J-S07023-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

TERRANCE GARRIS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 3085 EDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 20, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0011384-2007

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., KING, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED MARCH 12, 2020

Appellant, Terrance Garris, appeals from the order entered in the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his first petition 

filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-

9546. We affirm. 

The PCRA court opinion set forth the relevant facts of this appeal as 

follows: 

In response to numerous complaints, the Philadelphia Police 

Department’s Narcotics Enforcement Team set up a 

narcotics surveillance at the Sunoco Gas Station at Oxford 

Avenue and Roosevelt Boulevard in Philadelphia on 

September 28, 2005, approximately at 9:00 p.m. A male, 

William Ramos, driving a green Mazda, was observed pulling 

up to a gas pump, exiting the vehicle, and made a cell phone 

call. Moments later, Appellant arrived on the scene in a blue 

Buick and parked nearby. Appellant went into the store, 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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made no purchase, exited and entered the passenger side 

of Ramos’s vehicle. While Appellant was in the store, Ramos 

retrieved a backpack from his trunk, then returned to his 

driver’s seat. After a few minutes the males drove to 

Appellant’s car, whereupon [Appellant] exited with a white 

plastic bag and entered his vehicle. 

The males drove off in their respective vehicles with officers 

following in pursuit of Appellant. When the officers 

activate[d] their lights and sirens, Appellant fled, ultimately 

jumped from the moving vehicle, and was later 

apprehended. As Appellant fled from the moving vehicle he 

was observed tossing the plastic bag, which was later 

recovered, that he carried from Ramos’s car. Cocaine, 

marijuana, and $103.00 [were] confiscated from Appellant 

upon his arrest. 

(PCRA Court Opinion, filed May 6, 2019, at 2) (internal citations and footnote 

omitted). 

At trial, the Commonwealth presented testimony from Philadelphia 

Police Officer Cynthia Frye. Officer Frye, a member of the Narcotics 

Enforcement Team, participated in the surveillance operation on the night of 

Appellant’s arrest. Officer Frye confirmed that Appellant entered Mr. Ramos’ 

vehicle, exited with a white plastic bag, and drove off in his own vehicle. When 

the police attempted to stop Appellant, he did not pull over. Rather, Appellant 

“made a couple of sharp turns,” before he “jumped out of the vehicle while it 

was still moving. His vehicle struck two parked cars.” (N.T. Trial, 5/8/08, at 

97). 

Appellant testified in his own defense, indicating that he exited the 

convenience store and an unidentified male “asked me if I had a light.” (N.T. 

Trial, 5/9/08, at 40). Appellant claimed he gave the man a light and drove 
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off. Appellant acknowledged that police vehicles pursued him; however, he 

indicated that he “turned and pulled over.” (Id. at 41). On crossexamination, Appellant stated that Officer Frye lied about witnessing him jump 

out of the vehicle. Appellant also denied causing an accident, claiming: “I 

stopped. It never crashed.” (Id. at 49). 

Following Appellant’s testimony, the Commonwealth asked to present a 

rebuttal witness. At that point, the court called a recess for the weekend. 

When trial continued, the Commonwealth called Joseph Purfield, a retired 

police officer who prepared the accident report (“the report”) regarding the 

two parked cars struck by Appellant’s vehicle. The Commonwealth also sought 

to introduce the report into evidence. 

Defense counsel immediately objected, arguing the Commonwealth did 

not provide a copy of the report during discovery.1 Defense counsel concluded 

that the Commonwealth’s failure amounted to a violation of Brady v. 

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Nevertheless, 

the trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection and permitted the 

Commonwealth to introduce the report and the testimony from Mr. Purfield. 

On May 14, 2008, a jury found Appellant guilty of knowing or intentional 

possession of a controlled substance, possession with intent to deliver a 

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1 The Commonwealth first faxed the report to defense counsel sometime 

during the trial recess that began on May 9, 2008. (See N.T. Trial, 5/12/08, 

at 6). 
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controlled substance, and fleeing or attempting to elude police officers.2 On 

August 5, 2008, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of seven 

(7) to fourteen (14) years’ imprisonment, followed by six (6) years’ probation. 

This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on November 30, 2009, and 

Appellant did not seek further review with our Supreme Court. 

Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition on January 25, 2010. On 

July 12, 2011, the PCRA court reinstated Appellant’s right to file a petition for 

allowance of appeal nunc pro tunc. Appellant filed his petition for allowance 

of appeal nunc pro tunc, which our Supreme Court denied on December 19, 

2012. 

On December 31, 2012, Appellant filed the current pro se PCRA petition. 

The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed a motion for leave to withdraw 

and “no-merit” letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 

544 A.2d 927 (1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 

(Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). On April 20, 2016, the PCRA court issued 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a 

hearing. 

Prior to the entry of a dismissal order, privately retained counsel entered 

his appearance on Appellant’s behalf. The PCRA court continued the matter, 

and Appellant filed a counseled, amended petition on October 21, 2016. In 

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2 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), (30), and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a), respectively. 
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the amended petition, Appellant challenged trial counsel’s effectiveness for 

failing to request or receive the report prior to trial. Appellant also claimed 

that direct appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to raise any issues related 

to the Commonwealth’s failure to provide the report during discovery. The 

PCRA court conducted evidentiary hearings on February 26, 2018 and July 24, 

2018. Appellant, trial counsel, and direct appeal counsel testified at the 

hearings. On September 20, 2018, the court denied PCRA relief. 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on October 21, 2018.3 On 

November 7, 2018, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant 

timely filed his Rule 1925(b) statement on November 19, 2018. 

Appellant raises two issues for our review: 

WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING RELIEF ON 

THE PCRA PETITION ALLEGING [THE] COMMONWEALTH 

COMMITTED A BRADY VIOLATION. 

WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S 

PCRA PETITION REGARDING TRIAL COUNSEL’S 

INEFFECTIVENESS. 

(Appellant’s Brief at 7). 

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3 Appellant’s notice of appeal was technically due on October 20, 2018, which 

was a Saturday. See Pa.R.A.P. 903 (stating notice of appeal shall generally 

be filed within thirty days after entry of order from which appeal is taken). 

Accordingly, the notice of appeal Appellant electronically filed on Sunday, 

October 21, 2018 was timely. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (providing general 

guidelines for computation of time). 
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In his two issues, Appellant insists a prosecutor must disclose all 

material information, including impeachment evidence. Appellant argues the 

report constituted impeachment evidence, because it revealed a ten-minute 

discrepancy regarding what time the police encountered Appellant on the night 

at issue.4 Appellant maintains the Commonwealth could have reasonably 

anticipated: 1) Appellant’s decision to testify and dispute the officers’ version 

of events; and 2) the necessity to rebut Appellant’s potential testimony with 

the report. Under these circumstances, Appellant contends the 

Commonwealth was obligated to provide the report during discovery, and its

failure to do so amounted to a Brady violation. 

Regarding prior counsels’ representation, Appellant claims trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to request the report during discovery. Appellant 

asserts direct appeal counsel compounded trial counsel’s error by failing to 

raise Brady issues on appeal. Based upon the foregoing, Appellant concludes 

the PCRA court erred by denying PCRA relief. We disagree. 

Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to 

examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s determination 

and whether its decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Conway, 

14 A.3d 101 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 612 Pa. 687, 29 A.3d 795 

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4 At trial, Officer Frye stated that the criminal episode occurred around 9:00 

p.m. (See N.T. Trial, 5/8/08, at 90). The report lists the time of the accident 

as 8:50 p.m. (See Commonwealth’s PCRA Ex. C-2). 
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(2011). This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if 

the record contains any support for those findings. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 

923 A.2d 513 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 74 

(2007). We give no such deference, however, to the court’s legal conclusions. 

Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190 (Pa.Super. 2012). 

Pennsylvania law presumes counsel has rendered effective assistance. 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 597 Pa. 109, 950 A.2d 294 (2008). When 

asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petitioner is required 

to demonstrate that: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel 

had no reasonable strategic basis for his action or inaction; and, (3) but for 

the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the 

outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Commonwealth v. 

Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 724 A.2d 326 (1999). The failure to satisfy any prong 

of the test for ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail. Williams, supra. 

“The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the 

issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis 

for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit....” Commonwealth 

v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 524, 645 A.2d 189, 194 (1994). “Counsel cannot be 

found ineffective for failing to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” 

Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Geathers, 847 A.2d 730, 733 (Pa.Super. 

2004)). 
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Once this threshold is met we apply the ‘reasonable basis’ 

test to determine whether counsel’s chosen course was 

designed to effectuate his client’s interests. If we conclude 

that the particular course chosen by counsel had some 

reasonable basis, our inquiry ceases and counsel’s 

assistance is deemed effective. 

Pierce, supra at 524, 645 A.2d at 194-95 (internal citations omitted). 

Prejudice is established when [an appellant] demonstrates

that counsel’s chosen course of action had an adverse effect

on the outcome of the proceedings. The [appellant] must 

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome. In [Kimball, supra], we held that a “criminal 

[appellant] alleging prejudice must show that counsel’s

errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair 

trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” 

Commonwealth v. Chambers, 570 Pa. 3, 21-22, 807 A.2d 872, 883 (2002) 

(some internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

“Under Brady and subsequent decisional law, a prosecutor has an 

obligation to disclose all exculpatory information material to the guilt or 

punishment of an accused, including evidence of an impeachment nature.” 

Commonwealth v. Roney, 622 Pa. 1, 22, 79 A.3d 595, 607 (2013), cert. 

denied, 574 U.S. 829, 135 S.Ct. 56, 190 L.Ed.2d 56 (2014). “To establish a 

Brady violation, an appellant must prove three elements: (1) the evidence at 

issue was favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or because 

it impeaches; (2) the evidence was suppressed by the prosecution, either 

willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice ensued.” Id. 

Instantly, the PCRA court determined the report was not material: 
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Here, the Commonwealth’s failure to produce the report 

neither enticed Appellant’s testimony nor “baited” him to lie. 

All of [the] discovery referenced an accident, and was 

supported by the testimony of the officers at trial. Appellant 

was on notice that the evidence established that he fled 

from police, jumped from his moving vehicle, and that an 

accident occurred. 

(PCRA Court Opinion at 7) (internal citation omitted). 

Additionally, we emphasize Officer Frye’s testimony that the criminal 

episode occurred “around” or “at approximately” 9:00 p.m. (See N.T. Trial, 

5/8/08, at 90, 91, 125). Because the officer did not provide an exact time for 

the incident, we cannot say that a discrepancy actually existed between her

testimony and the time listed in the report. Therefore, the report did not 

amount to impeachment evidence under Brady, and prior counsel cannot be 

deemed ineffective on the grounds alleged by Appellant. See Roney, supra; 

Poplawski, supra. Accordingly, we affirm the order denying PCRA relief. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/12/20