2015 UT App 111

_________________________________________________________

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JUAN CARLOS COLLAZO-COLLAZO,

Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

STATE OF UTAH,

Respondent and Appellee.

Memorandum Decision

No. 20131126-CA

Filed April 30, 2015

Fourth District Court, Provo Department

The Honorable Steven L. Hansen

No. 120402000

German T. Flores, Attorney for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes and Andrew F. Peterson, 

Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. authored this Memorandum 

Decision, in which JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN and KATE 

A. TOOMEY concurred.

VOROS, Judge:

¶1 Juan Carlos Collazo-Collazo pled guilty to a single count 

of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, 

a second degree felony. He filed a postconviction petition 

alleging ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel 

failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of his plea. 

The district court denied the petition on summary judgment on 

the ground that Collazo-Collazo was advised of the immigration 

consequences of the plea and that, in any event, he suffered no 

prejudice. We affirm.
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¶2 In 2012, Collazo-Collazo and a companion drove from 

Arizona to Provo, Utah, with two pounds of methamphetamine 

hidden in the insulation of a cooler. Utah County law 

enforcement officers received a tip that Collazo-Collazo and his 

companion planned to distribute the drugs. Officers executed a 

search warrant at the motel where the two men were staying. A 

police dog detected the methamphetamine, and officers arrested 

both men. Collazo-Collazo admitted knowing about the drugs. 

Although he claimed to have been ‚only along for the ride,‛ 

Collazo-Collazo drove the car at least part of the trip and 

admitted to police that he possessed the drugs with intent to 

distribute. 

¶3 Collazo-Collazo was charged with possession with intent 

to distribute a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a first 

degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia in a 

drug-free zone, a class A misdemeanor. He pled guilty to a 

single count of possession of a controlled substance with intent 

to distribute, a second degree felony.

¶4 During the plea colloquy, Collazo-Collazo’s trial counsel

confirmed that Collazo-Collazo was a legal resident and that 

counsel had explained the immigration consequences of a plea to 

his client. Counsel further explained that the plea would put 

Collazo-Collazo ‚at some risk‛ of deportation, but that 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement had not yet shown any 

‚interest‛ in the case. The district court then asked 

Collazo-Collazo whether he understood that ‚there could 

possibly be some [i]mmigration consequences.‛ Collazo-Collazo 

responded, ‚Yes, sir.‛ 

¶5 Collazo-Collazo subsequently filed a petition for 

postconviction relief alleging that trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance by not advising him of the plea’s 

immigration consequences. The State moved for summary 

judgment. The district court granted the motion. It ruled that 

counsel did not perform deficiently, because the record reflects 
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that counsel told Collazo-Collazo that he was ‚at some risk‛ of 

deportation. The district court then ruled that even if counsel 

had performed deficiently, Collazo-Collazo suffered no 

prejudice. The court noted that Collazo-Collazo had neither 

pleaded nor proffered evidence suggesting that had he known 

about the risk of deportation he would have insisted on a trial. 

The district court further ruled that, given the evidence weighing 

against him, ‚a decision to reject the plea bargain here would 

have been irrational.‛ It concluded, ‚Collazo-Collazo faced no 

option that eliminated the risk of deportation, and thus he was 

forced to make his choices based solely on the weight of the 

direct consequences of his plea.‛ 

¶6 On appeal Collazo-Collazo contends that the district court 

erred in granting the State’s motion for summary judgment. He 

argues that trial counsel’s failure ‚to advise him of the 

immigration consequences—including the real risk of 

deportation—of his guilty plea constitutes ineffective assistance 

of counsel because it falls below an objective standard of 

reasonable professional behavior for any criminal defense 

attorney.‛ The State responds that the district court properly 

granted summary judgment because ‚*t+he undisputed facts in 

the criminal record demonstrated that counsel advised 

Collazo-Collazo on the record that he was ‘at some risk’ of 

negative immigration consequences.‛

¶7 Summary judgment is appropriate when ‚the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 

to a judgment as a matter of law.‛ Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). We 

review a district court’s ‚legal conclusions and ultimate grant or 

denial of summary judgment for correctness, and view[] the 

facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party.‛ Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 

UT 2, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted).
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20131126-CA 4 2015 UT App 111

¶8 To succeed on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, 

an appellant must show that (1) ‚counsel’s performance was 

deficient in that it ‘fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness’‛ and (2) ‚counsel’s performance was prejudicial 

in that ‘there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different.’‛ Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ¶ 87, 150 P.3d 

480 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 

(1984)). An appellant must rebut ‚a strong presumption that 

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance.‛ Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. ‚*P]roof of 

ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter 

but must be a demonstrable reality.‛ Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, 

¶ 21, 194 P.3d 903 (alteration in original) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). In the deportation context, counsel 

performs effectively so long as she, among other things, 

‚inform*s+ her client whether his plea carries a risk of 

deportation.‛ Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) 

(emphasis added). 

¶9 We agree with the district court that trial counsel

performed adequately under these standards. During the plea 

colloquy, counsel confirmed that Collazo-Collazo was a legal 

resident and that counsel had explained the immigration 

consequences of a guilty plea to his client. Collazo-Collazo 

concedes that when counsel explained that the plea would put 

him ‚at some risk,‛ the risk referred to was the risk of 

deportation. In addition, during the plea hearing the district 

court asked Collazo-Collazo whether he understood that ‚there 

could possibly be some [i]mmigration consequences.‛ 

Collazo-Collazo responded, ‚Yes, sir.‛ Because counsel satisfied 

his obligation to inform his client about the ‚risk of 

deportation,‛ Collazo-Collazo has failed to show that counsel

performed deficiently. See id.; see also Ramirez-Gil v. State, 2014 

UT App 122, ¶ 10, 327 P.3d 1228. Accordingly, the district court 

correctly granted summary judgment on the element of deficient 

performance.
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20131126-CA 5 2015 UT App 111

¶10 Collazo-Collazo has also failed to show prejudice. To 

show prejudice in the plea-bargain context, an appellant ‚must 

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have 

insisted on going to trial.‛ Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); 

see also Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 525 (Utah 1994). To show 

a reasonable probability that he would have gone to trial, an 

appellant must show ‚that a decision to reject the plea bargain 

would have been rational under the circumstances.‛ Padilla, 559 

U.S. at 372. An appellant’s ‚’mere allegation that he would have 

insisted on trial but for his trial counsel’s errors, although 

necessary, is ultimately insufficient to entitle him to relief. 

Rather, we look to the factual circumstances surrounding the 

plea to determine whether [defendant] would have proceeded to 

trial.’‛ Rhinehart v. State, 2012 UT App 322, ¶ 6, 290 P.3d 921 

(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Clingman, 288 

F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir. 2002)). 

¶11 Collazo-Collazo has not demonstrated that a decision to 

reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the 

circumstances. Collazo-Collazo argues that because ‚there was 

ample evidence to suggest [he] did not know about the drugs 

and had no intent to distribute them,‛ had counsel properly 

advised him about the deportation consequences of his plea, 

Collazo-Collazo ‚would have taken the case to trial and a jury 

would have ample basis to conclude he was not guilty.‛ 

¶12 That is not how we read the record. Police recovered two 

pounds of methamphetamine in a lined cooler that 

Collazo-Collazo knowingly transported from Arizona to Utah. 

Collazo-Collazo invites us to ‚disregard the State’s repeated 

reference . . . to the supposed fact that [he] was aware of the 

drugs in the car and intended to distribute them‛ because the 

statements ‚are the very product of . . . *counsel’s+ ineffective 

assistance.‛ But the record shows that before any charges were

filed—and thus before counsel appeared in the case—

Collazo-Collazo told police that he knew about the drugs and 
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20131126-CA 6 2015 UT App 111

that he intended to distribute them. This confession was not the 

product of any act on the part of counsel. And Collazo-Collazo 

has not shown why, on the facts of this case, his confession did

not make conviction at trial all but inevitable.

¶13 Given the weight of the evidence against him, 

Collazo-Collazo rationally exchanged a greater offense, an 

additional offense, and longer incarceration for a lesser criminal 

penalty carrying no greater deportation consequences. See 

Ramirez-Gil, 2014 UT App 122, ¶ 13. In short, we agree with the 

district court that Collazo-Collazo did not suffer prejudice 

because he ‚faced no option that eliminated the risk of 

deportation, and thus he was forced to make his choices based 

solely on the weight of the direct consequences of his plea.‛ 

Accordingly, the district court correctly granted summary 

judgment on the element of prejudice.

¶14 The judgment of the district court is affirmed.