1

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 93-8603.

Artelia M. SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

George E. MOORE, individually and as an employee of Killeen

Police Department, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

June 17, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western

District of Texas.

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and WISDOM and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

WISDOM, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff/appellant, Artelia M. Scott, appeals the summary

judgment dismissal of her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 inadequate staffing

claim against the City of Killeen, Texas ("the City"), and its

Chief of Police, Francis L. Giacomozzi. Because we conclude that

a material fact issue remains in dispute, we VACATE and REMAND to

the district court for further proceedings.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

The plaintiff/appellant, Artelia Scott, was arrested on

December 31, 1988, for public intoxication, assault, and resisting

arrest. She was taken to the Killeen City Jail, processed by the

female jailer on duty at that time, and placed in a holding cell to

await arraignment. When the female jailer's shift ended, she was

relieved by a male jailer, defendant George Moore. At that time,

Moore was the only correctional officer on duty. Over the course

of his eight hour shift, Moore repeatedly entered Scott's cell and
 

1Scott v. Moore, 987 F.2d 771, No. 92-8284 (5th Cir., March

3, 1993) (unpublished) (per curiam ). 

2

sexually assaulted her. Scott was unable to report the incidents

until she was released from custody on January 2, 1989, because

Moore followed her to the phone and stood next to her during her

three telephone calls to her mother.

When Chief Giacomozzi received Scott's complaint against

Moore, he asked Scott to give a statement to the police and take a

lie detector test. Scott agreed to do so. After the results

indicated that Scott was telling the truth, Giacomozzi transferred

the matter to the criminal investigation division, and placed Moore

on administrative leave. Moore resigned four days later, and

subsequently pleaded guilty to criminal charges.

Scott filed suit in state court against Moore, the City, and

Chief Giacomozzi, alleging various state and federal constitutional

claims. Moore subsequently declared bankruptcy and was dismissed

from the suit after the bankruptcy proceeding discharged Scott's

claim against him. The City and Giacomozzi removed the case to

federal court, where they filed their first motion for summary

judgment. Scott did not file a response, and the district court

granted the motion. On appeal, this court affirmed the district

court's grant of summary judgment on all grounds except inadequate

staffing of the jail, as both the defendants' motion and the

district court's ruling failed to address this aspect of Scott's

suit.1

After remand, the City and Giacomozzi filed a second motion
 

2Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 474 (5th

Cir.1989). 

 

3Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). 

 

4Isquith v. Middle South Utilities., Inc., 847 F.2d 186,

198-99 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926, 109 S.Ct. 310, 102

L.Ed.2d 329 (1988). 

 

5Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321-23, 106 S.Ct.

2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). 

 

6Id. 

3

for summary judgment on the issue of inadequate staffing. The

district court granted the motion. Scott filed a timely notice of

appeal of this decision.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the

same standards as those that govern the district court's

determination.2 Summary judgment may be granted only if the court,

viewing the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party, determines that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.3 The moving party must demonstrate by

competent evidence that no issue of material fact exists.4 The

non-moving party then has the burden of showing the existence of a

specific factual issue which is disputed.5 If any element of the

plaintiff's case lacks factual support, a district court should

grant a defendant's motion for summary judgment.6

B. Scott's § 1983 Claim:

We first examine the allegations in Scott's complaint to
 

7Collins v. City of Harker Heights, TX, 503 U.S. 115, 112

S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992). 

 

842 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). 

 

9Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 329-31, 106 S.Ct. 662,

664-65, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986); Evans v. City of Marlin, 986 F.2d

104, 107 (5th Cir.1993), disagreed with on other grounds, Hare v.

City of Corinth, MS, 74 F.3d 633 (5th Cir.1996). 

4

determine a context for examining the facts and inferences in the

record.7 Specifically, Scott alleges that "the City and Giacomozzi

failed to provide proper and adequate staffing of the City jail by

having only one individual on duty, and/or by not having a female

member present when female prisoners are confined." She further

alleges that the defendants/appellees "knew or should have known

that the inadequate and improper staffing created an unsafe and

uncontrolled situation for abuse and assaults of people confined in

the jail."

Section 1983 provides that, "[e]very person who, under color

of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any

State ... subjects or causes to be subjected, any ... person within

the jurisdiction [of the United States] to the deprivation of any

rights ... secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to

the party injured."8 Therefore, an actionable § 1983 claim must

allege a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution by a

person acting under color of state law.9

 Although municipalities are "persons" within the meaning of

§ 1983, they may only be held liable if the constitutional harm

suffered was the result of an "official policy, custom, or
 

10Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S.

658, 690-94, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-37, 2039, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). 

 

11Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 817, 105 S.Ct.

2427, 2433, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98

S.Ct. at 2036; Doe v. Taylor Indep. School Dist., 15 F.3d 443,

452 (5th Cir.) (en banc ), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct.

70, 130 L.Ed.2d 25 (1994). 

 

12Rhyne v. Henderson Cty., 973 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir.1992)

(citing, City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387, 109 S.Ct.

1197, 1204, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989)). 

 

13Farmer v. Brennan, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1970,

1973, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). 

 

14Hare v. City of Corinth, MS, 74 F.3d 633 (5th Cir.1996); 

Colle v. Brazos Cty., TX, 981 F.2d 237, 246 (5th Cir.1993)

(concluding that "the ultimate question is whether Brazos County

adopted policies creating an obvious risk that pretrial

detainees' constitutional rights would be violated"); Rhyne, 973

F.2d at 392 ("while the municipal policy maker's failure to adopt

a precaution can be the basis for § 1983 liability, such omission

must amount to an intentional choice, not merely an

unintentionally negligent oversight."). 

5

pattern."10 Municipalities may not be held liable under either a

theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.11 They also

may not be held liable under § 1983 for mere negligence in

oversight.12 Nonetheless, prison officials may not ignore obvious

dangers to inmates.13

Therefore, in order to hold a municipality liable, a

plaintiff must show that his or her constitutional deprivation was

caused by the city's adoption of (or failure to adopt) the

particular policy, and that such action went beyond mere negligent

protection of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.14 That is, an

alleged inadequacy in a municipal policy must amount to "an

intentional choice, not merely an unintentionally negligent
 

15Id. 

 

16Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-94, 98 S.Ct. at 2035-37. 

 

17Id. 

 

18Hare, 74 F.3d at 643, Colle, 981 F.2d at 246; Rhyne 973

F.2d at 392. 

 

19Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th

Cir.1984). 

6

oversight".15

In sum, proper analysis of a § 1983 claim against a

municipality requires three determinations. First, we must decide

if the City promulgated "an official policy, practice, or custom,"

which could subject it to § 1983 liability.16 Next, we determine

if the policy can be linked to a constitutional violation.17 And

finally, we must ascertain if the municipality's action (or

inaction) extended beyond mere negligent oversight of the

plaintiff's constitutional rights.18

1. The Existence of an "Official Policy"

This court has defined an "official policy" for the purposes

of § 1983 liability to be either: 1) a policy statement,

ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and

promulgated by the municipality's law-making officers or by an

official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making

authority; or 2) a persistent widespread practice of city

officials or employees, which, although not authorized by

officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well

settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal

policy.19 We find that the facts of this case present an "official
 

20Id. 

 

21The General Order contains only three references to

staffing: 1) "[t]he Jailer shall be the booking officer when on

duty;" 2) "[i]n the absence of an on-duty Jailer, the assigned

desk officer shall assume the overall duties and responsibilities

of the jailer;" and 3) "the arresting officer shall book his or

her own prisoner if the desk officer is not available". 

7

policy" under the second of these definitions.

The City's Code of Ordinances vests Chief Giacomozzi, as

Chief of Police, with administrative and policy-making authority.

Therefore, Giacomozzi's acts or omissions as policy-maker for the

jail may subject both him and the city to § 1983 liability.20 While

acting under his policy making authority, Giacomozzi issued

"General Order MSC-1-78," ("the General Order") consisting of rules

relating to the management and administration of the City jail.

These rules mandate in relevant part that male personnel dealing

with female prisoners should search the female prisoner's coats or

outer garments, but may not frisk them or conduct a pat-down search

unless there is a strong probability of finding a weapon. In

addition, female prisoners booked into the jail must be "thoroughly

and completely searched" by female personnel with the jailer

remaining nearby, then placed in a cell separated from male

prisoners. And finally, the regulations provide that "[a]nytime a

prisoner is released from his or her cell for any reason other than

release from custody, the prisoner shall be searched upon release

from and return to the cell." The General Order does not regulate

the number of jailers needed to staff the jail.21

Appellant Scott conceded at oral argument that this policy is
 

22Webster, 735 F.2d at 841. 

 

23For example, if a female prisoner has to leave her cell

while a single male jailer is on duty, the jailer will have to

violate either the rule that the prisoner be searched both upon

exiting and reentering her cell, or the rule that all searches of

female prisoners be done by a female employee. In this case,

Scott left her cell a least three times to use the telephone. 

 

24See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036, (a

"permanent and well settled" custom may provide basis for

imposing liability on a municipality) (quoting Adickes v. S.H.

Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 168, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1614, 26 L.Ed.2d

8

constitutional as written. Therefore, the General Order is not an

actionable "official policy" under the first definition of that

term.22 Scott contends, however, that there is an "unofficial"

staffing policy which is actionable under the second definition of

"official policy." We agree.

Since the late 1970's the City jail has been staffed by four

jailers, with one jailer working each of four shifts: a.m., p.m.,

day, and relief. At the time of Scott's detention, two male and

two female employees filled these positions. Thus, a female

detainee would necessarily be guarded by a single male jailer at

some time during a twenty-four hour period. This staffing

arrangement made it difficult, if not impossible, for the City

jailers to follow the mandates of the General Order.23 Yet, this

conflict between the written General Order and the day-to-day

staffing procedures existed for at least ten years before Scott's

detention. In this situation, we conclude that the consistent

custom or "unofficial policy" of having only one unsupervised male

jailer present when a female detainee is in the jail constitutes an

"official policy" for the purposes of § 1983 liability.24
142 (1970)); Webster, 735 F.2d at 841, (defining "official

policy" as including a "persistent widespread practice of city

officials and employees, which although not authorized by

officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well

settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents

municipal policy"). 

 

25Collins, 503 U.S. at 120, 112 S.Ct. at 1066. 

 

26Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671, n. 40, 97 S.Ct.

1401, 1412, n. 40, 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977). 

 

27See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244,

103 S.Ct. 2979, 2983, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983). 

 

28Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers of the City of

Houston, 791 F.2d 1182, 1186 (5th Cir.1986). 

 

29Collins, 503 U.S. at 125, 112 S.Ct. at 1068. 

9

2. Existence of a Constitutional Violation:

The next step in our § 1983 analysis is to determine if

Scott's complaint alleges a constitutional deprivation.25 The

sexual assault on Scott while she was a pre-trial detainee is not

covered by the Eighth Amendment, as the Eighth Amendment's

prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishment" applies only to

convicted prisoners and not to pretrial detainees like Scott.26 It

is clear however, that pretrial detainees are Constitutionally

entitled to at least as great a protection in their detention as

are convicted prisoners.27 This right arises from the substantive

protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

which protects an individual's liberty interest in bodily

integrity.28 Although the Supreme Court has expressed a general

reluctance to expand the concept of substantive due process in §

1983 claims,29 it has concluded that the government owes a duty to

care for those whom have already been deprived of their liberty
 

30Id. at 126-27, 112 S.Ct. at 1069-70. 

 

31Id. at 127, 112 S.Ct. at 1070. 

 

3274 F.3d 633 (5th Cir.1996). 

10

before the alleged constitutional violation occurs.30 In such

cases, "the Due Process Clause of its own force requires that

conditions of confinement satisfy certain minimal standards for

pretrial detainees."31

In this case, by detaining Scott on criminal charges, the

City had already deprived Scott of her liberty when the alleged

violation of her Constitutional rights stemming from Moore's sexual

assault occurred. The City therefore had a constitutional

obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment to provide Scott with

minimal levels of safety and security. Scott's claim of inadequate

staffing challenges the adequacy of the levels of safety and

security given to pretrial detainees in the City's jail.

Therefore, Scott's claim properly alleges a constitutional

violation.

3. Did the City's Actions Extend beyond Negligent Oversight of

Scott's Rights?

Finally, we address whether the City's and Giacomozzi's

failure to adequately staff the jail or to adopt a written policy

on adequate staffing for the jail extends beyond mere negligent

oversight of Scott's constitutional rights. Resolution of this

issue requires us to examine this court's recent en banc decision

in Hare v. City of Corinth, MS.32

In Hare, this court attempted to clarify the divergent case
 

33Id. at 643. 

 

34Id. 

 

35Id. at 643, adopting the standard set forth in Farmer v.

Brennan, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). 

 

36Id. 

 

37Id. at 645. 

 

38Id. at 640, adopting the standard set forth in Bell v.

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). 

11

law on the different standards used to measure pre-trial detainees'

constitutional rights to medical care and protection from harm.

The en banc court concluded there should be no distinction between

cases involving the right to medical care and those involving the

right to be protected from harm.33 The court did find a

distinction, however, between cases involving episodic acts and

omissions by jail officials, and cases involving general

conditions, practices and restrictions of confinement.34 In cases

involving episodic acts or omissions by jail officials, the court

held that liability attaches only if the officers involved were

subjectively and "deliberately indifferent" to the prisoner's

rights.35 This high level of scrutiny insures that municipalities

will not be held liable for mere negligence, but will instead must

only answer for intentional violations of prisoners rights.36

In contrast, in cases involving the general conditions of

confinement, there is an automatic assumption that the practice in

question was intentional.37 Therefore, in such cases, the proper

standard is whether the practice in question was "reasonably

related to a legitimate governmental purpose".38 When this test is
 

39Id. at 643. 

 

40Id. 

 

41See, DeShaney v. Winnebago Co. Dep't of Social Services,

489 U.S. 189, 198, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1005, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989)

(recognizing that "when the state takes a person into its custody

and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes

upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for

his safety and general well-being"). 

12

properly applied, it is the functional equivalent of the subjective

"deliberate indifference" standard applied to the episodic acts of

prison officials.39

In the present case, the staffing procedures in question

qualify as a general condition of confinement. We therefore need

not inquire into Chief Giacomozzi's subjective intent in allowing

a single male jailer to guard female prisoners in such a manner

that he would by necessity have to violate the existing General

Order. We need only inquire whether the practice was reasonably

related to a legitimate government goal.40

It is our conclusion that a reasonable factual dispute exists

on this point, thereby precluding summary judgment. The defendants

have offered only financial considerations as an explanation for

the staffing policy at the Killeen City Jail. Although financial

considerations may reasonably concern a municipality, such concerns

may not trump the constitutional rights of individuals who are left

at the mercy of the municipality.41 Furthermore, the record does

not reflect how often the City detains female prisoners, or how

difficult it would be to provide for an additional female staff
 

42In fact, the deposition testimony of Chief Giacomozzi

indicates that the officer in charge of the jail had the

discretion to call extra officers from the Killeen City Police

Department to the jail in times of need. Yet, inexplicably, this

procedure has never been used. 

13

member during those times.42

In addition, the unofficial staffing policy at the Killeen

City jail does not appear to serve a reasonable safety goal, and

actually contradicts the official safety measures set forth in the

General Order. Because the General Order reflects common concerns

about the safety and privacy of female inmates, the decision to

contradict the mandates of the General Order can actually be

interpreted as a sign of deliberate disregard of the constitutional

rights of female prisoners.

It is our opinion that a reasonable jury could find that the

unofficial staffing policy at the Killeen City Jail resulted in a

violation of Scott's constitutional rights, and that the City's

actions in allowing such inadequate staffing went beyond negligent

oversight of prisoners' Constitutional rights. Therefore, we

VACATE the district court's grant of summary judgment on Scott's §

1983 claim of inadequate staffing, and REMAND for further

proceedings.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

In what amounts to social engineering by judicial fiat, the

panel majority has decided that as a matter of constitutional

imperative, the city must maintain a minimum of two male guards, or

at least one female guard, in its jail whenever a female detainee

is present. Because there is no showing—even remotely—of a
14

constitutional violation by the city, and because the summary

judgment evidence does not support a finding of deliberate

indifference, I respectfully dissent.

I.

My first disagreement is over the standard we use to determine

municipal liability. Both sides treat this as a controversy over

inadequate staffing and analyze the city's conduct under the

deliberate indifference standard. Erroneously, however, the

majority applies the reasonable relationship standard of Bell v.

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).

A.

Deliberate indifference is the proper standard for assessing

municipal liability when the custom at issue is one of inadequate

staffing. See Colle v. Brazos County, 981 F.2d 237, 245-46 (5th

Cir.1993); Rhyne v. Henderson County, 973 F.2d 386, 393-94 (5th

Cir.1992). The custom challenged in this case is one of providing

staffing that is inadequate to protect female detainees from sexual

assaults. The plaintiff's challenge to this custom is that the

city's failure to adopt a different policy—i.e., to require the

presence of additional guards—caused her injury. "The Supreme

Court has held that municipal failure to adopt a policy does not

constitute such an intentional choice unless it can be said to have

been "deliberately indifferent.' " Id. at 392.

Treating this case as one about conditions of confinement is

a misapplication of Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633 (5th

Cir.1996) (en banc). The majority concludes, without explanation,
15

that the city's custom of allowing a single male to guard a female

detainee is a condition of confinement. At a high level of

generality, this could be so, in the sense that one of the

conditions in the jail is a lack of extra guards. But, at that

level of generality, the omission that led to the suicide in Hare

also could be called a "condition of confinement": A condition in

the jail was the lack of a guard to watch over the suicidal

detainee.

The problem with the majority's approach is that it ignores

both the common-sense understanding of "conditions of confinement"

and the reasons articulated in Hare for distinguishing those

conditions from episodic acts or omissions. In Hare, this court

carefully distinguished episodic acts or omissions from conditions

of confinement. We did so because a pretrial detainee has a due

process right to be free from punishment, and a hardship amounts to

punishment when there is an intent to punish. See Wolfish, 441

U.S. at 538, 99 S.Ct. at 1873 ("A court must decide whether the

disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it

is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.")

(emphasis added).

When asking whether a jailer intended to punish a detainee,

the reasonable relationship test works comfortably in "jail

condition cases," because intent can be presumed in the form of the

challenged condition, practice, rule, or restriction. Hare, 74

F.3d at 644. Thus, when the hardship of which the detainee

complains is the very act of imposing a condition, practice, rule,
 

1Hare, 74 F.3d at 645 ("Asking about the rationality of the

relationship between an official's episodic acts or omissions and

a legitimate governmental objective begs the underlying question

whether that official had the requisite mental state to establish

his liability as a perpetrator of the particular act or omission,

not as a dispenser of intended conditions or restrictions."). 

 

2See, e.g. Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d 714 (7th Cir.1995)

(treating shackling and revocation of telephone, television, and

cigarette privileges as a condition of confinement); CollanzoLeon v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 51 F.3d 315 (1st Cir.1995)

(treating disciplinary segregation and denial of telephone and

visitation privileges as a condition of confinement); United

States v. Millan, 4 F.3d 1038 (2d Cir.1993) (treating length of

pre-trial detention as a condition of confinement), cert. denied,

--- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1375, 128 L.Ed.2d 51, and cert. denied,

--- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1386, 128 L.Ed.2d 60 (1994); Hause v.

Vaught, 993 F.2d 1079 (4th Cir.1993) (treating restriction on

mail privileges as a condition of confinement), cert. denied, ---

U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 702, 126 L.Ed.2d 668 (1994); Brogsdale v.

Barry, 926 F.2d 1184 (D.C.Cir.1991) (treating overcrowding as a

condition of confinement); Lyons v. Powell, 838 F.2d 28 (1st

Cir.1988) (treating 22-23 hour confinement and placement of

mattress on the floor as a condition of confinement); Fredericks

v. Huggins, 711 F.2d 31 (4th Cir.1983) (treating policy of

refusing detainees access to drugs for rehabilitation as a

condition of confinement); Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96 (2d

Cir.1981) (treating overcrowding as a condition of confinement). 

16

or restriction, the only question is whether there is a reasonable

relationship to a legitimate state interest. In the case of

episodic acts or omissions, on the other hand, the reasonable

relationship test is more difficult to apply, as intent cannot be

presumed.1

The lesson of Hare is that a condition of confinement is a

condition, practice, rule, or restriction that itself is the wrong

of which the detainee complains. The common-sense interpretation

of a "condition of confinement" includes the number of bunks in a

cell, the number of showers and meals per day, and even a policy of

daily beatings.2 The intent to impose the hardship can be presumed
 

3I pause to point out that Hare dealt with the question of

when a detainee's constitutional rights have been violated. As

the court pointed out, determining the existence of a

constitutional violation is only the first step in determining

municipal liability for that violation. Hare, 74 F.3d at 649 n.

4.

In the case of an omission or episodic act, the

existence of a constitutional violation would be determined

by the subjective deliberate indifference standard. 

Municipal liability for that violation would be determined

under the objective deliberate indifference standard.

We separate the two issues: the existence of a

constitutional violation simpliciter and a

municipality's liability for that violation. Different

versions of the deliberate indifference test govern the

two inquiries. Our opinion in this case makes clear

that to prove an underlying constitutional violation in

an individual or episodic acts case, a pre-trial

detainee must establish that an official acted with

subjective deliberate indifference. Once the detainee

has met this burden, she has proved a violation of her

rights under the Due Process Clause. To succeed in

holding a municipality accountable for that due process

violation, however, the detainee must show that the

municipal employee's act resulted from a municipal

policy or custom adopted or maintained with objective

deliberate indifference to the detainee's

constitutional rights.

Id.

If a non-policymaker imposed a condition of confinement

on a detainee, see, e.g., Bryer v. Creati, 915 F.2d 1556

17

from the existence of the policy.

Here, the wrong of which the plaintiff complains is the sexual

assaults; the policy she attacks is the lack of additional

staffing. One cannot infer an intent to cause the wrong merely

from the existence of the challenged policy. Certainly, if the

city's policy were the complained-of disability (such as in a

double-bunking case), the standard for municipal and jailer

liability theoretically could merge.3 In this case, it should not.4
(1st Cir.1990) (unpublished) (applying

condition-of-confinement analysis where a police officer

left open a window during freezing weather), the reasonable

relationship test would be used to determine whether the

detainee's constitutional rights had been violated. To

determine municipal liability for the violation, the

objective deliberate indifference test would be used,

because a policymaker did not promulgate a policy of

imposing that condition of confinement.

The majority has assumed that when a policymaker

creates the condition of confinement, the standards for

determining the underlying constitutional violation and

municipal liability are the same. Because I disagree with

the majority that this is a case about conditions of

confinement, I do not address that contention. See

generally Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 197-98 (3d

Cir.1990) (applying the reasonable relationship test to

determine whether a policy of limiting a detainee to one bag

of possessions during a transfer violated his constitutional

rights, but applying the objective deliberate indifference

standard to determine whether the municipality was liable

for promulgating the rule). 

 

4Even if the district court relied on an incorrect legal

standard, the plaintiff has waived any challenge to that error. 

The district court granted summary judgment under the deliberate

indifference standard, and plaintiff has not challenged the use

of that standard. Instead, she has consistently argued that

there is a material fact issue on the question of deliberate

indifference.

The majority's reliance on Hare is misplaced. The

reasonable relationship test predated Hare. If the

plaintiff believed that the district court applied the wrong

standard, she should have raised that argument on appeal. 

That the en banc court limited the applicability of the

reasonable relationship test hardly justifies an exception

to the waiver rule. The plaintiff was on notice that the

reasonable relationship test existed, and she has not argued

that it should apply to this case. 

18

B.

A failure to adopt a policy can be deliberately indifferent

when it is obvious that the likely consequence of not adopting a

policy will be a deprivation of constitutional rights. City of

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1205, 103
 

5There is no evidence that Chief Giacomozzi has ever had any

complaints of sexual assault by a jailer or any related type of

complaint prior to the incident at issue here. 

 

6The City subjected Moore, the perpetrator of this incident,

to a background investigation, medical examination and polygraph

test as a condition of his employment. In addition, Moore had

been previously employed as a commissioned police officer,

without incident, for four years prior to his employment with the

jail. He was trained in the official policies of jail management

by experienced jailers. 

 

7General Order MSC-1-78 ("the General Order"), which

regulates the management of the city jail, prohibits male

personnel from frisking or conducting a pat-down search of a

female prisoner. It also requires that a female be searched by

female personnel. Moreover, anytime a prisoner is released from

her cell for any reason, the General Order requires that she be

searched upon release from and return to the cell. Finally, the

policy allows for additional staffing by commissioned officers of

the police department when the holding facility's population is

large or if a difficult prisoner is in custody.

The majority claims that the staffing policy made it

inevitable that the General Order would be disregarded. I

find nothing in the record to support such a conclusion or

inference. The majority bases its conclusion on the fact

19

L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). The plaintiff relies on the affidavit of

Charles Craig, an expert on jail policy, who averred that his

experience showed him that a prison should have female officers to

prevent sexual assaults, or that male officers should be supervised

when allowed access to female inmates. He concluded that a failure

to have two guards or a female guard could not be justified.

The record also establishes that the city has followed the

same staffing procedures since the late 1970's, yet no incident

such as this has transpired.5 Jailers were subjected to a number

of background checks, including a polygraph test,6 and the city

limited contact between male and female jailers in order to

minimize the possibility of sexual misconduct.7 The jail is
that the four jailers could not possibly follow the General

Order. What the majority fails to consider is that the jail

is located where the jailers could easily call for a

uniformed officer to assist them when a female detainee is

booked and searched. 

20

located on the first floor of the police department, in the patrol

division area, and a patrol duty sergeant would periodically check

on jail personnel. More than one hundred uniformed police officers

in the building had unlimited access to the jail at all times.

There is no jury question as to whether the failure to have

additional staffing amounts to deliberate indifference. The city

took numerous precautions to safeguard the safety of female

detainees, including the requirements of the General Order and the

extensive background checks of the jailers. See Rhyne, 973 F.2d at

393 (finding that the existence of a policy—albeit an inadequate

one—demonstrated that the municipality was not indifferent, in the

literal sense of the word). A patrol sergeant was assigned to

monitor the jail and would periodically stop by to check on jail

personnel.

In summary, Craig's testimony does not establish that the city

policymakers faced an obvious risk and were consciously indifferent

to it. At most, the evidence could be construed to show that the

jail might have been better managed, or even that Giacomozzi was

not prescient in failing to consider the risk that well-trained

jailers would, without warning, assault a female detainee.

II.

Even assuming that the "reasonable relationship" test should

apply to this case, there is no jury question as to whether the
 

8See also Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 542, 99 S.Ct. at 1875 (citing

rational basis cases to support the use of a reasonable

relationship test); id. at 586, 99 S.Ct. at 1898 (Stevens J.,

dissenting) ("In short, a careful reading of the Court's opinion

reveals that it has attenuated the detainee's constitutional

protection against punishment into nothing more than a

prohibition against irrational classifications or barbaric

treatment. Having recognized in theory that the source of that

protection is the Due Process Clause, the Court has in practice

defined its scope in the far more permissive terms of equal

protection and Eighth Amendment analysis."). 

21

city's custom was reasonably related to a legitimate government

interest. I find the majority's conclusions surprising; the

opinion can be supported only by misunderstanding the summary

judgment evidence and by failing to apply the deference that

Wolfish demands.

The reasonable relationship test is a highly deferential test

that, as the majority acknowledges, should be no different, in

result, from the deliberate indifference standard. As this court

has explained,

The "reasonably related to a valid penological [interest]

standard" never purported to allow recovery for mere

negligence. To the contrary, this test is deferential to jail

rulemaking; it is in essence a rational basis test of the

validity of jail rules. That is, asking whether a rule is

reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective is

much like asking whether a legislative enactment has any

rational basis, except in the context of jail administration

the legislative purpose is a given—typically a penological or

administrative purpose. Violation of the Bell test requires

acts or omissions not too distant from a standard of arbitrary

and capricious conduct.

Hare, 74 F.3d at 646.8 In Wolfish, the Court articulated the

deference courts must accord prison officials:

"The problems that arise in the day-to-day operations of a

corrections facility are not susceptible of easy solutions.

Prison administrators therefore should be accorded

wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of
22

policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to

preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain

institutional security. "Such considerations are peculiarly

within the province and professional expertise of corrections

officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the

record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their

response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily

defer to their expert judgment in such matters' "

441 U.S. at 547-48, 99 S.Ct. at 1878-79 (citations omitted); see

also Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 584-85, 104 S.Ct. 3227,

3231-32, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 (1983) (reaffirming the deferential

standard of Wolfish ).

When applying the Wolfish test, we must take, as a given, that

the city's policy is based on a penological purpose and must ask

whether the policy at issue is reasonably related to that end.

Hare, 74 F.3d at 646. In this case, the question is whether the

city's policies are reasonably related to the goal of providing a

safe detention center for female detainees. In other words, do the

alleged deficiencies with the city's policies prove that those

policies were arbitrary and capricious?

The custom at issue is broader than that which the majority

describes. The majority is correct that it is a custom to have

four guards—two of whom are women—and to split their duties into

four shifts over a twenty-four-hour period. The policy also

includes provisions to protect female detainees from some types of

sexual molestation. Additionally, the city requires substantial

background checks of its applicants.

The plaintiff has failed to show the existence of facts

demonstrating that the city's custom was arbitrary and capricious.

The city took precautions to protect the safety of female inmates
23

and made a decision to staff its jails based on limited financial

resources. There is no evidence demonstrating that, objectively,

such a policy generally would fail to protect pretrial detainees.

In fact, the evidence demonstrated that for ten years, the city had

not received any complaints of sexual assaults. The city's choice

may not have been perfect, but it was not unconstitutional. See

Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 542 n. 25, 99 S.Ct. at 1876 n. 25

("Governmental action does not have to be the only alternative or

even the best alternative for it to be reasonable, to say nothing

of constitutional.").

"Courts must be mindful that these injuries spring from

constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them must

reflect that fact rather than a court's idea of how best to operate

a detention facility." Id. at 539, 99 S.Ct. at 1874. I

respectfully dissent.