United States Government Accountability Office

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 12:00 p.m. EST 

Monday, March 14, 2005 REBUILDING IRAQ 

Testimony 

Before the Committee on Government Reform; 

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging 

Threats, and International Relations; House of 

Representatives 

Preliminary Observations 

on Challenges in 

Transferring Security 

Responsibilities to Iraqi 

Military and Police 

Statement of Joseph A. Christoff, Director 

International Affairs and Trade 

GAO-05-431T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

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www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-431T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Joseph 

Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or 

christoffj@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-05-431T, a testimony 

before the Committee on Government 

Reform; Subcommittee on National 

Security, Emerging Threats, and 

International Relations; House of 

Representatives 

March 14, 2005

REBUILDING IRAQ

Preliminary Observations on Challenges 

in Transferring Security Responsibilities 

to Iraqi Military and Police 

The Multinational Force in Iraq has developed and begun to implement a 

strategy to transfer security responsibilities to the Iraqi military and police 

forces. This strategy would allow a gradual drawdown of its forces based on 

the multinational force neutralizing the insurgency and developing Iraqi 

military and police services that can independently maintain security. 

U.S. government agencies do not report reliable data on the extent to which 

Iraqi security forces are trained and equipped. As of late February 2005, the 

State Department reported that about 82,000 police forces under the Iraqi 

Ministry of Interior and almost 60,000 military forces under the Iraqi Ministry 

of Defense have been trained and equipped. However, the reported number 

of Iraqi police is unreliable because the Ministry of Interior does not receive 

consistent and accurate reporting from the police forces around the country. 

The data does not exclude police absent from duty. Further, the departments 

of State and Defense no longer report on the extent to which Iraqi security 

forces are equipped with their required weapons, vehicles, communications 

equipment, and body armor. 

The insurgency in Iraq has intensified since June 2003, making it difficult to 

transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. From that time through 

January 2005, insurgent attacks grew in number, complexity, and intensity. 

At the same time, the multinational force has faced four key challenges in 

increasing the capability of Iraqi forces: (1) training, equipping, and 

sustaining a changing force structure; (2) developing a system for measuring 

the readiness and capability of Iraqi forces; (3) building loyalty and 

leadership throughout the Iraqi chain of command; and (4) developing a 

police force that upholds the rule of law in a hostile environment. 

The multinational force is taking steps to address these challenges, such as 

developing a system to assess unit readiness and embedding US forces 

within Iraqi units. However, without reliable reporting data, a more capable 

Iraqi force, and stronger Iraqi leadership, the Department of Defense faces 

difficulties in implementing its strategy to draw down U.S. forces from Iraq. 

 

Since the fall of the former Iraq 

regime in April 2003, the 

multinational force has been 

working to develop Iraqi military 

and police forces capable of 

maintaining security. To support 

this effort, the United States 

provided about $5.8 billion in 2003-

04 to develop Iraq’s security 

capability. In February 2005, the 

president requested a supplemental 

appropriation with an additional 

$5.7 billion to accelerate the 

development of Iraqi military and 

police forces. 

GAO provides preliminary 

observations on (1) the strategy for 

transferring security 

responsibilities to Iraqi military and 

police forces; (2) the data on the 

status of forces, and (3) challenges 

that the Multi-National Force in 

Iraq faces in transferring security 

missions to these forces. 

To prepare this statement, GAO 

used unclassified reports, status 

updates, security plans, and other 

documents from the Departments 

of Defense and State. GAO also 

used testimonies and other 

statements for the record from 

officials such as the Secretary of 

Defense. In addition, GAO visited 

the Iraqi police training facility in 

Jordan. 
Page 1 GAO-05-431T 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss challenges in transferring security 

responsibilities from the multinational force to the Iraqi military and 

police forces. In April 2005, we will issue a classified report to the 

Congress that provides additional analysis on this subject. 

The former Iraqi regime fell in April 2003, and the United Nations 

recognized an interim administration—the Coalition Provisional Authority. 

On May 23, 2003, the Authority dissolved the military and paramilitary 

organizations of the former Iraqi regime and announced plans to create a 

new national self-defense capability for Iraq. In June 2004, the Authority 

transferred sovereignty to an interim government. At the time of Iraq’s 

January 2005 elections, more than 159,000 U.S. forces and 24,500 coalition 

forces were operating throughout Iraq. 

As of March 2005, the United States has made available about $5.8 billion 

to develop Iraq’s security capability. In February 2005, the President 

requested a supplemental appropriation for Iraq, Afghanistan, and other 

purposes that included an additional $5.7 billion to accelerate the 

development of Iraqi security forces. 

Today, I will provide preliminary observations on (1) the strategy for 

transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi military and police forces, 

(2) data on the status of Iraqi forces, and (3) challenges the Multi-National 

Force in Iraq (MNF-I) faces in transferring security missions to these 

forces. 

This statement only includes unclassified information. (See appendix I for 

details on our scope and methodology.) We conducted work for this 

statement in February and March 2005 in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. 

Since fall 2003, MNF-I has developed and refined a plan to transfer 

security responsibilities to the Iraqi military and police forces.1

 The plan’s 

objective was to allow a gradual drawdown of coalition forces first in 

conjunction with the neutralization of Iraq’s insurgency and second with 

 1

GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and 

Oversight Issues, GAO-04-902R (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004). 

Summary 
Page 2 GAO-05-431T 

the development of Iraqi forces capable of securing their country. In 

summer 2004, MNF-I developed and began implementing a comprehensive 

campaign plan with this transition concept. The campaign plan is 

classified. As of March 2005, the Commander, U.S. Central Command, 

stated that Iraqi security forces were growing in capability but were not 

ready to take on the insurgency without the presence, help, mentoring, 

and assistance of MNF-I. 

U.S. government data do not provide reliable information on the status of 

Iraqi military and police forces. The goal of the multinational force is to 

train and equip about 271,000 Iraqi security forces by July 2006. As of late 

February 2005, the State Department reported that about 82,000 police 

forces under the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and almost 60,000 military forces 

under the Iraqi Ministry of Defense have been trained and equipped. 

However, the reported number of Iraqi police is unreliable because the 

Ministry of Interior does not receive consistent and accurate reporting 

from the police forces around the country. The data also include police 

absent from duty. Further, State no longer reports on the extent to which 

Iraqi security forces have their required weapons, vehicles, 

communication equipment, and body armor. 

The insurgency in Iraq has intensified since June 2003, making it difficult 

to transfer security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. According to 

Department of Defense officials and documents, the insurgency has grown 

in intensity and sophistication. Attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi 

forces have increased in number over time, with the highest peaks of 

attacks occurring in August and November 2004 and in January 2005. At 

the same time, MNF-I faces four challenges in building an Iraqi security 

force capable of combating the insurgency. First, the Iraqi force structure 

for the military and police is changing with the creation of new units by 

MNF-I and the Iraqi ministries. This makes it difficult to provide effective 

support—the training, equipment, and sustaining of Iraqi forces. Second, 

MNF-I is still developing a system to assess the readiness of Iraqi military 

and police forces so they can identify weaknesses and provide them with 

effective support. Third, developing strong Iraqi leadership and ensuring 

the loyalty of all personnel throughout the chain of command has proven 

difficult. Fourth, MNF-I and the Iraqi ministries find it difficult to train a 

national police force that abides by the rule of law while operating in a 

hostile environment. 

MNF-I is aware of these challenges and is working to address them. For 

example, MNF-I is developing a system to measure the readiness of the 
Page 3 GAO-05-431T 

Iraqi military and police and is moving to expand a system of embedded 

U.S. trainers to help develop strong Iraqi leadership. 

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), established in May 2003, was 

the U.N.-recognized coalition authority led by the United States and the 

United Kingdom that was responsible for the temporary governance of 

Iraq. In May 2003, the CPA dissolved the military organizations of the 

former regime and began the process of creating or reestablishing new 

Iraqi security forces, including the police and new Iraqi army. Over time, 

multinational force commanders assumed responsibility for recruiting and 

training some Iraqi defense and police forces in their areas of 

responsibility.2

 On June 28, 2004, the CPA transferred power to a sovereign 

Iraqi interim government, the CPA officially dissolved, and Iraq’s 

transitional period began. Under Iraq’s transitional law,3

 the transitional 

period covers the interim government phase and the transitional 

government period, which is scheduled to end by December 31, 2005.4

The multinational force (MNF-I) has the authority to take all necessary 

measures to contribute to security and stability in Iraq during this process, 

working in partnership with the Iraqi government to reach agreement on 

security and policy issues. A May 2004 national security presidential 

directive required the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to direct all 

U.S. government efforts to organize, equip, and train Iraqi security forces. 

The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, which operates 

under MNF-I, now leads coalition efforts to train, equip, and organize Iraqi 

security forces. 

In October 2003, the multinational force outlined a four-phased plan for 

transferring security missions to Iraqi security forces. The four phases 

were (1) mutual support, where the multinational force establishes 

conditions for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi forces; (2) 

transition to local control, where Iraqi forces in a local area assume 

responsibility for security; (3) transition to regional control, where Iraqi 

forces are responsible for larger regions; and (4) transition to strategic 

 2

The CPA was responsible for police training at the Baghdad and Jordan academies. The 

Iraqi army units were trained by the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq. 

3

Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, March 2004. 

4

See Iraq’s Transitional Law, GAO-04-746R, May 25, 2004, for more information on key 

events during Iraq’s transitional period. 

Background 

MNF-I Plan for 

Transferring Security 

Responsibilities to 

Iraqi Forces 
Page 4 GAO-05-431T 

over watch, where Iraqi forces on a national level are capable of 

maintaining a secure environment against internal and external threats, 

with broad monitoring from the multinational force. The plan’s objective 

was to allow a gradual drawdown of coalition forces first in conjunction 

with the neutralization of Iraq’s insurgency and second with the 

development of Iraqi forces capable of securing their country.5

Citing the growing capability of Iraqi security forces, MNF-I attempted to 

quickly shift responsibilities to them in February 2004 but did not succeed 

in this effort. In March 2004, Iraqi security forces numbered about 203,000, 

including about 76,000 police, 78,000 facilities protection officers,6

 and 

about 38,000 in the civilian defense corps. Police and military units 

performed poorly during an escalation of insurgent attacks against the 

coalition in April 2004. According to a July 2004 executive branch report 

to Congress, many Iraqi security forces around the country collapsed 

during this uprising. Some Iraqi forces fought alongside coalition forces. 

Other units abandoned their posts and responsibilities and in some cases 

assisted the insurgency. 

A number of problems contributed to the collapse of Iraqi security forces. 

MNF-I identified problems in training and equipping them as among the 

reasons for their poor performance. Training of police and some defense 

forces was not uniform and varied widely across Iraq. MNF-I’s 

commanders had the leeway to institute their own versions of the 

transitional police curriculum, and the training for some defense forces 

did not prepare them to fight against well-armed insurgents. Further, 

according to the CPA Director of Police, when Iraqi police voluntarily 

returned to duty in May 2003, CPA initially provided limited training and 

did not thoroughly vet the personnel to get them on the streets quickly. 

Many police who were hired remain untrained and unvetted, according to 

Department of Defense (DOD) officials. 

 5

For more information on the security transition concept, see GAO-04-902R. 

6

The Departments of State and Defense stopped counting the Facilities Protection Service 

as part of the Iraqi security force structure in September 2004. The mission of the Facilities 

Protection Service is to guard and secure individual ministry and municipal buildings 

against vandalism and theft. 
Page 5 GAO-05-431T 

MNF-I completed a campaign plan7 during summer 2004 that elaborated 

and refined the original strategy for transferring security responsibilities to 

Iraqi forces at the local, regional, and then national levels. Further details 

on this campaign plan are classified. 

On March 1, 2005, the CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed 

Services Committee that Iraqi security forces were growing in capability 

but were not yet ready to take on the insurgency without the presence, 

help, mentoring, and assistance of MNF-I. He cited a mixed performance 

record for the Iraqi security forces during the previous 11 months. The 

commander further testified that focused training and mentoring of Iraqi 

Intervention Forces, Iraqi Special Operations Forces, and National Guard 

forces contributed to successful coalition operations in places such as 

Najaf and Kufa during August 2004 and Fallujah during November 2004, 

and during the January 2005 elections. On the other hand, he also cited 

instances of poor performance by the police in western Baghdad from 

August through October 2004 and Mosul during November 2004. 

U.S. government data does not provide reliable information on the status 

of Iraqi military and police forces. According to a March 2005 State 

Department report, as of February 28, 2005, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense 

had 59,695 operational troops, or roughly two thirds of the total required. 

The Ministry of Interior had 82,072 trained and equipped officers on duty, 

or almost half of the total required. Table 1 shows status of Iraqi forces 

under the Ministries of Defense and Interior. 

 7

According to DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JP 1-02; Nov. 30, 2004), 

a campaign plan is a plan for a series of related military operations to accomplish a 

strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. 

Data on Iraqi Security 

Forces Has 

Limitations 
Page 6 GAO-05-431T 

Table 1: Status of Iraqi Security Forces as Reported by the Department of State 

Ministry Component Requireda

Operational/ 

Trained and 

Equippedb

Percentage 

of Required

Iraq Army 

• Regular Army 

• National Guard 

• Intervention Force

• Special Operations

94,656 58,992 62

Air Force 453 186 41

Navy 582 517 89

Defense 

Sub-total 95,691 59,695c

62

Iraqi Police Service 135,000 

Highway Patrol 6,300 

55,274 39

Other forces 

• Civil Intervention 

• Special Police 

• Emergency Response 

• Border Enforcement 

• Dignitary Protection 

34,050 26,798 79

Interior 

Sub-total 175,350 82,072d

47

Total 271,041 141,761 52

Source: State Department reports. 

a

Required numbers are from 1/19/05 Iraq Weekly Status Report. 

b

The term “operational” refers to Ministry of Defense forces. The term “trained and equipped” refers 

to Ministry of Interior forces. Numbers are from 3/2/05 Iraq Weekly Status Report. 

c

Unauthorized absent personnel are not included in Ministry of Defense numbers. 

d

Unauthorized absent personnel are included in Ministry of Interior numbers. 

MNF-I’s goal is to train and equip a total of about 271,000 Iraqi security 

forces by July 2006. However, the numbers of security forces, as reported 

in table 1, are limited in providing accurate and complete information on 

the status of Iraqi forces. Specifically: 

• The reported number of security forces overstates the number actually 

serving. Ministry of Interior reports, for example, include police who 

are absent without leave in its totals. Ministry of Defense reports 

exclude the absent military personnel from its totals. According to 

DOD officials, the number of absentees is probably in the tens of 

thousands. 
Page 7 GAO-05-431T 

• The reported number of Iraqi police is unreliable. According to a 

senior official from the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, MNF-I does not 

know how many Iraqi police are on duty at any given point because the 

Ministry of Interior does not receive consistent and accurate reporting 

from police stations across Iraq. 

• The Departments of Defense and State do not provide additional 

information on the extent to which trained Iraqi security forces have 

their necessary equipment. As recently as September 2004, State issued 

unclassified reports with detailed information on the number of 

weapons, vehicles, communication equipment, and body amour 

required by each security force compared to the amount received. 

State had also provided weekly unclassified updates on the number of 

personnel trained in each unit. 

In addition, the total number of Iraqi security forces includes forces with 

varying missions and training levels. Not all units are designed to be 

capable of fighting the insurgency. For example, the police service, which 

numbers about 55,000 of Iraq’s 141,000 personnel who have received 

training, has a civilian law enforcement function. As of mid-December 

2004, paramilitary training for a high-threat hostile environment was not 

part of the curriculum for new recruits. The missions of other units, such 

as the Ministry of Defense’s commando battalion and the Ministry of 

Interior’s Emergency Response Unit, focus on combating terrorism. 

Required training for both forces includes counterterrorism. Table 2 

provides information on the types of military and police units, their 

missions, and their training. 

 
Page 8 GAO-05-431T 

Table 2: Missions and Training of Iraqi Security Forces

Ministry Unit Mission Training 

Iraqi Army 

• Regular Army Defend Iraq against external threats. 

When directed, assist in providing 

defense against internal threats. 

Eight weeks of basic training. Before 

deployment units receive follow-on 

operational training. 

• National Guard Conduct stability operations to support 

internal security. Conduct constabulary 

duties in support of internal security. 

Abbreviated 3-week basic training. 

Follow-on training similar to that given 

the regular army. 

• Intervention Force Conduct operations to defeat anti-Iraqi 

forces, with primary focus on urban areas. 

Assist in the restoration of a secure and 

stable environment. 

Four weeks of cadre training (for officers 

and noncommissioned officers); 13 

weeks basic and urban operations 

training. 

• Commando Battalion Support the Iraqi Counter-Terrorist Force. 

Similar in organization, training, and 

mission to the U.S. Army Ranger 

Battalion. 

Regular army basic training. Instruction 

includes counter terrorism and 

unconventional warfare. 

• Counter-Terrorist Task Force Direct action counter-terrorism similar 

mission, and training to U.S. Special 

Forces with counter-terrorist function. 

Regular Army basic training; specialized 

13-week course. 

Air Force Provide aerial reconnaissance and rotary 

and fixed-wing transport for Iraqi Security 

Forces and authorities. 

Training consists of 1 to 4 month 

familiarization instruction. 

Defense 

Navy Conduct security operations on Iraqi 

territorial waters, including gas and oil 

platforms, and, in conjunction with 

Department of Border Enforcement, 

conduct police operations on Iraq’s 

coastline and territorial waters to counter 

piracy, smuggling, and other unlawful 

actions. 

Regular Army basic training; follow-on 

training for land- and sea-based troops, 

advanced seamanship training. 

Police Provide law enforcement, public safety 

and internal security. 

New officers: 8-week academy training. 

Serving officers: 3-week course. 

Highway Patrol Provide law enforcement, internal 

security, and convoy security along Iraq’s 

highways. 

N/A 

Other forces 

• Civil Intervention Force Provide a national level, high end, rapid 

response police capability to counter 

large-scale disobedience and insurgents. 

N/A 

• Special Police Commando Provide a direct action, special 

operations, and counter insurgency 

capability in support of Ministry of Interior. 

N/A 

Interior 

• Emergency Response Unit Provide a special operations police 

capability in support of the Iraqi Police 

Service. 

Standard regular police training; 8-week 

specialized training focusing on terrorist 

incidents, high-risk searches, and 

weapons of mass destruction. 
Page 9 GAO-05-431T 

Ministry Unit Mission Training 

• Department of Border 

Enforcement 

Protect the integrity of Iraq’s border and 

monitor and control the movement of 

persons and goods. 

4-week academy training. 

• Bureau of Dignitary Protection Provide close protection, convoy security, 

and fixed-site security for Iraqi key 

political leaders. 

N/A 

Source: MNF-I documents and DOD testimonies before Congress. 

Note: N/A = Not available from an unclassified source. 

The multinational force’s security transition plan depends on neutralizing 

the insurgent threat and increasing Iraqi security capability. The insurgent 

threat has increased since June 2003, as insurgent attacks have grown in 

number, sophistication, and complexity. At the same time, MNF-I and the 

Iraqi government confront difficulties to building Iraqi security forces that 

are capable of effectively combating the insurgency. These include 

programming effective support for a changing force structure, assessing 

progress in developing capable forces without a system for measuring 

their readiness, developing leadership and loyalty throughout the Iraqi 

chain of command, and developing police who abide by the rule of law in a 

hostile environment. 

According to senior military officials, the insurgency in Iraq—particularly 

the Sunni insurgency—has grown in number, complexity, and intensity 

over the past 18 months. On February 3, 2005, the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the 

insurgency in Iraq had built up slowly during the first year, then became 

very intense from summer 2004 through January 2005. Figure 1 provides 

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) data showing these trends in enemy 

initiated attacks against the coalition, its Iraqi partners, and infrastructure. 

Overall attacks peaked in August 2004 due to a rise in violence in Sunnidominated regions and an uprising by the Mahdi Army, a Shi’a insurgent 

group led by radical Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Although the November 

2004 and January 2005 numbers were slightly lower than those for August, 

it is significant that almost all of the attacks in these 2 months took place 

in Sunni-majority areas, whereas the August attacks took place 

countrywide. MNF-I is the primary target of the attacks, but the number of 

attacks against Iraqi civilians and security forces increased significantly 

during January 2005. On March 1, 2005, the CENTCOM Commander told 

the Senate Armed Services Committee that more Iraqi security forces than 

Americans have died in action against insurgents since June 2004. 

Challenges to 

Transferring Security 

Missions to Iraqi 

Control 

The Insurgency Has 

Intensified 
Page 10 GAO-05-431T 

Figure 1: Violent Incidents Against the Coalition and Its Partners, by Month, June 2003 Through February 2005 

a

According to DIA officals, June 2003 data are incomplete. 

Insurgents have demonstrated their ability to increase attacks around key 

events, according to the DIA Director’s February 2005 statement before 

the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. For example, attacks spiked 

in April and May 2004, the months before the transfer of power to the Iraqi 

interim government; in November 2004 due to a rise in violence in Sunnidominated areas during Ramadan and MNF-I’s operation against 

insurgents in Fallujah; and in January 2005 before the Iraqi elections. The 

DIA Director testified that attacks on Iraq’s election day reached about 

300, double the previous 1 day high of about 150 during last year’s 

Ramadan. About 80 percent of all attacks occurred in Sunni-dominated 

central Iraq, with the Kurdish north and Shia south remaining relatively 

calm. 
Page 11 GAO-05-431T 

In February and March 2004, the DIA Director and CENTCOM Commander 

presented their views of the nature of the insurgency to the Senate Select 

Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Armed Services Committee, 

respectively. According to these officials, the core of the insurgency 

consists of Sunni Arabs, dominated by Ba’athist and former regime 

elements. Shi’a militant groups, such as those associated with the radical 

Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, remain a threat to the political process. 

Following the latest round of fighting last August and September, DIA 

concluded that al-Sadr’s forces were re-arming, re-organizing, and training, 

with al-Sadr keeping his options open to employ his forces. Jihadists have 

been responsible for many high-profile attacks that have a 

disproportionate impact, although their activity accounts for only a 

fraction of the overall violence. Foreign fighters comprise a small 

component of the insurgency and a very small percentage of all detainees. 

DIA believes that insurgents’ infiltration and subversion of emerging 

government institutions, security, and intelligence services will be a major 

problem for the new government. 

In late October 2004, according to a CENTCOM document, MNF-I 

estimated the overall size of active enemy forces at about 20,000. The 

estimate consisted of about 10,000 former regime members; about 3,000 

members of al Sadr’s forces;8

 about 1,000 in the al-Zarqawi terrorist 

network; and about 5,000 criminals, religious extremists, and their 

supporters. In February and March 2005, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff and the CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed Services 

Committee that it is difficult to develop an accurate estimate of the 

number of insurgents. The CENTCOM commander explained that the 

number of insurgent fighters, supporters, and sympathizers can rise and 

fall depending on the politics, problems, and major offensive operations in 

a given area. He also acknowledged that gaps exist in the intelligence 

concerning the broader insurgency, particularly in the area of human 

intelligence. 

The CENTCOM commander and MNF-I commanding general recently 

cited Iraq’s January 2005 elections as an important step toward Iraqi 

sovereignty and security but cautioned against possible violence in the 

future. In March 2005, the MNF-I commanding general stated that the 

insurgency has sufficient ammunition, weapons, money, and people to 

maintain about 50 to 60 attacks per day in the Sunni areas. The CENTCOM 

 8

MNF-I refers to the al-Sadr’s forces as Muqtada Militia. 
Page 12 GAO-05-431T 

Commander told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the upcoming 

processes of writing an Iraqi constitution and forming a new government 

could trigger more violence, as the former regime elements in the 

insurgency seek a return to power. The MNF-I commanding general stated 

that a combination of political, military, economic, and communications 

efforts will ultimately defeat the insurgency. 

On March 1, 2005, the CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed 

Services Committee that Iraqi security forces are not yet ready to take on 

the insurgency without the presence, help, mentoring, and assistance of 

MNF-I. MNF-I has faced four key challenges in helping Iraq develop 

security forces capable of combating the insurgency or conducting law 

enforcement duties in a hostile environment. These key challenges are 

(1) training, equipping, and sustaining a changing force structure; 

(2) determining progress in developing capable forces without a system 

for measuring their readiness; (3) developing loyalty and leadership 

throughout the Iraqi chain of command; and (4) developing police capable 

of democratic law enforcement in a hostile environment. 

The Iraqi security force structure has constantly changed in response to 

the growing insurgency. This makes it difficult to provide effective 

support—the training, equipping, and sustaining of Iraqi forces. DOD 

defines force structure as the numbers, size, and composition of units that 

comprise defense forces.9

 Some changes to the Iraqi force structure have 

resulted from a Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq analysis 

of needed Iraqi security capabilities during summer 2004 and reported in 

October 2004.10 The Iraqi government has made other changes to forces 

under the Ministries of Defense and Interior to allow them to better 

respond to the increased threat. According to a February 2005 DOD 

budget document, MNF-I and the Iraqi government plan to increase the 

force structure over the next year. 

According to the October report, a number of enhancements in Iraqi force 

capabilities and infrastructure were critically needed to meet the current 

threat environment. Based on this review, the MNF-I Commander decided 

to increase the size of the Iraqi Police Service from 90,000 to 135,000 

personnel; the Iraqi National Guard by 20 battalions to 62 battalions; and 

 9

DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 

10Office of Management and Budget, Quarterly Update to Congress, Section 2207 Report, 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2004). 

Challenges to Increasing 

the Capability of Iraqi 

Security Forces 

Iraqi Security Force Structure 

Is Constantly Changing 
Page 13 GAO-05-431T 

the Department of Border Enforcement from 16,000 to 32,000 border 

officers. The review also supported in the creation of the Civil 

Intervention Force, which consists of nine specialized Public Order 

Battalions and two Special Police Regiments under the Ministry of 

Interior. This force is designed to provide a national level, high-end, rapid 

response capability to counter large-scale civil disobedience and 

insurgency activities. 

Over the past year, the Iraqi government has created, merged, and 

expanded Iraqi security forces under the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior. For example, according to a DOD official, the Iraqi Army Chief of 

Staff created the Iraqi Intervention Force in April 2004 in response to the 

unwillingness of a regular Army battalion to fight Iraqi insurgents in 

Fallujah. This intervention force will be comprised of nine battalions and 

is the counter-insurgency wing of the Iraqi Army. According to Iraq’s 

national security strategy,11 the Iraqi government decided to increase the 

Iraqi Army from 100,000 soldiers to 150,000 personnel by the end of this 

year and extend the time required to complete their training from July 

2005 to December 2005. The government planned to form this larger army 

by including the Iraqi National Guard and accelerating the training and 

recruitment of new troops. In addition, in late 2004, the Ministry of 

Interior added the Mechanized Police Brigade, a paramilitary, counterinsurgency unit that will consist of three battalions that will deploy to 

high-risk areas. It also created the paramilitary, army-type Special Police 

Commando brigades. 

According to DOD document supporting the February 2005 supplemental 

request, the Iraqi government planned to add a number of additional 

military elements, primarily support units, to the force structure over the 

next year. These include logistics units at the division level and below, a 

mechanized division, and a brigade each for signals, military police, 

engineering, and logistics. 

MNF-I officials stated that, as of March 2005, MNF-I and the Iraqi 

government do not yet have a system in place to assess the readiness of 

Iraq’s various security forces to accomplish their assigned missions and 

 11Strategy for National Security and the Role of the Army and Internal Security Forces,

January 2005. 

System for Measuring Iraqi 

Readiness Has Not Been 

Developed 
Page 14 GAO-05-431T 

tasks.12 However, in early 2005, the commanding general of the MultiNational Security Transition Command-Iraq said that MNF-I had begun 

work on a system to assess Iraqi capabilities. MNF-I plans to develop a 

rating system along the lines of the U.S. military readiness reporting 

system. According to the commanding general of the Multi-National 

Security Transition Command-Iraq, this system most likely would have 

Iraqi brigade commanders evaluating such things as the training readiness 

of their units, their personnel field, and their equipping levels. They also 

would provide a subjective judgment of the units’ readiness. The 

commanding general said that this rating system would take time to 

implement. 

It is unclear at this time whether the system under development would 

provide adequate measures for determining the capability of Iraqi police. 

Because the police have a civilian law enforcement function rather than a 

military or paramilitary role in combating the insurgency, MNF-I may have 

to develop a separate system for determining police readiness. 

On March 1, 2005, the CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed 

Services Committee that the establishment of an effective Iraqi chain of 

command is a critical factor in determining when Iraqi security forces will 

be capable of taking the lead in fighting the counterinsurgency. The 

CENTCOM Commander added that the Iraqi chain of command must be 

loyal and capable, take orders from the Iraqi head of state through the 

lawful chain of command, and fight to serve the Iraqi people. MNF-I faces 

several challenges in helping to develop an effective chain of command, 

including questionable loyalty among some Iraqi security forces, poor 

leadership in Iraqi units, and the destabilizing influence of militias outside 

the control of the Iraqi government. 

The executive branch reported in July 2004 that some Iraqi security forces 

had turned to fight with insurgents during the spring uprising.13 In October 

2004, in response to questions we submitted, CENTCOM officials indicated 

that it is difficult to determine with any certainty the true level of insurgent 

 12DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines readiness as the synthesis of 

two distinct but interrelated levels: (1) unit readiness, which is the ability to provide 

capabilities required by combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions; this is 

derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was assigned; and 

(2) joint readiness, which is the combatant commander’s ability to integrate and 

synchronize ready combat and support forces to execute his or her assigned missions. 

13Section 2207 report. 

Developing an Effective Iraqi 

Chain of Command 
Page 15 GAO-05-431T 

infiltration within Iraqi security forces. Recent reports indicate that some 

Iraqi security personnel continue to cooperate with insurgents. For 

example, a February 2005 report cited instances of insurgent infiltration of 

Iraqi police forces. Police manning a checkpoint in one area were 

reporting convoy movements by mobile telephone to local terrorists. 

Police in another area were infiltrated by former regime elements. 

In February 2005 press briefings, the Secretary of Defense and the 

commanding general of the Multi-National Security Transition CommandIraq cited the leadership of Iraqi security forces as a critical element in 

developing Iraqi forces capable of combating insurgents. MNF-I officials 

indicated that they plan to expand the use of military transition teams to 

support Iraqi units. These teams would help train the units and 

headquarters and accompany them into combat. On March 1, 2005, the 

CENTCOM Commander told the Senate Armed Services Committee that 

there is broad, general agreement that MNF-I must do more to train, 

advise, mentor, and help Iraqi security forces. CENTCOM has requested 

an additional 1,487 troops to support these efforts and must have the 

continued support of the new Iraqi government. 

The continued existence of militias outside the control of Iraq’s central 

government also presents a major challenge to developing an effective 

chain of command. In late May 2004, the CPA developed a transition and 

reintegration strategy for disbanding or controlling militias that existed 

prior to the transfer of power to the Iraqi interim government.14 Detailed 

information on the current status of militias in Iraq is classified. However, 

the CENTCOM Commander acknowledged the continued existence of 

older militias and the recent creation of new militias. He said that their 

presence will ultimately be destabilizing unless they are strictly controlled, 

come under government supervision, and are not allowed to operate 

independently. 

MNF-I’s efforts to develop a police force that abides by and upholds the 

rule of law while operating in a hostile environment have been difficult. 

U.S. police trainers in Jordan told us in mid-December 2004 that Iraqi 

police were trained and equipped to do community policing in a 

permissive security environment. Thus, Iraqi police were not prepared to 

 14Nine militias accepted the transition plans, but others either had not agreed or decided to 

continue hostile operations against the coalition rather than take part in the transition and 

reintegration process. See GAO-04-902R for more information on Iraq’s militias and earlier 

efforts to disband them. 

Developing a Police Force in a 

Hostile Environment 
Page 16 GAO-05-431T 

withstand the insurgent attacks that they have faced over the past year and 

a half. According to the State Department’s Country Report on Human 

Rights Practices for 2004, more than 1,500 Iraqi police have been killed 

between April 2003 and December 2004. To address this weakness, MNF-I 

and the Iraqi government report taking steps to better prepare some police 

to operate during an insurgency. In a December 2004 press briefing, the 

MNF-I Commander stated that MNF-I was moving to add paramilitary-type 

skills to the police training program to improve some units’ ability to 

operate in a counterinsurgency environment. U.S. police trainers in Jordan 

told us that the curriculum was being revised to provide police 

paramilitary capabilities. In addition, according to the Iraq’s national 

security strategy, the Iraqi government is in the process of upgrading 

security measures at police stations throughout the country. 

According to State’s 2004 human rights report, police have operated in a 

hostile environment. Attacks by insurgents and foreign terrorists have 

resulted in killings, kidnappings, violence, and torture. Bombings, 

executions, killings of government officials, shootings, and intimidation 

were a daily occurrence throughout all regions and sectors of society. The 

report also states that members of the Ministry of Interior’s security forces 

committed numerous, serious human rights abuses. For example, in early 

December 2004, the Basrah police reported that the Internal Affairs Unit 

was involved in the killings of 10 members of the Baath Party and the 

killings of a mother and daughter accused of prostitution. The report 

further states that, according to Human Rights Watch, torture and ill 

treatment of detainees by the police was commonplace. Additionally, the 

report states that corruption continued to be a problem. The Iraq 

Commission for Public Integrity was investigating cases of police abuse 

involving unlawful arrests, beatings, and theft of valuables from the homes 

of persons detained. 

The multinational force has been working to transfer full security 

responsibilities for the country to the Iraqi military and police. However, 

the multinational force and Iraq face the challenges of an intense 

insurgency, a changing Iraqi force structure, the lack of a system to 

measure military and police readiness, an Iraqi leadership and chain of 

command in its infancy, and a police force that finds it difficult to uphold 

the rule of law in a hostile environment. MNF-I recognizes these 

challenges and is moving to address them so it can begin to reduce its 

presence in Iraq and draw down its troops. Of particular note is MNF-I’s 

effort to develop a system to assess unit readiness and to embed MNFI-I 

transition teams into units to mentor Iraqis. 

Conclusion 
Page 17 GAO-05-431T 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to 

answer any questions you or the other Subcommittee members may have. 

For further information, please contact Joseph A. Christoff on (202) 512-

8979. Individuals who made key contributions to this testimony were 

Lynn Cothern, Mattias Fenton, Laura Helm, Judy McCloskey, Tet 

Miyabara, Michael Rohrback, and Audrey Solis. 

Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 
Page 18 GAO-05-431T 

We provided preliminary observations on 1) the strategy for transferring 

security responsibilities to Iraqi military and police forces, 2) the data on 

the status of the forces, and 3) challenges the Multi. National Force in Iraq 

(MNF-I) faces in transferring security missions to these forces. We 

conducted our review for this statement during February and March 2005 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

We used only unclassified information for this statement 

To examine the strategy for transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi 

forces, we focused on the 2003 security transition concept plan. We 

obtained and reviewed the transition plan and related documents and 

interviewed officials from the Coalition Provisional Authority and the 

Departments of State and Defense. Our work on this issue is described in 

June 2004 GAO report entitled Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, 

Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues (GAO-04-902R). To 

update information on the transition concept, we reviewed statements for 

the record from the Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) 

Commander and the MNF-I commanding general on the campaign plan 

and on the capability and recent performance of Iraqi security forces. 

These statements focused on Iraqi security forces’ ability to perform 

against the insurgency, as well as the training and mentoring of forces that 

contributed to successful operations. 

To determine the data on Iraqi security forces, we reviewed unclassified 

Department of State status reports from June 2004 to March 2005 that 

provided information about the number of troops by the Ministries of 

Defense and Interior. We interviewed State and Department of Defense 

(DOD) officials about the number of Iraqi police on duty and the structure 

of the Iraqi police forces. To identify the type of training the Iraqi security 

forces receive, we reviewed and organized data and information from the 

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq. We also visited the 

Jordan International Police Training Center in Amman, Jordan to 

determine the training security forces receive. This approach allowed us 

to verify that Iraqi security forces have varying missions and training levels 

and not all are designed to be capable of fighting the insurgency. 

To discuss the insurgency in Iraq, we reviewed statements for the record 

from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Defense 

Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the CENTCOM Commander on the status 

of the insurgency. We obtained data and reports from DIA on the number 

of reported incidents from June 2003 through February 2005. We obtained 

written responses from CENTCOM on the strength and composition of the 

insurgency. To address the challenges to increasing the capability of Iraqi 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Page 19 GAO-05-431T 

security forces, we reviewed statements for the record by the CENTCOM 

Commander, the MNF-I commanding general, and DOD officials. We also 

examined the Iraqi National Security Strategy, funding documents from 

the Office of Management and Budget and State Department, and the fiscal 

year 2005 Supplemental Request of the President. We obtained and 

reviewed further breakdowns of briefings on the supplemental request. To 

identify challenges in developing the Iraqi police force, we interviewed 

police trainers in Jordan and reviewed the State Department’s Country 

Report on Human Rights Practices for 2004. 

We obtained comments on a draft of this statement from State and DOD, 

including CENTCOM. All generally agreed with our statement and 

provided technical comments that we have incorporated as appropriate.

(320329) 
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