alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>   1

                                  EXHIBIT 6.24

          AGREEMENT FOR RETIREMENT OF KCD HOLDINGS OPTION SHARES, DATED
       SEPTEMBER 12, 1996, BY AND BETWEEN THE COMPANY AND WELLINGTON EWEN


<PAGE>   2

                               September 12, 1996

Mr. Wellington Ewen
2835 Townsgate Road, Suite 110
Westlake Village, CA 91361

    Re:      Retirement of KCD Holdings ("KCD") Option Shares

Dear Wellington:

    In connection with your agreement to tender to KCD for retirement the
250,000 shares of KCD common stock issued to you upon exercise of "Option 1"
under paragraph 4.1.1 of your Employment Agreement with KCD dated October 15,
1995, KCD has agreed to extend the Option 1 exercise period through and
including the expiration of the Option 2 exercise period set forth in paragraph
4.1.1 of your Employment Agreement.

    If you are in agreement with the foregoing, please act to countersign this
letter where indicated hereinbelow and return same to KCD.

                                          Sincerely,

                                          KCD HOLDINGS INCORPORATED



                                          Bonnie Richards, Vice President

AGREED AND ACCEPTED:


--------------------------------
Wellington Ewen
Form of Option Award Agreement.



 Exhibit 10.1 
  

					
	 Notice of Grant of Stock Options
 and Option
Agreement
	  	 Harley-Davidson, Inc.
       ID: 39-1805420
 3700 West Juneau Avenue
 Milwaukee, WI 53208
	  	


			
	«FirstName» «LastName»	  	Option Number:	  	
	«Address1»	  	Plan: 2009 Incentive Stock Plan	  	
	«City,» «State» «Zip»	  	ID:	  	
	«Country»	  		  	

  
  
 Effective <insert date> (the “Grant Date”), you have been granted a(n) Non-Qualified Stock Option to buy <insert number of shares>
shares of Harley-Davidson, Inc. (the Company) stock at «price» per share. 
 The total option price of the shares granted is «$
amount». 
 Shares in each period will become fully vested on the date shown: 
  

							
	 Shares
	  	Vest
Type	  	Full
Vest	  	Expiration
	 «shares»
	  		  		  	
	 «shares»
	  		  		  	
	 «shares»
	  		  		  	
	 «shares»
	  		  		  	

 These options are granted under and governed by the terms and conditions of the Company’s 2009 Incentive
Stock Plan and this Option Agreement; provided that the occurrence of a Change of Control (as defined in the Plan) shall not, in and of itself, cause otherwise unvested options to become vested. Unless the Committee has exercised its discretion
under Section 17(c) of the Plan to provide a result more favorable to you, whether or not the vesting of otherwise unvested options is accelerated following such Change of Control shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of the
Transition Agreement then in effect between you and Harley-Davidson, Inc. (or, if you had been but are not then a party to a Transition Agreement, the provisions of the Transition Agreement that would have applied if the last such Transition
Agreement to which you were a party had continued). 
 You may return this Option Agreement to the Company (in care of the Vice President and Treasurer)
within thirty (30) days after the Grant Date, and by doing so you will forfeit any rights under this Option Agreement. If you choose to retain this Option Agreement beyond that date, then you accept the terms of these options and agree and
consent to all amendments to the Plan and the Company’s 1995 Stock Option Plan and 2004 Incentive Stock Plan through the Grant Date as they apply to these options and any prior awards to you under such plans. 
  

			
	Vice President and Treasurer	 	
	Date:	 	
	Time:
EXHIBIT 31.1
 Certification
      a.
    
    designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and
procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating
to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others
within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;b.
    
    designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control
over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable
assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial
statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;c.
    
    evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and
presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls
and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation;
andd.
    
    disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal
control over financial reporting; and
  a.
    
    all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal
control over financial reporting, which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the
registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; andb.
    
    any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a
significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.
 Date: May 8, 2009
    /s/ G. Gary YetmanChief Executive Officer and President
#### § 302.1 Definitions.

*Inspector.* Any employee of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service or other person authorized by the Administrator to inspect and certify the plant health status of plants and products under this part.

*Interstate.* From any State into or through any other State.

*State.* The District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, or any State, territory, or possession of the United States.
#### The People of the State of Illinois ex rel. John S. Rusch, defendant in error, v. James Pacente, Jr. et al., respondents. James Pacente, Jr., plaintiff in error.

Gen. No. 37,294.

Opinion filed October 16, 1934.

Barrett, Barrett, Costello *So*Barrett, for plaintiff in error; Edward L. Hoyer, of counsel. Thomas J. Courtney, State’s Attorney, for defendant in error; John F. Cashen, Jr., of counsel.

Mr. Justice Scanlan

delivered the opinion of the court.
From:Sent:To:Cc:Subject:Attachments:Josh,Schneider,Shelley<shelley.schneider@nebraska.gov>Tuesday,March11,201411:03AMTapp,JoshuaCrable,Gregory;Jay,Michael;brian.kozisek@nebraska.gov;Gutierrez,Katie;Algoe-Eakin,AmyClarificationtoNebraska'sS02i-SIPwithregardtoSection128Title-116.pdfOnAugust22,2013,theNebraskaDepartmentofEnvironmentalQuality(NDEQ)submittedanInfrastructureStateImplementationPlanforthe2010SulfurDioxideNationalAmbientAirQualityStandard{2010S02I-SIP).Documentswereincludedwiththe2010S02I-SIPtoclarifytherequirementsinSection128ofthefederalCleanAirActAmendmentsof1990.TheNDEQisrequestingthattheEnvironmentalProtectionAgency(EPA)approvethesedocumentsintotheNebraskaStateImplementationPlan{SIP).Thedocumentstobeincludedare:1.Section49-1493(13)ofthe"NebraskaPoliticalAccountabilityandDisclosureAct";and2.Chapter2ofTitle4-NebraskaAccountabilityandDisclosureCommissionInaddition,Nebraskaissubmittingthefollowingattacheddocumentasclarificationtothe2010S02I-SIPwithregardstotherequirementsofSection128andfurtherrequeststhatthisdocumentbeapprovedintotheNebraskaSIP:Title116-DepartmentofEnvironmentalControlCodeofEthicsoftheNebraskaAdministrativeCodeTheNDEQrequeststhattheEPAamendtheNebraskaSIPtoincludethereferenceddocuments,totheextentthattheyaredeemedapprovable.AttachedisasearchablepdfversionofTitle116-DepartmentofEnvironmentalControlCodeofEthics.Thankyouforyourattentiontothismatter.Ifyouhavequestionsregardingthisclarification,pleasecontactBrianKozisek,Grants,Planning,andOutreachUnitSupervisorat(402)471-6624ormeat{402)471-4299.ShelleySchneiderAirQualityDivisionAdministratorNebraskaDepartmentofEnvironmentalQuality1200NStreet,Suite400Lincoln,NE68509-8922PH:402-471-4299Pleaseconsidertheenvironmentbeforeprintingthisemail.1
#### John Russo, Appellant, v Anna Iacono, Respondent.

In a defamation action, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, dated March 15, 1979, which denied his motion to dismiss defendant’s amended counterclaim. Order modified, on the law, by dismissing the third pleaded cause of action in the amended counterclaim. As so modified, order affirmed with $50 costs and disbursements to defendant. Plaintiff contends that the counterclaim—dismissed twice previously for failure to state a cause of action—still does not make out causes of action. Plaintiff also contends that even assuming, *arguendo,*that an intentional tort is made out, it is barred by the Statute of Limitations, to wit, it is not protected by CPLR 203 (subd [e]) because dismissal was predicated on the failure of the original pleading to "give notice of the transactions * * * to be proved pursuant to the amended pleading”. We disagree and find that the first two causes of action in the amended counterclaim should stand. Defendant’s allegations that the plaintiff pointed a gun at her, shouted "I got to kill you”, and that she became severely frightened, spell out an action for assault. An action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress is pleaded by her allegations that plaintiff on three separate occasions shouted vile, objectionable and obscene language at her. However, we do not agree with Special Term’s conclusion that a cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress was made out. No allegations of negligence appear in the pleadings. Furthermore the third cause of action alleged in the amended counterclaim must be dismissed because there is no independent cause of action for punitive damages. The statute that protects the defendant’s causes of action from dismissal because of the Statute of Limitations is CPLR 205 (subd a). Inasmuch as the causes of action in the amended counterclaim were not barred since they were not barred at the time the claim asserted in the complaint were interposed (CPLR 203, subd [c]), their dismissal upon grounds other than a voluntary discontinuance, the neglect to prosecute or a final judgment on the merits, permits a new action upon the same causes of action within six months after the termination (CPLR 205). Hopkins, J. P., Lazer, Margett and O’Connor, JJ., concur.
§ 253.9 Claims against households. ( a ) *What are the procedures for establishing a claim against a household for an overissuance?* ( 1 ) The State agency must establish a claim against any household that has received more Food Distribution Program commodities than it was entitled to receive.
( 2 ) The procedures for establishing and collecting claims against households are specified in FNS Handbook 501, The Food Distribution Program on Indian Reservations.
( b ) *Who is responsible for repaying a household overissuance claim?* ( 1 ) All adult household members are jointly and separately liable for the repayment of the value of any overissuance of Food Distribution Program benefits to the household.
( 2 ) Responsibility for repayment continues even in instances where the household becomes ineligible or is not participating in the program.
[64 FR 73385, Dec. 30, 1999]
#### § 3570.100 OMB control number.

The information collection requirements contained in this regulation have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and have been assigned OMB control number 0575-0173. You are not required to respond to this collection of information unless it displays a valid OMB control number.
```

[Federal Register Volume 75, Number 140 (Thursday, July 22, 2010)]
[Notices]
[Page 42680]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2010-17890]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS

Agenda and Notice of Public Meeting of the Colorado Advisory 
Committee

    Notice is hereby given, pursuant to the provisions of the rules and 
regulations of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (Commission), and 
the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), that a planning meeting of 
the Colorado Advisory Committee to the Commission will convene at 10 
a.m. on Monday, August 16, 2010. The purpose of the meeting is for the 
committee to participate in orientation and ethics training; discuss 
recent Commission and regional activities, discuss current civil rights 
issues in the state and plan future activities. The Committee will also 
be briefed by the director of a city anti-discrimination agency and a 
representative of the Denver American Indian Commission on civil rights 
issues in the state.
    Members of the public are entitled to submit written comments; the 
comments must be received in the regional office by September 16, 2010. 
The address is Rocky Mountain Regional Office, 1961 Stout Street, Suite 
240, Denver, CO 80294. Comments may be e-mailed to ebohor@usccr.gov. 
Records generated by this meeting may be inspected and reproduced at 
the Rocky Mountain Regional Office, as they become available, both 
before and after the meeting. Persons interested in the work of this 
advisory committee are advised to go to the Commission's Web site, 
http://www.usccr.gov, or to contact the Rocky Mountain Regional Office 
at the above e-mail or street address.
    Hearing-impaired persons who will attend the meeting and require 
the services of a sign language interpreter should contact the Regional 
Office at least ten (10) working days before the scheduled date of the 
meeting.
    The meeting will be conducted pursuant to the provisions of the 
rules and regulations of the Commission and FACA.

    Dated in Washington, DC, July 19, 2010.
Peter Minarik,
Acting Chief, Regional Programs Coordination Unit.
[FR Doc. 2010-17890 Filed 7-21-10; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6335-01-P
```
#### PEOPLE ex rel. BEATTY v. BEATTY.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fir-st Department.

June 8, 1906.)

Proceedings by the people of the state of New York, on the relation of Nellie C. Beatty, against Herbert T. Beatty.

No opinion. Motion denied, with leave to appellant to apply in the court below to open default. Order filed.
### C OURT OF 

### A PPEALS FOR THE



### F IRST 

### D ISTRICT OF 

### T EXAS AT 

### H OUSTON



### O RDER ON 

### M OTION



### November 7, 2008 Revision Cause number: 01

- 1 6

- 0 0 104

- C V

Style: In the Interest of J. G

. , a Child

Date motion filed * : February 29 , 201 6

Type of motion: Motion for extension of time to file reporter’s record

Party filing motion: Court reporter ( Rachel L. G amez )

Document to be filed: Reporter’s record (approximately 60 0 pages covering 5 day s of testimony)

Is appeal accelerated? Yes

If motion to extend time:

Original due date: February 17

, 20 1 6

Number of previous extensions granted: 1 Current Due date: February 29, 2016

Date Requested: March 7, 2016

Ordered that motion is:

 Granted

If document is to be filed, document due: March 7 , 201 6

 T he Court will not grant additional motions to extend time

.

 Denied

 Dismissed ( e.g. , want of jurisdiction, moot )

 Other: _____________________________________

Because this is a termination case, the Court is required to bring this appeal to final dispositio n within 180

days of the date the notice of appeal was filed so far as reasonably possible. See Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 6.2,

reprinted in T EX

. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN

. , tit. 2, subtit. F app. (West 2013). Accordingly, no further extensions

will be granted.

Judge ’ s signature: /s/ Terry Jennings



Panel consists of

____________________________________________

Date: March 1, 2016
98-1281.

#### Weinberger v. Weinberger.

Hamilton App. No. C-970552. This cause is pending before the court as a discretionary appeal and cross-appeal. On July 29, 1998, appellee/eross-appellant filed a memorandum in support of jurisdiction of cross-appeal and in response to appellani/cross-appellee’s memorandum, which was due July 27, 1998. Whereas S.CtPrac.R. XIV(1)(C) prohibits the filing of a document after the filing deadline has passed,

IT IS ORDERED by the court, *sua sponte,*that appellee/cross-appellant’s combined memorandum be, and hereby is, stricken.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED by the court, *sua sponte,*that the cross-appeal of Barrett Weinberger be, and hereby is, dismissed.

The appeal of Cathy F. Weinberger remains pending.
#### A. Phillip Goldsmith, Respondent-Appellant, v Monroe Silver, Defendant, and Joseph Popolow, Appellant-Respondent.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered September 7, 1978, denying plaintiffs motion for summary judgment in lieu of a complaint but striking the defenses, except as to the issue of damages, and directing a trial on that issue, is unanimously affirmed, without costs. Defendants Silver and Popolow being united in interest, the service of the summons on defendant Silver within the period of the Statute of Limitations tolled the statute as against defendant Popolow. (CPLR 203, subd [b].) The severance of the action as against defendant Popolow at the time that the judgment was obtained against defendant Silver was not a dismissal of the action as against Popolow but rather a provision for continuing it as against him. Furthermore, the action against Popolow is not time barred, being saved from that by CPLR 1502. *(Hofferberth*v *Nash,*191 NY 446.) The earlier judgment rendered against defendant Silver did not purport to be taken against both defendants. In that respect, the judgment was not a compliance with CPLR 1501; but we think that this is at most an irregularity. As plaintiff apparently claims to be entitled to keep the collateral for the indebtedness, defendant is entitled to credit for the value of that collateral. The determination as between plaintiff and defendant Silver that the collateral was worthless does not bind defendant Popolow. (Cf. CPLR 1502.) Accordingly, Special Term properly directed a hearing as to the value of the collateral. Any judgment that may ultimately be entered in this action will of course provide that any payments made either on the judgment against defendant Silver or against defendant Popolow shall be credited against both judgments. Concur—Fein, J. P., Sullivan, Lupiano, Silverman and Bloom, JJ.
<PAGE>

COMMON STOCK INFORMATION
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
UNITED ASSET MANAGEMENT CORPORATION

The Company's common stock is listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Presented
below are the high, low and closing quarterly stock prices for 1996 and 1997, as
reported on the New York Stock Exchange composite tape, together with quarterly
dividends declared.

Ticker Symbol: UAM

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                     DIVIDEND
                               HIGH            LOW          CLOSE    DECLARED
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
<S>                        <C>            <C>            <C>         <C>
FIRST QUARTER, 1996        $23 5/16       $18 3/16       $23 3/16       $.160
SECOND QUARTER, 1996       $25 1/8        $21 3/4        $24            $.160
THIRD QUARTER, 1996        $25 1/8        $21 3/4        $23 5/8        $.170
FOURTH QUARTER, 1996       $27 5/8        $23 1/4        $26 5/8        $.170
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
FIRST QUARTER, 1997        $29 1/8        $25 5/8        $25 5/8        $.185
SECOND QUARTER, 1997       $28 7/8        $24 1/4        $28 5/16       $.185
THIRD QUARTER, 1997        $28 13/16      $26            $28 11/16      $.200
FOURTH QUARTER, 1997       $30 3/16       $24 1/4        $24 7/16       $.200
</TABLE>
# C o u rt o f

A p p ea ls

o f t h e S t a te o f

G eo rg ia

ATLANTA,_

_ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _
Th e Co u rt

o f Ap p ea l s h er eb y p a s s es t h e f

o ll owi n g o r der :

A 22I0017. C H IL D R E N ’ S W O R L D LEARNI NG CE N T E R , L L C

. v. B R A N D IC E CARTER et a l

.

Ch i l dren ’ s W o rl d Learn in g Cen t er, L L C s eek s i nt erl o cu t o ry rev i ew o f t h e t ri al

co u rt ’ s o rd er d en y i n g i t s m o t i on fo r s u m m ary ju d g m en t

. Th e t ri al co u rt ’ s o rd er was

e n t e red o n J u l y 2 0, 2 0 2 1

, an d t h e cert i fi cat e o f i m m ed i at e rev i ew was en t er e d o n Au g u s t 2 , 2 0 2 1 . W e l ack ju ri sd i ct i o n

. Un d er OCGA § 5 -6 -3 4 (b ), a p art y m ay req u es t i n t erl o cu to ry rev i ew o n l y i f t h e

t ri al co urt cert i fi es wi t h i n t en d ay s o f en t ry o f t h e o rd er at i s s u e t h at i m m ed i at e rev i ew

s h o u ld b e h ad

. A t i m el y cert i fi cat e o f i m m e d i at e rev i ew i s a j u ri s d i ct i o n al

r e q u i rem en t

. See V

o n W a l d n er v. B a l d

wi n / Ch es hi r e, In c

. , 1 33 Ga. Ap p

. 2 3

, 2 4 (2 ) (2 0 9 SE2 d 7 1 5 ) (1 9 7 4 ). If th e cert i fi cat e o f i m m ed i at e rev i ew i s n o t en t ered wi t h in

t h e pres cri bed t en -d ay p eri o d

, it i s u n t i m el y , an d t h e p art y s eek i n g rev i ew m u s t wai t

u n t i l t he fi n al ju d g m en t t o ap p eal

. See OCGA § 5-6 -3 4 (b ); Tu r n er v. Ha rp er , 2 3 1 Ga.
1 7 5 , 1 7 6 (2 0 0 SE2 d 74 8 ) (1 9 7 3 ). Here, t h e cert i fi cat e o f i m

m ed i at e rev i ew was n o t en t ered u n t i l 13 d ay s aft er t h e

en t ry of t h e ord er d en y i ng su m m ary j u d g m en t

. Th e cert i fi cat e of i m m ed iat e rev i ew i s t h u s u n t i m el y

. See V

a n S ch a ll er n v. S t an co , 1 3 0 Ga. Ap p

. 6 8 7
, 6 8 7 (2 0 4 SE2 d 3 1 7 ) ( 1 9 7 4 ) ( “ [A] cert i fi cat e fo r t h e i m m ed iat e rev i ew of a n o n fi n al o r in t erl o cu t o ry ju d g m en t i s i n effect i v e u n l es s en t ered

, i .e., fi l ed wi t h t h e cl erk

, wi t h i n t en d ay s aft er

en t ry o f t h e ju d g m en t ap p eal ed fro m .”). September 02, 2021Acco rd i ng l y , we l ack ju ri s d i ct i o n t o co n si d er t h i s ap p li cat i o n , wh i ch i s h ereb y

DISM ISSED.

C o u r t o f A p p e a l s o f t h e S t a t e o

f G e o r g ia C le r k ’ s O f f i c e , A t la n t a ,

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I c e r ti fy t h a t t h e a b o v e i s a t r u e e x t r a c t f r o m
t h e m i n u t e s o

f t h e C o u r t o

f A p p e a l s o f G e o r g i a

. W i tn e s s m y s i g n a t u r e a n d t h e s e a l o

f s a i d c o u r t h e r e t o a f f i x e d t h e d a y a n d y e a r l a s t a b o v e w r i t t e n

.

, C l e r k

. 09/02/2021
§ 3201.76 Asphalt and tar removers. ( a ) *Definition.* Cleaning agents designed to remove asphalt or tar from equipment, roads, or other surfaces.
( b ) *Minimum biobased content.* The Federal preferred procurement product must have a minimum biobased content of at least 80 percent, which shall be based on the amount of qualifying biobased carbon in the product as a percent of the weight (mass) of the total organic carbon in the finished product.
( c ) *Preference compliance date.* No later than April 4, 2013, procuring agencies, in accordance with this part, will give a procurement preference for qualifying biobased asphalt and tar removers. By that date, Federal agencies that have the responsibility for drafting or reviewing specifications for products to be procured shall ensure that the relevant specifications require the use of biobased asphalt and tar removers.
[77 FR 20289, Apr. 4, 2012]