1 IN TH E SUPREME COURT O F THE ST ATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 Opinion N um ber: 3 F ili ng D at e: N ove m be r 12, 201 5 4 N O. S -1 -S C -3 4637 5 6 STATE OF NEW MEXI CO, 7 Pl ai nti ff

-R es pond en t, 8 v. 9 MA RK SERROS , 10 De fendant-Petitioner.

11 ORI GI NAL PROCEEDI NG ON CERTI ORARI 12 R ob er t M . S ch w ar tz , D ist ri ctJu dg e

13 Jorge A. Alvar ado, Chief Public De fender 14 Nina L alevic, Assistant Appellate D efender 15 Santa Fe , N M 16 for Pe tition er 17 He ctor H . B alderas, Attorney Ge neral 18 Yvonne M. C hicoine, A ssistant Attorney Ge neral 19 San ta Fe, NM 20 fo r Re spon de nt1 OPIN ION

2 BOSS ON, Justice. 3 { 1} Fo ur

y ears a nd thr ee m onths a ft er D ef en da nt M ar

k S er ro s w as a rr es te d and 4 charged w ith sexuallyabusing his nephew, the distric t co u rt dism issed his case, 5 concludin g that his righ t to a speedy trial u nder the Sixth Am endm ent to the United 6 St at es Co nst ituti on ha d be envio la te d. A m ong oth er thi ngs, the dis tr ic t c ourt f ound 7 tha t D ef

en da nt h ad

suf fe re d e xtr em e pr ej udi ce as ar es ult of the le ngth and 8 circum stances of his det en t i o n . From the tim e of his arr est over four y ears e arlier, 9 De fendan th a d be e n he l d a tt he B e rna l i l l o C ounty M e t r op ol i t a n D e t e nt i onC e nte r 10 (MD C) in protective custody , a form of adm inistrative segregation in which he w as 1 1 c o n f i n e da l o n e i n aja i l c e l l f

o r o v e r 2 3 h o u r s ad a y. 12 { 2} In a di vi de d m em or an du m op in io n, t he C o u r t o f App eal s re ve rs ed

. Se e Sta te 13 v. Se rro s , N o. 31, 565, m em . op. ¶ ¶ 1, 58 (N

. M. Ct . Ap p. Mar. 10, 201 4) ( non14 precedential). The m aj ority re as o n ed that the delay in bringin g Def

endant to trial 15 co ul d n ot be att rib ut edto th e St at e. Se e id. ¶ 52. T he m aj or ity

f au lte d D ef

en da nt 16 because he had agree d to num erous requests to e xtend the tim e for c omm encing trial 17 an d h adtwi ce re qu es te d n ew co un se l. Se e id. By contrast, the dissent concluded th at 1 8 t h e d el ays re s u l t ed p ri m ar i l y fr o m t h e “ne g l i g en c e a n d d i s re g ar d ” o f D ef en d an t ’s 19 at tor ne y s and tha t, w he the r or not the S ta te w as a t f

au lt, D ef en da nt’ s r igh t t o aspe edy2

1 tri al ha d b een vi ol at ed

. Se e id. ¶ 60 (Z am ora, J., dissenti ng). 2 { 3} W e gr an te d c er

tio rari a nd n ow reve rs e. 201 4- N MC E RT -0 05. W e ag re e w ith 3 the district court’ s conclusio n that the length and circum stances of D efendant’ s pre4 trial incarc eration resulted in extrem e prej udice. W e theref ore hold that dis m issal was 5 ap pr opr ia te be ca

use D ef en da nt did not ca

use or a cquie sc e in the num er ous de lay s in 6 his c as e an d be ca

use the S ta te f

ai le d init s ob lig at ionto br in g D ef en da nt’ s c as e to 7 tr ia l. 8 I. BACKGRO UND 9 A . Th e ri gh t to a sp ee dy t ri al 10 { 4} The S ixth Am endm ent to the United Stat e s C on st itutio n begins , “ In all crim inal 11 prosecution s, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy

. . . trial. ” See N

. M. Co nst

. 12 ar t. I I, § 14

. I n Sta te v . G arz a , w e em pha siz ed tha t “ [t ] he he ar

t of the ri ght

to a spe edy 13 tr ia l i s pr ev en tin g pr ej udi ce to the a cc use d. ” 2009 -N MS C- 038, ¶ 12, 146 N

. M. 499 , 14 21 2 P

. 3d 3 87. Bu t w e al so r ec ogni ze d th at the r igh t i s un iqu e am ong the 15 co nst itu tio na l gu ar an te es a ff or de d a cr im ina l de fe ndant be ca use of the c onc om itant 16 “ so c i e t a l i nt e r e st

i n br i ng i ng a n a c c us e d t o t r i a l.” Id

. (ci tin g B ark er v . W ing o , 407 1 7 U.S . 5 1 4 , 5 1 9 (1 9 7 2 ))

. A s a r es u l t , m er el y s h o wi n g d el ay i n b ri n g i n g an ac cu s ed ’s 18 ca se to tr ia l i s no t e noug h to e sta bli sh a spe edy tr ia l viol ation ; r athe r, w e m ust3

1 scrutinize every

claim ed violatio n to determ ine whether the accused has suffer ed an 2 “ act ua l an d a rti cu labl e d ep riv at io n” of t he rig ht to a sp eed y tri al

. Se e id. ¶

¶ 12- 13. 3 { 5} Inm ak ing that de te rm ina tio n, w e co nsi de r the f our fa ct or s artic ula te d in 4 Barker : ( 1) the le ngth of de lay in br ing ing the cas e to tri al , ( 2) the r ea sons f or the 5 delay , ( 3) the defendant’ s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prej udice 6 to the de fe ndant c au se d by the de lay . See 40 7 U

. S. a t 53 0; se e als o G arz a , 200 9- 7 NMS C-038, ¶ 13 (“ [W ] e have adopted the balancing test created by the United States 8 Su pr em e Co urt i n Barker

. ”)

. W e w ei gh the se f ac tor s a cc or din g to the uni que 9 ci rc um stanc es of

e ac h c as e in l igh t of

“ the S ta te a nd the de fe ndant’ s c ondu ct a nd the 10 harm to the defendant from

the delay .” Se e G arz a , 2 0 0 9 -N M SC -0 3 8 , ¶ ¶ 1 2 -1 3 . We 11 therefore begin with a reviewof the circ um stances in this case. 12 B. Fact ual and pr ocedur al tim e line 13 { 6} D ef

en da nt w as arre st ed on M ar ch9, 200 7, a nd d et ai ne d a t the MD C o n 14 sus pic ionof

se xua lly abusi ng h is f

our -y ear- old ne phe w . D ue to the c ha rg es a ga ins t 15 him a nd b ec au se he is hom ose xua l, MD C of fi ci al s pl ac ed

him a lm ost im m ed ia te ly in 16 pr ote ct ive c ust ody

f or his sa fe ty

. O n M ar ch26, 200 7, agr an d j ur y ind ic te d D ef

en da nt 17 on on e co un t ea ch of fir st -d eg ree crim in al se xu al pe ne tra ti on (a chi ld un de r 13 ), see 18 N MS A 1978 , § 30- 9- 11( C) (2 003) ; br ibe ry of a w itn es s (thr ea ts o r4

1 br ib es —re po rti ng ), see N MS A 197 8, § 30-2 4- 3( A )( 3) ( 1997 ); a nd c ontri but ing to the 2 de li nq ue nc y

of a m in or , see N MS A 197 8, § 30 -6 -3 (19 90 ). Defe ndant p le ad ed not 3 gui lty to al l thr ee co un ts, a nd the dis tr ic t c ourt se t hi s bo nd a t $1 50, 000 ca sh o r 4 su r e t y . U n ab l e t o a f

f o r d h i s b o n d , D e f

e n d a n t r e m a i n e d i n p r o t e c t i v e c u s tod ya t t he 5 MD C aw ai tin g tr ia l. 6 { 7} D ef

en da nt n ev er

ha d a tr ia l. In ste ad , m or e than fo ur y ears af te r his a rr es t, the 7 dis tr ic t c ourt di sm iss ed D ef en da nt’ s c as e w ithpr ej udi ce , f oll ow ing thr ee day s of 8 he ar ing s onD ef

en da nt’ s m oti on to dism iss on spe edy tr ia l gr ound s du e to i ne ff

ec tiv e 9 as sis tanc e of

c ouns el

. T he e vid en ce intro duc ed at the he ar ing s, w hic h w e re vie w in 10 som e de ta il thr ough out thi s opi nio n, inc lud ed te sti m ony f ro m f our de fe nse w itn es se s, 11 in cl ud in g Def

en da nt hi m se lf; co ur t-o rd ered ap pe aran ces by D efen da nt ’s firs t t wo 1 2 co urt

- ap p o i n t e da t t o rn e ys , H o u s t o n R o s s a n dS c o t tP i s t o n e ; s ub p o e n a s f o r M r . Ro s s ’s 13 an d M r. P ist one ’ s a tto rn ey c as e fi le s and D isc ipl inary Bo ar d r ec or ds; a nd e xte nsi ve 14 ar gum en t by

the part ie s. 15 { 8} Th e r ec o rd s h o ws t h e f o l l o wi n g t i m e l i n e o f s i g n i fi ca n tev en t s i n De fe n d an t ’s 16 case. On May

10, 2007, Mr. Ross filed a single docum ent on De fendant’ s behalf that 17 included h is entry

of appearance, a re q u es t fo r grand jury tapes, and dem ands for a 18 speedy

trial , d i sc ov e r

y , and e xculpatory

evidence. On Se ptem

ber 11, 2007, the district5

1 co urt se t D ef

en da nt’ s c as e fo r tr ia l onS ep te m be r 24, 200 7. T hr ee day s late r, on 2 Se pte m

be r 14, 200 7, the S ta te f ile d it s f ir st p et iti on f

or a n e xte nsi on o f tim e to 3 co m m en ce D ef

en da nt’ s tr ia l, not ing that the S ta te ’ s in ve sti ga tio n w as o ngoi ng and 4 that De fendant had not requested or condu cted any pretrial interview s. Mr . R oss later 5 sti pu la te d to the pe tit ionon D ef en da nt’ s be ha lf

a nd r eque ste d aple a of fe r. T he 6 dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d th e pe ti tio n and e xte nde d th e de ad lin e fo r co m m en ci ng 7 D ef en da nt’ s tr i a l t o J a n u a ry

2 , 2 0 0 8

. T h e d i s t r i c tc o u rta l s o s e tap l e ah e a r i n g f or 8 O ct obe r 23, 200 7. 9 { 9} On N ovem

ber 21, 2007, the district court set a pretr ial hearing for D ecem ber 10 14, 200 7. O n D ec em be r 12, 200 7, how ev er , the S ta te f ile d it s sec ond pe tit ionto 11 ex te nd the ti m e fo r co m m en ci ng D ef

en da nt’ s tr ia l, ag ai n w ith Mr

. Ro ss’ s a gr ee m en t. 12 Init s se co nd p et iti on, the S ta te r ep re se nte d th at it w as in the pr oc es s of

“ fo rm ula tin g 13 an offer ” in response to Defe ndant’s r equest for a plea a greem ent, that the ca se wa s 14 not ready

for tria l, that D efendant had not requeste d o r conducted anypretrial 15 int er vie w s, a nd tha t the parti es w er e “ hope fu l tha t i f giv enm or e tim e, the c as e w ill 16 re sul t i n anon -tri al dis posi tio n. ” T he dis tr ic t co urt gr an te d the pe tit ion , ex te nde d th e 17 de ad lin e fo r co m

m en ci ng D ef

en da nt’ s tr ia l t o Apr il 2, 200 8, a nd s et the tr ia l f

or 18 March 24, 2008 . I n the interim , the district court set a second plea hearing for January6

1 25, 200 8. 2 { 10} On Fe bruary

22, 2008 , the district court continued the March 24, 2008 trial 3 setting. The co u rt noted in its contin uance order that Mr . R oss had requested an 4 “ evaluati o n ” a n dt h at “ [a ]d d i t i o n al / n ew ev i d en ce [h ad b ee n ] di s cl o s ed re cently .” That 5 or de r w as f

oll ow ed on M ar ch20, 200 8, by

the S ta te’ s th ird pe titionto ex te nd the 6 deadline for comm encing De fendant’ s trial, filed in this Court as was then required 7 byRu l e 5

- 6 0 4 ( D ) N M RA , a n d a g a i n s t i p u l a t e d t o b y M r . R o s s . A s g r o u n d s f orthe 8 pe tit ion , the S ta te r ep re se nte d that al tho ugh it had co m ple te d its i nit ia l i nve sti ga tio n, 9 it ha d be enne ce ssary

to co nduc t a

se co nd s af

eh ouse int er

vie wof the victimon 10 Fe br ua ry 20, 200 8, be ca

use of a re port tha t the vic tim ha d r ec an te d th e al le ga tio ns 11 against Defe ndant or po ssibl y had nam ed a diffe rent ab user. The S tate further 12 represe nted that the victim had not, in fact, rec anted his story at the second interview 13 an d th at

asup ple m en ta l re port ha d be en pr ep ar ed by a de te ct ive a nd d istri but ed to the 14 parties. The S tate also noted that Mr. R oss w as “ still evaluating the case in an effort 15 to determ ine whether an evaluation of his client is in order” and that Def endant had 1 6 not r e qu e s t e do r

c o n du c t e da n y

p r e t r i a l i n t e rv i e w s . T h e S t a t e c o n c l u d e db y s t a t ing 17 tha t D ef

en da nt’ s c as e ha d be en“ se t f or ade fi nit e tria l se tti ng o n Augus t 11 , 200 8, 18 which is outsid e the curr ent . .

. date [perm itted by Rule 5-604] ,” and requested an7

1 ex te nsi on thr ough O ct obe r 2, 2008

. T his Co urt grante d the pe tit ion on Ap ri l 1, 200 8, 2 an d e xte nde d th e de ad lin e fo r co m m en ci ng D ef

en da nt’ s tr ia l to Se pte m

be r 2, 200 8. 3 { 11} Inthe e nsui ng m onths, the dis tr ic t c our t se t pr etri al c onf

er en ce s fo r May

29, 4 2008 , a nd July

31, 200 8, a nd s et

the c as e fo r a j ur

y tr ia l onA ugus t 25 , 200 8. Bu t on 5 Au g u s t 1 8 , 2 0 0 8 , t h e S t at e— o n ce ag ai n n o t i n g Mr . R o s s ’s ag re emen to n De fe n d an t ’s 6 be ha lf —f ile d it s f ourth p et iti on t o e xte nd the ti m e to c om m en ce D ef

en da nt’ s tr ia l. 7 The S tate re presented to this Court that it had m ade a plea offer to Mr. Ross that had 8 not y et been acc epted, th at M r. Ro ss had refused the State’ s request “ that a sex 9 of fe nde r [e va lua tio n] be c om ple te d, ” an d th at

Mr

. Ro ss h ad

not req ue st ed or 10 co nduc te d any

pr etri al int er

vie w s. T he S ta te a lso r ep re se nte d th at , be ca use it ha d no t 11 he ar d f

ro m Mr

. Ro ss abo ut the ple a of fe r an d bec au se the part ie s w oul d no t be r ea dy 12 for tri al on Au gust

25, 200 8, the dis tr ic t c ourt ha d r e- se t the m atte r at the part ie s’ 13 re que st f

or tr ia l on D ec em

be r 8, 200 8, w hic h th e St at e not ed w as a ft er the pr ev iou s 14 de ad lin e se t by

thi s C our

t. T he S ta te the re fo re re que ste d, an d thi s Co urt gr an te d on 15 A ugus t 25 , 200 8, a n or de r ex te ndi ng the ti m e to c om m en ce D ef

en da nt’ s t ria l to 16 March 2, 2009. O n Septem ber 2, 2008 , the district court set a plea hearing for O ctober 17 14, 2008, and on October 14, 2008 , the district c ourt se t De fendant’ s case f or a j ury 18 tr ia l onD ec em

be r 1, 200 8.8

1 { 12} H er e, the c as e too k an un ex pe ct ed tur n. O n O ct obe r 23, 200 8, a ft er o ve r 17 2 m ont hs of Mr

. Ro ss’ s r ep re se nta tio n, D ef en da nt f ile d apr o se m oti on t o a ppoi nt 3 subs tit ute c ouns el

. T he m oti on w as sim ple , al le gin g onl y tha t D ef en da nt ha d be enin 4 cu sto dy

sin ce Marc h 9, 200 7, a nd tha t he be lie ved tha t M r. Ro ss w as “ not able to 5 adequately

repre sent [his] interests” in the case. 6 { 13} In t he we eks that followed, the State f iled several docum ents sug gesting that 7 the parties were preparing for trial. Mos t notably , the State subm itted two stipul ated 8 or de rs tha t the dis tr ic t co urt gr an te d. T he fi rs t, en te re d on N ove m be r 3, 2 008, 9 pr ovi de d f

or the pr oduc tio n to D ef

en da nt of the vic tim ’ s sa fe hous e int er vie w s an d f

or 10 the pr ote ct io n of the vic tim ’ s pr iva cy . T he se co nd, e nte re d onN ove m be r 7, 200 8, 11 or de re d pr oduc tio n to the St at e of tr ea tm en t an d m ed ic al re co rd s f ro m the Be rn al ill o 12 Co unty

F ir e D ep ar

tm en t r el at ed

to its r es pons e to the victim ’s hom e on M ar ch2, 13 2007

. 14 { 14} In ste ad

of pr oc ee din g w ith D ef

en da nt’ s tr ia l, w hic h ha d be ense t t o be ginon 15 D ec em

be r 1, 200 8, the dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d De fe ndant’ s pr o se m oti on t o a ppoi nt 16 subs tit

ute co unse l tha t sa m e da y an d re m ove d Mr

. Ro ss fr om the c as e. I n it s or de r, the 17 dis tr ic t c ourt f

ound that “ w hil e the re is no ind ic at ion tha t [M r. Ro ss] ha s no t f ull y a nd 18 effe ctively

repre sented . .

. [D ] efendant, it is in the interest of j ustice to appo int new9

1 co u n s e l i n v i e w o f [ D ] e f e n d a n t ’ s . . . u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o w o rk w i t h [ M r . Ro ss]

. ” T he 2 co urt t h e r e f

o r e o r d e r e d t h a t t h e c a s e b e r e tu rn e d t o t h e P ub l i c D e f e n d e r fo r 3 re as sig nm en t and spe ci fi ca lly or de re d th at

“ an y de lay c au se d by

the c ha nge of 4 co unse l be ch arg ed a ga ins t the de fe ndant f or spe edy tr ia l purp ose s. ” A lso on 5 D ec em be r 1, 200 8, th e di stri ct

c ourt r es ch ed

ule d D ef en da nt’ s tr ia l f

or F eb ru ar y 9, 6 2009

. 7 { 15} O n January

23, 200 9, D ef

en da nt’ s sec ond at tor

ne y , Sc ott Pi sto ne , en te re d hi s 8 ap pe ar an ce a nd f

ile d anot ic e of

de m an d f

or dis co ve ry

a nd a de m an d fo r a spe edy 9 tr ia l. O n Fe br

ua ry 13, 2009 , the dis tr ic t c ourt i ssu ed anot ic e se tti ng D ef

en da nt’ s c as e 10 fo r tr ia l onJul y

20, 2009 , an d on Fe br

ua ry 16, 2009 , the S ta te f ile d it s f if th p et iti on 11 to request an extension o f tim e to com m ence D efendant’ s trial. The S tate re presented 12 that it had been contacted by Mr. Pistone on Janu ary 28, 2 009, that he had indi cated 13 tha t he w oul d not be re ady fo r tr ia l on Fe br ua ry 9, 200 9, a nd tha t he w oul d “ sti pul at e 14 to whatever wa s needed to contin ue the trial setting.” The State further e xplained th at 15 on F eb ru ar

y 3, 200 9, th e St at e ha d le ar ne d th at Mr

. P ist one w as out

of the state 16 tending to his ill father an d that a fewday s later, Mr. Pistone’ s father had passed 1 7 a w a y. Th e S t at e s ai dt h at i th ad n o t i fi ed t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt o f M r. Pi s t o n e’s 18 una va ila

bil ity , the co urt ha d ag re ed to co nti nue the tr ia l se t fo r Fe br ua ry 9, 2009 , a nd10

1 it h a d s e t a n e w t r i a l d a t e o f J u l y 2 0 , 2 0 0 9 , w h i c h w a s a f t e r t he de ad lin e fo r 2 com m encing Def

endant’ s trial under Rule 5-60 4

. Th e State then re quested an 3 extension of the tim e to com m ence De fendant’ s trial until Septem ber 2, 2009, w hich 4 thi s C ourt gr an te d onF eb ru ar y 24, 200 9. 5 { 16} The next entry

in the district court record, entered on July 10, 2009, is an order 6 stay ing the c as e pe ndi ng a de te rm ina tio n of

D efen da nt’ s c om

pe te nc y to stand tri al

. 7 The order

states only

that the court had “ considered inform ation from both cou nsel 8 an d [ fo und] that the re is ev ide nc e tha t .

. . [ D ] ef en da nt m ay no t be co m

pe tent to 9 pr oc ee d inthi s c as e. ” T he c ourt the re fo re sta y ed the c as e an d a ll de ad lin es und er Ru le 10 5- 604 “ unt il anor de r is fi le d find ing

. . . [D ] ef en da nt com

pe te nt t o st an d tr ia l or

unt il 11 fu rth er o rd er o f th e co ur t.” 12 { 17} T he r ec or d do es no t sh owa ny f urthe r ac tiv ity

in D ef en da nt’ s c as e unt il 13 ap pr oxi m at el y

six m onths l at er , w he n M r. P ist one f ile d an uno pp os ed

m oti on t o 14 w ith dr awa s D ef

en da nt’ s c ouns el

. Mr

. P ist one a lle ge d th at D ef en da nt h ad

f ile d a 15 discipli nary

com plaint against him , that De fendant wa s filing hi s own m otion s, that 16 D ef en da nt w as not

c om ply ing w ith Mr. Pis ton e, a nd tha t the a tto rn ey -c lie nt 17 re la tio nshi p ha d d et eri orat ed

. T he dis tr ic t c ourt he ld a he ar ing on the m oti on t o 18 w ith dr awon M ar ch24, 201 0, a nd g rante d M r. Pi st on e’s re que st. T he c ourt di d no t11

1 iss ue an or de r w ithf

orm al f ind ing s and c onc lus ion s, but in the tr an sc ri pt o f the 2 hearing—at which D efendant w as present but did not testify —the district court 3 adm oni she d D efend an t th at “ the ne xt atto rn ey

y ou g et , y ou’ re stu ck

w ith

. I ’ m

not 4 goi ng t o pl ay

thi s gam e w ithy ou, so tha t’ s th e w ay it ’ s go ing to be

. Y our

ne xt 5 at to rn ey , whet he r y ou li ke hi m or h er, ai n’t g on na m at te r.” 6 { 18} O n M ay

19, 201 0, L iane K er

r en te re d her

appe ar an ce on D ef

en da nt’ s be ha lf 7 an d dem an de d a spee dy tr ia l. T ha t sam e da y , Ms

. K er r fi le d D ef

en da nt’ s f ir st w itn es s 8 dis cl osur e in the c as e; a noti ce of dis co ve ry

de m an d; and a

not ic e of non -ava ila

bil ity 9 for severa l dates in October, Novem ber and D ecem

ber of 2010. T he case r emai n ed 10 quiescent un til October 18, 2010 , when the district court entered an order subm itted 11 by Ms

. K er r tha t l if te d th e stay

in D ef en da nt’ s case . T he or de r ex pla ine d th at a 12 com petency evaluation had been com pl et ed and that Ms. K err wa s satisfied “ that 13 the re [w er e] no com

pe te nc y iss ue s. ” A lso on Oc tob er 18, 2010 , m or e than th re e- an d14 a- ha lf y ears a ft er

D ef enda nt ’s a rrest, Ms

. K er r fi le d am oti on t o di sm iss the c as e 15 ag ai ns t Def

en da nt “ on sp eed y tri al gr ou nd s d ue to in effe ct iv e as si st an ce o f co un se l.” 16 { 19} U nf

ortun at el y , the f

ili ng o f D efend an t’s m oti on t o di sm iss did not e nd the 17 de lay s inhis c ase. The di str ic t c ourt or igi na lly se t the m oti on f

or ahe ar ing on 18 N ove m

be r 17, 201 0, one of

the da te s th at

Ms . Ke rr had

ind ic at ed she w oul d no t be12

1 available. T he court then reset the hearing for Decem ber 1 6, 20 10, and later vac ated 2 tha t se tti ng a ft er

Ms

. K er r fi le d an un oppo se d m oti on t o cont inu e the he ar ing be ca use 3 she ha d le ar

ne d tha t she w oul d be re co ve ri ng fr om am ed ic al pr oc ed

ur e thr oughthe 4 end of 2010 . O n Novem ber 2 9, 20 10, t he district court set De fendant’ s case f or a j ury 5 trial on February

28, 2011, notin g tha t “ THE RE W IL L B E N O MO RE 6 CO N T IN U A

N CE S. ” Bu t on Fe br

ua ry 22, 2011 , the co urt re tr ea te d fr om tha t po sit ion 7 an d se t a

he ar ing on De fe ndant’ s m oti on to dism iss fo r Marc h 23, 201 1, f ive m onths 8 after Ms. K err had f

i l ed the m otion to dism iss. T hat hearing tookplace and it w as 9 fo llo w ed by tw o oth er he ar ing s ove r the ne xt tw o m onths— one on Apr il 15, 2011, 10 and one on May

24, 2011—and finally , on Ju ne 23, 2 011, the district court granted 11 D ef en da nt’ s m oti on, dis m iss ed the ca se ag ai nst him

w ithpr ej udi ce , a nd o rd er ed his 12 relea se. 13 II. DISC US SION 14 { 20} In i t s d i sm issal order, the district court w eighed the Barker f ac tor s and 15 co nc lud ed

that D ef en da nt’ s r igh t t o aspe edy tr ia l ha d be envio la te d. I n r ev ie w ing a 1 6 d i s t r i c tco u rt ’s ru l i n g o n a s p ee d y t ri al v i o l at i o n cl ai m , we d ef ert o t h e c o u rt ’s 17 finding s of fac t, and we w eigh and balance the Barker fact or s d e n ov o. State v. 18 Spe arm an , 201 2- N MS C- 023, ¶ 19, 283 P

. 3d 2 72.13

1 { 21} Before we begin our analy sis, we note that the circum stances of this case are 2 ex t r e m e . A s w e w i l l e xp l a i n i n f ur t he r de t a i l , t he part i e s a gr e e t hat D e f e nd ant was 3 held without a trial for over f our y ears and three m onth s in condi tions that am ount ed 4 to s oli tary

c onf ine m en t. T he se c ir cu m stanc es ne ce ssari ly c olo r our e nti re a na ly sis

. 5 A . Le ng th of

d el ay 6 { 22} T he f

ir st f ac tor , the le ngth of

de lay , ha s a dua l f

unc tio n: i t a ct s a s atr igg er ing 7 m echanism

for considering the four Barker f ac tor s if the de lay cr oss es the thr es hol d 8 of be ing “ pr es um

pti ve ly p rej udi ci al , ” an d it is anind ep en de nt f

ac tor to co nsi de r in 9 ev al ua ti ng whet he r a s pe ed y t r i a l v io la ti on ha s o ccu rred

. Se e G arz a , 2009-NMS C10 038, ¶¶ 21, 23. W e h ave establ ished benchm arks for presum ptivelyprej udicial delay 11 according to the com

plex i t y o f a case: one y ear for a sim ple case, 15 m onth s for a 12 case of inter

m ediate com

plexity , and 18 m onth s for a c om plex case. Se e id. ¶

48. 13 { 23} T he dis tr ic t c ourt f ound ade lay in D ef

en da nt’ s ca se of al m ost fo ur an d one ha lf 14 y ears . T he c ourt, how ev er , m ad e no f ind ing s a bout the le ve l of

c om ple xity of 15 De fendant’ s case or about whether the length of delay we ighed for or against either 16 pa rty . T he S ta te c onc ed es that the le ngth of de lay m ay ha ve be co m e pr es um

pti ve ly 1 7 p r e ju d i c i a l i rr e s p e c t i v e o f t h e c a s e ’s c o mp l e x i t y. G i v e n t h e e x t r e me l e n g t h o f d e l a y, 18 w e fi nd i t un ne ce ssary to de te rm ine w he the r the c as e shou ld h av e be entr ie d w ith in14

1 15 o r 18 m onths; f

ro m D ef en da nt’ s pe rs pe ct ive , it m ak es little dif fe re nc e w he the r he 2 w as e nti tle d to atr ia l a f ull thr ee y ears be fo re his r el ea se or a“ m er e” tw o y ears a nd 3 nine m onth s before h i s re l ea s e. Either w ay , he rem ained in ja il without a trial far 4 long er than w as presum ptivelyallowed. W e therefo re h old th at the district court 5 correc tly considered the four B ark er fact or s. Se e G arz a , 2009-NMS C-038, ¶ 23 (“ If 6 a co urt de te rm in es that the le ngth of de lay is ‘ pr es um

pti ve ly pr ej udi ci al , ’ the n it 7 shou ld consid er the length of delay as one of four fa ctors in the analy sis . .

. .” ). 8 { 24} In ev al ua tin g th e fi rs t Barker factor, we previousl y have held that “ the greater 9 the delay [, ] the m ore h eavily it will potentially we igh against the State. ” G arz a , 200 9- 10 N MS C- 038, ¶

24. T he dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t expl ic itl y w ei gh the le ngth of del ay f or 11 or a ga ins t e ith er

party . Bu t give n the ex tr em e le ngth of the de lay in this c as e, w e do 12 not cons ider this to be a difficult questio n. T he delay of over 51 m onth s was 13 extraordinary , and therefore it w eighs heavilyin Def endant’ s favor. Se e, e.g. , Sta te 14 v. F ie rro , 2012 -N MC A -0 54, ¶ 36, 278 P. 3d 541 (hol din g that a per iod of a lm ost 55 15 m onths b etw ee n th e de fe ndant’ s arr es t and tri al w ei ghe d he av ily in his f av or ); cf

. 16 G arz a , 200 9- N MS C- 038, ¶ 24 ( h o l d i n g t h a t a d e l a y o f o n e mo n t h a n ds i x d a ys 17 be y ond the gui de lin e fo r pr es um pti ve pr ej udi ce “ w as not ex tr ao rd inary an d [d id] not 18 we igh heavilyin Def

endant’ s favor”).15

1 { 25} W e pause before turning to the other Barker f act or s to a ddr es s th e Co urt of 2 Appeals m aj ority ’ s analy sis on this po int. A s we explain m ore fully below, the district 3 co urt f ound that the S ta te w as not at fa ult f or the de lay in br ing ing D ef

en da nt’ s c as e 4 to tri al , a nd i t f

ou nd th at all o f the de lay w as a ttr ibu ta

ble to D ef

en da nt’ s a tto rn ey s. 5 Re ly ing on the se fin dings, the Co urt of Appe al s m aj or ity

c onc lud ed

that the le ngth 6 of de la y “ can no t . . . wei g h [ ] e v en sl ig ht ly agai ns t t he Sta te . At th e v ery le as t, we 7 we igh th is factor slightly against Defe ndant.” Se rro s , N o. 31, 565, m em . op. ¶ 17. T he 8 St at e ag re es a nd arg ue s th at G arz a stands fo r the pr opos iti on tha t “ [w ] he re the S ta te 9 is no t at fau lt , itis in ap pr op ria te to weig h e ve n l en gt hy del ay s ag ai ns t i t.” 10 { 26} W e dis ag re e an d clari fy tha t the pa rt ie s’ fa ult in ca usi ng the de lay

is ir re le va nt 11 to the an al y sis of

the f ir st Barker

fact or . See State v. Stock , 200 6- N MC A -1 40, ¶ 16, 12 140 N

. M. 676 , 147 P

. 3d 8 85 (“ Whil e . . . it w oul d se em

to m ak e se nse to co nsi de r the 13 re as on f

or de lay in de ci di ng w ha t w ei ght to as sig n to the le ngth of de lay [, ]

. . . our 14 ca se s ha ve not se em ed to pr oc ee d inthat m at te r. ”) ; c f. Sta te v. U

rban , 2004-NMS C15 007, ¶

13, 135 N

. M. 279 , 87 P

. 3d 1 061 (“ A lth oughnot a ll of the de la y

c anbe 16 at tr ibu te d to the S ta te , w e do n ot c onsi de r the e xte nt to wh ic h th e de lay c anbe 17 at tr ibu te d to th e St at e or D ef en da nt whe n f

ir st d et er m ini ng w he the r the de lay is 18 presum

ptivelyprej udicial.”). The length o f delay is an objec tive determ ination that16

1 is ca pable of m ea sur em en t w ith som e pr ec isi on, an d onc e es ta bli she d, it co lo rs the 2 re st o f the spe edy

tr ia l ana ly sis

. A d el ay tha t c ro sse s th e thr es hol d f or pr es um pti ve 3 pr ej udi ce ne ce ssari ly

w ei ghs in f

av or of t he accuse d; the onl y que sti on i s, how 4 he a vi l y ? See Stock , 2 0 0 6

- N M C A

- 1 4 0 , ¶ 1 7 ( “[ E ]v e n w h e r e a d e f e n d a n t b e a r s s o me 5 re spon sib ili ty

f or de lay , the shee r fa ct

of le ngthy inc ar ce ratio n or

oth er r es tr ai nt o n 6 liberty shoul d count for som ething i n t h e s p ee dy trial analy sis.”). A delay that 7 “ sc ar ce ly

c ro sse s th e ‘ ba re m ini m um ne ed ed to tr igg er

j udi ci al e xa m ina tio n of

the 8 cl ai m ’” is o f li tt le he lp to a de fen da nt cla im in g a sp eed y tri al vi ol at io n. G arz a , 200 9- 9 N MS C- 038, ¶ 24 (q uo ti ng Doggett v. United States , 505 U. S. 647, 652 (199 2)). 10 Co nve rs el y , a n e xtr ao rd inary de lay , lik e the de lay in this c as e, w ei ghs he av ily in favor 11 of a de fe ndant’ s spe edy tr ia l cl ai m , be ar ing in m ind tha t no sin gle f ac tor is dis posi tiv e 12 of whet he r a v io la ti on ha s o ccu rred

. Se e id. ¶ ¶ 23- 24. 13 { 27} W e ack now le dge that our fr am ing of thi s f ac tor a s po te nti al ly

w ei ghi ng 14 “ agai nst

th e St at e” m ay

ha ve in vi te d s om e co ns id erat io n o f fau lt

. Id

. ¶ 24 ( em pha sis 15 ad de d)

. I nde ed , the Co urt of Appe al s m aj or ity ap pa re ntl y w as r el uc tant t o w ei gh this 16 factor “ agai nst the S ta te ” be ca use the dis tr ict co ur t had spe ci fi ca lly f ound that the 17 St at e was no t at f

a u l t f o r t h e de la y . Se rro s , N o. 31, 565, m em . op. ¶ 17 ( em pha sis 18 ad de d)

. Bu t a s th e m aj or ity ’ s ho ldi ng i llu stra te s, f au lti ng the part ie s a t this sta ge of17

1 the analy sis can lead to an incong ruous result, especially in a case such as this o ne, 2 w he n th e obj ec tiv e le ngth o f de la y off er s pe rh ap s th e cl eare st e vid en ce that a 3 vio la ti on m ay ha ve oc curr ed

. T o w ei gh a de lay of ove r fo ur

y ears a ga ins t 4 D ef en dant —e ve n sl igh tly

—i s si m ply unj ust , ke ep ing in m ind tha t the ri ght a t st ak e 5 is D ef en da nt’ s r igh t to a spe edy tr ia l. T he r em ai nin g Barker f ac tor s le av e am

ple r oom 6 to c onsi de r whe th er the othe r ci rc um stanc es in the c as e, inc lud ing the f au lt of the 7 p a rt i e s , o u t w e i g h t h e l e n g t h o f t h e d e l a y. 8 { 28} Insum , w e co nc lu de that the le ngth of de lay in thi s c as e w as pr es um

pti ve ly 9 prej udicial and weighs heavily in favor of D efend an t ’ s claim that his sp eedy

trial 10 rights were violated. W e theref ore look to th e other Barker f ac tor s to de te rm ine 11 w he the r the y

ti p th e ba lanc e ba ck

in favor of th e “ soc ie ta l i nte re st i n br ing ing 12 [D efendant] to trial.” G arz a , 200 9- N MS C- 038, ¶ 12. 13 B. R ea son f

or t he d el ay 14 { 29} The sec ond factor in the B ark er an al y sis , the r ea son fo r the de lay , r equir es a 15 court to evaluate “ ‘ the reason the governm ent assigns to justify the delay .’ ” G arz a , 16 2009 -N MS C- 038, ¶ 25 ( quot ing Barker , 407 U

. S. a t 53 1)

. “ ‘ T he r ea sons f or ape ri od 17 of the de lay m ay e ith er he igh te n or

te m pe r the pr ej udi ce to the de fe ndant c au se d by 18 the length o f the delay .’ ” Id

. ( quot ing Sta te v . M

addox , 200 8- N MS C- 062, ¶ 13, 14518

1 N. M. 242, 195 P. 3d 12 54). W e previously have rec ogni zed three ty pes of delay

that 2 m ay be attribu t ed t o t h e State and weighted against it at vary ing levels. First, “ ‘ [a] 3 deliberate attem

pt to delay

the trial in order to ham

per the defe nse shou ld be weighted 4 heavily against the gov ernm ent.’ ” Id

. ( quot ing Barker , 407 U

. S. at 531 ( al te ratio n in 5 or igi nal) ). Second , “ ne gli ge nt o r adm ini str at ive de lay . . . ‘ shou ld b e w ei ght ed le ss 6 he av ily but ne ve rthele ss s houl d be c onsi de re d si nc e the ult im at e re spon sib ili ty f or 7 s u ch ci rc u m s t an ce s m

u s tre s twi t h t h e g o v er n m en tra t h ert h an wi t h t h e d ef en d an t .’” 8 Id

. ¶ 26 ( quot ing Barker , 407 U

. S. a t 53 1)

. A s th e le ngth of de lay inc re as es , ne gli ge nt 9 orad m in is tra ti ve de la y weig hs m or e h eav il y

ag ai ns t t he Sta te

. Se e id. A nd thir d, 1 0 “ ap pr o p r i a t e d e l a y , ” j u s t i f i e d f o r “ a v a l i d r e a s o n , s u c h a s a m i s s i n g w i t n e ss, ” is 11 ne ut ral an d d oe s n ot weig h a ga in st th e St at e. Id

. ¶ 27 (quoting Barker , 407 U. S. at 12 531)

. T he U

. S. S upr em e Co ur t a lso ha s r ec ogni ze d af ourth ty pe of de lay that this 13 Co urt ha s no t y et

c onsi de re d, de lay

“ ca use d by the de fens e,” wh ic h w ei ghs ag ai nst 14 th e d efen da nt

. Se e V

erm ont v . B ril lon , 556 U .S

. 81, 90, 94 ( 2009 ) (h old ing that the 15 de fe ndant’ s “ de lib er at e at te m pt t o di sr upt pr oc ee din gs” w ei ghe d he av ily a ga ins t the 16 defendant). 17 { 30} Since filing his m otion to dism iss, De fendant consist ently has blam ed the delay 1 8 i n t h i s c a s e n o to n t h e S t a t e , b u to n M r . R o s s a n d M r . P i s t o n e , t h e f i r s tt w o a t t o rn e ys19

1 appoin ted to represent him . I ndeed, D efendant’ s m otion to dism iss pu rportedly relied 2 on i ne ff

ec tiv e as sis tanc e of

c ouns el a s th e ba sis f

or the vio la tio n of De fe ndant’ s r igh t 3 to a spe edy tr ia l. Bu t Ms. K er r la te r cl ar if

ie d at the he ar ing on the m oti on t o di sm iss 4 tha t he r use of tha t te rm w as im pr ec ise ; sh e ins te ad

a rg ue d th at

D ef en da nt’ s sp ee dy 5 tr ia l r igh ts w er e vio la te d du e to atto rn ey ne gle ct, a s rec ogni ze d by the Co urt of 6 Appe al s in Stock

. See 2006 -N MC A -1 40, ¶¶ 21- 22 (h old ing tha t the de fe ndant’ s r igh t 7 to a spe edy tr ia l w as vio la te d w he n, a m ong oth er thi ngs, de lay s c au se d by the 8 “ neglect” of his att o rn eys co u ld not be held against him for speedy

trial purposes 9 be ca use the y we re “ unr ea sona

ble a nd u nne ce ssary ” an d “ sol el y a ttr ibu ta ble to 10 [d ef en se ] c ouns el ”)

. Si m ilarl y , the dis tr ic t co urt re fe rr ed to ine ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e of 11 co unse l i n it s di sm iss al or de r, but it e xpr es sly ba se d it s di sm iss al on Stock a nd d id n ot 12 en ga ge in anine ff

ec tiv e- as sis tanc e- of

-c ouns el a na ly sis. Se e, e . g. , Sta te v . A sto rga , 13 2015 -N MS C- 007, ¶ 17, 343 P

. 3d 1 245 (“ ‘T o e sta bli sh i ne ff

ec tiv e as sis tanc e of 14 co unse l, ade fe ndant m ust sho w : ( 1) ‘ co unse l’ s pe rf orm an ce w as de fi ci en t, ’ a nd ( 2) 15 ‘ the de fi ci en t perf

orm an ce pr ej udi ce d th e de fe nse . ’ ” (quot ing State v. Paredez , 16 2004 -N MS C- 036, ¶

13, 136 N

. M. 53 3, 101 P. 3d 7 99) ). W e the re fo re a na ly ze the 17 perform ances o f Mr. Ross and Mr. Pistone in thi s case under Stock and do no t reac h 18 the a de qua cy

of the ir r ep re se nta tio n un de r the Six th Am en dm en t r igh t t o e ff ec tiv e20

1 as si st an ce o f co un se l. Cf

. State v. Strauch , 2015-NMS C-009, ¶ 13, 345 P.3d 317 (“ In 2 interpreting statuto ry

language as well a s in m

uch of t he other work courts are called 3 on to p erfor

m , it is nece ssary

to thin k thou ghts and not words.”)

. 4 { 31} The district court agr eed with De fendant that the delay wa s attributable to Mr

. 5 Ross and Mr . P iston e and that the State did not cause the delay . T he court concluded 6 in its di sm issal order (1) that the State had not intentio nally caused any

of the delay 7 in D ef en da nt’ s c as e or

sou ght to int er fe re w ith D ef

en da nt’ s rig ht to a sp ee dy tr ia l, ( 2) 8 tha t the S ta te “ re as ona bly a cquie sc ed

to re que ste d c ha nge s in de fens e co unse l and 9 de fe nse c ont inu an ce s, ” an d ( 3) that M r. Ro ss an d Mr

. Pi sto ne w er e “ re spon sib le f or 10 the de lay

in thi s c as e. ” Re ga rd ing Mr

. Ro ss, the dis tr ic t co urt f ound that a lth oughhe 11 w a s no ti ne f

f e c t i ve u nder Stock , he ha d de lay ed D ef en da nt’ s tr ia l by

“ sc he dul [i ng] 12 plea hearings when the defe ndant did not request them .” As f or Mr. Pistone, however , 13 the c ourt fo und tha t he w as ine ff ec tiv e an d th at

he ha d de lay ed

the c as e by

r ai sin g th e 14 iss ue of

D ef en da nt’ s c om

pe te nc y j ust be fo re atr ia l se tti ng i n Ju ly 20 09 w ith out 15 actually

seeking or obtain ing a com petency evaluation, and by

seeking to withdraw 16 from the case because of a discipli nary com plaint against him that actually wa s never 17 fi le d. A s w iththe le ngth of de lay , th e dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t e xpl ic itl y w ei gh the 18 reasons for the delay

against either party

when it dism issed Defe ndant’s ca se.21

1 { 32} The C ourt of Appeals m aj ority agree d with the district court that the S tate had 2 no t in te nt io na ll y cau se d th e de la y in th is cas e. Se e Se rro s , N o. 31, 565, m em . op. ¶ 19. 3 T he Co urt the refo re co nc lud ed that “ the r ea sons f

or the de lay

. . . do n ot w ei gh 4 ag ai nst the St at e, ” an d it “ tur

n[ ed ] to ex am ine w he the r the de lay w as a ttr ibu ta

ble to 5 De fendant or h is couns el.” Id

. T he Co urt of

Appe al s th enc onsi de re d th e thr ee pe ri ods 6 during which Defe ndant was repr es en t ed by Mr. Ross, Mr. Pistone, and Ms. Ke rr, 7 respectively , and conclud ed that all but three m onth s of the delay in the case w eighed 8 h e a v i l y ag ai ns t Def

en da nt

. Se e id. ¶

¶ 1 2, 1 9-

- 38

. T he C ourtp r i m a r i l y f aul t ed 9 De fendant for either not ob j ecting to or stip ula t ing to the “ num erous continu ances 10 and extensio ns” in the case and for see king to replace Messrs. R oss and Pist o n e at 11 “ cru ci al ti m e[s ]” in t he cas e. Id

. ¶ ¶ 22, 33, 36. 12 { 33} D ef

en da nt c ont inu es to ar gue in thi s a ppe al that the r ea sons -f

or -d el ay f ac tor 13 shou ld not w ei gh ag ai nst him be ca use the de lay s w er e ca

use d byhi s att or

ne y s’ 14 ne gle ct

. A lth oughD ef en da nt a gr ee s w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt an d the Co urt of Appe al s 15 tha t the S ta te did

not a ct “ in any w ay to cause the de lay , ” he co nte nds tha t the re is a 16 dif fe re nc e be tw ee n “ the S ta te ’ s la ck of a ff irm at iv e action to d el ay

the tr ia l and the 17 St at e’ s know le dge tha t [D ef en da nt’ s] at tor

ne y s w er e doi ng nothin g to m ove the c as e 18 forw ard. ” Bec ause of the latter contentio n, D efendant argues th at the State w as “ at22

1 least partly responsib le [for the delay ] due to its inaction.” De fendan t t h er efore 2 co nte nds tha t, a s in Stock , this factor sho uld we igh against the State because it failed 3 in it s “ ob li ga ti on to m ov e [t he cas e] forwar d a nd to see th atjus ti ce i s d on e.” 4 { 34} W e ha ve ne ve r co nsi de re d th e co nt ou rs of the Co urt of

Appe al s’ hol din g in 5 Stock or how it m ight app ly

in a case like the one before us, in w hich Def endant was 6 s ub je ct ed t o ex t ra o rd i n ar y d el a y wh i l e b ei n g h el di n cu s t o d i al s eg re g at i o n . We 7 therefore reviewthe analy sis and ho lding of Stock be fo re w e co nsi de r whe the r it 8 applies in th is case. 9 1. We adopt the reasoning of S t a t e v . S t o c k in spe ed y trial c ases w he n th e de lay 10 is e

xtraord in ary an d th e ac cu se d is h el

d in c us tod

y 11 { 35} In Stock , our Court of Appeals held that the defendant’ s speedy trial rights had 12 be envio la te d a ft er

a“ pa rt ic ularl y

e gr eg iou s” de lay

of thr ee an d- a- ha lf y ears , dur ing 13 whi ch ti m e th e d efen da nt ha d bee n in carc erat ed an d “ ha ras se d and ass au lt edin jail .” 14 See 2006 -N MCA -140, ¶¶ 18, 36. An aly zing the reasons for the delay , the C ourt 15 fo cu se d onape ri od o f ne ar ly tw o and- a- ha lf

y ears in w hic h th e de fe ndant’ s c ourt16 ap poi nte d a tto rn ey

ha d ( 1) r eque ste d ac om pe te nc y e va lua tio n; ( 2) r ec ei ve d th e 17 re sul ts o f the e va lua tio n, w hic h de te rm ined th at th e de fe ndant w as c om pe te nt, but 18 fa ile d to share the re sul ts w iththe S ta te a nd the dis tr ic t c ourt f or ove r ei ght

m onths;23

1 (3 ) re qu es te d ase co nd c om pe te nc y e va lua tio n; and ( 4) r ec ei ve d th e re sul ts o f the 2 second evaluation and again failed to share them with the State or the district court 3 fo r ne arl y

a y ear. Id

. ¶ 20. 4 { 36} J u d g e Pickard, wr iting for a unanim ous Cou rt, began by notin g that a delay 5 ca use d by ac om pe te nc y e va lua tio n ordinari ly

sho uld not c ount a ga ins t the S ta te 6 be cau se th e ev al ua ti on is forth e d efen da nt ’s ben efi t. Id

. ¶ 19. N onetheless, the Court 7 he ld th atbo th pa rti es sh ared res po ns ib il it y forth e d el ay . Id

. First, t h e Cou rt 8 ac know le dge d “ the ge ne ral r ule that a de fe ndant m

ust be he ld a cc ount ab le f

or the 9 actions of his or her attorney s,” but it rea soned th at the delay s in the defendant’ s case, 10 w hic h ha d no t been re que ste d or c onse nte d to by

the de fe ndant, a m ount ed to 11 “ ne gl ect ” by hi s at to rn ey s. Id

. ¶ 22. A s such , the de lay s coul d not be he ld a ga ins t the 12 de fe ndant f

or spee dytr ia l purp ose s be ca use the y w er e “ unr ea sona

ble a nd 13 unnecessary ” and “ solely attributable to [defense] counsel.” Id

. ¶ ¶ 21- 22. 14 { 37} Se c o n d, Stock c onc lud ed

that the “ ex tr ao rd inary de lay [ w as ] part ia lly 15 at tr ibu ta

ble to the S tate ” b ecau se th e St at e ha d do ne “ little or nothin g to a sc er

ta in 16 w hatw a s ha

pp e ni ng i n t he c a se o r

t o m ov e t he c a se f

or w ard. ” Id

. ¶ 25. T he Court 17 obse rv ed , “ It is ult im at el y the sta te ’ s duty to m ak e sur e tha t de fe ndants a re br ough t 18 to trial in a tim ely

m anner. ” Id

. The Court therefore concluded that whi l e t h e delay24

1 w as “ te ch nic al ly

a ttr ibu ta ble to [the de fe ndant] , be ca use it w as oc ca si on ed by

his 2 co un se l pu rs ui ng or , m or e accu rat el y , f ai li ng to pu rs ue , th e is su e o f hi s co m pe te nc y ,” 3 the r ea sons fo r the de lay w ei ghe d aga ins t the S ta te be ca use of it s “ fa ilure to m oni tor 4 the c as e an d e nsur e tha t ste ps w er e be ing ta ke n to br ing [the de fe ndant] to tr ia l in a 5 tim ely m anner. ” Id

. ¶ 29

. Thu s, the Co ur t hel d on th e on e ha nd th att h e d e l a ys 6 oc ca sio ne d by

de fe nse co unse l di d no t w ei gh a ga ins t the de fe ndant, a nd i t he ld o n th e 7 oth er hand tha t the part ic ularl y e gr eg iou s de lay

w ei ghe d a ga ins t the St at e be ca use of 8 its f ai lur e to p ush the c as e to tri al

. 9 { 38} W e fi nd Stock ’ s reasoning com pelling , particularly

in a case like the one before 10 us, w he n th e de lay

is ex tr ao rd inary an d the de fe ndant i s de ta ine d w hil e aw ai tin g tr ia l. 11 U nde r suc h c ir cu m stanc es , w e ag re e tha t i t m ay be appro pr ia te to shi ft

the f oc us t o 12 the State’ s efforts to bring the case to trial, at least when the record dem onstrates that 13 th e d efen da nt di d n ot affi rm at iv el y cau se or c on se nt to th e d el ay . A cc ord, e . g. , 14 Barker , 407 U

. S. a t 527 (“ A de fe ndant ha s no duty to b ri ng h im se lf to tr ia l; the S ta te 15 ha s th at

duty a s w el l a s th e duty

of ins ur ing that the tr ia l i s c onsi st en t wit h due 16 pr oc es s. ” (f

ootnot es om itt ed )) ; M

addox , 2008 -N MS C- 062, ¶ 26 ( “ Be ca

use the S ta te 17 has the burden of bring ing a case to trial, we will w eigh unreasonable periods of delay 18 against the S tate. ”); State v. M arqu ez , 200 1- N MC A -0 62, ¶ 8, 130 N

. M. 651 , 29 P

. 3d25

1 1052 ( “ It

is pr im ar ily

the r es pons ibi lity

of the State to br ing ac as e to tri al w ith in a 2 reasonable period of tim e. ”). 3 { 39} T he S ta te im

pli es that Stock ma y b e o n s h a ky f o o t i n g s i n c e t h e U

. S

. S up r e me 4 Co urt de ci de d B ril lon . W e d is ag ree. B ril lon re v er s ed t h e V er m o n tSu p re m e C o u rt ’s 5 hol din g th at w ei ghe d the de lay ca use d by appoi nte d de fe nse c ouns el ’ s “ ‘ ina ct ion ’ or 6 fai lu re ‘to m ov e [t he ] cas e fo rward ’” agai ns t t he Sta te

. See 55 6 U.S

. a t 92 ( quot ing 7 Sta te v. B ril lon , 20 0 8 VT 3 5 , 9 5 5 A.2 d1 1 0 8 , 1 1 1 1 , 1 1 1 2 ) ( “ An as s i g n ed co u n s el ’s 8 failure ‘ to m ove the case forw ard’ does not warrant attribution of delay to the State. ”). 9 T he U nit ed

S ta te s S upr em e Co urt f

au lte d the V er

m ont S upr em e Co urt’ s r ea soni ng 10 tha t a ssi gne d c ouns el a re e sse nti al ly sta te ac tor s for pur pose s of aspe edy tr ia l c la im 11 because th ey are “ part of the cr im inal justice sy stem .” Se e id. ( quot ing B ril lon , 955 12 A. 2d at 112 1). T he United State s Suprem e Court held , i n s t ead, that “ the indiv idual 1 3 co u n s el h er e a ct ed o n l y o n b eh al f o f [ t h e d ef en d an t ], n o tt h e S t at e, ” a n dco u n s el ’s 14 co nduc t the re fo re m

ust be a ttr ibu te d to the de fe ndant unde r the ge ne ra l rul e tha t “ the 15 at tor ne y is the [ de fe ndant’ s] a ge nt w he n a ct ing , or f ai lin g to a ct , in furthe ranc e of the 16 litigatio n.” Id

. at 90, 92 ( al te ratio n inor igi na l) ( int er na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks and c itatio n 17 om itt ed ). A c ontrary

r ule , the Co urt r ea sone d, c oul d c re at e aninc en tiv e fo r de fe nse 18 counsel “ to delay

proceedings byseeking un reasonable continuances.” Id

. a t 93

. T he26

1 Ve rm ont Suprem e Court’ s rule also would crea te an arbitrar y and unjustified 2 distin ction between the conduct of appoin ted and privately retained d efense c ouns el 3 in sp eed y

tri al cas es . Se e id. 4 { 40} B ril lon al so h el d th at the V er m ont S upr em e Co ur

t ha d f ai le d to tak e int o 5 a c c o u n tt h e d e f

e n d a n t ’s c o n du c t du r i n g t h e f i r s tye a r o f t h e p r o c e e d i n g s a g a i n s th i m. 6 T he U nit ed

S ta te s S upr em e Co urt not ed tha t the de fe ndant h ad sou ght to dis m iss his 7 fi rs t a tto rn ey

on the e ve of tr ia l, ha d be ha ve d stri de ntl y a nd a ggr es siv el y

tow ar d, a nd 8 had even threatened, his second attorney , and had so ught the d i s m i s s al of a third 9 at to rn ey , de sp it e th e tri al co ur t’s warni n g a b o u t d e la y . Se e id. T he Co urt r ea sone d, 10 “ Jus t a s aS ta te ’ s de lib er at e at te m pt t o de lay the tr ia l i n or de r to h am pe r the de fe nse 11 shou ld b e w ei ght ed he av ily ag ai nst the [S ta te ] , so too shou ld a de fe ndant’ s de lib er at e 12 attem pt to disrupt proceedings be we ighted heavily against the defendant.” Id

. at 93- 13 94 (alteration in origin al) (inter nal quot ation m arks and citation om itted). T he Court 1 4 t h er ef o re co n cl u d ed t h at t h e d el ays i n t h e c as e w er e t h e r es u l to f t h e d ef en d an t ’s 15 “ deliberate ef

forts to force the withdraw al of [his first two a ttorney s] ,” without which 16 “ no speedy -trial issue w ould have arisen. ” Id

. a t 94

. 17 { 41} W e v ie w B ril lon a s stre ngthe nin g, r athe r th an und er m ini ng, our

Co urt of 18 Appe al s’ hol din g in Stock . Firs t, Stock d i d n o t t ra n s fe r bl ame fo r de fe n s e c o u n s el ’s27

1 failure to m ove the case forwar d to the State based on a theory of state ac tion. Rather, 2 in attributin g delay

to th e St ate, our Court of Appeals focused on th e State’s 3 obl iga tio n to m on ito r an d m ove the c as e fo rw ar d and i ts f ai lur e to d o so “ dur ing 4 ex tra or din ar

y pe ri ods of

de lay . ” 2006 -N MC A -1 40, ¶ 29. T his is anim

portant 5 dis tin ct ion ; B ril lon did not fo rb id hol din g the St at e ac co unt ab le f or it s ow n in ac tio n, 6 pa rt ic ularl y

in the f ac e of it s du ty to br ing ade fe ndant t o tr ia l. 7 { 42} Seco nd , B ril lon ’ s holdi ng tha t the de fe ndant’ s “ de lib er at e at te m pts to dis ru

pt 8 pr oc eed in gs ” m

us t wei gh ag ai ns t h im

is no th in g n ew. Se e, e . g. , Sta te v . T ala m ant e , 9 2003 -N MC A -1 35, ¶

14, 134 N

. M. 539 , 80 P

. 3d 4 76 ( w ei ghi ng d el ay s ag ai ns t the 10 de fen da nt when he fai le d t o ap pe ar at two arrai gn m en ts an d a he ari ng ). Stock did not 11 hol d to the c ontrary , a nd i nst ea d c onsi de re d th e fa ir ne ss o f at tr ibu tin g to the 12 de fe ndant d el ay s ca us ed by de fe nse c ouns el w he n th e de fe ndant w as e ff ec tiv el y 13 blam el es s. T he Co urt of Appe al s’ c onc lus ionthat su chde lay sho uld not w ei gh 14 ag ai nst

the de fe ndant r efl ec ts the r ea lity that the de fe ndant h as no d uty to br ing 15 hi m se lf t o t ria l. See B arker , 407 U

. S. a t 52 7. 16 { 43} W e th eref

or e v ie w Stock as an im

portant, w ell-rea soned part of our speedy trial 17 j ur isp ru de nc e in c as es w he n th e de lay is extra or din ar y a nd the de fe ndant i s he ld i n 18 cu sto dy

. A cc or din gly , w e adopt an d e xte nd Stock ’ s tw o- pa rt appr oa chf

or16 W e al so quest io n th e pr opr ie ty of w ei ghi ng e xte nsi ons tha t are a gr ee d to by 1 17 bo th pa rti es ag ai ns t Def en da nt

. Se e, e . g. , Sta te v . V ale nc ia , 201 0- N MC A -0 05, ¶ 21, 18 147 N.M. 432, 224 P. 3d 659 (w eighing the delay from “ an agreed- upon continu ance” 19 ne utr al ly ). H ow ev er , be ca use w e hol d that D ef

en da nt d id n ot a gr ee to the e xte nsi ons, 20 we do not rea ch this iss ue. 28 1 de te rm ini ng w he the r the r ea sons f or the de lay in suc h a ca se sho uld w ei gh a ga ins t a 2 d e f e n d an to r t h e S t a t e . We f

i r s t c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r D e f

e n d a n t i s t o b l a me f

o r t h e d e l a ys 3 in this case bec ause he has personally caused or acquiesced to the delay in his case. 4 If n o t , th en we co n s i d er wh et h er t h e St at e h as m et i t s o b l i g at i o n t o b ri n g De fe n d an t ’s 5 ca se to tr ia l. 6 2. D ef

en dan t did no t ca us e or a cq uies cein th e co nt in ua nc es or e

xte ns ion s of 7 tim e in h is c ase 8 { 44} T he S ta te a rg ue s th at the Co urt of Appe al s c or

re ct ly de te rm ine d th at

D ef en da nt 9 ca use d th e de lay s inhis c as e by e ith er f ai lin g to obj ec t t o or

a gr ee ing to al l of

the 10 continu ances and extensions in his case and by twice seeking to subs titute his coun sel 11 at c ru ci al ti m es du rin g the pr oc ee din gs. W e co nsi de r ea chof the se c ont en tio ns i n 12 tur n. 13 { 45} T he Co urt of

Appe al s’ c onc lus ionth at Defen da nt e ith er f ai le d to obj ec t or 14 ag re ed

to al l of the c ont inu an ce s and e xte nsi ons in h is c as e is n ot s uppo rt ed by the 15 record. To the c ontrary , the district court explicitly found that th e evidence showed 129

1 tha t D ef

en da nt h ad

“ co nti nua lly

a sse rt ed his r igh t to a spe edy

tr ia l t o hi s de fe nse 2 at t o rn eys .” Th at fi n d i n g i s n o td i s p u t ed o n ap p ea l , an d i t i s s up p o rt ed b y De fe n d an t ’s 3 uncont radicted testim ony at the hearing on his m otion to dism iss. D efendant testified 4 tha t fr om the be gin nin g of his ca se , he ha d ins ist ed to his at tor ne y s that h e d id not 5 w an t t o ple ad gui lty an d tha t he w an te d to go to tr ia l. D ef en da nt al so te sti fi ed tha t he 6 “ ne ve r ag re ed

to an y of tho se e xte nsi ons [i n hi s cas e] ” an d th at he onl y f ound out 7 about th em

after they had been granted. W

hile the district court was free to disregard 8 D ef en da nt’ s se lf

-s er vin g te sti m ony , the c ourt’ s f ind ing de m onstrate s th at it f ound 9 D ef en da nt c re dib le w he n he te sti fi ed that M r. Ro ss and M r. P ist one ha d st ipu la te d to 10 the S ta te ’ s r eque sts wi tho ut D ef en da nt’ s c onse nt. 11 { 46} W e ar e m ind fu l tha t the ac tio ns of de fe nse c ouns el or din ar ily a re a ttr ibu ta

ble 12 to th e d efen da nt

. Se e B ril lon , 556 U

. S. a t 90 -9 1. Bu t wh en the ev ide nc e fo und by the 13 d i s t rict court shows that both defense counsel were acting contrary to Def enda n t ’s 14 w ish es w he n th ey

a gr ee d to the S ta te ’ s re que sts to de lay the tr ia l, w e w ill not

w ei gh 1 5 t h e i r a c t i o n s a g a i n s tD e f

e n d a n t

. Ap p l yi n g t h e r

u l e w e h a v e t a k e n f

r o m Stock , we 1 6 t h er ef o re h o l dt h at Mr . Ro s s ’s an d M r. Pi s t o n e’s re p ea t ed s t i p u l at i o n s t o t h e S t at e’s 17 re que sts to ex te nd the t im e fo r co m m en ci ng D ef

en da nt’ s tr ia l do not

w ei gh a ga ins t 18 D ef en da nt b ec au se D ef

en da nt n ei the r ca

use d no r co nse nte d to tho se sti pul at ion s.30

1 { 47} T he m ore dif

fi cu lt que sti on i s w he the r, by se ek ing sub sti tut e co unse l, 2 D ef en da nt c au se d or co nse nte d to the de lay s inhis c as e. W e ag re e w iththe Co urt of 3 Appeals dissent that thi s inqu iry eff ectively pits Defe ndant’s r ight to a speedy trial 4 ag ai ns t h i s r i g h t t o e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l , a n d h e s h o u l d n o t h a v e to 5 su rren de r on e ri gh t t o a ss ert th e o th er. Se e Se rro s , N o. 31, 565, m em . op. ¶ 74 6 (Z am ora, J., dissenti ng); c f. , e . g. , State v. G utierrez , 199 5- N MC A -0 18, ¶ 19, 119 7 N

. M. 618 , 894 P

. 2d 3 95 (“ ‘ [W ] e fi nd it int ole ra ble tha t on e co nst itu tio na l r igh t sh oul d 8 ha ve to be sur

re nde re d inor de r to a sse rt a nothe r. ’ ” (quot ing Simm o n s v. United 9 States , 3 9 0 U. S

. 3 7 7 , 3 9 4 (1 9 6 8 )) ). We t h er ef o re wi l l o n l y we i g h De fe n d an t ’s 10 assertion of his right to effe ctive assistance of counse l ag ai nst him for speedy

trial 11 purpo se s i f hi s a ss e rt i on w a s un r e a so na bl e . T ow a r ds t hat e nd , w e r e vi e w t he legal 12 re pr es en ta tio n a ct

ua lly pr ovi de d by

e ac h a tto rn ey

to as se ss the r ea sona

ble ne ss o f 13 D ef en da nt’ s un tim el y

e ff orts t o r em ove the m

a s c ouns el

. 14 3. D ef

en dan t’ s m otion to re

pla ceMr

. Ro ss a s de

fens e cou ns el

wa s n ot 15 un re ason abl

e 16 { 48} Be gin nin g w ithMr

. Ro ss, w e al re ady ha ve not ed the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f ind ing 17 tha t M r. Ro ss h ad

de lay ed D ef en da nt’ s ca se by

“ sc he dul [i ng] ple a he ar ing s w he n th e 18 defendant did no t request them .” The court, ho we ver, also found th at Mr. Ross was31

1 not in effe ctive under Stock because he “ engaged in plea n egotiation s with the State, 2 inv es tig at ed

the f ea sib ili ty of ase x off en de r ev al ua tio n to a ssi st i n pl ea ne got ia tio ns, 3 an d c ondu ct ed

a num be r of pr e- tr ia l i nte rv ie w s w iththe S ta te ’ s w itn es se s. ” W e al so 4 not e tha t the dis tr ic t co urt f ound that i t ha d pe rm itt ed

Mr

. Ro ss t o w ith dr awbe ca use 5 De fendant had filed a discipli nary com plaint against him . W

hen the court perm itted 6 Mr

. Ro ss t o w ith dr aw , it e xpl ic itl y

f ound “ no i ndi ca tio n th at [h e ha d] n ot f ull y a nd 7 effe ctively

repre sented [De fendant] .” The court therefore concluded that “ any delay 8 caused by

the change of counsel be charged against [D efendant] for s peedy trial 9 pu rp os es .” 10 { 49} Ba se d onour

r ev ie w of

the r ec or d and th e ev id en ce sub m itt ed a t the he ar ing 11 on Defe ndant’s m otion to dism iss, w e conclude that De fendant’ s request to replace 12 Mr. Ross as defense coun s el wa s not un reasonable. It appears f rom the rec ord that 13 Mr

. Ro ss d id l itt le in D ef en da nt’ s ca se fo r ove r 17 m onths. H is i nvol ve m en t, a t l ea st 14 on p ap er , w as li m ite d to be la te dly a gr ee ing to the St at e’ s fir st pet iti on t o e xte nd the 15 tim e fo r co m

m en ci ng D ef

en da nt’ s tr ia l, sti pul at ing to thr ee a ddi tio na l pe tit ion s to 16 extend the tim e for com m encing tr ial, and appearing at five plea hear ings. Other than 17 his entry of appearance, which included a one-sentence dem and for a speedy trial, Mr. 1 8 Ro s s d i dn o tf

i l e as i n g l e w i t n e s s l i s t , m o t i o n , r e s p o n s e , o r o t h e r p l e a d i n g w i t h t he32

1 dis tr ic t c ourt be fo re he w as r em ove d f ro m the c as e in D ec em

be r 20 08

. A nd a s of 2 A ugus t 18 , 200 8, Mr

. Ro ss h ad not r eque st ed or

c ondu ct ed

a ny pr etri al int er

vie w s, 3 ha d n o t r e s p o n d e d t o a p l e a o f f e r f r o m th e S t a t e , h a d r e f

u s e d a r e qu e s t b y t h e St at e 4 to o bta in a

se x of fe nde r ev al ua tio n, a nd w as not pr ep ar ed fo r the tr ia l se t f or A ugus t 5 25, 200 8, 17 m onths a ft er D ef en da nt’ s arr es t. 6 { 50} D ef

en da nt’ s te sti m ony

a t the he ari ng on his m oti on t o di sm iss sup ports o ur 7 vie w of

the r ec or d a

bout Mr

. Ro ss’ s per fo rm an ce . D ef en da nt te sti fi ed

that M r. Ro ss 8 ne ve r an sw er ed

or r et ur ne d D ef en da nt’ s te le phon e ca lls , ne ver res po nde d to 9 D ef en da nt’ s r eque sts to se e the dis co ve ry in his ca se , ne ve r m en tio ne d th e poss ibi lity 10 of a se x o ffen de r e v a l ua ti on , and ne ve r sh owe d Def en da nt “ pl ea p ap erwo rk .” 11 De fendant also te stified that on the occasions when he m et w ith Mr. R oss, “ all [Mr. 12 Ross] would ask [De fendant] to do” was accept a plea o ffer from the State, to which 13 D ef en da nt c onsi ste ntl y

r es pond ed

that he did

not w an t t o pl ea d gu ilty

a nd tha t he 14 w an te d to go t o tr ia l. 15 { 51} D ef

en da nt f ile d apr o se m oti on to appo int subs tit ute co unse l on O ct obe r 23, 16 2008 , a nd h e adm itt ed dur ing c ro ss- ex am ina tio n t ha t he ha d sent ale tte r to the 17 D isc ip li na ry

Bo ar d c om

pla ini ng a

bout Mr

. Ro ss’ s pe rf

orm an ce in the c as e shor tly 18 after filing h i s pro se m otion . T hese filings follo we d the fifth plea setting that Mr.13 T he he ar ing tr an sc ri pts ind ic at e tha t M r. Ro ss c onse nte d to shari ng h is 2 14 dis ci pli na ry

f ile w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt and the part ie s. D ef en da nt’ s le tte r to the 15 discipli nary board, howe ver, wa s not form ally entered into evidence. M s. K err read 16 the langua ge qu ot ed above int o th e re co rd w ith out obj ec tio n du ri ng h er

c los ing 17 ar gum en t onthe m oti on t o di sm iss

. 18 Based on the State’ s representations, it appears that Mr. Ross interviewed as

3 19 m an y a s te n w itn es se s in

N ove m be r 2008 but

that he ha d no t y et in te rv ie w ed the 20 vic tim

or the vic tim ’ s c ar eg ive rs , inc lud ing the vic tim ’ s m oth er w ho h ad r ep orte d th e 21 alleged abuse. 33 1 Ro ss h ad

sc he dul ed

a ga ins t D ef

en da nt’ s w ish es , w hic h to ok p la ce on O ct obe r 14, 2 2008

. A t tha t he ar ing , D ef en da nt i nsi ste d to the dis tr ic t c ourt, to Mr

. Ro ss, a nd t o th e 3 St at e th a t h e d i d n o t w a n t t o a c c e p t a p l e a o f f e r a n d t h a t h e w a n t e d t o g o t o tr ia l. 4 D ef en da nt a lle ge d inhis m oti on tha t he “ ha [d ] re as on to beli ev e . . . tha t [M r. ] Ro ss 5 [w as ] not ab le to ad equa te ly r ep re se nt the de fe ndant’ s in te re sts

. ” A nd h e w ro te in his 6 le tte r to the D isc ipl inary Bo ar d tha t “ [M r. Ro ss] onl y w an ts to of fe r m e ple a ba rg ai ns 7 an d k eep s re qu es ti ng ex te ns io ns of t im e wit ho ut m y co ns en t.” 2 8 { 52} De fendant also adm itted on cross-exam ination that unbekn ownst to him , Mr

. 9 Ro ss h ad co nduc te d a num be r of w itn es s inte rv ie w s in N ove m be r 2008

. D ef

en da nt 3 10 de nie d havin g any

kno w le dge of the se w itn es s in te rv ie w s un til Ms

. K er r en te re d th e 1 1 ca s e . D e f

e n d a n ta l s o a d m i t t e dt h a tw h e n h e f i l e dh i s m o t i o n t o ap p o i n ts ubst itu te 12 co unse l i n O ct obe r 2008 , he w as a w ar e tha t a tr ia l ha d be ense t f

or D ec em be r 1, 200 8,34

1 tha t the S ta te ha d in dic at ed that it wou ld be re ady to pro ce ed to tr ia l by tha t date , a nd 2 tha t D ef

en da nt p ro ce ed ed

non ethe le ss w ithhis m oti on to appo int subs tit ute c ouns el , 3 w hic h th e dis tr ic t c ourt gr an te d onD ec em be r 1, 200 8. 4 { 53} W e ar e troubled by De fendant’ s decision to ask the district court to replace Mr

. 5 Ross on what am ount ed to the e ve of

tr ia l, a nd w e ac know le dge that othe r co urts, 6 inc lud ing our

Co urt of Appe al s, ha ve he av ily

w ei ghe d su chac hoi ce a ga ins t the 7 de fen da nt

. Se e, e . g. , F

ie rro , 2012-NMC A- 054, ¶ 4 0 (attributing to the defendant over 8 tw o y ears of

de lay that fo ll owe d hi s r eque st t o c ha nge c ouns el le ss tha n am onth 9 be fo re tr ia l) ; se e als o B ril lon , 5 5 6 U.S . a t9 3 -9 4 (h o l d i n g t h at t h e d ef en d an t ’s 10 dis m iss al of

his f ir st atto rn ey

on the e ve of

tr ia l w as a“ de lib er at e at te m pt t o di sr upt 11 pr o c e e d i n g s ” th at

w e i g h e d h e av i l y a ga ins t hi m ). G en er al ly

spe ak ing , suc h la st- m inu te 1 2 p l e a s t o c h a n g e c o u n s e l s h o u l db e r e v i e w e ds k e p t i c a l l y. 13 { 54} Bu t un de r the c ir cum stanc es of thi s c as e, w e hol d th at D ef en da nt’ s m oti on t o 1 4 re p l ac e M r. Ro s s wa s n o tu n re as o n ab l e. T h e d i s t ri ctco u rt cr ed i t ed De fe n d an t ’s 15 te sti m ony

that M r. Ro ss h ad

f ai le d to c onsu lt w ithhim , a nd h ad f ai le d to he ed

his 16 w ish es a

bout w he the r to n eg oti ate a pl ea agre em en t and w he the r to a gr ee to 1 7 c o n t i n u a n c e s o r e x t e n s i o n s o f t i me . T h e d i s t r i c tc o u rta l s o a c c e p t e dt h e S t a t e ’s t i me 18 line of events in the case, which reflec ted that the State had sent its plea offer to Mr.17 W e not e tha t a t the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s r eque st M r. Ro ss app ear ed a t the se co nd 4 18 hearing on Defe ndant’s m otion to dism iss, b ut for reasons we cannot fathom , he wa s 19 not a ske d to te sti fy , nor

w as he dir ec te d to appe ar a t a sub se que nt h eari ng. 35 1 Ross in January 2008 and that the last plea hearing in the case occurr ed on October 2 14th, 200 8, ne arly

nin e m onths l at er . A nd a lth oughMr

. Ro ss d id n ot t es tif y a t the 3 he ar ing s onD ef

en da nt’ s m oti on t o di sm iss , Ms

. K er r re porte d du ri ng clo sin g 4 argum ents—without obje ction f rom the State—her conversation w ith Mr . R oss th at 5 corroborated D efendant’ s testim ony . S pecifically , Mr . R oss had adm itted that 6 De fendant had said from the beginni ng that he did not want a p lea bargain and th at 7 he w an te d to go t o tr ia l. A cc or din g to Ms

. K er r, Mr

. Ro ss al so adm itt ed

that he ke pt 4 8 as kin g f

or ple a se tti ngs fo r Defe ndant b ec au se he “ w as hop ing that he c oul d ta lk 9 [D efendant] into it.” Whi l e al l eg ations of coun sel generally are not consi dered 10 ev id en ce, se e, e . g. , Spe arm an , 2 0 1 2 -N M SC -0 2 3 , ¶3 9 , we n o t e t h at Mr . R o s s ’s 11 pur porte d r ec oll ec tio n is c onsi ste nt w ithD ef en da nt’ s ow n te sti m ony , a nd the S ta te 1 2 d i dn o tp r o v i d e a n y e v i d e n c e t o t h e c o n t r a ry. 13 { 55} Mr. Ross’ s failure to heed De fendant’ s repeate d refusals to acce pt a plea offe r, 14 as f ound by the dis tr ic t c ourt, a nd c onc ed ed by de fe nse co unse l him se lf , r ai se s se ri ous 15 c o n c e r n s ab ou t t he ad eq ua cy of h is rep res en ta ti on . See , e. g. , R ule 16-104 NMR

A 16 (p ro vid ing that a

law y er sha ll, am ong oth er thi ngs, “ re as ona bly c onsu lt w iththe c lie nt14 The r e c or d i s i nc on si st e nt abo ut w ho a c tua l l y r a i se d t he po ss i bi l i t y of a sex 5 15 of fe nde r ev al ua tio n inthi s c as e. T he iss ue f ir st aro se in a Fe br

ua ry 200 8 or de r in 16 w hic h th e dis tr ic t c ourt c ont inu ed the Marc h 20 08 tri al se tti ng bec au se the “ [d ] ef en se 17 [w as ] r eque sti ng an e va lua tio n. ” Inthe sub se quent st ip ula te d m oti on t o e xte nd the 18 tim e lim it fo r co mm en cing trial, the S tate re presented to the dist rict court that 19 “ De fense counsel is still evaluating the case in an effort to dete rm ine wheth er an 20 ev al ua tio n of

his c lient is in o rd er . ” Fi ve m onths l at er , the S ta te r ep re se nte d to thi s 21 Co urt tha t M r. Ro ss h ad r ef use d the State’s r eque st f or ase x of fe nde r ev al ua tio n. 36 1 ab out the m eans by w hic h the cl ie nt’ s obj ec tiv es ar e to be ac co m pli she d” ; “ ke ep the 2 cl ie nt r ea sona

bly inf orm ed about the status of

the m at ter”; a nd “ ex pla in a m at te r to 3 the e xte nt r ea sona

bly ne ce ssary

to pe rm it th e cl ie nt t o m ak e inf orm ed de ci sio ns 4 regarding the repre sentation”). It a lso un derm ines the d i st r i c t c ou rt’ s finding s that Mr. 5 Ro ss w as not

ine ffe ct ive in pa rt

be ca use he ha d “ en ga ge d inple a ne got ia tio ns w ith 6 the S ta te [ an d ha d] inv es tig at ed the f ea sib ili ty of ase x of fe nde r ev al ua tio n to a ssi st 7 in plea n egotiation s.” These efforts, irrespective of whether Mr. Ross comm unicated 5 8 the m to D ef en da nt, w er e co ntr ar

y to D ef en da nt’ s ex pr es s w ish es that he did not w an t 9 to acc ep t a pl ea off

er a nd tha t he w an te d to go t o tr ia l. A nd a s w e pr ev iou sly ha ve 10 observed, the rec ord is devoi d of any other eff orts by Mr. Ross t o prepare for trial 1 1 u n t i l a f

t e r D e f e n d a n t f i l e d h i s mo t i o n t o ap p o i n t s ub s t i tu t e c o u n s e l

. T h u s , a tt h e t i me 12 tha t D ef

en da nt f ile d hi s m oti on, a ll tha t he ha d to sho wf or Mr

. Ro ss’ s 17 m onths o f 13 repre s en t ation—17 m onth s in which De fendant had been held in cust odial37

1 se gr eg at ion

—w er e Mr

. Ro ss’ s r ep ea te d, unw el co m e at te m pts to co nvi nc e D ef

en da nt 2 to a cc ep t a

ple a ba rg ai n. 3 { 56} W ith out

c om m en tin g on the ac tua l lev el of Mr

. Ro ss’ s pr ep ar at ionf or tr ia l or 4 w he the r his r ep re se nta tio n w as c onst itu tio na lly e ff ec tiv e, und er

the c ir cu m stanc es of 5 this case, we do not fault De fendant for seeking to h ave Mr. Ross replaced less than 6 six weeks b efore a trial setting, re gardless of the State’ s preparedness for tr ial. B ased 7 on the evidence presented on D efendant’ s m otion to dism iss and on the d istrict 8 cour t ’ s f

i nd i ng t hatM r . R os s ha d de l a y e d D e f e nd a nt ’ s c a se b y

r e qu e st i ng p l ea 9 se tti ngs w he n D ef

en da nt d id n ot w an t the m , D ef en da nt’ s a lle ga tio n inhis m oti on t o 10 ap poi nt s ubst itu te c ouns el that he “ ha [d ] re as on to beli ev e . . . that [ Mr

. ] Ro ss[ ] is not 11 ab le to ad equa te ly

r ep re se nt the D ef

e n d an t ’ s int er es ts” w as not unr ea sona

ble

. F ind ing 12 no ind ication that Defe n d an t ei ther caused or ac quiesced in th e delay s during Mr. 1 3 Ro s s ’ s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , w e h o l dt h a tt h i s p e r i o do f t i m e d o e s n o tw e i g h a g a i nst 14 D ef en da nt. 15 4. D ef

en dan t’ s at te m pt t o re pla ceMr . P ist on e wa s n ot u nr ea son abl e 16 { 57} Turning to Mr. Pistone’ s representation of De fendant, w e note that the district 17 court concluded th at he wa s ineffec tive und er Stock ba se d ontw o e xpl ic it fi ndi ngs. 18 Fi rs t, the c ourt f

ound that M r. P ist one ha d so ught a nd ob ta ine d astay

in the c as e38

1 pendin g a determ ination of D efendant’ s com petency ten day s before a July 2009 trial 2 se tti ng, w ith out

takin g st ep s to obt ai n an e va lua tio n over the c our se of the e nsui ng 3 fi ve m onths. A nd s ec ond, the dis tr ic t c ourt f ound tha t Mr

. Pi sto ne ha d fi le d a m oti on 4 to w ith dr awf

ro m the c as e ba se d on D ef

en da nt’ s all eg ed fi lin g of both a p ro se m oti on 5 to appoi nt sub stitut e counsel and a disciplin ary co m p l ai n t , neither of which w ere 6 ac tua lly

f ile d. 7 { 58} W e view the district court’ s conclusio n that Mr. Pistone was ineff ective under 8 Stock a s ade te rm ina tio n th at

the de lay s oc ca sio ne d by

his ne gle ct

of D ef en da nt’ s c as e 9 shou ld not we igh against De fendant. B ased on our review of the record, the district 1 0 co u rt ’s co n cl u s i o n wa s we l l -f o u n d ed . Ov ert h e c o u rs e o f 1 4 m o n t h s as De fe n d an t ’s 11 attorney , Mr

. Pistone f iled three docum ents in the case. T he first tw o wer e his entry 12 o f ap pearance and his dem and for evidence and a speedy trial, both o f w hich wer e 13 filed on January

23, 2009. The third was his m otion to wi t hdraw a s counsel, which 14 he filed on January 4, 2010

. In the intervening y ear, the only activity in the case w as 15 a notice that De fendant’ s trial had been rescheduled fo r J u l y 20, 2009, an 16 ac co m

pa ny ing pe ti ti on a nd o rd er gr an tin g th e St at e’ s f

if th r eque st f

or a n e xte nsi on 17 of tim e, and an order enter ed on July10, 2009, stay ing th e proceedings pendin g an 18 evaluation of Defe ndant’s com petency . T he July 10, 2 009, order rem ained in effec t39

1 unt il O ct obe r 18, 201 0, e ff ec tiv el y pr ev en tin g an y

c ha nc e of

D ef en da nt’ s c as e goi ng 2 to trial during th at tim e. 3 { 59} At the hear ing on De fendant’ s m otion to dism iss, D efendant testified that Mr. 4 Pi sto ne ne ve r m et , spok e, or co rr es pond ed w ith him dur ing the 14 m onths he s pe nt 5 as De fendant’ s at t o rn ey. Def endant learned from

his MDC c asew orker that Mr. 6 Pi sto ne ha d be ena ssi gne d to the c as e, a nd a ft er loo kin g up Mr

. P ist one ’ s te le phon e 7 num be r in the Y el low Pa ge s, D ef en da nt c al le d M r. P ist one ’ s of fi ce about 12 t im es to 8 re qu es td i s co v er y. Def en d an tal s o t es t i fi ed t h at h e l ea rn ed fr o m Mr . P i s t o n e’s 9 assistant after the July 2009 trial settin g h ad p as sed that his case had been stay ed 10 be ca use the S ta te ha d r eque ste d ac om pe te nc y e va lua tio n, a nd tha t “ it w as up t o 11 [D ef en da nt] w he the r [h e] w an te d to take it or not

. ” D ef

en da nt t es tif

ie d th at he tol d 12 Mr. Pi st on e’s assis tant tha t he “ fe lt

. . . f ull y c om pe te nt and [ tha t he ] f

el t ki nd o f 13 insul ted, a s well. ” A ccording to Defe ndant, neither Mr. Pisto ne nor his assis tant ever 14 ex pla ine d to D ef

en da nt the pur

pose of ac om pe te nc y ev al ua tio n or

w hy Mr

. P ist one 1 5 o r t h e S t a t e b e l i e v e dt h a tac o mp e t e n c y e v a l u a t i o n wa s n e c e s s a ry. 16 { 60} De fendant also te stified that the onl y tim e that he actually

m et Mr. Pistone was 17 at the he ar ing in Mar ch 201 0, “ the day w he n he sa id h e w as goi ng t o no t r ep re se nt 18 [D ef en da nt] a nym or e. ” Mr

. P ist one ha d f iled a m oti on t o w ith dr awa s c ouns el on16 W e not e that lik e Mr

. Ro ss, Mr

. P ist one appe ar ed a t the se co nd h eari ng o n 6 17 Defen da nt ’s m ot io n t o d is m is s at th e d is tri ctco ur t’s re qu es t, b ut f o r r e as on s we 18 cannot

f athom , a lso li ke Mr

. Ro ss, Mr. Pi stone w as ne ith er a ske d to te sti fy

nor 19 dir ec te d to appe ar

a t a sub se que nt h eari ng.

40 1 January

4, 2010, claim ing th at D efendant had filed a bar com plaint against him , w as 2 fi lin g pr o se m oti ons, an d wa s not com ply ing w ith him

. D ef

en da nt con fi rm ed at

the 3 he ar ing on his m oti on to w ith dr aw tha t he ha d fi le d a dis ci pli na ry c om pla int a ga ins t 4 Mr. Pistone “ around the m iddle or towards the end of 2009” because Mr. Pistone was 5 not c om m uni ca tin g w ithhim

or und er ta k i n g any

e ff orts i n hi s de fe nse . D ef

en da nt a lso 6 te sti fi ed

that he ha d f

iled “ an oth er

[ m oti on t o] sub sti tut e co unse l” a ft er about nin e 7 m onth s of

b e i ng r e pr e se nt e d by

M r . P i st on e b e c aus e h e h a d no t h e a r d f r om Mr. 8 Pi sto ne a nd b ec au se he ke pt g et tin g th e runa ro und fr om Mr

. P ist one ’ s a ssi stant. T he 9 district court was unable to find a rec ord o f ei t h er of these docum ents while it wa s 10 co nsi de ri ng De fe ndant’ s m oti on to dism iss , de spi te Mr

. P ist one ’ s gr udgi ng c onse nt 11 to view his discipl inary file. 6 12 { 61} T he dis tr ic t cour t grante d Mr. Pi sto ne ’ s m oti on to wi thdraw af te r a heari ng o n 13 Marc h 24 , 201 0, a t w hic h D ef en da nt w as pr es en t bu t di d not te sti fy

. T he onl y 14 ev ide nc e pr es en te d a t tha t he ar ing w er e Mr

. Pi sto ne ’ s r ep re se nta tio ns p ar ro tin g th e 15 allegations in his m otion to withdraw . A lthou gh the co u rt d i d n ot issu e any form al41

1 fi ndi ngs in its or de r gr an tin g Mr. Pi sto ne ’ s m oti on, it ca uti one d D ef

en da nt f ro m the 2 bench, stating “ Mr. Ser ros, let m e advise y ou that th e n ex t at t o rney y ou get, y ou’r e 3 stu ck w ith

. I ’ m not goi ng to play thi s ga m e w ith y ou, so tha t’ s th e w ay it ’ s go ing to 4 be

. Y our ne xt at tor

ne y , w he the r y ou l ike him or he r, a in’ t go nnam at te r. ” A ft er takin g 5 ev ide nc e on D ef

en da nt’ s m oti on t o di sm iss appr oxi m at el y 15 m onths l at er , the 6 dis tr ic t cour

t re vis ed its posi tio n whe n it dism iss ed D ef en da nt’ s ca se , sta tin g “ I w ill 7 tell y ou no w, if I knew then what I know now, I w ould have never allow ed Mr. 8 Pi st on e to wit hd raw fro m th e cas e.” 9 { 62} W e ha ve li ttl e tr oubl e co nc lud ing that the de lay oc ca sio ne d by

Mr

. P ist one 1 0 s h o u l dn o t w e i g h a g a i n s tD e f e n d a n t

. A s t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rto b s e rv e d , du r i n g t h e t i me 11 of Mr

. P ist one ’ s r epres en tati on o f D ef en da nt, “ ab sol ute ly

nothin g w as f

ile d, no 12 w itn es se s w er e int er vie w ed , a nd a

c om pe te nc y e va lua tio n w as a ske d f or 13 ap pr ox i m a t e l y a w e e k t o t e n day s pr i or t o t he t r i a l se t t i ng i n t hi s c a se . ” T he rec ord 14 supp orts the dis tr ic t c ou rt’ s f ind ing that M r. P ist one de lay ed D ef en da nt’ s c as e by 15 raising the quest ion of Defe ndant’s com petency and then failin g t o p u rsue an 16 ev al ua tio n on ce the c as e ha d be en stay ed

. A llo w ing D ef en da nt’ s c as e to l an gui sh f or 17 si x m o n ths after the stay wa s entered—w hen Def endant already

had been detained 18 for near ly

two and a half

y ears in custodial seg regation—is inexcus able. And then42

1 letting another two m onth s of inactivity slip by after filing a m otion t o wi t h d raw 2 show s ut te r dis re ga rd

on M r. P ist one ’ s part

f or D ef en da nt’ s c ir cu m stanc es . 3 { 63} W e ac know le dge that i t i s no t cl ear in the re co rd w he the r D ef

en da nt a ct

ua lly 4 f i l e de i t h e r

amo t i o n t o r e p l a c e M r . P i s t o n e o r ad i s c i p l i n a ry c o mp l a i n ta g a i n s th i m. 5 Th e ab s en ce o f t h es e d o cu m en t s fr o m co u rt re co rd s a n dfr o m Mr . P i s t o n e’s 6 discipli nary

file appare ntly

troubled the dis trict court, given its decision to perm it Mr. 7 Pi sto ne to w ith dr awf

ro m the ca se . Bu t e ve n a ssu m ing that M r. P ist one ’ s m oti on t o 8 w ith dr aww as pr om

pte d by D ef en da nt’ s fil ing of suc h docu m en ts, w e co nc lud e ag ai n 9 t h at , b as ed o n t h e c i rc u ms t a n ce s , De fe n d an t ’s ac t i o n s we re n o tu n re as o n ab l e. We 10 therefore hold th at none of the delay s during th e period that Mr. Pistone represented 11 D ef en da nt w ei ghs ag ai nst

D ef en da nt. 12 5. De

fendant did

not cause or acquiesce in the delays during Ms. Kerr’s 13 re

prese nt ation 14 { 64} T he dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f ind ing s a bout the de lay s duri ng M s. K er r’ s r ep re se nta tio n 15 of De fendant we re lim ited to her role in obt aining a com petency evaluation. T he court 16 found th at Ms. Ke rr w as appointed after the withdraw al of Mr. Pisto n e, an d that 17 althoug h she did n o t believe that De fendant wa s incom petent, she investigated 18 w he the r a com

pe te nc y ev al ua tio n had bee n done be ca use asta y w as in pla ce pe ndi ng43

1 a deter m i n at i o n of De fendant’ s com petency . U

pon learning that Mr. Pistone had 2 neither arr anged nor requested an evaluation of De fendant’ s com petency , Ms. K err 3 soug ht an ex pedited com petency evaluation, in which D efendant w as deem ed 4 co m pe te nt t o pr oc ee d. T he dis tr ic t c ourt dr ewno c onc lus ion s f ro m the se f ind ing s. 5 { 65} T he Co urt of Appe al s m aj or ity co nc lud ed that M s. K er

r w as not r es pons ibl e fo r 6 an y of the de lay in D ef en da nt’ s c as e. H ow ev er , the Co urt he ld w ith out e xpl an at ion 7 that all but th ree m onth s of th e t i m e t h at Ms. Ke rr r epresented D efendant w eighed 8 he av il y ag ai ns t h im

. Se e Se rro s , N o. 31, 565, m em . op. ¶¶ 34, 38. It appe ar s im

pli ci tly 9 that the Court faulted Def en d an t for “ caus[ing] the delay by try ing to have Mr. 10 Pistone rem oved from the case. ” Se e id. ¶

38; se e als o F

ie rro , 2 0 1 2

- NMCA-0 54 , ¶ 11 40 ( w ei ghi ng o ve r tw o y ears of de lay a ga ins t the de fe ndant be ca use his r eque sts f

or 12 ne w c ouns el a t c ru ci al ti m es in the ca se re qui re d “ re pe at ed co nti nuanc es so d ef en se 13 co unse l c oul d ade qua te ly pr ep ar e a def en se ”)

. A s for the re m ai nin g th re e m onths, the 14 Court held that the period from Marc h to June 2011 , in which the district c ourt “ set 15 four separate hearings on the m otion [to dism iss], ” counted as negligent delay that 16 weig hs ag ai ns t t he Sta te

. Se e Se rro s , N o. 31, 565, m em . op. ¶ 34. 17 { 66} W e see nothin g inthe r ec or d du ri ng the ti m e of Ms

. K er r’ s r ep re se nta tio n of 18 De fendant to sug gest that Defe ndant either caused or acqu iesced i n delay s during th at44

1 pe ri od o f tim e. Ms

. K er r en te red he r ap pe ar an ce a nd d em an d f or aspe edy tr ia l on 2 May 19, 2 010, a lon g w ithaw itn es s di sc los ur e an d anot ic e of dis co ve ry

de m an d. 3 Five m onth s later, Ms. Ke rr filed De fendant’ s m otion to dism iss, and the district court 4 entered an order lifting the stay because D efendant’ s com petency had been evaluated 5 an d M s. K er

r w as sa tis fi ed

that D ef en da nt w as c om

pe te nt to s tand tri al

. D ef

en da nt 6 te sti fi ed

a t the he ar ing on h is m otion to dism iss that he ha d a gr ee d to ha ve his 7 com petency evaluated “ right away , j ust to m ake things s tart going on ” af ter Ms. Ke rr 8 ha d e xpl ai ne d to him

that the c as e “ co ul dn’ t m ove f or w ar d w ith out

that e xa m

or 9 ev al ua tio n. ” The pe ri od o f tim e fr om O ct obe r 2010 unt il the f ir st h eari ng o n 1 0 De fe n d an t ’s m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s o n M ar ch 2 3 , 20 1 1 , res u l t ed fr o m t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s 11 settings and resettings of the hearing due to Ms. Ke rr’ s unexpectedly long rec overy 12 fr om a m ed ic al pr oc ed

ur e and fr om the dis tr ic t cour t’ s ca le ndari ng pro ce ss. G ive n th e 13 adva nc ed

state of the pr oc ee din gs and D ef

en da nt’ s c oope ratio n w ithMs

. K er r dur ing 14 thi s pe ri od, w e do n ot w ei gh this ti m e ag ai nst D ef en da nt. 15 { 67} Finally , w e consider the three m onth s that the dist rict co u rt tookto hear 16 ev ide nc e an d r en de r a de ci sio n on D ef en da nt’ s m oti on to d ism iss

. T he S ta te c ont en ds 17 tha t the Co urt of

Appe al s i m

pr ope rl y w ei ghe d th is p er iod

of ti m e ag ai nst

the S ta te 18 be ca use the he ar ing s w er e co nti nue d a s a r es ult of D efend ant’ s f

ai lur e to m ee t hi s45

1 b u r d e n o n h i s c l a i m s o f i n e f f e c t i v e o f c o u n s e l

. B a s e d o n o u r r e v i ew of the 2 pr oc ee din gs and the c as es c ite d by the St at e, w e disa gr ee . T he de lay s we re ca use d by 3 the S ta te ’ s f

ai lur e to c al l M r. Ro ss and M r. P ist one to te sti fy at the f ir st h eari ng, by 4 the district court’ s subs equent attem pts to s ecure the i r

t e st i m ony

and their disciplin ary 5 files, and by

the district court’ s taking the m atter un der advisem ent for a m onth before 6 it ru le d onthe m oti on to dis m iss

. T he Co urt of Appe al s co rr ec tly de te rm ine d th at

the 7 three-m onth delay

wa s negligent delay

that we ighs agains t the State. 8 6. T

he S tat e ne gli ge nt lyf ail ed to m ov e D ef

en dan t’ s c aseto trial 9 { 68} H av ing c onc lud ed that D ef en da nt d id n ot unr ea sona

bly c au se or c onse nt to the 10 de lay s inthi s c as e, w e ad dr es s w he the r the S ta te m et it s ob lig at ionto m ove 11 De fendant’ s case to trial. W e agree with the district court that no thing in the record 12 sugg es ts tha t the S ta te int en tio na lly de lay ed D ef en da nt’ s tr ia l or i nte rf

er ed w ithhis 13 ri ght to a spe edy

tr ia l. I n f ac t, the S ta te appe ar s to ha ve dil ige ntl y pur sue d it s c as e 14 dur ing th e tim e tha t M r. Ro ss r ep re se nte d D ef en da nt. I n th at

ti m e, the S ta te m ad e 15 num er ous dis co ve ry

dis cl osur es , f

ile d a w itn es s lis t w hic h it a m en de d se ve ra l t im es , 16 pursued DNA analy sis, i nvestig ated a possible recantation by the victim , put together 17 a plea off

er in consultation with the v i ct i m ’s fam ily , and int erview ed and prepared 18 witnesses for tria l. While the State’ s efforts are less appare nt during the tim e that Mr.46

1 Pi sto ne a nd M s. K er

r re pr es en te d D ef

en da nt, it s in ac tiv ity

c anbe e xpl ai ne d, a t l ea st 2 som ewha t, by

the S ta te ’ s c ont en tio n that it w as pr ep ar ed f or tr ia l onD ec em

be r 1, 3 2008

. 4 { 69} A t the sa m e tim e, w e note tha t the St at e fi le d all fi ve of its pe tit ion s to e xte nd 5 the tim e to c om

m en ce D ef

en da nt’ s tr ia l i n th is c as e. I n e ac h pe tit ion , the S ta te 6 rep res en te d th at

D ef en da nt h ad

be ende ta ine d si nc e the da te of his a rr es t, a nd i t 7 presented a d etailed d escription of t he work in the case that had y et to be com pleted 8 be fo re it

c oul d go to tr ia l. I t w as the S ta te that f ile d th e A ugus t 18, 2008 pe tit ionin 9 thi s Court— ove r 17 m onths af te r D ef en da nt’ s arre st—

re portin g a ne ar -t ota l l ac k of 10 pr ep ar at ionf

or tr ia l by Mr

. Ro ss. T hus, the St at e w as int im at el y aw ar e of the status 11 of Mr

. Ro ss’ s tr ia l pr ep ar at ion s, y et it ef fe ct ive ly e nable d hi s ne gle ct

of D ef en da nt 12 by se ek ing m or e tim e to b ri ng h im to tr ia l. Whe n pr es se d by the dis tr ic t cour

t a bout 13 whythe S t a t e ha d no t “ pu sh [ e d] t he c a se , ” t he S t a t e r e sp on de d t hat un t i l t he plea 1 4 h ea ri n g o n O c t o b er1 4 , 2 0 0 8 , i tb el i ev ed t h at “ t h i s ca s e w o u l dp ro b ab l y p l ea .” We 15 acknowledge the crucial ro l e that plea negotiatio ns play in our crim inal justice 16 sy ste m , but it is w el l se ttl ed tha t the poss ibi lit y of a ple a ag re em en t do es not r el ie ve 17 th e St at e o f it s d ut y

to pu rs ue a ti mel y d i s p os it io n o f th e cas e. Se e M addox , 200 8- 18 NMS C-062, ¶ 26 ( “ The State m ust af firm atively seek to m ove the case to trial, even47

1 while plea negotiations are pending .” ). 2 { 70} A s f

or the ti m e tha t Mr. P ist one r ep re se nte d D ef en da nt, the S ta te sim ilarl y 3 assum ed respons i b i l i t y for postpon ing th e case . S hortly after Mr. Pistone was 4 ap poi nte d, the State f

ile d it s f if th p et iti on f

or a n e xte nsi on o n F eb ru ar y 16, 200 9, 5 ex pla ini ng tha t Mr

. Pi sto ne ha d lef t the sta te shor

tly af te r be ing a ssi gne d to the c as e 6 to tend to h i s fa ther, who w as ill. T he State a lso prepared and subm itted the order 7 stay ing the ca se pe ndi ng an eva lua tio n of De fe ndant’ s com pe te nc y af

te r m ee tin g w ith 8 Mr

. P ist one a nd l earn in g th at he w oul d no t be r ea dy f or the Jul y 200 9 tr ia l se tti ng. 9 O ve r the c our se of

the en sui ng f

ive -and- a- ha lf

m onths, nothin g ha

ppe ne d inthe c as e 10 until Mr. Pistone filed his m otion to withdraw , and it to ok anoth er tw o m onth s before 1 1 t h e S t at e re qu es t ed a h ea ri n g o n M r. Pi s t o n e’s m o t i o n an dt h e s t at u s o f D ef en d an t ’s 12 co m pe te nc y e va lua tio n. W e cannot

c ondo ne the S ta te ’ s pe rm itting m or e than e igh t 13 m onths t o pa ss f

ro m Jul y 200 9 un til Marc h 2010 wi th ful l kn ow le dge that D ef en da nt 14 ha d be ende ta ine d si nc e Marc h 20 07. 15 { 71} Another aspect of the State’ s conduct th at influenced this case, and therefore 1 6 d es er v es s cru t i n y, is i t s p o l i cy t o re s t ri ct i n t er v i ew s o f t h e v i c t i m an dt h e v i ct i m ’s 17 fam ily

in cases w ith alleg ations of sexu al abuse. T he State a lluded to this po licy 18 dur ing it s c ro ss- ex am ina tio n of one of D efe ndant’ s w itn es se s a t the he ar ing on48

1 D e f e n d a n t ’s mo t i o n t o d i s mi s s . Th e wi t n e s s , a n e x p e r i e n c e dd e f e n s e a t t o rn e y, 2 testified that in sexual abu se cases involvin g child vi ctim s, it is im portant to in terview 3 the vic tim an d the vic tim ’ s fa m ily earl y in the pr oc es s be ca use ac hil d’ s m em or

y , in 4 pa rti cu la r, “ is su sc ep ti bl e to th e p as sa ge of t im e.” 5 St at e: N ow , y ou a lso m en tio ne d that in s ex of fe nse c as es , the 6 thi ng tha t y ou w an t t o do is ta lk t o f am ily m em be rs a nd the 7 ch ild f ai rl y e ar ly on; is tha t r igh t? 8 W itn es s: Y es . 9 St at e: A re y ou aw ar e of the pol ic y

or the pr oc ed

ur e, ba sic al ly , of 10 the D istri ct A tto rn ey ’ s O ff

ic e to try to ne got ia te ac as e 11 pr ior to anint er

vie ww iththe c hil d to av oid the tr au m a of 12 th e ch il d c om in g t o a n i nt erv ie w? 13 W itn es s: Sure . I ’ m not a w ar e of th at , b ut I c anim ag ine w hy y ou 14 w oul d do that. 15 St at e: A nd i n th is c as e, y ou’ re aw ar e tha t the ch ild w as about

f our 16 at the tim e of the disclosure? 17 W itn es s: Y es . 18 Though the po licy ’ s p recise c onto urs are unclear, Mr. Ross purpo rtedly delay ed 19 requesting i n t er v i ew s during plea negotiation s because he believed that if he had 20 as ke d th e St at e to p er m it h im to i nte rv ie wthe vic tim , the S ta te w oul d no t have 21 ex te nde d any kin d of a pl ea of fe r to D ef en da nt. Ms

. K er

r sim ilarl y

e xpl ai ne d th at

the49

1 State had inform ed her that it “ would rather n o t p ro v i d e the child and th e very 2 im portant w itn es se s [ to b e int er vie w ed ] unt il an d unl es s y ou’ re goi ng t o tr ia l. ” T he 3 St at e ac know le dge d th at it ha d pr ev en te d M s. K er

r fr om int er vie w ing the vic tim 4 w hil e D ef

en da nt’ s sp ee dy

tr ia l m oti on w as pe ndi ng t o a voi d “ pr es sur e fr om the 5 fam il y .” 6 { 72} W e ar e m ind fu l of the ne ed to avo id re -tra

um at iz ing vic tim s and the ir f am ili es . 7 Th i s ca s e, h o we v er , i l l u s t ra t es t h e h av o c t h at s u ch a p o l i cy ca n wr ea ko n an ac cu s ed ’s 8 ri ght to a spe edy

tr ia l. T he dis tr ic t c ourt su m m ed up the pr ob le m at th e he ar ing on 9 D ef en da nt’ s m oti on t o dis m iss : “ A nd so de fe nse a tto rn ey s are say ing

. . . , ‘ W el l, how 1 0 t h e h el l am I su p p o s ed t o kn o w if I sh o u l d s ee k a p l ea d ea l fo r m y cl i en twh en I d o n ’t 11 knoww ha t the e vid en ce is?’ ” In de ed , to thi s day , Defen da nt ha s ne ve r ha d th e 12 oppo rtunity

to interview the cr itical witnesses in his case. 13 { 73} I n l i g h to f

t h e S t a t e ’s a c t i o n s , w e c o n c l u d e t h a tt h e S t a t e a tl e a s ts h a r e s b l a me 1 4 fo r t h e e x t ra o rd i n ar y d el ay i n t h i s ca s e. On t h e o n e h an d , th e St at e e n ab l ed Mr . R o s s ’s 15 and Mr. Pis tone’ s neglect of De fendant’ s case by repea tedly

requesting to d elay 16 D ef en da nt’ s tr ia l on the ir

be ha lf

. O n th e oth er

hand, the S ta te ’ s po lic y

of r es tr ic tin g 1 7 i n t er v i ew s o f t h e v i ct i m a n dt h e v i ct i m ’s fa m i l y ef fe ct i v el y p re v en t ed De fe n d an t ’s 18 at tor ne y s fr om fu lly de ve lop ing a de fe nse ; tha t pol ic y co ntr ibu te d to thei r de la yin50

1 pr ep ar ing f

or tr ia l. W e str es s th at

nothin g inthe r ec or d hi nts that the S ta te ’ s a ct ion s 2 w er e de lib er at el y

a im ed a t de lay ing D ef

en da nt’ s tr ia l. H ow ev er , w e hol d th at in lig ht 3 of the St at e’ s obl iga tio n to br ing D ef en da nt t o tr ia l, it s a ct ion s a m ount ed to ne gli ge nt 4 de lay . A nd giv en the ex tr ao rd inary le ngth of the de lay , w e hol d th at thi s f ac tor w ei ghs 5 he av il y ag ai ns t t he Sta te

. Se e G arz a , 2009 -N MS C- 038, ¶ 26 (“ T he de gr ee of w ei ght 6 w e as sig n aga in st the S ta te f or ne gli ge nt d el ay

is cl ose ly

r el at ed to the le ngth of 7 de lay : ‘ [O ] ur

tol er at ionof

suc h ne gli ge nc e va ri es inv er se ly w ithit s pr otr ac te dne ss, 8 an d its cons eque nt thr ea t to the f ai rn es s of the a cc use d’ s tr ia l. ’ ” (quot ing D ogge tt , 505 9 U. S. at 657)). 10 { 74} Thus, looking at the reasons for the delay as a whole under the approach that 1 1 w e h a v e a d o p t e df

r o m Stock , w e hol d tha t D ef en da nt w as not re spon sib le fo r the 12 ex tr ao rd inary

de lay in th is ca se . H e did

not a ff irm at ive ly

c au se or a cquie sc e in the 13 de lay s inhis c as e, and h is atte m pts to re pla ce Mr

. Ro ss an d Mr. Pi sto ne w er e not 14 unr ea sona

ble ba se d onthe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f ind ing s and the e vid en ce pr es en te d on 15 De fendant’ s m otion to dism iss. We acknowledge that m uch of the evidence wa s one16 sided because neither Mr. Ross nor Mr. Pistone testified

. How ever, the State w as 17 giv en th e oppo rt

uni ty to ca ll the tw o a tto rn ey s a s w itn es se s a t the c los e of 18 D ef en da nt’ s e vid en ce a nd i t e xpr es sly de clin ed to do s o. T he S ta te a lso m ad e no51

1 ef fo rt to que sti on the m w he n the y ap pe ar ed be fo re the dis tr ic t co urt at th e se cond 2 hearing on Defe ndant’s m otion to dism iss. Finally , the S tate did not objec t at t he third 3 he ar ing on the m oti on t o di sm iss w he n the distri ct c ourt and M s. K er

r ag re ed that i t 4 wa s not necessary

to call Mr. Ross or Mr. Pistone to testify because both m en had 5 ag re ed to dis cl ose the ir dis ci pli na ry fi le s. T he S ta te the re fo re w as larg el y r es pons ibl e 6 fo r the la ck

of ev ide nc e in the r ec or d to c ontra dic t D ef en da nt’ s te sti m ony

if , in fa ct , 7 such evidence existed. Moreover, the district court rem ained free to disregard 8 D ef en da nt’ s te sti m ony , y et

the c ourt st ill fo und m

uc h of it to be cr ed ibl e. U nde r the se 9 ci rc um stanc es , we de fer to the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s f ind ing s, a nd w e do n ot w ei gh the 10 re as ons fo r the de lay

a ga ins t D ef

en da nt. 11 { 75} W e al so hol d tha t the St at e ne gli ge ntl y fa ile d in its duty to br ing D ef en da nt t o 12 tr ia l, a nd tha t be ca

use of the ex te nde d nature of the de lay , thi s f ac tor w ei ghs he av ily 13 ag ai nst

the S ta te

. W e em

pha siz e tha t our hold ing is bas ed on the St at e’ s c ondu ct in 14 this proceeding , which we hold contribut ed to the extraordinary delay in this case. 15 C. Assert ion of the right 16 { 76} U nde r the thi rd f ac tor , w he the r D ef

en da nt as se rt ed his ri ght to a spe edy tr ia l, 17 w e “ ac co rd

w ei ght to the ‘ fr eque nc y an d f

or ce ’ of the de fe ndant’ s ob

j ec tio ns t o th e 18 delay [, and we] also analy ze the def endant’ s actions with regard to the delay .” G arz a ,52

1 2009 -N MS C- 038, ¶

32 ( quot ing Barker , 407 U

. S. a t 52 9)

. “ [T ] he ti m el ine ss and v igo r 2 with w hich the right is asserted m ay be considered as an ind i ca t ion of whether a 3 defendant wa s denied needed access to [a] speedy trial over his objec tion o r w hether 4 the issue was ra ised on app eal as [ an] after thou ght.” Id

. 5 { 77} The district court found that, “ [a] lthou gh [ De fendant] did not specifically enter 6 a ple ad ing on h is be ha lf , the ev ide nc e show s th at [ he ] c ont inu al ly

a sse rt ed his r igh t 7 to a spe edy tr ia l t o hi s de fe nse at tor

ne y s, al tho ugh he ne ve r as se rt ed that r igh t t o th e 8 State or the C ourt unti l the filing of the [m otion to dism iss]. ” W e not e i n itially that 9 part of this finding is contradicted by th e record. As w e previously explained, eac h 10 of De fendant’ s three court-a ppoi nted attorney s filed a dem and for a speedy trial w hen 11 ea che nte re d an ap pe ar an ce on his be ha lf

. A lth oughthe se w er e pr o f orm a as se rt ion s 12 of th e rig ht , th ey

st il l ar e en ti tl edto so m e wei gh t. Se e, e . g. , G arz a , 200 9- N MS C- 009, 13 ¶ 34 ( hol din g th at

a si ng le de m an d f

or aspe edy tr ia l, “ tuc ke d w ith in the w ai ve r of 14 ar ra ign m en t and n ot g uil ty ple a, ” w as suf

fi ci en t t o a sse rt

the de fe nd an t’s r igh t and 15 w ei ghe d sl igh tly

in the de fe ndant’ s f

av or be ca use the re w as no e vid en ce that the 1 6 d ef en d an t h ad ac qu i es ce d t o t h e d el ay). We th er ef o re re v er s e th e d i s t r i c t c o u rt ’s 17 finding that De fendant did no t assert his right to a speedy trial to the district court 18 unt il he f

ile d hi s m oti on t o di sm iss

.53

1 { 78} The m o re d i ff

icult questi on is whether the district court corre ctly concluded 2 tha t D ef

en da nt h ad

a sse rt ed his ri ght to a spe ed

y tr ia l to his a tto rn ey s. T he Co urt of 3 Appe al s m aj or ity

c onc lud ed

that this f

ac tor did not w ei gh i n D ef

enda nt ’s f

av or 4 because (1) the dem an d s fo r a s peedy trial w ere pro form a and entitled to m inim al 5 w ei ght , ( 2) D ef

en da nt h ad

“ ei the r sti pul at ed to, m ove d for , or f ai le d to obj ec t t o any 6 of the State’ s requested continu ances or extensions of tim e, ” (3) De fendant had filed 7 a pr o se m oti on t o a

ppoi nt s ubst itu te c ouns el “ in l at e O ct obe r 2008 , know ing tha t hi s 8 tr ia l w as sc he dul ed

f or D ec em be r 1, 200 8, a nd tha t the S ta te w as pr ep ar ed to 9 proceed, ” and (4) D efendant had failed to assert his right to a speedy trial at e ither 10 he ari ng to ap po in t s ub st it ut e co un se l. S e r ros , N o. 31, 565, m em . op. ¶ ¶ 40- 41. T he 11 Court of Appeals also specifica lly disregarded t he district court’ s finding that 1 2 D e f e n d a n th a da s s e rt e dh i s r i g h tt o as p e e d y t r i a l t o h i s a t t o rn e ys b e c au s e i t“c a me 13 onlyfrom

De fendant him self at the hearing on his m otion to dism iss.” Id

. ¶ ¶ 27, 42. 14 { 79} W e ta ke a diff er en t vi ewof

the r ec or d onthi s f

ac tor than di d th e Co urt of 15 Appe al s m aj or ity

. W e ini tia lly se e a dis tin ct ionin thi s c as e be tw ee n D ef en dant 16 ag re ei ng t o th e St at e’ s r eque sts to ex te nd the ti m e fo r co m m en ci ng h is tri al a nd 17 De fendan t’s attorn eys ag re ei ng to suc h r eque sts

. A s w e ex pla ine d inour a na ly sis of 18 the reasons for the delay , ther e w as am ple evide n ce fr o m wh ich the district court15 D ef

en da nt a lso te sti fi ed tha t he ha d fi le d a dis ci pli na ry c om pla int a nd a pr o se 7 16 m otion to subs titute coun sel against Mr. Pistone because he could no t get in tou ch 17 w ithhim

a nd he ke pt ge tti ng the runa ro und fr om Mr

. P ist one ’ s a ssi stant. Mr

. P ist one 18 refe rred to these filings in his m otion to withdraw ; however, neither the disciplin ary 19 board nor the dist rict cou rt cou ld find any rec ord of these docum ents. W e theref ore 20 do n ot r el y

on the m a s e vid en ce of

D ef en da nt’ s e ff

orts t o a sse rt

his r igh t t o aspe edy 21 tr ia l. 54 1 co uld ha ve c on cl ude d—and d id c onc lud e— tha t D ef en da nt d id n ot a gr ee to the 2 requests to extend th e tim e for c omm encing his trial. The State offered no evidence 3 t o t h e c o n t r a ry. 4 { 80} D ef

en da nt i ntr oduc ed le ss ev ide nc e of his ef fo rt s to as se rt

his r igh t t o aspe edy 5 trial to Mr. Pisto ne, but he testified that he repeatedly attem pted to cont act Mr. 6 Pi sto ne ’ s of

fi ce a nd v ie w the dis co ve ry in his c as e. H e al so te st ifi ed that, w he n he 7 le ar ne d f ro m Mr

. P ist one ’ s a ssi stant tha t he w oul d not be go ing to tr ia l i n Ju ly 200 9 8 be ca use the St at e had ra ise d a que sti on o f his c om pe te nc y , he r es pond ed

that he did 9 not want a com

petency evaluation and that he j ust wanted to go to trial. T he district 10 co urt i m

pli ci tly f ound thi s te sti m ony

c re dib le , a nd w e de fe r to tha t f ind ing

. 11 { 81} Bu t pe rh ap s the cl eare st ex am ple of D ef en da nt’ s e ff

orts o n th is f

ac tor w er e his 12 m o t i o nt o a

p poi nt s ubst itu te c ouns el a nd h is d isc ipl inary c om pla int a ga ins t M r. Ro ss. 7 13 D ef en da nt fi le d both doc um en ts in the af te rm ath of the fi fth plea

se tti ng r eque ste d by 14 Mr

. Ro ss, at w hic h D ef en da nt i nsi ste d to the c ourt, Mr

. Ro ss, a nd the S ta te that he did55

1 not w an t t o pl ea d gu ilty

a nd tha t he w an te d to go t o tri al . De fend an t st at ed in his 2 m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s t h a th e b e l i e v e dt h a tM r . R o s s w a s “ n o tab l e t o a d e qu at el y 3 represe nt [his] interests” in the case, and his disciplinary com plaint elaborated on th at 4 poi nt: “ [M r. Ro ss] onl y w an ts t o of

fe r m e ple a ba rg ai ns and k ee ps r eque sti ng 5 ex te nsi ons of

ti m e w ith out m

y co nse nt. ” A s w e pr ev iou sly e xpl ai ne d, w e do n ot f

au lt 6 De fendant for filing the m otion and com plaint “ knowing that his trial was scheduled 7 fo r De cem

ber 1, 2008 , and that th e State wa s prepared to proceed. ” S e rro s , N o. 8 31, 565, m em . op. ¶

40. U nde r the se c ir cu m stanc es , w e vie wD ef en da nt’ s m oti on and 9 co m pla int a s c le ar —thoug h pe rh ap s m isg uid ed—at tem pts to as se rt

his r igh t t o a 10 spe edy

tr ia l, w hil e al so s ee kin g to a sse rt his ri ght to ef fe ct ive a ssi stanc e of

c ouns el

. 11 A s th e Co urt of

Appe al s di sse nt o bse rv ed , the se r igh ts s houl d no t be m utu al ly 12 ex cl us iv e. Se e id. ¶

74 ( Z am or a, J. , dis se nti ng) ( “ A de fe ndant shoul d not be put in a 13 posi tio n to ha ve to ch oos e be twee n pr oc ee din g w ithhis c ri m ina l tri al w ith 14 ina dequ at el y pr ep ar ed le ga l c ouns el a nd the pos sib ili ty of w ai vin g hi s r igh t t o a 15 speedy

trial by filing a pro se m otion to have his ill -prepar ed legal counsel rem oved 16 from his case.” ). 17 { 82} W e al so ar e not c onc er ne d by the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s in iti al r uli ngs tha t e xpr es sly 18 w ei ghe d any

de lay a ga ins t D ef

en da nt r es ult ing f

ro m the sub sti tut ion s of

c ouns el

.56

1 Over the course of the hear ing on De fendant’ s m otion t o d i sm iss, the district court 2 re t re at ed fr o m

i t s p ri o r f i n d i n g s as m o re i n fo rmat i o n ca m e t o l i g h t ab o u t M r. Ro s s ’s 3 and Mr. Pistone’ s representation of De fendan t

. Regarding Mr. Pistone, the district 4 co urt expr es sly sta te d at the he ar ing gr an tin g D ef en da nt’ s m oti on t o di sm iss , “ I w ill 5 tell y ou no w, if I knew then what I know now, I w ould have never allow ed Mr. 6 Pi sto ne to w ith dr awf

ro m the ca se . ” W e the re fo re do not af fo rd m uc h de fe re nc e to the 7 dis tr ic t c ourt’ s e ar lie r pr onounc em en ts. 8 { 83} In sum , w e conclude that Def endant asserted his right to a s peedy trial 9 thr ough out

the pr oc ee din gs i n th e be st w ay he kne w . T ha t M r. Ro ss and Mr

. P ist one 10 di d n ot fur th er Defe nd an t’s effor ts sh ou ld no t b e h el d a ga in st hi m . Con se qu en tl y , we 11 we igh th is factor in D efendant’ s favor. 12 D. Pr ejud ice 13 { 84} Regarding the four th and f i na l f a c t or , whe the r

D efendant has suffer ed prej udice 14 from the delay in bringin g his case to trial, w e analy ze three interests that are a ffec ted 15 by the r igh t t o aspe edy

tr ia l: “ (i ) to p re ve nt o ppr es siv e pr etri al inc ar ce ratio n; ( ii) to 16 m ini m iz e an xie ty an d co nc er n of the ac cu se d; an d (i ii) to lim it the poss ibi lity tha t the 17 defen s e will b e im

paired.” G arz a , 200 9- N MS C- 038, ¶ 35 ( quot ing M

addox , 200 8- 18 NMS C-062, ¶ 32).57

1 { 85} T he thi rd int er es t, w hic h Barker ch ar ac te ri ze d a s th e “ m ost se ri ous, ” pr ote ct s 2 the defendant’ s ability to assert an adequate d efense at trial from the prej udicial effec t 3 of the pa ssa ge of tim e, suc h as the de ath or dis ap pe ar an ce of

aw itn es s or

the los s of 4 m em or y . G arz a , 200 9- N MS C-03 8, ¶ 36 ( quot ing Barker , 40 7 U.S. at 53 2) . A 5 defendant who claim s this ty pe of prej udice m

ust sh ow “ with particula rity what 6 ex cu lpa tor

y [ ev ide nc e] w oul d hav e be enof fe re d [ an d] that the de lay c au se d th e 7 [evidence’ s] unavailabilit y .” Id

. ( quot ing Ja ck

son v. R ay , 390 F. 3d 1254, 1265 ( 10th 8 Cir. 2004 )). 9 { 86} O rd inari ly , a de fe ndant be ar s the bur de n of pr oof on thi s fa ct or by sho w ing 10 “ pa rti cu la riz edpre

jud ic e” wh en cla im in g a sp eed y tri al vi ol at i o n . G arz a , 200 9- 11 NMS C

- 03 8, ¶

3 9. H ow e ve r , “ i f

t he l e ng t h of

d e l a y a nd t he r e a so ns f

or t he delay 12 w ei gh h eavil y

in de fe ndant’ s f

av or a nd d ef en da nt h as a sse rt ed

his r igh t and n ot 1 3 ac qui es ce d t o t h e d e l a y , t h e n t h e d e f e n d a n t n e e d n o t s h o w p r e j u d i c e f o r a c o u rtto 14 conclude that the defendant’s r ight h as been violated.” Id

. 15 { 87} W e al re ady

ha ve de te rm ine d th at

the f ir st thr ee f

ac tors weigh heavil y

in 16 D ef en da nt’ s f av or , an d w e the re fo re ne ed not c onsi de r w he the r D ef

en da nt h as m ad e 17 a particulariz ed showing o f prejudice. W e address this factor, however, to clarify 18 what w e view as a m isapplication of t he law by the Court of Appeals m aj ority , which58

1 c o n c l u d e dt h a tD e f

e n d a n th a df

a i l e dt o s h o w t h a t h e w a s p r e j u d i c e d b y t h e e x t r e me 2 delay in his case. 3 { 88} W e start

w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt’ s c onc lu si on that, “ [t ] he f ac t tha t [ D ef

en da nt 4 ha d] be enin cu sto dy

in se gr eg at ionf

or a lm ost f our a nd o ne -h al f (4 -1 /2) y ears w ith 5 no a dj udi ca tio n, r es ult ed in extre m e pr ej udi ce . ” T his c onc lus ionw as ba se d on 6 D ef en da nt’ s unchal lenged

testim ony

at the hear ing on his m otion to dism iss, i n which 7 he de sc ri be d hi s li vin g c ondi tio ns f or the pr ev iou s f

our y ears . D ef

en da nt t e s t i fi ed

that, 8 fr om the ti m e tha t he was first i nc ar ce rate d, he ha d be ense gr eg at ed a nd p la ce d in 9 pr ot ect iv e cu st od y “ wit ho ut [h is ] req ue st orkn owl ed ge of wh ere [h e] was go in g.” He 10 described being held alone in a private cell, except for tw o 20-m inute periods per day 11 in whic h he wa s perm itt ed to te nd to his per sona l nee ds, suc h a s ba thi ng, c le an ing his 12 ce ll, a nd a tte m

pti ng t o com

m uni ca te w ith his at tor

ne y s or his fa m ily

. D ef

en da nt a lso 13 ex pla ine d th at as ar es ult of be ing pla ce d inse gr eg at ion , he did not ha ve a cc es s to the 14 educat i onal program s, librar y tim e, or rec reational tim e available to the inm ates 15 hous ed

w iththe j ai l’ s gene ra l po pul at ion

. H e furthe r te sti fi ed that he ha d m ad e 16 w ri tte n re que sts to be m ove d ou t of se gr eg at ion“ al l the ti m e” “ be ca use of the w ay the 17 in m at es . . . i n se gr eg at io n are tre at ed , bu t b ecau se of t he na tu re o f [h is ] ch arg es , . . . 18 [j ail officials w ould n’ t] allow [ him ] to m ove.” A nd Defe ndant t es t i fi ed that he had59

1 been subjecte d to “ a lo t” o f sexual, phy sical, and verbal harassm ent; that he had been 2 la be le d a“ Ch es te r” ( a slang ter m fo r ch ild m ole ste r) by his fe llo w de ta ine es an d by 3 MD C o ff

ic ia ls; a nd tha t he ha d be enphy sic al ly at ta ck ed by oth er inm at es in his pod 4 b e c au s e h e i s g a y. 5 { 89} Fo r the f

ir st tw o i n t er es ts r el ev an t t o ou r pr ej udi ce inquir y , a voi din g op pr es siv e 6 pr et ria l i nc ar ce ratio n and m ini m iz ing a nxi ety a nd c onc er

n of the a cc use d, w e ha ve 7 n o t e dt h a t , b e c au s e “ ‘[ s ]o me d e g r e e o f o p p r e s s i o n a n da n x i e t y i s i n h e r e n t f o r e v e r [ y] 8 de fe ndant w ho is j ai le d w hil e aw ai tin g tr ia l’ , ” w e onl y fi nd pr ej udi ce wh en the 9 de fe ndant m ak es a“ pa rt ic ulari ze d sh ow ing ” tha t the “ pr etri al inc ar ce ratio n or the 10 anxiety suffere d is und ue.” G arz a , 200 9- N MS C- 038, ¶ 35 ( quot ing M

addox , 200 8- 11 NMS C-062, ¶ 32) (altera tions in original). “ The oppressive nature of the pr et rial 12 incarce ration depends o n the length of incarc eration, whether the defendant obtained 13 re le as e pr ior

to tr ia l, a nd w hat pr ej udi ci al e ff ec ts the de fe ndant h as sho w n a s ar es ult 14 of the incarce ration.” Id

. 15 { 90} D ef

en da nt’ s te sti m ony

e as ily e sta bli she s th at

the de lay in his c as e ca

use d hi m 16 to s uf fe r oppr es siv e pr etri al inc ar ce ratio n. It is und isp ute d th at , be ca use D ef en da nt 17 could no t affor d to pay hi s $ 1 5 0,000 bon d, he w as incarce rated for over four y ears 18 w ith out

a n a dj udi ca tio n of

gui lt, ale ngth of

ti m e tha t w e hol d is opp ress iv e on i ts14 W e re ce ntl y r ea ff irm ed that “ the N ewMe xic o C onst itu tio n r equir es tha t ‘ [a ] ll 8 15 pe rs ons sha ll

. . . be ba ila ble by suf fi ci en t sur et ie s’ an d tha t ‘ [e ] xc es siv e ba il sha ll not 16 be required. ’ ” State v. B rown , 20 14 -NMSC -0 38 , ¶ 21 (q uo ti ng N.M. Co ns t. art. II, § 17 13). T his case illustrates the dangers of requi ring excessive bail. N othin g in the record 18 sugg es ts tha t e ith er D ef en da nt o r soc ie ty

in ge ne ra l be ne fi tte d f

ro m loc kin g up 19 Defen da nt forov er fo ury ears be cau se he co ul d no t affo rdhi s b on d. Co ntr a F ie rro , 20 2012 -N MCA -054, ¶ 58 (c onclud ing th at the defendant’ s 55 m onth s in sol itary 21 co nf ine m en t wa s not pre

j udi ci al be ca

use it w as “ fo r [h is] ow n saf ety ” an d be ca

use he 22 had threatened the victim and her fam ily ).

60 1 face

. Cf

. , e . g. , id. ¶ 37 (holdin g that the defendant had not establ ished prejudice w hen 8 2 he w as he ld f

or tw o hour s be fo re he w as re le as ed on b ond)

. T ha t D ef

en da nt w as he ld 3 in s eg re ga tio n fo r al l of that t im e onl y

c om poun ds the pr ej udi ci al e ff ec t of his 4 ex ce ssi ve pr e- tr ia l i nc ar ce ratio n. 5 { 91} T he Co ur

t of A ppeals m ajor it y

co nc lu de d t ha t Def

en da nt ’s f our -y ea r pla ce m ent 6 in s eg re ga tio n w as not opp re ssi ve be ca

use he w as “ pla ce d in pr ote ct ive cu sto dy f or 7 his own safety ” and because “ the two attacks

. . . we re isolated incidents.” Se rro s , N o. 8 31,565, m em . op. ¶ 46. T o the extent the m aj ority wa s sugg esting th at D efendant w as 9 better off in segregation th an with t he general po pulatio n, D efendant’ s testim ony that 10 he repeate dly

requested to be transferr ed out of protective cust o d y c o ntradicts that 11 notio n. T his testim ony also suff ices to establish prejudice to the second interest, that 12 th e de lay

c au se d D ef

en da nt t o su ff

er und ue a nxi ety

a nd c onc er

n. I t do es not

take 13 m uc h e m pa thy to se e the a nxi ety

a nd con ce rn tha t De fe ndant suf fe re d f ro m be ing he ld61

1 al one in a ce ll fo r m or e than 23 hou rs a da y , fo r ove r fo ur y ears . T he psy ch olo gic al , 2 phy sic al , a nd e m oti ona l e ff ec ts o f sol itary co nf

ine m en t have be en w el l do cu m en te d. 3 Se e, e . g. , D av is v

. A

ya la ,

__ _ U.S.

__ _ (20 15 ), 13 5 S . Ct. 2 18 7, 2 20 9 (Ke nn ed y , J., 4 concurring) (“ Ye ars on end of n e ar-total isolation exact a terr ible price. ” (c iting Stuart 5 Gras si an , P

sy ch iatric E

ffe ct s of Sol ita ryCo nfi ne m en t , 22 W as h. U

. J. L

. & Po l’ y 325 , 6 334-36 (2006) (com

m on side-effe cts of s olitary confinem ent include anxiety , panic, 7 wi t h d ra wa l, hallucinations, self-m utilation , a

nd sui cidal t h o u g h t s an db eh av i o rs )) . We 8 w ill not pr es um e to s ec ond- gue ss D ef en da nt’ s pr ef

er en ce to be gr an te d f

re ed om f ro m 9 the c onf

ine s of his c el l. 10 { 92} A s f

or pr ej udi ce to the thi rd

int er es t, D ef

en da nt’ s a bil ity to pr es en t an a de qua te 11 defense, the length of the delay again wa s enough to m eet De fendant’ s burden un der 12 t h e ci rc u m stances of this case. The Court of Appeals m aj ority concluded that 13 D ef en da nt h ad

f ai le d to ide nti fy spe ci fi c exc ulp at or y ev ide nc e tha t wa s lost due to the 14 pa ssa ge of

ti m e. Whil e tha t m ay

be tr ue , D ef en da nt e sta

bli she d th at

the vic tim in this 15 ca se was four

y ears old a t the ti m e of

the a lle ge d a

buse , a nd tha t i n th e subs eque nt 1 6 fo u r y ea rs t h at De fe n d an t ’s ca s e s at u n t ri ed

— a p er i o do f t i m e i n wh i ch t h e v i ct i m ’s 17 ag e doub le d—the St at e did not pe rm it D ef en da nt to int er

vie w ei the r the vic tim

or the 18 vic tim ’ s f

am ily m em be rs . A s ar es ult , the onl yc ont em por an eo us a cc ount

of the62

1 inc ide nt w as the vic tim ’ s r ec or de d sa fe hous e int er vie w , w hic h w as not

sub j ec t t o 2 cr oss -e xa m ina tio n. W e ar e pe rs ua de d th at the pa ssa ge of

ove r fo ur y ears w ith out

the 3 ab ili ty to int er vie w the vic tim

or the vic tim ’ s f

am ily , part ic ularl y

in lig ht o f the 4 vic tim ’ s ve ry

y oung a ge , w as suf

fi ci en t t o de m ons tra te th at th e de lay w oul d have 5 pr ej udi ce d D ef

en da nt’ s a

bil ity to pr es en t an ad equa te de fe nse if his c as e ha d go ne to 6 tr ia l. 7 { 93} In sum , w e agre e w ith the district c ourt that De fendant’ s four y ears and three 8 m onth s in custo dial segregation without a trial r esulted in extrem e prej udice. 9 E. Balancing the factors 10 { 94} W e hol d that the e xtr em e le ngth of the de lay in thi s c as e of

ove r fo ur

y ears , 11 coupled with Def

endant’ s incarce ration in custodi al s egregation for the entire tim e, 12 re sul te d ine xtr em e pr ej udi ce to D ef en da nt and e sta

bli she d apr es um

pti on tha t hi s 13 ri ght to a spe edy tr ia l w as vio la te d. W e furthe r hol d th at the r ea sons f

or the de lay do 14 not weigh against Defe ndant, but they we igh heavilyag ai n s t t h e State , and that 15 D ef en da nt a de qua te ly as se rt ed his ri ght to a spe edy tr ia l un de r the c ir cu m stanc es of 16 this case. 17 { 95} In r e a c hi ng t hi s c on c l us i on , w e a c kn ow l e dg e t hatw e h a ve n e ve r b e f ore 18 co nsi de re d the Court of Appe al s’ hol din g in Stock , e xc ep t i n Stock it se lf, i n wh ic h we63

1 gr an te d rev ie w a nd la te r qu as he d ou r writ of c ert io rari

. See 20 06 -NMCA- 14 0, ce rt. 2 gran ted , 20 06 -NMCER T- 0 11 , cert. quas hed , 20 07 -NMCER T-00 1. Stock an d th is 3 ca s e te ac h t h at as t h e d el ay m o u n t s i n b ri n g i n g a d ef en d an t t o t ri al , t h e S t at e’s 4 oblig ation to alert the district court becom es increasingly pressing, especially when 5 the de fe ndant i s he ld i n c ust ody a w ai tin g tr ia l. I de al ly , the S ta te , the de fe ndant, 6 de fe nse c ouns el , a nd the dis tr ic t c ourt al l w oul d be a lig ne d inthe ir e ff orts t o br ing the 7 de fe ndant t o tr ia l i n ati m el y f as hio n. 8 { 96} W e acknowledge that there are tim es when def ense counsel m ay prefer

delay 9 in the be st i nte re sts of

his c lie nt. Whe n th e cl ie nt e xpr es sly c onc ur s, tha t de lay

w ill 10 continu e to b e at t ri b uted to th e acc used. But it is the State that is ultim ately tasked 11 with bringing the accused to tr ial in a tim ely m anner. Ac cordingly , w e do not deem 12 it unf ai r to im pose upon the pr ose cu tio n the bur de n of m oni tor ing the pr ogr es s of the 13 ca se a nd, a t so m e poi nt, a le rt ing the tr ia l c ourt of pot en tia l spe edy tr ia l c onse que nc es . 14 { 97} T ha t do es not

r el ie ve the re m ai nin g pa rt ic ipants fr om the ir ow n obl iga tio ns t o 15 pr ote ct th e const itu tio na l r igh ts o f the a cc use d. Bu t i t i s un iqu el y the duty of the 16 prosecution —as the State’ s representative—to ensure that the accused is prosecuted 17 in a m an ne r co nsi ste nt w iththe Co nst itu tio n. T his is no l es s tr ue fo r th e ri ght

to a 18 “ spe edy

a nd p ubl ic tr ia l” und er

the S ixth Am en dm en t tha n it is fo r the r igh t t o64

1 counsel and con frontation un der that sam e am endm ent, and the rights against self2 inc ri m ina tio n un de r the F if th A m en dm en t and a ga ins t un re as ona ble se ar ch es a nd 3 seizures under the Fourth Am endm ent. T he State m ust ensu re that j ustice is don e. 4 { 98} T ha t m eans tha t at som e poi nt the de lay sim ply be co m es int ole ra

ble

. A s Ju dge 5 Schw artz, him self form erly a longtim e district attorney , e xplained when he dism issed 6 this case: “ [U ] nfortunately , it’s the dutyof the State to work both sid es of the street 7 som et im es . ” A lth oughpe rh ap s in el eg an tly phr as ed , the j udge got it ri ght

. H is quot e 8 ca pture s th e es se nc e of the St at e’ s du ty —a s c om ple x and f ru str at ing a s it

m ay be —i n 9 o u r mo d e rn s o c i e t y i n w h i c h e v e ryo n e , b i g o r s ma l l , i s g o v e rn e d b y t h e s a me 10 Co ns ti tu ti on an d t he rul e o f la w. 11 III. CON CLU SION 12 { 99} W e re v erse the Court of Appeals and rem and to the dis trict court for f urther 13 pr oc ee din gs c onsi ste nt w iththi s op ini on. 14 { 100} IT IS S O ORDERE D.

15

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ 16 RIC HAR D C . B OSSON , Just ice, 17 R et ir ed , S it ti ng b y D es ign at ion65

1 WE CO NCUR:

2

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ 3 BARBAR

A J. VIGIL, Ch ief Justice

4

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ 5 PE TRAJIMEN EZMA ES, Justice

6

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ 7 EDWA RD L. CH ÁV EZ , Just ice

8

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ___ 9 CHA RLE S W. DA NIEL S, Justice