Thiet Giap!

The Battle of An Loc,

April 1972

by

Lieutenant Colonel James H. Willbanks,

U.S. Army, Retired

A TX A T T

50th Anniversarv

V V v Ai

 -I II I I _-- - --- I -I -= II a- a

- I I--
FOREWORD

The Battle of An Loc was one of the most important battles of the Vietnam

War. It took place during the 1972 North Vietnamese Spring Offensive, after most

U.S. combat troops had departed South Vietnam. The battle, which lasted over

two months, resulted in the virtual destruction of three North Vietnamese

divisions and blocked a Communist attack on Saigon. The sustained intensity of

combat during this battle had not been previously seen in the Vietnam War.

Although this battle occurred after the high point of American involvement in

Vietnam, when U.S. forces were in the process of withdrawing from that country,

Americans played a key role in the action. South Vietnamese ground forces and

their U.S. Army advisers, working in close cooperation with U.S. Army and Air

Force air support, proved a combination capable of resisting defeat and seizing

victory.

Because the Battle of An Loc did not involve large numbers of American

troops, little has been written about the battle or American participation in it. Jim

Willbanks' study focuses on the conduct of the battle and the role American

combat advisers and U.S. air power played in defeating the North Vietnamese

forces during the spring of 1972.

September 1993 RICHARD M. SWAIN

Colonel, Field Artillery

Director, Combat Studies Institute

CSI publications cover a variety of military history topics. The views expressed

herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of the

Army or of the Department ofDefense.

·bb-ahtl-.·l--.·p.araa ------- ` '' nrmax;woapaaaad
Thiet Giap!

The Battle of An Loc,

April 1972

by

Lieutenant Colonel James H. Willbanks,

U.S. Army, Retired

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

- I -- I · ---- II
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Willbanks, James H., 1947-

Thiet Giap!: the battle of An Loc, April 1972 / by James H.

Willbanks.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references.

1. Vietnamese Conflict, 1961-1975-Campaigns-Vietnam-An Loc.

2. An Loc (Vietnam)-History. I. Title.

DS557.8IA5W55 1993

959.704'34-dc20 93-2398

CIP

- I IIL'C -- e -·-- ·
To all the American men and women who answered their

nation's call and served in the Republic of Vietnam, but

especially to those who made the supreme sacrifice with

their lives, to include Brigadier General Richard Tallman,

Lieutenant Stanley Kuick, Major Richard Benson, First

Lieutenant Richard Todd (killed by incoming artillery in An

Loc on 9 July 1972), and Lieutenant Colonel William B.

Nolde, the last American who died in Vietnam before the

negotiated cease-fire went into effect. (Nolde was killed in

An Loc on 27 January 1973, just eleven hours before the

guns stopped firing.)

CONTENTS

Illustrations ............................................... vii

T ables ..................................................... ix

Preface ....................................... .. ....... i

Acknowledgments ....................................... xiii

I. Introduction ........................................ 1

II. The North Vietnamese Spring Offensive ............ .. 3

The North Vietnamese Strategy .................. 3

Military Region III ............... ............... 5

The Vietnamization Program ...................... . 7

III. The Battle of An Loc, Phase I . ........................ 13

The NVA Plan in MR III .......................... 13

The Assault on Loc Ninh ........................... 14

The North Vietnamese Turn on An Loc .............. 22

The Battle for An Loc .............................. 25

The NVA Change Their Plan ....................... 36

The Second Attack ................................ 38

Conditions in the City ............................. 40

IV. The Battle of An Loc, Phase II ......................... 47

The Third Attack ................................ 47

The Battle on QL-13 ............................... 55

The Siege Is Broken ............................... 57

The ARVN Are Victorious ......................... 60

V. The American Contributions ......................... 63

American Air Power .......... .................... 63

American Advisers ................................ 67

VI. The North Vietnamese Victory in 1975 ................ 71

1973-1974 .............................. . ........ 71

v
The Initial Attack on Phuoc Long ................... 71

The General Offensive ......... .................. 72

VII. Conclusions .................................. ..... . 75

Appendix .................................. ..... . . 79

N otes ..................................... .......... 83

Bibliography ........... ......... 91

vi

EB -. PB --r-Pi·l-- -·sl-l--l----- -^ --P -C·1--C91 -slP·
ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures

1. Organization, U.S. Army advisory structure, 1972 ........ 9

Maps

1. The NVA Easter Offensive, 1972 ....................... 4

2. Key locations, Binh Long Province, MR III ............... 6

3. Binh Long Province, 5 April 1972 ....................... 15

4. The Loc Ninh-An Loc vicinity .......................... 17

5. The defense of An Loc, 12 April 1972 .................... 26

6. The NVA high-water mark in An Loc, 11 May 1972 ...... 48

7. The NVA final offensive, March-May 1975 .............. 73

vii

· ICII·· i-I · · I·

TABLES

1. Estimated NVA troop strength ......................... 13

ix

L II I -- I

PREFACE

The genesis of this paper goes back to 1972 in a hospital ward in

the 3d Field Hospital in Saigon, Republic of Vietnam. Having just been

evacuated from the besieged city of An Loc, I thought that someday I

would attempt to write of the desperate battle that was fought there

during the massive North Vietnamese Easter Offensive.

Twenty years after the fact, as part of a master's degree program

at the University of Kansas, I began drawing together the many

aspects of this key battle that blocked the North Vietnamese attack on

Saigon. The result is the following study.

Aside from the obvious personal interest that this battle held for

me, I also wanted to address the critical contribution of U.S. advisers

and American close air support to the eventual South Vietnamese

victory in defeating the 1972 North Vietnamese offensive in Military

Region III. The body of literature on the war in Vietnam grows daily,

but the emphasis of most of these works falls within two categories:

historical overviews and first person accounts. These books usually

focus on the height of American involvement, when large numbers of

U.S. troops and units were actively conducting combat operations.

Very little has been written about the American commitment in the

latter part of the war when U.S. participation was embodied in a

handful of advisers who remained with the Vietnamese units in the

field and the few air elements left in country.

This paper focuses on the role of U.S. advisers and American

tactical air power in the latter part of the war, specifically the 1972

Easter Offensive. While I was a participant in this battle, this study is

by no means a memoir or a personal account. The purpose of this paper

is to examine the battle of An Loc to determine the contribution made

by the American advisers and flyers.

I have relied on my own personal experience for context but have

attempted to document the story of the battle from multiple sources.

My research drew heavily on' primary sources, such as unit histories,

official communiqu6s, operational summaries, intelligence reports,

after-action reports, and a limited number of first person accounts. The

research also considered the South Vietnamese point of view by

examining the U.S. Army Center of Military History Indochina

Monograph Series, in which former senior South Vietnamese military

leaders discuss a variety of issues germane to the Vietnam War,

including the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) performance

during the 1972 North Vietnamese invasion.

xi
A limited number of North Vietnamese sources are also

considered. While these works are very political in nature, they

provide a glimpse of the Communist perspective and the strategy that

led to the North Vietnamese decision to launch a large-scale offensive

in 1972.

Most primary sources for this study are available in the Combined

Arms Research Library, U.S. Army Command and General Staff

College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

I am indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Ramsey III and

Colonel Richard M. Swain of the Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College, for giving me the opportunity to

publish this study.

xii

Llb---ll ----- =-g --II - I --
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are a number of groups and persons that I would like to

thank for their contribution to this effort.

First, I wish to acknowledge Dr. Ted Wilson of the University of

Kansas for his kind guidance and encouragement in what has become

a reconstruction of one of the most significant emotional events in my

life. I greatly appreciate his patience, indulgence, and wise counsel.

I am also indebted to Mr. Dan Doris and the staff of the Combined

Arms Research Library, U.S. Army Command and General Staff

College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, for their superb and timely

assistance during the research for this paper.

I also express my appreciation to my fellow instructors in both the

Center for Army Tactics, the Directorate of Joint and Combined

Operations, and the Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command

and General Staff College, for their insight, comments, and

recommendations for improving this study. A particular debt of

gratitude is owed to Mr. Don Gilmore for his professionalism and

expertise in editing this paper.

A special heartfelt thanks goes to my wife, Diana, who served on

the home front and supported me through the difficult times addressed

in this study. I also commend her and our children, Jennifer and

Russell, for their support during the preparation of this paper. Lastly, I

am grateful to my mother and father, Master Sergeant (U.S. Army,

Retired) and Mrs. James E. Willbanks, for their unfailing love and

support over the years.

xiii

I - I - -· - __ , I I· I -- -
I. INTRODUCTION

The sun had just come up in An Loc, the capital city of Binh Long

Province in South Vietnam; it was 13 April 1972. The author, at the

time a U.S. Army infantry officer serving as an adviser with the army

of South Vietnam (the ARVN), was on the roof of a building putting up

a radio antenna. It had been a relatively quiet night with regard to

enemy probes and ground attacks, but there had been a significant

increase in the number of incoming rockets and artillery rounds. The

ARVN infantry task force that the author advised had just moved into

the city the day before. It had withdrawn under intense North

Vietnamese Army (NVA) pressure from two firebases to the north that

it had previously occupied.

I and Major Raymond Haney had joined the regimental task force

after the original advisory team members had been wounded and

subsequently evacuated during the withdrawal from the north. The

replacement advisory team arrived in An Loc by helicopter on 12 April

to find the city nearly panicked. Artillery rounds and rockets were

falling steadily on the city, and the helicopter that brought the officers

into the city hovered only long enough for them to jump off the aircraft

into a freshly dug hole in the city soccer field as artillery rounds

impacted near the landing zone. During the evening, the South

Vietnamese soldiers prepared for the inevitable North Vietnamese

attack, and they were up early for whatever the day would bring.

As I finished installing a radio antenna, I heard a tremendous

explosion and ran down the stairs to the front of the building. Frantic

South Vietnamese soldiers ran by shouting, "Thiet Giap!" I had never

heard this phrase before, but as the soldier ran around the corner of

the building, it became all too apparent that the cry meant "tank";

advancing down the street from the north was a line of North

Vietnamese T-54 tanks! So began the Battle of An Loc, described by

Douglas Pike as "the single most important battle in the war."l

For the next four months, a desperate struggle raged between 3

North Vietnamese divisions (estimated at over 36,000 troops) and the

greatly outnumbered South Vietnamese defenders, assisted by their

U.S. Army advisers. The 66-day siege of An Loc would result in

horrendous losses on both sides and would culminate with South

Vietnamese forces blocking the North Vietnamese thrust toward the

South Vietnamese capital in Saigon.

Although this battle occurred after the high point of American

commitment in Vietnam, American forces were active and key

1
2

participants in the action. The American advisory effort had become

increasingly more important as American combat troops were

withdrawn. During the Battle of An Loc, American advisers on the

ground, working in consonance with American air power, would prove

to be the key ingredients to the South Vietnamese victory.

The Battle of An Loc, although one of the key battles in the entire

Vietnam War, has been discussed only briefly in the literature about

the war. The purpose of this study is to examine the battle in detail to

determine the extent of the American contribution to the victory. This

battle will then be compared with the performance of the South

Vietnamese forces against the North Vietnamese invasion of 1975 in

an effort to assess the impact of an absence of American participation

in the latter action. The focus of the study will be on the American

military's role in thwarting the 1972 North Vietnamese invasion; it

will not debate the relative merits and demerits of the Vietnamization

process or the efficacy of the eventual American withdrawal from

South Vietnam.

I - I L I L· L-
II. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

SPRING OFFENSIVE

The North Vietnamese Easter Offensive of 1972 consisted of a

massive, coordinated three-pronged attack designed to strike a

knockout blow against the South Vietnamese government and its

armed forces. In the offensive, the North Vietnamese used

conventional tactics and introduced weaponry far exceeding that

employed during any previous guerrilla campaigns.

This was a radical departure from earlier North Vietnamese

strategy. The NVA decided to employ conventional tactics for this

offensive for several reasons. First, they did not believe that the

Americans, with only 65,000 troops left in Vietnam, could influence

the strategic situation. Furthermore, they did not think that the

political situation in the United States would permit President Nixon

to commit any new troops or combat support to assist the South

Vietnamese forces. Additionally, they believed that a resounding NVA

military victory would humiliate the president, destroy his war

politics, and perhaps foil his bid for reelection in November. 1

The North Vietnamese Strategy

The architect of the North Vietnamese campaign was General Vo

Nguyen Giap, the hero of Dien Bien Phu. According to captured

documents and information obtained from NVA prisoners of war after

the invasion, Giap's campaign was designed to destroy as many ARVN

forces as possible, thus permitting the North Vietnamese to occupy key

South Vietnamese cities, putting the Communist forces in a posture to

threaten President Nguyen Van Thieu's government. At the same

time, Giap hoped to discredit Nixon's Vietnamization and pacification

programs, cause the remaining American forces to be withdrawn

quicker, and ultimately to seize control of South Vietnam.2

A subset of Giap's strategy called for a Communist provisional

government to be established in An Loc as a precursor to the assault on

Saigon. 3 Although the North Vietnamese hoped to achieve a knockout

blow, a corresponding objective was to seize at least enough terrain to

strengthen their position in any subsequent negotiations.

The offensive began on 30 March 1972, when three NVA divisions

attacked south across the demilitarized zone (DMZ) that separated

North and South Vietnam toward Quang Tri and Hue. Three days

later, three more divisions moved from sanctuaries in Cambodia and

pushed into Binh Long Province, the capital of which was only sixty3
4

N

{)

.* Savannakhet

N -NLAOS

THAILAND

0 Siem Reap

CAMBODIA

CAMBODIA /

nT

LEGEND

Major highway

-Primary route

- - - - Provincial road

. . f Railroad

+ Airport

^ International airport

-..-..- International boundary

Map 1. NVA Easter Offensive, 1972

II _ - I ·C ·-8

%
5

five miles from the South Vietnamese capital in Saigon. Additional

North Vietnamese forces attacked across the Cambodian border in the

Central Highlands toward Kontum (see map 1). A total of 14 NVA

infantry divisions and 26 separate regiments (including 120,000 troops

and approximately 1,200 tanks and other armored vehicles)

participated in the offensive. 4

The North Vietnamese invasion was characterized by large-scale

conventional infantry tactics, accompanied by tanks and massive

artillery support. The enemy thrusts were initially successful,

particularly in the north, where the NVA quickly overran Quang Tri,

threatened Hue and Kontum, and generally routed the defending

ARVN forces.

Military Region III

Military Region III (MR III), comprised of the eleven provinces

that surrounded Saigon, was located between the Central Highlands

and the Mekong River delta. The enemy activity in this region began

in the early hours of 2 April with attacks by the 24th and 271st NVA

Regiments against elements of the 25th ARVN Division in several

firebases near the Cambodian border in northern Tay Ninh Province.

The North Vietnamese attacked with infantry and tanks (Americanmade M-41 tanks previously captured from ARVN forces), supported

by heavy mortar and rocket fire. Although there had been earlier

intelligence reports that the North Vietnamese were making

preparations for offensive operations, there was little indication that

there would be attacks on the scale of those in Military Region I. While

intelligence had shown an increase in enemy activity in Tay Ninh

Province in March, the general feeling at Headquarters, MACV, was

that the enemy would not try to attack the towns along Highway QL13. It was felt that ARVN operations along the Cambodian border

would prevent the NVA from massing for an all-out attack like the one

at Quang Tri in the north. Thus, while the South Vietnamese were

surprised at the ferocity of the enemy attacks and the use of tanks, the

attacks themselves coincided with expectations that any significant

attacks would occur in Tay Ninh.5

The initial assaults on the outlying South Vietnamese posts

would prove to be diversionary attacks designed to mask the

movement of three North Vietnamese divisions (5th VC, 7th NVA,

and 9th VC) taking up their final attack positions in Binh Long

Province. 6
TAY NIl

I

QL-13

f r ~ LOC NINH DISTRICT

TF52/

;'"I ~ .\ QuanLoi

-*0 | *Windy Hill

'.* [ ~* Hill 169

NH : AN LOC DISTRICT · · .~~~~~~~~-4

LEGEND

* Province ....... boundary

-. *-*. International boundary

--- District boundary

PHUOC

LONG

Lai Khe

PROVINCE

Scale

0 5 10 15 miles

I I I I 0 5 10 15 20 kilometers 0 5 10 15 20 kilometers

Source: Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong, Indochina Monographs: The Easter

Offensive of 1972 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980).

Map 2. Key locations, Binh Long Province, MR III Map 2. Key locations, Binh Long Province, MR III

6

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7

Binh Long ("Peaceful Dragon") Province is located in the

northwestern portion of Military Region III and is bordered on the

west by Cambodia (see map 2). The capital of the province is An Loc, a

city of 15,000, which lies only 65 miles north of Saigon. An Loc, a

thriving and prosperous city surrounded by vast rubber plantations

totaling 75,000 acres, sat astride QL-13, a paved highway leading

directly from the Cambodian border to the South Vietnamese capital.

Because of its proximity to Cambodia and the accompanying

Communist base areas, the city had endured the rigors of war since the

early 1960s. Due to its strategic location between Cambodia and

Saigon, An Loc figured prominently in the North Vietnamese strategy.

Seizure of An Loc would provide a base for a follow-on attack on the

South Vietnamese capital city to seize President Thieu's seat of

government.

At the beginning of the North Vietnamese offensive in MR III, the

Saigon government had only a single division, the 5th ARVN,

operating in this critical area. This division, a regular South

Vietnamese infantry division, was dispersed throughout Binh Long

Province.

The Vietnamization Program

By this time in the war, President Nixon had instituted his

"Vietnamization" program, designed to turn over the conduct of the

war to the South Vietnamese. During the 1968 election campaign,

Nixon had pledged to bring American troops home and secure an

honorable peace in Vietnam. As part of this plan, he directed that a

"highly forceful approach" be taken to cause President Thieu and the

South Vietnamese government to assume greater responsibility for

the war. 7 This program, first called "Vietnamization" by Secretary of

Defense Melvin Laird, sought to make preparations to turn over the

war to South Vietnam. This was to be accomplished by a progressive

buildup and improvement of South Vietnamese forces and institutions,

accompanied by increased military pressure on the enemy, while, at

the same time, steadily withdrawing American troops. The ultimate

objective was to strengthen ARVN capabilities and bolster the Thieu

government such that the South Vietnamese could stand on their own

against the Communists from North Vietnam.

In order to accomplish program objectives, Nixon directed the

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), the senior U.S.

military headquarters in Vietnam, to provide maximum assistance to

the South Vietnamese to build up their forces, support the pacification

program, and reduce the flow of supplies and materiel dispensed to
8

Communist forces in the south.8 Between 1969 and 1972, the Thieu

government, with American aid, increased the size of its military

forces from 825,000 to over 1 million. American military aid provided

the ARVN with over 1 million M-16 rifles, 12,000 M-60 machine guns,

40,000 M-79 grenade launchers, and 2,000 heavy mortars.9 The

ARVN military schools were improved and expanded to handle over

100,000 students a year. The Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) was

increased to 9 tactical wings, 40,000 personnel, and nearly 700

aircraft. By 1970, the South Vietnamese military was one of the

largest and best equipped in the world.

Equipment and numbers were not the only answers to the

problem of the South Vietnamese becoming self-sufficient on the

battlefield. In order to improve the quality of the ARVN force, MACV

increased the advisory effort. This program was not a new effort;

Americans had been serving with Vietnamese units since 1955.10

However, the importance of the advisory program had increased as the

number of American combat units dwindled. By 1972, most U.S.

ground combat forces had been withdrawn, and the only Americans on

the ground in combat roles were advisers who served with ARVN

forces in the field.

The American advisory structure closely paralleled that of the

Vietnamese military command and control organization.

Headquarters, MACV, provided the advisory function to the Joint

General Staff (JGS), the senior headquarters of the Republic of

Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF).

Just below the JGS level were four South Vietnamese corps

commanders who were responsible for the four military regions that

comprised South Vietnam (see figure 1). Their U.S. counterparts were

the commanders of the four regional assistance commands, whose

responsibilities included providing assistance, advice, and support to

the corps commander and his staff in planning and executing

operations, training, and logistical efforts. As the corps senior adviser,

the regional assistance commander, usually a U.S. Army major

general, exercised operational control over the subordinate U.S. Army

advisory groups in the military region.

Under the U.S. regional assistance commander in each region,

there were two types of advisory teams: province advisory teams and

division advisory teams. Each province in each military region was

headed by a South Vietnamese colonel. His American counterpart was

the province senior adviser, who was either military or civilian,

depending on the security situation of the respective province. The
9

Figure 1. Organization, U.S. Army advisory structure, 1972

province advisory team was responsible for advising the province chief

in civil and military aspects of the South Vietnamese pacification and

development programs. Additionally, the province team advised the

regional and popular forces, which were essentially provincial militia.

There was a division combat assistance team (DCAT) with each

ARVN infantry division. This advisory team's mission was to advise

and assist the ARVN division commander and his staff in command,

administration, training, tactical operations, intelligence, security,

logistics, and certain elements of political warfare. 11 The division
10

senior adviser was usually an Army colonel, who exercised control

over the regimental and battalion advisory teams.

Each ARVN division usually had three infantry regiments, one

artillery regiment, and several separate battalions-such as the

cavalry squadron and the engineer battalion. The regimental advisory

teams were normally composed of from three to five U.S. Army

personnel (they had been larger earlier, but the drawdown of U.S.

forces in country gradually reduced the size of the American teams

with the ARVN units). The regimental teams were usually headed by

an Army lieutenant colonel and included various mixes of captains

and noncommissioned officers. The separate battalion advisory teams

usually consisted of one or two specialists, who advised the South

Vietnamese in their respective functional areas, e.g., cavalry,

intelligence, engineering, etc.

Elite ARVN troops, such as the airborne and ranger units (and

the Marines in MR I), were organized generally along the same lines

as regular ARVN units, except the highest echelon of command in the

ranger units was the group (similar to a regiment). The airborne

brigades were organized into a division. There was also an airborne

division advisory team headed by an American colonel. Each of the

airborne brigades was accompanied by an American advisory team,

which was headed by a lieutenant colonel and was similar, but

somewhat larger, than those found with the regular ARVN regiments

because they included advisers down to battalion level.

U.S. Army advisers did not command, nor did they exercise any

operational control over any part of the ARVN forces. Their mission

was to provide professional military advice and assistance to their

counterpart ARVN commanders and staffs in personnel management,

training, combat operations, intelligence, security, logistics, and

psychological-civil affairs operations. 12 As U.S. combat forces

withdrew from South Vietnam, the U.S. Army advisers increasingly

became the focal point for liaison and coordination between ARVN

units and the U.S. Air Force, as well as other elements of U.S. combat

support agencies still left in country.

By early 1972, there were just 5,300 U.S. advisers in the whole of

Vietnam. 13 Only a small fraction of this number were actually

involved in advising units conducting combat operations. In Binh Long

Province, the 5th ARVN Division, in and around An Loc, was

accompanied by a small division advisory team consisting of ten to

fifteen advisers who worked with the division headquarters and

several small teams of two to five persons with each of the division's
11

subordinate regiments. (The rest of the division advisory team were at

the division base camp in Lai Khe.) The division senior adviser at the

time of the North Vietnamese offensive was Colonel William ("Wild

Bill") Miller. In addition to the division team, there was also a

province team, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Robert J. Corley, with

the Binh Long Province headquarters in An Loc. Most of this advisory

team, except Corley and a small party, would be evacuated after the

start of the battle. Other American advisers accompanied the ARVN

reinforcements that would be brought in during the course of the

battle. These few Americans (never numbering more than twenty-five

during the course of the battle) would find themselves in the thick of

the combat action once the North Vietnamese attack began in earnest.

Although there were few American forces operating on the

ground in combat roles in Vietnam, U.S. tactical air power was still

much in evidence throughout the theater of operations. U.S. Air Force

and Marine aircraft operated from bases in South Vietnam and

Thailand, while the Navy and other Marine aircraft operated from

carriers in the South China Sea. B-52 heavy bombers flew missions in

both North and South Vietnam regularly from bases in Guam and

Thailand. Prior to the 1972 offensive, the B-52s had been used mostly

in the strategic role, but during the Eastertide battles, the big bombers

were used increasingly in the tactical support role. Additionally, U.S.

Army armed helicopters continued to fly ground support missions

throughout South Vietnam. The availability and responsiveness of

this American aerial firepower would prove critical in the conduct of

the battles to come.

·-L---------- · i -C. -- --_-1 I-

III. THE BATTLE OF AN LOC, PHASE I

The NVA Plan in MR III

The focus of the North Vietnamese main effort in Military Region

III was on seizing An Loc, the capital city of Binh Long Province. Once

An Loc was taken, the path would be clear for a direct assault down

Highway QL-13 to Saigon.

The plan for taking An Loc involved the use of three NVA

divisions and supporting forces (see table 1). By this time in the war,

although some of the North Vietnamese formations still carried the

traditional Vietcong (VC) designations, the divisions were organized

and equipped as main-force NVA units manned primarily by North

Vietnamese soldiers who had come down the Ho Chi Minh Trail from

the north.

Table 1. Estimated NVA Troop Strength*

5th VC Division

HQ & Support

275th Regt

174th Regt

E6 Regt

Total

7th NVA Division

HQ & Support

141st Regt

165th Regt

209th Regt

Total

9th VC Division

HQ & Support

271st Regt

272d Regt

95th Regt

Total

4,680

1,550

1,500

1,500

9,230

4,100

1,500

1,500

1,500

8,600

4,680

2,000

2,000

2.000

10o,680

69th Artillery Command

HQ & Support

42d Artillery Regt

208th Rocket Regt

271st AAA Regt

Total

Other Forces

205th NVA Regt

101st Regt

203d Tank Regt

(includes 202d Special

Wpns Regt)

429 Sapper Group (-)

Total

NOTE: The total estimated North Vietnamese forces committed to the Battle of An

Loc were 35,470. Additionally, intelligence projections estimated that the committed

units received more than 15,000 replacements during the course of the seige.

*Strengths are prior to the Battle of An Loc, April 1972.

Source: Major General James F. Hollingsworth, "Communist Invasion in Military

Regional III," unpublished narrative, 1972. (Microfiche Reel 44, University

Publications of America: Records of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.)

13

1,395

800

835

800

3,830

1,250

760

800

320

3,130
14

The 9th VC Division, considered one of the elite NVA divisions,

was targeted against An Loc itself. The 7th NVA Division was tasked

to interdict supplies and reinforcements from reaching An Loc from

Saigon by cutting QL-13 south of An Loc, between Chon Thanh and

Lai Khe (see map 3). The 5th VC Division was to initiate the offensive

campaign by capturing Loc Ninh, the northernmost town in Binh Long

Province. After securing this foothold, the North Vietnamese forces

would move on An Loc.1

The Assault on Loc Ninh

At 0650 on the morning of 5 April, the 5th VC Division crossed

the Cambodian border and attacked Loc Ninh (see map 4). This district

town was defended by approximately 1,000 soldiers from elements of

the 9th ARVN Infantry Regiment and an attached armored cavalry

squadron (which was deployed north of the town) from the 5th ARVN

Division, part of an ARVN border ranger battalion, and a small

number of local territorial forces. The NVA attacked initially from the

west with a heavy ground assault led by at least one tank and

supported by artillery, rockets, and mortars. These attacks were

violently executed, and only skillful employment of tactical air strikes

prevented the defenders from being overrun that day. The situation

had stabilized, but the attackers had been successful in forcing the

defenders into small compounds in the northern and southern ends of

the town.

The commander of Third Regional Assistance Command (TRAC)

was Major General James F. Hollingsworth, a graduate of Texas A&M

University, a proteg6 of General George S. Patton Jr. during World

War II, and a veteran of the Korean War. He had served one previous

tour in Vietnam as the assistant division commander of the 1st

Infantry Division and was the holder of three Distinguished Service

Crosses and five Purple Hearts. He and his ARVN counterpart,

Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Minh, commander of III Corps, the

senior ARVN headquarters in MR III (located in Bien Hoa), realized

the seriousness of the situation at Loc Ninh.2 Intelligence reports had

indicated for months that an attack was on the way, but Hollingsworth

and Minh believed that the main attack would come in Tay Ninh

Province based on previous intelligence. 3 This was despite the fact

that the advisers of the 5th ARVN Division began getting indications

of increased NVA activity in Binh Long and around An Loc during the

period 1-3 April.

The intensity of the attack on Loc Ninh ultimately convinced

Minh and Hollingsworth that this was the real opening shot of the
15

-0*

............... Scale * International boundary 0 5 10 15 miles

District boundary I lI

0 5 10 15 20 kilometers

Source: U.S. Department of the Army, RB 100-2, Selected Readings in Tactics, Vol.1

(Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, April 1974).

Map 3. Binh Long Province, 5 April 1972

I - L - I I --- I I I -

------- Pm-rnvlnra nnelnndrv
16

offensive and that an attack of major proportions was imminent.

Accordingly, they directed all available air support north to Binh Long

to assist the 5th ARVN Division elements in Loc Ninh.

On the morning of 6 April, the defenders heard tanks moving

around the southern end of the airstrip. At 0530, the NVA attacked

from three directions supported by twenty-five to thirty T-54 and PT76 tanks.

The ARVN forces and their seven American advisers inside the

small compounds fought desperately against the North Vietnamese

onslaught. The American advisers coordinated and directed U.S.

tactical air support from Bien Hoa Air Base, the aircraft carriers

U.S.S. Constellation and U.S.S. Saratoga, and other attack aircraft

flying from bases in Thailand, including AC-130 Spectre gunships.

The volume of well-placed air strikes and AC-130 fire enabled the

tenacious defenders to hold the NVA at bay for two days (see map 4).

When the NVA tried to get through the defenses of the southern

compound, an AC-130 gunship, according to Major General

Hollingsworth, "slaughtered" them in the wire and "destroyed the

better part of a regiment."4

The four-engine propeller-driven aircraft was originally designed

as a cargo carrier, but it had been armed and modified earlier in the

war to carry out interdiction missions against North Vietnamese men

and materiel moving down the Ho Chi Minh Trail into South Vietnam.

An AC-130 Spectre gunship. These aircraft were on station over An Loc for the

entire battle and proved highly effective against the NVA attackers.
17

L'

Scale

o 5 miles

I I I I I I lI

0 5 kilometers

Map 4. The Loc Ninh-An Loc vicinity

I
18

The aircraft was initially armed with 7.62-mm Vulcan miniguns, 20-

mm Vulcan, and 40-mm Bofors automatic guns. It was also equipped

with a variety of tracking equipment, to include a Black Crow radar

(used to pick up vehicle ignitions), low-light-level television camera,

infrared detector, ground target radar, and a strong searchlight. These

well-armed, versatile aircraft would prove crucial in the coming battle

for An Loc.

U.S. Air Force fighters stopped three mass attacks on the

compounds by what was known as "snake and nape," a mixed ordnance

load of conventional high-drag bombs, cluster bomb units (CBUs), and

napalm. As the North Vietnamese troops massed for attacks on the

remaining ARVN positions, the repeated tactical air strikes and

accurate AC-130 fire wrought terrible damage.

However, the next day, 7 April, the sheer force of NVA numbers

prevailed, and the repeated human-wave attacks, supported by 75-mm

recoilless rifles, 122-mm rockets, 105-mm and 155-mm howitzers,

BTR-50 armored personnel carriers, and tanks, eventually

overwhelmed the defenders. The southern compound fell at around

0800; the remaining ARVN positions in the northern compound were

overrun about 1630.

Less than 100 of the Loc Ninh defenders escaped to An Loc; the

remainder of the ARVN troops and American advisers were killed or

captured by the victorious North Vietnamese forces. One adviser,

Captain Mark Smith (who had virtually assumed command of the

ARVN soldiers when the 9th ARVN Regiment's commander, Colonel

Nguyen Cong Vinh, had surrendered), was last heard from as he called

in air strikes on the NVA troops overrunning his own position in the

southern compound. 5 He was wounded multiple times, captured, and

not repatriated until the spring of 1973.

Another adviser in Loc Ninh, Major Thomas A. Davidson, part of

the Binh Long Province advisory team, escaped through the wire just

as the North Vietnamese troops entered one end of his command

bunker in the northern compound. He and his Vietnamese interpreter

evaded the NVA for the next four days, barely avoiding capture on

numerous occasions and finally reaching an ARVN Ranger battalion

in the northern part of An Loc. One other adviser, Captain George K.

Wanant, Loc Ninh district adviser, also escaped but was captured by

the North Vietnamese near Cam Le Bridge thirty-one days later.

As the final attack on Loc Ninh unfolded, Task Force 52 (TF 52),

commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Ba Thinh, was conducting

operations from two small firebases located between Loc Ninh and An
19

Loc near the junction of LTL-17 and QL-13. This task force had been

formed from a battalion of Thinh's own 52d Regiment (2-52) and one

from the 48th Regiment (1-48), both originally from the 18th ARVN

Division, which had been moved from the 18th Division base in Xuan

Loc (Long Khanh Province) in late March and placed under the

operational command of the 5th ARVN Division to serve as part of the

border screen for the division. The task force was accompanied by three U.S. Army advisers, Lieutenant Colonel Walter D. Ginger, Captain Marvin C. Zumwalt, and Sergeant First Class Floyd Winland.

On 6 April, Brigadier General Le Van Hung, the 5th ARVN

Division commander, at the urging of Colonel Miller, his U.S. adviser,

ordered Lieutenant Colonel Thinh, to mount an attack to reinforce the

beleaguered Loc Ninh garrison. Thinh attempted to accomplish this

task with his northernmost battalion (2-52), but the battalion ran

almost immediately into an ambush as they moved toward the

junction of LTL-17 and QL-13. During this ambush the battalion came

under heavy enemy attack from several directions, and it was forced to

withdraw to its original firebase. The NVA unleashed an artillery barrage on both firebases, pouring down more than 150 rounds of 82-

mm mortar and 105-mm howitzer fire and 122-mm rockets from the

south and northwest.6 Barely able to defend themselves against these

attacks, the task force was unable to comply with General Hung's order to assist the garrison at Loc Ninh. As the NVA attacks on TF 52

increased in intensity, it became apparent that Loc Ninh could not

hold out much longer, and Colonel Miller realized that they were about

to lose Thinh's forces as well. On the morning of 6 April, Lieutenant

Colonel Ginger radioed to Colonel Miller that the NVA forces had

nearly completed the encirclement of TF 52.

On the morning of 7 April, after numerous attempts, Colonel

Miller finally convinced General Hung, who was badly shaken by the

events at Loc Ninh, that something had to be done quickly to preclude the destruction of the task force. Hung ordered Lieutenant Colonel

Thinh to evacuate the firebases and move the task force to An Loc.

At 0830 on the morning of the 7th, the lead element, complete with trucks towing artillery pieces and water trailers, moved east

along LTL-17 toward the junction of 17 and QL-13. Near the junction,

the convoy ran into a strong ambush (in the same area as the previous day's action); the survivors of this brief, but violent, ambush withdrew

once again back to the firebase, abandoning three 105-mm howitzers

and numerous vehicles. The NVA gunners increased the volume of

artillery into both ARVN firebases.
20

It was clear that the NVA was not going to let TF 52 evacuate

their position without a fight. At 0900, General Hung ordered

Lieutenant Colonel Thinh to destroy the task force's heavy weapons

and vehicles and withdraw on foot to An Loc.7

Thinh directed that 2-52 continue to hold the northern firebase as

a rear guard, while the command group and 1-48 attempted to force

the enemy positions along LTL-17 to break through to QL-13. The

destruction of vehicles and equipment (to include 105-mm

ammunition) was not complete when the lead elements moved out.

They soon passed the site of the two previous ambushes, marked by

both destroyed and undamaged ARVN vehicles. Shortly after that, the

1-48 was taken under direct and indirect fire by the NVA and their

movement stalled. Meanwhile, 2-52 had departed the northern

firebase and ran into the rear of 1-48 where it had been stopped by the

North Vietnamese. A near panic situation ensued in the ARVN ranks,

and unit integrity began to break down as the forces became

intermingled.

In the process of trying to regain control of the situation and get

the task force moving toward An Loc, Thinh and his command group,

accompanied by the American advisory team, ran into a large ambush

and Captain Zumwalt was wounded in the face by a fragment from an

enemy B-40 rocket. Lieutenant Colonel Ginger determined that

Zumwalt was too badly injured to continue and requested extraction

by helicopter. Leaving several wounded ARVN soldiers with the

Americans, Thinh and the remnants of the task force pressed on for An

Loc.

For the next thirty-six hours, Lieutenant Colonel Ginger and his

small band of comrades fought off continual enemy attacks at very

close range. Tactical aircraft, AC-130 Spectre gunships, and helicopter

gunships were called in to aid the beleaguered group, while repeated

efforts were made to pick them up. The Americans were completely

surrounded, and NVA ground fire prevented U.S. Army helicopters

from landing. Two aborted rescue attempts resulted in the wounding of

one crewman on the first medevac and the death of Chief Warrant

Officer (WO-2) Robert L. Horst, the pilot of the second. 8

s

At 0800 on 8 April, Ginger's men were finally extracted under

extremely heavy fire by an American OH-6 helicopter. By the time the

party was picked up, both Ginger and Winland were also wounded.

The helicopter picked up Ginger's party plus six ARVN soldiers

hanging on the skids; a total of twelve personnel flew on a helicopter

designed to carry four. A second OH-6 extracted additional ARVN
21

wounded. Ginger, Zumwalt, and Winland were evacuated to 3d Field

Hospital in Saigon.

The pilot of the lead OH-6, Captain John B. Whitehead, D

Company, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, received the Silver Star

and was nominated for the Congressional Medal of Honor for braving

intense ground fire to effect the rescue. Sergeant First Class Winland

would later receive the Distinguished Service Cross for his valorous

actions during the withdrawal operations and subsequent evacuation

attempts.

The remainder of TF 52, only 600 of the original 1,000 soldiers,

reached An Loc after a week of infiltrating through the NVA positions

astride QL-13. They joined the defenders girding themselves for the

coming attack.9 The next day, the regiment was joined by Major

Raymond Haney and Captain James H. Willbanks (the author), who

arrived by helicopter from the 18th ARVN Division headquarters in

Xuan Loc, to replace the evacuated advisory team.

As the attacks on Loc Ninh and TF 52 unfolded, General Minh

and Major General Hollingsworth became convinced that An Loc

would be the primary objective of the enemy attack.O 1 They also

realized that if An Loc fell, the North Vietnamese would have very

little between them and Saigon. Accordingly, the decision was made to

hold An Loc at all costs. South Vietnamese President Thieu radioed

the senior ARVN officers in An Loc that the city would be defended to

the death.11 This had a psychological impact on the enemy as well as

the defenders. By directing that the city be held "at all costs," Thieu all

but challenged the North Vietnamese to take it. In the weeks that

followed, the NVA became virtually obsessed with the desire to

overrun An Loc, even long after it had ceased to hold any real military

significance. 12

On the American side, some advisers had been pulled out of

Quang Tri when the enemy offensive had started in Military Region I,

and this had had disastrous effects on the morale of the South

Vietnamese forces there. Hollingsworth determined that the stakes

were too high to risk a reoccurrence this close to Saigon. He notified

the advisers in An Loc that they were there for the duration.1 3 Thus,

the American advisers prepared to share the fate of their ARVN

counterparts in the coming battle. This proved to be a crucial factor in

convincing the South Vietnamese defenders that they would not be left

in the lurch to face the repeated North Vietnamese attacks alone.

While concerned about the welfare of his advisers, Hollingsworth

was excited about the opportunity to get the NVA to stand and fight.
22

He later said, "Once the Communists decided to take An Loc, and I

could get a handful of soldiers to hold and a lot of American advisers to

keep them from running off, that's all I needed." 14 He told the advisers

in An Loc, "Hold them and I'll kill them with air power; give me

something to bomb and I'll win."1 5

The North Vietnamese Turn on An Loc

On 6 April, the enemy forces arrayed in and around Loc Ninh had

begun moving south toward An Loc. Under cover of darkness and

moving stealthily through the jungle and rubber plantations, the NVA

forces took up positions encircling the provincial capital.

As th' pressure on An Loc increased, General Minh, III Corps

commander, ordered two battalions of the 3d Ranger Group to An Loc

to bolster the ARVN defenders. Additionally, on 7 April, Minh was

given operational control of the 1st Airborne Brigade, which had

previously been located in Saigon as the Joint General Staff strategic

reserve. He ordered the brigade, consisting of the 5th, 6th, and 8th

Airborne Infantry Battalions and the 81st Ranger Group, to move to

Lai Khe to assume the mission of III Corps' reserve; he told them to

deploy north of Lai Khe along QL-13.

On the evening of 7 April, North Vietnamese forces from the elite

9th VC Division attacked the Quan Loi airstrip, just three kilometers

northeast of An Loc, where the U.S.-ARVN helicopter rearming and

refueling areas were located. The attack was characterized by repeated

human wave attacks and the use of tear and nausea gas by the

attackers. The two companies from the 7th ARVN Regiment defending

the airfield were unable to hold against the NVA attacks, and they

were ordered to destroy their equipment and withdraw to the city.

With the loss of Quan Loi, it appeared that the North Vietnamese

were trying to isolate and encircle An Loc. Hollingsworth advised

Minh to order the 1st Airborne Brigade to attack north to secure QL13, An Loc's lifeline to Lai Khe and ultimately Saigon. With the 5th

Battalion in the lead, the brigade attempted to push north but

immediately came under heavy attack from North Vietnamese forces

entrenched along the highway. It was clear that the NVA were

determined to interdict any attempt to reinforce or resupply An Loc by

road. 16 The loss of Quan Loi airstrip and the blocking of QL-13 by the

NVA meant that the city was surrounded and cut off from the outside.

Thus began a siege that would last for over two months.

Over the next several months, the forces in An Loc would undergo

a protracted attack, marked by repeated human wave assaults and
23

NVA artillery in action, April 1972

continuous heavy shelling at levels seldom seen during the conduct of

the entire Vietnam War. To withstand the intensity of this prolonged

level of combat would demand almost superhuman endurance on the

part of the defenders and their advisers. Additionally, the absence of

any significant friendly artillery support and surface resupply would

demand the utmost from American air support, both for firepower and

resupply.

With the seizure of the Quan Loi area, the NVA gained control of

the high ground overlooking the city from which to direct accurate

artillery fire and rockets into the city. Still, the NVA made no move to

attack the city on the ground for several days. North Vietnamese

documents later revealed that the ARVN's rapid withdrawal from Loc

Ninh and the other border outposts surprised the NVA and upset their

planning timetable. 17 They had expected the securing of Loc Ninh and

the outlying border posts to take more time, which would have

permitted them to continue to build up the logistics base in Binh Long

Province in preparation for the attack on An Loc. Their success in the

initial attacks on Loc Ninh and TF 52 had far exceeded their greatest

expectations, and they needed time to regroup and continue the

buildup for the main thrust on the provincial capital.
24

A column of T-54 tanks destroyed during the initial assault on An Loc, April 1972

The defenders had their own logistical problems. With the

blocking of QL-13, all resupply had to be flown in by helicopters. On 12

April, intense antiaircraft fire downed a VNAF CH-47 helicopter

attempting to bring supplies into the city. The amount and types of

antiaircraft fire indicated that the NVA had greatly strengthened the

ring around the city, and it became very difficult to get helicopters into

and out of the city. The NVA had all avenues of approach covered with

massive .51-caliber, 23-mm, 37-mm, and 57-mm fire. Additionally,

they had introduced the SA-7 Strella heat-seeking antiaircraft missile,

similar to the American-made Redeye shoulder-fired heat seeker.

Furthermore, a system of early warning spotters enabled the North

Vietnamese to identify incoming aircraft so that their gunners would

be ready to fire. The result was a devastating pattern of antiaircraft

fire every time an aircraft got close to the city.

Within the city, the situation was becoming extremely grim.

Artillery and rocket fire were increasing, and patrols outside the

defensive perimeter ran into heavy enemy concentrations. Refugees

streaming into the city from the north reported sighting tanks,

artillery, and other heavy equipment-all headed south. An ARVN

officer who was captured by the NVA at Loc Ninh, but escaped and

made his way to An Loc, reported that his captors told him that they

were going to take An Loc at "any" cost.18 This and other intelligence

indicated that the enemy was preparing for an all-out assault on the

city.19
25

Reinforcements were flown into An Loc during the relative lull

following the NVA attack on Quan Loi. The 1st and 2d Battalions of

the 8th ARVN Regiment and the regimental reconnaissance company

were flown in on 11 and 12 April.

By the afternoon of 12 April, ARVN forces in and around the city

had grown to a total of four regiments (nine infantry battalions),

consisting of regular infantrymen from elements of two divisions,

rangers, and territorial forces (see map 5).20 This force of about 3,000

soldiers would be outnumbered 6 to 1 by the 3 NVA divisions

advancing on An Loc.

At Headquarters, Third Regional Assistance Command, in Long

Binh, General Hollingsworth and his deputy, Brigadier General John

R. McGiffert, read the intelligence reports and determined that the

enemy's main attack on An Loc was about to begin.21 They met with

U.S. Air Force representatives at Lai Khe and planned B-52 missions

and tactical air strikes on suspected enemy positions around An Loc

for the next day.

The Battle for An Loc

During the early hours of 13 April, enemy artillery increased

dramatically in volume all over An Loc. The whole spectrum of NVA

weapons was brought to bear, including Soviet-made 57-mm and 75-

mm recoilless rifles, 100-mm and 76-mm tank guns, as well as 107-mm

and 122-mm rockets and all types of heavy mortars. It was also

reported that the NVA used Soviet-made 130-mm howitzers. In

addition to the Soviet weapons, the NVA also employed Americanmade 105-mm and 155-mm howitzers captured from the ARVN forces

during the Lamson 719 incursion into Laos in 1971 and at Loc Ninh

and TF 52 firebases. A total of 7,000 shells and rockets would fall on

the city during the next 15 hours, a rate of one round every 8

seconds. 2 2

Shortly after dawn, the NVA forces began a combined tank and

infantry attack from the northeast. The Soviet-made T-54 and PT-76

tanks moved down Ngo Quyen Street, the main north-south street in

An Loc, toward the 5th ARVN Division command post in the southern

section of the city. The South Vietnamese troops, who had never faced

tanks in battle before, were panic-stricken; the forces in the north of

the city that took the initial brunt of the tank assault quickly fell back

in the face of the NVA attack.

The key event for the South Vietnamese forces in this early attack

occurred as the tanks moved toward the center of the city. Private
26

0 .5 miles

0 .5 kilometers

Note: All advisers used sketch maps of An Loc similar to this one, with each block numbered

for ease of identification.

Source: Major John D. Howard, "An Loc: A Study of U.S. Power," Army, 25 September, 1975.

Map 5. The defense of An Loc, 12 April 1972

! X §~~~~~i ' i I a i

i I--
27

An NVA T-54 killed near the center of the city by the 8th Regiment

of the 5th ARVN Division

Binh Doan Quang, a soldier from the local territorial forces destroyed

one of the lead tanks with an M-72 light antitank weapon (LAW). This

was a galvanizing act that demonstrated that the enemy tanks could

be stopped and greatly enhanced the confidence of the badly shaken

defenders. 23 Word spread quickly and the ARVN soldiers began to

emerge from their holes and fire at the tanks.

Two other factors contributed to ARVN efforts to stabilize their

defensive lines. First, the NVA were extremely inept in their use of

coordinated armor and infantry in the attack. Although most of the

tank crews had recently returned from tank training in the Soviet

Union, they quickly demonstrated that they did not understand the

use of combined arms tactics. 24 The tanks routinely attacked without

infantry, persisted in advancing along roads when cross-country

movement would have been safer, and, when speed and initiative were

called for, proceeded slowly and indecisively. 25 This failure to apply

the most basic tenets of combined arms tactics left the North

Vietnamese tanks unprotected against the ARVN defenders, who

found them easy prey for their LAWs, once they overcame the initial

shock of the armored attack.

During the confusion of the initial attack, one North Vietnamese

tank crew demonstrated that even the NVA had that small percentage

of people who "don't get the word." Thinking that the city had been

secured by the NVA infantry, they rolled into the city with all hatches

open, completely oblivious to the fact that the soldiers in the fighting

positions were ARVN, not NVA. The tank made it all the way to the
28

An ARVN defender at An Loc. Using M-72 LAW missiles, such defenders

knocked out several North Vietnamese tanks.

southern part of the city before it was knocked out by an ARVN soldier

with an M-72 LAW.26

But what thwarted the North Vietnamese onslaught was the

well-executed air support that struck the enemy well forward of the

ARVN positions and prevented the NVA from reinforcing their initial

success in the northern part of the city. While A-6s, A-7s, F-4s, and A37s and VNAF A-ls and A-37s dropped their bombs on the NVA forces

massing around the city for the attack, the ARVN forces, supported by

Army AH-1G Cobra attack helicopters and Air Force AC-119K Stinger

and AC-130 Spectre gunships, were able to defend against the reduced

number of NVA infantry and tanks that escaped the air strikes and

assaulted the city.

The Cobras from F Battery, 79th Aerial Rocket Artillery, and F

Troop, 9th Cavalry, were particularly effective in hitting the tanks in

the close confines of the city streets. During the initial NVA assault,

they caught one tank column attacking south near the 8th ARVN

Regiment's command post. They knocked out the lead tank, one in the

middle, and the last tank in the column, effectively stopping the attack
29

in its tracks. Another Cobra, flown by Captain Bill Causey with

Lieutenant Steve Shields as gunmen, was eventually credited with

killing or disabling five tanks during the first week of the battle for An

Loc.27

For the remainder of the 13th and the next two days, the

American advisers directed repeated air strikes against the NVA

forces, which were sometimes as close as twenty meters to friendly

troops.28 The tenacity of the defenders and the continuous air strikes

prevented the enemy from expanding its foothold in the northern part

of the city.

A fighter aircraft destroyed this North Vietnamese ZSU57/2 antiaircraft

weapon near the center of the city
30

An A-37 with the various types of ordnance it was capable of carrying. These aircraft

provided close air support during the intense fighting in An Loc in April and May.

The house-to-house fighting continued unabated. Lieutenant

Colonel Edward B. Benedit, one of Colonel Miller's deputies, later

recalled: "The enemy pounded and pounded. He'd hit and take a house,

then reinforce at night, and next day take the next house and the

next."29

The civilian citizens of An Loc were not immune to the death and

destruction going on all around them. One of the NVA T-54 tanks

made it into the center of the city, where it rolled into a Catholic

church. Huddled inside were old men, women, and children conducting

a prayer service. The tank fired its cannon and machine guns, killing

well over 100 of the innocent civilians. 30

As the battle inside the city raged, General Hollingsworth

directed B-52 strikes on NVA staging areas very close to the city. Each

B-52 strike, code-named Arc Light, consisted of three aircraft, each

carrying up to 108 MK-82 500-pound conventional bombs. The

devastation wrought by these missions was immense. One B-52 strike
31

caught an entire battalion in the open before it reached the northwest

approach to the city. The bombs killed an estimated 100 attackers,

destroyed at least 3 tanks, and broke the back of the NVA attack on

that part of the city.31 These strikes would prove the difference

between victory and defeat countless times during the next two

months.

The NVA increased the heavy shelling on the city, but the ARVN

defenders "circled the wagons" and used tactical air power to hold the

NVA ground attacks at bay while the B-52s worked on the enemy

staging areas. General McGiffert later commented on the effectiveness

of the B-52 strikes and the tactical air sorties of 13 through 15 April

thusly: "I really believe that without these the city would have fallen,

because I think the infantry would have gotten in with the tanks."32

Air support in all its forms had a tremendous impact on the

outcome of every battle. Patrols after the first assault on An Loc

American B-52s like these, flying from Guam and Thailand, were instrumental in

breaking up NVA troop concentrations at An Loc
32

Brigadier General Le Van Hung, commander, 5th ARVN Division, in his

command bunker in An Loc

confirmed more than 400 enemy dead, half of whom were killed by

air.33 During the first two weeks of the battle for the city, over 2,500

air strikes were flown in support of the ARVN forces in and around An

Loc.34 The U.S. Air Force had been a key factor in the stabilization of a

very serious tactical emergency.

The North Vietnamese forces were undeterred by the heavy

casualties inflicted on them by the continuous air strikes. They

continued to press the attack, still leading with tanks. On 14 April, one

such attack, accompanied by small groups of infantry, came within 500

meters of the 5th Division Command Post in the center of the city

before it was beaten back by the defenders.

After two days of intense fighting and relentless shelling, the

ARVN morale remained high. Recovering from the initial shock of the

armored attack, the ARVN soldiers had rallied and reorganized their

defenses. The presence of the American advisers and the around-theclock tactical air support they controlled demonstrated to the

defenders that they were not going to be left to fend for themselves.
33

The advisers were busy. Colonel Miller and his fellow American

officers in the 5th ARVN Division's command bunker worked twentyfour hours a day, stopping only briefly to grab quick naps. Huddled

around a plywood map table, they planned and coordinated the battle.

The ARVN commander and his staff had little training or experience

in handling operations as complex as those demanded by the NVA

attack. The American officers acted as General Hung's staff; they

advised him on troop dispositions, planned air strikes, coordinated

support, and processed intelligence. They spoke constantly with the

forward air controllers coordinating the air support vital to the defense

of the city. They also planned the next day's missions and attempted to

coordinate the air resupply drops.

The advisers with the regiments and battalions also had their

hands full. They advised their counterparts on defenses and tried to

bolster their morale. Their primary function, however, was to

coordinate the air strikes that had been allocated to their respective

units by the advisers in the 5th ARVN Division's command bunker.

To coordinate the allocated air strikes, the advisers talked

directly to the forward air controllers (FACs) of the 21st Tactical Air

Support Squadron, who were orbiting over the city in 0-2Bs, small

Cessna fixed-wing aircraft with push and pull motors. These "good old

boys," as one adviser called them, were the true heroes of the air war.35

Their job was to fly "low and slow" over the battlefield to coordinate

with the ground troops and direct the aircraft to their targets. The

FAC aircraft were unarmed, except for smoke rockets, which were

The Cessna 0-2B Super Skymaster, flown by the forward air controllers from 21st

Tactical Air Support Squadron, during the Battle of An Loc
34

A North Vietnamese T-54 tank destroyed in the western sector of the perimeter at An Loc

used to mark the targets. Since most of the fighter-bomber aircraft did

not have the same kind of tactical radios that the ground forces had,

the FACs, who had both kinds, acted as the link between those on the

ground who needed the ordnance put on target and those aircraft

carrying the ordnance.

The normal procedure was for the senior advisers in the 5th

ARVN Division's command post to coordinate requests for air support

by talking to what became known as the "King FAC," who parceled

out available tactical aircraft sorties to various other FACs who had

been given area responsibility for different parts of the city and

surrounding area. The FACs talked directly with the advisers on the

ground to learn the nature of the target to be struck. They then spoke

with the inbound fighter-bombers and directed them to the targets,

using smoke rockets and adjustment instructions relayed from the

ground. For the duration of the entire battle, the FACs and advisers,

working closely together, were able to make the best use of all

available aircraft and munitions to help the outnumbered defenders in

very tenuous situations.
35

The ever-present U.S. Air Force greatly bolstered the ARVN's

morale, which got another boost on 14 April when General Minh

ordered the 1st Airborne Brigade to disengage along QL-13 and move

by helicopter to reinforce the 5th ARVN Division forces at An Loc. The

6th Battalion conducted the initial combat assault by helicopter into

an area adjacent to Windy Hill and Hill 169, the high ground three

kilometers to the southeast of the city. The combat assault was made

unopposed, but shortly thereafter, the airborne troopers made heavy

contact with the enemy, sustaining moderate casualties. The

American advisers with the unit called in tactical air support and the

situation stabilized.

The next day, the remainder of the brigade was inserted in the

same area southeast of the city. The brigade headquarters, along with

the 5th and 8th Battalions, occupied positions east of the city. The 81st

Ranger Group assaulted into a landing zone southeast of Hill 169 and

began moving toward An Loc. The 6th Battalion began to construct a

firebase for the six 105-mm howitzers from a battery of the 3d Artillery

Battalion that were airlifted in that morning by CH-47 Chinook

helicopters.

The pressure on An Loc increased on 15 April when the NVA once

again renewed their attacks on the city in earnest. Two separate tankled thrusts were made during the course of the day, but both were

turned back after pitched battles. The outcomes of both of these battles

were extremely close; in the latter attack, the NVA attackers once

again almost took the 5th ARVN Division's command post, with one

tank making it to within 200 meters of General Hung's command

bunker, firing directly into it and killing three division staff officers.36

As the defenders held tenaciously to their small piece of terrain,

tactical air support once more provided the difference between victory

and defeat. In one attack at 1400 that day, tactical aircraft destroyed

nine of ten attacking tanks.

Meanwhile, President Thieu, realizing the criticality of holding

An Loc to prevent a direct thrust on Saigon, had earlier ordered the

21st ARVN Infantry Division from its base in the Mekong delta to

Binh Long Province to reinforce III Corps' forces. General Minh

ordered the new division to attack north from Lai Khe to open the

highway to An Loc. By 16 April, the 21st had moved north and was

attacking the heavily entrenched NVA forces at Tau O Bridge on QL13 south of the city. Unfortunately, they were having a difficult time of

it and were not able to relieve any of the pressure on the ARVN

defenders in An Loc to the north.
36

By late on 16 April, the battle inside An Loc had abated

somewhat. The enemy shelling was still heavy, but there was a lull in

the ground attack. After three days of combat, the enemy had lost

twenty-three tanks, most of them T-54s. 37 Still, the NVA forces held

the northern part of the city, and in many cases, the opposing forces

were separated only by the width of a city street. Meanwhile, the NVA

tightened its stranglehold on An Loc. The city had received 25,000

rounds in the previous 5 days, and it would continue to receive

between 1,200 and 2,000 enemy rocket, artillery, and mortar rounds

per day. 38

General Hollingsworth reported on the 16th to General Abrams,

commander of MACV in Saigon, that "there was a great battle at An

Loc yesterday, perhaps the greatest of this campaign. The enemy hit

us hard all day long with all he could muster-and we threw it back at

him. The forces in An Loc realized that they had to fight and they

fought well."39

In truth, the fighting ability of the ARVN during the initial NVA

onslaught had been less than uniformly outstanding, yielding half of

the city in the face of heavy ground, armor, and artillery attacks.

However, the fact remained that the ARVN had held, and at least the

southern half of the city was still in South Vietnamese hands.

The NVA Change Their Plan

Although the defenders did not know it at the time, the first phase

of the battle had ended. The enemy's initial plan to seize the city had

been thwarted. The main attack, conducted by the 9th NVA Division,

supported by the 3d and 5th Battalions of the 203d Tank Regiment,

had been unsuccessful-largely due to the continuous pounding by B52s, fighter-bomber aircraft, AC-130 Spectre gunships, and attack

helicopters. Accordingly, the North Vietnamese modified their plan.40

The original North Vietnamese plan had called for An Loc to be

overrun and occupied by NVA forces no later than 20 April.41 Due to

the American tactical air support, the ARVN defenders were able to

hold out, and the original Communist timetable was no longer

achievable. Accordingly, the NVA headquarters ordered a renewed

main attack on An Loc from the east by the 9th VC Division, supported

by secondary attacks on the airborne brigade south of the city by

elements of the 5th VC and 7th NVA Divisions. In an attempt to

negate the impact of American air power, additional antiaircraft

weapons were emplaced around An Loc.
37

By a twist of fate, the revised NVA plan of attack came into

ARVN hands on 18 April. On that day, an ARVN Ranger element

engaged NVA forces near Tong Le Chon firebase, just outside the city. The Rangers found a handwritten report on one of the enemy bodies

after the battle; the report was from the 9th VC Division's political

commissar assigned to the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN),

the North Vietnamese headquarters. This report addressed the failure

of the NVA attack to take An Loc in accordance with the initial plan. The report cited two reasons for this failure. First, the intervention of

American air power had been devastating on the attacking forces.

Secondly, the lack of coordination between armor and infantry forces

in the attack had allowed the ARVN forces to regroup and reorganize

their defenses. The report also contained a narrative of the modified

plan to take the city.

With this plan, the enemy was very confident that the city could

be seized within a matter of hours.42 In fact, the NVA were so

confident of victory that Radio Hanoi broadcast a report that the city would be taken and the People's Revolutionary Government

established in An Loc by 20 April.43

Captured North Vietnamese soldiers later reported that after the

initial attack, their leaders increased efforts to exhort them to do their

utmost to defeat the ARVN "puppets." There were also reports that

North Vietnamese tankers were found chained in their tanks.44

Whether this was actually true or merely a symbolic gesture on the

part of the NVA soldiers, it is indicative of the North Vietnamese

commitment to take the city.

The defenders inside the city realized that they had only a

momentary respite before the NVA attacked once again. On 17 April, Colonel Miller, senior adviser to the 5th ARVN Division, reported to

General Hollingsworth that An Loc continued to sustain heavy shelling and that he believed the enemy planned to continue its

stranglehold on the city and then attack in mass. Although the ARVN

troops still held the city, Colonel Miller was pessimistic regarding

their capability to carry on: "The division is tired and worn out;

supplies minimal, casualties continue to mount, medical supplies are

low; wounded a major problem, mass burials for military and civilians,

morale at a low ebb. In spite of incurring heavy losses from U.S. air

strikes, the enemy continues to persist." 45

The situation in An Loc was indeed bleak. The U.S. and

Vietnamese Air Forces attempted to resupply the city on a daily basis,

but the enemy antiaircraft fire made it increasingly difficult to drop
38

the supplies so the defenders could recover them. Extremely heavy

casualties had been sustained by all ARVN units. Evacuation of the

wounded was nearly impossible, because the VNAF evacuation

helicopters either refused to fly into the city, or if they made it into the

city, they refused to touch down long enough to load the wounded.

Those few courageous South Vietnamese airmen who did try to pick up

the wounded were usually shot down or their aircraft heavily damaged

by enemy ground fire.

The Second Attack

It was under these conditions that the defenders prepared

themselves for the next NVA assault. The attack began in the early

morning hours of 19 April, with a massive bombardment by rockets

and artillery on both the city and the 1st Airborne positions on Windy

Hill and Hill 169, southeast of the city. Following the heavy artillery

preparation, the three regiments of the 9th VC Division (271st, 272d,

and 95th) conducted the main attack on An Loc itself.

At the same time, the North Vietnamese launched a supporting

attack with two NVA regiments, the 275th and the 141st (from the 5th

VC and 7th NVA Divisions respectively), on the scattered elements of

the 1st Airborne Brigade around the city. This attack was extremely

violent, but the 5th Airborne Battalion was able to repulse the NVA

from their positions east of QL-13 just outside the city. Tactical air

support and B-52 strikes inflicted heavy casualties on the attackers.

However, the 6th Airborne Battalion in and around the firebase on

Hill 169 was eventually overwhelmed. A small force of about eighty

paratroopers was able to break out and was later extracted. Two

companies made it into the city and joined the besieged defenders.

Stragglers and escaped prisoners from the 6th Airborne Battalion

continued to turn up in An Loc for several weeks, but the 6th Battalion

as a unit was virtually out of the operation until it was reconstituted in

late May. 46

The result of this action was that NVA forces were able to occupy

the dominant terrain previously held by the South Vietnamese

paratroopers; these positions provided them unencumbered

observation of ARVN defenses throughout the southern and eastern

parts of the city.

Meanwhile, the main enemy attack on An Loc by the 9th VC

Division did not go as well for the NVA. The 5th and 8th Airborne

Battalions assumed positions in the rubber plantation just south of the

city and were able to block the NVA thrust from that direction. In An
39

This NVA T-54 tank was knocked out just as it attempted to breach the barbed wire

around the Binh Long Province compound near the southern gate of An Loc

Loc itself, the defenders and their advisers continued to repulse

repeated ground assaults and employed close air support to bring

devastating fire on enemy massed formations attacking all over the

city. The fighting was intense, but the air support permitted the

defenders to beat back the attacks.

By 22 April, the ground assaults had abated somewhat, but the

artillery and rocket attacks had increased significantly, almost to the

point of continuous "bombardment" according to one adviser.

Nonetheless, the situation had stabilized; the NVA still held the

northern part of the city, while the ARVN occupied the southern

portion.

That night, the ARVN decided to see if they could improve the

situation. The 81st Airborne Ranger Group, which had moved into the

city and occupied defensive positions on the perimeter, launched a

limited counterattack to eliminate several enemy lodgments in the

northern sector of the city. Their aggressive attacks, among the first

South Vietnamese offensive actions since the NVA invasion began,

were supported by a Pave Aegis AC-130, a specially outfitted Spectre

gunship with a 105-mm cannon. Sergeant First Class Jesse Yerta,

light weapons adviser with the 81st, employed the Spectre's fire in the

form of a rolling barrage to support the ARVN attack. In order to bring

the supporting fire in close, Yerta moved with the lead assault element

and repeatedly exposed himself to enemy fire. He was later awarded

the Distinguished Service Cross for his actions that night.

The attack by the 81st was mildly successful, but the tactical

situation remained virtually unchanged from 22 April until 10 May.

While both sides jockeyed for position and the opposing forces
40

A Pave Aegis AC-130 Spectre gunship, armed with a 105-mm howitzer, a 40-mm cannon,

and 20-mm miniguns. The 105-mm howitzer was very effective against NVA tanks in An

.-CO

remained in contact, neither side made significant gains. However, the

NVA were able to secure a small salient in the western part of the city.

Conditions in the City

During this period, the enemy continued to pour 100-mm tank

fire, rockets, and artillery and mortar rounds into the city. Meanwhile,

the conditions in An Loc deteriorated to a new low. On at least three

occasions, the NVA fired tear gas projectiles in the vicinity of the 5th

ARVN Division's command bunker. The defenders lived underground,

venturing outside only at great risk. One adviser put the odds for

surviving five minutes outside in the open at only fifty-fifty. 47 The

defenders had been brought to a point where they feared to move,

shoot, or expose themselves in any way. 48 Most buildings and other

structures in the city had been destroyed by the repeated ground

attacks, shelling, and air strikes. The city, once considered one of the

most beautiful in Military Region III, was strewn with mounds of

rubble, shattered trees, garbage, and dead domestic animals. Captain

Harold Moffett, an adviser with the 3d ARVN Ranger Group, later

described the landscape as looking "like Berlin at the end of World

War IL.949
41

The civilian refugees from the fighting in Loc Ninh had escaped to

the "safety" of An Loc earlier in the month; they now joined the

citizens of the provincial capital in the battle for survival amidst some

of the most intense combat of the Vietnam War. By this time, the

civilian population in An Loc was estimated at between 15,000 and

20,000.50

Suffering from lack of food, water, medical supplies, and shelter,

the noncombatants were caught in the crossfire between the defenders

and the NVA attackers. The NVA realized that the civilians

complicated the problems of the defenders and made every effort to

guide additional refugees into the city and prevent them from leaving,

indiscriminately killing anyone who attempted to escape the city.

The civilians merely wanted to get away from the fighting, but

the North Vietnamese forces had the city encircled, and there was no

way out. Still, the refugees tried to escape; some were successful, but

many suffered the same fate as a group of 200 refugees who made a run

for it on 15 April. Led by a French Catholic priest and a Buddhist

monk, they went through the barbed wire and concertina that

surrounded the city and tried to move south down QL-13 to safety.

They made it to the southern edge of the city before the NVA opened

fire with rockets and artillery, driving those that survived back into

The flood of refugees that crowded the roads often obstructed operations against the NVA
42

the city. This abortive attempt left dead and wounded "laying in

ditches like cordwood" all along the highway.51

This was not an isolated incident. Almost every time a large

group of refugees tried to escape from the heavy combat, the NVA's

artillery forward observers targeted the fleeing columns and

devastated these innocents. This pattern also prevailed in Military

Region I and the Central Highlands; President Thieu claimed on 9

May that enemy guns had killed a total of 25,000 refugees trying to

escape the 3 major battlefields in the previous 72 hours. 52

The human toll inside the city was ghastly; the streets and rubble

were littered with bodies, both military and civilian. Province Senior

Adviser Corley reported that "the bodies of men, women, and children

are everywhere." 53 The smell of death permeated the air. Under these

conditions, innumerable diseases, including cholera, soon ran rampant

through both civilian and soldier ranks. To avoid a full-fledged

epidemic, bodies were buried in common mass graves, some containing

300 to 500 corpses, by soldiers operating bulldozers during the

infrequent lulls in the shelling. 54 Many bodies had to be reburied after

exploding shells churned up the original graves. 55

Antiaircraft fire had increased to the point that it became even

more difficult to supply the defenders by air. By 26 April, two U.S. Air

Force C-130s and three VNAF C-123s had been shot down over An Loc,

and every transport that had flown over the city had sustained severe

damage from enemy ground fire.

The situation was particularly critical since medical supplies

were almost exhausted. The NVA forces had shelled the province

hospital and its 300 patients on the night of 13 April, destroying the

hospital and killing most of the patients and staff.56 The few

remaining ARVN medical officers were overwhelmed by the rapidly

mounting number of casualties. It remained almost impossible to

evacuate the wounded because the few VNAF helicopters that made it

near the city usually refused to do anything but hover for a few

minutes before flying away. Many of the wounded, particularly the

civilian refugees trapped in the city, went unattended. Obviously, this

grim situation had a major impact on the defenders' morale.

The morale was further degraded by several incidents involving

what one adviser called "the olympic wounded." 57 On at least two

separate occasions, evacuation helicopters braved intense ground fire

to land in the city to pick up casualties only to have certain "wounded"
43

Frantic South Vietnamese soldiers scrambling aboard a hovering helicopter at An Loc. Such

behavior by able-bodied ARVN soldiers had a devastating effect on troop morale in An Loc,

particularly among the wounded.

ARVN soldiers drop their more severely wounded compatriots to

clamber aboard the departing helicopters.

The resupply situation changed somewhat for the better when the

U.S. Air Force assumed total responsibility for resupplying the city.

The amount and range of the various NVA antiaircraft weapons

dictated that the C-130 transport aircraft drop their cargo bundles

from an altitude in excess of 6,000 feet. Using the An Loc soccer

stadium as a drop zone, the Air Force pilots attempted to deliver much
44

An example of a high-altitude airdrop from the 61st Tactical Airlift Squadron. Much trial and

error was required before the proper procedure was developed and successful resupply

drops could be effected in the high-intensity air defense situation over An Loc.

needed food, medical supplies, and ammunition by high-altitude, lowopening parachutes. This technique resulted in less exposure to the

aircraft from ground fire, but there was a problem with the packing of

the parachute bundles, and most fell outside the drop zone and into

enemy hands.

Colonel Andy Iosue, commander of the 374th Tactical Airlift

Wing, instituted a new tactic that involved low-altitude drops, but the

first attempts resulted in severe aircraft damage from NVA ground

fire and several aircraft losses. Iosue then tried the same approach at

night, but this did not appreciably reduce the exposure to ground fire,

plus it was more difficult to identify the drop zones in the dark. The

supply situation in the city became so desperate that often fire fights

broke out between ARVN units competing for the few cargo bundles

that were recoverable. One adviser observed that the supplies that

made it into the city went to the "strongest, swiftest, and the closest to

the pallet drop."58

One captured NVA officer demoralized his ARVN interrogators,

who were existing on brackish water and an ever-decreasing supply of

canned fish and rice, when he asked for a can of C-ration fruit cocktail.
45

He said he had grown very fond of it when his unit had retrieved cases

of the stuff dropped by the American airplanes. 59

On 1 May, General Hollingsworth estimated that during the

period 15-30 April, less than 30 percent of the USAF's C-130 tonnage

had been recovered by ARVN forces. 60 As much as 85 percent of the

rest of the supplies fell into North Vietnamese hands. 61

As the defenders inside the city attempted to deal with the

resupply problems and increasing casualties inflicted by the intense

shelling, NVA units surrounding An Loc began to reposition

themselves for yet another assault. While elements of the 7th NVA

Division in the south continued to block the relief attempt by the 21st

ARVN Division, seven NVA regiments were poised for the next attack

on the city.

On 6 May, an NVA prisoner from the 9th VC Division informed

his captors that his division commander had been reprimanded for not

taking the city in April and that the 5th VC Division commander had

boasted that his troops would take An Loc in three days. 62 Other

intelligence indicated that the E6, 174th, and 275th Regiments of the

5th VC Division would attack from the east supported by the 271st and

ARVN soldiers rigging loads at Bien Hoa Airbase for an airdrop at An Loc
46

272d Regiments of the 9th VC Division and the 141st and 165th

Regiments of the 7th NVA Division.

Defending against these forces were barely 4,000 ARVN troops,

including both regular and territorial forces. At least 1,000 of the

defenders were wounded, but those that were able continued to man

their defensive positions.

The American advisers on the ground realized that the situation

in the city was critical and doubted that the ARVN could hold against

another determined attack.63 The South Vietnamese troops knew that

they would not be evacuated if they were wounded. Thus, the

continuous artillery bombardment had a demoralizing effect on the

ARVN's morale and resolve. The advisers were afraid that the ARVN

would break if the NVA attacked in force, and the Americans stepped

up their efforts to bolster their counterparts' morale. It was under

these conditions that the defenders found themselves when the NVA

launched their next attack to take the city.

IY---·---^·----·s·aa-PI-·--·ls--- -a-a---------·L---·-__-___·___
IV. THE BATTLE OF AN LOC, PHASE II

The Third Attack

At Third Regional Assistance Command, all intelligence

indicated to General Hollingsworth that the enemy was preparing to

make another push to take the city. Reports of enemy movements and

a tremendous increase in shelling meant that the time of the attack

was near. Hollingsworth knew that the situation in the city was

deteriorating rapidly. He later reported:

I spent many hours during the course of the next few days encouraging the

province chief [Colonel Nhut], the division commander [General Hung],

and their advisers to hold their positions. My attempts to belittle the

capability of the enemy and to strengthen friendly forces' morale seemed

almost hopeless. Enemy positions and movements, intensity of antiaircraft

fire, and the increase in enemy artillery and rockets against An Loc pointed

to an imminent all-out attack.1

At 0530 on 9 May, the enemy commenced strong ground probes all

around the ARVN perimeter. Additionally, the volume of enemy

artillery fire increased even more. Based on the patterns established in

the previous two attacks, General Hollingsworth correctly guessed

that the main attack would come on the morning of 11 May.2

Accordingly, he planned 18 B-52 boxes (target sets for 3-ship missions)

and almost 200 tactical air strikes to support the besieged defenders.

Armed with his air support plan and intelligence reports,

Hollingsworth flew to Saigon to speak with General Abrams,

commander of MACV. He convinced Abrams that the enemy main

attack was coming and that the ARVN could not hold without

maximum air support. Abrams agreed and promised to send him

everything that he needed for the battle. 3

On 10 May, the enemy continued the pattern from the previous

day, with heavy shelling and limited ground probes throughout the

day. Hollingsworth was even more convinced that the enemy main

attack would come the next day, and that afternoon, he once again

called Abrams, requesting that he be allocated one B-52 strike every

fifty-five minutes for the next twenty-four hours. 4 The MACV

commander agreed, and Hollingsworth's planners quickly drew up

plans for their use and transmitted them through channels to the

Seventh Air Force planners and the Strategic Air Command Advanced

Echelon (who acted as liaison between Seventh Air Force and the B-52

wings in Guam and Thailand) at Ton Son Nhut Air Base in Saigon.

At 0035 on 11 May, the NVA drastically increased its

bombardment of the ARVN perimeter, which by now only measured

47
Scale

I I I 0

1 5 kilomets 0 .5 kilometers

LEGEND

miles - - Limit of NVA advance

I I I IITI ARVN blocking positions

Source: Major John D. Howard, "An Loc: A Study of U.S. Power," Army, 25 September, 1975.

Map 6. The NVA high-water mark in An Loc, 11 May 1972

48

-- --- I · lrI L· I I

---- L CIISIL·---L-C·_ I- - -
49

1,000 by 1,500 meters. For the next 4 hours, 7,000 rounds (or one shell

every 5 seconds) fell on the ARVN positions. Major Kenneth Ingram,

an adviser with the 5th ARVN Division command post, said later that

the barrage was so heavy that to leave your bunker was "certain

death."5

Captain Moffett, with the 3d Ranger Group, said that the noise

"kept going up to a crescendo... it sounded like somebody was popping

popcorn . . . and about 4 or 4:30 it stopped-bam-just like somebody

dropped a baton. Everything stopped at once."6

For the next thirty minutes, there was a deathly silence. At 0500,

the artillery barrage resumed in earnest, and during the next 12 hours

the city was struck by 10,000 rounds of enemy indirect fire.7 Under

cover of this barrage, the NVA commenced the ground assault from all

sides of the city, with the main attacks in the north and northwest. The

tanks preceded the infantry and forged salients in the ARVN lines; the

NVA infantry then attempted to widen these incursions (see map 6).

The NVA plan was to join the two salients, thereby separating the

defenders into enclaves that could be defeated in detail.

The NVA had moved in additional 23-mm, 37-mm, and mobile

twin 57-mm antiaircraft guns (the latter mounted on tank chassis), as

well as more SA-7 Strella heat-seeking antiaircraft missiles to provide

cover for the attack. The focus of this effort was directed at the Cobra

gunships and the forward air controllers. The NVA hoped to eliminate

the FACs to degrade the effectiveness of the close air support. They

also wanted to drive away the Cobras, which were very effective

against the attacking infantry and tanks that were trying to negate

the tactical aircraft by "hugging" the defenders. The Cobras were able

to bring their minigun fire and 2.75-inch rockets in very close to the

defenders where the tactical aircraft could not work. The NVA knew

that they had to neutralize the effect of the air support to be victorious,

so they threw everything possible into the air over An Loc.

The situation in the city rapidly became an extreme tactical

emergency. Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft handlers loaded all

available ordnance, as aircraft made rapid turnarounds to get back to

support the defenders. The situation was so dire that the forward air

controllers turned no aircraft away, regardless of ordnance load. For

example, in one case, the 36th Ranger Battalion was in imminent

danger of being overrun, and the only immediately available ordnance

was an F-4 loaded with 500-pound bombs with "Daisy Cutters," a delay

fuze usually used for clearing landing zones. The FAC directed the
50

This T-54 was part of a six to eight-tank column attacked by F-4 Aircraft. When this tank

stopped during the attack, two airborne soldiers boarded it, opened its hatch, and lobbed a

grenade on top of its struggling crew.

aircraft to drop the bombs 200 meters in front of the ranger positions,

and the resulting blasts turned back the NVA attack.

The Air Force planners at Ton Son Nhut threw every available

aircraft into the fight. The 49th Tactical Fighter Wing self-deployed

from its home base in New Mexico and arrived at Ton Son Nhut on 10

May. It went into action the next day without normal familiarization

or safety-check flights.

General Hung and his adviser, Colonel Walter F. Ulmer, who had

just replaced Colonel Miller, realized that the NVA were trying to

separate the ARVN forces and moved the 5th Airborne Battalion from

the southern part of the perimeter to blunt both NVA penetrations in

the northeast and west. These ARVN paratroopers fought tenaciously,

and the enemy advances were halted. Once the penetrations were

stopped, the Air Force (both U.S. and VNAF) went to work reducing

the western salient with repeated bomb strikes. The enemy troops in

the northeastern salient were too close to the ARVN defenders to use

bombs, but the AC-130 Spectre gunships were able to bring accurate

and effective 40-mm and 105-mm cannon fire on the attackers, driving

them back.

At one point, Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Weed, commander of the

8th Special Operations Squadron, made two low-level passes in his A37 through a curtain of intense enemy antiaircraft fire to destroy a

North Vietnamese T-54 tank that was firing point blank into the 5th

ARVN Division's command post. On the first pass, his 250-pound bomb

scored a direct hit on the tank, but the bomb was a dud. The tank
51

stopped firing, but it was not immobilized. Lieutenant Colonel Weed

made another pass through a hail of 37-mm and .51-caliber ground

fire, and this time the bomb scored another direct hit; the subsequent

explosions destroyed the tank and drove back the supporting infantry

troops.

During the course of this battle, 297 sorties of tactical air support

were flown on 11 May and approximately 260 sorties on each of the

following 4 days. These missions were flown in the face of some of the

most severe antiaircraft fire ever encountered in South Vietnam. The

airspace over An Loc during this battle was what one observer called a

"mass of confusion."8 At least three FACs were over the city at all

times, constantly putting in air strikes as the aircraft arrived on

station. In addition, several AC-130 Spectre gunships were also

orbiting as they struck targets in support of ARVN forces in contact

with the enemy.

The situation in the air was made more hazardous by the

unprecedented volume of enemy antiaircraft fire from the North

Vietnamese gunners. Further complicating the mission for the airmen

The A-37 light ground attack aircraft, a small but reliable tactical support aircraft, here

dropping a 500-pound bomb. These aircraft, flown at An Loc by Lieutenant Colonel Gordon

Weed and his 8th Special Operations Squadron, were extremely effective in the close

fighting that characterized the battle for An Loc.
52

By dropping 155-mm powder bags inside the hatch and igniting them with a grenade,

infantrymen blew up this tank (with the help of the tank's own main gun ammunition)

was the presence of the SA-7 Strella heat-seeking missile, which was

used in significant numbers for the first time in the war. Several near

misses on AC-130 Spectres and the downing of two Cobra gunships by

SA-7 missiles caused all aircraft in the area to take extreme evasive

maneuvers when delivering ordnance on target. The FACs played a

key role in ensuring that the missiles did not tip the scales in favor of

the attacker. The FACs maintained sufficient control to make

maximum use of available aircraft on immediate ground targets while

minimizing the exposure of the aircraft to the heat-seeking missiles

and withering ground fire.

While the FACs continued to employ all available tactical air

support in sorties on targets in direct support of the ARVN forces

engaged in close combat, General Hollingsworth increased his efforts

to ensure that B-52s were available to strike enemy staging areas. He

had "borrowed" an additional five B-52 strikes from Second Regional

Assistance Command (MR II) to bring the total of B-52 strikes against

the forces surrounding An Loc to thirty within a twenty-four-hour

period. These massive "Arc Light" missions were a tremendous morale

booster for the defenders, who could readily see their effects. The

American advisers requested that the B-52 strikes be brought closer to
53

the ARVN perimeter, and several of the strikes were moved to as close

as 600 meters to the ARVN positions.

In one instance, a large enemy force was inflicting heavy

casualties on the 81st Ranger Battalion on the eastern perimeter. A B52 strike was diverted to that location, and the attack virtually

annihilated the enemy force. General Hollingsworth reported to

General Abrams that "B-52 strikes and tacair allowed us to punish the

enemy severely." 9

By late on the 11th, the repeated B-52 strikes, continuous tactical

air support, and tenacious defense by the ARVN forces in the city

combined to break the main enemy attack, but fierce fighting

continued until the following day when the situation stabilized, due

more than anything else to fatigue on both sides.

The NVA continued to pour massive amounts of indirect fire on

the city, while the defenders replied with devastating air strikes.

However, stopping the NVA was not without its price; the withering

enemy antiaircraft fire downed one A-37, two Cobra gunships, and two

FAC 0-2 aircraft during the course of the day's action. A Spectre

gunship also was hit by an SA-7 missile but was able to safely return

to its home base.

During the night of 12 May, the NVA mounted yet another

desperate attempt to take the city. Once again, the attack was

spearheaded by tanks, but this time, most of them were PT-76 light

tanks, because a heavy toll had been taken by the defenders on the T54 medium tanks that led the earlier assaults. Under cover of darkness

and extremely bad flying weather, the NVA attacked with tanks from

the north and east, supported by infantry attacks from the west and

south.

Without air cover, the defenders found themselves in deep

trouble. Hollingsworth responded to the situation by diverting six B52 strikes against the NVA troop concentrations. These strikes,

accomplished in close proximity to friendly positions, broke up the

enemy attacks.

Shortly after midnight, the weather improved slightly, and two

AC-130 Spectre gunships arrived on station and responded to the

defenders' call for fire. The Spectres were extremely effective against

the enemy troop formations and equipment. Hollingsworth cited the

Spectre's "magnificent performance" during marginal flying weather

and believed that, in the final analysis, the B-52 raids "spoiled another

apparent enemy effort to seize An Loc."lo
54

AH-1G Cobra attack helicopters proved to be very effective tank killers in An LOC,

particularly in the early part of the battle in April and early May

The heavy shelling of An Loc continued unabated (3,000 rounds

on 13 May, 2,000 on 14 May, and 2,600 on 15 May), but the intensity of

the ground attacks decreased in frequency, strength, and duration. 11

There were only two more significant attempts to breach the ARVN

perimeter between the 11th and the 15th, and both efforts were

blunted by the ever-present B-52 strikes.

Continuous air strikes by B-52s and close air support aircraft had

enabled the ARVN forces to counterattack and retake what remained

of the enemy salients. By nightfall on the 15th, it appeared that the

NVA forces had called off their attack plans and withdrawn farther

into the surrounding rubber plantations.

It was slowly becoming evident that what one adviser termed the

"almost ritualistic pattern of action and reaction" was beginning to

take a heavy toll on the attackers as well as the defenders. 12 Although
55

Lieutenant James W. Beaubien, one of the forward air controllers from the 21 st Tactical Air

Support Squadron, who were essential in coordinating the air strikes so critical to the

defense of An Loc. These courageous pilots (using the call signs SUNDOG and RASH)

repeatedly braved intense antiaircraft fire over the city to provide support to the ARVN

soldiers and their advisers.

the NVA troops still ringed An Loc, this last attempt had cost the

enemy dearly. Almost his entire armor force had been destroyed; over

forty tanks and armored vehicles littered the battlefield in and around

the city.13 The continual aerial bombardment had decimated whole

NVA units. The beleaguered defenders had held the city against

overwhelming odds. Major General Hollingsworth concluded, "The

enemy has lost his capability for further offensive actions in Binh Long

province." 14

The Battle on QL-13

The battle of An Loc, however, was not over yet. The 5th ARVN

Division advisers estimated that the enemy had shifted his focus

toward the south to prevent the 21st ARVN Division from moving

north and relieving the still besieged city.

The 21st ARVN Division had closed on Lai Khe on 12 April. The

division's initial mission had been to secure QL-13 from Lai Khe to
56

Chon Thanh, a village thirty kilometers south of An Loc. The division

moved north from Lai Khe and immediately ran into heavy enemy

contact. After ten days of hard fighting, the lead ARVN elements

reached a point fifteen kilometers north of Lai Khe, where they

encountered a heavily entrenched NVA force astride the highway. The

21st Division commander, who had only recently assumed command,

attempted to maneuver elements of the division against the NVA

forces, but the attacks were conducted in an uncoordinated fashion.

What followed was an almost daily pattern of attempting to attack in

the morning hours, followed by attempts to evacuate casualties and

prepare for the next day's attack in the afternoon. The ARVN division

commander was not adept at coordinating the efforts of several

regiments against an entrenched enemy. As Colonel Ross Franklin,

senior adviser to the 21st Division said, "It doesn't take a lot of guys in

bunkers to stop an uncoordinated attack."15 It would take until 29

April to reduce the NVA forces in those positions and finally reach

Chon Thanh.

The 21st was ordered then to move up QL-13 from Chon Thanh to

effect a linkup with the ARVN airborne forces south of An Loc. Upon

launching the attack from Chon Thanh, the lead ARVN regiment

came under intense fire from elements of the 7th NVA Division, which

was entrenched in yet another belt of fortified positions along the

highway. Two weeks of continuous battle ensued before the ARVN

attackers finally defeated the dug°in NVA units and reached a point

eight kilometers north of Chon Thanh.

The 32d Regiment continued the attack north, but the enemy had

regrouped, and the resistance was severe. The ARVN troops

sometimes advanced only fifty meters a day. Colonel Franklin later

said, "Once in a while we would break through and push a mile, but

the attack was being fought piecemeal . all the good leaders had

been killed."16

One regiment, the 15th from the 9th ARVN Division,

maneuvered around the 21st and got behind the NVA positions on QL13. However, for the next three weeks, it was pounded by NVA tanks,

artillery, and infantry as it inched toward An Loc. The remnants of

this regiment, numbering only 120 survivors, ravaged by dysentery

and all wounded at least once, finally reached the outskirts of the city,

but the road behind them remained closed to the 21st ARVN as it tried

to relieve the besieged city.

Although the 21st Division was unsuccessful in effecting the

linkup with the forces in An Loc, its attack tied down almost an entire
57

NVA division, making it unavailable for the fight in An Loc. This was

a major contribution to the ultimate South Vietnamese victory,

because the presence of one more NVA division in the direct assault on

the city would almost certainly have tipped the scales in favor of the

attackers, and An Loc would probably have fallen.

General Minh, the III Corps commander, recognized that

providing fire support to both the defenders of An Loc and the would-be

relief force from the 21st ARVN Division was crucial. He ordered the

9th Armored Cavalry Squadron and other elements of the 9th ARVN

Division, which had been moved from the Mekong delta to Lai Khe as

reinforcements, to establish a fire support base at Tan Khai on QL-13,

just ten kilometers south of An Loc. This was accomplished on 16 May.

The occupation of the firebase at Tan Khai occurred at the time of

the second major NVA effort to take An Loc. The enemy attacked the

newly established firebase on 20 May and over the next three days, the

ARVN soldiers turned back repeated attacks. The defenders would

continue to hold this small outpost for the next forty-five days.

The establishment of the firebase at Tan Khai served to alleviate

some of the pressure on An Loc and helped raise the morale of the

defenders inside the city. This position remained the only ARVN

redoubt in the enemy-held territory between An Loc and the 21st

Division north of Chon Thanh.

The Siege Is Broken

By the end of May, the situation at An Loc had improved

considerably. There was a lull in the fighting, and even the incoming

artillery had decreased significantly. The around-the-clock air strikes

had taken a horrendous toll on the NVA forces. ARVN intelligence

estimated that the 3 NVA divisions, the 5th, 7th, and 9th, had already

suffered over 10,000 casualties in the fight for the city and along QL13.17

The massive air strikes had destroyed many of the antiaircraft

weapons that ringed the city, and this permitted the first sustained

aerial resupply to the defenders since the battle began. Additionally,

the improved enemy air-defense environment permitted the delivery

of much-needed personnel replacements and evacuation of the more

seriously wounded.

The defenders had held their position against overwhelming odds

and, with the increase in resupply and the arrival of fresh soldiers,

morale in An Loc soared. Taking advantage of the success of the air
58

strikes and the devastation they had wrought on the enemy, the

ARVN commanders shifted to the offensive with the objective of

expanding the city's defensive perimeter.

As the ARVN troops began to push their perimeter outward, they

soon saw the death and destruction wrought by the continual massed

air strikes. Three kilometers south of An Loc, in a B-52 target area,

ARVN soldiers discovered 208 enemy dead from one regiment, all

apparently killed by a single B-52 strike. Inside the city, several NVA

regimental command post complexes were found that had been

completely destroyed by the murderously accurate AC-130 Spectre

gunship fire. 18 Unburied NVA bodies littered the terrain in and

around the city.19

By 8 June, ARVN units had cleared the center of the city of most

enemy resistance and greatly expanded the area controlled by friendly

units. The situation further improved on 13 and 14 June when III

Corps ordered in the 48th ARVN Regiment, a fresh unit from the 18th

ARVN Division, to begin replacing the battered troops of the 5th

Division. On 17 June, the 48th retook the hills to the south of the city

and from that vantage point began to direct tactical air strikes on the

remaining enemy concentrations to the west and south of the city.

From that point on, the enemy shelling of An Loc was greatly

reduced. For the first time since early April, the ARVN soldiers were

able to move around above ground without risking almost certain

death.

On 18 June, General Minh declared that the siege of An Loc was

broken and released the 1st Airborne Brigade to return to its parent

unit in Saigon. Although the siege was officially lifted, this did not

mean that the battle was over. ARVN and NVA forces continued to

exchange fire as the South Vietnamese forces attempted to destroy the

remaining enemy. North Vietnamese artillery and rockets continued

to fall on the city, but in a much reduced volume.

On 9 July, Brigadier General Richard Tallman, General

McGiffert's successor as General Hollingsworth's deputy (who had

been promoted to his rank only eight days earlier), landed in the city

with several of his key staff officers to observe the progress of ARVN

operations and coordinate the reinforcement effort. They were met by

two advisers from the 18th ARVN Division, Major Joe Hallum of the

48th Regiment Advisory Team and the author, who had joined the 43d

Regiment after TF 52 was evacuated from the city earlier. As the

helicopter departed, the general's party was struck by enemy artillery

fire. Three American officers accompanying Tallman-Lieutenant
59

ARVN infantry advancing through An Loc after the NVA siege was broken

Colonel Stanley Kuick, Major Richard Benson, and First Lieutenant

Richard Todd-and Sergeant Son, an ARVN interpreter, were killed

instantly. General Tallman, Major Hallum, and Captain Willbanks

were wounded by the incoming fire. They were immediately evacuated

by U.S. medevac helicopter to 3d Field Hospital in Saigon, where the

general, mortally wounded, died on the operating table. 20 The other

two officers later recovered from their wounds.

In order to relieve the exhausted 5th ARVN Division, General

Minh ordered the entire 18th ARVN Division into An Loc. The 18th

arrived by a massive helicopter airlift on 11 July. Brigadier General

Le Minh Dao directed his troops to commence operations immediately

to eradicate the remaining enemy resistance in and around the city.

Also at this time, General Minh moved the 25th ARVN Division

from Tay Ninh to Chon Thanh to replace the 21st ARVN, which had

fought hard but still had not broken the NVA roadblocks astride QL13 south of An Loc. During the course of the effort to relieve the

embattled city, the 21st sustained 660 killed and 3,400 wounded.21

Still, the exhausted division had inflicted tremendous casualties on

the North Vietnamese forces. The 25th, on its part, was fresh and able

to encircle the remaining enemy positions along the highway and

destroy them by 20 July.
60

The AR VN Are Victorious

The Battle of An Loc was over. The continuous shelling, estimated

at over 78,000 rounds during the 3-month period, had reduced the city

to almost total ruins.2 2 Over 15,000 refugees had been forced from

their homes, and a like number were dead or missing. The ARVN

defenders in the city had sustained 5,400 casualties, 2,300 of whom

were killed or missing.2 3 As one adviser described it, 'The graves, the

burned out vehicles, and the rubble were mute testimony to the

intensity of the battle that had been fought there." 2 4

In spite of this cost, the defenders and their advisers, with the

help of tactical air power (262 B-52 missions and 9,203 tactical air

strikes were flown against the North Vietnamese in An Loc and along

QL-13), had decisively defeated three of the finest divisions in the

North Vietnamese Army and held the city against overwhelming

odds. 25 It is estimated that the North Vietnamese suffered 10,000

soldiers killed and 15,000 wounded during the battle. 26 The area in

and around the city was littered with over eighty burned-out NVA

tanks and other vehicles. 27

Interrogation of NVA prisoners indicated the extent of the

Communist defeat. A prisoner from 95C Regiment, 9th VC Division,

reported on 10 June that only thirty to forty men remained in each

battalion; he said that his battalion commander and all company

commanders had been killed. The situation was much the same in the

other NVA units. Prisoners from the 141st and 165th Regiments of the

7th NVA Regiments reported their units almost 100 percent

destroyed. 28

The South Vietnamese victory prevented a direct threat to the

national capital in Saigon. In addition to inflicting a military defeat on

the enemy, the ARVN defenders won a decisive psychological victory

as well. Although there were obvious problems and the situation could

have gone either way, the ARVN had stood up against the best of the

North Vietnamese Army, defeated them, and prevented them from

establishing their "liberation government" in the south. 29 President

Thieu and his government emerged from the crisis stronger than ever,

at least on the surface. He and his army, although badly battered, had

been victorious. The brutality of the North Vietnamese invaders had

not won them many converts in the south. The victory seemed a

turning point for South Vietnam. 30

The Nixon administration used the South Vietnamese victory at

An Loc to declare the President's Vietnamization policy a success. 31

Citing the "fierce determination of its Vietnamese defenders,"
61

President Thieu (right) congratulates Brigadier General Le Van Hung (next to Thieu)

on the victory at An Loc

administration officials proclaimed the victory at An Loc as clear proof

that the policy of turning the war over to the South Vietnamese was

working.32 The ARVN had indeed won a decisive victory against

overwhelming odds in the desperate battle for An Loc, and in many

cases, the courage, skill, and endurance of South Vietnamese officers

and soldiers were exemplary. Published MACV reports at the time

lauded the bravery and performance of the South Vietnamese

defenders; however, the reports failed to reveal just how close the

outcome of the battle had been. 33

Colonel Miller, the original 5th ARVN Division senior adviser,

upon his return to the United States in May, was called before the

House Armed Services Committee to testify on the battle and ARVN

performance. During these hearings (and additional discussions with

Senator John Stennis, Alexander Haig, and other high government

officials and members of the media), Miller testified that in his

opinion, the ARVN had not really won, but had merely avoided defeat

with the help of their advisers and American air power.34 He also said

that removing the advisers and U.S. air support prematurely would

result in disaster for the South Vietnamese. These warnings were not
62

heeded; An Loc became one of the underlying rationales for pressing

on with Vietnamization and complete U.S. withdrawal.

-9 11 C a I - ----,
V. THE AMERICAN CONTRIBUTIONS

In comparing the claims of the Nixon administration and the

closeness of the outcome of the battle, it is appropriate to examine

more closely the American contributions to the victory. American

military might was clearly a major factor in the fight and subsequent

victory in An Loc. The American contribution can be considered in two

areas: U.S. air power effectiveness and the role provided by American

combat advisers on the ground in and around An Loc.

American Air Power

U.S. air power in all its forms was absolutely critical throughout

the campaign to defend An Loc from repeated North Vietnamese

attacks. It took primarily three forms: tactical air support, aerial

resupply, and evacuation of wounded.

Tactical air support was so critical that the city would almost

certainly have fallen before 1 May without it. Members of the U.S.

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations traveled to Saigon in late

1972 to investigate the conduct of the Easter Offensive. The

Committee Report in 1973 cited U.S. air support as the key ingredient

to the ARVN victory. During one of the briefings presented to the

committee members at MACV headquarters, the briefer was asked

what would have happened if U.S. air support had not been available;

the briefer replied: "We would be meeting some other place today."l

General Abrams, former MACV commander, later stated that in

his opinion, "American air power and not South Vietnamese arms, had

caused his [the enemy's] losses."2 This evaluation was echoed by

participants at all levels. The after-action report of the 21st ARVN

Division stated, "The accuracy, devastation, and responsiveness of

U.S. tactical air meant the difference between victory and defeat." 3

Brigadier General McGiffert, General Hollingsworth's deputy at Third

Regional Assistance Command, was even more emphatic in his

evaluation of the impact of U.S. air power. During the battle, he was

quoted as saying that the B-52 force was "the most effective weapon we

have been able to muster" and asserted that the threat of bomber

strikes "forces the enemy to break up his ground elements into small

units and makes it difficult to mass forces for an attack." 4 When asked

after the battle what he thought about the ability of the ARVN to hold

An Loc without American tactical air support, he replied, "No

contest-never would have hacked it."5

63
64

Even South Vietnamese officials shared this sentiment. General

Cao Van Vien wrote after the war, "The tremendous firepower

unleashed by the USAF, especially B-52 strikes, effectively blunted all

enemy efforts on three fronts, disrupted enemy supply lines, and

helped the RVNAF conserve their ground forces. It also gave the

RVNAF much-needed respite to recover from the initial enemy shock,

consolidate their lines of defense, and regroup for the counterattack."6

He further stated, "Without this support, the RVNAF success in

stalling the enemy invasion would have been impossible." 7

A smaller and less publicized, but no less important part of the

critical air support, came from Army attack helicopters. This support

was provided by AH-1G Cobras from units such as F Battery, 79th

Aerial Rocket Artillery (known as "the Blue Max"); F Troop, 9th

Cavalry; and D Troop, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion-all of Task

Force Gary Owen (part of what was left in country from the 1st

Cavalry Division), one of the last remaining U.S. combat units in

South Vietnam. Colonel Miller recommended these units for

Presidential Unit Citations after the battle, citing their willingness to

brave intense antiaircraft fire to provide much needed close support to

the ground forces.

There is absolutely no doubt that U.S. tactical air support,

including the Army helicopters, but especially the B-52 strikes,

wrought tremendous damage on the North Vietnamese attackers. The

importance of this support was heightened by the fact that after the

first week, the ARVN defenders in the city had no artillery support of

their own. When the last ARVN artillery pieces were destroyed in the

city in early April, the ARVN soldiers were left with nothing but rifles,

machine guns, LAWs, and a few mortars to defend themselves against

repeated human wave assaults. Without air support, the defenders

would have been quickly overrun, and three NVA divisions would

have had insufficient strength to stop them from making a direct

assault on Saigon. Tactical air power saved An Loc, and it may have

also saved Saigon.

The other two facets of American air power in the battle for An

Loc are closely interrelated. Aerial resupply and evacuation of

wounded soldiers and civilians had a tremendous impact on the

outcome of the battle. Initially, resupply and medical evacuation were

accomplished by the VNAF's helicopters. However, as the North

Vietnamese tightened the ring around An Loc and increased the

number of antiaircraft weapons in the area, the VNAF helicopters
65

The devastation of An Loc. The lignter areas indicate the destruction wrought by continuous

NVA artillery bombardments and repeated U.S. tactical air strikes. The pockmarks east of

the city (right side of photo) are the results of B-52 "Arc Light" missions.

became less and less effective. With the loss of Quan Loi airfield in

early April, the city was cut off from access to the outside world.

Airdrops by VNAF C-123 cargo aircraft began on 12 April, but the

volume of ground fire was such that these parachute drops were very
66

inaccurate. Another attempt was made to drop loads from high

altitude, but two aircraft were lost. It became apparent that the VNAF

efforts were not going to provide the critical ammunition, medical

supplies, and food that the defenders needed to hold out.8

The situation in the city was worsening. The few cargo bundles

that made it into the city and were recoverable often led to

confrontations between friendly units on the ground. Morale was

suffering as the defenders watched the preponderance of the resupply

efforts land in the enemy's hands.

The situation improved only after MACV directed the U.S.

Seventh Air Force to assume responsibility for the An Loc resupply

effort. The American pilots experienced the same volume of

antiaircraft fire that the VNAF pilots had seen. Additionally, they

experienced extreme mechanical difficulties in configuring the

parachutes for cargo drops. The enemy ground fire and the difficulties

with the parachutes continued to wreak havoc with the resupply of the

embattled garrison. After much trial and error and serious damage to

aircraft operating over the city, the USAF eventually solved these

problems, and improved techniques led to 238 successful drops,

totaling 3,100 tons, in the months of May and June.9 Although this

was less than the Americans hoped to get into the city, it represented a

significant improvement over previous efforts and vastly improved the

defenders' morale. By August, the aerial resupply effort totaled over

600 sorties and 7,600 tons of ammunition, food, and other supplies.10

An equally important part of the air support issue deals with the

evacuation of wounded. The same antiaircraft fire that made resupply

missions extremely dangerous and difficult also impeded efforts to get

VNAF evacuation helicopters into the city to pick up the large number

of casualties. A U.S. Air Force report after the war stated, "The heavy,

intense AAA [antiaircraft artillery] and accurate artillery, however,

created an environment in which VNAF crews either were reluctant to

land helicopters in order to pick up wounded or seemingly deliberately

landed on LZs [landing zones] where no wounded were waiting."11

On occasions when a VNAF helicopter did land, the walking

wounded and even healthy ARVN jumped aboard the helicopter or

clung to the skids in an almost crazed attempt to get out of the hellish

environs of An Loc.12 Morale inside the city plummeted because the

defenders realized that their chances of making it out of the city if

wounded were almost nil.

On 3 May, General Hollingsworth directed that a U.S. mission

commander and a single U.S. command ship lead a combined medical
67

evacuation operation into An Loc. He hoped to demonstrate to the

South Vietnamese that successful medical evacuation was possible at

a reasonable risk if proper leadership, planning, and execution were

applied. 13 The mission was led by Colonel John Richardson of the 12th

Combat Aviation Group and included four VNAF evacuation

helicopters. The mission succeeded, bringing in thirty-six fresh troops

and taking out forty-two wounded with no loss of aircraft. The

demonstration worked and showed the VNAF pilots that they could

evacuate their own wounded if they planned and executed properly.

Still, the VNAF never really mounted the sustained medical

evacuation effort dictated by the level of combat in and around An Loc.

The MACV command history attributed the difficulty that the

South Vietnamese had in providing much needed evacuation

helicopter support to a lack of leadership on the part of VNAF senior

officers. 14 This situation could have had a terminal impact on the

morale of the soldiers in An Loc had not General Hollingsworth and

other Americans stepped in.

The importance of the American role in providing air support for

the defense of An Loc cannot be overstated. Tactical air support

provided the necessary firepower to defeat a numerically superior

enemy. The improvement of the aerial resupply situation and the

resumption of helicopter medical evacuation flights greatly improved

the defenders' morale and permitted them to continue the fight. As one

U.S. Air Force report stated after the war, "In combination with the

resilience of the defenders, and the responsiveness of the air strike

forces, the successful air resupply of An Loc became a decisive factor

determining the Allied victory."15

American Advisers

The last major contribution made by the American forces in this

battle was the performance of the advisers on the ground in An Loc.

The advisers stayed with their counterparts throughout the battle and

shared their fate on a daily basis. They served in several key roles.

First, they provided encouragement to their counterparts. This

encouragement was particularly important in the darkest hours of the

repeated North Vietnamese attacks. The very presence of the

American advisers was a tangible demonstration of American resolve.

The fact that the advisers remained with their counterparts in and

around An Loc to coordinate U.S. support and were in constant contact

with General Hollingsworth greatly encouraged the South

Vietnamese defenders and provided excellent leadership by example.
68

Lieutenant General Phillip Davidson wrote that the advisers

"stiffened the morale of the ARVN commanders in time of desperate

peril." 16

One of the most critical roles served by the American advisers

relates to the importance of U.S. tactical air support. The advisers

provided the link between the ARVN defenders and the American

tactical aircraft and helicopters supporting the battle. Without the

advisers and their radios, the defenders on the ground in the city and

surrounding area would have been unable to talk to the aircraft. The

advisers were tireless in coordinating the around-the-clock air strikes

that prevented the North Vietnamese forces from overrunning the

city. General McGiffert said that the ARVN defenders would have

been unable to hold out if the advisers had not been there controlling

the air strikes. He said of the advisers, " ... their primary duty and

their primary reason for existence was coordination of US tacair

[tactical air support] and without them it [the defense of An Loc] would

have just been damn near impossible."1 7

The advisers also provided General Hollingsworth and the other

senior Americans who controlled the air assets with an accurate and

reliable assessment of the situation on the ground. Determining

exactly what was going on in the city was particularly difficult in the

beginning stages of the battle when confusion and near panic reigned.

The advisers in An Loc talked daily by radio with Hollingsworth and

his operations personnel. This allowed the general to plan the air

strikes that proved so crucial in the battle for the city. General

McGiffert described this role of the advisers in the following manner,

"It was the only way we could get any kind of objective analysis of

what was really going on in there, it was talking to them [the advisers]

everyday." 18

The last and maybe most crucial role performed by the American

advisers in An Loc is less tangible. Many of the ARVN fought bravely

and maintained their fighting edge under the most trying conditions.

Unfortunately, others allowed panic and fear to rule and fought less

than valiantly. On several occasions, the situation in An Loc was only

a breath away from crumbling. General McGiffert said that the

advisers "were the glue that kept them [the ARVN] together."19

Leadership in the South Vietnamese armed forces had long been a

problem, and the situation still existed in 1972.20 The crucible of An

Loc only served to exacerbate this shortcoming. While leadership and

morale were generally high in the elite airborne and ranger units,

they were often less than satisfactory in the regular units, including
69

Colonel Tran Van Nhut (left), Binh Long Province chief; Major General James F.

Hollingsworth, commander, Third Regional Assistance Command; and Sir Robert

Thompson, noted British counterinsurgency expert, contemplating the defense of An Loc.

Colonel Nhut was a shining example of South Vietnamese combat leadership during the

battle. Major General Hollingsworth provided guidance and direction to the U.S. advisers in

An Loc and ensured that they had all available tactical air support.

the higher echelons of command. Certainly there were exceptions; one

of these was Colonel Tran Van Nhut, the Binh Long Province chief,

who provided visible leadership and an excellent example for his

soldiers during the most difficult times during the battle. However,

such leadership at the higher levels was not the norm. The 5th ARVN

Division commander was a case in point. According to Colonel Miller,

"a spring came loose inside General Hung" when the NVA overran Loc

Ninh, and he failed to exercise command when it was needed most.21

General McGiffert stated later that Hung "choked" under the pressure

and "just didn't do a damn thing for a long time."22 McGiffert also felt

that the regimental commanders, with some exceptions, were no better

than mediocre. McGiffert said that "there was no control. There was no

supervision; there was no command emphasis to get out into the crew

positions."23

The leadership and discipline was so poor in some of the 5th

ARVN units that the civilians who remained in An Loc had nothing

but scorn for these soldiers, many of whom had seemingly spent as

much time looting as fighting.24 Looting incidents and firefights

between friendly troops over the airdrops that made it into the city

were indicators of the breakdown of discipline among some of the

defenders.
70

This situation was so critical at several points during the siege

that some advisers felt that the city would probably have fallen if the

NVA had left the road open to the south so the ARVN troops could

have escaped. 25 In many cases, troops who did not wish to be there had

no choice but to fight in order to survive. 26 Given this situation, the

advisers in An Loc often did a lot more than advise their counterparts;

in many cases, the Americans stepped into the void and assumed

virtual command of the ARVN units they were with, providing the

leadership that they so badly needed. 27 The Senate Foreign Relations

Committee reported, "No one with whom we talked, American or

Vietnamese, thought that the South Vietnamese could have held had

there not been American advisers." 28

Another part of the problem with the South Vietnamese

leadership had to do with the tactical competence of the South

Vietnamese leaders. U.S. advisers had been working with ARVN

commanders for years, and much emphasis had been placed on the

conduct of tactical operations and planning. However, the focus of this

training had been mostly on conducting counterinsurgency operations.

The situation in An Loc was extremely far removed from the type of

circumstances that even the best ARVN commanders had previously

experienced. Facing tanks was a far cry from chasing guerrillas. As

one adviser later described the situation that existed in An Loc:

"Regimental and higher level leadership was not tactically or

psychologically prepared for a battle of the duration and intensity of

the Binh Long campaign; battalion level leaders lacked preparation

for the close coordination necessary between fire and maneuver

elements." 29 In many cases, the American advisers provided the

expertise in handling battles of such magnitude.

The American contribution to the battle of An Loc was key to the

South Vietnamese victory in 1972. American air power and the

performance of the U.S. advisers on the ground meant the difference

between victory and defeat. To appreciate this contribution fully, one

must compare this action with the final North Vietnamese offensive in

1975 after the United States had departed South Vietnam. This time,

there was neither U.S. air power nor American advisers.

Il I  1
VI. THE NORTH VIETNAMESE

VICTORY IN 1975

1973-1974

The treaty ending the Indochina War was signed in Paris in

January 1973; by the end of March, the United States had the

prisoners of war back, and nearly all Americans had left Vietnam.

However, the signing of the treaty did not mean the end of the

war. The South Vietnamese were struggling to remain an independent

nation; the North Vietnamese wanted unification of both Vietnams on

their terms. Since the remainder of the Communist military units that

had come south and survived the desperate battles of 1972 were still in

place, this soon led to open combat with the South Vietnamese, as the

Communists tried to consolidate control of the areas they occupied.

During the first 3 months of "peace," the South Vietnamese lost 6,000

soldiers in fighting with the North Vietnamese. 1

Although the North Vietnamese forces occupied areas in the

south, they had been hurt seriously during the 1972 combat. They

needed time to regroup and refit. They instituted a program of quiet

infiltration to bring in supplies and fresh replacements from the north.

Large volumes of tanks, other armored vehicles, rockets, long-range

artillery, and antiaircraft weapons were moved south. Replacements

came down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and North Vietnamese units in the

south were reorganized and refitted. This effort even included the

building of a 5,000-kilometer pipeline from Quang Tri in the northern

MR I to Loc Ninh in MR III.

Most of the South Vietnamese Army, now numbering over a

million soldiers, was tied down in the defense of static positions. This

permitted the North Vietnamese to prosecute their regeneration

unhindered.

The Initial Attack on Phuoc Long

By 1974, the North Vietnamese decided to test the South

Vietnamese with a limited attack. In December, they attacked Phuoc

Long Province with both regional and mainline NVA units. This time,

unlike the action in An Loc, the infantry and armor forces were well

coordinated, and they routed the South Vietnamese force, killing or

capturing 3,000 soldiers, took control of vast quantities of war

materiel, and "liberated" the entire province.

71
72

The United States did nothing. President Nixon had left office in

disgrace, and most Americans wanted nothing further to do with

Vietnam. General Van Tien Dung, commander of NVA forces, realized

that President Thieu, without American help, was now relegated to

fighting a "poor man's war."2 The posttreaty balance of power had

shifted in favor of the North Vietnamese.

The Communist war planners developed a two-year strategy that

called for large-scale offensives in 1975 to create conditions for a

"general offensive, general uprising" in 1976.3 The strategy hinged on

the assumption that the United States, having pulled out, would not

return to Vietnam. The thrust of the strategy was to determine which

battles would have the greatest impact on the Thieu government.

Having determined the high-value targets, the North Vietnamese

planners massed armor and infantry to overwhelm the ARVN

defenders at those points. NVA plans called for "blooming lotus"

attacks, in which the critical point was to be captured and then NVA

control spread out in every direction.4

The General Offensive

On 10 March 1975, the North Vietnamese launched the general

offensive with an attack on Ban Me Thuot in the Central Highlands.

The ARVN were spread thinly throughout the country, and the

Central Highlands was no exception. The NVA overran the city in two

days, and the ARVN fell back in panic.

The NVA then turned on Pleiku and Kontum, securing the

highlands before the advent of the monsoon season. The success of the

NVA onslaught panicked President Thieu, and he ordered ARVN

forces to withdraw from the highlands. But the NVA cut the roads to

the south, blocking the ARVN's retreating forces. Thus, the

withdrawal became a totally disorganized rout, with every man

concerned only for himself. To compound the problem, the civilian

populace tried to escape to the south. The mass confusion and

disorderly retreat led to the virtual destruction of the ARVN forces in

the Central Highlands. South Vietnam had been cut in half, six

provinces had been lost, and two ARVN divisions ceased to exist as a

fighting force. The confidence of both the army and the South

Vietnamese people was shaken to the core.

Dung and the other North Vietnamese generals were surprised by

the success of these initial attacks and instituted contingency plans to

exploit the staggering ARVN's situation (see map 7). NVA forces

struck both Hue and Da Nang. The ARVN response was no better than
73

Map 7. The NVA final offensive, March-May 1975
74

in the highlands, and they fell back in disarray. Within ten days, both

critical cities fell to the Communists.

The Thieu government and the remnants of its president's army

were in dire straits. Thieu had lost contact with the northern half of

the country, and at least 50 percent of his army had given up after

putting up only token resistance. Thieu, in response, ordered the

evacuation ofNha Trang and Cam Ranh Bay.

Still, the United States did nothing. Even as South Vietnam fell,

the mood of the country would not permit President Ford to recommit

American forces or even send military aid. General Dung stepped up

the timetable for the "Ho Chi Minh Campaign" and ordered his troops

to execute a "deep advance" on Saigon.5 The drive from Da Nang to

Saigon took less than a month. The only real resistance was put up by

the 18th ARVN Division at Xuan Loc.

On 24 April, North Vietnamese tanks crashed the gates to the

Presidential Palace in Saigon and Thieu resigned. The last ARVN

resistance in Military Region III was overcome, and the North

Vietnamese took Saigon on 1 May, raising the Communist flag over

the Presidential Palace and renaming Saigon, Ho Chi Minh City.

The South Vietnamese had folded in less than fifty-five days. The

ARVN, with few exceptions, became ineffective as a fighting force

almost immediately after the North Vietnamese attacked. The same

army that had been victorious with American help in 1972 could do

nothing by itself. American tactical air power and the advisers that

provided the backbone of resolve in 1972 were not there in 1975, and

the ARVN fell apart. Without the Americans, the South Vietnamese

forces were rapidly overwhelmed, and Vietnamization was revealed,

as retired U.S. Army Brigadier General Douglas Kinnard later

described, as "the fraud and deception that it was."6

C I -- -- I - --e --·II
VII. CONCLUSIONS

General McGiffert said that the battle of An Loc was "an

American show in its essence."l Indeed, as Major John Howard said, it

was "the war we came to fight."2 As Andrew Krepinevich so aptly

points out, the United States had never been comfortable fighting a

counterinsurgency war. American forces were not principally

equipped and organized for such operations; they were designed to

bring superior technology and firepower to bear on a foe who fought in

the open under "normal" rules.

The American way of war called for U.S. forces to close with and

destroy the enemy by firepower and maneuver. There is some debate

that the emphasis was on firepower rather than maneuver.

Nevertheless, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong refused to provide

the appropriate targets for this type of attrition-based warfare, with its

heavy reliance on technology and firepower. Although North

Vietnamese and Vietcong forces were confident in their own tactical

skills, they knew that they could not match the Americans' ability to

mass indirect and aerial fires for extended periods of time.

Consequently, the Communist forces fought their own style of war

designed to negate the American advantages. They generally refused

to fight the type of battles that would allow the Americans to prevail,

opting for hit and run tactics and avoiding set piece battles of long

duration.

In 1972, General Giap and his fellow North Vietnamese generals

made a serious mistake when they decided to abandon their previously

successful strategy and initiate conventional attacks against the

South Vietnamese. An Loc was a battle the Americans were trained

and equipped to fight. When ARVN leadership and resolve wavered,

General Hollingsworth and his advisers provided the technical

expertise and fighting spirit to stabilize a desperate tactical

emergency.3 American firepower and American advisers, fighting in

the American way of war, enabled the ARVN defenders to win a great

victory (or at least stave off a disastrous defeat).

Unfortunately, this victory led to a fatal set of perceptions, both

for the Americans and the South Vietnamese. Many ARVN soldiers

fought valiantly under conditions never seen before in the history of

the Southeast Asia war. Yet the battle had been close, and many South

Vietnamese leaders and units had not done well. Nevertheless, the

Nixon administration promoted the South Vietnamese victory as a

vindication of the Vietnamization program. The President made

statements that the South Vietnamese had demonstrated that they

75
76

were ready to prosecute "their war" without American help. Many in

the American press agreed; Joseph Alsop wrote after the battle of An

Loc, "ARVN has a damn good record in this fighting; ARVN has

proven itself... "4

Both Michael MacLear and Lieutenant General Phillip B.

Davidson maintain that President Nixon put the best face on the

South Vietnamese performance in 1972 to validate the Vietnamization

policy and provide the justification for completing the American

withdrawal from Vietnam. 5 Davidson further maintains that even as

early as 1968, "any cold-blooded analysis of the capacity of the South

Vietnamese to carry out their part of Vietnamization would have

argued against its adoption." 6 This evaluation was supported by

examining other battles prior to 1972, such as the Lam Son 719

debacle in 1971, which clearly demonstrated that the South

Vietnamese were not ready to take over the war. 7 This operation

involved an invasion of the North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Laos and

was made by South Vietnamese forces without U.S. support; the

ARVN forces were badly bloodied.

The fact that U.S. tactical leadership and firepower were the key

ingredients in the battle for An Loc was either lost in the mutual

euphoria of victory or ignored by Nixon administration officials who

wanted to get the United States out of Vietnam in the most expeditious

manner. The victory at An Loc provided the rationalization for the

complete withdrawal.

Even though South Vietnamese forces had learned some valuable

lessons and made strides in improving their combat capability, ARVN

forces were not prepared for what happened at An Loc. They were still

plagued by the same kinds of problems that had bothered them for the

entire Vietnam War: politicized commanders, inept leadership, and

tactical incompetence at the higher levels of command. The ARVN

were victorious at An Loc because the American advisers and U.S. air

power had negated the debilitating effects of these long-standing

maladies.

Evidence is irrefutable that the South Vietnamese would not

have performed as well as they did in the spring of 1972 if the

American advisers and U.S. tactical air support had not been there.

Unfortunately, the North Vietnamese proved this in 1975, after the

advisers and U.S. tactical air support were gone, when they overran

South Vietnam in just fifty-five days. Although some South
77

Vietnamese soldiers fought valiantly, the ARVN force as a whole,

without the "steel reinforcing rods" provided by the American advisers

and air support, crumbled precipitately. 8 The North Vietnamese had

suffered a strategic defeat in 1972, but they took the long-term

approach to reap a greater victory in 1975, after the United States had

departed and the South Vietnamese were left to their own devices. The

ultimate result was that South Vietnam ceased to exist as a nation,

and the United States lost the first war in its history.

IP·IPIAL -RZ·IBL-·IIRPLRrlsFIBYII.

APPENDIX

Order of Battle

Battle of Loc Ninh, 4-8 April 1972

ARVN NVA

9th Regiment (2 battalions)

1st Armored Cavalry Squadron

74th Border Ranger Battalion

1st Battalion Regional-Popular Forces

1 105-mm Battery

*Task Force 52

1st Battalion, 52d Regiment

1st Battalion, 48th Regiment

1 105-mm Battery

*Not in Loc Ninh itself

5th VC Division

E6 Regiment

174th Regiment

275th Regiment

69th Artillery Division

42d Artillery Regiment

208th Rocket Regiment

271st Antiaircraft Regiment

203d Tank Regiment

Elements of 202d Special Weapons

Tank Regiment

429th Sapper Group(-)

Battle of An Loc, 9-15 April 1972

NVA

5th Division

7th Regiment (minus 1 battalion)

8th Regiment

Task Force 52

1st Battalion, 52d Regiment

1st Battalion, 48th Regiment

3d Ranger Group

Binh Long Province Forces

2 battalions of Regional-Popular Forces

9th VC Division

271st Regiment

272d Regiment

95C Regiment

203d Tank Regiment (2 battalions)

Elements of 202d Special Weapons

Tank Regiment

69th Artillery Division

42d Artillery Regiment

208th Rocket Regiment

271st Antiaircraft Regiment

429th Sapper Group(-)

79

ARVN
80

Battle of An Loc, 19-22 April 1972

ARVN NVA

5th Division

7th Regiment (minus 1 battalion)

8th Regiment

Task Force 52

1st Battalion, 52d Regiment

1st Battalion, 48th Regiment

3d Ranger Group

1st Airborne Brigade (arrived 15 Apr)

5th Battalion

6th Battalion

8th Battalion

81st Airborne Ranger Battalion

Binh Long Province Forces

2 battalions of Regional-Popular Forces

9th VC Division

271st Regiment

272d Regiment

95C Regiment

203d Tank Regiment (2 battalions)

Elements of 202d Special Weapons

Tank Regiment

141st Regiment (7th NVA Division)

275th Regiment (5th VC Division)

69th Artillery Division

42d Artillery Regiment

208th Rocket Regiment

271st Antiaircraft Regiment

429th Sapper Group(-)

Battle of An Loc, 9 May-June 1972

NVA

5th Division

7th Regiment (minus 1 battalion)

8th Regiment

Task Force 52

1st Battalion, 52d Regiment

1st Battalion, 48th Regiment

3d Ranger Group

1st Airborne Brigade (arrived 15 Apr)

5th Battalion

8th Battalion

81st Airborne Ranger Battalion

9th VC Division

271st Regiment

272d Regiment

95C Regiment

5th VC Division

174th Regiment

275th Regiment

E6 Regiment

141st Regiment (7th VC Division)

165th Regiment (7th VC Division)

AR VN
Binh Long Province Forces

2 battalions of Regional-Popular Forces

203d Tank Regiment(-)

Elements of 202d Special Weapons

Tank Regiment(-)

69th Artillery Division

42d Artillery Regiment

208th Rocket Regiment

271st Antiaircraft Regiment

429th Sapper Group(-)

Battle Along QL-13, 5 April-June 1972

NVA

21st Division

31st Regiment

32d Regiment

33d Regiment

9th ACR

15th Regiment

7th NVA Division

141st Regiment (departed for

An Loc, 16 Apr)

165th Regiment (departed for

An Loc, 7 May)

209th Regiment

101st Regiment (Independent)

3d Airborne Brigade (thirty days only) Elements of 69th Artillery Regiment

208th Rocket Regiment(-)

42d Artillery Regiment(-)

271st Antiaircraft Regiment(-)

81

ARVN

L  L - I - I I e I ' L s ILLB L I
I
NOTES

Chapter 1

1. Douglas Pike, PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986),

229.

Chapter 2

1. Lieutenant General Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War, the History: 1946-1975

(Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988), 606.

2. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Special Intelligence Report (Declassified):

The Nguyen Hue Offensive-Historical Study of Lessons Learned (Saigon: Military

Assistance Command, Vietnam, January 1973), C-1.

3. Major General James F. Hollingsworth, "Communist Invasion in Military Region

mI," unpublished narrative, 1972 (Microfiche Reel 44, University Publications of

America: Records of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam), 21.

4. General Cao Van Vien and Lieutenant General Dong Van Khuyen, Indochina

Monographs: Reflections on the Vietnam War (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center

of Military History, 1980), 104.

5. Military History Branch, Headquarters, U.S. Military Assistance Command,

Vietnam, Command History, 1972-1973, Saigon, 1973, J-1.

6. Major General Nguyen Duy Hinh, Indochina Monographs: Vietnamization and the

Cease-Fire (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980), 97.

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Special Intelligence Report, C-1.

7. David C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-

1975 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 198.

8. Davidson, 538.

9. Herring, 232.

10. State of Vietnam, Ministry of National Defense, "Memorandum: Principles

Authorizing TRIM Advisers with Units and Formations of the Vietnamese

National Armed Forces," Saigon, 10 April 1955.

11. General Cao Van Vien, Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong, Lieutenant

General Dong Van Khuyen, Major General Nguyen Duy Hinh, Brigadier General

Tran Dinh Tho, Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung, and Lieutenant Colonel Chu Xuan

Vien, Indochina Monographs: the U.S. Adviser (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center

of Military History, 1980), 16.

12. Vien, Truong, Khuyen, Hinh, Tho, Lung, and Vien, 53.

13. Jeffrey C. Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years-The U.S. Army in

Vietnam (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1987), 452.

83
84

Chapter 3

1. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Periodic Intelligence Report

(PERINTREP), April 1972, Saigon, 1972, 3.

2. Hollingsworth narrative, 7.

3. Brigadier General John R. McGiffert, deputy commanding general, Third Regional

Assistance Command, interview by Walter S. Dillard, Military Assistance

Command, Vietnam, SJS-History, 10 October 1972, Saigon. Military History

Branch, Honolulu, 4-5.

4. Directorate of Operations Analysis, Headquarters, Pacific Command,

Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations Report: The Battle of

An Loc, 5 April-26 June 1972, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1973, 7.

5. Directorate of Operations Analysis, 10.

6. Dale Andrad6, "Three Days on the Run," Vietnam, August 1990, 40.

7. Military History Branch, Command History, 1977-1973, J-8.

8. Directorate of Operations Analysis, 11.

9. Military History Branch, J-7.

10. Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong, Indochina Monographs: The Easter

Offensive of 1972 (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980),

115. McGiffert interview, J-7.

11. Major John D. Howard, '"The War We Came To Fight: A Study of the Battle of An

Loc, April-June 1972," unpublished student paper (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,

June 1974), 29.

12. Ian Ward, "North Vietnam's Blitzkreig-Why Giap Did It: Report From Saigon,"

Conflict Studies, October 1972, 5.

13. McGiffert interview, 17.

14. David Fulghum and Terrence Maitland, The Vietnam Experience: South Vietnam

on Trial, Mid-1970 to 1972 (Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1984), 152.

15. Personal experience of the author.

16. Truong,118.

17. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Special Intelligence Report, C-1.

18. Directorate of Operations Analysis, 16. McGiffert interview, J-9.

19. Truong, 118.

20. Major John D. Howard, "An Loc: A Study of U.S. Power," Army, September 1975,

20.

21. Hollingsworth narrative, 9.

22. Ward, 6.

23. Truong,119.
85

24. Ward, 5.

25. K. N. Stacey, "North Vietnamese Armor Operations: The Lessons of 1972 and

1975," Armor, July-August 1981, 50.

26. RB 100-2, 1972 Vietnam Counter Offensive, vol. 1, Selected Readings in Tactics

(Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1974), 7-

37.

27. Benjamin F. Schemmer, "Bien Hoa Air Base: Short on Toilet Paper, But Long on

Teamwork," Armed Forces Journal, June 1972,18.

28. Ibid.,8.

29. Philip C. Clarke, 'The Battle That Saved Saigon," Reader's Digest, March 1973,

151-56.

30. "An Adviser's 2-Month Nightmare Ends," Stars and Stripes, 4 June 1972,1.

31. John Morrocco, The Vietnam Experience: Rain of Fire, Air War, 1969-1973 (Boston:

Boston Publishing Company, 1985), 105.

32. Military History Branch, J-13.

33. Howard, 13.

34. Major A. J. C. Lavalle, ed., United States Air Force Southeast Asia Monograph

Series, vol. 2, Airpower and the 1972 Spring Offensive (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL:

Air Command and Staff College, 1976), 85.

35. Major John D. Howard, "An Infantryman Remembers An Loc and the Air Force,"

unpublished student paper (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, March 1974), 1.

36. Truong,122.

37. Ibid.

38. Hollingsworth narrative, 9.

39. Major General James F. Hollingsworth, message to General Creighton Abrams,

"Backchannels: Daily Commander's Evaluation," 151000H-161000H, April 1972

(Microfiche Reel 44, University Publications of America: Record of the Military

Assistance Command).

40. Truong,118.

41. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Special Intelligence Report, C-2.

42. Truong,123.

43. Hinh,103.

44. Gerard Hebert, "Both Sides Claim An Loc," Stars and Stripes, 18 April 1972, 6.

45. Military History Branch, J-14.

46. Headquarters, 1st Airborne Brigade, "Combat After Action Report, 1st Airborne

Brigade," Saigon, 1973, 3.

47. Clarke, "The Battle That Saved Saigon," 154.
86

48. Hollingsworth narrative, 16.

49. "AnAdviser's 2-Month Nightmare Ends," Stars and Stripes, 4 June 1972,1.

60. Headquarters, Third Regional Assistance Command, Tactical Operations

Command Center Duty Log, 23 April 1972.

51. Personal observations of the author and Major Raymond Haney, An Loc, RVN, 15

April 1972.

52. Ward, 6.

53. Headquarters, Third Regional Assistance Command, Tactical Operations

Command Center Duty Log, 16 April 1972.

54. Truong,124.

55. Clarke, "The Battle That Saved Saigon," 154.

56. Nick Thimmesch, "A Grisly Story," Stars and Stripes, 13 May 1972, 1, and personal

observation of author.

57. Howard, 14.

58. Fulghum and Maitland, 153.

59. Morrocco, 118; and personal experience of the author.

60. Directorate of Operations Analysis, 30.

61. Hollingsworth narrative, 13.

62. Directorate of Operations Analysis, 40.

63. Military History Branch, J-22.

Chapter 4

1. Hollingsworth narrative, 17.

2. Hollingsworth narrative, 17-18.

3. Military History Branch, J-22.

4. Ibid.; and McGiffert interview, 32-33.

5. Directorate of Combat Operations, 42.

6. Ibid.

7. Hinh, 104.

8. Morrocco, 119.

9. "Backchannels," 111000H-121000H, April 1972.

10. "Backchannels," 121000H-131000H, April 1972.

11. Directorate of Combat Operations, 49.

12. Howard, 24.
87

13. Hinh,104.

14. "Backchannels," 151000H-161000H, April 1972.

15. David Fulghum and Terrence Maitland, The Vietnam Experience: South Vietnam

on Trial, Mid-1970 to 1972 (Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1984), 153.

16. Ibid., 162.

17. Truong, 134.

18. Lavalle, 104.

19. Personal experience of author, An Loc, RVN, April-May 1972.

20. "U.S. General Dies in Anloc Shelling," The New York Times, 10 July 1972, 1.

21. Headquarters, 21st Infantry Division (ARVN), "After-Action Report-Binh Long

Campaign, 1972," Saigon, July 1972, C-1.

22. Clarke, "The Battle That Saved Saigon," 153.

23. Howard, 29.

24. Howard, 1.

25. "Battle of An Loc Ends in Crucial Red Setback," Stars and Stripes, 18 June 1972, 1.

26. Truong, 134.

27. Colonel Walter F. Ulmer Jr., "Notes on Enemy Armor at An Loc," Armor, JanuaryFebruary 1973, 15.

28. Hollingsworth narrative, 27.

29. Military History Branch, J-30.

30. Ward, 9.

31. "Vietnam: the Specter of Defeat," Newsweek, 15 May 1972, 25.

32. "A Record of Sheer Endurance," Time, 26 June 1972, 26.

33. Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 483.

34. Colonel William Miller, letter to author, 17 March 1993.

Chapter 5

1. Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Staff Report, Vietnam,

1972 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), 2.

2. Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 482.

3. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, "Senior Officer Debriefing Report,

Colonel Jack Conn," Saigon, February 1973, K-3.

4. Donald J. Mrozek, Air Power and the Ground War in Vietnam: Ideas and Actions

(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1988), 144.

5. McGiffert interview, 32.
88

6. Cao Van Vien and Dong Van Khuyen, 109.

7. Ibid.

8. Lavalle, 86.

9. Ibid.

10. Carl Berger, The U.S. Air Force in Southeast Asia, 1961-1973 (Washington, DC:

Office of Air Force History, 1977), 183.

11. Director of Operations Analysis, 37.

12. Ibid.; and author's personal observations, An Loc, RVN, April-July 1972.

13. Director of Operations Analysis, 38.

14. Military History Branch, J-17.

15. Lavalle, 91.

16. Davidson, 637.

17. Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 484.

18. McGiffert interview, 26.

19. Ibid., 27.

20. Committee on Foreign Relations, 19.

21. Miller letter.

22. McGiffert interview, 22.

23. Ibid., 23.

24. Headquarters, Third Regional Assistance Command, "Debriefing Report of

Advisers Returning from An Loc," Long Binh, June 1972.

25. Conversations between the author and other advisers in An Loc, April 1972.

26. Clarke, "The Battle That Saved Saigon," 153.

27. Clarke, Advice and Support: The Final Years, 510.

28. Vietnam, 1972, 11.

29. "Senior Officer Debriefing Report, COL Jack Conn," K-1-3.

Chapter 6

1. George C. Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-

1975 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 258.

2. Van Tien Dung, Our Great Spring Victory: An Account of the Liberation of South

Vietnam (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), 17.

3. Dung, 19-20.

4. Ibid., 31-32.
89

5. Ibid.

6. Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group, Inc.,

1985), 156.

Chapter 7

1. McGiffert interview, 27.

2. Howard,1.

3. Walter Scott Dillard and John Francis Shortal, "Easter Invasion Repulsed,"

Vietnam, Winter 1988, 55.

4. Joseph Alsop, "Fighting of the ARVN at An Loc," Los Angeles Times, 9 May 1972,

6.

5. Lieutenant General Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War: The History 1946-1975

(Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1988), 542, 544.

6. Davidson, 476.

7. Bruce Palmer, The 25- Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam (Lexington:

University of Kentucky Press, 1984), 113.

8. Dave Richard Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet: US-Vietnam in Perspective (San

Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978), 255.

II I I II II I I -
I
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Unpublished Primary Source Material*

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91
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Alsop, Joseph. "Fighting of the ARVN at An Loc." Los Angeles Times, 9 May 1972,6.

. "Lack of Reserves in South Vietnam." Stars and Stripes, 10 May 1972, 1.

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"Both Sides Claim An Loc." Stars and Stripes, 18 April 1972, 1.

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Grayson, Eugene H., Jr. "Great Spring Victory." Vietnam, June 1992, 18-24.

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"Hanoi's High-Risk Drive for Victory." Time, 15 May 1972,8-15.

Hayward, Henry S. "Siege of An Loc Intensifies as Hue Defenders Dig In." The Christian

Science Monitor, 13 May 1972,3.

Hebert, Gerard. "Both Sides Claim An Loc." Stars and Stripes, 18 April 1972, 1, 6.

Howard, John D., Major. "An Loc: A Study in U.S. Power." Army, September 1975, 18-

24.

"Human Wave Attacks Batter An Loc." Stars and Stripes, 22 April 1972, 1.

"In Furious Battle." Newsweek, 24 April 1972, 31-33.

"Major Ran for His Life 4 Days-and Won." Stars and Stripes, 30 April 1972, 1.

"No One Could Survive, But They Did." Stars and Stripes, 2 May 1972, 1.

"Nixon's Vietnam Gamble." Newsweek, 22 May 1972,18-20.

Parker, Maynard. "Vietnam: The War That Won't End." Foreign Affairs, January 1975,

252-75.

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Saar, John. "A Nervous Air Mission to An Loc and Back." Life, 12 May 1972, 36-37.

Schaefer, Allen. "Report Few NVA Left in An Loc." Stars and Stripes, 2 June 1972,1.

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"South Viet Nam: Pulling Itself Together." Time, 22 May 1972,15-17.

Stacey, K. N. "North Vietnamese Armor Operations: The Lessons of 1972 and 1975."

Armor, July-August 1981, 48-53.

"The Dying Is Over, But Not Quite." Stars and Stripes, 16 June 1972, 1.

"The Miscalculation Is Mutual." Newsweek, 1 May 1972, 49-52.

"The Toll in Battered An Loc-Unknown, But in Hundreds." Stars and Stripes, 17 June

1972,1.

"The War That Won't Go Away." Newsweek, 17 April 1972,16-21.

Thimmesch, Nick. "A Grisly Story." Stars and Stripes, 13 May 1972, 1.

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98

"U.S. General Dies in An Loc Shelling." New York Times, 10 July 1972, 1.

"Vietnam: The Specter of Defeat." Newsweek, 15 May 1972, 20-22.

Ward, Ian. "North Vietnam's Blitzkrieg-Why Giap Did It: Report from Saigon."

Conflict Studies, October 1972, 1-11.

A full list of CSI\CGSC Press publications, many of them available for

downloading, can be found at:

http://www.cgsc.army.mil/carlCSIPUBS/index.htm

AU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE:2003-556-708/60018
Lieutenant Colonel

"--" James H. Willbanks,

U.S. Army, Retired

Lieutenant Colonel James H.

Willbanks, U.S. Army, Retired, was

commissioned in the Infantry on

graduation from Texas A&M University

in 1969. He has served in command and

staff assignments in the United States,

Germany, Japan, and Panama. In 1971-

72, he was an adviser in Vietnam with

the 18th Infantry Division (ARVN) and

received the Silver Star for action in the

Battle of An Loc. Willbanks is a

graduate of the U.S. Army Command

and General Staff College, the School for

Advanced Military Studies, and holds a

master's degree in military and

diplomatic history from the University

of Kansas. He retired from active duty

in June 992: and isnow an instructor in

the Department of Joint and Combined

Operations.

COMBAT STUDIES INSTITUTE

Missions

The Combat Studies Institute was established on 18 June 1979 as a department-level activity within the U.S. Army Command and General Staff

College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. CSI has the following missions:

* Prepare and present instruction in military history at USACGSC and assist

other USACGSC departments in integrating military history into their

instruction.

* Publish works in a variety of formats for the Active Army and Reserve

omponents on historical pics pertinent to the doctrinal concerns of the ?

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U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas