J-S10044-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MARGARET E. FITZPATRICK 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1318 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 17, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-21-CR-0000497-2019

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED MAY 24, 2021

Margaret E. Fitzpatrick (Fitzpatrick) appeals from the judgment of 

sentenced imposed in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County (trial 

court) after her plea of nolo contendere to misdemeanor Theft by Unlawful 

Taking, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a). Fitzpatrick argues that the trial court erred in 

denying her motion to withdraw her plea because it was not voluntarily given

and she is innocent. We affirm.

We take the following factual background and procedural history from 

our independent review of the record and the trial court’s December 18, 2020 

opinion.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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I.

On April 16, 2018, Detective Ray Taylor and Chief County Detective 

Jonathan Mays were assigned to review a case involving 82 year-old

Cumberland County Manor Care resident Frances Baker (Baker) after an April 

11, 2018 hearing in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County

regarding her need for guardianship due to her mental health and inability to 

care for herself without assistance. There also were questions concerning 

money withdrawals from Baker’s bank accounts.

On April 25, 2018, the detectives met with Mary Fox (Fox) at the 

Cumberland County Office of Aging who advised that she had received a report 

from a source that Baker might be the victim of theft. Before the court 

assigned guardianship, Fitzpatrick managed Baker’s affairs through a power 

of attorney. After conducting a review of Baker’s account, Fox noticed two 

large check withdrawals from Baker’s account payable to Mediation Ministries 

and Litigation Services (MMLS). Fitzpatrick is the sole founder of MMLS, which 

advertises itself as an organization providing pro bono legal services to 

underprivileged individuals. The first check withdrawal, dated September 29, 

2017, was for $7,500, and the second, dated March 8, 2018, was for $10,000. 

(See Affidavit of Probable Cause, 1/15/19, at 1-2).

On September 7, 2018, when Fitzpatrick met with detectives, she 

claimed that the $7,500 check was for a realtor’s commission after the sale of 

Baker’s property that the realtor said he wanted to donate to MMLS. However, 
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when detectives met with the realtor, he told them he did not know anything 

about a donation to MMLS and, in fact, he had donated his services to Baker 

and did not ask for any commission from her. Fitzpatrick stated that the 

$10,000 check was for expenses arising from services provided by MMLS for

Baker’s case, although such services were advertised as pro bono. A review 

of MMLS’s financial records indicated the funds donated to MMLS were solely 

controlled by Fitzpatrick. (See id. at 2-3).

On January 15, 2019, the Commonwealth charged Fitzpatrick with two 

counts each of Theft by Unlawful Taking as felonies of the first degree and 

Access Device Fraud as third-degree felonies. She filed a pre-trial motion to 

dismiss the charges that was denied.

At the August 17, 2020 Call of the List

1 before President Judge Edward 

E. Guido (Judge Guido),2the following conversation occurred:

THE COURT: What are the charges []?

[Senior Assistant District Attorney] MS. METZGER: Your Honor, 

the theft offense, she did take money from-she had a power-ofattorney and did take money from that person’s account. The 

____________________________________________

1

‘“Call of the List’ in Cumberland County is held the morning of jury selection 

for cases previously called for a jury trial at a pre-trial conference. The 

purpose of Call of the List is to finalize any last-minute negotiations between 

parties, for defendants to understand any plea offers tendered, and to call 

cases for trial while placing on the record the expected number of days, etc.” 

(Commonwealth’s Brief, at 4 n.3).

2 President Judge Edward E. Guido presided over the Call of the List. Judge 

Christylee L. Peck presided over the Guilty Plea proceedings later that day.
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offer is for M-1 with an agreement of probation for 5 years with 

early termination once she pays off the restitution.

THE COURT: What are the guidelines?

MS. METZGER: The guidelines are ...

THE COURT: How much was stolen?

MS. METZGER: I’m sorry?

THE COURT: How much is alleged to have been stolen?

MS. METZGER: 17,000.00, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Fitzpatrick, you’re not going to take that for 

probation?

[FITZPATRICK]: I can’t hear what you’re saying. I’m sorry, Your 

Honor.

THE COURT: The offer is a probationary sentence. You want a 

trial on this?

[FITZPATRICK]: I’m not sure I understand, sir.

THE COURT: If you go to trial and you’re convicted Ms. Fitzpatrickit won’t be my case, because I’ll be recused-but it is almost certain 

you will end up in jail. They are making an offer to give you 

probation.

[FITZPATRICK]: Oh, okay.

THE COURT: With the opportunity to pay the money back within 

5 years. Do you understand that?

[FITZPATRICK]: I think so.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. METZGER: RS to 9 on the Felony 3, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: All right. Well, 17,500.00 almost guarantees she’s 

going to jail. I won’t be doing the sentencing, but-all right. Go 

talk to those two clients.

(N.T. Call of the List, 8/17/20, at 3-4).

Later that day, in Judge Peck’s courtroom, Fitzpatrick entered a nolo 

contendere plea to the charge of Theft by Unlawful Taking as a misdemeanor 

in the first degree in exchange for the Commonwealth withdrawing all the 

other felony charges. Before entering the plea, counsel assisted Fitzpatrick in 

answering a 16-question written colloquy. In that document, Fitzpatrick 

confirmed that she reads, writes and understands the English language, she 

understood the charges against her as stated in the Information, and that by 

pleading nolo contendere, she was giving up her right to a trial and had limited 

appellate rights. She also affirmed that no threats or promises had been made 

to persuade her to enter the plea and that the decision to plead nolo 

contendere was hers alone. (See Written Nolo Contendere Colloquy Form, 

8/17/20, at 2-3).

At the plea hearing, counsel advised the court that Fitzpatrick “feels that 

in her scope of her power of attorney she was acting appropriately, but she 

understands the evidence against her.” (N.T. Plea Hearing, 8/17/20, at 2). 

She told the court that Fitzpatrick had “done a lot of charitable work in the 

community throughout the course of her career” and is “dealing with a lot of 

health issues. She doesn’t want to take this to trial and risk having a felony 
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and more serious consequences today. So she would like to pay back the 

restitution as she’s able and take responsibility for this.” (Id. at 3-4).

After the Commonwealth recited the facts, the court engaged in a 

colloquy with Fitzpatrick. Fitzpatrick admitted that the Commonwealth could 

prove the recited facts against her beyond a reasonable doubt, and that she 

understood what it had to prove to establish her guilt of theft and the 

maximum penalty that could be imposed. She agreed that she was pleading 

no contest to one count of theft as a misdemeanor and the Commonwealth 

would dismiss the rest of the charges against her. When the court asked 

Fitzpatrick if anyone had made any threats or promises to induce her plea or 

if she was under the influence of drugs or alcohol that rendered her unable to 

understand what is going on, she answered, “No, Your Honor.” Fitzpatrick 

stated she understood that the sentence would be five years of probation. 

Finally, the court confirmed again that Fitzpatrick wished to plead no contest 

to theft. When given the opportunity to speak to the court, Fitzpatrick thanked 

both the court and counsel, stating that she understood how overwhelmed 

they can be since she was a former employee of MidPenn Legal Services. (See 

id. at 4-5).

Fitzpatrick agreed to be sentenced that day, and, consistent with the 

plea agreement, the court sentenced her to pay the costs of prosecution, a 

$100 fine, restitution to Baker in the amount of $17,500 and up to five years 

of probation. It also noted that Fitzpatrick would be released from the 
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probationary period sooner upon the full payment of the costs, fine and 

restitution if she remained in good behavior. (See id. at 6-7).

Approximately one week later, on August 26, 2020, Fitzpatrick filed a 

motion to withdraw her plea in which she represented that she did not freely 

and voluntarily enter the plea because she felt “threatened by Judge Guido’s 

demeanor and remarks to her that she would go to prison.” (Motion to 

Withdraw Plea, 8/26/20, at 1). At the September 15, 2020 hearing on the 

motion, Fitzpatrick testified on direct that she was shocked by Judge Guido’s 

demeanor and “didn’t hear much of anything else” other than his statement, 

“you either take the plea or you go to jail for [five] years.” (N.T. Hearing, 

9/15/20, at 4). She explained she had known Judge Guido through her work 

as a Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) in dependency court and he 

had “been nothing but kind,” but at the Call of the List, she “felt like Jesus 

when Judas betrayed him for [thirty] pieces of silver.” (Id. at 5). She told 

the court she thought she was going to trial that day and wanted to withdraw 

the plea now. Fitzpatrick explained her cancer history, hearing problems and 

family situation, including caring for her 48-year-old son who suffered from 

schizophrenia. (See id. at 4-7).

On cross-examination, Fitzpatrick testified she could not remember if 

Judge Guido or Judge Peck took her plea because it was “a fog.” (Id. at 13). 

She said that her counsel probably explained the agreement the 

Commonwealth was willing to make in exchange for the plea, but she could 
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not remember everything that was said, including whether she told her 

attorney that she was in “in a fog” or “stressed” due to Judge Guido acting 

“out of character.” (Id. at 15). Similarly, she stated she could not remember 

what she said to Judge Peck, the substance of the colloquy or whether she 

told either Judge Peck or Judge Guido that she had trouble hearing. She also

denied that she committed theft or fraud. She agreed that she was on 

probation, not in jail, because of the plea agreement. The court confirmed 

that, although in 2003, Fitzpatrick was diagnosed with PTSD resulting from an 

assault, she had not been diagnosed with any mental health infirmities since 

taking the plea and her hearing had not changed since that time. (See id. at 

7-25).

Upon the court’s questioning, Fitzpatrick’s counsel3 explained that the 

Call of the List was hectic, and Fitzpatrick probably was expecting a calmer

environment. It was counsel’s opinion that there was more pressure to 

resolve cases at that time due to the Covid-19 pandemic. After Judge Guido 

asked Fitzpatrick about taking the guilty plea, counsel spoke with her and 

Fitzpatrick asked about a nolo contendere plea, which the Commonwealth 

ultimately agreed to accept. Although counsel stated that, in hindsight, 

maybe Fitzpatrick did not understand what a nolo plea is, the court stated that 

____________________________________________

3 Lindsay M. Renard, Esquire, represented Fitzpatrick at the hearings for the

nolo contendere plea and the motion to withdraw and spoke to the court in 

her representative capacity. She also is representing Fitzpatrick on appeal.
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it had clearly explained what it was. At no time did Fitzpatrick tell counsel 

that she felt blind-sided by Judge Guido or threatened to take the plea. 

Counsel explained that after Fitzpatrick was sentenced, she followed up with 

counsel with additional questions regarding her post-sentence rights and 

stated she wanted to appeal the conviction. Counsel confirmed to the court 

that, if convicted, Fitzpatrick faced a possible maximum sentence of seven 

years as to each count and that, due to the amount allegedly stolen, the 

Commonwealth could have argued for a higher sentence. (See id. at 25-30).

At the close of the hearing, Judge Peck denied the motion to withdraw, 

stating that she would have the nolo plea hearing transcribed, although she 

clearly remembered the events, and that, despite the hectic Call of the List,

Fitzpatrick appeared in a separate courtroom in front of her where she 

knowingly, voluntarily and freely entered the nolo contendere plea. In her 

opinion, Judge Peck explains more fully that:

[Fitzpatrick] testified that Judge Guido told her she would go to 

jail for 5 years if she did not take the plea. This is not an accurate 

recitation of Judge Guido’s statements. Judge Guido instead 

asked [Fitzpatrick] if she wanted to go to trial on her charges after 

hearing that the Commonwealth was offering a probationary 

sentence and advised [Fitzpatrick] that if she was convicted at 

trial she would almost certainly face incarceration. Same is part 

of cautionary practice to ensure defendants are fully informed of 

the bargains available to them. [Fitzpatrick] was subsequently 

given additional time to speak to counsel after Call of the List to 

discuss a plea, a discussion which evidently lasted longer than a 

fleeting moment given that [Fitzpatrick] filled out the 16-question, 

multiple-subpart plea colloquy with her counsel.

Whatever degree of distress [Fitzpatrick] felt following Call 

of the List (which we did not find was abnormally heightened in 
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[Fitzpatrick] outside that which would be naturally felt when faced 

with information that the maximum penalty is five years following 

conviction), it was not Judge Guido who took [Fitzpatrick’s] plea 

but this Court, some time later that morning, in a separate 

proceeding. [Fitzpatrick] did not appear distressed at that time, 

nor did she relay distress to this Court prior to entering her plea. 

Nothing prevented [Fitzpatrick] from expressing any issues or 

disorientation to this Court prior to entering the plea, and, indeed, 

our colloquy of [Fitzpatrick] presented her with ample opportunity 

to alert this Court to any concerns she had about pleading.

... Indeed, [Fitzpatrick’s] counsel represented at the motion 

hearing that at the time of the plea, “nothing was conveyed to 

[her] [indicating] that [Fitzpatrick] felt blind sided.” At the close 

of the plea proceeding, just prior to sentencing, [Fitzpatrick] 

thoughtfully thanked her counsel for her services, noting that she 

had been “very kind and very considerate,” which was meaningful 

to her as a former employee of MidPenn Legal Services, and 

thanked this Court. It is clear to us, as it was clear to us at the 

time of the plea, that [Fitzpatrick], particularly following both 

colloquies in which she provided appropriate and satisfactory 

answers, understood what she was doing in entering the plea.

Finally, [Fitzpatrick’s] counsel represented to this Court at 

the motion hearing that it was [Fitzpatrick] who asked counsel 

about the prospect of pleading nolo contendere after observing 

counsel with other clients who were pleading nolo contendere ... 

at the time of the plea, counsel represented to this Court that 

[Fitzpatrick] was entering into the plea because “[s]he doesn’t 

want to take this to trial and risk having a felony and more serious 

consequences today.” To the extent [Fitzpatrick] felt compelled 

to enter the plea because of her interaction with Judge Guido, we 

again note there was a break in the time between Call of the List 

and her entry of the plea during which she could and did discuss 

a plea with counsel, clearly desired the benefit of the bargain 

which she did so receive, and at no point did she present any 

indication of compulsion to this Court. While [Fitzpatrick] 

apparently later regretted her decision to plead, we find that she 

did enter the plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, and 

that manifest injustice has not been done.

(Trial Court Opinion, 12/18/20, at 10-12). Fitzpatrick timely appealed. She 

and the court have complied with Rule 1925. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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II.

Fitzpatrick argues that the trial court “failed to address and correct 

manifest injustice in denying [her] Motion to Withdraw her plea, after 

sentencing, on the basis that her plea was not voluntary and on her assertions 

that she was innocent of the charges in question.” (Fitzpatrick’s Brief, at 9).4 

She claims that she was distressed at the time she entered the plea because 

of the “very personal affront by Judge Guido, someone she previously had 

greatly admired and respected, [which] affected her mindset throughout the 

rest of the day.” (Id. at 13-14). The Commonwealth responds that the court 

properly denied the motion where Fitzpatrick’s answers to both the written 

and on-the-record Nolo Contendere Plea Colloquies, her counsel’s 

representations to the court and Fitzpatrick’s active participation in asking to 

plead no-contest evidence the voluntariness of her plea. (See

Commonwealth’s Brief, at 13).

A.

We are guided by the following legal principles. “[A]ppellate review of 

a nolo contendere plea is the same as for a guilty plea.” Commonwealth v.

Jackson, 569 A.2d 964, 966 (Pa. Super. 1990), appeal denied, 592 A.2d 43 

(1990) (citation omitted). “[N]o absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea exists 

____________________________________________

4 We review a court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse 

of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 382 (Pa. 

Super. 2002).
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in Pennsylvania[.] ... [A] defendant may withdraw his guilty plea after 

sentencing only where necessary to correct manifest injustice. ... [P]ostsentence motions for withdrawal are subject to higher scrutiny since the courts 

strive to discourage the entry of guilty pleas as sentence-testing devices.” 

Commonwealth v. Hart, 174 A.3d 660, 664 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted).

To be valid, a guilty plea must be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently 

entered. See Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 522 (Pa.Super.

2003). “[A] manifest injustice occurs when a plea is not tendered knowingly, 

intelligently, voluntarily, and understandingly.” Commonwealth v. Gunter,

771 A .2d 767, 771 (Pa. 2001). The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure 

mandate pleas be taken in open court and require the court to conduct an onthe-record colloquy to ascertain whether a defendant is aware of his rights 

and the consequences of his plea. See Commonwealth v. Hodges, 789

A.2d 764, 765 (Pa.Super. 2002). Under Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal

Procedure 590, the court should confirm, inter alia, that a defendant 

understands: (1) the nature of the charges to which she is pleading guilty; 

(2) the factual basis for the plea; (3) she is giving up her right to trial by jury; 

(4) and the presumption of innocence; (5) she is aware of the permissible 

ranges of sentences and fines possible; and (6) the court is not bound by the 

terms of the agreement unless the court accepts the plea. See 

Commonwealth v. Watson, 835 A.2d 786 (Pa. Super. 2003). The reviewing 
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Court will evaluate the adequacy of the plea colloquy and the voluntariness of 

the resulting plea by examining the totality of the circumstances surrounding 

the entry of that plea. See Muhammad, supra at 384.

Finally, Pennsylvania law presumes a defendant who entered a guilty 

plea was aware of what he was doing, and the defendant bears the burden of 

proving otherwise. See Pollard, supra at 522. “[A] defendant is bound by 

the statements which [she] makes during [her] plea colloquy.” 

Commonwealth v. Jabbie, 200 A.3d 500, 506 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation 

omitted). She “may not assert grounds for withdrawing the plea that 

contradict statements made when [she] pled guilty, and [she] may not recant 

the representations [she] made in court when [she] entered [her] [] plea.” 

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he law does not 

require that a defendant be pleased with the outcome of his decision to plead 

guilty. The law requires only that a defendant’s decision to plead guilty be 

made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.” Id. (citation omitted).

B.

We first observe that Fitzpatrick concedes that she read and signed a

written plea colloquy, and that Judge Peck conducted a verbal colloquy and 

she does not challenge their adequacy. (See Fitzpatrick’s Brief, at 10-16). 

Indeed, our review of the colloquies confirms that the colloquies adequately 
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apprised Fitzpatrick of her rights and the consequences of the plea pursuant 

to Rule 590.5

Fitzpatrick argues, however, that under the totality of the 

circumstances, the plea was involuntary and that her testimony at the hearing 

on the motion to withdraw “shed additional light on her subjective state of 

mind during and after the entry of the plea.” (Id. at 10). Specifically, she 

points to the fact that she had previous professional interactions with Judge 

Guido whom she greatly respected, and that “she had such an intense reaction 

to his behavior that she was ‘in a fog’ which impacted her understanding of 

the remainder of the proceedings.” (Id. at 11) (footnote omitted).6 She also 

maintains that her difficulty hearing and understanding the court when she 

____________________________________________

5 Specifically, Fitzpatrick affirmed that she understood the charges against 

her, what the Commonwealth would have to prove and that they would be 

able to do so, and the maximum punishment that could be imposed. She was 

advised of the trial rights she would be giving up by pleading guilty and her 

limited appellate rights and confirmed that she understood the decision to 

plead was hers alone and that no promises or threats were made to induce 

her plea.

6 On appeal, Fitzpatrick mentions for the first time that Judge Guido referenced 

that he would be recusing himself, but then discussed the plea and potential 

sentence instead of seeking a different judge to handle the matter. (See

Fitzpatrick’s Brief, at 11). However, at the motion to withdraw hearing, she 

did not argue that Judge Guido should have recused himself from conducting 

the Call of the List. Hence, any recusal issue is waived for our review. See

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Moreover, Judge Guido did not participate in Fitzpatrick’s 

case other than in his narrow role of conducting the Call of the List, a local 

procedural custom that included last minute negotiations and ensuring that 

Fitzpatrick understood the Commonwealth’s plea offer, but did not include 

either taking the plea, conducting the colloquy or engaging in substantive 

matters. Hence, any argument in this regard would fail.
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entered the plea, as well as her health conditions and responsibility for her 

son, “contributed to her shock, fear, and confusion upon the assertion of Judge 

Guido that she would ‘almost certain[ly] end up in jail’ if she did not accept 

the plea offer[,]” which was not alleviated by the break in the proceedings or 

the fact that another judge ultimately took the plea. (Id. at 12); (see id. at 

13). Finally, she contends that she indicated to Judge Peck that she is 

innocent and wanted to challenge the case. (See id. at 14).

First, we are not persuaded by Fitzpatrick’s claim that her interaction 

with Judge Guido during the Call of the List rendered her plea involuntary. 

Her characterization of Judge Guido’s statement to her that she faced a fiveyear prison term if she did not plead guilty is belied by the record. In fact, 

after hearing the facts of the case and that the Commonwealth was offering a 

probationary sentence, he confirmed with Fitzpatrick that, despite that offer,

she wanted to go to trial where she would almost certainly face incarceration 

if convicted. As explained by the trial court, such is a customary practice by 

the Cumberland County judiciary to ensure that a defendant is informed about 

her available options.

Even if, as Fitzpatrick now complains, she was unaware of what she was 

doing due to her inability to hear, her reaction to Judge Guido’s statements 

that put her “in a fog” and her overall health would not entitle her to relief. 

While Fitzpatrick did evidence hearing problems, Judge Peck accommodated 

this by repeating herself to ensure that Fitzpatrick heard and understood the 
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court’s questions. After which, she would fully respond. (See N.T. Plea 

Hearing, at 4-5).

Further, at the plea colloquy, Judge Peck describes Fitzpatrick as not 

exhibiting any more distress than any other defendant would under the 

circumstances, and states that she did not present any indication of 

compulsion, despite having “ample opportunity to alert [the court] of any 

concerns she had about the pleading.” (Trial Ct. Op., at 11). In fact, when 

given the opportunity to speak on her own behalf, Fitzpatrick thanked her 

counsel for her services, particularly considering her status as a former 

employee of MidPenn Legal Services. During the motion hearing, Fitzpatrick’s 

counsel even told the court that at the time of the plea, nothing was conveyed 

to her indicating Fitzpatrick felt blind-sided. After conducting the colloquy, 

Judge Peck found that Fitzpatrick understood what she was doing and was 

voluntarily entering a plea. Under these circumstances, Fitzpatrick’s claims 

that her plea was involuntary because she was in a fog due to the Call of the 

List, her health issues and responsibilities, do not rise to the level of manifest 

injustice. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 A.3d 997, 1008 (Pa. 

Super. 2013) (defendant did not enter involuntary plea to justify its 

withdrawal despite claims that he felt tranquilized during colloquy where 

counsel did not observe any indication that he was not clear of mind during 

plea and court conducted colloquy in which defendant cogently answered all 

questions); Commonwealth v. Jackson, supra at 966 (nolo contendere
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plea entered while on prescription drugs valid where defendant failed to 

indicate he did not understand his rights during his plea and he responded 

appropriately to all colloquy questions); Commonwealth v. Hazen, 462 A.2d 

732, 735 (Pa. Super. 1983) (sedated patient competently entered plea where 

lower court stated he showed no signs of being influenced by medication at 

plea hearing and where colloquy transcript showed he cogently answered each 

question addressed to him).

Hence, Fitzpatrick’s claim that she did not enter a voluntary plea due to 

her reaction to the Call of the List and her hearing, health and personal 

responsibilities does not merit relief.

Neither are we persuaded by Fitzpatrick’s claim that she is innocent and 

always intended to go to trial as a ground to withdraw her plea of nolo 

contendere.

[B]y entering a nolo contendere plea, a defendant does not admit 

that he is guilty. ... [A] plea of nolo contendere is a plea by which

a defendant does not expressly admit his guilt, but nonetheless

waives his right to a trial and authorizes the court for purposes of

sentencing to treat him as if he were guilty.

Commonwealth v. V.G., 9 A.3d 222, 226 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010).

The Commonwealth initially offered Fitzpatrick a plea deal based on her 

entering a guilty plea. However, it ultimately agreed to her request that she 

be allowed to enter a nolo contendere plea in which she did not admit guilt, 

but instead that the evidence, if proven, would establish the elements required 

to prove the alleged crimes. At the hearing, her counsel advised the court 
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that Fitzpatrick herself asked about entering a nolo contendere plea and that 

she was entering the plea because, although “she feels that in her scope of 

her power of attorney she was acting appropriately, [] she understands the 

evidence against her.” (N.T. Plea Hearing, at 2). Her Written Plea Colloquy

expressly asked if Fitzpatrick understood that, by pleading nolo contendere, 

she was giving up her right to a trial, and she answered yes.

Because Fitzpatrick expressly acknowledged that she was giving up her 

trial rights by entering a nolo contendere plea, she is precluded from recanting 

that statement now where the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. 

See Jabbie, supra at 506. In the totality of the circumstances, Fitzpatrick’s

claim of innocence does not rise to the level of manifest injustice necessary 

for the plea’s post-sentence withdrawal. Hart, 174 A.3d 660, 664. 

Accordingly, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying 

Fitzpatrick’s motion to withdraw her nolo contendere plea. See Muhammed, 

supra at 382.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date:05/24/2021