 

House Speaker John W. McCormack (D–MA), 

majority party Members had to turn back a spirited attempt by the coalition and its allies to return the panel to its pre-1961 size of 12 members. 

Despite some slight improvement in the enlarged 

Rules Committee’s record of cooperation with 

The Speaker of the House and the Committee on Rules 153 

67 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Rules, Official 

Web site, www.house.gov rules, accessed on Aug. 12, 2003. 68 Public Law 91–510. 69 Mary Russell, ‘‘Speaker Scooping Up Power in the House,’’ Washington Post, Aug. 7, 1977, p. A1. 

70Roger H. Davidson, ‘‘The New Centralization on Capitol Hill,’’ 

Review of Politics, vol. 50, 1988, p. 357. 71Ibid. 

72Russell, ‘‘Speaker Scooping Up Power in the House,’’ p. A5. 73 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Rules, Official 

Web site, www.house.gov rules, accessed on Aug. 12, 2003. 

the leadership, it continued to obstruct floor consideration of certain education, labor and civil 

rights bills for the duration of the Kennedy administration. 

TRUCE: THE RETURN OF THE SPEAKER’S

POWER

By the late sixties, the Speaker’s relationship 

with the House Rules Committee had improved 

somewhat, as ‘‘Judge’’ Smith was defeated for reelection in 1966 and the committee chair was assumed by Representative William M. Colmer 

(D–MS). ‘‘Although of similar ideological bent 

to Smith, Colmer viewed the role of the jRulesk 

Committee in a different way, in part reflecting 

his own threatened ouster from the committee 

and the adoption of committee rules in 1967 permitting a committee majority to circumvent a 

recalcitrant chairman.’’ 67

Passage of the Legislative Reform Act of 

1970 68 coupled with numerous institutional reforms made in the House Democratic Caucus in 

the post-Watergate era, returned to the Speaker 

the authority to nominate majority members of 

the Rules Committee. These reforms made the 

Rules Committee a reliable arm of the House 

leadership for the first time since the 1910 revolt 

against Speaker Cannon, and gave the Speaker 

true de facto control of the panel. 

The willingness to return considerable power 

to the Speaker was undertaken in response to a 

larger decentralization of the House that led 

many Members to turn to the Speaker to provide 

order in the coordination of business: to make 

a busy and complicated legislative body work. 

Rank and file Members were particularly willing 

to return power to the Speaker after observing 

periods during the tenures of Speaker McCormack and Speaker Carl Albert (D–OK) when 

there was ‘‘paralysis in moving Democratic legislation even though there were heavy Democratic 

majorities’’ in the body.69

‘‘In the House, the decentralizing reforms of 

the 1960s and 1970s were,’’ according to congressional scholar Roger Davidson, ‘‘paradoxically, 

accompanied with innovations that enlarged the 

power of the Speaker.’’ 70 Davidson goes on to 

observe, ‘‘The fruits of these innovations were not 

immediately realized. Speaker John McCormack 

resisted most of the changes . . . his successor, 

Carl Albert . . . was a transitional figure who 

hesitated to use the tools granted to him by the 

rules changes.’’ 71

The main beneficiary of these grants of additional power was House Speaker Thomas P. 

O’Neill (D–MA), himself a longtime member of 

the House Rules Committee. O’Neill was given 

more control over the Rules Committee and the 

orchestration of the details of legislative business. 

As Speaker, O’Neill ‘‘used control on important 

issues to restrict the freedom of House Members 

in offering amendments—in making changes in 

important pieces of legislation that he wanted 

kept intact.’’ 72

Speaker O’Neill utilized the power of the 

Rules Committee not only as a tool of his majority power, but also as a buffer to Member demands, and as a hedge against minority party attacks. During the Carter administration, for example, O’Neill was often less concerned with losing votes on the House floor—an unlikely event 

given the large Democratic majority in the 

body—than with minority Members forcing 

Democrats ‘‘on the record’’ with politically difficult votes. 

Speaker O’Neill responded to this challenge by 

increasingly using his control of the Rules Committee to manage floor votes during the eighties 

with ‘‘complex’’ and ‘‘restrictive’’ rules on major 

pieces of legislation that barred votes on minority 

amendments. Whereas restrictive rules constituted only 15 percent of all rules in the 

midseventies, by the end of the eighties they 

made up 55 percent, according to a Rules Committee minority staff study.73

An additional challenge emerged for the 

Speaker when Republicans and ‘‘Boll Weevil’’ 

Democrats formed a de facto majority coalition 

on some issues following the election of President 

Ronald Reagan in 1980. The shifting electoral 

154 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

74William Chapman, ‘‘Bolling, Near Retirement, Muses About a 

Battle That Never Was,’’ Washington Post, Aug. 24, 1982, p. A7. 75Alan Ehrenhalt, ‘‘The Unfashionable House Rules Committee,’’ 

Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Jan. 15, 1983, p. 151. 76 Ibid. 

77 Donald R. Wolfensberger, ‘‘The House Rules Committee Under 

Republican Majorities: Continuity and Change,’’ Paper prepared for 

delivery at the 34th Annual Meeting of the Northeastern Political 

Science Association, Oct. 25, 2002. 78 Eric Pianin, ‘‘House GOP’s Frustrations Intensify,’’ Washington 

Post, Dec. 21, 1987, p. A1. 79Roger H. Davidson, ‘‘The New Centralization on Capitol Hill,’’ 

p. 357. 80 Ibid. 

terrain meant that a Democratic Speaker, for the 

first time in many years, had to worry about losing important votes on the House floor. In response, Speaker O’Neill had the Rules Committee manage legislative business in increasingly creative ways, including the more frequent 

use of closed rules. An important innovation was 

the so-called ‘‘King of the Hill’’ rule, where the 

last measure voted upon in a series of alternatives 

would prevail, enabling Members to take ‘‘free’’ 

votes on controversial issues that provided political cover. The leadership would naturally place 

its preferred version last in the sequence. 

These efforts met with mixed success. During 

this period, the Rules Committee ‘‘crafted rules 

to enhance the Speaker’s power, although they 

have been only sporadically successful during the 

Reagan Presidency when conservative Democrats 

have bolted to the White House side.’’ For example, the committee ‘‘fashioned an extraordinary 

rule allowing separate votes on seven different 

budget proposals, with successful amendments 

being applied to all seven. Eventually, all seven 

budgets were defeated on the floor.’’ 74

As if these challenges were not enough, changing demands on Members of Congress offered 

Speaker O’Neill still more challenges in the management of the Rules Committee. For example, 

in 1983, the Speaker reluctantly reduced the 

membership of the committee from 16 members 

to 13 members because he was ‘‘unable to persuade any senior Members to take vacant seats 

on Rules.’’ 75 While Members recognized the 

continued power of the panel, the growing need 

for rank and file Members to generate media attention, raise campaign funds, and become legislative entrepreneurs had simply made the ‘‘inside 

baseball’’ Rules Committee ‘‘powerful but 

unfashionable.’’ 76

During this season of closed and structured 

rules, it is important to note that not all of the 

rules granted by the committee were exercises in 

partisanship; many structured rules were adopted 

by large bipartisan margins in the House. Increasingly, however, the minority party viewed 

the more frequent use of this type of resolution 

with concern and resentment. 

‘‘As the House became more politicized and 

polarized during the 1980s,’’ a congressional 

scholar has written, ‘‘the Rules Committee 

played a critical role in assisting the Democratic 

Leadership in structuring House floor debates on 

bills to ensure greater efficiency and predictability in outcomes.’’ Predictably, the more restrictive the amendment process became, the 

‘‘more the Rules Committee was blamed by Republicans for violating the rights of minority 

party members to fully participate in the legislative process and represent their constituents.’’ 77

Speaker James C. Wright, Jr. of Texas further 

centralized and focused the use of the Speaker’s 

Rules Committee power, continuing and building on this trend of issuing closed rules. In 1987, 

the Washington Post reported, ‘‘The Democrat’s 

use of ‘restrictive rules’ which . . . limited debate 

and amendments on 43 percent of the bills sent 

to the floor,’’ was ‘‘a continuation of a practice 

begun under O’Neill. During O’Neill’s last two 

years as Speaker, the leadership obtained restrictive rules on 36 percent of the bills sent to the 

floor.’’ 78

Roger Davidson stressed at the time that 

Wright ‘‘exploited his extraordinary scheduling 

power . . . using jhisk tight control over scheduling, including aggressive use of the Rules 

Committee to shape alternatives during floor deliberations.’’ 79 While critics expressed concern 

about these tactics, supporters pointed to their 

success. ‘‘When he took office, Wright unveiled 

an ambitious list of legislative goals . . . Two 

years later, nearly all the bills had passed the 

House and many had been signed into law.’’ 80

By the end of the 103d Congress, during the 

speakership of Thomas S. Foley of Washington, 

the final tally of open versus restrictive rules revealed ‘‘the largest number of restrictive rules of 

any Congress (73), comprising the highest perVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00164 Fmt 8165 Sfmt 8165 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.009 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
The Speaker of the House and the Committee on Rules 155 

81Ibid., p. 358. 82 Donald R. Wolfensberger, ‘‘The Institutional Legacy of Speaker 

Newt Gingrich: The Politics of House Reform and Realities of Governing,’’ Extensions, A Journal of the Carl Albert Congressional Research 

and Studies Center, Fall 2000. 

83 Ibid. 

84 David W. Rohde, ‘‘The Gingrich Speakership in Context: Majority Leadership in the House in the Late Twentieth Century,’’ Extensions, A Journal of the Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center, Fall 2000. 85 Ibid. 

centage of total rules ever reported in a Congress 

(70 percent).’’ 

RULE REFORM AND THE REPUBLICAN

MAJORITY

At no period in the history of the House of 

Representatives has the Rules Committee been 

more central to the power of, and legislative 

agenda pursued by, a Speaker than in the days 

immediately following the change in control of 

the House to Republicans in 1994. ‘‘To best understand the extent of continuity and change on 

the Rules Committee under House Republicans,’’ 

Roger Davidson emphasizes, ‘‘it is important to 

first understand how the Republican minority 

viewed the House under Democratic control and 

how it envisioned the institution should be run, 

both in terms of changes in the standing rules 

of the House and the way in which special rules 

were framed for considering legislation.’’ 81

In orchestrating the Republican Party’s rise to 

power in the House, Speaker Newt Gingrich (R– 

GA) had long focused public attention on the behavior of the Democratic majority through the 

Rules Committee. ‘‘One of the central themes of 

the Conservative Opportunity Society (COS), 

which Gingrich and others formed in 1982,’’ 

Donald R. Wolfensberger, chief of staff of the 

House Rules Committee during the 104th Congress, stresses, ‘‘was its portrayal of a corrupt 

House in which the majority’s arrogance was regularly reflected in procedural abuses of deliberative process, not to mention of a beleaguered minority.’’ 82

Just as perceived abuses of power by the Rules 

Committee had angered rank and file Members 

and engendered calls for reform since the days 

of Speaker Reed, as Republicans pushed to become the majority party in the House, their public arguments about why they should be in power 

focused increasingly on the actions of the Rules 

Committee. 

At a press conference in the months before the 

1994 election, Representative Gingrich and members of the House Republican Conference began 

an effort that was intended to call public attention to what they claimed were abuses by the 

Rules Committee and the Democratic leadership 

of the regular democratic process. ‘‘Among the 

props was a poster used on the House floor of 

a gagged Statue of Liberty over a running scorecard of open versus restrictive rules (e.g., ‘‘Democracy-0; Tyranny-6).’’ 83

Given this approach of centering their public 

appeal on reform of the institution itself, it is 

not surprising that many of the Republicans’ legislative efforts once they assumed the majority in 

1995 were centered around reforming the House 

through the use of the Rules Committee. 

After his election as Speaker, Gingrich ‘‘instigated many . . . changes in House rules and practices, which all had the common theme of undermining the independent power of committees 

and their chairs and enhancing the power of the 

majority leadership.’’ At Speaker Gingrich’s behest, ‘‘Three full committees were eliminated, 

and 106 (12 percent) of the previous Congress’s 

subcommittee slots were eliminated . . . Gingrich 

personally designed a new committee assignment 

system for the GOP in which the party leader 

was given a dominant formal role.’’ 84

As with Speaker Reed before him, Speaker 

Gingrich’s reforms were largely accomplished 

through amendments to the standing rules of the 

House. Speaker Gingrich took an active hand in 

crafting the rules package adopted at the beginning of the 104th Congress. As one scholar has 

noted, this rules reform package was ‘‘considered 

under a special rule jRules Committee chair 

Gerald B.H.k Solomon (R–NY) had devised on 

Gingrich’s instructions’’ 85

Like many powerful Speakers before him, 

Speaker Gingrich also proved willing to use his 

control of the Rules Committee for purposes 

other than the scheduling and shaping of legislative business, for example, to help enforce party 

discipline. In one instance in 1996, in a move 

reminiscent of actions taken by strong Speakers 

such as Cannon and Rayburn, Speaker Gingrich 

reportedly employed the power of the panel to 

156 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

86 Karen Foerstel, ‘‘Punished But Unrepentant,’’ Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, July 29, 1996. 87Rohde, ‘‘The Gingrich Speakership in Context: Majority Leadership in the House in the Late Twentieth Century.’’ 88 Jim VandeHei, ‘‘Using the Rules Committee to Block Democrats,’’ Washington Post, June 16, 2003, p. A21. 

punish two Republican Members who had endorsed the primary challenger to a sitting GOP 

colleague. Congressional Quarterly reported that, as 

punishment for this action, Speaker Gingrich had 

‘‘instructed jthe House Rules Committeek to reject any floor amendment the two Members 

might seek to offer to legislation for the rest of 

the session.’’ 86

The Republican majority came to power 

promising open rules as the norm, but, as they 

had under previous Speakers of both parties, the 

demands of governing in a legislative body with 

narrow party ratios and a full agenda of business 

soon contributed to the issuance of fewer purely 

open rules on major pieces of legislation. Scholars 

argue that this lesson was learned relatively early 

after Republicans assumed the majority in 1995. 

As one observer recounted, ‘‘The first major Contract jwith Americak bill out of the box after 

opening day was the Unfunded Mandate Reform 

Act which the Rules Committee put on the floor 

under an open rule. Two weeks and dozens of 

amendments later the bill was finally completed 

and its manager, Government Reform and Oversight Chairman Bill Clinger (R–PA) . . . was totally exhausted and disillusioned with open rules. 

From that point on, the Rules Committee took 

a more cautious approach, reporting ‘‘modified 

open’’ rules on bills that set an overall time limit 

on the amendment process.’’ 87

As Representative David Dreier (R–CA) 

‘‘learned quickly’’ after becoming Rules Committee chair in the 106th Congress, the responsibility of running the House of Representatives 

that a majority party holds sometimes requires 

some of the same procedures he had expressed 

concern about a decade ago. ‘‘I had not known 

what it took to govern,’’ he acknowledged. Now, 

‘‘our number one priority is to move our agenda 

. . . with one of the narrowest majorities in history.’’ 88

CONCLUSION

From the 1st Congress to the 108th Congress, 

the Committee on Rules and the Speaker of the 

House have been linked. Under czars and caretakers, reformers and managers, the Rules Committee has played an integral role in the Speaker’s ability to regulate the business of the House. 

This link between the panel and the Speaker 

has been marked by ebbs and flows in the tides 

of power, including battles for independence, a 

reinforcing of mutual authority, and periods of 

close cooperation. Speakers have controlled the 

committee with an iron hand, been forced to cajole and negotiate with it, and been bent to its 

will. Through those ebbs and flows has been a 

constant search for balance, with some Members 

believing, as Speaker Reed did, that the rules 

exist ‘‘to promote the orderly conduct of the 

business of the House,’’ and others charging that 

the rules give the Speaker ‘‘greater power’’ than 

any man ought to possess in relation to the full 

House. That struggle for balance and role continues today. 

The Rules Committee has helped Speakers impose order on the chaos of a young and growing 

legislative body. It has helped them enshrine the 

status quo, and, at other times, been their primary vehicle for reform and institutional change. 

Speakers have used the committee to centralize 

their power, and the House has, in turn, positioned the panel as a competing base of authority 

to their presiding officer. The committee’s power 

to write and rewrite the rules has enabled Speakers to manage the business of the House in times 

of razor-thin party margins, and increased partisanship, media scrutiny and electoral pressure. 

While the days may have passed when an individual can dictate the actions of the House singlehandedly, the Rules Committee continues to 

be the most powerful arm of the Speaker and, 

in a large part, a centrally important governing 

entity of the House. In it, Congress has largely 

consolidated its constitutional power to decide 

the ground rules of its own proceedings. The 

panel enables the Speaker to direct the legislative 

business of the Chamber and press forward the 

agenda of the majority party. It imbues him with 

the power to reward and punish individual Members and can act as a shield from Member deVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00166 Fmt 8165 Sfmt 8165 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.009 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
The Speaker of the House and the Committee on Rules 157 

mands. Most importantly, it serves as a forum 

in which the ever-changing and often competing 

interests of the House leadership, the legislative 

committees, and individual Members of Congress 

can be raised, negotiated, vetted and ultimately 

resolved. 

If Congress in committee is Congress at work, 

as Woodrow Wilson famously observed, the 

Rules Committee is where that work is resolved 

and finalized. It is the last step in the House’s 

legislative assembly line and the ‘‘engine room,’’ 

where the procedural, political and policy mechanics that make the Chamber ‘‘work’’ are crafted by the Speaker and his majority party allies. 

For all of these reasons, the panel remains, as 

much as ever, the ‘‘Speaker’s committee.’’ The 

history of the Rules Committee is, in essence, a 

history of the power of the Office of the Speaker 

and the evolution of the modern House of Representatives. 

158 

1Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 30, July 23, 1897, 

p. 2867. 

Chapter 4 

The Speaker and the Senate 

Elizabeth Rybicki 

Analyst in American National Government 

Congressional Research Service 

In 1897, a Senator described a ‘‘very curious 

thing’’ to his colleagues in the Senate Chamber. 

It seems Speaker Thomas Brackett Reed (R–ME; 

1889–1891; 1895–1899) had spent a great deal of 

time in the Senate side of the Capitol persuading 

(the Senator said ‘‘coercing’’) Senators into supporting the pending tariff measure. The Senator 

found it even more extraordinary that as he 

passed a room where Representatives and Senators were meeting to negotiate a compromise 

between the Chambers on the tariff bill, he saw 

‘‘a powerful policeman standing guard at the 

door.’’ When the Senator inquired as to why the 

guard was there, he was told ‘‘it was for the purposes of keeping the presiding officer of the 

House from invading the secrecy and the councils 

of the conference committee.’’ 1

The characteristically vigorous efforts of 

Speaker Reed in this instance may indeed have 

been, as the Senator claimed, ‘‘extraordinary and 

unusual.’’ The need to coordinate with the Senate 

on legislation, however, is as established and necessary as the Office of the Speaker itself. According to the Constitution, each House of Congress 

must agree to a measure before it can be sent 

to the President. The two Chambers, however, 

often disagree over policy proposals, and the 

Constitution is silent as to how the House and 

Senate should reconcile differences in pending 

legislation. 

In no small way, the responsibility of resolving 

differences and coordinating with ‘‘the other 

body’’ has fallen on the Speaker of the House. 

Disagreements between the Chambers on most 

major legislation are resolved by conference committees, ad hoc panels composed of legislators 

from each Chamber that meet to negotiate a 

compromise acceptable to both the House and 

Senate. The Speaker appoints the House conferees, or ‘‘managers,’’ and at times his careful 

selection of individuals has influenced the final 

policy outcome. Further, a great deal of interchamber coordination takes place prior to, instead of, or after the formal creation of a conference committee. The Speaker works with Senate leaders in order to shepherd significant measures through the entire legislative process. In 

sum, the Speaker plays a major role in the two 

principal devices of legislative coordination: bicameral leadership cooperation and conference 

committees. 

Both the relationship between the Speaker and 

Senate leaders and the role of the Speaker in the 

appointment of managers to conference have 

changed over time. Since the major reforms of 

the seventies, the Speaker has had greater discretion over who he appoints to conference. For 

most of congressional history, the Speaker selected a few senior members from the standing 

The Speaker and the Senate 159 

2 ‘‘Speaker Reed Frowns,’’ New York Times, Aug. 4, 1890, p. 1. 3Norman Ornstein and Amy L. Schenkenberg, ‘‘The 1995 Congress: 

The First Hundred Days and Beyond,’’ Political Science Quarterly, vol. 

110, no. 2, summer 1995, p. 194. 4 Jake Thompson, ‘‘Dole Thrives, Despite Hype for Gingrich,’’ Kansas City Star, Jan. 7, 1995, p. A1; Transcript, ‘‘News Conference with 

Co

committee with jurisdiction over the bill to negotiate with the Senate. Late 20th-century 

changes in practice, including multiple referral 

and the tremendous growth of conference committee delegations, have left the Speaker with 

more authority over conference committee composition. The modern Speaker chooses how many 

Representatives serve as conferees, as well as what 

committees the conferees come from and what 

matters they may consider in conference. In addition, the transformation of the Senate from a 

committee-centered, seniority-driven institution 

to a more open body with an equal distribution 

of power has transformed the role of the Speaker 

in inter-chamber negotiations. A close personal 

relationship with the Senate majority leader and 

important committee chairmen likely solves 

fewer legislative logjams than it did in the mid20th century, and the press of business makes the 

threat of a filibuster more potent. Although conflict between the Chambers is an inherent part 

of the bicameral system, the Speaker today faces 

a particularly significant challenge in coordinating the passage of legislation with the Senate. 

THE ‘‘OTHER BODY’’ 

At the end of the 19th century, the procedures 

of the House and Senate began to move in divergent directions. The House, under the leadership 

of Speaker Reed, developed into a majoritarian 

body, able to act whenever most of the Members 

favored action. The Senate, meanwhile, continued 

to grant great parliamentary powers to individual 

Senators. The lack of Senate rules allowing a simple majority to end debate left Senate leaders dependent on unanimous consent agreements to set 

the schedule for considering and voting on measures (even after the enactment of a rule in 1917 

allowing a super-majority to close debate). For 

over 100 years, the Speaker has been accustomed 

to setting the legislative agenda with the backing 

of the majority, but the Senate majority leader 

must always take into account the rights afforded 

to individual Senators under the rules and precedents. 

Not surprisingly, because of the differences in 

the decisionmaking processes of the two Chambers, Speakers have long found working with the 

Senate to be challenging. In 1890, Speaker Reed 

grew exasperated with Senators, including those 

in his own party, who chose to deliberate and 

debate, rather than quickly pass, House bills on 

the tariff and election reform. He urged the Senate to change its rules, attempted to stir public 

sentiment against the Senate, and threatened to 

keep Congress in session until the Senate decided 

the fate of the bills. The Speaker’s disapproval 

of the Senate could not expedite the process; as 

one Senator commented dryly to the press, ‘‘Unless Mr. Reed comes over here in person, and 

takes command, I do not see how we are to 

oblige him . . . It would hardly be fair to him 

to ask him to run the Senate and the House at 

the same time.’’ 2

Over 100 years later, a public campaign by another powerful Speaker was no more successful 

in spurring Senate action. An electorate reportedly fed up with politics as usual in Washington, 

DC, gave Republicans control of the House and 

Senate in the 1994 elections. House Republicans, 

led by Newt Gingrich (R–GA; 1995–1999), had 

campaigned on a list of legislative proposals 

known as the Contract with America. As expected, while the House voted on every Contract 

proposal during the first 100 days of the 104th 

Congress (1995–1996), the Senate debated only 

some of the proposals in the same time period.3

Despite his unquestionable skills in communicating with the public, the Speaker could not 

force the Senate to act. Threats or trades are unlikely to be effective when the Senate leader has 

few tools at his disposal to force action on legislation. Speaking at a joint press conference during 

the consideration of the contract, Senate Majority 

Leader Bob Dole (R–KS) illustrated the differences between the job of the Speaker and the 

job of the majority leader. After stating that the 

Senate would probably not be able to ‘‘keep up’’ 

with the speedy House in passing the contract 

items, Dole turned the podium over to Speaker 

Gingrich by joking that he needed to get back 

to the Senate floor for an upcoming vote ‘‘before 

anybody defects.’’ 4

160 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

House Speaker Newt Gingrich, Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, Republican National Committee Chairman Haley Barbour,’’ Federal News 

Service, Jan. 6, 1995, available from LexisNexis (database online), 

accessed May 1, 2004. 5 Steven S. Smith, ‘‘Forces of Change in Senate Party Leadership,’’ 

in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., Congress Reconsidered, 5th ed. (Washington: CQ Press, 1993), p. 277; Walter Kravitz, 

‘‘Relations Between the Senate and the House of Representatives: The 

Party Leadership,’’ in Policymaking Role of Leadership in the Senate: A 

Compilation of Papers Prepared for the Commission on the Operation of the 

Senate (Washington: GPO, 1976), p. 128. 6Barbara Sinclair, Majority Leadership in the U.S. House (Baltimore, 

MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), p. 113. 

7Robert A. Caro, Master of the Senate (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 

2002); Ralph K. Huitt, ‘‘Democratic Party Leadership in the Senate,’’ 

American Political Science Review, vol. 55, no. 2, June, 1961, p. 338. 8 David S. Broder, ‘‘ ‘The Other Body’—Not ‘the Upper House,’ ’’ 

New York Times, May 20, 1962, p. SM23. 

LEADERSHIP COORDINATION

No Speaker can change the nature of the Senate, but many have succeeded in working with 

Senate leaders to ensure that the key pieces of 

their legislative agenda do not die in the other 

Chamber. To varying degrees since the 19th century, Speakers have met with Senate leaders to 

plan or discuss major policy proposals and strategy. Coordination between the Chamber leaders 

is largely ad hoc, depending partially on the personalities of the leaders as well as the preferences 

of the majority party in each Chamber. 

At the very least, the leaders coordinate dates 

for adjournment, since the Constitution forbids 

either Chamber from adjourning for more than 

3 days without the consent of the other (Article 

I, Section 5). They have also met regularly at various formal party or government events and 

served together on a myriad of commissions. The 

Speaker and the Senate majority leader have also 

long met jointly with the President, although 

the timing and agenda of these meetings are generally dictated by the President.5

The Speaker does not, however, just meet Senate leaders at formal events or at the White 

House. The Chamber leaders also meet to accomplish several legislative goals. Sometimes the 

leaders meet to discuss the measures they plan 

to bring to the floor in the coming weeks, but 

often, the leaders simply inform each other of 

their Chamber’s actions, without attempting to 

coordinate or to even consult about their actions.6 Such information can prove particularly 

useful at the end of a session when decisions 

about when, or whether, to consider a bill can 

determine its fate. Any bill that has not passed 

both Chambers in the same form at the end of 

a Congress dies. The frequency of bicameral leadership meetings and less formal contacts rises 

considerably at the end of a session. 

At bicameral leadership meetings, the Speaker 

and his lieutenants might also discuss legislative 

strategy with Senate leaders. The leaders might 

agree, for example, that one Chamber should act 

before the other on a major piece of legislation. 

Passage of a bill by one Chamber might provide 

the momentum or public attention necessary to 

carry the bill through the other Chamber. Alternatively, the Speaker might urge the Senate to 

act first because he does not want to consume 

the precious time of the House to consider a 

measure that has little chance of passing the Senate. The Chamber leaders might agree to assign 

identical numbers (such as H.R. 1 and S. 1) to 

legislation to spotlight the issue as an agenda 

priority. 

The frequency and nature of the coordination 

between the Speaker and Senate leaders apparently depends to some extent on the individuals 

holding the offices. The relationship between 

Speaker Sam Rayburn (D–TX; 1955–1961) and 

Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson (D–TX) 

in the fifties is generally held up as the quintessential example of a close personal bond between Chamber leaders.7 Rayburn had been a 

mentor to Johnson when he served in the House, 

and they capitalized on their well-established 

friendship to turn bills into law. 

The press could not help but compare the relationship of Rayburn’s successor, John McCormack (D–MA; 1962–1971) with Senate Majority 

Leader Mike Mansfield (D–MT). One reporter 

described the leaders’ relations in 1962 as not yet 

approaching ‘‘in intimacy or effectiveness the alliance of Rayburn and Johnson.’’ 8 After Richard 

M. Nixon succeeded Lyndon Johnson as President, another journalist reported that McCormack and Mansfield rarely coordinated with each 

other. At times they would disagree with each 

other publicly over policy issues or even about 

how to best process legislation through both 

Chambers. The Senate leader told reporters in 

1969 there was ‘‘no need for more formal party 

The Speaker and the Senate 161 

9Richard L. Lyons, ‘‘Democratic Leadership Gap Widens,’’ Washington Post, May 21, 1969, p. A1. 10Barbara Sinclair, Majority Leadership in the U.S. House, p. 114. 11 ‘‘William F. Hildenbrand, Secretary of the Senate, 1981–1985,’’ 

(Washington: Senate Historical Office, Oral History Interviews), p. 

326. 

12Richard V. Oulahan, ‘‘Sense of Duty Prevails: Democrats Form 

Senate-House Board to Deal With Hoover Program,’’ New York Times, 

Dec. 8, 1931, p. 1. 13W.H. Humbert, ‘‘The Democratic Joint Policy Committee,’’ 

American Political Science Review, vol. 26, no. 3, June 1932, pp. 552– 

554. 

14Roger H. Davidson, ‘‘The Emergence of the Postreform Congress,’’ in Roger H. Davison, ed., The Postreform Congress (New York: 

St. Martin’s Press, 1992); Steven S. Smith, Call to Order: Floor Politics 

in the House and Senate (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1989). 15Ronald M. Peters, Jr. ‘‘The Changing Speakership,’’ Chap. 1, infra. 16Barbara Sinclair, The Transformation of the U.S. Senate (Baltimore, 

MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), p. 2; Christopher J. 

Deering and Steven S. Smith, Committees in Congress, 3d ed. (Washington: CQ Press, 1997), p. 183. 17Barbara Sinclair, ‘‘Party Leaders and the New Legislative Process,’’ 

in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., Congress Reconsidered, 6th ed. (Washington: CQ Press, 1997), p. 244. 

coordination between the House and Senate. 

Each should conduct its own business and consult when it has problems.’’ 9

The nature of bicameral leadership coordination has also varied with changes in party control 

of the Chambers and the White House. If the 

House and Senate are controlled by opposite parties, coordination can be even more challenging. 

A congressional scholar and former staff member 

in the House majority leader’s office reported 

that monthly bicameral leadership meetings, infrequently productive under unified control, disappeared almost entirely during the divided control of the 97th Congress (1981–1982). The scholar 

quotes one participant of the bicameral leadership meetings as saying, ‘‘They do what they 

want to do and we do what we want to do and 

we try to agree on an adjournment date.’’ 10 The 

sentiment was echoed by a long-time Senate 

staffer who claimed the Senate Republican Leader 

Howard Baker (R–TN) was in constant contact 

not with the Democratic Speaker but with the 

House minority leader. The Senate leader did not 

otherwise actively work with the House. ‘‘We 

did our own thing,’’ the staffer said, ‘‘whatever 

it was.’’ 11

If the House is controlled by the party in opposition to the President, then the Speaker might 

seek to coordinate with the Senate in the hopes 

of building a strong response to the policy platforms of the Executive. For example, when the 

Democrats gained control of the House, but not 

the Senate, in the 72d Congress (1931–1933), they 

formed a joint policy committee. The committee 

was created to shape the party’s legislative program and determine how much support to give 

to the program of the Republican President Hoover.12 Speaker John Garner (D–TX; 1931–1933), 

according to one source, opposed the creation of 

the committee, but the party caucus voted for 

its formation.13 Garner appointed the House 

membership of the committee, convened its 

meetings in his office, and together with Senate 

Minority Leader Joseph T. Robinson (D–AR) 

acted as its spokesman. 

CHALLENGES OF LEADERSHIP COORDINATION

IN THE POST-REFORM ERA

The significant challenges to bicameral leadership coordination have become even greater since 

the major institutional reforms of the midseventies. Political scientists generally describe 

the reform era of the 20th century as a shift from 

committee-dominated policymaking to a more 

participatory process involving junior Members 

and granting new powers to individual Members.14 The institutional changes made by both 

Chambers in the seventies magnified the differences in House and Senate procedures. 

While the weakening of committee chairs in 

the House was accompanied by a rise in the powers of the Speaker, no such centralization of 

power occurred in the Senate. In the last 30 years, 

the Speaker gained the power to refer bills to 

multiple committees and the Rules Committee 

became an arm of party leadership. Changes to 

the committee assignment process in the House 

also increased the power of the Speaker.15 The 

Senate majority leader, in contrast, gained no 

such increased authority over agenda-setting or 

debate control. Committee autonomy declined in 

the Senate as well as the House, but influence 

in the Senate was transferred to individual Members not to party leaders.16 ‘‘In the contemporary 

Congress,’’ a legislative scholar noted in the late 

nineties, ‘‘the legislative process in the two 

chambers is more distinct in form and in results 

than ever before.’’ 17 In short, rising individualism, especially when combined with the recent rise in partisanship, have made leading the 

162 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

18 Smith, ‘‘Forces of Change in Senate Party Leadership,’’ Congress 

Reconsidered, 5th ed., p. 273. 19Barbara Sinclair, Legislators, Leaders, and Lawmaking (Baltimore, 

MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 83. 20 Sinclair, ‘‘Party Leaders and the New Legislative Process,’’ Congress Reconsidered, 6th ed., p. 236. 21 Emily Pierce, ‘‘What’s Driving: This Week’s Agenda,’’ Roll Call, 

Sept. 2, 2003, available from LexisNexis (database online), accessed 

May 1, 2004.; Tim Curran, ‘‘Leaders Consider Election Reform Strategy,’’ Roll Call, March 7, 1994, available from LexisNexis (database 

online), accessed May 1, 2004. 22 Kravitz, ‘‘Relations Between the Senate and the House of Representatives: The Party Leadership,’’ Policymaking Role of Leadership in 

the Senate: A Compilation of Papers Prepared for the Commission on the 

Operation of the Senate, p. 131. 23 Emily Pierce, ‘‘Tax Conference Getting Parental Supervision,’’ 

Roll Call, May 22, 2003, available from LexisNexis (database online), 

accessed May 1, 2004. 

Senate in the past 30 years extremely challenging.18

The Speaker and his lieutenants have attempted to meet the challenge of an often slowmoving, if not obstructionist, Senate. According 

to a long-time observer of Congress, formal contact between the Speaker and the Senate majority 

leader increased in the eighties.19 Speaker James 

Wright (D–TX; 1987–1989) and Senate Majority 

Leader Robert Byrd (D–WV) reportedly took 

turns hosting bi-weekly breakfast meetings 

which later became weekly meetings. The staffs 

of the Speaker and the Senate majority leader also 

stay in constant contact. After his election as 

party leader, current Speaker Dennis Hastert (R– 

IL; 1999– ) designated a staff member to serve 

as his Deputy Chief of Staff for Bicameral and 

Intergovernmental Affairs. In the current Congress, House and Senate leadership aides reportedly meet every Wednesday that Congress is in 

session. 

The Speaker and other leaders in the postreform House have become more involved in determining the substance of legislation.20 The 

Speaker, for example, might strive to shape legislation so it passes by a wide enough margin to 

send a message to the Senate regarding its broad 

support. Special meetings with Senate leaders 

might be called to discuss specific pieces of legislation. 

Furthermore, the Speaker and the Senate majority leader in recent Congresses have been more 

directly involved in conference committee negotiations. The two leaders may even meet prior 

to the appointment of a conference committee to 

reach an agreement about the legislative vehicle.21 In the midseventies, it was reported that 

‘‘as a rule’’ party leaders do not ‘‘inject themselves into conference negotiations unless asked 

to do so.’’ 22 If this was a rule in an earlier era, 

it is followed less often today. Although usually 

not named as managers, leaders of both Chambers often meet with the committee members 

serving as conferees. The Speaker and other party 

leaders are more likely to become involved when 

conference negotiations are expected to be difficult, or when the talks break down. The Speaker can help in behind-the-scenes dealmaking because of his influence over other aspects of the 

legislative process that sometimes become key 

bargaining chips in difficult negotiations. If 

House and Senate conferees reach a stalemate, 

they may seek assistance from their leaders, in 

part because party leadership is often in a better 

position to judge what compromise the Chamber 

as a whole might accept. The Speaker might also 

be called upon to mediate policy disputes between Representatives and Senators of the same 

party.23

CONFERENCE COMMITTEES

Forging relationships with Senate leaders is 

only one avenue of bicameral coordination the 

Speaker pursues. After a major piece of legislation passes both Chambers, the House and Senate 

usually resolve their disagreements over the legislation in a conference committee. Traditionally, 

the Speaker never appoints himself to a conference committee, but this norm has not diminished his role in the crucial final negotiations on 

the major pieces of legislation in a Congress. In 

addition to his informal role in bicameral negotiations, the Speaker chooses the Members who 

will represent the position of the House in conference. 

The selection of managers has clear implications on the content of a conference committee 

report and, in fact, on the success of a conference 

committee. Service on a conference committee 

carries with it the potential for enormous influence in the version of the legislation that will 

most likely become law. Conference committees 

report, at a time of their choosing, agreements 

that cannot be amended. Furthermore, despite 

The Speaker and the Senate 163 

24The 1890 rule was omitted in the following two Congresses, when 

party control of the House changed, and restored in 1895. Neither 

the adoption nor omission of the rule affected House practice (Asher 

Hinds, Hinds Precedents of the House of Representatives, vol. IV, § 4470 

(Washington: GPO, 1907), pp. 896–897) 25Congressional Record, 63d Cong., 1st sess., vol. 56, Dec. 20, 1913, 

p. 1316. Cited in Clarence Cannon, Cannon’s Precedents of the House of 

Representatives, vol. VIII, § 3221 (Washington: GPO, 1936), p. 716. 

26Congressional Record, 72d Cong., 1st sess., vol. 75, June 24, 1932, 

p. 13879. Cited in Cannon, Cannon’s Precedents of the House of Representatives, vol. VIII, § 3220, p. 716. 27 Elizabeth Rybicki, ‘‘Resolving Bicameral Differences in Congress,’’ Paper presented at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American 

Political Science Association, p. 19. 28 Lawrence D. Longley and Walter J. Oleszek, Bicameral Politics: 

Conference Committees in Congress (New Haven, CT: Yale University 

Press, 1989), pp. 178–181; Resolving Legislative Differences in Congress: 

Conference Committees and Amendments Between the Houses, by Stanley 

Bach, CRS Report 98–696. 

some restrictions placed on conference committee 

reports by Chamber rules and precedents, conference reports sometimes include provisions not 

previously considered by either Chamber. In 

other words, provisions of law are sometimes 

drafted within a conference committee. 

The Speaker takes care in selecting Representatives to serve on conference because their policy 

positions and personalities can affect the outcome 

of the conference committee. Members who feel 

strongly that the House version is the best policy 

solution will likely be less willing to compromise 

with the Senate. Also, some Members are more 

skilled at the arts of negotiation than others. 

Most of the time, conferees come from the standing committees with jurisdiction over the bill, 

and sometimes past interactions between House 

and Senate members of committees can influence 

the bargaining sessions. Some Members have 

built up trust or reputations for fairness among 

them. The Speaker might take these factors into 

account when choosing conferees. 

The Speaker has appointed House managers 

since the First Congress, although this authority 

was not specifically codified in House rules until 

1890.

24 Even when the House stripped the Speaker of the power to appoint standing committees 

in 1911, it preserved the right of the Speaker to 

appoint conferees. Rulings in the early 20th century confirmed the authority of the Speaker to 

determine how many House conferees will be 

sent to negotiate with the Senate conferees. In 

1913, a Representative made a motion to instruct 

the Speaker to appoint seven conferees. Another 

Member raised a point of order against the motion, arguing that it was entirely within the 

Speaker’s discretion to determine the size of the 

conference delegation. Speaker James ‘‘Champ’’ 

Clark (D–MO; 1911–1919) agreed, sustaining the 

point of order and appointing three conferees.25

The ruling was cemented in 1932 when Speaker 

John Garner (D–TX; 1931–1933), in response to 

a parliamentary inquiry, replied that ‘‘you can 

not direct the Speaker as to the number or the 

manner in which conferees shall be appointed.’’ 26

To be sure, the rules and precedents have long 

granted the Speaker wide authority in selecting 

members of conference committees. The discretion exercised by the Speaker in appointing managers to conference, however, has varied over 

time. Since the 1880s the Speaker has generally 

appointed members from the standing committee 

of jurisdiction.27 Conferees, again by long-standing tradition, also represent the major partisan 

divisions of a Congress. The selection of conferees 

is sometimes described as a consultative process 

between the committee chair and ranking member, who then pass their recommendations on to 

the Speaker.28 The Speaker need not simply follow the recommendations of the committee leaders, although he often does. 

Until the second decade of the 20th century, 

the Speaker generally followed norms of conference appointment that seem to have limited 

his discretion in the selection of conferees. Nearly 

all House conference committee delegations were 

composed of three Representatives, usually the 

committee chair, the ranking member, and another majority party member of the committee 

of jurisdiction. Variation from the norm of appointing three senior members of the standing 

committee of jurisdiction was unusual, and in 

some cases controversial. Nevertheless, at times 

Speakers did appoint more than three conferees, 

or members who did not serve on the committee 

of jurisdiction, in order to create a delegation 

that could better represent the policy position of 

the House majority. 

In 1900, for example, Speaker David Henderson (R–IA; 1899–1903) faced a situation where 

members from the committee of jurisdiction appeared to be poor representatives of the House 

position. The House had voted to instruct the 

conferees on the naval appropriation bill not to 

164 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

29Ada C. McCown, The Congressional Conference Committee (New 

York: AMS Press, Inc., 1967), p. 153. 30 ‘‘Contest of the Two Houses,’’ New York Times, June 7, 1900, 

p. 2. 

31 DeAlva Stanwood Alexander, History and Procedure of the House of 

Representatives (New York: Burt Franklin, 1916), p. 228. 32 ‘‘Cannon Selects Nine,’’ Washington Post, July 10, 1909, p. 4. 

33Congressional Record, 47th Cong., 2d sess., vol. 14, Feb. 27, 1883, 

p. 3356. 34Cannon, Cannon’s Precedents of the House of Representatives, vol. VIII, 

§ 3221, p. 716. 35 Political scientists have recently attempted to assess more precisely the influence of the Speaker in conference committee appointments in the modern era. See, for example, Jeff Lazarus and Nathan 

W. Monroe, ‘‘The Speaker’s Discretion: Conference Committee Appointments from the 96th–104th Congress,’’ Paper presented at the 

2003 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association; 

Jeff Lazarus and Nathan W. Monroe, ‘‘The Speaker’s Discretion: Conference Committee Appointments from the 97th–106th Congress,’’ 

Paper presented at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political 

Science Association; Jamie L. Carson and Ryan J. Vander Wielen, 

include a specific provision in the conference report. The Speaker, following the norm, had appointed three members from the committee of 

jurisdiction to represent the House in conference. 

The conferees met with the Senate conferees, and 

then they presented to the House a report that 

included the language they had been instructed 

to omit. The House conferees claimed that the 

Senate conferees insisted on the provision. The 

House rejected the report and asked the Senate 

for a further conference. The Speaker, in what has 

been perceived as an instance of ‘‘discipline by 

the House of its conferees’’ appointed a new delegation to represent the House in these negotiations.29 None of these members served on the 

committee of jurisdiction, and the Speaker’s announcement of the new conferees led to ‘‘a buzz 

of surprised comment.’’ 30 The new conferees, 

however, could no more convince the Senate to 

take the House position on the contested provision than the original conferees, and the House 

eventually yielded to the position of the Senate. 

In another example, Speaker Joseph Cannon 

(R–IL; 1903–1911) discarded the generally wellfollowed appointment norms in the hopes of influencing the conference committee outcome on 

the 1909 tariff bill.31 Cannon selected nine members from the committee of jurisdiction, but he 

did not follow the norm of appointing more senior members before junior members. Cannon explained that he selected conferees in order to assure that the House was well represented geographically; indeed, he chose three members from 

the East, three from the West, and three from 

the South. According to press reports at the time, 

however, these appointments also happened to 

tilt the conference committee in a particular policy direction. ‘‘The fact is not overlooked,’’ the 

Washington Post reported, ‘‘that by this arrangement Speaker Cannon has been able to eliminate 

from consideration on the conference committee 

. . . the most aggressive and persistent fighter for 

the free-war-material policy.’’ 32

While Cannon’s decision to appoint nine conferees to the 1909 Tariff Conference was met with 

some disapproval, critics noted that the appointment of more than three conferees, especially on 

major legislation, was not unprecedented. Indeed, starting in the 1880s the Speaker occasionally appointed larger conference delegations to 

consider the most important policy questions of 

the day. In 1883, Speaker J. Warren Kiefer (R– 

OH; 1881–1883) appointed five managers to a conference committee on a highly controversial tariff 

bill.33 Speaker Reed appointed eight conferees to 

consider a tariff bill in 1897, and Speaker Cannon 

appointed five Representatives to consider a Philippine Islands measure in 1905. 

Over the course of the 20th century, the 

Speaker began to appoint larger delegations to 

conference. By the thirties, the average size of a 

House delegation had risen to five members.34

The Speaker continued to appoint just three Representatives to some conference committees, but 

generally the smaller delegations considered 

measures that were important to fewer Members. 

The average size of House delegations increased 

gradually throughout the forties and fifties (Figure 1). While most contained 5 or fewer members, the delegations on the major appropriation 

bills, for example, often consisted of 10 or more 

representatives. 

Anecdotal evidence suggests that past Speakers 

have, at least on occasion, taken advantage of the 

discretion granted to them by House rules to appoint conference delegations to serve the policy 

or political goals of their party. Such qualitative 

accounts cannot answer the questions of how 

often and under what conditions the Speaker is 

likely to diverge from committee recommendations or appointment norms, and there is no attempt to answer those questions here.35 Instead, 

The Speaker and the Senate 165 

‘‘Legislative Politics in a Bicameral System: Strategic Conferee Appointments in the U.S. Congress,’’ Paper presented at the 2002 Annual 

Meeting of the Northeastern Political Science Association. 36 See House Rule 1, clause 11 for the full guidelines the Speaker 

is expected to follow in the selection of conferees during the 108th 

Congress. 

37Congressional Record, 93d Cong., 1st sess., vol. 119, Oct. 8, 1974, 

p. 34470. 38Congressional Record, 95th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 123, Jan. 4, 1977, 

p. 53. 

39Congressional Record, 95th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 123, Jan. 4, 1977, 

p. 55. 

the discussion below simply aims to demonstrate 

that, in the last 30 years, institutional changes 

and new practices have increased the potential for 

the Speaker to exercise discretion in the selection 

of House managers. 

Figure 1.—Average Size of House and Senate Conference Delegations, Selected 

Congresses, 1855–2000. 

INCREASED DISCRETION OF THE SPEAKER IN

THE POST-REFORM ERA

The major committee reforms of the seventies 

weakened the norm of appointing senior committee members to conference committee, and, 

as a result, strengthened the Speaker’s ability to 

shape conference committee membership. The 

House modified the standing rule granting the 

Speaker the authority to appoint conferees twice 

in that decade.36 In 1975, the House amended the 

rule to direct the Speaker to appoint conferees 

who ‘‘generally supported the House position as 

determined by the Speaker.’’ 37 In 1977, the rule 

was modified again, this time to direct the 

Speaker to appoint Representatives who were 

‘‘the principal proponents of the major provisions 

of the bill or resolution.’’ 38 The new language, 

according to Majority Leader James Wright (D– 

TX), would encourage the Speaker to ‘‘consider 

appointing sponsors of major successful amendments which have been adopted on the floor of 

the House.’’ 39 In both instances, the aim of the 

reformers was to increase the influence of rankand-file members in the crucial conference committee stage of the legislative process. The 

Speaker, as leader of the majority party, was expected to appoint members who represented the 

position of the House. 

Neither of these rules changes had as significant an impact on the role of the Speaker in conferee appointment, however, as a 1975 rule granting the Speaker the authority to refer bills to 

more than one standing committee. Multiple referral transformed the composition of conference 

committees and increased the discretion of the 


92800.009
166 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

40 Garry Young and Joseph Cooper, ‘‘Multiple Referral and the 

Transformation of House Decision Making,’’ Congress Reconsidered, 5th 

ed., p. 226; Walter J. Oleszek, ‘‘House-Senate Relations: A Perspective 

on Bicameralism,’’ The Postreform Congress, p. 205. 41Constitution, Jefferson’s Manual, and Rules of the House of Representatives, H. Doc. 107–284, 107th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington: GPO), 

p. 284; Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 2d sess., vol. 96, Aug. 7, 1950, 

pp. 11894–11895. 

42Congressional Record, 102d Cong., 1st sess., vol. 137, Jan. 3, 1991, 

p. H31. 43 Longley and Oleszek, Bicameral Politics: Conference Committees in 

Congress, p. 67. 

Speaker in the selection of conferees.40 When 

multiple committees consider a bill, the Speaker 

must decide how the various committees should 

be represented on the conference committee. Instead of taking the recommendations of a single 

chair, the Speaker may have to work with and 

coordinate among several committee chairs and 

their requests for representation on a conference 

committee. If disputes arise among committee 

chairs, they often call on party leadership to resolve the policy conflicts. 

The new referral practices also make it more 

likely that the Speaker will limit the negotiating 

authority of a conferee. The Speaker has the ability to appoint what are sometimes called ‘‘limited purpose’’ conferees, or members appointed 

to consider only selected matters in disagreement 

with the Senate. If only a portion of a measure 

falls under the jurisdiction of a standing committee, for example, the Speaker may appoint 

conferees from that committee only for the purposes of considering those matters within their 

jurisdiction. Prior to the seventies, the Speaker 

rarely appointed limited purpose conferees, although he did so under certain circumstances. In 

1950, for example, the general appropriation bills 

were combined into a single omnibus bill, and 

Speaker Rayburn appointed a unique set of managers (corresponding with the Appropriations 

subcommittees) to negotiate over each chapter of 

the omnibus bill.41

After the Speaker was given the authority to 

refer bills to more than one committee, he also 

began to appoint limited purpose conferees more 

often. From the 91st through the 94th Congress 

(1969–1976), the Speaker appointed limited purpose conferees on only three bills. In contrast, in 

the four Congresses (1977–1984) following the 

emergence of multiple referral, the Speaker set 

limited authority for conferees on 61 bills, or an 

average of 15 measures per Congress. At the start 

of the 102d Congress (1991–1992), Speaker Thomas Foley (D–WA; 1989–1995) announced that he 

intended to simplify the appointment of conferees,42 but the appointment of complex conference delegations has continued to the present 

day. In the 107th Congress (2001–2002), the 

Speaker appointed limited purpose conferees on 

10 out of the 37 measures the Chambers agreed 

to send to conference. 

The option to appoint a conferee for a single 

purpose can be an important tool of the Speaker. 

It allows the Speaker to name Representatives 

with the most knowledge about portions of legislation as negotiators, without granting them influence over the entire compromise package. If 

a Member best represents the House or the party 

on only one element of the legislation, the Speaker can limit his or her involvement in conference 

negotiations to that element. 

Since the reforms of the seventies, the norm 

of the small conference delegation has disappeared, giving the Speaker more flexibility to 

determine the size of the House delegation. In 

the last 30 years, the Speaker has appointed more 

Representatives to conference committees than he 

did in earlier eras (Figure 1). In the 94th Congress (1975–1976), for example, the average size 

of a House delegation was 10 Members, and 98 

percent of all conference committees had delegations larger than 5 Members. The size of conference committees continued to rise throughout 

the eighties and nineties. To some extent, the average number of delegates is driven upward by 

a few mega-conferences each Congress. In the 

100th Congress (1987–1988), for example, the 

Speaker appointed 155 delegates to the conference 

on the omnibus trade bill.43 Yet even excluding 

the huge conferences, the average size of both 

House and Senate delegations grew in the second 

half of the 20th century. 

While the historical evidence suggests that the 

Speaker has long taken advantage of the power 

to appoint conferees, since the seventies the 

Speaker has had a greater capacity to exercise discretion over the composition of the House delegation. The Speaker’s ability to use conference assignments as a mechanism to influence conference outcomes was rather limited, both by the 

The Speaker and the Senate 167 

44Congressional Record, 103d Cong., 1st sess., vol. 139, Jan. 5, 1993, 

p. 49. 

size of the conference and the norm of appointing 

the two party leaders from the committee. In the 

modern Congress, the rules and practices leave 

the Speaker with more authority over conference 

composition. The most recent rules change in the 

103d Congress (1993–1994) granted the Speaker 

the authority to add, or remove, conferees after 

the initial appointment.44 Regardless of how 

often the Speaker actually exercises this power, 

the rules change could potentially increase his influence over conference committees. Conferees are 

aware that the Speaker can remove them from 

the committee or add enough other Members to 

the conference to ensure a majority will sign the 

conference report. 

CONCLUSION

Over the past century, the Speaker has helped 

transform policy proposals into law by working 

informally with Senate leadership and by applying his formal conference appointment powers to 

further the goals of a majority of the House. The 

Speaker’s role in bicameral coordination in the 

modern era is particularly challenging. The equal 

distribution of power in the Senate, one result 

of the seventies reforms, makes that body difficult to lead. The Speaker must coordinate not 

just with Senate party and committee leaders, 

but with other Senators, who, in the modern era, 

are more likely to be interested in a broad array 

of issues and are more likely to exercise their individual prerogatives afforded under the rules of 

the Senate. 

The modern Speaker also has greater responsibilities in the appointment of House conferees. 

The advent of multiple referral and other rules 

changes have left the Speaker with the ability to 

determine not just who will serve as conferees, 

but how many will serve, what committees they 

will represent, and what portions of the legislation they will consider. The most recent rules 

change also allows the Speaker to add or remove 

conferees from the committee during the negotiations. 

The changes in rules and practices that occurred three decades ago continue to shape the 

role of the Speaker in bicameral relations. It remains to be seen whether the duties of the Speaker in the two principal devices of bicameral coordination, leadership cooperation and conference 

committees, will continue to grow. It seems likely that the Speaker’s role in bicameral relations 

will vary, as it has in the past, with changes in 

the membership and institutions of Congress. 

168 

1 ‘‘Uncle Joe,’’ Time, vol. 1, Mar. 3, 1923, p. 2. 2Nancy Gibbs and Karen Tumulty, ‘‘Master of the House,’’ Time, 

vol. 146, Dec. 25, 1995, p. 54. 

Chapter 5 

The Speaker and the Press 

Betsy Palmer 

Analyst in American National Government 

Congressional Research Service 

Thirteen years after he last held the gavel as 

Speaker of the House of Representatives, Joseph 

‘‘Uncle Joe’’ Cannon (R–MO) graced the cover 

of a new national magazine. It was March 3, 1923, 

and Cannon, who served as Speaker from 1903 

until 1911, had just announced his retirement 

from the House. The editors of Time decided to 

write a tribute to Cannon and his turbulent 

times as leader and accompany it with a sketch 

of the former Speaker on their very first cover. 

The article on the inside of the magazine is hardly what modern readers would consider a cover 

story—just a few paragraphs on one page. The 

magazine wrote: 

Uncle Joe in those days was a Speaker of the House and 

supreme dictator of the Old Guard. Never did a man employ 

the office of the Speaker with less regard for its theoretical 

impartiality. To Uncle Joe, the Speakership was a gift from 

heaven, immaculately born into the Constitution by the will 

of the fathers for the divine purpose of perpetuating the dictatorship of the standpatters in the Republican party. And 

he followed the divine call with a resolute evangelism that 

was no mere voice crying in the wilderness, but a voice that 

forbade anybody else to cry out—out of turn.1

Seventy-two years later, a Speaker achieved another first with Time—Speaker Newt Gingrich 

(R–GA) was named its ‘‘Man of the Year’’ for 

1995, the first House Speaker ever to be so honored.2 These profiles of Cannon and Gingrich are 

part of a complex history of the relationship between the Speaker and the press corps. 

Several elements appear to affect the kind of 

relationship a Speaker has with the press corps. 

Among these elements, raised as questions, are 

the following: Is the Speaker the opposition voice 

for the party that does not control the White 

House? Do the Speaker and his party (they have 

all been men) have a clearly defined and explained legislative agenda? What kind of personality does the Speaker bring to the job? Is he 

confrontational? Confident? Or more of a quiet, 

behind-the-scenes dealmaker? 

Perhaps the most important element affecting 

the relationship between the Speaker and the 

press has been the changing nature of the press 

itself. There have been three major eras that help 

to understand the volatile interaction and interdependence between the Speaker and the press. 

The first was characterized by partisanship on the 

part of the press, the second was marked by 

Speakers who carefully cultivated relationships 

with a few congressional reporters, and the third 

was defined by the advent of television and electronic broadcasting. This chapter examines 

Speakers during each of the three periods, focusing on those who had well-documented relationships with the press. 

The Speaker and the Press 169 

3 Donald A. Ritchie, Press Gallery: Congress and the Washington Correspondents (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 12. 

Hereafter referred to as Ritchie, Press Gallery. 4 Ibid., p. 3. 

5 Ibid., p. 4. 6 Greeley had been elected as a Whig to the 30th Congress, from 

December 4, 1848 to March 3, 1849. 7Ritchie, Press Gallery, pp. 50–51. 

AN ERA OF PARTISANSHIP

In the earliest days of the House, reporters and 

the newspapers for which they wrote were explicitly partisan. Their goal was not merely to report 

the news, but to do so in a way that helped the 

political party with which they were affiliated. 

Many reporters found that their fortunes rose and 

fell with that of their party. So, for example, 

when the House convened for a lame duck session in November 1800 after the defeat of the 

Federalists: 

Samuel Smith of the Intelligencer and John Stewart of the 

Federalist were on hand to cover its debates, and the two reporters petitioned for a place on the House floor. Federalist 

Speaker Theodore Sedgwick cast a tie-breaking vote against 

them, on the grounds that their presence would destroy the 

dignity of the chamber and inconvenience its members. 

When the Intelligencer challenged the Speaker’s ruling, Sedgwick ordered editor Smith banned from the House lobby and 

galleries. The election of Thomas Jefferson, together with 

new Republican majorities in Congress, vastly improved 

Samuel Smith’s fortunes. The House welcomed him back, and 

in January 1802 voted forty-seven to twenty-eight to find 

room on the floor for the reporters.3

At first, the most important role played by reporters in the Capitol was that of recorders of 

debate, taking down for the record the debates 

of what went on in the House and the Senate. 

Those summaries were made available to newspapers outside Washington, which were free to 

use them or not. Eventually, newspapers began 

hiring ‘‘letter writing’’ correspondents, who 

would sit in the House and Senate galleries and 

compose commentaries on the actions of the two 

Chambers that would then be sent home to their 

local newspapers. By the Civil War, there was 

an identifiable press corps in Washington whose 

members focused most of their attention on Capitol Hill.4

Reporters not only shared the political ideology of some of the Members they covered, they 

also worked for Members during congressional 

recesses. Newspapers could not afford to pay reporters for a full year’s work when Congress was 

in recess for a good portion of the time; so reporters turned to the people they covered to find 

additional work. Many were hired as clerks for 

committees or secretaries for Members themselves.5

This made for an interesting relationship between the Speaker and the press corps. During 

the winter of 1855–1856, for example, Horace 

Greeley, a powerful editor and reporter for the 

New York Tribune, became deeply involved in the 

hotly contested race for Speaker, even though he 

was not a Member of the House.6 Greeley wanted to see Representative Nathaniel Banks (D– 

MA) elected because of Banks’ antislavery policies. Greeley filed daily dispatches from the 

House as Members cast ballot after ballot trying 

to elect a Speaker, and he made it clear he favored Banks and worked on his behalf. ‘‘After 

the House cast its 118th unsuccessful ballot, Representative Albert Rust (D–AR) proposed that all 

leading contenders withdraw in favor of a compromise candidate.’’ Greeley wrote a letter 

strongly opposing Rust’s plan, and the day after 

the letter appeared in the Tribune, Rust encountered Greeley and severely beat him. Greeley, 

however, recovered sufficiently to write stories 

about Banks’ election as Speaker on the 133d ballot.7

Reporters were so involved in the politics of 

Washington that many also decided to run for 

office themselves. The first journalist to become 

Speaker of the House was Schuyler Colfax, a Republican from Indiana, who served as Speaker 

from December 7, 1863 through March 1869. 

Schuyler Colfax’s election as Speaker had brought special 

pleasure to the press . . . Now one of their own—the proprietor and occasional letter writer to the South Bend Register— 

presided over the House of Representatives. . . . To celebrate 

Colfax’s election as Speaker, the Washington Press corps 

hosted a dinner in his honor, one of the first of what became 

a favored device for bringing together reporters and politicians in a social setting. ‘‘We journalists and men of the 

newspaper press do love you, and claim you as bone of our 

bone and flesh of our flesh,’’ said toastmaster Sam Wilkeson. 

‘‘Fill your glasses, all, in an invocation to the gods for long 

life, greater successes, and ever-increasing happiness to our 

editorial brother in the Speaker’s Chair.’’ . . . Having sprung 

from the press, Speaker Colfax applied the lessons of his profession skillfully, making himself always available for interviews, planting stories, sending flattering notes to editors, 

suggesting editorials, and spreading patronage. He intended 

to parlay his popularity with the press into a national folVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00179 Fmt 8165 Sfmt 8165 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.011 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
170 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

8 Ibid., p. 67. 9The National Cyclopedia of American Biography (New York: James 

T. White and Company, 1891), vol. 1, pp. 137–139. 10Ritchie, Press Gallery, p. 131. 11Ibid., p. 138. 12 Ibid., p. 137. 

13 Ibid., pp. 139–142. 14Henry V.N. Boyton, ‘‘The Press and Public Men,’’ Century, vol. 

42, Oct. 1891, p. 855. 

lowing that would make him the first journalist in the White 

House.’’ 8

But the Speaker of this period who would 

transcend even Colfax’s popularity with the press 

was James G. Blaine (R–ME). Blaine came to 

politics directly from journalism—he had been 

the part owner of the Kennebec Journal, and later 

accepted the editorship of the Portland, ME, Advertiser. Blaine was elected to Congress in 1862, 

and served as Speaker for three Congresses, from 

1869 to 1875. He was a contender for the Republican Presidential nomination in both 1876 and 

1880, and was the party’s nominee in 1884.

9

Blaine used his news experience to win over 

the Washington press corps. ‘‘Blaine courted correspondents for Republican and Democratic papers alike and learned how to give reporters what 

they wanted. Having begun as an editor and reporter, rather than as a lawyer, he employed his 

instinct for news and genius for self-advertisement to generate an immense and devoted national following.’’ 10

Blaine took care to cultivate personal relationships with reporters, calling them by their first 

names and seeking them out with news. He also 

came up with unique ways to get his point of 

view into the newspaper. ‘‘Blaine invented the 

Sunday news release, recognizing that anything 

distributed on that slow news day would get 

prominent display in the Monday papers. He experimented with the semipublic letter, intended 

more for the press than for its nominal recipient. 

He floated trial balloons to test public sentiment, 

and disavowed them if they burst.’’ 11

‘‘No man in America better understood the 

ways and means of reaching the public ear 

through the newspaper press than Blaine,’’ wrote 

correspondent David Barry. Blaine actively pursued reporters, regardless of their party, but ‘‘if 

a reporter wrote critically of Blaine he found 

himself cut off from this important source,’’ 

Barry wrote. 12

Blaine’s intense attention to press relations 

served him well during the Credit Mobilier scandal. Lobbyists were accused of giving Members 

of Congress stock in Credit Mobilier, a Union 

Pacific Railroad subsidiary, at par value, i.e., less 

than half its market price, sometimes without 

making Members pay for the stock at all. Speaker 

Colfax was accused of participating in the stock 

dealings, and the scandal contributed to the demise of his career. Blaine, however, who also 

stood accused of obtaining stock at less than market value, decided to take on his accusers and 

managed to weather the storm. 

Blaine’s broker, James Mulligan, had kept letters from Blaine about the stock deals, which investigators wanted to make public. Blaine went 

to Mulligan’s hotel room in Washington and 

took the letters. Then, from the floor of the 

House, Blaine read selected portions designed to 

clear himself of the charges. To the amazement 

of his opponents, he was successful, though it became clear later that he had edited the letters 

rather substantially in their reading to the 

House.13

The Credit Mobilier scandal left a lasting imprint on the relationship between the press and 

Congress, as noted by Henry Boyton, an influential reporter for the Cincinnati Gazette in postCivil War Washington. Boyton wrote that the 

scandal marked a turning point in the relations 

between the press and the politicians they covered: 

The general relations of friendship between the two classes 

continued, however, without marked interruption to the days 

of the explosions over Credit Mobilier and kindred scandals. 

Up to that time Newspaper Row was daily and nightly visited by the ablest and most prominent men in public affairs. 

Vice presidents, the heads of departments, heads of bureaus, 

the presiding officers of the two houses of Congress, and the 

strongest and most noted men of the Senate and of the House 

in the grandest period of the Republic’s life, were frequent 

and welcome visitors in the Washington offices of the leading 

journals of the land. Suddenly, with the Credit Mobilier outbreak, and others of its kind which followed it, these pleasant 

relations began to dissolve under the sharp and deserved criticism of the correspondents. To this situation succeeded long 

years of estrangement. Newspaper Row was gradually deserted by the class named.14

The press also became concerned about the 

many reporters who lobbied the government at 

the same time they were writing stories about 

Congress. In November 1877, Boyton and other 

The Speaker and the Press 171 

15Ritchie, Press Gallery, p. 109. 16 Michael E. McGerr, The Decline of Popular Politics: The American 

North, Üçãä–Üéáç (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 107; 

Michael Schudson, Discovering the News: A Social History of American 

Newspapers (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1978), p. 4. 

17 ‘‘Mr. Noyes at Rest,’’ Washington Post, Mar. 1, 1908, p. 1. 18 Joseph G. Cannon, The Memoir of Joseph Gurney ‘‘Uncle Joe’’ Cannon, 

as transcribed by Helen Leseure Abdill (Danville, VA: Voorhees Printing Co., 1996), p. 132. 

leaders of the press met with House Speaker 

Samuel Randall (D–PA) to discuss press gallery 

accreditation. Over the next 2 years the journalists created a set of rules that defined who could 

be an accredited journalist, a plan that was 

adopted by a gathering of reporters in 1879. The 

House agreed to the plan later the same year, and 

the Senate followed suit in 1884. Under the plan, 

a group of five journalists, called the Standing 

Committee of Correspondents, would monitor 

the galleries and be responsible for ensuring that 

lobbyists did not use the facilities reserved for 

reporters.15

The press was also in a major transition at this 

time, from partisan newspapers that covered the 

Capitol with an ideological intent, to moneymaking businesses, where getting the news was 

what mattered. ‘‘From the 1860s to the 1920s, the 

newspaper served less and less well as a medium 

of traditional exuberant partisanship,’’ wrote 

media scholar Michael McGerr. By the 1870s, an 

independent press, focused more on a ‘‘restrained 

and factual style’’ had emerged, a development 

aided by the creation and expansion of the Associated Press.16

These elements—the development of a less 

partisan press, the creation of a formalized structure for journalists within Congress and the distance between the press and politicians following 

the Credit Mobilier scandal—marked the beginning of a new period in the relationship between 

the Speaker and the press, a time when many reporters were viewed by Speakers with suspicion, 

but a few came to be regarded as trusted allies 

and friends. 

‘‘THE BOYS’’ OF THE PRESS

Speaker Joe Cannon, who was Speaker from 

1903 to 1911, divided the press into two groups— 

those who regularly covered Capitol Hill and 

those who did not. For the former, Cannon had 

praise and even some affection—in 1908 he was 

an honorary pallbearer at the funeral of Crosby 

S. Noyes, editor in chief of the Evening Star, then 

the leading Washington daily, for example.17 It 

was the other reporters, those who did not report 

out of Washington regularly, who earned Cannon’s ire. 

I was always fond of the newspaper boys in Washington. 

Few of them ever betrayed my confidences, and they said 

many nice things about me. For the great part they were 

honorable men, animated by decent instincts. It was significant that during the ‘‘muckraking’’ campaign that flourished 

from about 1907 to 1911, few, if any of the regular newspaper 

men in Washington took part. Their work was to report 

facts, not to deal in slander and half-truths. The ‘‘muckrakers’’ were generally men unfamiliar with Washington, politics or men in political life. I attended Gridiron dinners regularly, for the Club was always kind enough to ask me to 

go.18

This distinction between the ‘‘regulars’’ and 

those who did not spend their time at the Capitol was adopted by many Speakers who followed 

Cannon, regardless of their political affiliation. 

To some extent, it has influenced how Speakers 

from Cannon on related to the press. 

Cannon, known to friend and foe as ‘‘Uncle 

Joe,’’ was a major national figure during his 

speakership, particularly in 1910 during the 

struggle with a group of insurgent House Republicans over the scope of his control. He became a favorite subject of editorial writers and 

cartoonists, who called him a ‘‘czar’’ or a ‘‘tyrant.’’ The Speaker blamed the bad press, or the 

‘‘muckraking’’ as he called it, on what he said 

was a cabal of newspaper reporters and editors 

who had wanted him to support changing the 

tariff on woodpulp and print paper. 

According to Cannon, a newspaper editor by 

the name of Herman Ridder said he would help 

Cannon obtain the 1908 Republican Presidential 

nomination if Cannon would support the changes 

to the tariff. Cannon said later he had no idea 

if Ridder could have helped him win the Republican nomination, but he thought it was clear 

Ridder could hurt him for not going along. 

‘‘jAknyone who read the papers for the three 

years or so following 1907 must remember the 

success that he or someone else achieved in a 

campaign of vilification, virtual misrepresentation, and personal abuse of myself, along with 

172 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

19 Ibid., pp. 140–141. 20 Scott William Rager, ‘‘Uncle Joe Cannon: the Brakeman of the 

House of Representatives, 1911–1915,’’ in Roger H. Davidson, Susan 

Webb Hammond, and Raymond W. Smock, eds., Masters of the House: 

Congressional Leadership Over Two Centuries (Boulder, CO: Westview 

Press, 1998), p. 77. 21 Frederick J. Haskin, ‘‘The American Congress: XX. Speaker Cannon’s Career,’’ Washington Post, Dec. 12, 1909, p. 7. 22This was the first press gallery, designed for the ‘‘print’’ press, 

or those who wrote for daily newspapers. Over time, both the House 

and Senate created additional, separate press galleries for the periodical 

press (such as weekly magazines) and for radio and television reporters. 

23Cannon, The Memoir of Joseph Gurney ‘‘Uncle Joe’’ Cannon, pp. 119– 

120. 

24Henry Litchfield West, ‘‘Scribes Easy for Senatorial Golfers,’’ 

Washington Post, June 28, 1922, p. 10. 25 Donald C. Bacon, ‘‘Nicholas Longworth: The Genial Czar,’’ in 

Masters of the House, p. 135. 26Richard B. Cheney and Lynne V. Cheney, Kings of the Hill: Power 

and Personality in the House of Representatives (New York: Continuum, 

1983) pp. 156, 158. Hereafter referred to as Cheney, Kings of the Hill. 

the responsible Republican leaders of the 

House.’’ 19

Whatever the reason, Cannon certainly saw his 

fair share of critical coverage by the national 

press, as documented by scholar Scott William 

Ranger. 

Extensive and sometimes biased press coverage of the rules 

controversy had alerted the public to the fact that Speaker 

Cannon might not be quite the benevolent character they had 

once believed him to be. 

The Baltimore Sun cited Cannon as being ‘‘the very embodiment of all the sinister interests and malign influences that 

have brooded over this land and exacted toil from every 

hearthstone.’’ Both Colliers and Success magazines had been 

running articles in regular installments that not only detailed 

the Speaker’s wrongdoings but also praised the insurgents. 

When a large segment of the public responded by turning 

against Cannon, some moderate Republicans realized that 

their own political futures would soon be in jeopardy if they 

continued to support him. The press, therefore, did the insurgents an absolutely invaluable service. The Speaker was angered by the press assault and the public response to it but 

refused to make changes in the way he ran the House.20

The Washington Post, in a profile of Cannon, 

began the story like this: ‘‘The central figure in 

every discussion of the American Congress today 

is the Speaker of the House of Representatives, 

Joseph Gurney Cannon. He is as much of a character in American politics as was the rugged Andrew Jackson, or the terrible John Randolph of 

Roanoke, or the imperious Roscoe Conkling.’’ 21

As Speaker, Cannon was in charge of the 

House press gallery, an organization of reporters 

established in 1890. The 1890 agreement between 

the House and the press corps established a permanent gallery on the third floor of the Capitol 

from which reporters could watch House floor action. In addition, the press gallery had office 

space for reporters to make and receive phone 

calls and write their reports.22 Cannon delegated 

control of the gallery and the care of the press 

to his secretary, L. White Busbey, a former 

Washington correspondent for Chicago newspapers: 

The Speaker had charge of the press gallery, and I turned 

this over to Busbey, telling him that I would hold him fully 

responsible for keeping the boys happy, and that he was not 

to bring any disputes to me unless there was no escape . . . 

The newspaper boys always seemed to have a hankering for 

stories and Busbey relieved me of too much interruption by 

them. Busbey had a busy life, working to all hours.23

Speakers who followed Cannon, also appeared 

to enjoy the company of Capitol Hill reporters. 

Speaker Frederick H. Gillett, for example, joined 

a dozen members of the Senate press gallery and 

an equal number of Senators in a golf game in 

1922.

24

Speaker Nicholas Longworth (R–OH), Speaker 

from 1925 to 1931, played the inside game with 

reporters to great advantage. The charming husband of Alice Roosevelt was extremely popular 

with the press. He was able to move portions of 

President Coolidge’s legislative program through 

the House in just 2 short months, for example, 

and won plaudits from the press for this achievement.25

Said another writer: ‘‘. . . an indisputable aura 

of glamor did hover around Nicholas Longworth. 

He was even profiled by a movie magazine, and 

though he was the only Speaker in history to 

whom the klieg lights were so attracted, there 

was no egoistic pretension about him.’’ Further, 

‘‘Another result of Longworth’s characteristic detachment—or cynicism, some call it—was to endear him to newsmen who had been born knowing that life would go on no matter what the 

Congress decided. Many of them became enthusiastic fans of Longworth, and they tendered him 

the kind of praise few politicians have ever enjoyed.’’ 26

His method of dealing with the press was described in detail in an Associated Press article, 

written by Walter Chamblin, that was included 

in a biography of Longworth written by his sister. The story sets the scene in Longworth’s priVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00182 Fmt 8165 Sfmt 8165 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.011 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
The Speaker and the Press 173 

27Clara Longworth DeChambrun, The Making of Nicholas Longworth: 

Annals of an American Family (New York: Ray Long and Richard 

Smith, Inc., 1933), pp. 306–307. 28Cheney, Kings of the Hill, p. 158. 29Anthony Champagne, ‘‘John Nance Garner,’’ in Masters of the 

House, p. 152. 

30 ‘‘Garner and Rainey Reply,’’ New York Times, June 26, 1932, p. 

21.; Howard Kurtz, ‘‘Gingrich Plans to End Daily News Briefings,’’ 

Washington Post, May 3, 1995, p. A7. 31 Elaine S. Povich, Partners and Adversaries: The Contentious Connection 

Between Congress and the Media (Arlington, VA: Freedom Forum, 1996), 

p. 13. 

32 Jim Cannon, ‘‘Congress and the media: the loss of trust,’’ in Partners and Adversaries, pp. 68–69. 

vate office just off the floor of the Chamber after 

the House had adjourned for the day: 

It was in this retreat that the press learned to know and 

to love him. His door never was closed to a reporter and 

no matter how muddled the legislative situation might be, 

Nick ever was smiling and genial. Nothing pleased him more 

than for the correspondents to arrive with a batch of good 

stories. He would laugh heartily and then would tell one of 

his own. His supply seemingly was inexhaustible. It was in 

such a setting that Nick liked best to discuss affairs with 

the press. He never cared much for formal conferences, which 

are so popular with most officials in Washington, although 

at times a troop of correspondents would arrive from the Senate or downtown departments and insist on such an interview. He always complied, but seldom spoke as freely as he 

did at the informal gatherings. No matter how his social engagements might pile up, he always found time to attend 

any gathering of correspondents. He was invited to all . . . 

Upon a few occasions when the correspondents felt that their 

prerogatives were being ignored, such as instances usually 

arising with some new Representative who arrived at the 

Capitol quite puffed up over the importance of his office, 

the Speaker each time personally took up the battle for the 

press. He believed the press of paramount importance in the 

functioning of the House.27

This easy, comfortable behind-the-scenes relationship with the press allowed Longworth to 

shape news coverage to his liking in many instances, persuading some reporters, for example, 

that the House was the predominant Chamber 

over the Senate during much of his speakership.28

Following Longworth’s unexpected death, 

there followed three one-term Speakers. The first 

of those, John Nance Garner held views about 

the press similar to those of Longworth. ‘‘He 

granted few formal interviews to the press, although he admitted a small number of correspondents into his personal circle and sometimes used them for his political purposes. Reporters such as Cecil Dickson, Marquis James, 

and especially Bascom Timmons were as close to 

him as any politician.’’ 29

Garner, who was Speaker from December 1931 

through March 1933, held a regular, daily briefing for the press when the House was in session, 

possibly the first Speaker to do so. This tradition, 

of meeting with the press before the start of the 

day’s session to discuss the House’s schedule, 

continued for more than 60 years until Speaker 

Newt Gingrich dropped it in 1995.

30

A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP

Speaker Sam Rayburn was known to dislike 

dealing with the press. The Texas Democrat ‘‘actively avoided much of the media, especially television. He refused to appear on the popular television talk show of the day, ‘Meet the Press,’ and 

routinely avoided most print and broadcast reporters as well . . .’’ 31

During at least some of the time he was 

Speaker, however, Rayburn rented a room in the 

house of C.P. Trusell, a congressional reporter for 

the New York Times. Rayburn and Trusell were 

good friends, such good friends that the reporter 

eventually asked the Speaker to move out. 

Trusell reportedly was having trouble keeping 

his information straight, separating what he 

knew from his own work and what he had 

learned about the goings on in the House from 

his friendship with Rayburn, information that 

could not be reported.32

Rayburn distinguished between ‘‘the press,’’ a 

generic group he did not like, and certain congressional reporters, who he trusted and with 

whom he was friends. Two anecdotes illustrate 

how Rayburn saw this divide. One, recounted in 

a largely positive biography of the Speaker, 

shows him helping a reporter he knew. The other 

shows his disdain for television, a form of media 

with which he was uncomfortable. 

In the first story, the teenage daughter of a 

reporter who had been at several of Rayburn’s 

press conferences had died. Early the morning 

after her death, Rayburn went to the reporter’s 

house to offer his condolences. The book continues: 

‘‘I just came by to see what I could do to help,’’ he jRayburnk said. A bit flustered, the father replied, ‘‘I don’t think 

there’s anything you can do. We’re making all the arrangements.’’ 

174 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

33C. Dwight Dorough, Mr. Sam (New York: Random House, 1962), 

p. 287. 34Cheney, Kings of the Hill, pp. 177–178. 35 Ibid., p. 178. 

36 Joe S. Foote, ‘‘The Speaker and the Media,’’ in Ronald M. Peters, 

ed., The Speaker: Leadership in the U.S. House of Representatives (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1994), p. 137. 37 Ibid., p. 138. 38 Ibid. 

‘‘Well, have you had your coffee this morning?’’ Mr. Sam 

asked. 

‘‘No, we haven’t had time.’’ 

‘‘Well,’’ he replied promptly, ‘‘I can at least make the coffee this morning.’’ 

And while Mr. Sam was puttering about in the kitchen, 

the reporter said, ‘‘Mr. Speaker, I thought you were supposed 

to be having breakfast at the White House this morning.’’ 

‘‘Well, I was, but I called the President and told him I 

had a friend who was in trouble, and I couldn’t come.’’ 33

In the second tale, Rayburn explained to Lawrence Spivak, a well-known journalist, why he 

would not appear on the NBC program, ‘‘Meet 

the Press.’’ ‘‘I never go on programs such as yours 

because some twenty or more years ago I did go 

on a panel program on the radio and all the folks 

on the panel got in such an argument that I had 

enough.’’ The writer continues, ‘‘Never having 

had a very high opinion of publicity, he wasn’t 

going to change his mind about it now. One of 

the greatest compliments he could pay a colleague was to say, ‘He doesn’t run around getting 

his name in the newspapers all the time.’ ’’ 34

Rayburn was direct with the reporters he did 

decide to talk to. ‘‘He handled the press in the 

same straightforward way he had since they first 

started paying him attention. The reporters who 

came to his office got five minutes for their questions. His answers were short, to the point and 

off the record. ‘You’ll have to go somewhere else 

to get your quotes,’ he told them.’’ 35

It was clear that Rayburn saw the value in letting certain, selected reporters into his confidence. They were invited to the ultimate insider’s meetings, the sessions with the ‘‘Board of 

Education,’’ as it was known, the late-night 

meetings and drinking sessions of some of the 

most powerful men in Washington, led by Rayburn in his Capitol hideaway. ‘‘In Rayburn’s 

mind, these trusted reporters were different from 

the rest of the national press; they understood 

and appreciated the work of the House of Representatives. They also understood the importance of longstanding personal relationships as 

Rayburn did, and would not sacrifice those relationships for a single story. It was a true symbiotic relationship.’’ 36

Rayburn’s contact with this group of media 

was not necessarily designed to reach out to the 

country, or to try and build any kind of grassroots coalitions. Rather, he used the reporters, 

many of whom worked for the country’s top news 

organizations, to communicate with his fellow 

Members. ‘‘Speaker Rayburn perceived relationships with reporters as an advantage internally 

within the House rather than a conduit to a national constituency. He was far more concerned 

with what his colleagues read than with what the 

general public read.’’ 37

Rayburn also continued the daily press briefings begun under earlier Speakers. For 5 minutes 

before the start of the House he would meet with 

reporters. The questions and the tone of those 

briefings made it clear he was aiming the information at his fellow House Members primarily. 

‘‘It was purely an insider’s game. Questions focused on arcane procedure or mundane scheduling of business. . . . Observers not initiated to 

the process would have a difficult time understanding what was going on. House jargon and 

parliamentary shorthand punctuated answers.’’ 38

It was clear that the trust he gave to the reporters was repaid. In a lengthy profile of Rayburn for the New York Times, reporter William 

S. White tells the story of having been in the 

room when Rayburn was notified of the death 

of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and he makes 

it clear that he would not divulge the specifics 

of what Rayburn said: 

His heavy and very nearly immobile face was still in the 

shadows and the only movements upon it were the small and 

barely visible traces of the tears. He swept them away roughly. For a long time, no one said anything at all. Then Mr. 

Rayburn hunched his shoulders and, looking out unseeingly 

into the dusk, he spoke slowly in short, hard, phrases as 

though talking to himself. There, before friends, in words 

that are yet under the seal of that room (in which this correspondent was among those present), Mr. Rayburn took an 

oath for the future. Its substance was that Sam Rayburn— 

Southern Democrat and all—had followed Franklin Roosevelt 

The Speaker and the Press 175 

39William S. White, ‘‘Sam Rayburn—The Untalkative Speaker,’’ 

New York Times, Feb. 27, 1949, p. SM10. 40 Foote, ‘‘The Speaker and the Media,’’ in The Speaker: Leadership 

in the U.S. House of Representatives, p. 140. 41Ibid, p. 141. 

42 John W. Finney, ‘‘McCormack, 77, Faces Increasing But Disorganized Criticism,’’ New York Times, Dec. 22, 1968, p. 32. 43Timothy E. Cook, Making Laws and Making News: Media Strategies 

in the U.S. House of Representatives (Washington: Brookings Institution, 

1989), pp. 192–193. 44Robert L. Peabody, Leadership in Congress: Stability, Succession and 

Change (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1976), p. 77. 

in life, and that Sam Rayburn would follow Franklin Roosevelt in death.39

Rayburn’s dislike of television extended into 

committee rooms. In 1952, Rayburn decided to 

ban radio and television broadcasts of House 

committee hearings, reasoning it was an extension of the ban on televising House action. In 

1957, the chair of the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities, Francis E. Walter (D–PA), 

implicitly challenged the ban by holding a televised field hearing in San Francisco. He was admonished by Rayburn sufficiently so that no 

other chair challenged the camera ban.40

CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

While Rayburn was a master at using the 

press to play his inside game, the nature of the 

press and the relationship between the press and 

the politicians they covered began to change in 

such a way that Rayburn’s successors, John 

McCormack (D–MA) and Carl Albert (D–OK), 

were not able to use the same relationship-based 

technique for their media plan. 

The Vietnam war and Watergate influenced 

the way reporters viewed both their jobs and 

Members of Congress. The two events combined 

to change the relationship between the reporters 

and their subjects into a much more 

confrontational posture. Added to that, the 

growth of television and broadcast as the way 

Americans were getting their news left Speakers 

such as McCormack struggling to cope with new 

demands from rank-and-file Democrats to be 

more of a national figure and party spokesman. 

That meant more air time, making television and 

radio speeches—a role McCormack was uncomfortable trying to fill. ‘‘Both the presidency and 

the television networks grew in stature and visibility during the 1960s while Congress stood silently in the background.’’ 41

Elected to the speakership upon the death of 

Rayburn, McCormack served in the Office from 

1962 until 1971. As early as 1967, however, there 

were rumblings among some House Democrats 

that Members wanted a more dynamic spokesman. ‘‘The question now being asked by his 

Democratic critics is whether Mr. McCormack, 

with his gaunt, pale visage and his tendency to 

talk in patriotic platitudes, has either the intellectual drive or the proper public image to serve 

as a spokesman for the Democratic party over the 

next two years,’’ wrote John W. Finney for the 

New York Times. He quoted an anonymous young 

Democratic House Member as saying ‘‘The trouble with John McCormack is that he is completely out of touch with modern American politics.’’ 42

According to one study, McCormack was mentioned on the nightly news broadcasts of the 

three major networks 17 times in 1969. Five other 

Members of the House, including Minority Leader Gerald Ford were mentioned more frequently. 

In 1970, McCormack jumped to the front of the 

pack, being mentioned 46 times, but by 1971, 

he did not make the list of the top 15 House 

Members to be talked about on the evening 

news.43 However, it was during McCormack’s 

speakership that the House authorized its committees to make their own decisions about 

whether to allow broadcast coverage of their 

hearings or meetings, thus overturning the ban 

that Rayburn put in place in 1952. 

Carl Albert, Speaker from 1971 until 1977, also 

found it difficult to adapt to the new, changing 

media environment. When he was elected majority leader under McCormack in 1962, he noted 

that he had done so with very little media coverage. ‘‘I never once got on television. The sum 

total of my national publicity was a jpressk release when I got into the race and a jpressk release when I got up to Washington saying I 

thought I had enough votes to win. I refused to 

go on television, although I was invited to go 

on most of the news and panel shows.’’ 44 Albert 

continued his low-profile style throughout his 

time in the leadership. ‘‘As Majority Leader, Albert has attracted little national attention. He 

has made relatively few televised appearances and 

176 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

45 ‘‘Carl Albert of Oklahoma: Next House Speaker,’’ Congressional 

Quarterly Weekly Report, vol. 28, Dec. 25, 1970, p. 3074. 46 Foote, ‘‘The Speaker and the Media,’’ in The Speaker: Leadership 

in the U.S. House of Representatives, p. 144. 47Alan Ehrenhalt, ‘‘Media, Power Shifts Dominate O’Neill’s 

House,’’ Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, vol. XXX, Sept. 13, 1986, 

p. 2131. 48 Mary Russell, ‘‘Speaker Scooping Up Power in the House,’’ Washington Post, Aug. 7, 1977, p. 1. 

49Tip O’Neill with William Novak, Man of the House: The Life and 

Political Memoirs of Speaker Tip O’Neill (New York: Random House, 

1987), p. 227 50 Ibid., p. 285. 51Ibid, p. 288. 52Barbara Sinclair, ‘‘Tip O’Neill and Contemporary House Leadership,’’ in Masters of the House, p. 309. 

has introduced little legislation on his own,’’ a 

feature story on Albert said.45

However, he did take some steps into the 

media age. Albert was the first Speaker to hire 

a press secretary. During Watergate, Albert took 

into account the massive needs of the press, 

going so far as to begin planning for possible 

broadcast of House impeachment proceedings 

against President Richard Nixon: 

While uneasy about the carnival atmosphere that was developing around the Judiciary Committee hearings, Speaker 

Albert tried hard to accommodate the television networks 

and the rest of the media. When the Judiciary Committee 

had completed its work, Speaker Albert authorized his staff 

to make plans for the televising of impeachment proceedings 

in the House. This was a key decision, because it represented 

a turnaround from Rayburn’s strict ban on television in the 

House, which had been in effect since the day Albert came 

to Congress in 1947. Speaker Albert’s willingness to open the 

House to television during this crucial moment in history 

paved the way for permanent access to the House five years 

later. 46

A MEDIA CELEBRITY

Albert’s successor, Thomas P. ‘‘Tip’’ O’Neill 

(D–MA) won rave reviews both inside and outside the House for his handling of the media. 

One reporter called him ‘‘the first media celebrity in the history of the Speakership.’’ 47 Another attributed much of O’Neill’s success to his 

management of the media: 

O’Neill has built his mystique through the press. Albert 

feared the press. O’Neill plays with it like a cat with a 

mouse. He has killed the tough, post-Watergate press with 

candor and charm. Ask O’Neill about an alleged gambling 

ring in a House office building and whether he has quashed 

a Justice Department investigation into it. O’Neill says no, 

he knew nothing about it. Then he regales the press with 

stories and mottos about gambling. He tells the story of 

going to the Pimlico racetrack as a young congressman and 

meeting J. Edgar Hoover there. Hoover offers him a lift. He 

accepts. When they get back to town, Hoover discovers he 

has taken the wrong car from the parking lot. There are no 

more questions about the gambling ring.48

O’Neill responded to the changing demands 

of the media by adopting new patterns: 

When I became majority leader in Washington, I was 

interviewed constantly. I was always happy to talk to the 

press, but I drew the line at the Sunday morning talk shows 

on television. After a full work week, consisting of long days 

and frequent late evenings, I insisted on keeping my weekends free for my family and friends. In 1977, when I became 

Speaker, I started meeting with TV reporters each morning 

when I arrived at work. Later in the morning, I would hold 

a news conference before the House opened. I always told 

the truth, and almost never answered with ‘‘no comment.’’ 

Ninety-nine percent of the time, if you’re straight with the 

press, they’ll be straight with you.49

O’Neill realized, too, that he could use the 

daily Speaker’s press conference to get the party’s 

message out to the public, as well as fellow 

Members of Congress.50

Despite concerns from his fellow Members, 

O’Neill agreed to allow C–SPAN broadcasts of 

House floor action, beginning in 1979, a decision 

he would later say was one of the best he made 

as Speaker.51

As skillful as O’Neill was with the press, it 

was the 1980 election of Republican President 

Ronald Reagan and a Republican Senate that 

really thrust the Speaker on to the national stage. 

‘‘In the aftermath of the Republican takeover of 

the Senate in the 1980 elections, the press anointed Speaker O’Neill—now clearly the highestranked Democrat in Washington—as chief 

Democratic spokesman and thus enhanced his 

media access,’’ wrote one congressional scholar.52

Democrats took a page from Reagan’s playbook to urge O’Neill to challenge Reagan’s policies—frequently and publicly. 

In the early 1980s Ronald Reagan taught House Democrats 

a lesson about the uses of the media that altered their expectations of their own leaders. Reagan’s media skills and the 

favorable political climate allowed him to dominate public 

debate and thereby dictate the policy agenda and propagate 

a highly negative image of the Democratic party. Unable as 

individuals to counter this threat to their policy and reelection goals, Democrats expected their leaders to take on the 

task, to participate effectively in national political discourse 

and thereby promote the membership’s policy agenda and 

protect and enhance the party’s image. Unlike rank-and-file 

The Speaker and the Press 177 

53 Ibid, p. 290. 54 Ibid. 

55 Ehrenhalt, ‘‘Media, Power Shifts Dominate O’Neill’s House,’’ p. 

2131. 

56 Sinclair, ‘‘Tip O’Neill and Contemporary House Leadership,’’ in 

Masters of the House, p. 309. 

57 Ehrenhalt, ‘‘Media, Power Shifts Dominate O’Neill’s House,’’ p. 

2131. 

58 Foote, ‘‘The Speaker and the Media,’’ in The Speaker: Leadership 

in the U.S. House of Representatives, p. 150. 59 Ibid, p. 151. 60 Douglas B. Harris, ‘‘The Rise of the Public Speakership,’’ Political 

Science Quarterly, vol. 113, Summer 1998, pp. 201–202. 

House members, the party leadership did have considerable 

access to the national media.53

It was a part of a growing realization that the 

climate of Congress itself had changed. No 

longer was it enough to make the case for legislation within the Capitol, the public needed to be 

involved as well. ‘‘A decade ago, nearly all influential House members would have said that legislative arguments are won on the floor, by the 

tireless personal cultivation of colleagues. Nowadays, many of them say that sort of work is only 

part of the story. Increasingly, they believe, floor 

fights are won by orchestrating a campaign 

aimed over the heads of the members, at the 

country at large. . . . ‘Sometimes to pass a bill,’ 

jHouse Majority Leaderk Foley says, ‘you have 

to change the attitude of the country.’ ’’ 54

Speaker O’Neill used his Office as a ‘‘bully 

pulpit’’ to challenge the Reagan White House, 

particularly during his daily press briefings: 

An O’Neill press conference these days is a media event, 

not only because dozens of print and broadcast reporters 

crowd his office to hear him, but because much of what he 

says is designed for their benefit. O’Neill often begins with 

a prepared statement challenging one or another aspect of 

Reagan administration policy, drafted for him by press secretary Christopher J. Matthews, a glib wordsmith and specialist in one-liners. Often, O’Neill’s comments are repeated 

on the evening news that night; even more often they are 

printed in the New York Times or the Washington Post the 

next day.55

Republicans saw this as an opportunity to use 

O’Neill as a target for their anti-Democrat campaign—a strategy that did not succeed: 

As part of their 1982 election campaign, Republicans tried 

to make the Speaker, a heavy, rumpled man with a cartoonist’s dream of an old pol face, into a symbol of big, outof-control government; generic ads with an O’Neill look-alike 

were run nationwide. As a result, O’Neill became much better known to the public at large than any Speaker before him. 

(Presumably much to the Republicans’ surprise, by the mid1980s O’Neill not only became a nationally known figure but 

a highly popular one.) 56

At the end of his speakership, Tip O’Neill was 

a nationally known figure. ‘‘Sam Rayburn could 

have walked down the streets of Spokane, Wash., 

without anybody noticing him,’’ Majority Whip 

Thomas S. Foley of Washington jsaid in 1986k, 

‘‘Tip O’Neill couldn’t do that. And it’s very unlikely that any future Speaker will be anonymous 

to the country.’’ 57

O’Neill remained a popular public figure after 

leaving office in 1986. ‘‘That Speaker O’Neill’s 

autobiography was a best seller and that he received contracts for a variety of high profile commercial endorsements after leaving office showed 

just how high a Speaker’s visibility could climb 

in the television age,’’ wrote one scholar.58

DEMOCRATS AFTER O’NEILL

Speaker Jim Wright (D–TX) continued in the 

steps of his predecessor, reaching out to the press 

and maintaining high visibility as an outspoken 

opponent of many Reagan administration policies, particularly those in Central America. His 

relationship with the media had peaks and valleys and some of his encounters with the press 

became verbal battles. ‘‘Speaker Wright courted 

the media aggressively and was more available for 

television appearances than any of his predecessors. . . . Yet, he also had a more contentious 

relationship with journalists than previous Speakers, once calling them ‘enemies of government.’ ’’ 59

Wright and the Democratic leadership of the 

House decided to use the daily press conference 

even more than O’Neill had to push their priorities. The leadership would meet prior to the 

press conference and create a message for the day. 

‘‘Upon completion of the press conference, the 

other party leaders would remain to talk to reporters in an effort to reinforce Wright’s points. 

Wright also extended contacts to broadcast reporters immediately following the daily print 

meeting.’’ 60

When Wright resigned as Speaker in May 

1989, his successor, Thomas S. Foley, had a much 

warmer relationship with the press. Foley cultivated reporters by, among other things, having 

regular early morning breakfasts with the CapVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00187 Fmt 8165 Sfmt 8165 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.011 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
178 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

61Jeffrey R. Biggs and Thomas S. Foley, Honor in the House (Pullman, WA: Washington State University Press, 1999), p. 114. 62Biggs, Honor in the House, p. 131, italics in original. 63 Quoted in Ibid., p. 180. 64 Ibid., pp. 180–181. 

65 Ibid., p. 128. 66Ronald D. Elving, ‘‘CQ Roundtable: The Media Whirlwind of 

Speaker Gingrich,’’ CQ Weekly, vol. 51, Dec. 9, 1995, p. 3774. Online 

version. 67 Sinclair, ‘‘Tip O’Neill and Contemporary House Leadership,’’ in 

Masters of the House, p. 315. 

itol’s bureau chiefs and major newspaper columnists.61 He also decided to release an unedited 

transcript of the daily press conferences, which 

made it easier for reporters to check their quotes 

and for those reporters who had missed the session to know what had happened. Foley’s relationship with the press is evidenced by the following anecdote: 

Symbolic of Foley’s relationship with the congressional 

press was the press conference day when members of the press 

presented him with a T-shirt that many of them had shown 

up wearing. A cartoon from the Baltimore Sun portrayed the 

Speaker as a bonneted and exasperated nanny surrounded by 

a pack of childlike adults dressed in knickers and in the middle of a food fight. The text quoted Foley from his June 10, 

1993 press conference when he was asked whether there was 

a lack of leadership being marshaled on behalf of the president’s agenda. Foley’s response: Everybody is exercising sufficient 

leadership. It is the followership we are having trouble with.

62

Foley recognized the limits of what he could 

do in his daily meeting with the press. ‘‘While 

the traditional daily Speaker’s press conference 

served to influence the perceptions of opinion 

leaders in Congress and the congressional media, 

it proved to be a very limited vehicle for reaching 

the American people,’’ he wrote in his book.63

Foley wrote that he wondered if he should 

have opened up the daily briefings, known to reporters as pad and pen briefings, to broadcast 

media. ‘‘If I had it to do over again, I would 

have experimented occasionally with radio and 

television coverage. The electronic media were 

represented at the press conferences, but without 

tape recorders or cameras. It was, perhaps, an 

anachronism for a Speaker to be carrying on his 

principal communication with the press through 

the print media at the same time that the entire 

House proceedings were being carried live on 

cable television’s C–SPAN.’’ 64 Foley acknowledged that the audience he wanted to reach required a broader outlet: 

When you went on a television program you were trying 

to reach the public, the press beyond the program itself, and 

your own congressional colleagues. It depends on the issue, 

but part of the way you influence your colleagues is by having some impact on public opinion and creating a mood or 

attitude toward legislation, or explaining what might otherwise be difficult for the public to understand. You don’t do 

that all alone, but it’s part of the task of being Speaker to 

try to explain the Congress to justify what might be unpopular legislation, to defend the institution during periods when 

it comes under fire or attack. I think members appreciate 

that.65

A TELEVISION-AGE SPEAKER

No other Speaker to date has had the media 

exposure of Newt Gingrich (R–GA), nor experienced the highs and lows of such coverage in 

such a short period of time (he was Speaker from 

1995 to 1999). In part, Gingrich’s appeal to the 

media was based on his long-standing reliance on 

reporters to convey his message to the public. 

Elected to the House at the same time that cameras for C–SPAN began covering House floor action, Gingrich became well known to C–SPAN 

watchers for delivering impassioned 1-hour 

speeches after the daily business of the House sessions was completed. It was C–SPAN that elevated his national visibility, especially after one 

contentious episode. 

As one reporter noted, Gingrich spoke daily 

to: 

jAk sea of empty seats and a nationwide C–SPAN audience largely unaware that the chamber was deserted. This 

practice so nettled Speaker Thomas P. ‘‘Tip’’ O’Neill of Massachusetts that he ordered the camera operators to pull back 

and expose the charade. The fracas that followed led O’Neill 

to lose his temper and speak of Gingrich’s behavior as ‘‘the 

lowest thing I’ve ever seen.’’ O’Neill’s remark had to be 

stricken from the record as an offense to House rules, the 

first time since 1797 a Speaker had been rebuked for language.66

In brief, Gingrich’s use of the media likely 

contributed to his ‘‘climb up the leadership ladder,’’ and eventual election as Speaker.67

Gingrich became Speaker when media coverage of Congress was increasing both in kind 

and in frequency, from the number of print 

media outlets to Internet publications to radio 

talk shows. As Gingrich stated: ‘‘But by January 

of 1995, when the new Contract with America 

class was being sworn in, the amount of congressional media coverage had expanded immensely. 

The Speaker and the Press 179 

68 Gingrich, Lessons Learned the Hard Way: A Personal Report, p. 5. 69 Ibid., pp. 36–37. 70 Jeanne Cummings, ‘‘When Gingrich Holds Court, Washington 

Listens,’’ Austin American-Statesman, Apr. 2, 1995, p. J1. 

71 Donna Cassata, ‘‘Gingrich to End News Briefings,’’ CQ Weekly, 

vol. 51, May 6, 1995, p. 1224. Online version. 72 Gingrich, Lessons Learned the Hard Way: A Personal Report, p. 42. 

In addition to C–SPAN, there was now CNN, 

a twenty-four-hours a day news channel, a daily 

Congressional Quarterly bulletin, and two ‘local’ 

newspapers, Roll Call and The Hill. In short, we 

now had a giant screen and loudspeaker to catch 

all our missteps and misstatements.’’ 68

As Speaker, Gingrich decided to permit television and radio coverage of his daily press briefings. Gingrich explains the decision like this: 

Because we had been so successful at getting our message 

out before the election, my press secretary Tony Blankley and 

I still hoped that we might still get at least part of the press 

on our side. So we decided to hold daily televised press briefings. The daily press briefing was an institution that Democratic Speakers had used for years, but their briefings had 

been restricted to reporters without cameras. We on the other 

hand had decided to show how bold and up-to-the-minute 

media-wise we were. . . . CNN indicated how important it 

considered these briefings by carrying them live. That alone 

should have been the tip-off to us that we were playing with 

fire. But we plunged on. It will thus surprise no one to learn 

that our press briefings turned out to be an ongoing headache. They got to be little more than a game of ‘‘pin the 

tail on the Speaker.’’ 69

A congressional reporter who covered Gingrich 

on a daily basis explained the significance of allowing media coverage of the Speaker’s briefings. 

In the pre-camera era, speakers comfortably gave one-word 

answers and reporters barked out short, cryptic questions. In 

the camera era, answers go on for pages and the questions 

are elaborate, even pretentious. . . . In the pre-camera era, the 

reporters who gathered around the speaker’s desk in his private office were mostly anonymous worker-bees. In the camera era, network White House correspondents swallow their 

pride and settle their expensive suits into one of the coveted 

eight seats at Gingrich’s table . . . . In the pre-camera era, 

reporters could run through a dozen or so questions. Jokes 

were welcome. Humor is a rarity in the camera era—after 

all, editors have television sets, too. . . . With a regular crowd 

of about 30 newspaper and magazine reporters and TV producers, Gingrich starts the 20-minute briefing with an opening monologue.70

After a particularly intense exchange between 

Gingrich and a reporter for Pacifica Radio, the 

Speaker decided to pull the plug on the daily 

press briefings. They had lasted just a few 

months of 1995. ‘‘Tony Blankley, a spokesman for 

Gingrich, said May 2, that the decision was due 

to ‘excessively flamboyant questions’ from reporters. The staff was also concerned that as they 

made the Speaker available to meet the daily and 

varying demands of reporters, Gingrich was in 

the limelight far too often. In all, Gingrich had 

30 briefings between Jan. 4 and March 29 before 

stopping the sessions.’’ 71 During the remainder 

of his speakership, Gingrich met irregularly with 

reporters. His successor, J. Dennis Hastert (R– 

IL) conducts infrequent ‘‘pad and pen’’ briefings 

with journalists. 

The media were also at the heart of what 

Gingrich called the ‘‘single most avoidable mistake I made during my first three years as Speaker.’’ He calls it the saga of Air Force One.72

Israeli Prime Minister Rabin had been assassinated in November 1995. President Bill Clinton 

flew to Israel for the funeral and asked several 

Members to join him on Air Force One, including Speaker Gingrich and Senate Majority Leader 

Bob Dole (R–KS). At the time, President Clinton and congressional Republicans were having 

trouble agreeing on how to address the budget 

for that year, problems that eventually led several 

Federal agencies to close down later that year because they had not received an appropriation. 

The Republicans had hoped that on the plane 

ride back from Rabin’s funeral they might have 

an opportunity to sit down and discuss the budget situation with the President. But Gingrich 

and Dole were seated at the back of the plane, 

and they did not have the opportunity to speak 

with Clinton about this. In addition, Gingrich 

and Dole were asked to deplane from the rear, 

again nowhere near Clinton. 

Several days later, Gingrich went to a morning 

breakfast to talk with reporters. There, he says 

he told reporters that the plane incident showed 

how hard it was to do business with the Clinton 

administration. 

‘‘If he is genuinely interested in reaching an agreement 

with us,’’ I said, ‘‘why didn’t he discuss one with us when 

we were only a few feet away on an airplane?’’ Then, I continued, digging my grave a little deeper, ‘‘if he wanted to indicate his seriousness about working with us, why did he leave 

the plane by himself and make us go out the back way?’’ 

I said it was both selfish and self-destructive for the President 

to hog the media by walking down those steps from the plane 

alone instead of showing a little bipartisanship precisely when 

he claimed he wanted to reach an agreement with us . . . By 

180 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

73 Ibid., pp. 44–45. 74Tony Blankley, Washington Times editorial page editor, telephone 

conversation with author, Aug. 20, 2003. 

now my press secretary Tony Blankley was positively white 

with horror . . . The story exploded almost immediately. Of 

all the papers, and there were quite a few who put the story 

on the front page, the worst was the New York Daily News, 

which ran a banner headline on page one that read simply, 

‘‘Crybaby.’’ 73

Blankley characterized the next few days after 

the story broke as the ‘‘single worst press moment’’ of Gingrich’s career. It ‘‘all but destroyed 

his speakership,’’ he said.74 The loss of GOP 

House seats in November 1996 and particularly 

in 1998 also contributed to the end of Gingrich’s 

career in the House. 

CONCLUSION

The relationship between the Speaker and the 

press, in sum, depends to a great extent on the 

individual style of the leader, the context of the 

times (whether he is the opposition party leader, 

for example) and the constantly changing media 

technology. It is unclear, for example, whether 

Speaker Longworth would be as successful with 

the press now, in the days of instant Internet 

news and live television coverage, as he was when 

personal relationships were the key to getting his 

message out. 

The individual style of the current Speaker, J. 

Dennis Hastert (R–IL), appears to be headed 

down a different path from his predecessor Gingrich. While Speaker Hastert does not show the 

blanket antipathy toward television that Sam 

Rayburn did, neither does he invite the limelight. 

181 

1Joseph Gurney Cannon, The Memoirs of Joseph Gurney ‘‘Uncle Joe’’ 

Cannon, transcribed by Helen Leseure Abdill (Danville, IL: Vermilion 

County Museum Society, 1996), p. 128. 

2Harold J. Laski, The American Presidency, An Interpretation (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1940), p. 13. 3 Paul F. Boller, Congressional Anecdotes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 227, italics in original. See also Joseph Martin, 

My Fifty Years in Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 180 and 

Neil MacNeil, Forge of Democracy: The House of Representatives (New 

York: David McKay, Co., 1961), p. 67. 4Thomas P. O’Neill, Foreword in Donald R. Kennon, The Speakers 

of the U.S. House of Representatives: A Bibliography, Üåçé–Üéçâ (Baltimore, 

MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. xxiii. 

Chapter 6 

The Speaker and the President: 

Conflict and Cooperation 

R. Eric Petersen 

Analyst in American National Government 

Congressional Research Service 

It is all very well for the President of the United States 

to suggest to Congress a forward-looking legislative program. 

That is one of the duties of the President. It is a horse of 

another color to get such a program accepted by even the 

President’s own party in either House or Senate . . . To accomplish this result it was necessary for the President and 

the Speaker to work in close harmony.1

Joseph G. Cannon, Speaker of the House, 1903–1911 

Under the Constitution, Congress and the executive branch are coequal. While the Constitution does not specify the relationship between the 

Speaker of the House and the President of the 

United States, it has been the practice in the past 

century that the Speaker regularly interacts with 

the President on a variety of legislative and political matters. In modern practice, political realities dictate that the Speaker and President regularly work together as policymaking partners. In 

that reality lies the potential for both tension and 

controversy. As political scientist Harold Laski 

wrote, ‘‘the President is at no point the master 

of the legislature. He can indicate a path of action to Congress. He can argue, bully, persuade, 

cajole; but he is always outside Congress, and 

subject to a will he cannot dominate.’’ 2 On the 

congressional side, the constitutionally grounded 

position of equality is exemplified by Speaker 

Sam Rayburn. In an ABC news interview near 

the end of his life, Speaker Rayburn asserted the 

constitutional position between Speaker and 

President in the five decades he served in the 

House. Angered at a reporter’s suggestion of subservience to the President, Rayburn replied, ‘‘I 

never served under any President. I served with 

eight.’’ 3

Much has been written about the Presidents 

who have served during the past century, but observers note that comparatively little has been 

written about the Speakers. Twenty years ago, 

then-Speaker Thomas P. O’Neill suggested that 

‘‘there is a great deal more we need to know 

about the history of the office and the lives of 

the men who have been Speaker.’’ 4 Observers 

182 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

5Those who have served in the past 100 years as Speaker of the 

House, and their years of service as Speaker, are: Joseph G. Cannon, 

1903–1911; James B. ‘‘Champ’’ Clark, 1911–1919; Frederick H. Gillett, 

1919–1925; Nicholas Longworth, 1925–1931; John Nance Garner, 1931– 

1933; Henry T. Rainey, 1933–1934; Joseph W. Byrns, 1935–1936; William B. Bankhead, 1936–1940; Sam Rayburn, 1940–1947, 1949–1953, 

and 1955–1961; Joseph W. Martin, Jr., 1947–1949, and 1953–1955; John 

W. McCormack, 1962–1970; Carl Albert, 1971–1977; Thomas P. 

O’Neill, Jr., 1977–1987; James C. Wright, Jr., 1987–1989; Thomas S. 

Foley, 1989–1995; Newt Gingrich, 1995–1999; and J. Dennis Hastert, 

1999– . 

6Those who have served in the past 100 years as President of the 

United States, and their years in office, are Theodore Roosevelt, 1901– 

1909; William Howard Taft, 1909–1913; Woodrow Wilson, 1913–1921; 

Warren G. Harding, 1921–1923; Calvin Coolidge, 1923–1929; Herbert 

C. Hoover, 1929–1933; Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1933–1945; Harry S Truman, 1945–1953; Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953–1961; John F. Kennedy, 

1961–1963; Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963–1969; Richard M. Nixon, 1969– 

1974; Gerald R. Ford, 1974–1977; Jimmy Carter, 1977–1981; Ronald 

W. Reagan, 1981–1989; George H.W. Bush, 1989–1993; William J. 

Clinton, 1993–2001; and George W. Bush, 2001– . 7The Presidential Succession Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 380) provides 

that if ‘‘there is neither a President nor Vice President to discharge 

the powers and duties of the office of the President, then the Speaker 

of the House of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker 

and as Representative in Congress, act as President.’’ To succeed to 

the Presidency, a Speaker would also need to qualify under the terms 

of Article II, Section 5 of the Constitution, which requires that the 

President be a ‘‘natural-born citizen,’’ at least 35 years of age, and 

a resident within the United States for 14 years. No Speaker has succeeded to the Presidency under these conditions. The 1947 law superseded the Succession Act of 1886 (24 Stat. 1), which placed in the 

line of Presidential succession after the Vice President the Cabinet 

officers in the chronological order in which their departments were 

created. 

8 Speaker Thomas Foley, ‘‘Joint Session of the House and Senate 

Held Pursuant to the Provisions of House Concurrent Resolution 83 

to Hear an Address by the President of the United States,’’ remarks 

in the House, Congressional Record, vol. 137, Mar. 6, 1991, p. 5140. 

note that an area of inquiry that is poorly understood is how the Speaker and the President interact as leaders of their respective branches. In the 

past century, 17 men have served as Speaker of 

the House of Representatives,5 while 18 others 

have been President of the United States.6 As national political leaders, the Speaker and President 

undertake a number of similar public functions. 

Each leader is in the public eye through speeches, 

appearances on radio and television, press conferences, and the print media. The President and 

the Speaker each publicize the achievements of 

their branches. They also assist their party members seeking election and reelection. When the 

majority party in the House is not the same as 

that of the President, the Speaker may act as a 

spokesman for the loyal opposition. Acts of Congress become law only when signed by the 

Speaker, presiding officer of the Senate, and the 

President. By statute, the Speaker is second in 

line, behind the Vice President, to succeed to the 

Presidency.7

While the activities of these two leaders may 

often be similar, relations between the Speaker 

and the President are complex and influenced by 

a number of factors. Their relationships are influenced by the Constitution, policy necessities, perceived prerogatives of the executive and legislative branches, world events, domestic politics, 

and their personalities and governing styles. At 

different times, these factors have the potential 

to create divergent personal, political, and institutional consequences. Understandably, the relationship between the two officials has been 

marked by periods of both conflict and cooperation. On occasion, the relationship between the 

Speaker and the President attracts widespread 

public notice due to an isolated incident that 

comes to the attention of the public. In spring 

1991, for example, President George H.W. Bush 

came to the Capitol to deliver an address to a 

joint session of Congress regarding the role of the 

U.S. military in operations leading to the liberation of Kuwait. Departing from the typical protocol of these occasions, Speaker Thomas Foley 

said: 

Mr. President, it is customary in joint sessions for the 

Chair to present the President to the Members of Congress 

directly and without further comment. But I wish to depart 

from tradition tonight and express to you, on behalf of the 

Congress and the country, and, through you, to the members 

of our Armed Forces our warmest congratulations on the brilliant victory of the Desert Storm Operation.8

Although Speakers may support Presidential 

actions, there also have been important instances 

of institutional, political, and even personal conflict between the two leaders over the past century. Seemingly isolated or trivial events may 

upset the relationship between the Speaker and 

the President in a much greater fashion than the 

incident appeared to warrant at the time. Noteworthy among such incidents are the following: 

• In fall 1995, Speaker Newt Gingrich and 

other Members of Congress were reportedly 

angry with President Bill Clinton over his treatment of congressional leaders during a diplomatic trip. Gingrich and Clinton had traveled together on Air Force One with a delegation of 

current and former U.S. officials to attend the 

funeral of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, 

who had been assassinated. Before the trip, congressional leaders were negotiating with PresiVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00192 Fmt 8165 Sfmt 8165 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.012 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
The Speaker and the President 183 

9 John E. Yang and Eric Pianin, ‘‘Interim Measures Advance in 

House; Spending, Debt Bills Include Provisions Strongly Opposed by 

Clinton,’’ Washington Post, Nov. 8, 1995, p. A4; Todd S. Purdue, ‘‘November 5–11: on Air Force One, Cabin Fever,’’ New York Times, Nov. 

12, 1995, p. 4; and Newt Gingrich, Lessons Learned the Hard Way: A 

Personal Report (New York: Harper Collins, 1998), pp. 42–46. 10Tip O’Neill with William Novak, Man of the House: The Life and 

Political Memoirs of Speaker Tip O’Neill (New York: Random House, 

1987), pp. 310–311. See also John Aloysius Farrell, Tip O’Neill and the 

Democratic Century (New York: Little, Brown, 2001), pp. 450–453. 

11 See William Rea Gwinn, Uncle Joe Cannon, Archfoe of the Insurgency: 

A History of the Rise and Fall of Cannonism (New York: Bookman Associates, 1957), pp. 79–80; and Irwin Hood Hoover, Forty-Two Years at 

the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1934), pp. 2992–2993. In 

his memoirs, Speaker Cannon remembered a Presidential dinner given 

to honor the diplomatic corps. Due to a scheduling conflict, the 

Speaker asked the President’s leave not to attend. Alluding to the 

importance placed on such matters by other Members of the House, 

and precedent established by Speaker Thomas Reed, who reportedly 

would not attend functions when other government officials might 

outrank him, Cannon suggested that he and Roosevelt discuss the 

matter and seek the assistance of the State Department’s protocol experts. The outcome of these discussions was the Speaker’s dinner. See 

Joseph Gurney Cannon, The Memoirs, pp. 123–124. While the dinners 

for the Speaker continued after Roosevelt left office, their efficacy was 

somewhat diminished. President William Howard Taft continued the 

tradition of honoring the Speaker with an annual dinner, and was 

accused of associating himself too closely with what some observers 

thought was Cannon’s autocratic style of overseeing the House. 12 ‘‘Wise Sayings that Made Joe Cannon the Sage of His Party,’’ 

Chicago Tribune, Nov. 13, 1926, p. 4. 

dent Clinton to set spending levels for the Federal Government, but the leaders held no talks 

regarding the budget during the flights between 

Washington, DC, and Tel Aviv. On arrival in 

Israel, the President exited Air Force One 

through the main door. The Speaker was reportedly angered that he and other officials, including Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole, and 

former Presidents George H.W. Bush and Jimmy 

Carter, were asked to disembark through the 

plane’s rear door.9

• The evening before President Jimmy 

Carter’s inauguration in 1977, a gala was held at 

the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing 

Arts. Speaker O’Neill and his wife were to be 

seated with the President-elect and Mrs. Carter. 

Speaker O’Neill requested an additional dozen 

tickets for friends and members of his family, 

and White House staff reportedly assured him 

that his guests would be seated near the stage 

in an area reserved for Members of Congress. In 

his autobiography, Speaker O’Neill described 

searching the audience for his relatives and 

friends. After the program, he was reunited with 

them and told that their seats were in the last 

row of the second balcony. On Inauguration Day, 

Speaker O’Neill, concerned about the tone the 

incident set between Congress and the White 

House, reportedly telephoned a senior Carter adviser to relate his displeasure. In a short time, 

the new President’s adviser appeared in the 

Speaker’s office to apologize in person and assure 

the Speaker that the seating arrangements were 

the result of a mistake. In his autobiography, 

Speaker O’Neill indicated that he had doubts 

about the sincerity of the apology, saying that 

as far as he could see, the aide appeared to regard 

‘‘a House Speaker as something you bought on 

sale at Radio Shack. I could see that this was 

just the beginning of my problems with these 

guys.’’ 10

• During President Theodore Roosevelt’s administration, dinners were held to honor the 

Cabinet, diplomatic corps and members of the 

Supreme Court. An invitation to these affairs was 

routinely extended to Speaker Joseph Cannon, 

who usually declined, often at the last minute, 

because he objected to seating arrangements that 

did not recognize his position in government. 

For the 1905 Supreme Court dinner, Cannon reportedly learned he was to be seated below the 

Associate Justices of the Supreme Court at the 

banquet table. On the basis of his position as 

Speaker, Cannon thought it more appropriate to 

be seated next in line to the Chief Justice of the 

United Sates and the Vice President, with the 

Associate Justices, who were among the honored 

guests, seated after him. In a letter to President 

Roosevelt, Speaker Cannon reportedly wrote that 

‘‘even if ‘a wooden Indian’ were Speaker of the 

House, he would deserve that courtesy.’’ Shortly 

thereafter, President Roosevelt instituted a dinner to honor the Speaker, and to invite no one 

in government who might be seated more prominently than the guest of honor.11

Despite periodic conflicts between the two 

leaders, the Speaker and President must work together if policy proposals are to be enacted into 

law. As Speaker Joseph Cannon stated, ‘‘a President without both houses of Congress back of 

him doesn’t amount to much more than a cat 

without claws . . .’’ 12 To better understand the 

relationship between a Speaker and President, 

this chapter describes how two Speakers, Joseph 

Gurney Cannon, and Sam Rayburn, and two 

Presidents, Theodore Roosevelt and Franklin 

184 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

13 Scott William Rager, The Fall of the House of Cannon: Uncle Joe 

and His Enemies, ÜéÖà–ÜéÜÖ (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1991), pp. 34–49. 14Cannon, The Memoirs, p. 127. 15 Ibid., p. 128. 16 Gwinn, Uncle Joe Cannon, p. 74. 17The legislative proposal considered at the Oyster Bay meeting 

was the Aldrich bill, after Senator Nelson Wilmarth Aldrich of Rhode 

Island. The proposal would have authorized the use of customs receipts 

and nongovernmental securities as the basis for the issuance of currency. 

Delano Roosevelt, interacted on the national 

stage. The two pairs of leaders were chosen for 

pragmatic and practical purposes. The election of 

Representative Cannon as Speaker marked the 

high point of the autocratic speakership. Representative Rayburn’s career in Congress spanned 

48 years, and the administrations of 8 Presidents, 

with Rayburn serving as Speaker during periods 

in which the House and speakership were vastly 

changed from Cannon’s time. 

A review of the Speaker-President relationship 

during two contrasting periods underscores the 

importance of political context, leadership, and 

working relationships between leaders in shaping 

policy outcomes. The first examines how President Theodore Roosevelt had to deal with Speaker Cannon’s ‘‘command and control’’ leadership 

of the House. As Speaker, Cannon dominated the 

Chamber and all its committees. He often 

worked to block Roosevelt’s initiatives, which 

contributed to the revolt against him by progressive Republicans and minority Democrats. By 

comparison, Speaker Rayburn led a committeecentered institution where southern committee 

chairs exercised large sway over the fate of Presidential proposals. Rayburn employed a pragmatic 

leadership style of bargaining, employing political and personal cajolery to win legislative victories for President Franklin Roosevelt. 

CONFLICT BETWEEN LEADERS: JOSEPH

CANNON AND THEODORE ROOSEVELT

By fall 1902, several weeks before the adjournment of the 57th Congress (1901–1903), members 

of President Theodore Roosevelt’s administration 

concluded that Representative Joseph Gurney 

Cannon of Illinois, then-chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, would be elected 

Speaker at the commencement of the 58th Congress (1903–1905). The two men knew each other 

from the periods when Roosevelt served at various times as Civil Service Commissioner, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and Vice President of 

the United States under William McKinley. 

During Roosevelt’s time with the Civil Service 

Commission, for example, the agency had its 

budget cut by the House Committee on Appropriations.13 For his part, Cannon said that his impressions of Roosevelt from these earlier contacts 

were not positive.14 This unfavorable opinion appears to have grown out of the two leaders’ divergent governing and political philosophies. 

Roosevelt believed that the government should 

be the great arbiter of the conflicting economic 

forces in the Nation, especially between capital 

and labor, guaranteeing justice to each and dispensing favors to none. By contrast, Speaker Cannon’s world view was developed by his early experiences as a self-made man, who had started 

adult life as a store clerk. Cannon described how 

his life’s experience had impressed him ‘‘with the 

value of conservatism, and warned me against advocating ‘change for change’s sake.’ The span of 

30 years in Congress, before I became Speaker, 

had borne in upon me the dangers that lay in 

catch phrases, and popular slogans, and the difficulty of transforming reforming ideals into legislation that could be got through the Congress 

of the United States in recognizable form, and 

that would work after it became law.’’ 15

In spite of such widely divergent views, it is 

noteworthy that both leaders made a generally 

successful effort to work together. With Cannon’s ascendance to the Speaker’s chair all but 

assured, members of Roosevelt’s Cabinet conveyed congratulations to the incoming Speaker. 

Included in the congratulations were assurances 

that the President and his Cabinet understood 

that, regarding Roosevelt’s policies, ‘‘nothing 

could be done unless there was a ‘very general 

consent in Congress.’ ’’ 16 President Roosevelt 

personally took steps to cultivate an improved relationship with Cannon. In August 1903, Roosevelt met with several Senate leaders in his summer home in Oyster Bay, NY, to discuss proposed currency and financial legislation.17 When 

the meetings were finished, the President wrote 

to Cannon to assure him that no financial plan 

The Speaker and the President 185 

18 Gwinn, Uncle Joe Cannon, pp. 74–77. 19No legislation was passed during the special session, because the 

Senate was unable to reach agreement on its own measure, and did 

not adopt the version passed by the House. 20 Under the rules of the House, formal written communications 

from the President of the United States to the Speaker of the House 

would be referred to the appropriate committee. 21Cannon, The Memoirs, p. 131. 

22 Letter from Theodore Roosevelt to Joseph Cannon, Jan. 13, 1905, 

in Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 8 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951), vol. 4, p. 1101. 23Cannon, The Memoirs, p. 129. 24 L. White Busbey, Uncle Joe Cannon: The Story of a Pioneer American, 

(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1927, republished 1970), pp. 

217–218. 

would be proposed without first taking into account the views of the House. After summarizing 

his discussions with the Senators, the President 

asked Cannon, ‘‘Now what are your views on the 

subject? We are all decided that of course we 

would not make up our minds in any way until 

we found out what your judgement was.’’ 18 Cannon reportedly responded that, with a Presidential election to be held in 1904, he saw little 

benefit from considering financial legislation. 

In November 1903, a month before the legislature was scheduled to convene, President Roosevelt called the 58th Congress into special session to consider Cuban reciprocity, but not financial issues.19 With the speakership vacant, however, House rules dictated that the first order of 

business was the election of Joseph Cannon as the 

new Speaker. On assuming the post, Cannon and 

Roosevelt worked to build an effective working 

relationship. Throughout their time as leaders, 

Roosevelt and Cannon met regularly to discuss 

measures that Congress was to consider. President Roosevelt wrote informally to the Speaker 

regarding matters before the House. The material 

in these missives could be used by the Speaker 

as he saw fit to persuade other Members regarding the President’s positions.20 In his autobiography, Speaker Cannon noted that, during the 

time he was Speaker and Roosevelt was the President, ‘‘Mr Roosevelt and I were on terms of full 

and free consultation. I went often to the White 

House in the evening, and the President came 

to my house at times to talk things over. When 

we differed, in principle or method, we were 

frank about it, and threshed the problem out to 

the end.’’ 21

For Roosevelt, Cannon was the spokesman for 

a majority of the House and a sounding board 

for the activist President. Roosevelt reportedly 

conferred with the Speaker regarding all of his 

serious legislative initiatives before making them 

public. Other notes reassured the Speaker that 

the President would work with him despite publication in newspapers of claims to the contrary. 

In one note to Cannon, who had returned to his 

Illinois district between sessions, Roosevelt implored the Speaker to visit the White House on 

his return to Washington, and dismissed press 

speculation regarding differences between the 

two: 

Stop in here as soon as you can. I care very little for what 

the newspapers get in the way of passing sensationalism; but 

I do not want the people of the country to get the idea that 

there will be any split or clash between you and me . . .22

While Roosevelt and Cannon were mostly able 

to look past public speculation regarding their 

political relationship and work together, the 

Speaker took care that the President was not 

given free rein by the House. Cannon recognized 

that when a forceful, activist chief executive was 

in office, the legislature could sometimes be led 

by the executive. The Speaker’s position was that 

while executive leadership was likely, the House 

must not be driven by a President, and that 

‘‘Roosevelt was apt to try to drive’’ it.23 Consequently Cannon’s task was to move the President’s programs forward in a House where some 

members had deep reservations regarding the 

President’s progressive inclinations. Personally, 

Speaker Cannon, too, viewed certain Roosevelt 

policies with dismay. Their disagreements, Cannon suggested, occurred because ‘‘Roosevelt had 

the ambition to do things; I had the more confined outlook of the legislator who had to consider ways of meeting expenditures of the new 

departures and expansions in government.’’ 24

A discussion regarding the President’s 1905 

annual message to Congress illustrates the different outlooks of the two leaders. In preparing 

the message, Roosevelt enquired of congressional 

leaders as to the possibility of revising the tariff. 

Based on those discussions, Roosevelt sent Cannon, who was at his home in Danville, IL, a draft 

of what he would say. The draft statement included a proposal that Congress create a minimum and maximum scale for setting tariffs that 

could be put into force at the discretion of the 

186 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

25 Ibid., pp. 207–209; and Gwinn, Uncle Joe Cannon, pp. 91–92. 26 See Theodore Roosevelt, ‘‘Fourth Annual Message to the Senate 

and House of Representatives,’’ Dec. 6, 1904, in James D. Richardson, 

comp., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 20 

vols. (New York: Bureau of National Literature, 1897–1911), vol. XIV, 

pp. 6894–6930. 27Cannon, The Memoirs, p. 130. 28 Gifford Pinchot, Breaking New Ground (New York: Harcourt 

Brace, 1947), pp. 203–212, 242–243; quote found on p. 243. 

29Rager, The Fall of the House of Cannon, pp. 47–48. 30Busbey, Uncle Joe Cannon, p. 231. 

Executive. Cannon viewed this proposal as a 

power grab by the White House. On returning 

to Washington, Cannon and Roosevelt discussed 

the matter further. In the course of these discussions, which Cannon described as ‘‘very frank,’’ 

the Speaker suggested that tariff legislation not 

be concluded during the lame duck session of the 

58th Congress.25 When the President’s message 

arrived on Capitol Hill, it included legislative 

proposals to expand the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission to fix railroad rates, 

a number of measures related to the District of 

Columbia, the creation of a forest service in the 

Department of Agriculture, and several other 

proposals. There was no mention of tariff revision.26 Tariff policies, would, however, remain an 

issue between the two leaders throughout Roosevelt’s tenure as President. 

The collaboration between the Speaker and the 

President produced success for the President’s 

legislative program, ‘‘. . . modified in practical 

ways by individuals and committees of the House 

and Senate . . .’’ 27 During the 58th and 59th Congresses (1903–1907), Congress enacted changes to 

the railroad rates, the creation of the Bureau of 

Corporations in the newly established Department of Commerce and Labor, meat inspection 

laws, and other measures. The success of Roosevelt’s legislative program was strongly determined by his ongoing consultation and cordial 

relations with Speaker Cannon. 

Of course, some difficulties did develop during 

this period, due to political differences between 

the two men. The establishment of a forest service within the Department of Agriculture and 

the creation of national forests in the southern 

Appalachians and the White Mountains of New 

Hampshire were initiatives that caused personal 

tension between a conservationist President and 

a Speaker who, while Appropriations Committee 

chairman, would consider ‘‘not one cent for scenery.’’ 28 Personal and institutional tensions between the leaders and branches were also exacerbated during frequent considerations of tariff policy throughout Roosevelt’s time as President. 

On balance, the working relation between the 

two leaders appears productive. The wear and 

tear of conflict and compromise, however, may 

have contributed to a serious rift between the 

two men regarding the Secret Service. By statute, 

the agency’s role was to detect the counterfeiting 

of currency. Since the assassination of President 

William McKinley in 1901, the Secret Service 

had also unofficially assumed responsibility for 

Presidential protection. For several years the 

agency had exceeded its statutory mandate by 

spending some of its appropriation, which was 

intended to fund anticounterfeiting laws, on 

Presidential security and investigations. 

In 1908, the House Committee on Appropriations amended the Sundry Civil Appropriation 

bill to institute restrictions on employment in 

the Secret Service as a way to curb its activities. 

The measure was subsequently passed by both 

Chambers and signed into law by Roosevelt. 

Later that year, the chief of the Secret Service requested that all limitations on the $125,000 appropriation provided to the agency be lifted to 

allow him and the Secretary of the Treasury to 

allocate funds as they saw fit. The House Committee on Appropriations declined to remove the 

limitation.29

President Roosevelt’s response to the committee’s action was to appeal directly to Speaker 

Cannon. In another personal message arguing 

that the provisions regarding the employment of 

Secret Service agents would ‘‘work very great 

damage to the government in its endeavor to prevent and punish crime,’’ 30 Roosevelt suggested 

that only criminals need fear the proposed 

changes. Before Speaker Cannon could solicit the 

thoughts of House Members, or respond to Roosevelt’s personal message, the President’s annual 

message arrived on Capitol Hill. In a departure 

from previous practice, Speaker Cannon reported 

that he had neither been consulted, nor seen a 

draft of the document before the message was officially presented. Cannon described himself ‘‘as 

much surprised as any one when it was found 

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The Speaker and the President 187 

31Ibid., pp. 231–232. 32Theodore Roosevelt, ‘‘Eighth Annual Message to the Senate and 

House of Representatives,’’ Dec. 8, 1908, in Messages and Papers of the 

Presidents, vol. XVI, pp. 7198–7240; quote found on pp. 7225–7226. 33Representative James Breck Perkins, ‘‘Question of Privilege,’’ remarks in the House, Congressional Record, vol. 43, Dec. 11, 1908, p. 

140. 

34Busbey, Uncle Joe Cannon, pp. 235–236. 35Representative James Breck Perkins, ‘‘The Secret Service—President’s Annual Message,’’ remarks in the House, Congressional Record, 

vol. 43, Dec. 17, 1908, p. 373. 36Busbey, Uncle Joe Cannon, p. 239. 

gress, and especially upon the House of Representatives,’’ due to the limitations on the activities of the Secret Service.31

The President’s message included a passage referring to the issue of the limitations imposed 

on the Secret Service. Regarding that matter, 

Roosevelt wrote, in part: 

Last year an amendment was incorporated in the measure 

providing for the Secret Service, which provided that there 

be no detail from the Secret Service and no transfer therefrom. 

It is not too much to say that this amendment has been of 

benefit only, and could be of benefit only, to the criminal 

classes . . . The chief argument in favor of the provision was 

that the Congressmen did not themselves wish to be investigated by Secret Service men. Very little of such investigation has been done in the past; but it is true that the work 

of the Secret Service agents was partially responsible for the 

indictment and conviction of a Senator and Congressman for 

land frauds in Oregon. I do not believe that it is in the public 

interest to protect criminally jsick in any branch of the public service, and exactly as we have again and again during 

the past seven years prosecuted and convicted such criminals 

who were in the executive branch of the Government, so in 

my belief we should be given ample means to prosecute them 

if found in the legislative branch. But if this is not considered 

desirable a special exception could be made in the law prohibiting the use of the Secret Service force in investigating 

Members of the Congress.32

The House responded to this message with 

what Speaker Cannon described as indignation. 

On December 9, 1908, Representative James 

Breck Perkins, a friend of Roosevelt’s and fellow 

Republican from New York, introduced H. Res. 

451 (60th Congress) to authorize the Speaker to 

appoint a special committee to consider what action the Chamber should take in response to 

Roosevelt’s message. In introducing the measure, 

Representative Perkins said ‘‘to the Congress is 

granted great power. And upon it are imposed 

great responsibilities. We can not neglect our 

duties nor shirk our responsibilities. The dignity 

of that body . . . should be properly maintained. 

The statements made by the President of the 

United States can not be lightly disregarded 

. . .’’ 33

Cannon supported the special committee to 

appease House Members who wished to immediately introduce a measure to censure the President. After a week of deliberation, the committee, on December 17, was prepared to report 

a measure to the House when it convened at 

noon. As Speaker Cannon was about to assume 

the chair and call the House to order, he received 

word from the President that he was to come to 

the White House for a consultation with the 

President. Upon being told that the Speaker was 

in the hall of the House, the President reportedly 

directed that the message be delivered to the 

Speaker personally, and that the consultation be 

held before the House considered the report of 

the special committee. Speaker Cannon indicated 

that: 

. . . when the Secretary to the Speaker brought the message 

to the Chair, Mr. Perkins was on his feet demanding recognition to present his report . . . I held the gavel in the air for 

a moment as my secretary delivered the President’s telephone 

message, which was probably the only one of its kind ever 

sent by the President to the Speaker of the House. I was 

indignant, but the business in hand saved me from making 

any comment. I simply brought down the gavel and recognized Mr. Perkins. Then I told my secretary to telephone the 

President’s secretary just what had occurred and to say that 

the Speaker would be pleased to call upon the President as 

soon as the report of the committee was disposed of.34

The special committee unanimously reported 

a resolution that the President be requested to 

provide any evidence upon which he based his 

claims, including: (1) that Members of Congress 

did not wish to be investigated by the Secret 

Service; (2) any evidence connecting any Member 

of the current Congress to criminal activity; and 

(3) whether the President had referred any Member to the courts for trial or reported any illicit 

behavior by Members to the House of Representatives.35

The resolution was adopted by the House on 

December 17, 1908, and forwarded to the President. On January 4, 1909, the President responded with a special message, the contents of 

which Cannon described as ‘‘more offensive than 

the one to which the House had taken exception.’’ 36 Roosevelt’s message included references 

to a newspaper article written by a reporter who 

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188 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

37 ‘‘Annual Message of the President—Secret Service,’’ Congressional 

Record, vol. 43, Jan. 8, 1909, pp. 645–684. See also Rager, ‘‘The Fall 

of the House of Cannon,’’ pp. 47–49. 

38Booth Mooney, Roosevelt and Rayburn: A Political Partnership 

(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1971), pp. 45–53. 39 ‘‘Basic Law Change Gains in Congress,’’ New York Times, Jan. 

8, 1937, p. 1. For a discussion of Speaker Bankhead’s interactions with 

FDR, see William J. Heacock, ‘‘William B. Bankhead and the New 

Deal,’’ Journal of Southern History, vol. 21, Aug. 1956, pp. 354–358. 40Alfred Steinberg, Sam Rayburn: A Biography (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1975), p. 140. 

sonal secretary. Again, the reaction of the House 

was to interpret the President’s response as an 

attack on a coequal branch of government. In addition, some Members considered the inclusion 

of work done by the Speaker’s secretary before 

he was employed by the government as a veiled 

broadside at the Speaker himself. In due course, 

the newspaper article was referred to the special 

committee established to respond to the first report. After three days of deliberation, the committee reported back, recommending that the 

House table the message from the President. 

After extensive debate, the House voted 212 to 

36 to accept the committee’s tabling proposal, 

and the President’s message received no further 

consideration by the House.37

Tabling an item in the House constitutes the 

immediate, final, and adverse disposition of a 

matter under consideration. At the time of the 

controversy between Roosevelt and the House, 

messages from the President and other executive 

branch communications were usually received by 

the House, and referred to the appropriate committee for consideration. As these communications were suggestive, and did not compel Congress to take specific action, the committee referral signified the effective end of congressional 

consideration. When the House went to the effort of introducing, debating, and voting on a 

motion to table the President’s message, it signaled its symbolic refusal to accept the message. 

This was and is a rare occurrence. Before Roosevelt’s Secret Service controversy, the House had 

not taken steps to refuse a Presidential message 

since the administration of President Andrew 

Jackson, more than 70 years earlier. A few weeks 

later, Roosevelt’s term ended. Cannon continued 

as Speaker in the 61st Congress, and proceeded 

to forge a relationship with the new President, 

William Howard Taft. 

COOPERATION BETWEEN LEADERS: SAM

RAYBURN AND FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

When Representative Sam Rayburn of Texas 

was elected Speaker on September 16, 1940, following the death of Speaker William B. 

Bankhead, Franklin Delano Roosevelt jFDRk 

was completing his second term as President. 

Like Theodore Roosevelt and Joseph Cannon, 

Rayburn and FDR had previous interactions, although Rayburn had come to view FDR more 

positively than Cannon saw Theodore Roosevelt. 

During FDR’s first term, Rayburn had been 

chairman of the Committee on Interstate and 

Foreign Commerce. Many of FDR’s New Deal 

proposals were referred to the Rayburn-led panel, 

including measures which became the Securities 

Act of 1933; Home Owners Loan Act; Banking 

Act of 1933; National Industrial Recovery Act; 

Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933; 

Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and Communications Act of 1934.

38 Further, Rayburn, who 

was majority leader during the 75th and 76th 

Congresses (1937–1940), regularly served as 

Speaker pro tempore because of Bankhead’s ill 

health, and worked with FDR on a number of 

legislative issues, including the President’s unsuccessful effort to change the number of justices 

on the Supreme Court. 

Despite general political agreement between 

the President and congressional leaders during 

FDR’s terms, Rayburn and Speaker Bankhead 

were often unaware of the President’s intentions 

regarding policy and legislative proposals. Legislative initiatives, such as FDR’s proposals to enlarge the Supreme Court, and the contents of the 

President’s 1937 annual message to Congress, 

were unknown to the House leaders until they 

were delivered to the Chamber.39 Often, Speaker 

Bankhead would be embarrassed when he made 

a statement to the media, only to find that the 

President had already issued a message contradicting the Speaker. In one instance when this 

occurred, Rayburn told Jimmy Roosevelt, the 

President’s son and liaison to Congress, to ‘‘tell 

your father if I’m ever Speaker this kind of thing 

won’t happen to me more than once.’’ 40 Rayburn 

reportedly believed that FDR would have more 

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The Speaker and the President 189 

41 D.B. Hardeman and Donald C. Bacon, Rayburn: A Biography 

(Austin, TX: Texas Monthly Press, 1987), p. 227. 42 John Nance Garner of Texas, had been Speaker of the House in 

the 72d Congress (1931–1933). 43Hardeman and Bacon, Rayburn, p. 227. 44 Ibid., p. 245. 45 Ibid., p. 101. 

46 Franklin D. Roosevelt, ‘‘The Annual Message to the Congress, 

Jan. 6, 1941,’’ in Samuel I. Rosenman, comp., The Public Papers and 

Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 13 vols. (New York: Macmillan Company, 1938–1950), vol. 3, pp. 663–678. 47 Steinberg, Sam Rayburn, pp. 166–167. 48 McCormack later served as Speaker during the 87th through 91st 

Congresses (1961–1970). 

nications were better between the White House 

and Capitol Hill. To address this problem, Rayburn set out to establish regular meetings between FDR and congressional leaders. He told 

Tommy Corcoran, a lobbyist with access to the 

White House that: 

the President ought to be having a meeting every week with 

his House and Senate Leaders so we could tell him what we’re 

planning, and he could tell us his plans. It could eliminate 

a lot of confusion. See what you could do—but don’t you 

dare let him know I suggested it ’cause he thinks he 

‘‘borned’’ every idea that ever was.41

At a subsequent White House meeting, FDR 

informed Rayburn that he had been thinking 

that ‘‘maybe it would be a good idea if I had 

a meeting with Bill . . .’’ (Speaker Bankhead), 

Rayburn, Vice President John Nance Garner,42

and Senator Alben Barkley of Kentucky, who was 

majority leader of the Senate. Roosevelt proposed 

that the leaders could meet about once a week 

to discuss and coordinate planning. Rayburn replied that the suggestion was one of the smartest 

ideas that he had ever heard.43

By the time Rayburn became Speaker, he and 

FDR had worked out their communications 

issues and were beginning to turn to legislative 

and policy matters. With war raging in Europe 

and Japan engaging in aggression in Asia, both 

leaders recognized that defense and preparedness 

issues would consume much of their time in the 

coming months. Rayburn believed strongly that 

the American system of government was best 

served by a strong, independent legislature. 

While the new Speaker liked and admired FDR, 

he was determined not to yield to the executive 

branch any constitutional prerogatives granted to 

the Congress.44 At the same time, Rayburn understood that, in times of national jeopardy, the 

country needed to be led by the President. 

‘‘When the nation is in danger,’’ Rayburn believed, ‘‘you have to follow your leader. The man 

in the White House is the only leader this nation 

has . . . Although we may disagree with him, we 

must follow our president in times of peril . . .’’ 45

Global events soon gave Rayburn the opportunity to act on his beliefs. On January 6, 1941, 

Speaker Rayburn’s 59th birthday, President Roosevelt addressed a joint session of Congress to deliver his Annual Message to the Congress. 

Around the world, the forces of Germany, Italy, 

and Japan had engaged in invasions and other 

aggression. In Europe, France had fallen in 1940, 

and as Roosevelt stood before Congress, the 

United Kingdom was enduring regular attacks 

by the Nazi air force. In the course of the speech, 

FDR warned of the possibility that the United 

States could find itself involved in the conflict.46

The President specifically requested authority 

from Congress to produce munitions and other 

war supplies that could be provided to countries 

that were at war with Germany, Italy and Japan, 

and whose defense was considered vital to the defense of the United States. This aid was to be 

directed primarily to the United Kingdom, but 

other countries would also be eligible for assistance. As these countries were unlikely to be able 

to pay for these materials, FDR also proposed 

funding their acquisition of ships, planes, tanks, 

and guns, through a program that would become 

popularly known as Lend-Lease.47

On January 10, 1941, the President sent to 

Congress the first of several measures designed 

to move the Nation forward in war preparation. 

At Rayburn’s behest, Representative John 

McCormack of Massachusetts, who served as majority leader,48 introduced the lend-lease measure, which was deliberately assigned the number 

H.R. 1776. The measure provided the President 

with the authority to transfer title to, exchange, 

lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of any defense 

article to any government whose defense the 

President deemed vital to the defense of the 

United States. The proposal called for $7 billion 

to fund the provision of war materials to nations 

that could not afford to pay. Under the proposal, 

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190 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

49 Mooney, Roosevelt and Rayburn, pp. 159–162. 50Hardeman and Bacon, Rayburn, pp. 257–258. 

51Transcripts of the consideration of H.R. 1776 in the House can 

be found in the Congressional Record, vol. 87, Feb. 3–7, 1941, pp. 484– 

519, 522–568, 573–678, 710–749, and 753–815. 52 55 Stat. 31. 53Alvin M. Josephy, On the Hill: A History of the American Congress 

(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), p. 334. 

cide which countries would receive military assistance. 

Opponents of lend-lease expressed concern that 

the measure, if passed, would invest too much 

power in the President. These concerns focused 

on what appeared to some to be a Presidential 

request for a ‘‘blank check’’ which could be used 

with little congressional oversight. Others saw 

the measure as an outright abandonment by Congress of its power to declare war, allowing it to 

be transferred to the President so he could draw 

the United States into the global conflict.49 For 

his part, Speaker Rayburn publicly supported 

granting the President wide latitude in carrying 

out the lend-lease program. ‘‘If we are to aid the 

democracies,’’ Rayburn said, ‘‘Congress must 

enact a law giving the power to somebody to administer the law. There could be no one man in 

this country as well qualified to administer it as 

the President.’’ Rayburn also discussed the possible consequence of failing to provide the President with the proposed authority, saying ‘‘either 

we give the President the flexible powers necessary to help Britain, or by our inaction, we 

strengthen Hitler’s power to conquer Britain and 

attack us.’’ 50

Privately, however, Rayburn communicated to 

the President the concerns of Members, and informed the President that the bill was dead without changes. At FDR’s urging, Rayburn led efforts in the House to craft a compromise that 

addressed the concerns of the House. Working 

with the President, Representative Sol Bloom, 

chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

and other committee members, Rayburn was able 

to negotiate amendments that preserved the basic 

outline of FDR’s proposal while addressing the 

concerns that the measure would represent too 

large a grant of power to the executive. These 

included a prohibition on American shipping 

convoys transporting war materials, a requirement that the President report three times a 

month to Congress regarding the program’s 

progress, and a 2-year limit on the program. In 

addition, the $7 billion the President requested 

would have to go through scrutiny of the regular 

appropriations process. 

On the floor, where debate began February 3, 

Speaker Rayburn, Majority Leader McCormack, 

and Chairman Bloom managed the progress of 

the lend-lease measure through 5 days of debate. 

Several Members who were opposed to the proposal offered amendments designed to scuttle the 

legislation. Many of these were declared nongermane by the chair. The House rejected 19 

amendments before passing H.R. 1776 by a vote 

of 260 to 165.

51 One month later, the Senate 

passed lend-lease with minor amendments. Rayburn convened the House soon thereafter, and, 

with little debate, the Chamber accepted the 

changes. An hour after the House gave final approval, the measure was signed into law by President Roosevelt.52

Throughout 1941, Congress worked with the 

President to develop the Nation’s capacity to defend itself and its allies. In one significant action, 

Congress approved an administration-backed 

measure to reauthorize the draft, and extend the 

time of enlistment for draftee soldiers under the 

Selective Service Act from 1 year to 30 months. 

Rayburn was opposed to the extension when it 

was first proposed. After meeting with the President, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and 

Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, 

the Speaker reluctantly conceded the necessity of 

the extension, and agreed to advance the measure 

in the House. The Speaker faced a House that 

was very reluctant to extend the mandatory period of military enlistment. In addition to the 

efforts of the whip organization run by Representative Pat Boland, Rayburn personally approached several Members for their support, telling them to ‘‘do this for me. I won’t forget it.’’ 53

One Member reportedly said that the Speaker 

was quite successful at the effort: ‘‘Mr. Sam is 

terribly convincing . . . There he stands his left 

hand on your right shoulder, holding your coat 

button, looking at you out of honest eyes that 

reflect the sincerest emotion.’’ Rayburn’s effort 

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The Speaker and the President 191 

54 Steinberg, Sam Rayburn, p. 170. 55 50 Stat. 1081. 56 Majority Leader McCormack. 

57Representative Sam Rayburn, ‘‘Amending the Neutrality Act,’’ 

remarks in the House, Congressional Record, vol. 87, Nov. 13, 1941, pp. 

8890–8891. 58 Ibid., pp. 8890–8891. 

proved the draft extension by 1 vote, 203 to 

202.

54

As 1941, and the 1st session of the 77th Congress drew to a close, Rayburn and FDR collaborated once again on a national defense measure. 

For several months, German submarines and surface ships had been attacking American merchant 

ships. The Roosevelt administration wanted to 

repeal sections of the Neutrality Resolution, 

passed by the 74th Congress in 1935,

55 to permit 

the arming of American merchant ships, and to 

authorize those ships to enter combat zones and 

the ports of belligerent nations. In response, the 

House passed a bill that authorized the arming 

of merchant ships, but did not permit their entry 

into belligerent ports. In the Senate, amendments 

were added that allowed the President to send 

the ships to any port in the world. The Senatepassed version of the bill also authorized the 

President to order merchant ships to defend 

themselves against attack. The Senate version was 

returned to the House for review. 

Following a day of debate on the Senate 

amendments, Rayburn’s vote count showed that 

the merchant ships bill would be defeated. Rayburn and Majority Leader McCormack met with 

FDR to work out a strategy to win House acceptance of the Senate amendments. The three leaders 

agreed that the Speaker would provide a written 

letter summarizing the concerns of House Members, and that the President would provide a 

written reply. 

When the House resumed the debate on the 

Senate amendments. Rayburn monitored the debate throughout the day. With 11 minutes of debate on the Senate amendments remaining, Rayburn descended from the chair to speak from the 

well of the House regarding his views and the 

position of President Roosevelt: 

A great deal has been said about the position of the President. Does the President want these amendments? Does he 

advocate them? . . . Last evening late the gentleman from 

Massachusetts 56 and I addressed the following letter to the 

President of the United States: 

A number of Members have asked us what effect the failure 

on the part of the House to take favorable action on the Senate amendments would have on our position in foreign countries, and especially in Germany. Some of these Members 

have stated that they hoped you would make a direct expression on this matter.57

Rayburn then read to the House the letter 

from FDR that he and Majority Leader McCormack had worked out with the President the previous evening. The President’s letter said in part: 

I had no thought of expressing to the House my views 

to the effect, in foreign countries, and especially in Germany, 

of favorable or unfavorable action on the Senate amendments. 

But in view of your letter, I am replying as simply and 

clearly as I know how . . . 

. . . In regard to the repeal of sections 2 and 3 of the Neutrality Act, I need only call your attention to three elements. 

The first concerns the continued sinking of American-flag 

ships in many parts of the ocean. The second relates to great 

operational advantages in making continuous voyages to any 

belligerent port in any part of the world; thus, in all probability increasing the total percentage of goods—foodstuffs 

and munitions—actually delivered to those nations fighting 

Hitlerism. The third is the decision by the Congress and the 

Executive that this Nation, for its own present and future 

defense, must strengthen the supply line to all of those who 

are keeping Hitlerism far from the Americas. 

With all of this in mind, the world is obviously watching 

the course of this legislation. 

In the British Empire, in China, and in Russia—all of 

whom are fighting a defensive war against invasion—the effect of the failure of the Congress to repeal sections 2 and 

3 of the Neutrality Act would definitely be discouraging. I 

am confident that it would not destroy their defense or morale, though it would weaken their position from the point 

of view of food and munitions. 

Failure to repeal these sections would, of course, cause rejoicing in the Axis nations. Failure would bolster aggressive 

steps and intentions in Germany, and in the other wellknown aggressor nations under the leadership of Hitler. 

Our own position in the struggle against aggression would 

definitely be weakened, not only in Europe and in Asia, but 

also among our sister republics in the Americas. Foreign nations, friends and enemies, would misinterpret our own mind 

and purpose . . . 58

Reading the President’s letter consumed approximately 10 minutes. In the remaining moments of debate, Rayburn endorsed the President’s approach, and added his own thoughts, 

saying: 

In the moment, let me say this: Let us not cast a vote 

today that will mean rejoicing in Germany, or Italy, or Japan. 

Let me say that with all my heart, this moment, that the 

failure to enact these amendments will have repercussions too 

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192 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

59 Ibid. 

60C.P. Russell, ‘‘Congress Decided,’’ New York Times, Dec. 8, 1941, 

p. 1. 

61 Sam Rayburn interview with Walter C. Hornaday, Jan. 7, 1944, 

in H.G. Delaney and Edward Hake Phillips, eds., Speak Mister Speaker 

(Bonham, TX: Sam Rayburn Foundation, 1978), p. 104. 

62Roosevelt, ‘‘The Annual Message to the Congress, Jan. 6, 1941,’’ 

in The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, pp. 32–42. 63 Steinberg, Sam Rayburn, pp. 210–211. 64 Ibid., pp. 211–213; quote, p. 212. See also Mooney, Roosevelt and 

Rayburn, pp. 177–182. 

tween the representatives of Japan and the representatives of 

the United States of America. Let us show the world by our 

vote, at least a majority vote, where we stand. Let me appeal 

to you, whether you love one man or hate another, to stand 

up today for civilization as it is typified in the United States 

of America.59

As time for debate expired, the roll call began. 

In the end, the House accepted the Senate 

amendments by a vote of 212 to 194. 

On December 7, 1941, Japan attacked the 

United States forces in Pearl Harbor, HI. Soon 

after the attack, Speaker Rayburn returned to 

Washington from a personal trip to Richmond, 

VA, and received a message that the President 

wanted to meet congressional leaders that 

evening. At the conclusion of the meeting, Rayburn was asked by a reporter if Congress would 

support a war declaration. Rayburn replied, ‘‘I 

think that is one thing on which there would 

be unity.’’ 60 The next day, the President addressed a joint session of Congress to request a 

declaration of war against Japan. Following the 

joint session, each Chamber convened and passed 

a joint resolution declaring a state of war between the United States and Japan. The President signed the measure into law that afternoon. 

In his first full year as Speaker of the House, 

Sam Rayburn worked closely with President 

Franklin Roosevelt to roll back a neutral, isolationist policy, prepare the Nation for war, and 

assist nations already fighting the Axis. When 

the United States entered the conflict, the Speaker and the President successfully urged the Nation to produce the materials essential to combat 

the enemy, maintain morale on the home front, 

and bring ‘‘the war to its earliest possible conclusion.’’ 61 The first few months after the United 

States joined the conflict were marked by extensive gains for the Axis powers. In the Pacific theater, Japanese forces captured Guam, Wake Island, parts of the Aleutian Islands and the Philippines. In the Atlantic, the naval forces of Germany, which declared war on the United States 

4 days after the Pearl Harbor attack, launched 

effective submarine attacks on American merchant ships. Roosevelt’s 1942 Annual Message to 

the Congress formed the basis of the American 

response. In the address, the President called for 

increased production of airplanes, tanks, and 

merchant shipping.62 When the goals of Roosevelt’s program were questioned in the media 

and by the public, Speaker Rayburn embarked 

on a series of speaking engagements around the 

country to defend the proposed goals.63

In the House, Rayburn guided numerous 

measures to passage that strengthened the American war effort. Measures passed included changes 

in tax law that allowed war industries to write 

off capital expenditures at an accelerated rate; the 

establishment and funding of several new executive branch agencies that controlled the distribution of raw materials, civilian goods production 

and rationing, prices, war propaganda, and economic warfare overseas; amendment of military 

draft laws to conscript 18-year-old men; and bills 

that prevented labor actions in war industries. 

Less publicly, Rayburn, Majority Leader McCormack, and Minority Leader Joseph Martin of 

Massachusetts were briefed by Secretary Stimson, 

General Marshall, and Dr. Vannevar Bush about 

a secret plan to construct an atomic bomb. Initial 

efforts to fund the program had come through 

illegal transfers of military appropriations. When 

the administration officials tried to tell the congressional leaders about the project, Rayburn cut 

them off, saying ‘‘I don’t want to know . . . because if I don’t know a secret I can’t let it leak 

out.’’ A few weeks later, Rayburn persuaded Representative Clarence Cannon, who was chairman 

of the Committee on Appropriations, to quietly 

insert an appropriation of $1.6 billion for the 

Manhattan Project.64

Summarizing congressional action and cooperation with the President in a speech in Texas 

in November 1942, Rayburn mentioned several 

other actions Congress had taken in support of 

the President’s war program, saying: 

. . . let no one tell you that the seventy-seventh Congress 

and the executive branch of the government have not worked 

together. The President asked for 185,000 airplanes. Congress 

provided the authority and the appropriation. He asked for 

The Speaker and the President 193 

65 Sam Rayburn speech to the Texas Forum of the Air, Nov. 1, 1942, 

in Delaney and Phillips, eds., Speak Mister Speaker, p. 93. 66House membership and party division is based on results reported by the Clerk of the House, based on immediate results of elections held in November 1942. Four vacancies were reported. U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Printing, áÖÖà–áÖÖâ Official Congressional 

Directory, ÜÖçth Congress, 108th Cong., 1st sess., S. Pub. 108–18 (Washington, GPO, 2003), p. 547. 67C. Dwight Dorough, Mr. Sam (New York: Random House, 1962), 

pp. 348–357. 68 Franklin Delano Roosevelt letter to Sam Rayburn, Sept. 16, 1942, 

in Delaney and Phillips, eds., Speak Mister Speaker, p. 91. 69 Mooney, Roosevelt and Rayburn, p. 164, italics in original. 

billions to build war plants. He got them. He asked for 

amendments to the Neutrality Act for . . . lend-lease shipments across the sea. He got them. He asked for authority 

to take over Axis ships. He got it. The executive recommended a wage and price bill and requested legislation 

by October 1. He got it on October 2 . . . We have made 

every attempt to weld our peacetime government machinery 

into a compact fist of steel.65

While the war effort advanced, Rayburn’s efforts appear to have come at a political price. Despite broad public support for the war, some of 

the new policies adopted by Congress, such as 

the extension of the Selective Service Act, and 

rationing measures, were not popular. Some have 

argued that this public displeasure led to a loss 

of more than 50 Democratic seats in the House 

in the 1942 elections. This left the Chamber with 

222 Democrats and 209 Republicans, at the beginning of the 78th Congress in 1943.

66 During 

the first few weeks of the new session, several 

administration-backed measures were defeated by 

the House, despite Rayburn’s efforts. Over the 

course of the session, a sense of national purpose 

appears to have overcome partisan and factional 

preferences in the House, and the President’s 

proposals received more favorable consideration. 

Beyond the Chamber, Rayburn continued to tour 

the country as a spokesman and partner of the 

President. The Speaker began to carry out symbolic duties as well, including dedicating hospitals, war production facilities, and receiving 

honorary degrees.67 Despite the occasional, temporary setbacks in Congress, FDR held Rayburn 

in high esteem. On the occasion of Rayburn’s 

second anniversary as Speaker, Roosevelt acknowledged the milestone in a letter to Rayburn 

that said ‘‘the speakership has assumed a special 

importance because of the gravity of issues with 

which you have continually had to deal . . . the 

country has need of you.’’ 68

Rayburn and Roosevelt would continue to 

work together on war measures and other issues 

until Roosevelt died in 1945. On the afternoon 

of April 12, 1945, Speaker Rayburn adjourned the 

House at 5 o’clock and was in his private Capitol 

office known as the ‘‘Board of Education,’’ where 

he often met with Members to discuss matters 

before the House. On this day, Vice President 

Harry S Truman was due at the close of the day’s 

Senate session. Before the Vice President arrived, 

Rayburn received a call from the White House; 

Truman was to call as soon as he arrived. When 

Truman reached the Speaker’s office, he called 

the White House and was told to come to the 

executive mansion. After he left, a special radio 

bulletin informed Rayburn and the Nation that 

President Roosevelt had died at Warm Springs, 

GA, earlier that afternoon. Later that evening, 

Speaker Rayburn went to the White House to 

see Truman take the oath of office as President. 

The only Member of Congress to hold the 

speakership in four different decades, Rayburn 

served with, not under, Presidents Franklin D. 

Roosevelt, Harry S Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and John F. Kennedy. Some time after 

World War II ended, Rayburn reflected on his 

collaboration with Roosevelt: 

I would go to the White House with the other congressional leaders, and we would talk things out frankly and 

openly. Sometimes we agreed, and sometimes we disagreed, 

but in the end we would find more points of agreement than 

disagreement. And we would get things done. We had to 

get things done.69

CONCLUSION: TOWARD A MORE COMPLETE

UNDERSTANDING OF LEADERS

Although his focus was World War II and 

Franklin Roosevelt, Rayburn’s observation suggests a starting point for efforts to understand 

the nature of the relationship between the Speaker and the President over the last century. The 

cases of Theodore Roosevelt and Joe Cannon, and 

Franklin Roosevelt and Sam Rayburn, strongly 

suggest that in war, peace, periods of prosperity, 

or periods of national emergency, things still 

need to get done, and that the Speaker and President are integral actors in achieving those ends. 

The institutional environment established by 

separation of powers brings together two leaders 

who have different, and sometimes contentious, 

194 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

governing responsibilities. To some extent, the 

relationship between the two sets of leaders 

bridged that gulf and facilitated legislative activity. In both cases, Cannon and Rayburn served 

as an intermediary between the House and the 

President, who is always on the outside of the 

Legislature. Each Speaker reflected the mood and 

will of the House, and provided advice to the 

Presidents on the basis of those observations. 

When both Presidents followed the advice, 

whether Cannon’s suggestion to avoid the tariff 

issue in 1907, or Rayburn’s suggestion to revise 

a lend-lease program that was sure to be defeated 

without changes in 1941, both Presidents enjoyed 

the benefits of reduced conflict and the advancement of their legislative programs. When the 

two Chief Executives ignored advice, or failed to 

seek consultation with the Speakers, as with 

Theodore Roosevelt’s contretemps over the Secret 

Service, or the setbacks FDR’s New Deal programs suffered as a result of his failed court reorganization, each suffered political damage. 

Both cases strongly suggest that to govern, 

Speakers and Presidents must surmount the challenges of divergent constitutional responsibilities, political contexts, and personal chemistry. 

Without recourse to similar studies of the relationship between other Speakers and Presidents 

over the last century, however, it is unclear 

whether these findings are generally applicable to 

the other 15 Speakers and 16 Presidents that have 

served during this time. The volatility of political contexts and interpersonal relationships 

shown in the Cannon and Rayburn eras, as well 

as Speaker O’Neill’s observation that there is 

much still to be learned about the Office and 

men who have been Speaker, strongly suggests 

that further inquiry into the relationship between 

other Speakers and Presidents would make a valuable contribution to understanding American 

Government. 

195 

1Henry Bosley Woolf, ed., Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 

(Springfield, MA: G&C Merriam, 1974), p. 372. 2 Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 440 

(1934). 3 Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, Üåçå–Üéäå, 4th 

rev. ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1957), p. 3. 

Chapter 7 

Speakers, Presidents, and National 

Emergencies 

Harold C. Relyea 

Specialist in American National Government 

Congressional Research Service 

At various times in American history, emergencies have arisen—posing, in varying degrees 

of severity, the loss of life, property, or public 

order—and threatened the well-being of the Nation. The Constitution created a government of 

limited powers, and emergency powers, as such, 

failed to attract much attention during the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 which created the 

charter for the new government. It may be argued, however, that the granting of emergency 

powers to Congress is implicit in its Article I, 

section 8 authority to ‘‘provide for the common 

Defence and general Welfare’’; the commerce 

clause; its war, Armed Forces, and militia powers; and the ‘‘necessary and proper’’ clause empowering it to make such laws as are required 

to fulfill the executions of ‘‘the foregoing Powers, 

and all other Powers vested by this Constitution 

in the Government of the United States, or in 

any Department or Officer thereof.’’ The President was authorized to call special sessions of 

Congress, perhaps doing so in order that arrangements for responding to an emergency might be 

legislated for executive implementation. 

A national emergency may be said to be gravely threatening to the country, and recognizable 

in its most extreme form as auguring the demise 

of the nation. The more extreme the threat, likely more widespread will be the consensus that 

a national emergency exists. At times, however, 

the term has been artfully used as political rhetoric to rally public support, or employed nebulously. According to a dictionary definition, an 

emergency is ‘‘an unforeseen combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for 

immediate action.’’ 1 In the midst of the Great 

Depression, a 1934 majority opinion of the Supreme Court characterized an emergency in terms 

of urgency and relative infrequency of occurrence, 

as well as equivalence to a public calamity resulting from fire, flood, or like disaster not reasonably subject to anticipation.2 Constitutional law 

scholar Edward S. Corwin once explained emergency conditions as being those ‘‘which have not 

attained enough of stability or recurrency to 

admit of their being dealt with according to 

rule.’’ 3 During Senate committee hearings on national emergency powers in 1973, a political scientist described an emergency, saying: ‘‘It denotes the existence of conditions of varying nature, intensity and duration, which are perceived 

196 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

4 U.S. Senate, Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency, National Emergency, hearing, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 

Apr. 11, 1973 (Washington: GPO, 1973), p. 277. 5 Ibid., p. 279. 

6 James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers 

of the Presidents, vol. 7 (New York: Bureau of National Literature, 

1897), pp. 3165–3167. 

to threaten life or well-being beyond tolerable 

limits.’’ 4 The term, he explained, ‘‘connotes the 

existence of conditions suddenly intensifying the 

degree of existing danger to life or well-being 

beyond that which is accepted as normal.’’ 5

In responding to an emergency situation, 

Presidents have exercised such powers as were 

available by explicit grant or interpretive implication—so-called implied powers—or otherwise 

acted of necessity, trusting to a subsequent acceptance of their actions by Congress, the courts, 

and the citizenry. They have, as well, sought 

statutory bestowal of new powers. In such circumstances, the Speakers of the House of Representatives have played varied roles. Presidents 

also have occasionally taken an emergency action 

which they assumed to be constitutionally permissible. Thus, in the American governmental 

experience, the exercise of emergency powers has 

been somewhat dependent upon the Chief Executive’s view of the office. The authority of a President in this regard, however, is not determined 

by the incumbent alone. Other institutions and 

their leaders, such as the Speaker of the House, 

may have a tempering effect on, or constitute either an obstacle to, or a sustainer of, the President’s actions in response to an emergency. 

In the account that follows, four of the most 

challenging national emergencies in the American governmental experience—the Civil War, 

World War I, the Great Depression, and World 

War II—are reviewed with a view to the role 

of the Speaker during these crises. That role has 

been a varied one due to several factors, not the 

least of which are personality, political partisanship, ideology, institutional stature, and statesmanship. 

THE CIVIL WAR

For several decades after the inauguration of 

the Federal Government under the Constitution, 

controversy and conflict over slavery had steadily 

grown in the Nation until it erupted in regional 

rebellion and insurrection in late 1860. News of 

the election of President Abraham Lincoln, who 

was known to be hostile to slavery, prompted a 

public convention in South Carolina. Convening 

a few days before Christmas, the assembled voted 

unanimously to dissolve the union between South 

Carolina and the other States. During the next 

2 months, seven States of the Lower South followed South Carolina in secession. Simultaneously, State troops began seizing Federal arsenals and forts located within the secessionist territory. In his fourth and final annual message to 

Congress on December 3, 1860, President James 

Buchanan conceded that, due to the resignation 

of Federal judicial officials throughout South 

Carolina, ‘‘the whole machinery of the Federal 

Government necessary for the distribution of remedial justice among the people has been demolished.’’ He contended, however, that ‘‘the Executive has no authority to decide what shall be the 

relations between the Federal Government and 

South Carolina.’’ Any attempt in this regard, he 

felt, would ‘‘be a naked act of usurpation.’’ Consequently, Buchanan indicated that it was his 

‘‘duty to submit to Congress the whole question 

in all its bearings,’’ observing that ‘‘the emergency may soon arise when you may be called 

upon to decide the momentous question whether 

you possess the power by force of arms to compel 

a State to remain in the Union.’’ Having ‘‘arrived 

at the conclusion that no such power has been 

delegated to Congress or to any other department 

of the Federal Government,’’ he proposed that 

Congress should call a constitutional convention, 

or ask the States to call one, for purposes of 

adopting a constitutional amendment recognizing the right of property in slaves in the 

States where slavery existed or might thereafter 

occur.6

By the time of Lincoln’s inauguration (March 

4, 1861), the Confederate provisional government 

had been established (February 4); Jefferson Davis 

had been elected (February 9) and installed as the 

President of the Confederacy (February 18); an 

army had been assembled by the secessionist 

States; Federal troops, who had been withdrawn 

to Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, were becoming desperate for relief and resupply; and the 

36th Congress had adjourned (March 3). A dividVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00206 Fmt 8165 Sfmt 8165 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.013 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
Speakers, Presidents, and National Emergencies 197 

7Wilfred E. Binkley, President and Congress (New York: Alfred A. 

Knopf, 1947), p. 126. 8Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 

vol. 7, pp. 3214–3217. 9 Ibid., p. 3225. 

10 12 Stat. 326. 11Allan G. Bogue, The Congressman’s Civil War (Cambridge, UK: 

Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. xviii. 12 Ibid., pp. 60–88. 

ing nation was poised to witness ‘‘the high-water 

mark of the exercise of executive power in the 

United States.’’ Indeed, in retrospect, it has been 

observed: ‘‘No one can ever know just what Lincoln conceived to be limits of his powers.’’ 7

A month after his inauguration, the new President notified South Carolina authorities that an 

expedition was en route solely to provision the 

Fort Sumter troops. The receipt of this message 

prompted a demand that the garrison’s commander immediately surrender. The commander 

demurred, and, on April 12, the fort and its inhabitants, over the next 34 hours, were subjected 

to continuous, intense fire from shore batteries 

until they finally surrendered. The attack galvanized the North for a defense of the Union. Lincoln, however, did not immediately call Congress 

into special session. Instead, for reasons not altogether clear, he not only delayed convening Congress, but also, with broad support in the North, 

engaged in a series of actions which intruded 

upon the constitutional authority of the legislature. These included ordering 75,000 of ‘‘the militia of the several States of the Union’’ into Federal service ‘‘to cause the laws to be duly executed,’’ and calling Congress into special session 

on July 4 ‘‘to consider and determine, such measures, as, in their wisdom, the public safety, and 

interest may seem to demand;’’ blockading the 

ports of the secessionist States; adding 19 vessels 

to the Navy ‘‘for purposes of public defense;’’ extending the initial blockade to the ports of Virginia and North Carolina; and enlarging the 

Armed Forces with 22,714 men for the regular 

Army, 18,000 personnel for the Navy, and 42,032 

volunteers for 3-year terms of service.8

In his July 4 special session message to Congress, Lincoln indicated that his actions expanding the Armed Forces, ‘‘whether strictly legal or 

not, were ventured upon under what appeared to 

be a popular and a public necessity, trusting 

then, as now, that Congress would readily ratify 

them. It is believed,’’ he continued, ‘‘that nothing has been done beyond the constitutional 

competency of Congress.’’ 9 Indeed, in an act of 

August 6, 1861, Lincoln’s ‘‘acts, proclamations, 

and orders’’ concerning the Army, Navy, militia, 

and volunteers from the States were ‘‘approved 

and in all respects legalized and made valid, to 

the same intent and with the same effect as if 

they had been issued and done under the previous express authority and direction of the Congress.’’ 10 During the next 4 years of civil war, 

Congress would continue to be largely supportive 

of Lincoln’s prosecution of the insurrection. 

THE HOUSE ENVIRONMENT.—The 37th Congress, which Lincoln convened in July, initially 

met for about a month. Members returned in December for a second session, which consumed 

about 200 days of the next year, and a third session, beginning in December 1862 and ending in 

early March 1863. The President had party majorities in both Chambers: about two-thirds of 

the Senate was Republican and the House counted 106 Republicans, 42 Democrats, and 28 

Unionists. The 1862 elections shifted the House 

balance to 102 Republicans and 75 Democrats. 

Despite the numerical dominance of the Republicans, however, ‘‘no one individual or faction was 

able to establish firm control of the congressional 

agendas during the Civil War.’’ 11

Investigation and oversight activities by congressional committees increased during the Civil 

War, ‘‘when 15 of 35 select committees were primarily concerned with wrongdoing or improper 

performance of duties,’’ and similar probes were 

being conducted by at least six standing committees. The war affected these inquiries because it 

added urgency to proper administrative performance and prompted enlarged Federal expenditures. There were, as well, committee examinations of matters more closely connected with the 

war.12

Perhaps the best known of the wartime oversight panels was the Joint Committee on the 

Conduct of the War. While some of its tactics— 

secret testimony, leaks to the press, disallowance 

of an opportunity to confront or cross examine 

accusers—and its bias against West Point officers 

remain unacceptable, its probes of the Fort Pillow massacre, in which Union black troops were 

198 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

13Bruce Tap, Over Lincoln’s Shoulder: The Committee on the Conduct 

of the War (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998), pp. 253, 

255. 

14Ronald M. Peters, Jr., The American Speakership: The Office in Historical Perspective (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 

1990), p. 54; cf. Hubert Bruce Fuller, The Speakers of the House (Boston: 

Little, Brown, 1909), pp. 152–157. 

15Robert D. Illisevich, Galusha A. Grow: The People’s Candidate 

(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988), p. 156. 16 Ibid., pp. 182–183. 17 Ibid., pp. 173–191, 196–197; 12 Stat. 392. 18 Ibid., pp. 202–203. 19 Ibid., pp. 194–195. 20 Ibid., p. 203. 

murdered and not allowed to surrender, and the 

poor condition of Union soldiers returned from 

Confederate prisons ‘‘were among its more positive achievements.’’ Indeed, ‘‘a number of its investigations exposed corruption, financial mismanagement, and crimes against humanity,’’ 

with the result that the panel ‘‘deserves praise 

not only for exposing these abuses but also for 

using such disclosures to invigorate northern 

public opinion and bolster the resolve to continue the war. Had the committee’s work always 

been modeled on these investigations,’’ it has 

been rightly concluded, ‘‘there would be little 

debate about its positive, albeit minor, contribution to the Union war effort.’’ 13

By one estimate, the ‘‘most influential member of the House of Representatives during this 

period was Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania,’’ 

whose ‘‘influence over the House exceeded that 

of its speakers.’’ 14 An attorney and former member of the Pennsylvania legislature, he had initially been elected to the House of Representatives as a Whig in 1848. He was subsequently 

elected to the House as a Republican in 1858, and 

soon became the leader of the radicals who 

strongly opposed slavery. He chaired the Ways 

and Means Committee during the 37th and 38th 

Congresses, and died in office in the summer of 

1868. 

SPEAKER GALUSHA A. GROW.—Born and 

reared in Pennsylvania, Grow had been a practicing attorney before he was first elected to the 

House of Representatives as a Democrat in 1850. 

He was returned to the 33d and 34th Congresses 

as a Democrat, but slavery and related issues 

prompted him to change party affiliation and he 

was elected to the 35th, 36th, and 37th Congresses as a Republican. A redrawn district contributed to his electoral defeat in 1862, and he 

would not return to the House until 1883 when 

he was elected to fill a seat left vacant by the 

death of the incumbent. Grow’s oratorical and 

leadership qualities contributed to his initially 

being nominated by former Speaker Nathaniel 

Banks for the speakership in 1857. Although 

Grow had the support of nearly all Republicans, 

he lost to Democrat James L. Orr of South Carolina.15 He was nominated again for the speakership in 1860, but the more moderate William 

Pennington of New Jersey was the choice.16 A 

long-time champion of the Homestead Act, 

Grow was among the leaders who, having 

brought the legislation to final passage, saw their 

efforts defeated by President Buchanan’s veto. 

The bill enacted by the 37th Congress, however, 

was successfully carried into law in May 1862, a 

few months before Grow would be defeated for 

reelection.17

With the convening of the 37th Congress, 

Grow had the support of Thaddeus Stevens, who 

nominated him for the speakership. Less radical 

contenders were Schuyler Colfax of Indiana and 

Frank Blair of Missouri. The situation was urgent, and ‘‘the Republicans had agreed not to 

tolerate any protracted conflict over the speakership.’’ On the first ballot, Grow had 71 votes, 

9 short of victory. ‘‘Blair, in second place with 

forty, withdrew and urged his supporters to 

switch their votes; twenty-eight did,’’ and ‘‘Grow 

won with ninety-nine votes.’’ 18

Stevens was instrumental in Grow’s capture of 

the speakership. The two men had become acquainted some time ago in their native Pennsylvania. They had come to hold similarly strong 

views opposing slavery and supporting the preservation of the Union, and both were resistant 

to the efforts of Simon Cameron and Andrew 

Curtin to control the State Republican Party. 

Stevens had nominated Grow for the speakership 

in 1860, and Grow had recommended Stevens to 

President-elect Lincoln for a Cabinet position.19

‘‘When it came time to make committee assignments, Grow did what was expected of 

him—he appointed radicals and friends.’’ He also 

annoyed some Cabinet secretaries for not consulting with them on appointments that affected 

their departments.20

Speakers, Presidents, and National Emergencies 199 

21Ibid., pp. 204–205. 22 Ibid., p. 205. 23 Ibid. 

24 Ibid., p. 207. 25 Ibid., p. 204. 26Concerning Colfax’s preparations and support in this regard, see 

Willard H. Smith, Schuyler Colfax: The Changing Fortunes of a Political 

Idol (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1952), pp. 182–184, 196. 

27 Illisevich, Galusha A. Grow: The People’s Candidate, p. 112. 28 Fuller, The Speakers of the House, p. 158; cf. Smith, Schuyler Colfax, 

pp. 189–190. 29Anonymous, The Life and Times of Hon. Schuyler Colfax, Speaker 

of the United States House of Representatives and Republican Candidates for 

the Vice-Presidency (New York: E.B. Treat, 1868), p. 12; the author is 

identified on the title page as ‘‘a distinguished historian.’’ 30Bogue, The Congressman’s Civil War, p. 116. 31Ibid., p. 118. 

Described as ‘‘firm, calm, and precise in construing the rules’’ of the House, Grow deferred 

to Stevens in the party caucus and ‘‘Stevens was 

the domineering personality on the floor,’’ but 

he would occasionally challenge his friend regarding procedure.21

One good example occurred on July 18, 1861, when Henry 

May of Maryland asked for the floor to defend himself against 

charges that he had had ‘‘criminal intercourse’’ with the 

rebels in Richmond. John Hutchins of Ohio objected to the 

way in which May attacked the military authorities in Baltimore. Stevens said May was out of order, but Grow ruled 

that May was entitled to the floor. Stevens put his protest 

into the form of a motion, which the chair refused to entertain. When Stevens appealed the decision, Grow insisted he 

had no control over the train of remarks May might pursue 

and, therefore, could not rule him out of order. The chair 

was overruled, but May was permitted to continue.22

Perhaps surprising to some, Grow, the radical, 

got along ‘‘admirably’’ with the President, and 

reportedly ‘‘believed Lincoln to be almost infallible, a leader who never rubbed Congress the 

wrong way and who handled men masterfully.’’ 23

Grow, Stevens, and a caucus of a dozen other 

radicals, accepted Lincoln’s moderate approach to 

emancipation, supporting the President’s proposal for Federal assistance to any State that 

adopted a plan of gradual emancipation, as well 

as legislation for immediate emancipation in the 

District of Columbia.24

It was Grow’s fortune to be Speaker during one of the nation’s critical moments. The Thirty-seventh Congress faced 

an awesome task. It had to raise, organize, and equip military 

forces, and to find the means to support them and the government as well. Yet its performance record was impressive. 

Before it adjourned in early August, the special session had 

passed more than sixty bills, and productivity was to continue 

into the second and third sessions. Fortunately, the Republicans enjoyed a comfortable majority and were able when 

necessary to ride roughshod over the Democratic opposition. 

A call for the question often ended the Democrat’s efforts 

at prolonged debate.25

SPEAKER SCHUYLER COLFAX.—Grow’s electoral defeat in 1862 assured that the 38th Congress would have a new Speaker of the House.26

The choice was Schuyler Colfax of Indiana, a 

newspaperman who had unsuccessfully sought 

election to the 32d Congress as a Whig. Two 

years later, running as a Republican, he was sent 

to the House and remained there for the next 

5 Congresses (1855–1864). He and Grow ‘‘became 

friends and close allies in their struggle for a free 

Kansas and a homestead bill.’’ 27 However, his relationship with Stevens, according to one assessment, was somewhat different than that of his 

predecessor. 

Colfax possessed neither will nor mind of his own. Thaddeus Stevens furnished him with these mental attributes. The 

fact that Stevens permitted him to remain as speaker for six 

years furnishes the best index of his character. He was the 

alter ego.28

By contrast, an 1868 campaign pamphlet by 

an anonymous author offered the following description of Colfax’s speakership. 

Every session of Congress has been marked by great bitterness of feeling, and yet so just has been his ruling, so courteous and kind his manner to foes as well as friends, that 

he has been popular with both parties. Probably not one man 

in a thousand could have passed through the trying scenes 

which he has, with the same equanimity and approbation of 

both friends and foes.29

Indeed, Colfax was well regarded as a presiding officer, and his party, still under the iron 

rule of Stevens in the caucus, enjoyed dominant 

majorities during his tenure as Speaker.30 As a 

Representative, however, he appears to have left 

no individual mark upon the statute books. 

Moreover, ‘‘Colfax’s influence on the development or passage of specific legislation is unclear.’’ 31 In a biography published shortly after 

the former Speaker’s death, Ovando J. Hollister 

summed up his late brother-in-law’s role in the 

House. 

The two successive re-elections of Speaker Colfax attest the 

great satisfaction he gave in this high office. These were as 

eventful times as ever chanced in the annals of men, and the 

actors played their part in a manly way, worthy of their place 

in the line of generations that has won from the oppressor, 

maintained, and transmitted liberty. Neither before nor since 

have there been greater Houses than those which called 

200 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

32 O.J. Hollister, Life of Schuyler Colfax (New York: Funk and 

Wagnalls, 1886), p. 216. 33Bogue, The Congressman’s Civil War, pp. 116–117; another historian 

has written that the exact relationship between Colfax and Lincoln 

‘‘is difficult to ascertain,’’ but expressed doubt that it was ‘‘the intimate relationship’’ portrayed by Hollister; see Smith, Schuyler Colfax, 

pp. 168–169. 34 David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (New York: Simon and Schuster, 

1995), p. 469. 

35 40 Stat. 1. 36Clinton Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in 

the Modern Democracies (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

1948), p. 242. 37Concerning the Committee on Public Information, see Stephen 

L. Vaughn, Holding Fast the Inner Lines: Democracy, Nationalism, and 

the Committee on Public Information (Chapel Hill, NC: University of 

North Carolina Press, 1980); concerning the Council of National Defense, its mandate may be found at 39 Stat. 649–650 and its operations 

are discussed in Grosvenor B. Clarkson, Industrial America in the World 

War: The Strategy Behind the Line ÜéÜå–ÜéÜç (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 

1923); see also, generally, William Franklin Willoughby, Government 

Organization in War Time and After (New York: D. Appleton, 1919). 

Schuyler Colfax to be their presiding officer; at no time in 

our history were the people and their Congresses in closer 

sympathy, and this was due in part to the Speaker’s faculty 

of wise and successful political management.32

That political management included consultations with Cabinet members concerning their 

preferences for Representatives assigned to the 

House committees with which they had to deal. 

It also involved scheming and connivance that, 

according to an entry in the diary of Secretary 

of the Navy Gideon Wells, resulted in Lincoln 

considering him to be ‘‘a little intriguer,—plausible, aspiring beyond his capacity, and not trustworthy.’’ The diary of John Hay, Lincoln’s secretary, reflected similar White House doubts 

about Colfax.33 Lincoln had preferred others for 

the speakership, but when it fell to Colfax, the 

President met with him, only to receive ‘‘what 

was not exactly a pledge of support but a promise 

of neutrality in the upcoming fights in Congress 

between Radicals and Conservatives.’’ 34 It was, 

seemingly, less than he had enjoyed with Grow. 

WORLD WAR I

When war swept over Europe during the latter 

months of 1914, the United States, in terms of 

emergency conditions confronting the Nation, 

was unaffected by the conflict. Initially pursuing 

a policy of neutrality, President Woodrow Wilson, in September 1915, reluctantly agreed to 

allow American bankers to make general loans 

to the belligerent nations. These loans, foreign 

bond purchases, and foreign trade tended to favor 

Great Britain and France. Earlier, in February 

1915, Germany had proclaimed the waters around 

the British Isles a war zone which neutral ships 

might enter at their own risk. In May, the British transatlantic steamer Lusitania was sunk by 

a German submarine with the loss of 1,198 lives, 

including 128 Americans. Disclosures of German 

espionage and sabotage in the United States later 

in the year, unrestricted submarine warfare by 

Germany as of February 1917, and March revelations of German intrigue to form an alliance with 

Mexico contributed to the President calling a 

special session of Congress on April 2, when he 

asked for a declaration of war, which was given 

final approval 4 days later.35

As Wilson led the Nation into war, the ‘‘preponderance of his crisis authority,’’ it has been 

noted, ‘‘was delegated to him by statutes of Congress.’’ Indeed, ‘‘Wilson chose to demand express 

legislative authority for almost every unusual 

step he felt impelled to take.’’ By comparison, 

the source of Lincoln’s power ‘‘was the Constitution, and he operated in spite of Congress,’’ while 

the ‘‘basis of Wilson’s power was a group of statutes, and he cooperated with Congress.36

The President also exercised certain discretion 

over and above that provided by statute. For example, he armed American merchantmen in February 1917; created a propaganda and censorship 

entity in April 1917—the Committee on Public 

Information—which had no statutory authority 

for its limitations on the First Amendment; and 

he created various emergency agencies under the 

broad authority of the Council of National Defense, which had been statutorily mandated in 

1916.

37

‘‘Among the important statutory delegations 

to the President,’’ it has been recounted, ‘‘were 

acts empowering him to take over and operate 

the railroads and water systems, to regulate and 

commandeer all ship-building facilities in the 

United States, to regulate and prohibit exports’’ 

and ‘‘to raise an army by conscription.’’ Others 

authorized him ‘‘to allocate priorities in transportation, to regulate the conduct of resident enemy 

aliens, to take over and operate the telegraph and 

telephone systems, to redistribute functions 

among the executive agencies of the federal government, to control the foreign language press, 

Speakers, Presidents, and National Emergencies 201 

38Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 243. 39 41 Stat. 1359. 40Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., On the Hill: A History of the American Congress (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979), p. 293. 

41Ibid. 

42 Ibid., pp. 297–298. 

and to censor all communications to and from 

foreign countries.’’ 38

In November 1918, Republican majorities were 

elected to both Houses of Congress, and an armistice was signed in Europe, bringing a cessation 

of warfare. As peace negotiations, with Wilson 

participating, began in Paris in mid-January, 

many temporary wartime authorities began to expire; most of the remaining war statutes and 

agencies were terminated by an act of March 3, 

1921.

39

THE HOUSE ENVIRONMENT.—The Presidential contest of 1912 had resulted in the election of Woodrow Wilson, the first Democrat to 

occupy the White House since 1897. His party 

held a substantial margin of seats (291 to 127) 

in the House at the start of his administration, 

which quickly dwindled during the next two 

Congresses and disappeared in 1918; an initial 

seven-seat margin in the Senate grew slightly 

during the next two Congresses before the opposition gained a two-seat majority in 1918. 

The 63d Congress convened about a month 

after Wilson’s March 4, 1913, inauguration. On 

April 8, a day after their assembly, the two 

Houses in joint session were personally addressed 

by Wilson—‘‘the first President to do so since 

Jefferson stopped the practice in 1801. He wanted 

the members of Congress to see that he was a 

real person,’’ one commentator has observed, 

‘‘and a partner in their work, he told them, not 

‘a mere department of the Government hailing 

Congress from some isolated island of jealous 

power’.’’ 40 It was the beginning of a new relationship between the first and second branches. 

During the new President’s first years in office, relations 

between the White House and Congress underwent a drastic 

change. jTheodorek Roosevelt had fought Congress and had 

often gone over its head to the people to get it to act, but 

he was never able to establish the primacy of his office over 

the conservative leadership in the legislature. jWilliam Howardk Taft had shied away from even contesting for dominance. But it was now a different Congress. . . . jWilson’sk 

Democratic majorities were well organized and led by, and 

to a large extent composed of, men who shared the chief executive’s goals, were as eager as he to compile a record of 

party achievement, and were willing to follow or cooperate 

with him. It was a situation made to order for a man of 

Wilson’s commitment and temperament. . . . Believing 

strongly in party government and in his responsibility to be 

the nation’s political head, Wilson gave forceful leadership 

to his party in Congress from his first day in office, telling 

it what he wanted it to do, introducing and sponsoring legislation, working closely with the Democratic leaders, committee heads, and individual members to achieve his programs, and in the process strengthening and broadening the 

powers and prestige of the presidency.41

The outbreak of war in Europe in August 1914 

found the President and Congress initially in 

agreement on a policy of strict neutrality. German submarine warfare soon created a division 

of opinion between the neutralists and peace 

forces, on the one hand, and those demanding 

the defense of American’s rights on the high seas, 

on the other. This division led to conflicts in 1915 

and 1916 between the White House and congressional Democrats. In the first instance, Wilson’s 

refusal to issue a warning to Americans against 

traveling on armed merchantmen not only 

prompted protests from Democrats in both 

houses, but also resolutions mandating such a 

warning and an entree for congressional formulation of foreign policy. Vigorous efforts by the 

President, key Republicans in Congress, and the 

press, got the resolutions tabled. The second controversy arose over Presidentially proposed military preparedness legislation, which included a 

new national volunteer ‘‘Continental Army’’ program. The measure was held captive in committee by a peace bloc led by the House Majority 

Leader, Claude Kitchen. Wilson had to compromise: the resulting legislation provided for an 

immediate expansion of the regular Army, enlargement of the National Guard, and integration of the Guard into Army organization and 

command.42

Although Wilson emphasized a neutrality 

theme in his 1916 campaign for reelection, he was 

almost defeated, edging by his opponent with a 

plurality of 23 electoral votes, and saw his party 

strength in the House reduced to a majority of 

only a few seats. At the end of January 1917, Germany stunned Wilson with the announcement 

that it was resuming unrestricted submarine warfare. Shortly thereafter, an American ship was 

torpedoed and sunk without warning, prompting 

the President to break diplomatic relations with 

202 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

43 Ibid., pp. 299–301. 44 Ibid., p. 301. 45 Ibid., p. 302. 

46 Ibid., p. 303. 47 Ibid., pp. 303–304. 48The controversy actually continued into the early months of 1920, 

but without any resolve of the impasse realized earlier. 49 42 Stat. 105. 

Germany. Near the end of February, Wilson 

asked Congress for authority to arm merchant 

ships and to use other ‘‘instrumentalities or 

methods’’ to protect American shipping. The 

House, on March 1, overwhelmingly gave approval to the first part of the President’s request; 

adamant noninterventionists in the Senate 

launched a filibuster against the authorization. 

Subsequently, Wilson went ahead with the ship 

armament on his own authority and called for 

a special session of Congress on April 16, then 

changed the convening to April 2. That evening 

he asked the 65th Congress for a declaration of 

war against Germany. This was accomplished 4 

days later.43

There followed the passage of a stream of war legislation, 

beginning with the appropriations of $4 billion for the army 

and navy and authorization for a Liberty Loan of bonds to 

be sold to the public (four Liberty Loan drives during the 

war and a Victory Loan in 1919 raised a total of $20.5 billion). 

A Selective Service Bill providing for universal conscription 

caused bitter controversy in the House, where Speaker 

jChampk Clark left his chair to oppose the measure. Its constitutionality—sending drafted men outside the United 

States—seemed open to question, but it was enacted on May 

18, 1917.

44

The stream of war legislation continued, including ‘‘several acts, urged by the administration and supported by the fervent patriotism and 

anti-German feeling of a great majority of the 

American people and their representatives in 

Congress, jwhichk broke sharply with the relatively benign atmosphere of political tolerance 

and freedom of dissent of the progressive period. 

Paralleling . . . emergency controls on business, 

they seriously abridged civil liberties and traditional American rights.’’ 45 Meanwhile, in Europe, the arrival of American troops was decisive 

in stemming German offensives and launching 

fierce counterdrives that moved Allied forces toward the German border. 

As the conflict in Europe neared an end, Wilson’s uncompromising determination to handle foreign affairs himself and 

impose on the world his idealistic vision of an enduring peace 

headed him on a collision course with the Senate. On January 

8, 1918, he delivered a stirring address to the Sixty-fifth Congress, boldly outlining fourteen points as a basis for a moral 

peace. Among them were proposals for open diplomacy, freedom of the seas, the reduction of armaments, and ‘‘a general 

association of nations.’’ Liberals in America and the Allied 

countries supported the Fourteen Points with enthusiasm, but 

many of the Republicans and militants in Congress were cynical, fearing that Wilson would not be stern enough with 

Germany and showing signs of resentment at his aggrandizement of the role of sole arbiter of post-war settlements.46

The conflict continued and became more 

acute, with many Republicans separating from 

Wilson and demanding that he call for Germany’s unconditional surrender. Wilson responded, in part, by appealing to the voting public to give him stronger party control of each 

House in the November 5, 1918, congressional 

elections. Republicans viewed the President’s tactic as an attack on their patriotism and a violation of the wartime truce on politics. When the 

returns came in, ‘‘the Republicans won the 

House by fifty seats and the Senate by two seats, 

jandk Wilson not only lost his hold over Congress and his goal of a strong national unity behind him, but because of his ill-advised appeal 

seemed even to have suffered a repudiation of his 

peace policies on the eve of the war’s end.’’ 47

That end came on November 11 with a general 

armistice in Europe. Wilson’s efforts to negotiate 

a peace ultimately came to an end in fall 1919 

when the Senate, divided into three irreconcilable 

camps, failed to approve any form of the 

Versailles Treaty.48 During a campaign to rally 

public support for the treaty, Wilson collapsed 

in Pueblo, CO, on September 25, and, after having returned to Washington, suffered a debilitating stroke on October 2. The declaration of 

war against Germany (and Austria-Hungary) was 

subsequently terminated by joint resolution on 

July 2, 1921.

49

SPEAKER CHAMP CLARK.—When President 

Wilson addressed a joint session of the 63d Congress on April 8, 1913, James Beauchamp 

‘‘Champ’’ Clark of Missouri was beginning his 

second speakership. A State legislator, he had 

been unsuccessful in his bid for the Democratic 

nomination for a House seat in 1890. Two years 

later, he won his party’s nomination and was 

elected as a Representative, but lost the reelection contest to a Republican in 1894. Regaining 

Speakers, Presidents, and National Emergencies 203 

50 Peters, The American Speakership, pp. 92–94. 51Ibid., p. 93. 52 Ibid., p. 94. 

53 Ibid., p. 97. 54 Ibid., pp. 97–98. 55Champ Clark, My Quarter Century of American Politics, vol. 2 (New 

York: Harper and Brothers, 1920), p. 339. 

his House seat in 1896, he served continuously 

thereafter until 1920. In the House, he was a 

floor leader (1907–1911) before being elected to 

the speakership in April 1911. During the 60th 

Congress, he had led the Democrats who joined 

a group of Republican insurgents in a revolt 

against the dictatorial Speaker Joseph G. Cannon 

and his power over the Committee on Rules. 

While the House had voted in 1910 to remove 

the Speaker from serving on the committee, public dissatisfaction with the Republican majority 

in that Chamber resulted in a Democratic landslide in the elections of that year and the basis 

for Clark subsequently becoming Speaker. 

As a consequence of his distaste for Cannon’s 

dictatorial ways, Clark changed the Speaker’s role 

in House affairs, leaving the business of floor 

scheduling and party caucus management to the 

floor leader, Oscar Underwood of Alabama. 

Under this arrangement, the floor leader and caucus guided the party program. Clark, as Speaker, 

was an impartial presiding officer of the House, 

but he could, and often did, temporarily step 

down from his position to participate actively in 

legislative debate.50 As a result of his role in the 

overthrow of Cannon and his frequent discussion 

of legislative issues, Clark became the leading 

Democratic candidate for the Presidency in 1912. 

At the party nominating convention, Clark ran 

ahead of both William Jennings Bryan, his political adversary, and Woodrow Wilson, but was ultimately defeated when Bryan threw his support 

to Wilson. 

During Clark’s speakership, the Democrats exercised party governance through a binding caucus, with Underwood using individual pieces of 

legislation for such approval.51

The caucus rules established a simple majority as a quorum 

for business, with two-thirds of those members present and 

voting required to approve a motion to bind. It was not always necessary for the leadership to control two-thirds of the 

rank and file, but rather some lesser number, ranging down 

to two-thirds of a quorum. Of 291 Democratic members of 

the Sixty-third Congress, for example, the number required 

to bind might have been as few as ninety-eight.52

The Speaker could speak in the caucus or offer 

a motion to bind it, but he could not control 

it. Similarly, he could influence the members of 

the Committee on Rules regarding the floor 

agenda and debate, but he could not control 

them. As a consequence, compared with the 

Democratic floor leader and committee chairmen, 

it is understandable that the Speaker might not 

have been viewed as the best agent for realizing 

the President’s legislative agenda. By one estimate, the ‘‘operation of the caucus system used 

by the Democrats attained its maximum effectiveness during Wilson’s first administration, especially during the Sixty-third Congress while 

Underwood served as majority leader.’’ Why? 

‘‘Progressivism had its moment in the sun, and 

the Democrats were able to govern the nation 

just so long as the policy consensus kept the 

party united behind the administration’s program.’’ 53 War in Europe militated against that 

consensus, as did Underwood’s departure for the 

Senate in 1915, resulting in the succession of 

Claude Kitchen of North Carolina as floor leader. 

Basic differences in political philosophy between Wilson 

and Kitchen led to a clash of political wills, and they did 

not work as closely together as had Wilson and Underwood. 

Because of this, Wilson began using congressman John Nance 

Garner of Texas as his intermediary to the House. The Democrats had suffered heavy losses in the election of 1914, bringing their congressional majority down from 290 seats to 231. 

With the growing involvement of the United States in European affairs, Americans became increasingly concerned about 

the possibility of engagement in a general European war. 

Running on the theme that he had ‘‘kept us out of war,’’ 

Wilson was reelected in 1916, but the party retained control 

of the House of Representatives by the narrowest of margins, 

electing an identical 215 members to the Republicans, and 

relying on the support of five independent members to retain 

organizational control. Wilson did not keep America out of 

the war, and during his second administration he won congressional support for his war program only at the cost of 

bitter divisions within the party, which proved fatal in the 

1918 congressional elections, when the Republicans swept the 

Congress.54

Clark admired Kitchen, calling him ‘‘one of 

the most brilliant debaters this generation has 

known—fluent, intelligent, witty, sarcastic, affable, courageous, and at times eloquent.’’ 55 He occasionally voted, as a matter of conscience, contrary to the position of the President. Joining 

Kitchen, Clark opposed the administration’s 

204 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

56 Seward W. Livermore, Politics Is Adjourned: Woodrow Wilson and 

the War Congress, ÜéÜã–ÜéÜç (Seattle, WA: University of Washington 

Press, 1966), p. 17. 57 Ibid., pp. 57, 89. 58 Ibid., pp. 163–164. 59Clark, My Quarter Century of American Politics, vol. 2, pp. 442– 

443. 

60 Fred L. Israel, ed., The State of the Union Messages of the Presidents, 

ÜåéÖ–Üéãã, vol. 3 (New York: Chelsea House-Robert Hector, 1966), 

p. 2727. 

highly controversial military conscription plan, 

and denounced the proposal on the House floor 

in April 1917.

56 He also proved to be a valuable 

ally of the White House, however, such as when 

he frustrated efforts in September 1917 to establish a powerful joint congressional committee to 

oversee the conduct of the American war effort, 

and privately assured Wilson that he would 

render any service to defeat legislation creating, 

separate from the traditional Cabinet, a war cabinet or council, composed of three distinguished 

citizens, ‘‘with almost unlimited jurisdiction over 

plans and policies, to insure the most vigorous 

prosecution of the war.’’ 57 When the President 

lent support in July 1918 to a local effort to deny 

Representative George Huddleston of Alabama 

the Democratic nomination for reelection to the 

House, Clark and Kitchen provided their colleague with letters praising his patriotic service 

in Congress. Their intervention was denounced 

locally as the interference of a pair of ‘‘super pacifists,’’ but Huddleston captured the nomination 

and was returned to the House.58 In the closing 

pages of his autobiography, Clark characterized 

Wilson as ‘‘a great President,’’ but, perhaps best 

explained his own role when refuting a newspaper allegation that he had campaigned for Wilson in 1912 in the hope of obtaining a Cabinet 

position. ‘‘The man who wrote that,’’ counseled 

Clark, ‘‘did not have sense enough to know that 

the Speakership of the House of Representatives 

is a much bigger place than is any Cabinet position, and he was not well enough acquainted 

with me to know that I would not accept all ten 

Cabinet portfolios rolled into one, for I would 

not be a clerk for any man.’’ 59

THE GREAT DEPRESSION

In his final State of the Union Message of December 4, 1928, President Calvin Coolidge advised the legislators that no previous Congress 

‘‘has met a more pleasing prospect than that 

which appears at the present time,’’ and concluded that the ‘‘country can regard the present 

with satisfaction and anticipate the future with 

optimism.’’ 60 One year later, the dreamworld envisioned by Coolidge vanished and was replaced 

by a nightmare. On October 24, 1929, an overspeculated stock market suddenly experienced a 

deluge of selling, which sent prices plummeting. 

Panic ensued. In the howling melee of the stock 

exchange, brokers fought to sell before it was too 

late. Rapidly, it became too late. 

Economic crisis was not new to America. The 

country had experienced financial setbacks of nationwide proportion in 1857, 1875, and 1893. History, however, was an enemy in the devising of 

strategy to deal with the depression of 1929. The 

periods of economic difficulty of the past were 

but a tumble when compared with the plunge 

of the Great Depression. This was the first problem experienced by those attempting to rectify 

the plight of the country: they did not recognize 

the ramifications of the situation or the extent 

of damage done and continuing to be done. Perhaps, too, the administrative machinery was not 

available or sufficiently developed to halt the 

downward economic spiral. It may have been 

that the President’s philosophy of government 

was inadequate for meeting the exigency. In the 

face of all efforts to halt its progress, the cancer 

of economic disaster continued to devastate 

American society mercilessly. 

The depression demoralized the Nation: it destroyed individual dignity and self-respect, shattered family structure, and begged actions which 

civilized society had almost forgotten. In brief, 

it created a most desperate situation, ripe for exploitation by zealots, fanatics, or demagogs. It 

also created an emergency which, unlike exigencies of the past, dealt a kind of violence to the 

public that neither Armed Forces nor military 

weaponry could repel. It was a new type of crisis 

leading to a broad extension of executive power. 

In 1932, a malcontent and despairing electorate 

voted against President Herbert C. Hoover, Coolidge’s successor. Although a dedicated public 

servant of demonstrated ability, he was replaced 

with Franklin D. Roosevelt, who came to the 

Presidency from the governorship of New York, 

Speakers, Presidents, and National Emergencies 205 

61 Samuel I. Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. á: The Year of Crisis, Üéàà (New York: Random 

House, 1938), pp. 11, 15. 62Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: 

Houghton Mifflin, 1959), p. 4. 

63 48 Stat. 1; Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. á: The Year of Crisis, Üéàà, pp. 24–26, 48. 64 48 Stat. 1. 65 48 Stat. 22. 66 48 Stat. 195. 

and had previously served as Assistant Secretary 

of the Navy during the Wilson administration. 

In his inaugural address, the new President was 

eloquent, telling the American people ‘‘that the 

only thing we have to fear is fear itself—nameless, unreasoning, unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into advance.’’ More important, on the exertion of leadership during crisis, he expressed hope that the 

normal balance of executive and legislative authority would prove to be adequate ‘‘to meet the 

unprecedented tasks before us,’’ but acknowledged that ‘‘temporary departure from that normal balance’’ might be necessary. ‘‘I am prepared 

under my constitutional duty to recommend the 

measures that a stricken Nation in the midst of 

a stricken world may require,’’ he said, but, in 

the event Congress did not cooperate ‘‘and in the 

event that the national emergency is still critical, 

I shall not evade the clear course of duty that 

will then confront me’’—using ‘‘broad Executive 

power to wage a war against the emergency, as 

great as the power that would be given to me 

if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.’’ 61

THE HOUSE ENVIRONMENT.—The day after 

his inauguration, Roosevelt called for a special 

session of Congress. When the proclamation for 

the gathering was issued, no purpose for the 

March 9 assembly was indicated. Nonetheless, 

the President’s party enjoyed overwhelming majorities in the House (310 to 117) and Senate (60 

to 35). Roosevelt had arrived in Washington with 

drafts of two proclamations, one calling for the 

special session of Congress and the other declaring a so-called ‘‘bank holiday,’’ which would 

temporarily close the Nation’s banks and restrict 

the export of gold by invoking provisions of the 

Trading With the Enemy Act.62 The bank holiday proclamation was issued on March 6. Between the evening of the inauguration and the 

opening of Congress, Roosevelt’s lieutenants, 

aided by Hoover’s Secretary of the Treasury, 

Ogden Mills, drafted an emergency banking bill. 

When Congress convened, the House had no 

copies of the measure and had to rely upon the 

Speaker reading from a draft text. After 38 minutes of debate, the House passed the bill. That 

evening, the Senate followed suit. The President 

then issued a second proclamation, pursuant to 

the new banking law, continuing the bank holiday and the terms and provisions of the March 

6 proclamation.63

Thereafter ensued the famous ‘‘hundred days’’ 

when the 73d Congress enacted a series of 15 

major relief and recovery laws, many of which 

provided specific emergency powers to the President or broad general authority to address the 

crisis gripping the Nation. The Emergency 

Banking Relief Act, for example, authorized the 

President to declare a condition of national emergency and, ‘‘under such rules and regulations as 

he may prescribe,’’ regulate banking and related 

financial matters affecting the economy. This 

statute also continued the Chief Executive’s authority to suspend the operations of member 

banks of the Federal Reserve System.64 Under the 

authority of the Civilian Conservation Corps Reforestation Relief Act, the President was granted 

broad power ‘‘to provide for employing citizens 

of the United States who are unemployed, in the 

construction, maintenance, and carrying on of 

works of a public nature in connection with the 

forestation of lands belonging to the United 

States or to the several States.’’ Authority also 

was granted to house, care for, and compensate 

such individuals as might be recruited to carry 

out programs established pursuant to the act.65

After declaring the existence of a national emergency with regard to unemployment and the disorganization of industry, the National Industrial 

Recovery Act authorized the President to establish an industrial code system and a public works 

program to facilitate the restoration of prosperity. The President could establish administrative agencies to carry out the provisions of the 

act, and might delegate the functions and powers 

vested in him by the statute to those entities.66

Additional recovery programs would be given approval by the 74th Congress. 

206 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

67 Peters, The American Speakership, pp. 106–107. 68 Ibid., p. 107. 69 Ibid., p. 108; in February 1937, President Roosevelt sent Congress 

a draft bill to change the composition of the Federal judiciary, and, 

in particular, to allow him to expand the membership of the Supreme 

Court, which had recently struck down New Deal recovery legislation; 

the following year, he made appeals to party faithful for the defeat 

of some southern Democrats seeking reelection to Congress. 

70 Ibid., pp. 108–109. 71Ibid., p. 110. 72 Ibid., p. 109. 73Robert A. Waller, Rainey of Illinois: A Political Biography, ÜéÖà– 

Üéàâ (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1977), p. 159; see also 

Ibid., pp. 138–158. 74 Peters, The American Speakership, p. 114. 75 Ibid., p. 113. 

These federal programs served widespread, enduring, and 

organized interests in American society. The political coalition to which they gave rise lent definition to American political life, and the consequences were felt in the Congress. 

The tendency towards stability was already present, especially 

within the Democratic party, and the seniority system had 

entrenched the power of southern Democrats. The newcomers 

who came to town in 1933 and 1935 did not upset it; instead, 

those who stayed on enlisted themselves in its long apprenticeship. By cooperating with those at the top of the power 

structure, those at the bottom served their own interests and 

those of their constituents. This was a game ideally suited 

to the character and temperament of the Democratic party, 

a party marked by diversity and devoted to logrolling. From 

the Roosevelt administration, to the oligopoly on Capitol 

Hill, through the growing bureaucracy, to the congressional 

constituencies, everyone found something to gain.67

Indeed, ‘‘Roosevelt was careful to defer to the 

Democratic barons in the Congress on the control 

of federal spending,’’ and harmony prevailed because Federal largesse was particularly sought by 

the southern States where the Great Depression 

had hit the hardest.68 ‘‘Conservative southern opposition to Roosevelt remained quiescent,’’ it has 

been observed, ‘‘until the court-packing episode 

of 1937, which triggered the development of the 

conservative coalition in the Congress. Roosevelt’s decision to purge the Congress of southern Democrats who had opposed his reelection 

in 1936 sealed many southerners in opposition to 

him.’’ 69

Apart from Congress, New Deal efforts at 

combating the Depression, in the estimate of one 

analyst, also resulted in a transformation of the 

Presidency as well as inter-branch relations. 

Since FDR, the public’s expectations of the presidency have 

been different than they were before. The public expects leadership from the president, and it is the president who sets 

the basic elements of the national political agenda. But if 

the president can and must set the major items on the agenda, he cannot enact them by himself. Instead, he must seek 

to persuade the Congress to follow his leadership. This led 

to a strengthening of the link between the president and the 

speakership. On occasion speakers had been supporters of 

presidents, but there existed no norm that demanded it prior 

to the New Deal. Since the New Deal, speakers, especially 

Democratic speakers, have viewed it as their obligation to 

support presidents of their own party. Thus, the New Deal 

had the ironic effect of solidifying congressional power in the 

committee system, which the speaker could influence but not 

control, and of imposing on the speaker the duty of supporting a president of his own party. From 1932 forward, 

speakers would be caught in a crossfire between the congressional power structure and their obligation to the White 

House.70

SPEAKER HENRY T. RAINEY.—Formerly a 

practicing attorney and county master in chancery in Illinois, Henry T. Rainey was first elected 

to the House of Representatives as a Democrat 

in 1902. He served in the 58th Congress and the 

8 succeeding Congresses (1903–1921). Unsuccessful in his 1920 campaign, he was returned 2 years 

later to the 68th Congress and served in the next 

five Congresses (1923–1934) until his death in office. When the Democrats, after 12 years, were 

returned to majority status in the House in 1931, 

‘‘power in the party was centered in the Texas 

delegation’’ with John Nance Garner, ‘‘a leading 

force in the party since the Wilson administration,’’ elected Speaker.71 That year, ‘‘the southern 

Democrats controlled twenty-seven of forty-seven 

chairmanships’’ of the House committees.72

Emerging as the new floor leader for the Democrats was Rainey, renowned for his ‘‘progressive 

political independence,’’ according to his biographer, but a man who had gained the support 

of his more conservative colleagues through his 

reelection successes and efforts on behalf of farmers and agricultural relief.73 However, in his new 

position, Rainey ‘‘was never able to win acceptance within the establishment’’ of House southern Democrats ‘‘and his relationship with Speaker 

Garner was strained.’’ 74

Ironically, ‘‘Garner’s leadership of the Democratic party in the House brought to him great 

public visibility,’’ as well as ‘‘ample political assets to enable him to contend for the presidency 

in 1932.’’ 75 Supported by the newspapers of William Randolph Hearst, Garner won the California primary election and entered the Democratic National Convention with the solid support of the delegations from that State and Texas. 

Speakers, Presidents, and National Emergencies 207 

76 Ibid., p. 114. 77 Ibid., p. 115. 78 Ibid., pp. 114–115. 79 Ibid., p. 115; Rainey’s biographer notes that when he announced 

his intention to seek the speakership, ‘‘Rainey indicated that he expected considerable support from the newly elected Democrats in the 

lower House,’’ and identified other factors lending support to his bid 

for the speakership, such as being ‘‘a rallying point for all northern 

Democrats who were tired of seeing most of the party plums go to 

the South,’’ having a ‘‘rural and small town background jwhichk 

would help balance a party which drew heavily from the urban areas 

and the Solid South,’’ having the precedent that ‘‘jfkour of the Democratic Speakers since the Forty-seventh Congress . . . elevated from the 

post of majority leader and a fifth from acting majority leader,’’ and 

perhaps even the ‘‘striking personal appearance’’ of the candidate; see 

Waller, Rainey of Illinois, pp. 174–175. 80 Peters, The American Speakership, p. 116. 81Ibid., p. 117. 82Waller, Rainey of Illinois, p. 181; this biographer also acknowledges that ‘‘the record upon which to construct the climax of Rainey’s 

career is limited severely’’ because ‘‘Franklin Roosevelt did not preserve memoranda of his personal conferences and phone conversations’’ 

and ‘‘most of the key legislative transactions were handled in this fashion;’’ Ibid., p. 181. 

With the convention deadlocked after three ballots, Garner threw his support to Roosevelt to 

be the party’s Presidential candidate and was rewarded with the Vice Presidential position on 

the ticket. When the Democrats won the Presidential contest, the speakership for the 73d Congress became open. 

Rainey had been elected his party’s floor leader 

in 1931 ‘‘with a coalition of southern and northern 

support,’’ but ‘‘he remained very much an outrider in a leadership structure that was dominated by the southern oligarchy.’’ 76 Several factors contributed to his election to succeed Garner 

as Speaker. In addition to Rainey, four southerners and a New York City Representative 

emerged as contenders for the speakership, with 

the result that ‘‘the party suffered a complete geographic split, with candidates from each of its 

major regions.’’ 77 Within the institution of the 

House, Rainey was the second-longest-serving 

Member, and had earned the respect of many of 

his Democratic colleagues as their floor leader 

and as one in that role who ‘‘was not disloyal 

to Garner.’’ Moreover, ‘‘Rainey’s election was ensured by the election of 129 new Democrats; of 

these, ninety-five were from the North, twelve 

from border states, and seventeen from the 

South,’’ with Illinois, his home State, electing 

the most new Democratic Members—11 in 

total.78

These new members were politically tied to President Roosevelt’s commitment to political action. Rainey had for several years advocated a diffusion of the power structure in the 

House through the creation of a party steering and policy 

committee similar to that employed by the Republicans. In 

1933 he made this proposal a key element in his campaign 

platform for the speakership. The concept of a party steering 

committee had been strongly opposed by Garner, who favored 

the management of the House by the speaker and the committee chairmen. But the idea was very attractive to new 

members, who could have no hope of influence under the 

leadership of the old guard. . . . Rainey became the first 

speaker since Champ Clark to come to the office committed 

to reform, and like Clark he was committed to decentralizing 

reforms.79

However, after becoming Speaker, Rainey 

eventually made only slight changes in the committee system. ‘‘Among forty-five standing committee chairmen of the House,’’ by one estimate, 

‘‘there were no uncompensated violations of seniority.’’ 80 He would, nonetheless, carefully 

manage the House committee system in other 

ways, while attempting to pursue his reform proposals and lend support to the new President’s 

efforts at achieving economic recovery. 

Speaker Rainey’s commitment to diffuse power in the 

House ran head-on into the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt 

and his first hundred days. However much the speaker and 

his supporters might have wanted collegial decision making, 

the country demanded immediate action that could only 

come about by firm control of the House. Rainey did appoint 

a steering and policy committee for the Democrats, and created a variety of special committees designed to involve 

members in the canvassing of opinion. But the real business 

of the House was being done at the other end of Pennsylvania 

Avenue, and Speaker Rainey’s job was primarily to see to 

it that the president’s program was expedited. In order to 

accomplish this, the speaker held up the appointment of most 

committees during the special session called by Roosevelt to 

deal with the crisis. He appointed a special committee to 

deal with the Economy Act, a budget-cutting measure that 

gave broad power to the president to cut federal expenditures, 

and he used the Rules Committee to bring the New Deal 

legislation to the House under special orders that severely 

limited the capacity of the membership to amend the bills 

as reported by committees.81

As Speaker, Rainey, according to his biographer, ‘‘was in an ideal position to serve as middleman between executive wishes and legislative 

fulfillment.’’ 82 Prior to the convening of the 73d 

Congress, Rainey, in a January 1933 meeting with 

Roosevelt, had proposed a program to balance 

the budget and warned that increasing taxes 

‘‘would be inviting revolution.’’ It was, by one 

estimate, ‘‘an instance in which a congressional 

leader had prepared a complete fiscal program for 

208 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

83 Ibid., p. 182. 84 48 Stat. 8. 85Waller, Rainey of Illinois, pp. 182–183. 

86 Ibid., pp. 183–184. 87 Ibid., p. 184. 88 Ibid., p. 185. 89 Ibid., p. 187. 

the President-elect.’’ 83 Subsequently, authority 

for the President to cut Federal expenditures to 

realize a balanced budget was included in legislation to maintain government credit.84 However, 

it also enabled the President to reduce the pensions and allowances of war veterans. In the 

course of an unsuccessful attempt to bind the 

party on the measure in caucus, Rainey learned 

of an amendment backed by the veterans’ lobby 

to prevent the President from completely discontinuing a pension or other allowance or reduce them by more than 25 percent. Given that 

‘‘Democratic unity was shattered by the economy 

bill,’’ the legislation was brought to the floor 

‘‘under a rule providing a two-hour limit, no opportunity for amendments, and one motion to recommit by anyone opposing the proposition.’’ To 

avoid the veterans’ lobby amendment, arrangements were made for another Democrat, ‘‘an ardent veterans’ supporter,’’ to seek to be recognized in order to move to recommit the entire 

bill. Rainey, as prearranged, recognized this man 

and, as expected, his motion was defeated, but 

the terms of the rule had been satisfied on this 

point. When the Member with the veterans’ 

lobby amendment protested, contending that he 

believed he had caucus agreement that he would 

have an opportunity to offer his amendment to 

the recommitted measure, ‘‘Rainey coldly replied 

that he had no knowledge of a binding agreement.’’ Moreover, he voted with those approving 

the bill. Thus, ‘‘the Speaker used his right to recognize with decisive effect, and saved the administration from an embarrassing defeat during its 

first few days in office.’’ 85

On another occasion, ‘‘Rainey used his influence as Speaker to block legislation that was not 

a part of the President’s urgent program.’’ As the 

Senate began considering an industrial recovery 

bill limiting labor to a 5-day week and 6-hour 

day, ‘‘Rainey predicted that if it should pass the 

Senate, it would be sidetracked in the House 

temporarily to clear the way for more urgent 

bills.’’ When a companion bill to the Senate legislation was reported in the House, ‘‘Rainey was 

not inclined to give the matter preferential treatment on the House floor, and supported the administration in its demand for considerable revision.’’ During the delay, the White House developed its own measure—to be known as the National Industrial Recovery Act—embracing the 

reduced labor hours objectives of the competing 

House and Senate 30-hour week bills.86

Once the new measure was ready, Rainey announced that 

both the thirty-hour week bills had been put on ice. Several 

House committees wanted jurisdiction over the new bill. The 

Speaker assigned it to the Ways and Means Committee, although it was not directly a revenue measure. Rainey used 

his discretionary power in assigning bills to committee to 

foster the Roosevelt program. By the close of the session, the 

bill for industrial self-government was ready for the President’s signature. The thirty-hour measures were left in 

limbo.87

Not every piece of Presidential legislation offered to achieve economic recovery, however, required the Speaker’s attention. For example, to 

enact Roosevelt’s ‘‘federal emergency relief, supervision of stock market operations, relief of 

small home owners, and railroad reorganization 

and relief’’ proposals, ‘‘Rainey’s services as master 

parliamentarian were not needed.’’ Nonetheless, 

the Chief Executive was appreciative of the assistance he provided. 

Rainey had identified himself fully with the President’s 

program. While the Speaker is not called upon to vote during 

roll calls, the Illinoisan established a record by being 

enscribed as supporting New Deal measures on twenty-three 

separate occasions during the hundred days. At the close of 

the session, Roosevelt made a point of thanking the legislators through Rainey for their cooperation and teamwork in 

meeting the nation’s problems.88

When the House convened in January 1934 to 

begin the 2d session of the 73d Congress, Rainey 

predicted ‘‘a short, harmonious and constructive 

session.’’ The approaching fall elections, however, 

provided House Members a clear and understandable reason to assert themselves to gain visibility 

and an individual record that would justify being 

returned to office. This situation, together with 

the ‘‘presidential decision to outline needed legislation in his annual message and let Congress 

iron out the details proved a detriment to a short 

and harmonious session, but it was nonetheless 

a productive term.’’ 89

Speakers, Presidents, and National Emergencies 209 

90 Ibid., pp. 189–191. 

91Ibid., pp. 191–192. 92 Ibid., pp. 192–194. 

As the session got underway, Rainey soon engendered Presidential displeasure on three issues. 

The first involved a bill providing special consideration for silver in financial transactions. In 

March, Rainey publicly praised the recently reported measure, and said it would likely pass the 

House and not incur White House objection. In 

fact, both the President and Secretary of the 

Treasury Henry Morgenthau were, by one estimate, ‘‘horrified at this bill’s implications.’’ 

Rainey subsequently got into a heated public dispute with Morgenthau over silver policy, moved 

the controversial silver bill, and was surprised by 

its approval by the House, which necessitated 

White House efforts to strike a compromise on 

the legislation in the Senate. More tension between the Speaker and the President ensued, but 

Roosevelt ultimately obtained sufficient compromise on the disputed legislation in the Senate 

that a veto was avoided. ‘‘The silver inflation debate was the only major occasion on which the 

Speaker differed markedly with the President,’’ 

but it was the first of three controversies that 

left Roosevelt with less than full confidence in 

Rainey.90

The second controversy involved legislation— 

the Patman bonus bill—authorizing an immediate payment to World War I veterans based 

upon their service certificates. During the latter 

half of February, supporters of the bonus bill obtained the requisite number of signatures on a 

discharge petition to force the measure out of 

committee. At that time, the President warned 

the House, through Rainey, that it was not the 

appropriate time to approve such legislation. 

Both Rainey and Roosevelt were unwilling to expend the $2.4 billion authorized by the bill. 

When some question arose as to whether or not 

the President would allow the proposal to become law without his signature, Rainey wrote for 

clarification and received what became a highly 

public and unequivocal response from Roosevelt 

saying he would veto the legislation. The House, 

nonetheless, elected to follow an independent 

course and, in early March, voted by a 3 to 1 margin to approve the discharge petition. Thereafter, 

the House approved the bonus bill on a 295 to 

125 vote, but when it arrived in the Senate, it 

was reported adversely and died without a floor 

vote. Nonetheless, ‘‘Rainey had been unsuccessful 

in getting the House to follow the President’s 

guiding hand.’’ 91

The third controversy arose with the Independent Offices Appropriations bill and adherence to the President’s economy program. In 

early January, ‘‘Rainey had pledged that the 

House would keep ‘absolutely’ within the budget 

recommendation limits submitted by the President,’’ which was done when the Independent 

Offices measure was considered, but ‘‘only by an 

adroit series of parliamentary moves.’’ As passed 

by the House, the bill was ‘‘perfectly acceptable 

to the President.’’ Senate leaders were unsuccessful in their efforts to defeat amendments providing for the restoration of government employee pay cuts. When the legislation came back 

to the House, Rainey did not follow custom and 

send it to a conference committee, but took the 

somewhat unusual step of referring it back to the 

committee of origin, presumably to be crafted 

into a version acceptable to both the Senate and 

the President. The Appropriations Committee, 

however, declined to redraft the Senate version, 

and Democratic leaders failed in two caucuses to 

bind their House Members to ignore the Senate 

amendments to the legislation. When the Rules 

Committee reported a special rule on the measure 

that would have sent it to a conference committee without instructions from the House, the 

rule was overwhelmingly defeated. The bill was 

then open to amendment from the House floor, 

and among those successfully added was the full 

restoration of veterans’ benefits reduced by the 

Economy Act of 1933. Ultimately, House amendments added $228 million to the President’s 

original recommendations, which both Houses 

accepted. The President, however, did not, and 

he vetoed the bill. Rainey confidently predicted 

the veto would be sustained, but he completely 

misjudged the situation. The House voted 310 to 

72 to override, with no fewer than 209 Democrats bolting.92

In the aftermath of this tumult—‘‘Rainey 

helped to lead one revolt and was unsuccessful 

in halting the two others’’—speculation and 

210 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

93 Ibid., p. 197. 94 Ibid., pp. 202–203. 95 Peters, The American Speakership, p. 119. 96Ann B. Irish, A Political Biography: Joseph W. Byrns of Tennessee 

(Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 2001), pp. 190–199. 

97 Ibid., p. 193. 98 Ibid., p. 196. 99 Ibid., p. 202. 100 Ibid., pp. 216–217. 101Ibid., pp. 220–221. 

rumor soon arose that the President was sufficiently displeased with his party’s House leaders 

that he would welcome a change. Emerging from 

a White House meeting in April, Rainey volunteered that the President ‘‘wanted me to stay 

where I am’’ as Speaker of the House.93 After the 

2d session of the 73d Congress ended in midJune, Rainey embarked upon an extensive speaking tour as an ambassador for the New Deal. On 

August 10, due to fatigue and a slight cold, he 

elected to be admitted to a hospital in St. Louis 

for a few days’ rest. Speaker Rainey died unexpectedly on August 19, 1934, 1 day short of his 

74th birthday.94

SPEAKER JOSEPH W. BYRNS.—An attorney 

and former member of the Tennessee legislature, 

Joe Byrns was elected to the House in 1908 as 

a Democrat and served in the 61st and 13 succeeding Congresses. During the 72d Congress, he 

chaired the Appropriations Committee. He was 

among those who sought the speakership for the 

73d Congress, and was made floor leader by the 

coalition that elected Rainey as Speaker. Although he was part of the House leadership that 

had displeased the President in 1934, his party 

colleagues in the House had high regard for him, 

not only as their floor leader, but also as the 

chairman of their Congressional Campaign Committee. ‘‘With his help,’’ it has been observed, 

‘‘the Democrats had actually increased their representation in the House in the off-year election 

of 1934,’’ with the result that many in his party 

who had been returned to their seats or were 

newcomers ‘‘felt themselves indebted to him.’’ 95

Many newspapers expected Byrns to be the next 

Speaker after Rainey’s death. He had a few competitors for the position, the strongest of whom 

might have been Sam Rayburn of Texas, but he 

subsequently withdrew for several reasons, not 

the least of which was his State’s control of several committee chairmanships and the Vice Presidency. Ultimately, the same coalition of northeastern, border, and midwestern Democrats who 

had installed Rainey as Speaker elected Byrns, 

with southern supporters, to that position.96

While some of the President’s ‘‘brains trust’’ 

advisers urged him to announce his support for 

Rayburn, whom they favored as Speaker, Roosevelt remained discreetly silent about the contest. By one estimate, ‘‘Byrns was probably not 

his preference, but he may have thought that 

Byrns would win.’’ 97 Nonetheless, ‘‘among all 

the candidates for the speakership, the only one 

who had stood with FDR in opposition to the 

jveteransk bonus in the previous session had 

been Byrns.’’ 98 Moreover, ‘‘Byrns was known for 

party loyalty, for always being a regular party 

supporter. While he had served as majority leader,’’ it has been observed, ‘‘his strong and continuing support of New Deal legislation, even 

those measures which he philosophically opposed, illustrated his party loyalty.’’ 99 In a radio 

address given shortly after the convening of the 

74th Congress, Speaker Byrns indicated that it 

was ‘‘not the function of Congress to initiate executive policies.’’ That was the President’s responsibility, and Congress ‘‘is and should be 

proud to accept his leadership,’’ he said. Of the 

issues he foresaw ahead, he hoped a noninflationary way could be found to pay the veterans’ bonus.100

Byrns soon brought the bonus question before 

the House, the legislative solution being to provide the necessary $2 billion by printing more 

money—a clearly inflationary course of action. 

He was among the 90 Members who voted 

against the legislation. In the aftermath of Senate 

approval of the bill, the President personally delivered his veto message to a joint session of the 

two Houses of Congress when, at the conclusion 

of his remarks, he handed the rejected legislation 

to Byrns. Immediately thereafter, the House 

voted overwhelmingly to override the veto, ‘‘but 

Byrns was one of the 98 in opposition.’’ The next 

day, the Senate vote for an override was insufficient, but Speaker Byrns’ loyalty to the President 

was, by then, on the record.101

Byrns next became involved in negotiating a 

massive emergency relief appropriations bill. 

Many House Members wanted to specify the 

Speakers, Presidents, and National Emergencies 211 

102 Ibid., pp. 221–222. 103 Ibid., pp. 223–224. 104 Ibid., p. 224. 

105 Ibid., p. 226. 106 Ibid., p. 227. 107 Ibid., p. 232. 108 Ibid., pp. 241–242. 109 Ibid., pp. 242–243. 

kinds of jobs that would be created by the legislation, thereby limiting the discretionary authority of Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, 

whom they felt was unresponsive to congressional 

concerns. In a meeting on this matter, Roosevelt, 

Byrns, and Appropriations Committee Chairman 

James Buchanan reached a compromise: the 

funds would be appropriated without directions 

to the President regarding their expenditure, but 

the President would allocate the money himself 

rather than designating Ickes to perform this 

task. Byrns obtained caucus agreement to the 

compromise and the bill received overwhelming 

party support, with only 10 Democrats voting 

against it in the House. ‘‘Byrns had held his 

party in line; here was an example of his ability 

to forge consensus among the very different kinds 

of Democrats in the House.’’ He and Vice President Garner subsequently intervened with the 

conference committee on the legislation to obtain 

a version acceptable to the President.102

Next came the Social Security Program. Byrns 

exerted his influence early, referring the legislation to the Ways and Means Committee, whose 

members he perceived were more favorable to the 

proposal than the skeptical members of the Labor 

Committee. When there was hesitation to report 

the bill, Byrns convinced committee members 

‘‘that if they wanted to kill the measure, it 

should be defeated on the floor during public debate, not in a secret committee session.’’ On the 

matter of a rule for bringing the legislation to 

the floor, ‘‘Byrns insisted the debate be as open 

as possible so that members would feel trusted, 

not coerced.’’ He ‘‘based his desire for an open 

debate on the social security bill on assurance 

from Pat Boland’s whip organization that the bill 

would pass.’’ Indications were that an alternative 

plan to the President’s proposal did not have 

much support. Such proved to be the case; Byrns’ 

strategy succeeded.103

The House had to consider a number of additional important bills, and in expediting (or blocking) them, the speaker 

was influential mostly in little-noticed ways. These included 

persuading committees to finish their consideration so that 

bills could come to the floor, helping convince the Rules 

Committee to schedule bills for floor debate, and urging efficient floor consideration.104

The President’s gratification with Byrns became apparent in early May 1935 when ‘‘Roosevelt lightheartedly scolded Senate leaders, suggesting they could learn from Speaker Byrns’s 

methods and adopt legislation more expeditiously.’’ 105 When illness prevented William 

Bankhead from carrying out his duties as Democratic floor leader, Byrns sometimes functioned 

as Speaker and majority leader, ‘‘and won compliments for his dual leadership role during 

Bankhead’s absence.’’ 106

When the sometimes fractious House came to 

the close of the 1st session of the 74th Congress 

in late August, it was clearly evident that ‘‘Byrns 

had helped the administration achieve its goals,’’ 

the last 3 months being so productive that many 

termed them the ‘‘second hundred days.’’ 107

Returning from travel in Asia late in the year, 

Byrns foresaw ‘‘nothing on the horizon that 

should cause any controversies’’ in the next session, but quickly added that ‘‘one never knows 

what is going to happen in the legislative halls 

at Washington.’’ The unforeseen did burst on the 

scene a few days after the new session got underway: the Supreme Court invalidated the Agricultural Adjustment Act, with the result that the 

Nation was left with no farm program. Byrns arranged for efficient House consideration and passage of a constitutionally acceptable replacement 

program.108

More predictable was the early reappearance of 

veterans’ bonus legislation. The track record on 

this issue was familiar by now, and support for 

such legislation was strengthened by a modest 

upturn in the economy and a looming national 

election. Byrns thought the passage of such a bill 

was inevitable. The White House may have concurred, but when the measure was sent to the 

President, he perfunctorily vetoed it, only to have 

his rejection overridden by both houses.109

Due, in part, to Bankhead’s return to perform 

his floor leader duties, ‘‘Byrns was not nearly as 

prominent in the 1936 session as he had been a 

year earlier,’’ and ‘‘because the long 1935 session 

had been so productive, the 1936 session saw less 

212 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

110 Ibid., p. 249. 111Ibid., p. 252. 112 Peters, The American Speakership, p. 120. 113 Ibid. 114 Irish, A Political Biography, p. 249. 

115Walter J. Heacock, ‘‘William B. Bankhead and the New Deal,’’ 

Journal of Southern History, vol. 21, August 1955, p. 354. 116 Ibid., p. 355; see also Kenneth S. Davis, FDR: Into the Storm, 

Üéàå–ÜéâÖ: A History (New York: Random House, 1993), pp. 84–87. 117Heacock, ‘‘William B. Bankhead and the New Deal,’’ p. 356. 118 Ibid.; see, generally, Richard Polenberg, Reorganizing Roosevelt’s 

Government: The Controversy Over Executive Reorganization, Üéàã–Üéàé 

(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966). 

controversy and less necessity for a speaker to use 

his position publicly to achieve a result.’’ As it 

happened, ‘‘Byrns had no chance to compile his 

own summary of this session’s accomplishments,’’ 

it has been observed, ‘‘but he must have felt satisfaction as he saw the Seventy-fourth Congress 

meeting the goals he had suggested at the outset 

of his speakership.’’ 110 Approximately 2 weeks 

prior to the end of the Congress, Speaker Byrns 

died suddenly on June 4, 1936. 

SPEAKER WILLIAM B. BANKHEAD.—Advised 

by the House Parliamentarian of the need for a 

new Speaker in order that the business of the 

74th Congress could be concluded, House leaders 

turned to Will Bankhead.111 An attorney, State 

legislator, and city attorney of Huntsville, 

Bankhead was first elected to the House of Representatives from Alabama in 1915, serving in the 

65th and 11 succeeding Congresses. His father 

had been a Member of the House and the Senate, 

and during his own service in the House, his 

brother was a Senator. Unsuccessful in his bid 

to become House majority leader in 1932, he became the acting chairman and then chairman of 

the Rules Committee during the 74th Congress. 

Two years later, his election as majority leader 

was secured. In his later congressional career, 

Bankhead was beset by health problems. He suffered major heart attacks in 1932 and 1935, and 

‘‘labored with a weak heart during the remainder 

of his life.’’ 112 As a consequence, Bankhead 

formed a close working relationship with his 

deputy, Majority Leader Sam Rayburn. ‘‘Working in close cooperation with the administration, 

Sam Rayburn,’’ according to one assessment, 

‘‘provided the strength that Bankhead lacked.’’ 113

At the time of the death of Speaker Byrns in 

June 1936, the ‘‘Depression continued, but people 

had confidence that their federal government was 

working to end their distress.’’ 114 For many, the 

sense of desperation within the country had subsided and the relief legislation Congress was 

being asked to enact by the Roosevelt administration was of a smaller quantity and somewhat 

less urgent character than the New Deal proposals of 1933–1934. Indeed, the exclusively domestic focus of the first Roosevelt administration 

was supplemented with growing defense and foreign policy considerations during the second 

term. It was in this changing policy environment 

that Bankhead played his leadership role. 

Bankhead’s party loyalty was beyond question; the high 

regard in which he was held by minority leaders Bertrand 

H. Snell and Joseph W. Martin, Jr. and others is a testimony 

to his fairness as a presiding officer. His congressional colleagues remember him as the only Speaker who could get 

order in the House merely by standing up. Gavel rapping 

was seldom necessary. He followed House precedent and seldom made a formal speech. When he did leave the chair to 

speak in behalf of a particular bill, he was listened to with 

much more than usual interest.115

Bankhead’s efforts (and those of Rayburn) to 

assist the White House with securing the passage 

of legislation addressing the emergency conditions of the Great Depression were complicated, 

and sometimes hampered, by other legislative 

issues and the President’s demands regarding 

them. For example, ‘‘the congressional leaders 

were not consulted and knew nothing of the 

President’s explosive judiciary reorganization 

plan until they were called to the White House 

a few hours before it was made public.’’ 116 Subsequently, among the more ‘‘serious consequences’’ 

of this legislation was ‘‘the split it produced in 

the Democratic ranks’’ with the result that ‘‘congressional leaders encountered unexpected opposition to less controversial administration measures.’’ 117 The President’s executive reorganization 

legislation, which was proposed shortly after his 

judiciary reorganization plan was unveiled, was 

affected, the bill being perceived ‘‘as giving the 

President dictatorial power.’’ The executive reorganization legislation ‘‘continued to be a headache for Bankhead and other party leaders until 

a greatly watered-down version was passed in 

1939.’’ 118

Other fractious issues militating against 

Bankhead’s efforts to gain support for the President’s relief proposals included the Ludlow resoVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00222 Fmt 8165 Sfmt 8165 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.013 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
Speakers, Presidents, and National Emergencies 213 

119 Davis, FDR: Into the Storm, Üéàå–ÜéâÖ, pp. 189–190, 392–394, 399– 

415, 449–458. 120Heacock, ‘‘William B. Bankhead and the New Deal,’’ p. 357. 121 D.B. Hardeman and Donald C. Bacon, Rayburn: A Biography 

(Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1987), p. 245. 122Heacock, ‘‘William B. Bankhead and the New Deal,’’ p. 358. 123 55 Stat. 795. 

124 55 Stat. 796, 797. 125 49 Stat. 1081, 1152; 50 Stat. 121. 126 54 Stat. 4. 

lution, which proposed to amend the Constitution to require a national referendum to validate 

any congressional declaration of war and neutrality legislation.119 ‘‘The year 1938,’’ by one estimate, ‘‘saw the culmination of domestic reforms 

and the shifting of attention to international affairs.’’ 120 Bankhead served Roosevelt as a legislative leader through the President’s second term. 

He was not the only such leader consulted by 

the President. ‘‘Roosevelt, preferring to deal with 

Congress in his own way, frequently chose to 

consult directly with chairmen whose committees 

held the fate of his program,’’ and, it was said, 

by engaging in such consultations, ‘‘FDR embarrassed Bankhead to demonstrate his own dominance over Congress.’’ 121 Although Bankhead was 

not among those ‘‘urging the President to seek 

re-election, he announced his full support of the 

Roosevelt program and his readiness to support 

the President should he decide to seek another 

term.’’ 122 At the July 1940 Democratic National 

Convention in Chicago, he stood as a candidate 

to be Roosevelt’s Vice Presidential running mate, 

but was not successful. Nonetheless, he subsequently called upon all Democrats to support the 

party ticket. Following his own advice, Speaker 

Bankhead, about to launch the Democratic campaign in Maryland with a speech in Baltimore, 

collapsed suddenly in his hotel room and died 

a few days later on September 15, 1940. 

WORLD WAR II

At the time of Speaker Bankhead’s death, nations of Europe had been at war for 12 months, 

and Japan’s aggression in China had been underway for an even longer period of time. The formal entry of the United States into World War 

II occurred on December 8, 1941, with a declaration of war against Japan in response to the attack on Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands and 

other U.S. possessions that had occurred the previous day.123 Three days later, on December 11, 

war was declared against Germany and Italy.124

As a result of the 1940 elections, President Roosevelt had been returned to office for an unprecedented third term. 

During Roosevelt’s first and second Presidential terms (1933–1940), as totalitarian regimes 

began threatening the peace of Europe and Asia, 

Congress adopted a series of Neutrality Acts restricting arms shipments and travel by American 

citizens on the vessels of belligerent nations.125

Two months after war commenced in Europe in 

September 1939, Congress, at the President’s request, modified the neutrality law by repealing 

the arms embargo and authorizing ‘‘cash and 

carry’’ exports of arms and munitions to belligerent powers.126 Some advanced weapons—aircraft carriers and long-range bombers—were procured for ‘‘defensive’’ purposes. More bold during 

the period of professed neutrality was the President’s unilateral transfer of 50 retired American 

destroyers to Great Britain in exchange for 

American defense bases in British territories located in the Caribbean. The President also negotiated a series of defense agreements whereby 

American troops were either stationed on foreign 

territory or were utilized to replace the troops 

of nations at war in nonbelligerent tasks so that 

these countries might commit their own military 

personnel to combat. Such was the case with 

Canada when, in August 1940, it was announced 

that the U.S. Navy, in effect, would police the 

Canadian and American coasts, providing mutual 

defense to both borders. Canadian seamen would, 

of course, be released to aid the British Navy. 

In April 1941, American military and naval personnel, with the agreement of Denmark, were located in Greenland. In November, the Netherlands concurred with the introduction of American troops into Dutch Guiana. 

With the declarations of war and the impending international crisis, Roosevelt, by one estimate, became ‘‘a President who went beyond 

Wilson and even Lincoln in the bold and successful exertion of his constitutional and statutory 

powers.’’ Congress ‘‘gave the President all the 

power he needed to wage a victorious total war, 

but stubbornly refused to be shunted to the back 

214 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

127Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship, p. 265; for a catalog of emergency powers granted to the President during the period of the war, 

see U.S. Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, Acts of Congress Applicable in Time of Emergency, Public Affairs Bulletin 35 (Washington: Legislative Reference Service, 1945). 128Roland Young, Congressional Politics in the Second World War 

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), pp. 4–5. 129Heacock, ‘‘William B. Bankhead and the New Deal,’’ p. 357. 

130 Josephy, On the Hill, p. 336. 131Ibid. 132Young, Congressional Politics in the Second World War, p. 19; concerning the Truman committee, see Donald H. Riddle, The Truman 

Committee: A Study in Congressional Responsibility (New Brunswick, NJ: 

Rutgers University Press, 1964); Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Diary of Democracy: The Senate War Investigating Committee (New York: Richard 

R. Smith, 1947); Theodore Wilson, ‘‘The Truman Committee, 1941,’’ 

in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and Roger Bruns, eds., Congress Investigates: A Documented History, Üåéá–Üéåâ, vol. 4 (New York: Chelsea 

House, 1975), pp. 3115–3136. 

of the stage by the leading man.’’ The Supreme 

Court ‘‘gave judicial sanction to whatever powers 

and actions the President and Congress found 

necessary to the prosecution of the war, and then 

post bellum had a lot of strong but unavailing 

things to say about the limits of the Constitution-at-War.’’ 127

THE HOUSE ENVIRONMENT.—The 1940 elections gave the Democrats large majorities in the 

House (268 to 162) and Senate (66 to 28). As a 

result of the 1942 elections, these margins narrowed in the House (218 to 208), although less 

so in the Senate (58 to 37). The 1944 elections 

strengthened the Democratic majority in the 

House (242 to 190), but resulted in only a slight 

change in the Senate (56 to 38). 

Once war came, Congress quickly adjusted itself to the 

conditions of war, and it was by no means the anachronism 

that many—including some of its own members—predicted 

it would be. Issues were raised which needed to be resolved 

politically, and, as before the war, the President and the government agencies continued to ask Congress for funds and 

for authority. The President was given great powers, but he 

was not a dictator, and Congress did not become a rubber 

stamp in delegating power. The relationship with the President and the numerous war agencies raised many problems, 

for though it was agreed that the prosecution of the war came 

within the province of the President, Congress did not wish 

to delegate all authority over domestic issues to the expanding bureaucracy. A wartime President was expected to have 

more power, to be able to act without certain congressional 

restraints, but once this major premise was granted, the allowable sphere of congressional action had still to be determined.128

In the House, Speaker Bankhead and Majority 

Leader Rayburn had encountered determined opposition to administration legislation from southern Democrats in 1938, but, ‘‘when administration foreign policy was involved, the South was 

inclined to be cooperative.’’ 129 Such cooperation 

generally became more widespread as war erupted in Europe late the following year, and culminated in the declarations of war in December 

1941. When the 1942 elections reduced the 

Democratic majority in the House, ‘‘sniping at 

the administration increased’’ during the 78th 

Congress.130 The wartime bureaucracy was a primary object of attack and derision. 

In the growing tensions and frustrations of the war economy, citizens registered complaints of every kind to their 

Congressmen—against administrative ineptitudes, against 

highhanded bureaucrats, controls, and rationing, against the 

forty-hour week and strikes, and against real or assumed injustices to relatives in the armed forces. Many members of 

both houses were quick to champion such causes, waging 

something of a guerrilla war in the two chambers and 

through the newspapers and radio against war agencies and 

their administrators. Much of the drumfire was of more than 

momentary significance, for it reflected a growing offensive 

to try to dismantle Roosevelt’s prewar domestic reforms and 

halt any moves that tended to impose new social ideas.131

It also contributed to a phenomenon, described below, which often produced consternation and discomfort for both the administration 

and the principal congressional leaders of the 

President’s political party. 

The proliferation of investigation committees was one of 

the singular characteristics of the war Congress. The emphasis 

on investigation, on the control of policy after the passage 

of an Act, was a spontaneous congressional reaction, as it 

were, to the increasing number of activities with which the 

administrative branch was concerned. At the beginning of the 

war, the major investigation committees were the Truman 

Committee (Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program), which was interested in questions 

relating to production; the Tolan Committee (House Committee on Inter-state Migration), which broadened its activities from migratory labor to include also general problems 

relating to the organization of production; the Murray and 

Patman Committees (Senate and House Committees on Small 

Business); the Maloney Committee (Senate Special Committee 

to Investigate Gasoline and Fuel-Oil Shortages); and the 

House and Senate Committees on Military Affairs and on 

Naval Affairs. There was considerable overlapping of committee interests inasmuch as jurisdictions were not precisely 

determined. Some dozen different committees were concerned 

with such controversial subjects as rubber production; manpower policy was considered by the Labor Committee as well 

as by the Military Affairs, Appropriations, Judiciary, and Agricultural Committees, and by the Truman and Tolan Committees.132

Generally, the congressional situation did not 

improve as the prospects for victory in Europe 

Speakers, Presidents, and National Emergencies 215 

133Josephy, On the Hill, p. 338. 134 Peters, The American Speakership, p. 123. 135 Ibid., p. 120. 136 Ibid., pp. 118–119. 137 Ibid., p. 121. 

138Booth Mooney, Roosevelt and Rayburn: A Political Partnership 

(Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1971), p. 147. 139 Ibid., p. 155. 140 Ibid. 141 See, generally, Warren F. Kimball, The Most Unsordid Act: LendLease, Üéàé–ÜéâÜ (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969). 

and the Pacific steadily became stronger during 

1943 and 1944 and Roosevelt’s return to the 

White House for a fourth Presidential term grew 

more likely. By one estimate, the ‘‘1944 session 

of Congress, attuned to the presidential election 

of that year, was more partisan and quarrelsome 

than the one of the year before.’’ 133 In the subsequent playout of history, Roosevelt retained the 

Presidency and his party increased its majority 

hold on the House, but his tenure in office ended 

suddenly on April 12, 1945, with his death in 

Warm Springs, GA. Shortly thereafter, on May 

8, came the Allies’ victory in Europe, followed 

by victory over Japan on August 15. 

SPEAKER SAM RAYBURN.—First elected to the 

speakership on September 16, 1940, to succeed 

the fallen Will Bankhead, Samuel T. Rayburn remained in this position throughout the years of 

World War II, and subsequently became the 

longest serving Speaker—over 17 years—in 

American history. A Texas attorney and State 

legislator, he was first elected to the House in 

1912 as a Democrat, serving in the 63d and the 

24 succeeding Congresses. Rayburn became the 

chairman of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee during the 72d Congress and 

remained in that leadership position for the next 

two Congresses. In this capacity, he had endeared 

himself to the Roosevelt administration by assisting with the passage of some of the most controversial New Deal legislation.134 Moreover, 

within a few years after entering the House, Rayburn became a protege of the influential John 

Nance Garner, who became an intermediary to 

the House for President Wilson, Speaker of the 

House (1931–1932), and Vice President (1933– 

1941).135 His close ties to Roosevelt and Garner, 

as well as his being a member of the powerful 

Texas congressional delegation, militated against 

his initial attempts to gain a top House leadership position in 1934.

136 ‘‘Speaker Byrns’s death 

in 1936 opened the door for Rayburn,’’ it has 

been said, ‘‘and Speaker Bankhead’s death four 

years later closed it behind him.’’ 137 Moreover, 

his long experience in the House would serve 

him well. Indeed, according to one considered 

view, ‘‘Sam Rayburn entered upon the duties of 

Speaker of the House with better training for the 

speakership than any of the forty-two men who 

had preceded him.’’ 138

The House environment initially encountered 

by Speaker Rayburn in 1941 was familiar from 

his recent majority leader experience. ‘‘The 

Democratic majority was substantial, but it included a number of members who were prepared 

to oppose the administration on almost any given 

issue,’’ according to one assessment.139 Moreover, 

there were dangerous cross currents at work. 

The delicate situation was made more so by the necessity 

of winning congressional acceptance of a shift in the official 

government posture toward the war in Europe. The President, while pushing for a strong defense program, had sedulously endeavored to turn popular thinking away from the 

possibility that the nation might become involved in armed 

combat.140

The President quickly tested Rayburn’s skills 

as a legislative manager working on his behalf. 

In early January, administration draftsmen began 

developing a bill authorizing the President to 

have the Armed Forces place orders for such defense articles as they required, as well as for such 

additional quantities of such materials as the 

United States might lend or lease to other nations. Great Britain, which had just repelled savage and sustained German air attacks, would be 

the immediate beneficiary. Rayburn contributed 

to perfecting the final version of the lend-lease 

legislation, which was introduced by Majority 

Leader John McCormack as H.R. 1776, ‘‘A Bill 

to Further Promote the Defense of the United 

States.’’ 141

The bill defined defense articles so broadly as to make 

nearly anything a defense article if the President said so. It 

authorized the Chief Executive to order any government official to have manufactured in arsenals, shipyards, factories or 

to procure in any way any defense article for the use of any 

country the President named—‘‘notwithstanding the provisions of other laws.’’ The President also could order any defense article to be sold, exchanged, transferred, leased, lent, 

or tested, inspected, proved, repaired, outfitted or reconditioned, for the use of any party he might name—again without regard to other laws. The bill provided that defense inforVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00225 Fmt 8165 Sfmt 8165 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.013 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
216 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

142 Mooney, Roosevelt and Rayburn, p. 159. 143 Ibid., pp. 160–162. 144 55 Stat. 31. 145 Mooney, Roosevelt and Rayburn, pp. 164–165. 

146Alfred Steinberg, Sam Rayburn: A Biography (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1975), pp. 171–172. 147Hardeman and Bacon, Rayburn, p. 272. 148 Ibid., p. 279. 

mation might be communicated to any government the 

President named and that any defense article could be released for export to any country he named. And it authorized 

the President to issue such orders as he considered necessary 

to carry out any part of the act.142

Rayburn began gathering votes in support of 

the legislation. He could count on the southern 

Democrats, who were ‘‘almost unanimously 

interventionist while the Republicans were hopelessly split.’’ After canvassing other colleagues, he 

perfected four specific modifications, to be approved in committee, which would garner additional votes for the measure on the floor. ‘‘Rayburn thought it might also be well, as an insurance measure, to do some trading with representatives from farm states by providing that cash 

payments would be made for food and other raw 

materials provided under terms of the bill.’’ Finally, ‘‘during the two days of debate Rayburn 

successfully stifled efforts by isolationist members to amend it into innocuousness.’’ The House 

adopted the legislation in early February by a 

margin of almost 100 votes.143 It was subsequently signed into law on March 11, 1941.

144

An even more daunting task, however, soon 

fell to Rayburn. The military conscription law 

enacted in September 1940, providing that Army 

draftees would be in uniform for only 1 year of 

training, would expire unless it was statutorily 

extended before the end of August. In continuing 

the draft law, Roosevelt wanted to extend tours 

of service to 18 months. Opposition to extending 

the law was widespread and highly emotional. 

Initially, Rayburn personally appealed to many 

of his colleagues, being ‘‘no less convinced than 

Roosevelt that an extension of the draft was imperative for national security.’’ 145 Up to the moment the final vote began, the outcome was uncertain. The clerk completed the first call of 

names and then started the second required call 

to obtain the votes of those who had not initially 

answered. The result was a tie, which meant defeat for the draft extension bill, but many Members were coming to the well of the House to 

be recognized to change their votes. When this 

process reached a point where the vote was 203 

to 202 in favor of the legislation, Rayburn announced the final vote and declared the bill had 

passed. Protests broke out. The Speaker recognized a Member opposed to the bill, who asked 

for a recapitulation of the vote, a purely mechanical examination of the vote to determine that 

each Member had been correctly recorded. When 

this was completed, Rayburn declared there was 

no correction in the vote, ‘‘the vote stands, and 

without objection a motion to reconsider is laid 

on the table.’’ The tabling of the motion to reconsider meant that no reconsideration could 

occur without unanimous consent. The draft extension bill had been saved in the House by a 

single vote and the adroit action of the Speaker.146

In the closing weeks of 1941, Rayburn was instrumental in obtaining passage of amendments 

to the Neutrality Acts which would allow armed 

American merchant ships to enter combat zones 

or the ports of belligerent nations. He gained 

some votes by persuading the President to send 

him a letter making a personal appeal for the 

amendments. This he read on the floor to the 

Members, but, to garner a sufficient number of 

votes for the amendments, he also agreed to 

allow an antistrike bill, which he had blocked 

because he considered it unfair, to come to the 

floor. ‘‘If Rayburn deserved credit for winning repeal of the neutrality restrictions,’’ it was observed, ‘‘he also shared blame for allowing a 

harsh antistrike measure to pass the House a few 

days later.’’ 147 The political climate, necessitating such tradeoffs, would shift significantly 

shortly thereafter with the attack on Pearl Harbor and the entry of the United States into 

World War II. 

United, at least, in their desire to win the war, Democrats 

and Republicans temporarily put aside their differences to 

give Franklin Roosevelt the basic laws he needed to strengthen the war effort. Victories came deceptively easy for the 

House leadership as Congress handed the President vast wartime powers, appropriated staggering sums for the military, 

found new revenue to finance the war by adding some 25 

million Americans to the tax rolls, and expanded the draft 

to include 18-year-olds. ‘‘No administration in time of war 

ever had greater cooperation than we have given the present 

administration,’’ said House Republican Leader Joe Martin.148

Speakers, Presidents, and National Emergencies 217 

149 Steinberg, Sam Rayburn, p. 213. 150 Ibid., p. 215. 151Ibid., pp. 215–220, 222; Hardeman and Bacon, Rayburn, pp. 291– 

297. 152Hardeman and Bacon, Rayburn, p. 301. 

This last action—extending the draft to 18- 

year-olds—was costly for Democrats in the 

House and Rayburn could see the result when 

he convened the 1943 session: 50 Members from 

his party in the previous Congress were gone, 

and his margin over the minority was 11 votes. 

The precariousness of the situation soon became 

apparent when a large number of southern 

Democrats failed to appear on the House floor 

to cast their votes for an initial group of administration bills, causing them to be defeated. Rayburn, however, declined to punish the absentees.149 Nonetheless, his efforts on behalf of the 

administration during the year brought him public praise from both the President and the First 

Lady.150 There was even a fleeting possibility that 

Rayburn might become Roosevelt’s Vice Presidential running mate on the 1944 ticket.151 Rayburn was reelected to the House where he once 

again was installed as Speaker and the Democrats 

again held a 50 vote margin. 

Renewed optimism gripped Washington as 1945 began. It 

promised to be an eventful year. The Democrats firmly controlled Congress. Political appointees could see four more 

years of job security ahead. In Europe, the allies were drawing 

a tight ring around Hitler’s Germany; in the Pacific, U.S. 

Marines were advancing rapidly toward a final showdown 

with Japan. The war would be over in a year, according to 

most predictions.152

Indeed, it was an eventful year: the Presidency 

of Franklin D. Roosevelt came to an end with 

his death, and the end of World War II came 

with the dawning of the Atomic Age. The career 

of Sam Rayburn as Speaker of the House, however, continued for many years after the conclusion of the national emergencies which had first 

tested his leadership. 

218 

1The Speaker does not preside over the Committee of the Whole 

House, where most amendments to legislation are considered. He does 

preside over the House itself on final consideration of legislation, unless he chooses to name a Speaker pro tempore. Speaker Albert usually 

did not name a Speaker pro tempore unless he was unable to preside 

for some reason. Speaker Hastert routinely appoints Speakers pro tempore. 

Chapter 8 

The Changing Speakership 

Ronald M. Peters, Jr. 

Regents’ Professor, Carl Albert Research and Studies Center and 

Department of Political Science, University of Oklahoma 

The speakership is a unique office due to its 

dual institutional and partisan functions. On the 

one hand, the Speaker of the House is its constitutionally designated presiding officer. As 

such, the Speaker has an obligation to preserve 

the prerogatives and respect the integrity of the 

House as a whole and of all of its Members without regard to party affiliation. The Speaker’s 

main parliamentary obligation is to enable the 

House to perform its legislative functions. To the 

office is entrusted the responsibility to facilitate 

the legislative process so that the Congress can 

perform its constitutional role. On the other 

hand, the Speaker is the leader of the majority 

party and is responsible for offering political and 

policy direction, attending to the electoral needs 

of Members of his own party, and enabling his 

party to gain or retain a legislative majority so 

that it can press its policies into public law. 

In the 30 years since the reform movement of 

the early seventies, the speakership has undergone substantial change. The evolving character 

of the office has demonstrated two tendencies: a 

shift in emphasis from the parliamentary role of 

presiding officer to the political role of party 

leader, and a shift in attention from legislation 

to events external to the legislative process. This 

change can be easily illustrated by contrasting 

the way that Speaker Carl Albert (D–OK, Speaker from 1971 to 1977) and current Speaker Dennis 

Hastert (R–IL) allocated their time. Albert presided over the reform movement. A protege of 

Speaker Sam Rayburn (D–TX), Albert bridged 

the transition from the pre-reform to the postreform eras. He straddled the transition from the 

old order to the new, but his orientation toward 

the speakership was distinctly traditional. Albert 

was well known for a punctilious attendance on 

his duties as presiding officer, recognizing Members to speak, ruling on points of order, and so 

forth.1 He was often to be found in the chair, 

and felt that it was the best place to be if one 

wanted to feel the pulse of the institution, as 

Members knew where to find him and would frequently come to visit with him. When not presiding, Albert was typically to be found in his 

office, arriving at 7 each morning and usually not 

leaving the building until the early evening. His 

attendance at political functions was intermittent, and participation in fundraising events was 

rare. Albert did initiate some changes consistent 

with the new order. He proposed a legislative 

agenda, was the first to use an ad hoc committee 

to process legislation, the first to utilize a party 

task force to define a party position, and the first 

to hire a full-time press secretary. Nonetheless, 

The Changing Speakership 219 

2 Jonathan Franzen, ‘‘The Listener,’’ New Yorker, Oct. 6, 2003, pp. 

84–99. 

3Burton D. Sheppard, Rethinking Congressional Reform (New York: 

Schenkman, 1985). 

Albert recognized his obligation to fulfill the 

Speaker’s parliamentary role. This was clearly illustrated in his approach to the impeachment 

proceedings for President Nixon and the handling of Vice President Agnew’s resignation, 

during which Albert was insistent that no partisan advantage be taken. 

Speaker Hastert’s schedule is fuller and his 

days perhaps even longer than Albert’s, but his 

time is spent differently. He is rarely in the 

chair. Instead, his time is spent in an endless series of meetings with members of the extended 

leadership group, members from various committees working on pending legislation, various factional organizations within the Republican conference, staff meetings to develop legislative 

strategy, meetings to set strategies for upcoming 

campaigns and elections, and of course, the meetings, phone calls, receptions, and trips necessary 

to sustain the legislative party’s fundraising base. 

Whereas Speaker Albert had his primary residence in Washington, DC, Speaker Hastert 

maintains his primary residency in his Illinois 

district, and spends many weekends at home 

there.2 Speaker Albert rarely traveled to campaign or to solicit campaign funds; Speaker 

Hastert visits scores of legislative districts each 

year, and is his legislative party’s primary fundraiser. When Hastert was elected Speaker it was 

anticipated that he would take a different approach to the office than had his predecessor, 

Newt Gingrich (R–GA). Gingrich had offered 

himself as a national leader of the Republican 

Party and wanted to use the speakership as a 

platform for his policy positions. He was also the 

field general of the Republican revolution, raising money and campaigning for Members. 

Hastert, in contrast, was to be a ‘‘man of the 

House,’’ returning the House to ‘‘regular order,’’ 

and respecting the prerogatives of the committees. When we consider how Hastert spends his 

time, however, it looks a lot more like Gingrich 

than like Albert. Hastert travels often, has raised 

more money than Gingrich did, and is deeply 

engaged in both legislative and political strategy. 

How did the speakership evolve from Albert 

to Hastert, and what have been among the most 

important aspects of this transformation serving 

to define the speakership today? To address these 

questions, we first discuss the political context 

that defines the speakership today. Then, we consider the changing character of the Speaker’s role 

within the legislative process, the ‘‘inside game.’’ 

Third, we characterize the increasing external demands on the Speaker, the ‘‘outside game.’’ 

Fourth, we assess the relationship between the 

Speaker’s internal and external role in the context 

of what has been called the ‘‘permanent campaign.’’ Fifth, we consider the Speaker’s important relationship to the Presidency. We conclude 

by considering the effect on the speakership of 

political party and the personal characteristics of 

individual Speakers. 

THE POLITICAL CONTEXT

In a stable, democratic regime the process of 

change often occurs so incrementally that we do 

not take note of the changes until they have already occurred. Occasionally, of course, there is 

a sharp break with the past. Such was the case 

when the reform movement fundamentally realigned the power structure in the House, empowering the Speaker and diminishing to a degree the power of the committees. But we can 

now see that the changing character of the speakership was not due to the changes wrought by 

the reform movement as much as it was to an 

underlying realignment in American politics. 

The reformers themselves did not foresee this. 

They were liberal Democrats who wanted to 

break the grip of the southern, conservative committee chairs of their own party; but they certainly had no notion of empowering Republicans.3 They wanted to strengthen the speakership because this would serve their own policy 

goals; but they had no desire to create a ‘‘czar’’ 

for the House. The liberal Democrats believed 

that the majority of the American people supported their policy positions, and that a more 

open and accountable legislative body would embrace those policies; they did not anticipate that 

the more open and accountable process could be 

accessed by conservative Republicans whose aim 

220 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

4 David W. Rhode, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 

5 Dan Balz and Ronald Brownstein, Storming the Gates (Boston: Little 

Brown, 1996). 6At the outset of the 108th Congress there were 229 Republicans, 

205 Democrats, and 1 Independent who organized with the Democrats. 

was to drive them from power. But this is in 

fact what happened. 

The realignment in the American political system that brought about the transition from a 

Congress dominated by the Democrats to one 

that, albeit narrowly divided, is at present under 

Republican control, took a full generation to materialize. It began with the passage of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964 which, as President Johnson 

well understood, opened the door to the South 

to the Republican Party. It was delayed for 20 

years in part because the Watergate scandal enabled the Democrats to seize and subsequently 

to hold a substantial number of previously Republican districts in the elections of 1974 and 

1976. It culminated in the election of Republican 

House and Senate majorities in the 1994 election. 

By the 2000 election, the American people appeared to be about evenly divided in their support of Democrats and Republican; but the constitutional structure gives more square miles to 

the GOP, with the Democrats piling up substantial majorities in congressional districts that are 

stacked on the two coasts and in the big cities 

of the Midwest. With population shifting to the 

South and Southwest, and with the conversion 

of the South from Democratic to Republican control, the political landscape has been radically 

transformed since the reform movement in the 

House of Representatives. One result has been 

the ‘‘homogenization’’ of the two parties.4 Most 

Democrats and Republicans now hold safe seats. 

As the two parties have sorted out the districts, 

each party has become more ideologically homogenous. Democrats are more solidly liberal 

with a small and dwindling number of conservatives; Republicans are now more solidly conservative with a small and dwindling number of 

moderates. Thus, two evenly divided congressional parties face each other across a wider ideological chasm. There are two principal consequences of this: first, each party must place 

greater emphasis on elections in order to hold 

place; second, the majority party (presently the 

Republicans) must gather legislative majorities 

from within its own ranks since it can anticipate 

few, if any, crossover votes from the minority 

(now the Democrats). 

The House of Representatives was a main battleground of this partisan realignment. Beginning with the election of 1978, a new generation 

of younger, more conservative, and more confrontational Republicans came to the House determined to bring to the House a Republican 

majority.5 Their leader was Newt Gingrich. During the eighties, Gingrich and his allies in the 

‘‘Conservative Opportunity Society’’ sought every 

opportunity to challenge the Democrats—their 

policies, their leaders, and their management of 

the House. The Republican’s goal was to turn 

seats held by Democrats into seats held by Republicans. This Republican onslaught forced the 

Democrats to take defensive measures in both the 

legislative and electoral processes. Legislatively, 

the Democrats sought to use their majorities to 

control the House agenda in order to prevent the 

Republicans from forcing floor votes on politically inspired amendments. This greatly enhanced the role of the Speaker and the Rules 

Committee as agents of party governance. 

Electorally, the Democrats sought to strengthen 

their fundraising capacity, candidate recruitment, 

and electoral strategy. As their leader, Speakers 

O’Neill, Wright, and Foley became increasingly 

engaged in electoral activities. These activities 

were not confined to a campaign season, but instead extended through the calendar year with 

planning for the next election beginning as soon 

as the current election was over. 

Since the Republican triumph in the 1994 

elections, party control of the House of Representatives has been up for grabs. The Republican 26-seat majority was initially expanded by 

the recruitment of five party-switching Democrats, but then dwindled with the elections of 

1996 and 1998 to establish the very narrow Republican House majority we observe today.6 In 

the description of Michael Barone: 

The United States at the end of the 20th century was a 

nation divided down the middle. In 1996, Bill Clinton was 

re-elected with 49.2 percent of the vote. That same year, Republicans held the House, as their candidates led Democrats 

The Changing Speakership 221 

7 Michael Barone, ‘‘The 49 Percent Nation,’’ National Journal, June 

8, 2001, pp. 1710–1716. 8The effect of redistricting is not only to secure safe seats for incumbents; it also has the effect of tying those incumbents to primary 

election voters who are typically more partisan than general election 

voters. This accentuates the partisanship in the House. Previously, 

safe-seat incumbents had more leeway to vote against the leadership; 

now they have less. For a recent discussion see Jeffrey Toobin, ‘‘The 

Great Election Grab,’’ New Yorker, Dec. 8, 2003, pp. 63–80. 

9 Sheppard, Rethinking Congressional Reform. See also Ronald M. Peters, Jr., The American Speakership, 2d ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins, 1997), pp. 146–208. 

by 48.9 percent to 48.5 percent. In 1998, Republicans again 

held onto the House, as their candidates led in the popular 

vote by 48.9 percent to 47.8 percent. On November, 7, 

2000—although the final result was not known until 5 weeks 

later—George W. Bush won 47.9 percent of the vote, and 

Al Gore won 48.4 percent. The same day, House Republican 

candidates led Democrats by 49.2 percent to 47.9 percent.7

Congressional redistricting pursuant to the 

2000 census has reinforced the current stalemate. 

The term limits movement reached its zenith in 

the late eighties and early nineties when it appeared that the only incumbent Members of the 

House likely to be defeated were under indictment or the shadow of scandal. In 1988, only six 

incumbents were defeated. The stability of incumbency provided little basis for anticipating 

the Republican victory in 1994. Rapid turnover 

marked the elections of 1990, 1992, 1994, and 

1996. Not only were the two parties narrowly divided, but average seniority plummeted as longserving Members retired or were defeated. Given 

the close competition for control of the House 

one might have expected that a pattern of regular 

turnover, incumbent vulnerability, and changes 

in partisan control might have emerged. Instead, 

the House has become as stable as it was before, 

even though it is more narrowly divided. In the 

2000 redistricting, Republicans and Democrats 

worked at the state and national levels to create 

safe-seat districts for incumbents with the result 

that only a few dozen House seats are competitive in a typical election year. In the 2002 congressional elections, 96 percent of incumbents 

were reelected.8

Thus, the political context in which the speakership functions today is defined by a stable but 

narrow division between the majority Republicans and the minority Democrats. Should the 

Democrats succeed in electing a majority of 

Members in a future election, it seems very likely 

that their majority would be as narrow as that 

which the Republicans now enjoy. The result is 

that the two parties continuously contest power, 

policy, and politics. This has occasioned new 

roles for the Speaker both within the House and 

external to it. 

THE INSIDE GAME

The reform movement offered new power and 

influence to the Speaker.9 The most significant 

change under the rules of the House pertained 

to bill referral. The Speaker was empowered, in 

1975, to offer multiple and sequential referral of 

bills to committees in order to facilitate consideration of legislation that cut across the jurisdictions of the standing committees. Committee 

chairs could no longer stand behind jurisdictional 

claims in order to delay legislation or dictate its 

terms. More important changes occurred within 

the rules of the Democratic Caucus. The Speaker 

was given real control over the Rules Committee, 

naming its chair and designating the majority 

members, making it for the first time since the 

revolt against Speaker Cannon in 1910 a reliable 

arm of the leadership. This meant that the 

Speaker would be able to control terms of floor 

consideration for bills and could keep legislation 

off of the floor entirely by denying a rule. The 

power of naming Democrats to committees was 

transferred from the Democratic Caucus of the 

Ways and Means Committee, which held this responsibility since the days of Champ Clark and 

Oscar Underwood, to the party’s Steering and 

Policy Committee, several members of which 

were named by the Speaker. The Steering and 

Policy Committee also made nominations to the 

Democratic Caucus for committee chairs. Within 

the committees, a bidding process was established for selecting subcommittee chairs, further 

eroding the power of the committee chairs. These 

changes dramatically strengthened the power of 

the Speaker vis-a-vis that of the committees and 

their chairs, as the reformers intended. 

These changes also placed demands upon the 

Speaker. No longer could a Speaker sit back and 

allow others to decide committee assignments, 

chair appointments, bill referrals, and the terms 

of floor consideration. Now the Speaker had to 

take a hand and take a stand. Sam Rayburn had 

been happy to avoid these choices because he 

222 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

10Richard Fenno, Home Style (Boston: Little Brown, 1978); David 

R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, CT: Yale 

University Press, 1974). 11Burdette Loomis, The New American Politician (New York: Basic 

Books, 1988). 12 Fenno, Home Style. 

knew that it would thrust him into the middle 

of conflicts between the southern conservative 

and northern liberal wings of his party. This is 

precisely what happened to Tip O’Neill, Jim 

Wright, and Tom Foley. The initial effect of the 

reforms occurred within the Democratic Caucus 

as the policies of the Carter administration divided the Democrats along ideological and regional lines. 

Tip O’Neill’s use of legislative task forces to 

forge floor majorities was a response to the more 

diffuse legislative environment but also to the 

underlying cleavages among Democrats. O’Neill 

found it necessary to draw upon the powers of 

the speakership to shape the context of legislation. The multiple referral of bills meant that 

compromise would have to be brokered across 

committee and subcommittee jurisdictions. The 

Speaker and his staff had to become involved 

early rather than late in the legislative process. 

The Speaker’s control of the Rules Committee 

meant that he could shape the terms of floor consideration, including the determination of 

amendments to be made in order. Structuring 

floor consideration provided opportunities to negotiate compromise by enabling some amendments and not others. The use of task forces to 

press for passage of key bills or amendments provided a mechanism to push through the compromises that had been made. Thus, the Speaker’s role in the legislative process became much 

more pervasive. 

In addition to changes that empowered party 

leaders, there was also a countertendency during 

this period toward greater autonomy of individual Members. Tip O’Neill’s most famous aphorism was that ‘‘all politics is local.’’ Political 

science ratified this discovery when it found that 

if you wanted to understand the Congress you 

had to understand the relationship between 

Members and their districts.10 In the seventies, 

a new breed of representatives was identified, 

comprised of Members who were found to be 

more autonomous and more entrepreneurial, the 

‘‘new American politician.’’ 11 The decentralization of power in the House reflected the aspirations of such Members. Members learned to work 

their districts by a range of techniques that included good old-fashioned constituency service, 

pork barreling, extensive use of the frank, regular 

trips to the district, occasional townhall meetings, and other novelties such as ‘‘representation 

vans,’’ mobile offices that traveled the district.12

These techniques were developed first by younger 

Democrats elected in the post-Watergate landslides, and they enabled the party to consolidate 

its control as many Democrats hung on to previously Republican districts. This was good news 

for Democratic Speakers. But other aspects of the 

new politics were not so good. Under the terms 

of the Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1974, 

Members could receive campaign contributions 

from individuals and newly defined ‘‘political action committees.’’ This development enabled enterprising Democrats to establish independent 

and secure funding for their campaigns. The result was that Members became less and less dependent on the political parties and the party 

leadership. If all politics is local, then the tug 

of constituency would pull Democrats away from 

centralized party positions and make coalitionbuilding more difficult. That was the challenge 

that Tip O’Neill faced. 

The inside game is affected by outside forces. 

The political terrain fundamentally changed with 

the election of Ronald Reagan and a Republican 

Senate in 1980. During the Carter administration, the Speaker was asked to play offense, 

building majority support for Democratic bills. 

Now, O’Neill was on the defensive. The House 

of Representatives was the last bastion of the 

Democrats facing the Reagan onslaught. Faced 

with the real possibility of losing the House, 

Speaker O’Neill sought means of building greater discipline within the Democratic Caucus. 

Whereas during the Carter administration 

O’Neill had occasionally let the chips fall where 

they may, he could not take that risk when faced 

with Republican proposals. The Republicans 

were to hold the Presidency for 12 years. For 6 

of those years, the House of Representatives was 

the only branch of the government controlled by 

The Changing Speakership 223 

13 Peters, The American Speakership, pp. 209–286; Barbara Sinclair, 

Majority Party Leadership in the U.S. House of Representatives (Baltimore, 

MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983); Barbara Sinclair, ‘‘Tip 

O’Neill and Contemporary House Leadership,’’ in Roger H. Davidson, 

Susan Webb Hammond, and Raymond W. Smock, eds., Masters of 

the House: Congressional Leadership Over Two Centuries (Boulder, CO: 

Westview Press, 1998), pp. 289–318. 14 John Barry, The Ambition and the Power (New York: Viking Press, 

1989); Barbara Sinclair, ‘‘The Emergence of Strong Leadership in the 

U.S. House of Representatives,’’ Journal of Politics, vol. 54, no. 3, Aug. 

1993, pp. 657–683. 

the Democrats. Reaganism would be stopped 

there or not at all. 

The implication for the Speaker’s management 

of the House was twofold: on the one hand, control of the House agenda was now critically important; on the other hand, the balance of power 

now lay with the southern Democrats who had 

organized into the ‘‘Conservative Democratic 

Forum.’’ O’Neill had to reach out to these conservatives while still maintaining the support of 

liberals in opposition to the Reagan proposals. 

During the first year of the Reagan administration Tip O’Neill lost these battles as the southerners, shaky in their districts, jumped ship to 

support Reagan. Thereafter, O’Neill was more 

successful in holding the caucus together behind 

Democratic alternatives. He always lost some 

Democratic votes, but was able to hold a sufficient majority of the party on several key votes. 

Examples include 1981 votes on the Voting 

Rights Act Extension and on the Labor Health 

and Human Services Appropriation bill, and 1982 

votes on emergency housing aid, Medicare funding, and an override of President Reagan’s veto 

of a supplemental appropriations bill. 

The techniques that he used were not by then 

new but were used to new effect. An example 

is the use of the Rules Committee to structure 

floor debate. During the Carter administration 

O’Neill was less concerned with losing votes than 

with politically inspired Republican amendments 

designed to force Democrats on the record on 

controversial issues. Now, he had to worry that 

Republicans might carry comprehensive substitute amendments or motions to recommit bills 

to committee with instructions, another method 

of substituting Democratic bills with Republican 

bills. Thus, in the early eighties the House Rules 

Committee, led by Congressman Richard Bolling 

(D–MO) introduced the use of ‘‘King of the 

Hill’’ rules by which the House would consider 

a series of comprehensive budget proposals, including bills offered by liberal Democrats, by 

conservative Democrats, by the Congressional 

Black Caucus, and by the Republicans, along 

with the bill proposed by the House Budget 

Committee on behalf of the leadership. The last 

bill to pass was to be adopted even if it had fewer 

votes than a previously considered proposal. Naturally, the leadership bill was voted on last. This 

strategy aimed to give as many Democrats as 

possible a vote to take home and a vote that really counted, leaving the Republicans to cavil 

about the process. 

Stringent control of process was the key device. The Democrats had increasing recourse to 

modified rules that limited the number and nature of amendments that could be offered. They 

sought to prevent Republicans from offering 

competitive proposals or amendments that were 

designed to force Democrats from conservative 

districts to cast hard votes. But their main goal 

was to develop legislative alternatives that could 

gather support across the party spectrum. This 

became more important after the 1986 elections 

returned the Democrats to power in the Senate. 

Now, the Democrats could force the action by 

passing party bills that Presidents Reagan and 

Bush would have to sign or veto. While Republican Senators could still mount filibusters, the 

Democrats had more leeway to craft bills that 

could command majorities in both houses of 

Congress. This created a need for even broader 

intra-party communications. The response of 

Speakers O’Neill and Wright was to preside over 

the development of an elaborate organizational 

system that included an expanded Steering and 

Policy Committee, an enlarged whip organization, more extensive use of task forces, and new 

efforts to utilize the Democratic Caucus as an avenue for policy development and intra-party dialog. These collaborative venues and mechanisms 

aimed to build consensus among Democrats in 

order to enact Democratic legislation.13

The culmination of these trends occurred in 

the 100th Congress under the leadership of 

Speaker Jim Wright.14 This Congress was among 

the most productive in recent American history, 

and its agenda was set and driven by Speaker 

Wright and Senate Majority Leader George 

Mitchell (D–ME). In the House, Wright used all 

224 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

of the tools that had evolved under Speaker 

O’Neill, but did so with more determination and 

insistence. Wright set the policy agenda, gave direction to committees, set deadlines for committee consideration of bills, and used the tools 

of floor control to ramrod bills to passage. Using 

this legislative juggernaut (and the fact that the 

Democrats were in some cases spreading benefits 

to Republican districts), the Democrats pushed 

to enactment a number of bills with bipartisan 

support. Many House Republicans chafed under 

the Democratic thumb, equally resentful at the 

Democrats and at President Bush for his unwillingness to stand up for conservative principles. 

Bush signed an extension of the Civil Rights Act 

as well as major environmental bills that included provisions that many Republicans opposed. Many perceived his worst offense was reneging on his pledge against new taxes as part 

of the budget negotiations of 1990. House Republicans initially balked, thus repudiating their 

own President. 

A key moment for Speaker Wright occurred 

in October 1987 when the House was considering 

the budget for the fiscal year already underway. 

The stock market had plunged and there was an 

atmosphere of panic on Wall Street if not in 

Washington. Wright felt that it was imperative 

that Congress act to adopt a budget. However, 

when the Speaker lost the vote on the ‘‘rule’’ 

from the Rules Committee making the deficit reduction bill in order for consideration, he employed a rare tactic that would permit another 

‘‘rule’’ to be taken up on the same day without 

having to obtain the required two-thirds vote. 

(The rule book of the House requires ‘‘rules’’ to 

lay over one day before they can be considered 

on the floor unless that requirement is waived 

by a two-thirds vote of the House.) Wright took 

the extraordinary step of declaring the current 

legislative day adjourned, and declaring a new 

legislative day in session. He then called for a 

new vote on the second rule, which was adopted 

by the House. When, again, the Democrats were 

one vote short, Wright held the vote open until 

a vote was changed. When the voting board 

showed a majority for the Democrats, Wright 

declared the vote over. 

This episode played into the image of Wright 

as a heavy-handed politician that many Republicans were trying to convey to the public with 

their relentless assault on his ethics. And no 

doubt Wright’s actions were extraordinary and 

unusual. But this episode offers only a dramatic 

example of an underlying tendency toward the 

use of procedural control that had evolved since 

the reform movement and certainly throughout 

the eighties. Wright used his formal powers to 

control legislative procedure and used his influence to pressure Members to support the party 

position. Wright’s specific actions were sometimes controversial, but the principle underlying 

them was not: the Speaker was responsible for 

the party’s agenda. 

With Wright’s resignation in 1989, Tom Foley 

(D–WA) became Speaker. Foley was well suited 

to the challenges facing him in two respects. 

First, he was a seasoned product of the new leadership, richly experienced in the techniques of 

intra-party coalition building that had evolved 

under O’Neill and Wright. Second, he took very 

seriously his obligation, as Speaker, to restore a 

sense of comity across party lines. Wright’s resignation, however, only served to whet Gingrich’s appetite, and the Republican attacks on the 

Democrats’ administration of the House continued. Internally, the Republicans challenged 

Democratic management of the House bank, restaurant, and post office. Externally, they called 

for term limits. Foley sought to defend the 

House against these institutional attacks, arguing 

that the vast majority of Members were serious, 

competent, and ethical. Foley also opposed term 

limits on constitutional grounds. 

The Democrats might have survived the 1994 

elections were it not for key strategic decisions 

made early in the Clinton administration. Congressional reform had been an issue during the 

1992 campaign, and new Democratic Members 

elected that year pressed the leadership to pursue 

an internal reform agenda. Speaker Foley and 

other party leaders looked back on the experience 

of the seventies and drew two lessons: reform is 

always divisive and the failure to govern is usually fatal. During the first half of the seventies 

the Democrats fought each other over reform 

issues. During the second half of the seventies, 

they fought with the Carter administration over 

policy issues such as health care cost control. The 

chosen path now was to put reform on the rear 

The Changing Speakership 225 

burner in order to unite behind an economic program in support of the Clinton administration. 

This strategy led the Democrats to a major tax 

increase in 1993 that passed with no Republican 

votes, and led the Democrats away from any effort to address the internal reforms demanded by 

Republicans and the new Democrats. 

This contributed to the election of a Republican majority in 1994 and a new Speaker in the 

104th Congress, Newt Gingrich. It immediately 

became clear that the Republicans intended to 

manage the internal administrative and legislative affairs of the House very differently than had 

the Democrats. With respect to administration, 

Speaker Gingrich sought to professionalize and, 

where possible, privatize management. He took 

control of the Office of House Administrator, 

which had been created by the Democrats in the 

wake of the scandals at the House bank, restaurant, and post office. This led to a tussle with 

the House Administration Committee, the venue 

for Member control of administrative process. 

Gingrich initially won this battle and was able 

to implement a series of major administrative reforms, including the elimination of the Office of 

Doorkeeper and the professionalization of the Office of Sergeant at Arms. Eventually, Gingrich’s 

hand-chosen administrator came under attack by 

the House Administration Committee, and was 

fired. The House Administration Committee reasserted its prerogatives. 

With respect to legislation, Gingrich and his 

leadership circle were determined to make sure 

that, under Republican control, the committees 

would be subordinated to the party leadership. 

They placed a three-term limit on service as committee chair and a four-term limit on the speakership. Term limits greatly enhance the power 

of the Speaker relative to the committee chairs. 

Speaker Gingrich also assumed the power to appoint several committee chairs, abandoning seniority in some important instances, and approved some of their senior staff. Proxy voting 

in committees, which had been an important resource for Democratic chairs, was abolished. 

With the committee system firmly in control, he 

nonetheless proceeded to bypass the committees 

entirely in moving key elements of the Republican Contract with America. Ad hoc task forces 

were appointed to develop legislation. These task 

forces sometimes worked in cooperation with 

lobbyists. The Democrats, members of the committees but not of the task forces, were essentially cut out of the legislative process. 

Gingrich’s conception of the speakership was 

essentially parliamentary, although he conflated 

the role of Speaker and Prime Minister. Under 

the British Constitution, the Speaker of the 

House of Commons is thoroughly non-partisan. 

Those appointed Speaker remove themselves from 

partisan politics not just during their tenure in 

office, but permanently. They fulfill what we 

have here termed the ‘‘constitutional’’ function of 

presiding officer. Party leadership is left to the 

Prime Minister who, when supported by a majority of party members, is able to dominate the 

legislative process. The Prime Minister also 

serves as Chief Executive. In a parliamentary system, there is greater party discipline and bills 

are more likely to be passed along party lines. 

Gingrich, as Speaker, saw himself as the leader 

of the congressional party and as a national political leader for the Republicans. As discussed further below, he sought to stand toe-to-toe with 

the Presidency. With respect to internal House 

governance, he sought to gather the strings of 

power in his own hands. Surrounded by a rather 

narrow leadership circle (the Speaker’s advisory 

group), he sought to dictate strategy and in some 

cases the terms of legislation. This is not to say 

that he was not consultative; the task forces, extensive communications operation, and extended 

leadership staff structure, along with the weekly 

meetings of the Republican conference, provided 

ample opportunity for Member input. But Gingrich did not want to be constrained by an autonomous committee structure. 

The momentum generated by the 1994 election and the novelty of the Republican takeover 

of the House sustained this powerful leadership 

regime through the 104th Congress even as 

Gingrich came under attack by the Democrats 

for violations of House ethics rules. As Gingrich’s position eroded, his various leadership 

mantras (listen, learn, help, lead) appeared less 

salient to the needs of Republican Members. 

Gingrich’s leadership became increasingly problematical for many Republicans. The 73 new Republicans elected in 1994 were very conservative, 

and thought that the Speaker was too accommoVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00235 Fmt 8165 Sfmt 8165 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.014 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
226 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

15 DeLay is also very active in promoting and enlarging the Republican majority through fundraising and redistricting efforts, important 

aspects of the outside game discussed below. See Richard E. Cohen, 

‘‘The Evolution of Tom DeLay,’’ National Journal, Nov. 15, 2003, pp. 

3478–3486. 16 Jonathan Franzen, ‘‘The Listener,’’ New Yorker, Oct. 6, 2003, pp. 

84–99. 

dating. More senior Members thought that he 

was too overbearing. In July 1997 a coup attempt 

was aborted. The committee chairs became restive, insisting on their prerogatives. After the 

Republicans lost 8 seats in the 1998 election, 1 

of them, Appropriations Committee Chair Robert Livingston (R–LA), announced his candidacy 

for Speaker. Gingrich withdrew from the contest 

and announced his planned resignation from the 

House. Then, in a surprising development, Livingston himself resigned. In a crisis, the Republicans turned to Chief Deputy Whip Dennis 

Hastert of Illinois as their new Speaker. 

Hastert wanted to return the House to ‘‘regular order,’’ by which he meant that the committees would resume their legislative functions. 

This led some to an impression that Hastert was 

more like Foley, if not Albert. Others suggested 

that Republican Whip Tom DeLay was the more 

influential member of the Republican leadership 

team. With DeLay’s election as majority leader 

in the 108th Congress, he has been widely regarded as exercising more influence than previous 

majority leaders, possibly suggesting a relationship between Hastert and DeLay similar to that 

of Speaker Champ Clark and Majority Leader 

Oscar Underwood. This perception of DeLay’s 

power often comes from the Democratic side of 

the aisle. It is important to focus on the role that 

Speaker Hastert actually plays. The speakership 

remains more powerful under him than it was 

under any of his Democratic predecessors. While 

Hastert is not in the dominating position that 

Gingrich, for a time, was, he is not vulnerable 

to the kind of internal dissension that eventually 

brought Gingrich down. He is very popular 

among Members. Hastert decided to make term 

limits for committee chairs stick and then, at the 

outset of the 108th Congress, his members voted 

to remove term limits on the speakership. It 

seems plain that the Republicans are satisfied 

with his leadership. A reasonable depiction of the 

Republican leadership under Hastert would characterize the Speaker and his subordinate leaders 

as playing different but complementary roles. As 

Speaker, Hastert is the glue that holds the Republicans together. He plays a listening, conciliating role similar to Democratic Speakers such 

as Tip O’Neill and Tom Foley. In the inside 

game, he is the dealmaker and the closer. Tom 

DeLay’s role is rather different. As whip, he 

counted the votes and rallied the troops. As majority leader, he presses for policies supported by 

the conservative majority in the Republican conference.15 These party leaders appear to be doing 

about what their job descriptions require. 

Under Hastert’s leadership, the Republicans 

have sought to develop legislation that almost all 

Republicans support, and then to ram that legislation through on the House floor. Initially, the 

Republicans sought to avoid using restrictive 

rules for floor consideration of bills, but they 

eventually faced the reality of their situation. 

With a narrow majority, party bills have to be 

protected on the floor against divisive amendments. The result is that Speaker Hastert has had 

strained relations with the Democratic leadership. Democratic Floor Leader Richard Gephardt 

did not get along with Speaker Gingrich and it 

was anticipated that his relationship with Speaker Hastert would be better. This anticipation ignored the underlying political reality. The 

Democrats want to win back the House and to 

do so they have to go on the offensive. This is 

a lesson they learned from Newt Gingrich. 

Speaker Hastert wants to protect his legislative 

majority and will use the powers of the speakership toward that end. This has contributed to a 

decline in comity in the House observable over 

the past two decades. It seems likely to endure 

so long as the House is relatively closely divided. 

The new Democratic floor leader, Nancy Pelosi 

(D–CA), is moved by the same imperatives as her 

predecessor. Perhaps the best that can be hoped 

for during this season of heavy political maneuvering is that Members and party leaders will 

find a way to depersonalize the fight and restore 

to the House its most important tradition, the 

respect that Members should have for each other 

as representatives of their constituents, the 

American people. That Speaker Hastert is personally well-liked by many Democrats is helpful.16

The Changing Speakership 227 

17 See Speaker Hastert’s comments printed in this volume. 

18When asked to define the job of Speaker, John W. McCormack 

(D–MA) said that it was the Speaker’s job to marshal majorities to 

pass legislation on the House floor. Interview with author, July 1979. 19Robin Kolodny, Pursuing Majorities (Norman, OK: University of 

Oklahoma Press, 1998). 

The imperatives of the legislative process, 

however, make it difficult for the majority and 

minority parties to work together. Speaker 

Hastert has defined his institutional obligation 

to the minority by two criteria: the Speaker 

should rely on the nonpartisan recommendations 

of the House Parliamentarians in making rulings 

from the chair; and the minority party by rule 

is entitled to offer a motion to recommit with 

instructions. Beyond this, it is the Speaker’s obligation to pass legislation.17 When in passing the 

2003 Medicare reform bill Hastert held the vote 

on final passage open for almost 3 hours (normally votes consume 15 minutes) in order to 

round up enough Republican votes to pass the 

bill, he was, in his words, ‘‘getting the job 

done.’’ Democrats alleged abuse of power and 

fundamental unfairness. Speaker Hastert here 

faced a dilemma that defines the speakership 

today. Any modifications in the Medicare bill 

that might have attracted more Democratic votes 

would have cost more Republican votes, and any 

changes that might have attracted more Republican votes would have lost sufficient Democratic 

votes to defeat the bill. The choice was to pass 

the bill or not to pass the bill. Hastert defines 

his obligation as passing legislation. In this, his 

attitude is identical to that of his Republican and 

Democratic predecessors.18

THE OUTSIDE GAME

Even as House Speakers have come to play a 

much more central role in the legislative process, 

they have also become much more actively engaged in the electoral process. When Carl Albert 

was Speaker, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee held one major fundraising 

event each year. Political action committees did 

not exist.19 While the Speaker and other party 

leaders would from time to time attend fundraisers on behalf of Members, these usually took 

the form of receptions held in Washington and 

raised relatively small amounts of money. Speakers had long gone on the campaign trail on behalf of Members. In the 19th century this was 

called ‘‘the canvas’’ and Speakers would go ‘‘canvassing’’ on behalf of Members in the 2 months 

immediately prior to the election. As Speaker, 

Albert campaigned in Member districts during 

the runup to the election, but the number of 

such appearances was limited. 

Speaker O’Neill was more broadly engaged. 

He selected Tony Coehlo (D–CA) to head the 

Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee 

and brought that position into the inner leadership circle. Coehlo’s charge was to dramatically 

enhance the congressional party’s fundraising 

base by bringing in more contributions from corporate and special interest political action committees. O’Neill permitted Coehlo to schedule 

him for party fundraisers and, during the campaign season, for political appearances on behalf 

of Democratic candidates in competitive districts. Still, O’Neill’s electoral activities were relatively modest in comparison to that of subsequent Speakers. In order to understand the dynamic, it is necessary to shift focus from O’Neill 

as Speaker to Jim Wright, his majority leader. 

Tip O’Neill had become Speaker before the effects of the Campaign Finance Reform Act of 

1974 were fully experienced. He never had a leadership PAC and he did not need one. Leadership 

PACs were developed by Members who aspired 

to become Speaker. Through them, the majority 

leader, party whip, or key committee chairs could 

build constituencies among Members by providing campaign contributions. While Tip 

O’Neill preoccupied himself with the legislative 

battles in Washington, Jim Wright was seeking 

to build support within the Democratic Caucus. 

He campaigned on behalf of hundreds of Democratic candidates during his 10 years as majority 

leader. His activities established a norm for subordinate party leaders that carried into the speakership itself. Fundraising became a year-round 

activity. Under Coehlo’s influence, the party 

leadership took a more active hand in recruiting 

candidates. Wright was as, or more, active in this 

respect as was O’Neill. Wright knew that when 

O’Neill retired he might well face opposition in 

his bid to become Speaker by rivals such as John 

Dingell (D–MI) and Dan Rostenkowski (D–IL), 

two powerful committee chairmen. Press reports 

openly discussed the rivalry between these aspiVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00237 Fmt 8165 Sfmt 8165 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.014 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
228 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

20 DeLay claimed that 54 of 73 freshmen Republicans voted to make 

him whip. Hedrick Smith, The Unelected: The Lobbies, PBS Video, 1996. 21Balz and Brownstein, Storming the Gates; David Maraniss, Tell 

Newt to Shut Up (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). 

22

www.cfinst.orgstudiesvitaltables3–8.htm. 23 On the relationship between campaign fundraising and committee chair appointments, see Paul R. Brewer and Christopher J. 

Deering, ‘‘Interest Groups, Campaign Fundraising, and Committee 

Chair Selection: House Republicans Play Musical Chairs,’’ in Paul S. 

Herrnson, Ronald G. Shaiko, and Clyde Wilcox, eds., The Interest 

Group Connection: Electioneering, Lobbying, and Policymaking in Washington (New York: Chatham House Publishers, 2004). 

rants. Wright had won the majority leadership 

by a single vote in 1976, and he appears to have 

concluded that the best means of ensuring his 

election as Speaker was by holding more chits 

among Members. Thus, his fundraising and campaign activities served his own interest as well 

as that of the party. 

Since the eighties it has become customary for 

party leaders to develop their own fundraising 

PACs alongside their fundraising efforts on behalf of the Congressional Campaign Committees 

and individual Members. These efforts create 

centrifugal force. Each aspirant to higher leadership position seeks to build a constituency of 

Members who will support a later candidacy. The 

results can be telling. When the Democrats first 

made the choice of their whip an elected position 

in organizing the 100th Congress in 1987, Congressman Coehlo was chosen due primarily to his 

fundraising activities. He had become an independent operator within the Democratic leadership group. After the Republican victory in the 

1994 elections, Speaker Gingrich appeared to be 

in a position to dictate the terms of party organization. His preferred choice for GOP whip was 

a long-time ally, Congressman Robert Walker 

(R–PA). Walker was challenged by Congressman 

DeLay, and DeLay won a closely contested election. Among the main reasons for DeLay’s election as whip was the investment he had made 

through his PAC in the campaigns of numerous 

Republican challengers. These new Members recognized an obligation and a relationship to 

DeLay.20 As whip, DeLay was instrumental in 

supporting Dennis Hastert’s election as Speaker. 

DeLay built an unprecedented power base that 

later led to his election as Republican floor leader. 

By all accounts, however, it was Newt Gingrich who transformed expectations for party leaders, especially the Speaker, in party fundraising. 

The tale of Newt Gingrich’s rise to the speakership has been well told.21 In leading the Republicans to the promised land Gingrich recruited 

and trained candidates, articulated a GOP message, organized the party apparatus, and campaigned actively. He also raised money, and lots 

of it. When Tony Coehlo was raising money for 

the Democrats in the mideighties, total spending 

on House races came to around $204 million. 

When the Republicans took the House in 1994, 

the figure was $371 million. By 2000, it had 

risen to over $550 million.22 Since 1994, the 

Speaker has been the most important fundraiser 

for the Republicans. Furthermore, the Republican leadership now expects committee chairs to 

contribute to the campaigns of Members and 

candidates in closely contested districts.23 The 

Speaker, then, is soliciting even more money 

than he may raise directly. Gingrich had the reputation as fundraiser par excellence. But the 

Speaker’s role as leading party fundraiser is endemic to the office and not a product of the person. Speaker Hastert was not generally known to 

be deeply involved in fundraising during his 

years as chief deputy whip; but as Speaker, he 

has raised more money than did Speaker Gingrich. 

The Speaker’s fundraising role has one very 

specific consequence: he is asked to travel a great 

deal. Over a 2-year election cycle, the Speaker 

will appear in most, if not all, Republican districts. Today, the Speaker’s obligation to elect 

and maintain his party’s majority makes it imperative that he travel to districts for fundraising 

events and that he campaign on behalf of candidates in closely contested districts. These obligations, of course, take him away from the Capitol on a regular basis. While a Speaker will always give precedence to critical legislative matters, he now may be less able to provide a fulltime leadership presence on Capitol Hill. Speaker 

Gingrich had hoped to impose a system of delegated responsibility that would free him to be 

a national leader and issue articulator while often 

leaving legislative mechanics to subalterns. He 

was surprised in June 1997 when subordinate 

leaders included a politically inspired provision 

to prevent any future shutdown of the Federal 


Campaign Finance Institute, Web site, http: //
The Changing Speakership 229 

24Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Üééå, vol. 53 (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1998), pp. 1–14—1–15. 25 Douglas B. Harris, ‘‘The Rise of the Public Speakership,’’ Political 

Science Quarterly, vol. 113, Summer 1998, pp. 193–211. 

26 Some observers stress the continuity between the Democratic and 

Republican Speakers of the post-reform era. See Barbara Sinclair, Legislators, Leading, and Lawmaking (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); Sinclair, ‘‘Transformational Leader or Faithful 

Agent? Principal-Agent Theory and House Majority Party Leadership.’’ Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. XXIV, no. 3, Aug. 1999, pp. 

421–449. 

Government on an emergency flood relief bill 

that he supported.24 The following month, a 

group of ‘‘renegade’’ Members supported by some 

members of the leadership group sought to oust 

him while he was out of town. It appears that 

Gingrich had allowed himself to become too removed from the sentiments of his Members including his most trusted allies. While Speaker 

Hastert also relies on the extended leadership 

group to facilitate the legislative process, he is 

consistently involved in negotiating intra-party 

agreements. He keeps his finger on the pulse of 

the House. Sam Rayburn used to say that if a 

Speaker could not feel the mood of the House 

he was lost. While Hastert seeks to foster his relationships with Members, he still finds it necessary to balance his internal and external role, 

a task made more difficult by electoral demands. 

One aspect of the Speaker’s external role is 

media relations.25 As mentioned, Speaker Albert 

was the first Speaker to appoint a formal press 

secretary. He named a relatively junior member 

of the staff whose function was to respond to 

press inquiries. Speaker O’Neill elevated the 

prominence of the press secretary’s role in proportion to his own rising public profile. O’Neill 

wanted a press secretary who would be in regular 

touch with key members of the press corps, a 

competent spinner who was adept in presenting 

the Democratic position and in articulating 

O’Neill’s own perspective. He settled upon Chris 

Matthews, later of ‘‘Hardball’’ fame. Since then, 

all Speakers have had press secretaries who have 

served in this capacity. Within the extended 

leadership group, the focus was on projecting the 

party ‘‘message’’ in contrast to that of Republican 

administrations. Under O’Neill, message development was assigned to the leadership and staff 

of the Democratic Caucus, but all members of 

the extended leadership group participated in defining and projecting the party’s themes. Under 

Speakers Wright and Foley, the message function 

was further elaborated and institutionalized. Each 

Speaker had a press secretary responsible for handling the media. 

In this, as in other respects, the external function of the speakership took a quantum leap 

when the Republicans came to power.26 Whereas 

the Democrats had delegated message development to a caucus working group and the Speaker’s press secretary functioned primarily in support of his media relations, the Republicans 

sought to systematically integrate message development and media relations. The Speaker’s press 

secretary led a staff with responsibility to coordinate message and media. Each Republican Member designated a communications director. The 

Republican conference, like the Democratic Caucus, was given the outreach function. It included 

the development of a sophisticated polling capacity, a state-of-the-art Web site, and an extensive 

talk radio initiative. Speaker Gingrich’s press secretary, Tony Blankley, was a sophisticated Washington insider, well connected to the national 

press corps. Under his leadership, the Speaker’s 

press relations reached its zenith and found its 

limits. For in spite of the greater degree of organization and more expansive efforts, the House 

Republicans continued to lose ground in the 

public relations battle with the Clinton administration. In part, this was simply due to unequal 

resources and organizational capability. Even 

though more robust than at any previous time, 

the House communications and media operation 

still paled in comparison to the scope and sophistication of the White House Communications 

Office. The former consisted of a press secretary 

with a small staff working in cooperation with 

over 220 Members who were all independent operators. The White House had an around-theclock communications operation staffed in shifts 

that was prepared to offer a Presidential response 

on any issue within a half-hour. And too, in spite 

of Speaker Gingrich’s high public visibility, it 

is the President who has the bully pulpit and 

not the Speaker. 

The Republican effort under Speaker Gingrich 

might have been more productive had Speaker 

Gingrich better appreciated the risks inherent in 

230 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

the high public profile that he sought. History 

demonstrates that Speakers often become famous 

at their own risk. In the late 19th century, Speakers such as James G. Blaine (R–ME) and Thomas 

Brackett Reed (R–ME) were dominating figures 

embroiled in regular controversy. Blaine came 

under an investigation for his financial dealings. 

Reed was not tainted by scandal but his assertion 

of the powers of the chair (and his acerbic wit) 

made him a ripe target for the Democrats. Uncle 

Joe Cannon, of course, represented the apotheosis 

of the partisan speakership at the turn of the century and became a campaign issue in the 1910 

elections. From Cannon to O’Neill, no Speaker 

attained any great degree of public recognition, 

much less notoriety. It was said that Sam Rayburn could walk down most streets in Washington without being recognized. All of this 

changed when Tip O’Neill became the Nation’s 

leading elected Democrat and therefore the primary opponent of President Ronald Reagan. 

O’Neill became a symbol of Democratic liberalism, an icon on the left, but viewed as a relic 

by the right. Republicans ran campaign advertisements against him in 1982 and baited him on 

the floor in 1985, but it was all to no avail. 

Speaker O’Neill’s public approval ratings exceeded those of Ronald Reagan when he left office 

and he had succeeded in preserving the heart of 

the welfare state against the Reagan onslaught. 

His Democratic successors had less luck. During the 100th Congress, Speaker Jim Wright 

drove the legislative process and moved to consolidate his power. Recognizing the threat, the 

Republicans, led by Newt Gingrich, charged 

Wright with violating House ethics rules. In 

June 1989 Wright resigned the speakership and 

his House seat rather than put the House 

through the agony of a floor vote on the ethics 

charges. His successor, Tom Foley, was not vulnerable to ethics complaints, but had opposed a 

term limits proposition in his home State of 

Washington. The Republicans accused Speaker 

Foley of opposing his own constituents and funneled money to his opponent in the 1994 elections. Foley lost his House seat and the Democrats lost their majority in the House and in the 

Senate. 

Newt Gingrich certainly was aware that two 

consecutive Speakers had been dethroned; he, 

after all, had been part of those efforts. He made 

Wright’s and Foley’s leadership of the House 

campaign issues and painted the two Speakers as 

symbols of what was wrong with the House 

under Democratic control. He could not have 

been surprised, then, when the Democrats, led 

by Whip David Bonior (D–MI), chose to repay 

him in kind, lodging over 80 ethics charges 

against the Speaker. The ethics battle was fought 

out over the course of the 104th Congress, and 

culminated when Gingrich agreed to accept a 

censure and financial penalty for having provided 

false information to the Committee on Standards 

of Official Conduct jEthics Committeek. The 

resolution of the ethics charges did not alleviate 

the pressure on the Speaker. President Clinton 

had won a square off with congressional Republicans over the government shutdowns of late 

1995 and early 1996, and during his Presidential 

campaign he associated Gingrich and Republican 

Presidential candidate Robert Dole with putatively reactionary policies. Speaker Hastert has 

maintained a much lower profile than had Speaker Gingrich. He was largely unknown to the general public when he became Speaker and remains 

relatively unknown even now. Hastert’s lower 

visibility represents a strategic choice. He has 

had ample opportunity to observe the fates of his 

three immediate predecessors, and has yet managed to lead his party to victory in both the 2000 

and 2002 elections. Given the effects of redistricting, some believe the Republican majority 

may be secure for years to come. The Democrats 

will, of course, strive to win enough seats to dislodge the Republicans from power. But they are 

likely to make little progress by attacking 

Hastert. The Speaker is popular among those 

who know him, and little known otherwise. 

Amiability and a sense of personal decency will 

perhaps enable him to avoid becoming a symbol 

of the larger political conflict. Under Speaker 

Hastert, the communication operation has centered in the Republican conference and its extended staff. The Speaker’s press secretary, John 

Feehery, functions more in the role of Chris Matthews, providing interface between the Speaker 

and the press corps. Since Hastert has deliberately chosen a more low profile role than had 

Gingrich (or, for that matter O’Neill), Feehery’s 

role is to make sure that the press knows what 

The Changing Speakership 231 

27 Elizabeth Drew, Showdown: The Struggle Between the Gingrich Congress and the Clinton White House (New York: Simon and Schuster, 

1996). 

28 In his remarks at the Congressional Research Service Carl Albert 

Center Conference on the Speakership, former White House Chief of 

Staff Leon Panetta offered the budget negotiations of 1995 and 1996 

Co

Hastert wants it to know about the Speaker’s legislative and political activities. Since the election 

of George W. Bush, message coordination with 

the White House has become a key component 

of congressional Republican strategy. The goal 

has been to echo, and not drown, the Presidential 

message. 

THE SPEAKER AND THE PRESIDENT

The relationship between the Speaker and the 

President has been historically significant. The 

U.S. Constitution refers to five officers of the 

Federal Government: the President, Vice President, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, President of the Senate (a position filled by the Vice 

President), and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. By statute, the Speaker stands second in line to the Presidency, and Speaker Albert 

twice was first in line, a ‘‘heartbeat away’’ from 

the Oval Office. Sam Rayburn used to say that 

he had served under no President but had served 

with seven. Actually, Rayburn always demonstrated deference to the Presidents with whom 

he served. His ties to Roosevelt and Truman 

were particularly close, but Rayburn and Senate 

Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson (D–TX) chose 

to work cooperatively with President Eisenhower 

rather than to seek confrontation with him. In 

part, this reflected the fact that Rayburn and 

Johnson straddled the divide between southern 

conservative and northern liberal Democrats; but 

it also revealed Rayburn’s sense of the constitutional obligation of the Speaker to make the government work. With the election of Richard 

Nixon, cooperation between House Speakers and 

Presidents of the opposite party ended, and relations between Speakers and Presidents of their 

own party has been sometimes strained. 

Much of this is explained by the political context. When the Speaker and the President are of 

the same party, there will be an incentive to cooperate, amply demonstrated today by the relationship between Speaker Hastert and President 

Bush. Bush relies on the House Republican majority to set the table for dealings with the more 

recalcitrant Senate. But these relations can be 

strained nonetheless, as witness the experience of 

Tip O’Neill and Jimmy Carter. The Speaker at 

times has a greater incentive to protect his Members than to support the President, and if Presidential initiatives put Members at risk, the 

Speaker might oppose them. Otherwise, electoral 

catastrophe may ensue, as apparently happened 

when Speaker Foley placed support of the Clinton economic and health plans above the need 

to address political and institutional reform. 

When the Speaker and the President are political opponents, then most incentives lead to conflict. The two leaders will differ philosophically, 

have different and opposing political constituencies and party interests, and clashing institutional obligations. The impeachment proceedings 

against Presidents Nixon and Clinton suggest the 

extremes to which this conflict may be carried, 

but these are simply the most obvious manifestations of the underlying tendency. Historically, 

only a few Speakers have actually sought to place 

themselves on a par with the Presidency. Henry 

Clay was a national leader during his entire career as House Speaker and Senator, and as Speaker did not take a back seat to Presidents Madison 

and Monroe. Uncle Joe Cannon was perfectly 

willing to oppose progressive legislation proposed by President Theodore Roosevelt, although 

the number of progressive laws enacted during 

Roosevelt’s administration testifies that Cannon 

did not always obstruct. Most recently, Speaker 

Gingrich brought to office a very high expectation of the Speaker’s role.27 During the 104th 

Congress, he was characterized as the most important policymaker in the government. After 

Congress completed work on the elements of the 

Contract with America, (enacted in fewer than 

100 days in symbolic emulation of the New Deal 

and Great Society), Gingrich went on national 

television to speak to the American people. At 

a meeting in New Hampshire he conducted a 

joint press conference with President Clinton and 

the two men shook hands over a pledge to press 

for lobby and campaign finance reform. Gingrich’s aspirations came a cropper when the Republican Congress mishandled the budget negotiations with the White House.28 Clinton proved 

232 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

as an example of mistaken political judgment by the House leadership. 

In response, Speaker Gingrich argued that by closing down parts of 

the government House Republicans had shown resolve that was reassuring to the financial markets. There is little doubt that public opinion favored the administration in this conflict. The remarks of Mr. 

Panetta and Mr. Gingrich appear in this volume. For an analysis similar to Mr. Panetta’s, see Ronald M. Peters, Jr. and Craig A. Williams, 

‘‘The Demise of Newt Gingrich as a Transformational Leader,’’ Organizational Dynamics, vol. 30, no. 3, 2002, pp. 257–268. 29That Tip O’Neill was successful in fighting a rear-guard action 

against Reagan is a conspicuous exception to the generalization that 

Speakers will usually lose battles with Presidents, and was certainly 

related to O’Neill’s favorable public image. For a perspective on the 

relationship between Presidents and Speakers, see Jim Wright, Balance 

of Power: Presidents and Congress from the Era of McCarthy to the Age 

of Gingrich (Atlanta: Turner Publishing Company, 1996). 30Norman J. Ornstein and Thomas F. Mann, eds., The Permanent 

Campaign and its Future (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 

2000). 

31I have this from Rayburn’s long-time assistant, D.B. Hardeman. 

Of course, the Democrats already had all of the southern seats and 

so Members in excess of 269 would come from northern districts and 

increase liberal pressure on Rayburn. 

that the Presidency had a louder megaphone than 

the Speaker of the House. Public opinion sided 

with Clinton and Gingrich’s approval ratings 

plummeted, never to recover. Clinton rebounded 

from the low point of the 1994 election to win 

easy reelection in 1996. He survived the Republican attempt to impeach him, and left office 

with high public approval ratings. This record 

suggests that Speakers need to be very careful 

when they take on Presidents. The Speaker can 

articulate issues and give a face to the loyal opposition; but the resources available to the speakership appear to be insufficient to win in a sustained battle with the White House.29

THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN

The inside game and the outside game are related. Recently, political scientists have used the 

term ‘‘permanent campaign’’ to describe this now 

extended period of close division in the Congress 

and intense competition for control of the House 

and the Senate.30 In understanding the evolving 

role of the speakership, it is important not only 

to understand the role that the Speaker plays in 

the campaign process (a ‘‘permanent’’ one to be 

sure), but, as or more important, how the pressure of electoral politics has reshaped the legislative environment and altered the Speaker’s internal role. Previously, we described that role and 

stressed the greater involvement of the Speaker 

in the legislative process. The Speaker has become more systematically involved in all aspects 

of legislation at every lawmaking stage. In the 

context of the permanent campaign, however, we 

stress the strategic implications of the Speaker’s 

role and how that has affected the House and the 

speakership. 

The permanent campaign is fought over political terrain as narrowly divided as any in American history. This has evident effects on the 

Speaker’s role. Sam Rayburn used to say that it 

was never good to have more than 269 Democrats 

in the House.31 He felt that an extraordinary majority made it more difficult to pass bills because 

Members would feel more free to defect. Rayburn 

was certainly aware of the challenges posed by 

a very narrow majority as well, but the very narrowness of the majority may create an incentive 

for Members to support the leadership. Between 

1931 and 1994, when the Democrats were in the 

majority for all but 4 years, their leaders often 

forged bipartisan coalitions, picking up some 

votes from moderate Republicans while tolerating defections from some conservative Democrats. With the House very narrowly divided, a 

small number of defectors can defeat a bill unless 

there are offsetting defections from the other 

side. The permanent campaign, however, offers 

an incentive for the minority to rally in opposition in order to create campaign issues. Furthermore, the homogenization of the parties has 

made it less likely that many Members of either 

party will have a natural inclination to vote with 

the other side. Since most Members are safe in 

their districts, many could, in principle, defect 

and survive. But the minority party leadership 

will go to extraordinary lengths to persuade 

Members to stand by the party position because 

it will enhance the prospect of winning control 

in the next election. That, at least, has been a 

discernible pattern for the Democrats since 1995. 

The result is that the Republicans have had 

to build majorities from within their own ranks. 

To do so, they have had to utilize all the tools 

available to a majority. These include agenda 

control (deciding what bills will come to the 

floor), legislative control (determining what 

those bills will contain), procedural control (determining the timing and rules under which bills 

will be considered), and membership control (efforts to ensure that bills can pass with RepubVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00242 Fmt 8165 Sfmt 8165 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.014 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
The Changing Speakership 233 

32When the majority party has a substantial majority, it can pass 

legislation even when a number of party members defect due to district pressure. With a narrow majority the party leadership has to 

structure either the legislation, the legislative process, or both so as 

to bring aboard almost every member. It may, therefore, include provisions that it does not really want in the bill and thus legislation 

can become less coherent. 

33 It is difficult for a Speaker to establish comity when he actively 

campaigns against incumbent Members of the opposite party. Democratic Speakers from Rayburn to Foley were very reluctant to do so, 

and in fact almost never did. This was due in part to the fact that 

they usually enjoyed safe margins in the House, and in part to the 

fact that the most vulnerable Republicans were precisely those who 

were most likely to vote with the Democrats on key votes. However, 

there was also a norm at play. The Speaker, as presiding officer, may 

choose not to campaign against a Member on whose motions he would 

have to rule. Republican Speakers Gingrich and Hastert both have 

campaigned against incumbent Democrats. 34 In addition to their remarks published in this volume, these 

Speakers speak for themselves in Ronald M. Peters, Jr., ed., The Speaker 

(Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995). 

lican votes alone). As this pattern suggests, the 

first and most important strategic decisions address the nature and substance of legislation. It 

appears that these decisions are now made in substantial part based on political calculation. 

When, for example, the Democrats pushed for 

enactment of a prescription drug bill or a patients’ bill of rights, the Republicans found it 

in their interest to offer counterproposals. In 

doing so, they searched for bills around which 

their Members could cohere. When the Republican majority pushed tax cuts, the Democrats 

sought alternatives that their Members could 

support. In this connection, the narrow majority 

can be a blessing, since it offers its own incentive 

for Members to vote with the party. The quid 

pro quo is often this: the leadership structures 

legislation and the legislative process to give 

Members bills they can support; the Members 

vote for the leadership proposals provided that 

their political needs are somewhere addressed. 

This is an old formula. With a narrow majority, 

however, it can lead to poor legislation.32

And that is the real disadvantage of a government as narrowly divided as this one is. In a parliamentary regime, with an expectation of party 

discipline, the governing party can shape legislation according to its principles even with a narrow majority. In a presidential system marked by 

the separation of powers, the majority party must 

often place political consideration above policy 

substance. The results can be diluted policy, policy incrementalism, symbolic framing of issues, 

and in many cases a failure to act altogether. In 

addition, the permanent campaign has affected 

the legislative milieu. Public discourse has been 

coarsened. Ad hominem attacks undermine reasoned debate. Comity, that ancient norm, has 

eroded. Fixing these problems is not easy to do, 

because both congressional Republicans and congressional Democrats are so closely tied to their 

party’s base voters and major interest-group supporters that neither can easily break free. Believing themselves to be in the right, most Members 

may not even contemplate the need. But it is an 

obligation of the Speaker to remind Members on 

both sides of the aisle to do their duty.33

PERSONALITY AND PARTY CULTURE

This analysis of the contemporary speakership 

has sought to be generic, addressing trends and 

forces affecting all modern Speakers and both political parties. We must recognize, however, the 

great impact that personality and party culture 

have in shaping individual speakerships. These 

effects may seem idiosyncratic and thus beyond 

the reach of theory; but any attempt to build 

theory must at least take them into account. 

They are easy to demonstrate. 

Consider Democratic Speakers Carl Albert, 

Tip O’Neill, Jim Wright, and Tom Foley.34 All 

of these Speakers presided over the reformed 

House, and there are many similarities in the 

way that they did it. All sought to build legislative coalitions, foster more open and participatory intra-party processes, establish better media 

relations, promote more effective control over the 

floor, set a policy agenda, and so forth. We observe a steady evolution from Albert to Foley in 

which various leadership techniques are initiated 

and perfected. Yet any attempt to evaluate the 

performance of these Speakers would lead directly 

to an assessment of their respective personal characteristics and political personas. Albert was a 

dedicated institutionalist who preferred a more 

private and lower profile role as Speaker. Some 

felt that he would have been better served by a 

more aggressive posture, but he did not think 

that is what a Speaker should do. It is far from 

clear that a more assertive Speaker would have 

presided as effectively over the tumult of legislative reform, Watergate impeachment, Vietnam, 

234 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

35Jimmy Breslin, How the Good Guys Finally Won (New York: Viking Press, 1975). 

36 Jo Freeman, ‘‘The Political Cultures of the Democratic and Republican Parties,’’ Political Science Quarterly, vol. 101, no. 3, 1986, pp. 

327–356. 

and civil rights as Albert did. O’Neill took to 

the public aspects of the speakership like a duck 

to water. He reveled in the limelight, filled the 

camera, and made himself into a political icon. 

Yet although he appeared more forceful, he was 

rarely more assertive than Albert had been. He 

was a strong supporter of the committee system 

and defended several senior committee chairs 

who were deposed by the caucus. One of 

O’Neill’s greatest talents lay in the appearance 

of power. He was the master of what Jimmy 

Breslin called ‘‘blue smoke and mirrors.’’ 35

Jim Wright enjoyed power and he wanted to 

drive the House toward his preferred policies. He 

rolled over Democratic committees, House Republicans and the Reagan White House in the 

100th Congress, became involved on foreign policy matters respecting Nicaragua, and demonstrated the assertiveness that Tip O’Neill appeared to have but rarely used. Yet just for this 

reason, Wright made himself anathema to the 

Republicans, angered many Democrats, and 

caused some to regard him as a political liability. 

There is nothing in contemporary legislative theory that can explain Wright’s assertiveness; it 

was simply the product of his character. Tom 

Foley proceeded differently, but not because the 

nature of the speakership required it of him. To 

be sure, Foley had been an operator in the Democratic regime for two decades, and had been a 

key negotiator for Speakers O’Neill and Wright. 

But when he became Speaker, this experience is 

not what defined his orientation toward the job. 

Foley had come to the House in 1964 and was 

the first Speaker never to have served with Sam 

Rayburn. But like Rayburn, he had a keen appreciation of the traditions and institutions of the 

House and he saw it as his role to defend them. 

The contrast between Speakers Gingrich and 

Hastert is evident. Gingrich saw himself as a 

great party leader, a modern Disraeli. He had 

been a college professor, and he loved to profess 

his views. He loved conflict and controversy, and 

where he could not find these at hand he often 

created them. Hastert is a former high school 

teacher and wrestling coach. He is experienced 

and talented in working with people face to face. 

He had been an ideal chief deputy whip, and in 

that capacity had developed strong personal relationships with Members. He was often the one 

to work out the deal to win a wavering Member’s 

vote. When Speaker Gingrich sought to impose 

what was in effect a new institutional order on 

the House he was acting consistently with his 

values, beliefs, and personal ambitions. When 

Speaker Hastert sought to return the House to 

regular order, he was doing likewise. These two 

Speakers, both Republican, were as different from 

each other as their Democratic predecessors had 

differed from each other, and the differences defined their speakerships as much as any underlying similarities deriving from the institutional 

context in which they served, certainly as any biographer or historian would write about it. 

But the Democratic and Republican Speakers 

differed across party lines as well. Party culture 

is not easy to define.36 Institutional culture generally refers to a persistent pattern of attitudes 

and relationships giving definition to organizational behavior. It is undeniably the case that Republican speakerships have demonstrated a centralizing tendency while Democratic speakerships 

have characteristically been more decentralized. 

Institutional and party effects are interrelated. 

Thus, during the late 19th century when parties 

were strong, both Democratic and Republican 

Speakers were more powerful than those who 

served during the mid-20th century when the 

committees were ascendent. Still, Republican 

Speakers of the partisan era, such as James G. 

Blaine, Thomas Brackett Reed, and Joe Cannon 

were more powerful than their Democratic counterparts, such as Samuel Randall (PA), John Carlisle (KY), and Charles Crisp (GA); and during 

the era of committee dominance Joe Martin was 

on occasion more assertive than Sam Rayburn. As 

we compare the Democrats under Albert, 

O’Neill, Wright and Foley, with the Republicans 

under Gingrich and Hastert, it is plain that the 

GOP leadership is usually more forceful than the 

Democratic leadership. While all aspects of the 

speakership that Gingrich first created have not 

been sustained by the Republicans, others have. 

The Changing Speakership 235 

37To be sure, there are fissures within the Republican conference 

arising from matters of policy, constituency, or even ideology. But 

these fissures, even though they may generate intense feelings, take 

place within a relatively narrow range compared to the historical diversity that has marked the Democratic Party. 

The Republican Speakers do not simply behave 

like their Democratic predecessors. 

CONCLUSION

Four forces shape the speakership today. The 

first is political context, now defined by the narrow division of power between the two major 

parties as sometimes affected by a division in partisan control of our nationally elective institutions. The second is institutional context: the 

post-reform House as substantially modified by 

the Republicans. The third is party culture, differentiating Democratic and Republican regimes. 

The fourth is the character and political persona 

of individual Speakers. We cannot now anticipate 

who might rise to the speakership in the future, 

or in what specific circumstances future Speakers 

will serve. The path to the speakership has usually been through the ranks of subordinate party 

leadership positions. The advantage of this farm 

system is that it brings to the speakership Members who are richly experienced in party leadership; its disadvantage can be that Speakers are 

so molded by their prior experience that they 

may find it hard to adapt to the changing circumstances in which they are called upon to lead. 

We may ask how might the speakership evolve 

if Republicans maintain control in the near future? Most observers have by now concluded that 

Newt Gingrich’s parliamentary model is ill-suited to the American constitutional regime. Under 

Speaker Hastert, the Republicans have developed 

a more nuanced party apparatus in which the 

Speaker plays the pivotal, if not always the most 

visible role. The party machinery usually runs 

smoothly in the hands of the floor leader, whip, 

and other members of the leadership team. In 

challenging circumstances, the leadership is usually able to carry its bills on the floor. The committees now perform their traditional functions, 

although they do not function as autonomously 

from the leadership as had been the case with 

the Democrats. Underlying the Republicans’ cohesiveness is the basic homogeneity of the Republican conference. This arises from similar constituencies and shared ideology.37 Their world 

view sometimes appears unleavened by conflicting voices from within their constituencies or 

from across the aisle. It is an essential principle 

of American democracy that representative institutions ‘‘refine and enlarge the public view by 

passing it through the medium of their chosen 

representatives,’’ as Madison put it in Federalist 

No. ÜÖ. This cannot occur if only some views are 

brought into consideration. 

And what if the Democrats resume control? 

On the one hand, the party has learned lessons 

from its sojourn in the wilderness. They have had 

time to contemplate the causes of their defeat in 

1994, the challenges they have faced in trying to 

regain it, and the methods by which the Republicans have solidified their narrow majority. The 

Democrats have been far more cohesive in the 

minority than they ever were in the majority. A 

future Democratic majority might be narrow, 

and arguably would require the same approach 

to intra-party coalition building that the Republicans have taken. A strong party leadership 

would be required. On the other hand, Democrats are not as cohesive as Republicans, reflecting the more diverse nature of their constituencies. A sufficient number of seasoned Democrats remains to give rebirth to a more autonomous committee structure. Democrats remember 

that the committee system is a source of power 

and influence that served them well for 60 years 

in maintaining control of the House. It is a rare 

Democrat who will say that the party would retain term limits on committee chairs. Democrats 

might have more difficulty in maintaining cohesion than the Republicans have, and may be less 

willing to cede power to the central party leadership. That, at least, would be consistent with 

their historical practices and party culture. 

Whichever party is in power, the key to a successful speakership can be read in the historical 

record. Speakers must find a way to balance their 

institutional and partisan responsibilities. To create this balance, it is important that they exercise 

sufficient power to command the attention and 

respect of Members. At the same time, they must 

be perceived to be fair. It has proven most useful 

for Speakers to buffer their partisan role. HistoriVerDate jan 13 2004 10:35 Dec 10, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00245 Fmt 8165 Sfmt 8165 C:\DOCS\SPEAKERS\92800.014 CRS1 PsN: SKAYNE
236 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

cally, there are two models though which this 

can be achieved, one centered in the committees 

and one centered in the party leadership apparatus. During the era of committee dominance, 

the power of the Speaker was mediated by that 

of the committee chairs. During the past 30 

years, the power of the Speaker has meshed with 

an elaborated party leadership structure. Speakers 

who have sought to dominate the committees 

and the party leadership structure have not fared 

well. Speakers who have given the committees 

and the leadership structure some lead have been 

better able to fulfill their dual roles. 

The speakership will, in the years ahead, be 

more central to the House of Representatives 

than at any time since the turn of the 20th century. Speakers will be called upon to offer partisan leadership both within the Chamber and 

externally. They will broker deals, raise money, 

campaign for Members, define policy positions, 

and seek to enforce party discipline. And they 

must do this without losing sight of their constitutional role and responsibility. The speakership was created long ago in England, when the 

Commons selected one from among them to 

‘‘speak for the Commons’’ in Parliament. The 

Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives has 

the obligation to ‘‘speak for the House’’ as well. 

All of it. 

Part III 

Appendices 

The offices of Speakers Hastert, Gingrich, Foley and Wright, submitted their personal biographies for publication in this document. 

239 

J. Dennis Hastert 

Dennis Hastert rose to his position as Speaker 

of the House from the cornfields of Illinois. Born 

in Aurora, he grew up in Oswego and earned degrees from Wheaton College and Northern Illinois University. After 16 years of teaching and 

coaching at Yorkville High School, he served in 

the Illinois House of Representatives for 6 years 

before being elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1986. In 1999, Hastert’s colleagues 

honored him by electing him Speaker of the 

House, the third highest elected official in the 

U.S. Government. 

Speaker Hastert, who turned 62 on January 2, 

2004, is now serving his third term as Speaker 

and his ninth term as the Republican Congressman for Illinois’ 14th Congressional District. 

Hastert’s home district comprises a suburban 

landscape of high tech firms, small and large industrial complexes and expansive farm land west 

of Chicago, which includes the boyhood home of 

President Ronald Reagan. The 14th Congressional District reelected Hastert in 2002 with 74 

percent of the overall vote. 

As Speaker, Hastert is responsible for the dayto-day functions of the U.S. House. When he 

succeeded Newt Gingrich on January 6, 1999, he 

broke with tradition by delivering his acceptance 

speech from the House floor and by allowing Minority Leader Dick Gephardt to briefly preside 

over the day’s proceedings. These two actions 

served as fitting symbols for the content of the 

new Speaker’s remarks, when he emphasized the 

need for both parties to come together in the 

House to get their work done: 

Solutions to problems cannot be found in a pool of bitterness. They can be found in an environment in which we trust 

one another’s word; where we generate heat and passion, but 

where we recognize that each member is equally important 

to our overall mission of improving the life of the American 

people. 

Hastert outlined a four-part commonsense 

agenda that day for the 106th Congress—lowering taxes, improving education, strengthening 

Social Security and Medicare, and bolstering national defense. Under his leadership, the 106th 

Congress balanced the budget for the fourth year 

in a row; paid down a historic amount of public 

debt ($625 billion); locked away 100 percent of 

Social Security and Medicare dollars to be spent 

solely on Social Security and Medicare—not 

other government programs; sent more education 

dollars and decisionmaking to local classrooms; 

stepped-up and enhanced medical research; and 

worked to revitalize low-income neighborhoods 

in urban and rural areas. The agenda proved to 

be such a success that in November 2000, the 

American voters elected another Republican majority to the House. 

Throughout his legislative career, Speaker 

Hastert has drawn from his experience as a 

former wrestling coach by emphasizing 

teambuilding and setting clear-cut, achievable 

goals. The Speaker has since remained committed 

to the goals he laid out during his first term as 

Speaker and his accomplishments during the 

107th Congress prove this. 

The 107th Congress was successful in enacting 

landmark education reform, far-reaching election 

reform, and completing work on the most significant tax relief in a generation. Furthermore, 

in response to the tragic attacks that occurred on 

September 11, 2001, the Congress passed historic 

legislation by creating a Department of Homeland Security—the most significant restructuring 

of the Federal Government in the last 50 years. 

With this new department, and with the passage 

of anti-terrorism legislation designed to mitigate 

the threat of terrorist activities, the President has 

the tools he needs to help ensure that the safety 

240 The Cannon Centenary Conference 

and security of our homeland will not be compromised again. 

On January 7, 2003, Hastert rose again to the 

challenge of continuing his role as Speaker of the 

House. During his opening speech of the 108th 

Congress, he laid out a commonsense plan that 

would make this Nation a safer and more secure 

place for all Americans. He vowed to the men 

and women in our armed services that they 

would receive continued congressional support in 

their fight against terrorists and the terrorist 

states that harbor them. Hastert also promised 

to work with Members on both sides of the aisle 

to pass an economic growth package that would 

create jobs, grow our economy and ensure more 

financial security for Americans. Furthermore, 

Hastert emphasized his commitment in promoting more foreign trade, passing a prescription 

drug package to make drugs more affordable for 

our Nation’s seniors, and furthermore improving 

America’s schools so that all children have the 

opportunity to get a good education. 

Prior to his election as Speaker in 1999, 

Hastert served as chief deputy majority whip, a 

leadership position he had held since the election 

of the 104th Congress in 1994. In that capacity, 

Hastert was responsible for advancing commonsense legislation to the House floor by working 

with Members, developing an achievable policy 

strategy, lining up support and counting Republican and Democrat votes to ensure passage. His 

reputation is one of reaching across the aisle to 

develop bipartisan legislation. 

He also served as chairman of the House Government Reform and Oversight Subcommittee on 

National Security, International Affairs and 

Criminal Justice. Chairman Hastert had broad 

oversight for the Departments of State, Defense 

and Justice, as well as the Nation’s war on drugs 

and the 2000 Census. As a member of the House 

Commerce Committee, Hastert had jurisdiction 

over energy policy, interstate and foreign commerce, broadcast and telecommunications policy, 

food, health and drug issues. 

Additionally, Hastert has been the House Republican point person on health care reform. He 

has chaired the Speaker’s Steering Committee on 

Health and the Resource Group on Health, and 

he helped author the health care reform bill, 

which was signed into law by President Clinton 

in 1996 to expand coverage to the uninsured. In 

the 105th Congress, Hastert again was tapped by 

the House leadership to chair the House Working Group on Health Care Quality, which ultimately authored the Patient Protection Act. That 

legislation, which passed the House on July 24, 

1998, expanded Americans’ choices and access to 

affordable, high-quality health care. 

During his years in Congress, Hastert championed legislation to balance the Federal budget, 

cut taxes and government waste and clean up the 

environment. For instance, he led the nationwide 

fight with U.S. Senator John McCain (R–AZ) to 

repeal the unfair Social Security earnings limit 

that kept millions of senior citizens from working—a project finally accomplished during his 

speakership in the 106th Congress. He also has 

passed legislation to reduce big government regulations in areas such as trucking and telecommunications in order to increase competition 

and consumer choice. In addition, Hastert has 

fought to preserve safe groundwater standards by 

successfully working for the removal and proper 

disposal of 21 million cubic feet of low-level thorium waste in West Chicago, IL, and by blocking 

a proposed garbage dump that would threaten 

the Fox Valley’s groundwater supply. 

Congressman Hastert has continued to build 

on his record of accomplishment for all his constituents. During the most recent Congress, he 

successfully supported a full-funding agreement 

with the U.S. Department of Transportation that 

will expand Metra train service in the 14th District. He secured dozens of Federal grants for district communities and organizations that will assist with everything from bolstering police services to protecting district farmland. Hastert also 

successfully sponsored legislation in 2002 to designate the Ronald Reagan Boyhood Home in 

Dixon a National Historic Site. Signed by President George Bush on Reagan’s 91st birthday, the 

legislation ensures that the property will be 

maintained as a living legacy to our 40th President. 

Hastert enjoys strong editorial support from 

the newspapers in his district and has received 

the ‘‘Outstanding Legislator’’ award by numerous 

groups. He is particularly proud to have been 

named repeatedly a ‘‘Friend of Agriculture,’’ 

‘‘Guardian of Senior Rights,’’ and to have won 

Biographies 241 

in each of his years in Congress the ‘‘Golden 

Bulldog Award’’ for fighting against waste in 

government. 

Prior to Congress, during the eighties, Hastert 

served three terms in the Illinois General Assembly, where he spearheaded legislation on child 

abuse prevention, property tax reform, educational excellence and economic development. 

While there, he also led an effort that resulted 

in the adoption of a new public utilities act, reforming the law to benefit Illinoisans. 

Hastert spent the first 16 years of his career 

as a government and history teacher at Yorkville 

High School, and it also was there that he met 

his wife, Jean, a fellow teacher. In addition to 

teaching, he coached football and wrestling and 

led the Yorkville High School Foxes to victory 

at the 1976 Illinois State Wrestling Championship; later that year, he was named Illinois Coach 

of the Year. Hastert, a former high school and 

college wrestler himself, was inducted as an Outstanding American into the National Wrestling 

Hall of Fame in Stillwater, OK, in 2000. In 

2001, the United States Olympic Committee 

named him honorary vice president of the American Olympic movement. 

Born on January 2, 1942, Hastert is a 1964 

graduate of Wheaton jILk College where he 

earned a bachelor’s degree in economics. He attended graduate school at Northern Illinois University in DeKalb, where he earned a master’s 

degree in the philosophy of education in 1967. 

Hastert lives in Yorkville, IL, along the Fox 

River with his wife Jean. They have two grown 

sons, Ethan and Joshua. Whenever he can find 

free time, Hastert enjoys attending wrestling 

meets, going fishing, restoring vintage automobiles, and carving and painting duck decoys. 

242 

Newt Gingrich 

Newt Gingrich is well-known as the architect 

of the Contract with America that led the Republican Party to victory in 1994 by capturing 

the majority in the U.S. House of Representatives for the first time in 40 years. After he was 

elected Speaker, he disrupted the status quo by 

moving power out of Washington and back to 

the American people. Under his leadership, Congress passed welfare reform, passed the first balanced budget in a generation, and restored funding to strengthen our defense and intelligence capabilities, in addition to passing the first tax cuts 

in 16 years. 

But there is a lot more to Newt Gingrich than 

these remarkable achievements. As an author, 

Newt has published seven books including the 

bestsellers, Gettysburg, Contract with America and 

To Renew America. His most recent books are 

Grant Comes East, the second in a series of active 

history studies in the lessons of warfare based on 

a fictional account of the Civil War and Saving 

Lives & Saving Money, which demonstrates how 

to transform health and health care into a 21st 

century system. 

In his post-Speaker role, Newt has become one 

of the most highly sought-after public speakers, 

accepting invitations to speak before some of the 

most prestigious organizations in the world. Because of his own unquenchable thirst for knowledge, Newt is able to share unique and unparalleled insights on a wide range of topics. His audiences find him to be not only an educational 

but also an inspirational speaker. 

Widely recognized for his commitment to a 

better system of health for all Americans, his 

leadership helped save Medicare from bankruptcy, prompted FDA reform to help the seriously ill and initiated a new focus on research, 

prevention, and wellness. His contributions have 

been so great that the American Diabetes Association awarded him their highest non-medical 

award and the March of Dimes named him their 

1995 Georgia Citizen of the Year. Today he serves 

as a board member of the Juvenile Diabetes 

Foundation. 

In his book, Saving Lives & Saving Money, Newt 

describes his vision of a 21st century system of 

health and health care that is centered on the individual, prevention focused, knowledge intense, 

and innovation rich. Moreover, he makes the case 

for a market-mediated system that will improve 

choice and quality while driving down costs. 

To foster such a modern health system that provides better outcomes at lower cost, Newt 

launched the Center for Health Transformation 

(www.healthtransformation.net). 

Recognized internationally as an expert on 

world history, military issues, and international 

affairs, Newt serves as a member of the Defense 

Policy Board. Newt is the longest-serving teacher 

of the joint war fighting course for major generals. He also teaches officers from all five services as a distinguished visiting scholar and professor at the National Defense University. Newt 

serves on the Terrorism Task Force for the Council on Foreign Relations. He is an editorial board 

member of the Johns Hopkins University journal, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, and is an advisory 

board member of the Foundation for the Defense 

of Democracies. 

In 1999, Gingrich was appointed to the United 

States Commission on National Security 21st 

Century, the Hart Rudman Commission, to examine our national security challenges as far out 

as 2025. The Commission’s report is the most 

profound rethinking of defense strategy since 

1947. The report concluded that the number one 

threat to the United States was the likelihood 

Biographies 243 

over the next 25 years of a weapon of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical, and or biological— 

being used against one or more major cities unless our defense and intelligence structures underwent a massive transformation. That report 

was published 6 months before September 11. 

Because of his work on the Commission, Newt 

Gingrich is credited with the idea contained in 

the report of a homeland security agency with 

a secretary to serve on the Cabinet level. President George W. Bush has since created the Department of Homeland Security. 

Newt Gingrich is CEO of the Gingrich 

Group, a communications and consulting firm 

that specializes in transformational change, with 

offices in Atlanta and Washington, DC. He 

serves as a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC; a distinguished visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution 

at Stanford University in Palo Alto, CA; the honorary chairman of the NanoBusiness Alliance; 

and as an advisory board member for the Museum of the Rockies. Newt is also a news and 

political analyst for the Fox News Channel. 

Newt Gingrich is a leading advocate of increased Federal funding for basic science research. 

In 2001, he was the recipient of the Science Coalition’s first Science Pioneer award, given to him 

for his outstanding contributions to educating 

the public about science and its benefits to society. 

A strong advocate of volunteerism, Gingrich 

has long championed the positive impact every 

individual can have on society. He has raised 

millions of dollars for charity, donating both 

time and money to a wide array of causes, including Habitat for Humanity, United Cerebral 

Palsy, the American Cancer Society, and 

ZooAtlanta. A former environmental studies professor, he is widely recognized for his commitment to the environment and to the advancement 

of a new, commonsense environmentalism. In 

1998, the Georgia Wildlife Federation named 

him Legislative Conservationist of the Year. 

Newt was first elected to Congress in 1978 

where he served the Sixth District of Georgia for 

20 years. In 1995, he was elected Speaker of the 

U.S. House of Representatives where he served 

until 1999. The Washington Times has called him 

‘‘the indispensable leader’’ and Time magazine, in 

naming him Man of the Year for 1995, said, 

‘‘Leaders make things possible. Exceptional leaders make them inevitable. Newt Gingrich belongs in the category of the exceptional.’’ 

His experiences as the son of a career soldier 

convinced him at an early age to dedicate his life 

to his country and to the protection of freedom. 

Realizing the importance of understanding the 

past in order to protect the future, he immersed 

himself in the study of history, receiving his 

bachelor’s degree from Emory University and 

master’s and doctorate in modern European history from Tulane University. Before his election 

to Congress, he taught history and environmental 

studies at West Georgia College for 8 years. 

He resides in Virginia with his wife, Callista. 

He has two daughters and two grandchildren. 

244 

Thomas S. Foley 

Ambassador Thomas S. Foley advises clients 

on matters of legal and corporate strategy. He 

is currently the chairman of the Trilateral Commission. 

In addition to being a partner at Akin Gump, 

Ambassador Foley is also a senior advisor at AG 

Global Solutions, a joint venture of Akin Gump 

and First International Resources, Inc., focusing 

on strategic communications and problem-solving for corporations and sovereign governments, 

particularly in complex cross-border matters. 

Prior to rejoining the firm in 2001, Ambassador Foley served as the 25th U.S. Ambassador 

to Japan. 

Before taking up his diplomatic post in November 1997, Ambassador Foley served as the 

49th Speaker of the House of Representatives. He 

was elected to represent the State of Washington’s Fifth Congressional District 15 times, serving his constituents for 30 years from January 

1965 to December 1994. 

Mr. Foley served as majority leader from 1987 

until his election as Speaker on June 6, 1989. 

From 1981 to 1987 he served as majority whip, 

the number three position in the House leadership. He also was a chairman of both the House 

Democratic Caucus and the Democratic Study 

Group. 

During his years in Congress, Mr. Foley was 

a member of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. He served as chairman of the Committee on Agriculture and the Committee on 

Standards of Official Conduct. 

As majority leader, Mr. Foley served on the 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the 

Committee on the Budget, the Select Committee 

to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with 

Iran, and as chairman of the House Geneva Arms 

Talks Observer Team. 

In 1995, following his career in Congress, Ambassador Foley joined Akin Gump as a partner. 

Mr. Foley has served on a number of private 

and public boards of directors, including the 

Japan-America Society of Washington. He also 

served on the board of advisors for the Center 

for Strategic and International Studies and on the 

board of directors for the Center for National 

Policy. He was a member of the board of governors of the East-West Center and is currently 

a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. 

Before his appointment as Ambassador, he served 

as chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. 

Mr. Foley is an honorary Knight Commander 

of the British Empire. He has been awarded the 

Cross of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany and also is a member of the 

French Legion of Honor. In 1996 the Government of Japan conferred upon him the Grand 

Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun, 

Paulowina Flowers, in recognition of his service 

to the U.S. House of Representatives and the important impact he had in facilitating harmonious 

U.S.-Japan relations and promoting understanding of Japan in the United States. 

Mr. Foley is a native of Spokane, WA, and a 

graduate of the University of Washington and its 

School of Law. He is a member of the District 

of Columbia Bar. 

Mr. Foley is married to the former Heather 

Strachan. They reside in Washington, DC, and 

Spokane, WA. 

245 

James C. Wright, Jr. 

The insights gained by Speaker Jim Wright 

in his long and tumultuous career can shed light 

on many of the problems we face in the world 

today. A Member of Congress for 34 years, Mr. 

Wright served with eight American Presidents. 

He was chosen by his colleagues as Speaker of 

the U.S. House of Representatives, the highest 

honor Members can bestow upon one of their 

number. He has met and come to know many 

heads of state including Mikhail Gorbachev and 

several of the current leaders of Middle Eastern 

nations. 

As majority leader, Mr. Wright helped President Carter achieve the historic peace agreement 

between Egypt and Israel. He was the principal 

advocate in Congress for an energy policy to reduce our Nation’s dependence on Middle Eastern 

oil. 

As House Speaker, Mr. Wright presided over 

the historic 100th Congress, considered the most 

productive in a generation. Under his leadership, 

Congress passed landmark legislation on such 

major issues as shelter for the homeless, catastrophic medical assistance for the elderly, safer 

highways and bridges, quality education, clean 

water and affordable housing. That 100th Congress fashioned the beginnings of an effective war 

on drugs and passed the first major trade bill in 

50 years. 

Jim Wright was born in Fort Worth, TX, a 

city he represented in Congress from 1955 

through 1989. He completed public school in 10 

years and was on his way to finishing college 

within 3 years when Pearl Harbor was attacked. 

Following enlistment in the Army Air Corps, 

Mr. Wright received his flyer’s wings and a commission at 19. He flew combat missions in the 

South Pacific and was awarded the Distinguished 

Flying Cross and the Legion of Merit. 

After the war, Mr. Wright was elected to the 

Texas Legislature at 23. At 26, he became the 

youngest mayor in Texas when voters chose him 

to head their city government in Weatherford, 

his boyhood home. 

Elected to Congress at 31, he served 18 consecutive terms and authored major legislation in 

the fields of foreign affairs, economic development, water conservation, education, and energy. 

Mr. Wright received worldwide recognition for 

his efforts to bring peace to Central America. 

Jim Wright served 10 years as majority leader 

before being sworn in as Speaker on January 6, 

1987. He was reelected as Speaker in January 

1989. 

A prolific writer, he has authored numerous 

books: You and Your Congressman, The Coming 

Water Famine, Of Swords and Plowshares, Reflections 

of a Public Man and Worth It All: My War for 

Peace. He has also written articles for major magazines and newspapers. His most recent book, 

Balance of Power: Congress and the Presidents from 

the Era of McCarthy to the Age of Gingrich, was 

published in May 1996 by Turner Publishing. 

Mr. Wright currently serves as senior political 

consultant to American Income Life Insurance 

Company. He writes a frequent newspaper column and occasionally appears on network television news programs. Speaker Wright has donated his papers and memorabilia to the Texas 

Christian University library in Fort Worth, TX. 

Archivists there are cataloging these pieces for 

reference and display. He is currently a distinguished lecturer at TCU where he teaches a 

course entitled, ‘‘Congress and the Presidents.’’ 

246 

Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr. 

For Thomas P. ‘‘Tip’’ O’Neill, Jr., becoming 

Speaker of the House in 1977 was the pinnacle 

of a lifetime of service in government and the 

Democratic Party. Born in a working class neighborhood in Cambridge, MA, in 1912, the son of 

a city councilman, he entered politics at 15, campaigning for fellow Irish Catholic Al Smith in 

the Presidential election of 1928. While still a 

senior at Boston College, O’Neill lost a bid for 

the Cambridge City Council. 

Tip O’Neill learned two great lessons from his 

first campaign. One lesson was learned on the 

last day of the campaign from his high school 

elocution and drama teacher, a neighbor who 

lived across the street from his residence. On that 

day, Mrs. Elizabeth O’Brien approached the aspiring politician and said ‘‘Tom, I’m going to 

vote for you tomorrow even though you didn’t 

ask me.’’ O’Neill was puzzled as he had known 

Mrs. O’Brien for years and had done chores for 

her, cutting grass, raking leaves and shoveling 

snow. He told his neighbor that ‘‘I didn’t think 

I had to ask for your vote.’’ She replied, ‘‘Tom, 

let me tell you something: People like to be 

asked.’’ The second bit of advice came a few days 

after the election from O’Neill’s father, when he 

told Tip: ‘‘Let me tell you something that I 

learned years ago. All politics is local.’’ During 

that first campaign, Tip took his neighborhood 

for granted and did not work hard enough in his 

‘‘own backyard.’’ O’Neill took these lessons to 

heart. He would not hold his career aspirations 

over the interests of his constituents. The advice 

paid off. Beginning in 1936, when he was elected 

to the State House of Representatives, Tip never 

lost another election and he never took any vote 

for granted. Not forgetting the advice of Mrs. 

O’Brien, on every election he would ask his wife 

Millie for her vote. She would typically reply, 

‘‘Tom, I’ll give you every consideration.’’ 

In 1937, O’Neill began his first year of public 

life as a Massachusetts State representative and 

was elected minority leader in 1947. 

In 1948, U.S. Congressman John W. McCormack (Democratic Party whip and leader of the 

Massachusetts delegation) offered his support and 

encouraged O’Neill to campaign hard to make 

the Democratic Party the majority party in the 

Massachusetts House of Representatives for the 

first time in a century. Their effort paid off as 

they captured 38 out of 40 GOP districts targeted by the Democratic strategy. The Democrats now held a majority of the seats, and 

O’Neill became the speaker of the Massachusetts 

House of Representatives. 

In 1952, by a 3,000-vote margin, O’Neill won 

the seat in Congress vacated by John F. Kennedy, 

who had been elected to the U.S. Senate. 

In Washington, under the tutelage of John 

McCormack, O’Neill learned the system and rose 

steadily through the party ranks. 

In 1955, he became a member of the House 

Rules Committee. In 1967 his principled opposition to the Vietnam war startled many in his 

working class district, as well as President Lyndon Johnson, but gained him support among 

younger House Democrats. In 1970, he was a cosponsor of a reform bill that ended the practice 

of unrecorded voting in the House. Congressmen 

would now be accountable to their constituents 

for their actions. In 1971 he was named majority 

whip, then elected majority leader in 1972, a position he used to lead the fight against President 

Richard Nixon during the Watergate scandal. In 

1974, O’Neill played a key role in managing the 

Nixon impeachment proceedings. 

Biographies 247 

In 1977, O’Neill became the Speaker of the 

House of Representatives and held the position 

until 1987. This was the longest continuous term 

of the speakership in the Nation’s history. One 

of his most important actions was to open the 

House to live television coverage jC–SPANk beginning in 1979. In the eighties, O’Neill spearheaded the Democrats’ efforts to hold the excesses of the Reagan revolution in check and to 

prevent massive scalebacks of social programs for 

the Nation’s aged and less advantaged citizens. 

The Speaker felt Reagan did not have a firm 

grasp on domestic affairs and once characterized 

the popular President as a ‘‘Herbert Hoover with 

a smile.’’ For these efforts, O’Neill was vilified 

as a ‘‘tax and spend liberal’’ by the Republicans, 

the conservative press and even some of his own 

constituents. By November 1982, America was in 

the grips of the worst economic downturn since 

the Great Depression and Reagan’s economic 

policies brought him the lowest approval rating 

of his Presidency. In leading the loyal opposition 

into Reagan’s second term, O’Neill stayed true 

to the Democratic tradition he viewed almost as 

a religion (alongside his other faiths, Roman Catholicism and the Boston Red Sox). Also to the 

displeasure of the Reagan administration, 

O’Neill was horrified by the atrocities committed 

by Contra rebels in Nicaragua and sought to 

limit U.S. funding to these groups. 

After 10 years as Speaker, O’Neill retired in 

1987, dividing his time between an apartment in 

Washington and a house on Cape Cod. ‘‘He was 

the Congressman’s Congressman,’’ said longtime 

rival Senator Bob Dole when O’Neill died in 

1994 at the age of 81. ‘‘He loved politics and government because he saw jtheyk could make a difference in people’s lives,’’ remembered President 

Bill Clinton, ‘‘and he loved people most of all.’’ 

248 

List of Conference Participants 

Jeff Biggs. Director, Congressional Fellowship 

Program, American Political Science Association. 

Former Press Secretary to Speaker Thomas S. 

Foley. 

James C. Billington. Librarian of Congress. 

David E. Bonior. Democratic Member of the 

House from Michigan (1977–2003). 

Gary Copeland. Director, Carl Albert Congressional Studies and Research Center, University of 

Oklahoma. 

Mickey Edwards. Republican Member of the 

House from Oklahoma (1977–1993). 

John A. Farrell. Washington Bureau Chief, 

Denver Post. 

Vic Fazio. Democratic Member of the House 

from California (1979–1999). 

Thomas S. Foley. Speaker of the House of Representatives (1989–1995). Democratic Member of 

the House from Washington (1965–1995). 

Bill Frenzel. Republican Member of the House 

from Minnesota (1971–1991). 

Newt Gingrich. Speaker of the House of Representatives (1995–1999). Republican Member of 

the House from Georgia (1979–1999). 

J. Dennis Hastert. Speaker of the House of 

Representatives (1999– ). Republican Member 

of the House from Illinois (1987– ). 

Janet Hook. Chief Congressional Correspondent, Los Angeles Times. 

Gary Hymel. Former administrative assistant 

to Majority Leader Hale Boggs and Speaker 

Thomas P. O’Neill, Jr. 

Tom Loeffler. Republican Member of the 

House from Texas (1979–1987). 

Robert H. Michel. Republican Leader of the 

House (1981–1994). Republican Member of the 

House from Illinois (1957–1995). 

Daniel P. Mulhollan. Director, Congressional 

Research Service, Library of Congress. 

Walter J. Oleszek. Senior Specialist, Congressional Research Service. 

Leon E. Panetta. Democratic Member of the 

House from California (1977–1993). OMB Director (1993–1994). White House Chief of Staff to 

President William Clinton (1994–1997). 

Robert V. Remini. Professor of History; Kluge 

Scholar, Library of Congress. 

Dan Rostenkowski. Democratic Member of 

the House from Illinois (1959–1995). 

Robert S. Walker. Republican Member of the 

House from Pennsylvania (1977–1997). 

Donald Wolfensberger. Director, The Congress Project, Woodrow Wilson International 

Center for Scholars. Former staff director of the 

House Rules Committee (1995–1997). 

James C. Wright, Jr. Speaker of the House of 

Representatives (1987–1989). Democratic Member 

of the House from Texas (1955–1989). 

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