alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Wholesale Service Supply Corporation, Respondent, v. Herbert Rubin et al., Appellants.

—In an action by a judgment creditor of defendant Ruvo Lumber Corporation to declare a certain promissory note, sold to plaintiff upon a Sheriff’s sale, to be a lien upon certain real property and for other relief, defendants appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Orange County, dated February 11, 1966, which (1) granted plaintiff’s motion to dismiss defendants’ separate defense as insufficient in law, without leave to amend the answer, and (2) denied defendants’ cross motion (a) to vacate the Sheriff’s sale to plaintiff of said promissory note and (b) to direct a resale thereof, on the ground that the sale was jurisdietionally defective. Order modified by (1) striking from its decretal paragraph the provision granting plaintiff’s motion without leave to amend the answer, and (2) inserting therein a provision that plaintiff’s motion is denied. As so modified, order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements to defendants. In our opinion the separate defense as pleaded, together with the facts adduced on the instant motion to dismiss the defense for insufficiency (CPLR 3211, subd. [b]), adequately raises the issue that plaintiff bought in at the execution sale with knowledge that the Sheriff had proceeded upon only five days’ notice of sale, instead of the minimum of six days as prescribed by statute (CPLR 5233). Whether defendants can prove such allegation is for the trier of the facts. Under the circumstances, it was error to hold that the defense must be dismissed because of its failure to allege *in haee verba*that plaintiff had purchased with notice of the Sheriff’s failure to post notice of sale for six days prior thereto. Defendants’ reference to the statute (CPLR 5233) in their separate defense was comprehensive enough to alert plaintiff to this issue and .thus constituted compliance with defendants’ obligation to plead, by way of affirmative defense, facts showing illegality (CPLR 3018, subd. [b]). It was error, therefore, to hold that the defense contained a fatal omission in pleading. Brennan, Acting P. J., Rabin, Hopkins, Benjamin and Munder, JJ., concur.
EXHIBIT 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection  with the Quarterly  Report of Dolce Ventures Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-QSB for the period ended March 31, 2005 as filed with the  Securities
and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  I, Carl E. Worboys,
President  of the  Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  section  1350,  as
adopted pursuant to section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002, that to the
best of my knowledge:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.


/s/ Carl E. Worboys
Carl E. Worboys
President, Dolce Ventures Inc.


Date: June 24, 2005
#### Allied 31st Avenue Corporation, Respondent-Appellant, v. City of New York et al., Defendants; Brooklyn Union Gas Company et al., Appellants, and New York Telephone Company, Appellant-Respondent.

Order of the Supreme 'Count, Queens County, dated November 12, 1965, affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs. We do not consider that the defendants New York Telephone Company and Consolidated Edison Company of New *949York, Inc., waived their right to move to dismiss the complaint on the ground of a defense founded upon documentary evidence because they failed to make such a motion prior to answer and did not allege the defense in their answer (CPLR 3211). Under the circumstances of this case, we deem the motion to be addressed to the sufficiency of the complaint, rather than a motion based on new matter which should properly be pleaded as a defense or be the subject of a motion prior to answer. Moreover, the defendant Brooklyn Union Gas Company, whose legal position is similar to that of the other appealing defendants, had made its motion prior to answer, and the motions by the other appealing defendants, though made after answer, followed closely after the motion by Brooklyn Union Gas Company. If we were disposed to grant the latter’s motion, it would accordingly be anomalous to continue the action as against the other appealing defendants. In our opinion, however, we consider that the motions of all the appealing defendants were properly denied. Since those motions were directed to the complaint as a whole, they must be denied if any cause of action is valid *(Rosenblatt*v. *Birnbaum,*16 N Y 2d 212; *Griefer*v. *Newman,*22 A D 2d 696). We think that plaintiff’s action for damages based on trespass is presently sufficient. An action for trespass may be brought by a person in exclusive legal possession at the time of trespass (1 Harper and James, Law of Torts, § 1.2, p. 5; Restatement, Torts, § 157; cf. *Farrer*v. *Piecuch,*278 App. Div. 1011; *Domhoff*v. *Paul Stier, Inc.,*157 App. Div. 204). The documentary evidence presented by the appealing defendants is neither clear nor conclusive that plaintiff had no possessory rights in the land claimed to have been the subject of the trespass at the time of the trespass; and accordingly we think that the legal positions of the parties may be better determined at a trial. We express no opinion as to the other points raised by the appealing defendants. Ughetta, Acting P. J., Brennan, Rabin and Hopkins, JJ., concur; Christ, J., not voting.
#### In the Matter of James Albea, Petitioner, v John Fahey, as Commissioner of the Albany County Department of Social Services, et al., Respondents.

— Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this court by order of the Supreme Court at Special Term, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of respondent State Commissioner of Social Services which sustained a determination of the Albany County *740Department of Social Services. In June of 1978, petitioner, age 19, was receiving an individual grant of public assistance in the category of home relief from the Albany County Department of Social Services (department) when, in accordance with its statutory responsibility under section 131 of the Social Services Law, the department obtained employment for him at Joe’s Caterers, a restaurant in the City of Albany. Petitioner worked only three days at this job and did not return to the restaurant after June 22, 1978. Instead, he commenced a high school equivalency training program at the Adult Learning Center, also in the City of Albany, and, as a consequence, he was notified by the department that his assistance grant was to be discontinued for 75 days because he had voluntarily terminated his employment (see Social Services Law, § 131, subd 10). He thereupon requested and was granted a fair hearing to review this decision, and following the hearing, respondent State Commissioner of Social Services affirmed the determination of the department. This proceeding ensued. We hold that the challenged determination should be confirmed. Applicants for home relief have the burden of proving their eligibility therefor *(Matter of Pailley v Fahey,*55 AD2d 201), and in this instance, petitioner has failed to carry this burden. While he asserts that he is not an "employable person” and, accordingly is eligible for the public assistance grant because he is under the age of 21 years and attending school full time (see Social Services Law, § 131, subd 5), he has failed to rebut the testimony of the department’s representative at the fair hearing to the effect that his enrollment at the Adult Learning Center could not serve to render him unable to work and eligible for home relief because the Adult Learning Center did not operate an approved schooling program. Under these circumstances, the presumption of employability lends support and rationality to the State commissioner’s determination, and, therefore, it should not be disturbed. Determination confirmed, and petition dismissed, without costs. Sweeney, J. P., Main, Mikoll and Herlihy, JJ., concur.
J. Having considered the response, the reply, and the parties' competing motions to dismiss, it appears that respondent's counterclaims for assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress' remain pending and that no final judgment has been entered. NRAP 3A(b)(1); Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 996 P.2d 416 (2000); KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc. v. Workman, 107 Nev. 340, 810 P.2d 1217 (1991). Accordingly, as the notice of appeal was premature, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal, NRAP 4(a)(6), and we

ORDER this appeal DISMISSED. 2



# S eca eirt-t; Hardesty

-4 

## ,0 4 9gel " Douglas

'To the extent that the parties also note that respondent's counterclaim for attorney fees has not been resolved, a request for attorney fees is not a cause of action and would not preclude an order from being a final judgment. Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 (2000) ("[A] final judgment is one that disposes of all the issues presented in the case, and leaves nothing for the future consideration of the court, except for post-judgment issues such as attorney's fees and costs.").

2 To the extent that the parties' competing motions request relief other than dismissal for a premature notice of appeal, the parties' motions are denied.

SUPREPAE COURT

OF NEVADA 2

(0) 1947Acc: Hon. Douglas W. Herndon, District Judge Carolyn Worrell, Settlement Judge Law Offices of Richard S. Small, Esq. Cary Colt Payne Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3
(0) 1947A 4110479
## NUMBER 13

- 1 9

- 00 3 92

- CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI

- EDINBURG

____________________________________________________________ RYAN SANDERS AND ALL OCCUPANTS , A ppellant s ,

v.

STEPHEN W. DEAN , A ppellee

.

____________________________________________________________ On a ppeal from the County Court at Law No. 5 of Nueces County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________ 

## MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Perkes Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes

Appellant, Victoria Sanders , appealed a judgment of eviction entered by the

County Court at Law No. 5 of Nueces County, Texas. On September 9 , 2019

, the Clerk

of this Court notified appellant that the notice of appeal failed to comply with Texas Rule s
of Appellate Procedure 9.5(e) and 25.1(d) (1),(2)

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P

. 9.5( e ) ; id. R.

25.1(d) (1),(2) . The Clerk directed appellant to file an amended n otice of appeal with the2 district clerk's office within 30 days from the date of that notice. On September 30, 2019

, the Clerk notified appellant that the defect s had not been corrected and warned appellant

that the appeal would be dismissed if the defect s w ere not cured within ten days.

Appellant has not responded to the notice from the Clerk or corrected the defect s

. On its own motion, with ten days ’ notice to the parties, an appellate court may

dismiss a civil appeal for want of prosecution or failure to comply with a notice from the

clerk requiring a response or other action within a specified time. See Tex. R. App. P.

42.3(b), (c). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution and failure to

comply with a notice from the Court. See id.

GREGORY T. PERKES Justice

D elivered and filed the 26th day of November, 2019.
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### International Trade Commission

# AGENCY:

United States International Trade Commission.

# ACTION:

Appointment of individuals to serve as members of performance review board.

# DATES:

*Effective:*                         November 9, 2010.                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Cynthia Roscoe, Director of Human Resources, U.S. International Trade Commission (202) 205-2651.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The Chairman of the U.S. International Trade Commission has appointed the following individuals to serve on the Commission's Performance Review Board (PRB):

Chair of the PRB: Vice Chairman Irving A. Williamson

Vice-Chair of the PRB: Commissioner Daniel R. Pearson

Member: David Beck

Member: Catherine DeFilippo

Member: Robert B. Koopman

Member: Karen Laney

Member: Lynn I. Levine

Member: James M. Lyons

Member: Stephen A. McLaughlin

Member: Lyn M. Schlitt

Member: Andrew Martin

                    This notice is published in the                     **Federal Register**                     pursuant to the requirement of 5 U.S.C. 4314(c)(4). Hearing-impaired individuals are advised that information on this matter can be obtained by contacting our TDD terminal on (202) 205-1810.                

By order of the Chairman.

 Issued: November 10, 2010.

Marilyn R. Abbott,

Secretary to the Commission.

[FR Doc. 2010-28887 Filed 11-16-10; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7020-02-P
**MEMORANDUM**

DATE : May 6 , 20 15 TO: Dockets EPA - HQ - OAR- 2013 - 0602, EPA - HQ - OAR- 2013 - 0603, and EPA - HQ OAR- 2013 - 0495 FROM: Lora Strine SUBJECT : Summary

of Stakeholder Conference C all with RGGI S tates and EPA S taff **SUMMARY** Discussion of 111 ( d) Clean Power Plan **ATTENDEES** Mike Gordon, EPA Region 3 Lora Strine, EPA Shutsu Wong, EPA Region 1 Ray mond Ford, EPA Region 2 **State Representative**  CT Jaimeson Sinclair, Keri Enright - Kato, Eric Annes, Dino Pascua DE Valerie Gray ME Erle Townsend, John Brautigam, Marc Cone MD George (Tad) S. Aburn Jr., Scott Zacharko, Luke Wisniewski, Diane Franks MA Rachel Evans, William Space , Bill Lamkin NH Joe Fontaine, Karla McManus NY Jim Austin, Allison Rose, Anthony Belsito , Dave Coup, L ois New, Jon Binder RI Frank Stevenson, Dena Gonsalves VT Brian Woods , Megan O’Toole RGGI , Inc. Lisa DeVito, Anna Ngai, Jiin Park, Nicole Singh
# L_2021420DE.01013401.xml

| 25.11.2021 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | L 420/134 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.11.2021

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

L 420/134

---

Berichtigung des Beschlusses (GASP) 2021/1989 des Rates vom 15. November 2021 zur Änderung des Beschlusses 2012/642/GASP über restriktive Maßnahmen angesichts der Lage in Belarus

(
  Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 405 vom 16. November 2021
  )

Seite 8, Artikel 1, neuer Artikel 2j Absatz 2:

Anstatt:

„(2)   Die Verbote nach Absatz 1 gelten weder für die Bereitstellung einer Haftpflichtversicherung für belarussische Personen, Organisationen oder Einrichtungen, sofern das versicherte Risiko in der Union belegen ist, noch für die Bereitstellung von Versicherungsleistungen für diplomatische oder konsularische Vertretungen von Belarus in der Union.“

muss es heißen:

„(2)   Die Verbote nach Absatz 1 gelten weder für die Bereitstellung einer Pflichtversicherung oder einer Haftpflichtversicherung für belarussische Personen, Organisationen oder Einrichtungen, sofern das versicherte Risiko in der Union belegen ist, noch für die Bereitstellung von Versicherungsleistungen für diplomatische oder konsularische Vertretungen von Belarus in der Union.“

---
```

[Congressional Bills 113th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2223 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

113th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 2223

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             July 15, 2014

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security 
                        and Governmental Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
at 220 Elm Avenue in Munising, Michigan, as the ``Elizabeth L. Kinnunen 
                        Post Office Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ELIZABETH L. KINNUNEN POST OFFICE BUILDING.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 220 Elm Avenue in Munising, Michigan, shall be known and 
designated as the ``Elizabeth L. Kinnunen Post Office Building''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Elizabeth 
L. Kinnunen Post Office Building''.

            Passed the House of Representatives July 14, 2014.

            Attest:

                                                 KAREN L. HAAS,

                                                                 Clerk.
```
#### Robert Ostrom, Appellant, v. Patchogue Electric Light Co., Respondent.

In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, dated February 13, 1968, in favor of defendant upon the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint at the close of plaintiff’s case on a jury trial. Judgment affirmed, without costs. Plaintiff sustained his injuries when a crane upon which he was standing apparently came in contact with defendant’s high tension wires. On the record presented, including the fact that defendant’s wires were set back at least 50 feet from the traveled portion of a secondary road in a sparsely inhabited area, and that the accident apparently occurred on the morning of the first day that the crane was at the site of the accident, we are of the opinion that the trial court correctly held, as a matter of law, that defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that a crane would be operated in close proximity to its wires. (Cf. *Mikolasko*v. *New York State Elec. & Gas Corp.,*8 A D 2d 648, mot. for lv. to app. den. 7 N Y 2d 707; *Moses*v. *City of New York,*15 A D 2d 534, mot. for lv. to app. den. 11 N Y 2d 643.) Brennan, Acting P. J., Hopkins, Benjamin, Munder and Martuscello, JJ., concur.
No. 89-6575.

#### Barley *v.*Collins, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.

C. A. 5th Cir. Certiorari denied.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. Case No. 3:99cr98/RV

 

FREDERICK NELAMS, JR.

__________________________________/

ORDER REDUCING SENTENCE

Currently pending is the Government’s motion for a reduction of the defendant's

sentence under Rule 35(b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc.45/50 ) The

Government has certified defendant Nelams’ subsequent substantial assistance in the

investigation of prosecution of other individuals, so that a reduction of sentence under

Rule 35(b) is warranted.

Upon consideration, I find that the grounds set out in the Government's motion

do constitute substantial assistance within the meaning of Rule 35(b), and that the

Government's motion should be, and is hereby, GRANTED. Accordingly, defendant

Nelams’ sentence and judgment entered herein on April 4, 2000, is hereby amended

and his sentence of imprisonment is reduced from a term of two hundred four months

(204) months to a term of one hundred sixty-two (162) months. In all other respects,

the defendant's judgment of April 4, 2000 (doc. 40), remains in full force and effect.

DONE AND ORDERED this 4th day of August, 2006.

/s/ Roger Vinson 

ROGER VINSON

Senior U.S. District Judge

Case 3:99-cr-00098-RV Document 54 Filed 08/04/06 Page 1 of 1
#### § 3419.5 Certification of matching funds.

Prior to the distribution of capacity funds each fiscal year, each eligible institution must certify as to the availability of matching funds. Eligible institutions may revise their certification of matching funds through July 1 of the fiscal year in which funds are appropriated.

[65 FR 21631, Apr. 21, 2000, as amended at 83 FR 21850, May 11, 2018]
Exhibit 10.1
 
  
   Position
 Departmental Responsibilities
 Salary Grade / Base Annual Salary
 Reimbursement of Relocation Fees
 Vacation
 Annual Incentive Plan Eligibility




---



##### 



Exhibit 10.1
  Long-Term Incentive Eligibility
 Employee Benefits
 Post -Employment Screening
 Severance:
 Starting Date:




---



##### 



Exhibit 10.1
  
 By signing below, I agree to accept the above referenced promotion with ACL under the terms
outlined herein. I acknowledge and agree that my employment with ACL does not breach any agreements
with any other employer and I further agree to maintain the secrecy of, and not to use in any way,
any confidential or proprietary information or trade secrets belonging to any other employer in the
performance of my duties for ACL. I understand and agree that this letter is provided for
information purposes only and does not guarantee employment for any definite duration. I understand
that I shall have the right to terminate my employment with ACL at any time for any reason by
providing ACL with reasonable notice and the Company shall have the same right to discontinue my
employment at any time for any reason.
 /s/ William A Braman
    
    7/26/2010[Name]
    
    Date
§ 3300.7 General. Testing of equipment according to the ATP is basically done in two phases: ( a ) Measurement of the insulating capacity, that is, the K-coefficient, of the insulated body.
( b ) Determination of the efficiency of the thermal appliance as installed in the insulated body. In the case of mechanically refrigerated equipment, the mechanical refrigerating appliance may be tested separate from the body.