The

9th Australian

Division Versus the

Africa Corps:

An Infantry Division Against

Tanks-Tobruk, Libya, 1941

by

Colonel Ward A. Miller

August 1986
FOREWORD

In April and May 1941, the previously successful blitzkrieg

tactics of the German Army met defeat by the outnumbered Australian forces of the 9th Division at Tobruk. The Australian

infantry achieved victory through a successful all-around defense

against tank attacks in force. By employing all available assets

in a combined arms effort, well-supported light infantry forces

defeated a heavier armored force.

The 9th Australian Division Versus the Africa Corps: An

Infantry Division Against Tanks-Tobruk, Libya, 1941 provides

the reader with a valuable historical context for evaluating how

light infantry forces can confront armored attacks. This CSI

special study also reveals how light infantry forces operated and

were supported and sustained in a desert environment-a message that has continuing relevance for today's Army.

LOUIS D. F. FRASCHE

Colonel, Infantry

Director, Combat Studies Institute

CSI publications cover a variety of military history topics. The views expressed

herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of

the Army or the Department of Defense.

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The

9th Australian

Division Versus the

Africa Corps:

An Infantry Division Against Tanks--Tobruk, Libya, 1941

by

Colonel Ward A. Miller

August 1986

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Miller, Ward A. (Ward Anson), 1937-

The 9th Australian Division Versus the Africa Corps.

"August 1986."

Bibliography: p.

1. Tobruk, Battles of, 1941-1942. 2. Australia. Australian Army. Australian

Division, 9th-History. 3. World War, 1939-1945-Regimental historiesAustralia. I. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Combat Studies

Institute. II. Title. III. Title: Ninth Australian Division versus the African

Corps.

D766.93.M55 1986 940.54'23 86-21538

- I
CONTENTS

Illustrations ........................................ v

I. Tobruk: The Context of the Battle ..................... 1

Introduction .......................................... 1

B ackground ........................................... 4

Combat Organization of Friendly Forces ............. 12

Combat Organization of Enemy Forces .............. 15

II. T he B attle ............................................. 19

The Easter Battle Chronology ....................... 19

Critical Events ....................................... 33

III. C onclusions ............................................ 35

Analysis of German and Australian

Capabilities ........................................ 35

Lessons Learned ..................................... 44

Appendix

A. Tobruk Fortress Order of Battle, 14 April 1941 .......... 51

B. The North African Campaigns .......................... 55

C. German Offensive Tactics ............................... 57

D. British Antitank Operations ............................ 61

Notes . ............................................... 65

B ibliography ................................................ 69

iii

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures

1. Tobruk strongpoint ...................................... 10

Maps

1. The eastern Mediterranean ............................. 2

2. The western desert ............... ..................... 5

3. Rommel's first offensive ................................. 7

4. Fortress Tobruk ......................................... 9

5. Tobruk defense lines ..................................... 11

6. Rommel's line of advance-1941 ......................... 19

7. German attack, 13-14 April ............................ 24

8. Friendly unit dispositions, 14 April ..................... 29

v
I. TOBRUK: THE CONTEXT OF THE BATTLE

Introduction

The North African theater during the early stages of World

War II provided British and American forces with valuable

battlefield experience and training in the tactical employment

of units and weapon systems. The desert war was also a deadly

proving ground for the development of new weapons and techniques and demonstrated the need, as well as the methods, for

ensuring close coordination between ground, air, and naval

forces. In addition, the infantryman in North Africa learned to

fight against tanks in a desert environment.

During 10-14 April 1941 and from 30 April to 4 May 1941,

the newly formed 9th Australian Division repelled two major

German Africa Corps tank assaults against their defensive positions around the strategic fortress at Tobruk, Libya. The 9th

Division, although relatively untried, rushed from Palestine to

North Africa in order to help delay the German attack on Egypt

(see map 1).

During both engagements, the Australians fought from a

static defense in depth. Australian infantrymen occupying the

first line of defense allowed the German tanks to pass through

their initial perimeter into extensive minefields. British and Australian artillery and antitank gunners, deployed well to the rear

of the infantry and supported by British tanks, then engaged

the German tanks with devastating direct fire. As the German

infantrymen, artillerymen, and machine gunners following the

tanks passed through the perimeter, the Australian infantry,

lying in wait on the flanks, moved in behind them with rifle

fire and bayonets. At the same time, British fighter planes

overhead, supported by antiaircraft artillery, attempted to fight

off the attacking German dive-bombers and fighter aircraft.

At the conclusion of the Easter Battle, known German and

Italian losses were 150 killed in action (KIA), 250 prisoners of

war (POWs), 29 tanks destroyed out of 112 available,1 and 17

aircraft destroyed. 2 The Tobruk garrison losses were twenty-six

KIA, twenty-four wounded in action (WIA), four tanks destroyed,

one aircraft destroyed, and one artillery gun disabled.3

In the second action, the Battle of the Salient, known

German and Italian losses were 167 KIA, 574 WIA, and 213

missing in action (MIA). Out of eighty-one tanks available,
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twelve tanks were destroyed and thirty-two were damaged but

recovered. The garrison had 59 KIA, 355 WIA, and 383 MIA. 4

In both battles, the German's combined arms attack featured

tanks, infantry, engineers, artillery, and close air support. Their

armaments were superior to Australian weapons in all categories

except artillery, where the Australians possessed a marked

advantage. Because of their edge in arms, the Germans were

stunned by their defeat at the hands of the Australians. The

Germans had rarely failed before, never encountered such defensive tactics, nor faced such a determined opponent. The accuracy

and efficiency of the British artillery and antitank gunners and

the discipline of the Australian infantry-who held their ground

and fire until the German infantry and gunners advanced into

a killing zone-had defeated the German blitzkrieg tactics.

A captured veteran of the early European campaigns stated:

"I cannot understand you Australians. In Poland, France, and

Belgium, once the tanks got through the soldiers took it for

granted that they were beaten. But you are like demons. The

tanks break through and your infantry still keep fighting." 5

A German battalion commander wrote:

The Australians, who are the men our troops have had opposite

them so far, are extraordinarily tough fighters. The German is more active in the attack but the enemy stakes his life in the defense

and fights to the last with extreme cunning. Our men, usually easy going and unsuspecting, fall easily into his traps especially as a result of their experiences in the closing stages of the Western

[European] Campaign.

The Australian is unquestionably superior to the German

soldier:

1. in the use of individual weapons, especially as snipers

2. in the use of ground camouflage

3. in his gift of observation, and the drawing of the correct conclusions from his observation

4. in every means of taking us by surprise....6

Lt. Gen. Erwin Rommel was also impressed by the Australians. He said:

Shortly afterwards a batch of some fifty or sixty Australian prison- ers were marched off close behind us-immensely big and powerful

men, who without question represented an elite formation of the

British Empire, a fact that was also evident in battle. Enemy resistance was as stubborn as ever and violent actions were being fought

at many points.7
4

After the Battle of the Salient, Rommel reflected on the difference between mobile and positional warfare in the desert. He

stated:

In this assault we lost more than 1,200 men killed, wounded and

missing. This shows how sharply the curve of casualties rises when

one reverts from mobile to position warfare. In a mobile action,

what counts is material, as the essential complement to the soldier.

The finest fighting man has no value in mobile warfare without

tanks, guns, and vehicles. Thus a mobile force can be rendered unfit

for action by destruction of its tanks, without having suffered any

serious casualties in manpower. This is not the case with position

warfare, where the infantryman with rifle and hand grenade has

lost little of his value, provided, of course, he is protected by antitank guns or obstacles against the enemy's armour. For him enemy

number one is the attacking infantrymen. Hence, position warfare

is always a struggle for the destruction of men-in contrast to

mobile warfare, where everything turns on the destruction of enemy

material. 8

The Australians held out for almost eight months against

the German siege at Tobruk. The siege was abandoned by the

Germans after 242 days, when on 7 December 1941, Rommel

made the decision to fall back to Gazala. However, on 21 June

of the next year, Rommel began a second offensive that finally

captured the fortress.

At the time, the Australians' epic stand at Tobruk had a

major impact on the war because the Germans suffered a serious

and unexpected reversal. The Tobruk garrison demonstrated

that the hitherto successful German blitzkrieg tactics could be

defeated by resolute men who displayed courage and had the

tactical and technical ability to coordinate and maximize the

capabilities of their weapons and equipment in the defense.

This historical battle study can serve to illustrate the capabilities of a World War II infantry division in combating a

heavier armored force. When compared to present-day scenarios,

both the 9th Australian Division and the German Africa Corps

could be classified as World War II rapid deployment contingency forces, and the battle at Tobruk should be studied in this

context. In providing an in-depth description of the techniques

and tactics used by the 9th Australian Division in battle, only

the Easter Battle will be discussed.

Background

By 10 February 1941, British forces in the western desert

had swept the Italian Army from North Africa to beyond

Benghazi (see map 2). However, prior to reaching Tripoli and
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the final eradication of Axis forces in North Africa, British

efforts were shifted to meet Hitler's invasion of Greece. With

British troops diverted to Greece, the newly formed 9th Australian Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. L. J. Morshead, moved

on 8 March from Palestine to take over the task of holding the

Cyrenaica frontier in Libya. Simultaneously, the German Africa

Corps, under the command of Lieutenant General Rommel,

arrived in Tripoli, Libya. On 31 March 1941, Rommel began an

offensive to drive the supply- and equipment-constrained British

forces-already overextended and with their armored vehicles

badly in need of overhaul-eastward across the desert past

Derna and Tobruk and eventually to the Egyptian frontier (see

map 3). Rommel's objective was to seize the Suez Canal, but by

the time he reached the port of Tobruk, he had overextended

his lines of communication, being 900 miles from his base at

Tripoli. The Germans, therefore, desperately needed an intermediate supply base. Additionally, Tobruk blocked the only highspeed avenue of approach to the Egyptian frontier. The desert

sands south of the coastal road through Tobruk were extremely

difficult to traverse. Thus, it became critical for the Germans to

capture the port of Tobruk in order to replenish their forces

and to sustain the offensive. On 6 April, the Australian 9th

Division was ordered to pull back from Derna along the coast

to Tobruk.

General Sir Archibald Wavell, Commander in Chief of the

Middle East and North Africa, decided that Tobruk must be

held for at least two months to allow time for British reinforcements to be brought in to augment the defense of Egypt.

Wavell's concept was to establish a strongpoint at Tobruk, while

employing a mobile armored force to harass the enemy in the

desert outside the perimeter.

After the Germans captured General Neame, British commander in chief in Cyrenaica, on 6 April, General Wavell

appointed Major General Lavarack, commander of the 7th Australian Division, to replace him, at the same time giving

Lavarack the mission to hold the enemy's advance at Tobruk.

General Lavarack divided his available forces into three groups.

The first group, under Major General Morshead, comprised

mainly of the 9th Australian Division and four British artillery

regiments, was to defend Tobruk fortress. The second group, a

mobile force under Brigadier Gott, was composed of reconnaissance vehicles, artillery, and antitank guns. It was to operate

outside the perimeter to harass the enemy south of the main
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coast road that ran through Tobruk. The third group, which

would constitute the Cyrenaica command's force reserve, was

Lavarack's own 18th Brigade, with a battery of antitank guns

and all available tanks.

The perimeter on which Lavarack and Morshead agreed to

base their forward defense ran in a wide arc, twenty-eight miles

in length. The width of the perimeter at the intersection of the

coast road was about seventeen miles. The average distance of

the perimeter from Tobruk was nine miles (see map 4). The bay

provided a deep natural harbor. The coast, except near the

harbor, was broken by a succession of narrow inlets. A plain

about three miles wide west of the town was bordered on the

south by an escarpment at the top of which was a ledge of

land leading to a second escarpment. South from the second

escarpment, the terrain flattened out toward the perimeter,

except in the southwest where the Pilastrino ridge extended

toward the most dominant feature in the area of Ras el

Medauuar. In the east, the two escarpments came together on

the coast short of the perimeter boundary.

Except at the perimeter's extreme eastern and western

flanks, where the wire descended the escarpments to the coast,

the perimeter defenses spread across a plateau some 400 to 500

feet above sea level. Beyond this, the terrain ran in ridges to

the west and southwest but was almost flat to the south and

southeast. The arid desert ground was bare except for chance

occurrences of dwarf camel thorn shrubs and a few fig trees

located near desert wells. From the coast road to the sea, on

both extremes of the perimeter, the terrain was generally an

effective obstacle to tanks. However, south of the coast road,

the flat terrain neither hindered frontal assault nor provided

cover and concealment.

During their earlier occupation of Tobruk, the Italians had

surrounded most of the perimeter with a box wire obstacle or

concertina wire. 9 In some'places forward of the perimeter, there

was an antitank ditch that was incomplete and varied in depth

from two to twelve feet. The antitank ditch was partly covered

with light boards and a thin layer of sand and stones, so that

its outline could not be distinguished even at close range.10 Forward of the ditch was more concertina wire. Also, a thin line

of antitank and antipersonnel mines had been laid in front of

the perimeter wire.

The 150 individual strongpoints along the perimeter had

been placed in a zigzag pattern, with the posts one forward
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and one in the rear, with intervals of about 750 yards between

forward posts. The effect was of two parallel rows of posts, the

second row 500 yards behind the first and filling in the gaps between the forward posts. The posts were numbered consecutively, the odd-numbered posts being on the perimeter, the even

posts behind them. A typical post was eighty meters long and

contained three circular concrete weapons pits emplaced flush

with the ground and connected by a concrete communications

trench.ll This trench was about 2 1/2 meters deep and covered

over with boards and a thin layer of earth. Around the post

was an antitank ditch. Observation from the posts was excellent,

the fields of fire good, and the perimeter wire well placed. A

forward post, in most cases, could enfilade both arms of perimeter wire leading out from it, the fire forming a beaten zone

forward of the next post (see figure 1).12

(Source: Barton Maughan, Tobruk and El Alamein [Adelaide: The Griffin Press, 1966], p. 131.)

Figure 1. Tobruk strongpoint

Behind the first line of defense, called the Red Line, antitank mines were placed in depth to prevent deep penetrations.

Two miles behind the Red Line was the Blue Line, occupied by the three reserve battalions. General Morshead's instructions

were that if the enemy penetrated the Red Line, the forward

posts were to hold at all costs, while the Blue Line absorbed

the attack. If the enemy penetrated the Blue Line and the

Cyrenaica command's mobile reserve was unable to stop them,

then every support element left would make a last effort at the

Green Line (see map 5).

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Combat Organization of Friendly Forces

The 9th Australian Division had been formed on 23 September 1940. When Major General Morshead took command on 5

February 1941, little did he realize that his division would be

heavily engaged in two months. The 20th Brigade, formed in

May 1940, had been in Palestine three months; the 26th, formed

in July 1940, had been there one month. None of the brigades

had received a full issue of weapons, yet each had fired automatic weapons in range practice. Individual training was well

advanced, and there had been some subunit training. However,

battalions and regiments had not conducted unit exercises, and

the training of brigades as battle groups had not begun. In

short, the individual soldiers had been trained to fight, but the

officers and staffs had not yet been trained in the complex techniques of battlefield management and the integration of combined arms formations.

Brigades in the 2d Australian Imperial Forces (AIF) contained three battalions, each recruited chiefly on a regional

basis. For the sake of tradition, battalions took the numbers of

their counterparts in the World War I 1st AIF, with the prefix

2- preceding the new unit designations. In addition to its headquarters and support companies, the battalion consisted of four

rifle companies, each composed of three 30-man platoons. The

strength of an Australian infantry battalion varied, but in the

Middle East it contained 32 officers and 750 to 770 men. The

total strength for an infantry division was about 14,000, to

include its headquarters, three brigades, an antitank regiment,

field artillery regiment, engineers, and signal.13

By 10 April 1941, the garrison at Tobruk consisted of the

9th Australian Division with its three brigades of infantry-the

20th, 24th, and 26th-together with the 18th Brigade of the 7th

Australian Division and several thousand British and Indian

troops. Altogether, 14,270 Australian troops; 9,000 British troops;

about 5,700 troops of mixed Australian, British, and Indian

origin; and 3,000 Libyan laborers defended Tobruk.14

General Morshead's concept of defense was based on four

principles: no ground should be given up; garrisons should dominate no-man's-land by extensive nightly deep patrolling; no

effort should be spared in improving the defensive positions and

obstacles; and the defense should be organized in depth, with a

large mobile reserve. 15
13

The twenty-eight miles of perimeter were occupied by the

division's three brigades. From west to east, they were the 26th,

20th, and 24th Brigades, respectively. Part of the garrison's

reserve, the 18th Brigade, was located in Wadi Auda, near the

sea west of town, and the 3d Armored Brigade had the responsibility for covering the approaches to Pilastrino extending to the

El Adem-Bardia road junctions. Six battalions manned the forward perimeter, and one battalion in each brigade sector was

positioned to the rear, as brigade reserve. Each battalion on

line occupied an average of five miles, with more than two

companies plus maintained as a reserve dug in one-half mile to

the rear. Ten to fifteen infantrymen occupied each post.

The 2-24th Battalion with one company of the 2-23d Battalion occupied the right-hand sector from the coast to the escarpment, a distance of six miles. On their left, covering the highest

point on the perimeter, Ras el Medauuar (Hill 204), was the 2-

48th Battalion. Farther on the left was the 2-17th Battalion,

which covered the southern approaches to Fort Pilastrino, where

the division headquarters was located. Next was the 2-13th Battalion astride the El Adem road, then the 2-28th Battalion. On

the 2-28th's left, covering from the main east-west road to the

coast, was the 2-43d Battalion. With field artillery and antitank

artillery being the garrison's main defense against an armored

attack, all guns were sited in an antitank role. Gun pits were

made large and shallow to enable rapid traverse and to assure

clear fields of fire in all directions.

The forty-eight 25-pounders of the three Royal horse artillery

(RHA) regiments and the twelve 18-pounders and twelve 4.5-inch

howitzers of the 51st Field Regiment were organized into three

groups to cover the three infantry brigades on line. 16 The 51st

Field Regiment was in direct support of the 26th Brigade in

the west; the 104th RHA was in support of the 24th Brigade in

the east. In the central (southern) sector held by the 20th

Brigade, the 1st and 107th RHA were formed into a tactical

group of thirty-two guns. The guns were mainly employed at

the escarpment below Pilastrino and near Sidi Mahmud.

With the exception of the 8th Battery of the 3d Light Antiaircraft (AA) Regiment, which was Australian, all the antiaircraft guns were manned by British troops. The 4th AA

Brigade consisted of the 153d and 235th Heavy AA Batteries

from the 51st Heavy AA Regiment; the 14th Light AA Regiment;

and the 39th, 40th, and 57th Light AA Batteries from the 13th

Light AA Regiment. 17 At the beginning of the siege, the anti-
14

aircraft artillery in Tobruk consisted of sixteen mobile 7-inch

guns (heavy) in action and eight unmounted guns not yet

brought into action; five mobile and twelve static 40-mm Bofors

(of which six static guns were not in action); and forty-two

captured 20-mm Italian Bredos. As soon as four of the static

3.7-inch guns were brought into action, four heavy mobile guns

were released for perimeter defense to deter enemy dive-bombers

and observation aircraft. However, whenever Allied ships were

unloading in the port, the mobile guns were returned to the

harbor area.18

Additionally, captured Italian 75-, 100-, and 149-mm guns

were employed by the so-called Australian "bush artillery" (infantrymen without gunner training who manned and fired guns

from their battalion positions). By 9 April, all remaining

armored units were organized into the 3d Armored Brigade.

These included the 1st Kings Dragoon Guards, with thirty

armed Mormon-Harrington scout cars; the 3d Hussars; and the

5th Royal Tanks, forming a composite unit of four cruisers and

eighteen light tanks. 1 9 The 1st Royal Tank Regiment was composed of nineteen cruisers and fifteen light tanks; and the 4th

Royal *Tank Regiment was comprised of a troop of four Mark

II Matilda (infantry) tanks. 20 In all, about sixty tanks were

operational with another twenty-six undergoing repairs.

There were only 113 antitank guns in the garrison, half of

which were captured Italian Bredo 47- and 32-mm gunsweapons that could penetrate 30 millimeters of steel plate at

1,000 yards but had a traverse of only 60 degrees. 21 Antitank

units were the Australian 2-3d Antitank Regiment with four of

its six batteries-the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th; the three brigade

antitank companies; and the British 3d RHA Antitank Regiment, with its M and J Batteries but minus D Battery. Antitank

regiments were normally organized with three battalions, each

having two 8-gun batteries. Each battery had two 4-gun troops,

and each troop had two sections of two guns. The principal

British antitank gun at the time was the British 2-pounder. However, British antitank guns suffered badly in comparison with

German guns because, in most cases, they did not have the

weight, penetrating power, or range that the German 50-, 57-,

75-, and 88-mm weapons possessed. The 2-pounder was outranged and nearly ineffectual, as it could not penetrate the

Mark III and IV beyond 500 meters. 2 2 As a result, the 25-

pounders, with a direct-fire range of 1,000 yards, bore the brunt

of the antitank defense. The total number of 2-pounders at
15

Tobruk is not known, but there was a critical shortage of such

weapons.

Australian troops dug in, North Africa*

All Royal Air Force (RAF) units in the desert were under No.

204 Group. Reconnaissance, close air support, and air interdiction were provided by a forward command post of the No. 204

Group along with the No. 73 Squadron (Hurricane) and the No.

6 Squadron (Hurricane and Lysinder), which were under the

fortress commander. Bomber support was provided by Blenheim

IV bombers of Nos. 45 and 55 Squadrons, which could rearm

at the Tobruk airfields. Fourteen Hurricanes were kept at Tobruk

during daylight hours for immediate response. 23

Combat Organization of Enemy Forces

The German 5th Light Division faced the Australians at

Tobruk. The 5th was a light armored division, somewhat weaker

in force structure than the usual German armored division. The

*The source of all photos in this work is Australian War Memorial, Canberra,

Pictorial History of Australia at War 1939-45, vol. (Canberra: [S.N.]), 1959.
16

German High Command was preoccupied with equipping its

forces for the coming invasion of the USSR, so Rommel's initial

mission was defensive rather than offensive. The 5th Division,

consequently, had only three-quarters of its allocated motor transport and was short some 50 tanks of the 200 authorized to it.

However, it was far stronger than the battle-depleted 2d

Armored Division that it initially opposed. The German 5th

Light Division consisted initially of a headquarters; the strong and partly armored 3d Reconnaissance Unit with its company of about twenty-five armored cars; the 5th Armored Regiment with its 1st and 2d Battalions containing a total of seventy light Mark II tanks and eighty medium Mark IIIs (with 50-mm

guns) and Mark IVs (with 75-mm guns); 24 a fully motorized

machine-gun regiment with the 2d and 8th Battalions; the 1-

75th Artillery Regiment with a twelve-gun field artillery battery; and the 605th Antitank Regiment, with the 33d and 39th Antitank Battalions (thirty-three 37- and 50-mm antitank guns in

each, plus several 88-mm antiaircraft guns in the 33d).2 5 Though these units had no desert training, most had operational experience in the campaigns in Poland and France. Additionally, in

the German's favor, the Mark III could penetrate the armor of

British tanks at 1,000 yards due to its superior ammunition and

optics. 2 6 The Mark IVs could shell the British armor and antitank guns at 3,000 yards with impunity.27

Rommel's German Air Force support came from Fliegerkorps

X, commanded by General Frohlich. Fighter and dive-bomber

units worked in conjunction with Rommel but were not under

his control. The total strength of Fliegerkorps X varied between

400 and 450 aircraft, of which only about 250 were serviceable

at any one time. This included thirty single-engined fighters, thirty twin-engined fighters, approximately eighty dive-bombers,

and fifty to sixty long-range bombers.2 8

Rommel continually task organized the German and Italian

forces to fit the mission. New groupings and new commands

were set up almost daily, with the major units, the 5th Light Division and the Italian Ariete and Brescia Divisions, constantly shifting units.

The Italian forces, operating with their German allies, consisted of elements of three divisions: the 27th (Brescia) Division,

the 102d (Trento) Motorized Division, and the Armored 132d

(Ariete) Division. The two infantry divisions mustered slightly

more than six infantry battalions each. The armored division

had some eighty tanks, mainly of the M-13 variety, but
17

possessed few antitank guns. 29 The combined German-Italian

forces consisted of around 25,000 combat, combat support, and

combat service support troops (although these figures are not

fully documented).

I
I

I
II. THE BATTLE

The Easter Battle Chronology*

10 April

In less than 3 weeks, the Africa Corps had fought and

marched over 600 miles through sandstorms and over mountains

and difficult trails, pushing the British ahead of them. At last

Tobruk was to be cut off (see sketch map 6). Rommel announced

that his next objective was the Suez Canal and that the British

must not be allowed to break out of Tobruk. Meanwhile, General

(source: I. S. u. rlayfair, Ime Mediaerranean ana the Middle best LLonaon: Her Majesty's Stationery Office,

19561, p. 25.)

Map 6. Rommel's line of advance-1941

*Except where noted, the following is a summary of Barton Maughan's

narration of the battle in his book, Tobruk and El Alamein: Australia in the

War of 1939-1945.

19
20

Prittwitz was killed by antitank fire as his group probed the

Australian perimeter along the Derna road, and Lieutenant

Colonel Schwerin replaced him.

11 April (Good Friday)

The Tobruk fortress was surrounded, but the Germans were

widely scattered after a two-day sandstorm. Streich Group was

too far to the east; Prittwitz Group, now the Schwerin Group,

moved in from the south; and the Brescia Division was to the

west.

1200 to 1300 (hours). The Germans shifted to get into position

for the attack. The 5th Panzer Regiment, from the Streich Group,

began its first reconnaissance against the southern sector of the

perimeter, probing with tanks and infantry against Posts R59

and R63. Five German tanks were destroyed 1,000 yards in front

of R59.

1500oo. Overconfident and in defiance of the Australian defenses, 700 enemy infantry advanced to within 400 yards of the

2-13th's positions. The Australians engaged them with small

arms and machine guns. Seven enemy tanks appeared in front

of Post R31 and advanced toward the perimeter, where the RHA

engaged them.

1615. Artillery observers reported enemy infantry approaching

the 2-17th's sector in the vicinity of Post R33. The artillery

stopped the infantry, but seventy German tanks passed through

the British barrage heading toward the Australian perimeter in

front of D Company, 2-17th. Captain Balfe, the D Company

commander, later described the action:

About 70 tanks came right up to the antitank ditch and opened fire

on our forward posts. They advanced in three waves of about twenty

and one of ten. Some of them were big German Mark IVs, mounting

a 75-mm gun. Others were Italian M13s and there were a lot of

Italian light tanks too. The ditch here wasn't any real obstacle to

them, the minefield had only been hastily rearmed and we hadn't

one antitank gun forward. We fired on them with antitank rifles,

Brens, and rifles and they didn't attempt to come through, but blazed

away at us and then sheered off east towards the 2/13th's front. 30

The German infantry came foward again, 700 of them en

masse, shoulder to shoulder through the gunfire.

When the infantry were about 500 yards out (Balfe said later) we

opened up, but in the posts that could reach them we had only two

Brens, two antitank rifles and a couple of dozen ordinary rifles.

The Jerries went to ground at first, but gradually moved forward

in bounds under cover of their machine guns. It was nearly dusk

by this time, and they managed to reach the antitank ditch. From
21

there they mortared near-by posts heavily. We hadn't any mortars

with which to reply, and our artillery couldn't shell the ditch without

risk of hitting our own posts. 31

At the same time, the 1st Royal Tank Regiment (RTR) with

its eleven cruiser tanks moved up in the direction of the El

Adem roadblock. After skirting the 2-17th's front, the enemy

tanks moved along the 2-13th's perimeter, firing to suppress the

forward posts as they passed. Along the El Adem road, gunners

of the 2-13th's mortar platoon, manning two Italian 47-mm antitank guns, knocked out one Italian medium tank and hit several

others. Another Italian light tank, disabled by small-arms fire,

was knocked out by one of the antitank guns and its crew was

captured.

At the El Adem road, enemy tanks halted before a minefield

and turned away just as the 1st Royal Tank Regiment arrived.

Both sides engaged at long range. Three light tanks and one

medium Italian tank were knocked out by British tanks, and

one German medium tank was destroyed by antitank fire. Two

British medium tanks were lost. The enemy withdrew to the

south, having lost seven tanks.

In the late afternoon, combat patrols from the 2-17th's reserve

company found the enemy had withdrawn from the antitank

ditch in front of D Company. That night, more tanks probed

along the ditch in front of the 2-13th looking for a crossing.

They were followed by pioneers with demolitions and bangalore

torpedoes, whose mission it was to break the wire and bridge

the antitank ditch. The breaching party was driven off by the

Australians, however, and abandoned their demolition equipment.

General Morshead issued orders for vigorous day and night

patrolling to be conducted in all sectors. Engineers with the three

forward brigades spent the night improving the perimeter defenses. Overnight, the 2-3d Field Company layed more than 5,000

mines, covering the entire 24th Brigade sector.

After the probing attacks, aerial reconnaissance reported road

movement from the southwest, an attempted breach at the antitank ditch, and continued movement outside the perimeter in

the southeastern sector. All indications were that the enemy

would attack at first light on the 12th, near the boundary of

the 20th and 24th Brigades.

2300. General Lavarack ordered the 18th Brigade to move

from its reserve position at Wadi Auda, to the junction of the

El Adem and Bardia roads.
22

Patrolling along the antitank ditch at Tobruk

12 April

Throughout the day, the Germans continued their reconnaissance, but no attack developed as their tank and motor

transport concentrations were bombed by the RAF and heavily

shelled by artillery. The Germans also sent dive-bombers against

the harbor, only to have them repelled by the RAF's Hurricanes

and heavy antiaircraft fire. In addition, British gunners shot

down four Stukas.
23

Fully, presuming the garrison to be worn down and in the

process of evacuating by sea, the Germans expected to take the

defenders without a fight. They were shocked and taken aback,

however, by the violent response against their reconnaissance

units, the British artillery's pounding of their panzer troops, and

their first encounter with Australian bayonets.

13 April (Easter Sunday)

Axis forces were now in position to attack. The Schwerin

Group was in the eastern zone, opposite the 24th Brigade sector.

Streich's 5th Light Division, the main assault force, was in the

south on both sides of the El Adem road opposite the 20th

Brigade. On its left was the Italian Ariete Division and farther

to the left, a regiment of the Trento Division around Carrier

Hill, west of Ras el Medauuar. The Brescia unit sat astride the

Derna road to the west, opposite the 26th Brigade's sector.

The original German plan called for the 5th Light Division

to break the Australian perimeter defenses on the evening of

the 13th at the El Adem road and then to penetrate five miles

to the junction of the El Adem and Bardia roads, while the

Brescia Division conducted a demonstration to the west (see map

7). The initial breach, to be conducted by Lieutenant Colonel

Ponath's 8th Machine Gun Battalion, was to be supported by

artillery at 1700. The vanguard of the attack was to be the 5th

Panzer Regiment, whose mission was to push through the gap

with two battalions in column, continue two miles north, then

split off, with the lead battalion pushing on to the crossroads,

while the trailing battalion drove northwest toward Fort Pilastrino. Early on the 14th, the attack was to be continued toward

Tobruk (city), with the 5th Panzer Regiment leading, the Italian

Ariete Division following, and elements of the 8th Machine Gun

Battalion securing the penetration area.

Australian alertness and an aggressive defense, however,

denied the enemy a thorough reconnaissance of the perimeter.

In addition, the Italian maps used by the Germans were outdated

and inaccurate. Furthermore, there were no photographs or aerial

reconnaissance reports available from the Luftwaffe. 32

As a result, the German engineers chose to make the crossing

just south of R33. This was some two and one-half miles west

of the planned crossing site on the El Adem road. This would

cause delay and confusion later. At the point chosen, the antitank ditch was continuous and for the most part twelve feet

deep. Unknown to the Germans, the ditch was not continuous
24

(Source: Barton Maughan. Tobruk and El Alamein [Adelaide: The Griffin Press, 1966], p. 131.)

Map 7. German attack, 13-14 April

throughout the sector. There was no ditch from posts R11 to

R21, which would have given direct access to the vital Pilastrino

ridge. Additionally, just north of R33, between R27 and R29,

the ditch was only two and one-half feet deep, with a solid

rock bottom.

On the afternoon of the 13th, men of the 2-17th saw motorcycles and a staff car in front of their sector. Soon after, a

Heinkel reconnaissance aircraft made a low-level pass over this

part of the perimeter. Later, other enemy aircraft scattered leaflets over the garrison that read:

The general officer commanding the German forces in Libya hereby

requests that the British troops occupying Tobruk surrender their

arms. Single soldiers waving white handkerchiefs are not fired on.

Strong German forces have already surrounded Tobruk, and it is

useless to try and escape. Remember Mekili. Our dive-bombers and

Stukas are awaiting your ships which are lying in Tobruk. 33

"Remember Mekili" referred to the British surrender there the

week before on 8 April, when the Germans took some 3,000

prisoners, including 102 Australians. As for the white hand-
25

kerchiefs, there were no such luxuries at Tobruk with the dust

and shortage of water.

Doubtless, the enemy was giving special attention to the

2-17th's sector. Later in the afternoon, enemy aircraft again flew

over the perimeter, and armored cars began probing the southern

perimeter. Enemy troops in trucks assembled 4,000 yards from

the perimeter. They dismounted but made no move to disperse

until brought under artillery fire. Trucks carried small detachments of German machine gunners forward within 1,500 yards

of the defenses, where they engaged any Australian movement

along the perimeter.

Watching a tank battle on the perimeter, Tobruk

1600. Lieutenant Colonel Crawford, the 2-17th's battalion

commander, moved his reserve, B Company, up behind D Company, which was occupying Posts R30 through R35.

1700. The Germans fired heavy artillery concentrations on

D Company but did not follow up with an attack.

1730. The Australians saw enemy infantry and several tanks

about 500 yards from the wire. They were advancing under cover
26

of heavy small-arms and machine-gun fire. The 1st and 107th

RHA engaged and stopped the advance.

RAF evening reconnaissance indicated the buildup for a

major attack with a report that 300 vehicles were concentrated

along the El Adem road.

After dark, three enemy tanks cruised singly along the antitank ditch, possibly looking for any opening in the obstacle.

2300. Before blowing the gap in the antitank ditch, the

Germans attempted to storm R33. Thirty German infantrymen

with 2 small field guns, a mortar, and 8 machine guns broke

through the wire, dug themselves in 100 yards east of the post

and engaged the defenders. The post returned fire, and when

that failed to drive off the Germans, Lieutenant Colonel Mackell,

the post commander, and six of his men counterattacked with

grenades and bayonets. Twelve Germans were killed, one was

captured, and the remainder fled. One of the Australian infantrymen, Cpl. Jack Edmondson, was posthumously awarded the

Victoria Cross, the first such medal to be awarded to an Australian in the war of 1939-45.

On the night of 13 April, the Australians conducted deep

patrolling around their perimeter. Lieutenant Colonel Crawford

sent out two patrols to locate the enemy positions taken up

during the afternoon near Post R33. Both patrols brought back

a prisoner from the German 8th Machine Gun Battalion and

also reported enemy movement in front of D Company. Crawford

alerted his reserve, B Company, to be ready to make a strong

counterattack at dawn from behind Post R32, which was 500

yards inside the perimeter wire.

14 April

0030. A German tank approached the still unbreached ditch,

stopped as if to check the area, then withdrew. Mines taken

out by the Germans were neatly stacked on both sides of the

intended gap.

0230. Some 200 German infantry came through the wire near

R33 and then spread out for several hundred yards inside the

perimeter. Captain Balfe signaled with his Very pistol for artillery support. The 1st and 107th RHA responded, along with

small-arms fire from the infantry. The Germans suffered casualties but did not withdraw. D Company, 2-15th, from the brigade

reserve battalion, was moved into position in the rear of D

Company, 2-17th.
27

0400. Enemy tanks were seen by moonlight assembling close

to the wire near the El Adem road and were brought under

artillery fire.

Members of C Company, 2-13th Battalion, on daylight patrol at outer

perimeter, Tobruk

0445. The same tanks approached the perimeter at R41 near

the El Adem road. Col. Ernst Bolbrinker, operations officer for

the 5th Panzer Regiment, stated the attack was to start at 0400

with a thirty-minute artillery preparation that would shift forward at 0430. The night was dark and bitterly cold. Terrain

orientation was nearly impossible because of inaccurate maps

and because a compass direction had not been provided. As a

result, engineer officers had to guide the units to the tank ditch.

Under blackout driving conditions and radio silence, the regimental staff following the combat columns got mixed in with

some logistical vehicles and lost contact with the tanks. The

regimental commander halted the column and broke radio silence

to reassemble the units. With all the commotion, the British

started to fire in the direction of the noise. Next, the engineer

guides became disoriented and led the attacking columns across

the front of the British positions. By the time the attacking
28

An effective artillery observation post, Tobruk

force reached the opening in the tank ditch, their artillery fires

had been shifted. Because the breaches allowed passage of only

one vehicle at a time, only the early morning fog prevented a

disaster. Nevertheless, the mounted infantry had already incurred

great losses. 34

0450. Forty German tanks were reported moving west from

R41 along the perimeter just outside the wire. The 1st RHA

engaged them. Enemy 88-mm guns began to fire on the Australian defensive positions.

0520. The lead German tanks turned and entered the perimeter through the gap just south of post R33. As planned, the

Australian infantry made no attempt to stop them but lay in

wait for the German infantry. The Germans headed straight

toward the D Company command post at R32. The first fifteen

tanks were seen towing antiaircraft and antitank guns. Groups

of fifteen to twenty men riding on or following the tanks dropped

behind them once they were inside the perimeter.
29

0545. Thirty-eight tanks of the 5th Panzer Regiment's 2d

Battalion were formed up for the attack nearly a mile inside

the perimeter wire. At the same time, the 1st Battalion's tanks

were moving up behind the infantry, field guns, and antitank

guns. British artillery fires were shifted from in front of the

wire to R32 and with excellent results. The German machinegun crews who had been riding on the tanks were mostly killed

or wounded, and the tanks moved on without them. The infantry

scattered and, under small-arms fire from the Australians, moved

back toward the wire. The German tanks continued to move

but back to the east, inside the perimeter, until they were within

a mile of the El Adem road. They then turned northeast, moved

for a short time parallel to the road, and then stopped about a

mile and one-half from the British artillery. The thirty-two 25-

pounders of the 1st and 107th RHA and the antitank guns of

the 2-3d Australian Antitank Regiment were directly ahead along

the Blue Line. The mobile antitank guns of M Battery, 3d RHA,

were to the Germans' left, and the 1st RHA was dug in and

hull down on the east side of the El Adem road, on the German

right flank (see map 8).

(Source: Peter Firkins, The Australians in Nine Wars [New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971], p. 230.)

Map 8. Friendly unit dispositions, 14 April

;?,C. - o 0

XK X~ `,A*-, ~a-XWC)O KX
30

Taking fire from all sides, the German tanks began to move

forward by bounds. As they closed within 600 yards, the British

artillerymen, using open sights, fired their 25-pounders with

deadly accuracy. Even without armor-piercing shells, their fire

was effective. Five tanks caught fire and the turret was blown

off of one 22-ton Mark IV. Two German tanks attempted to

outflank the guns to the right but were engaged and stopped

by antitank guns of the 2-3d Australian Antitank Regiment

positioned to their right flank. The 2d Battalion, 5th Panzer

Regiment, which had been leading the advance, then halted,

turned its tanks around, and began to withdraw, only to run

straight into the following element, its regiment's 1st Battalion.

The Germans had reached their high-water mark and were

now engaged from all sides. At the same time, back to the south

along the perimeter, the forward posts were covering the perimeter gap with fire, thus blocking the German follow-on forces.

The second line of posts was covering the open ground between

the perimeter and the tanks and was preventing the enemy tanks

and their infantry from rejoining. As dawn approached, the

firefight intensified near R32. Three German antitank guns and

a small fieldpiece were brought into action, firing behind R32.

Though under return fire, the D Company post killed the German

crew members with sniper fire. Next, the Germans brought up

a 75-mm field gun and several long-barreled 88-mm guns to the

gap. Again, the Australian infantry dealt the crews a deadly

blow. As dawn broke, enemy machine-gun positions were spotted

and one by one suppressed.

With General Lavarack's permission, General Morshead ordered the two cruiser squadrons of the 1st RTR to counterattack

the enemy tanks at first light. As the British cruiser tanks

moved west across the El Adem road in the early morning light,

they saw the enemy tanks grouped in front of them, one and

one-half miles south of the 1st and 107th RHA. The British

artillery fires had caused the enemy tanks to scatter, and they

began moving forward in groups toward the gaps in the artillery

positions. The Mark IIIs fired their guns as they moved, with

the heavier Mark IVs stopping to fire their 75-mms. At the same

time, one five-gun troop of M Battery, 3d RHA, with its antitank

guns mounted on trucks (Portee), worked its way around to the

rear of the German tanks, coming up on their right flank and

engaging them with hit-and-run tactics.

For forty-five minutes, the British artillerymen met the

enemy's advance, standing by their guns and proving themselves
31

more determined than their enemy. They lost one gun, ten men

killed in action, and four wounded in action.

0700. The German tanks again turned to the east but again

ran into antitank fire from the 2-3d and the 25-pounders of the

RHA. The antitank guns enfiladed them, and the RHA fired

from the front. The tanks passed and the smoke and dust cleared

to reveal four immobilized tanks in front of the 2-3d. Three

antitank guns were also destroyed. The 1st Royal Tanks now

engaged the German tanks at one mile and began to close with

them. Smoke and dust were everywhere. Farther back, near the

perimeter, B Company of the 2-17th was counterattacking against

100 Germans holed up near the ruins called Goschen's house,

north of R32. D Company of the 2-15th established a blocking

position just to the north to assist in containing the Germans.

Attacking with grenades and bayonets, the Australians killed

eighteen Germans and captured eighteen. Overhead, Tobruk's

RAF Hurricanes were fighting a battle with German and Italian

fighters, while antiaircraft guns fired at the weaving and turning

aircraft. The Hurricanes brought down four enemy planes and

lost one of their own.

Under fire from all sides, the German tanks finally withdrew,

turning to the south and heading for the gap. Tank after tank

was being knocked out as they ran the gauntlet. The British

cruisers and two infantry tanks which had joined them gave

chase.

On the perimeter, the German infantry, who had failed to

widen the gap and secure the flanks of the penetration, were

scattered everywhere. Enemy pockets near the gap were being

suppressed by the Australians, but groups who had penetrated

deeper to the rear of the perimeter posts continued to cause

trouble. There was great confusion as the German tanks and

infantry pushed together out through the gap. Captain Balfe,

the D Company commander, described the scene:

The crossing was badly churned up and the tanks raised clouds of

dust as they went. In addition, there was the smoke of two tanks

blazing just outside the wire. Into this cloud of dust and smoke we

fired anti-tank weapons, Brens, rifles, and mortars, and the gunners

sent hundreds of shells. We shot up a lot of infantry as they tried

to get past, and many, who took refuge in the anti-tank ditch, were

later captured. It was all I could do to stop the troops following

them outside the wire. The Germans were a rabble, but the crews

of three tanks did keep their heads. They stopped at the anti-tank

ditch and hitched on behind them the big guns, whose crews had
32

been killed. They dragged these about one thousand yards, but by

then we had directed our artillery on to them. They unhitched the

guns and went for their lives. 35

0730. The Germans were in full retreat. Forty German divebombers appeared above the harbor to bomb the town in an

attack meant to be coordinated with the lead German tank

battalion. Four Stukas were shot down by British antiaircraft

gunners and two by Hurricane fighters. Seventy-five Germans

were captured at Goschen's house.

Iroops in a oust storm, Iobruuk

0830. Except for sporadic fighting, the battle was over. By

noon, the last of the enemy was rounded up. Rommel gave the

order to attack again at 1800, but the order was canceled when

sufficient forces could not be mustered. Two days later, on 16

April, Rommel, thinking the 8th Machine Gun Battalion was

still within the perimeter, personally directed a new attack from

the west against the Ras el Medauuar sector with six medium

and twelve light tanks of the Ariete Division, plus the 62d

Infantry Regiment of the Trento Division. When counterattacked

by the 2-48th Australian Infantry, 26 German officers and 777

men surrendered.

Continuing the attack the next day with ten tanks, the

Italians reached their forward posts, but when the infantry failed

to follow, they withdrew losing five tanks. 3 6 During the next
33

ten days, the Australians gave the Germans and Italians little

rest, conducting aggressive patrolling and bringing in approxi- mately 1,700 prisoners. The Germans didn't attack again until

their second abortive attempt on 30 April.

Critical Events

The clearly recognizable turning point of the battle was when

the 5th Panzer regimental commander, Colonel Olbrich, ordered

his forces to withdraw. 3 7 A mile and one-half inside the Australian perimeter, having reached a slight rise across their front, the panzers suddenly faced a line of British 25-pounders, antitank

guns, and tanks on their flanks. The British fire was devastating, and seventeen panzers were destroyed. As soon as the lead panzer battalion turned to avoid the British fire, it ran into the

trailing panzer battalion. With this reverse in direction came

confusion and an immediate shift of momentum to the defenders.

This key event was further magnified by the actions of the

German 8th Machine Gun Battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Ponath, the battalion commander, had tried unsuccessfully to prevent Colonel Olbrich from withdrawing.38 Without tank support, the

8th Machine Gun Battalion's men were lying on the ground, with no cover, under heavy fire, and their ammunition was

running short. Colonel Ponath decided to pull the battalion back, and as they made the first rush to withdraw, he was killed, a

bullet through his heart. The next senior officer ordered the men

to cease fire, and many then surrendered.39 With this event, the

Australian infantry was able to restore the perimeter, except for minor pockets of German resistance. Other key events were

B Company of the 2-17th's counterattack to eliminate the German

resistance around Goschen's house, thereby relieving the pressure

on D Company and Post R33, which was covering the gap; there

was also the failure of the German engineers to lead the attacking columns directly to the perimeter opening, causing a

delay in the attack time and a loss of the effects of preparatory fires; the numerous probes and the abortive attack on 11 April against the 2-17th's sector also alerted the Australians to the

imminence of an attack. Forewarned, General Morshead concentrated his artillery, antitank guns, tanks, and infantry reserves to meet the German assault. All of these major occurrences favored the Australians and certainly helped effect a

decisive victory.

LPIILBIBBU- ----_-____I··--·;·--raa-a---