IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs July 8, 2015

 

IN RE E.T.P.

Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Knox County

No. 47546 Timothy Irwin, Judge

No. E2015-00298-COA-R3-PT-FILED-SEPTEMBER 25, 2015

In this parental termination case, A.J.S.P. (Mother) appeals the termination of her rights 

to her minor son, E.T.P. (the Child). After the Child was placed in state custody and 

adjudicated dependent and neglected, custody was awarded to a non-relative. 

Subsequently, physical custody was returned to the Department of Children’s Services 

(DCS). At that time, both parents were incarcerated. As to Mother, DCS filed a petition 

to terminate1her rights to the child based on her wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare. 

After a trial, the court granted the petition based on its findings, said to be made by clear 

and convincing evidence, that (1) grounds for termination exist and (2) termination is in 

the best interest of the Child. On appeal, Mother challenges only the court’s best interest 

determination. We affirm. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which D. MICHAEL 

SWINEY and JOHN W. MCCLARTY, JJ., joined.

Jennifer S. Bjornstad, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, A.J.S.P. 

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter, and Ryan L. McGehee, Assisant 

Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of

Children’s Services. 

 

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The State also sought to terminate the rights of J.W.P., the Child’s biological father. 

J.W.P. voluntarily surrendered his parental rights prior to trial. 
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OPINION

I.

The Child was born on December 26, 2002. In November 2010, DCS was 

summoned to the family’s home after a two-year-old sibling of the Child was left 

unattended outside. An investigation revealed that, in all, seven children were living in 

the filthy, bug-infested home, with little or no supervision. Mother and Father tested 

positive for numerous drugs. As a result of the parents’ drug abuse and neglect, all of the 

children were removed. Ultimately, the Child and two siblings were taken into 

temporary state custody, while the other four children were placed with relatives. DCS 

reviewed the criteria for termination of parental rights with Mother. The Child began a 

trial home placement with a family friend, K.D., in March 2011. In September 2011, full 

custody of the Child was awarded to K.D. Mother and Father were granted supervised 

monthly visits. 

In April 2012, Mother was convicted pursuant to her guilty pleas to felony 

charges, the commission of which occurred after the Child’s removal. She pleaded to

two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of burglary. She was sentenced to an 

effective term of ten years in prison. Prior to the time of the offenses, Mother had 

already been tasked with completing certain requirements under permanency plans 

established for two of the Child’s siblings who then remained in DCS custody. 

In 2014, K.D. gave physical custody of the Child to the Child’s maternal aunt and 

uncle after K.D. became financially unable to support him. In May 2014, after the aunt 

and uncle had decided that they could not raise the Child, DCS took temporary custody of 

the Child, who was subsequently placed in foster care with a goal of adoption.2 The 

following month, the Child was adjudicated dependent and neglected. To that end, in 

July 2014, DCS filed its petition to terminate parental rights. 

Trial was held in January 2015. At that time, the Child was twelve. Days before 

the hearing, he was moved from his previous foster care placement to another preadoptive home. His case worker testified that the Child had behavioral issues, 

particularly in dealing with his peers, but was otherwise a happy, healthy child. Through 

his case worker, the Child expressed his wish to be adopted in short order rather than to 

return to his parents. Mother participated in the hearing via telephone from prison where 

she had been incarcerated for the past three years. She admitted that she continued to 

use drugs after the Child’s removal in 2010, including on the night she committed the 

crimes that ultimately led to her incarceration. Mother testified that she had been sober 

 

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The record indicates that all of the Child’s siblings have been adopted. 
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since entering prison and had taken courses on parenting, substance abuse, and other 

topics while incarcerated. Mother believed that she would be able to parent the Child 

properly upon her release in two to three years. 

At the conclusion of the proof, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights

on the ground of abandonment by wanton disregard. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-

102(1)(A)(iv) (Supp. 2015). The court further found that termination was in the Child’s 

best interest. The court said that both findings had been proven by clear and convincing 

evidence. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal. 

II.

Mother raises a single issue for our review: 

Whether the trial court erred in finding by clear and 

convincing evidence that termination of the parental rights of 

the Mother was in the best interest of the [C]hild.

III.

A.

As we have noted, Mother challenges only the trial court’s determination that 

severing her parental rights is in the Child’s best interest; she does not contest the finding 

that grounds for termination exist. We are mindful, however, that before terminating a 

parent’s rights, a court must determine that two things have been clearly and 

convincingly proven: (1) at least one statutory ground exists, and (2) termination is in the 

best interest of the child. In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002) (citing 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)). On our review, this Court has a duty to determine 

“whether the trial court’s findings, made under a clear and convincing standard, are 

supported by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d 528, 530 

(Tenn. 2006). The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed de novo upon the record 

accompanied by a presumption of correctness unless the preponderance of the evidence is 

against those findings. Id.; Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). Questions of law are reviewed de 

novo with no presumption of correctness. Langschmidt v. Langschmidt, 81 S.W.3d 741, 

744-45 (Tenn. 2002).

B.

Despite Mother’s apparent waiver of the issue, we have thoroughly reviewed the 

evidence relative to the trial court’s finding of abandonment by wanton disregard

pursuant to § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv). That section provides, with respect to a parent who is 
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incarcerated at the time a termination petition is filed, that abandonment occurs when the 

parent “engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a wanton disregard for the 

welfare of the child.” Here, the trial court expressly found that “prior to incarceration, 

[Mother] engaged in conduct which exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the 

child.” The proof at trial showed that after she lost custody of the Child and his siblings, 

Mother chose to continue using drugs rather than working to reunite her family. Within 

months after the Child was placed temporarily with a non-relative, Mother’s drug use 

admittedly contributed to her criminal activities, resulting in a lengthy prison sentence

and, therefore, a long absence from the Child. This Court has observed that a “parent’s 

decision to engage in conduct that carries with it the risk of incarceration is itself 

indicative that the parent may not be fit to care for the child.” In re Audrey S., 182 

S.W.3d 838, 866 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Further, it is well established “that probation 

violations, repeated incarceration, criminal behavior, substance abuse, and the failure to 

provide adequate support or supervision for a child can, alone or in combination, 

constitute conduct that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of a child.” Id. at 867-

68 (citations omitted). In short, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial 

court’s termination of Mother’s rights on the ground of abandonment by wanton 

disregard for the Child’s welfare. 

C.

Turning our focus to the best interest of the Child, Mother contends that the court 

erred by relying almost exclusively on the fact of her incarceration. Mother asserts that 

the trial court failed to take into account other factors. In particular, Mother contends that 

the trial court should have given greater weight to the steps she had taken while 

incarcerated, steps that, according to her, indicate she has made such an adjustment of 

circumstances that it would be safe for the Child to be returned to her upon her release. 

Mother adds that the Child’s placement is presently “uncertain” and unstable, given his

transfer to a new foster home just before trial. 

On our review, we are guided by the non-exclusive list of factors set forth at Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i) (Supp. 2015). The listed factors are as follows:

(1) Whether the parent or guardian has made such an 

adjustment of circumstance, conduct, or conditions as to 

make it safe and in the child’s best interest to be in the home 

of the parent or guardian;

(2) Whether the parent or guardian has failed to effect a 

lasting adjustment after reasonable efforts by available social 

services agencies for such duration of time that lasting 
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adjustment does not reasonably appear possible;

(3) Whether the parent or guardian has maintained regular 

visitation or other contact with the child;

(4) Whether a meaningful relationship has otherwise been 

established between the parent or guardian and the child;

(5) The effect a change of caretakers and physical 

environment is likely to have on the child’s emotional, 

psychological and medical condition;

(6) Whether the parent or guardian, or other person residing 

with the parent or guardian, has shown brutality, physical, 

sexual, emotional or psychological abuse, or neglect toward 

the child, or another child or adult in the family or household;

(7) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s or 

guardian’s home is healthy and safe, whether there is criminal 

activity in the home, or whether there is such use of alcohol, 

controlled substances or controlled substance analogues as 

may render the parent or guardian consistently unable to care 

for the child in a safe and stable manner;

(8) Whether the parent’s or guardian’s mental and/or 

emotional status would be detrimental to the child or prevent 

the parent or guardian from effectively providing safe and 

stable care and supervision for the child; or

(9) Whether the parent or guardian has paid child support 

consistent with the child support guidelines promulgated by 

the department pursuant to § 36-5-101.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i). In addition, this Court has observed:

Every factor need not be applicable in order for the trial court 

to determine that it is in the best interest of the child for a 

parent’s right[s] to be terminated. The weight and relevance 

of these factors may vary from case to case and it is possible 

that a single factor is determinative. In evaluating the issue of 

best interests, the court must remember that any conflict 
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between the best interests of a child and the adult parent shall 

always be resolved to favor the rights and the best interests of 

the child.

In re Payton A.D.L., No. E2012-00090-COA-R3-PT, 2012 WL 2336256, at *5 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. E.S., filed June 20, 2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

In the case at bar, the trial court set out its best interest analysis as follows:

[Mother] has not made such an adjustment of circumstance, 

conduct, or conditions as to make it safe and in the child’s 

best interest to be in her home despite reasonable efforts by 

available social services agencies for such duration of time 

that lasting adjustment does not reasonably appear possible. 

She remains incarcerated. Whether she has made a long-term 

adjustment remains to be seen once she is released and has an 

opportunity to prove herself in the community. Due to her 

circumstances, [Mother] has not been able to maintain regular 

visitation or other contact with the [C]hild. [Mother] has 

shown neglect toward this child. She is without a healthy and 

safe physical environment to offer [the Child]. Prior to her 

arrest, [Mother] engaged in criminal activity and in such use 

of alcohol or controlled substances as may render [Mother] 

consistently unable to care for the [C]hild in a safe and stable 

manner. 

The trial court’s findings make it clear to us that more than Mother’s incarceration

was considered. At the same time, the effects of her lengthy prison term with regard to 

nearly all of the best interest factors cannot be understated – for the time being, Mother is 

simply unavailable to build and maintain a healthy, meaningful, supportive parent/child 

relationship or environment or to demonstrate that she has gained the ability and 

willingness to do so in the future. The progress and accomplishments Mother has made 

while incarcerated are commendable and we credit them just as the trial court did. 

However, as the trial court aptly observed, “[t]hat is not the point.” Once a parent has 

been found to be unfit based on the establishment of a statutory ground for termination, 

then the interests of the parent and the child diverge. In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d at 

877. As a result, when a court considers the best interest issue, it does so from the 

perspective of the child, not the parent. Here, the Child has been out of Mother’s care for 

years and Mother remains unavailable. The Child has been in at least three other homes 

since his removal, but heads into his teenage years hopeful that he will soon find a 

permanent, loving home. Under these circumstances, we agree with the trial court’s view 
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that “[i]t’s not fair to [the Child] to make him wait.” 

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence to 

support the trial court’s conclusion that the Child’s interest is best served by permanently 

severing Mother’s parental rights and thereby freeing the Child for adoption. 

IV.

The judgment of the trial court terminating Mother’s rights to the Child, E.T.P., is

affirmed. Costs on appeal are assessed to the appellant, A.J.S.P. This case is remanded, 

pursuant to applicable law, for enforcement of the trial court’s judgment and the 

collection of costs assessed below. 

 _____________________________________

 CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., CHIEF JUDGE
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