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******************************************************STATE v

. BRUNDAGE—DISSENT McDONALD,J., dissenting. Icannotsquarethemajority’s conclusion that the state was entitled to file a substitute information containing exclusively new charges against the defendant, Richard Brundage, with the focused and definite terms ofthe Appellate Court’s remand order under our established law. Moreover, I
am troubled by the institutional implications that await the Judicial Branch if a specific remand order is interpreted so broadly that it allows a party who is disenchanted with the outcome of an appeal to reinvent its
case after the conclusion of that appeal. Because I do not agree that an unsuccessful litigant to an appeal should be permitted ajudicial mulligan in such circumstances, I respectfully dissent.
I begin by emphasizing the significance of the fact that the Appellate Court’s remand order was directed to a specific end. The order instructed the trial court to conduct a ‘‘new trial as to the remaining charges.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Brundage, 138 Conn. App. 22, 40, 50 A.3d 396 (2012); cf. Beccia v. Waterbury, 185 Conn. 445, 463, 441 A.2d 131 (1981) (‘‘the case is remandedforfurtherproceedings notinconsistentwith this opinion’’). As the majority properly recognizes, a trial court must strictly comply with a remand order and cannot consider matters that are extraneous to the issues andpurposes ofthe remand. SeeHurleyv. Heart Physicians, P.C., 298 Conn. 371, 384, 3 A.3d 892 (2010), and cases cited therein. Compliance with a remand order ‘‘means that the direction is not deviated from.

. . . Nojudgment other than that directed or permitted by the reviewing court may be rendered

. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
It is manifest that a trial on new charges, rather than
a new trial on the remaining charges, does not satisfy theseplainrequirements. Atrial onnewchargesundeniablyand directly deviatesfromthe remand order. Moreover, a trial on new charges indisputably requires the trial court and the parties to consider extraneous matters not within the purview of the original information because the state must prove the distinct elements of the newly charged crimes, the defendant must assert any applicable defenses to those new charges and the trial court must instruct the jury on those charges and any associated defenses that never were the subject of the originalcase. Regardlessofwhetherthestateproves those elements, the judgment that is rendered will be
onethatwasnotpermittedbytheremandorderbecause it is not a judgment on the remaining charges (which the state here abandoned after remand). As such, allowingthe state to file asubstitute information impermissibly exceeds the scope of the Appellate Court’s limitedremand order. SeeFairHaven & WestvilleRail-road Co. v. New Haven, 77 Conn. 667, 672–73, 60 A. 651 (1905) (plaintiff not allowed to amend pleading where remand order was specific and new trial was notordered); Oldaniv. Oldani, 154 Conn. App. 766, 776, 778, 108 A.3d 272 (new claims in amended complaint extraneous to remand for specific purpose), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 930, 110 A.3d 433 (2015); see also Jacksonv. CommissionerofCorrection, 227 Conn. 124, 128–29, 629 A.2d 413 (1993) (lower court exceeded scope of limited remand); Mazzotta v. Bornstein, 105 Conn. 242, 244, 135 A. 38 (1926) (same); Patron v. Konover, 43 Conn. App. 645, 653, 685 A.2d 1133 (1996) (same), cert. denied, 240 Conn. 911, 690A.2d400 (1997); Grady v. Schmitz, 21 Conn. App. 111, 115, 572 A.2d 71 (same), cert. denied, 215 Conn. 806, 576A.2d 537 (1990).
The majority’sprincipalreliance onacase thatissued
an open-ended remand order ‘‘for further proceedings not inconsistent with [the court’s] opinion’’; Beccia v

. Waterbury, supra, 185 Conn. 463; and on the fact that the Appellate Court’s opinion was silent about whether
a substitute information could be filed is unpersuasive. The Appellate Court did not issue an open-ended remand for a new trial, but instead ordered a new trial
on those charges in the original information that remainedafterthat court concludedthatthe state could not prosecute the defendant on certain charges. Although the Appellate Court’s opinion did not address whether a substitute information could be filed, we cannot construe the absence of something as permission for such an action, as such a construction conflicts with the remand. ‘‘[W]here the language used in the body of an appellate decision conflicts with the directions given for remand, the directions given for remand control.’’ 5 Am. Jur. 2d 482, Appellate Review § 732 (2007). Nor can we construe such a void as similar to circumstances in which we have allowed a party to pursue aclaimordefensebasedoneventsthatoccurred subsequenttothe initialproceeding on appeal. See, e.g., Bauer v. Waste Management ofConnecticut, Inc., 239 Conn. 515, 522, 686 A.2d 481 (1996) (defendant could be allowedto amendansweronremandto raise defense based on events that occurred after trial). The charges advanced in the substitute information in the present
case couldhave beenbrought atthe outset ofthe defendant’s trial.
In addition to violating our remand jurisprudence, I
am concerned that the majority’s view allows for the reinvention of this case. Like civil pleadings, the purpose of an information ‘‘is to frame, present, define, and narrow the issues and to form the foundation of, andto limit, theproofto be submitted’’ attrial. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perez v. Cumba, 138 Conn. App. 351, 367, 51 A.3d 1156, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 935, 56 A.3d 712 (2012); 71 C.J.S. 33, Pleading § 2 (2011). By permitting the filing of a substitute information containing entirely new charges against the defendant, themajorityallowsthe state to expand, ratherthannarrow, the issues asthe casehasproceeded, therebyundermining the wisdom of our rule that ‘‘a case cannot be presented by halves.’’ Fitch v. State, 139 Conn. 456, 460, 95A.2d 255 (1953). More importantly, the majoritygives the state an unwarranted second bite at the apple. We have stated that parties should never be permitted ‘‘to go back [after] all that had been done, and be allowed to change their pleadings and try the case de novo, when they had taken their chance of success in the
course theyhad chosen to pursue, and had lost. Indeed, the door would have been closed to them ifthe request had been made

. . . .’’ Crane v. Eastern TransportationLine, 50 Conn. 341, 343 (1882). Accordingly, I cannot agree that it is proper to allow the state to file a substitute information chargingthe defendantwithnew offenses after it recognized that it could not obtain a conviction on the crimes on which it chose to originally chargethe defendantfollowingthe defendant’ssuccessful appeal. While I do not suggest that the state should overcharge in anticipation of the possibility of such a failure ofproof, I am ofthe opinion that litigants should frame andpresentall ofthe goodfaith claims orcharges that the facts warrant at the outset of a case, in order to conserve the resources ofthe parties and thejudicial system, and to spare all involved the piecemeal presentation of a case. To be clear, I do not dispute the majority’s assertion that the state could have filed a new information or that doing so would have been more disadvantageous to the defendant than allowing the filing ofa substitute information. In fact, that is precisely what should have happened under the circumstances of this case. The efficient operation of our judicial system depends on strict compliance with remand orders as issued. I foresee a day, probably in the not too distant future, where this court will be forced to distance itself from today’s holding because ofthe mischiefthat it will yield in both
our criminal and civil courts.