### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 57876

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v. WILLIAM MATTHEW WATSON, UNPUBLISHED OPINION Appellant.
V ELJACIC , J

. — William Watson was convicted by a jury of robbery in the first degree under the theory of accomplice liability. On appeal, Watson argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to show that he acted as an accomplice to the crime of robbery. Watson also argues that the “to convict” jury instruction impermissibly relieved the State of its burden of proving an element of the crime of robbery. Finally, Watson argues that the $500 victim penalty assessment (VPA) should be stricken pursuant to a r ecent change in the law. We hold that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Watson guilty as an accomplice to robbery in the first degree. We decline to address the instructional issue because it was not preserved on appeal. Finally, we rema nd only for the trial court to strike the $500 VPA.
FACTS
I. B ACKGROUND Watson and Tess Babauta were in a romantic relationship. They were both addicted to drugs and out of money. Babauta mentioned that she wanted to “rob” and “hit” a MetroPCS store,

a store that sells tablets, cell phones, and other electronics, in order to obtain money to buy drugs. Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two July 23, 202457876

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2 Report of Proceedings ( RP ) at 282 , 287. Babauta spoke about this with Watson several times, but he brushed it off and did not believe she would go thr ough with it. Watson drove Babauta to the MetroPCS in Bonney Lake. The store is located in a strip mall that shares a parking lot with a Safeway grocery store. There is a wooded area behind the strip mall. Babauta put on black snow pants, black snow sh oes, a jacket that said “Chris” on it, a black face mask, a beanie, and sunglasses before getting into the Watson’s car. 2 RP at 279. Babauta told Watson to wait for her in his car by the gas station on the other side of the woods. Babauta first went into the Safeway. She stole gloves and a notepad and wrote, “Hand over the money. I have a gun.” 2 RP at 296. Babauta did not have a gun; however, she was carrying a torch lighter that resembled a gun, which she usually carries with her to cook drugs and light cigarettes. She then left the Safeway and went into the MetroPCS, where she approached Lauren Wright, the only employee there at the time. Babauta handed Wright the note and tapped the torch lighter on the glass to make it see m like she was carrying a gun. Wright, feeling scared and hoping to get through the incident as easily as possible, handed Babauta $1,000. Babauta ran through the wooded area behind the store. She took off her clothing and left it in the woods before sh e met Watson at the designated pick up location and drove away. Watson was surprised that Babauta had gone through with it. Immediately afterward, they purchased drugs and split the remaining proceeds. About a month later, in a separate investigation, B onney Lake Police Officer Kyle Torgenson was listening to recordings of Brandon Johnson’s calls from jail. Torgenson heard a woman confess to Johnson that she had committed the robbery at MetroPCS. Through the phone records, Torgenson was able to identif y the woman as Babauta. When she was arrested, Babauta admitted that she had committed the crime and that Watson had driven her to and from the scene.57876

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II. T RIAL T ESTIMONY Babauta pleaded guilty to robbery in the first degree and agreed to testify against Wat son in exchange for a reduced sentence. In her testimony, Babauta repeatedly stated that the robbery was all her idea, and that Watson did not know the extent of what she was going to do or think she would actually go through with it. She testified that she had given Watson vague details: “I just told him that I was going to go into Safeway and that I was going to go to the store, MetroPCS, and then I was going to come out of the woods. I just told him to just be over there. Wait for me over by the gas station is what I told him.” 2 RP at 289. Babauta testified further that: “ [Watson] didn’t think I was going to do it. He really didn’t. That’s why when I got in the car, I was like, I can’t believe I just fucking did that.” 2 RP at 307. She also tes tified that her and Watson often frequented the location of the robbery:

Q. And you guys have been to this general shopping area before; correct? A. Almost every day because that's where we’d go to get food or get cigarettes. It was just a main location store. Q. Every day for basically months on end? A. Every day for like years. Q. Okay. So a thousand times, maybe? A. Yes. Q. Okay. And you had never robbed the store there before? A. I never robbed MetroPCS there before, no. Q. And you didn’t ha ve a car to drive yourself over to do this robbery by yourself, right? A. No, I didn’t. Q. Okay. So you needed somebody to drive you over there; right? A. Yes. Q. And just like you had on other days, he drove you over there so you guys could go get stuff; right? A. Yes.
2 RP at 317

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Babauta further testified that she always carries a torch lighter on her: Q. Did he ever tell you to use a gun? A. No. Q. Or a torch that kind of looked like a gun? A. No. Q. That was all your idea? A. It was all my idea. Q. Okay. Is that something you normally would carry with you to the store? A. A torch? Q . Yeah. A. It was always in my purse or my

— I was

— needed it to

— drugs, cigarettes. I liked torches. Q . So this was something you carried around with you all the time? A. Yes. Q. So the fact that you had it wouldn’t lead one necessarily to believe that you’re going to use it to

—use it as a fake gun to do a ro bbery; right?

. . . . A. Correct.
2 RP at 319

- 20. When asked how Watson had reacted, Babauta said: Staying quiet, just kind of like in disbelief that I did do it still. Because I’ve never done a crime this serious before ever. Like I’ve gone into stores and I’ve stolen things, you know, but I never took it to this extent. And there’s been times when, like, I’d try to get bigger items at stores and I would pull back from it. So in this particular incident, I felt like he was in the same state of m ind thinking that I was going to be, like, with

— in the stores with bigger items, not actually pull through with it. So it’s

—he was quiet, in disbelief, like he didn't know how to handle it, but we were on our way to get drugs and, so.
2 RP at 309

- 10. However, Babauta also described her discussions with Watson in the days leading up to the robbery: I just told him

— I was like, I ’ ve been scoping

— I want to hit this store. That ’ s what I said. I want to hit MetroPCS because I know I can get some money bec ause it’s easy and the woods are right there. I want to do it. I want to get the money. I need to get drugs. . . . He just was like brushing it off, as in like, okay, she ’ s just dope

sick talking.
2 RP at 282

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Babauta told Watson that she was “g oing to do it. That was the discussion. It was more like me demanding

. . . and letting him know I’m going to do it. Because I wouldn’t take no for an answer.” 2 RP at 305. She described that, over the course of a few days, she and Watson had driven p ast the store a couple of times, discussed where the cameras were, and where to park. She said that Watson saw her put on the disguise and that they discussed going to the Safeway parking lot to commit the robbery.

A: I just started to get dressed and say ing I want to go that way to the store.

. . . Initially, wanted to go to Safeway, but then I was just wanted to rob the store, rob MetroPCS, because I needed to get the break. Q . Did you discuss that with Mr. Watson? A. Yes, I did mention it to him. Q . And did you discuss it, talk about it? A. Yes. Q. Did he mention to you, when you said he said don ’ t do it, did he also mention that I ’ m sick, too, that kind of thing? A . Yes.
2 RP at 287. Babauta also testified as to how she took advantage of th e fact that Watson was in love with her. For example, she said that she “was a narcissist with him” and “would love bomb him”
so she could make him do what she wanted. 2 RP at 316. As to the planning of the robbery, Babauta testified that: What I meant by as we planned was, like, as I told him where to be. So I know that he loves me and that he would do anything that I tell him to do. And so that was me taking advantage of that. I was like, you need to do this and this and this, and he wouldn’t take no for an answer with me. So it was

— it was just, yeah.
2 RP at 306.
III. V ERDICT The jury found Watson guilty of robbery in the first degree. He was sentenced to 31 months in prison. T he court found Watson indigent ; it imposed the $500 VPA. Watson appeals.57876

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I. S UFFICIENCY OF THE E VIDENCE Watson argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for robbery. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review On a claim of insufficient evidence, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Salinas , 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). A claim of insufficient evidence admits the truth of the State’s evidence. State v. Pacheco , 70 Wn. App. 27, 38

- 39, 851 P.2d 734 (1993), rev’d on other grounds , 125 Wn.2d 150, 882 P.2d 183 (1994). All reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in the State’s favor. Salinas , 119 Wn.2d at 201. We defer to the trier of fact’s resolution of conflicting testimony, evaluation of witness credibilit y, and generally its view of the persuasiveness of the evidence. State v. Lubers , 81 Wn. App. 614, 619, 915 P.2d 1157 (1996). We will affirm if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Sa linas , 119 Wn.2d at 201. Circumstantial and direct evidence are equally reliable. State v. Cardenas

- Flores , 189 Wn.2d 243, 26 6 , 401 P.3d 19 (2017). Also, a jury can infer specific criminal intent of a defendant where it is a matter of logical probabilit y. State v. Delmarter , 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980).
B. Legal Principles “A person commits robbery when he or she unlawfully takes personal property from the person of another or in his or her presence against his or her will by the use or threa tened use of immediate force, violence, or fear of injury.” RCW 9A.56.190. Robbery in the first degree requires additional proof that the defendant is “armed with a deadly weapon; or . . . [d]isplays what57876

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appears to be a firearm or other deadly weapon; o r . . . [i]nflicts bodily injury.” RCW 9A.56.200(1)(a). A person can be convicted as an accomplice to a robbery committed by another person. RCW 9A.08.020(1), (2)(c); State v. Trout , 125 Wn. App. 403, 409, 105 P.3d 69 (2005). Criminal liability applie s equally to a principal and an accomplice because they share equal responsibility for the substantive offense. State v. Rodriguez , 78 Wn. App. 769, 772

- 73, 898 P.2d 871 (1995). A person is guilty of a crime as an accomplice if, “[w]ith knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime, he

. . . (i) [ s ] olicits, commands, encourages, or requests such other person to commit it; or (ii) [ a ] ids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it.” RCW 9A.08.020(3)(a); State v. Grendahl , 110 Wn. App. 905, 910, 43 P.3d 76 (2002). An accomplice must have actual knowledge that the principal was engaging in acts constituting the criminal charge. State v . Allen , 182 Wn.2d 364, 374, 341 P.3d 268 (2015). The State can prove actual knowledge through the use of circumstantial evidence. Id. A jury can find that a person has actual knowledge when a person is aware of a fact, facts, or circumstances or result described by a statute defining an offense; or has information which would lead a reasonable person in the same situation to believe that facts exist which facts are described by a statute defining an offense. RCW 9A.08.010(1)(b). It is the intent to facilitate another in the commission of the crime through presence and actions that makes an accomplice criminally liable. State v. Galisia , 63 Wn. App. 833, 840, 822 P.2d 303 (1992). The State must show that the defendant aided in th e planning or commission of the crime and had knowledge of the crime. State v. Berube , 150 Wn.2d 498, 511, 79 P.3d 1144 (2003). And “[w]hile an accomplice may be convicted of a higher degree of the general crime he sought to facilitate, he may not be con victed of a separate crime absent specific knowledge of that57876

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general crime.” State v. King , 113 Wn. App. 243, 288, 54 P.3d 1218 (2002). The culpability of an accomplice cannot extend beyond the crimes of which the accomplice actually has knowledge.
Stat e v. Roberts , 142 Wn.2d 471, 511, 14 P.3d 713 (2000). For instance, a defendant cannot be convicted of robbery as an accomplice if he intends merely that the principal commit theft. Grendahl , 110 Wn. App. at 911.
C. The Evidence was Sufficient for the Jury to Find Watson Guilty as an Accomplice to Robbery in the First Degree The jury found Watson guilty of robbery. We next review the evidence in a light most favorable to the State. Salinas , 119 Wn.2d at 201; see also Trout , 125 Wn. App. at 4 09 . When viewed under this standard and taken as true, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Watson guilty as an accomplice to robbery in the first degree. As previously stated, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask whether the evidence adduced at trial could support any rational determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Salinas , 119 Wn.2d at 201. We do not second guess the jury, so long as the evidence at trial is sufficient to support the guilty verdict. State v. Goins , 151 Wn.2d 728, 730, 92 P.3d 181 (2004). Watson’s sufficiency of the evidence claim focuses on his lack of knowledge of the crime. He argues that the State’s evi dence did not prove that Watson shared in Babauta’s criminal intent. A review of this evidence in a light most favorable to the State suggests otherwise. Babauta told Watson several times that she planned to “rob” or “hit” the MetroPCS. 2 RP 282, 287. She put on a disguise in front of him. They discussed the cameras around the area. Watson agreed to drive her to the location of the robbery and help her get away. Babauta told Watson to wait for her on the other side of the woods by the g as station, and Watson did exactly that. Both Watson and Babauta were withdrawing from drugs, and they both needed money to acquire more. They57876

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both shared the proceeds by immediately purchasing drugs for themselves afterward. Looking at this evidence, w hen viewed in a light most favorable to the State, a jury could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Salinas , 119 Wn.2d at 201. Watson argues this case is like Grendahl , and should be reversed. In that case, Grendahl waited in a getaway car and was not present when the principal committed a robbery by knocking down the victim and stealing her purse. Grendahl , 110 Wn. App. at 906. The evidence was unclear as to what the principal had discussed with Grendahl, and whet her Grendahl knew the principal was planning to commit a robbery. Id . at 907

- 08. In his conflicting testimony, the principal stated that he told Grendahl he was going there “just to look around and see where everything would be,” and that he planned to “ go in there and take a purse and just come out.” Id . at 907. Division Three of this court reversed Grendahl’s conviction, finding that the jury instructions and prosecutor’s closing argument misstated the law and impermissibly relieved the State of its b urden to prove an element of robbery. Id . at 911. Watson asserts that the same result should be reached here, because similar to Grendahl , Watson waited in a getaway car, was not present when Babauta committed the robbery, and Babauta’s testimony was un clear about what details she discussed with Watson. We disagree. While some facts here are similar to those in Grendahl , in this case Babauta specifically told Watson she was going to rob the store

— several times. Grendahl is distinguishable on this fact alone. But additionally, Grendahl is distinguishable because our standard of review here is different. Grendahl challenged his conviction because the jury instructions and the prosecutor’s closing argument misstated the law. 110 Wn. App. at 908. Here, because we are reviewing a claim of sufficiency of the evidence , we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State.57876

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When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State, a jury could reasonably infer that Watson knew Babauta was going to commit a robbery rather than a theft. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Watson guilty as an accomplice to robbery in the first degree.
II. J URY I NSTRUCTIONS Watson argues that i nstruction 11, the “to convict” instruction , 1 impermissibly relieved the State of its burden to prove an element of the crime of robbery. Watson did not object to this instruction at trial. Pursuant to RAP 2.5(a)(3), we may decline to review any claim of error not raised in the trial court. Watson does not acknowledge his failure to preserve this argument below, and makes no argument about why we should review this claim for the first time on appeal. “Appellate courts need not consider arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority,
referen ces to the record, or meaningful analysis.” Cook v. Brateng , 158 Wn. App. 777, 794, 262 P.3d 1228 (2010). Accordingly, we decline to review this claim of error. RAP 2.5(a).

1 Instruction 11 was as follows:

To convict the defendant of the crime of robbery in the first degree as charged in Count I, each of the following six elements of the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) That on or about the 30th day of December 2021, the defendant unlawfully took personal property from Lauren D. Wright; (2) That the defendant intended to commit theft of the property; ( 3) That the taking was against Lauren D. Wright’s will by the defendant’s use or threatened use of immediate force, violence or fear of injury to that person ; (4) That force or fear was used by the defendant to obtain or retain possession of the property or to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking; (5) (a) That in the commission of these acts or in immediate flight therefrom the defendant was armed with a firearm or (b) That in the commission of these acts or in immediate flight therefrom the defe ndant displayed what appeared to be a firearm [;] and (6) That any of these acts occurred in the State of Washington. Clerk’s Papers at 137.57876

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III. V ICTIM P ENALTY A SSESSMENT Watson asks us to strike the $500 VPA imposed on his judgment and sentence. The State concedes this point. We agree, and remand to the trial court to strike the $500 VPA from Watson’s judgment and sentence. The trial court found that Watson was indigent under RCW 10 .01.160(3) and waived discretionary costs under RCW 10.01.160. When Watson was sentenced the $500 VPA was mandatory. See former RCW 7.68.035(l)(a) (2018); former RCW 9.94A.6333(3)(f) (2018). However, while Watson’s appeal was pending, the legislature am ended RCW 7.68.035 to prohibit courts from imposing the VPA on defendants who are indigent as defined in RCW 10.01.160(3). RCW 7.68.035(4) (“The court shall not impose the penalty assessment under this section if the court finds that the defendant, at the time of sentencing, is indigent as defined in RCW 10.01.160(3).”); L AWS OF 2023, ch. 449, § 1 (effective July 1, 2023). Our state supreme court has held that statutes regarding legal financial obligations should apply to persons on appeal. State v.
Rami rez , 191 Wn.2d 732, 746

- 50, 426 P.3d 714 (2018). The new statute became effective on July 1, 2023. See L AWS OF 2023, ch. 449, § 27. Watson was sentenced on February 10, 2023. Because the sentencing court found Watson indigent, and his appeal was pendin g when the law was amended, this change in the law applies to him. We remand to the trial court to strike the $500 VPA from his judgment and sentence.57876

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12 CONCLUSION We affirm the trial court, and remand only for the trial court to strike the $500 VPA. A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

Veljacic, J.
We concur:

Cruser, C.J.

Che, J.